

SAMBANDHA-VĀRTIKA

[1]

स्वाविद्याविभवप्रसूतविपुलद्वैतप्रपञ्चाहित-

स्पष्टभ्रान्तिरोहितात्ममतयो यं भागशो मन्वते ।

निर्भागं सकलाभिधानमननव्यापारदूरस्थितं

वन्दे नन्दितविश्वमव्ययमजं भक्त्या तमेकं विभुम् ॥ १ ॥

With devotion do I bow to that one who is imperishable, unborn, all-pervasive and partless, who stands far above the operations of all speech and thought, who makes the universe happy and whom they regard as being endowed with parts—they whose view of the Self is veiled by the potent delusion which is brought about by the expansive world of duality, generated by the power of nescience resident in themselves.

This is an invocation addressed to the supreme Reality which is eternal and without parts, and which transcends the reach of speech and mind. That Reality is of the nature of unexcellable bliss, and is the source of all happiness. It is one without a second. There are no divisions in it. The apparent differentiations are due to nescience (*avidyā*) which veils the real self and projects the non-real world. Nescience too has no locus apart from the non-dual self. Somehow it resides in the self and veils it, and weaves the variegated texture of the illusory world. Being blinded by this illusion, the ignorant imagine that the supreme is a whole-of-parts, and that it really creates the world.

Four preliminary matters (*anubandha-catuṣṭaya*) are to be settled before the commencement of any work. They are: (1) subject-matter (*viśaya*), (2) relation (*sambandha*), (3) fruit (*prayojana*), and (4) eligible

person (*adhikārin*). Here, in the invocation, these four are indicated. (1) The words 'that one who is all-pervasive' teach that the non-dual self is the subject-matter. (2) The relation is between this subject and Scripture which teaches it. (3) The words 'who makes the universe happy' show that the attainment of supreme happiness is the fruit. (4) And, the one who desires that happiness is the eligible person.

[2]

यां काण्वोपनिषच्छलेन सकलाम्नायार्थसंशोधिनीं

संचक्रुर्गुरवोऽनुवृत्तगुरवो वृत्तिं सतां शान्तये ।

अर्थाविष्करणं कुतार्किककृताशङ्कासमुच्छित्तये

तस्या न्यायसमाश्रितेन वचसा प्रक्रम्यते लेशतः ॥ २ ॥

The commentary explaining the sense of all scriptures which the preceptor¹ wrote for the satisfaction of the good people, following his preceptors, under the pretext of (explaining) the Kāṇvopaniṣad²—the exposition of its meaning in brief through words supported by reason is commenced for the purpose of removing the objections raised by pseudo-logicians.

The *Vārtika* on Śaṅkara's commentary on the *Bṛhadāraṇyakaopaniṣad* is commenced for refuting the arguments put forward by those who are opposed to non-dualism. Rājaśekhara says in his *Kāvyamīmāṃsā* that *Vārtika* is a work which examines what is said, what is not said and what is not well said in the original text.*

1. I. e. Śaṅkara.

2. The *Bṛhadāraṇyakaopaniṣad* forms part of the *Śatapatha-brāhmaṇa* (of the *Śūkla-yajur-veda*) which is in two recensions—

*The Haridas Sanskrit Series No. 14, Benares (1934), p. 21. *uktā-'nukta durukta-cintā vārtikam*.

Mādhyandina and *Kāṇva*. It covers the last five sections (*prapāṭhakas*) of the XIVth book of the *Śatapatha-brāhmaṇa* in the *Mādhyandina śākhā* and the whole of the XVIIth book in the *Kāṇva-śākhā*. Śaṅkara's commentary is on the *Kāṇva* recension of the Upaniṣad. Hence, it is referred to, here, as the *Kāṇvopaniṣad*. Śaṅkara calls it *Vājasaneyi-brāhmaṇopaniṣad*. One of the *Samhitās* of the *Śukla-yajurveda* is the *Vājasaneyi-samhitā*, which takes its name from Yājñavalkya Vājasaneya, the chief teacher of this Veda. Śaṅkara gives the same name to the *Brāhmaṇa* also.

NKL—*vedāntānām advaitaparatvam ayuktaṁ bhedālabhanapratyakṣādi-virodhādityādi śuṣka-tārkikottha-sambhāvanā-nirāso-’vāntara-phalam ityarthah.*

[3]

अत्र चोपनिषच्छब्दो ब्रह्मविद्यैकगोचरः ।

तत्रैव चास्य सद्भावादभिधार्थस्य तत्कुतः ॥ ३ ॥

And here the word *upaniṣad* has for its sense exclusively Brahman-knowledge, since in respect of that alone there is its express sense. Why is it so?

That release (*mukti*) is the fruit of the Upaniṣads is shown in this and the succeeding verses (i.e. vv. 3-10), by explaining the meaning of the title *Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad*. First, the word *upaniṣad* is explained. The meaning of it is Brahman-knowledge; for that is the express sense of the word. The etymological meaning of the word is 'to sit (*sad*) down (*ni*) near (*upa*)'. It refers to the ancient practice of competent pupils sitting near their preceptors and listening to them. What was imparted at such 'sessions' came to be called *upaniṣad*.

[4]

उपोपसर्गः सामीप्ये तत्प्रतीचि समाप्यते ।

त्रिविधस्य सदर्थस्य निशब्दोऽपि विशेषणम् ॥ ४ ॥

The prefix *upa* means nearness; that, in effect, indicates the inner self; and the particle *ni* also is a qualification of the sense of *sad* which is threefold.

The prefix *upa* is used in the sense of nearness or proximity. It refers to what is immediate; and that is the self. The distinctions of 'in' and 'out' do not apply to the self. It is called 'inner' only in the sense that it is not remote or mediate.

The particle *ni* (meaning 'completely' or 'fully'), like *upa*, goes with *sad* which has, three senses, viz. destroying, leading to understanding, and terminating (*sad! viśaraṇa-gaty-avasādanēṣu*).

The next three verses interpret the meaning of the word *upaniṣad* in these three senses respectively.

[5]

उपनीयेममात्मानं ब्रह्मापास्तद्वयं यतः ।

निहन्त्यविद्यां तज्जं च तस्मादुपनिषद्भवेत् ॥ ५ ॥

Because by bringing this self near Brahman which transcends duality it destroys nescience and its product, it may be called *upaniṣad*.

The *upaniṣad* is so called because it makes known the non-duality of the self and Brahman, and *destroys* nescience along with its product, the world.

[6]

निहत्यानर्थमूलं स्वाविद्यां प्रत्यक्तया परम् ।

गमयत्यस्तसंभेदमतो वोपनिषद्भवेत् ॥ ६ ॥

Or, destroying one's own nescience which is the cause of evil, it makes known the supreme as the inner and indivisible (self). Hence it is called *upaniṣad*.

Because it *leads* to the knowledge of the identity of the inner self with Brahman, it is called *upaniṣad*.

[7]

प्रवृत्तिहेतून्निःशेषांस्तन्मूलोच्छेदकत्वतः ।

यतोऽवसादयेद्विद्या तस्मादुपनिषन्मता ॥ ७ ॥

Or, through the removal of their causes, knowledge puts an end to the conditions of activity without residue. Hence it is held to be *upaniṣad*.

Self-knowledge *causes the termination* of nescience and its brood, attachment, etc.; so, it is known as *upaniṣad*.

[8]

यथोक्तविद्याबोधित्वाद्ग्रन्थोऽपि तदभेदतः ।

भवेदुपनिषन्नामा लाङ्गलं जीवनं यथा ॥ ८ ॥

Because the text teaches the aforesaid knowledge and is non-different therefrom, it too has the name *upaniṣad* as the ploughshare is called livelihood.

It has been shown in the previous three verses that *upaniṣad* means *vidyā* (knowledge). Here it is stated that the books which teach *vidyā* are also called *upaniṣads*. An example from empirical usage is cited. The ploughshare is the *means* of livelihood, but is itself spoken of as livelihood. Similarly, the sacred books which serve as the means for Brahman-knowledge (*upaniṣad*) are themselves referred to as *upaniṣads*.

G. A. Jacob quotes this *vārtika* in his *A Second Handful of Popular Maxims*, under the heading ‘*lāṅgalaṁ jīvanam*.’*

* *Laukikanyāyāñjaliḥ*, Part II (Nirnayasagar Press, Bombay, 1909), p. 72.

[9]

अरण्याध्ययनाच्चैतदारण्यकमितीर्यते ।

बृहत्त्वाद्ग्रन्थतोऽर्थाच्च बृहदारण्यकं मतम् ॥ ९ ॥

It is called *āranyaka* because it was studied in the forests; since it is great, both in extent and sense, it is called *Brhadāranyaka*.

Here, the expressions *āranyaka* and *brhat* are explained. As the Upaniṣad was taught and studied in the forest-regions, it is called *āranyaka*. And, as it is great both in length and in meaning, it is *brhat*. *Brhat + āranyaka + upaniṣad = Brhadāranyakopaniṣad*.

[10]

इत्यादिनामव्युत्पत्तिच्छद्मना प्रकृतोचितम् ।

सर्वोपनिषदामाह मुक्तिमात्रं प्रयोजनम् ॥ १० ॥

Thus under the pretext of explaining the etymological meaning of the name, he (the commentator) has stated that the end of all *Upaniṣads* is release alone.

By explaining the meaning of the word '*upaniṣad*' it has been shown that the fruit of Brahman-knowledge is the removal of bondage with its cause, and the attainment of unexcellable happiness.

[11]

मिथोविरोधसिद्ध्यर्थं कर्मज्ञानाधिकारिणोः ।

संसारव्याविवृत्सुभ्य इत्युक्तिं भाष्यकृज्जगौ ॥ ११ ॥

In order to establish the mutual conflict between those who are eligible for action and those who are

eligible for knowledge, the commentator wrote the words 'for the sake of those who desire freedom from transmigration'.

After indicating the fruit of Vedānta-study, the question as to who is the eligible person for such study is taken up. Śaṅkara, the commentator, declares that the eligible persons are those who desire freedom from transmigration, viz. release, and not those who are attached to actions.

[12]

त्यक्ताशेषक्रियस्यैव संसारं प्रजिहासतः ।

जिज्ञासोरेव चैकात्म्यं त्रय्यन्तेष्वधिकारिता ॥ १२ ॥

He alone is eligible to study the Vedāntas¹ who has renounced all actions without residue, who desires to shake off transmigration and also to know the unity of the self².

It may be urged that the same person is eligible for ritual actions and Brahman-knowledge, even as is the case with *Agnihotra* and *Darśapūrṇamāsa* rites. But it is not so. Even among rituals all are not meant for all. E.g., *Bṛhaspatisava* and *Rājasūya* are enjoined on different persons. There is no rule, therefore, that the same persons should be eligible for following all that is taught in the Veda. The eligibility for Vedānta consist of discrimination between the eternal and the non-eternal, non-attachment to the enjoyments of this world and the next, possession of virtues like equanimity, self-control, etc., and desire for release. In short, those who want to get freedom from transmigration and realize the non-dual self are fit students for Vedānta-study.

1. *Trayī* is Veda ; *Trayyanta* is Vedānta. The plural indicates the texts of Vedānta.

2. *Aikātmya* is the truth that there is only one reality which is the self. We have rendered this word by employing such expressions as the unity of the self, the oneness of self, and the one self.

[13]

एतमेवेति च तथा प्रत्यग्याथात्म्यवित्तये ।

सर्वकर्मत्यजं प्राह श्रुतिर्विद्याधिकारिणम् ॥ १३ ॥

Scripture too says in the passage 'This only, etc.' that the one who is eligible for knowledge is he who has renounced all actions for the sake of knowing the real nature of the inner self.

The scriptural text declarative of the eligibility for Brahman-knowledge is cited here.

1. *BU*, IV, iv, 22: "Desiring this world (the Self) only, the renouncers renounce. Verily, because they knew this, the ancients did not desire offspring, saying: 'What shall we do with offspring, we whose is this self, this world?' They, verily, rising above the desire for sons and the desire for wealth and the desire for worlds, led the life of mendicancy."

[14]

प्रत्यग्विविदिषासिद्धयै वेदानुवचनादयः ।

ब्रह्मावाप्त्यै तु तत्त्याग ईप्सन्तीति श्रुतेर्बलात् ॥ १४ ॥

Reciting the Veda, etc. are for the sake of generating the desire to know the inner self; for attaining Brahman, however, they (action, etc.) are to be renounced, on the strength of the scriptural passage 'They desire' (*īpsanti*).

How, then, it may be asked, is the performance of sacred acts like reciting the Veda, etc. related to Brahman-knowledge? The answer is that such acts are helpful in generating in the mind of the *adhikārin* the desire to know Brahman. Cf. *BU*, IV, iv, 22: 'Such a one the Brāhmaṇas desire to know by reciting the Vedas, by sacrifice, by gifts, by penance, by fasting. By knowing that one, one becomes a sage.' For attaining Brahman, however, the renunciation of actions is the means. Here, the *Mādhyandina* version of that part of *BU*, IV, iv, 22, translated in note 1 to the previous verse, is quoted. See *Śatapatha-brāhmaṇa*, XIV, vi, 25: (ed. by A. Weber, 1855, p. 1090). *tam-etaṁ vedānuvacanena vividiṣanti, brahmacaryeṇa tapasā śraddhayā yajñenānāśakena caitameva viditvā munir bhavati; etam eva pravrajino lokam īpsantaḥ pravrajanti.* (*īpsantaḥ* of the *Mādhyandina-sākhā* is the same as *icchantaḥ* of the *Kāṇva-sākhā* meaning 'desiring'.)

[15]

उक्ताधिकारविषयप्रतिपत्त्यर्थमीरितम् ।

संसारहेत्विति वचः स्फुटन्यायोपबृंहितम् ॥ १५ ॥

For the purpose of knowing the aforesaid eligibility and content (which is to be explained), are stated the words 'the cause of transmigration, etc.' which are replete with clear reasonings.

After commenting on the eligibility for the Vedānta-study, the subject-matter is introduced here.

[16]

ऐकात्म्यविषयान्नान्यो वेदान्तवचसां यतः ।

लभ्यते विषयः कश्चित्तद्धीस्तस्मात्तमोपनुत् ॥ १६ ॥

Since the words of the Vedāntas have for content the one self, no other content results—the knowledge thereof, therefore, dispels the darkness (of ignorance).

The subject-matter or content of Vedānta is *aikātmya*, the oneness of self. The knowledge of that is what removes ignorance.

[17]

संसारकारणाविद्याध्वंसकृज्ज्ञानलब्धये ।

प्रारब्धेयं प्रयत्नेन वेदान्तोपनिषत्परा ॥ १७ ॥

In order to attain the knowledge which destroys nescience, the cause of transmigration, this work based on the Vedāntopaniṣad¹ has been commenced, with care.

The primal cause of transmigration is 'ignorance or nescience (*ajñāna*, *avidyā*). Merit (*dharma*) and demerit (*adharma*) are only intermediary causes. What dispels nescience is not mediate knowledge but the direct experience (*sākṣātkāra*) of the self. The aim of this work is to lead to that goal.

1. I. e. the *Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad*.

[18]

प्रत्यग्याथात्म्यधीरेव प्रत्यगज्ञानहानिकृत् ।

सा चाऽऽत्मोत्पत्तितो नान्यद्धान्तध्वस्तावपेक्षते ॥ १८ ॥

Knowledge of the true nature of the inner self alone is the destroyer of the ignorance regarding the inner self. And, it requires nothing other than its own generation to destroy the darkness (of ignorance).

Self-knowledge is what is opposed to ignorance, and therefore what removes it. Apart from its rise, nothing else is required for the removal of ignorance. Action which is governed by ignorance cannot remove it.

NKL gives the following syllogism. The knowledge of self does not require action, because it is the knowledge of truth, like the knowledge of the reality of nacre. (*pratyag-dhīr na karmāpekṣā tattva-dhītvāt śukti-tattva-dhīvat.*)

[19]

साधनं चाधिकारी च कर्मविज्ञानकाण्डयोः ।

मिथो विरोधतः सिद्धावधुना तत्र चोद्यते ॥ १९ ॥

As it has been established that in the rites- and knowledge-sections, the means, eligible persons, etc. are mutually conflicting, now in respect thereof it is objected to (as follows).

Now it has been shown that the two sections of Scripture—ritual and knowledge—are different from each other in regard to the means they teach, and in regard to the eligibility for their study. They differ also as regards content and fruit. The Pūrvamīmāṃsaka, of course, will not accept this position. He opens his case in the next verse.

NKL—*sādhanaṁ phalaṁ ca adhikārī viśayaś cety arthaḥ.*

[20]

नन्वभ्युदयवन्मुक्तिं गृहीमो विधिलक्षणाम् ।

कार्यं विना नाधिकारी नापीज्याफलसङ्गमः ॥ २० ॥

“Now, let us admit that, like prosperity, release (too) is attained through injunctions (i. e. *karma*), for

without something to be done (*kārya*) there is no eligible person, nor the relation of sacrifice (i.e. means) and end.

An objection usually begins with a *nanu* (an inceptive particle implying doubt or objection). Here the Mīmāṃsaka begins to state his objection. Just as heaven, etc., which constitute prosperity (*abhyudaya*), are obtained through ritual acts, release (*mukti*) also is attained through action, because it is an end taught in Scripture. Thus, the eligibility is the same for both *karma-kāṇḍa* and *jñāna-kāṇḍa* (ritual- and knowledge-sections of the Veda).

NTV—nanu abhyudayavat mumukṣoḥ iṣyamāṇo mokṣaḥ sādhyāḥ siddhe prepsānupapatteḥ, ataś ca kriyaiva tatsādhanam, na jñānam, kriyāyā eva abhūta-prādurbhāva-phalatvāt, jñānasya pradīpavat siddhārthābhivṛtyakṛti-mātra-phalatvāt.

NKL—muktiḥ karma-sādhyā vaidika-phalatvāt, svargādivat.

ijyā-ṣabdo yāgavacano 'py atra sādhanamātra-gocaraḥ. Though the word 'ijya' means sacrifice, here it indicates 'means' in general.

[21]

लभ्यते लौकिकोऽपीह किमङ्गाऽऽगमसंश्रयः ।

विधिलक्षणसिद्धयर्थं सन्ति वाक्यानि च श्रुतौ ॥ २१ ॥

“Even what relates to the empirical world results (only through *kārya*); how much more what depends on Scripture? For establishing injunction as the means, there are texts in Scripture.

Here an argument *a fortiori* (*kaimutika-nyāya*) is advanced. Even in the world, without a knowledge of something to be done (*kārya*), there is no eligibility. It goes without saying, therefore, that this must be so with regard to sacred matters. Nor may it be said that there is no parity between what obtains in the world and

what is true of the Veda. In *PM*, I, iii, 10 (*Lokavedādhikaraṇa*) it is established that the words and their meanings are the same in the Veda and in empirical usage. It is not as if an uncommon set of words is used in the Veda. Hence there is parity.

The Mīmāṃsā view is as follows :—In texts like ‘One performs the *Agnihotra* as long as one lives,’ *life-long-ness* is enjoined, not as a property of the act, but as a property of the agent. The meaning is that the performance of the act is contingent upon the ‘being alive’ of the agent. Now, since the contingency is upon a constant factor, viz. being alive, the act is an obligatory one (*PM*, II, iv, 1-7. *Yāvaj-jīvādhikaraṇa*). Heaven is said to be the fruit of sacrifice. But sacrifice which is an act perishes as soon as it has been performed while heaven comes only later on at death. What, then, is the cause of heaven? In order to solve this problem, an unseen potency called *apūrva* or *kārya* is assumed. The sacrifice generates the *apūrva*, and this lasts till the fruit is gained (*PM*, II i, 5. *Apūrvādhikaraṇa*). It is the *kārya* that is the principal. Not only are substances, properties and preparations auxiliaries; actions, result and agent also are auxiliaries (*PM*, III, i, 3-6. *Bādaryadhi-karaṇa*.)

On the basis of the sections of the *Pūrvamīmāṃsā-sūtra* cited above, the Mīmāṃsaka urges that *mukti* results only through the performance of action, and that, therefore, it is what is to be accomplished (*kārya*).

[22]

कुर्वीत क्रतुमित्यादिर्विधिरभ्युदये यथा ।

उपासीतेति च तथा मुक्तावपि समीक्ष्यते ॥ २२ ॥

“Just as in respect of prosperity (*abhyudaya*) there is the injunction ‘Perform the rite,’ so in respect of release (*mukti*) there is seen (the injunction) ‘Meditate.’”

The objector now quotes Scripture in support of his view. There is no doubt regarding the existence in the Veda of the injunctions of ritual. They take the form 'Perform the rite'. Similarly, it is contended, there are injunctions regarding release, which are expressed in the form 'Do meditate'.

[23]

नाभ्युदयस्य मुक्तेश्च साध्यासाध्ये ध्रुवाध्रुवे ।

वैलक्षण्यान्न युक्त्यं तुल्यसाधनता तयोः ॥ २३ ॥

No. Prosperity and release, which are (respectively) what-is-to-be-accomplished and what-is-not accomplished, what-is-impermanent and what-is-permanent, are opposed to each other. Therefore, they cannot have the same means.

To the objection raised, the *siddhāntin* now replies. Prosperity and release are quite different ends. Prosperity is what-is-to-be-accomplished; release is the eternally-accomplished. The former is impermanent; the latter is permanent. Therefore, the same means cannot serve the two ends; nor can the eligibility be the same for both.

NTV—*anyathā svargādivat saṁsāra eva mokṣa iti prasajyeta*. Otherwise, like heaven, *saṁsāra* itself would have to be regarded as release.

[24]

अन्यच्छ्रेयोऽन्यदुतैव प्रेय-

स्ते उभे नानार्थे पुरुषं सिनीतः ।

तयोः श्रेय आददानस्य साधु

भवति हीयतेऽर्थाद्य उ प्रेयो वृणीते ॥ २४ ॥

‘The good is one thing, the pleasing is quite another. The two bind man to different ends. Of these, all is well with him who chooses the good; and he who weds the pleasing falls from the (supreme) end.’

A text of the *Kāṭhōpaniṣad* (ii, 1) is reproduced here. *Śreyas* is *mokṣa* that is eternal. *Preyas* is pleasure that perishes. They govern different men. He who lets himself to be governed by the former attains the final goal. And he who chooses the latter falls away from that goal. The means also are different. While *jñāna* is the means to *śreyas*, *karma* is the means to *preyas*.

[25]

परीक्ष्य लोकान्कर्मचितान्ब्राह्मणो

निर्वेदमायान्नास्त्यकृतः कृतेन ।

तद्विज्ञानार्थं स गुरुमेवाभिगच्छे-

त्समित्पाणिः श्रोत्रियं ब्रह्मनिष्ठम् ॥ २५ ॥

‘Examining the enjoyments acquired through deeds a Brāhmana becomes dissatisfied, since what is not accomplished (*akṛta*) is not attained through deeds. For a knowledge of that he should, verily, approach, with fuel in hand, a preceptor who is versed in Scripture and established in Brahman.’

This is a text from the *Muṇḍakōpaniṣad* (I, ii, 12). It declares that for him who has become non-attached to *samsāra* there is eligibility for *jñāna*. His non-attachment is the result of a realization of all that is finite. Whatever is accomplished in the world perishes. Nothing wrought through *karma* lasts for ever. He who realizes this truth turns away from *samsāra* and seeks the knowledge

of the non dual self which is eternal, immortal, fearless, immutable, unmoving and firm. In order to obtain that knowledge, he approaches a preceptor (*guru*) who is established in Brahman and learned in the *sāstras*.

[26 a]

नन्वभ्युदयवत्साध्या मुक्तिरप्राप्तरूपतः ।

“Now, like prosperity, release is to be accomplished, since it is of the nature of what has not been attained.”

Now, the objector argues that release is a thing-to-be-accomplished, for it has not yet been accomplished by us. So, he maintains that release is on a par with prosperity.

SP—vimatā muktiḥ sādhyā, aprāpta-rūpatvāt, svargavat.

Release, which is in dispute, is what-is-to-be-attained, because it is of the nature of the unattained, like heaven.

[26 b]

मैवं साध्याऽपि नो मुक्तिर्न त्वभ्युदयवद्यतः ॥ २६ ॥

Not thus. Even though release for us is what-is-to-be-accomplished, it is not so in the sense that prosperity is.

This is the reply to the above objection. Release is not what-is-to-be-accomplished in the sense in which prosperity is. It is imagined to be so on account of delusion. Therefore, it is not what-has-not-been-attained, or what-is-to-be-accomplished, in the principal sense. It is so, only in a figurative sense.

SP—bhrāntam aprāptirūpatvaṁ mukteḥ, na mukhya-sādhya-vāvaḥam. That release is the unattained is a delusion; it is not what-is-to-be-attained in the primary sense of the term.

NTV—dvividho hi loke prāpyaḥ, yathā gamanādinā grāmādiḥ, yathā ca jñānena kaṇṭhe cāmīkarādiḥ, pariharaṇīyaś ca dvividhaḥ, cikitsādinā rogādiḥ, yathā vā sthāṇvādi-jñānena corādiḥ.

There are two kinds of attainables in the world: (1) like a village, etc., which are to be reached by walking, etc., and (2) like the forgotten ornament round the neck which is to be attained through knowledge. Similarly, there are two kinds of remediables; (1) like disease, etc., which are to be remedied by proper treatment, and (2) like the imagined thief, etc., who are to be driven away by a knowledge of the post, etc.

[27]

स्वतोमुक्तान्तरायस्य तमसो विद्यया हतेः ।

तत्कैवल्यमतः साध्यमुपचारात्प्रचक्षते ॥ २७ ॥

Where, by knowledge, darkness (ignorance) which is an obstruction already removed is destroyed, there is perfection (*kaivalya*); it is figuratively spoken of as what is accomplished (*sādhya*).

Ignorance (*avidyā*) which is not real is removed by knowledge (*vidyā*). Release which is the eternal nature of the self is figuratively spoken of as what is to be attained through knowledge.

[28]

चिकित्सयेव संप्राप्य स्वास्थ्यं रोगार्दितस्य तु ।

आत्माविद्याहतेर्बोधात्तत्कैवल्यमवाप्यते ॥ २८ ॥

For one who is afflicted by disease there is attainment of one's native state (i.e., health) through medical treatment. When through knowledge the ignorance of self is destroyed, perfection is attained.

Here an illustration is offered. Health is one's natural state. Sometimes it gets obscured by disease. When, by proper treatment, the disease is removed, we say, one becomes whole. This is only a figure of speech.

NTV—nitya-suddha-mukta-buddha-svabhāvam brahmaiva mokṣaḥ tac-ca svāntarāya tamo-nivṛtyā prāpnotīty upacaryate.

Release is Brahman itself which is by nature eternal, pure, ever free and intelligent, and that is said to be attained, figuratively, when the obstacle to it, viz. the darkness of ignorance, is removed.

NKL—muktir asādhya ātmābhinnatvāt ātmavat.

[29]

ब्रह्म वा इदमित्यादिब्रह्मैवेति तथा श्रुतिः ।

सुषुप्तनरवच्छत्या बोध्योऽतोऽयं न कार्यते ॥ २९ ॥

'Brahman verily was this'¹ etc., 'Brahman alone'²: thus Scripture. Like the man who sleeps (is awakened) so one is made to know by Scripture and not made to act.

The Scriptural texts that declare the eternal nature of release are cited.

1. *BU*, I, iv, 10. 'Brahman, verily, was this in the beginning. It knew only itself thus: "I am Brahman." From it all this came into being.'

2. *BU*, IV, iv, 6, 'Being Brahman alone, he attains Brahman.'

These and other texts teach that Brahman is the eternally attained.

What Scripture has to do is only to awaken the individual to this truth, and not to make him do anything.

*NKL—yathā rājā supto bandi-prabhṛtibhis tattva-kathanena bodh-
yate, na kaṁcid anuṣṭhāpyate.*

[30]

किमत्र विधिना कार्यमनृतन्त्रत्वहेतुतः ।

श्रुतोऽप्यनर्थकोऽत्र स्याद्विध्यर्थासंभवत्वतः ॥ ३० ॥

What can be accomplished by injunction here, since (release) is not dependent on human effort? Injunctions that are declared in Scripture have no purport here, since the injunctive sense is impossible.

Jñāna cannot be the content of an injunction. Only *karma* can be enjoined. Deeds are dependent on the will of man. Not so is knowledge. Even if there are passages in Scripture relating to knowledge which appear to be in the form of injunctions, they are not to be understood as such. What can a razor's edge do against a rock? It will only get blunted. Even so, injunction cannot affect knowledge.

[31]

यच्चास्यासति कर्तव्ये नाधिकारो निरूप्यते ।

तदप्यशेषतश्चोद्यमूर्ध्वमुन्मूलयिष्यते ॥ ३१ ॥

As for what is stated, that in the absence of what is to be accomplished there is no eligibility, that objection too will be uprooted completely later on.

What was stated by the objector in v. 20 is recalled here, and the promise is made that it will be replied to later. See v. 228 *et seq.*

[32]

पर आहाऽऽत्मनः स्वास्थ्यं श्रेयो यद्यभिवाञ्छसि ।
कर्मभ्य एव तत्सिध्येच्छतत्वात्कर्मणः श्रुतौ ॥ ३२ ॥

Another says: "The natural state of the self which you desire as the good can result only from deeds; since deeds are taught in Scripture.

The objector now says: You hold that the remaining of the self in its own nature is the goal. Agreed. But that can be achieved only by performing the deeds enjoined in Scripture.

The combination of *mukti* and *karma* is on the maxim of *the lost horses and burnt chariot* (*naṣṭāśva-dagdharathavat*). Jacob explains the maxim thus: "This is based on the story of two men travelling in their respective chariots, and one of them losing his horses and the other having his chariot burnt, through the outbreak of fire in the village in which they were putting up for the night. The horses that were left were harnessed to the remaining chariot, and the two men pursued their journey together. Its teaching is—union for mutual advantage." *

[33]

श्रुतौ स्मृतौ च विहितं कर्मैव श्रूयते यतः ।
न च कर्मातिरेकेण मुक्त्यभ्युदयसाधनम् ॥ ३३ ॥

* *A Handful of Popular Maxims* (Nirnayasagar Press, Bombay, 1925), p. 31.

“Since in Scripture and in Traditional Code action alone is declared to be obligatory, there is no means other than action for release and prosperity.

Whether the end be prosperity or release, the means taught in Scripture is action.

[34]

यत्नतो न्यायतः किञ्चित्प्रश्यामो वेदचक्षुषा ।
निषेधविधिमात्रत्वाद्देदार्थस्येह सर्वतः ॥ ३४ ॥

“With care and through reasoning let us see with the eye of the Veda. Here, everywhere, the sense of the Veda is either prohibition or injunction alone.”

So far as the sphere of relative experience is concerned, it is clear that the purport of the Veda lies in injunctions and prohibitions. That is to say, it is taught in the Veda that *karma* alone is the means to the human goal. Release is a human goal, like heaven. Therefore, *karma* should be the means thereto.

NTV—etad uktam bhavati—niṣedha-vidhi-codanaiva sāstram pravartaka-nivartakāveva sāstrārthaḥ pravṛtti-nivṛtti-sādhyaṁ eva sāstra-prayojanam; vidhi-pada-rahitānām vākyānām apramāpakatvād ajñātārthaprameyābhāvāt pravṛtti-nivṛtti-sādhya-prayojanābhāvac ca pauruṣeya-vākyavat nirapekṣa-prāmāṇyābhāvāt na karmātirekeṇa mukty-abhyudaya-sāadhanam-iti.

This is what has been said: Scripture is only mandate, of the form of prohibition and prescription; the sense of Scripture is only what prompts and prevents; the fruit of Scripture is only what can be accomplished by activity and withdrawal.

[35]

ननु श्रुतौ पुरोक्तानि वाक्यानि बहुशो मया ।
अविधायित्वतस्तेषां न न्याय्यं भवतोदितम् ॥ ३५ ॥

Now, several texts of Scripture were cited by me above. Since they are non-injunctive, what you have stated is not reasonable.

The *siddhāntin* observes that, as he has already cited Scriptural texts which are non-injunctive in character, it is wrong to maintain that Scripture has purport only in injunctions and prohibitions.

[36]

आम्नायस्य क्रियार्थत्वाद्विधिनेति च सूत्रणात् ।
विधिशेषतया तेषामेकवाक्यत्वसंभवे ॥ ३६ ॥

“Syntactical unity for them is possible as subsidiary to injunction because of the aphorisms ‘Since Scripture has *kriyā* for purport’¹ ‘With injunction, etc.’².

The *pūrvapakṣin* replies that the non-injunctive texts have no independent purport, and that they should be construed with an injunction.

1. *PM*. I, ii, 1. ‘Since Scripture has action for purport, what are not for the sake of that are useless; in these, therefore, Scripture is declared to be non-eternal.’

2. *PM*, I, ii, 7. ‘Being construed with injunction, they would serve the purpose of eulogizing those injunctions.’

These two *sūtras* occur in the *Arthavādādhikaraṇa* (PM, I, ii, 1-18). The first one states the opponent's (i.e., he who is opposed to Mīmāṃsā) contention that eulogistic passages are useless, and that, therefore, to that extent the Veda would become unreliable. The other *sūtra* (I, ii, 7) gives the reply. The eulogistic (*arthavāda*) passages have no independent purport. They should be construed syntactically with the injunctions. Their duty, in fact, is to praise the injunctions.

For example, there is the following text in the Veda (*Taittirīya-saṁhitā*, II, i, 1) 'One desiring prosperity should sacrifice the animal *śveta* dedicated to Vāyu: Vāyu, verily, is the efteft deity: he leads the man to prosperity'. Here, the sentence 'Vāyu, verily, is the efteft deity' does not indicate any action. It has to be construed with the injunctive sentence 'One desiring prosperity should sacrifice, etc.'

Similarly, those texts of the *jñāna-kāṇḍa* which are themselves non-injunctive, says the *pūrvapakṣin*, acquire meaning only as construed with the injunctive texts. In other words, they have syntactical unity (*ekavākyatva*) with *vidhi-vākyas*.

NTV—*codanātirikta-vedavākyānām niṣpramāpakatvāt, nirviṣayatvāt, niṣprayojanatvācca aprāmāṇyam.*

The Vedic texts which are non-injunctive do not make known the truth, have no content, and are futile; hence, they are not authoritative.

NKL—*vimatā na svārthaparā vidhi-vikala-vedatvāt so'rodīd ity ādivat.....karmāpekṣita-kartrādi-prakāśanadvārā teṣām api vidhinai-kavākyatvam lāghavāt.*

[37]

वचसामक्रियार्थानां वाक्यभेदप्रकल्पना ।

गुर्वी स्यान्ननु कैवल्यं फलं नित्यमिहेष्यते ॥ ३७ ॥

“To assume sentence-split for sentences which do not have *kriyā* for purport would be prolix.”

Now, here, what is desired is perfection, the eternal truth.

Here, the statement of *pūrvapakṣa* continues upto the words *gurvī syāt* in the second line. The rest of that line states an objection raised by the *siddhāntin*.

Pūrvapakṣin.—There is no fruit in the sense of the Vedānta texts ; even as there is no fruit seen in the *artha-vāda*, ‘He wept (*arodīt*) ;—because he wept, *Rudra* came to be called *Rudra*.’ (*Traittirīyasamhitā*, I, v, 1). The sentence ‘He wept, etc.’ should be construed with the injunction ‘Silver shall not be given on the *barhīs*’. Otherwise there would be sentence-split (*vākyabheda*) and prolixity (*gaurava*). To separate the *arthavāda* text from the injunctive text would be wrong. Equally unjustifiable is it to assume a separate fruit for the *arthavāda* text.

Siddhāntin.—*Mokṣa* is the fruit of Vedānta, and that is eternal. If the Vedānta-texts were subsidiary to the injunctive texts *mokṣa* would become non-eternal. Therefore, *mokṣa* is not what is accomplished through action.

SP—*na sā (muktiḥ) karma-sādhyā nityatvād ātmavat*.

[38]

कथं नित्यं भवेत्तन्नो यदि स्यात्कर्मणः फलम् ।

कर्मोत्थं न यतः किञ्चिद्भुवं जगति वीक्ष्यते ॥ ३८ ॥

How can it be eternal, if it were the fruit of action ? Nothing that is given rise to by action is seen to be permanent in the world.

The *siddhāntin* continues : Whatever is accomplished through action perishes. *Mokṣa* is eternal. Therefore, it cannot be the fruit of action.

[39]

तत्साधनेन चावश्यं भवितव्यमतो भवेत् ।

पारिशेष्यादिह ज्ञानं वेदान्ते तत्प्रसिद्धितः ॥ ३९ ॥

That (release) should result necessarily through some means. Hence, by elimination, knowledge becomes here (the means). This is well known in the Vedānta.

If action is not the means to *mokṣa*, what is the means ? By a process of elimination it is settled that knowledge is the means. *Pāriśeṣya-nyāya* is the principle of residues.

[40]

नैवं क्रियाभ्य एवास्या मुक्तेः सिद्धत्वहेतुतः ।

कुतः क्रियाभ्यः सिद्धिश्चेच्छृणु तद्गण्यते यतः ॥ ४० ॥

“ Not thus ; for the reason that release results from rites alone. If it be asked, how does it result from rites ?, listen, how it is so is explained.

The *pūrvapakṣin* contends that the principle of residues does not apply here, as, in his view, *mokṣa* is accomplished through action. He proceeds to explain how this is so.

[41-42]

निषिद्धकाम्ययोस्त्यागात्कर्मणोर्नित्यकर्मणः ।

करणात्प्रत्यवायस्य हतेर्भोगेन च क्षयात् ॥ ४१ ॥

शरीरास्मकस्यैवं मुक्तिः सिद्धाऽन्तरात्मनः ।

विनाऽप्यैकान्त्यसंबोधात्कर्मणैवोक्तवर्त्मना ॥ ४२ ॥

“By giving up prohibited and optional rites and by performing the obligatory rites, the sin of non-performance being removed and the *karma* responsible for generating (a fresh) body being destroyed through experiencing: when thus release for the inner self results, (it must be admitted that) even without the knowledge of the one self, action alone is the means to release in the aforesaid manner.”

This is the recipe for *mokṣa* : your present body is the result of the accumulated *karma* of your past. If you desire *mokṣa*, all that you need accomplish is that when your present body falls, there should be no more embodiment for you. The causes of embodiment (i.e. birth) are merit (*punya*) and demerit (*pāpa*). If you succeed in avoiding both till the time of death, thereafter you will not be born. How to avoid merit and demerit? By not performing prohibited (*niṣiddha*) acts, you avoid demerit. By not resorting to optional rites (*kāmya-karma*), you do not gather merit. Obligatory duties (*nitya-karma*) you should perform, because their non-performance will bring in demerit, while their performance does not lead to any fresh merit. The *karma* that is responsible for the present body, however, perishes when it has been experienced. Thus when the present body falls, there will be no cause for seizing another body. And that is *mokṣa*. When it is attained through *karma*, where is the need for *jñāna*?

NKL—mokṣārthī na pravarteta tatra kāmyaṇiṣiddhayoḥ, nitya-naimittike kuryāt pratyavāya-jihāsayā-iti nyāyena uktam upapādayati niṣiddheti.

[43]

ननु चाऽऽत्मावबोधस्य निचाय्येति फलं श्रुतम् ।

ब्रह्म वेदेति च तथा नैवं तस्यार्थवादतः ॥ ४३ ॥

Now, that release is the fruit of self-knowledge is declared by Scripture in 'Having realized (him, one is released from the mouth of death),'¹ as also in 'He who knows Brahman (becomes Brahman)'.²

"Not thus; since they are eulogies."

Siddhāntin : In spite of what you have said, *karma* cannot be the means to *mokṣa*; for Scripture expressly declares that knowledge is the means.

1. *KU*, I, iii, 15. 'Devoid of sound, of touch, of form, without decay, and likewise devoid of taste, eternal, and devoid of odour, beginningless, endless, superior to the Great (*Mahat*) and firm: having realized him, one is released from the mouth of death.'

2. *MU*, III, ii, 9. 'He, verily, who knows that supreme Brahman, becomes Brahman itself. In his family there will be born no one who does not know Brahman. Sorrow he crosses; sin he crosses: Liberated from the knots of the cavity (of the heart), he becomes immortal.'

Pūrvapakṣin : The Scriptural texts you have quoted are eulogies (*arthavāda*).

[44]

फलोत्तेरर्थवादत्वं द्रव्यसंस्कारकर्मसु ।

सर्वत्र दर्शनाच्छास्त्रे पर्णमय्यां फलोक्तिवत् ॥ ४४ ॥

“In Scripture everywhere it is seen that the declaration of fruit in respect of material and purificatory rites is eulogistic, as in the case of the declaration of fruit for (the sacrificial ladle) made of *parṇa*-wood.

Admitting that there are texts in Scripture declaring *jñāna* to be the means to *mokṣa*, the *pūrvapakṣin* maintains that these texts are eulogistic and, therefore, have no purport of their own. *PM*, IV, iii, i, declares: “The mention of fruit in connection with ‘material’, ‘purification’, and ‘acts’ should be regarded as eulogistic, because they are for the sake of another (action).” There is the text, for example, which says: ‘He whose sacrificial ladle is made of *pārṇa*-wood does not hear any evil of himself.’ Here the text does not enjoin the non-hearing of evil as an actual result. It is only a praise of the ladle made of *parṇa*-wood which is subservient to the act of offering. Similarly, the declaration of fruit in the texts relating to self-knowledge is an eulogy.

[45]

आत्मनःकर्मशेषत्वात्तद्वियः कर्मशेषता ।

विधिं त्वयाऽनिच्छताऽपि ह्यभ्युपेयाऽर्थवादता ॥ ४५ ॥

“Since the self is subsidiary to action, the knowledge of that is subsidiary to action. Though injunction is not accepted by you (in Vedānta), the eulogistic character (of Vedānta texts) must be admitted (by you).”

The *pūrvapakṣin* continues: Just as *parṇa*-hood helps the sacrifice by offering its material to the ladle, even knowledge helps the same by way of purifying the agent. Therefore, the mention of fruit in the texts about self-knowledge is an eulogy. Even though knowledge may not be enjoined, it becomes subsidiary to injunction by purifying the agent.

NKL—karmāṅga-saṁskāratayā jñānasya kriyā-śeṣatvam ity arthah.

AVS—etad uktam bhavati ātma-jñānasya ātma-saṁskāratvāt ātmanas ca kriyā-śeṣatvāt, tad-dvāreṇa taj-jñānasya kriyā-śeṣatvopapatteḥ phala-sravaṇam avivakṣitam iti.

[46]

नैवं तद्धेतुतद्रूपविरोधादितरेतरम् ।

मुक्त्यभ्युदययोस्तस्मान्न सम्यग्भवतोदितम् ॥ ४६ ॥

Not thus. Since release and prosperity are opposed to each other as regards means and nature, what was stated by you is not sound.

The *siddhāntin* replies: Action cannot be the means to release, even though it may lead to prosperity. Discrimination (*viveka*) is the means to release; non-discrimination or nescience (*aviveka*) is the basis of prosperity. Permanence or eternity (*dhruvatva*) is the nature of release; transitoriness (*adhruvatva*) is the characteristic feature of prosperity. Since prosperity and release are so divergent, the same means cannot serve both ends.

NKL—kaivalyam karmaphalam ity etad dūṣayati—ne'ti. tayoḥ hetu, taddhetu, rāga-vairāgya-pūrvakau tayo rūpe bandha-tad-dhvaṁ-sātmake tayo virodhān mukty-abhyudayayor eka-puruṣāsaṁbandhaḥ.

[47]

स्वरूपेऽवस्थितिर्मुक्तिरात्मनो भवतोच्यते ।

काम्यादिवर्जनादिभ्यस्तस्याः सिद्धिश्च वर्ण्यते ॥ ४७ ॥

You say that the resting of the self in its own nature is release ; and you explain that it is attained through giving up optional rites, etc.

The *siddhāntin* recalls here what was stated by the *pūrvapakṣin* in v. 32. Admitting that the resting of the self in its own nature is release, it was urged that this is achieved through the performance of Scripture-ordained acts.

[48-49]

तत्राऽऽत्मा किं स्वरूपे प्राङ्मन स्थितो येन तत्स्थितौ ।

हेतुं व्यपेक्षते यत्नात्स्वरूपं हि न तद्भवेत् ॥ ४८ ॥

स्वतोऽनवस्थितो यत्र हेतुना स्थाप्यते बलात् ।

अथावस्थित एवायं किमर्थं हेतुमार्गणम् ॥ ४९ ॥

Does the self not rest in its nature previously, that in order to rest therein it depends on a means through effort ? But, then, that cannot be its nature wherein it has to be made to rest forcibly through means, as it does not rest of itself. If it rests, then for what purpose is the search for means ?

Here the *pūrvapakṣin* is asked: Prior to the performance of actions, does the self rest in itself or not ? If the latter, then 'resting-in-itself' cannot be the nature of the self, for it is adventitious, being dependent on an external means. If the former, then, where is the need for the performance of actions ? Surely, no one wants to go to a village which has already been reached.

कैवल्येऽपि च तत्सत्तेरनिर्मोक्षः प्रसज्यते ।

अतो निषिद्धकाम्यादिवर्जनान्नाऽऽत्ममुक्तता ॥ ५० ॥

If even in release there be attachment thereto (rites) there is the contingency of non-release. Therefore, by giving up prohibited and optional rites, there is no release for the self.

If it be said that the performance of actions is natural to the self, then, there would be no difference between bondage and release.

विषयाभ्यासजास्वास्थ्यनुत्त्यर्थमिति चेन्मतम् ।

स तु विषयसंपर्कः कस्माद्भवति कारणात् ॥ ५१ ॥

If it be thought that it (the prescription of rites, etc.) is for the sake of resolving the non-abidance in the self brought about by repeated contacts with the objects, due to what cause does that contact with objects come about?

The *pūrvapakṣin* may say: 'I admit that the performance of actions is not natural to the self. Nor is it required to make the self remain in itself. Yet I maintain that it is necessary for removing the sin that has been generated in the self by repeated contact with the objects of sense.'

Now, if that be so, he should be asked: 'What brings about contact with sense-objects?'

NTV—*paramārthato 'saṁgasyā 'tmano viṣayādinā tat-kāraṇena vā kenāpi saṁbandhānupapatteḥ na tan-nivartanena karmaṇām mokṣa-sāadhanayogyatā syāt.*

In truth, the self is unattached, and there can be for it by no means any relation either to the objects, etc., or to their cause. And so, actions cannot be the means to *mokṣa* for the purpose of removing them (viz. the objects and their cause).

[52]

अकस्माद्भवतः सत्तेर्मुक्तावप्यनिषेधतः ।

अनिर्मोक्षप्रसक्तिर्वस्तथा सति समापतेत् ॥ ५२ ॥

If, according to you, such contact is accidental, then, since it cannot be prevented even in release, there is for you the contingency of non-release.

If contact with sense-objects is accidental, i.e. if it be without a cause, then, it may occur even in *mokṣa*, with the result that there would be no *mokṣa*.

[53]

धर्माधर्मनिमित्तश्चेत्किं पुनर्धर्मपातके ।

अप्यसङ्गस्वभावस्य संपर्कं कुरुतो बलात् ॥ ५३ ॥

If the cause be merit and demerit, do merit and demerit occasion contact by force for what is by nature unattached ?

It may be held that merit (*dharma*) and demerit (*adharma*) are the cause of the contact. In that case, two alternatives are possible :

(A) that merit and demerit establish contact with the objects for the self that is unattached ; and

(B) that the self for which contact is established is not unattached.

Here, the first alternative (A) is mentioned.

NTV—nityāsaṅgacinmātrasyā 'tmana ukta-saṁparko nopapadyate.

For the self which is eternal, unattached pure consciousness, the aforesaid relation (to the objects, etc.) is not possible.

avidyaiva akhaṇḍānanda-caitanyasya asaṅgasyā 'tmanoḥ ukta-saṁparkam karoti.....tan-nivṛttaye jñānamevaiṣitavyam, na karma.

For the self which is impartite bliss and consciousness and is unattached, nescience alone brings about the said relation; for removing that, knowledge alone is to be sought for, not action.

[54-55]

भल्लातकाङ्कवद्वस्त्रे न हि लोके स्फुरन्नपि ।

कुशलोऽपि कुलालः सन्नघटादिस्वभावकम् ॥ ५४ ॥

मृद्वव्योम घटी कुर्यान्मरुद्वाऽग्नेश्च शीतताम् ।

आत्मा कर्त्रादिरूपश्चेन्मा काङ्क्षीस्तर्हि मुक्तताम् ॥ ५५ ॥

Just as the marking-nut makes the cloth bear marks, not thus can merit and demerit produce contact for the self.¹ A potter, even though able-bodied and skilled, cannot make a pot out of ether which is not of the nature of pot, etc; nor can wind produce coolness in fire.²

If the self be of the nature of agent, etc.,³ then do not hope for release.

The alternative (A) is not sound.

1. This is a contrary example. A piece of cloth may be stained, but not the self.

2. These two are similar instances: ether cannot serve as the material of pot; fire cannot be made cool by a blowing wind.

3. This is the second alternative (B). Here, again, there are minor distinctions.

i. Is the self of the nature of effects (*kārya*) such as agent, etc.? Or,

ii. is it of the nature of the potency (*śakti*) of being agent, etc.?

And, as regards the first of these :

(a) Is there release for the self on the destruction of the effects, agency, etc.? Or,

(b) is there release even when there is not that destruction?

The first, i (a), is not possible.

[56]

न हि स्वभावो भावानां व्यावर्त्येतौष्ण्यवद्रवेः ।

स्वभावाद्धिनिवृत्तोऽर्थो निःस्वभावः खपुष्पवत् ॥ ५६ ॥

Not, indeed, can the nature of things be changed, as the heat of the sun. A thing which has lost its nature is void of reality like the sky-flower.

Here, the reason for the impossibility of i (a) is given.

A thing cannot change its essence. If it should change, it will cease to be itself. Gauḍapāda says (*GK*, iv, 29) :

prakṛter anyathābhāvo na kathaṅcid bhaviṣyati.

[57]

नाविनश्यन्यतो वह्निर्व्यावर्त्येतौष्ण्यतः क्वचित् ।

न च कर्त्ताद्यनिर्मुक्तौ मुक्तिः संभाव्यतेऽन्यतः ॥ ५७ ॥

Fire which has not been destroyed does not lessen its heat at any time.

For if the self be not freed from agency, etc., will release be possible by any other means?

Here, the unsoundness of i (b) is shown.

ननु कर्तृत्वभोक्तृत्वकार्यमेवाऽऽत्मसंसृतिः ।

न तु तच्छक्तिरित्येवं शक्तिमात्रतया स्थितौ ॥ ५८ ॥

सर्वानर्थविनिर्मुक्तेरुपपन्नाऽऽत्ममुक्तता ।

“ Now the effect consisting in agency and enjoyer-ship, is alone the transmigration of the self, and not the potency thereof. Thus when the potency alone remains, and all evil is removed, the release of self is intelligible.”

Here, the *pūrvapakṣin* accepts the alternative ii, and argues: The self is of the nature of the potency of being agent, etc. But what constitute *saṁsāra* actually are the effects, such as agency, enjoyership, etc., and not their potency. So, when the effects are destroyed, there is release, even though their potency may persist.

AVS—karṭṛ-śakti-kāryasya anarthatvāt tasya ca muktāḥ abhāvāt śaktes ca anarthatvābhāvāt, tad-bhāve 'pi mokṣaḥ syād eva ity arthaḥ.

[59b]

मैवं भेदे तथाऽभेदे दोषः स्याच्छक्तिकार्ययोः ॥ ५९ ॥

Not thus; whether potency and its effect be different or non-different, there will be the (aforesaid) defect.

The *siddhāntin* rejects the alternative. Whether potency be identical with its effects or different from them, there would result non-release for the soul.

NTV—śakti-tatkāryayor bhede.....ityaṁ śaktir idaṁ ca kāryam iti vyavasthā na syāt, tilebhya eva tailam payasa eva dadhītivat karṭṛtva-śakter eva kriyā bhokṭṛtva-śakter eva bhoga iti ca vyavasthā na syāt.

Were potency and its effect different, then, one cannot say 'this is potency, and this is its effect.' Just as we say 'from the sesamum seeds, oil; from milk, curds,' we cannot say that action comes from the potency of agency alone, and enjoyment from the potency of enjoyership alone.

[60]

शक्तित्कार्ययोर्यस्माद्व्यतिरेको न विद्यते ।

नियमासंभवः प्रापव्यतिरेकस्तयोर्यदि ॥ ६० ॥

For there is no difference between potency and its effect. If there be difference between them, invariable relation (of cause and effect as between them) would be impossible.

There can be no difference between potency and its effect. If there is difference, potency cannot be the cause of its effect. Indeed, as between differentials like cow and horse, there is no causal relation.

AVS—ayam arthaḥ. śakti-śakyayor vyatirekāyogāt, vyatirekas tāvan nāsti, yadi kathamcid vyatirekaḥ syāt, tadā mṛda eva ghaṭaḥ kṣīrād eva dadhī 'ti niyamo na siddhyet, sarvataḥ sarvaṁ sambhavet.

[61]

कार्यकारणता न स्यात्स्वतो भेदेन सिद्धयोः ।

अभेदे च तयोरैक्यात्कार्यकारणता कुतः ॥ ६१ ॥

If they are established to be different by nature, there would not be the relation of cause and effect. And if they are non-different, they would be identical; whence, then, the relation of cause and effect?

Whether it is held that potency and its effect are different, or that they are identical, there is difficulty because either way the two cannot be related as cause and effect.

[62-64]

नाकुर्वत्कारणं दृष्टं कार्यं चाक्रियमाणकम् ।

अथाभेदस्तयोरिष्टः कार्यध्वस्तौ प्रसज्यते ॥ ६२ ॥

तच्छक्तेरपि विध्वंसस्तयोरव्यतिरेकतः ।

शक्तिस्वरूपहाने च शक्तिमद्रूपनिहुतिः ॥ ६३ ॥

तयोरव्यतिरेकत्वात्स एवाऽऽयात्यनीप्सितः ।

निरात्मवादः पूर्वोक्तस्तस्मान्नैवं प्रकल्पयेत् ॥ ६४ ॥

No cause is seen that is unproductive; nor an effect that is not produced. If non-difference between the two is what is accepted, then, on the destruction of the effect, there is the contingency of destruction for its potency too, for they are non-different. When the nature of potency is destroyed, the nature of the potent also is destroyed, because they are non-distinct. The same aforesaid view of no-self is brought in, even without our desire. Hence not thus should it be objected.

On the view that potency and its effect are non-different, defect is shown here. If the effect is included in potency, then, so long as the latter lasts, the former cannot be destroyed. In other words, agency, etc., will be constantly there for the self. So, there will be no release for it.

AVS—*abhede idaṁ kurvad idaṁ kriyamāṇam iti vibhāgasya kartum asakyatvāt, akurvata eva kāraṇatvam akriyamāṇasyaiva kāryatvam prāpnoti tad ubhayaṁ drṣṭa-virodhī 'ti.*

[65]

मतं कार्यानभिव्यक्तिर्निमित्तासंभवाद्यदि ।

शक्तेरिति न तद्युक्तं शक्तितद्देतुसंभवात् ॥ ६५ ॥

If it be your view that release is the non-manifestation of the effect of the potency, since the cause is impossible, that does not stand to reason, as potency, and the cause (dharma, etc.) are there.

Pūrvapakṣin—It is not the destruction of either the effect or its potency that is release. Release is the non-manifestation of the effect of the potency. It cannot be said that, then, release would be the same as deep sleep. In sleep there is the cause of renewed manifestation, viz. *adrṣṭa*, etc., whereas in release there is no such cause.

Siddhāntin—What you have stated is wrong. The cause of *samsāra* is potency or some excellence present in it. What produce its effect are merit (*dharma*), etc. Since they are present, even in release there is the contingency of the manifestation of the effect.

NTV—*yady api kāryānabhivṛtyakṛtiḥ muktau sambhavati, tathāpi mukty-avasthāyām kartṛtva-śakter ātmano nityādyananuṣṭhāna-janya-pāpmanah kāmya-pratiṣiddhānuṣṭhāna-janya-puṇya-pāpayoś ca bhāvāt punar dehāntara-prāptyādi sambhavāt, viśayābhyāsajāsvāsthyanuttīlakṣaṇo mokṣo na sambhavatīti pariharati na tad yuktam ityādinā.*

[66]

शक्तिरूपेण संबन्धो निमित्तानामपीष्यते ।

नैमित्तिकैरिति ततो बह्वयौष्यादिसमानता ॥ ६६ ॥

The relation of causes with what are occasioned is through the form of potency. Hence there is parity with fire-heat, etc.

Causes are related to effects through potency. So, if potency is there, the effect must be there. E.g. if there is fire, there must be heat. The fire-heat example was given in v. 57.

[67]

कार्यस्य शक्तितन्त्रत्वे सर्वदा कारणस्थितेः ।

कार्योत्पत्तिः सदैव स्यान्निदाघे घर्मवद्यतः ॥ ६७ ॥

If the effect is dependent on potency, then, as the cause is always existent, the origination of the effect would always be there, like heat in summer.

Does the effect consisting of agency, etc., depend on the entire cause? Or, does it not? If the first alternative is accepted, then, potency is the entire cause, and since it is present in release the effect too must be present.

[68-69]

तथैव शक्त्यतन्त्रत्वेऽप्येष दोषो यतो भवेत् ।

सदा कार्यं न जायेत कारणासंभवात्सदा ॥ ६८ ॥

निदाघे शीतवद्यस्मादतोऽसम्यगिदं वचः ।

निष्कारणस्य चोद्भूतौ कार्यजन्म सदा भवेत् ॥ ६९ ॥

Likewise, even if it be independent of potency, the same defect there would be. The effect would never arise, since always the cause is not, as cold (does not arise) in summer. Therefore these words (of yours) are not sound. If what has no cause is generated, then, there would be the generation of effect always.

If the effect is not dependent on the entire cause, then, it would never arise. Or, if it arises even without a cause, it would be there always.

NKL—tasmād ajñānam eva viśayasāṃparka-kāraṇam tac ca jñāna-mātro 'panodyam iti bhāvaḥ.

[70-71]

कार्यता वा कुतोऽस्य स्यान्न चेत्कारणतन्त्रता ।

न च शक्यं प्रतिज्ञातुं जन्माऽऽरभ्याऽऽमृतेर्नृभिः ॥ ७० ॥

निषिद्धकाम्यकर्मादिवर्जनं निपुणैरपि ।

सूक्ष्मापराधसंदृष्टेरतियत्नवतामपि ॥ ७१ ॥

And how could there be effectness for it, if it be not dependent on a cause? Even by the skilled men it is not possible to resolve to renounce prohibited and optional rites, etc., beginning from birth until death; for even in the case of the most diligent, subtle mistakes are seen.

If agency, etc., were independent, they would not be effects; if so, they would always be there.

The Mīmāṃsaka said that, in order to attain *mokṣa*, one must give up optional rites and prohibited actions. But, is it possible for anyone to do so throughout one's life from birth to death? Even the best of persons cannot conform to this rule.

NTV—asaty ātmaviññānena karmaghasmare sarvātmanā kāmya-pratiśiddhāni na kenacit parihartum śakyante, rāga-dveṣa-lobhādinām doṣāṇām anivṛtteḥ.

[72]

संशयस्तु भवत्येव पक्षासिद्धिस्तु तावता ।

अथ चेन्मोक्ष्यते सोऽत्र यस्य संपत्स्यते तथा ॥ ७२ ॥

The doubt at least is there, and so your view is not established (*pakṣāsiddhi*).

‘He, for whom this is realized in full, is released’, if thus it be said (we reply):

At any rate, the doubt as to the possibility of acting according to the Mīmāṃsaka prescription is there. If it were a small matter, then even if there be doubt, one may act. But *mokṣa* is not a small matter; nor the prescription of the means. So, no one would undertake to follow the way shown by the Mīmāṃsaka.

The *pūrvapakṣin* still persists in saying: “He who acts according to my prescription does surely attain *mokṣa*.”

[73]

त्वदुक्तं नैतदेवं स्यादवक्तव्यत्वहेतुतः ।

निश्चितं साधनं वाच्यं ज्ञानं निःश्रेयसं प्रति ॥ ७३ ॥

What is stated by you cannot be so, for the reason that it cannot be explained. In respect of release an ascertained means should be stated, viz. knowledge.

Siddhāntin's reply: A doubtful means is not adequate to establish its end. That which is doubtful cannot be determinate. If it were such operations as agriculture, etc., one may be active even though one may not be sure of the yield. Not so in the case of *mokṣa*. You profess to teach the means to *mokṣa*. But that means should be such that it has been ascertained to be the means.

[74]

न तु यादृच्छिकी सिद्धिर्वक्तव्येह विपश्चिता ।

दैवगोचर एवैष न तु मानुषगोचरः ॥ ७४ ॥

Not by the one who is wise will it be held that accomplishment is accidental. This is the sphere of destiny, and not the sphere of man.

No one who is intelligent would adopt a hit-or-miss method for achieving a goal. The hit-or-miss process is a gamble with destiny.

[75]

सहकत्री भवेच्छक्तिरिति न्यायाद्भवेद्यदि ।

मनुष्यगोचरोऽपीति नाऽऽख्यातासंभवात्तथा ॥ ७५ ॥

If it be stated that it also is the sphere of man on the rule that 'potency becomes helpful (to the verbs)', no, because there is no such verb.

Nor may it be said that this is within the sphere of man also (i.e. that human effort also is required) on the rule that potency or ability is helpful to injunction.

The rule is mentioned in the Mīmāṃsā works in connection with the topic of injunction of eligibility (*adhikāra-vidhi*). The rule runs thus: "For verbs, which express a meaning, power is an auxiliary." Here the meaning is: an injunction applies only to him who has the ability to perform the act enjoined. This is a commonsense rule. For instance, the Vedic injunctions, which require, on the part of the agent, the use of his eyes, tongue and ears, are not applicable to the blind, the dumb and the deaf.

This rule, says the *siddhāntin*, does not apply in the present case. Where there is an injunctive verb, there the ability of the agent is helpful. But nowhere in the Veda is there the injunction that he who desires *mokṣa* should give up optional rites, etc.

[For an explanation of the rule, see G. A. Jacob, *A Third Handful of Popular Maxims*, pp. 21-22; also *Arthasaṃgraha*, section on 'Adhikāra-vidhi', Śābara-bhāṣya on *PM*, I, iv, 30, and *Tantravārtika*, II, ii, 27. The present verse is quoted by Jacob as an illustration.]

[76]

मुक्त्यर्थी न हि काम्यादि वर्जयेदिति चोदना ।

अस्ति वेदे कचिद्येन शक्तेर्विध्येकदेशता ॥ ७६ ॥

There is no injunction anywhere in the Veda that he who desires release should leave off optional rites, etc., in which case there would be for potency the nature of being part-content of the injunction.

What was stated above is explained. There is no Vedic injunction that he who desires *mokṣa* should leave off optional rites, etc.

[77]

काम्यादिवर्जनं त्वेतत्स्वमतिप्रभवं यतः ।

नातः शक्तेस्तदंशत्वं कथंचिदपि युज्यते ॥ ७७ ॥

Since the saying about the leaving off of optional rites, etc., has its source in your imagination, it is not proper to say that for potency there is the nature of being part thereof (i.e. of the injunction).

Nor may the following statement be quoted by the *pūrvapakṣin* :

“Let the one who desires *mokṣa* turn away from optional rites and prohibited actions; let him perform the obligatory and occasioned rites in order to avoid sin.”*

**mokṣārthī na pravarteta tatra kāmya-niṣiddhayoḥ nitya-naimittike kuryāt pratyavāya-jihāsayā.*

This statement is not supported by Scripture.

If the view of the *pūrvapakṣin* is born out of his own brain, it carries no authority for us.

[78]

नित्यादिकरणान्नापि काम्यादेश्चापि वर्जनात् ।

श्रेयः संभाव्यते विद्यानिष्फलत्वप्रसङ्गतः ॥ ७८ ॥

Not from the performance of obligatory rites, nor from leaving off optional rites, is release (*śreyas*) possible ; since there is the contingency of the futility of knowledge (*vidyā*).

The *pūrvapakṣin* may say: "I have already quoted a *smṛti* passage in support of my view ; and we have to presume a *śruti* text as the basis of the *smṛti* passage."*

The *siddhāntin* replies: "What you say is not sound. The *śruti* expressly declares that *mokṣa* is through *jñāna*. With that declaration your view is in conflict."

NKL—*kāmyādi-varjanam abhyupagamyā na tataḥ kaivalya-siddhir ity āha nityād iti.*

[79]

काम्यात्स्वर्गादिकं मा भूदक्रियायां तदुद्भवम् ।

अर्थान्तरात्स्वभावाद्वा भवन्न तु निवार्यते ॥ ७९ ॥

From the optional rites let there not be heaven, etc., and from prohibited rites what is generated thereby (viz., hell). But nothing could prevent their coming into being either through some other means or of their own accord.

* *ācārāc ca smṛtiṁ jñātvā smṛteś ca śruti-kalpanam iti nyāyāt.*

Let there be, somehow, the giving up of optional rites, etc. Even then that cannot serve as the means to *mokṣa*.

Heaven, etc., and the body that is adequate for their enjoyment may not come to one, because one has given up the optional rites. Similarly, hell and the body appropriate to it may not result to one, because one has not done the prohibited deeds.

Even, then, there is no *mokṣa*. For, heaven, etc., may come to one through some other means.

[80]

अन्यतो भवने मानं न चेदस्त्वह संशयः ।

एतावताऽपि पक्षस्ते प्रतिबद्धो न सिध्यति ॥ ८० ॥

If it be said that there is no evidence in the matter of their resulting from other causes, (we reply) there may be doubt in regard thereto. And so your view is not established, it being obstructed.

Pūrvapakṣin—To one who has followed the way I have shown, there is no evidence that heaven, etc., come through some other means.

Siddhāntin—Even granting that there is no evidence, the possibility that they may come is still there.

[81]

अथैतयोरिति तथा चोदनार्थातिलङ्घिनाम् ।

सुखदुःखादिसंदृष्टेर्न चाप्यस्तीह संशयः ॥ ८१ ॥

Since those who transgress the sense of injunction are declared to be related to pleasure and pain in the

words “ But on neither of these ways ”¹, etc., there is not the said doubt here.

There is no doubt, whatsoever, that those who follow the way of works have to be re-born. Scripture speaks of three alternatives. Those who perform ritual go by the Southern Path. Those who combine ritual with knowledge go by the Northern Path. A third place—the status of low creatures—is indicated for those who transgress injunctions and prohibitions.

¹CHU, V, x, 8: “ But on neither of these ways are the small, constantly revolving creatures, (of whom it is said :) ‘ Take birth, die’—theirs is a third state.”

NTV—smṛtir api viruddha-phalena karmaṇā pratibaddhasya karmāntarasya ciram apy avasthānaṁ darśayati—kadācit sukṛtaṁ karma kūṭastham iva tiṣṭhati, majjamānasya saṁsāre yāvad duḥkhād vimucyate.

[82]

नित्यस्याकरणे दोषस्तात्क्रियायां न यद्यपि ।

अन्यतोऽसौ स्वभावाद्वा न तु मानेन वार्यते ॥ ८२ ॥

Even though there be defect if there is non-performance of obligatory rites and no defect if there is performance thereof, there is no evidence to prevent the same resulting otherwise or by its own nature.

In this birth one may perform obligatory rites and thus avoid demerit. But still, there may be demerit or defect due to the non-performance of obligatory rites in a former birth. Or, the demerit may result from some other cause ; or, it may appear of its own accord.

[83]

नित्यादेः फलमिष्टं चेदुपात्तदुरितक्षयः ।

तथाऽप्यागामिदोषेष्वशङ्का पूर्ववदुद्भवेत् ॥ ८३ ॥

If it is admitted that the fruit of obligatory rites is the destruction of accumulated sin, even then the doubt would arise, as before, in regard to defects that are to come.

Even if the present performance of obligatory rites destroys the previously accumulated demerit, what can prevent the demerit that may accrue in the future as a result of the neglect of obligations? Since that danger is there, the doubt regarding re-embodiment still persists.

[84]

अनभीष्टफलानां च दुरितत्वात्क्षयो भवेत् ।

नत्वाभ्युदयिकानां स्यादभीष्टत्वात्क्षयस्तव ॥ ८४ ॥

Though fruits which are not desired may perish because they are of the nature of sin, the destruction of those which lead to prosperity is not for you, since they are desired by you.

Granting that the performance of obligatory duties destroys demerit or sin, what about the merit that has not yet been enjoyed or is yet to come? Since merit is desired, and is not opposed to the performance of obligatory rites, the latter cannot destroy it. So, for the sake of enjoying merit, one may have to be re-born.

[85]

सर्वेषां दुष्टता चेत्स्यान्न विधानाददुष्टता ।

नापि श्येनादितुल्यत्वं फलदोषेण दुष्टता ॥ ८५ ॥

If there is defectiveness for all, no; what is enjoined cannot be defective. Nor is there parity with

the Hawk sacrifice, etc.; for it is defective because of the defect of the fruit.

It cannot be argued that merit (*dharma*) is a defect even as demerit (*adharma*) is a defect. For, merit is enjoined, and what is enjoined cannot be a defect. Here, the *Śyena* sacrifice is no example. The *Śyena* is defective because its fruit is defective. There is no *adhikārī* for it; and it is not enjoined at all. Not so the *Soma* sacrifice which is enjoined; and which yields merit.

NKL—*vimatam aduṣṭam, vihitatvāt, agnihotravat.*

[86]

ऐकात्म्यज्ञानतश्चेत्स्याव्यर्था कर्मप्रधानता ।

प्रधानत्वं च विद्यायास्तमेतमिति दर्शितम् ॥ ८६ ॥

If (release be) through the knowledge of the one self, futile is action as the principal. That knowledge is the principal is shown in the text ‘Such a one (the Brahmins desire to know)’¹

If it be admitted that release is attained when all actions are destroyed by the knowledge of identity with pure consciousness which is the self, then action cannot be the direct means. And, Scripture expressly declares that knowledge is the direct means.

1. *BU*, IV, iv, 22.

NKL—*karmanām sākṣān-mokṣa-hetutvam pramāṇa-prayojana-vikalam iti dūṣayati-vyarthē ’ti...karmanām jñānecchā-sādhana-tva-pradarśita-dvārā jñānasya sākṣān-mokṣa-hetutvaṁ darsitam ity arthaḥ.*

NTV—*evam sati karmanām kaivalya-sādhana-tvaṁ niṣpramāṇakam ity arthaḥ. kimca mukti-phala-jñānecchā-sādhana-tvena karmanām viniyogāt, jñānasyaiva kaivalya-sādhana-tvaṁ sapramāṇakam ity āha-pradhānatvaṁ ce’ ti.*

[87]

तत उक्तेन मार्गेण कर्तृसंस्कारकारिणाम् ।

ऐकात्म्यज्ञानतात्पर्यं कर्मणामिति निश्चितम् ॥ ८७ ॥

In the manner stated it has been settled that the rites which purify the agent have for purport the knowledge of the one self.

Actions purify the agent and culminate in knowledge; and knowledge is the means to *mokṣa*.

NKL—karmanā suddha-buddher viraktasya jñānecchā syād ity arthaḥ.

[88]

तेन निःसारतां बुद्ध्वा कर्मणां वेदतत्त्ववित् ।

ऐकात्म्यज्ञानमन्वेति तपोमुषितकल्मषः ॥ ८८ ॥

Therefore, he who knows the truth of the Veda will realize the futility of rites, and seek the knowledge of the one self, being rid of blemishes through austerity.

He, whose mind has been purified by the performance of obligatory duties (*nityakarma*), learns in general the teaching of the Veda, realizes that no lasting fruit can result from deeds, becomes unattached to work, renounces and enters upon the path of inquiry with a view to gaining knowledge.

[89]

यस्तु जन्मान्तराभ्यासात्क्षपिताशेषकामनः ।

आदावेवाधिकारी स पुनः कर्म न वीक्षते ॥ ८९ ॥

He, who, through practice in a previous birth is free from desires without a residue, is an eligible person

even at the beginning (i.e. while in the first *āśrama*). He does not stand in need of action again.

In certain cases the requirement of mental purification through obligatory duties might have been fulfilled in the previous birth itself. Where this is so, there is no need for fresh actions. Such persons are eligible for renunciation and knowledge even in the first *āśrama*.

NKL—ajñāna-nivṛtter jñāna-mātra-phalatvād ity arthaḥ.

[90]

विरक्तस्य तु जिज्ञासोर्मानान्नान्यव्यपेक्षणम् ।

कर्मापेक्षा हि साध्येऽर्थे सिद्धेऽर्थे तदनर्थकम् ॥ ९० ॥

For him who is dispassionate and who desires knowledge there is no need of anything other than knowledge. Action is required in respect of what is to be accomplished. In respect of the established it is of no use.

For accomplishing what is to be accomplished action is required, but not for realizing what is eternally established. For the latter, only knowledge is necessary. Knowledge does not stand in need of *karma*. It is not like the *Āgneya* which requires the aid of the *Prayājas*.

[91]

वामदेवस्य मैत्रेय्या गार्ग्याश्चैव समञ्जसम् ।

दर्शनं ब्रह्मचर्यादेस्तथा प्राव्राज्यशासनात् ॥ ९१ ॥

This is clearly seen in the cases of Vāmadeva, Maitreyī and Gārgī.¹ Renunciation even at the stage of a student's life is declared in Scripture.²

As sprinkling helps in the case of the *Darsapūrṇamāsa* by purifying the material sprinkled upon, so here *karma* helps in the rise of *jñāna* by purifying the mind. *Karma* is not the direct and independent means to *mokṣa*.

1. In these cases there is *jñāna* even without the performance of Vedic rites.

2. *Jābāla*, 4.

NKL—*janmāntarā-'nuṣṭhita-karmaṇām suddhi-dvāreṇa jñāna-hetutva-liṅgam āha-vāmadeve 'ti.*

NTV—*tasmāt kevala-jñānād eva sañcitā- 'seṣa-puṇyā-'puṇya-nivṛttiḥ na karmaṇa iti. janmāntara-kṛtena karmaṇā suddha-sattvasya sa-sannyāsa-jñānam eva mokṣa-sādhanaṁ ity atra liṅga-darśanaṁ srutiṁ cā 'ha.*

[92]

इष्टापूर्तादिहेतूनामानन्त्यात्स्वर्गसिद्धये ।

हेत्वन्तरासंभवोऽतो दुर्ज्ञानः संभवाद्भवेत् ॥ ९२ ॥

Since causes like sacrifice and good works (*iṣṭāpūrta*), etc., are innumerable, the impossibility of other causes for attaining heaven is difficult to know. As they are possible, it may quite well be.

The *pūrvapakṣin* believes that if one abstains from optional rites in this birth and performs the obligatory duties, one will attain release. But as against him, it is pointed out that even if one succeeds in keeping away from optional rites in this birth, the enjoyment of heaven may come to him when his present body falls, as a result of good deeds performed in previous births.

Iṣṭa means scripture-ordained deeds (*śrauta-karma*); *pūrta* means works taught in the *smṛtis* (*smārta-karma*).

NKL—*agnihotrādikam iṣṭam vāpy-ādikam pūrtam śaraṇāgata-paripālanādi dattam.*

[93]

एवं निषिद्धवाक्येषु यथोक्तं न्यायमादिशेत् ।

नित्यकर्मवचःस्वेवं नातो मुक्तिविनिश्चयः ॥ ९३ ॥

Thus in the case of prohibitory texts, the aforesaid rule must be applied; thus also in the case of texts enjoining obligatory rites. Hence there is no certainty of release.

The argument advanced above in regard to optional rites applies also to prohibited deeds. The same consideration holds good in the case of the obligatory and occasioned rites.

[94]

अनेकजन्मोपात्तस्य पुण्यापुण्यस्य कर्मणः ।

अनन्तदेहहेतोश्च विप्रधातस्य संभवात् ॥ ९४ ॥

For, there are merit and demerit of deeds like brahmanicide gathered in several births which are productive of innumerable bodies.

It cannot be said that the present birth is enough to experience the sum-total of merit and demerit acquired in all the previous births. For, we hear that to suffer for a single sin like brahmanicide one may have to take on a series of bodies.

[95]

ततः शेषेण वचनान्तथा तद्य इहेत्यतः ।

अनारब्धफलेहानां गम्यते संस्थितिस्ततः ॥ ९५ ॥

The existence of the fruit of works which have not begun to take effect is made known in texts like 'Hence by the residue (of the fruit of deeds)', and 'Accordingly, those who are (of pleasant conduct) here', etc.

Scripture and Traditional Code are cited here to show that there is unspent *karma* which is the cause of future births.

1. *Gautama-dharma-sūtra*, x, 31.
2. *CHU*, V, x, 7.

[96]

फलं नित्यस्य नापीह दुरितक्षयमात्रकम् ।

फलान्तरश्रुतेः साक्षात्तद्यथाऽऽम्रस्मृतेस्तथा ॥ ९६ ॥

The fruit of obligatory rites is not merely destruction of sin, because other fruit (also) is declared in Scripture directly,¹ as in the Traditional Code 'When mango (is planted)'.²

It was stated by the *pūrvapakṣin* that in the case of the obligatory rites their non-performance leads to demerit whereas their performance brings in no result. The latter part of this belief is refuted here. Scripture and Traditional Code expressly declare that merit is the fruit of the obligatory rites. So, whether the obligatory rites are performed or not performed, there is *saṃsāra*.

1. *BU*, I, v, 16.
2. *Āpastamba-dharma-sūtra*, I, xx, 3.

[97]

आम्रे निमित्त इत्यादि ह्यापस्तम्बस्मृतेर्वचः ।

फलवत्त्वं समाचष्टे नित्यानामपि कर्मणाम् ॥ ९७ ॥

The words of the *Āpastamba-dharma-sūtra* 'When mango is planted', etc. declare fruitfulness of even obligatory rites.

The passage from the *Āpastamba-dharma-sūtra* is explained.

[98]

उक्तमेव तु संशीतावियं त्वत्त विनिश्चितिः ।

कार्यमारभते शक्तिर्यत्किंचेह व्यवस्थिता ॥ ९८ ॥

As regards the doubt (*vide* v. 80), its resolution has already been stated. Potency, as long as it lasts, will be productive of effect.

As regards the doubt expressed by the *pūrvapakṣin* in v. 80, viz. that *mokṣa* may result if one follows the course prescribed by him, as there is no evidence that heaven, etc., would come through some other means, in the case of such a person, the reply has already been given (*vide* v. 81).

It has also been stated that as long as there is potency there is the possibility of its fructifying.

[99]

यस्मादसति कार्येऽसौ शक्तिरेव न सिध्यति ।

कार्यकारणयोः सिद्धिरन्योन्याव्यतिरेकतः ॥ ९९ ॥

For, if the effect be absent, the potency itself will not be established. The establishment of cause and effect is reciprocal.

It cannot be argued that, though there is potency in the state of release, it does not fructify; for if there is potency it must express itself. Cause and effect are reciprocally related. The establishment of one depends on that of the other.

[100]

कर्तृभोक्तृस्वरूपेऽतो ह्यभ्युपेतेऽन्तरात्मनि ।

न मुक्त्याशाऽस्ति पूर्वोक्तन्यायमार्गसमाश्रयात् ॥ १०० ॥

Hence, if the inner self be admitted to be of the nature of agent and enjoyer, there is no hope of release

(as has been shown) through having recourse to the arguments set forth above.

Hence if the soul has the potency of agency and enjoyership, there can be no release for it. This has already been stated (*vide v. 55 ff.*).

NKL—ataḥ sakti-pakṣe mokṣāsiddhiḥ.

[101]

सापराधत्वतो मुक्तिः संदिग्धैव प्रसज्यते ।

द्विजातीनां खरादेस्तु त्वदुक्त्या स्यादसंशयात् ॥ १०१ ॥

Since there is the possibility of transgression, there arises doubt in respect of release for the twice-born; and by what you have stated there would be release, without doubt, for the donkey, etc.

Even though a person belonging to the twice-born class follows assiduously the course of discipline prescribed by the Mīmāṃsaka, one cannot be sure that he has not transgressed. Without his knowing, he may overlook an injunction or perform a prohibited deed, with the result that when the present body falls he will have to take on another body. So, there will be no release for him.

If it is contended that the effects of all the previous actions can be reaped in the present birth, then release must be admitted even for the donkey, etc., when their present bodies are destroyed.

NKL—itthaṁ darśanam eva kaivalya-sādhanaṁ iti sādhana-bheda-siddhāv adhikāri-bheda-siddhaḥ.

[102]

ननूक्तं कर्मशेषत्वमात्मनो यागकर्तृता ।

नैतदेवं यतो नैतत्कर्माङ्गं ज्ञानमिष्यते ॥ १०२ ॥

“Now, it was said (in verse 45) that knowledge is subsidiary to action and that the self is the agent of

sacrifices ”. This is not so ; for, this kind of knowledge which is subsidiary to action is not what is accepted.

The *pūrvapakṣin* stated in v. 45 that since the self is subsidiary to action, the knowledge of that is subsidiary to action.

With reference to that, the *siddhāntin* says here that the knowledge of the self as the agent of sacrifices, etc. is not what is meant by self-knowledge. The knowledge of the empirical self may be useful to action. But that is not knowledge of the true self.

[103]

कर्तृत्वमात्मनः सिद्धं यतोऽन्यत्वापि यागतः ।

निःशेषकर्मकारित्वात्तस्मादुक्तमपेशलम् ॥ १०३ ॥

Even elsewhere, apart from sacrifices agency is established for the self, since it is the agent of all actions. Hence what you have said is unsound.

The knowledge of the empirical self cannot properly be said to be subsidiary (*aṅga*) to ritual action ; for that kind of knowledge, we find, is related to secular action also. And, a subsidiary is that which helps the principal, while being unique to it.

[104]

न ह्यात्मज्ञानविरहात्कर्म कर्तुं न शक्यते ।

पर्णज्ञानमृते यद्वज्जुह्वर्त्तुं न शक्यते ॥ १०४ ॥

It cannot be said that in the absence of a knowledge of the self it is not possible to perform ritual, even as, without the knowledge of the *parṇa*-wood, it is not possible to fetch the sacrificial ladle.

It cannot be said that in the absence of self-knowledge it is not possible to perform action, as without the knowledge of the *parṇa*-wood it is not possible to employ the sacrificial ladle. For, true

self-knowledge is inimical to the performance of any action. The self is transcendent of all that is empirical; it is beyond hunger, etc.; it has no use for caste-distinctions such as Brahmin, Kṣatriya, etc.; it is not subject to transmigration; it is known through the Vedānta.

[105]

देहान्तराभिसंबन्धी नत्वात्माऽस्तीत्यजानतः ।

विवेकिनो न युक्त्यं प्रवृत्तिः पारलौकिकी ॥ १०५ ॥

Nor may it be said that an intelligent man will not be active in respect of the other world if he does not know that there is the self related to another (divine) body.

It may be said that in order to perform sacrifices, etc., one must know that it is the same self that will go to heaven after death. In other words, the sacrificer must be able to distinguish the self from the present body, etc.

This is replied to in the next verse.

[106]

एवं तर्हि न कर्माङ्गं कर्तुश्चेष्टैकहेतुतः ।

फलार्थिवन्न च ज्ञानं क्रियाङ्गत्वेन चोदितम् ॥ १०६ ॥

Even thus (the knowledge of the self) is not subsidiary to action; since the agent alone is the instrument to the desired, like the one who desires the fruit. Knowledge is not enjoined as subsidiary to action.

Now, it has been said that the self as distinct from the body should be known in order to perform ritual action. What kind of self is intended here? Is it the self as agent, or as non-agent? The

knowledge of the self as agent is common to all action—sacred and secular. And so, it cannot be the subsidiary of sacred action. As an example, we may cite the knowledge of the self as enjoyer which is required for all action. As for the knowledge of self as non-agent, it is not at all required for action. On the contrary, it is destructive of all action.

[107]

नन्वेवमपि सिद्धः स्यात्प्रवेशः सर्वकर्मसु ।

आत्मज्ञानस्य सामर्थ्यान्न नाम विधिसंश्रयात् ॥ १०७ ॥

“Now, even so, it would be established that knowledge of self enters into every act, because of competence, though not as dependent on an injunction.”

The *pūrvapakṣin* says, here, that in the absence of a self distinct from the present body, all acts relating to the other world would be unintelligible. Knowledge of such a self, then, is subsidiary to action, even though it may not be so as dependent on injunction.

[108]

नैतदेवमविज्ञाततत्त्वस्यैवेह कर्मसु ।

अनात्मार्थविशिष्टस्य ह्यधिकारित्वहेतुतः ॥ १०८ ॥

It is not so ; because eligibility here in respect of rites is for him who has not known the truth and who is qualified by the sense of not-self.

Siddhānta—You seek to establish the subsidiariness of self-knowledge to action through presumption (*arthāpatti*). Now, what is the kind of self that you are thinking of? Is it the qualified self (*viśiṣṭa*)? Or, the pure self (*kevala*)? The qualified self is an illusory one (*kalpita*). The knowledge of that may be subsidiary to action. Thereby, true self-knowledge does not become subsidiary. Knowledge of the

pure self which is true self-knowledge is what is opposed to action. It is only he that is endowed with ignorance (*ajñāna*) that is eligible for action. Self-knowledge is what liberates one from ignorance.

NTV—brāhmaṇyādy-anātma-viśiṣṭasyaivā-'tmano 'dhikāra-hetutvāt taj-jñānasyaiva karmasu praveśaḥ, natv-apeta-brahma-kṣatrādi-bhedā-'saṁsāry-ātmatattva-jñānasyā-'nupayogāt, virodhāc ca.....anātmārtha-brāhmaṇyādi-vaiśiṣṭyam adhyāsa iti, tat-kāraṇam ajñānam evā 'nvaya-vyatirekābhyām.

NKL—brāhmaṇo gr̥hastha iti brāhmaṇatva-gr̥hasthatvādi-dharma-viśiṣṭa-dehātmābhimānino 'dhikārāt ity arthaḥ.

[109]

स्वरूप आत्मनः स्थानमाहुर्निःश्रेयसं बुधाः ।

ततोऽन्येनाभिसंबन्ध आत्मनोऽज्ञानहेतुकः ॥ १०९ ॥

The abidance of the self in its nature, the wise say, is beatitude. The relation of the self with what is different from that is the result of ignorance.

What is release? It is the abidance of the self in itself. And, that results to one for whom ignorance has been removed through knowledge. Since knowledge is the means to *mokṣa* it cannot be subsidiary to action. The relation of the self to the not-self is caused by nescience. Of the pure self which is unattached, that relation is not possible.

NTV—jāti-vyaktyādi-bhāvābhāvāt ajñāna-hetukam eva tādātmyam.

NKL—svātmāvasthāna-kaivalyasya svābhivakatvād anya-saṁsarga-rūpam asvāsthyam ajñāna-kṛtam ity arthaḥ.

[110]

आगन्त्वनात्मरूपं तत्स्वसंविद्यैव गम्यताम् ।

नातोऽवाप्तपुमर्थस्य स्वरूपावस्थितस्य तु ॥ ११० ॥

The adventitious nature of not-self is made known by the self-same intelligence. Not therefore is there (for the ignorant) the attainment of the human goal which is being-in-the-self.

Moreover, we offer the following inference: The not-self has nescience for its basis, because it is an effect, like the serpent. Likewise is the relation thereto.

And, the nature of not-self is known by the witness-self. Without the relation of the self to it, this is not possible. Both the not-self and the relation thereto have nescience as their ground.

NTV—yat svasaṁvityaiva gamyatām ahaṁ-rūpaṁ tad anātmā ghaṭavat.....ahaṁ-rūpaṁ anātmā suṣuptāv ahaṁkāraḥbhāvāt.

[111-113]

कर्तृभोक्त्रादिरूपत्वं प्रत्यगज्ञानतोऽन्यतः ।

कर्म तत्फलभोगश्च बाह्यानि करणानि च ॥ १११ ॥

ततोऽपि बाह्यो देहश्च जातिस्तत्समवायिनी ।

जरामरणजन्मानि देहाधिकरणानि च ॥ ११२ ॥

दारपुत्रधनादीनि देहबाह्यानि यानि च ।

कर्माधिकारहेतूनि स्वतोऽस्यानधिकारिणः ॥ ११३ ॥

The nature of the agency, enjoyership, etc., is on account of the nescience of the inner self; not otherwise. Also, action, enjoyment of its fruit, and outer sense-organs; thence also the physical body and the caste inherent therein, old age, death and birth which are located in the body; and wife, son, wealth,

etc., which are external to the body and which serve to make the self eligible for action, though by itself it is not eligible.

Agency, enjoyership, etc., are caused by nescience. Similarly the other factors that make for finitude: mind, sense-organs, physical body with its attributes, and what are related to it, like son, wealth, etc. It is as endowed with these that one becomes eligible for action. The pure self which is unattached, unchanging, and unconditioned, is not eligible for action.

*NKL—kartṛtvādir nātmadharmo dr̥śyatvād rūpavad iti tu-
ṣabdārthah.*

[114-116 a]

अभिन्नस्याऽऽत्मनो मोहाद्भेदकानीति मन्वते ।

विशेषणं स्वरूपं वा नान्योन्यस्य स्वतो यतः ॥ ११४ ॥

लोके दृष्टं विनाऽविद्यां मोहाद्दृष्टं तु सर्वतः ।

चोरोऽसौ मामभिप्रैतीत्येवं चोरविशेषणम् ॥ ११५ ॥

स्थाणुं संभावयत्यज्ञो न तु दृष्टं तमो विना ।

These, it is thought, are what bring about differentiation for the self which is undifferentiated. One being either the attribute (*viśeṣaṇa*) or the nature (*svarūpa*) of another is not out of itself. Without nescience it is not seen in the world. It is everywhere seen due to delusion (*moha*). It is the ignorant man that superimposes the attribute of being a thief on a post thus, 'This thief comes against me'. Without darkness this is not seen.

The attribute or the nature of a thing is not, of its own accord, seen in another thing. This happens only on account of delusion

(*moha*). Agency, etc., are not the attributes of the self; nor do they constitute its nature. So, it is ignorance or nescience that is responsible for making these appear in the self.

An illustration is given. One mistakes a post for a thief in the dark. This is clearly a case of delusion.

NTV—kartrtvādy-ātma-viśeṣaṇam ajñāna-kṛtam eva.

NKL—sarvataḥ sarvatra dehādi-kalpitaṁ anyātmanā bhāsamānatvād anyasya viśeṣaṇatvāc ca rajju-sarpādivat ity arthaḥ.

[116 b-117 a]

नन्वविद्यामृतेऽप्यन्यद्दृष्टमन्यविशेषणम् ॥ ११६ ॥

औपगवो नृपहयस्तथा श्येनचिदादयः ।

“Now, even without nescience, one is seen to be the attribute of another; as for instance, *Aupagava* (son of Upagu), *nṛpahaya* (the king's horse) and *Śyenacit* (he who performs the hawk-sacrifice), etc.”

Pūrvapakṣa — Even in the absence of delusion, there may be transference of attributes. Examples:— (1) *Aupagava* means ‘son of Upagu’. Here Upagu is the attribute of son. (2) *Nṛpahaya* means ‘the king's horse’. Here king is a qualification of horse. (3) *Śyenacit* means ‘he who performs the hawk-sacrifice’. Here hawk-sacrifice stands in adjectival relation to the person who performs it. In each of these cases there is the relation of qualification and qualified, without nescience.

[117 b-118 a]

नैतदेवं यतस्तत्र नैवं प्रत्यक्तयेष्यते ॥ ११७ ॥

अन्येनान्यस्य संबन्धः कुशोऽहमिति वत्कचित् ।

It is not so; for in those cases there is not the relation of identity between the two (the qualification and the qualified) as in ‘I am lean’.

Siddhānta — The examples you have given have no parity with the cases of delusion we mentioned. When a person says, 'I am lean', he does not see any difference between himself and the lean body. Here, the qualification is not distinguished from the qualified. Not so in the case of *Aupagava*, etc. Upagu and his son are, certainly, not identified; only their relation is indicated.

[118 b-119 a]

उपग्वादिर्हि पित्रादिः प्रकृत्यर्थो विशेषणम् ॥ ११८ ॥

भिन्नस्यौपगवापत्यप्रत्ययार्थस्य गम्यते ।

The sense of the stem *Upagu*, namely, father, etc., is the qualification of the sense of the suffix, which is different in *Aupagava*, namely, son.

In the instances of *Aupagava*, etc., the difference between the qualification and the qualified is evident; and so, they are not on a par with the delusions, 'I am lean', etc. The *pūrvapakṣin* cannot argue thus: What is in dispute, viz., the relation of the qualification and the qualified is caused by the non-apprehension of difference, because it is a relation of the qualification and the qualified, as, for instance, in 'I am lean'.

[119 b-120 a]

नैवं कर्त्रादिदेहान्ताज्जात्यादीन्देहगांस्तथा ॥ ११९ ॥

व्यतिरेकतया कश्चिद्विशिनष्टीह मानवः ।

Not so does man here¹ think (of himself) as different from the qualifications beginning with egoity and ending with the body and likewise from the caste, etc., inherent in the body.

Just as Upagu differentiates himself from his son, the individual does not distinguish himself (i.e. the self) from egoity, etc.

1. Here means 'in the state of ignorance'.

[120 b-121 a]

यत आत्मतयैवैतैर्विशिनष्ट्यविशेषणम् ॥ १२० ॥

करोम्यन्धो द्विजो बालो दग्धश्छिन्नोऽहमित्यपि ।

For, man thinks of these as the self, as non-different therefrom. Thus he says, 'I do', 'I am blind', 'I am a twice-born', 'I am a child', 'I am burnt', 'I am cut', etc.

That the difference between the self and its adjuncts is not grasped by the individual is evident from his experience such as 'I do this action', 'I am blind', etc.

[121b-122 a]

नाविद्यामन्तरेणैषां विशेषणविशेष्यता ॥ १२१ ॥

इयमेवाऽऽत्मनो ज्ञेया कर्माधिकृतिकारणम् ।

This relation of qualification and qualified is not possible without nescience. This alone is to be known as the cause of making the self eligible for rites.

The relation between the self and egoity, etc., is due to nescience, even as the relation between the post and man in the delusion 'This is a thief'. (See vv. 114-116a.)

It is the self that is identified with the adjuncts like egoity that is eligible for performing rites.

NTV—*avidyā-kṛta-viśeṣaṇa-viśeṣyataiva karmādhikṛti-kāraṇam... evaṁ kartṛtvādeḥ avidyādhyastatva-prasāadhanena ajasyaiva karmādhikārah prasādhitah*

[122 b-123 a]

अधिक्रियन्ते येनैते बृहस्पतिसवादिषु ॥ १२२ ॥

अतोऽनवगतैकात्म्यकर्माधिकृतिहेतुतः ।

It is for the reason that ignorance of the one self makes one eligible to (perform) rites that eligibility is prescribed for *Brhaspatisava*, etc.

That it is only the ignorant man that is eligible for rites is further shown. In the text 'A Brāhmaṇa is to sacrifice with the *Brhaspati-sava*', it is seen that the person who is eligible for this sacrifice is one who has conceit in a particular caste. This is so with all sacrifices. Otherwise, all persons would be eligible to perform all sacrifices. Without conceit (*abhimāna*) of some sort or other, the performance of sacrifice is not possible. And, conceit is born of nescience. Therefore, it is only the ignorant person that is eligible for rites. A knowledge of the nature of such a person, viz. the empirical soul, may be auxiliary to ritual, but not the knowledge of the pure self.

NKL—ajñasya karmādhikāratve jñānasya tadviparītādhikāritvam, ato na karmāṅgatā.

[123 b-124 a]

श्रुत्यादिमानप्रमितप्रत्यग्याथात्म्यनिष्ठितम् ॥ १२३ ॥

सर्वकर्मसमुच्छेदि ज्ञानं वेदान्तमानजम् ।

The knowledge, which has for content the real nature of the inner self made known by the means of valid knowledge, like Scripture, etc.¹, and which removes entirely all action (with its fruit) arises from the testimony of Vedānta.

The knowledge of the pure self which is obtained from the Vedānta cannot be an auxiliary to *karma*, because it is destructive of all *karma*. There are texts in support of this view. The *Muṇḍaka Upaniṣad* (II, ii, 8) declares: 'The knot of the heart is cut, all doubts are dispelled, and his deeds perish, when the higher and the lower

Brahman has been realized.' And, the *Bhagavad-gītā* (iv, 37): 'The fire of knowledge reduces all deeds to ashes.'

1. *Et cetera* may mean Traditional Code, Epics, Purāṇas, the experience of the wise, inference, etc. Or, if *śruti* is taken to mean the first of the six *pramāṇas* (modes-of-evidence for determining the purport of a scriptural passage), viz. express statement, then *et cetera* would stand for *liṅga* (capacity), *vākya* (syntactical connection), *prakaraṇa* (context), *sthāna* (position), and *sāmākhya* (name). *

[124 b-125]

तन्मूलाज्ञानघातित्वाज्ज्ञानस्येह प्रसिद्धितः ॥ १२४ ॥

न तु प्रवर्तकं तस्मान्नार्थवादत्वसंभवः ।

फलोक्तेः पर्णमय्यां तु युज्यते कर्मशेषतः ॥ १२५ ॥

Knowledge is well known as the remover of ignorance which is the root cause of that (viz. action). It is not what prompts one to activity. Hence, the declaration of fruit in respect thereof cannot be an eulogy. As for the (ladle) made of *parṇa*-wood, eulogistic character (of the text) is intelligible, because it is an auxiliary to rite. (See vv. 44 and 45.)

It cannot be maintained that knowledge removes nescience alone, and not *karma*; for nescience is the cause of the conceit of agency, etc., which are responsible for *karma*, and with the destruction of the cause the effects also get destroyed. That knowledge destroys ignorance is evident, even as the fact that light dispels darkness. So, the knowledge of the pure self which is destructive of the cause of all activity cannot be an auxiliary to *karma*. Because it is not auxiliary, the texts that proclaim its fruit cannot be of the nature

* See *Mīmāṃsā-nyāya-prakāśa*, para 67 ff. translated by Franklin Edgerton (Yale University Press, New Haven, 1929):

of *artha-vāda*. The case of the ladle made of *parṇa*-wood is quite different. Here a separate statement of fruit is an eulogy because the wood is an auxiliary of the sacrifice and whatever is the fruit of the sacrifice is the fruit of the wood also.

NKL—*yato jñānam ajñānasyaiva nivartakam ity uktatvān na karma-nivartakatvam.....tattva-jñānam ajñāna-nivartakam iti sūkti-jñānādaḥ dr̥ṣṭatvāt.*

[126]

यत्त्वचोदि त्वयाऽपीयमभ्युपेयाऽर्थवादता ।

अनिच्छताऽपि विध्यर्थमत्र प्रतिविधीयते ॥ १२६ ॥

What you asked me to admit even without my willingness to admit, that knowledge is the content of an injunction, being eulogistic in character—to that we shall reply here. (See v. 45.)

What has already been refuted is being further refuted. Knowledge is not the content of an injunction.

[127]

इच्छाम्येवार्थवादत्वं वचसोऽन्यपरत्वतः ।

यथाश्रुतार्थवादित्वान्न त्वभूतार्थवादता ॥ १२७ ॥

I even admit that the text declaring fruit is an eulogy, since the words are dependent on another (i.e. the major text). But as it is an eulogy in accordance with what is declared in Scripture, it is not an eulogy of what is non-existent.

We may even admit that the declaration of the fruit of knowledge is an *artha-vāda*, because such declaration is an auxiliary of the major texts like 'that thou art'. But it is certainly not a case of *abhūtārtha-vāda*.

[128]

इज्येते स्वर्गलोकाय दर्शादर्शौ यथा तथा ।

न त्वभूतार्थवादित्वं पापश्लोकाश्रुतेर्यथा ॥ १२८ ॥

‘For the sake of attaining the heavenly world, the New Moon and Full Moon rites are performed.’ As in this text, so in that also. There is no eulogy of what is non-existent, as in the text ‘He who has a ladle of *parṇa*-wood hears no evil sound.’

The text ‘The knower of Brahman becomes Brahman’ is a *bhūtārtha-vāda* like the text relating to the New Moon and Full Moon rites; it is not *abhūtārtha-vāda* like the text which declares the fruit of the ladle made of *parṇa*-wood.

[129]

कुतः प्राप्तं फलमिति प्रत्यक्षं ह्यात्मधीफलम् ।

यतोऽवगम्यते तेन ज्ञानं कर्म न ढौकते ॥ १२९ ॥

‘How is it obtained that it is the fruit?’ Indeed, the fruit of self-knowledge is immediate. Since this is seen to be so, knowledge does not touch action.

That the fruit of the knowledge of Brahman is the attainment of Brahman is known from the direct experience of the wise. Therefore, knowledge cannot be an auxiliary of *karma*.

NKL—*jñānasya kartrtvādi-nivartakatvān na karmāṅgatvam.*

[130]

प्रवृत्तेः प्रतिकूलत्वान्मुक्तिं प्रति विरोधतः ।

मुमुक्षोरधिकारोऽतो निवृत्तौ सर्वकर्मणाम् ॥ १३० ॥

Because activity is an obstacle and is opposed to release, the one who desires release is eligible to withdraw from all action.

The knowledge of the pure self is the means to release ; *karma* is the means to prosperity. Since their ends are different, the eligible persons also must be different. The discipline that the person who desires release follows is repeated hearing of the Vedānta texts, etc. This is opposed to *karma* which is prompted by the conceit of agency, etc. So, the person who seeks release has nothing to do with *karma*. He is eligible for Vedānta-study through the renunciation of works.

NTV—jñānasya svatantra-phalatva-prasāadhanena adhikāri-bhedo 'pi siddhah.

[131-133 a]

प्रवृत्तिहेतुप्रध्वस्तेर्न प्रवृत्तौ कथंचन ।

नाभिप्रेतपुरप्राप्तिसमर्थं सुगमं शिवम् ॥ १३१ ॥

वारिपथ्यदनोपेतं सर्वानर्थविवर्जितम् ।

प्राप्तं मार्गं समुत्सृज्य तद्विरुद्धेन वर्त्मना ॥ १३२ ॥

यियासति सुधीः कश्चिद्यथा भ्रान्तोऽध्वगस्तथा ।

He for whom the cause of activity has been destroyed has no (eligibility) whatsoever for action. No wise man would leave the path he is on, which has the capacity to lead to the desired city, which is easy and good, which is endowed with water and victuals for the journey, which is free from all obstacles, and desire to take to the contrary path, like a deluded traveller.

Attachment, etc., are the cause of activity. He who longs for release has no attachment, etc. And so, there is no activity for him.

Nor is there activity for him who has realized the truth through Vedānta-study. The path of *karma* is such that it will not take one to *mokṣa*; the way of knowledge is the appointed road. No discriminating traveller will choose the wrong route, leaving the right one.

NTV—yo hi yad icchatī tat-sādhane pravartate, atat-sādhanāt tad-viruddha-sādhāne ca nivartata ityuktam. ito 'pi karmanī na pravartate mumukṣuḥ, pravṛtti-hetu-rāgādi-dhvaṁsāt.

NKL—sugamaṁ giri-nady-ādi-pratibandha-rahitaṁ, sivaṁ kaṇṭa-kopalādi-rahitaṁ, sarvānārtha-vivarjitaṁ cora-vyāghrādy-anākulam.

[133 b-136 a]

तथाऽविद्योत्थकर्त्रादिधर्मशून्यमविक्रियम् ॥ १३३ ॥

अक्रियाकारकं ज्ञात्वा निःशेषपुरुषार्थदम् ।

आत्मप्रत्ययमागम्यमात्मानं देवमञ्जसा ॥ १३४ ॥

तत्स्थितौ च फलेऽभीष्टे नित्ये साधनवर्जिते ।

तद्विरुद्धफले बाह्यसाधनेऽनेककारके ॥ १३५ ॥

कथं कर्मणि सर्वज्ञो मनो दध्यौद्धसन्नपि ।

Likewise, having known the unchanging Self which is devoid of the nescience-generated characteristics such as agency, etc., which neither acts nor causes others to act, and which is the giver of the final human end, which is knowable by self-knowledge, and when that knowledge of the divine self is there, in respect of the eternal fruit which is desired and which is devoid of any other means, how can the omniscient one set his mind, even in jest, on action whose fruit is contrary (to release) which depends on external means and on several causal correlates?

The seeker and the knower of the self have no use for *karma*. The self is devoid of agency, etc. It is itself the human end and is eternal. The fruit of *karma*, on the contrary, is non-eternal and is contingent upon so many factors. So, he who seeks the self and he who has realized the self have no need of *karma*.

1. *NKL* interprets *āgamyam* as *āgama-yogyam*, or as *parāmarśa-siddha-svāpānubhava-gamyam*.

[136 b-137 a]

सम्यग्धीमृदिताशेषध्वान्तस्य च न पूर्ववत् ॥ १३६ ॥

अज्ञानादि पुनः कर्तुं शक्यतेऽकारकत्वतः ।

For one whose ignorance has been entirely destroyed by right knowledge, it is not possible to perform (action) which is of the nature of nescience, etc., as before, for, there is no prompter to activity.

It cannot be said that the one who has realized the self may have to perform action again because of some other nescience. For, there is no possibility of nescience for such a person.

NKL—akāraakatvata iti kūṭasthatvād ātmanah kāraṇatvāyogāt kāraṇāntarasya cā 'bhāvād ity arthaḥ.

[137 b-138 a]

श्रुत्यादिमानप्रमितयाथात्म्यज्ञानतत्फलः ॥ १३७ ॥

प्रतिकूलत्वतो विद्वान्यतः कर्मसु नेहते ।

The wise one, who is endowed with the knowledge of the truth as understood through the means of valid knowledge like Scripture, etc., and with the fruit of such knowledge, does not desire action, since it is opposed (to knowledge).

The wise one who has realized the self will not desire *karma*, because *karma* is opposed to self-knowledge.

[138 b-139 a]

अतोऽज्ञस्यैव निःशेषमुमुक्षुप्रजिहासितः ॥ १३८ ॥

कर्त्राद्यनात्मधर्मस्य कर्माधिकृतिरात्मनः ।

Therefore for the ignorant one alone, who has the characteristics of the not-self, like agency, etc., is there the eligibility for rites, shunned by all seekers after release.

Mere nescience is not enough for qualifying a person for *karma*. In sleep one has nescience, but does not act. The eligibility for action consists in being endowed with agency, etc., which are the products of nescience. He who seeks release renounces agency, etc. So, not for him is the eligibility for action.

[139 b-140 a]

विद्यात्ममोहतत्कार्यविरोधाच्च परस्परम् ॥ १३९ ॥

रोगादिवदनर्थत्वात्कर्त्रादिः प्रजिहासितः ।

Because knowledge and delusion of self are mutually opposed by nature as well as in their effects, agency, etc. are sought to be relinquished, as they are evil, like disease, etc.

Knowledge and delusion are opposed to each other both by nature (*rūpataḥ*) and by result (*kāryataś ca*). Therefore, he who seeks release through knowledge desires to renounce delusion-born agency, etc.

NTV—*vidyā tad-viśayā-'tmā ca prepsitau, tad-virodhāt mohas tat-kāryam cā 'narthah.*

[140 b-143 a]

जिहासितुः स्वभावोऽसावित्युक्तिः शिशुवक्तृका ॥ १४० ॥

कर्त्रादिश्चेत्स्वभावः स्यात्प्रत्यक्षाकर्तृरूपिणः ।

प्रत्यक्षादिविरोधः स्यादनिर्मोक्षस्तथैव च ॥ १४१ ॥

अस्तु काममनिर्मोक्षो विक्रियावत्त्वतो दृशेः ।

अग्निवत्फलभोक्तृत्वान्नो चेदाकाशकल्पता ॥ १४२ ॥

इति चेन्नाऽऽत्मनो ध्रौव्याद्विक्रियानुपपत्तिः ।

‘This (agency, etc.) is the nature of the one who desires to leave.’ This statement is infant’s prattle. If agency, etc., be the nature of what is immediately experienced (by the wise) as non-agent, there would be conflict with perception, etc.¹, and likewise non-release. ‘Let there be non-release, since the seer (soul) is subject to transformation, being the enjoyer of fruit, like fire. Or, if not, it would be unreal, like ether’. If thus it be said, no; for transformation in the case of the soul is unintelligible, since it is constant (*dhruva*).

The self is not an agent of actions or enjoyer of fruits. To say that it is, is to go against the immediate experience of the wise ones. And, if the self were really agent, etc., there would be non-release.

The materialist (*Lokāyata*) may say that this is a contingency of the acceptable. There is no unchanging or permanent self. The so-called self is subject to transformation, even as the element, fire, is. Even if the self is distinguished from the physical body, it must be regarded as the enjoyer, and enjoyership involves change. If the self is neither agent nor enjoyer, it would be nothing like ether. [The *Lokāyata* recognizes only four elements: earth, water, fire and air.]

The contention of the Lokāyata is unsound, because the self is eternal.

1. Etc. means inference, etc.

NTV—ādi-grahaṇena anumānādi-virodha ucyate, tathāhi kartṛtvāder dr̥ṣyatvāt ātmanah svarūpaṁ dharma vā na sambhavati ghaṭa-tad-rūpādivat.

NTV—tad āhuḥ, antarbhāve tu bāhyānām cit-svabhāvo nirañjanah, bahirbhāve tu bāhyatvāt cit-svabhāvo nirañjana iti.

*NKL—kartṛtvādir nātmadharmo jñeyatvāt rūpādivat apūro-
'nantaro-'bāhyah kṛtsnah prajñāna-ghana eveti anumānāgama-virodha-
saṅgrahah.*

[143 b-144 a]

मूर्तामूर्तत्वहीनस्य प्रतीचो विक्रिया कुतः ॥ १४३ ॥

प्रमायोगो हि भोक्तृत्वं प्रमा चैवाऽऽत्मनः सदा ।

For the soul which has neither shape nor non-shape, how could there be transformation? Enjoyership is but conjunction with experience; and the self is always consciousness.

That there can be no transformation for the self is further explained. It is the world that consists of elements and elementals that is subject to transformation. The self is not so; it is the unchanging witness. Agency, enjoyership, etc., are attributed to it, when it is in conjunction with the ego, etc., and, this attribution is due to nescience.

*NKL—bhāvābhāva-sādhaka-caitanyasyā-'bhāvah kena siddhyed
iti bhāvah.*

[144 b-146 a]

वाय्वमिवद्विकारो न प्रागभावाद्यसंभवात् ॥ १४४ ॥

अग्न्यादीनां तु सांशत्वाद्बलवद्भिस्तदिन्धनैः ।

अभिभूतस्वरूपाणां काष्ठनिर्मथनादिना ॥ १४५ ॥

युक्तैवाऽऽविष्कृतिर्नित्यं तेषां कार्यात्मकत्वतः ।

Transformation is not possible (for the self), as for wind and fire, because there is no possibility of prior non-existence. Of fire, etc., being overpowered by heavy fuel, manifestation is intelligible through the churning of wood, etc., because they (fire, etc.) are endowed with parts and are always of the nature of products.

That, of which there is prior non-existence, is subject to transformation. This is true of all elements and elementals. The self is not so ; therefore, it does not change.

Fire, etc., may become manifest by the rubbing of sticks, etc. That is because they are finite wholes-of-parts. The self, however, has no parts. Therefore, it has no transformation.

NKL—nahi svataḥsiddhasya prāgabhāvādayaḥ svatonyato vā siddhyanti, prāgabhāvādimatva-vyāptam vikāritvam nātmanah.

[146 b-147 a]

न त्वात्मनो निरंशत्वान्मुख्यौ संभवतः क्वचित् ॥ १४६ ॥

आविर्भावतिरोभावौ स्वतःसिद्धेश्च कारणात् ।

For the self, manifestation and disappearance are nowhere to be found in the primary sense, because it is without parts and is self-established.

Really speaking, there can be no obscuration and manifestation for the self; for it has no parts and is self-established.

NTV—kim ātmana ekadeśenā 'virbhāva-tirobhāvādiḥ sarvātmanā vā? natāvad ekadeśena nirāṁśatvāt, nāpi sarvātmanā, svarūpābhāva-prasaṅgāt. kimca, yad anyādhīna-savyapadeśyaṁ tasyaivā 'virbhāva-tirobhāvādiḥ, ātmā tu svatas-san atopy āvirbhāvādiḥ tasya nāsti. api ca yaj jaḍaṁ tasyā 'virbhāvādiḥ, ātmā tvajaḍaḥ svayaṁprakāśatvāt, ato 'pi nāvirbhāvādir asya.

[147 b-148 a]

अभ्युपेताऽप्यभिव्यक्तिर्नाभिव्यङ्ग्यस्य विक्रिया ॥ १४७ ॥

यथा तथाऽनभिव्यक्तिः सर्वेषामपि वादिनाम् ।

Even if manifestation be admitted, there is no transformation in what is to be manifested. So also in the case of non-manifestation. This is true for all disputants.

Even if manifestation and non-manifestation be admitted for the self, there is no transformation for it. All philosophers who believe in the self at all must recognize its changelessness.

NTV—vimata ātmā na abhivyakti-vikriyāvān abhivyaṅgyatvāt, kūpa-khananādāv ākāśādivat. tathā na anabhi-vyakti-vikriyāvān ātmā anabhi-vyaṅgyatvāt tadvat. vikriyāvātve ca carmādivad anityatva-prasaṅgāt.

[148 b-149 a]

अतोऽनभ्युपगच्छद्भिर्मुक्तौ कर्त्रादिरात्मनः ॥ १४८ ॥

अविद्याकल्पितो ज्ञेयो न ह्यसौ परमार्थतः ।

Therefore, for those who do not admit agency, etc., for the self in the state of release, it (agency, etc.) must be understood as posited by nescience. It is not, indeed, in reality.

If there is no change for the self, it may be asked, how is the manifestation, in it, of agency, etc., to be explained? We reply: that

manifestation is caused by nescience. In *mokṣa* there are no agency, etc., for the self. So, these are illusory like the nacre-silver and the rope-serpent.

NTV—*natāvad ātmani karṭṛtvādiḥ paramārthaḥ tasya kūṭastha-bodhaghanatvāt, nāpy anātmani loṣṭa-pāṣāṇādiṣv adrṣṭatvāt, tasmād dehādaḥ ātmādhyāsāt ātmani ca ahaṅkāradhyāropāt karṭṛtvādir bhavati. kimcā 'laktaka - sannidhānāt sphaṭika - lauhityavad antaḥkaraṇopādhy-uparāgād ātmany āropyamāṇaḥ karṭṛtvādiḥ katham paramārthaḥ syāt.*

NKL—*karṭṛtvādi tat - sthitau mukty - anupapattes tasya jñāna-nivartyatvo'pagame rajju - sarpādivat kalpitatvam ity arthaḥ.*

[149 b-150]

कर्त्राद्यात्मस्वभावस्य प्रात्यक्ष्यान्न तदात्मनि ॥ १४९ ॥

मात्रादिबोधकं मानं प्रत्यगात्मनि साक्षिणि ।

न व्यापारयितुं शक्यं वह्निं दग्धुमिवोल्मुकम् ॥ १५० ॥

Because agency, etc., are perceived by the self, they are not in the self. The means of valid knowledge which makes known cognizership, etc., are incapable of functioning in respect of the inner witness-self, just as the fire-brand cannot burn fire itself.

Agency, etc., cannot be the characteristics of the self, because they are perceived by the self. What reveals cognizership, etc., cannot reveal the witness-self, because it is the witness-self that reveals them. Verily, fire cannot burn itself.

NKL—*ahaṁ daṇḍitvad ahaṁ-pratyayo 'haṁkāravacchinna-dehādi-viṣayo, na tat-sākṣiṇi karṭṛtvādy-abhāvānumāna-virodhī 'ty arthaḥ.*

[151]

साक्षिसाक्ष्याभिसंबन्धः प्रमात्रादौ यथा तथा ।

साक्षिवस्तुनि नैव स्यात्केवलानुभवात्मनि ॥ १५१ ॥

The relation of witness and witnessed which obtains in the case of cognizer, etc., is not thus possible in the case of the witness-reality, the self which is pure experience.

The empirical cognizer which is the ego requires to be illumined by the witness, because it is inert. The witness itself does not require another witness to illumine it. It is pure intelligence, of the nature of illumination, like the resplendent sun.

NTV—pramātrādeḥ jadātvāt sākṣi-dṛśyatvaṁ, sākṣiṇaḥ svayam-prakāśa-kevalānubhavātmatvāt na svagrāhyatvaṁ, nāpi paragrāhyatvaṁ.

NKL—sākṣiṇo na sva-grāhyatvaṁ vṛtti-virodhāt, nāpy anyeṇa jadasyā 'sādhakatvāt, ajadātve tasyaiva sākṣitvāt, ity arthaḥ.

[152]

परार्थसंहतानात्मभोग्यकर्त्तादिबोधिना ।

विरोधात्तद्विरुद्धोऽर्थः प्रत्ययेनेक्ष्यते कथम् ॥ १५२ ॥

By the cognition which makes known the not-self consisting of being enjoyed, agency, etc., which are collocations for the sake of another, how is it possible to see a content (self) opposed to it, because of the opposition ?

The witness is not the content of the empirical *pramāṇas*. It is not an agent; nor is it what is enjoyed. It is not for the sake of another, i.e. it is not an instrumental value. So, it cannot be known by the cognition which has for content the cognizer, etc.

[153]

इच्छाद्वेषादिरप्येवं नाऽऽत्मनो धर्म इष्यताम् ।

कामः संकल्प इत्येवं मनोधर्मत्वसंश्रयात् ॥ १५३ ॥

Thus, desire, aversion, etc., too, are not admitted to be the characteristics of the self; because they are declared to be the features of the mind in the text 'Desire, resolve', etc.

It cannot be argued that since desire, etc., belong to the self, agency, etc., also must belong to it. Desire, etc., are declared by Scripture to be the features of the mind.

1. BU, I, v, 3.

NTV—yathā kartṛtvādiḥ na ātma-dharmah, kiṁtv avidyā-kalpitaḥ, evam icchā-dveṣādir api na ātma-dharmah, kiṁtu avidyā-kalpita eva, ātmanah pramāṇa-³viśayatvena tad-gatecchādīnām api māna-meyatvā-bhāvāt, dr̥śyatvāc ca icchādīnām.

[154]

स्वपरोभयहेतुत्वे ह्यनिर्मोक्षप्रसङ्गतः ।

सम्यङ्निरूपणे चैषामविद्याकार्यतैव हि ॥ १५४ ॥

If either themselves or some other or both be the cause (of desire, etc.) there is the contingency of non-release. On closer examination, they turn out to be the effects of nescience.

An inquiry into the nature of desire, etc., does not yield any conclusion. What is the cause of desire, etc.? Are they self-caused, other-caused, or both? None of these alternatives is sound. If desire, etc., are self-caused, they cannot be removed. If they are other-caused, there will be infinite regress. The third alternative involves a contradiction. Therefore, we say that desire, etc., are the result of nescience. They belong to nescience, which does not brook inquiry and yet is immediately experienced, e.g. the blue colour of the sky.

[155]

इच्छादीनां स्वहेतुत्वेऽनर्थं कुर्यात्कथं स्वयम् ।

आत्मा जानन्न्यथा शत्रोरात्मनोऽतो न युज्यते ॥ १५५ ॥

If desire, etc., be caused by oneself, then how is it that one brings evil upon oneself, knowing that it is so, as on the enemy? So it is not proper.

The soul cannot be the cause of desire, etc. These are of the nature of evil. And, no one would consciously cause evil for oneself.

[156]

तथा परनिमित्तत्वेऽनर्थस्यापरिहारतः ।

नैकान्तिकफलत्वं स्याद्रोगादिपरिहारवत् ॥ १५६ ॥

Likewise, if the supreme soul (i.e. God) were the cause, evil would not get remedied, and there would be no constancy of fruit. It would be like the temporary cure of disease, etc.

If God be the cause of desire, etc., then they cannot be rooted out completely, for God may cause them even in a released person. So, even if they are once removed, they may re-appear.

[157]

करणैः संहतिं चर्ते परिहारः कुतो दृशेः ।

तथोभयनिमित्तत्वे नैकान्तिकफलोदयः ॥ १५७ ॥

How can the seer (i.e. the released soul) find remedy without instruments and the collocation (viz., body)? If both cause (desire, etc.), there would be no rise of constant fruit.

It cannot be said that a released soul will have the power to remove, again, the desire, etc., caused by God. For, how can the released soul do anything, as it has no instruments and auxiliaries of action ?

If it be held that both the soul and God are responsible for the rise of desire, etc., even then it is not possible to secure release that will last for ever.

[158]

पराभिप्रायानियमान्नैव स्यान्मोक्षनिश्चितिः ।

निर्हेत्वविद्याकलुप्तौ तु दोषः कश्चिन्न विद्यते ॥ १५८ ॥

Since the will of the supreme would be without regulation, there would be no certainty of release. But if nescience which is without cause be the cause, no defect whatever is seen.

So, if God be regarded as the cause of desire, etc., there is the defect of the impossibility of release. In the view that nescience is their cause, there is not this defect.

NTV—na ātmā kartrādi-rūpaḥ kiṃtu bodha-lakṣaṇaḥ.....tasminn evā 'tmani pratiyamānaḥ kartṛtvādi-pramukho-'nārtha-vrātaḥ paramārthato na bhavati, kimtv avidyaka iti.....asmākaṃ tu anādy-avidyā-vijṛmbhitatvābhyupagamāt na kaścid doṣaḥ.

[159-160 a]

तद्वर्जनस्य संसिद्धेः प्रसिद्धोपायसंश्रयात् ।

परागर्थप्रमेयेषु या फलत्वेन संमता ॥ १५९ ॥

संवित्सैवेह मेयोऽर्थो वेदान्तोक्तिप्रमाणतः ।

Since the removal of that (nescience) by resorting to the well-known means is well established, the same

consciousness (*saṁvit*), which is accepted as the fruit in the case of the external objects of knowledge, is the sense to be known, here, through the Vedāntic testimony as the means of valid knowledge.

In the state of release there is the removal of nescience. And so, desire, etc., are also removed there. Without the material cause, the effect cannot exist, and nescience is the material cause of desire, etc.

How is the removal of nescience brought about? The self itself is the means to the removal of nescience. In the case of one who is endowed with all the qualifications for Vedānta-study and who has gained the true teaching, the self-luminous self manifests itself and destroys the nescience which is located in itself.

The reflection of the intelligence-self in the external objects when they are known through means of valid knowledge is technically called the 'fruit'. The prototype of this reflection is the content of Vedānta.

NTV—jñānam ajñānasyaiva nivartakam iti loke prasiddham, yathā ghaṭa-śukty-ādi-jñānam tat-tad-ajñāna-nivartakam, nivartakam eva arthāt prakāśakam, pramāṇam iti hi sthitiḥ.....tasmād ātma-jñānam eva ātmajñāna-tat-kārya-nivṛttau sādhanam yathā veṇujopy agniḥ taṁ sa-mūlam dahati, svaṁ ca śāmyati tadvat.

pratyakṣādeḥ advayānubhavāt anya-viśayatvaṁ na kalpayet, kiṁtu tad-viśayatvam eva kalpayet ity arthah. tasmād ākāśādi-prapañce pramāṇābhāvāt asau avidyā vijṛmbhata iti, jñānan nivr̥ttir mokṣa upapannah.

NKL—vākya-kṛta-vṛttivyāpti-caitanyam ajñāna-nivartakam ity arthah.

[160 b-161 a]

अप्रामाण्यप्रसक्तिश्च स्यादितोऽन्यार्थकल्पने ॥ १६० ॥

वेदान्तानामतस्तस्मान्नान्यमर्थं प्रकल्पयेत् ।

If some other content be assumed, the Vedāntas would become unauthoritative. Therefore, let no other content be assumed.

For empirical *pramāṇas*, external objects are regarded as contents. This, however, is not true. Even for empirical *pramāṇas*, we say, the self is the content; i.e. they have as their object the conditioned self; whereas the content of Vedānta is the unconditioned self.

[161b-162 a]

नन्वेवमपि मानत्वव्याघातः स्यात्क्रियाविधेः ॥ १६१ ॥

वेदान्तेष्वप्यनाश्वासस्तथा च प्रसजेद्भुवम् ।

“Now, even thus there would be contradiction of validity for injunction of rites. And likewise, even as regards Vedāntas there would result loss of faith.”

Pūrvapakṣa : If what the Vedānta teaches is true, the teaching of the *karma-kāṇḍa* cannot be true. If that be the case, one may not have faith in any part of the Veda, including the Vedānta.

[162 b-163 a]

नैतदेवं यतोऽशेषमानानामपि मानता ॥ १६२ ॥

आ परात्मावबोधात्स्यात्तत्र सर्वसमाप्तिः ।

It is not thus; for all means of valid knowledge are valid till the realization of the supreme self; and in that all end.

The validity of the ritual teaching of the Veda, as of all empirical *pramāṇas*, lasts till the rise of knowledge. The Vedānta, however, is supremely valid because its content is the highest truth.

NTV—ukta-lakṣaṇā-'tmāvabodhāt prāg aprāmāṇyaṁ na sakyate prasamjayitum sarva-pramāṇānām avyāhatatveṇa prāmāṇyopapatteḥ,

*uktā-'tmābodbhād ūrdhvaṁ na mānānāṁ mānatāsti bodha-ghanasyā
'tmano jñānād ajñāna-nivṛtyā tat-kāryasyāpi nivṛtteḥ.*

*NKL—kiṁ tattvāvedana-pramāṇasya hānir uta vyāvahārika-
pramāṇasya? nādyo 'bhyupagamāt ity āha-naitad iti. dvitīyopi
brahma-sākṣātkārāt pūrvam uttara-kālaṁ vā? na prathama ity āha-yata
iti. dvitīyepi iṣṭāpattir ity āha-tatreṭi.*

[163 b-164 a]

नातोऽवतारो मानानामैकात्म्येनैव संक्षयात् ॥ १६३ ॥

श्येनाविविधिबाधः स्यादहिंसाविधिना यथा ।

Thereafter, the means of valid knowledge do not function, for they have been destroyed by the oneness of the self. Just as the injunction relating to the hawk-sacrifice is sublated by the injunction of non-violence.

Empirical *pramāṇas* cannot function after the rise of absolute knowledge, because their cause, nescience, has been destroyed. The knowledge of identity sublates the empirical *pramāṇas*, even as in the *karma-kāṇḍa* itself the injunction about non-injury sublates the injunction relating to the hawk-sacrifice.

*NTV—dagdha-paṭavat bādhitānuvṛtṭyaiva dehādi-pratibhāso-
'padeśo- 'papattiḥ, dr̥dhatarā- 'haṁmamābhīmānā- 'bhāvād dehādiṣu
na pramāṭṛtvam upapadyate, aikātmya-jñānena bādhitatvāt.*

*yathā na hiṁsyāt bhūtānīty anena syenenā- 'bhicaran yajetety
asya bādhaḥ, evam aikātmya-jñānena sarva-pramāṭṛ-pramāṇa-prameya-
bādhaḥ.*

tasmād aikātmya-jñāna-bādhitatvād saṁsāro mithyaiveti bhāvaḥ.

[164 b-165 a]

कर्माण्यतो विधीयन्तेऽविद्यावन्तं नरं प्रति ॥ १६४ ॥

न तु विध्वस्तसकलकर्महेतुं द्विजं प्रति ।

Rites, therefore, are enjoined on the man who is endowed with nescience, and not on the twice-born for whom the seed of all action has been destroyed.

Karmas are for him who is endowed with nescience, and who considers himself to be a man. Therefore, the *karmakāṇḍa* is an empirical *pramāṇa*, and is valid only till the rise of absolute knowledge. There is no injunction to perform *karma* for him who has gained wisdom, and who has risen above all the conditions that make for finitude.

[165 b-166 a]

सर्वकर्मनिरासेऽतो ह्यधिकारो विवेकिनः ॥ १६५ ॥

यथोक्तन्यायतः सिद्धो न तु कर्मसु कर्हिचित् ।

Hence, to the discriminating there is eligibility, indeed, for repudiation of all action, and not for actions in the least ; this has been settled through the aforesaid reasoning.

He who seeks knowledge has no need to perform *karma*. He has discrimination and dispassion. He has only to renounce the world and study the Vedānta. That is the means to *mokṣa*. Therefore, it is only in regard to the ignorant that there is the injunction of rites. Such injunction cannot reveal the truth.

NKL.—*karma-phalatve mokṣasya sātīṣayatvā-'nityatvādi-prasakter ity arthah.*

[166 b-167 a]

कारकव्यवहारे हि शुद्धं वस्तु न वीक्ष्यते ॥ १६६ ॥

शुद्धे वस्तुनि सिद्धे च कारकव्यापृतिस्तथा ।

If there be the operation of causal agents, verily, the pure reality is not seen; and if the pure reality is attained, there would be no operation of causal agents.

Karma is the activity of such causal factors as the agent, etc. If these factors exist, there will not arise even the desire for knowledge, and it will not be possible to intuit the pure reality. Therefore, the performance of *karma* is only till knowledge has not arisen. When there is discriminative knowledge, *karma* is given up.

NKL—kartrādy-abhimānasya tad-vilakṣaṇa-brahmābhimānasya ca virodhād ity āśayaḥ.

[167 b-168 a]

कारकाकारकधियोर्नैकदैकत्र वस्तुनि ॥ १६७ ॥

विरोधात्संभवोऽस्तीह प्रकाशतमसोरिव ।

The cognitions of agent and non-agent are not possible in the one reality at one and the same time, because they are opposed (to each other) like darkness and light.

The wise one has the knowledge of the self as non-agent. And so, to say that such a one has eligibility to perform action carries no meaning. Agency and non-agency cannot co-exist.

NKL—yathā annam madhu-samyuktam madhu cā 'nnaṇa samyuktam, evam tapaś ca vidyā ca samyuktam bheṣajam mahat—iti smaraṇāc chuddha-vastu-darsane kāraṇam vyāpāraḥ syād atrāha—kāraketi. smṛtau vidyā-śabdena saguṇa-jñānam uktam ity āśayaḥ.

[168 b-169 a]

अविरोधः क्रमेण स्यात्स्थितिगत्योरिवेति चेत् ॥ १६८ ॥

नाऽऽत्मज्ञानस्य कूटस्थवस्तुतन्त्रत्वहेतुतः ।

“Let there be no opposition, through sequence, as for standing and walking.” If thus it be said, no ; for the reason that self-knowledge is dependent on the immutable reality.

It may be said that there is sequence as between the sense of agency and the sense of non-agency. While, we admit, there may be the sense of agency before the rise of the sense of non-agency, the other way is impossible. After the knowledge of Brahman which is non-agent has arisen, there can be no sense of agency at all.

NTV says that even the sequence of agency and non-agency is unintelligible.

nā ca pūrvam kartṛtvam paścād akartṛtvam ity avirodha iṣyata iti vācyaṃ—avidyayā kartṛtvasya jñānotpatteḥ prāg apy asatvāt. paramārthatas tu kauṭasthyād eva nirastam, tad uktam—tvam kuru tvam tad eveti pratyayāv ekakālikau, eka-nīḍāu katham syātām viruddhau nyāyato vada—iti.

[169 b-170 a]

नौण्यात्मको मितो वह्निः क्रमशोऽक्रमशोऽथवा ॥ १६९ ॥

वस्तुतः शीततामेति कर्तृतन्त्रं तथा भवेत् ।

Fire which is known to be of the nature of heat does not, of its own accord, become cold, either in sequence or otherwise. What is dependent on an agent admits of that (sequence).

The nature of a thing cannot be altered. It is not within the power of the agent to do so. No agent can make fire cold.

[170 b-171 a]

भेदाभेदात्मकत्वाच्चेदेकस्यापीह वस्तुनः ॥ १७० ॥

अविरोधो न तन्न्याय्यं त्वदुक्तार्थविरोधतः ।

“Of the one reality, because of difference *cum* non-difference, there is no conflict (of being agent and non-agent).” This does not stand to reason, because the sense of what you say is conflicting.

The *Bhedābheda-vādin* contends that Brahman is both agent and non-agent. The reply is that his statement involves self-contradiction. How can one and the same thing be agent as well as non-agent, identical and yet different?

[171 b-172 a]

नानेकस्यैकता न्याय्या तथैकस्याप्यनेकता ॥ १७१ ॥

वस्तुतन्त्रत्वतो बुद्धेर्न चेदेवं मृषा मतिः ।

It does not stand to reason that there is oneness for the many or manyness for the one. Cognition is dependent on the object. If this were not so, cognition would be false.

The contradiction is further explained. If a thing is identical, it cannot be different ; if different, it cannot be identical. Cognition must be in accord with the nature of the thing cognized. And, a thing cannot possess contradictory natures.

NTV—bhedābheda - jñānāyor anyonyasya viśayopamardanam antareṇa prāmāṇyaṁ nopapadyate, tad-viśayayoḥ paraspara-viruddhatvena bhāvābhāvavat samuccayānupapattēh.

yuktaṁ tatra puruṣa-prayatna-sādhyayoḥ vṛhi-yava-yāgayoḥ buddhī vikalpena-prāmāṇyam aśnuvāte iti. bhedābheda-buddhyos tu puruṣa-prayatnā-'sādhyā-gocarayor idaṁ rajatam nedaṁ rajatam iti jñānavad anyatara-viśayāpahāram antareṇa prāmāṇyaṁ nopapadyate.

[172 b-173 a]

यथा चास्य विरुद्धत्वं तथोदर्के प्रवक्ष्यते ॥ १७२ ॥

ऐकात्म्यस्यैव मेयत्वं तस्यैवाप्रतिबोधतः ।

And, how there is contradiction will be explained later. Being-the-object-of-valid-cognition (*meyatva*) is for the one self alone, for that alone is unknown.

The one self alone is the content of valid knowledge, not the world. There is no unknownness in the world, for we experience it. It is the self that remains unknown, and needs to be realized. The world is superimposed on the self.

*NTV—bhedābhedayoḥ paraspara-virodhād anyatarasyā 'prāmāṇi-
katvāt bādhyām sāmānādhikaranyam.*

[173 b-174 a]

वस्तूनीह प्रमीयन्ते व्यावृत्तानि परस्परम् ॥ १७३ ॥

अभावेन प्रमाणेन तेनोक्तं ते विरुध्यते ।

“Things are known here, as mutually exclusive through means of valid knowledge which are different (viz., perception, etc.). Therefore, what you have stated stands contradicted.

Pūrvapakṣa—It is wrong to say that there is no evidence for plurality. Perception, etc., are the *pramāṇas* which make known a plurality of things.

[174 b-175 a]

भेदे वा यदि वाऽभेदे संसृतेर्ब्रह्मणा सह ॥ १७४ ॥

ब्रह्मणोऽब्रह्मता तद्वद्विद्यानर्थक्यसांशते ।

“Whether the empirical world is different or non-different from Brahman, there would be non-Brahmanhood for Brahman and likewise there would be futility of knowledge, and being endowed with parts.

It was stated (in v. 172 b-173 a) that the world is superimposed on Brahman. Is the world different from Brahman or identical with it? If different, there would be duality, and Brahman would become a limited entity. If there be identity or non-difference, is the world non-different from Brahman, or is Brahman non-different from the world? If the former be the case, there is no need for Brahman-knowledge. If the latter, Brahman will be an entity with parts.

[175 b-176 a]

ब्रह्माविद्यावदिष्टं चेन्ननु दोषो महानयम् ॥ १७५ ॥

निरविद्ये च विद्याया अनर्थक्यं प्रसज्यते ।

“If it be admitted that Brahman has nescience, then this is a great defect. And if it be free from nescience, there results futility for knowledge.”

If it is stated that the world is different from Brahman, and that there is neither the futility of knowledge nor the limitation of Brahman because the world is not real, being a product of nescience, then what this nescience is must be explained. Is nescience located in Brahman or in the jīva, or is it independent? Brahman cannot be the locus of nescience, because it is of the nature of knowledge and is all-knowledge. For the same reason the jīva which is non-different from Brahman cannot be the locus. If nescience be an independent entity it cannot be removed by knowledge.

[176 b-177 a]

नाविद्याऽस्येत्यविद्यायामेवाऽऽसित्वा प्रकल्प्यते ॥ १७६ ॥

ब्रह्मदृष्ट्या त्वविद्येयं न कथंचन युज्यते ।

No; nescience is predicated (of Brahman) (by the jīva which is) in the state of nescience. From the standpoint of Brahman, however, this nescience is by no means intelligible.

Siddhānta—Brahman is the locus of nescience. This, however, is only from the empirical point of view. The supreme truth is that there is no nescience at all; only Brahman is.

NTV—*na cā 'kāra-ropasya brahmaṇaḥ kāra-ropāśraya-viśayat-vavirodhaḥ kāra-kāra-virodhasya avidyāyām eva āsitvā'vakalpanāt, tad evam brahmaiva avidyāyām eva āsitvā avidyāyāḥ āśrayaḥ īśvaro'ntar-yāmī mukto baddhaḥ śiṣyo gurur ityādi sarva-vyavahāra-bhāg bhavati.*

vastu-gatyā brahmaṇi vicāryamāṇe na avidyā nāpi tad-āśrayatā nāpi tad-viśayatā na bandho na muktir na tat-sādhanaṁ, ato niravidye vidyānarthakyaṁ iṣyate.

tad-uktaṁ sampradāyavidbhir ācāryaiḥ na nirodho na cotpattiḥ na bandho na ca sādhaḥ, na mumukṣur na vai muktaḥ ityeṣā paramārthatā iti.

[177 b-178 a]

यतोऽनुभवतोऽविद्या ब्रह्मास्मीत्यनुभूतिवत् ॥ १७७ ॥

अतो मानोत्थविज्ञानध्वस्ता साऽप्येतथाऽऽत्मताम् ।

As nescience is experienced like the experience 'I am Brahman', so, being destroyed by knowledge generated by valid means of knowledge, it also attains selfhood.

Nescience is not the content of *pramāṇa*; it is in the sphere of the experience which is Brahman. Brahman is the basic consciousness which is common to both *pramāṇa* and *apramāṇa*. Scripture, etc., remove only the delusion of those who believe that it is non-existent.

Since nescience is not the content of *pramāṇa*, since it is established only on the basis of the witness-self, and since it is destroyed by the psychosis born of the Vedānta-text, it is not real. And, what is called the destruction of nescience is Brahman itself. When destroyed by *pramāṇa*, nescience attains Brahman-hood and gets resolved there.

NTV—yathā brahmāsmīti anubhūtiḥ anubhava-siddhā tarkaṇa nāpalapanīyā, evaṃ avidyā tat-sambandhaś ca nāpalapanīyaḥ, mānottha vijñānasya avidyā-dhvastiḥ prayojanam ity āha—ata iti. avidyāyāḥ param pāram tārayasi, bhūyaścānte viśva-māyā-nivṛttiḥ mām eva ye prapadyante māyām etām taranti te,

jñānena tu tad-ājñānam yeṣāṃ nāsitam ātmanah,

taraty avidyām vitatām hr̥di yasmin nivesite—

ityādyāḥ śrutayaḥ smṛtayaś ca jñānāt ajñāna-dhvastiṃ darśayanti.

ājñānam punaḥ na sad-asad-ubhayā-'nubhaya-lakṣaṇam, atas tan-nivṛttir api tad-anusāriṇī yuktā kalpayitum, yakṣānurūpo hi balir iti nyāyāt, yadyapi mānottha-vijñāna-dhvastiḥ tataḥpūrvam avidyā ātmanah prthag iva avabhāṣate.

tad uktam ānandabodha-bhaṭṭāarakaiḥ—neha nāneti ca pratipanno-pādhau srauta-niṣedhātmano bādhaḍ avidyā-nivṛtter apy atītatvāditi mānottha-vijñānānantaram tv avidyā-tat-kāryeṣv iva satvānāpādanād ātmatām āpnotīty arthah.

NKL—brahmāsmīty anubhūtir vākya-jāntaḥkaraṇa-nivṛttiḥ kevalasya śakṣi-vedyā yathā ity arthah.

[178 b-179 a]

ब्रह्मण्यविदिते बोधान्नाविद्येत्युपपद्यते ॥ १७८ ॥

नितरां चापि विज्ञाते मृषाधीर्नास्त्यबाधिता ।

When Brahman is not known through valid cognition, that there is nescience is unintelligible; and more so when it is known; there is no unsublated false knowledge.

That nescience and its relation to Brahman are not known through *pramāṇa* is still further shown. They cannot be known while Brahman remains unknown; for without knowing the locus one cannot know the located. Nor can they be known when Brahman is known; for, then, there is no nescience to be known. No delusion survives its sublation.

AVS—brahmaṇi brahmaṇas cā 'vidyete mithyā-jñānam etat. tan na tiṣṭhati jñāne uditā ity arthaḥ.

[179 b-180 a]

अविद्यावानविद्यां तां न निरूपयितुं क्षमः ॥ १७९ ॥

वस्तुवृत्तमतोऽपेक्ष्य नाविद्येति निरूप्यते ।

He who is endowed with nescience cannot establish it; in consideration of the nature of reality it is established that there is no nescience.

The ignorant do not have valid cognition of nescience and its relation, for there is no *pramāṇa*; and if there be *pramāṇa*, nescience will cease to be nescience. Nor do the wise cognize nescience, for there is no nescience for them. So, nescience is established only through the witness-self.

NKL—nirūpamāṇākṣamatvaṁ ajñānatvād iti draṣṭavyam. ajñānam mithyā apramāṇikatvāt sūkti-rajatavad iti.

[180 b-181 a]

वस्तुनोऽन्यत्र मानानां व्यापृतिर्न हि युज्यते ॥ १८० ॥

अविद्या च न वस्त्वष्टं मानाघातासहिष्णुतः ।

It does not stand to reason that the means of valid knowledge function except in relation to what is real. And nescience is not admitted to be real, for it cannot bear the scrutiny of the means of valid knowledge.

An inference is here given to show that nescience cannot be known through *pramāṇa*. What is not a thing cannot be known through *pramāṇa*, like the horns of a hare. Nescience cannot be known through *pramāṇa* because it is not a thing.

NTV—*yad vastvanyan na tan mānagocarah yathā naraviṣāṇādi, avidyā ca na vastumānasambandhā-'sahiṣṇutvād ity arthaḥ.*

[181 b-182 a]

अविद्याया अविद्यात्वं इदमेव तु लक्षणम् ॥ १८१ ॥

मानाघातासहिष्णुत्वमसाधारणमिष्यते ।

Of the nescience-nature of nescience this is the non-common definition that it does not stand the scrutiny of the means of valid knowledge.

Nescience does not stand the scrutiny of *pramāṇa* ; for that is its nature.

[182 b-183 a]

त्वत्पक्षे बहु कल्प्यं स्यात्सर्वं मानविरोधि च ॥ १८२ ॥

कल्प्याऽविद्यैव मत्पक्षे सा चानुभवसंश्रया ।

In your view, many assumptions will have to be made, and all opposed to validity. In my view, nescience alone has to be assumed, and that too as dependent on experience.

Here the *siddhāntin* says that, while in the view of *bhedābheda* several assumptions have to be made, in his own view only nescience has to be assumed. The assumptions of *bhedābheda* are that as between Brahman and the world there are difference and non-difference, that there is the destruction of bondage which is beginningless and real, that release is the fruit of *karma*, and that it is eternal, etc. These assumptions may be made if they are valid. But everyone of them involves a contradiction.

Nescience, which we assume, is established by the witness-intelligence.

NKL—*sarvasya bhinnābhinnatvaṁ saṁsārasya anādeḥ paramārthasya nivr̥ttimatvaṁ, kṛtakasya mokṣasya nityatvaṁ ca mānaviruddhaṁ kalpyam ity arthaḥ.*

AVS—*bhedābhedavādi-pakṣe anāder bandhasya paramārthasya nivr̥tṭiḥ kalpyā, sā ca pramāṇa-viruddhā, na hy anādeḥ paramārthasya 'tmano nivr̥ttir dr̥ṣṭā, sāder mokṣasya nityatvaṁ ca kalpyeta, tac ca pramāṇa-viruddhaṁ, yat kṛtakaṁ tad anityam iti sthitatvāt sarvaṁ vastu bhinnābhinnam iti ca sarva-pramāṇaviruddhaṁ parikalpyata iti.*

[183 b-184 a]

तत्त्वमस्यादिवाक्योत्थसम्यग्धीजन्ममात्रतः ॥ १८३ ॥

अविद्या सह कार्येण नाऽऽसीदस्ति भविष्यति ।

On the mere rise of the true knowledge generated by the sentence 'That thou art', nescience, along with its effects, was not, is not and will not be.

That nescience is not real is realized when the supreme wisdom dawns on hearing the great text 'That thou art.'

[184 b-185 a]

अतः प्रमाणतोऽशक्याऽविद्याऽस्येति निरीक्षितुम् ॥ १८४ ॥

कीदृशी वा कुतो वाऽसावनुभूत्येकरूपतः ।

Therefore, it is impossible to demonstrate through means of valid knowledge that nescience is in (Brahman), or as of what form it is, or whence, for there is only experience (of it).

Questions about nescience, as to where it is, whence it is, what it is, etc., cannot be answered intelligibly. It is only established through experience.

[185 b-186 a]

देवताद्रव्यकर्तादि ननु वस्त्वस्तु नाद्वयम् ॥ १८५ ॥

सर्वलोकप्रसिद्धत्वादद्वयस्याप्यसिद्धितः ।

“Now, deity, material, agent, etc.—let these be real and not the non-dual, because they are well known to all people, and non-duality is not established.”

Pūrvapakṣa—The world of plurality is real because it is well known to all people. The non-dual Brahman is not known to people ; so it cannot be real.

[186 b-187 a]

नैतत्साधु प्रमाणानां सर्वलोकाभिधं न हि ॥ १८६ ॥

प्रमाणमस्ति यत्प्राणाद्भवानेवं प्रभाषते ।

This is not sound. Among the means of valid knowledge, there is no means of valid knowledge called ‘known to all people’, on whose strength you speak thus.

Siddhānta—There is no *pramāṇa* called ‘known to all people.’

[187 b-188a]

अभिमानश्च यत्नायं सर्वलोकस्य गम्यते ॥ १८७ ॥

प्रत्यक्षोऽर्थोऽयमित्येवं मिथ्यात्वं तस्य चोदितम् ।

The conceit (of the form) ‘This object is perceived’ is experienced by all people. The illusoriness thereof has been declared.

It is true that people imagine ‘I see this,’ etc. But all such imagination is illusory because it is sublated by the knowledge of the true self.

[188 b-189 a]

प्रत्यक्षं च यथाऽऽसन्नं परोक्षाद्वस्तुनो मतम् ॥ १८८ ॥

सर्वप्रत्यक्तमस्तद्वद्बोधो वाक्योत्थ आत्मनि ।

As perception is thought to be of what is nearer than the mediate object, so is there knowledge of the self as the inner-most of all, generated by the sentence (of Scripture).

If it be said that the cognition of the self got from Scripture cannot sublate the world that is sense-perceived, because that cognition is not immediate, like inference, we ask : what is meant by the non-immediacy of the Scriptural cognition ? Does it mean (1) not making known a content that is proximate, (2) not making known a content that is immediate, (3) not being the locus of immediacy, or (4) being devoid of independence ?

The first alternative is not correct. There is nothing nearer or more proximate than the inner spirit. So, the knowledge that is born of the Vedānta-texts has a content which is most proximate.

AVS—pratyakṣād āgamasya sannihitārthatvāt, pratyakṣād āgamo balavān.....yathā pratyakṣānumānayor virodhe pratyakṣasyaiva balavatvam anumānāt pratyakṣasya sannihitārthatvāt. sannihitārthatvañ ca liṅga-vyavadhānābhāvāt. atra ca tadbhāvāt. āgamasya tu pratyakṣāt sannihitārthatvam ātma-viśayatvāt. pratyakṣasya vā 'san-nihitārthatvañ parāg-viśayatvāt. ato durbalam ato bādhyatvañ ato mithyātvañ iti.

[189 b-190 a]

आत्मानुभवमाश्रित्य प्रत्यक्षादि प्रसिध्यति ॥ १८९ ॥

अनुभूतेः स्वतः सिद्धेः काऽपेक्षा ह्यात्मसिद्धये ।

Depending on self-experience, perception, etc., are established. As experience is self-established, what

need is there (for means of valid knowledge) in the matter of establishing the self?

The second alternative is not possible. Perception, etc., are not self-established, because they are inert; nor are they established through *pramāṇas*, for then there would be an infinite regress; nor are they not established, for in that case no object can be known. Perception, etc., are established only on the basis of the self which is experience. The self, however, is not dependent on any other. So, it is intrinsically immediate. The knowledge of it that rises from the study of Vedānta cannot have for its content something which is not immediate.

NTV—pratyakṣa-sphuraṇasya āgama-gamyā-'tmānubhavā-'dhīnatvāt āgamo balavān, durbalaṁ pratyakṣam ity ato bādhyatvān mithyātvam.....pratyakṣa-sattāyā ātmādhīnatvāt ātma-sattāyāś ca pratyakṣā-nadhīnatvāt ātma-viṣayoyam āgamo balavān.

AVS—pratyakṣa-sphuraṇasya āgamagamyātmādhīnatvād āgamo balavān, pratyakṣam durbalam.

[190 b-191 a]

आत्मानुभवपूर्वत्वात्प्रत्यक्षत्वस्य न स्वतः ॥ १९० ॥

आत्मैकगम्यमैकात्म्यं वेदान्तेष्ववगम्यते ।

Since perceptuality is preceded by self-experience and does not exist of its own accord, the one self is known by the self alone—thus it is understood from the Vedāntas.

The third alternative, that the cognition generated from Scripture is not the locus of immediacy, is not tenable. Even perception is not immediate of its own accord, because it is inert. It is immediate only because of its relation to the self-nature which is eternally immediate. So, the immediacy of perception is dependent on the self-established

self-experience. Similarly, Scriptural cognition, too, which is dependent on the same, may well be the locus of immediacy.

Nor is the fourth alternative—that scriptural cognition is devoid of independence—sound. Validity is intrinsic. The Vedāntas which have the self for purport are not expectant of anything else. And the self-cognition which arises from them is intrinsic.

AVS—pratyakṣa-sattāyā ātmādhīnatvād ātma-sattāyās ca pratyakṣatvāt tad-adhīnatvābhāvat āgama ātma-viṣayo balavān pratyakṣam durbalam.

[191 b-193 a]

यच्चाप्युक्तं श्रुतिस्मृत्योः क्रियाया एव सिद्धितः ॥ १९१ ॥

अतः क्रियातिरेकेण नास्त्यन्यन्मुक्तिसाधनम् ।

केन चोक्तं क्रिया मुक्तेः साधनत्वं न गच्छति ॥ १९२ ॥

तमेतमिति नाश्रौषीः संस्कारा इति च स्मृतिम् ।

As for what was said, that because Scripture and Traditional Code establish rites alone, there is no means to release other than rites, by whom was it said that rites do not attain the status of means to release? Have you not heard the Scriptural text ‘That one’¹, etc., and the Traditional Code ‘Purificatory rites’²?

It was stated by the *pūrvapakṣin* (in v. 33) that Scripture and Traditional Code establish rites alone, and that rites are the means to release. Now, are rites the direct means to release, or do they serve as the means in sequence? Not the first, because they cannot bring about release; and there are Scriptural texts which say that release is not attainable through *karma* (e.g. *Mahānārāyaṇa Upaniṣad*, x, 5; and *Kaivalya*, 2.). The second alternative is acceptable to us. Rites

are instrumental to release either by generating the desire for knowledge or through purification.

1. *BU*, IV, iv, 22. See note on v. 14.

2. See *Gautama-dharmasūtra*, ed. by L. Srinivasacharya (Government Oriental Library Series, Bibliotheca Sanskrita No. 50, Mysore, 1917), viii, 19-22, pp. 127-132.

NKL—*nānyaḥ panthā iti sākṣātsādhana-tva-niṣedhād vividiṣādvārā saṁskāra-dvārā vā mukti-hetutvaṁ vācyaṁ tad-iṣṭam eva.*

AVS—*kriyayaiva kaivalya-sādhanaṁ cen nāsti pramāṇam, kriyāpi kathaṁcit śuddhi-dvāreṇa sādhanam ced asti pramāṇam.*

[193 b-194 a]

यद्यप्यैकात्म्यधीः साक्षाच्छ्रुतिस्मृत्योर्न चोद्यते ॥ १९३ ॥

तथाऽप्यसौ न तद्वाह्या ताभ्यामेवाऽऽत्मबोधनात् ।

Though the cognition of the one self is not directly enjoined by Scripture and Traditional Code, it is not outside of them, for through them alone there is self-knowledge.

Although knowledge of the self is not the content of injunction (*acodita*), it is not something which is alien to the Veda (i. e. not *avaidika*). It is taught in Scripture and Traditional Code, even as knowledge of *karma* is taught therein. Hence, it stands to reason that self-knowledge is the means to the human goal, viz. release.

AVS—*śrutismṛtyavihitam api brahmātmaikatva-jñānam na śruti-smṛti-bāhyaṁ śruti-smṛti-janyatvāt.*

[194 b-195 a]

यच्च न ज्ञाप्यते वेदे वस्त्वित्येतदचूचुदः ॥ १९४ ॥

तच्चापहस्तितं चोद्यं वक्ष्यते च निराकृतिः ।

As for what was stated (in v. 33) that in the Veda the reality is not made known, that objection has been refuted (in v. 123) and its (further) refutation will be set forth later on.

The contention of the *pūrvapakṣin* that the Veda does not teach the oneness of self has already been refuted, and will be refuted again.

[195 b-196 a]

विधावसति वाक्यस्य यच्चावोचोऽप्रमाणताम् ॥ १९५ ॥

स्फुटन्यायोक्तिभिस्तच्च यत्नात्परिहरिष्यति ।

As for what you said that, in the absence of injunction, the sentence (about Brahman knowledge) would be invalid, that will be refuted¹ with care through clear and logical arguments.

The objection raised in v. 34 is referred to here.

1. NKL—*parihariṣyatīti pāṭhe bhāṣyakāra īti śeṣaḥ.*

[196 b-199 a]

यच्चोक्तं न पुमर्थोऽस्ति वस्तुमात्रावबोधनात् ॥ १९६ ॥

आख्यानप्रचुरा यस्मात्प्रय्यन्ता इह लक्षिताः ।

रामो राजा बभूवेति न ह्येतावत्प्रबोधतः ॥ १९७ ॥

संभाव्यते पुमर्थोऽतो विध्यर्थविरहात्कचित् ।

परार्थतैव सर्वत्र ज्ञानस्येहोपलक्ष्यते ॥ १९८ ॥

ज्ञात्वाऽनुष्ठानवचनाद्विद्वान्यजत इत्यपि ।

And as for what was said: “There is no human goal by a knowledge of the mere reality, for the

Vedāntas are characterized by a profusion of stories ; by a knowledge thus ‘There lived a king named Rāma’, the human goal does not result, as there is not any injunctive sense ; everywhere, here, knowledge is indicated as being for the sake of another ; for there is the statement about performance after knowing, thus : ‘ The learned one performs sacrifice’.”

Here, the objection stated in v. 36 is alluded to. The view of the *pūrvapakṣin* is that the Vedāntas are subsidiary to *karma*, even as the looking into clarified butter by the sacrificer’s wife is a subsidiary to the *Darśapūrṇamāsa* rites.

[199 b-200 a]

उक्तोऽत्र परिहारः प्रागूर्ध्वं चापि प्रवक्ष्यते ॥ १९९ ॥

विद्याफलस्य प्रात्यक्ष्यादितिहेतुसमाश्रयात् ।

The reply to it has been stated already (v. 129) and will be stated hereafter also, in reliance on the ground that the fruit of knowledge is immediate.

The reply has been stated already, and will again be stated. We rely on the texts which speak of the experience of the wise. Self-knowledge leads to the destruction of evil in its entirety and to the manifestation of unlimited bliss. And so, Vedānta is not an auxiliary of the injunction of *karma*.

[200 b-201 a]

ननु निर्धूतशोकादि फलं यच्छ्रूयते श्रुतौ ॥ २०० ॥

आत्मस्तुतिरसौ तस्मात्त्वन्मनोरथकल्पितम् ।

“ Now, as for what is declared in Scripture about the fruit of freedom from sorrow, etc., that is an eulogy of the soul. Therefore, what you say is your imaginary dream”.

Pūrvapakṣa—The texts ‘The knower of the self crosses sorrow,’ etc., are intended to praise the soul which has the eligibility for ritual action. They do not teach the wisdom about the non-dual self.

[201 b-202]

अत्रोच्यते ह्यभिप्रेतं गम्यमानं प्रमाणतः ॥ २०१ ॥

फलं तत्संपरित्यज्य कस्माल्लक्षणया स्तुतिम् ।

अश्रुतामनभिप्रेतां कल्पयस्यबुधो यथा ॥ २०२ ॥

Here it is replied: Leaving the fruit which is intended and which is validly cognized, why do you, like one ignorant, assume through secondary implication eulogy which is neither declared in Scripture nor intended (by it)?

Siddhānta—On what ground do you say that the texts quoted above do not have for purport the destruction of sorrow, etc.? (1) Is it because it is not wished for, or (2) because it is not known from the sentence, or (3) because it is not known through other means of valid knowledge? Not the first; for, every one desires the fruit in the form ‘Let me be happy; let not sorrow come to me’; and it cannot be said that this fruit is not wished for. Not the second; for, the sense we have urged is readily understood from the text. Nor the third; for, the experience of the wise is the evidence for it.

You think that the text in question is a case of *abhūtārthavāda*. On what ground, we ask. Is it known directly from the statement? Or, is it what is wished for? Or, is it established through some other *pramāṇa*? Not the first; for, from the statement itself we do not understand any praise of the soul; it has only to be assumed by implication; and such an assumption is not proper because it would go against the fruit which is known from Scripture, and which is experienced by the wise. Not the second; for, praise of the soul cannot be what is wished for; what is wished for is the attainment

of happiness, the destruction of sorrow, and the means thereto. Nor the third; for, it is not known through any *pramāṇa* that the destruction of sorrow, etc., constitute the praise of the soul.

NKL—jñāna-phalasya kimaniṣṭatvāt tyāgaḥ, apratīyamānatvād vā, bādhitatvād vā. nādyā ity āha—abhipretam iti. sukha-duḥkha-pari-hāratvād ity arthaḥ. avagata-saṅgatikasya pratīte na dvitīya ity āha—gamyamānam iti. na tritīyaḥ apauruṣeyatayā vidhi-vākyāt svataḥ pramāṇatvād ity āha—pramāṇata iti.

AVS—jñāna-phalasya karṣṇtvādy-upamardasya pratyakṣatvād ata eva karṣṇtvādi- pratibhāsanasya viduṣo bādhitānuvṛttitvāt phala-srutir nābhūtārthavādaḥ ataḥ sādhanādhikāri-bhedo vastuparatvaṁ ca vākyasya ity etam manoratham ity uktam manorathamātram.

[203-204 a]

न चास्त्येकविषयत्वं प्रत्यक्षवचसोर्यतः ।

श्रुत्यैव परिहारोक्तेः स्वप्नादिस्थानसंचरात् ॥ २०३ ॥

बहुशोऽसङ्गवचसा निःसङ्गत्वं ब्रुवाणया ।

Nor is there identity of content between the perception (I am miserable) and the Scriptural statement; the reply has been stated by Scripture itself in the text referring to the passage through dream and other states, which declares several times the unattached nature (of the self) in texts declarative of non-attachment.

The perceptual experience of the form 'I am miserable' cannot contradict the Scriptural text, because the two do not have an identical content. The experience has for its content the empirical soul. Scripture speaks about the true self which is of the nature of the eternal bliss-experience, which is the witness of the three states of experience, and which is not affected by these changing states.

[204 b-205 a]

मनोराज्यसमं मन्ये सर्वमेतत्त्वयोदितम् ॥ २०४ ॥

न प्रत्येमि यतः साक्षात्प्रत्यक्षं ज्ञानतः फलम् ।

“I consider all that has been stated by you to be a castle in the air; for I do not see the fruit of knowledge to be directly perceived.”

Pūrvapakṣa—Your belief that Brahman is pure consciousness, that agency, etc., are superimposed thereon, and that the fruit of Brahman-knowledge is the complete removal of agency, etc., is a product of your imagination. There is no direct experience of what you say.

[205 b-206 a]

श्रुतादपि न चेद्वाक्याज्जायेत फलवन्मतिः ॥ २०५ ॥

आशङ्क्येत तदैवैतद्यदेतद्भवतोदितम् ।

If the fruitful knowledge does not arise even from the sentence (That thou art) declared in Scripture, then what you have said may be raised as a doubt.

Siddhānta—Our view is not a day-dream. You may legitimately raise the doubt you have raised only if from the Vedānta text wisdom leading to release did not result. For the proper person the Veda does generate knowledge. If for the ineligible person the said wisdom does not rise, it is not the fault of the Veda.

NKL—*jñāninopi sukhādi-darśanāt, bādhitānuvṛtteḥ paribhāṣā-mātratvād, ity arthaḥ. tadyathā ahinirivayanītyādi-śruti-siddhatvāt bādhitānuvṛtṭiḥ paribhāṣāmātram.*

[206 b-207 a]

नित्यमुक्तत्वविज्ञानं वाक्याद्भवति नान्यतः ॥ २०६ ॥

वाक्यार्थस्यापि विज्ञानं पदार्थस्मृतिपूर्वकम् ।

The knowledge of the eternally free arises from the sentence, not otherwise. The knowledge of the sentence-sense is preceded by the memory of the word-senses.

For the eligible person, knowledge arises from hearing the major text 'That thou art'. It is true that all do not get this knowledge. That is because the true knowledge of this sentence can come only after there has been a correct understanding of the words constituting it. Those who do not have this understanding cannot realize the truth of the major text, even as a deaf person cannot appreciate music.

NKL—sodhitapadārthajñānavatām viśiṣṭādhikāriṇām eve'ty arthaḥ;

[207 b-208 a]

अन्वयव्यतिरेकाभ्यां पदार्थः स्मर्यते ध्रुवम् ॥ २०७ ॥

एवं निर्दुःखमात्मानमक्रियं प्रतिपद्यते ।

The word-sense is remembered for certain through co-presence and co-absence. Thus, the self free from sorrow and action is understood.

The knowledge of the word-senses too does not come to all. One must inquire into the meaning of the words through the application of the rule of co-presence and co-absence. Nor is it enough to have a knowledge of the word-senses alone. One must understand the sentence as a whole also.

NTV—kena krameṇa vākyāt tad-arthāvagatir ity apekṣāyām āha—vākyārthasyāpi ityādinā—prathamam anvayavyatirekābhyām tvāmpadārthaḥ smaryate, anantaram nirduḥkham akriyas-tvāmpadalakṣyam ātmānam pratipadyate, tadanantaram sadevetyādi-vākyebhyo brahmāsmṛiti pratyagātmany aparokṣa-pramā jāyate.

NKL—ātmano 'vasthā-īrayeṇugamād avasthā-trayasya paraspara-vyabhicārād ityādi caturvidhānvayavyatirekābhyām ity arthaḥ. śodhita-tatpadārtha-jñānam tathāpi durlabham tatrānvayavyatirekayor

The reply to this suggestion is : no. The meditations are either for the fulfilment of *karmas*, or for achieving prosperity, or for gaining release in sequence (*krama-mukti*). What we have already said with regard to *karmas* holds good as regards meditations also. In the *vividiṣā*-text (*BU*, IV, iv, 22) the word *tapas* stands for meditations.

[330]

विमुच्यमान इत्युत्तेरर्चिराद्युक्तितस्तथा ।

स्वार्थमात्रावसायित्वं नोपास्तीनां प्रतीयते ॥ ३३० ॥

Because of the text, 'Being released,'¹ and because of the text about the path of light,² it is seen that the meditations do not directly lead to release.

Upāsanas are not the direct means to release; they are the means only in sequence. As evidence, two scriptural texts are cited :

1. *BU*, IV, ii, 1.

2. *BU*, VI, ii, 15; *CHU*, V, x, 1.

NTV—*tad āhuḥ paurāṇikāḥ—brahmaṇā saha te sarve samprāpte pratisaṅcare, parasyānte kṛtātmānaḥ praviṣanti param padam-iti.*

AVS—*arcirādivākyodāharaṇam upāsanānām krama-mukti-phalatva-dyotanāya. svārtha-śabdena viriñcyādi-phala-grahaṇam.*

[331]

इत्येवमभिसंबन्धः कर्मकाण्डस्य युज्यते ।

इतोऽन्यथाऽभिसंबन्धे न किञ्चिन्मानमीक्ष्यते ॥ ३३१ ॥

It cannot be said that the Vedānta texts are invalid because their cause is defective ; for, the Veda is not the composition of any human being.

There can be no conflict of other means of valid knowledge with the Vedānta, because their contents differ.

Nor may it be said that the Vedānta cannot give rise to direct knowledge ; for the kind of knowledge one gets depends upon the nature of the object too. The object of Vedāntic knowledge is the self which is eternally immediate. So, the Vedānta texts may well generate immediate knowledge of the self.

Śaṅkara will establish this later, while refuting the view that valid knowledge requires four factors, viz., the word, reasoning, meditation and the self. He will, then, say that from the major text alone the immediate knowledge of the self arises.

[211]

नवसंख्याहतज्ञानो दशमो विभ्रमाद्यथा ।

न वेत्ति दशमोऽस्मीति वीक्षमाणोऽपि तान्नव ॥ २११ ॥

Though seeing the nine, the tenth man does not know 'I am the tenth', because his knowledge is clouded by the number nine and he is deluded.

The *pūrvapakṣin* may say that there is no need for *Veda-pramāṇa* because the self is of the nature of immediate awareness .

In reply, the *siddhāntin* cites the illustrative story of the ten travellers. The tenth man does not realize that he is the tenth because he is obsessed with the number 'nine.' And he realizes the truth—that, too, immediately—when he is told 'You are the tenth'.

[212]

अपविद्धद्वयोऽप्येवं तत्त्वमित्यादिना विना ।

वेत्ति नैकलमात्मानं प्रत्यङ्गोहाप्रबोधतः ॥ २१२ ॥

Similarly, though the duality might have been destroyed, he does not know the one self without the text, 'That thou art', etc., because he is without wisdom, due to delusion regarding the inner self.

Although one knows in general about the self, one does not know it truly because of the obstacle, viz., nescience. In order to remove this obstacle *Veda-pramāṇa* is necessary.

[213]

बुभुत्सोच्छेदिनैवास्य सदसीत्यादिना दृढा ।

प्रतीचि प्रतिपत्तिः स्यात्प्रत्यगज्ञानबाधया ॥ २१३ ॥

For him there arises firm knowledge in respect of the inner self through the texts, 'Thou art real', etc., which destroy the desire to know, sublating the ignorance regarding the inner self.

Although the self is of the nature of immediate awareness, and we are that, there may arise in us the desire to know the self which is the eternal bliss. We study the Veda and Vedānta and acquire superficial knowledge of that. In order to acquire distinct and clear knowledge of the same we should listen to the major texts. From such listening arises illumination which is unsublatable and free from doubts.

It cannot be said that when the self is known, nescience also would become a content of valid knowledge. When nescience is sublated, the self is realized ; and so in that experience there is no nescience at all.

NKL—*dr̥dhety abādhita-niściti rūpā ity arthaḥ.*

[214]

निःशेषकर्मसंन्यासो वाक्यार्थज्ञानजन्मने ।

तस्याऽऽरादुपकारित्वात्सहायत्वाय कल्प्यते ॥ २१४ ॥

Renunciation of all action is assumed to be a proximate auxiliary, because it helps in the generation of the knowledge of sentence-sense.

Renunciation of all *karma* is an auxiliary of knowledge; for it helps in the understanding of the major texts.

NTV—tatra śravaṇam śabda-śakti-nirdhāraṇāvasānaidamparya-viparyaya-vināśi, mananam bādhabhāva-parīkṣā sā bādha-buddhim niruṇddhi, ekālaṃbanapratyayāmreḍanam dhyānam tac chinatti citta-vikṣepam bhinatty aṭad-vāsanām, vedāntas tv ātmānam sākṣāt bodhayanti, tathāpi vedāntaḥ śravaṇādiṣu satsv eva 'tmavidyām prasūyante nāsatsu.

śravaṇa - manana - dhyānābhyāsāḥ śabdasya jñānotpatti - pratibandhāpanayena sahāyatām pratipadyante.

[215]

त्याग एव हि सर्वेषां मोक्षसाधनमुत्तमम् ।

त्यजतैव हि तज्ज्ञेयं त्यक्तुः प्रत्यक्परं पदम् ॥ २१५ ॥

Renunciation is the supreme means to release in the case of all. By him who renounces is to be known the supreme place which is the inner self of the renouncer.

Here by 'release' is meant knowledge. Renunciation is an auxiliary of knowledge. It is called the *supreme* means because it is the proximate auxiliary. *Karma* cannot serve as the proximate auxiliary because it involves the conceits of agency and enjoyership.

NTV—atra mokṣa-śabdena mucyateneneti brahma-jñānam ucyate.

[216]

शान्तो दान्त इति तथा सर्वत्यागपुरःसरम् ।

उपायमात्मविज्ञाने श्रुतिरेवाब्रवीत्स्वयम् ॥ २१६ ॥

Scripture itself has declared the means to self-knowledge as preceded by renunciation of all (action) in the words 'subdued, self-controlled', etc.

Scripture is cited to show that renunciation of *karma* is an auxiliary of knowledge. *BU*, IV, iv. 23 : 'Therefore, he who knows it thus becomes subdued, self-controlled, indrawn, forbearing and absorbed, and sees the self even in the self ; he sees all as the self.' Here by the word 'indrawn' (*uparatah*) is meant renunciation of obligatory and occasioned rites. It is as preceded by renunciation that the self is to be seen.

[217]

प्रवृत्तिलक्षणो योगो ज्ञानं संन्यासलक्षणम् ।

तस्माज्ज्ञानं पुरस्कृत्य संन्यसेदिह बुद्धिमान् ॥ २१७ ॥

Yoga (action) is characterized by activity ; knowledge is characterized by renunciation. Therefore, having knowledge in view let the wise one, here, renounce.

Another text is quoted here : The *Mahābhārata*, *Āśvamedhika-parvā*, 43, 26.

[218]

मुक्तेश्च बिभ्यतो देवा मोहेनापिदधुर्नरान् ।

ततस्ते कर्मसूद्युक्ताः प्रावर्तन्ताविचक्षणाः ॥ २१८ ॥

The gods, fearing release, covered men with delusion. Therefore, they, devoid of sight, began to perform rites with zeal.

It cannot be said that all might renounce for the sake of knowledge which is the means to release. The gods delude men, whom they use as their domestic animals. *BU*, I, iv, 10 : 'He who

worships another god thinking, “He is different, and I am different”, does not know ; he is as an animal to the gods.’ It is only a few that see through this delusion and escape from the herd and seek knowledge. Renunciation, therefore, is not something which comes of its own accord effortlessly and with ease.

[219]

अतः संन्यस्य कर्माणि सर्वाण्यात्मावबोधतः ।

हत्वाऽऽविद्यां धियैवेयात्तद्विष्णोः परमं पदम् ॥ २१९ ॥

Therefore, renouncing all actions and destroying nescience through knowledge of the self, let him attain the supreme place of Viṣṇu, through knowledge alone.

After renouncing the world, one ought to ‘hear’ the Vedānta texts for the sake of gaining self-knowledge. This is an originative injunction (*utpatti-vidhi*) even as the injunction to renounce is. An originative injunction is that which makes known the bare nature of an act, e.g., ‘He is to offer the *Agnihotra* oblation.’ [The other types of injunction are: applicatory injunction (*viniyoga-vidhi*), injunction of the eligible (*adhikāra-vidhi*), and procedural injunction (*prayoga-vidhi*).]

When through ‘hearing’, etc., one matures, one acquires self-knowledge. With that, nescience which is the root of all evil is destroyed. The body may last for some time longer so that the unspent portion of the *prārabdha* may be enjoyed. When that enjoyment is over, one attains the supreme Reality.

The last quarter of this verse is from the Upaniṣads. See

[220]

इति भाल्लविशाखायां श्रुतिवाक्यमधीयते ।

सर्वकर्मनिरासेन तस्मादात्मधियो जनिः ॥ २२० ॥

Thus in the Bhāllavi section the Scriptural text is found: Through the renunciation of all action the knowledge of self is born.

The *Bhāllavi Śākhā* is not now extant.

[221]

सत्यानृते इति तथा सर्वसंन्यासपूर्वकम् ।

आत्मनोऽन्वेषणं साक्षादापस्तम्बोऽब्रवीन्मुनिः ॥ २२१ ॥

Sage Āpastamba taught directly in the words 'True and false' that the search for the self is to be preceded by renunciation.

Āpastamba-dharma-sūtra, II, xxi, 13.

[222]

नाविरतो दुश्चरितान्नाशान्तो नासमाहितः ।

नाशान्तमानसो वाऽपि प्रज्ञानेनैवमाप्नुयात् ॥ २२२ ॥

'He who has not desisted from evil conduct, who is not subdued, nor self-composed, and whose mind is not quiescent cannot attain him (self) through knowledge.'

KU, ii, 24.

Here renunciation is laid down as a condition precedent for self-knowledge—not renunciation of optional rites alone, but of all *karma*.

[223]

वेदानुवचनादीनां विनियोगोक्तियत्नतः ।

भिन्नाधिकारितालिङ्गं कर्मविज्ञानकाण्डयोः ॥ २२३ ॥

The statement of procedure 'By the recitation of the Veda,'¹ etc., which has been made through effort shows that there is a difference of eligibility for the two sections, viz. of rites and knowledge.

It is not that the one who is eligible for *karma* is eligible for knowledge. *Karma* is an auxiliary of knowledge. For the two sections of the Veda, the eligible persons are different.

1 BU, IV, iv, 22. See note on v. 14.

[224]

ज्ञानोत्पत्त्यादिकाह्निङ्गाद्यतस्तद्धेतुमात्रकम् ।

गम्यते न विशेषोऽतः कर्मैवेति न गम्यते ॥ २२४ ॥

Through the mark, generation of knowledge, etc., it is known that action is a cause thereof; but not that it alone is the distinctive cause.

Although, sometimes, *karma* is said to be generative of knowledge, it is not the distinctive cause of knowledge. *Karma* is the cause of knowledge through the purification of the mind; but *sannyāsa* is the direct means through the *modus operandi*, 'hearing', etc.

NTV—*jñānotpatti-liṅgāt karmaṇām na sākṣāt jñāna-sādhanaṭvaṃ gamyate kiṃtu paraṃparayāpi sādhanatva-mātraṃ gamyate atah karma-jñāna-kāṇḍayor bhinnādhikāritā.*

NKL—*dharmāt sukhaṃ ca jñānaṃ ceti. kvacit jñānahetutvaṃ gamyate. vividiṣantīti kvacid vividiṣā-hetutvaṃ. saṃskārā iti kvacit saṃskāratvaṃ. anupahatamanāveti kvacit chuddhi-pradhānatvaṃ.*

ato 'nekabalāt karmanām jñāna-hetutvamātram gamyate, na tu karmaiveti viśeṣaḥ. tasmāt karmanām suddhi-dvāreṇa hetutvaṁ, tatyāgasya sākṣād eveti na virodhaḥ ity arthaḥ.

AVS—karmanām jñāna-sādhana-tva-mātram gamyate, na tu karmaiva sādhanam iti, tasmāt karmāṇi suddhi-dvāreṇa sādhanam, sannyāsas tu sākṣāt-sādhanam iti vibhāgaḥ.

[225]

मुण्डोऽपरिग्रहोऽसङ्गो बहिरन्तः शुचिः सदा ।

ब्रह्मभूयाय भवति परिव्राडिति च श्रुतिः ॥ २२५ ॥

‘With shaven head, without possession, non-attached, pure always within and without, the wandering monk is fit to become Brahman’—thus Scripture.

This is an adaptation from the *Jābālopaniṣad*, 5: *atha parivrāḍ vivarṇa-vāsā muṇḍo 'parigrahaḥ sucir adrohī bhaikṣaṇo brahmabhūyāya bhavatīti.*

NKL—bāhya-yajñopavītādirahito 'parigrahaḥ.

[226]

इत्यादिश्रुतिवाक्यानि स्मृतिभिः सह कोटिशः ।

ज्ञानाय विदधत्युच्चैः संन्यासं सर्वकर्मणाम् ॥ २२६ ॥

The texts like these from Scripture, along with crores of texts of Traditional Code, enjoin emphatically the renunciation of all action for the sake of knowledge.

NKL quotes the following text: *śasikhaṁ vapanam kṛtvā bahiḥsūtram tyajed budhaḥ, tasmāt karma na kurvanti yatayaḥ pāradaṛśinaḥ.*

[227]

यच्चाभाणि विना कार्यं नाधिकारो निरूप्यते ।

दोषोऽयमपि नैव स्याज्ज्ञानोपाये यथोदिते ॥ २२७ ॥

As for the defects you pointed out, viz. that without something to be done eligibility is not established (v.31), even this does not exist, as there is the means for knowledge in the manner stated above.

It cannot be said that there must be something-to-be-done (*kārya*), in the absence of which there will be no eligibility. Is it contended that *kārya* is necessary for establishing in one who desires release eligibility for the means to *jñāna*, or for *jñāna* itself? Not the first; for, the means to knowledge consists of 'hearing', etc., as preceded by *sannyāsa*. Here the means itself is *kārya*; nothing else.

[228]

विधिमार्गेऽधिकारस्य परीक्षा वर्तते यतः ।

फलभूते तु विज्ञाने नाधिकारो निरूप्यते ॥ २२८ ॥

As in the path of injunctions there exists an examination of eligibility, there is no need to establish eligibility in regard to knowledge which is of the nature of fruit.

The second alternative too is not possible. As regards *jñāna*, there is no question of considering eligibility. It is not the content of an injunction, and it is a seen fruit. Inference: what is in dispute, viz. *jñāna*, is not what is enjoined, because it is a fruit, like *svarga*.

NTV—*vidheyasādhane kriyāyām loka-vedayor adhikārasya parīkṣā vartate, jñāne tu pramāṇaphalabhūte pramāṇatantratvān na vidheyatā, tena adhikāras tatra nirūpyate. yato 'to yathodita-jñānopāya evā*

'dhikāra ity arthaḥ. kiñca puruṣatantra eva vidheyatayā 'dhikāra iṣyate, na vastutantre, pramāṇaphalabhūtaṁ ca vijñānaṁ vastutantraṁ yataḥ ato vijñānasādhana evā 'dhikāraḥ, na jñāne.

[229]

अधिकारविचारो हि नृतन्त्रे वस्तुनीष्यते ।

वस्तुतन्त्रे न युक्तोऽसौ स्वयं चैव पुमर्थतः ॥ २२९ ॥

Inquiry into eligibility is necessary in respect of an object which is dependent on man ; that is not proper in respect of what is reality-dependent, for that itself is the human goal.

What is called *jñāna* is nothing other than the destruction of nescience through the rise of the self-cognition from the major texts. In fact, the self itself is the destruction of ignorance. Therefore, self-knowledge is the human goal. That is the nature of reality, and does not depend on an agent.

NTV—*puruṣeṇa kartum akartum anyathā ca kartum asakyatvāt jñānasya ity arthaḥ. kiñca pumarthasāadhanam eva vidheyam na pumarthaḥ svargādi, brahmajñānam tu svayam pumarthaḥ svargādi-sukha-sākṣātkārādivat, jñāna-jñeyasyā 'tmanah svargādivat svayam pumarthatvāt.*

NKL—*ātmanah sukha - rūpatvāt tadākāra - vṛtteḥ sukhasākṣātkāratayā svargavat pumarthatvān na vidheyatvam.*

AVS—*vihitampraty adhikāri-cintā, jñānasyā 'vihitatvāt svargādivat phalarūpatvāt jñānasya kartum-akartum-anyathākartum asakyatvāt jñāna-jñeyasya cā 'tmanah pumarthatvāc ca nāthā 'dhikāri-cinteti. kva tarhi adhikāri-vicārah prastuta iti cet jñāna-sādhana śravaṇādāy iti brūmah.*

[230]

अनात्मनि प्रमेयेऽर्थे या फलत्वेन संमता ।

प्रेमया सैव वेदान्तेष्वनुभूतिरिहाऽऽत्मनः ॥ २३० ॥

What is admitted as the fruit in the case of the not-self which is known as an object, that itself is to be known here in the Vedāntas as the experience of the self.

What was stated in v. 159-160a is here recalled. See note thereon.

NTV—etad uktam bhavati-yā yā pumarthe saṁvit sā sā pumarthā loke dr̥ṣṭā yathā sukha-tatsādhanādy-anubhūtiḥ, ātmā ca sukha-tatsādhanādy-anubhūti-svabhāvo vedānta-prameyaḥ, tasmād anena pumarthena bhavitavyam iti.

na hy anubhūter apumarthatā loke paramārthatō 'sti, apumartharūpatvasya anubhūter āropāt, anyathā nirupādhika-premāspadatā yadartham sarvaṁ yac ca nānyārtham tat sukham iti sukha-lakṣaṇa-lakṣitatā ca anubhūty-ātmano na syāt.

[231]

विज्ञानमानन्दमिति ह्यात्मैवेति श्रुतेस्तथा ।

पुमर्थस्यैव मेयत्वं मातृत्वाद्यनपेक्षिणः ॥ २३१ ॥

Because of the Scriptural texts “Consciousness, bliss”,¹ “The self alone (is bliss)”,² the human goal is alone the object of knowledge, without being expectant of cognizership, etc.

Cognizership, etc., are conditioned by adjuncts such as egoity, etc., which are the products of nescience. Although the contents of cognition vary, because, again, of nescience, the immediateness of cognition is the same in all cases. That is the self of the nature of awareness. That is the human goal.

1. BU, III, ix, 28.

2. SP makes the *śruti* text referred to here read 'ātmaivānandah'. But there is no such text in the Upaniṣads, though there are many which teach the same meaning; e.g. BU, IV, iii, 32.

[232]

तज्ज्ञानं यस्य संजातं जातमेवास्य नान्यथा ।

कुक्षिस्थस्यापि हि सतो वामदेवस्य तद्यथा ॥ २३२ ॥

In whom the knowledge of that has arisen, in him, for ever, has that arisen and never will it be otherwise ; as that (arose) in the sage Vāmadeva even while in the womb¹.

On the view that there is injunction of knowledge, it must be stated why there should be injunction. Is it for the non-sublation of knowledge, or for bringing about relation to the fruit, or for the destruction of the obstacles to knowledge ?

Not the first ; for in the case of Vāmadeva there was knowledge even while he was in the womb of his mother. There was no sublation of the study, etc., made in his earlier birth, and no one exhorted him to know the self. The true knowledge that results from 'hearing', etc., can never be sublated.

1. AIU, iv, 5.

NTV—*yathā sukṭi-jñāna-samakālam eva tat-prāptir evam brahma-jñāna-samakālam eva tat-prāptir bhavati, yathā garbhastho vāmadevo brahma-jñāna samakālam eva sārvaṭmyaṁ pratipede.*

[233-234]

तच्चाविद्यानिरास्येव व्याधभावनयाऽञ्जितः ।

राजसूनोः स्मृतिप्राप्तौ व्याधभावो निवर्तते ॥ २३३ ॥

यथैवमात्मनोऽज्ञस्य तत्त्वमस्यादिवाक्यतः ।

लब्धैकात्म्यस्मृतेर्व्येति सर्वाऽविद्या सकार्यका ॥ २३४ ॥

And that certainly removes nescience. When for the prince who is deluded by the idea that he is a hunter there is the recollection, the hunter-idea is removed; even so, for him who is ignorant of the self and attains recollection of the one self through the sentence 'That thou art', etc., all nescience, along with its products, vanishes.

Nor is the second alternative possible. There is no need for an injunction to bring about a relation between self-knowledge and the destruction of ignorance which is the fruit.

Nor the third. In the story of the prince who grew as the son of a hunter, forgetting his royal birth, the destruction of the obstructing belief is brought about by true recollection, even without an injunction.

NTV—kaścid rājakumāro jātamātrād eva vyādhakulaṁ praviṣṭo vyādhō 'smī 'ty ātmānaṁ manyate, tatra rājākumāro 'sī 'ty upadeśa-mātreṇa rājakumāra-smṛtau vyādhabhāvo nivartate.

NKL—kasyacid rājakumārasya garbhaniḥsāraṇānantara-bhraṣṭa-rājyatayā vanam praviṣṭasya vyādhaiḥ putratayā poṣitasya dṛḍhabhā-vita-vyādhabhāvasya auśadhādi-sevayā prāpta-rājya-sāmarthyasya tan-mantrabhis cinha-viśeṣa-darśanena avagata-rājabhāvasya nāsti tvam vyādhō rājaiveti bodhita-vākya-ja-bodhaḥ abodha-dhvaṁse nāparam apekṣate yathā ity arthaḥ.

[235]

यत एवमतो नात्र विधिः कल्प्यः कथञ्चन ।

अनर्थकः कल्पितोऽपि तस्येहानुपयोगतः ॥ २३५ ॥

This being so, injunction here is not to be assumed by any means. And, the assumption is futile, as it is of no use here.

Moreover, does Scripture say that there is injunction with regard to knowledge, or is such injunction assumed? There is no Scriptural declaration to that effect. As for the texts like, 'The self is to be seen,' (*BU*, II, iv, 5) etc., they are not injunctions. This will be explained later on.

There is no need to assume an injunction, for there is no ground for such an assumption. As, in respect of the self, activity and turning away are not possible, what is the use of assuming an injunction?

[236]

उत्पत्तिराप्तिः संस्कारो विकारश्च विधेः फलम् ।

मुक्तिर्विलक्षणैतेभ्यस्तेनेहानर्थको विधिः ॥ २३६ ॥

Origination, attainment, purification, and modification—these are the fruit of injunction. Release is different from these; therefore, injunction here is futile.

Injunction is possible only with regard to action. Action may lead to one of four results: origination, attainment, purification, and modification. Release which is the fruit of knowledge is none of these. It cannot be originated, because it is not what is made, and is beginningless. It is not what is attained, because it is without any relation, and is of the nature of what is eternally attained. It is not what is purified, because it is devoid of qualities, and no speciality can attach itself to it. It cannot be modified, because it is not a finite entity and is unchangeable. Therefore, release is not the fruit of an injunction.

NTV—vastunaḥ.....notpādyatā ananyāyatta-prakāśatvāt, na svaviṣaya-jñāna-vikāreṇa vikāryatā, niravidyatvāc ca na saṃskāryatā, ātmatvāc ca nāpyatā ity arthaḥ.

NKL—piṇḍotpatti-phalaṁ saṁnyavanāṁ piṣṭau saṁnyantīti vidhīyate. payaḥ-prāpti-phalaṁ dohanaṁ gām dogdhīti vrīhi-saṁskāra-phalaṁ prokṣaṇaṁ vrīhīn prokṣatīti vrīhi-vikāra-phalo 'vaghāto vrīhīn avahantīti.

[237]

अनन्यायत्तसंसिद्धेर्निरविद्यात्मवस्तुनः ।

न क्रियात्वं फलत्वं वा नापि कारकरूपता ॥ २३७ ॥

Since the real self which is free from nescience is not brought about by anything else, there is not for it the nature of being act, fruit, or causal correlate.

It cannot be said that Brahman is the content of the injunction to meditate. For, no action is possible with reference to Brahman. Brahman is not dependent on anything else. It is self-established. It cannot even be called a fruit, because it is not generated by any act.

[238]

अतोऽत्र विध्यभावोऽयं न कथञ्चन दूषणम् ।

अलंकृतिरियं साध्वी वेदान्तेषु प्रशस्यते ॥ २३८ ॥

Hence, the non-existence of injunction, here, is by no means a defect; this is a good ornament; it is praised in the Vedāntas.

The Vedāntas do not become *apramāṇa* because there is no injunction in them. On the contrary, the absence of injunctions is their merit.

AVS—yatra vidhi-kṛtyaṁ nāsti tatra vidhyasāmbhavo na doṣaḥ, pratyuta alaṅkāraḥ.

[239]

चोदनाभिर्नियुक्तोऽहं तथा ब्रह्माहमित्यपि ।

परस्परविरुद्धत्वादेकदैक्यं न द्वयम् ॥ २३९ ॥

‘By the commands I am prompted’ and ‘I am Brahman’—these two, because of mutual contradiction, cannot be (valid) at the same time and in the same place.

Injunction and knowledge belong to different universes of discourse. The one who has self-knowledge cannot be the patient of an injunction. There is nothing for him to do or not to do.

[240]

स्वामी सन्न हि भृत्येन स्वामिनेव नियुज्यते ।

संबोधनीय एवासौ सुप्तो राजेव बन्दिभिः ॥ २४० ॥

Being master, one is not prompted by a servant, as by a master. He is only to be awakened, as a sleeping king by his bards.

Even the seeker of knowledge is not to be prompted by an injunction. He is the master of the Veda, and not its servant, because he has risen above the way of *samsāra*. He is only to be awakened, even as a king may be by his bards.

The above explanation is on the assumption that the entire verse refers to the seeker of knowledge. An alternative explanation is that the first half of the verse applies to the one who has self-knowledge already, and the second half to the one who seeks it.

The seeker of knowledge may require prompting for ‘hearing’, etc., but not for knowledge.

NTV—*sarva-niyantuḥ pratyagātmano veda-svāmitayā na vedanīyojyatayā, kiṃtu avidyā-nidrayā supto bodhyata eva.*

NKL—*lakṣaṇayā tadākāra-vṛtti-janana-dvārā ajñāna-nivartakatvāt prāmāṇyam ity arthaḥ.*

AVS—*mumukṣuḥ padārtha-vivekavān veda-svāmitvān na vedena preryāte, kiṃtu bodhyata ity arthaḥ.*

[241]

चोदनालक्षणत्वादि धर्मं प्रत्येव गृह्यताम् ।

धर्मस्यैव प्रतिज्ञोक्तेर्न तु ब्रह्म प्रतीष्यते ॥ २४१ ॥

Being of the nature of command, etc., is to be understood with reference to religious duty (*dharma*) alone; because religious duty alone is declared as the premise; and it is not Brahman that is intended.

Injunctions have meaning only in regard to religious duty (*dharma*), and not in regard to Brahman. The *Pūrvamīmāṃsā-sūtra* has only *dharma* as the content of its inquiry.

[242]

अथातो धर्म इत्युक्तेश्चोदनालक्षणोक्तिः ।

तद्भूतानां क्रियार्थेन ह्याम्नायस्य क्रियार्थतः ॥ २४२ ॥

Because of the statement “Then, therefore, (the desire to know) religious duty” (*PM* I, i, 1), because of the declaration “Of the nature of command” (I, i, 2), because of (the *sūtra* I, i, 25) “(In a sentence) all words denoting things are (in close textual juxtaposition) with the words expressive of action”, and because of (the *sūtra* I, ii, 1) “Scripture is for the sake of ritual”, (Brahman is not subsidiary to injunction).

A few aphorisms of the *Pūrvamīmāṃsā-sūtra* are cited here to show that injunction has no reference to Brahman.

[243]

भावार्थाः कर्मशब्दा ये प्रतीयेत क्रिया ततः ।

इत्येवं नरतन्त्रेऽर्थे ज्ञेया द्वादशलक्षणी ॥ २४३ ॥

“All verbs are indicative of productive operations (*bhāvanās*); from them the unseen potency (*apūrva*) is known”, etc., (II, i, 1). Thus the twelve-chaptered work (on *Pūrva-mīmāṃsā*) is to be understood as having for purport what is dependent on man.

After quoting another aphorism, it is declared here that *Pūrvamīmāṃsā* discusses *dharma* alone which depends on man, and not Brahman which is beyond such distinctions as action, causal agent, etc.

NKL—*kartum akartum anyathā vā kartum vyacchakam, tad viṣaya prāktana-mīmāṃsā na para-niṣpanna-brahma-gocarā ity arthaḥ.*

[244]

वेदान्तार्थापवादाय नालं साऽतत्प्रमाणतः ।

मानं नालं निराकर्तुं वस्तु यन्मान्तरैर्मितम् ॥ २४४ ॥

It cannot remove the sense taught by *Vedānta*; for it is not an evidence therefor. A thing that is known through one means of valid knowledge cannot be set aside by another means of valid knowledge.

Mīmāṃsā has no power to sublate what is taught by *Vedānta*. Nor is injunction of *karma* capable of cancelling what is known through *Vedānta*.

If the reading be *tat-pramāṇataḥ* instead of *atat-pramāṇataḥ*, then the rendering would be ‘for, it is the authority for that (viz. *dharma*).’

AVS—*pūrva-bhāgasya vyāvahārikaṁ prāmāṇyam na tattvāvedana-lakṣaṇam, ato na tattvamādi-siddhārtha-bādhakatvam.*

[245–246]

स्वमेयमात्रशूरत्वान्मितेर्नान्यत्र मानता ।

अथातो ब्रह्मजिज्ञासा इत्याद्युक्तं नयान्वितम् ॥ २४५ ॥

मीमांसान्यायवत्त्वाभ्यां धर्ममीमांसनोक्तिवत् ।

एवं सत्यनुकूलार्थं तत्त्वमित्यादिकं वचः ॥ २४६ ॥

An evidence is valid only in respect of what can be known by it ; it is not an evidence elsewhere. The text “Then, therefore, the desire to know Brahman”, etc., is endowed with reasoning, because there are enquiry and rules, as in the case of the Pūrva-mīmāṃsā text. This being so, the text ‘That thou art’, etc., has a harmonious sense.

A *pramāṇa* functions only in respect of its content. It has no business to intrude into another field. If *Karma-mīmāṃsā* be valid, *Vedānta* too is valid. So, it cannot be said that *Vedānta* is a pseudo-*pramāṇa*.

[247-248 a]

सर्ववेदान्तविषयमन्यथा तद्विरुध्यते ।

न तत्र करणापेक्षा नेतिकर्तव्यता तथा ॥ २४७ ॥

यत्र यत्राऽऽत्मभावेन श्रुत्या ब्रह्मावबोध्यते ।

(It is) the content of all Vedāntas. Otherwise, that would be contradicted. Not there is the expectancy of instrument, nor of a *modus operandi* where by Scripture Brahman is made known as being of the nature of the self.

The Vedānta-teaching is about the non-dual Brahman. Its aim, thus, is to make known the truth. *Karma-kāṇḍa*, however, which depends on differences such as action, etc., makes known only what is not true. So, it must be admitted that each is *pramāṇa* in its own field.

There can be no productive operation (*bhāvanā*) in relation to Brahman. Each productive operation has three elements. What is to be accomplished (*bhāvya*)? What is the instrument (*karana*)? And, what is the *modus operandi* (*itikartavyatā*)? Brahman is not what is to be accomplished (*bhāvya*). The other two elements, therefore, have no meaning with reference to it. *Bhāvanā* relates to action, and not to Brahman. The Vedāntas only teach that Brahman is the Self.

NKL—sarva-vedānta-viṣayaṁ sarvopaniṣad-gataṁ mahāvākyam upakramādi-liṅga-gati-sāmānyābhyāṁ tatparam ity arthaḥ.

kiṁ kena katham bhāvayed ity aṁsatrayāpekṣā bhāvanā neha sambhavati, karaṇāṁsābhāvad iti bhāvah.

AVS—yatra aṁsa-trayaṁ tatra bhāvanā, yatra bhāvanā tatra vidhiḥ, atra tu tattvamasīty-ādi-pradeśeṣu na aṁsa-trayam, tata eva na bhāvanā, tata eva na vidhiḥ, ato 'dhikāri-sādhana-bheda iti.

[248 b-249 a]

इतिकर्तव्यतादानं करणादानमेव च ॥ २४८ ॥

तत्र तत्र विधिः स्थाने प्रहितस्य फलेच्छया ।

Where *modus operandi* and instrument are brought in, it is but proper that there should be an injunction for one who is impelled by the desire for fruit.

Bhāvanā with the three elements mentioned above is possible only in the sphere of action.

[249 b-250]

आप्ताशेषपुमर्थत्वात्त्यक्तानर्थस्य च स्वतः ॥ २४९ ॥

अनात्मनीव नेच्छेयं कथंचित्स्यादिहात्मनि ।

तन्निवृत्तौ निवर्तेते इतिकर्तव्यसाधने ॥ २५० ॥

Because the human goal has been attained fully and because evil has been removed of its own accord, there does not arise by any means desire here for the self, as for the not-self.

When that desire is removed, the *modus operandi* and means are removed.

It is intelligible that there may be desire for heaven, etc., which constitute the not-self. There can be no such desire in relation to the self. When one knows the nature of the self from the major texts, one realizes one's eternal bliss-nature and freedom from evil. So, the self is not the fruit or result of some activity. There can be no *bhāvanā* with regard to it.

[251]

निरन्तरायतोऽशेषपुमर्थस्याऽऽत्मरूपतः ।

न चांशत्वयशून्येह भावनेष्टा परीक्षकैः ॥ २५१ ॥

As the human goal without residue and free from obstacles is of the nature of the self, a productive operation devoid of the three elements is not acceptable to inquirers.

It cannot be said that there may be in *Vedānta* a *bhāvanā* without the three elements. Such a productive operation is impossible. And, the one who has realized the self desires nothing; he has nothing to accomplish.

NTV—*avidyākhyontarāyo vidyodayād eva nivartate na tu vidhi-vasād ity arthaḥ.*

NKL—*pumarthasya sukha-sākṣātkārasyā 'tmarūpataḥ svataḥ-prāptatvān nirantarāyato pratibandhatvād bhāvyāntarasya kalpayitum asakyatvād ity arthaḥ....avidyāstamayāḥ phalaṁ dhīśādhyaṁ dhīś ca na prayatnam apekṣata ity arthaḥ.*

[252 a]

भावनातो न चान्यत्र विधिरभ्युपगम्यते ।

And in cases other than where there is productive operation, injunction is not admitted.

Since *bhāvanā* is not possible in the case of Brahman, there can be no injunction with regard to it. Brahman is made known by the major texts. It is only that knowledge that is the means to release, not *karma*. Therefore, for the two sections the eligible persons and the means are different.

NTV—tasmāt pūrṇa-niśreyasa-pratyag-anubhūty-avidyā-nivṛtṭyā tadavaseṣa-sādhana-jñāne vidhyabhāvanā na tatrā 'dhikārah, kiṃtu jñāna-sādhana-śravaṇādāv eveti siddham.

[252 b-253]

मोहमात्रान्तरायायां मुक्तावस्तु यथोदितम् ॥ २५२ ॥

एकदेशो विकारो वा संसारी त्वात्मनो यदा ।

किं तदाऽप्युक्तमार्गेण मुक्तिः किंवा क्रियाश्रयात् ॥ २५३ ॥

“ If delusion were the only obstacle, what has been stated (by you) will do for release. When, however, the soul in bondage is either a part (*ekadeśa*) or a modification (*vikāra*) of the self, even then, is release got through the said path, or as dependent on action? ”

Pūrvapakṣa—If delusion alone were the obstacle to *mokṣa*, then *jñāna* may remove it. But it is not so. In the views which regard the *jīva* as a part or as a mode of the supreme spirit, there would be required *karma* for effecting release. If that be so, how can there be difference of means as between the two sections?

[254]

निवृत्तावेव निःशेषसंसारस्य तदाऽपि तु ।

आगन्तोरधिकारः स्यान्न प्रवृत्तौ कथंचन ॥ २५४ ॥

Even then, the eligibility is for turning away from the adventitious transmigration without residue and not, by any means, for activity.

Siddhānta—Even in the view that the *jīva* is a part of Brahman, what is it that is regarded as release—is it the attainment of Brahman, or is it the destruction of difference? On the first alternative, the non-difference of the part and the whole is not brought about by *karma*, because that is self-established. What is required is only the destruction of bondage including *karma*. Therefore, the attainment of Brahman does not require *karma*.

[255]

आत्माज्ञाननिमित्तस्य ह्यन्यत्वानुपपत्तिः ।

तदाऽप्यविद्याविध्वस्तावधिकारो न कर्मणि ॥ २५५ ॥

As difference is unintelligible being dependent on nescience of self, even so, eligibility is for destroying nescience, not for action.

Now for the other alternative. If the *jīva* is a part of Brahman, it is non-different therefrom. So, there can be no real difference between them. And, the difference must be due to nescience. The destruction of that can be only through *jñāna*, and not through *karma*.

[256]

कर्तव्याभावतस्त्वेवं विकारेऽपि न कर्मणि ।

कारणैकत्वसंपत्तेः स्वतःसिद्धत्वहेतुतः ॥ २५६ ॥

Even if (the soul be) a modification (of the self) there is no (eligibility for) work, as there is nothing to be done, since attaining oneness with the cause is established of itself.

After examining the view that the *jīva* is a part of Brahman, the other view that it is a mode is here considered. If the *jīva* is a mode, then Brahman must be its principal. Here, what is release? Is it the attainment of Brahman which is the principal? Or, is it the destruction of difference from that? Not the first, for the non-difference of the effect from the cause is not accomplished through *karma*, because that non-difference is natural.

[257]

मृदापत्तिर्घटस्येव विकारस्याऽऽत्मनो ध्रुवम् ।

अविकारात्मसंपत्तिः सा च तत्त्वावबोधतः ॥ २५७ ॥

As the attainment of clay by pot, the attainment of the unmodified self by the *jīva*-self which is a modification is certain; and that is through knowledge of the truth.

The other alternative, viz., that *karma* is required for the destruction of difference is now refuted. Just as pot, the effect, is non-different by nature from clay, the cause, so also is the *jīva* from Brahman. The difference, such as it is, must be due to nescience; and that can be removed only by true knowledge.

[258]

कार्यकारणयोर्मित्तौ कार्यकारणता कुतः ।

अमित्तौ च तयोरैक्यात्कार्यकारणता कुतः ॥ २५८ ॥

If cause and effect be different, how is there relation of cause and effect; if non-different, since they are identical, how is there the relation of cause and effect?

Hitherto, admitting the views that the *jīva* is a part and a mode of Brahman, it was shown that *karma* cannot be the direct means to *mokṣa*. Now, those views themselves are criticized.

At the basis of all relations is that of cause and effect. But this relation is unintelligible.

[259-260 a]

विज्ञानात्मविकारस्य कारणैक्यं विमुक्तता ।

स्वतस्तस्य च संसिद्धेः कार्यता नोपपद्यते ॥ २५९ ॥

कर्मातोऽनर्थकं मुक्तावेकदेशविकारयोः ।

Release is identity of the modification of the intelligence-self with the cause. Since that is established of itself, it is not something to be accomplished (*kāryatā*). There is futility of action for release of what is either a part or a modification.

Brahman is of the nature of consciousness. Even those who hold that the *jīva* is a part or mode of Brahman believe that its release consists in its identity with Brahman which is its cause and ground. But that identity is self-established, and so cannot be accomplished by *karma*.

[260 b-261]

अप्यनर्थाय कर्म स्यात्क्रियमाणं न मुक्तये ॥ २६० ॥

प्रतिकूलं विमुक्तेश्च क्रियमाणमसंशयम् ।

कर्माऽऽरभेत तेनैतन्मुक्तौ कर्म निरर्थकम् ॥ २६१ ॥

Moreover action that is being done will make for evil, not for release. Action that is being done will produce, without doubt, obstacle to release. Therefore, in regard to this release, action is futile.

Not only is *karma* futile, but also it will be the cause of evil. *Karma* that is done according to the injunction of Veda will lead to *Svarga*, etc., that are obstacles to *mokṣa*.

NKL—na kevalam nairarthakyaṁ kaivalya-pratikūla-saṁsārā-rambhakatvād anarthakaram ca.

[262]

विकारोऽत्यन्तनिर्मिन्नो यदा तु स्याद्विकारिणः ।

तदाऽपि विकृतेर्नाशो मुक्तिरित्यभिधीयते ॥ २६२ ॥

If, however, the modification is wholly different from that which is modified, even then, it must be said that the destruction of the modification is release.

If it be held that the *jīva* is radically different from Brahman, then release would consist in its total destruction.

[263]

अत्राप्यनर्थकं कर्म तत्फलासंभवत्वतः ।

कर्मेव ज्ञानमप्यत्र फलाभावादनर्थकम् ॥ २६३ ॥

Even here action is futile, since there is no possibility of its fruit. Like action, even knowledge is of no use, here, as there is no fruit.

If it be held that the destruction of the *jīva* is release, there would be no need for *karma*. If it be said that there may be need for knowledge, then our view will have to be accepted.

NKL—phalinobhāve phalāsaṁbhavād ity abhisandhiḥ.

[264]

नैवाविद्याकृतैवासौ वास्तवी यदि संसृतिः ।

स्वरूपनाशदोषः स्यादेकदेशेऽपि पूर्ववत् ॥ २६४ ॥

If transmigration were real, it will not be a product of nescience. There will be the defect of destruction of nature, even on the view of (the *jīva* being) a part, as before.

Moreover, on the view that the *jīva* is a mode of Brahman, is bondage natural, or is it nescience-caused? If bondage be natural, it cannot be destroyed by Brahman-knowledge. Nor can it be removed by *karma*, because *karma* is the cause of bondage.

The same criticism holds good with regard to the view that the *jīva* is a part of Brahman.

[265-266 a]

यदा त्वविद्ययाऽध्यस्तं संसारित्वं न वस्तुतः ।

विकारेऽवयवे चैव तदा पूर्वोक्त एव तु ॥ २६५ ॥

पक्षो निर्वहणीयः स्यादस्माभिरपि संमतः ।

If, however, transmigration is superimposed by nescience, and not a reality, whether (the *jīva* be) a modification or a part, then what was stated before has to be maintained. This is acceptable to us also.

If bondage be nescience-caused, then the modality or part-hood of the *jīva* cannot be real; that too would be the result of nescience. If that be so, then, what results is our view. The two sections of the Veda are different; and the persons eligible for them are different.

[266 b-267]

सर्ववादाविरोधी च नातो विधिरिहेष्यते ॥ २६६ ॥

तदा हि कल्पनाः सर्वा विकारावयवादिकाः ।

वृथैवेमा ह्यविद्यैव सर्वाः संपादयिष्यति ॥ २६७ ॥

This does not conflict with any view. Therefore, there is not admitted here injunction. Then, indeed, all assumptions such as 'modification', 'part', etc., are futile. Nescience itself will accomplish all these.

All those who believe in *mokṣa* will have to admit that bondage is nescience-caused and that release is through knowledge. Then, it follows that there is no possibility of injunction in the *Vedāntas*. *Mokṣa* is not a fruit like *Svarga*, and *jñāna* is not dependent on human will. So, the *Vedāntas* terminate simply after revealing the nature of Reality. The assumptions that the *jīva* is a part or mode, etc., of Brahman are all imaginations.

NKL—ātma-jñānān niḥśreyasādhigama iti sarva-vādinām avivāda-padam ity arthaḥ.

[268-269 a]

पूर्ण निःश्रेयसं तस्मात्तदपूर्णमविद्यया ।

आभासते मृषैवातो यथाभूतात्मविद्यया ॥ २६८ ॥

प्रध्वस्तायामविद्यायां पूर्णमेवावशिष्यते ।

Wholeness is release. Hence the non-wholeness which is on account of nescience appears but illusorily. Therefore, when nescience is destroyed through the knowledge of the real self, wholeness alone remains.

Brahman is the whole (*pūrṇa*); that itself is release, perfection. *Karma* cannot achieve that, because Brahman is not a finite object.

Cp. BU, V, i, 1 :

pūrṇam adaḥ pūrṇam idam

pūrṇāt pūrṇam udacyate,

pūrṇasya pūrṇam ādāya

pūrṇam evā 'vaśiṣyate.

[269 b-270]

अनर्थको विधिस्तस्मात्सर्वो निःश्रेयसं प्रति ॥ २६९ ॥

इत्येतन्न्यायतः सिद्धं यत्तु प्राक्चोदितं त्वया ।

आम्नायस्य क्रियार्थत्वादित्यत्राप्यभिधीयते ॥ २७० ॥

Futile, therefore, is all injunction in regard to release; this has been logically established. (v. 228, ff.) As for what was objected to by you 'Because Scripture is for the sake of ritual' (v. 36), in regard to this also, it may be remarked as follows.

Since Brahman does not fall within any of the four categories of the fruit of action, there can be no injunction with regard to it.

As for what was said that Scripture is for the sake of ritual, we have already stated our reply. We shall explain that further.

*AVS—niḥśreyasa-sabdena brhmābhilapyate, tat pūrṇam deśādy-
aparicchinnam, tasya ca bhedaḥ tad-avidyā-vilasitaḥ, vidyayā tv avidyā-
nivṛttau brahmaiva bhavati, ataḥ sarva-prakāro vidhir mokṣam-praty
anarthaka eva.*

[271]

तत्राऽऽम्नायाभिधानस्य ह्याम्नायांशाभिधानतः ।

विध्युत्तीनां क्रियार्थत्वं सिद्धं हेतुतयोच्यते ॥ २७१ ॥

There, the term, 'āmnāya' refers only to a part of Scripture, because 'being for the sake of ritual' is only as regards injunctive texts.

In the *Pūrvamīmāṃsā-sūtra* (I, ii, 1) 'Since Scripture has action for purport', etc., the word 'Scripture' (*āmnāya*) refers only to the *karma-kāṇḍa*, and does not include the Upaniṣads. From *PM*, I, i, 2, it is clear that only injunctive texts have action for purport, and not all scriptural texts.

[272]

क्रियाप्रकरणस्थानां विधिशेषात्मनां सताम् ।

वचसामक्रियार्थानामानर्थक्याय तद्वचः ॥ २७२ ॥

That statement (in the *Sūtra*: *ānarthakyam atadar-thānām*) relates to the futility of those words which do not have ritual for purport, but which are subsidiary to injunction in the context of ritual.

The expression in *PM*, I, ii, i, 'There is futility for those (words) which do not have that (ritual) for purport', also refers to *karma-kāṇḍa*.

[273]

न तूपनिषदां न्याय्यं पार्थगर्थ्यस्य संभवात् ।

पूर्वोक्तेनैव न्यायेन नातस्तद्विधिशेषता ॥ २७३ ॥

Because they have a different purport, it is not proper to regard the Upaniṣads as auxiliary to injunction. This is evident, by the aforesaid reasoning.

Although the Upaniṣads do not have action for purport, they are not futile. They have a different sense; and their fruit cannot be denied, because it is declared in Scripture, and because it is actually experienced by the wise.

[274]

विधिना त्वेकवाक्यत्वादिति यच्चापि चोदितम् ।

तेषामेव तदप्यस्तु तदानर्थक्यचोदनात् ॥ २७४ ॥

As for what was urged, 'Because of syntactical unity with injunction,' let that be so with regard to

those (texts which occur in the ritual sections); because it is declared that they would be futile (otherwise).

PM, I, ii, 7 'Because of syntactical unity with injunction through eulogizing, (the non-injunctive texts) may be for the sake of injunction' (see v. 36) also refers to those non-injunctive texts which are to be found in the *karma-kāṇḍa*.

NTV—*na cā 'rthavādasṭha-padānām anuṣṭhāpanam asti, ato yuktam tāni vidhinaikavākyatām anubhaveyur iti.*

[275]

न तु वेदान्तवचसां दृष्टार्थत्वेन हेतुना ।

तद्बुद्धेः पृथगर्थत्वमुक्तमेवातिविस्तरात् ॥ २७५ ॥

This is, however, not so as regards Vedānta texts, for the reason that they have a seen fruit. That the knowledge thereof has a different purport has been explained at length (v. 23 *et seq.*).

Those texts in which there is no mention of fruit may have syntactical unity with those wherein a fruit is mentioned, and they may be subsidiary to the latter. The Upaniṣads, however, do have a fruit and that too a seen fruit (*dr̥ṣṭa-phala*), and not an unseen fruit like *Svarga*. Therefore, it is clear that the Vedānta texts have a purport other than what the ritual-sections have.

NTV—*na co 'paniṣad-gatāni padāny adr̥ṣṭārthīni bhavanti. na hi vedāntaiḥ pratyag-advaye brahmaṇy avagatē jñātavyam āptavyam vā 'vaśiṣyate.*

[276a]

अन्यार्थानुपपत्तेश्च वेदान्तवचसां तथा ।

And because for the Vedānta texts, being for the sake of another is unintelligible.

The texts about *Prayāja* (fore-sacrifice), etc., are auxiliary to the texts about *Darsapūrṇamāsa* rites because the fore-sacrifices are helpful in regard to the *Darsapūrṇamāsa* rites yielding their fruit. But there is no such relation between the Vedānta texts and the ritual texts. The self which is known through Vedānta receives no help from *karma*. And so, Vedānta is not subsidiary to *karma-kāṇḍa*.

[276b-277a]

अर्थैकत्वगतौ सत्यां वाक्यभेदप्रकल्पना ॥ २७६ ॥

न न्याय्या सेति दृष्टत्वाद्देवस्य त्वादिवाक्यवत् ।

“When there is unity of sense, to postulate sentence-split is not proper, as it is seen in the text: (At the impulse) of the divine (Savitṛ, I take) thee, etc.

Pūrvapakṣa—Where syntactical unity (*ekavākyatā*) is possible, sentence-split (*vākyabheda*) is improper. This is the rule. As there is syntactical unity between the *Prayāja* text and the *Darsapūrṇamāsa* text, so is there syntactical unity between the Vedānta texts and the ritual-texts. The reason for this is that they have a unitary sense. As an instance may be cited the syntactical unity between ‘*devasya tvā savituh*’ and ‘*nirvapāmi*’ in the text ‘At the impulse (*prasavana*) of the divine Savitṛ, I take thee with the arms of the Aśvins, with the hands of Pūṣan, thee, agreeable to Agni!’ ((*Vājasaneyi-saṁhitā*, i. 10). See *Śatapatha-brāhmaṇa*, SBE, vol. xii, p. 16.

NKL—*karma-jñānayoḥ prayāja-darsapūrṇamāsavād aṅgāṅgitvāt tatkāṇḍayos tad-vākya-vedakārtḥayor ekavākyatva-sambhave tad-bhedo na kalpyo gauravād ity arthah.*

[277b-278a]

तथैव पृथगर्थत्वगतौ भिन्नवचस्त्वतः ॥ २७७ ॥

इषे त्वादिषु दृष्टत्वान्न न्याय्यैकार्थकल्पना ।

Even so, where there is difference in sense, there must be sentence-split. This is seen in *iṣe tvā*, etc. So the postulation of unity of sense is not proper.

Siddhānta—There is no unity of sense. Where there is difference of sense, sentence-split has to be admitted. As an illustration may be cited the text ‘*iṣe tvā, ūrje tvā*’ [For the sake of growth, thee (I cut); for the sake of strength, thee (I plane)] (*Vājaṣaneyi-saṁhitā*, I, i). These *mantras* are addressed to the presiding deity of the *palāśa* tree as it is being cut and planed. The question here is whether ‘*iṣe tvā, ūrje tvā*’ is one *mantra* or two. The answer is that they are two *mantras*, even though they are found together. See *PM*, II, i, 47: ‘When the sentences are equally independent (of one another) they should be treated as syntactically distinct (sentences).’

[278b-279a]

ज्ञानकाण्डार्थशेषत्वं कर्मकाण्डस्य यत्पुनः ॥ २७८ ॥

विनियोजकहेत्वेतत्तयोर्वाक्यैकवाक्यतः ।

As for the subsidiariness of the ritual section to the sense of the knowledge-section, that is accounted for as a case of syntactical unity with sentence, because of (the *vividiṣā* text) being the applicatory text.

We do admit that the ritual section (*karma-kāṇḍa*) is auxiliary to the knowledge-section (*jñāna-kāṇḍa*) through purification of the mind. This is evidenced by the *vividiṣā* text. But this does not mean that the two sections have an identical sense. The unity here is as between two different sentences which are related as the helper and the helped. It is not like the syntactical unity of *mantras* and *arthavādas*, which have no independent purport, with injunction (*vidhi*). Just as the injunction to earn wealth is related to the injunction to perform sacrifice, so is *karma-kāṇḍa* to *jñāna-kāṇḍa*

Wealth may be used for purposes other than the performance of sacrifice. Similarly, *karma* may be the means to ends other than *jñāna*. What the *vividiṣā* text says is that *karma* is to be used as a means to *jñāna*. So, there is, as between the two *kāṇḍas*, syntactical unity of sentence with a sentence (*vākyaikavākyatā*.)

NTV—etad uktam bhavati—tam etam vedānuvacanenetyādi viniyojaka-vaśāt saṁskāra-dvāreṇa vividiṣā-dvāreṇa vā jñānotpatti-śeṣatvam eva karmaṇām, na mokṣa-śeṣatvam, ato bhinnārthatvāt naikavākyatvam karma-vijñāna-kāṇḍayor iti.

[279b-280]

न्यायेन वक्ष्यमाणेन भूयोऽप्येतत्प्रवक्ष्यते ॥ २७९ ॥

पार्थगर्थ्यमतः सिद्धमपास्तविधिलक्षणम् ।

सर्वोपनिषदां चाऽऽत्मज्ञानं कैवल्यसाधनम् ॥ २८० ॥

By the reasoning to be hereafter set forth, this will be stated again (i.e. that the Upaniṣads have a fruit of their own). Therefore, for all the Upaniṣads there is a different sense. This is self-knowledge which has no characteristic of injunction and is the means to release (*kaivalya*).

There may be *vākyaikavākyatā* between two sentences each of which has a fruit of its own. The Upaniṣad texts have as their fruit self-knowledge. So, they have a sense different from that of the ritual texts.

[281]

निःशेषवाङ्मनःकायप्रवृत्त्युपरमात्मिका ।

तन्निष्ठा चेह विज्ञेया यथोक्तन्यायवर्त्मना ॥ २८१ ॥

The discipline (of knowledge) is of the nature of the quiescence of all activity, of speech, mind and body. This is to be known by the reasoning already set forth.

It is only for those who are endowed with quiescence, self-control, etc., that the Upaniṣads reveal knowledge.

AVS—niṣṭhā-sabdena śravaṇādy atra grhyate, tad eva jñāna-sādhanaṁ ity arthaḥ.

[282]

अधिकारोऽपि तस्यां च सिद्धोऽशेषक्रियात्यजः ।

जिज्ञासोरेव कर्तुस्तु न सिषाधयिषोः सदा ॥ २८२ ॥

Eligibility therefor (*viz.*, the discipline) is also established only for him who has renounced all activity and who desires knowledge ; and not for the agent who always seeks to accomplish something.

The eligibility for the path of knowledge, *viz.* *śravaṇa*, etc., does not depend on *niyoga*. It is the *sannyāsin* that is the eligible person for *jñāna*, and not the agent of actions.

[283]

ब्रह्मात्मतत्त्वव्युत्पत्तिमालेणान्यधिकारिता ।

भवत्येवात्र जिज्ञासोरज्ञस्यापि मुमुक्षुतः ॥ २८३ ॥

Eligibility results even for him who, although ignorant, possesses a general knowledge about the truth of the Brahman-self, and who desires knowledge and release.

It may be argued that eligibility for knowledge is not possible for the one who does not know Brahman, and is not necessary for

the one who already knows it. The reply is that the one who desires release learns from the Vedāntas a preliminary and quite general knowledge about Brahman, and thus gains eligibility for *śravaṇa*, etc.

[284]

मैवं प्रक्रमसंहारपर्यालोचनया पुरा ।

वेदस्यैकार्थ्यतात्पर्यमेकवाक्यतयोदितम् ॥ २८४ ॥

“Not thus. It has been stated already that, on a consideration of the initial and concluding passages, the Veda has one sense and purport; and so, there is syntactical unity.

Pūrvapakṣa—Through a study of the initial and concluding texts of the Veda, it is learnt that the Veda has *kārya* alone for purport. So, we must infer that the Vedāntas have syntactical unity with the *karma-kāṇḍa*. That being so, there cannot be a difference of eligibility for the Vedāntas.

[285]

तेन निःशेषवेदोक्तकारिणोऽत्राधिकारिता ।

सिद्धे ह्यनेकवाक्यत्वे कल्प्या भिन्नाधिकारिता ॥ २८५ ॥

“Therefore, eligibility, here, is for the one who does all that is enjoined by the Veda. For, it is only when the diversity of context has been established, that there is need for assuming difference in eligibility.”

Since the two *kāṇḍas* have syntactical unity, there is no difference in eligibility. He who has performed all the rites and sacrifices, follows *jñāna-niyoga* and attains *mokṣa*.

[286]

मैवं भिन्नैकवाक्यत्वे प्रागस्माभिः समर्थिते ।

ततश्च भवदुक्तस्य चोद्यस्येह न संभवः ॥ २८६ ॥

Not thus. When we have already established that there is syntactical unity of only what are different there is no occasion for raising your objection.

Siddhānta—We have already shown that the two *kāṇḍas* have different fruits, that the *karma-kāṇḍa* may become subsidiary to the *jñāna-kāṇḍa*, and that in this sense alone there may be syntactical unity.

[287]

नापि निःशेषवेदार्थमनुष्ठातुं क्षमो नरः ।

पुमायुषाऽपि येन स्यादात्मज्ञानेऽधिकारिता ॥ २८७ ॥

Nor is it possible for a man to perform all that is enjoined in the Vedas, even though he may strive all through his life (of one hundred years) in which case alone (according to you) there could be eligibility for self-knowledge.

Moreover, the condition precedent for adopting the path of *jñāna* laid down by you is impossible of achievement. No one can perform all the rites and sacrifices.

NKL—*sandhyāvandanam-ārābhya-sahasrasaṁvatsara - paryantānām karmanām ānanyād ity arthah.*

[288]

संपदां चार्थवादत्वं तेन वेदान्तगोचरे ।

ज्ञानेऽधिकारिणोऽभावत्प्रामाण्यं क्षिप्यते स्वतः ॥ २८८ ॥

Attaining prosperity (*sampat*) is an eulogy ; therefore as there would be no eligible persons for knowledge

having as its sphere the Vedānta, the intrinsic validity (of the Veda) would have to go.

If it be said that there is the same eligible person for the two *kāṇḍas*, we ask, who is this eligible person? Is it the one who desires *Svarga*, etc., or the one who desires *jñāna*? It cannot be the first, for sacrifice, etc., are auxiliary to *jñāna*, and the supposed fruits thereof, viz. *Svarga*, etc., are not intended to be the fruits. Nor the second, for, as it is not possible for any single person to perform all the rites and sacrifices, there would be no eligible person for *jñāna*.

AVS—sāmpac-chabdena upāsanā-'bhidhīyata iti kecit. teṣāṃ ayam abhiprāyaḥ aśvamedhādi-karmā-'nadhikṛtānām tat-phalārthinām sāmpad upadiśyate. yadi sakala-vedārthādhikāriṇaḥ jñānādhikāraḥ tadā sāmpad avivakṣitā bhaved iti.

[289]

किंच मानादविज्ञाता विमुक्तिः काम्यते न च ।

ज्ञातायां स्वात्मरूपत्वात्सुतरां नास्ति कामना ॥ २८९ ॥

“Now, if release is not known through a means of valid knowledge, it cannot be desired; if known, since it is the nature of one's own self, there cannot be still desire (therefor).

Pūrvapakṣa—The distinctive feature about the eligible person is said to be his desire for *mokṣa*. Does he desire *mokṣa* even without knowing it, or after knowing it? Without knowing it, he cannot desire; after knowing it, there is no need for desire.

In this verse *kimca* is used in the sense of *nanu*. See *NKL*: *nanvarthe kimceti prayogaḥ ātmano brahmabhūyaṃ kaivalyam anavagataṃcen na kāmyeta jñānakāryatvād kāmanāyāḥ avagataṃcet siddhatvāt kāmanām nirundhyād ato mumukṣur nādhikārity abhisandhiḥ.*

AVS—athavā kiñceti-slokaḥ pūrvapakṣaḥ. nanu kiñceti samuccaye gamyamāne pūrvapakṣatvaṁ katham siddhāntokty-anantaram nāyaṁ doṣaḥ anekārthatvān-nipātītānāṁ kiñca nanu ity arthaḥ. ayam arthaḥ. yathā asmat-pakṣe adhikāry-abhāvāt veda-prāmāṇyākṣepaḥ evam tvat-pakṣepi syāt mokṣakāmas tavādhikārī mokṣe ca kāmo no sambhavatīty uktam.

[290]

न युक्तं कामना मुक्तौ पुंसां नास्तीति भाषितुम् ।
देशकालानवच्छिन्नसुखाद्यर्थित्वदर्शनात् ॥ २९० ॥

It is not proper to say that there is no desire on the part of man for release ; for there is seen desire for happiness unconditioned by space and time.

Siddhānta—In our view, the possibility of the desire for *mokṣa* is stated thus : every living being wants happiness and shuns misery, and so the desire is possible for *mokṣa* which is the same as the self—the unlimited happiness marked by the total absence of misery. Although *mokṣa* is our own nature, we do not know it through *pramāṇa* before the rise of knowledge. Hence the need for Vedānta. And, the one who is eligible for Vedānta does not require the *karma-kāṇḍa*.

NTV—sukhaṁ me syād duḥkhaṁ me mābhūd iti deśakālāsprṣṭaṁ sukhamātraṁ duḥkhanivṛtti-mātraṁ vā kāmayaṁānās sarve puruṣā dṛśyante.

NKL—mābhūd anvapi me duḥkhaṁ, sukhy eva syām ahaṁ sadeti, niratisayānanda-niḥśeṣānarthanivṛtti-prārthanā-darśanāt.

[291]

किंच ज्ञानमदृष्टार्थमग्निहोतादिवद्यदि ।
ततोऽधिकारिचिन्ता स्यात्कृतेऽप्यफलशङ्कया ॥ २९१ ॥

Further, if knowledge were to have an unseen fruit, like *Agnihotra*, etc., then there might be the doubt whether there is an eligible person or not, because of doubt as regards something done not fructifying.

For the following reason also, in our view there results the eligible person for *jñāna*: *jñāna*, for us, has a seen fruit, and not an unseen fruit as for you. If it be an unseen fruit, there may be the doubt if it would result or not. If there be that doubt, the eligibility will not be certain. Since, in our view, *jñāna* is a seen fruit, like the fruit of agriculture, the desire for it as well as the eligibility are established.

[292]

कामिनाऽप्यभिहोत्रादि शूद्रेणानधिकारिणा ।

कृतमप्यफलं तेन यत्नात्तत्र निरूप्यते ॥ २९२ ॥

Agnihotra, etc., performed by a *Śūdra*, who is not eligible, though having desire (for heaven), do not yield fruit. Hence, there eligibility is determined with care.

Where the fruit is unseen, as in the case of *Agnihotra*, there is need to inquire as to who is eligible and who is not. Mere desire, here, for an end will not do.

[293]

अविद्याधस्मरज्ञानजन्ममात्रावलम्बिनः ।

पुमर्थस्याधिकं शास्त्रार्त्तिकचिदत्र तु नार्थ्यते ॥ २९३ ॥

But, here, nothing more is sought from Scripture than the human goal which depends only on the rise of knowledge which destroys ignorance.

As far as Vedānta is concerned, no unseen fruit is desired. What Scripture does here is to dispel ignorance; and when ignorance is dispelled, the human goal is reached.

[294]

कुतस्तज्ज्ञानमिति चेत्तद्धि बन्धपरिक्षयात् ।

असावपि च भूतो वा भावी वा वर्ततेऽथवा ॥ २९४ ॥

“Whence that knowledge?” If thus it be asked (it is replied): That, indeed, is from the removal of obstacle.

“Even that is either past, future, or present”.

Pūrvapakṣa—The aforesaid *jñāna* does not arise from Scripture, for we see that to be the case with many who are learned in Scripture.

Siddhānta—In the case of those who are free from sin, there is the rise of true knowledge from the ‘hearing’, etc., of Scripture.

Pūrvapakṣa—Is that sin (obstacle) past, present, or future? The sin that is past cannot stand as an obstacle. Nor the sin that is going to be in the future. As for present sin, that is impossible in the case of one who has followed the path of *jñāna*.

AVS—*anuṣṭhita-sāadhanasyāpi jñānotpatti-pratibandha-pāpādikṣaya-vyatiरेकेṇa jñānaṁ na sambhavati.*

[295]

अधीतवेदवेदाऽर्थोप्यत एव न मुच्यते ।

हिरण्यनिधिदृष्टान्तादिदमेव च दर्शितम् ॥ २९५ ॥

Therefore it is that even though one might have studied the Veda and its meaning, one is not released. This has been shown (in the *Chāndogya*) by the illustration of buried treasure.

Siddhānta—Present sin serves as an obstacle to the rise of Brahman-knowledge. There may be the causal aggregate for knowledge, and yet knowledge may not arise because of some obstacle. The *Chāndogya* text (VIII, iii, 2), which says that though all beings go to Brahman in sleep, they do not know it, is cited here as evidence. The Upaniṣad compares this to a person not knowing a buried treasure even though he may be walking over it.

[296]

भिद्यते हृदयग्रन्थिश्छिद्यन्ते सर्वसंशयाः ।

क्षीयन्ते चास्य कर्माणि तस्मिन्दृष्टे परावरे ॥ २९६ ॥

‘The knot of the heart is cut, all doubts are dispelled, his *karmas* are destroyed, when that than which there is nothing higher is seen.’

To show that *jñāna* is a seen fruit, the evidence of the experience of the wise ones is given. The Upaniṣad text quoted refers to this experience. See *MU*, II, ii, 8.

[297]

इत्यादिनाऽपि विज्ञानं नाद्याष्टार्थमितीरितम् ।

तथा स ब्रह्मणः केन स्याद्येनेति प्रदर्शितम् ॥ २९७ ॥

In this and other texts it is said that knowledge is not an unseen fruit. Even so, it is shown in the text ‘By what does he become a Brāhmaṇa,’ etc.

From the texts quoted we learn that *jñāna* has a seen fruit.

[298]

आत्यन्तिकसुखानर्थप्राप्तिविच्छेदकाङ्क्षिणः ।

प्रीत्युत्कर्षोऽपि लोकेऽस्मिन्दृष्टः स किं न काम्यते ॥ २९८ ॥

“There is seen in the world intense pleasure in the case of those who desire the attainment of absolute happiness and the removal of evil. So, why should it (release) not be desired ?

Pūrvapakṣa—(Here, the *Pūrvapakṣa* is not *Mīmāṃsā* but a school of Vedānta which advocates combination of *karma* and *jñāna*). Even though *ātma-jñāna* has a seen fruit, is it settled that he who desires *mokṣa* has eligibility for it, or is it not settled ? If it is not settled, even he who desires *Svarga* may want *jñāna*. If it is settled, then, the principle on which you have settled it may hold good in my view also. *Mokṣa*, according to you, is attainment of happiness and freedom from misery. He who desires that is the eligible person. That is possible in my view too. So, both the sections of the Veda are authoritative.

AVS—*prīty-utkarṣo mokṣaḥ tad viṣayā kāmāno 'palabhyamānā nivārayitum na śakyate.*

[299]

दृष्टादृष्टार्थसंबन्धिप्रीत्युत्कर्षविशेषतः ।

नाऽऽनन्दादन्यतो मुख्यात्पण्डितः पर्यवस्यति ॥ २९९ ॥

“Since there is no difference in degree as between the pleasure relating to the seen and that relating to the unseen fruit, the wise man chooses nothing other than the principal bliss.

The intelligent person chooses *mokṣa* in preference to *Svarga*, because it is the highest bliss. Even in my view that is so.

[300]

किंतु साधनसाध्यत्वादनित्यं कर्मजं सुखम् ।

अभिव्यञ्जकतन्त्रस्तु मोक्षस्तेनाक्षयो मतः ॥ ३०० ॥

“Moreover, the happiness born of action is non-eternal since it is accomplished through a means; release, however, is dependent only on what manifests it, therefore, it is admitted to be imperishable.

The reason why *mokṣa* is preferred is that it is eternal while heavenly happiness, etc., are non-eternal. *Mokṣa* is not produced by anything; it is only manifested.

NTV—tasmād deśa-kāla-vastvaparicchinna-pratyagātmā mukhyā-nanda iti bhāvah.

[301]

संस्कारमात्रकारित्वं सर्वेषामपि कर्मणाम् ।

ज्ञानकाण्डे प्रवेशो वा तेषां नार्थान्तरं ततः ॥ ३०१ ॥

“All rites effect only purification; or, they are to be regarded as subsidiary to the knowledge-section. Thus, there is no different purport for them.

Karmas purify the soul. Because of this, *karma-kāṇḍa* is subsidiary to *jñāna-kāṇḍa*. *Karma* has no aim other than *mokṣa*. So, it is part of the means to release. Only, *jñāna* is the principal, and *karma* is the subsidiary.

NKL—saṁskāro 'ntaḥkaraṇa-suddhiḥ, praveśo vividiṣā-dvāreṇa, mokṣābhivyañjakatvaṁ na tu sākṣād ity arthah.

AVS—saṁskāra-sabdena antaḥkaraṇa-suddhir vivakṣyate praveśa-sabdena vividiṣā tad-dvāreṇa mokṣābhivyañjakatvaṁ na sākṣād ity arthah.

[302-303a]

एवमत्रैकवाक्यत्वं नानुष्ठेयसमाप्तिः ।

असारफलसंप्राप्तिः पुमर्थो नेष्यते यतः ॥ ३०२ ॥

तृष्णया साधयन्प्रीतिं न प्रीतिलवमिच्छति ।

Thus is the syntactical unity here, and not by way of the completion of what is to be performed. As the attainment of an essence-less fruit is not accepted as the human goal, he who thirsts for accomplishing (the highest) pleasure does not desire fragmentary pleasure.

Thus, the two sections have syntactical unity, because the means to *mokṣa* is a combination of *jñāna* and *karma*. It is not as if one should finish performing all *karmas* and then pursue the path of *jñāna*. He who desires *mokṣa* performs *karmas* for the sake of *mokṣa*, and also seeks *jñāna*. He does not attain *Svarga* because *Svarga* which yields only limited happiness is not desired by him. As his aim is *mokṣa*, that alone he attains through *karmas* combined with *jñāna*.

NKL—*alpīyaḥ phala-saṁprāptiḥ svargo neṣyate yatotaḥ svarga-kāmo mumukṣur eve 'ty arthaḥ.*

AVS—*asārāphala-saṁprāptiḥ kṣudraphala-saṁprāptiḥ puruṣārtho neṣyate svargakāmo yajeta ity atra svargo neṣyata ity arthaḥ.*

[303b-304a]

प्रीतेः श्रुतः प्रकर्षोऽपि स्वर्गस्वाराज्यभेदतः ॥ ३०३ ॥

नापि प्रीतेरियत्तायाः स्वर्गशब्दोऽस्ति वाचकः ।

“The supreme pleasure is declared in Scripture differently as ‘heaven’, ‘autonomy’, etc. Nor does the word ‘heaven’ connote that the pleasure is this much alone.”

On the view of combination as between *jñāna* and *karma*, it has now been stated that as there is eligibility for *jñāna*, there is no non-authoritativeness of the Veda, nor difference of eligible person, etc.,

as between the two sections. Here, another reason is given for showing that there is no difference in means, etc., taught in the two sections. In texts such as 'He who desires *Svarga* is to sacrifice', etc., the term *Svarga* means *mokṣa*. It does not mean anything less than the highest happiness. So, it is clear that *mokṣa* is to be accomplished through *karma*.

[304 b]

न चाजानन्स्वसाध्यार्थं विद्वान्कश्चित्प्रवर्तते ॥ ३०४ ॥

“Nor does a wise man exert himself (in respect of rites) without knowing what he has to accomplish.”

Although those who are ignorant may understand by the word *Svarga* happiness in another world, and perform sacrifices, etc., for the sake of that, he who is wise inquires into the true meaning of that word, understands that it means *mokṣa*, and for the sake of attaining that performs *karma*. Thus, there is no difference in means, etc., as between the two sections.

NKL—*niratisaya-sukhasya svargatvāt tasya mokṣatvāt tat-sāadhanatvena yāgādi-vidhānāt na sādhanādi-bhedah.*

AVS—*eṣa samudāyārthah. niratisaya-prīteḥ svargatvāt tasyāś ca mokṣatvāt tat-sāadhanatvena yāgadānādi-vidhānāt na sādhanā-dhikāri-bhedah iti.*

[305]

प्रीतिर्या काचिदिष्टा चेत्स्वर्गशब्देन भण्यते ।

चित्ताग्निष्टोमयागादेः पश्वादिफलसंकरः ॥ ३०५ ॥

If some undefined pleasure is accepted as what is connoted by the word 'heaven', there would be confusion of the fruit, cattle, etc., of the *citrā* and *Agniṣṭoma* sacrifices.

Siddhānta—If it is your view that by *Svarga* what is meant is some undefined happiness, then he who has performed the *Citrā* sacrifice will not be prompted to perform the *Jyotiṣṭoma*; for having derived happiness by drinking the milk which is the fruit of the *Citrā* sacrifice, there is no need for him to perform the *Jyotiṣṭoma* for the sake of *Svarga*. But we do find that a distinction is made between the fruits of the two sacrifices. So, *Svarga* cannot mean mere undefined happiness.

[306-307]

विशेषो वाञ्छितश्चेत्स्यात्पुत्रपश्वाद्युपाधितः ।

न तावत्संभवेत्स्वर्गो ज्ञातोपाधिवियोगतः ॥ ३०६ ॥

मुक्तौ काम्यफलेऽभीष्टे सकृत्करण एव च ।

अनवच्छिन्नरूपायाः प्रीतेराप्तौ कृतार्थता ॥ ३०७ ॥

If it (i.e., heaven) be accepted as something more excellent than (the pleasure) which results from adjuncts like son, cattle, etc., that (the supreme happiness) cannot be heaven, because it is free from any known adjunct. If release be accepted as the fruit of optional rites, then, since by a single performance of a rite there would be the attainment of unconditioned happiness, there would be (final) accomplishment.

If *Svarga* be taken to mean some distinctive happiness which is other than that derived from son, cattle, etc., is it, we ask, conditioned happiness or unconditioned happiness? If it is conditioned happiness, it cannot be the same as *mokṣa*. It cannot be unconditioned happiness, for we do not know of any instance where the word *Svarga* is used to mean such happiness. *Svarga* is not a self-established or self-revealed experience. If it is self-established or self-revealed,

it would not require *karma* for its attainment. Therefore, the *Svarga* that is accomplished through *karma* is not *mokṣa*. And, there is no identity of means, etc., for the two sections.

Even granting that *Svarga* means *mokṣa* and that it is attained through *karma*, we can show that your view is not intelligible. If *mokṣa* is the result of an optional rite, then the mere performance of a rite once must yield *mokṣa*, in which case the injunctions in regard to all other rites would become futile.

AVS—etad api vārtikadvayam [305-6] pūrvapakṣa eveti kecit.

[308]

पुत्रा ह्येते परीक्ष्येति तथा तद्य इहेति च ।

कर्मभ्यो निर्वृतिर्नास्तीत्यादिवाक्यैः प्रदर्शितम् ॥ ३०८ ॥

That through rites there is no perfection is shown in the texts: ‘These are transitory’¹, ‘Having examined’², ‘As here’³, etc.

Three texts from the Upaniṣads are quoted here in support of the view that *karma* is not the means to *mokṣa*.

1. *MU*, I, ii, 7. ‘Unsteady, verily, are these boats of the eighteen sacrificial forms, which are declared to be inferior *karma*. Those misguided men who acclaim this with superior joy fall again into old age and death.’*

2. *MU*, I, ii, 12. ‘Deeply pondering over the worlds that are won by *karma*, let a Brahmin arrive at non-attachment. That (Brahman-world) which is not made, cannot be (won) through works. For the sake of this knowledge, let him only approach, with sacrificial fuel in hand, a preceptor who is learned in Scripture and who is firmly established in Brahman.’†

* T.M.P. Mahadevan, *The Upanishads* (Selections), G.A. Natesan & Co., Madras, 4th edn., 1950, p. 98.

† *Ibid.*, p. 100.

3. *CHU*, V, x, 7. 'Those whose conduct here has been good will soon attain a good birth,' etc.

NTV—*tasmāt jñānam eva kevalam mokṣa-sādhanaṁ na karma, tasmim̐sca jñāne avidhitantratvāt nādhikārah, kiṁtu tatsādhana-samnyāsādāv adhikāra iti.*

[309]

प्रत्यक्षश्रुतिविध्यन्तविहितानामकारणात् ।

त्यागोऽतिसाहसं मन्ये ननु यागादिकर्मणाम् ॥ ३०९ ॥

“Now, to reject, without (sufficient) reason, actions like sacrifices, which are enjoined by the direct injunctions¹ of Scripture, would be rashness, I think.”

Pūrvapakṣa—Injunctive texts are stronger than *arthavāda* texts. Therefore, *mokṣa* must be regarded as the fruit of action, in which case the two sections will have the same eligible person.

The text, ‘As long as one lives, one must offer the *Agnihotra*,’ is a direct and principal text. In view of this, to teach that one must renounce would be the height of rashness. And, *Agnihotra*, etc., are the means to *mokṣa* through being subsidiary to *jñāna*.

1. *Vidhyanta* means *vidhi* here, as *svapnānta* means *svapna* in *BU*, IV, iii, 13. See the present writer’s *Gaudapāda: A Study in Early Advaita* (2nd ed., University of Madras, 1954), p. 67.

[310]

प्रत्यक्षोपनिषद्वाक्यविहितायास्ततोऽपि तु ।

ऐकात्म्यज्ञाननिष्ठायास्त्यागोऽतीव हि साहसम् ॥ ३१० ॥

A far greater rashness it is to reject the knowledge-discipline of the one self which is directly enjoined in the Upaniṣad texts.

Siddhānta—The Upaniṣad texts such as *BU*, IV, iv, 23 (See v. 216) enjoin directly renunciation for one who has detachment. For such a one 'hearing', etc., are prescribed. If the view of combination of *karma* and *jñāna* be accepted, all those texts would have to be rejected, which is much worse than the renunciation of *karma*. The text about *Agnihotra* cited above refers only to those who have not yet developed a sense of detachment.

NKL—*sādhana-catuṣṭaya-viśiṣṭasya śravanādy-anuṣṭhānam aikāntya-niṣṭhā sarva-vedānta-siddhānta ity arthaḥ.*

[311-312 a]

विचार्यमाणे यत्नेन त्वधिकारे यथाश्रुति ।

न किञ्चित्साहसं त्वत् प्रत्यक्षश्रुतिवाक्यतः ॥ ३११ ॥

अधिकारविभागस्य प्रसिद्धेरेव कारणात् ।

If inquiry as regards eligibility be made with care, in accordance with what is declared in Scripture, there would, indeed be no rashness here; for the reason that difference in eligibility is established in Scripture by direct statements.

There is no rashness as alleged by the *pūrvapakṣin*. Nor is there conflict between the two sections. For one who inquires, the position becomes very clear. A person in whom there is non-attachment is eligible to renounce all actions including the obligatory rites. Actions are only for those in whom there is ignorance. Scripture is definite on this point.

AVS—*bibhīṣikāṁ kurvato bibhīṣikayaiva uttaram uktam. idānīm sākṣād uttaram āha.*

[312 b]

तस्मात्सिद्धोऽधिकारोऽत्र ब्रह्मरूपं विविक्षिताम् ॥ ३१२ ॥

Therefore, eligibility has been established here for those who desire entry into Brahman-nature.

It has now been settled that eligibility, etc., for the two sections are different. The seeker after release is eligible to study the *jñāna-kāṇḍa*; for he wants to realize Brahman which is of the nature of eternal happiness and consciousness. The means to that is only the knowledge of the one self. *Karma* is the means to prosperity (*abhyudaya*); it cannot effect release.

[313]

तस्यास्य कर्मकाण्डेन संबन्ध इति भाष्यकृत् ।

प्रतिज्ञायापि संबन्धं कस्मात्तन्नोक्तवान्स्फुटम् ॥ ३१३ ॥

“ Even though premising the relation thus, ‘ Of that (viz., the knowledge-section) the relation to the ritual-section (will be declared,)’ why has not the commentator (i.e., Śaṅkara) stated the relation explicitly ?

Pūrvapakṣa—why is it that the commentator, Śaṅkara, has not stated clearly the relation between the two sections ?

[314]

अभिधीयत इत्यादिवचसाऽपि स नोच्यते ।

सिद्धे वस्तुनि वेदस्य मानत्वं तेन भण्यते ॥ ३१४ ॥

“ Even in the words ‘ It will be declared,’ etc., it (the specific relation) is not stated. What is stated there is the evidence of the Veda in respect of the existent reality.”

Śaṅkara merely shows that the Veda is *pramāṇa* for the self which is an existent reality.

[315]

वेदान्तोक्तेः प्रमाणत्वे सति संबन्ध उच्यते ।

प्रामाण्यायैव तेनाऽऽदौ सर्वोऽपीत्यादि भण्यते ॥ ३१५ ॥

After establishing the evidentiary character of the Vedānta texts, the relation is stated. It is for establishing the evidentiary character that it is stated first 'Even all,' etc.

Siddhānta—After premising the relation between the two sections, the commentator seeks to establish the validity of the Vedānta texts. Then he will proceed to specify the relation. This is the proper procedure. Unless it is shown that Vedānta is valid, what is the use of relating it to the *karma-kāṇḍa*?

[316]

आक्षिप्यते वा संबन्धः संबन्धो नाभिधीयते ।

सप्तम्यन्तपदच्छेदात्कथं चेदिति भण्यते ॥ ३१६ ॥

Or, the relation is objected to (thus): 'The relation is not declared', by splitting the word (*karmakāṇḍena* into *karmakāṇḍe na*) (and taking the first word) as having the seventh case-ending. If it be asked 'How?', it is explained.

This is an alternative explanation of the words of the commentator. He is of the view that there is no relation of *jñāna-kāṇḍa* with *karma-kāṇḍa*.

[317]

भिन्नार्थयोर्न संबन्धो ह्यन्योन्यार्थानपेक्षतः ।

ऐकार्थ्ये चैकवाक्यत्वात्कर्मविज्ञानकाण्डयोः ॥ ३१७ ॥

If the ritual- and knowledge-sections have different senses, then, since each is not expectant of the sense of the other, there is no relation; if they have unity of sense, even then (there is no relation) because of syntactical unity.

Do the two sections have different senses or a non-different sense? If the former be the case, there cannot be any relation between them; if the latter, there would be syntactical unity between them, and so there would be no need for a relation.

[318]

तथा तयोरमानत्वे संबन्धोक्तिर्न युज्यते ।

द्वयोरेकस्य वा मात्वे न संबन्धादि शस्यते ॥ ३१८ ॥

Similarly, if the two have no validity, it is not proper to state a relation (between them); so also, if both or either of them be valid, no relation fits in.

Again, are both the sections invalid, or valid? If both are invalid, they cannot be related, even as there can be no coherence between two sets of insane statements. If both are valid, they would be independent and hence there can be no relation between them. If either alone be valid, even then there is no question of a relation between the two. Surely, there can be no relation between a valid statement and an invalid statement.

*AVS—ity-etad-vārtika-trayaṁ (316-8) pūrvapakṣaḥ, katham gam-
yate, atra sarvaprakāra-saṁbandha-nirākaraṇāt tasya ca aniṣṭatvāt,
ato vārtika-trayaṁ pūrvapakṣa eva. siddhānta itī kecit.*

[319]

श्रुत्यैव तस्य चोक्तत्वात्तमेतमिति यत्नतः ।

इति चेतसि संधाय संबन्धं नोक्तवान्गुरुः ॥ ३१९ ॥

And, because that (relation) has been stated by Scripture itself with care in the text ‘That, this one’, etc., bearing this in mind, the Preceptor did not state the relation.

It may be stated that the relation between the two sections is the unintelligibility of any invariable sequence. If that be the relation, then it is stated in *BU*, IV, iv, 22. See note on v. 14.

[320]

प्रसाध्य वा प्रमाणत्वं वेदान्तानां प्रयत्नतः ।

संबन्धं कर्मकाण्डेन पश्चात्सम्यक्प्रवक्ष्यते ॥ ३२० ॥

Or, after establishing with care the validity of the Vedāntas, he does explain well, later on, the relation to the ritual-section.

The commentator will explain later on the specific relation—the relation as taught in *BU*, IV, iv, 22.

[321]

वेदानुवचनादीनामैकात्म्यज्ञानजन्मने ।

तमेतमिति वाक्येन नित्यानां वक्ष्यते विधिः ॥ ३२१ ॥

“In the text ‘That, this one’, etc., it is the obligatory rites such as the recitation of the Veda that are declared by the injunction to be (the means) for the rise of the knowledge of the one self.”

The discussion now is about the *vividiṣā* text, *BU*, IV, iv, 22.

Pūrvapakṣa—The text under reference regards only the obligatory and occasioned rites as the means to the rise of *jñāna*. This means that the optional rites are of no use for *jñāna*. If that be so, there is no relation of the *jñāna-kāṇḍa* with the entire *karma-kāṇḍa*.

[322]

यद्वा विविदिषार्थत्वं सर्वेषामपि कर्मणाम् ।

तमेतमिति वाक्येन संयोगस्य पृथक्त्वतः ॥ ३२२ ॥

Or, in the text, ‘That, this one’, etc., all rites are stated to be for the sake of (generating) the desire for knowledge, because of a difference in relation.

Siddhānta—Because the general term *yajña* is used in the text, all *karmas* become the means to *jñāna* through generating the desire for knowledge (*vividiṣā*). It is true that the optional rites have other ends. But they can also have the generation of the desire for knowledge as their end.

For example, in the context of the *Agnihotra*, we read ‘*dadhnā juhoti*’ (one should offer curds), and again ‘*dadhnā indriyakāmasya juhuyāt*’ (for him who desires efficient sense-organs, one should offer curds). The former of these texts refers to an obligatory rite, and the latter to an optional rite. The question is whether the material to be used in these two rites is different or the same. The objector suggests that the material should be different. The *Pūrvamīmāṃsā-siddhānta* is that the material—viz. curds—is the same. That is, in

the case of the obligatory injunction, the connection of the material, the curds, is with all *homa*; and in the case of the optional injunction, the connection is only with that *homa* which is performed for a man desiring efficient sense-organs, and there is disconnection from all other *homa* (See *PM*, IV, iii, 5). Similarly, the *karmas* that are related to *Svarga* may subserve the purpose of generating the desire for knowledge, if the fruit, viz. *Svarga*, is given up; and thus the entire *karma-kāṇḍa* may be related to *jñāna-kāṇḍa*.

[323]

लोकतः सिद्धमादाय पशुव्रीह्यादिसाधनम् ।

इदं कार्यमिदं नेति कर्मकाण्डश्रुतेर्गतिः ॥ ३२३ ॥

“Taking what are well-established in the world, viz., the means like animals, rice-grains, etc., the way of Scripture in the ritual-section is (to teach) ‘This is to be done,’ ‘This is not (to be done).’

Pūrvapakṣa—How can there be relation between the *karma-kāṇḍa* which teaches difference of causative factors such as animal, etc., and the *jñāna-kāṇḍa* whose purport is the non-dual Brahman? The purport of *karma-kāṇḍa* is injunction.

[324]

मानान्तरेण संप्राप्तां साध्यसाधनसंगतिम् ।

कर्मशास्त्रं व्यनक्तीति न तु वस्त्ववबोधकृत् ॥ ३२४ ॥

“The teaching about ritual states the relation of ends and means for what have been obtained through other means of knowledge; it is not, however, what makes known the existent.”

It cannot be said that *karma-kāṇḍa* is invalid because it re-states the differences existing in the universe or the rites and rituals. The *karma-kāṇḍa* is not invalid, because it teaches a relation which remains otherwise unknown—viz. the relation of the soul to heaven. Scripture is valid, not because it reveals an existent entity such as the self, but because it makes known a relation which is otherwise unknown.

[325]

वेदो हि सर्व एवायमैकात्म्यज्ञानसिद्धये ।

अतो नान्योऽभिसंबन्धः कर्मविज्ञानकाण्डयोः ॥ ३२५ ॥

The entire Veda is, indeed, for the sake of gaining knowledge of the one self. Therefore, no other relation there is between the ritual- and knowledge-sections.

Siddhānta—We say that the purport of the entire Veda is the non-dual self. The *jñāna-kāṇḍa* teaches it directly, the *karma-kāṇḍa* indirectly. No other relation between the two sections is possible.

NTV—*vividiṣā saṁskārapakṣayoḥ śuddhi-dvāreṇa jñāna-sādhana-
natvaṁ karma-kāṇḍasya, upaniṣadāṁ tu sākṣāt-jñāna-sādhana-
natvam iti sarvasya vedasya jñāna-sādhana-
natvaṁ sambandhaḥ nāto 'nya ity arthaḥ.*

NKL—*śuddhi-dvāreṇa jñāna-sādhana-
natvaṁ karmaṇām, upaniṣadāṁ
tu sākṣād dhī-hetutvam ity evaṁ kṛtsna-
vedasya jñāna-hetutvaṁ
sambandhaḥ śruti-siddhaḥ.*

[326]

नित्यनैमित्तिकानीह कर्तृसंस्कारतो यतः ।

नान्यत्र पर्यवस्यन्ति ज्ञानादैकात्म्यगोचरात् ॥ ३२६ ॥

“The obligatory and occasioned rites culminate in nothing other than the sphere of the one self, through purifying the agent.

The *pūrvapakṣin* does not like the statement that the *entire* Veda has for purport the non-dual self. So, he argues that the obligatory and occasioned rites alone purify the soul and make it eligible for *jñāna*—not the optional rites.

[327]

प्लवा ह्येते परीक्ष्येति तथा तद्य इहेति च ।

निन्दाश्रुतेर्न काम्यानां कार्यताऽध्यवसीयते ॥ ३२७ ॥

“That the optional rites ought to be done is not made known, because of the condemnatory texts, ‘These are transitory’¹, ‘Having examined’², and ‘They, like those here’³.”

The *pūrvapakṣin* cites a few scriptural texts in his favour. All of them teach the futility of Vedic rites so far as self-knowledge is concerned.

These are the same as the texts quoted by the *siddhāntin* in v. 308.

1. MU, I, ii, 7.

2. MU, I, ii, 12.

3. CHU, V, x, 7.

AVS—*ayam arthaḥ. suddhy-utpādana-dvāreṇa jñāna-sādhana-tvaṁ nitya-naimittika-karmaṇāṁ bhavaty eva, kāmyānāṁ nindā-śravaṇāt kartavyataiva nāsti, katham jñāna-sādhana-tvaṁ. ato yadvā vividiṣārthatvam iti pakṣo ’nupapannaḥ iti.*

[328]

विधिनिन्दासमावेशो नैवमप्युपपद्यते ।

फलाभिसंधिमात्रे तु निन्दायामेव युज्यते ॥ ३२८ ॥

Even thus, the co-presence of injunction and condemnation is not intelligible. If, however, the condemnation relates to the desire for fruit, it is intelligible.

Siddhānta—It cannot be said that optional rites ought not to be performed, for they are enjoined. It is true that they are also condemned. But the condemnation refers only to the attachment to their fruit. When there is freedom from such attachment, the optional rites also can serve as the means to *jñāna*.

NTV—*yat-tu kāmyānām phalārthatayā coditatvāt tāni phalam eva ārabhante na suddhim ity uktam, tan na, pramāṇābhāvāt, na hi śāstrād anyat kāmyakarmāṇi phalam ārabhanta ity atra pramāṇam asti, śāstram tu phalecchor eva kāmyānām api phalāraṁbhakatvam āha. phalecchāyāś ca niṣiddhatvāt ananuṣṭheyatvam uktam. tasmāt phalāraṁbhakatve pramāṇābhāvāt suddhyāraṁbhakatve vividiṣantīti śāstrasya pramāṇatvāt, suddhir eva kāmyānām api phalam.*

[329]

उपासनं च यत्किञ्चिद्विद्याप्रकरणे श्रुतम् ।

तदप्यैकात्म्यविज्ञानयोग्यत्वायैव कल्प्यते ॥ ३२९ ॥

And, whatever meditation is taught in the knowledge section—that also is for making one fit for the knowledge of the one self.

‘Let the *karmas* be the means to *jñāna* through purification, etc. What about the meditations (*upāsanas*) which are taught in the *jñāna-kāṇḍa*? They can well be the direct means along with *jñāna*.’

The reply to this suggestion is : no. The meditations are either for the fulfilment of *karmas*, or for achieving prosperity, or for gaining release in sequence (*krama-mukti*). What we have already said with regard to *karmas* holds good as regards meditations also. In the *vividiṣā*-text (*BU*, IV, iv, 22) the word *tapas* stands for meditations.

[330]

विमुच्यमान इत्युक्तेरर्चिराद्युक्तिस्तथा ।

स्वार्थमात्रावसायित्वं नोपास्तीनां प्रतीयते ॥ ३३० ॥

Because of the text, 'Being released,'¹ and because of the text about the path of light,² it is seen that the meditations do not directly lead to release.

Upāsanas are not the direct means to release ; they are the means only in sequence. As evidence, two scriptural texts are cited :

1. *BU*, IV, ii, 1.

2. *BU*, VI, ii, 15 ; *CHU*, V, x, 1.

NTV—*tad āhuḥ paurāṇikāḥ—brahmaṇā saha te sarve samprāpte pratisaṅcare, parasyānte kṛtātmānaḥ praviṣanti param padam-iti.*

AVS—*arcirādivākyaodāharaṇam upāsanānām krama-mukti-phalatva-dyotanāya. svārtha-śabdena viriñcyādi-phala-grahaṇam.*

[331]

इत्येवमभिसंबन्धः कर्मकाण्डस्य युज्यते ।

इतोऽन्यथाऽभिसंबन्धे न किञ्चिन्मानमीक्ष्यते ॥ ३३१ ॥

Thus is the relation of the ritual-section (to knowledge) intelligible. In regard to any relation other than this, there is no evidence.

Karmas are the means to *jñāna* through purification; the *Upaniṣads*, however, are the direct means.

There is no evidence for the opposite view that the *jñāna-kāṇḍa* is an auxiliary to *karma-kāṇḍa* through purifying the agent.

NTV—*suddhivāreṇa jñāna-sāadhanatvaṁ karma-jñāna-kāṇḍa-sambandha ity arthaḥ.*

[332]

न चोद्गीथादिविषयज्ञानवत्कर्मसंगतिः ।

ऐकात्म्यबुद्धेस्तद्बुद्धिद्वारं नैव निरीक्ष्यते ॥ ३३२ ॥

Nor is there relation to ritual, as for the knowledge of the *udgītha*, etc.; for the knowledge of the one self, dependence on a knowledge of that (viz., ritual) is, certainly, not seen.

It cannot be held that self-knowledge enters into *karma*, even as the knowledge of *udgītha*, etc., is a part of *karma*, because it is Vedic knowledge. May be that the knowledge of the *udgītha* is a part of *karma*; for even though it is not an auxiliary thereof, it is related to an auxiliary. But there is no way by which self-knowledge can become a part of *karma*.

NTV—*udgīthādeḥ karmāṅgasya svaviṣaya-jñānamantareṇa prayogā-nupapatteḥ taj-jñānaṁ karmāṅgam iti yujyate, iha tv aupaniṣadāt-majñānam-antareṇa anupapattyabhāvāt karma-vidhayaḥ taj-jñānaṁ nākṣipatīty arthaḥ.*

[333-334 a]

श्रुत्या नैकात्म्यविज्ञानं विनियुक्तं श्रुतौ क्वचित् ।

उपस्थानं यथैन्द्रया स्यान्नापि लिङ्गेन संगतिः ॥ ३३३ ॥

बर्हिर्देवसदनं दामीत्यादौ च यथा तथा ।

The knowledge of the one self is not applied anywhere in Scripture (as an auxiliary to ritual) by express statement (*śruti*), as the *upasthāna* (i. e. the worship of the *Gārhapatya* fire) is (served) by the *Aindrī* hymn. Nor is there relation by the capacity of words (*liṅga*), as in ‘I cut the *barhis* as the seat for the deity,’ etc.

If self-knowledge is an auxiliary of *karma*, it must be capable of application in *karma*. For determining the application there are six *pramāṇas* (modes-of-evidence). [See note on v. 123 b-124 a.] By none of these six modes-of-evidence can it be shown that self-knowledge is an auxiliary of *karma*.

The first mode-of-evidence is express statement (*śruti*). A case where express statement decides the application is as follows: There is the text ‘With the *Aindrī*-mantra one worships the *Gārhapatya* fire’ (*aindryā gārhapatyam upatiṣṭhate*). [*Maitrāyaṇīya Saṃhitā*, III, ii, 4.] Here the problem is: What is the object of worship? Is it *Indra*, as signified by the word *aindryā*? Or, is it the *Gārhapatya* fire, as indicated by the word *gārhapatyam*? The answer is that the object of worship is the *Gārhapatya* fire, because of the express statement ‘one worships the *Gārhapatya* fire.’ The second case-ending in *gārhapatyam* indicates expressly that the fire is the object of worship. [See *PM*, III, ii, 3.] There is no such express statement to show that self-knowledge is to be applied in *karma*.

The second mode-of-evidence is word-capacity (*liṅga*). In connection with the *Darsapūrṇamāsa* rites there is the text 'I cut the *barhis* as the seat for the deity.' (*barhir deva-sadanam dāmi.*) From this we learn that the formula of the text is a subsidiary of the act of cutting, which is made known by word-capacity. The meaning of the words is that *barhis* is to be cut. And so, we understand that the formula is to be used while cutting the *barhis*. [See *PM*, III, ii, 1.] But no such word-capacity is seen for relating self-knowledge to *karma*. There is no formula through the meaning of whose words we may conclude that self-knowledge is subsidiary to *karma*.

NTV—śruti-liṅga-vākya-sthāna-prakarāṇa-samākhyānām śeṣa-śeṣi-pramāṇānām abhāvāc ca na jñānasya karmāṅgatvam ity āha—śrutyety ādinā.

[334 b-335 a]

न चापि वाक्याद्विज्ञानं कर्तृद्वारेण गच्छति ॥ ३३४ ॥
कर्मण्यप्रक्रियास्थं सज्जुहूर्पणमयीत्ववत् ।

Nor can knowledge be related (as auxiliary) to ritual by syntactical unity (*vākya*), through the agent, though it is not in the context (of ritual), as the state of being the *parṇa*-wood (is related to the ladle).

The third mode-of-evidence is syntactical connection (*vākya*). There is a text which reads 'He who has a ladle made of *parṇa*-wood hears no evil sound' (*yasya parṇamayī juhūr bhavati na sa pāpaṁ ślokaṁ śruṇoti*). (*Taittirīya-saṁhitā*, III, v, 7, 1.) Here, there is no express statement of a case-ending, such as accusative, etc.; only the ladle and the being-made-of-*parṇa*-wood are mentioned together. From their syntactical connection, it is inferred that being-made-of-*parṇa*-wood is subsidiary to (i. e. qualifies) the ladle. [See

PM, III, vi, 1.] In this manner it is not possible to determine from such statements as 'The self is to be known' that self-knowledge is subsidiary to *karma*.

[335 b-336 a]

जुह्वाद्याकृतिसंपत्तिव्यपेक्षापूर्णक्षमम् ॥ ३३५ ॥

विशेत्पर्णमयीत्वादि प्रकृत्युपनयात्क्रतुम् ।

By bringing in the primary material (*prakṛti*), 'being-made-of-*parṇa*-wood,' etc., may serve the rite, because it fulfils the expectancy about the form of the ladle.

In the case of the ladle, one would require to know of what material it should be made. So, from the text 'a ladle made of *parṇa*-wood' the expectancy is fulfilled, and being-made-of-*parṇa*-wood becomes a qualification of the ladle, thus serving the purpose of the rite.

[336 b-337 a]

कर्मापेक्षितकर्त्रादिरूपविध्वंसकृन्न तु ॥ ३३६ ॥

ऐकात्म्यज्ञानमन्वेति स्वातन्त्र्येऽप्यर्थवत्त्वतः ।

The knowledge of the one self, however, which destroys the nature of agency, etc., required by ritual, cannot be the auxiliary (of ritual), for even independently it has purport.

The case of self-knowledge is quite different. It cannot help the cause of rites in any way. For the performance of rites there is needed an agent. The knowledge, of which we are speaking, is of the self as non-agent.

Moreover, the text about the ladle made of *parṇa*-wood has no independent purport of its own, whereas the texts relating to self-knowledge have their own purport.

[337 b-338 a]

जुह्वाद्यव्यभिचारित्वात्प्रत्युपस्थापयेत्क्रतुम् ॥ ३३७ ॥

कर्ताऽन्यत्रापि सद्भावान्नाऽऽक्षेप्ता व्यभिचारतः ।

The ladle, etc., because of non-inconstancy may serve as auxiliary to rite; but because the agent is elsewhere too, he does not bring in (rite as the principal), as there is inconstancy.

‘Being-made-of-*parṇa*-wood’ becomes subsidiary to the rites through the ladle, because the ladle is indispensable for the rites. The agent, however, does not necessarily bring in *karma* as the principal of knowledge; for, agency is related not exclusively to Vedic *karma*. Even for secular acts, agency is required.

[338 b-339]

अनारभ्योक्तिश्चापि नेह प्रकरणग्रहः ॥ ३३८ ॥

सिद्धे सामान्यतो लिङ्गात्संबन्धे कर्मभिस्ततः ।

विशेषावगतिर्नाम्नः क्रमाच्चेति व्यवस्थितम् ॥ ३३९ ॥

Since, having commenced (to expound ritual) (the knowledge of self) is not taught, there is not here the application of context (*prakaraṇa*). When a relation, in general, with rites has been established through the capacity of words (*liṅga*), then a specific knowledge may result through name (*nāma*) and order (*krama*); thus has it been settled.

The fourth mode-of-evidence is context (*prakaraṇa*). Context is interdependence or mutual requirement. When a certain statement (i. e. injunction of action) stands in need of the statement of the *modus operandi*, and when this need is supplied by a statement which is found in close proximity with the original statement, then there is connection between the two statements. For example, in connection with the *Darśapūrṇamāsa*, we read ‘*samidho yajati, tanūnapātām yajati, iḍo yajati, barhir yajati, svāhākāraṁ yajati*’ (*Taittirīya-saṁhitā*, II, vi, I, 1). This text speaks of the five fore-sacrifices (*prayājas*). Now, the question is: in the context of which set of rites are these fore-sacrifices to be performed? The text about them is to be found in close proximity to the statement about *Darśapūrṇamāsa*. The two statements stand in mutual need. In the injunction of the *Darśapūrṇamāsa* rites, there is felt a requirement of the *modus operandi*: how is the fruit of the rites to be accomplished? In the statement of the fore-sacrifices there is felt a requirement of the fruit to be gained. What is the end to be achieved by them? Since the statement of the fore-sacrifices is to be found in the proximity of the injunction of *Darśapūrṇamāsa*, it is to be inferred that the fore-sacrifices are the subsidiaries of the *Darśapūrṇamāsa* rites. (*PM*, III, iii, 11.)

Applying the principle of context (*prakaraṇa*), it cannot be said that *jñāna* is subsidiary to *karma*. The context of *jñāna* is different from that of *karma*. And, self-knowledge is nowhere taught in the context of *karma*.

The last two modes-of-evidence are order or position (*krama, sthāna*) and name (*nāma, samākhyā*). Order or position means common-location. It may refer to either common-location in the text or common-location in the performance. For instance, if there is the mention of a series of ritual acts followed by the recital of a set of *mantras*, the problem would be: which *mantra* is to be uttered in which sacrifice? The answer is that the first *mantra* should be connected with the first sacrifice, the second with the second, and so on. Similarly, there may arise the question, in connection with a

sacrifice, as to whether a particular act is to be performed on one day or on the other. The question is to be decided by reference to the commonness of place in the performance. (*PM*, III, iii, 42.) The last mode-of-evidence which is name means a word understood in its literal or etymological sense. For example, the word '*hotṛcamasa*' means 'the cup from which the *hotṛ*-priest drinks.' From this it is to be understood that the *hotṛ* is subsidiary to the drinking of the contents of the cup. (*PM*, III, iii, 13.)

With regard to the application of word-capacity, order and name, there is the following discussion under *PM*, III, ii, 19. There is a section of the Veda bearing the heading '*kāmya-yājyānuvākyas*.' Here a set of verses called *kāmya-yājyānuvākyas* (verses of sacrifice and invitation) are to be found, beginning with '*indrāgnī rocanā divaḥ*' (Indra-Agni are the two light-spaces of heaven), etc. Then we have certain *kāmya* sacrifices mentioned in a definite order, such as '*indrāgnam ekādaśakapālaṁ nirvapet*' (He shall distribute a cake for Indra-Agni on eleven potsherds), '*vaiśvānaram dvādaśakapālaṁ nirvapet*' (He shall distribute a cake for Vaiśvānara on twelve potsherds), etc. Now, the question is whether the *yājyānuvākya* is connected with all the sacrifices that are offered to Indra-Agni, or only with that particular *kāmya* sacrifice enjoined in the text '*indrāgnam ekādaśakapālaṁ nirvapet*'. The answer is that it is connected with only that particular *kāmya* sacrifice. This is established on the evidence of word-capacity, order and name. The word-capacity of the *yājyānuvākya*, *indrāgnī*, etc., and also its order, are the same as those of the said sacrifice. The name '*yājyānuvākya*' also indicates that the verse is subsidiary to the *kāmya* sacrifice. Thus, through the combined force of word-capacity, order and name, the subsidiariness of the *yājyānuvākya* to the *kāmya* sacrifice is established.

In the next verse it is shown that the case of self-knowledge is not similar to that of the *kāmyayājyeṣṭi*.

[340]

इह त्वैकात्म्यधीयोगः काम्ययाज्येष्टिवन्न हि ।

तस्मात्कर्माभिसंबन्धो नैवैकात्म्यधियोऽमितेः ॥ ३४० ॥

But here, the relation of the knowledge of the one self is not like that of the *kāmya-yājyeṣṭi*; therefore, the knowledge of the one self is not related to rites (as their auxiliary), as there is no (other) means (of stating the relation).

Self-knowledge is not subsidiary to *karma*, as *yājyānuvākya* is to the *kāmya* sacrifice. So, the last two modes-of-evidence, order and name, are not helpful here in establishing the subsidiariness of self-knowledge to *karma*. And, there is no other mode-of-evidence to determine the principal-subsidiary relation.

[341]

न चाप्यस्यार्थवादत्वं विधिना वाक्यभेदतः ।

दृष्टार्थत्वाच्च तद्बुद्धेः पाठान्नादृष्टकल्पना ॥ ३४१ ॥

Nor is this (viz. the text about the fruit of self-knowledge) an eulogy, because there would then be sentence-split with the injunction. And, because that knowledge has a seen fruit, an unseen fruit cannot be postulated for the study (of the Vedānta).

It may be held that the text which declares the fruit of self-knowledge is an eulogy, on the analogy of the text about the ladle being made of *parṇa*-wood. But that is not correct because there is no syntactical unity of the Upaniṣad text with the ritual text which is mandatory.

Moreover, the fruit of Vedānta which is the destruction of all sorrow is a seen fruit, whereas the fruit of ritual action is an unseen fruit. Therefore, the Vedānta text cannot be subsidiary to *karma-kāṇḍa*.

NTV—na ca kartr-stāvakatvena karma-viśeṣatvaṁ vedāntānām.

[342 a]

तमेतमिति वाक्यात्तु यागादेः प्रत्युताङ्गता ।

From the text, ‘That, this one’, etc., it is (learnt), on the contrary, that sacrifice, etc., are auxiliary (to knowledge).

It has been shown that there is no evidence for *jñāna* being subsidiary to *karma*. Here, the *siddhānta* view already set forth is repeated, viz., that *karma* is auxiliary to *jñāna*. The evidence for this is the *vividiṣā* text (*BU*, IV, iv, 22).

NTV—kimca ātmajñānasya kartr-śeṣatve na kevalaṁ] pramāṇā-bhāva eva, pratyuta karmaṇām jñāna-śeṣatve pramāṇam asti.

[342 b–343 a]

अन्ये त्वाहुर्न शक्नोति कामसंदूषिताशयः ॥ ३४२ ॥

द्रष्टुं तत्परमद्वैतं सर्वकामासमाप्तिः ।

Others say : “One cannot realize the supreme non-duality, if his mind is defiled by desire and if every desire of his has not been fulfilled.

This objection is that of the *kāmavilaya-vādin*. While admitting that *karma* is auxiliary to *jñāna*, he contends that it is so, not through generating the desire to know (*vividiṣā*), but through resolving desire (*kāmavilaya*). And, desires are to be resolved through enjoyment. It is only when all desires are resolved that one obtains eligibility for knowledge. All desires including that for heaven should be first fulfilled, and then there would be no more attachment to them. When there is complete non-attachment, one becomes fit for the path of knowledge.

[343 b–344 a]

द्वैतैकत्वमतीहाभिः सूत्रान्तं फलमाप्स्य ना ॥ ३४३ ॥

प्राजापत्यं पदं भुक्त्वा तदैकात्म्यं प्रपद्यते ।

“By the contemplation of unity in duality (i. e. the *Sūtrātman*), one attains fruits ranging from human-ness to the status of the *Sūtrātman*, and after enjoying the status of *Prajāpati* attains the one self.”

The *kāmavilaya-vādin* continues: By meditating on the *Sūtrātman* and by performing all the rites beginning with *Darvi-homa* and ending with *Satra*, one attains all the grades of pleasures, ranging from those of the human species to those of the *Sūtrātman*. After that there will be nothing more to enjoy. So, one becomes detached from all desires, attains identity with *Prajāpati*, and eventually realizes the non-dual self.

NKL-pūrva-pūrva-kṣudratara-karmānuṣṭhānena kṣudraphalaprāptyā tato-nivṛtta-rāgo nityānuṣṭhāna-samuccita-hiraṇyagarbhopāsanāt tat-padam prāpya tatrāpi jāta-vairāgyo brahmabhūyaṁ gacchatīty arthaḥ.

[344 b–345 a]

नैवं न कामसंप्राप्त्या तन्नाशोऽब्दशतैरपि ॥ ३४४ ॥

तत्सेवातोऽतिवृद्धिः स्यान्निवृत्तिर्दोषदर्शनात् ।

Not thus. Desire is not destroyed by fulfilment even in hundreds of years ; it only increases enormously by being served ; it is removed only when its defect is seen.

The *Siddhāntin* replies: Not through enjoyment will desires cease. On the contrary, they will increase. It is only when their defect is seen that there will be non-attachment.

NKL — *bhogasya rāgavṛddhihetor na tannivartakatvam iti dūṣayati.*

AVS—*na bhogāt kāma-nivṛttiḥ, kintu doṣa-darśanād eva.*

[345 b–346 a]

न जातु कामः कामानामुपभोगेन शाम्यति ॥ ३४५ ॥

हविषा कृष्णवर्त्मैव भूय एवमिव वर्धते ।

Never does desire cease by the enjoyment of desires ; it only increases, like fire (fed) by oblation.

This is a verse from *Manu* (ii, 94).

NKL refers to this verse as *Parāśara-vacanam*.

[346 b–347 a]

निवर्तेतापि कामेभ्यस्तदुपायाप्रसिद्धितः ॥ ३४६ ॥

सर्वक्लेशोपशान्त्यात्मज्ञानं चापि समाश्रयेत् ।

One should, indeed, turn away from desires, for they are not the means ; and one should resort to the knowledge of self through the quiescence of afflictions.

Karmas cannot remove attachment. The knowledge of *karmas* and their performance are not the way for the one who wants to break the vicious circle of *samsāra*. Just as enjoyment does not free one from desire, so also performance of action does not destroy

desire. It is only when there is cessation from desire and action that there is a possibility of acquiring self-knowledge. So, the afflictions (*kleśas*) must go.

[347 b-348 a]

अथाऽऽनन्दः श्रुतः साक्षान्मानेनाविषयीकृतः ॥ ३४७ ॥

दृष्टानन्दाभिलाषं स न मन्दीकर्तुमप्यलम् ।

The happiness, which is heard of in Scripture but not realized through direct evidence, is not sufficient to diminish the longing for happiness derived from objects.

He who has attained the status of *Prajāpati* cannot even 'hear' from the *Śāstras* about Brahman-bliss; for only human beings are eligible to study the *Śāstras*. Even supposing that, somehow, he 'hears,' he will not develop a longing for that bliss while he is actually enjoying the pleasures of *Prajāpati*.

[348 b-349 a]

कामप्रविलयायातस्तद्विपक्षार्थभावनम् ॥ ३४८ ॥

विधयस्तत्क्रियाणां स्युस्तद्विपर्ययहेतवः ।

For resolving desire, the contemplation of what is contrary thereto (is the means). Injunctions of rites are the means to what is opposed to it.

The way to resolve desires is to constantly remember the defects of all sense-objects. If there is perception of the defects of objects, there will be no desire for them. Performance of actions will never lead to this end. Even obligatory rites result in the enjoyment of certain ends.

NKL—*karma-vidhayaḥ kāma-vṛddhi-hetavaḥ ity arthah.*

[349 b-350 a]

द्वारं न नियतं मुक्तेः प्राजापत्यं पदं भवेत् ॥ ३४९ ॥

नह्युपाधिषु तत्त्वस्य विशेषः कश्चिदीक्ष्यते ।

The state of *Prajāpati* is not an invariable door to release; nor is any excellence of the real seen among adjuncts.

The state of *Prajāpati* is not the means to true knowledge; nor is it the means to the augmentation of truth. Where the adjuncts such as *Prajāpati*-hood function, there can never be the excellence of truth. So far as the highest truth is concerned, the adjuncts are all the same.

NTV—upādhīnām anirvācyatvāt teṣu viśeṣāpi anirvācyā eveti tattvasya na tāttvika-viśeṣaḥ. śaviśeṣatve ca tattvaṁ na syād ity arthaḥ.

[350 b-351 a]

नाऽऽकाशस्य विशेषोऽस्ति कुम्भद्रोण्याद्युपाधिषु ॥ ३५० ॥

दूरान्तिकादिभिन्नेषु कल्पिताकल्पितेष्वपि ।

There is no excellence for ether as regards its adjuncts such as a pot or a valley, different as being distant or near, imaginary or non-imaginary.

That there is no excellence among adjuncts is explained with the help of the ether-analogy. The ether of a pot does not differ from the ether of a valley; for ether is the same, no matter what the adjunct is.

[351 b-352 a]

सत्तत्त्वापेक्षयाऽभेदो भावानां नाभ्युपेयते ॥ ३५१ ॥

स्वभावहानादन्योन्यं विशेषो बाह्य एव सः ।

Non-difference of objects is not admitted as dependent on *the nature of being* (*sat-tattva*), for then, the nature of things would be destroyed. The mutual particularity (of things) is but external.

It cannot be said that the adjuncts, viz., objects, are all non-different because of their nature as being. If that were so, they will cease to be the objects. Nor can they be different from being, for, then, they would be non-being. So what is called particularity or plurality is superimposed on Brahman.

NTV—sattattvād bāhyaḥ kalpita evety arthaḥ nahi kalpitena viśeṣeṇa tattvaṁ saviśeṣaṁ bhavati.

[352 b–353 a]

कार्यकारणपक्षेऽपि कार्यं नान्यत् कारणात् ॥ ३५२ ॥

न च तत्त्वे विशेषोऽस्ति कटकादीव हेमनि ।

Even on the view of cause and effect, the effect is not from what is other than the cause; nor is there any particularity in the real, as bracelet, etc., in gold.

Even admitting that Brahman is the cause and the world is its effect, there could be no absolute difference between the two. Nor is there any evidence to show that the world of plurality makes any difference in or for Brahman. In gold there is no difference such as between a bracelet and a necklace. So also, in Brahman there is no difference. There is no real difference either between the particulars that constitute the world, for they are appearances like the rope-snake.

NTV—vastutas tu kāryaṁ kāraṇaṁ cā 'tmani kalpitam iti na saviśeṣatva-śaṅkāpīty arthaḥ.

NKL—kaṭakādi vartulatvādi viśeṣepi hemarūpasya nirviśeṣatvāt brahmāpi nirviśeṣaṁ ity arthaḥ.

AVS—kāryam-tāvat kāraṇān na bhinnam, bhede ghaṭa-paṭavat kārya-kāraṇatva-hānāt, abhede 'pi tad-hānāt, bhedābhedasya nirastatvāt, kāryam-tāvat kalpitam, tathā kāraṇam api, ato nirviśeṣam brahma.

[353 b-354 a]

अतः प्रजापतौ तत्त्वं कृमौ वा न विशिष्यते ॥ ३५३ ॥

तर्कादागमतश्चापि तद्यो य इति हीदृशात् ।

Therefore, reality is not different in *Prajāpati* or in a worm ; this is established through reasoning and from the Scriptural texts like 'And whoever (among the gods) (knew) it,'¹ etc.

Brahman is distinctionless (*nirviśeṣa*). Distinctions such as between genus and species do not apply to Brahman. Reality does not differ. There can be no excess or diminution for it. It is the same whether in *Prajāpati* or a worm. This truth is known both through logic and Scriptural testimony.

1. *BU*, I, iv, 10. 'And whoever among the gods knew it also became that.'

[354 b-355 a]

यदा सर्वे प्रमुच्यन्ते कामा येऽस्य हृदि श्रिताः ॥ ३५४ ॥

अथ मर्त्योऽमृतो भवत्यत्र ब्रह्म समश्नुते ।

'When are shed all the desires lodged in his heart, then the mortal becomes immortal; he reaches Brahman here'.¹

To show that Brahman is distinctionless, that it is the same in all adjuncts, another Scriptural text is cited.

1. *BU*, IV, iv, 7; *KU*, vi, 14.

[355 b-356 a]

एको देवः सर्वभूतेषु गूढः सर्वव्यापी सर्वभूतान्तरात्मा ॥ ३५५ ॥
कर्माध्यक्षः सर्वभूताधिवासः साक्षी चेता केवलो निर्गुणश्च ।

‘The one God, hidden in all beings, all-pervading, the inner self of all beings, the one who presides over *karma*, the support of all beings, the witness, the sole intelligence, without attributes’.¹

The meaning of this Scriptural text is that Brahman is of one essence, free from all distinctions.

1. *SU*, vi, 11.

[356 b-357 a]

विज्ञानकर्मणोस्त्रेधा यद्युच्येत समुच्चयः ॥ ३५६ ॥
पूर्वोक्तैकात्म्यतात्पर्याद्वेदस्यासौ न युज्यते ।

If it be said that as between knowledge and action three ways of combination are possible, (we reply) it is not proper, for, as pointed out earlier, Veda¹ has for purport the oneness of self.

At this stage, the *samuccaya-vādin* (the combination-theorist) appears and says that the combination of *karma* and knowledge is the means to *mokṣa*. Three ways of combination are possible:

(1) *jñāna* is the principal and *karma* is its subsidiary; (2) *karma* is the principal and *jñāna* is its subsidiary; (3) both are equal.

Now, the *Siddhāntin* asks: What is the *pramāṇa* for combination, in whichever of the three ways it may be? Is it the *karma-kāṇḍa*? or, is it the *jñāna-kāṇḍa*? It cannot be the first, for *karma-kāṇḍa* only teaches that *karmas* are the means to *Svarga*, etc. Nor the second, for the purport of the *jñāna-kāṇḍa* is the one self (*Vide* v. 16.)

1. 'Veda' here means 'Upaniṣad'.

NKL—*jñānaṁ pradhānaṁ karmopasarjanaṁ, karma pradhānaṁ jñānaṁ upasarjanaṁ, dvayoḥ samaprādhānyaṁ ceti traividhyam.*

sākṣāt-pāramparyābhyāṁ kṛtsna-vedasya advaita-paratvād avidyā-darśita-dvaitasya vidyāmātrāpanodyatvāt na trividhopi samuccayaḥ.

[357 b-358 a]

एकवाक्यावशीभावात्साध्यैक्यायोगतस्तथा ॥ ३५७ ॥

समुच्चयः कुतो द्रव्यगुणवज्ज्ञानकर्मणोः ।

Because they do not admit of being included in the same sentence, and because the end is not the same for both, how can there be combination of knowledge and action, as in the case of the material and the auxiliary?

There can be no combination of *karma* and *jñāna* as equals, as there is between the new-moon and full-moon rites (*Darsapūrṇamāsa*). In the example taken from *Pūrvamīmāṃsā*, the question is whether the two texts '*ya evaṁ vidvān paurṇamāsīm yajate*' and '*ya evaṁ vidvān amāvāsyām yajate*' lay down two distinct and independent acts or the same set of rites to be performed at different times, viz. the new-moon and the full-moon. The conclusion is that they refer to the same set of rites called *Darsapūrṇamāsa*. The new-moon rites and the full-moon rites are of equal strength, and together they give rise to the unseen potency which leads to heaven. (See *PM*, II, ii, 3.) The case of *karma* and *jñāna* is not like that. The texts relating to them have no syntactical unity as the texts of new-moon and full-moon rites have.

There is another reason for saying that there is no parity between *karma* and *jñāna*, on the one hand, and the *Darsapūrṇamāsa* rites, on the other. The *Darsapūrṇamāsa* consists of six main sacrifices, the *Āgneya*, etc. Though there are six sacrifices, they are to be regarded as one act, because they are related to the same fruit. As evidence

for this may be cited the text, 'Desiring heaven, one should perform the *Darśapūrṇamāsa* sacrifices'. Heaven is the common fruit of the six sacrifices, even as when it is said 'The well should be dug by the village' we understand that the well is to be the fruit of the collective labour of the villagers. (See *PM*, XI, i, 1.) *Karma* and *jñāna* do not have the same fruit. How could there be combination between them?

A contrary example is now given to show that *karma* and *jñāna* cannot be related as principal and subsidiary. In connection with the *Jyotiṣṭoma* sacrifice, it is laid down 'One purchases *Soma* with a tawny-eyed and one-year-old (cow), which is red' (*aruṇayā piṅgākṣyā ekahāyanyā somam krīṇāti*). In regard to this, the question is: Does the property of redness go with the entire context, qualifying all that is mentioned therein? Or, does it go with the *one-year-old cow* only, and that too in connection with the act of *purchasing*? The answer given by the Mīmāṃsaka is that, as the cow which is the substance and redness which is its property serve the same purpose and have the same function, both of them should be connected with the act of purchasing. In other words, what is enjoined here is the purchase, and this purchase is qualified, not by each of the two factors, substance and property, severally, but by both collectively (*PM*, III, i, 12.). The case of *karma* and *jñāna* is quite different. There cannot be a combination between them, as there should be between the one-year-old cow and redness.

(358 b-359 a)

भेदाभेदाश्रयत्वेन ह्यैकात्म्यज्ञानकर्मणोः ॥ ३५८ ॥

परस्परोपकारित्वहानात्कीदृक्समुच्चयः ।

Knowledge of the one self is dependent on non-difference; and action is dependent on difference; as there is no mutual helpfulness, how can there be combination?

There can be combination only between what are helpful to each other. Such a relation cannot exist between *karma* which is dependent on distinctions such as agency, etc., and self-knowledge which is devoid of all distinctions.

*NTV—kimca kartṛtvādi-bhedāśritam karma, tad-rahitādvayātma-
viṣayaṁ jñānam atas tamaḥ-prakāśavat paraspara-viruddhayor
upakāryopakāra-katvābhāvān na sarvaprakāras-samuccayaḥ.*

(359 b-360 a)

देवताद्रव्ययाथात्म्यज्ञानं कर्माङ्गतां गतम् ॥ ३५९ ॥

तावदेव हि तत्कर्म नाज्ञातद्रव्यदैवतम् ।

The knowledge of the nature of the deity and the material is auxiliary to ritual; with this much, indeed, is it ritual, and not when there is no knowledge of the deity and the material.

It cannot be argued that there can be combination between self-knowledge and *karma* even as there is between the knowledge of deity, etc., and ritual action. For, the knowledge of deity, etc., falls entirely within ritual action, and therefore it requires no combination therewith. There can be no ritual action without the knowledge of deity, etc. Such knowledge is part and parcel of *karma*.

[360 b-361 a]

तद्विशेषेऽङ्गभूयस्त्वात्फलभूयस्त्वमित्यतः ॥ ३६० ॥

समुच्चयो न तस्य स्यान्नाङ्गेनाङ्गिसमुच्चयः ।

When there is that excellence (i.e. knowledge of the deity, etc.) there is an increase in parts and consequently an increase in fruit. Therefore, of that there can be no combination; for there is no combination of the part with the whole.

Knowledge of the true nature of the deity, etc., is a part of *karma*. When that knowledge increases and becomes more adequate, *karma* itself increases and yields more fruit. Knowledge of the deity, etc., is not outside *karma*. A part does not require to be united with the whole.

[361 b-362 a]

यच्चाप्यैकात्म्यविज्ञानं तदज्ञानैक्यस्मरम् ॥ ३६१ ॥

तस्मिन्सति कुतः कर्म का वाऽपेक्षाऽस्य गोचरे ।

That which is called knowledge of the one self is entirely destructive of ignorance (*ajñāna*). When that is present, how can there be action? And in the sphere of this (viz. knowledge), how can there be the expectation of anything?

Here is a syllogism: What is in dispute, viz., self-knowledge, does not combine with *karma*, because it is opposed to *karma*; what is opposed to another does not combine with that other, as light with darkness. The sphere of knowledge is the Brahman-self, viz., *mokṣa*. That does not depend on anything else.

NKL—*ātma-dhīr na karma-samuccitā tan-nivarttakatvāt prāyaścittādivat.*

AVS—*jñāna-karmaṇo' parasparopakārābhāvāt na samuccayaḥ.*

[362 b-363 a]

ब्राह्मणत्वादिविज्ञानमग्निहोतादिकर्मणाम् ॥ ३६२ ॥

यद्दृष्टं साध्यसिद्धयै तु कर्मानुगुणमेव तत् ।

The knowledge of Brahmanhood, etc., which is seen in the case of rites like *Agnihotra*, for the sake of attaining the end, is only in the nature of aiding ritual.

The knowledge of Brahminhood, etc., is certainly helpful to *karma*. But that does not mean that self-knowledge is auxiliary to *karma*.

[363 b-364 a]

ऐकान्त्यवस्तुयाथात्म्यबोधे जात्यादिबाधनात् ॥ ३६३ ॥

न केवलं क्रिया न स्यात्कर्मणां प्रत्युताक्रिया ।

When there is knowledge of the true nature of the one self, caste, etc., get sublated ; and so then, there is not only no performance of ritual but there is no action at all.

With what *karma* is *jñāna* to be combined? (1) Is it with the actions subsequent to the rise of *jñāna*? (2) Or, is it with the fruit of those actions performed in previous births? (3) Or, with those earned in this life prior to the rise of *jñāna*?

Not the first. When there is the knowledge of the true self, ignorance is destroyed along with its effects, viz., place, caste, etc. After the destruction of ignorance, there can be no action.

Nor the second. When through the direct experience of the self ignorance has been destroyed, there can be no *karma* acquired in previous births.

[364 b-365 a]

अयथावस्तुसर्पादिज्ञानं हेतुः पलायने ॥ ३६४ ॥

रज्जुज्ञानेऽहिधीध्वस्तौ कृतमप्यनुशोचति ।

The knowledge of illusory objects like the serpent is the cause of running away, etc. But, when by the knowledge of rope the cognition of serpent is destroyed one repents for one's past actions.

Ignorance is the cause of *karma*, even as mistaking the rope for the snake causes one to run, etc. When the nature of the rope is known, one feels ashamed of one's earlier running, etc. Similarly, when self-knowledge is gained, the illusory character of the earlier actions is realized. So, the third alternative also is not possible.

AVS—*evam jñānād ajñāna-kṣaye karma-kṣayāt, na jñānasya karmā'nugūṇatvam ity arthaḥ.*

[365 b-366 a]

न कर्मव्यापृतिर्मुक्तावाप्त्यादीनामभावतः ॥ ३६५ ॥

न च श्रुत्यादयस्तत्र तेन स्यान्न समुच्चयः ।

There is no empirical usage of action in release, because of the absence of attainment (*āpti*), etc. Nor are Scripture, etc. (the evidence) there (i.e., for combination); therefore, there is no combination.

Scripture does not teach combination of *karma* and *jñāna*. The only combination—if it may be called combination—is one of sequence (*krama-samuccaya*) between the two. That is, *jñāna* succeeds *karma*.

NTV—*paripakva-jñānasya acodya-svarūpatvāt vidyamānāyāḥ snānādi - pravṛtteḥ saṁskāra - nibandhanatvāt dvaita - pratyayavat, tasmād aikātmya-vastu-bodho jātyādi-bādhanaṭ, akartābhoktā-nubhūtyaikaraso-'dvaya ātmāvatiṣṭhate. mokṣasya karma-sādhya-tvābhāvāc ca ātma-jñānam na karmāṅgatayā samuccīyate.*

NKL—*evam jñāna-svarūpa-paryālocanayā samuccayaṁ nirasya, pramāṇa-prayojanayor abhāvenāpi nirācaṣṭe.*

AVS—*śrutyādaya iti śruti-liṅgādi-grahaṇam veda-smṛtyādi-grahaṇam vā.*

[366 b-367 a]

अन्तरङ्गं हि विज्ञानं प्रत्यङ्गात्रैकसंश्रयात् ॥ ३६६ ॥

बहिरङ्गं तु कर्म स्याद्बाह्यद्रव्याश्रयत्वतः ।

Knowledge is the internal means (*antaraṅga*) because it relates to the inner self alone; action, however, is an external means (*bahiraṅga*), because it depends on external materials.

Jñāna is the internal means to *mokṣa*, while *karma* is the external means. As between the internal and external means, the internal is stronger. And, there can be no combination between the strong and the weak.

NTV—*sattva-suddhiḥ karma-phalaṁ, jñāna-phalam-ajñāna-nivṛttiḥ.*

NKL—*antaraṅgasya bahiraṅgāt prabalaṭvāt, prabalena durbalasya bādho yukta ity arthaḥ.*

[367 b-368 a]

सत्यन्तरङ्गे विज्ञाने बहिरङ्गं न सिध्यति ॥ ३६७ ॥

संस्कारकं तु कर्म स्याज्ज्ञानात्त्वज्ञाननिह्नुतिः ।

When there is knowledge, the internal means, there cannot be the external means. Ritual can be the purifier (*samskāra*). By knowledge, however, there is removal of ignorance.

When the internal means, viz., *jñāna*, is present, the external means, viz., *karma*, cannot stand. When *jñāna* is there, ignorance is not there; and when ignorance is not there, *karma* cannot be. *Karma* can only purify the mind. *Jñāna* destroys ignorance.

NKL—pratyak - prāvaṇya-kāraṇā-'ntaḥkaraṇa - suddhiḥ karma-phalam.

AVS—sādhyā-bhedāc ca jñāna-karmaṇor na samuccayaḥ...suddhiḥ karma-phalam ajñāna-nivṛttiḥ jñāna-phalam ity arthaḥ.

[368 b-369 a]

यथावस्त्वात्मविज्ञानं मोहमात्राश्रयाः क्रियाः ॥ ३६८ ॥

सम्यग्ज्ञाने कुतः कर्म कर्महेतूपमर्दनात् ।

Knowledge of the self is (knowledge of) reality ; rituals rest on delusion alone. When there is true knowledge, how can there be action, since the cause of action (delusion) has been destroyed ?

Karma cannot remove ignorance ; for it depends on ignorance. When *jñāna* removes ignorance, it removes *karma* as well.

NKL—brahma-jñānaṁ na karma-nivarttakam jñānatvāt jñānānta-ravad ity atrāha—yatheti—brahmajñānam adhyasta-nivarttakam tattvadhītvāt sūkti-tattva-jñānavad iti satpratipakṣam āha.

AVS—brahma-jñānasya yathābhūtātma-viśayatvena karmaṇas tan-mohāśrayatvena jñānodaye karmāsaṁbhavāc ca na samuccayaḥ.

[369 b-370 a]

नित्यप्राप्तं च विज्ञानं प्रतीचः संनिधेः सदा ॥ ३६९ ॥

कर्मानित्यं पृथग्रूपं नित्यं चानित्यबाधकम् ।

Knowledge is eternally attained, since it is ever of the nature of the inner self. Action is non-eternal and varied. And, what is eternal is sublativ of the non-eternal.

There is no parity between *jñāna* and *karma*. *Jñāna* is the self, of the nature of intelligence-light, and is eternal. *Karma* is non-eternal, because it is dependent on a plurality of causal agents, and because it is itself plural. Thus the two have divergent natures; and so, there can be no combination between them.

NTV—ātma-jñānasya nitya-prāptatvāt karmaṇas tad abhāvāt anityatvāt, nityena anitya-bādhopapattes ca na samuccayah.

NKL—jñānaṁ na karma-hetu-nivarttakam kāryatvād ghaṭavad ity āsaṅkya hetvasiddhim āha—nityeti.

AVS—ātma-jñānasya nitya - prāptatvāt karmaṇas tad-abhāvāt nityena anitya-bādhopapattes ca na samuccayah.

[370 b-371 a]

क्षयी कर्मार्जितो लोकः स्वराड्ब्रह्मावबोधतः ॥ ३७० ॥

लब्धे त्रैलोक्यराज्ये ना भिक्षामाद्रियते तु कः ।

The enjoyment (*loka*) earned by action perishes; by Brahman-knowledge one becomes the lord of oneself (*svarāt*). Who would hug beggary, when there is rulership of the three worlds at hand?

It is not possible to combine *jñāna* with *karma*, because the results of the two are different, even as it is not possible to combine the *Citrā* rite with the *Darsapūrṇamāsa* for the same reason.

NTV—jñāna-phalaṁ svārājyam iti jñāninaḥ karma-phale prepsābhāvāc ca na samuccayah...yat sādhyam tat kṣayīti vyāpti-niyamāt.

AVS—karmaphalasya anityatvāt jñānaphalasya nityatvāc ca na samuccayah.

[371 b-372 a]

भिन्नप्रकरणं ज्ञानं काङ्क्षितं न च कर्मणा ॥ ३७१ ॥

विरोधान्च स्वतन्त्रं तद्गुणभूतं न कस्यचित् ।

Knowledge belongs to a different context ; nor is it needed by action. Because of opposition, that (*viz.* knowledge) which is independent is not an auxiliary of anything.

Jñāna and *karma* belong to different contexts. *Karma* does not require *jñāna*. They are not related as helper and helped. They have contrary natures. So, there can be no combination. *Jñāna* is independent, and, therefore, is not an auxiliary of *karma*.

[372 b-373 a]

यतो वस्त्वनुरोधेतन्न ज्ञातृवशवर्त्यतः ॥ ३७२ ॥

अज्ञानोच्छित्तये ज्ञानं स्वतन्त्रं तेन भण्यते ।

As it (*viz.* knowledge) is dependent on reality, it is not dependent on the knower. Knowledge is for the purpose of removing ignorance; therefore it is said to be independent.

Why is *jñāna* said to be independent? It is not dependent on the knower, as *karma* is dependent on the doer. *Jñāna*, it is true, is dependent on the real (*vastu*). Yet, it is independent in so far as it yields its fruit without depending on any other means.

NTV—brahma-jñānam svatantram, na karmāpekṣam.

[373 b-374 a]

अनावृत्तिश्च कर्मभ्यो न कचिच्छ्रूयते स्फुटम् ॥ ३७३ ॥

ज्ञानादेव त्वनावृत्तिः श्रूयते बहुशः श्रुतौ ।

Nowhere is it clearly stated in Scripture that by ritual one attains the state of non-return (*i.e.*, release); many Scriptural texts, however, declare that by knowledge alone there is non-return.

There is no combination of *jñāna* as the principal with *karma* as the subsidiary ; for, *jñāna* which is the means to release does not require the assistance of *karmas* which are not the means thereto. It is nowhere declared that through *karmas* one could reach the status of non-return. Scripture teaches repeatedly that *jñāna* is the path to perfection.

[374 b-375 a]

एकरूपं च विज्ञानमेकरूपात्ममेयतः ॥ ३७४ ॥

भिन्नरूपाणि कर्माणि बहुकारकसंश्रयात् ।

Knowledge is uniform because its content is the self which is of one-form ; actions are multiform, because they depend on many causal correlates.

There can be no combination of *jñāna* and *karma* as equals. The two are different : *jñāna* is uniform, whereas *karma* is multiform.

NTV—*jñāna-karmaṇor ekāneka-rūpatayā mokṣa-sādhanatve virodhāc ca na karma itikartavyatva-lakṣaṇas samuccayaḥ.*

[375 b-376 a]

एकरूपस्य मोक्षस्य भिन्नरूपं न साधनम् ॥ ३७५ ॥

एकरूपस्य मोक्षस्य होकरूपं हि साधनम् ।

For release which is uniform, what is multiform cannot be the means ; for release which is uniform, what is uniform is, indeed, the means.

As is the end, so should be the means. For release which is one, *jñāna* should be the means, and not *karma*.

AVS—*mokṣasyaikarūpatvāt jñānasyāpi tad-viśayatvena ekarūpatvāt, karmaṇo 'neka-kāraṇakāśritatvena anekātmakatvāt taj-jñānasyāpi tathātvāt, ekarūpasya mokṣasya ekarūpam eva jñānaṁ sādhanam ucitam, netarat.*

[376 b-377 a]

तस्मात्कर्मफलं नाना नानाकर्मसमुद्भवम् ॥ ३७६ ॥

देवमानुषतिर्यक्षु कर्तुः शास्त्रैर्निदर्शितम् ।

Therefore, the fruit of action is varied, being produced by various deeds ; (this is) for the agent in the forms of gods, men and animals. This has been shown by the Scriptures.

The fruits of *karma* are many. It is these fruits that constitute *samsāra*. And, they are enjoyed by the different kinds of beings.

[377 b-378 a]

अन्ये तु मन्वते केचिद्भ्रम्भीरन्यायवादिनः ॥ ३७७ ॥

भेदस्य विलयो वेदे गम्यते कस्यचित्कचित् ।

Some others who argue bravely, however, think that the resolution of some difference (*bheda*) or other is taught somewhere in the Veda.

Here, attention is turned to the view known as *prapañcavilaya-vāda*. According to it, *karma* is auxiliary to *jñāna* through effecting the resolution of the world.

[378 b-379 a]

देहात्मभावविलयः स्वर्गकामपदे यथा ॥ ३७८ ॥

देहाद्भिन्नोऽधिकार्यत्वं स्वर्गभोग्यवगम्यते ।

For example, in (the text containing) the expression 'desire for heaven', there is seen the resolution of the notion that the body is the self ; for, the eligible person

who is different from the body is known here as the enjoyer in heaven.

The *prapañcavilaya-vādin* argues as follows : The text 'He who desires heaven should sacrifice' conveys the resolution of the idea that the physical body is the self, for it is not this body that is to enjoy heaven.

[379 b-380 a]

गोदोहनेनेत्यत्रापि विलयोऽन्याधिकारिणः ॥ ३७९ ॥

अधिकृताधिकारित्वान्नान्योऽधिक्रियते यतः ।

Even in the text 'with the milk pail' there is seen resolution for one who is eligible in respect of another rite ; for here there is eligibility for one who is already eligible (*adhikṛta-adhikāritva*); no one else is eligible here.

The text about 'the milk pail' also teaches resolution—resolution of independent eligibility for the act indicated by this text in the eligibility for the *Darśapūrṇamāsa*.

In connection with the *Darśapūrṇamāsa* there is the text 'With the *camasa* (cup) he is to sprinkle the water'. Here sprinkling is enjoined. There is a further text which says, 'With the milk pail for him who desires cattle'.* This, evidently, does not enjoin any principal rite. In the case of one who is already eligible for the *Darśapūrṇamāsa*, for its own fruit, here there is the injunction, incidentally, of another subsidiary for a further fruit.

[380 b-381 a]

रागाद्युत्थप्रवृत्तीनां निषेधेषु लयोऽञ्जसा ॥ ३८० ॥

विधिष्वपि लयस्तासां कार्यान्तरनियोगतः ।

In prohibitions, there is the resolution, in no time, of activities roused by attachment, etc.; even in injunctions there is their resolution because of the prompting in respect of other activities.

The prohibition texts too have resolution for their purport—the resolution of activities prompted by attachment, etc. So do the texts enjoining obligatory and occasioned rites. Here also, there is the resolution of natural and instinctive acts.

[381 b-382 a]

लोकेऽपि चानभिप्रेतात्पथः साक्षान्निवारणम् ॥ ३८१ ॥

मार्गान्तरोपदेशाद्वा वेदेऽप्येवं प्रतीयताम् ।

Even in the world, a path that is not intended is prohibited either directly or by teaching another path ; similarly let it be understood as regards the Veda.

The prohibitions and injunctions of the Veda are similar to those that belong to empirical usage. The latter too involve resolution—preventing the performance of an act, or changing the course of action.

[382 b-383 a]

एवं रागादिहेतूत्थप्रवृत्तिलयवर्त्मना ॥ ३८२ ॥

आत्मज्ञानाधिकारार्था निःशेषा विधयः स्थिताः ।

Thus all injunctions without exception are for making one eligible for self-knowledge, through the resolution of actions roused by attachment, etc.

Thus, concludes the *prapañcavilaya-vādin*, all the texts of the *karma-kāṇḍa* make one fit for *jñāna* through the resolution of the world.

[383 b-384 a]

नैतदेवं यतोऽशेषा न कर्मविधयः श्रुतौ ॥ ३८३ ॥

स्ववाक्यावगतात्कार्यादपेक्षन्ते फलान्तरम् ।

This is not so ; for no injunctions of the Scripture relating to ritual are expectant of a fruit other than the *kārya* which is made known by the texts of the injunctions themselves.

The *siddhāntin* replies : For whom do the injunctive texts declare the resolution of the world ? Is it (1) for the one who seeks release, or (2) for the one who desires heaven, or (3) for the one who wishes for only the absence of the world, or (4) for the one who wants to know the content of *jñāna-niyoga* ?

(1) The injunctions of rites that are to be found in the Veda declare *Svarga* as the fruit. They, therefore, cannot be related to *mokṣa* which is quite a different fruit. To say that the ritual texts teach the resolution of the world for the sake of him who seeks release carries no sense at all.

[384 b-385 a]

वेदेऽनुष्ठानतात्पर्यान्न लयो गम्यते कचित् ॥ ३८४ ॥

फलश्रुतेरभावो हि साध्यः स्यादफलः कथम् ।

As, in the Veda, the performance is the purport, resolution is nowhere taught ; for, a fruit is declared in Scripture (for each rite). How, indeed, can non-existence which is no fruit be what is to be accomplished ?

(2) For him who desires heaven, the Veda does not teach the resolution of the world, for such resolution is not the means to heaven. What the Veda teaches in his case is the performance of rites.

(3) No one can desire a non-existence. The non-existence of the world is not what is to be accomplished, because it is a non-existence, like tortoise-hair. Also it cannot serve as a human goal, even as the non-existence of son, etc., is not a human goal.

[385 b-386 a]

वस्तुनोऽवगतिर्नापि लयाद्भवति कुत्रचित् ॥ ३८५ ॥

अभावेऽप्युपपन्नत्वात्सुषुप्ते चाप्यनीक्षणात् ।

Nor is the perception of the real brought about anywhere by resolution; for even where there is absence (of resolution) there is perception, and in deep sleep (where there is resolution) there is no perception (of the real).

(4) The content of *jñāna-niyoga* is *jñāna* as the means to release. But the non-existence of the world is not what causes *jñāna*. Through resolution, the real is never known. Even when the world is seen to exist, it is possible to know the real. Just as, even while two moons appear, one may know that there is only one moon through the words of a trustworthy person, etc., so also even while the body lasts one may realize Brahman through the study of Scripture, etc. The resolution of the world does not necessarily mean the realization of truth. In sleep, swoon, etc., there is no world, but there is no Brahman-knowledge either.

NKL—*prapañca-laye satyapi supti-pralayayor brahmānavagamāc ca.*

*anādi-bhāvasya ātmavad anivarttyatvād upādāna-nivṛttim-
antareṇa kāryasyātyantika-layāsiddhes tatkāraṇājñāna-nivarttaka-
jñānam eva āśrayaṇīyam ity āśayah.*

[386 b-387 a]

स्वाभाविकः प्रपञ्चश्चेत्स निरोद्धुं न शक्यते ॥ ३८६ ॥

कार्यश्चेत्कारणोच्छेदे कार्योच्छेदः स्वतो न हि ।

If the universe is natural (*svābhāvika*), it is not possible to remove it; if it is an effect, there would be removal of the effect when there is removal of the cause, and not of itself.

Whether the world be beginningless or with a beginning, its resolution cannot be the content of *jñāna-niyoga*. If it is beginningless like the self, it cannot be removed at all. If it is a product, then it will be destroyed only when its cause is destroyed. The cause of the world is ignorance; and that can be removed only by knowledge. So, it is not right to say that the resolution of the world leads to knowledge.

NTV—nahi svabhāvo bhāvānām vyāvartyeta auṣṇyavad raveḥ, svabhāvād vinivṛttortho niḥsvabhāvaḥ, kha-puṣpavad iti hy uktam, nityasya layābhyupagame ātmanopi laya-prasaṅga iti bhāvaḥ.

[387 b-388 a]

कृत्स्नप्रपञ्चविलयः कर्तुं शक्यो न केनचित् ॥ ३८७ ॥

स्वेन्द्रियादिलयः स्वापे स्वत एव न शास्त्रतः ।

It is not possible for anyone to resolve the entire universe by anything (except knowledge); the resolution of one's own sense-organs, etc., in sleep is of their own accord, and not from the sacred teaching.

Is the destruction of the entire universe along with its cause said to be the content of *jñāna-niyoga*, or only of a part thereof? The entire universe with its cause cannot be destroyed except by self-knowledge. If the destruction of a part of the universe be the content, what is this part? Is it any part of the universe, or that belonging to the individual such as sense-organ, etc.? If the destruction of any part would do, there is the contingency of the rise

of knowledge in one who has destroyed a part. As for the resolution of sense organ, etc., that happens automatically in sleep, etc., and there is no need for *niyoga*.

[388 b-389 a]

उत्थितस्य पुनर्भावादनुच्छेदोऽथ शङ्क्यते ॥ ३८८ ॥
आयातस्तर्ह्यनाश्वासस्त्वदभ्युपगतावपि ।

If it be doubted that there is no absolute resolution (of the sense-organs in sleep) as they come into being again when one wakes up, then there would result lack of trust even in what you maintain.

It may be thought that, as in sleep sense-organ, etc., are not altogether destroyed, there is need for *niyoga* to bring about their destruction. But what guarantee is there that in the resolution taught by the *prapañcavilayavādin* sense-organ, etc., are completely destroyed? For aught we know, they may remain there in an unmanifest form.

NTV—pravilīnasya punar-bhāvād anucchedaścet, niyogataḥ pravilīnasyāpi punar-udbhava-sambhavāt tatra prayāso vyarthah.

[389 b-390 a]

प्रपञ्चनाशनेनाथ नाशयते भेदकारणम् ॥ ३८९ ॥
नैवं न कार्यनाशेन कारणं नश्यति क्वचित् ।

“Then, by the destruction of the universe the cause of difference is destroyed.” Not thus; nowhere is the cause destroyed by the destruction of the effect.

It may be said that in sleep the cause of sense-organ, etc., is not destroyed, and that as the cause persists, sense-organ, etc., reappear on waking. But we ask: What is it that removes this cause? Surely,

it cannot be the destruction of the universe. The universe is only an effect. With the destruction of the effect, the cause is not necessarily destroyed.

AVS—na hi kuṇḍala-vilayāt prayatna-sādhyaḥ api suvarṇalayaḥ, tathā prapañcalayāt prayatna-sādhyaḥ na tat-kāraṇa-laya iti.

[390 b-391 a]

कारणस्याप्यविद्याया वस्तुबोधाद्विनाशतः ॥ ३९० ॥

यतोऽतोऽविद्यानाशार्थं प्रपञ्चविलयोऽफलः ।

As nescience which is the cause is destroyed by the knowledge of reality, resolution of the universe is useless for the sake of destroying nescience.

For the destruction of the cause, viz., nescience, what is required is the knowledge of truth ; therefore, the resolution of the universe is useless.

[391 b-392 a]

रज्जुज्ञानाद्धि सर्पादिप्रपञ्चविलयो यतः ॥ ३९१ ॥

सर्पाभासलयेऽपीयं रज्जुस्तमसि नेक्ष्यते ।

It is by the knowledge of rope that there is resolution of the appearance of serpent, etc., for even when the snake-appearance is resolved in darkness the rope is not seen.

What was stated above is here explained with the help of the rope-snake illustration.

[392 b-393 a]

लयनिष्ठे प्रमाणे नो वस्तुगोचरभेदतः ॥ ३९२ ॥

अथ वस्तुनि तन्मानं न लये स्यान्न च द्वये ।

If the evidence (of Scripture) be in regard to resolution, then reality cannot be its sphere, because of difference ; if, then, it be evidence for reality, it cannot be (evidence) for resolution ; nor for both.

What does Scripture teach—is it the resolution of the universe, or the nature of reality, or both ? If Scripture teaches the resolution, reality cannot be its purport. Nor can both be its purport, for, then, there would be sentence-split.

[393 b-394 a]

भाव्युच्छेत्तुमशक्यस्ते भूतोऽप्युपरतः स्वतः ॥ ३९३ ॥
प्रपञ्चो वर्तमानस्तु कार्यत्वान्नश्यति स्वतः ।

For you, of what is yet to be (*bhāvī*) destruction is not possible ; nor of what is past, for it has ceased to be of its own accord ; and the universe that is present, because it is an effect, will by itself cease to be.

Moreover, which universe is it that is sought to be resolved—the future, the past, or the present ? The past universe has ceased to be ; the future universe is not yet ; the present, because it is an effect, will disappear of its own accord. Hence there is no need for a *niyoga* to bring about the resolution of the world.

[394 b-395 a]

श्रुतेर्विलयतात्पर्ये फलमाकस्मिकं भवेत् ॥ ३९४ ॥
फलार्था चेष्टये न स्यान्नोभयं वाक्यभेदतः ।

If Scripture has resolution for purport, the fruit will become accidental ; if it has the fruit for purport, it cannot have resolution (for purport); nor both, because of sentence-split.

It may be contended that the ritual texts have the resolution of the world as their purport. But, if that were so, the attainment of heaven, etc., which is declared to be the human goal would become accidental. If the ritual texts teach the relation between heaven, etc., and sacrifice, etc., as ends and means, the resolution of the world cannot be their purport. The ritual texts cannot have both as their purport, for, then, there would be sentence-split.

[395 b-396 a]

प्रपञ्चविलयेनैव सर्वानर्थप्रहाणतः ॥ ३९५ ॥

पुरुषार्थस्य संसिद्धेर्विद्या नैष्फल्यमाप्तेत् ।

If by the resolution of the universe itself, there be the destruction of all evil, then, as the human goal has been accomplished, there would be futility for knowledge.

If the ritual texts have the resolution of the world for purport, and if by this the human goal is reached, where is the need for knowledge?

[396 b-397 a]

अत ऐकात्म्ययाथात्म्यज्ञानादज्ञानहानतः ॥ ३९६ ॥

सिद्धे पुमर्थे विलयकल्पना निष्प्रयोजना ।

Therefore, since by the true knowledge of the one self ignorance is destroyed, and thereby the human goal is accomplished, the postulation of resolution is useless.

It is by knowledge that ignorance is destroyed. With the destruction of ignorance, all evil is removed. Therefore, there is not required the resolution of the world.

[397 b-398 a]

स्वकार्योपक्षयादेव विधीनां च परस्परम् ॥ ३९७ ॥

कुत एकाधिकारत्वमपेक्षाभावतो वद ।

As injunctions are exhausted with their own (respective) *kāryas*, and as there is no mutual expectancy, say, how can there be singleness of eligibility ?

The eligibility for the *karma*- and *jñāna-kāṇḍas* cannot be the same. It is only in the case of what are related as principal and subsidiary that the same person is eligible for both. *Karma* and knowledge are not so related. Each of these results in its own fruit ; therefore, the eligibility for each is different.

NKL—karma - kāṇḍasya jñāna-kāṇḍavat svaphalopakṣiṇatvāt parasparānapekṣatvān na karma-vidhīnām jñāna-niyoga-śeṣatvam.

[398 b-399]

विधीनां चापि सर्वेषां निषेधवचसां तथा ॥ ३९८ ॥

नामादिलयनिष्ठत्वे ह्यभ्युपेतेऽप्रमाणके ।

अनिमित्तोऽपवर्गोऽपि शास्त्रं चैवमनर्थकम् ॥ ३९९ ॥

If it be admitted that all injunctions and prohibitions too have for purport the resolution of name, etc., which is not authorized (by the Scriptural texts), then release would be accidental and the sacred teaching would be futile.

If injunctions and prohibitions have for purport the resolution of the world, there would be no *śravaṇa*, etc., which are known as the means to *mokṣa*. Then, *mokṣa* too, like heaven, etc., would become accidental. And, Scripture would lose its value.

[400-403 a]

स्वर्गादिकार्यमार्गेण मन्यसे यदि कर्मणाम् ।

सोपानपाङ्क्तिगत्येव हर्म्यपृष्ठाधिरोहणम् ॥ ४०० ॥

आत्मज्ञानाधिकारानुप्रवेशित्वं भविष्यति ।

यथैव नगराध्वस्थग्रामगत्युपदेशनम् ॥ ४०१ ॥

नगराध्वोपदेशस्य शेषत्वं प्रतिपद्यते ।

नाकामितत्वाद्ग्रामादिगतेर्युक्तैव शेषता ॥ ४०२ ॥

स्वर्गादेर्न तु शेषत्वं पुरुषार्थत्वहेतुतः ।

If you should think thus : “Just as one climbs to the terrace of a house by a flight of stairs, so the ritual acts serve to introduce one into eligibility for self-knowledge through the instrumentality of *kāryas* like heaven, etc., even as the direction for going to a village which is on the way to a town becomes auxiliary to the direction for going to the town ;” it is not so, because as going to the village is not what is desired, it can well be ancillary ; heaven, etc., however, cannot be ancillary, since they are human goals.

Pūrvapakṣa—The two *kāṇḍas* have the same fruit which is release ; and heaven, etc., are not accidental results, as they constitute the channel to release. Heaven, etc., may be compared to the rungs of a ladder leading to the terrace, or to a village that is on the way to a town. So, one has to pass through heaven, etc., in order to attain *mokṣa*. The present argument may be expressed in the following syllogistic form : What are in dispute, viz. heaven, etc., are

auxiliaries to *jñāna-niyoga*, because they are taught for the sake of him who seeks knowledge; what is taught for the sake of a seeker is auxiliary to what he seeks; just as the teaching about going to a village with reference to a person who wants to go to a town is auxiliary to going to that town.

Siddhānta—The reasoning is fallacious. In the instances cited as examples, there is no particular fruit attached to the rungs of the ladder or to the wayside village. So, they may well serve as auxiliaries to go up to the terrace and to reach the town, respectively. Not so are heaven, etc. These are desired as ends-in-themselves.

AVS—*grāma-gamanopadeśeṣu puruṣārthasyāśravaṇāt phalavan nagara-gamanopadeśa-śeṣatvaṁ ghaṭata eva, svargādeḥ phalasya śravaṇān nānya-śeṣatvaṁ karma-vidhīnām iti.*

[403 b-405 a]

अथोपच्छन्दनार्थानि स्वर्गादीनि विमुक्तये ॥ ४०३ ॥

नगरास्तौ तदध्वस्थग्रामादिगुणगीरिव ।

नैवं मान्तरतः सिद्धेर्नृवाक्ये तत्समञ्जसम् ॥ ४०४ ॥

वेदे तु वक्त्रभावत्वादभिप्रायाद्यसंभवः ।

“Heaven, etc., are inducements to release, even as extolling the excellences of the village, etc., that are on the way is for reaching the town.” If thus it be said, not so; for, as there are other evidences possible in the case of a man’s statement, that is all right (i.e., praising the excellence of the village, etc., may be determined to be ancillary by other means of valid knowledge); but as regards the Veda, there is no speaker, and so it is not possible to determine the intention, etc.

Pūrvapakṣa—Heaven, etc., are not intrinsic ends. They are praised only in order to inspire those who have no longing for release. In other words, they are offered as baits to entice the worldly people away from their empirical attachments. This is just like extolling the wayside village. A boy that refuses to move may be induced to move by telling him that there are food, etc., available in plenty in that particular village. The objective, however, is to lead the boy to the town.

Siddhānta—How is the auxiliariness of ritual-commands to *jñāna-niyoga* known? Is it known by some other *pramāṇa*? Or, by verbal testimony? In the example, it is possible to determine the true intention of the person who extols the village through means other than his words. But, in the case of the Veda, such a procedure is not possible. The Veda is not a human composition; and there is no question of determining the intention through means other than the words of the Veda.

[405 b-406 a]

यद्वा तत्रैव तात्पर्यं यतोपच्छन्द्य नीयते ॥ ४०५ ॥

नगराप्तौ तु माभावात्प्रयतेत पुमान्कुतः ।

Or, if that itself were the purport (i.e. going to the village) where one is led to by persuasion, then since there is no evidence as regards reaching the town, how could a man strive for it?

If the words alone constitute the *pramāṇa*, then, in the example, going to the village will have to be declared as the end, and not going to the town. The boy who hears the praise of the village will regard the village as his destination, and not the town. Similarly, from the texts of the Veda, it cannot be determined that the injunctions of ritual are for the sake of eligibility for *jñāna*.

[406 b-407 a]

यदाऽपि वस्तुवृत्तेन नगरावाप्तिसाधनम् ॥ ४०६ ॥

ग्रामाप्तिर्नगरप्राप्तिस्तदाऽप्यर्थान्न मानतः ।

Even if, by the nature of things, reaching the village is the means for reaching the town, reaching the town (by that means) is by implication (*arthāt*) and not by a means of valid knowledge (*mānatah*).

In the example, going to the village is ascertained to be auxiliary to reaching the town, not from the express words which are only in praise of the village, but by implication. In the case of the ritual-commands, however, these are said to be auxiliary to *jñāna-niyoga* on the strength of testimony. Hence, there is disparity between the illustration and the illustrated.

[407 b-408 a]

अर्थादपि न तात्पर्यं द्रव्यार्जनविधेरिव ॥ ४०७ ॥

शब्दमात्रानुसारेण वेदे तात्पर्यधीर्यतः ।

Even by implication it is not the purport, as in the case of the injunction to gather money ; for the cognition of purport as regards the Veda must follow the simple words.

Even by implication, the injunctions and prohibitions do not have *jñāna-niyoga* as their purport ; for they are not unintelligible without postulating the latter. An example is given to show that *karma-kāṇḍa* is not for the sake of *jñāna-niyoga*. In the *Pūrvamīmāṃsā-sūtra* (IV, i, 2) distinction is made between what is a human end (*puruṣārtha*) and what is for the sake of a sacrifice (*kratvartha*). *Puruṣārtha* is that upon which follows man's happiness:

whereas *kratvartha* is that which is required for the performance of a sacrifice and is to be learnt from Scriptural injunction alone. Now, there is a text relating to the acquisition of property which says: 'For the *brāhmaṇa*, by means of receiving gifts; for the *kṣatriya*, by means of conquest, etc.; and for the *vaiśya*, by means of agriculture, etc.' The question with regard to this text is whether the acquisition of property is a *puruṣārtha* or *kratvartha*. The answer is that the acquisition of property is for the purpose of bringing about happiness which is the human end. It is not necessary, therefore, to include this acquisition in the injunction of the performance of the sacrifice. Similarly, *karma-kāṇḍa* has its own end. Why, then, should it be regarded as auxiliary to *jñāna-niyoga*?

[408 b-409 a]

स्वर्गादौ यदि तात्पर्यं न स्यादैकात्म्यबोधने ॥ ४०८ ॥

मुक्तौ चेन्न भवेत्स्वर्गे वाक्यभेदान्न च द्वये ।

If the purport be in respect of heaven, etc., it cannot be in respect of the knowledge of the one self; if (the purport be) as regards release, it cannot be as regards heaven; nor can it be in regard to both because of sentence-split.

Moreover, if *karma-kāṇḍa* be auxiliary to *jñāna-niyoga*, it must be stated whether the purport of *karma-kāṇḍa* is heaven, etc., or release, or both. If the purport be the first, the *kāṇḍa* cannot be auxiliary to *jñāna-niyoga*. If the purport be release, then there is contradiction with the cognition that *karma-kāṇḍa* is related to what is unknown, viz., heaven. The third alternative is impossible because if both heaven and release be the purport there would be sentence-split.

न च स्वर्गादिकार्याणां प्रयाजार्यसमानता ॥ ४०९ ॥

अनुप्रवेशः कल्प्येत येन कार्यान्तरं प्रति ।

What are to be accomplished, like heaven, etc., are not similar to the fore-sacrifices (*prayājas*) in which case they may be assumed to be included in some other thing to be accomplished.

Karma-kāṇḍa cannot be treated as an *arthavāda*, because we hear in it of fruit like heaven. Heaven, etc., cannot be compared to the fore-sacrifices, because they are ends-in-themselves.

NTV—*prayājādiṣu varma vā etad yajñasya kriyate ity-ādi śrūyamāṇārthavādika-phalavan na svargādi-phalaṁ, prayājādivad agniṣṭomādīnām ātma-jñānāṅgatvasya adyāpy aprasiddheḥ ity arthaḥ.*

वक्तव्यं च कथं त्वेते दृष्टेनैवोपकारिणः ॥ ४१० ॥

आत्मज्ञानाधिकारस्य यदि तावदिदं मतम् ।

रागाद्याक्षिप्तदृष्टार्थप्रवृत्तिप्रतिषेधतः ॥ ४११ ॥

अस्त्वेवं प्रतिषेधेषु निवृत्तेरुपकारतः ।

“Somehow, these (injunctions and prohibitions) must be stated (to be auxiliary to *jñāna-niyoga*) because they are seen to be helpful to eligibility for self-knowledge.” If this be your view, let this be so in the case of prohibitions, for they help turning away (*nivṛtti*) by banning activity towards seen objects brought about by attachment, etc.

If it be said that injunctions and prohibitions are helpful to *jñāna-niyoga* in so far as they make one turn away from too much activity, the *siddhāntin* replies that such is the case only with regard to prohibition.

[412 b-413 a]

विधयस्तु कथं रागं निरुन्धन्तीति भण्यताम् ॥ ४१२ ॥

न हि ते परिसंख्यार्था नापि चैते नियामकाः ।

But how is it possible to say that injunctions destroy attachment? They are not for the sake of exclusion (*parisaṅkhyā*); nor are they restrainers (*niyāmakāḥ*).

How can injunctions serve to remove attachment and thus make one turn away from activity?

There are three types of injunction—the injunction of the novel (*apūrva-vidhi*), the restrictively complementary injunction (*niyama-vidhi*), and the exclusive injunction (*parisaṅkhyā-vidhi*).

(1) *Apūrva-vidhi* is that injunction whose fruit is the establishment of what is not established in any other way; e.g. “He sprinkles the paddy-grains.” Here, what is enjoined is the purificatory act of sprinkling the paddy-grains. This is not established by any other evidence, the injunction being the only authority. (2) *Niyama-vidhi* is that injunction whose fruit is the complementation of the unestablished element, in respect of what is established in part; e.g. “He pounds the paddy-grains.” Here, even in the absence of injunction, pounding of the paddy-grains would result in order to get the rice which is the basic material of the sacrificial cake (*puroḍāśa*). But the pounding is established only in part, for there are other means of producing the rice such as husking with the nails. And so, the purpose of the injunction is to restrict the means to producing the rice by pounding. (3) *Parisaṅkhyā-vidhi* is that injunction which excludes one of two alternatives

that are simultaneously established or are available. For example, in the *Agnicayana* two acts are to be observed, viz. taking hold of the reins of a horse and taking hold of the reins of a donkey. Here there is an injunction which says, 'He takes hold of the reins of the horse with the words "they seized the bridle of the right"'. Since there are two animals connected with this sacrifice, the words "they seized," etc., may refer to the act of holding the reins of either a horse or a donkey. The purpose of the injunction is to exclude the possibility of taking hold of the reins of a donkey.

If the *karma-kāṇḍa* is held to be helpful to *jñāna-niyoga* by removing attachment, etc., it must be of the nature either of *parisaṅkhyā-vidhi* or of *niyama-vidhi*. But neither can be the case. There are no alternatives here, nor establishment in part.

[413 b-414 a]

अत्यन्ताप्राप्तमर्थं हि विधयो बोधयन्ति नः ॥ ४१३ ॥
प्राप्तार्थो यो विधिः सोऽन्यनिवृत्तिफल इष्यते ।

Injunctions, indeed, teach us what is not absolutely accomplished (otherwise). That injunction which relates to an accomplished object is in effect for excluding something else.

The main purpose of *karma-kāṇḍa* is to enjoin what is novel. It teaches what is not established by any other means. Restriction and exclusion are possible only in the case of what have been already established either in part or as alternatives.

[414 b-415 a]

सेवासांग्रहणीहावत्तुल्यकार्यतया न च ॥ ४१४ ॥
यतोऽनियतकालीनफला वैधी क्रियेय्यते ।

Nor is there similarity of being accomplished as for service (of the king) and the *Sāṅgrahaṇī* rite (in the matter of acquiring a village); for the activity consequent on Vedic injunction does not yield its fruit in a fixed time.

It may be contended that, even though the injunctions of ritual have what is novel as their content, they make one turn away from something else. For example, service to a king and the *Sāṅgrahaṇī* rite have the same fruit which is acquiring possession of a desired village; the adoption of one of these means, by implication, makes one not seek the other means. Similarly, activity that is prompted by attachment, etc., and the empirical usage prompted by Scripture result in transmigration; in the case of one who has recourse to the latter, the former is removed. So, even though the injunctions of ritual relate to what is not established otherwise, they do serve to remove activity prompted by natural desire.

In reply to the above contention it is stated that there is no parity between the illustration and the illustrated. While service may yield its fruit immediately, the *Sāṅgrahaṇī* may fructify in the future.

[415 b-416 a]

अदृष्टार्था हि दृष्टार्था रागाद्युत्थाः प्रवृत्तयः ॥ ४१५ ॥

ग्रामोपायेन सेवायाः सांग्रहण्याऽविरुद्धता ।

For (the activity consequent on Vedic injunction) has unseen fruit; whereas actions prompted by desire, etc., have seen fruits. And, there is no opposition between the *Sāṅgrahaṇī* and service as means for gaining a village.

Scripture-prompted activity and activity prompted by natural desire, etc., do, it is true, result in transmigration. Yet, there is a difference between them in regard to intermediary results. So, the illustration of service, etc., is not apt.

Service and the *Sāṅgrahaṇī* do not have the same fruit. There is Scriptural evidence for the *Sāṅgrahaṇī* leading to the possession of a village. There is no such evidence for service resulting in the same fruit. Since there is no mutual conflict between the two, the adoption of one does not necessarily mean the rejection of the other.

[416 b-417]

क्रियातः फलमित्येवं शास्त्रमेतावति प्रमा ॥ ४१६ ॥

क्रमेण युगपद्वाऽतः सेवासांग्रहणीहयोः ।

नानुष्ठाने विरोधोऽस्ति फलभूमार्थिनः क्वचित् ॥ ४१७ ॥

“Through rite (*kriyā*) the fruit.” This much alone Scripture makes known validly. Whether in sequence or simultaneously, if service and the *Sāṅgrahaṇī* be performed, there is nothing incongruous; they may well be performed by him who desires more of the fruit.

The text which declares, “He who desires a village is to perform the *Sāṅgrahaṇī*,” merely says that he who performs this rite along with its auxiliaries obtains the village; it does not say that service is not a means to that end.

There is no disjunction between service and the *Sāṅgrahaṇī*. One may perform them both on the same day or on different days. Therefore, the *Sāṅgrahaṇī* does not exclude service.

In addition to the *Sāṅgrahaṇī* one may perform service in order to acquire more of the fruit. The former results in the acquisition of a village. When service is added, one may acquire a bigger village.

[418]

रागाद्युत्थप्रवृत्तीनां कात्स्न्येन च विरोधतः ।

नैयोगिक्योऽपि नैव स्युर्द्रव्याभावात्प्रवृत्तयः ॥ ४१८ ॥

If there be opposition to all activities prompted by desire, etc., then there would be no activity at all as prompted by *niyoga*, because of the absence of money.

Does the Scripture-prompted activity remove all activity prompted by natural desire? If that were so, then the activity for earning wealth will also be removed. And if there is no wealth, no Scripture-ordained rite can be performed. There will, therefore, be no activity based on Scriptural injunction ; and *karma-kāṇḍa*. will become invalid.

[419]

दृष्टादृष्टप्रवृत्त्योश्च न विशेषोऽस्ति कश्चन ।

उपायत्वेन काम्यानां रागाद्याक्षिप्तहेतुतः ४१९ ॥

There is no difference (*viśeṣa*) whatever between activity in respect of a seen fruit and that in respect of an unseen fruit, for the reason that both are means to what one desired, and are brought about by attachment, etc.

Activity born of natural desire and Scripture-prompted activity are equal in the sense that they are adopted as means to an end that is desired. Desire is the root of both the types of activity. Without the desire for heaven, etc., there cannot, indeed, be Scripture-prompted activity.

[420]

प्रपञ्चाभिनिवेशित्वहेतौ तुल्येऽपि चानयोः ।

कं विशेषमपेक्ष्यैका चेष्टा मुक्त्यनुरोधिनी ॥ ४२० ॥

Since both of them are equal as being the means for developing attachment to the universe, depending on what difference can it be said that one of them is ancillary to release ?

Both types of activity bind one to the world. So, it cannot be stated that one of them, viz. Scripture-prompted activity, is the means to release.

[421]

कामोपायत्वमेवाथ नेष्टं यदि च कर्मणाम् ।

उक्तो न्यायः प्रहीयेत फलं चाऽऽकस्मिकं भवेत् ॥ ४२१ ॥

If you do not accept that actions are means to the accomplishment of desires, then the rule set forth (in the *Mīmāṃsā Śāstra*) would be destroyed, and the fruit would be accidental.

In texts such as 'He who desires heaven is to offer sacrifice,' etc., heaven is seen to be the principal and sacrifice to be the subsidiary (vide *PM*, VI, i, 2). So, it is clear that the fruit of ritual acts is heaven, etc. If that were not the case, the attainment of heaven, etc., would become a matter of accident.

[422]

सर्वकामाशनेनाथ कृत्स्नकामलयाध्वना ।

यान्ति मुक्त्यानुगुण्यं चेद्विधयो वार्त्तमेव तत् ॥ ४२२ ॥

“By the enjoyment of all desires, all desires get destroyed; and through this means the injunctions become ancillary to release”—this is without substance.

The *kāmadhvamsa-vādin* argues thus: “The injunctions of ritual prompt a man to perform ritual acts; and when a man performs those acts, they cause him to enjoy the appropriate fruit; and by causing him to enjoy, they remove his desire for that fruit. Through this procedure, the injunctions culminate in making that man eligible for *jñāna*.”

The *siddhāntin* finds no sense in this argument.

[423-424]

यन्निमित्ता प्रवृत्तिः स्यात्सा कथं तन्निवर्तिका ।

प्रवृत्तोऽपि निवर्तेत न कामोपायकर्मतः ॥ ४२३ ॥

उद्विजेताथवा ज्ञानात्सर्वपुंभोगघस्मरात् ।

अपि वृन्दावने शून्य इति कामिवचस्तथा ॥ ४२४ ॥

That for the sake of which (or, that caused by which) there is activity, how can that (activity or enjoyment) remove that? He who has begun to be active will turn away from the activity that is the means to the desired end; and there will be no activity.

Or, he who has desires will abhor knowledge which is destructive of all human enjoyments. Thus the statement of the man of desires: “Even in the deserted *Vṛndāvana*, etc.”

What removes the desire for fruit? Is it activity? Or, is it the enjoyment of that fruit? Activity cannot remove the desire for fruit, for it is the desire for fruit that prompts activity; and how

can activity remove its own aim ? If what removes the desire for fruit is enjoyment, it must be stated whether enjoyment removes desire during the time it lasts, or during the time of its prior non-existence, or during the time of its destruction. Not the first ; when there is enjoyment, that only increases desire and cannot remove it. Nor the second ; if enjoyment of fruit were to remove the desire for fruit even before its commencement, then one would turn away, at the very same time, from activities that are the means to the desired fruit, although one might have started being active. In other words, one would cease from all activity. The third alternative, that enjoyment of fruit removes the desire for fruit when it is destroyed, is also unacceptable. It is seen that when a man has enjoyed the object of his desire he does not cease from desire. On the contrary, desire only increases. If any one tells him at that time about self-knowledge, etc., he is greatly displeased.

SP gives also another interpretation of these two verses. According to this interpretation, the rendering of the first *śloka* would be : ‘That for the sake of which there is activity—how can that (activity) be the remover thereof ? He who has begun to be active will not turn away from the activity which is the means to the desired end.’

The second *śloka* proceeds to say : In the case of such a person, it cannot be maintained that there is cessation of activity through self-knowledge. He would not stand even the talk about self-knowledge. The following statement about the passionate soul is cited :—

*api vṛndāvane sūnye śṛgālatvam sa icchati,
na tu nirviṣayaṁ mokṣaṁ kadācid api gautama.*

‘Even in a deserted Vṛndāvana, he desires to be as a jackal ; not, indeed, (does he desire) at any time, O Gautama, the contentless *mokṣa*.’

This verse is referred to by the commentator as *kāmi-gīta*.

There is a similar verse which is in criticism of the Nyāya view of *mokṣa* :

*varaṁ vṛndāvane ramye śṛgālatvaṁ sa icchatu,
gautamābhihitāṁ muktiṁ gautamo gantum arhati.*

(*Nyāya-siddhānta-dīpa-prabhā*, p. 232.)

NTV—*iti rāgi-vacaḥ pramāṇam.*

NKL—*yataḥ kāraṇāt pravṛttiḥ sā sva-kāraṇasya kāmasya katham
nivarttikā ity arthaḥ.....bhogasya na kevalaṁ jñānānugūṇyābhāvaḥ
prātikūlyam api.*

NKL—*iti rāgi-gītam atra pramāṇam.*

AVS—*yataḥ kāmāt kāmāśanapravṛttiḥ sā katham sva-kāraṇasya
kāmasya nivartiketi. athavā yathā bhukte kāmotpattiḥ sā bhuktiḥ
katham tasya kāmasya nivartiketi.*

*yadi bhogāt kāma-kṣayas tadā punar-bhogasādhane karmaṇi na
pravarteta, pravartate ca, ato na bhogāt kāma-kṣaya iti.*

[425]

उक्तं यदपि वेदेऽस्मिन्कस्यचिद्विलयः क्वचित् ।

तन्नातत्परतस्तूक्तेर्न देहादिलयस्ततः ॥ ४२५ ॥

As for what was said that, in the Veda, somewhere the resolution of something or other is understood, that is not sound ; for the texts of the Veda do not have that for purport. From those (texts) there is no resolution of body, etc.

Karma-kāṇḍa does not have the destruction of difference for its purport. For its purport is only the relation to what is unknown, viz. heaven. Nor is the destruction of difference the purport of *jñāna-kāṇḍa* ; for the purport of that is the distinctionless Reality. So, the resolution of the world of duality is not the purport of the Veda.

The texts 'He who desires heaven,' etc., do not teach the resolution of body, etc. What they teach is the relation between heaven, etc., and sacrifice, etc. (*Vide v. 3776 b f.*)

NTV—svargakāmo yajetety evam - ādinām na prapañcavilaya-paratvaṁ kiṁtu sādhyā-sādhana-saṁbandha-vidhiparatvaṁ, atas tato vākyāt na dehātmabhāvādi-vilayas siddhyati.

[426]

श्रुतेऽपि स्वर्गतात्पर्ये कल्पना चेच्छयेऽर्थतः ।

तन्न प्रत्यक्षवचनाद्देहादिलयसिद्धितः ॥ ४२६ ॥

“Even though Scripture has heaven for purport, the resolution is assumed by implication.” If thus it be said, no ; for the resolution of body, etc., is established by direct statements.

It cannot be said that, even though the relation between sacrifice and heaven is the purport of *karma-kāṇḍa*, the resolution of body, etc., is to be assumed, as otherwise no man would be active in respect of the other world. For, assumption is necessary only of what is not established otherwise ; the resolution of body is established on the strength of other evidence ; and it is on that that otherworldly activity is based.

[427]

साक्षाद्वास्तिनि दृष्टेऽपि नहि हस्तिपदानुमा ।

अस्थूलादिवचः साक्षाद्देहादिप्रतिषेधकृत् ॥ ४२७ ॥

When an elephant is directly seen, the elephant is not, indeed, inferred. The text “not-gross,”¹ etc., directly negates body, etc.

The resolution of body, etc., is declared by Scripture directly ; so, there is no need to assume it.

1. *BU*, III, viii, 8. 'He (Yājñavalkya) said: O Gārgi, the knowers of Brahman declare, this immutable (Brahman) is, verily, that. It is not gross nor subtle, not short nor long, not red nor sticking, not shadowed nor dark, not airy nor aetherial, without attachment, without taste, without odour, without eyes, without ears, without speech, without mind, without light, without the vital air, without mouth, without measure, and without inside or outside. Not that does eat anything ; nor does that anything eat.'

[428]

विपर्ययेण येऽप्याहुर्यथोक्तज्ञानकर्मणोः ।

एकाधिकारितां वाच्यं मानं तैर्ज्ञानसंगतौ ॥ ४२८ ॥

As for those who maintain the view that there is contrary relation as between knowledge and action, as aforesaid, and that there is identity of eligibility, they must produce evidence for so relating knowledge.

The contrary relation is that *karma* is the principal and *jñāna* is the subsidiary. There is no use in merely asserting that there is such a relation ; evidence must be produced.

[429]

न तावत्प्रक्रियेहास्ति व्रीह्यादिप्रोक्षणे यथा ।

प्रकृतापूर्वसंबन्धलक्षणापरतः स्थितेः ॥ ४२९ ॥

As in the case of sprinkling the paddy-grains, etc., here there is no context, because the paddy-grains there suggest by implication the relation to the *apūrva* under reference.

Context (*prakaraṇa*) is not the evidence for making out that *jñāna* is subsidiary to *karma*. That the sprinkling of paddy-grains is subsidiary to the *Darśapūrṇamāsa* is known through context. Nothing like that obtains in the present case.

[430]

ब्रीहिशब्दस्य हि ब्रीहिस्वरूपे तु निरर्थकम् ।

प्रकृतापूर्वसंबन्धं बोधयेदिति युज्यते ॥ ४३० ॥

If the word 'paddy-grain' (denote) the paddy-grain itself, then it is futile. It is but proper to say that it makes known the relation to the *apūrva* under reference.

The expression 'paddy-grains' in the illustration does not denote paddy-grains as such; because it is not possible to sprinkle paddy-grains as such, and it is not necessary also. So, the expression refers to the relation to the *apūrva* in the context of *Darśapūrṇamāsa*. The sprinkling generates an unseen potency which is related to the supreme unseen potency of the *Darśapūrṇamāsa* rites.

[431-432 a]

नापि वाक्येन संबन्धो जुहूपर्णमयीत्ववत् ।

जुह्वाद्यव्यभिचारित्वकर्मसंगतिकारणात् ॥ ४३१ ॥

विनाऽपि प्रक्रियां तेन कर्मोपस्थापयेद्भ्रुवम् ।

Nor can that relation be established through *vākya*, as in the case of the ladle being made of *parṇa*-wood; because the ladle is invariably related to ritual, even without the context, (the nature of being made of *parṇa*-wood) will surely be related to ritual because of that (viz. *vākya*).

Syntactical connection (*vākya*) too is no evidence for establishing the subsidiariness of *jñāna* to *karma*. Through syntactical connection it is known that 'being-made-of-*parṇa*-wood' is subsidiary to the ladle. (See note on v 334 b-335 a.) And thus it comes to be related to the rite. This is intelligible because the material of the ladle, etc., is invariably related to the rite. But no such relation between *jñāna* and *karma* is known through syntactical connection.

[432 b-433 a]

वाक्येनैवाभिसंबन्धस्तत्र तस्येति वर्णितम् ॥ ४३२ ॥

आत्मज्ञानं तु नैवं स्यान्न तत्प्रकरणे श्रुतम् ।

There (in the third *adhyāya*) it was declared that the relation (of *parṇa*-wood to ritual) is by *vākya* itself. But self-knowledge is not thus ; it is not declared in that context.

Unlike 'sprinkling,' self-knowledge is not auxiliary to *karma*, because it is not taught in that context (*prakaraṇa*).

[433 b-434 a]

नापि चाव्यभिचारित्वमात्मनः कर्मणोक्ष्यते ॥ ४३३ ॥

तेनास्य कर्मसंबन्धो न मानेनोपपद्यते ।

Nor is there seen non-inconstancy as between the self and action ; the relation of that (knowledge) with action is not intelligible on any evidence (*māna*).

Syntactical connection (*vākya*) too is not the evidence ; nor express statement (*śruti*), etc. Even as empirical action is not unintelligible without self-knowledge, so also Scripture-ordained action is not unintelligible without that knowledge.

[434 b-435 a]

एवं चाज्ञातपारार्थ्ये नार्थवादः फलश्रुतिः ॥ ४३४ ॥

पृथगेवाधिकारोऽतो यथोक्तज्ञानकर्मणोः ।

Thus, when it (knowledge) is not known to be for the sake of something else, the declaration of the fruit thereof is not eulogy ; therefore, the eligibility is different for knowledge and action, as aforesaid.

Thus, self-knowledge is not a subsidiary of anything else ; and so the declaration of its fruit is not an *arthavāda*. *Jñāna* is the means to *mokṣa*; not *karma*. Therefore, the two *kāṇḍas* have different eligible persons, etc.

[435 b-436 a]

अर्थाक्षेपोऽपि योग्यस्य कर्तुर्भोक्तुश्च युज्यते ॥ ४३५ ॥

न तु विध्वस्तभेदस्य स्यादौपनिषदस्य सः ।

Postulation by implication (*arthākṣepah*) is intelligible, of what is competent therefor, viz., the agent and enjoyer ; but that is not possible of the self, to be known through the *Upaniṣads* alone, which is devoid of difference.

It may be claimed that there is evidence for stating the subsidiariness of *jñāna* to *karma*—the evidence being postulation (*arthāpatti*). Without knowing the nature of self, it is not possible for one to engage oneself in acts relating to the other world ; hence self-knowledge is a subsidiary of *karma*.

Here, the objector is to be asked: What is the kind of self-knowledge you are thinking of—is it the knowledge of the self as agent, or of the self as non-agent? The first alternative is acceptable to us. The second is not possible. The self which is to be known through the Upaniṣads as the real without any distinctions is of no use at all for *karma*.

NKL—*kartrādy - ātma - jñānaṁ karmāṅgam, na aśanāyādyatītā-
-tma - jñānam, anupayogāt, virodhāc ca.*

AVS—*yādṛśātma-jñānaṁ vinā karmānuṣṭhātum na sakyate, tādrṣ-
-ātmajñānasya karma - śeṣatvaṁ bhavatu, aupaniṣadātmajñānasya
kartrtvādy - aśeṣa - viśeṣopamardakatvāt tac - cheṣatvaṁ na ghaṭate.*

[436 b-437 a]

प्रत्यक्षवेदवचनप्रामाण्याद्यश्रयत्वतः ॥ ४३६ ॥

आदौ संन्याससंसिद्धेर्ऋणानीति ह्यस्मृतिः ।

Because, depending on the evidence of the direct statement of the Veda, renunciation even at the beginning is established, the Traditional Code 'Debts, etc.,' is no evidence.

Some may believe that the texts of the traditional code which speak of the three debts every man has to discharge are evidence for making *karma* subsidiary to *jñāna-niyoga*. The text referred to in this verse is from *Manu* (vi, 35). Besides this, the glossator quotes the *Taittirīya-saṁhitā* (VI, iii, 11).

The *siddhāntin* maintains that all such texts are of no avail against the express declaration of *Śruti* that one may renounce even from the student's stage in life (See *Jābāla*, 4). The texts quoted above only mean that one should discharge the three debts some time or other, not necessarily in the present life.

[437 b-438 a]

न च केवलकर्मभ्यो मुक्तिर्युक्त्योपपद्यते ॥ ४३७ ॥

तथा च वक्ष्यते स्पष्टमतो मुक्तिर्न कर्मतः ।

Nor is it possible to show by reasoning that release is through mere action ; how this is so will be explained clearly later ; therefore, release is not through action.

The words of the *Bhagavad-gītā* that ‘ By *karma* alone Janaka, etc., attained *samsiddhi* ’ (iii, 20) cannot be quoted in support of the view that *karma* alone is the means to *mokṣa*. For, these and similar words cannot make the Scriptural statement that *jñāna* is the means to *mokṣa* invalid. What they really mean is that *karma* purifies the mind and thus helps in the rise of *jñāna*. Scripture declares explicitly : ‘ Not by *karma*, not by progeny, nor by wealth, but by renunciation alone some attained immortality ’ (*Mahānārāyaṇa*, X, 5 ; *Kaivalya*, 2). This is corroborated by the experience of the wise. The reasoning in support of this will be stated later on.

[438 b-439 a]

न चैकात्म्यपरिज्ञानमभ्यासापेक्षमिष्यते ॥ ४३८ ॥

मुक्तये भावनार्थं वा तथा चोर्ध्वं प्रवक्ष्यते ।

Nor is knowledge of the one self dependent on practice (*abhyāsa*) ; nor is it expectant of meditation (*bhāvanā*) for the sake of release ; this will be explained later (iii, 3).

Jñāna does not require repeated practice (*abhyāsa*). Nor does it stand in need of continued meditation (*bhāvanā*). It is the teaching of Scripture that *jñāna* is the sole and independent means to release.

[439 b-440 a]

स्वतोऽनुभवतः सिद्धेरैकात्म्याख्यस्य वस्तुनः ॥ ४३९ ॥

न स्यात्सांपादिकं ज्ञानमित्येतच्चापि वक्ष्यते ।

The reality which is called the one self is self-established in experience. Hence knowledge is not that which produces it (*sāmpādika*); this also will be stated.

It cannot be said that self-knowledge is not valid, because it is generated by the Upaniṣads, like the knowledge that woman is fire (*CHU*, V, viii, 1; *BU*, VI, ii, 13): for, in the latter case, which is cited as illustration, the content is something which is superimposed and is therefore illusory; not so is self-knowledge whose content is the supreme truth. Even here, it must be remembered that the self is not produced, but only revealed by the Upaniṣads.

[440 b-441 a]

अन्य आहुः पदार्थत्वात्प्रमाणान्तरगम्यताम् ॥ ४४० ॥

आत्मनो नाऽऽगमात्सिद्धिर्ब्रह्माद्यन्यपदार्थवत् ।

Others say: "Because the self is an entity, it is known through *pramāṇas* other than Scripture. It is not established (through Scripture) even as other entities like paddy-grains (are not so established).

The view here set forth is as follows : As the self is an established entity, there is no need to depend on Scripture for knowing it. What is enjoined in the Vedāntas is the suppression of the residual impressions of waking and other states or the suppression of mind. Injunctions of *karma* are auxiliary thereto.

NKL—*ātmā āgamātirikṭamāgamyah siddhavastutvāt ghaṭavad ity arthaḥ.....vrihyādeḥ pratyakṣādi-siddhatvena avidheyatvād yathā kartavyatāparam vrihibhir yajate ityādi-vākyaṁ, tathā vedāntavākyaṁ api. itarathā anuvādāpātād ity arthaḥ.*

[441 b-442]

अन्वयव्यतिरेकाभ्यां जाग्रत्स्वप्नसुषुप्तिः ॥ ४४१ ॥

विविच्यतः स्वमात्मानं प्रत्यभिज्ञानतस्तथा ।

माव्यापारसमाप्तत्वान्न भूयस्तदपेक्षिता ॥ ४४२ ॥

“ Enquiring into waking, dream and deep sleep by co-presence and co-absence, thence one recognizes one's self; as the functioning of the means of valid knowledge is complete (with this), there is no need of it again.

The evidence for the self is such reasoning as is based on co-presence and co-absence. An inquiry into the states of experience reveals that the witness-self is constant, while the objects are inconstant. As a result of this inquiry the self is realized. So, Scripture is unnecessary.

NKL—*avasthātraya-sākṣitvena ātma-sphuraṇāt, avasthā-trayasya vyabhicārat, ātma-svarūpatva-taddharma tayor ayogāt, yo 'ham pūrvedyuh so 'ham idānim iti pratyabhijñānāc ca ātmānaṁ vivicyāvasthitasya punar mānāpekṣā vedāntāpekṣā vā na syād ity arthaḥ.*

AVS—*avasthātraya-sākṣitvena ātmanah sphuraṇāt, avasthātrayasya vyabhicārāc ca, ātmasvarūpatvadharmatvā-'yogāt, pratyabhijñā-balenaikyena ātmānaṁ vivicya sthitasya punar mānāpekṣā vedāpekṣā vā na bhaved iti yata ukta-prakāreṇa pramāṇāntara-siddham ātmavastu ato vedāntānāṁ tatra pramāṇatvāyogāt, vāsanānirodhe vedāntavākyaṁ pumān niyuḥyate, mano-nirodhe vā.*

[443-444 a]

तद्वासनानिरोधेऽतः पुमाञ्श्रुत्या नियुज्यते ।

मनसो वा निरोधेऽसौ न तु वस्त्ववबोधने ॥ ४४३ ॥

मानान्तरेण तत्सिद्धेर्नात्र व्याप्रियते वचः ।

“ Therefore, man is prompted by Scripture to control the residual impression thereof (i.e., the three states), or to control the mind, and not in respect of knowing reality; for, that having been established by other means of valid knowledge, the words (of Scripture) do not function here.

What Scripture does is to lay down the means which consists in suppressing the residual impression of the three states of the mind. The glossator cites here *KU* iii, 13, ‘Let the wise man resolve speech into mind, resolve that into the intelligence-self, resolve intelligence into the great-self, and resolve that into the peaceful self.’

NTV—kṛtisādhyo hi niyoga-viṣayaḥ ātmavastu-vivekāvabodho mānāntarasiddhas tena kṛtisādhyatvābhāvāt tatra na niyoga ity arthaḥ.

[444 b-445 a]

स्वयंज्योतिःस्वभावत्वान्निरुद्धस्वान्तवासनः ॥ ४४४ ॥

प्रमान्तरानपेक्षोऽपि स्वयमात्मा प्रकाशते ।

“ Because the self is self-luminous, when the residual impression of the mind has been removed, it shines of itself without depending on any other means of valid knowledge.

When the impressions of the mind have all been removed, the self which is self-luminous shines of its own accord. Hence too, it is not proper to say that the self is known through the Vedāntas.

NKL—vāsanāsu niruddhāsu svayam evā 'tmā siddhyati svaprakāśatvāt.

[445 b-446 a]

एवं कार्यमुखेनैव ज्योतिष्टोमादिवाक्यवत् ॥ ४४५ ॥

वेदान्तानां प्रमाणत्वं नाक्षवद्वस्तुनीष्यते ।

“Thus the validity of the Vedāntas is only by way of what-is-to-be-done (*kārya*), as that of the text relating to the *Jyotiṣṭoma*, etc.; it is not required in respect of an entity, as the sense of sight.

The Vedāntas are not *pramāṇa* in respect of the self. They have validity only through enjoining something-to-be-done (*niyoga*). What is to be done here is the suppression of the mind.

[446 b-447 a]

वासनामात्रहेतुत्वादात्मनोऽनर्थसंगतेः॥ ४४६ ॥

अन्योपाये सत्यसति निरोधादेव मुक्तता ।

“Since for the conjunction of the self with evil (*anartha*) the residual impression is alone the cause, whether a different means (*upāya*) is present or not release results from (mind-) control alone.

That which joins the self to evil (*anartha*, i.e., *samsāra*) is residual impression (*vāsanā*). When that is suppressed, there is release. It is not proper to say, therefore, that release is through

jñāna. It is seen that even *jñānīs* have *saṁsāra*. The sole means (*upāya*) to *mokṣa* is the suppression of residual impressions. Scripture and Traditional Code have this alone as their purport.

NKL—viduṣopi saṁsāra-darśanāt, nāsau ajñāna-kṛtaḥ, vāsanā-mātra-kṛta eva ity arthaḥ.

AVS—yadyapi jñānasya mokṣa-sāadhanatvaṁ śrūyate, tathāpi jñāninopi saṁsāra-darśanād vāsanā-nirodha eva mokṣa-sāadhanam ity arthaḥ.

[447 b-448 a]

संभाव्यं नानपेक्षत्वं नियोगविरहात्कचित् ॥ ४४७ ॥

शब्दप्रवृत्तेः सिद्धे च न नियोगस्य संभवः ।

“The functioning of words (*laukika* and *vaidika*) is not possible independently, without *niyoga* (mandatory force), and *niyoga* is not possible as regards what is an existent.

There is also another reason why the Vedāntas are valid only as being auxiliary to the injunction of suppression (*nirodha-vidhi*). Words, secular or sacred, become valid only through *niyoga* (command). *Niyoga* relates to what-is-to-be-done. It is of no use in respect of an established entity (*siddha-vastu*). The Vedāntas which are auxiliary to *niyoga* cannot, therefore, teach something which is already an established entity.

AVS—śabda-prayogasya anapekṣaṁ prāmāṇyaṁ niyoga-vyatirekeṇa tāvan na saṁbhavati, siddhe ca na niyogaḥ saṁbhavati, sādhyaviṣayatvān niyogasya, ato na siddhe vedānta-vākyānāṁ prāmāṇyam.

[448 b-449 a]

न च वस्तुनि मानत्वं उदाहरणमिष्यते ॥ ४४८ ॥

विधिर्गुणार्थस्तस्यापि व्यापारविषयत्वतः ।

“ *Guṇa-vidhi* is not an example for (the Vedāntas) being the means of valid knowledge in regard to an existent; for that too has for content an operation.

Nor may it be argued that the Vedāntas have an established entity for purport, even though they may be auxiliary to injunction, even as the text ‘One who is desirous of sense-efficiency should offer oblations of curds’ (*dadhnā indriya-kāmasya juhuyāt*), although having *niyoga* for purport, has as its content an established entity. (*PM*, II, ii, 25.) In the example cited, the problem is whether the text in question enjoins another act (i.e. an act other than *Agnihotra*) as qualified by an auxiliary, or whether it enjoins an auxiliary belonging to the present act (*Agnihotra*) itself for the sake of a fruit (here, sense-efficiency). The conclusion is that the text does the latter. But the example does not serve the purpose here. For, even there the content of injunction is not a bare entity but a subsidiary material as governed by an operation. So, operation is the principal, not an established entity.

[449 b-450 a]

किञ्चानुभूयमानस्य ह्यर्थस्य पुरुषार्थता ॥ ४४९ ॥

सर्वत्र गम्यते वेदे नानुभूतेः कथंचन ।

“Further, only a thing that is to-be-experienced can be a human end; this is seen everywhere in the Veda; by no means can experience be a human end.

Another reason for saying that the Veda cannot be *pramāṇa* in respect of what is pure (*śuddha*) and established (*siddha*): everywhere in the world it is seen that only what-is-to-be-experienced is a human end. The mere self-luminous self cannot be the human end. So, the Vedāntas are *pramāṇa* only as being auxiliary to a fruitful *niyoga*.

NTV — adhyayanavidhyupātta-vedāntavākyaśya puruṣārthaparatā svīkartavyā, anubhūti-lakṣaṇam ca siddham brahma na pumarthaḥ, anubhūyamānasyaiva pumarthatva-niyamāt, atopi nirodha-niyoga-paratā vaktavyā.

AVS—anubhāvyasyaiva modakādeḥ puruṣārthatvaṁ, na anubhūter ity arthaḥ.

[450 b-451 a]

ततश्च प्रतिभामात्रं शब्दादिति न मानतः ॥ ४५० ॥

प्रतीयमान एवातः पुरुषार्थः प्रसिद्धितः ।

“So from the words (of Scripture) there is only awareness (*pratibhā*), and not validity. It is only that which is experienced that can be a human end. This is settled.

Texts like ‘intelligence, bliss’ (*BU*, III, ix, 28), etc., merely generate insight. They do not become *pramāṇa* thereby. It is only what is being experienced that can become a human end, not experience as such.

[451 b-452 a]

अप्युपादीयमानं च सिद्धं वस्तु न कर्मणि ॥ ४५१ ॥

पुमर्थं साधयद्दृष्टमनिर्ज्ञाताङ्गभावकम् ।

“Even though an existent entity be taught (in the Veda), it is not seen to be taught as a human end unless it is known to be an auxiliary to an act.

Veda does not have for purport any pure existent entity. Such entities are certainly mentioned in the Veda, but only as auxiliaries of action.

[452 b-453 a]

अनुपादीयमानश्च न च ज्ञाताङ्गभावकः ॥ ४५२ ॥

आत्मा चेन्नास्य शेषत्वं विधिं प्रत्युपपद्यते ।

“If the self be not taught in the Veda (because it is of the nature of self-luminous experience), and if it is not known to be auxiliary, then it cannot be subsidiary to injunction.

If it is true that the self is of the nature of self-luminous experience, it cannot be taught in the Veda. Also, it cannot become a human end by being an auxiliary of injunction.

[453 b-454 a]

उपासीत स्वमात्मानमिति साक्षाद्वचःश्रवात् ॥ ५५३ ॥

तत्ताङ्गभाव इति चेन्मत्पन्थानं भवानिति ।

“If you say that there is subsidiariness (for the self) to the injunction of meditation because it is declared in Scripture ‘Meditate on your own self,’ then you adopt my view.

If it is your view that the self is taught as the content of the injunction of meditation, then you are adopting my position which is *niyoga-vāda*, relinquishing your doctrine that the *Vedāntas* are *pramāṇa* in respect of the pure self-established self.

AVS—*tarhi bhavat-siddhānto hataḥ, asmat-siddhāntaḥ siddhaḥ.*

[454 b-455 a]

क्रियाविधिपरत्वेन प्रामाण्यं वचसः स्थितम् ॥ ४५४ ॥

इति व्याचक्षते केचिन्नियोगार्थेकरागिणः ।

“Thus it is settled that words have validity only as having for purport injunction to act.”

Thus say some who are attached to the sense of *niyoga*.

Here the *niyoga-vādin* concludes the presentation of his case: The *Vedāntas* are auxiliary to the injunction of suppression (*nirodha-vidhi*). Karmas are also auxiliary to injunction. Thus there is connection between the two *kāṇḍas*.

[455 b-456 a]

नैतत्साध्वभ्यधायुच्चैर्नियोगविरहादपि ॥ ४५५ ॥

कामितार्थस्य संसिद्धेर्लौकिकादेव मानतः ।

What you have loudly proclaimed is not good. Even without *niyoga* we find the accomplishment of desired ends by empirical means of valid knowledge alone.

Siddhānta.—It is not right to say that release is through suppression alone. If suppression of mental impressions alone were the means, then it could be accomplished even through empirical *pramāṇas*; and there would be futility of Vedic injunction.

NTV—karma-nirodhayos samuccayān mokṣa iti pūrvottara-kāṇḍa-saṁbandhaṁ nirākaroti.

[456 b-457 a]

तद्भावभावतो लिङ्गाद्वैकसमाश्रयात् ॥ ४५६ ॥

ज्ञातोऽनर्थेन संबन्ध आत्मनो न तु वास्तवः ।

It is known that the relation of the self to evil is as dependent on residual impression (*vāsanā*) and it is not real. This is known through reasoning, viz., when that (*vāsanā*) is, the other (relation to evil) is.

Through empirical reasoning it is possible to establish the causal relation between residual impressions and the evil called *saṁsāra*. The reasoning, here, is based on co-presence and co-absence. What is the use, then, of the Veda?

NTV—jāgradādaṁ vāsanodbhave saṁsārodbhava-darśanāt, suṣup-tādaṁ vāsanābhibhave saṁsārābhibhava-darśanād ity arthaḥ.

[457 b-458 a]

तस्मात्संसारसंबन्धनिदानस्य प्रसिद्धितः ॥ ४५७ ॥

लिङ्गादेव ततस्तस्य ध्वंसेऽनर्थो निवर्तते ।

Therefore, since the cause of the relation to transmigration is established through reasoning itself (*liṅga*), when that (cause) is destroyed, evil is removed. (This is also known by the same reasoning.)

Just as through reasoning the cause of transmigration is determined, so also through reasoning it can be known that the suppression of the cause will result in the destruction of the effect.

Thus even without the help of Scripture, the human end can be achieved.

NKL—nirodha-vādinā saṁsārasya anvayādinā vāsanā-kṛtatvaṁ vācyam. ataś ca tan-nivartaka-nirodhasyā 'pi lokata eva siddhir ity arthaḥ.

[458 b-459 a]

अन्तरेणापि वचनं बौद्धादेरिव सिद्धितः ॥ ४५८ ॥

मोक्षस्य पुरुषार्थस्य वचोऽतो निष्फलं भवेत् ।

Since for you, as for the Bauddhas, etc., the human end which is release is accomplished even without the word (The Veda), the word (the Veda) would be futile.

If there is no help from Scripture, Scripture is futile. And, you would be joining the ranks of the *nāstikas*.

NTV—yathā bauddhādīnām mate mokṣo 'numānenaiva siddho nāgamam apekṣate tadvad ity arthaḥ.

[459 b-460 a]

व्यतीतानेकजन्मोत्थवासनानामनन्ततः ॥ ४५९ ॥

तासां निरोधोऽसंभाव्यो जन्मन्येकत्र मानवैः ।

As the residual impressions given rise to by the past several lives are endless, it is not possible for men to destroy them in a single life.

It may be said that man is prompted to suppress the residual impressions by Scripture. Even, then, it must be stated whether the residual impressions to be suppressed are of the past, the present, or the future. The past impressions are endless and, therefore, cannot

be suppressed. The present impressions are occasional, and do not stand in need of an injunction for suppression. The future impressions are not yet, and so how can they be suppressed ?

[460 b-461 a]

साक्षादोत्मावबोधेन प्रत्यग्ध्वान्तच्छिदा न चेत् ॥ ४६० ॥

दुःखादिभावना ध्वस्ता कथं तद्भावना नुदेत् ।

If by the direct intuition of the self there is no destruction of the inner darkness, how can it be removed by continued meditation (*bhāvanā*) which is itself destroyed by the contemplation of sorrow, etc.

If you believe that direct self-knowledge destroys ignorance, that that destruction suppresses mental impressions, and that through that there is release, you are virtually adopting our view. Or, if you think that the direct knowledge of the self cannot destroy ignorance, and that continued meditation is needed, we ask you, how is this intelligible ? If self-knowledge cannot destroy ignorance, continued meditation (*bhāvanā*) which is itself destroyed cannot destroy it.

*NTV—sākṣād ātmāvabodhaḥ pratyak-dhvāntam ajñānam bhinaiti k
tattva - jñānasya ajñāna - nivartakatva-niyama - darśanāt. tatra yadi
duḥkhādi-vāsanā dhvastāḥ kāraṇe dhvaste tatkāryasya anavasthānani-
yamāt, katham tarhi jñānottarakālaṁ, tad-dhvaṁsanāya upāsanāni
vidhīyate.*

[461 b-462 a]

नियोगवर्त्मना चेय यथा मुक्तिर्न सिध्यति ॥ ४६१ ॥

स्पष्टेन न्यायमार्गेण वक्ष्यामोऽक्सरे तथा ।

Later on, in its proper place, we shall show clearly through reasoning how release is not accomplished through the path of *niyoga*.

The view that release is obtained through the injunction of the practice of *jñāna*, we shall refute later (*vide* v. 762 f.).

[462 b-463 a]

न पदार्थो न वाक्यार्थ आत्माऽयं वस्तुतो यतः ॥ ४६२ ॥

तत्प्रत्याख्यानश्रुत्यैव तद्याथात्म्यावबोधनात् ।

The self, really, is not the sense of either a word or a sentence ; its true nature is understood only from the Scriptural texts which deny that.

It was stated in v. 440 b-441a that because the self is an entity, like paddy-grains, it is known through *pramāṇas* other than Scripture.

With reference to that contention, it is explained here how Scripture becomes evidence in respect of the self. The true nature of the self cannot be known through the literal sense of words or sentences. Scripture indicates the nature of the self through the exclusion or denial of the superimposed particulars constitutive of the world ; also through denying that the self is the content of words or sentences.

NTV—brahmātmany eva pramāṇam uttara-kāṇḍam iti samudāyārthah.....neti-netyādinā sakala-padārtha-vāk्यārtha-pratyākhyānena ātma-yāthātmyam pratipādyata ity arthah.

tena pramāṇāntara-gamyatvābhāvāt ātma-yāthātmyasya āgamād eva vidhiḥ yuktam, vrīhyādinām pada-vācyaatvāt pramāṇāntara-gamyatvam, ātma-yāthātmyasya tvam-pada-vācyaatvāt avāk्यārthatvāc ca na pramāṇāntara-gamyatvam iti vaiśamyam.

[463 b-464 a]

वासनानामभावेऽपि सुषुप्त्यादौ न मुक्तता ॥ ४६३ ॥

मानव्यापारविरहात्प्रथनं वा दृगात्मनः ।

In sleep, etc., even though there are no residual impressions, there is no release ; nor in the absence of the functioning of the means of valid knowledge in that state does the inner self manifest itself.

By the mere suppression of residual impressions one cannot attain release. There are no residual impressions in sleep ; but sleep is not release. It cannot be said that there are residual impressions in sleep, for if that were so, sleep would not be sleep. If it be urged that in sleep the impressions remain in the form of their cause, viz. nescience, then it is only the removal of that cause that would lead to release. And the removal of nescience is possible only through knowledge.

As for what was said that even without the functioning of *pramāṇas* the self shines when the impressions are removed, we have to make this observation, viz. that without *pramāṇa* the self-manifestation of the self cannot be known.

NTV—vāsanā-nirodhān na muktatā suṣṭyādaṁ vyabhicārāt, nāpi svānta-vāsanā-nirodhāt ātmā svayam eva prakāśate vāsanā-śūnye suṣṭyādaṁ dr̥g-ātmanah pr̥thag adarśanāt.

[464 b-465 a]

सर्वानर्थोभिसंबन्धे ह्यविद्यैवास्य कारणम् ॥ ४६४ ॥

वासनानामपि युतौ सैव यस्मादपेक्ष्यते ।

For the relation (of the self) to all evil, nescience alone is the cause; for conjunction with residual impressions nescience alone is required.

Nescience is the cause of residual impressions and of bondage.

NTV—ādhyātmikādhībhautikādhidāivikā-'nārtha-saṁbandhe mūla-kāraṇam avidyāiva, na ca tasyās sattvam asattvam vā yena tan-nirodhaka-prayatnāpekṣā kimtv anirvācyāyā jñānādeva nivṛttiḥ, tena vedāntānām tattva-jñānotpādakam eva.

[465 b-466 a]

संभाव्यतेऽनपेक्षत्वं नियोगविरहादपि ॥ ४६५ ॥

यथा तथा च वक्ष्यामः स्पष्टेन न्यायवर्त्मना ।

As to how independence (as means of knowledge) is possible (for Scripture) even without *niyoga*, we shall explain clearly through reasoning.

Scripture is *pramāṇa* even without dependence on *niyoga*.

NTV — siddhe vastuni niyogā-'saṁbhavasya tvayaivoktatvāt nirapekṣa-pramāṇa-bhāvena vedāntena kevalam brahmaiva pratīyate na niyogaḥ, nirviṣayatvād ity arthaḥ.

[466 b-467 a].

स्वानुभूतिबलादेव भवताऽपि विभाव्यते ॥ ४६६ ॥

नियोगादिः प्रमाणार्थो नानुभूतिर्नियोगतः ।

Even by you *niyoga*, etc., are known only on the strength of self-experience; experience is not known through *niyoga*.

Even the *niyoga-vādin* is able to understand the sense of *niyoga* which is inert only on the strength of the self which is consciousness. So, the self which is consciousness is self-established, and does not stand in need of *niyoga*. The impossibility of *niyoga* in its case is, therefore, not a defect. Surely, the sun which illumines colour, etc., does not shine as being dependent thereon.

NTV—niyogādeḥ jadasya anubhavaḥ siddhāv apekṣyate, anubhavasiddhau tu na niyogāpekṣā asti, anubhūtir eva ātmā ity arthaḥ.

[467 b-468 a]

यस्याप्रसिद्धिर्नाज्ञानात्प्रसिद्धिर्नापि मानतः ॥ ४६७ ॥

तस्यानुभवतत्त्वस्य कुतः सापेक्षतोच्यते ।

That of which there is neither non-establishment through ignorance nor establishment through means of knowledge—how can that experience-reality be said to be dependent ?

The self does not require to be established by *pramāṇa* ; nor does it become unestablished on account of ignorance. It neither rises nor sets. It is immutable and is of the nature of the one consistency of intelligence. Hence there is no need of *niyoga*.

[468 b-469 a]

स्वप्रधानात्मबुद्धयैव तदन्यस्य प्रसिद्धितः ॥ ४६८ ॥

कार्यबुद्धिव्यपेक्षातो नानुभूत्यात्मवस्तुनः ।

Because all other things are established only through self-knowledge which is independent, there is no dependence of the experience-self on the cognition of what-is-to-be-done.

The self is primary and independent. On it depend the entire host of things constituting the not-self. For its establishment, it does not depend on anything, even as the rope-cognition does not depend on the snake-cognition.

[469 b-470 a]

क नु प्रतीयमानस्य पुमर्थत्वं समीक्षितम् ॥ ४६९ ॥

मानान्मानफलस्यैव पुमर्थत्वसमन्वयात् ।

Where, indeed, is it validly seen that what is being experienced is the human end? The constant human end is only the fruit of the means of knowledge (*viz.* experience).

It was stated by the *pūrvapakṣin* that what-is-enjoyed alone is the human end. But that cannot be. What is enjoyed or experienced varies. Enjoyment or experience alone is constant. What is inconstant and contingent cannot be the human goal. Only that which is constant and unconditioned can be the goal.

[470 b-471 a]

प्रतीतेर्माफलत्वाच्च कथं मेयैकनिष्ठता ॥ ४७० ॥

साक्रियाफलयोगोऽयं यतो मातरि भोक्तारि ।

Because experience is the fruit of means of knowledge, how can it have the object alone for basis? The cognitive activity is in the cognizer; the fruit is related to the enjoyer. (These two are not different.)

It cannot be said that experience is dependent on the experienced object, even as the colour of the object is; for, experience is the fruit of *pramāṇa*, and the cognized object cannot be its locus, as the

object is inert. Surely, as between what is inert and what is not inert, there is not the relation of locus and the located.

Nor may it be urged that a fruit cannot be independent, and therefore experience must depend on the object ; for, the fruit of *pramāṇa* depends on the cognizer, and the fruit of action on the enjoyer ; and the two—cognizer and enjoyer—are not different. To speak of experience as the fruit of *pramāṇa* is only in the figurative sense. Experience is the self.

NTV—anubhavyaiva svayamprakāśatvāt anubhavyasya ca jādātīvāt na anubhāvyaśrayā pratītir ity arthaḥ. na kevalam pratīteḥ hetoḥ na meyaika-niṣṭhā anubhūtiḥ, kiṃtu māna-phalātīvāc ca tataś ca bhoktari phalam tat bhoktā ca pramātaiva.

AVS—anubhavya māna-phalātīvāt prameyasya jādātīvāc ca anubhavo na meyaśrayaḥ, kiṃtv ātmāśraya iti.

[471 b-472 a]

न चाऽऽत्मानुभवादन्यो विषयः कश्चिदिष्यते ॥ ४७१ ॥

अपि सर्वप्रमाणानां किमु वेदान्तशासने ।

Nothing other than self-experience is the content of all means of knowledge—what, then, of Vedānta-teaching!

The self which is experience is the content of all *pramāṇas*, for there is nothing other than the self which is unknown. So, it requires no special effort to know that for the *Vedāntas* there is no content other than the experience-self which is the human goal.

NTV—anavagatārtha-gaṇṭṛ pramāṇam iti lakṣanād ajñānanivartakaṃ pramāṇam, tac ca ajñānam jāde ghaṭādaḥ na sambhavati, tathā ca anubhūter eva ajñānaviśayatvena anavagatatvāt tasyā eva meyatvam pumarthatvam ceti yadā jāda-niṣṭhānām api pramāṇānām evam gatiḥ, tadā kimu vaktavyam anubhava niṣṭhānām vedāntānām.

[472 b-473 a]

लौकिको वैदिकः सर्वो व्यवहारो जगत्पि ॥ ४७२ ॥

भोक्त्रर्थ एव नान्योऽतः प्रधानं भोक्तुरिष्यते ।

All usage in the world, whether empirical or Scriptural, is for the sake of the enjoyer, and not for anything else—so, the enjoyer is the principal.

Here is another reason for saying that the *Vedānta* is *pramāṇa* in respect of the supreme consciousness-self which is the ultimate human goal, untouched by *niyoga* :

All empirical usage in the world is for the sake of the enjoyer-self. The self which is experience and which is of the nature of bliss is the principal ; all else is subsidiary. Hence, it is the goal of *Vedānta-pramāṇa*.

NTV—kimca sarvasya ātmārthatvena priyatvād ātmā niratisaya-sukham, anubhūtir eva ātmā iti saiva pumarthah.

[473 b-474 a]

न वा अरे पत्युरिति तदेतत्प्रेय इत्यपि ॥ ४७३ ॥

निखिलेऽपि जगत्स्मिन्प्रधानं नाऽऽत्मनोऽपरः ।

From texts like “Not for the sake of the husband, etc.”¹ and “So this is dearer, etc.”² it is learnt that everywhere in the world there is nothing superior to the self.

1. *BU*, II, iv, 5 ; IV, v, 6 : ‘Not indeed for the love of a husband is the husband dear ; but, for the love of the self is the husband dear.’

2. *BU*, I, iv, 8 : ‘This which is the self is dearer than a son, dearer than wealth, dearer than everything else, and is innermost.’

That the inner self is of the nature of unexcellable bliss is taught in Scripture. The self is the principal ; it is the sphere of unconditioned love ; hence, it is of the nature of supreme bliss.

NKL—yadartham sarvam upādiyate yac ca nānyārtham tat sukham iti lakṣaṇam ātmani paripūrṇam ity arthaḥ. nirupādhiprema gocaratvādapy ātmanah sukha-rūpatvam sādhayitum para-prema-gocaratve śrutim udāharati.

[474 b-475 a]

न प्रमाता प्रमाणं वा क्रियामेयफलानि वा ॥ ४७४ ॥

प्राधान्यायेह कल्पन्ते भोक्तुरेव प्रधानतः ।

Neither the cognizer, nor the means of cognition, nor activity, object, or fruit, can be assumed to be the principal here (in the empirical state), for the enjoyer alone is the principal.

The enjoyer alone is the principal ; everything else is for his sake.

[475 b-476 a]

आत्मनः कर्त्रवस्थाऽपि भोक्तृत्वमिति निश्चयः ॥ ४७५ ॥

यतोऽतोऽपरमप्येतद्भोक्तृत्वं विनियुज्यते ।

Even the state of agency for the self is certainly for the sake of the enjoyer ; for all other things subserve the purposes of the enjoyer.

Even agency is secondary. Agency is for the sake of enjoyership. The enjoyer-self is not subsidiary to anything else. If it imagines that it is subsidiary, such imagination is born of delusion.

[476 b-477 a]

नापि चाऽऽत्मातिरेकेण वस्त्वन्यन्मानभूमिगम् ॥ ४७६ ॥
संभाव्यते यथा चैतत्तथोदके प्रवक्ष्यते ।

Nothing other than the self can be the sphere of cognition ; how this is so will be explained later.

The self alone is the content of valid knowledge. What is other than that is illusorily posited.

NKL—udarke upariṣṭād avyākṛta-vicāradau ity arthah.

[477 b-478 a]

अनादृत्य यथोक्तार्थं नियोगार्थैकरागतः ॥ ४७७ ॥
केचित्कार्यैकनिष्ठत्वं वेदान्तानां प्रचक्षते ।

Setting aside the sense we have explained, some, because of exclusive attachment to the sense of *niyoga*, maintain that the Vedāntas have for their sole purport what-is-to-be-done.

So far it has been shown that the Vedāntas are not auxiliary to the injunction of suppression. Those who would not brook this view say that the Vedāntas culminate only in what-is-to-be-done (*kārya*).

[478 b-479 a]

कार्यैकमात्रनिष्ठत्वात्प्रमाणस्याऽऽगमात्मनः ॥ ४७८ ॥
कुत ऐकात्म्यनिष्ठत्वं त्वया यदुदितं पुरा ।

“ Since Scripture as means of knowledge has for its sole purport what-is-to-be-done alone, how can it have for purport what you have stated, viz. the one self ?

Pūrvapakṣa.—All Vedic texts, including ‘That thou art,’ etc., have *kārya* as their purport. Even when existent entities are mentioned, it is only with the intention of making them auxiliary to *kārya*.

NTV—*āgama hi śāstratvāt pravṛtti-nivṛtti-upadeśaparaḥ, vedānta-vākyamapy āgamaḥ, tena asyāpi pravṛtti-nivṛtti-paratā vācyā. tad uktam :*

pravṛttir vā nivṛttir vā nityena kṛtakena vā, pumsām yenopadiśyeta tat-śāstram abhidhīyate, iti.

[479 b-480 a]

नहि तस्यानपेक्षत्वं सिद्धवस्त्ववबोधनात् ॥ ४७९ ॥
यतो मानान्तरमितं सिद्धं वस्त्विति भण्यते ।

“That (Scripture) would not be independent if it taught an existent entity, for an existent entity is known through other means of knowledge.

Existent entities can be known through *pramāṇas* other than Scripture. If Scripture gave information about these alone, it would be dependent and stale. *Kārya* is known only through Scripture ; so, that alone constitutes its purport.

NTV—*vedāntānām siddhe vastuni anapekṣatayā prāmāṇyam na sambhavati. siddham hi pramāṇāntareṇa pramitam ity ucyate. tena vedāntānām kāryaparatorīkartavyā.*

[480 b-481 a]

शब्दसामर्थ्यनियमो लोकादेवावगम्यते ॥ ४८० ॥
लोके मान्तरसिद्धोऽर्थः कार्ययैवाभिधीयते ।

“The rule regarding capacity of words is understood from the world (secular practice) alone ; and in

the world an existent entity which is known through other means of knowledge is referred to by words only for the sake of what-is-to-be-done.

The capacity of words is learnt from the usage of elders ; and all words point to some *kārya* or other. Moreover, in empirical usage, the things that are established through perception, etc., are made to subserve a *kārya*.

NTV—kimca lokādeva śabda--sāmarthyādhigamaḥ, tatra hi kāryaparatayaiva vākyāni prayujyante, ataḥ kāryaparatvam eva vedāntānām api.

[481 b-482 a]

न प्रवृत्तिनिवृत्तिभ्यां शून्यस्य वचसो यतः ॥ ४८१ ॥
कश्चिदर्थोऽत्र दृष्टोऽतो वस्तुनि स्यान्न मानता ।

“ For a word which is void of either activity or withdrawal there is no meaning seen here ; therefore, there is no validity in respect of an existent.

Testimony as a means of valid knowledge depends on purport ; purport refers to a human end ; such an end is to be accomplished by appetite or desistance ; these are prompted by injunctions and prohibitions ; and they are what-are-to-be-done. Hence also the Veda does not have the existent for purport.

NTV—śrotuḥ prayojanaṁ vivakṣan prekṣāvān padāni prayuṇte, prayojanaṁ ca pravṛtti-nivṛtti-sādhyaṁ bhavati, pravṛtti-nivṛtti ca kāryatā-'bhijñānāt bhavata iti tat-paratayaiva sakala-padānām prayoga ity arthaḥ.

[482 b-484 a]

संबन्धावगमो नापि शब्दाद्भूतार्थवाचिनः ॥ ४८२ ॥
प्रवर्तकात्प्रवृत्त्याऽर्थे प्रत्ययो ह्यनुमीयते ।

ततः शब्दस्य सामर्थ्यं प्रतीतेरवधार्यते ॥ ४८३ ॥

कार्यैकविषयैवेयं वाक्यस्यातः प्रमाणतः ।

“Nor is there cognition of relation in the case of a word which expresses an existent entity. It is by the activity prompted by a prompter that the meaning in respect of a particular thing is inferred.

Thence the capacity of a word to signify certain things (through what-is-to-be-done) is determined. Thus it is settled through means of knowledge that a sentence has for its sole content what-is-to-be-done.

In the absence of activity, words do not convey meaning. Let us see how a child learns the meanings of words. The superior elder (say, the grand-father) commands the intermediate elder (his son) to do something. When the latter obeys the command, the child looks on ; and then the child infers the meanings of the words contained in the command. Thus action is the important factor. It is as associated with action that words become meaningful.

NTV—tathā ca pravṛtti-saṁbandha-rahiteṣu bhūtārtheṣu na śabdā-nām śaktir gamyate, tathāsaty anavagata-sāmarthyāś śabdāḥ bhūterthe katham tam avabodhayeyuḥ, mama punaḥ kāryatā-jñānād eva pravṛtṭiḥ, na kriyāmātra-jñānāt, nāpi phalamātra-jñānāt, na cāpi kriyā-phalayoḥ sādhya-sādhana-saṁbandhāvagamāt, ataḥ kāryatā-jñānād eva asyāpi pravṛttir ity anumimīte.

[484 b-485 a]

क्रियाकारकसंबन्धो वाक्यार्थो यैरपीष्यते ॥ ४८४ ॥

अनुवादविसंवादात्तेषामुक्तेरमानता ।

“As for those who say that the sense of a sentence is the relation between action and agent, their statement is not valid, because of the method of agreement and difference.

It cannot be said that the sense of a sentence is the relation between an action and an agent, as in the case of the sentence ‘He cooks food.’ For, in the example cited, the relation of agent to action is known through other means, such as perception and inference. So, it is not ‘sentence’, or testimony that is the evidence here. We can only say in such cases that the testimony is either in agreement with or differs from the other *pramāṇas*. Hence, *kārya* alone should be taken as the sentence-sense.

NKL—pacatītyādaḥ kriyā-kāraka-sāmbandhasya māntara-yogyatvāt tat siddha-bodhakatve anuvādakatvam, anyathā yogyānupalambha-virodhān mithyā-bodhakatvam, ato niyoge prāmāṇyaṁ vākyaśya ity arthaḥ.

[485 b-486 a]

मान्तरानुप्रवेशित्वं कार्यस्य तु न शङ्क्यते ॥ ४८५ ॥

शब्दादेव हि कार्यार्थप्रतिपत्तिर्न लोकतः ।

“It cannot be doubted that even for what-is-to-be-done there may be some other evidence; for the sense of what-is-to-be-done is known from the Veda alone, and not from the world.

Kārya cannot be known by any other means. That is why it is called *mānāntarāpūrva*. Vedic sentence, of the nature of command, is the only means for knowing *kārya*.

NTV—svargakāmādi-padānām niyojya-samarpakatvena na tatsa-mabhivyāhṛtānām liṅādi-padānām niyojyānvita-kāryābhidhāyinām

*alaukikāpūrva-kārya-vācakatvābhyupagamāt na anuvādatā-prasaṅgaḥ
.....niyojya-saṁbandha-samārthaḥ liṅādibhiḥ kāryam kālāntara-
sthāyi kriyāto bhinnam abhidhīyate ity anaṣṭasyāpūrvakāryasya svarga-
janakatvāt na mātāntara-virodhah.*

[486 b-487 a]

प्रवर्तनां वदञ्शब्दः प्रवर्तक इतीर्यते ॥ ४८६ ॥

ज्ञापकत्वात्प्रमाणस्य प्रेरयन्कारको भवेत् ।

“ Because the Vedic statement speaks of activity, it is called that which teaches activity ; for, the purpose of a means of knowledge is to make known ; if it actually prompted one to activity, it would be a causative agent (like desire or passion).

Here, the following objection may be raised : Śabara says that a command (*codanā*) means a statement which prompts activity. Therefore, that alone should be regarded as the cause of activity (*pravṛtti-hetu*). How, then, can *kārya* be inferred through activity as the *probans*, or *liṅ*, etc., connote *kārya* ? And also how can there be the apprehension of the sense of *apūrva-kārya* from ‘sentence’ alone ?

The reply is : ‘ Sentence ’ does not become directly the prompter. If it were to prompt directly, all those who hear the words, *liṅ*, etc., would begin to act. It is only as indicating an activity that a sentence becomes a prompter.

NKL—*vācya-vācakayor abhedopacāreṇa prerayan śabdaḥ pravartaka ity ukto bhāṣyakāreṇa ity arthaḥ.*

[487 b-488 a]

शब्दात्प्रवर्तनाबुद्धौ रागादिर्न च शङ्क्यते ॥ ४८७ ॥

रागादिः प्रेरणाकारी प्रेरणाज्ञापको ध्वनिः ।

“It cannot be doubted that desire, etc., are the cause in generating the cognition of activity from word (*liṅādi-śabda*); desire, etc., are what lead to prompting; sound (*i.e. liṅādi-śabda*) makes known prompting.

It cannot be said that appetite, etc., are responsible for knowing activity from ‘word’ (verbal testimony); for they may only lead to a command; that which makes command known is the word.

NKL — *śabdāt pratipannasya pravartakasya janako rāgādir iti bhāvah.*

[488 b-489 a]

आज्ञापितार्थनिष्पत्तौ कृतिमत्त्वेक्षणात्प्रभोः ॥ ४८८ ॥

रागाद्यर्थस्य चासिद्धौ कर्तृवृत्तिर्न रागतः ।

“Since we see activity for accomplishing something enjoined by a master, and since here appetite, etc., are not possible, the activity of the agent is not due to appetite.

It has been said that what prompts activity is neither appetite, etc., nor the word, and that it must only be the *kārya*. For example, commanded by the teacher, a student performs an action. Here, there is nothing like appetite, etc., on the part of the student. He acts merely as impelled by the power of the teacher’s command, *i. e.* out of a sense of obligatoriness.

[489 b-490 a]

स्वामिकोपप्रसादादिहृदयाकृतवेदनात् ॥ ४८९ ॥

नापि श्रोतुः प्रवृत्तिः स्याच्छब्दात्कोपाद्यवेदनात् ।

“Nor is the activity of the hearer prompted by a knowledge of the inner intentions like anger, pleasure, etc., of the master; for anger, etc., are not known from the word.

Nor may it be said that anger, etc., present in the one who issues the command are what prompt one to activity; for they cannot be known directly, as the *niyoga* or *kārya* is known from *liñ*, etc.

[490 b-491 a]

लिङादयो न कोपादेः स्मर्यन्ते प्रतिपादकाः ॥ ४९० ॥

मानान्तरमिताः सन्तस्ते हि पुंसां प्रवर्तकाः ।

“The potential ending, *liñ*, etc., are not taught to be the indicators of anger, etc. They, viz., anger, etc., become prompters of men's activity only as known through other means of knowledge.

The suffixes *liñ*, etc., make known command, and not the anger, etc., of the speaker. These latter are known through other means.

[491 b-492 a]

धिगङ्गाद्यभिधानैस्तु लिङ्गभूतैरिहेङ्गिताः ॥ ४९१ ॥

रागादयो नियोगस्य सिद्धयै विषयसाधनाः ।

“They (anger, etc.) are inferred from *probans* like the expressions ‘Fie’, ‘Dear one’, etc; appetition, etc.,

establish the content (*viṣaya*) and thereby make *niyoga* possible.

Anger, etc., are inferred from such expressions as 'Fie !,' etc.; they are not directly expressed by words.

If *kārya* is what prompts one to activity, and not *liñ*, etc., or appetite, etc., why was it said that attachment, etc., are what cause prompting? The reply is : attachment, etc., establish the stem-sense which in turn establishes the *niyoga*. Hence it is that they are said to cause the command.

NKL—*dhātvartha-sādhakatvena niyoga-sādhakā ity arthah.*

[492 b-493 a]

अत एव च रागादिसंस्पृष्टोऽपि विविच्यते ॥ ४९२ ॥

लोडाद्यर्थो व्रजेत्युक्तो याति स्वार्थं विना यतः ।

“Therefore, because, when the word (sense of the imperative ending, *lot*) ‘go’ (*vraja*) is uttered, he goes even without any purpose of his own, the meaning of the imperative ending *lot*, though mixed up with appetite, etc., is discriminated.

It cannot be said that in the case of empirical injunctive statements the *niyoga* is always associated with appetite, etc., for when his master says ‘go,’ the servant is seen to go even without appetite, etc. So, it is only the invariable *niyoga* that is the prompter, and not appetite, etc.

NKL—*phala-rāgaṁ vināpi kaścit pravartate ato yatra śabdānantara-pravṛtttau rāgādi-sambhāvanā tatrāpi niyogasyaiva pravartakatva-niścaya ity arthah.*

[493 b-494 a]

ननु दानादिसंबद्धमहावाक्यानुमानतः ॥ ४९३ ॥

गच्छेत्याद्येकदेशोक्तौ लोभादेव प्रवर्तते ।

“Now, it may be said that when a part of a sentence ‘go’ is uttered, one infers a full sentence (*mahāvākya*) relating to reward, etc., and so one acts from avarice alone.

It may be contended thus : One does not act without expectation of reward, etc. When one hears the word ‘go,’ one supplies the missing words ‘to the village,’ etc., and understands that some benefit will accrue from that action. And so, activity does not proceed merely from *niyoga*.

[494 b-495 a]

महावाक्यप्रयोगेऽपि पदार्थप्रविवेचने ॥ ४९४ ॥

पुंस्प्रवृत्तिस्तु दृष्टेयं लोडादेरेव नान्यतः ।

“(It is not so.) Even where a full sentence is used, when the word-senses are distinguished, it is seen that men’s activity is from the imperative ending *lot*, etc., alone, and not from anything else.

To the above contention, the reply is as follows : Even when the full sentence is used, on analysis it will be found that the person who is commanded acts not because of appetite, etc., but because of the *niyoga* which is the sense of the imperative *lot*, etc.

NKL—*mahāvākyaṇumānēpi niyogaḥ pravartako rāgoveti vicāre, niyogād eva pravṛttir niścīyata ity arthaḥ.*

[495 b-496 a]

लोडादेरेव श्रवणाद्यत्र रागाद्यसंभवः ॥ ४९५ ॥

बालः प्रवर्तते तत्र ज्ञायते प्रेरणार्थता ।

“Where appetite, etc., are impossible and *lot*, etc., alone are heard, a boy acts ; here we know that *lot*, etc., are for the sake of prompting.

It is observed that children sometimes obey commands issued to them even without appetite, etc.

[496 b-497 a]

आह मानान्तरेणासौ किल नार्थोऽवगम्यते ॥ ४९६ ॥

शब्दाच्च ज्ञायतेऽज्ञातसंबन्धादिति चित्ता ।

“It is said : ‘This sense, indeed, is not known through any other means of knowledge ; it is known through word alone ; and its relation has not been known ; so it is curious.

Here an objection is raised : If the *niyoga* is not known through any other *pramāṇa*, it cannot be known through *liñ*, etc. For, the relation of *liñ*, etc., to something unknown is not possible. And, how can even a child act without knowing the *niyoga* which is not a word-sense ?

NTV—*agr̥hita-sāmarthyāt śabdāt niyogaḥ pratīyata ity-anupapannam iti codyam udbhāvayati.*

[497 b-498 a]

यद्यनिर्ज्ञातसंबन्धोऽप्यर्थं शब्दः प्रबोधयेत् ॥ ४९७ ॥

को द्वेषोऽस्मासु भवतो येनोपालम्भ ईर्यते ।

“ ‘If the word can make known a sense whose relation has not been determined, then why is this hostility because of which you censure us ?’

If *liñ*, etc., may convey a sense, though their relation to their contents is not grasped, why should not the words ‘Brahman,’ etc., do so? If it is insisted that only words whose relation to their contents is grasped can convey a sense, then Brahman would become an object of other *pramāṇas*, and *Vedānta* would then cease to be authoritative.

An alternative interpretation is given in *AVS* and *NTV*, taking the verse to contain a plea of the *pūrvapakṣin*. Then the meaning of the verse would be this: The *pūrvapakṣin* says, “We do not hold that words whose relation to their senses is unknown can convey knowledge. Or, even if we held that a word whose relation to its sense is not known conveys knowledge, why should you, O calm *Vedāntin*, get provoked, since it is you who believe that the word ‘Brahman,’ whose relation to its content is not known, conveys a sense of its own?”

NTV—*brahmātmādi-padānām ayaṁ mahimā yadagr̥hītasaktayopi svārtham bodhayantīti samam samādhānam ity arthaḥ.....*

athavā yady anirjñāta-saṁbandha ity ārabhya pūrvavādināḥ parihāraḥ. ayam arthaḥ. nirjñāta-saṁbandheṣu gavādi-śabdeṣu artham abhidadhat svanirjñāta-saṁbandhā api brahmādi-śabdā artham abhidadhīran ity abhyupagacchato bhavato asmāsu liñādiśabdā agr̥hīta-saṁbandhā evārtham bruvantīti abhyupagacchatsu kaḥ pradveṣaḥ.

AVS—*athavā yady anirjñāta-saṁbandha ity ārabhya pūrvavādināḥ parihāraḥ. ayam arthaḥ. na hy anirjñāta-saṁbandhasya śabdasya bodhakatvam asmābhir iṣyate, yady api liñarthe pramāntaram na saṁbhavati. bhavatu vā agr̥hīta-saṁbandhasya śabdasya bodhakatvam, tathāpi kaḥ pradveṣo bhavataḥ, sānta-darpasya nirastakrodha-nidānasya sannyāsino ’smāsu, yenākṣepas tvayā kriyata iti.*

[498 b-499 a]

यदाऽवगम्यते नान्यत्प्रवृत्तेः कारणान्तरम् ॥ ४९८ ॥

शब्दश्च गम्यते स्पष्टस्तदाऽर्थः प्रविविच्यते ।

“ When for activity there is no other cause known, and when the word is clearly known to be the cause, then the sense (of *niyoga*) is to be distinguished.

The *pūrvapakṣin* replies : As there is no other cause discernible for action which follows a command, and as it is known that suffixes such as *liñ*, etc., are remembrancers of the cause of activity, so it is ascertained that the *niyoga* which is the sense of *liñ*, etc., is the cause of activity, as distinct from words which are names, etc.

NTV—*yadā pravṛtteḥ kāraṇāntaram rāgādiḥ na dr̥śyate pūrvam nirastatvāt, kārya-jñānam ca pravṛtteḥ kāraṇam svātmani dr̥ṣṭam pravṛtti-liṅgena avagamyate, śabdaś ca taj-janako 'nvaya-vyatirekābhyām avagamyate, tadā artho niyogaḥ pravivicyate nāma-padārthebhyah.*

[499 b-500 a]

अन्वयव्यतिरेकौ तु वाक्यार्थज्ञानपूर्वकौ ॥ ४९९ ॥

वाक्यार्थस्तु तदायत्तो नेत्यन्येभ्यो विशिष्टता ।

“ Co-presence and co-absence, however, are preceded by cognition of sentence-sense; but the sentence-sense is not dependent on them ; thus it is to be distinguished from the rest.

It may be objected that as the *kārya* is known from words by the application of the method of agreement and difference (co-presence and co-absence), it is not unknown by means other than verbal testimony.

The reply is that *kārya* is known only from word. It is only as thus known that it becomes the content of inference based on the method of agreement and difference. It is just like Rāhu becoming the content of perception only in association with the moon. So, *kārya* or *niyoga* should be distinguished from nouns, etc.

NTV—etad uktam bhavati yathā sāstraika-samadhigamyō rāhuś candrādityādi-samprkta eva pratyakṣa-gocarō na svarūpeṇa, evam niyogopi praiṣaṇādhyeṣaṇādy-upādhika eva pramāṇāntara-gocaraḥ na svarūpeṇa, evam upādhidvāreṇa niyoge pramāṇāntarānupravesāt.

NKL—anvaya-vyatirekau vyāpta-liṅgajam anumānam vākyaārtho niyogaḥ. iyaṁ pravṛttiḥ pravṛttyabhāva-virodhi-dhī-pūrvikā svatantra-pravṛttitvāt mādiya-pravṛttivat, iti, madhyama-vṛddhasya śābdam pratyayam anumāya madhyama-vṛddhena śābdāvagater niyoge bālena saṅgati-grahāt, na niyogasya māntara-gocaratvam ityarthah..... candrādi-bimboparaktasyaiva rāhor akṣa-gocaratvavat, niyogasya ājñādhyeṣaṇādy-upādhikasyaiva māntara-gocaratvam na svarūpeṇety arthah.

[500 b-501 a]

कर्तव्यताविवक्षैव नृवाक्येभ्योऽपि गम्यते ॥ ५०० ॥

विवक्षाया न कार्यत्वं शब्दार्थविषया हि सा ।

“It is the intention of duty that is understood even from human statements ; for mere intention there is no obligatoriness ; that is the content of the sense of words.

It may be contended that even though appetite, etc., are not the sense of *liṅ*, etc., *niyoga* is not their sense, because their sense is the intention of the speaker. The reply to this contention is as follows : Is intention alone the sense of *liṅ*, etc., ? Or, is the sense the intention as qualified by obligatoriness ? Not the first ; for in the

case of the Veda which has no author there can be no intention. Even as regards human statements or commands, intention appears only as qualified by obligatoriness. Nor the second ; for in the case of the Veda, the observation made above holds good. And as for human statements, it is prolix to assume that intention as qualified by obligatoriness is the sense, while obligatoriness may well be the sense. The two, intention and obligatoriness, are not the same.

[501 b-502 a]

तद्वशान्न तु शब्दार्थः स हि पूर्वं प्रतीयते ॥ ५०१ ॥

अतः प्रैषादिसंसृष्टोऽप्यर्थः सिद्धो विवेकतः ।

“ The word-sense (*i.e.* obligatoriness) is not dependent on that (intention) ; for it is known even earlier ; therefore, though related to the direction, the sense (obligatoriness) is settled by discrimination.

Activity is not governed by the intention of the speaker ; for it is seen that one acts on hearing the words even without knowing the intention of the speaker. So, the determination of the sense of words is not dependent on the intention. That, indeed, depends on the capacity of the words. Moreover, it has already been pointed out that in the case of the Veda intention is not possible. Hence, obligatoriness and intention are different.

Even direction is not the sense of *liñ*, etc. For, in direction too what persists uniformly is *kārya*.

NKL—vivakṣāyādi-saṁsṛṣṭopi niyogo vivakṣāder anyah.

[502 b-503 a]

शब्दार्थोपाधयो ह्येते पुरुषाशयपातिनः ॥ ५०२ ॥

प्रैषादयो न शब्दार्था न चानेकार्थता मता ।

“These which fall on the side of human intentions, direction, etc., are the adjuncts of word-sense (obligatoriness); they are not the word-sense; nor could there be many senses (for word).

Direction, etc., are not known as the sense of *liñ*, etc. In worldly sentences they are known only as the adjuncts of *niyoga* which is the sense of *liñ*, etc. In the case of the Veda, such direction, etc., are not possible. Also, instead of assuming many directions as the sense of *liñ*, etc., it is in keeping with the rule of parsimony to take the constant *kārya* (i.e. *niyoga*) as the sense of *liñ*, etc.

NKL—niyogopādhitvena praiṣādīnām laukika-liñādi-śabdānvaya-vyatirekavatvaṁ, na tad-arthataye 'ty arthaḥ.

[503 b-504 a]

अभिप्रायवतोऽभावादभिप्रायानुपातिनः ॥ ५०३ ॥

शङ्क्यतेऽपि न वेदे तु कार्यं वाच्यमिति स्थितम् ।

“Since there is no one who intends in the case of the Veda (which is not of human origin), it is not even possible to doubt those (direction, etc.), which fall within intention; hence it is settled that in the Veda the express sense of the word is what-is-to-be-done.

In the case of the Veda, as has been pointed out already, there is no one who intends or directs.

*NTV—kimca bhavet pauruṣeya-vākve praiṣādeś śabdārthatvā-
'saṅkā, vede tv apauruṣeyatvāt āsaṅkaiva nāsti, ato niyoga eva liñādī
artha iti.*

[504 b-505 a]

प्रयोगविधिशेषत्वात्तन्मूला एव नाऽऽशयात् ॥ ५०४ ॥

वेदे प्रैषास्तु ये दृष्टा अग्नीदग्नीनितीदृशाः ।

“Directions such as ‘Agnīd, draw off the fires’ which are found in the Veda are auxiliary to procedural injunctions; they are occasioned by them and not by any intention.

It is true that commands such as these are to be found in the Veda: ‘Agnīd, draw off the fires, spread the strew, make ready the sacrificial cake.’* But they do not imply any person with intention commanding. It is *niyoga* that prompts one to perform a principal rite with all its auxiliaries. A procedural injunction is subsidiary to it. And so, the operations of this nature that are observed in the Veda do not imply any human intention or command.

[505 b-506 a]

प्रैषादिभ्यो यथैवेयं भिन्ना कर्तव्यतेक्ष्यते ॥ ५०५ ॥

शब्दशक्तिवशात्तद्वत्क्रियादेरपि वीक्ष्यताम् ।

“Just as the obligatoriness is seen to be different from direction, etc., because of the nature of the potency of the word, even so it should be understood to be different from action, etc.

Even as command, etc., are not the meaning of *liñ*, etc., action, etc., are not their meaning. These latter also, like the former, are different from *niyoga*. And, it has already been shown that *niyoga* is the constant connotation of *liñ*, etc.

* *The Veda of the Black Yajus School entitled Taittirīya Saṃhitā* (Part II translated by A. B. Keith, Harvard Oriental Series, (Cambridge), Massachusetts, 1914), Vol. 19, p. 514.

[506 b-507 a]

नानिष्पन्नस्वभावोऽपि भावः कर्तव्यता यतः ॥ ५०६ ॥

लडादिश्रवणात्तस्यां अप्रतीतिर्लिङादिवत् ।

“Though the stem-sense (*i.e.* action) is of the nature of what-is-to-be-accomplished, as is obligatoriness, it is not (identical therewith); for that (the latter) is not expressed in *laṭ*, etc., (*pacati*, present tense, etc.), as it is expressed in *liṅ*, etc.

It may be asked : Since both action (*kriyā*) and *niyoga* are what are to be accomplished, and since there is no *niyoga* over and above action, why should not action be regarded as the sense of *liṅ*, etc. ?

It is replied thus : Activity is not the same as obligatoriness (*niyoga*), although it too is what-is-to-be-accomplished. Therefore, the two are not identical. For example, when one hears the word ‘*pacati*’ (he cooks), one does not cognize obligatoriness, although that word denotes action ; it is only on hearing *liṅ*, etc., that there is the cognition of obligatoriness.

[507 b-508 a]

ननु कालोपबन्धोऽत्र कार्यबुद्धिविघातकृत् ॥ ५०७ ॥

नैतत्संदेह एवात्र विवेकाभावतस्तत्र ।

“‘Now, here (in *pacati*, etc.) what impedes the cognition of obligatoriness is the obstruction in the form of (present) tense’. No ; this doubt of yours, here, is due to lack of discrimination.

It cannot be said that in the case of *pacati* there is no cognition of obligatoriness because of the obstruction caused by the ending which is in the present tense (*laṭ*) ; for there is no conclusive argument for such a view.

[508 b-509 a]

कालोपबन्धः किंत्वत्र कार्यबुद्धिविधातकृत् ॥ ५०८ ॥

किं भावात्कार्यता भिन्ना लडादिर्या न भाषते ।

“(The doubt is :) Is it the obstruction in the form of (present) tense that impedes the cognition of obligatoriness, or is obligatoriness different from the stem-sense because it is not expressed by *laṭ*, etc.?”

The doubt is there, in the case of *pacati*, etc., whether the non-cognition of obligatoriness is due to the use of present tense, or to the fact that *laṭ*, etc., which are not expressive of obligatoriness, are different from the stem-sense which expresses activity.

[509 b-510 a]

कर्तव्यः कट इत्यादावव्यापारेऽपि कार्यता ॥ ५०९ ॥

वीक्ष्यतेऽतः पृथग्भावात्फलाच्च प्राक्प्रतीतितः ।

“In ‘The mat is to be made’, etc., even though there is no operation, there is seen obligatoriness; so there is difference (between the two); from fruit too (obligatoriness is different), because it is seen earlier.

In statements such as ‘The mat is to be made’, ‘The village is to be gone to’ the *tavya* suffix does not express an activity; yet there is cognition of obligatoriness. So, the stem-sense which is activity and the sense of the suffix which is *niyoga* are different.

The fruit (*phala*) also cannot be the sense of *lin*, etc.; for it is different from *niyoga*, and in the case of ‘Go to the village,’ etc., even before the appearance of the fruit, there is the cognition of obligatoriness.

[510 b-511 a]

ननु कर्मणि कृत्योऽयं तयोरेवेति शासनात् ॥ ५१० ॥

मैवं प्रैषादिवद्यस्मादुपाधित्वादवाच्यता ।

“‘Now, this *kr̥tya*-suffix denotes an object, as taught in (the *sūtra*) “*tayor eva*” (Pāṇini, III, iv, 70).’ Not so; just like direction, etc., this (action) also is an adjunct, and is not the express sense.

The cognition of *niyoga* from the suffix *kartavyaḥ* (is-to-be-made) may be objected to thus: Pāṇini in his *Aṣṭādhyāyī*, III, iv, 70 (*tayor eva kr̥tyaktakhalārthāḥ*) says that the *kr̥tya* suffix has only the sense of an action (*bhāva*) or of an object (*karma*). So, it cannot have the sense of an imperative (*kārya* or *niyoga*).

The reply is as follows: Just as direction, etc. (*praiṣā*), may condition the sense of the imperative or optative suffix, as an adjunct, so also action and object may figuratively condition the meaning of the *kr̥tya*-suffix because they are the adjuncts of the *niyoga* which is the sense of the suffix.

NTV—*yathā praiṣādayo na liṅādy-arthāḥ, apitu liṅādy-arthopādhayaḥ, bhāva-karmaṇī api na kr̥tyānām arthau, kiṃtu kr̥tyārthopādhi iti pariharati maivam iti.*

AVS—*ayam arthaḥ-yathā praiṣādeḥ pratyayārthopādhitvāt pratyayārthopacāraḥ, evaṃ bhāvakarmaṇor api.*

[511 b-512 a]

प्रषौदिष्वपि कृत्यानां तथा च स्मरणं मुनेः ॥ ५११ ॥

कृत्यानां युक्तितोऽपि स्यान्नैव कर्माभिधायिता ।

“Hence it is that the sage (Pāṇini) lays down *kr̥tya*-suffixes in the case of direction, etc., also; so, even

through reasoning there is not for *kṛtya*-suffixes denotativeness in respect of object.

The case of direction (*praiṣā*) cited above is quite appropriate, because Pāṇini says (III, iii, 163 : *praiṣātisargaprāptakāleṣu kṛtyāśca*) that the *kṛtya* suffixes are used after verbs in the sense of direction also, as in the senses of impersonal action and object. Therefore, it cannot be said that these suffixes are used *only* in the senses of action and object.

Moreover, it can be shown through reasoning that the *kṛtya*-suffix does not directly denote object.

[512 b-513 a]

यथा कटं करोतीति कर्ममात्रावबोधनम् ॥ ५१२ ॥

कर्तव्यः कट इत्यत्र तथैव स्यान्न चेक्ष्यते ।

“ As in ‘ He makes a mat ’ the object alone is known, there may be the same in ‘ A mat is to be made ’. But it is not so observed.

The reasoning is as follows : In ‘ He makes a mat ’ (*kaṭam karoti*), by the accusative case-ending (*kaṭam*) the objectivity of the mat is made known. Not so in ‘ A mat is to be made ’ (*kaṭaḥ kartavyaḥ*). Here what is conveyed is direction. Hence, the view that the *kṛtya* suffix denotes object and impersonal action alone is not sound.

[513 b-514 a]

कर्तव्यत्वादमीष्टत्वसिद्धौ कर्मार्थलाभतः ॥ ५१३ ॥

साक्षादनभिधानेऽपि न द्वितीया प्रसज्यते ।

“ When the nature of being what is desired is accomplished from the nature of being what is to be

done, the sense of object is achieved (by implication), even though it is not directly expressed; there is no contingency of accusative case.

In the case of transitive verbs when the suffix does not express the object, the accusative case-ending is used, as in *kaṭam karoti*. In *kartavyaḥ kṛtaḥ*, since the *tavya*-suffix is not held to denote the object, should not the noun *kaṭa* take on the accusative case-ending, it may be asked. The answer is: No; because of the fact that the term *kartavyaḥ* implies that the mat is desired to be made, thereby suggesting the objective status of the mat. It is to be noted, therefore, that the accusative case-ending is to be used only where the objective status is altogether unexpressed.

[514 b-515 a]

न चाभीष्टत्वकार्यत्वमभिन्नं व्यतिरेकतः ॥ ५१४ ॥

इच्छेदेष्टव्यमित्येवं तत्रापि प्रत्ययो यतः ।

“ Nor are the nature of being what is desired and the nature of being what is to be done identical, for there is difference in ‘He shall desire’, ‘It should be desired’ ; also, there is difference in sense.

It may be objected thus: You say that *kartavyaḥ* implies that the mat is desired to be made. But, in fact, there is no difference between having to be made (*kartavyaḥ*) and being desired (*eṣṭavyaḥ*).

The reply is: There is a difference between the two. So, it is legitimate to infer *iṣṭatva* (desiredness) from *kāryatva* (the status of having to be made). For example, in *icchet* (one may desire) and *eṣṭavyam* (ought to be desired), the sense of the suffix is different from the stem-sense. Otherwise, there would be infinite regress, as ‘one may desire desire,’ ‘desire ought to be desired’, etc. So, here the meaning would be ‘desire is to be made’, etc.

[515 b-516 a]

तस्मात्कर्तव्यतावेशात्क्रिया वा यदि वा फलम् ॥ ५१५ ॥

कारकं वाऽपि कार्यत्वं लभते न स्वतन्त्रतः ।

“ Therefore, it is as dependent on obligatoriness that action, or fruit, or causative agent attains the status of what is to be done ; not independently.

Obligatoriness is fundamental. The notion that action, etc., are to be done arises only as penetrated by the sense of obligatoriness.

[516 b-517 a]

लोकवन्ननु वेदेऽपि कार्यमात्रं न गम्यते ॥ ५१६ ॥

साधनेहानुबन्धस्य वेदे कार्यस्य बोधनात् ।

“ ‘Now, as in the world, even in the Veda, it is not merely what is obligatory that is taught ; in the Veda, the obligatory as associated with the means in the form of effort is taught.

Here, an objection is raised against the view that *liñ*, etc., denote *kārya* which is other than action, etc.

The objection is : Just as in worldly usage *kārya* is known only as in association with the stem-sense which has been established through other *pramāṇas*, so also in the Veda what is taught is not mere *kārya*, but *kārya* which is related to activity which is the means such as sacrifice, etc., established through other *pramāṇas*.

NTV — yathā loka iṣṭaphala-sāadhanānubandhasyaiva kāryasyā-vabodho na kevalasya, nāpy aniṣṭasāadhanena, taduktam—kiñtu svayaṁ klesarūpaṁ karma yat-kāryatām vrajet, phala-sāadhanatā tatra kāraṇaṁ tena kāryate’ ti.

.....tasmāl loke phalasāadhanatānubandham eva kāryaṁ gamyate, evaṁ vedepi phalasāadhanatānubandha eva kāryāvagama iti.

[517 b-518 a]

ततश्चाऽऽरोग्यकामस्य पथ्यभोजनवाक्यवत् ॥ ५१७ ॥

मानान्तरप्रवेशेन सापेक्षत्वं प्रसज्यते ।

“ ‘Thence results (for the Veda) the nature of being dependent, because, as in the statement prescribing diet for him who desires health, there is dependence on some other means of valid knowledge.

The statement ‘Let him who desires health eat restricted diet’ depends for its sense on other means of valid knowledge. If in Vedic commands also, such as ‘Let him sacrifice,’ the *niyoga* has for its content the relation of end and means which is obtained through other *pramāṇas*, then it would become a dependent.

[518 b-519 a]

अतः प्रैषादितुल्योऽयं क्रियाफलनिबन्धनः ॥ ५१८ ॥

नियोगस्तदसंवादाच्चित्तादौ ते विहन्यते ।

“ ‘Hence, this *niyoga* which is bound up with action and fruit would be equal to direction, etc., and that (the authority of the Veda) in *Citra*, etc., will be destroyed for you, because there would be disparity.’

This dependence on other *pramāṇas* cannot be admitted in the case of sacrifices like the *Citra*. Here, there is no obvious relation between activity and fruitfulness. But *niyoga*, like direction (*praiṣā*), is based on the obviousness of the relation between action and fruit. Hence, *niyoga* cannot be admitted in the case of Vedic sacrifices.

[519 b-520 a]

मैवं मानान्तरावेशाल्लोके प्रैषाद्युपाधिकम् ॥ ५१९ ॥

कार्यं प्रयोजनार्थं च प्रवृत्तिरिति युज्यते ।

“ Not so ; it is intelligible that, in the world, obligatoriness, dependent as it is on other means of valid knowledge, should be conditioned by the adjuncts, such as direction, etc., and that activity should be for the sake of fruit.

The upholder of the doctrine of *kārya* now replies : In the case of worldly sentences it is true that the *kārya* denoted by *lin*, etc., and having direction (*praiṣā*), etc., as adjunct, has as its principal the procedure made known by other *pramāṇas*. Here, the sentences are uttered by human beings, and their purpose is to serve as the cause for bringing about some fruit.

NTV—yuktaṁ laukika-vākyānāṁ pauruṣeyāṇāṁ vaktr-jñānānumā-pakatayā kārye prāmāṇyameva vaktr-jñānasyaiva tatra prāmāṇyāt..... tathā ca yadāyaṁ pramāṇād artham avagamya vacanāny-uccāritavān iti dhīs tadā tāny artha-bodham ādadhatīti mātāntarāveśāt kāryaṁ pratīyate, tac ca mātaram praiṣādy-upādhikaṁ praiṣādikam eva vā kāryaṁ gamayati. tad uktam—

*saṅkya-mānā yathārthatva-racanaṁ tena puṁ-vacaḥ,
śrutamātrakam evārthe na tāvaṁ niścayāvaham.
yāvad vaktur avi-jñātam pūrvabhāvi pramāntaram,
vivakṣitārtha-viśayam indriyādi nibandhanam.*

—iti.....

*evaṁ ca saty anuvāda-kāṁ vākyāṁ bhavet. tad uktam—
tatrārthe niścite paścāt so'rtho vākyasya gamyate,
tasyāṁ daśāyāṁ vākyasya tasya syād anuvādatā.*

—iti.

NKL—pauruṣeyaṁ pravartaka-vākyāṁ mātāntara-siddha-praiṣādy-upādhika-kārya-bodhakaṁ, tad-arthe mātara-sambhavāt.

[520 b-521 a]

साध्यसाधनसंबन्धविषयत्वं पुमर्थतः ॥ ५२० ॥

नियोगस्यात एवात्र कर्तृत्वेन नियुज्यते ।

“ The (secular) *niyoga* has for content the relation between ends and means, as it refers to a human end ; therefore, the (secular) *niyoga*, here, construes with the agent.

The secular *niyoga* has for its content the relation of means and end—a relation that is established by other *pramāṇas* : e.g. that the eating of *harītakī* is a means to health is known through experience. When a physician prescribes it, he only sets [forth the procedure, as to who should adopt it, etc.

[521 b-522 a]

स्वत एव प्रवृत्तत्वात्कर्तुरेवाधिकारिता ॥ ५२१ ॥

पदं चाऽऽरोग्यकामादि भवेत्कर्तृविशेषणम् ।

“ Because he is active of his own accord, eligibility is for the agent alone ; and the words ‘ He who desires health’, etc., are a qualification of the agent.

In the present example ‘ He who desires health ought to eat *harītakī*’, the verb construes primarily with the agent. Here the agent is active of his own accord, even without waiting for the command. The command in such cases has for its content only the procedure. And the expression ‘ he who desires health ’ does not indicate primarily the *niyojya* (one who is prompted by the command) or the *adhikārin* (the eligible person), but the agent.

NTV—*loke ārogyakāmādi-padaṁ kartṛ-samarpakam na niyojya-samarpakam.*

NKL—*harītakī bhakṣayed ity-ādau niyogasya māntara-siddha-viniyoga-viṣayatvāt kartṛtvena anvayaḥ, na adhikāritvena.*

[522 b-523 a]

वेदे तु सकलाक्षादिप्रमाणागोचरत्वतः ॥ ५२२ ॥

साध्यसाधनताज्ञानं नियोगादेव नान्यतः ।

“In the Veda, however, the knowledge of end and means is not gained through any other means of valid knowledge like perception, etc.; it is gained from the *niyoga* alone, not otherwise.

Vedic injunctions are not like secular commands. The *niyoga* here is not the sphere of any other *pramāṇa*; the relation between sacrifice, etc., and heaven, etc., is known solely from the *niyoga*.

NTV—*niyogasya pratyakṣādi-sakala-pramāṇāgocaratvāt.*

AVS—*eṣorthaḥ—vede pratīyamāna-sādhya-sādhana-bhāvasya veda-vyatirikta-sarva-pramāṇāviṣayatvāt vaidika-niyogād eva tat siddhiḥ.*

[523 b-524 a]

तथा ह्यकारकः कामी स्वर्गकामपदार्पितः ॥ ५२३ ॥

नियोगात्कर्मसंबन्धे पश्चाद्यातीह कर्तृताम् ।

“Thus, indeed, the one who desires, as made known by the words ‘He who desires heaven,’ is not a causal agent; when there is relation to an object (known) through the *niyoga*, thereafter one (the desirer) attains the status of being an agent.

In regard to Vedic injunctions, the relation of means and end is not established through any other *pramāṇa*. The *niyoga*, therefore, is

known from the Veda alone. The expression 'He who desires heaven' indicates the *niyojya* and *adhikārin*, and not the agent. Here 'desire' is not a qualification of the agent, but serves only to indicate the *niyojya*.

NKL—*svarga-kāmo yajeta iti pratyayāt pratīta-niyogākāṅkṣayā svarga-kāmo mamāyaṁ niyoga iti niyojyatvena anvīya niyogaviṣaye karaṇe karmaṇy aiśvaryaṁ adhikāraṁ pratipadyata ity arthaḥ..... sāṅge karmaṇi mamāyaṁ niyoga iti niyoga-svāmitvena anvīto niyogaḥ mayā sādhyata iti niyoga-dvāreṇa niyoga-viṣaya-bhāvārthenā 'pi kartṛtvena sambandhata ity arthaḥ.*

[524 b-525 a]

कामस्य च प्रधानत्वात्तत्प्राधान्यानपायतः ॥ ५२४ ॥

पुंविशेषणता तस्माद्भोगी कामी न कारकः ।

“Since desire is the principal, without prejudice to its own importance it may become a qualification of man; therefore, the enjoyer is the desirer, and not the causal agent.

Another reason is given as to why desire is not a qualification of the agent: Desire is the principal, for it has the fruit for its content. Without losing its nature as principal, it becomes the qualification of man. It cannot be the qualification of the agent, for the agent is a subsidiary of action; and if desire were a qualification of the agent it would become a subsidiary of a subsidiary. This will not happen if desire were a qualification of the *adhikārin*, for the *adhikārin* is the master and not a subsidiary.

[525 b-526 a]

अप्रवृत्तप्रवृत्तेश्च कारकत्वं न युज्यते ॥ ५२५ ॥

प्रवृत्तस्य णिचोक्तिः स्यात्पचन्तं पाचयेद्यथा ।

“ Being causal agent is not intelligible in the case of the activity of one who has not been active ; as for one who has been active, there would be the causative form (*nicoktiḥ*) as in ‘ Make him cook, who is cooking.’

The causative suffix *nic* may not be used to indicate the primary action of an agent in the world who can know the relation of what is to be accomplished (*sādhya*) and what can accomplish it (*sādhana*). Such activity is not prompted by *niyoga*. But as regards Vedic actions, one cannot know them through means other than the Veda. So, here, the Veda alone may prompt one to act, having made that one the *niyojya*. Had agency in regard to Vedic action been independent of *niyoga*, and had an agent acting independently been the *niyojya* of the Vedic command, the form of that command would be not *svarga-kāmo yajeta* (Let one desirous of heaven offer sacrifice), but *svarga-kāmo yājayet* (Cause him who desires heaven to offer sacrifice) as in *pācayet* (Cause him to cook) in regard to a man independently starting to cook.

NTV—*kimca loke phala-sādhane pravṛtta eva pravarttate, vaidike tu niyoge apravṛtta eva pravarttate, atopi niyojyatvam eva svargakāminah na kartrtvam.....pacāntaṁ pācayed-itivad yajantaṁ yājayed iti niṁ na śrūyate ity-arthah.*

NKL—*yāgādaḥ sabdāt-prāk pravṛttiścet prayojaka-bhūta-niyogasya yājayed iti nij-antena vacanaṁ syād ity arthah.*

AVS—*na cātra nicoktiḥ, tasmād apravṛtta-pravartanāt kām्य-adhikāry eva na karte 'ti.*

[526 b-527 a]

अक्रियाकर्तृसंबन्धे ननु षष्ठी प्रसज्जते ॥ ५२६ ॥

नैवं नाम्नोः सदा योगे षष्ठीयं शैषिकी यतः ।

“ ‘ Now, if the relation is not that between the activity and the agent, there is the contingency of the genitive case.’ Not so; for, the residual genitive is laid down exclusively for the relation between nouns.

If the relation between the agent and act is given up in favour of that between seeker after heaven (*adhikārin*) and act, should there not be the genitive case used in the text thus: *svarga-kāmasya yajeta?*

No; for the genitive case can come in only when the relata are nouns (e. g. *rājñah puruṣaḥ*, the king's man), and not when one of the relata is a verb.

AVS—nanu kāmī karṣṭvā na sambadhyate svāmitvena sambadhyate cet, devadattasya vastram itivat svarga-kāmasya niyoga iti śaṣṭhī prāpnotīty āha.

[527 b-528 a]

क्रियाकारकयोगे च द्वितीयादिर्लडादि तु ॥ ५२७ ॥

स्यात्प्रातिपदिकार्थस्य भावार्थनेत्यसंकरः ।

“ The other cases like the accusative, etc., are used to express the relation between the act and the accessories thereof. And, the tenses like the present, etc., are used to express the meaning of the noun-stem and that of the root. Thus there is no confusion.

The accusative case, etc., are used to indicate the relation between verb and accessories—*kārakas* like agent, object, etc., (e. g. *vrkṣaḥ tiṣṭhati*, *taṁ paśyet*; the tree stands, look at it). Verbal suffixes are used to indicate the relation of verbs to nouns (e. g. *pācakaḥ pacati*, the cook cooks).

[528 b-529 a]

नीलोत्पले तु नामार्थावपहाय परस्परम् ॥ ५२८ ॥

भेदमेकात्मतां याताविति षष्ठी न संमता ।

“The words ‘blue’ and ‘lily’ though having the meaning of nouns, have attained identity by giving up their mutual difference; so, in their case the genitive case is not accepted.

It was stated in v. 526 b-527 a that the genitive case applies only when the relata are nouns. As against this observation, it may be asked why in the case of the ‘blue lily’ the genitive case is not used. The reply is: In such cases, the genitive case is ruled out because the denotations of the two component names have become one. The genitive case is possible only where there is difference, and not where there is identity of locus.

[529 b-530 a]

लिङ्गर्थे युज्यमानस्य कर्मत्वं न च कामिनः ॥ ५२९ ॥

अक्रियात्वान्नियोगस्य द्वितीया चेद्भवेत्तथा ।

“The desirer who is prompted by the use of the potential mood (the sense of *liṅ*) is not the object of the verb; because the *niyoga* is not action; if it were so, then the accusative case would be used.

Objection—Even though the genitive case is not possible, can we not use the accusative case and say *svargakāmaṁ yajeta*, as we say *grāmaṁ gacchati* (he goes to the village)?

Reply—No; for, the heaven-seeker is not an object, and the *niyoga* is not an act, but what is brought about by action.

[530 b-531 a]

तस्मादकारकः कामी स्वनियोगप्रसिद्धये ॥ ५३० ॥

नियुज्यमान एवेह विषयं साध्यमीक्षते ।

“Therefore, the desirer who is not a causal agent, only as being prompted in order that the *niyoga* relating to him may be established, perceives the object which has to be accomplished.

Thus, the *svarga-kāma* (heaven-seeker) is, first, related to *niyoga* as the one prompted by it. At that time, he has no sense of agency. He only recognizes his eligibility. And then, he comes to look about for the object of action, its instruments, etc.

[531 b-532 a]

राजादिषु प्रसिद्धश्च नियोगः साध्यगोचरः ॥ ५३१ ॥

भावार्थस्य च साध्यत्वमिति तेनापि युज्यते ।

“It is well known that in the case of kings, etc., the *niyoga* has what is to be accomplished for its sphere; and the stem-sense (action) is what is to be accomplished; thus he (the desirer of release) is related to that (the stem-sense) also.

Objection—There is no rule that the content of *niyoga* should be what-is-to-be-accomplished (*sādhya*). In the text, ‘For him who desires efficient sense-organs, one should offer curds,’ curds, which constitute what-are-already-established (*siddha*), are seen to be the content of *niyoga*.

Reply—The content of *niyoga* must always be what-is-to-be-accomplished. Curds, etc., get related only as auxiliaries of what-is-

to-be-accomplished. What-is-to-be-accomplished is always of the nature of activity, in the first instance. After having been, first, related to *niyoga*, the *svarga-kāma* gets related, next, to action. Without the action that perishes soon and which is the stem-sense (*dhātvartha*), *niyoga* cannot lead to the desired goal; and that cannot come about without the stem-sense; and also without itself coming into being, it cannot lead to heaven.

NTV—modakaṁ bhakṣayed iti hi niyogaḥ; na ākāśaṁ bhakṣayed iti tat kasya hetoḥ? modaka-bhakṣaṇasya sādhyatvāt.

[532 b-533 a]

अविवाक्षितमप्येवं लिङ्गसंख्यं विवक्ष्यते ॥ ५३२ ॥

पश्चाद्विषयसिद्धयर्थं कारकादि च यच्छ्रुतम् ।

“Though the gender and number are not (apparently) intended, they, in fact, are; later, causal agents, etc., are declared (in Scripture) in order that the object may be accomplished.

Although gender and number in the expression ‘*svarga-kāma*’ are not of the essence of the injunction (*svarga-kāmo yajeta*), both must be treated as significant as they find a place in the injunction.

There are such texts as the following: ‘On being initiated, he sacrifices the *animal* dedicated to Agni and Soma’ (*Taittirīya-saṁhitā*, V, i, 11, 6). ‘He yokes the *two* bulls.’ ‘To the Spring, he sacrifices the partridges’ (*Śatapatha-brāhmaṇa*, I, v, 1, 13). Here the question is whether the *number* (one, two, many) has any bearing on the sacrifice. The opponent of the Pūrva-mīmāṃsā says that it has no bearing because it is only an auxiliary to the object (in the texts quoted, to the animal, to the two bulls, and to the partridges). (*PM*, IV, i. 11.)

The Mīmāṃsaka replies to this by saying that the *number* has a bearing. On hearing the sentence 'Bring the animal,' one brings *one* animal; and on hearing the sentence 'Bring the animals,' one brings *several* animals. This only means that *number* is taken into account. Hence, in the case of the text 'He sacrifices the animal' (*paśum ālabheta*), what is understood from the words is the *sacrificing* (denoted by the verb 'ālabheta') as qualified by the two qualifying adjuncts (the *animal* denoted by the noun 'paśu' and the *number* 'one' as denoted by the singular case-ending in 'paśum'). Thus, it follows that *number* has a bearing on the sacrifice. (PM, IV, i, 15.) What is true of *number* is true of *gender* also. For example, there is the text: 'In spring, he sacrifices, in the morning, the black-necked animal (*kṛṣṇa-grīvām*) dedicated to Agni; in summer, he sacrifices, at noon, the lioness (*simhīm*) dedicated to Indra; in autumn, he sacrifices, in the afternoon, the white animal (*śvetām*) dedicated to Brhaspati' (*Taittirīya-saṁhitā*, II, i, 2, 5). Then follow the words 'These animals are pregnant' (*garbhīṇyo bhavanti*). It is clear, here, that what are meant in the text are *female* animals. (PM, IV, i, 17.)

In the expression *svarga-kāma*, therefore, *number* and *gender* are indicated. So also are the fruit, etc., indicated in the injunction. For, without these performance of sacrifice is not possible.

It cannot be said that if the fruit, etc., are also intended besides *niyoga*, there would be sentence-split; for, although the *niyoga* is the primary significance of the injunction, the other factors also come in, being related to *niyoga*.

[533 b-534 a]

ततश्च स्वर्गकामो यः स्वनियोगं स साधयेत् ॥ ५३३ ॥
केन यागादिनिर्वृत्येत्येतच्छास्त्रात्प्रतीयते ।

"Therefore, he alone who desires heaven should accomplish his *niyoga*. How? By the performance of sacrifice, etc. This is understood from Scripture.

So, the meaning of the injunction is that the person (*masculine, singular*) who desires heaven is the *adhikārin*, and that he should accomplish his own *niyoga* through the performance of the Vedic rite.

NTV—svarga-kāmo niyogaṁ bhāvayed ity arthaḥ.

[534 b-535 a]

न चानपनयन्यागः कामिनः स्वर्गकामिताम् ॥ ५३४ ॥

साधनं स्वाधिकारस्य भवतीह कथंचन ।

“Without removing the desire-for-heaven of the person who desires it, by bringing it (heaven) about, the sacrifice cannot be the means to accomplish its *niyoga* (*adhikāra*).

It cannot be said that if sacrifice, etc., are the means to *niyoga* there would be no means to heaven, and if *niyoga* be the means thereto it would cease to be the principal; for, the sacrifice cannot be the means to the *niyoga* if it does not fulfil the desire of the seeker after heaven by leading him to heaven, and so, the sacrifice generates heaven through *niyoga* and thus removes the desire of the *adhikārin*.

[535 b-536 a]

अनुन्मृदितकामो हि पूर्वावस्थाविशेषतः ॥ ५३५ ॥

निष्पादिताधिकारोऽपि नियोगार्हः पुनर्भवेत् ।

“If the desire has not been removed then even though one has accomplished his *niyoga* (*adhikāra*), his state being not different from the former state, again he would be subjected to *niyoga*.

If the sacrifice does not remove the desire for heaven, then the person would have to strive for *niyoga* again, even though he has acquired *niyoga*. Therefore, it is but proper to hold that the sacrifice gives rise to heaven through *niyoga*, and removes the desire relating thereto in the person.

AVS — yataḥ kāme 'nivr̥tte yāgena niṣpādita-niyogo'pi punar niyogārho bhavet, pūrvāvasthato 'viśiṣṭatvāt.

[536 b-537 a]

अधिकारः स्वसिद्ध्यर्थमतः कामस्य साध्यताम् ॥ ५३६ ॥

यागेनाऽऽपाद्य संसिध्यन्विषयस्यैति साध्यताम् ।

“ Thus *niyoga*, in order to accomplish itself, makes the desired object an end to be accomplished, by sacrifice, and having thus getting itself established, it attains the status of what is to be accomplished in relation to the object.

If the sacrifice generates heaven, and through that removes the desire relating thereto, where is the need, it may be asked, for *niyoga* ?

The sacrifice perishes soon; and heaven is to come hereafter. Therefore, *niyoga* is to be admitted as the link. *Niyoga* cannot accomplish itself if there is no *niyojya*. In order to have a *niyojya*, it makes heaven what-is-to-be-accomplished. And through the performance of the sacrifice by the *niyojya*, it establishes itself. Thus, *niyoga* is the principal; in order that it may have a *niyojya*, it must be helpful to the accomplishment of the fruit (viz. heaven).

[537 b-538 a]

नानन्तरफलाभावे विसंवादोऽत्र शङ्क्यते ॥ ५३७ ॥

क्रियासाध्ये फले स स्याद्विड्यर्थस्त्वक्रियात्मकः ।

“Nor may lack of agreement be feared if there be no immediate fruit; it may be so in the case of a fruit accomplished by action; but the *niyoga* which is the sense of the potential mood (*liṅārtha*) is not action.

Now, it may be said that, as no fruit is seen immediately after the performance of the sacrifice, the text about desire-for-heaven is invalid.

The reply is that the text is not invalid. Even in the case of sacrifices such as the *Citrā*, etc., which are performed for the sake of gaining cattle, etc., no immediate fruit is seen. Yet the texts enjoining them are quite valid. If a fruit were to result from mere action such as eating, then, if after the action there is no result, we may say that the injunction relating to the action is invalid. But, that does not apply in the present case. *Niyoga* is not action but the unseen potency (*apūrvā*); and the fruit that is to be accomplished thereby need not be immediate.

NTV—citrayā yajeta paśukāma iti hi coditam, na tv anantara-paśuphala-sādhanaṭvaṁ coditam ity arthaḥ.

[538 b-539 a]

प्रत्यर्थिनि च शब्देऽस्मिन्नाभावोऽनुपलब्धितः ॥ ५३८ ॥

मानाभावे ह्यसौ मानमानन्तर्यं त्वचोदितम् ।

“When there is the Scriptural statement about the fruit, the absence of that (fruit) cannot be suspected on the ground of non-cognition. This (non-cognition) is evidence only in the absence of (positive) evidence. Immediate sequence, however, is not declared (in Scripture).

Nor may it be said that, as the fruit is not seen immediately after the sacrifice, it must be concluded that there is no fruit on the ground of non-cognition of the competent (*yogyānupalabdhi*); for, there is not here non-cognition of the competent. Scripture declares that there is fruit. The *niyoga* given rise to by sacrifice, etc., should necessarily lead to its fruit. But it is not necessary that the fruit should result immediately. What Scripture teaches is that the fruit comes about surely through *apūrva*.

AVS — anuṣṭhita-sāadhanasya phalānupalabdhir na phalābhāvaṁ sādhayati. ... bhāva-pramāṇābhāve anupalabdhiḥ pramāṇam, śabdas tu bhāva-pramāṇam, ataḥ śabdād idaṁ phalaṁ bhavatīty avagamyate, nānupalabdhyā phalābhāva iti.

[539 b-540 a]

अतः कृताधिकारोऽपि यो विद्यादकृतार्थताम् ॥ ५३९ ॥

तस्य शास्त्रानभिज्ञत्वान्नाधिकारोऽल वैदिके ।

“Therefore, he who, through having accomplished the *adhikāra* (*niyoga*), thinks that he has not achieved his end, has no eligibility for the Vedic rites, for he does not know the Scripture.

A person may perform a sacrifice, and, seeing that no immediate fruit follows, may think that there is no fruit. Such a person, however, has no eligibility at all for Vedic rites. His scepticism can in no way affect the validity of Scripture.

[540 b-541 a]

मन्त्रार्थवादनाम्नां च कार्यार्थानुप्रवेशतः ॥ ५४० ॥

प्रामाण्यं न स्वतस्तस्मात्कार्ये वेदस्य मानता ।

“ *Mantra, arthavāda* and names are valid by being included in those that are for the sake of what-is-to-be-accomplished, and not independently; therefore the Veda is evidence in respect of what-is-to-be-accomplished.

Mantras, arthavādas and names are auxiliaries to *kārya*.

In the *Mantrādhikaraṇa* (PM, I, ii, 31–53), it is established that the *mantras* serve the rites by conveying certain meanings. In the *Arthavādādhikaraṇa*, it is explained that the *arthavāda* texts have no purport independent of *kārya*. Names also have *kārya* for purport. There are names of sacrifices like *Udbhid*, *Abhijit*, *Viśvajit*, etc. These too are for the sake of *kārya*, as they fall within the scope of injunctions. (PM, I, iv, 1.) Thus, it is evident that *all* Veda has *kārya* for purport.

NKL—*anuṣṭheya-smāraakatayā mantrāṇām tat-stāvakatvena arthavādāṇām tat-samjñātvena nāmnām vidhinaikavākyatvāt prāmāṇyam ity arthaḥ.*

[541 b-542 a]

वेदान्तानामतो वाच्यं कार्यार्थानुप्रवेशनम् ॥ ५४१ ॥

प्रामाण्यं वा निषेद्धव्यमत्र प्रतिविधीयते ।

“Therefore, of the Vedāntas, it must be said that they have validity only by being included in the accessories of what-is-to-be-accomplished; or their validity must be rejected.” This view is now refuted.

The Vedānta texts also can be valid only by being accessory to *kārya*. If this view be not admitted, there would be invalidity for those texts.

In this verse, the *pūrvapakṣa* is concluded, and the *siddhāntin* promises to refute it.

NTV—*udbhidā yajete' ty evam-ādi-nāma yasmāt kṛtsnasya vedasya kārye prāmāṇyam, ato vedāntānām api pratipatti-kartavyatā-prāmāṇya-bhājān tan-mukhena tad-anugata-bhūtārthātma-tattva-viśaya-bodhakatvaṁ, atah tepi kārya-niṣṭhatām nātivartata ity āha-vedāntānām iti.*

[542 b-543 a]

निःशेषमातृतद्बृत्तिजन्मनां तद्विलक्षण— ॥ ५४२ ॥

स्वतःसिद्धात्मसंबोधव्याप्तिर्वस्वनुरोधतः ।

In accordance with the nature of reality, there is the pervasion (*vyāpti*) of the cognizer, its modes and their originations *in toto*, by the self-established self-consciousness which is different therefrom.

What is the reason for saying that there would be invalidity for Vedānta texts if they are not considered to be accessory to *kārya*? (1) Is it because the Vedānta texts have no content (*viśaya*)? (2) Or, is it because words have no capacity to convey something already established (*siddhārtha*)?

(1) Not the first; for the witness-self is the content of the Vedāntas. The modifications of the intellect which bear reflections of the self are the cognizers. It is the self that pervades them, while being immutable. It is this that is to be realized through the Vedāntas.

NTV—*ananta-pramāṭṛn tadvṛtti-janmādīnāms ca rāga-dveṣādīms ca sākṣāt paśyantam anubhūti-svarūpam ātmānaṁ konāma nādrīyeta, tad anādarāṇe niḥśeṣa-māṭṛ-tadvṛttinām ananubhava-prasaṅga ity arthah.*

NKL—*kiṁ viśayābhāvād aprāmāṇyam, siddhe sabda-sāmarthyā-'bhāvādvā.*

[543 b-544 a]

वियद्वस्तुस्वभावानुरोधादेव न कारकात् ॥ ५४३ ॥

वियत्संपूर्णतोत्पत्तौ कुम्भस्येव दृशा धियाम् ।

Just as a pot when produced is already filled with ether, by virtue of the nature of the ether itself, and not because of any causal agents, even so the intellect (and its psychoses) are pervaded by the consciousness-self.

The ether example is given to show that the self is unchanging even though it pervades the intellect, etc.

[544 b-545 a]

घटदुःखादिरूपत्वं धियां धर्मादिहेतुतः ॥ ५४४ ॥

निर्हेतुत्वात्मसंबोधरूपित्वं वस्तुरूपतः ।

The intellect assumes the form of pot, misery, etc., because of merit, etc.; its assumption of the form of the causeless self-consciousness is because of the nature of the real itself.

It cannot be argued that, if the self could pervade the intellect, etc., without changing, the same must be possible for the intellect too; for, the intellect is of the nature of the inert, and its taking on of the form of the object is caused by *adr̥ṣṭa*; its taking on of the form of consciousness, however, is not caused by *adr̥ṣṭa*; but is on account of the constant pervasion by the unconditioned self.

NTV—jagat-vaicitryavat dhīvṛtti-vaicitryam dharmādi-hetukam eva, anyathā tat-vaicitryānupapatteḥ.

[545 b-546 a]

बुद्धितद्वृत्तिभावोऽयमभावश्चाप्यनन्यमात् ॥ ५४५ ॥

यतः सिद्धायते सोऽर्थो ज्ञेयः सिद्धः स्वतः सदा ।

That reality by which both the existence and non-existence of the intellect and the psychoses are established, should be known as self-established always, as it is self-evident.

The self reveals the existence as well as the non-existence of the intellect and its modes. Hence, it is self-established and self-revealing, requiring no other revealer.

[546 b-547 a]

ननु प्रमाणविरहात्स्वतः सिद्धो यदीष्यते ॥ ५४६ ॥

वचसो बुद्धबोधित्वादप्रामाण्यं प्रसज्यते ।

“ Now, if you believe that the self is self-established because there is no means of valid knowledge, then, the Vedāntic statements would be void of validity, because they would only be making known what has already been known.”

Objection—If the immutable self is self-luminous, of what use are the Vedānta texts?

[547 b-548 a]

मैवमप्रतिपन्नत्वादनुभूत्यैव वस्तुनः ॥ ५४७ ॥

तद्व्युत्पत्तेः पुरा साक्षाद्बोधो व्युत्पत्तिमात्रतः ।

It is not so ; because prior to a knowledge of the meaning of Scripture the reality is not known—and this is

a matter of experience—the direct knowledge thereof results from a knowledge of the meaning of Scripture alone.

Reply—Before the rise of the Vedānta-generated knowledge, everyone experiences ignorance of the form ‘I am ignorant, I do not know myself.’ So, although the self is self-luminous, it remains unknown. It is only through the ‘hearing’ (*śravaṇa*) of the Vedānta texts that it comes to be realized.

NTV—*yady api svatas-siddha-ātmā, tathāpy 'aham ajñō mām anyam ca na jñānīty anubhava-siddhā apratipattiyā apratipannatvād apratipatti-nivartakatvena tatra prāmāṇyam upapadyata ity arthaḥ.*

NKL—*vākya-janitāparokṣa-jñānāt-prāg aham ajñō na jñānīty ātmanopratipannatvasya svānubhavenaiva siddhatvāt ... vedāntānām ajñāna-nivartakāparokṣadhī-janakatvam ayuktam śabdasya parokṣadhī-hetutvād atrāha-sākṣād-iti.*

[548 b-549 a]

बोधाबोधौ यतो दृष्टौ स्वानुभूत्यनुसारतः ॥ ५४८ ॥

दृष्टे चानुपपन्नत्वं किंबलादभिधीयते ।

Since, on the ground of one's own experience, both knowledge and non-knowledge (of the self) are seen, on the strength of what do you maintain the unintelligibility of what is observed?

In regard to the self-luminous self, there are both occasional knowledge and beginningless ignorance. Through reasoning based on constancy and inconstancy and from the experience of the wise ones, one has occasional knowledge of the self. Because of the experience ‘I am ignorant,’ there is beginningless ignorance also.

NTV—*na hi kham kṛṣṇam ity-ādi-drṣṭam anupapannatayā tyajata ity arthaḥ.*

[549 b-550 a]

सुषुप्तादेश्च संसिद्धिर्मात्वादिविरेहेऽपि या ॥ ५४९ ॥

साऽपीहान्तरसंबुद्धमेयमात्रव्यपाश्रयात् ।

The experience (*sphūrṭi*) here (in empirical state) of sleep, etc., even though cognizer, etc., were absent then, is made possible only on the ground of the inner uncognized object.

It may be asked how ignorance which is opposed to knowledge can have knowledge as its basis. In reply, the sleep-experience is adduced. In sleep, there are no cognizer, etc; yet there is experience. Similarly, ignorance is established even though it is opposed to knowledge.

[550 b-551 a]

न चाभावप्रमाणात्सा सति मातर्यभावमा ॥ ५५० ॥

मात्राद्यभावसंसिद्धिः कथं मात्रादिपूर्विका ।

Nor is that through the evidence of non-cognition; non-cognition is possible when there is a cognizer; how can the absence of cognizer, etc., be established when the cognizer, etc., are posited prior to it?

It cannot be said that the *pramāṇa* for sleep is non-cognition (*anupalabdhi*). When a person wakes up, he says, 'I did not know anything in sleep.' This is recollection of an experience. In sleep itself there is no cognizer; and so, no *pramāṇa* can function there. Hence, sleep is established by experience. Similarly, the establishment of ignorance is by experience.

NTV—*ato 'nubhava-siddha-susuptyādi-nivartakatayā vacasām prāmāṇyam apy ādartavyam iti bhāvaḥ.*

[551 b-552 a]

यमप्रमीयमाणानि नानात्मानं प्रमिष्वते ॥ ५५१ ॥

वस्तुवृत्तानुरोधेन कथं तत्वाप्रमा वचः ।

That without knowing which, in accordance with the nature of things, the not-self is not known (through) means of valid knowledge like perception, etc.)—in respect of that, how could the Vedāntic statements be unauthoritative?

That although the inner self is self-luminous, Vedānta is *pramāṇa* therefor, because both knowledge and ignorance are experienced with reference to it, has been stated. Here, an argument *a fortiori* is employed. Even empirical *pramāṇas* such as perception, etc., cannot function without revealing, basically, the self. How much more is this the case in regard to Vedānta whose specific content is the real self?

NTV—pratyakṣādi-pramāṇāni śabdādi-viśaya-bodhanena caritār-thāny apy ātmānamapi pramiṣvate, anyathā anātmānam api na pramiṣvate, kimu vaktavyam vacasas tatra apramāṇam na bhavatīti.

[552 b-553 a]

अमीमांसक इत्युच्चैरमीमांसक इत्यतः ॥ ५५२ ॥

आक्षिपन्ति यदज्ञानात्तच्छान्त्या उत्तरं वचः ।

Because of ignorance (of the self), they (the Mīmāṃsakas) loudly denounce (the Vedāntin) saying, 'He is not an inquirer, not an inquirer'. To silence them, the following reply is given (in the Commentary).

The Pūrvamīmāṃsakas say that the Vedāntin has no competence for inquiry, as he teaches that the purport of the Veda may be with

reference to existent things also. Their view is the result of their ignorance of the true nature of the self. In order to silence them, Śrī Śaṅkara says, 'sarvo 'pī vedah,' etc.

AVS—eṣo 'rthah: amī mām ākṣipanti vedasya siddhavastuni prāmāṇyaṁ bruvan sa ko mīmāṃsakah iti yadyasmād ajñānāt tasmāt tac-chāntyai syāj jñānasya śāntyai uttaram vacaḥ athavā yadyasya prāṇojñānād ākṣipanti tasya prāṇico yadajñānaṁ tac-chāntyai uttaram vacaḥ iti apara-vyākhyā.

[553 b-554 a]

सर्वोऽपि वेद इत्यादि यथोक्तपरिहारकृत् ॥ ५५३ ॥

गुरुराह वचः स्पष्टं दृढन्यायोपबृंहितम् ।

Making the said reply, the Master (*guruḥ*) declared the lucid words, "the entire Veda, etc.," full of sound reasoning.

Here the words of Śaṅkara's *bhāṣya* 'sarvo 'pī vedah' are quoted, and their purport is indicated.

[554 b-555 a]

मानस्वभावमाश्रित्य सर्वोऽपीत्याद्युदीरणम् ॥ ५५४ ॥

काण्डद्वयसमाख्या हि तत्प्रमेयानुरोधतः ।

The statement "the entire, etc.", is in view of the nature of the means of valid knowledge; the declaration regarding the two sections is in view of what are taught in them.

The Veda as such makes known what is unknown. This is true of both the sections of the Veda. And, both of them deal with the supersensuous. But the difference is that, while the *karma-kāṇḍa* is concerned with the *sādhya* (what-is-to-be-accomplished), the *jñāna-kāṇḍa* is about the eternally established reality.

[555 b-556 a]

मानं हि व्यञ्जकं लोके सिद्धे तच्च स्वकारणात् ॥ ५५५ ॥

स्वतः सिद्धेऽथवा नित्यं मेयमात्रं विशिष्यते ।

The function of a means of valid knowledge in the world is to manifest ; it functions in relation to what is established by its cause, as also in relation to what is eternally self-established ; the difference is only as regards the objects known.

The function of *pramāṇa* is to reveal. The *pramāṇa* can reveal only an object that is already there—which object may be a product, or an eternally established reality. *Pramāṇa* thus is only a revealer (*vyañjaka*), and not a producer (*kāraka*) of its own object.

NKL—*svakāraṇāt siddhe ghaṭādaṁ svataḥsiddhe gaganādaṁ tacca bodhakatvam.*

AVS—*svato vā parato vā vidyamānasya mānaṁ bodhakam eva na kārakam.*

[556 b-557 a]

अतः सर्वोऽपि वेदोऽयं प्रमाणत्वैकहेतुतः ॥ ५५६ ॥

प्रकाशनपरो ज्ञेयः सिद्धसाध्यात्मवस्तुनः ।

Therefore, the entire Veda, because it is the same means of valid knowledge throughout, must be understood as making known the established and the to-be-accomplished contents.

Veda which is *pramāṇa* makes known what was unknown. It consists of two sections: *karma* and *jñāna*. So far as their *pramāṇa*-nature is concerned, there is no difference between the two sections. The difference is only as regards their contents: the content of *karma*

is what is to be accomplished; that of *jñāna* is what is already established.

[557 b-558 a]

एकवाक्यत्वतो यद्वा सर्वोऽपीत्यादि भण्यते ॥ ५५७ ॥
पुरुषार्थविसायित्वाद्धेदाधीतिविधेरिति ।

Or, because the injunction to study the Veda culminates in the human end, there is syntactical unity; and so it is stated, “the entire, etc.”

The meaning of the words of the Commentary may be stated differently also. The two sections are related, even as the *Prayāja* texts and the *Darsapūrṇamāsa* texts are. That is, they are related because they lead to the same human goal; only, while *jñāna* is the direct means, *karma* helps indirectly.

NKL — *svādhyāyo 'dhyetavyaḥ, vedaḥ kṛtsno 'dhigantavyaḥ, sarahasyo dvijanmaneti cā 'dhyayana-vidher eka-mokṣa-pramāpaka-vedādhyayana-kartavyatā-bodhakatvāt.*

[558 b-559 a]

निःशेषसुखसंप्राप्तेः सर्वानर्थह्नुतेस्तथा ॥ ५५८ ॥
मुक्तेरर्वाक्पुमर्थोऽन्यो नेह कश्चित्समीक्ष्यते ।

Nothing can here be the human end, which is lower than release which is the attainment of the highest happiness and the destruction of all evil.

It cannot be said that *svarga* (heaven) is the fruit of *karma-kāṇḍa*; for, nothing short of release could be the goal of Scripture. *Svarga* is but a pseudo-fruit.

NKL — *svargāder anityatvena pumarthābhāsatvāt na tatra adhyayana-vidhi-tātparyam.*

AVS — svargāder ādyantavattvena puruṣārthābhāsāt nā tatra adhyayana-vidheḥ paryavasānam ity arthah.

[559 b-560 a]

असिद्धार्थस्य वा सिद्धिरनुभूत्येकमात्रतः ॥ ५५९ ॥

सर्वोऽपीति वचः सिद्धिः सर्वा ह्यात्मैकसंविदः ।

Or, the words 'the entire Veda, etc.', mean that through experience (self) alone is established the non-established (world) (in respect of its existence and manifestation); indeed, all is established only through the one consciousness-self.

This is another meaning: *Veda* is the reality which is consciousness. The existence and manifestation that we attribute to the world are really the essence of the self. But for the self, the world has no status. So, consciousness is all this world; it is that which makes the world-appearance possible. All that which appears is in its root the consciousness which is the self; it is experience (*anubhava*) which is called the *Veda*.

AVS — asiddhārthasya jada-prapañcasya siddhir anubhūtyaika-mātrataḥ anvaya-vyatirekābhāva-parihāreṇa anubhava-mātre antarbhāvo yathā tathā siddhiḥ sattopalabdhir ity arthah.

[560 b-561 a]

यद्वाऽनवगतोऽतोऽन्यः संभाव्यो नाऽऽत्मनस्ततः ॥ ५६० ॥

सर्वोऽपीति वचः प्राह तथा चोर्ध्वं प्रवक्ष्यते ।

Or else, because nothing other than the self is unknown, it is stated 'the entire Veda, etc.' This will be explained later on.

A yet different meaning is here given. What is to be known is the self alone. The not-self cannot be the content of knowledge, for its very nature is nescience. Thus, in respect of the self alone is the entire Veda *pramāṇa*.

NTV—*sarvopi jaḍa-vargo yathoktānubhūtir eye 'tyarthah.*

NKL—*jaḍasya ajñāna-kāryasya ajñātatvāyogād ātmana eva tat sambhavād anubhava eva sarvo veda-rāṣiḥ pramāṇam ity ucyate.*

[561 b-562 a]

यद्धेतुकं प्रमाणत्वं वेदान्तानां समर्थ्यते ॥ ५६१ ॥

तेनैव हेतुना कर्मकाण्डस्यापि प्रमाणाता ।

The ground on which the validity of the Vedāntas is established is no other than the ground on which there is validity for the ritual section.

The reason for regarding the two sections as *pramāṇa* is the same, viz. that they make known what is unknown (*ajñāta-jñāpakatva*).

[562 b-563 a]

वेदान्तानाममानत्वं येन वा हेतुनोच्यते ॥ ५६२ ॥

तेनैव हेतुना कर्मकाण्डस्यापि प्रसज्यते ।

The ground on which the Vedāntas are stated to be non-authoritative—the same ground occasions the non-authoritativeness of the ritual section also.

If *jñāna-kāṇḍa* be invalid, then *karma-kāṇḍa* too would be invalid.

NKL—*dr̥ṣṭo hi tasyārthah karmāvabodhanam iti sābara-bhāṣya-virodhād vedāntānām na svārthe pramāṇam ity āśaṅkya, śāṅkara-bhāṣya-virodhāt karma-kāṇḍasya na svārthe mānatvam.*

[563 b-564 a]

अपि सर्वप्रमाणानि स्वप्रमेयामिसंगतेः ॥ ५६३ ॥

प्रमामेवेह कुर्वन्ति प्रामाण्यं यान्ति नान्यथा ।

And, all means of knowledge attain validity only by engendering valid knowledge through contact with the objects of knowledge, not otherwise.

The Vedāntas are *pramāṇa* in respect of their content, since they make known what is unknown, like perception. All *pramāṇas*, perception, etc., become valid by making known their respective contents. *Pramāṇa* is that which generates a cognition that is fruitful, determinate, and unsublated. This definition fits in with reference to the Vedāntas also.

NKL—*pratyakṣādīny api pramāṇṁ kurvanty eva santi prāmāṇyam yānti, anavagatārthādhiḡgantrtvena prāmāṇyam.*

[564 b-565 a]

विधिनैवैकवाक्यत्वं यतो मन्तार्थवादयोः ॥ ५६४ ॥

ततो दर्शननिष्ठत्वं न तयोरुपपद्यते ।

As *mantras* and *arthavādas* have syntactical unity with injunctions, it is intelligible that they do not generate valid knowledge.

It cannot be said that since the Vedāntas are non-injunctive texts, like *mantras* and *arthavādas*, they are not *pramāṇa*. In the case of *mantras* and *arthavādas*, it is intelligible that they are not *pramāṇa*, because they have no fruit of their own. The case of the Vedāntas is not so.

NTV—*vedānta-vākyānām brahma veda brahmaiva bhavati ityādi-phalavatām na vidhinaika-vākyatvam api tu vidhivākyānām svārtheniratiśaya-puruṣārthābhāvāt adhyayana-vidhi-balena vedāntaika-vākyatvam upapadyate.*

[565 b-566 a]

अर्थवादोक्तितो याऽपि प्रतिष्ठाकामिकल्पना ॥ ५६५ ॥

विध्यर्थसंगतावेव साऽपि नैव ततोऽन्यतः ।

The statement of the *arthavāda* by virtue of which (eligibility) of the one who desires reputation (as the reward) is assumed—that too becomes valid only as related to the sense of an injunction, not otherwise.

It may be objected that in the case of the *arthavāda* text, ‘Those who have recourse to those sacrifices become famous’ (*pratitiṣṭhanti ha vā ete ya etā upayanti*), there is the mention of fruit. [See *PM*, IV, iii, 17–18.] In reply we say that here the eligibility is assigned, not to the *svarga-kāma* (one who desires heaven), but to the *pratiṣṭhā-kāma* (one who desires fame), because this eulogistic text is associated with the injunction about the *Rātri-satra* sacrifice. This procedure is, however, not to be followed in the case of other texts such as the *mantras*, etc.

[566 b-567 a]

विध्यर्थशेषभावश्च ततश्चार्थान्तरोक्तिता ॥ ५६६ ॥

ऐकार्थ्याद्वचसोऽशक्या विरुद्धद्वयर्थकल्पना ।

Because a sentence has a single meaning, it is not possible to assume for it two opposed meanings, viz. that it is auxiliary to the sense of the injunction and that it has a different sense.

It is not proper to assume two purports of equal strength for a single text. The supreme purport (*mahā-tātparya*) of an *arthavāda* is that it is auxiliary to an injunction. It is only through this that the *arthavāda* has an intermediary purport (*avāntara-tātparya*) in regard to its own sense.

[567 b-568 a]

विरोधे गुणवादः स्यादनुवादोऽवधारिते ॥ ५६७ ॥

भूतार्थवादस्तद्धानादर्थवादस्त्रिधा मतः ।

Arthavāda is thought to be of three kinds: when there is contradiction, it is a case of figurative statement; if it relates to what has been determined, it is a re-statement; if it is neither, it is *bhūtārthavāda*.

Arthavāda is of three types: (1) *guṇa-vāda*, e. g., 'The sun, verily, is the sacrificial post' (*ādityo vai yūpaḥ*); (2) *anuvāda*, e. g., 'Fire is the medicine for snow' (*agnir himasya bheṣajam*); and (3) *bhūtārthavāda*, e. g., 'He who has the *Vajra*-weapon in his hand is Indra' (*vajra-hastaḥ purandharaḥ*). *Guṇa-vāda* states something which is in conflict with what is established through another *pramāṇa*; hence, the statement is figurative. *Anuvāda* is re-statement of what is established through another *pramāṇa*. *Bhūtārthavāda* relates to a matter which is neither established nor not-established through another *pramāṇa*.

[568 b-569 a]

विधिशेषोऽपि यद्यर्थमर्थवादः समर्पयेत् ॥ ५६८ ॥

अद्वैतविधिनाऽऽक्षिप्ता वेदान्ता नेति का मितिः ।

If even *arthavāda* which is auxiliary to injunction may convey its own meaning, what is there to show that the Vedānta texts which are brought in by the cognition

of non-duality are not authoritative (in respect of what is already established)?

It is admitted that the *arthavāda* texts have an intermediary purport, and so are authoritative. If this be so, why should not the Vedānta texts be authoritative? Surely, they are not void of meaning.

[569 b-570 a]

प्रत्यक्षाद्यभिधानेन सर्वमानोपलक्षणम् ॥ ५६९ ॥

मान्तरं नाऽऽगमादन्यद्यदैकात्म्यावबोधकृत् ।

The words 'perception, etc.', are indicative of all means of valid knowledge; for, other than Scripture there is no means of knowledge which makes known the unity of the self.

Here, the reference is to the words of the *Bhāṣya* which say that the Veda teaches the means to the ultimate goal which does not fall within the sphere of *pramāṇas* like perception and inference. To the category of these two *pramāṇas* belong the others also, such as comparison, etc.

AVS—āgamād anyasya pramāṇasya na gocaro brahma ity arthah.

[570 b-571 a]

सिद्धेऽनवगते यस्मात्पुरस्ताद्व्यापृतिर्मितेः ॥ ५७० ॥

मानादज्ञाततासिद्धौ स्यादन्योन्यसमाश्रयः ।

And, the function of a means of valid knowledge is there (only) in regard to what is already established and unknown; if unknownness is established through a means of valid knowlege, there would be mutual dependence.

Perception, etc., have only empirical validity; they cannot serve as guides to the supreme truth. In fact, the definition of *pramāṇa* does not fit in at all in the case of perception, etc. *Pramāṇa* can function only in the case of an unknown object that is already established. If perception, etc., were to be regarded as *pramāṇa*, it must be known that their object is unknown before they start functioning. But, can this unknownness be known? Is it through *pramāṇa* or through *anubhava* (experience)? If the former, then there is mutual dependence as between *pramāṇa* and unknownness. Nor can the latter be the case, for that is not acceptable. Experience can establish only what is other than it, and what is superimposed thereon. The inert object and its unknownness, then, would be of the nature of the superimposed, like the rope-snake. If such stuff be the content of perception, etc., then perception, etc., cannot be considered to be true *pramāṇas*.

NTV — jadasya ajñātatvaṁ na māna-siddhaṁ, nāpy anubhava-siddham anaṅgīkaraṇāt.

NKL—prameye 'navagate, prāgevāvagatēḥ pramāṇaṁ pravartate, ataś ca pramāṇa-pravṛttau ajñāta-pramitiḥ tat-pramitau pramāṇa-pravṛttir iti itaretarāśrayāt na tattvāvedana-pramāṇatvaṁ pratyakṣādeḥ.

[571 b-572 a]

तत्त्वमस्यादिवाक्यस्य विरोधोऽतो न केनचित् ॥ ५७१ ॥

सर्वाश्रयत्वात्संवित्तेस्तथाऽऽत्मन्यप्रवृत्तिः ।

Therefore, there is no conflict of the text 'That thou art', etc., with anything, because consciousness (*saṁvit*) is the locus of all, and (perception, etc.) do not function in respect of the self.

Perception, etc., have no conflict with Vedānta. Experience is the basis even of perception, etc. And, as experience (viz., the self) is the content of Vedānta, Vedānta cannot be opposed to perception,

etc. The basic *pramāṇa* is Vedānta; what are superimposed thereon, perception, etc., cannot sublate it.

Moreover, perception, etc., reveal things that are coloured, etc. As the self is devoid of colour, etc., perception, etc., cannot be *pramāṇas* in respect thereto.

NTV — *pratyakṣāder anumānatvāt tattvamasyādi-vākyasya na kenāpi-pramāṇena viśaṁvāda iti ... na pratyakṣādi svāśrayaṁ bodhayati bādhate vā, itopi pratyakṣādi-saṁvāda-viśaṁvādābhyāṁ na tattvamādi-vākyasya aprāmāṇyam.*

NKL—*anubhavasya sakala-pramāṇa-viśayādhiṣṭhānatvād āgamasya anubhava-viśayatvāt, pratyakṣāder anātma-viśayatvena bhinna-viśayatvāc ca no virodhaḥ.*

[572 b-573 a]

कृत्स्नेष्टार्थस्य संप्राप्तिः कृत्स्नानर्थह्नुतिस्तथा ॥ ५७२ ॥

आत्मस्वरूपान्नान्यत्र संभाव्या सा हि मानतः ।

The attainment of the entire desired end and the destruction of the entire evil are possible through self-nature, not through anything else; and that (the attainment of the self) indeed is through means of valid knowledge.

Self-realization is the supreme goal. That is accomplished through Vedānta. So, Vedānta is pre-eminently fruitful. There is nothing to be attained after the self is attained; there is nothing to be avoided either.

[573 b-574 a]

इत्येवमादिभाष्यार्थः क्रमेणैकात्म्यवस्तुनि ॥ ५७३ ॥

यत्नेन वक्ष्यते न्यायात्पूर्वपक्षनिरासतः ।

The meaning of (the words) 'this and other statements' of the Commentary as relating to the one self, will be explained logically in sequence, through a refutation of the *prima facie* views.

The thesis set forth above will be strengthened through a refutation of the *prima facie* views in the *Bhāṣya*.

[574 b-575 a]

वेदान्तवचसां स्वार्थे प्रामाण्यं न विहन्यते ॥ ५७४ ॥

मानलक्षणसद्भावाज्ज्योतिष्टोमादिवाक्यवत् ।

The authority of the Vedānta-texts in respect of their own sense is not destroyed, for they bear the characteristic of being a means of valid knowledge, like the *Jyotiṣṭoma* text.

The Vedānta texts are valid because their content, the self, is not the content of any other *pramāṇa*; and they reveal what is unknown otherwise.

NKL — *vedāntaḥ svārthe pramāṇam tatra phalavad-vedatvāt jyotiṣṭomena yajeteti-vākyaavat.*

[575 b-576 a]

नवै कार्यैकनिष्ठानि व्यवहारे वचांसि हि ॥ ५७५ ॥

नियमेन प्रयुज्यन्त इत्यत्र मितिरस्ति ते ।

There is no evidence for you to show that as a rule in empirical usage words are used only with reference to what is to be accomplished.

It cannot be said that the Vedānta texts are not purportful because they do not relate to *kārya*; for, there is no rule that words should be construed only with *kārya*.

NTV—na hi kāryaika-niṣṭhāny eva loke vacāmsī 'ti niyame pramāṇam asti, siddhaparāṇām api vākyānām prayoga-darśanāt.

[576 b-577 a]

दिष्ट्या त्वं वर्धसे भद्र जातः पुत्रस्तवर्धिमान् ॥ ५७६ ॥
इति नेदं प्रवृत्त्यर्थं वचो नापि निवृत्तये ।

‘You are happy, my friend, by God’s grace! A son is born to you, who will be prosperous.’ This sentence is neither for the sake of activity nor for the sake of avoiding activity.

In the statement about the birth of a son, there is no mention of any act to be done ; and yet the statement is meaningful.

[577 b-578 a]

सुखाद्युत्पत्तिहेतूनि दृश्यन्तेऽकार्यवन्त्यपि ॥ ५७७ ॥
वचनानि ब्रज ग्राममित्यादीनि यथा तथा ।

Statements which do not imply what is to be accomplished are seen to produce happiness, even as the statement ‘Go to the village’.

As injunctive statements are fruitful, so are non-injunctive statements.

[578 b-579 a]

सुख्येधीति न चानेन प्रवृत्तिरुपदिश्यते ॥ ५७८ ॥
सुखीभवनमस्यार्थान्नोपदेशव्यपेक्षया ।

By the statement ‘Be happy,’ no activity is enjoined. His (the father’s) becoming happy follows from the sense of the statement, and not because of any command.

It cannot be maintained that in the statement about the birth of a son there is an implicit injunction of the form 'Be happy.' The father becomes happy not because of any injunction, but because of the news conveyed by the statement.

[579 b-580 a]

विशेषोऽस्ति प्रवृत्तेश्चेत्तात्पर्यं वचसोऽपि च ॥ ५७९ ॥

नैवं सुखादिसंभूतावर्थवत्त्वोपपत्तिः ।

“There is special activity (in the form of *jātakarmā*, etc.) from the purport of the statement.” If this be said, no; for, by the occasioning of happiness, etc., the statement becomes purportful; and this stands to reason.

It may be pointed out that the statement about the birth of a son is related to activity in the sense that the father begins to arrange for performing *jātakarmā*, etc.

But this is irrelevant. The statement becomes purportful by generating happiness in the father. It is not directly connected with the performance of birth-rites, etc.

[580 b-581 a]

आनर्थक्यभयादेव श्रुतादन्यत्र कल्प्यते ॥ ५८० ॥

तात्पर्यं प्रोक्षणाद्युक्तेर्न स्वतन्त्रेऽधिकारवत् ।

It is because of the fear of futility that in the case of the text about sprinkling, etc., a purport other than what is declared is assumed; this is not the case as regards a text which is independent like the text about eligibility.

It may be said that the text 'That thou art' has no purport of its own, like the text about sprinkling. In the context of the *Darsa-pūrṇamāsa* there is the text: 'One threshes the corn with pestle and mortar that have been besprinkled; one pounds it with the pounding slab and stone that have been besprinkled.' The question here is whether the 'sprinkling' is prompted by the *threshing* and the *pounding*, or by the transcendental potency (*apūrva*). It is decided in *Mīmāṃsā* that the sprinkling is connected with the *apūrva*, because it is undertaken for the sake of gaining the objective (*apūrva*) of the primary act which is the sacrifice. (*PM*, IX, i, 2-3). If 'sprinkling' is construed with the *threshing* and the *pounding*, it is without fruit; it is only when it is construed with the *apūrva* that it becomes fruitful.

Siddhānta—There is no parity between the Vedānta text 'That thou art' and the text about sprinkling. The Vedānta text is fruitful in its own sense, and is not prompted by anything else.

Nor is the knowledge generated by the Vedānta text 'That thou art' on a par with the subsidiary acts such as threshing and pounding. These subsidiary acts are prompted by *apūrva*, and are to be construed therewith, not directly but through the act of purification. Not so is Vedānta-knowledge, since it leads to its fruit independently. The Vedānta text, therefore, is a primary text, even as the text 'He who desires heaven should sacrifice' is. (See *PM*, II, i, 6, 9-10).

[581 b-582 a]

किंचोपायेऽप्रवृत्तः सन्पुरुषोऽयं प्रवर्त्यते ॥ ५८१ ॥

ज्ञातोपायत्वतो यद्वा विधिनोपेयसिद्धये ।

Moreover, does this (statement about the birth of a son) prompt the man to activity, as he is not active in respect of the means, or does it prompt him, who has understood the means, in order that the object may be achieved through the injunction?

It cannot be said that, like the text of eligibility for heaven, the Vedānta text should be injunctive; for, it is non-injunctive like the news about the birth of a son. The statement regarding the birth of a son is not an injunction, even if it includes the words 'Be happy'. If it be an injunction, then the hearer (the father), on hearing it, should be active either in respect of the means which is the birth of a son, or in respect of achieving the end (viz. happiness).

[582 b-583 a]

तत्वेह तावन्नोपाये पुत्रजन्मादिलक्षणे ॥ ५८२ ॥

तस्य निष्पन्नरूपत्वान्नाप्युपेये सुखे तथा ।

Of these here, there is no (activity) in respect of the means, of the nature of the birth of the son, etc., for that is already accomplished; nor in respect of the object, viz. happiness, for the same reason.

Neither of the alternatives mentioned above is possible. The son is already born; and so there is no need for activity in respect thereof. Happiness results from hearing the news, and not from any further activity.

NTV—natāvat upāye putrajanmani tasya niṣpannatvāt, nopēye sukhe tadartha-vyāpārāntarābhāvāt.

[583 b-584 a]

न व्यापारान्तरं यस्मात्सुखार्थं किञ्चिदीक्ष्यते ॥ ५८३ ॥

पुत्रजन्मोक्तिमात्रेण पुरुषार्थवसानतः ।

For the sake of happiness no other operation is required; because the mere statement about the birth of a son culminates in the human end.

The father is happy just on knowing the meaning of the statement he hears; he does not engage himself in any activity for becoming happy.

[584 b-585 a]

किंचाध्यस्ताहिदृष्टस्य तद्विषव्यासचेतसः ॥ ५८४ ॥

स्रगियं न फणीत्युक्ते दृष्टा विषनिराक्रिया ।

Moreover, in the case of a man who has been bitten by an illusory snake and whose imagination is full of the poison thereof, it is seen that the poison is removed when he is told that it is a garland and not a snake.

Another example is given for showing that there is no rule that a statement should prompt activity. This example relates to the removal of misery.

[585 b-586 a]

मा भैषीरिति चोक्तेऽपि न नियोगः प्रतीयते ॥ ५८५ ॥

स्रगुक्तेरेव निःशेषसाध्वसध्वंसलाभतः ।

Even if it be stated 'Be not afraid', there is not seen a *niyoga*; for the mere mention of garland destroys the entire fear.

When the deluded person is told 'This is not a snake; it is only a garland,' he becomes rid of fear. Even if he is exhorted thus: 'Be not afraid,' it is not because of the exhortation that he relinquishes fear. Fear goes automatically when he knows that there is no snake before him.

[586 b-587 a]

न्याय्यो नियोगस्तत्रैव यत्र बुद्धाऽस्य कार्यताम् ॥ ५८६ ॥
अनन्तरं प्रवृत्तिः स्याद्विषये तस्य सिद्धये ।

A *niyoga* is properly there only where a person, having known that something is to be done, begins subsequently to be active in respect of it in order that he may attain the object of the *niyoga*.

Niyoga is possible only where a person knows that something is to be accomplished by him, and then begins to be active in respect thereof.

[587 b-588 a]

इह त्वैकात्म्यवाक्येषु तत्त्वमात्रावबोधतः ॥ ५८७ ॥
सद्यः पुमर्थसंसिद्धेः कार्यसिद्धिर्न वीक्ष्यते ।

But, here, however, in the case of the texts about the one self, the human goal is accomplished immediately from the knowledge of the truth; there is not observed any accomplishment of what-is-to-be-accomplished.

When one knows the Vedānta text and realizes its truth, one attains the final goal. There is nothing that one should do thereafter.

[588 b-589 a]

कुतूहलवतां तद्वन्निर्वृत्ताख्यानमात्रतः ॥ ५८८ ॥
दृष्टा नराणां निःशेषकुतूहलनिराक्रिया ।

Similarly, it is seen that in the case of persons who are curious, the mere narration of what is actually established removes their entire curiosity.

It is not in Vedānta alone that the texts relate to what-is-established; the stories that are told in Scripture and Traditional Codes are of the same character.

[589 b-590 a]

वस्तुमालावसायित्वात्तद्वचांसि न कानिचित् ॥ ५८९ ॥

उपादानाय वाऽलं स्युर्नापि हानाय तद्विदः ।

Those statements relate merely to facts; and so he who understands them has neither anything to take nor anything to leave.

These statements merely convey knowledge. They do not aim at making the hearer active.

[590 b-592 a]

यत्रापि च प्रतीयेते हानादाने वचःश्रवात् ॥ ५९० ॥

अयं चोराकुलः पन्था देशोऽयं निधिमानिति ।

तत्रापि नैव शब्दस्य व्यापारः सिद्धवेदनात् ॥ ५९१ ॥

कृतार्थत्वान्नरस्यापि रागादेव प्रवृत्तिः ।

Even where activity in the form of leaving or taking is found on hearing statements like “This road is infested with robbers,” “This spot contains a treasure-trove”, the operation does not belong to the words, for those words make known what is established, and thus have accomplished their purpose; the activity of the person concerned is from his desire alone.

A man may be active after hearing certain statements of facts. Even then, the activity is not an effect of those statements; it is prompted by the desire, etc., present in the man.

[592 b-593 a]

कामैकपाशाकृष्टः सन्निच्छयैव प्रवर्तते ॥ ५९२ ॥

निवर्तते च तद्द्वेषान्न शब्दव्यापृतेर्नरः ।

Man is active, because of desire, being impelled by greed, and turns away from an object because of aversion. Here, there is no functioning of words.

Positive activity and negative activity are caused, not by prescription and prohibition, but by appetite and aversion.

NTV—ayam arthaḥ : śabdāt bhūtam artham pratipadya taj-jāṭīyasya pramāṇāntarād upakārahetutām apakāra-hetutām vā avagatām samsmr̥tya taj-jāṭīyasyāpi tam anumāya icchayā pravartante dveṣeṇa ca nivartanta iti.

[593 b-594 a]

नन्वप्रयुक्तमप्येतद्वक्त्रा वाक्यं विवक्षितम् ॥ ५९३ ॥

न गन्तव्यं पथाऽनेन गृहाणेमं निधिं तथा ।

“But, though not uttered, does not the informant intend to say, ‘Do not go along this road’, ‘Take this treasure’?”

Objection—Is there not an injunction implied in a statement like ‘This road is infested with robbers’? Does not the speaker of this statement intend to say ‘Do not go this way.’?

[594 b-595 a]

मैवं न वक्त्रभिप्रायाच्छब्दार्थत्वं प्रकल्पते ॥ ५९४ ॥

शब्दसामर्थ्यतो यस्मात्तादर्थ्यं नान्यहेतुकम् ।

Not so; the sense of words is settled not from the intention of the speaker, but from the capacity of the words; so, that is not caused by anything else.

Reply—The sense of a statement is what is declared by it, and not what is intended by the speaker.

[595 b-596 a]

भवद्भिरपि चैवैतदभ्युपेयं प्रयत्नतः ॥ ५९५ ॥

वक्तृतन्त्रे हि शब्दार्थे न विश्वासः श्रुतेर्भवेत् ।

Even by you this must be admitted per force, for if the sense of words depended on the speaker, there would be no faith in (the determination of the sense of) Scripture.

The observation made above, the Mīmāṃsaka should necessarily accept; for the Veda has no speaker, according to him.

[596 b-597 a]

नानाविधपुमर्थान्तिरपि वक्तुः समीहिता ॥ ५९६ ॥

तस्या अपि त्वदुक्त्यैवं शब्दार्थत्वं प्रसज्यते ।

And, since the attainment of many kinds of human ends may be intended by the speaker, all that would have to become the sense of the words, if what you say is true.

Moreover, there may be no limit to the intentions of the speaker. Surely, all these cannot be regarded as the sense of his statement.

[597 b-599 a]

प्रवृत्तिं वा निवृत्तिं वा यदाऽभिप्रेत्य चेतसा ॥ ५९७ ॥

किञ्चिज्ज्ञास्यते ज्ञात्वा प्रत्यक्षादिप्रमाणतः ।

अभिप्रेताऽपि न तदा प्रवृत्तिर्यदि वेतरा ॥ ५९८ ॥

प्रत्यक्षादिप्रमेयेति शक्या वक्तुं विपश्चिता ।

Having in mind the intention of activity or turning away, a person knows something through the means of knowledge, perception, etc.; but no one who is wise would say in this case that the intended activity or turning away is the object of perception.

The illustration of other *pramāṇas* is given. A person *sees* a thing, with the intention either of grasping it or of rejecting it. Here it cannot be said that the *seeing* is the cause of grasping or rejecting; *seeing* gives only knowledge of the thing. Therewith its function ends.

[599 b-601 a]

इतश्चाभ्युपगन्तव्यमेतत्तुल्येऽपि वस्तुनि ॥ ५९९ ॥

एकस्य हानधीस्तस्मिन्नुपादित्सा परस्य च ।

शब्दार्थत्वे हि सर्वेषामादानायैव धीर्भवेत् ॥ ६०० ॥

नोपेक्षायां प्रहाणे वा न चानेकार्थता मता ।

What we have stated must be admitted for this reason also : with reference to one and the same object, for one there is cognition of avoiding it, and for another the desire to attain it. If (the intention) were the meaning of words, then for all there must be the cognition for attaining it, not the cognition for either indifference or rejection; for there cannot be a plurality of senses.

That the intention is not the meaning of words may be shown thus also : hearing a set of words, one acts for gaining something, another strives to avoid it, and a third is indifferent to it. All these cannot be the meanings of the identical set of words.

NTV — *nidhimān eṣa bhūbhāga ity ukte kasyacit svata eva viraktasya hānadhīḥ kasyacid rāgāndhasya ādānadhīḥ kasyacit śokāsaḥiṣṇoḥ jighṛkṣābuddhir upajāyate, tatra ādānaṁcet vaktrā vivakṣitaḥ sabdārthaḥ sarveṣāṁ śruta-vākyānāṁ ādānabuddhir eva bhavet, nopekṣāhāna-buddhī bhavetām.*

[601 b-602 a]

न च प्रवर्तकत्वेऽपि वाक्यस्याङ्गीकृते त्वया ॥ ६०१ ॥

शक्यो विधायिनोऽन्येषां पदानां वक्तुमन्वयः ।

Even admitting that a sentence prompts one to activity, you cannot explain the syntactical construction of words which are other than injunctive.

Even if we admit that a sentence prompts the hearer to activity, it is impossible for the *pūrvapakṣin* to show that the non-injunctive words of the sentence are to be construed only in relation to the verb.

NTV—*vidhāyakapadātirikta - padānāṁ na kāryānvaya - paratayā prayogaḥ, nāpi tatra sāmārthya-grahaḥ, kiṁtu योग्येतरान्विते सāmārthya-grahaḥ.*

[602 b-603 a]

किं स्वार्थमात्रनिष्ठत्वमुत कार्यैकनिष्ठता ॥ ६०२ ॥

पदार्थमात्रसंसर्गपरता किंत्वितीयताम् ।

You must say whether (words) refer merely to their own sense, or to what-is-to-be-accomplished alone, or whether they have for purport the relation of word-senses alone.

To show that in the *pūrvapakṣa* view it is difficult to construe words other than verbs, certain alternatives are set forth here:

(1) When a boy learns the meaning of words through the activity of the intermediate elder, being commanded by the superior elder, how does he do so? To him, do the words convey their individual meanings alone? In other words, do words have capacity only in respect of their own senses, without mutual relation?

(2) Or, because the capacity of words is understood as construed with the verb (expressing what-is-to-be-done), do the words have that (what-is-to-be-done) as purport?

(3) Or, because the words as construed with what-is-to-be-accomplished have capacity in regard to their own senses, do they have their own senses as their purport?

(4) Or, do the words have capacity to indicate what has direct relation to the *kārya* which is the meaning of the sentence as a whole?

(5) Or, do the words convey their senses as associated with other words such as are fit to be so associated, whether these latter be verbs or non-verbs?

[603 b-604 a]

स्वार्थमात्रावसायित्वे वाक्यार्थप्रत्ययः कुतः ॥ ६०३ ॥

वैयर्थ्यं च प्रयोगस्य व्यवहाराक्षमत्वतः ।

If words end merely with conveying their own senses, then how could the sentence-sense be understood? The application (*prayoga*) also would be futile, for it would not be fit for empirical usage.

(1) The first alternative is not possible. If the words convey their own senses without mutual relation, there would not, then, be the cognition of the sentence-sense on the part of the hearer. Nor can the sentence as a whole convey the sentence-sense. Does the sentence, in that case, need the denotative capacity of each word?

If it does, it cannot express any distinctive meaning of its own. If it does not, why seek to grasp the meaning of the words, at all? If words do not jointly express a unified sense, why use them in the form of a sentence?

[604 b-605 a]

पदार्थमात्रसंसर्गे कार्यार्थविरहेऽपि ते ॥ ६०४ ॥

व्यवहारस्य संसिद्धेर्व्यर्था कार्यप्रकल्पना ।

If the words convey the relation to other congruous word-senses even in the absence of the sense of what-is-to-be-accomplished, then, since empirical usage is accomplished, the assumption of what-is-to-be-accomplished is futile for you.

(5) On the fifth alternative, the *pūrvapakṣa* view will have to be abandoned, and the *siddhānta* view will result. Words as related with other congruous words convey their meaning. These other words need not be verbs.

[605 b-606 a]

कार्यैकव्यतिषङ्गे च वाक्याद्भूतानुवादकात् ॥ ६०५ ॥

प्रतीतिः स्यान्न वाक्यार्थे स्यादुक्तेर्व्यर्थताऽपि च ।

If the sentence-sense be the relation (of words) to what-is-to-be-accomplished alone, then there would be no meaning for sentences which convey something existent; and there would also be the futility of such statements.

(2-3) As regards the second and third alternatives, the following difficulty arises: If all words have capacity in respect of a single *kārya*, they would become synonyms. And, if no sentence without

an injunctive suffix conveys sense, then statements of facts would become futile, and no hearer would make any sense out of them.

[606 b-607 a]

कार्यान्तरस्य चाभावात्कार्यार्थैकामिधायिनः ॥ ६०६ ॥

संबन्धो न भवेदन्यैः साधनाद्यभिधायिभिः ।

And, for the word which conveys the sense of *kārya* alone there would be no relation with other words signifying means, etc., for there is no other *kārya*.

(4) The word which denotes action itself is not related to yet other word or words expressive of action, for they are not to be found in any given sentence. Nor is it related to the sense expressed by itself, for the Prābhākara does not favour the *abhihitānvaya-vāda*. Again, the word expressive of action is not related to its sense, which in its turn, is related to an accomplished entity. Finally, it is not related to something which is itself related to the action denoted by the sentence as a whole ; for this relation may not be conceived of as either an adjective or an adjunct of the word in question. And, if the relation of the word expressive of action is not to be determined, it remains suspended, as it were.

NTV—*kārya-padasya kāryāntarānvita-svārthābhidhāna-niyamānu-papatteḥ, kāryasya kāryāntarābhāvāt.*

NKL—*vivāda-padāni padāni na kāryānvita-svārtha-niyata-sāmarthyāni, padatvāt, kārya-padavat.*

gām ānaya daṇḍena ity-ātau kāryāntarābhāvāt tad-anvita-svārthābhidhāyitvāyogāt, arthāntarānvita-svārthābhidhāyakatvā-nabhyupagame daṇḍene'tyādibhiḥ sambandho na bhavet. ataḥ kārya-padam anvitamātrābhidhāyīty arthaḥ.

[607 b-608 a]

कार्यान्वयित्वे सर्वेषामपि चेह परस्परम् ॥ ६०७ ॥

पदार्थानामसंबन्धोऽनपेक्षत्वाद्भवेद्भवम् ।

If all words were related to *kārya*, then there would certainly be no mutual relation among them, because of absence of expectancy.

If every word had capacity for a sense, only as related to *kārya*, there would be no mutual relation among words.

[608 b-609 a]

नियोगो न प्रतीयेत विशिष्टविषयस्तथा ॥ ६०८ ॥

तदा चैकपदार्थस्य नियोगः साध्यतामियात् ।

Then, there would not be understood *niyoga* as the content of what is qualified; and the *niyoga* would become what is accomplished by each single word-sense.

If the senses of the words had no mutual relation, then a sentence such as 'Sacrifice with the *soma*' will not have for purport a *niyoga* whose content is the sacrifice as qualified by *soma*. The *niyoga* would then become the content of each of the constituent words.

[609 b-610 a]

अथ सोमादिसंबन्धे यागादौ विषये मतः ॥ ६०९ ॥

नियोगः कस्ततः पूर्वं संबन्धे हेतुरुच्यताम् ।

If the *niyoga* is thought to be the content of sacrifice, etc., as related to *Soma*, etc., it must be stated what before that is the cause of the relation.

If it be held that the *niyoga* is conveyed by the sentence as a whole, it must be stated how this is done. How are the qualifying words like 'soma' and others like 'yāga' related? If their mutual 'fitness' relates them, the insistence on *niyoga* as the hub of relation may be discarded. *Niyoga* becomes equally superfluous, if the cause of relation of the words be held to be either their status as accessories to action or the fruit they point to.

[610 b-611 a]

सिद्धेऽसति विशिष्टे न विषये कार्यमिष्यते ॥ ६१० ॥

अथ क्रियैव प्राक्कार्यात्सिद्धं नो यत्समीहितम् ।

If the established qualified content be not there, there would be no *kārya*; if that relation were established through the activity itself even before the *kārya*, then there results what is acceptable to us.

So, the *niyoga* cannot function without the mutually related words denoting a qualified action. If it is held that the action itself (viz. *yāga*, etc.), before *niyoga* operates, relates adjectives like 'soma' to 'yāga,' etc., that would be accepting our position.

NTV—*vināpi kāryaṁ yogyetarānvite sarva-padānāṁ sāmartyaṁ tātparyaṁ ca siddham ity arthah.*

[611 b-613 a]

तदेतरत्तदर्थमित्येवं चैतत्समञ्जसम् ॥ ६११ ॥

विषये यदि कार्यत्वं कार्यावगमपूर्वकम् ।

कार्ये कार्यान्तराभावात्कार्यबुद्धिः कुतोभवेत् ॥ ६१२ ॥

तदभावादनुष्ठेयो विषयोऽपि न ते भवेत् ।

And the words of the Commentary “Then the other for the sake of that,” etc., would then fit in; if there be the nature of being *kārya* in respect of the content even before knowing the *kārya*, then, since there is no other *kārya* in respect of the *kārya*, whence could there be the cognition of *kārya*? Because it is not there, even the content will not become for you what-is-to-be-done.

The principle that all other words contribute to the *apūrva* denoted by any one word, in a sentence, also supports our position, viz., that a word construes with a sense with which other words construe. Words first express senses which are compatible with those expressed by others in the same sentence; only then they may be subordinated to some other special sense. If it is held that a precedent knowledge of *niyoga* is needed to associate ‘the ought’ with *yāga*, etc., it may be asked whether this knowledge of *niyoga* also is preceded by the knowledge of another *niyoga*, and so on. And, in the absence of the knowledge of *niyoga*, no action is there for you to perform.

NKL—*atra sābara-bhāṣyaṁ jñāpakam āha-tadeti. pratipadādhi-
karaṇe kiṁ sarveṣāṁ padārthānāṁ pratyekaṁ niyogenā ’nvayaḥ,
utaikenaiva niyogene ’ti saṁdehe, pratyekam iti pūrvapakṣayitvā
yadekasmād apūrvam tadetarat tadartham] syād iti siddhāntitan-
saṁgatam syād ity arthaḥ.*

[613 b]

कार्यार्थता ततश्चेष्टा हीयेतानुष्ठितिं विना ॥ ६१३ ॥

Then, without performance the sense of *kārya* which you desire will be destroyed.

And, when you cannot perform *yāga*, etc., *yāga* will cease to be the object of *niyoga*.

[614-616 a]

अथ कार्यान्तराभावेऽप्यस्य कार्यत्वमिष्यते ।

विषयस्यापि कार्यत्वं स्वत एव भवेत्तथा ॥ ६१४ ॥

विषयोऽकार्यरूपत्वात्स्वसिद्धयै यद्यपेक्षते ।

कार्यं तदपि विषयमीक्षेतासाध्यरूपतः ॥ ६१५ ॥

कार्येऽपि कार्यतैवं च भवेद्विषयहेतुका ।

If you think that there is the nature of being *kārya* for this even in the absence of another *kārya*, then there would be the nature of being *kārya* for the content also of its own accord. If the content, because it is not of the nature of *kārya*, requires the *kārya* for its own accomplishment, then, even the *kārya* would require the content because it is not of the nature of something to be accomplished. Thus, even the *kārya*-ness of the *kārya* will have to be caused by the content.

If you say that *niyoga* can operate without requiring another *niyoga*, we reply that what applies to *niyoga* must equally apply to *yāga*, etc. If you should say, “*Yāga*, etc., require *niyoga* because in themselves they involve trouble and would not be carried out without the sense of *niyoga*,” we reply: A sense of mere oughtness does not make sense; to give it sense it has to be related to the content of the verbal roots like *yajeta*, etc.

NTV—*iṣṭopāyatā-dhiyā hi mamedam kāryam iti buddhvā svatantraḥ pravartate, iṣṭopāyatā-dhīta eva kleśarūpasya kāryatā iti ca.*

[616 b-617 a]

अन्योन्याश्रयतो च स्यान्न च कार्यप्रधानता ॥ ६१६ ॥

पुन्यापारव्यपेक्षायां स्वसिद्धौ कार्यमुच्यते ।

And, there would be reciprocal dependence; and the *kārya* would not be the principal.

That is called *kārya* which for its own establishment stands in need of human effort.

Also, there would be mutual dependence between *niyoga* and the sense of the verbal roots like *yāga*, etc. Thus, *niyoga* would cease to be more important than those root-senses.

Properly speaking, obligatoriness is for *yāga* alone, not for *niyoga*. For, what is *kārya*? It is that which needs human effort for being accomplished.

AVS—niyoga-kartavyatve viṣayakartavyatvam, viṣaya-kartavyatve niyogakartavyatvam iti itaretarāśrayatvam, niyoga-prādhānya-kṣatis ceti.

NKL—niyogasya dhātvartha-kāryatva-siddhyarthatvāt prādhānyam ca na syād ity arthaḥ.

[617 b- 618 a]

यागादिः स च नो कार्यं स्वतः कार्यैकरूपतः ॥ ६१७ ॥

कार्यस्यैव न कार्यत्वमकार्ये कार्यतेष्यते ।

That (*kārya*) is sacrifice, etc.; the *niyoga* is not *kārya*, because (according to you) it is itself the nature of *kārya*.

For the *kārya* itself there is no *kārya*-ness; there is *kārya*-ness only for what is not *kārya*.

And, that is *yāga*; for it has the nature of being accomplished. *Niyoga*, on the contrary, does not satisfy the definition of *kārya*. The *niyogavādin* contends that *niyoga* is *kārya* by itself, and that it does not depend on human effort. So, if *niyoga* is obligatoriness, (*kāryatva*), it cannot have obligatoriness; for one and the same thing cannot be the locus and the located. Thus, it is only *yāga*, etc., which are by themselves not *kāryatā*, that become obligatory on account of injunction.

AVS—niyogasya kāryatvaṁ svataḥsiddham, na puruṣa-vyāpārā-dhīnam, anyathā ghaṭa-tulyatvaṁ niyogasye 'ty arthaḥ.

[618 b-620]

न शौक्ल्ये शुक्लतापत्तिः पटादेः सा विधीयते ॥ ६१८ ॥

घटकार्ययजत्यादि स्वस्वभावतया स्थितम् ।

सिद्धसाध्यादिभेदेन स्वशब्देनाभिधीयते ॥ ६१९ ॥

यदा तदा ध्वनेर्न स्यादज्ञातार्थावबोधने ।

विशेषः कश्चिदित्येवं न प्रवृत्तिर्विधेर्भवेत् ॥ ६२० ॥

There is no contingency of whiteness in whiteness; that is predicated only of cloth, etc.

When 'pot', 'kārya', 'sacrifice', etc., each of which has its own nature, are expressed by their respective words differentiated as accomplished or to-be-accomplished, then, there is seen to be difference as regards making known an unknown sense by the sounds; thus activity is not the result of injunction.

It was stated above that there is *kāryatva* only for what is not *kārya*. An example of this is that there is no whiteness for whiteness, but only for cloth, etc.

The result of this discussion is this: Words relate to senses which are not related to *kārya*. According to their varying capacities, they denote either accomplished entities like pots, etc., or yet-to-be-accomplished activities like *yāga*, etc., or qualities like whiteness, etc. They denote what they are 'fit' to denote. So, sentences made up of words, also, may denote either accomplished entities, or activities yet to be accomplished. *Niyoga* comes nowhere into this picture.

[621]

अवबुद्धे तु शब्दार्थे पुरुषार्थानुरोधतः ।

स्वत एव प्रवृत्तिः स्यान्न शब्दान्नार्थतस्तथा ॥ ६२१ ॥

When the sense of the word has been understood, there is activity of its own accord, in accordance with the desired human end ; it is neither from the word nor from the sense.

If it be asked how there is activity after hearing the words, we reply: the activity springs from desire. When an unknown object has been known from words, a man begins to be active because he *desires* that object. Another who does not desire it is not active even though he comes to know of it from words.

NTV—pravṛtṭiḥ pravartaka-pūrvikā pravṛtṭitvāt madīya-pravṛtṭivad iti, sa ca rāga eva pravṛtṭi-hetutvāt madīya-pravṛtṭi-hetubhūta-rāgavad iti. sa ca rāgaḥ iṣṭasāadhanatā-jñānahetuko rāgatvāt madīya-rāgavad iti.

AVS—na śabdaḥ pravartakaḥ, nāpi niyogaḥ, rāga eva pravartakaḥ.

[622]

साधनादित्रयाद्बाह्यं पुरुषार्थबहिष्कृतम् ।

क एतत्साधयेद्दीमान्किं वा रूपमितीर्यताम् ॥ ६२२ ॥

That which is outside the three, means, etc., and also other than the human end—which wise man will accomplish it? And what is its nature? Let it be stated.

So far, assuming that *niyoga* is of the nature of *sādhya*, it was argued that it is not what prompts activity. Now, it is sought to be shown that *niyoga* is not *sādhya* at all. There is no *kārya* other than the means (*karana*), the *modus operandi* (*itikartavyatā*), and what

is to be accomplished (*bhāvya*). *Niyoga* is not the same as *bhāvya*; for the *bhāvya* (that which is to be accomplished) is either happiness or destruction of sorrow, which is the human end.

And, it is not possible to define *niyoga*. (1) Is *niyoga* a direction (*preraṇā*)? (2) Is it internal effort? (3) Is it action (*kriyā*)? (4) Is it fruit? (5) Is it instrument (*kāraka*)? (6) Or, is it something else? (7) Is it that which is unrelated to three times? (8) Or, is it something supersensible?

AVS—na yāgādī-sāadhanam niyogaḥ, nāpi prayājādītikartavyatā, nāpi brāhmaṇādy-adhikārī, nāpi sukha-duḥkhanivṛttir vā phalam, evaṁ lakṣaṇam niyogam kaḥ sādhayet, prekṣāpūrvakāri-svarūpaṁ ca tasya kim bhāṇyatām ity arthaḥ.

[623]

न तावत्प्रेरणा कार्यं कार्यार्थविषया हि सा ।

नाऽऽन्तरोऽपि प्रयत्नः स्यान्मानान्तरगतेस्तथा ॥ ६२३ ॥

Kārya cannot be direction, for that (direction) has for content the sense of *kārya*; nor internal effort, for, then, it would be known through other *pramāṇa*.

(1) *Niyoga* is not direction, for direction which is word-function is the content or object of *niyoga*, and as between the content and the container there is difference.

(2) Nor is *niyoga* internal effort; for effort is mental, and if *niyoga* were to be that, there would be no *apūrvatva* for it.

[624]

न क्रिया कर्तृसंबन्धात्फलं नानिष्टरूपतः ।

कारकं नाप्यसिद्धत्वान्नाप्यन्यदनिरूपणात् ॥ ६२४ ॥

It is not activity, because activity is related to the agent; nor the fruit, because the *niyoga* is not what is

desired ; nor what accomplishes the act, because the *niyoga* is not what has been established ; nor something else because it is not clearly stated.

(3) *Niyoga* is not activity; for activity is related to the agent, whereas *niyoga* relates to the prompted person, and the two—agent and prompted person—are not the same.

(4) Nor is *niyoga* the fruit; for it is not a human end, as it is not what is desired.

(5) Nor is it an instrument; for an instrument is an accomplished thing, whereas *niyoga* is what-is-to-be-accomplished.

(6) Nor is it any other; for there is no evidence therefor.

[625]

न च कालत्रयास्पर्शवाच्यत्वं कार्यलक्षणम् ।

घटशब्दाद्घटे मा भूत्कालास्पर्शेन कार्यता ॥ ६२५ ॥

Nor is the definition of *kārya* that which is expressed without being touched by the three times, lest from the word 'pot' the pot would be understood as *kārya* (*niyoga*), because it is untouched by time.

(7) The non-relation of *niyoga* with the three times—is it from word, or from sense? Not the first; for if that were so, when it is said 'pot', there would be *niyogatā* for pot, for the word itself does not mention any relation to time. Nor the second; for, the word 'pot' has for its sense the broad-bellied object, and has no capacity to indicate relation to time as such.

NKL—*ghaṭa ity ukte kālatrayasyā-'sprṣṭo ghaṭo bhāti. itarathā ghaṭostītyādau laḍādy-arthasya dvirabhidhāna-prasaṅgād ato ghaṭe kāryatā mā bhūt tatrā 'tivṣāntir iti bhāvaḥ.*

[626]

नियोगोऽपि नियोज्यस्य व्यापारः स कथं भवेत् ।

अतीन्द्रियो लिङाद्यर्थः सिद्धिश्चास्य कथं भवेत् ॥ ६२६ ॥

And, the *niyoga* is the operation of him who is prompted; how can that be the sense of the potential mood (*liñ*), etc., which is super-sensuous? And how can that be accomplished?

(8) Just as sacrifice, etc., constitute the activity of the agent, the *niyoga* too forms an operation of the one prompted; and so, it cannot be super-sensuous.

[627]

सिद्धिर्विषयसिद्धौ चेन्नैवं स्यात्कर्मणा न हि ।

आप्त्युत्पत्त्यादिकं शक्यमनारोप्यस्वभावतः ॥ ६२७ ॥

If it be said that the *niyoga* is accomplished when the object is accomplished, not so; attainment, origination, etc., are not possible through activity, for the *niyoga* is not of the nature of the superimposed.

It cannot be said that sacrifice, etc., when accomplished, accomplish *niyoga*; for the usual results of action, viz. origination, attainment, purification, and modification, cannot be brought about for *niyoga*, as those who advocate the doctrine of *niyoga* believe that no excellence can be imposed on *niyoga*; and also it would be a contradiction to say that *niyoga* is eternal and that it is what-is-to-be-accomplished.

NKL—*āpty-utpatti-vikāra-saṃskārā na niyogasya karma-sādhyāḥ tasyā 'nāropya-svabhāvataḥ anādheyātisaṃyathena svikārād ity arthaḥ.*

[628]

कार्यं स्वेनाऽऽत्मना सिद्धं पुमर्थं साधयेद्यदि ।

सर्वदा तस्य तादृक्त्वात्पुमर्थः सर्वदा भवेत् ॥ ६२८ ॥

If the *kārya*, which being self-accomplished, were to accomplish the human end, then because the *kārya* is always of that nature, the human end also will be always there.

Having shown that *niyoga* is not accomplished by anything, it is now argued that *niyoga* does not accomplish anything.

Does *niyoga* (i.e. *kārya*), being already there, accomplish heaven, etc. ? Or, does it come into being through human effort, and then accomplish heaven, etc. ?

On the first alternative, heaven, etc., will always be there, as *niyoga* is admitted to be there always, and there would be no need for accomplishing heaven, etc.

[629]

पुंव्यापारप्रसिद्ध्याऽथ सिद्धं स्वार्थकरं मतम् ।

तस्यानाधेयरूपत्वान्न कदाचित्फलं भवेत् ॥ ६२९ ॥

If it be thought that the *kārya* having been accomplished by human effort produces its fruit, it can never bear fruit as it is of the nature of what is not an effect.

The other alternative is also not possible; for it has already been shown that *niyoga* does not admit of the imposition of any excellence. As *niyoga* is not accomplished through human activity, never can heaven, etc., come into being as dependent thereon.

[630]

संभाव्यमानसिद्धेर्हि यागादेः कार्यता मता ।

व्योमतत्पुष्पयोर्न स्यात्सिद्धात्यन्ताप्रसिद्धयोः ॥ ६३० ॥

There is the nature of being *kārya* only for sacrifice, etc., which have the prospect of being accomplished; that is not possible in the case of the already-accomplished like the sky or the entirely non-existent like the sky-flowers.

The nature of being accomplished (*kāryatā*) can belong only to a positive entity whose origination is through human activity, and not to *niyoga* which is not of that nature. *Niyoga* which is of the nature of absolute non-existence, like the sky-flower, cannot be accomplished.

[631]

कर्तव्यो याग इत्येवं यागाद्विन्ना यथेक्ष्यते ।

कर्तव्यं कार्यमित्येवं ततोऽपि व्यतिरिच्यते ॥ ६३१ ॥

If it be said that in the statement 'The sacrifice is to be performed', what is to be performed is something different from the sacrifice, then even in 'What is to be performed is *kārya*' what is to be performed will be different from that.

If it be said that in the usage 'The sacrifice is to be performed', the sacrifice figures as something different from *kārya*, then on the strength of the usage '*kārya* (i.e. *niyoga*) is to be performed' we must say that *niyoga* is different from *kārya*.

[632]

कार्यकर्तव्यता कार्येत्येवमेवातिरिच्यते ।

तस्मान्न वस्तुधर्मोऽयं शब्दादेव प्रकर्षतः ॥ ६३२ ॥

There is a similar transcendence in “the to-be-accomplished nature of the *kārya* is to be performed”. Therefore, this is not a characteristic of reality, because the difference is only in word.

It may be said that *kāryatā* (nature of being what-is-to-be-done) is not *niyoga*, but its attribute (*dharma*), and that *kāryatā* is not the attribute of sacrifice, etc.

But we ask: the *kāryatā* of the *niyoga* which is *kārya*—is that to be done or not?

If that is to be done, then that would be different from *niyoga*. This will lead to an infinite regress.

If *kāryatā* is not what-is-to-be-done, then it would be similar to what is prohibited.

Thus *kāryatā* can be neither the nature nor the attribute of *niyoga*. It is only a verbal expression.

NKL—*śaśa-śṛṅgaṁ gagana-kusumam itivac chābda-vikalpa-mātram ity arthaḥ*.

[633]

अतो यदेव साध्यार्थसाधनत्वेन गम्यते ।

वेदात्तदेव साध्यत्वात्कार्यं नान्यत्ततः पृथक् ॥ ६३३ ॥

Hence that alone, which is understood from the Veda as being the means to the accomplishment of what is to be accomplished, is the *kārya*, because it has to be accomplished, and nothing else apart from it.

What is *kārya* is sacrifice, etc., alone which are the means to the end, viz. heaven, etc.

[634]

लिङादिः प्रेरणावाची कुतः कार्यमितीर्यताम् ।

विषयत्वेन नाऽऽक्षेपो भावार्थो विषयो मतः ॥ ६३४ ॥

The potential mood, etc., express direction. Whence, then, the *kārya*? The *kārya* cannot be regarded as the object either; for, the object is the stem-sense.

According to the Bhāṭṭas, the potential mood, *liñ*, etc., express direction (*preraṇā*). *Niyoga* is not the content of direction; sacrifice, etc., are the content.

[635]

प्रेरणाऽपीह नैव स्यादज्ञातज्ञापनात्पृथक् ।

समस्तकार्यदोषोक्तिप्रसङ्गान्मित्यभावतः ॥ ६३५ ॥

Even direction here is not different from the making known of what is unknown; for it involves all the possible defects pertaining to the *kārya*; and there is no evidence to the contrary.

It is wrong to say that even direction is the meaning of the potential mood, *liñ*, etc. For, what is direction? Is it different from making known what is unknown? Or, is it not different?

It cannot be different; for, if it were so, all the defects pointed out earlier in the case of *kārya* would appear here also.

[636]

न स्वरूपं लिङादीनां प्रेरणाज्ञापकत्वतः ।

अन्योन्यरूपभेदेऽपि प्रेरणानुगमात्तथा ॥ ६३६ ॥

Direction is not the nature of the potential mood (*liñ*), etc., for the potential mood is for making known (the unknown) and direction is understood even where there are different forms (like *let*).

Moreover, if direction is different, what is it? Is it the nature of *liñ*, etc.? Or, is it some potency? Or, is it some particular operation?

It cannot be the first; for, *liñ*, etc., are what make known, and direction, you say, is not of that nature. Moreover, although there are different forms such as *yajeta*, *juhota*, etc., employing *liñ*, *let*, etc., there is no difference so far as their sense, direction, is concerned; and if direction is the nature of *liñ*, it cannot be the nature of *let*, etc.

[637]

शक्तेरनभिधेयत्वात्तद्व्यापारोऽपि नेष्यते ।

प्रेरकाभावतो वेदे तद्व्यापारोऽपि नेरणा ॥ ६३७ ॥

(Direction cannot be) the capacity (*śakti*) (of *liñ*, etc.), for then it would not be what is expressed; nor can it be the operation thereof; nor can prompting be the operation of the director, for in respect of the Veda there is no director.

Nor is direction some potency or capacity of *liñ*, etc.; for those who argue against us hold that direction is expressed by *liñ*, etc. If they hold, at the same time, that direction is their potency, they would be contradicting themselves; for, as potency and the potent are non-different, if direction is the potency of *liñ*, etc., it cannot be what is expressed (*vācya*) by them.

If direction is to be regarded as some particular operation, whereof is it an operation—of *liñ*, etc., or of the director?

If it is the operation of *liñ*, etc., what is this operation? Is it movement (*spanda*)? Or, effort (*yatna*)? Not the first, because *liñ*, etc., are all-pervading. Nor the other, because effort is an attribute of the conscious, and *liñ*, etc., are unconscious.

If direction is the operation of the director, who is this director? Is it a person? Or, is it the Veda?

It cannot be a person, for the Veda has no human author, and it can have no director.

[638]

अतः समीहितोपायतया वस्त्ववबोधयन् ।

अबुद्धं प्रेरको वेदो ज्ञापना प्रेरणा मता ॥ ६३८ ॥

Therefore, the director is the Veda which makes known a reality which was unknown, as the means to the desired end; and the making known is direction.

Therefore, it must be admitted that direction is not different from making known what is unknown, and that the director is the Veda.

[639]

तथा च वस्तुयाथात्म्यज्ञापनेन प्रमाणता ।

न प्रेरकतया सा स्यात्प्रत्यक्षादेरनीक्षणात् ॥ ६३९ ॥

And thus, there is validity only as making known the real nature of things, and not as directing activity; for this latter is not seen in perception, etc.

Perception, etc., simply make known what is unknown; they do not direct activity. Similarly, the Veda too is valid, not as directing, but as making known.

NKL—*vedaḥ abuddha-bodhakatvenaiva pramāṇam pramāṇatvāt pratyakṣādivat.*

AVS—*pratyakṣādivat vedasya prāmāṇyam abuddha-bodhakatvena siddham, na prerakatvena ity arthaḥ.*

[640]

निष्पादितनियोगस्य वेदप्रामाण्यतो यथा ।

नियमेन फलं तद्वत्साधनानुष्ठितेर्भवेत् ॥ ६४० ॥

Just as (according to the *niyoga-vāda*) the *niyoga* carried out invariably bears fruit from the authority of the Veda, so also may it result through the performance of the means (*viz.*, sacrifice).

Although neither *niyoga* nor direction is the meaning of *liṅ*, etc., these latter can convey the meaning of instrumentality to the desired. Just as in the *niyoga-vāda* it is maintained that the *niyoga* that is acquired by performing the stem-sense (*viz.* sacrifice) leads to the fruit on the strength of the text 'He who desires heaven,' etc., even so we may legitimately hold that the same sacrifice, when performed, results in bringing in the fruit through the intermediary operation of an unseen potency (*apūrva*). Thus, it is possible for us to say that the sense of *liṅ*, etc., *viz.* sacrifice, etc., constitute the means to what is desired, i.e. heaven, etc.

[641]

विसंवादोऽपि नाऽऽशङ्क्यो नियोगार्थे यथा तथा ।

वैदिकत्वादुपायेऽपि नृतन्त्रे व्यभिचारिता ॥ ६४१ ॥

Just as, if the *niyoga* be the sense (of *liṅ*, etc.), failure of fruitful result cannot be doubted, even so, if the means (sacrifice) be the sense, for it is declared by the Veda; there is inconstancy only in what depends on man.

It cannot be said that if the instrumentality of sacrifice, etc., to heaven, etc., be the sense of *liñ*, etc., the *Svarga-kāma* text would become invalid, as immediately after the performance of sacrifice, heavenly enjoyment is not observed; for, the situation is the same in the case of both the views, viz. the view that *niyoga* is the sense of *liñ*, etc., and the view that sacrifice is the sense.

Just as even if *niyoga* be the sense of *liñ*, etc., there is no futility even though no immediate fruit is seen, and there is no invalidity for the Vedic text, so also if sacrifice, etc., be the sense of *liñ*, etc., there is no contingency of the suspected defects. The instrumentality of sacrifice to heaven is to be ascertained from the Veda alone. And, the Veda is unlike human statements, and so cannot miscarry. It has no human author, and is free from defects.

NTV—pauruṣeya-vākyasya hi mānāntara-visaṁvādāt prāmāṇya-vyabhicāritā, pramāṇāntara-nibandhanatvāt tat-pramāṇasya.

AVS—vedaika-samadhigamyatvād upāyatvasya na pauruṣeya-vākyaṛthavad vyabhicārāsaṅkā ity arthaḥ.

[642]

नानन्तरफलो यागो दृष्टो लोकेऽपि हि क्वचित् ।

अतः सामान्यतो.दृष्टं क्रियात्वादित्यदूषणम् ॥ ६४२ ॥

Sacrifice does not yield immediate fruit, for even in the world some cases of action do not yield immediate fruit (e.g. service); so the *sāmānyato-drṣṭa* probans 'because it is an act' cannot be (adduced as) a defect.

It cannot be argued thus: 'Sacrifice, etc., must have immediate fruit, because they are acts, like the act of churning'; for not all acts yield their fruit immediately, e.g. service.

NTV — *na hi loke 'nantara-phalo yāgaḥ prasiddho 'sti, tasyā 'laukikas-svarūpatvāt, vaidikasya ru kāriryādi-yāgasya yady api dr̥ṣṭaphalatā, tathāpi nā 'nantara-phalaiva-niyamo 'sti, tasmāt vyāpti-grahaṇābhāvāt yāgatvād anataraphalo yāga ity anumānā 'nupapattir ity arthaḥ.*

AVS—*atra yāga-sabdena kriyā ucyate.*

[643]

स्वसामर्थ्याद्यथा कार्यं कालास्पृष्टं प्रभाषते ।

लिङादिर्यागमप्येवं वक्ष्यतीत्यविशिष्टता ॥ ६४३ ॥

Just as *liñ*, etc., by their own capacity, are said to mean *kārya* untouched by time, even so sacrifice is said to be the meaning; thus there is no difference.

It may be argued thus: If sacrifice, etc., which are the means to heaven, etc., be the sense of *liñ*, etc., it must be stated if sacrifice, etc., are related to time or not. If they are related to time, then they cannot be performed because of relation to past time, etc. On the second alternative, if from word there is no relation to time, they would be like pot, etc.; and if from sense there is non-relation to time, they would be non-existent.

The reply is: It is true that there is similarity between *niyoga* and sacrifice, etc. But there is this difference: sacrifice is not non-existent, although it is not related to time. Even though as instrument to the desired, sacrifice is not related to time, by nature (i.e. as sacrifice) it is related to time; whereas *niyoga*, even by nature, is not temporal.

[644]

साक्षादेवं च संबन्धः साध्यसाधनयोर्भवेत् ।

नातिरिक्तलिङाद्यर्थव्यवधानाविडम्बना ॥ ६४४ ॥

And thus, there would be a direct relation between end and means; and there would be no farce of interposing something which is other than these, the sense of *liñ*, etc.

There is another reason why we say that sacrifice, etc., which are the instrument to the desired, are the sense of *liñ*, etc.

If this be the case, there is established an immediate relation between means and end. If, on the contrary, *niyoga* be the sense, there will be an interposition between them. This, however, is not proper, as, in this case, an immediate relation is possible.

[645]

साक्षादसति संबन्धे पारम्पर्यं न तु कचित् ।

गतौ सत्यां तदप्यत्र नान्यत्रेवोपलभ्यते ॥ ६४५ ॥

Where there is no direct relation, there may be sequence (*pāramparyam*); and not where there is such a way (direct relation); even that (the former) is not seen here, as elsewhere.

Where immediate relation is not possible, then relation in sequence is to be admitted. In the case of the *svarga-kāma* text there is no need to postulate relation in sequence, for there is seen immediate relation.

AVS—avyavadhānena sambandhe asati pāramparyam, natu sati, tac ca pāramparyam atra nāsti, yathā aruṇayā krīṇātīty atra vidyate ity arthaḥ.

[646]

श्रुत्या क्रयामिसंबन्धो व्यवच्छिद्यैव साधनम् ।

अरुणः साधको दृष्टो नानपेक्षो वृथा च सः ॥ ६४६ ॥

By the express statement, it is known that the tawny colour, though related to buying, becomes what accomplishes only by interposing the means (the cow). It is not independent, for, if so, it would be useless.

The contrary example is now given. When the scriptural text says, 'With the tawny he buys', what is the relation between 'tawny' and 'buying'? There cannot be a direct relation; 'tawny' becomes the instrument of buying only as qualifying the cow. The meaning of the text is: with the tawny cow he buys *soma*.

The *svarga-kāma* text is not like this; for, here a direct relation is seen between the means and the end.

NKL—*aruṇayā krīṇātīti tṛtīyā śrutyā aruṇo guṇaḥ kriyāyām viniyuktopi paśu-dravyaṃ viśeṣyaiva soma-krayasya sādhaḥ, guṇasya asvatantratvād anyathā kevalasya guṇasya sādhaḥ* ity arthaḥ.

[647]

यागः कार्याभिसंबन्धोऽप्यनुत्पाद्य फलं न ते ।

कथंचित्साधयत्कार्यं तच्च नास्तीत्यसाधकः ॥ ६४७ ॥

Sacrifice, though related to *kārya*, does not accomplish the *kārya* for you without accomplishing the fruit; but that it does not, and so it cannot be what accomplishes (in respect of *kārya*).

It was stated that sacrifice, etc., are related to heaven, etc., and not to *niyoga*. Here, it is pointed out that even if their relation to *niyoga* be admitted, there will be defect.

Does the sacrifice that is related to *niyoga* generate it without or with an intermediary operation? It cannot be without an intermediary operation, for there can be no instrumentation without operation. If it be with an intermediary operation, what is that

operation? Is it the generation of fruit? Or, some other operation? If it be the former then without generating heaven first, sacrifice would not bring about the *niyoga* that you desire. But in the case of no one is heaven seen immediately after a sacrifice. And so, sacrifice is not what establishes *niyoga*.

[648]

नचान्या व्यापृतिस्तस्य कार्यसिद्धौ त्वयेष्यते ।

फलानुत्पत्तितस्तस्मान्न कार्येणापि संगतिः ॥ ६४८ ॥

Nor do you accept any other operation in order that the *kārya* may be accomplished; because the fruit has not been produced, the *niyoga* cannot be even connected with the *kārya* (sacrifice).

Any other operation is not admitted by you.

As the fruit (viz. heaven) is not seen immediately after the performance of sacrifice, etc., these latter cannot be related to *niyoga* through the generation of fruit.

[649]

अथ शास्त्रप्रमाणत्वाददृष्टाऽप्यभ्युपेयते ।

फलोत्पत्तिर्ममाप्येवं तथा सति भविष्यति ॥ ६४९ ॥

If you admit on the authority of Scripture that an unseen (*adr̥ṣṭa*) fruit is generated, then even for me that happens so.

If you say, on the authority of Scripture, that an unseen potency is generated by the sacrifice, that is acceptable to us. And, even thus, there would be no need for *niyoga*.

[650]

मम शास्त्रप्रमाणत्वात्पश्चादपि भवेत्फलम् ।

पूर्वं तु भवतो न्याय्यं तदभावे ह्यसाधकम् ॥ ६५० ॥

Because I accept the authority of Scripture, for me the fruit may come even late; for you it is but proper that it must come earlier, for in its absence the *niyoga* will not be what accomplishes.

In our view, the fruit may come about even some time after the performance of sacrifice, the authority for this being the *svarga-kāma* text. But for you the fruit must be immediate, because in the absence of the intermediary operation (which is heaven) *niyoga* will not be established.

As, on the authority of Scripture, the fruit results from the sacrifice itself, it is futile to assume *niyoga*.

AVS—*tad-abhāve svargābhāve kāryaṁ sādḥaka-sūnyam ity arthaḥ.*

[651]

कार्यसिद्ध्या फलावाप्तावशेषफलसंभवः ।

सकृत्करण एव स्यात्कार्यस्याभेदतस्तव ॥ ६५१ ॥

If by accomplishing the *kārya* the fruit be obtained, then by once performing (the sacrifice) all fruits must result; for according to you the *kārya* is non-different.

If on the accomplishment of sacrifice, etc., there is the accomplishment of *niyoga*, and thence result heaven, etc., then as *niyoga* comes about by the performance, even once, of a sacrifice, there should be no need for other sacrifices or for repeating the same sacrifice. By the single performance of a sacrifice one must then be able to reap all possible kinds of fruit.

[552]

अनुबन्धाभिसंबन्धात्फलं चेत्स्याद्वयवस्थया ।

तत एव न कार्यत्स्यात्तदा तद्भावभावतः ॥ ६५२ ॥

If it be said that there is the settlement of the difference in fruit due to the relation (of the *niyoga*) with the adjunct (viz., the particular rite), then, because of that very reason the fruit is not from the *kārya* (*niyoga*), for it is determined by that (rite).

It may be said that although *niyoga* is one by itself, it becomes different on account of the sacrifices with which it is associated, and that the difference in fruit may thus be accounted for.

If this be the case, then the difference in fruit is conditioned by the difference in sacrifice. And so, what is the use of *niyoga*?

AVS—kim niyogena ajāgalastana-kalpena?

[653]

औपाधिकश्च मिथ्या स्यात्साध्यसाधनलक्षणः ।

व्यवहारः श्रुतेर्ज्ञातः परमार्थैकवादिनः ॥ ६५३ ॥

And, it would have to be recognized that for him (the Pūrvamīmāṃsaka) who says that all (*Svarga*, etc.) is real, the Scriptural usage consisting in means and ends conditioned by adjuncts is illusory.

If there be difference in *niyoga* because of difference in sacrifice, there will result another defect also. The *niyoga* as conditioned by sacrifice will be the means; and heaven, etc., will be the ends. Then the conditioned *niyoga* will have to be declared illusory, like the redness of the crystal. That being the case, heaven, etc., brought

about thereby will also be illusory. This, however, is not acceptable to the Mīmāṃsaka who maintains that all means and ends, such as sacrifice, etc., and heaven, etc., are absolutely real.

[654]

एवं ते कर्मकाण्डेऽपि कार्यं तावन्न युज्यते ।

ऐकात्म्ये तु यथा नास्ति विशेषेणोच्यते तथा ॥ ६५४ ॥

Thus for you the *kārya* is not intelligible even in the ritual-section; as to how it is not intelligible in respect of the one self (*jñānakāṇḍa*) it will be stated in detail.

It has been shown that there is no need for postulating *niyoga* in the *karma-kāṇḍa*. That such a postulation is not necessary in the *jñāna-kāṇḍa* will be demonstrated hereafter.

[655]

प्रतिपत्तिविधिस्तावन्नाऽऽत्मा द्रष्टव्य इत्ययम् ।

तस्य भावार्थनिष्ठत्वाद्वस्तुन्यनुपपत्तिः ॥ ६५५ ॥

The text 'The self is to be seen' is not a command for knowing; for that (the command) relates to the sense of the verb, and that is unintelligible as regards the real.

In the Upaniṣads there is the text, 'The Self is to be seen.' Does this not imply *niyoga*, it may be asked.

Now, in regard to what is there *niyoga*? Is it in regard to the reality, i.e. the self, or in regard to the knowledge thereof? It cannot be the first, because the command relates to knowing; and as regards the self, which is eternal, no command is intelligible.

AVS — *nāyam ātmani vidhiḥ, vidheḥ kriyāviśayatvād vastuny ayogāc ca.*

[656]

सिद्धेऽसिद्धेऽथ वैकाल्ये विधिर्नैवोपपद्यते ।

नाऽऽकाशे नापि तत्पुष्पे पुंव्यापारानपेक्षता ॥ ६५६ ॥

Whether the one self is existent or non-existent (*siddha* or *asiddha*), injunction is unintelligible; as in the case of the sky or the sky-flower, because there is no dependence on human effort in either.

As the one-self is an established reality, there can be no command with reference to it, even as there is nothing to be commanded about either. Even if the one-self be regarded as unestablished, like the sky-flower, it must be admitted that a command would be futile. In either case there is no place for human operation.

[657]

न विधिर्दर्शनेऽपि स्यादन्योन्याश्रयदोषतः ।

दर्शनाद्विधिसंसिद्धेर्विधेर्दर्शनसिद्धितः ॥ ६५७ ॥

Nor is there injunction in respect of seeing; for there would be the defect of reciprocal dependence thus: the injunction is established from the seeing, and the seeing is established from the injunction.

Nor may it be held that the injunction is with reference to seeing; for, that is not intelligible. Is the injunction in regard to seeing as such, or in regard to seeing Brahman (i.e. Brahman-knowledge)? If the first be the case, there is the contingency of injunction in regard to pot-cognition also. On the second alternative, there would be the defect of reciprocal dependence thus: for enjoining knowledge as qualified by Brahman, there must be the earlier knowledge of Brahman, and from the injunction of Brahman-knowledge

there is that knowledge: when Brahman is known, there is the injunction for that knowledge, and from that injunction there is the knowledge of Brahman.

NTV—aikātmya-siddhau tadviśeṣita-darśane vidhis siddhyati, tadvidhi-siddhau balād aikātmya-siddhir ity anyonyāśrayatā.

[658]

न च यूपादिवच्छक्यं वेदेनैव समर्पणम् ।

ऐकात्म्यस्य स्वतः सिद्धेः साध्यत्वाद्युपवस्तुनः ॥ ६५८ ॥

Nor is the oneness of self a contribution made by the Veda itself, as in the case of the sacrificial post (as auxiliary to injunction); for the oneness of self is self-established whereas the sacrificial post is what is to be accomplished.

It may be argued that the Veda offers Brahman as an auxiliary to the injunction of seeing, even as it offers the sacrificial post as an auxiliary to the injunctions of sacrifice.

But this argument is not sound. The sacrificial post is a product of action. Not so is Brahman which is the eternally established reality.

NKL—prakṛti-dravyasya siddhatvepi yūpākārasya asiddhatvād aikātmyasya tu kūṭastha-nityatvād rūpāntara-rahitatvād vā ity arthah.

AVS—yūpasya vastutvepi sādhyatvād vidheyatvaṁ ghaṭate, na tathaikātmyasya, kūṭastha-siddhatvāt.

[659]

सिद्धं चेद्दर्शयेद्वेदः प्रसिद्धं दर्शनं तथा ।

तन्निष्ठं च भवेद्वाक्यं व्यर्थता च विधेस्तदा ॥ ६५९ ॥

If the Veda reveals what is existent, then our view is established, and the text (*satyam*, etc.) will signify that (Brahman); so, the injunction would be useless.

So, the Veda offers Brahman, not as an auxiliary of injunctions but as the eternally established reality. By applying the sixfold marks of interpretation, it is learnt that the texts like 'Reality, intelligence, infinitude,'¹ etc., have Brahman for purport. If the Vedāntic texts have reality for purport, there is futility of injunction in regard to knowledge thereof.

¹*Tait.*, II, i, 1.

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सर्वमात्मेति वाक्यस्य न च वस्तुन्यसंभवः ।

येनार्थस्यासमाप्तत्वात्क्रियेताध्याहृतिः पदे ॥ ६६० ॥

In the text 'All is self'¹ it is not impossible that the teaching is about the real. It is only where the sense is incomplete that a word implying (an action) is to be imported.

It may be contended that, without injunction, a sentence cannot make reality known.

This is not right. For one who knows the meaning of words such a sentence does convey sense.

1. See *CHU*, VII, xxv, 2; *BU*, II, iv, 6; *Maitrī*, vi, 7.

NTV quotes the text: *idam sarvam yad ayam ātmā* (*BU*, II, iv, 6).

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आत्मा ब्रह्मेति विज्ञानं विधिं नैव व्यपेक्षते ।

यस्मात्तच्छतवाक्यस्य स्वयमेवोपजायते ॥ ६६१ ॥

The knowledge from the text 'The self is Brahman' is not expectant of an injunction; for it arises of its own accord in him who has heard the text.

Further, if it be held that Brahman-knowledge is enjoined, it must be stated what type of Brahman-knowledge is the content of the injunction. (1) Is it verbal knowledge of the text (*sābda*)? (2) Or, is it of the nature of contemplation (*bhāvanā*)? (3) Or, is it of the character of direct intuition (*sākṣātkāra*)? In the first alternative, there are the following sub-divisions: (a) Is the injunction for the sake of the generation of the verbal knowledge? (b) Is it for determining the content of the knowledge that has arisen? (c) Is it for the sake of the purport of the text? (d) Is it for making the knowledge subserve the human goal? (e) Is it because Brahman is not the object of any other *pramāṇa*? (f) Is it for relating the word-senses?

(1a) There is no need for an injunction to generate verbal knowledge. As soon as texts like 'The self is Brahman'¹ are heard, the knowledge of those texts arises without depending on an injunction.

¹ BU, II, v, 19; IV, iv, 5; *Māṇḍ*, 2.

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यजेतेतिविधिज्ञानं न विध्यन्तरमीक्षते ।

विध्यन्तरेऽनवस्था स्यान्न चायं कर्मणि स्थितेः ॥ ६६२ ॥

The knowledge of the injunction 'Perform the sacrifice' does not depend on another injunction, for if it did, there would be infinite regress; nor does that other injunction require this, for it relates to action.

For one who has studied the Veda, even from the text there arises the knowledge that the self is Brahman; and there is no dependence on an injunction. This is just like the rise of knowledge from the *Svarga-kāma* text without dependence on another injunction. If this be not admitted, there would be infinite regress.

Thus, just as the knowledge of the obligation to perform a sacrifice arises from the text, even so Brahman-knowledge arises from the Vedānta-text.

[663]

प्रतिपन्ने विधेयार्थे प्रवृत्तिः फलमिष्यते ।

प्रवृत्तेश्च विधिज्ञानमेवमन्योन्यसंश्रयः ॥ ६६३ ॥

When the sense enjoined is known, there is the fruit, viz. activity; and when there is activity, there is knowledge of the injunction—thus there is reciprocal dependence.

There is another defect in the view that there is the need of injunction for the generation of the verbal knowledge of Brahman. The defect is reciprocal dependence as between the generation of knowledge and activity caused by injunction.

NTV—draṣṭavya-vidhivākyārthābodbhe sati tatra pravṛttiḥ, pravṛttasya ca tad-arthābodbho jāyata iti, itaretarāśrayatā syād ity arthaḥ anyonya-saṁśraya ity upalakṣaṇam śabdārthābodbhād eva śabdārthābodbha ity ātmāśrayasyāpi.

AVS—brahma-jñāne jāte tatra vidhiḥ, vidhiṭaḥ pravṛttasya taj-jñānam iti itaretarāśrayatvam iti.

[664]

बोधेऽस्मिञ्शब्दतो जाते न प्रवर्त्योऽफलत्वतः ।

अनुत्पन्ने च नितरां प्रवृत्तेर्हेत्वसंभवात् ॥ ६६४ ॥

If the knowledge of this (self) has been generated from the word, then there is no need to be prompted, for that has no fruit; and much less if it has not arisen, for there is no cause for activity.

Further, does the knowledge of Brahman arise from verbal testimony or not? If it does arise, then a person does not require the prompting of an injunction. If it does not arise, then, in the absence of a content, how can injunction function?

[665]

अथ निश्चयसिद्ध्यर्थमुत्पन्नेऽपि प्रवर्त्यते ।

स निश्चयो वः किं शब्दादथान्यस्मादितीयताम् ॥ ६६५ ॥

If it be held that even though the knowledge has arisen, there must be the prompting of activity in order that the knowledge may become certain, then it must be stated whether that certainty for you results from the word or from something else.

(1b) If it be said that even though verbal knowledge arises from the text, an injunction is necessary for making that knowledge determinate, we ask, is that determination born of verbal testimony itself, or of some other *pramāṇa*?

[666]

शब्दाद्यदि तदेवेदमायातं पूर्वदूषणम् ।

अन्यस्मिन्निष्यमाणे च सापेक्षत्वं प्रसज्यते ॥ ६६६ ॥

If it is from the word, then the defect mentioned earlier would result (i.e. *vidhi-vaiyarthya*); if something else is desired, then, the Veda would become dependent.

If the determination of the content of knowledge is from the text itself, an injunction is futile. If another *pramāṇa* is required, the self-validity of the Veda will be destroyed.

[667]

अविवक्षितनुत्तर्यर्थमथात्र विधिरिष्यते ।

अयं ज्ञेयोऽर्थ इत्युक्तौ स्याद्विवक्षितधीर्यतः ॥ ६६७ ॥

“Now, the injunction here is required for removing the unintended sense, for when it is stated ‘This sense is to be known’ there would be the knowledge of what is intended.”

(1c) *Pūrvapakṣa*—The injunction in regard to the knowledge generated by the text is for the sake of the purport of the text which is reality. In other words, the injunction makes the purport of the text the content of the knowledge resulting from the text. Negatively, what is not the purport will not become the content of the knowledge.

[668]

नैवमुत्सर्गतो यस्माच्छब्दानां लोकवेदयोः ।

विशिष्टार्थैकनिष्ठत्वं स्वतो न विधिहेतुतः ॥ ६६८ ॥

Not so; for words, both secular and sacred, as a rule, convey their qualified sense by their own capacity, and not because of any injunction.

Siddhānta—Words have their senses for purport, of their own accord, without depending on injunction.

[669]

अविशिष्टश्च वाक्यार्थस्तथा लौकिकवैदिक-

वाक्ययोर्गम्यते यस्माद्विधिर्नातो विवक्षितः ॥ ६६९ ॥

The same is the case with sentence-sense also; i.e., similarly the meaning of sentence, secular or sacred, is known; and so, there is no need for injunction.

The same is the case with sentences.

AVS—loke vede ca padasya vākyasya ca sva-sāmarthya-kṛtaṁ na vidhikṛtaṁ.

[670]

अपि दृष्टार्थतैकात्म्ये कर्मस्विव न भिद्यते ।

वेदाधीतिविधेस्तस्माद्विधिरत्र निरर्थकः ॥ ६७० ॥

From the injunction to study the Veda, there is the seen fruit (i.e. knowledge) in respect of oneness of self as in the case of actions; therefore, injunction is useless.

The injunction to study the Veda brings about its seen fruit which is knowledge. This is common to both the sections, *karma* and *jñāna*. Thus the Veda as such becomes purportful; and no injunction in regard to Brahman-knowledge is required.

[671]

विधेर्विध्यन्तरेऽभीष्टे कृत्स्नोऽप्यविवक्षितः ।

पूर्वोक्तेनैव न्यायेन नैव कल्प्यो विधिस्ततः ॥ ६७१ ॥

If for the injunction to study, another injunction be required, then the entire sense would go unintended; and by the reasoning mentioned earlier, an injunction need not be assumed.

It is settled that words as such have their senses for purport. Therefore, there is no need to assume an injunction in regard to Brahman-knowledge for the sake of that purport.

[672]

मतं पुमर्थसिद्धयर्थं ज्ञानस्य विधिरिष्यते ।

फलस्य विध्यधीनत्वादुपेक्षाफलताऽन्यथा ॥ ६७२ ॥

It may be thought that knowledge stands in need of injunction so that the human end may be accomplished ; for fruit depends on injunction, as otherwise the fruit may be regarded as unintended.

(1d) It may be said that injunction in regard to Brahman-knowledge is for making it subserve the human goal. Even as it is the injunction that makes sacrifice, etc., yield their fruit, it may be argued, an injunction in regard to Brahman-knowledge is necessary in order that that knowledge may result in *mokṣa*.

[673]

ज्ञेयव्याप्त्यतिरेकेण न विज्ञानात्फलान्तरम् ।

इष्यते कर्मवन्नातस्तदर्थं विधिकल्पना ॥ ६७३ ॥

Other than the pervasion of the object of knowledge, there is no fruit of knowledge, as in action ; therefore, for the sake of that there is no need for assuming injunction.

In reply, we ask, what is the fruit of knowledge ? Is it the ascertainment of the object ? Or, is it something else ? There is no need of an injunction to ascertain the object. If the fruit is something else, does it occur in the object of knowledge or in the knower ? The fruit of knowledge remains, of its own accord, in the knower ; and that does not require any injunction.

NTV—jñānasya sva-viśaya-nisciti-vyatirekeṇa phalāntaram nāsti.

[674]

यदाऽपि मातरि फलं तदाऽपि विधिनाऽत्र किम् ।

मातृमानप्रमेयादौ तत्सिद्धेर्विधिना त्रिना ॥ ॥ ६७४ ॥

Even if the fruit be in the knower, then also, of what use is injunction? For without injunction, that (fruit) is established in cognizer, cognition, cognized object, etc.

Now, it may be said that in order to cause the fruit of *pramāṇa*, which is in the cognizer, to appear in the object there must be an injunction.

But, this is not necessary. Just as experience shines as making known the cognizer, it shines also as making known the *pramāṇa* and the object.

AVS—yathā māna-phalaṁ saṁvedanam anubhavo mātr-sādhakatvena bhāti, tathā māna-meya-sādhakatvenāpi bhāti, ato na tad-arthaṁ vidhi-kalpanā.

[675]

अथापि कार्यविरहात्सिद्ध्यर्थमनुवादकम् ।

वचो नैव प्रमाणं स्यात्तस्य मान्तरसंगतेः ॥ ६७५ ॥

“Even then, because of the absence of *kārya* (injunction), a sentence which restates an existent fact would not be a *pramāṇa*, for of that, relation with other *pramāṇas* is possible.

(1e) It may be argued thus: A text that speaks of an existent entity will not become a *pramāṇa* in the absence of an injunction (*niyoga*); it will be only a re-statement of what is known through other *pramāṇas*.

[676]

विध्यर्थाङ्गीकृतौ त्वेतदनपेक्षं प्रमाणताम् ।

अश्नुते मान्तराभावाज्ज्योतिष्टोमादिवाक्यवत् ॥ ६७६ ॥

“ But if the sense of injunction is accepted, this will attain to the status of an independent *pramāṇa*, because there is no other *pramāṇa*, as in the case of the *jyotiṣṭoma* text, etc.”

If, however, an injunction is admitted, the text relating to an existent entity like Brahman will become a *pramāṇa*. Although by itself it may be only a restatement, it becomes unique on account of association with *niyoga*, and is to be classed with such texts as that about *Svarga-kāma*.

[677]

वस्तु मान्तरयोग्यं चेद्विधौ सत्यपि तत्तथा ।

अथ तन्मान्तरायोग्यं विध्यभावेऽपि तत्तथा ॥ ६७७ ॥

If the reality is capable of being known through other *pramāṇas*, that would be so even if there be injunction; if, on the contrary, it is not capable of being known through other *pramāṇas*, it would be so, even in the absence of injunction.

The reply to the above argument is as follows:—Is Brahman knowable through other *pramāṇas* or not? If it is knowable, it will remain so even in the presence of injunction. If it is not knowable through other *pramāṇas*, then also it will continue to be so even in the absence of injunction.

NKL—anātmatvaṁ māntara-yogyatve prayojakaṁ na siddhatvam ity abhisandhāya dūṣayati.

[678]

किं वाक्यस्यानुवादत्वं सिद्धेऽर्थे मान्तरेण वा ।

मिते तत्र न पूर्वस्मिन्सिद्धेऽप्यर्थेऽनुवादता ॥ ६७८ ॥

Is the sentence a re-statement because its sense is an existent reality or because the sense is known through some other *pramāṇa*? Here, even if the sense is known to be the first, viz. existent reality, there is no re-statement.

It was stated above by the *pūrvapakṣin* that the texts about existent entities like Brahman are re-statements. Is it contended that these texts are re-statements because they relate to an existent entity, or because their contents are known through other *pramāṇas*?

Although the Vedāntic texts teach about Brahman which is an existent entity, they are not re-statements.

[679]

मानान्तरानधिगतं सिद्धं वस्त्ववबोधयत् ।

मानं किं नानपेक्षं स्यात्पुमर्थश्च स्वरूपतः ॥ ६७९ ॥

The *pramāṇa* (*śruti*) which makes known an existent reality, not known through any other *pramāṇa*, why is that not an independent *pramāṇa*? And why is not that the human end, of its own accord?

The Vedāntic texts teach about a reality which is not knowable through any other means. So, they constitute an independent *pramāṇa*, like perception, etc. The knowledge of Brahman is not fruitless like the knowledge that there are seven continents in the world; for Brahman is of the nature of unexcellable bliss, and is the highest human goal. Therefore, the texts that have that for content cannot be invalid.

NTV—*na ca siddhārthataiva mānāntarādhigatatvaṁ sāpekṣatvaṁ ca bodhayet, pratyakṣānumānayoḥ siddhārtha-vastvavabodhakayor api mānāntarānadhigata - nirapekṣārtha - bodhakatva - darśanāt, tasmāt siddhārthe kāryārthe vā adhigamāntara-saṁsparsaḥ pramāṇāntarā-*

pekṣā-hetuḥ, smṛtau tathā darśanāt tasyādhigamāntara-sambhinnārthatvāt. tasmāt yathā kārya-vākyānām mānāntarānadhigata-vastva-vabodhakatvāt prāmāṇyam, evaṁ siddhārthānām api vedāntānām prāmāṇyam yuktam ity arthaḥ.

advayānandabodha-pratyagarthatvena tat jñānasya svarūpataḥ puruṣārthatvāt anuṣṭhānam nāpekṣate.

NKL — anavagata - pariniṣpanna - vastu - gocara - pratyakṣāder iva vacasopi prāmāṇyam aviruddham iti bhāvaḥ.

[680]

पुंबुद्धिविषयो ह्यर्थो मानान्तरमपेक्षते ।

अभावात्पुरुषस्येह न तु सिद्धोऽपि वैदिकः ॥ ६८० ॥

It is only that sense which is the object of human intellect that stands in need of other *pramāṇa*; since, here, there is no human agency, that which is revealed by the Vedic text, though an existent, does not require other *pramāṇas*.

It may be argued thus : the text that is in dispute is a re-statement, because it is about an existent entity, like the statement about a fruit-bearing tree on the banks of a river.

The reply is : The example given is a human statement; and what it is about can be known through other *pramāṇas*. Not so is Brahman. The Veda is not a human composition; and even its teaching about an existent reality must be unique.

NTV—puruṣabuddhi-prabhavaṁ bhūtārthaṁ kāryārthaṁ vā vacanaṁ bhavati sāpekṣam, tena hi puruṣabuddhi-sambhinna evārthe pratyayo jāyate, na tvanapekṣita-pūrvādhigama-svātantryeṇārthe.

न च सिद्धत्वमात्रेण शङ्क्यते मान्तरं क्वचित् ।

शङ्क्यमानस्य मानस्य तुल्या सापेक्षता यतः ॥ ६८१ ॥

Nor, merely because of the existent nature, is other *pramāṇa* anywhere assumed; for dependence (on other *pramāṇa*) will be the same for the assumed *pramāṇa*.

The following argument may be urged against us: Brahman is knowable through other *pramāṇas*, because it is an existent reality, like pot.

Our reply is that pot is knowable through other *pramāṇas*, not because it is an existent, but because it is an inert object.

It may be said, 'Even though no other *pramāṇa* for Brahman is known, it is possible to assume that there is one.' But there is no end to such assumptions. If it be held that in view of the other assumed *pramāṇa*, verbal testimony is invalid, may one not maintain that in view of verbal testimony, the other *pramāṇa* is invalid?

NTV explains the meaning of the first line thus: If, because the sense of Vedānta is an established entity, it is contended that it is known through other *pramāṇa*, then the same may be said about what is to be accomplished, because in the world we find all words having as their content what is known through some other *pramāṇa*.

yadi siddhatva-mātreṇa vedāntārthe mānāntaram āśaṅkyeta, tarhi kāryatvenāpi mānāntaram śakyam āśaṅkitum, loke sakala-sabdasya pramāṇāntarādhiyata-viśaye darśanāt.

As regards the second line, *NTV* says: *dvayor mānayor eka-viśyat-vena pramāṇāntara-sambhavāt, na śabda eva sāpekṣaḥ, tad api pramāṇāntaram śabda-sambhavāt śabdāpekṣyam syāt.*

[682]

न च सापेक्षताऽप्यस्ति मितेर्मानत्वतः क्वचित् ।

मानान्तरानवबुद्धं हि बोधयन्मानमुच्यते ॥ ६८२ ॥

Nowhere is there dependence for a *pramāṇa* because it is a *pramāṇa*; for indeed, that is said to be a *pramāṇa* which makes known what is not known through another *pramāṇa*.

The Vedic text which has the existent reality for purport—is it valid in regard to its own sense or not? If it is valid in regard to its own sense, surely there is no dependence for it on another *pramāṇa*. It cannot be maintained that it is not valid in regard to its own sense; for it makes known what is otherwise unknown; and that is exactly the function of *pramāṇa*.

[683]

मानान्तरानपेक्षं चेन्मानं मेयं प्रबोधयेत् ।

मानमेव तदा तत्स्यान्नातोऽन्यन्मानलक्षणम् ॥ ६८३ ॥

If a *pramāṇa* makes known an object, without being dependent on another *pramāṇa*, then that is truly a *pramāṇa*; there is no other definition of *pramāṇa*.

The definition of *pramāṇa* is that it makes known what is otherwise unknown.

NTV—*mānāntara-nirapekṣatayā meya-bodhakam mānam*.

NKL—*ajñātam aikātmīyam bodhayad vākyaṁ mānam eva, anava-gatāvagantrīvasya māna-lakṣaṇatvāt*.

[684]

अथ मानान्तरापेक्षं तन्मानं मेयबोधकम् ।

द्वयोरेकक्रियावेशात्तथाऽप्यन्यानपेक्षता ॥ ६८४ ॥

If that *pramāṇa* makes known the object, depending on another *pramāṇa*, then because both are included in a single act, even then there is no dependence on another.

We have already stated that there is no possibility of other *pramāṇas* in respect of Brahman. But even granting that there may be other *pramāṇas*, we maintain, Vedāntic texts do not become invalid; nor need they depend on those other *pramāṇas*. Two *pramāṇas* such as perception and inference may make known fire. On that account, they do not become dependent on each other.

NKL—śabda-taditara mānayoṛ ekasyāṁ vastu-bodhana-kriyāyām vyāpṛtatvād anapekṣatvaṁ tulyam iti pariharati.

[685]

अथानधिगताभावादुत्तरस्याप्रमाणता ।

तत्सद्भावात्तु पूर्वस्य ज्ञानस्यास्तु प्रमाणता ॥ ६८५ ॥

“If the latter is not a *pramāṇa* because there is no unknownness (of content), then, because there is that (unknownness) let the earlier knowledge have validity.”

Objection:—The verbal testimony that arises after another *pramāṇa* does not have an unknown content; so it is not valid. The earlier *pramāṇa* has, an unknown content; hence it is valid.

NTV:—Verbal testimony functions in respect of a content which has been made known by another *pramāṇa*; and so, it is not valid.

nanv ekasminn arthe prathamam ekaṁ mānaṁ pravartate, śabda-mānaṁ tu tasminn eva 'rthe caramaṁ pravartate, tatra prathamam ajñāta-jñāpakatvāt pramāṇam, caramaṁ punaḥ śabdaṁ jñāta-jñāpakatvād apramāṇam eveti śaṅkate—atheti.

[686]

मातोऽनधिगतत्वस्य सिद्धिः स्यादथवाऽन्यतः ।

स्वतो वा ज्ञाततायाश्च कुतः सिद्धिरित्येताम् ॥ ६८६ ॥

How is the unknownness of a thing established—through a *pramāṇa*, or through some other means, or by itself? (Similarly) tell me, how is knownness of a thing established?

Reply:—It is not possible for you to distinguish between knownness and unknownness, for neither of them can be established in your view.

Is the unknownness in regard to a thing, prior to the functioning of a *pramāṇa*, established through *pramāṇa*, or through the eternal experience, or because of self-luminosity? A similar question may be asked about knownness also.

[687]

अज्ञातत्वस्य माव्याप्तेः पूर्वमेव प्रसिद्धितः ।

ततश्च मानतः सिद्धिर्नाज्ञातत्वस्य कुतचित् ॥ ६८७ ॥

Since unknownness is there only before the functioning of *pramāṇa*, nowhere is that unknownness established through *pramāṇa*.

The unknownness is not established through *pramāṇa*, either in respect of the self, or in respect of the not-self; for that is established only prior to the functioning of *pramāṇa*, and the functioning of *pramāṇa* is admitted only in respect of a thing that is unknown.

Nor is the unknownness established through eternal experience; for such an experience is not admitted by you.

Nor is the unknownness established by itself; for such a view is acceptable to neither of us.

NKL—*ajñātatvaṁ na nivartakajātiya - prakāśyaṁ nivartatvāt tamovat.*

[688]

मानव्यातिक्षमं चेत्स्यादज्ञातत्वं घटादिवत् ।

वास्तवं स्यात्तदा रूपमज्ञातं च सदा भवेत् ॥ ६८८ ॥

If unknownness, like that of pot, were capable of being pervaded by *pramāṇa*, then that would be the real nature (of things); and then everything would remain always unknown.

If unknownness were established through *pramāṇa*, then it would not be removed by *pramāṇa*, and the nature of a thing would remain unknown even after the functioning of *pramāṇa*, as before.

NTV—*māna-siddhasya mānena nirākaraṇāyogāc cā 'jñātatvaṁ na māna-siddham.*

[689]

तथा संशयमिथ्यात्वबुद्ध्योरेष यथोदितः ।

न्यायो वाच्यस्ततः सर्वो व्यवहारो न सिध्यति ॥ ६८९ ॥

Likewise, in the case of knowledge of doubt and falsity, the aforesaid reasoning can be stated; so no empirical usage (*vyavahāra*) will be possible.

The same argument applies in regard to the knowledge of doubt and falsity.

Doubt, etc., are not established by the witness; for you do not admit this. Nor are they self-established; for such a view is not acceptable to both of us. Nor are they established through *pramāṇa*; for *pramāṇa* is what removes them.

NTV — kinca saṁśaya - mithyājñānāyor api svayamprakāśatvā 'naṅgīkaraṇāt, sākṣimātra-siddhatvasya ca parair anaṅgīkaraṇāt, pramāṇenaiva siddhir vaktavyā, tathā ca mānena nirākaraṇāyogāt, sarva-vyavahāralopa-prasaṅgaḥ.

[690]

अज्ञातत्वाविशेषेऽपि मानानां यदि मानता ।

ज्ञातस्याज्ञाततोऽन्यत्वाच्च स्यात्किं न मानता ॥ ६९० ॥

If there can be validity for *pramāṇa* even though there is no distinction in the unknownness, why should there be no validity in the case of knownness which is other than unknownness?

It may be argued thus: the unknownness of a thing remains the same both prior to and after the functioning of *pramāṇa*; yet this is not in conflict with the *pramāṇa*-nature of the *pramāṇa*; and so, without the removal of unknownness, the empirical usage of means and object of valid knowledge results.

This argument would, then, mean that the form as qualified by knownness and the form as qualified by unknownness have different contents; and so, even without causing any excellence in the unknown object, *pramāṇa* becomes valid. If this be so, then why should not verbal testimony be valid even without causing excellence in what has been known through some other *pramāṇa*?

[691]

एकार्थोपनिपातित्वात्सापेक्षत्वं यदीष्यते ।

तथा च सर्वमानानां सापेक्षत्वं प्रसज्यते ॥ ६९१ ॥

If dependence (for Scripture) be urged because the object is the same (as the one known by another *pramāṇa*), then all *pramāṇas* would be dependent.

If it be said that there would be invalidity for verbal testimony if it has the same content as other *pramāṇas*, then that would result for all *pramāṇas* having an identical content for their sphere; and all *pramāṇas* would become mutually dependent.

NTV — śabda-taditarapramāṇayor ekasminn arthe samāveśāt śabdasya sāpekṣatvam iṣyate, tathā ca pratyakṣādīnām api itareṣāṃ sarva-mānānām anyonyasmin gocare vṛtti-sambhavāt, anyonyāpekṣatvenā 'prāmāṇya-prasaṅgaḥ.

[692]

एकस्यामपि सत्तायां सर्वाक्षाणां प्रमाणता ।

द्रव्ये त्वक्चक्षुषोस्तद्वत्प्रसज्येताप्रमाणता ॥ ६९२ ॥

In respect of the very same existent all the sense-organs have validity; but in that case, there would be invalidity for the senses of touch and sight in respect of a substance.

If having the same content makes *pramāṇas* dependent and, therefore, invalid, then, visual and tactual perceptions of the same object must be invalid. But the latter is not the case; and so, it

must be admitted that even though Brahman is known through other *pramāṇas*, verbal testimony does not become invalid by being dependent.

*NTV — kimca śrotra-tvak-cakṣur-jihvā-ghrāṇānām sarva-pratyak-
ṣāṇām ekasyām sattāyām pravṛtteḥ sāpekṣatvena amānatā prasajyena...
ato brahmaṇi mānāntarānuprevesepi na sāpekṣatvenā 'prāmāṇyaṁ
śabdasya ity arthaḥ.*

[693]

नियोगे लौकिके चाऽपि हरीतक्यादिभक्षणे ।

मानान्तरासंभवेन प्रसज्येतानपेक्षतां ॥ ६९३ ॥

Even in the case of a secular injunction (*laukika-niyoga*) like the eating of the myrobalan, there would result independence as no other *pramāṇa* would be possible.

So far, we have argued against the view which holds that, since Brahman is an existent reality, the text about it cannot be an independent *pramāṇa*. Now as regards the contention that, since *niyoga* is not the content of any other *pramāṇa*, the text about that is independent *pramāṇa*. Here we have to ask: is *niyoga* not the content of any other *pramāṇa* because it is *niyoga* as such? Or, because it is Vedic *niyoga*? If the former, then even secular injunctions will become independent of other *pramāṇas*, which is not the case.

[694]

नैष दोषो नरज्ञानपूर्विका विनियोगधीः ।

येन लोकेऽस्त्यतोऽपेक्षा वेदे तु स्याद्विपर्ययः ॥ ६९४ ॥

“ There is not this defect; the knowledge of application (*sādhya-sādhana-sambandha*) is preceded by the knowledge of the human origin (of the injunction); hence, in the world, there is dependence; in the Veda, however, the opposite is the case.”

The *pūrvapakṣin* argues that there is no independence for human statements. The speaker gets to know the relation between the means and end, and then commands one to do a certain thing. Here, the injunction relates to a content that has been known already through some *pramāṇa*. So, there is dependence for the injunction. In the case of the Veda, however, it is different. Its content is not known through any other *pramāṇa*. Hence, the Vedic *niyoga* is independent.

[695]

नैवं सत्यनपेक्षत्वं वचसः कार्यसंश्रयात् ।

पुंबुद्धिपूर्वकत्वेन यतः सापेक्षतोच्यते ॥ ६९५ ॥

This being so, a sentence would not be independent because of association with *kārya*, for you say that it is dependent because it is subsequent to human knowledge.

The *siddhāntin's* reply : If what you have now said is true, then your original thesis goes under. Your thesis was that those texts which enjoin action are independent because they have what-is-to-be-done for purport, while those other texts which teach about an existent reality are dependent on other *pramāṇas*, because of the existent nature of their content. Just now, you have declared that human injunctions are dependent because they are human statements.

Then, it is only proper that you should admit that Vedāntic texts are not dependent because they are not human statements, even though they relate to what is existent.

AVS—evam-sati kārya-niṣṭhaṁ nirapekṣaṁ, siddha-niṣṭhaṁ sāpekṣaṁ iti pakṣo hataḥ, yataḥ pumbuddhi-pūrvakatvaṁ sāpekṣatva-prayojakam.

[696]

नैवं नियोगनिष्ठत्वाद्दे तेनानपेक्षता ।

सापेक्षत्वं च लोके स्याद्विनियोगप्रधानतः ॥ ६९६ ॥

“Not thus; in the Veda there is independence because of reference to *niyoga*; and there is dependence in the world because of the predominance of application.”

The *pūrvapakṣin* (i.e. the *niyoga-vādin*) says: In the Veda, the *liṅ*, etc., have *niyoga* for content, and this *niyoga* is not known through other *pramāṇas*; and therefore, the Vedic injunctions are independent. The secular injunctions, on the contrary, depend so much on the knowledge of procedure, etc., otherwise known; and so they are dependent.

[697]

नैवं शब्दार्थयोरैक्यं यदा स्याल्लोकवेदयोः ।

तदा न शक्यते वक्तुं वैलक्षण्यं तयोरिति ॥ ६९७ ॥

Not so; because words and meanings are the same in empirical usage as well as in the Veda, it is not possible to speak of any difference between them.

Reply: What you now say contradicts the *Lokavedādhi-karaṇa* (PM, I, iii, 10; vide note on v. 21). The suffix *liñ*, etc., cannot mean one thing in the Veda and quite another thing in secular usage.

[698]

स्वरूपलाभः सिद्धश्चेत्स्वतो वा यदि वाऽन्यतः ।

स्वरूपेऽनुपयोगित्वान्न प्रमाणव्यपेक्षणम् ॥ ६९८ ॥

If the nature of a thing has been established, either by itself or by something else, then, because it would not be useful so far as its nature is concerned, there would be no need for another *pramāṇa*.

The *pūrvapakṣin* contends that the texts that speak of an existent reality are dependent. With reference to this contention, we ask: What is meant by the established-nature (*siddhatva*)? Does it mean the establishment of its own nature? Or, does it refer to its manifestation? In either case, is the establishment by itself, or through some other? The first alternative is not acceptable. In regard to self-existence, other *pramāṇa* is not useful, for even without the latter, it is. Even if its existence is through something else, that does not depend on *pramāṇa*, for *pramāṇa* can bring about only cognition.

NTV—*tat-siddhatvaṃ nāma kiṃ svarūpa-lābhah sattālakṣaṇah, kiṃvā abhivyaktiḥ prakāśalakṣaṇā, ubhayam api svataḥ parato veti. tatra ādyaṃ dūṣayati-svarūpeti. svatas-satve na pramāṇāntaram upayujyate, tad-vyatiरेकेनāpi satvāt, anyataḥ satvepi na pramāṇam apekṣate, pramitimātra-kāraṇatvāt pramāṇasya.*

[699]

अभिव्यक्तोऽथ सिद्धोऽयं स्वतो वा यदि वाऽन्यतः ।

अभिव्यक्तस्य भूयोऽपि निष्फलं मान्तरेक्षणम् ॥ ६९९ ॥

If an existent thing has become manifest either by itself or through something else, then for manifesting it, again, there is no need for depending on another *pramāṇa*.

As regards the second alternative, we reply: whether the self is manifest by itself or by a *pramāṇa*, there is no need of another *pramāṇa* for its re-manifestation.

NTV—*svyamprakāśatayā vā pramāṇena vā 'bhivvyaktasya punar abhivvyaktaye mānāntaram nākāṅkṣitavyam niṣphalatvāt, anavasthānāc ca.*

[700]

तस्मान्न सिद्ध इत्येव संभाव्येत प्रमान्तरम् ।

नरोक्तौ मान्तरापेक्षा तेन मान्तरसंभवः ॥ ७०० ॥

Therefore, merely because a thing is an existent there is no need for another *pramāṇa*. As regards human statements, there is dependence on other *pramāṇa* because that is possible there.

Thus, just because a text is about an existent reality, it need not necessarily be dependent. With regard to human statements, however, it is intelligible that they are dependent; for, here, a man conveys to another through words what he has already come to know.

[701]

क्रियां विना न संसर्गः पदार्थानामथोच्यते ।

क्रियैवापेक्ष्यतां तर्हि किं न सिद्धं विधिं विना ॥ ७०१ ॥

If it be said that without *kriyā* (verb) the word-senses will not combine, then let *kriyā* alone be depended on. What, then, is not established without injunction?

(1f) Now, as for the alternative that injunction is required for relating the word-senses; (*vide* v. 661) what is it that is required here? If it is the verb (*kriyā*) that is required to combine the word-senses, let it be. How does it follow from this that the injunction to know is also required?

NTV—na vidheḥ kiñcit prayojanam asti 'ti pariharati—kriyaive 'ti. tathā hi śrutayo vidhiṁ vinā janikriyādvāreṇa brahma pratipādayanti.

[702]

क्रिया चापेक्ष्यमाणाऽपि न या काचिदपेक्ष्यते ।

योग्यत्वहेतुतस्तर्हि साऽस्त्येवास्यादिका श्रुतौ ॥ ७०२ ॥

Even though a verb is required, it is not any verb that is required; if the requirement is competency or fitness, then there it is in *Śruti*, in *art*, etc. (That thou art).

If a verb, that is competent, is required, then we have it in the text 'That thou art (*asi*).'

NTV—na hi kriyā-dvāreṇaiva padārthānām saṁsarga iti niyamo 'sti, kriyām antareṇā 'pi padārthānām saṁsarga-darśanāt.

[703]

अकर्मकत्वादस्यादेर्न तावत्कर्म विद्यते ।

अभूतभवनं चार्थे नित्यत्वादात्मनश्च न ॥ ७०३ ॥

Since *art*, etc., are intransitive, there exists no object; also, there is no becoming of what has not been, because the self is eternal.

Now, it may be urged, 'Let the action indicated by that verb be enjoined, because the fruit is dependent on the enjoined action.'

Here, what is the fruit? Is it an excellence created in the object? Or, is it coming into being of what has not been? Or, is it the knowledge of the relation between the *jīva* and *Brahman*?

It cannot be the first, because verbs such as 'art' have no object; they are intransitive. It cannot be the second, because the *jīva* is not to *become Brahman*; for it is that already.

[704]

असंसृष्टात्मबोधित्वान्नापि संसर्गधीरतः ।

स आत्मेत्यभिसंबन्धान्नापि सत्ता सतोच्यते ॥ ७०४ ॥

Because the non-relational self is taught, there is no cognition of relation; and because it is stated 'He is the Self', the term does not mean the generic nature 'existence'.

The third alternative too is not sound. The text 'That thou art' teaches sameness of essence; it does not convey any relation between the *jīva* and *Brahman*.

It may be said that the text 'Existence alone, dear one, etc.,' declares that *Brahman* is the generic nature 'existence,' and that the other text 'That thou art' specifies that reality as the self. But this is not proper; for, the self is devoid of generic nature and special feature. If it had these, it would become the not-self. So, it is wrong to hold that an injunction is required for bringing about the relation of the generic existence, *Brahman*, with a speciality.

[705]

शब्दाद्यगोचरोऽर्थोऽतो लक्षणापाश्रयाच्छ्रुतौ ।

सदित्यादिपदैरात्मा साक्षान्नः प्रतिपाद्यते ॥ ७०५ ॥

Therefore, for us in Scripture the words, *sat*, etc., directly teach, through secondary implication (*lakṣaṇā*), the self, a reality which is beyond the scope of words.

Scripture teaches the unconditioned reality through implication (*lakṣaṇā*)—a reality which does not have the distinction of generic and special. This reality cannot be taught through words with their express meanings, because categories such as generic nature, etc., do not apply to it. So, it is the secondary implication (*lakṣaṇā*) of words that should be understood in regard to the teaching of Scripture.

AVS — sadādi-padais tarhi kiṁ pratipādyam iti nirviśeṣam advayānanda - lakṣaṇaṁ pratyagbhūtaṁ brahma lakṣaṇāvṛtṭyā pratipādyam.

[706]

यदाऽपि मानयोग्यत्वं सत्त्वं तच्च प्रतीयते ।

तदाऽपि वस्तुपरता नाऽऽर्गमस्य विहन्यते ॥ ७०६ ॥

Even if existence (*sattva*) be understood as what is competent to be known through *pramāṇa*, Scripture having for purport reality is not impaired.

We have maintained so far the *siddhānta* that, in respect of *Brahman* which is existence-consciousness-bliss, the Vedānta is independent *pramāṇa*. Now, we shall argue that, even if 'existence' were the content of other *pramāṇas*, and if that itself is made known by Vedānta, there is no dependence of the Vedānta on those other *pramāṇas*.

We ask: are the other *pramāṇas* external to the object of knowledge or not? If they are external, then fitness to be known belongs to the object, and the Vedānta texts may reveal it independently, because they are competent by themselves.

[707]

मान्तरेणापि संबद्धमर्थं वाक्यं प्रबोधयत् ।

मानतां न जहात्येव जगत्यास्तवचो यथा ॥ ७०७ ॥

A sentence making known a sense related to other *pramāṇas* does not cease to be a *pramāṇa*, even as the words of a trustworthy person in the world.

Even if the other *pramāṇas* are not external to the sphere of the object, the Vedānta texts do not become invalid. These texts may well validly make known a sense which is the content of other *pramāṇas*. For example, the statement made by a trustworthy person (*āpta*) does not become invalid simply because it relates to a matter already known otherwise.

NKL—*māntarāvagata-gamakalaunikavākyaiva vedāntānām api prāmāṇyam.*

NTV—*loke āptavākyaṁ yathā mānāntara-sambhinnārtham api pramāṇam evaṁ vedāntavākyaṇy apī 'ty arthaḥ.*

[708]

ज्ञातः सोऽर्थो मयेत्यत्र नाऽऽप्तवाक्यं विहन्यते ।

मानान्तरव्यपेक्षत्वाद्विहन्येतार्थनिश्चितौ ॥ ७०८ ॥

“That sense has been understood by me”. Here the statement of the trustworthy person is not destroyed. As regards the determination of the sense (or object), it may be impeded, because that depends on other *pramāṇas*.

The statement of the trustworthy person is independently valid so far as that person is concerned. The knowledge is of the form: "This sense has been known by me." As regards this knowledge, there is no dependence on any other *pramāṇa*. As for the validity of the sense of the statement, that depends on the knowledge of the speaker. And so it is not independently valid.

AVS—āptavākyaṃ vaktrjñāne nirapekṣaṃ pramāṇam.

[709]

मायोगेऽपि न मानत्वमनाप्तवचसः क्वचित् ।

तेनाऽऽप्तवाक्यं मायोगे मानादर्थेऽपि निष्ठितम् ॥ ७०९ ॥

The words of an untrustworthy person are nowhere authoritative, though associated with other *pramāṇas*; therefore not only are the words of a trustworthy person valid but the sense also, even though known through the other *pramāṇas*.

The statement of the trustworthy person is valid in respect of the sense through the knowledge of the speaker.

AVS—anāptavākyaṃ vaktrjñāne 'pi na mānam.

[710-711]

एवं च सति वेदान्ता यदि मानमलौकिकम् ।

प्रबोधयन्ति विध्वस्तनिखिलद्वैतगोचरम् ॥ ७१० ॥

कथं तेषाममानत्वं तदा स्यादाप्तवाक्यवत् ।

अर्थसिद्धिश्च मासिद्धौ सिद्धैवेति न साध्यते ॥ ७११ ॥

And this being so, when the Vedāntas generate valid knowledge which is transcendental and which has for its sphere the destruction of the entire duality, how

can they be invalid, even as the words of a trustworthy person are not invalid? When the validity (of the Vedāntas) is established the object (Brahman) is also established, and so it is not to be established.

The statement of the trustworthy person was given as an example. The argument so far has been that the statement can be valid even though it has a content which has been known through some other *pramāṇa*. Now the nature of the exemplified is explained. Just as at the time the knowledge of the speaker is ascertained from his statement, the sense also is ascertained, even so when the Vedānta texts are known to be valid, their content *Brahman* also is established. When the said validity is either generated or known from the Vedānta texts, then Brahman-knowledge also is generated, and there is no need for any further *pramāṇa* to make known *Brahman*. Hence the Vedānta texts have independent validity in respect of Brahman-knowledge.

NKL—evam api vedāntānām vastuparatva-pratijñāhānir atrā 'ha, arthasiddhiḥ ceti. māsiddhau svarūpabodhasya vākyajanya-buddhivṛtti-vyāptau satyām arthasiddhir aikātmaviśayājñāna-nivṛttiḥ siddhaiveti. na punar vedāntaiḥ sādhyata iti nivaritakatvena vastuni prāmāṇyam ity arthah.

NTV—yathaiva laukika-vākyaṁ svaprameya-pramāṇāntara-dvāreṇa arthe pramāṇam evaṁ vedāntā api brahmātmaikatvā 'nubhave nirapekṣaṁ pramāṇam tad-dvāreṇa brahmātmaikatve 'pi mānam.

AVS—svarūpa-jñānaṁ brahmātmaikatve pramāṇam, tatra jñāne vedaśiraḥ pramāṇam.....ato brahmātmaikatva-sādhaka-svarūpa-jñāna-sādhakatvam eva vedaśirasas tadartha-sādhakatvam.....yathā puruṣa-vākya vaktr-jñāne pramāṇam arthe ca tad-balāt pramāṇam ity etad upapadyata eva.

[712]

किंच चिद्धत्वसंबन्धादैकात्म्ये मान्तरानुमा ।

यथैवं कार्यतायोगान्नियोगेऽप्यनुमा न किम् ॥ ७१२ ॥

Further, if other *pramāṇas* be inferred in respect of the oneness of self because it is related to what is existent (*siddha*), similarly, why should there be no inference in regard to the *niyoga* which is related to what is to be done (*kārya*)?

It cannot be contended that other *pramāṇas* are possible in the case of *Brahman* because it is an existent; for, if that were so, even in the case of *niyoga* there should be admitted the possibility of other *pramāṇas* as in the case of direction, etc. And so, if a text relating to *niyoga* could be independently valid, a text about reality also could be so valid in the same way.

NKL—*aikātmyam māntara-gamyam siddhatvāt ghaṭavad ity anumāyām, niyogo māntara-gamyah kāryatvād adhyeṣaṇavad ity anumānāt tan-niṣṭhasyāpi sāpekṣatvam ity arthaḥ.*

[713]

नियोगस्यापि कार्यत्वं प्रेषणाध्येषणादिभिः ।

समं तद्वर्त्मनैवास्य संबन्धग्रहणं यतः ॥ ७१३ ॥

Of the *niyoga* too, the nature of what is to be done (*kāryatva*) is the same as of direction and entreaties; for through that channel alone its relation (to meaning) is understood.

It cannot be maintained that there is no parity between *niyoga* on the one hand and direction, etc., on the other. The nature of what-is-to-be-done (*kāryatva*) is the same. Hence, the *probans* mentioned above is valid.

NKL—*utkr̥ṣṭena nikr̥ṣṭam prati vyāpāraḥ preṣaṇā, satkārapūrvako vyāpāro 'dhyeṣaṇā, ādi-padena nimantraṇādi-saṅgrahaḥ.*

[714]

परायत्तात्मलाभत्वं नियोगस्येह कार्यता ।

कार्यैर्मन्तरगम्यैः सा न कथंचिद्विशिष्यते ॥ ७१४ ॥

The nature of what is to be done (*kāryatā*) in the case of *niyoga* is an accomplishment brought in by something else, *i.e.*, by *kāryas* understood through other *pramāṇas*: and that by no means is distinct.

Moreover, the to-be-done nature of *niyoga* is ascertained through other *pramāṇas*. We may formulate the inference thus; *niyoga* is known through other *pramāṇas*, as its being is dependent on something else, like the pot.

NKL—*niyogo māntara-gamyah parādhīnātmalābhatvāt ghaṭavat.*

NTV—*sukhaviśeṣakāmī kṛti-sādhyatvaṁ praiṣādīnām niyogasya ca tulyam, niratiśaya sukhakāmī kṛti-sādhyatvam niyogasya aprasiddham svargādes sātisayatvād ity arthaḥ.*

[715]

यत्त्वसाधारणं तस्य कार्यत्वमिति भण्यते ।

लौकिकेष्वपि कार्येषु तन्नैव विनिवार्यते ॥ ७१५ ॥

If it be said that its nature of being *kārya* is something uncommon, then that cannot be excluded from the *kāryas* of the world also.

If it be said that *niyoga* is what-is-to-be-done in an uncommon sense, then that statement would apply to secular *kāryas* also. There is no distinction between *niyoga* and direction, etc., because each is what is accomplished by an act.

NTV—*sukhaviśeṣakāmī-kṛtyuddesyatvaṁ praiśādiṣvapi samānam svargasyāpi sukhaviśeṣataya laukikatvād ity arthaḥ.*

AVS—*yathā niyoga-sādhyatvaṁ niyogasyaiva, tathā paṭāder api, na hi paṭasya sādhyatā ghaṭasya bhavati.*

[716]

अथासाधारणज्ञानपरिच्छेद्यत्वमिष्यते ।

तच्च सर्वपदार्थानां न दण्डैर्विनिवार्यते ॥ ७१६ ॥

If it be urged that (in the case of the *niyoga*) there is determination by some unique knowledge, then that cannot be prevented by batons in the case of anything.

If it be said that the to-be-done character of *niyoga* consists in its being the content of the knowledge that it is to be done, that would be true of direction, etc., also.

[717]

प्रमाणायत्तमेतावत्स्वप्नमेयावभासनम् ।

कार्यताऽकार्यता वाऽत्र मेयायत्ता न मानतः ॥ ७१७ ॥

This much only is occasioned by *pramāṇa*, viz., the illumination of the object of knowledge; whether something is to be done or not to be done depends on the object, not on the *pramāṇa*.

Moreover, if *niyoga* is the content of the knowledge of what-is-to-be-done, there would be for it the nature of being made known by a *pramāṇa* other than Scripture. Scripture only sets forth such matters as 'This is the means to what is desired', 'This is the means to what is not desired', etc. The cognitions 'This is to be done', 'This is not to be done', etc., are not conveyed by Scripture. These latter arise in the mind thus: 'This is the means to what I desire:

therefore, I should accomplish it', 'This other is contrary to what I desire; therefore, I should avoid it.' So, *niyoga* would thus be the content of the mental perception of what-is-to-be-done.

NTV—ayam arthaḥ—vedavākyam idam iṣṭasāadhanam idam aniṣṭasāadhanam iti vā bodhayati nedaṁ kartavyam nedaṁ akartavyam iti ca bodhayati, paścāt tu idam kartavyam idam na kartavyam iti mānasa-pratyaya upajāyate na tau śāstrārthau iti.

AVS—vedaśāstram idam iṣṭasāadhanam idam aniṣṭasāadhanam iti bodhayati, nedaṁ kartavyam idam akartavyam iti, tau tu pratyayau mānasau.

[718]

सिद्धत्वहेतुको योऽपि दोष एकात्म्य उच्यते ।

नियोगस्यापि संसिद्धौ स दोषो नापनुद्यते ॥ ७१८ ॥

The defect which is said to be caused in the case of the oneness of Self on account of its nature as existent—that defect cannot be warded off in the case of *niyoga* also, when it is established.

To the argument of the opponent that *Brahman* is known through other *pramāṇas* because it is an existent, it was replied above that *niyoga* too is known through other *pramāṇas*, though on the ground of some other reason. Now, the opponent's reason itself is given for proving that *niyoga* is known through other *pramāṇas*.

It is maintained by the *Mīmāṃsaka* that *niyoga* is only what-is-to-be-accomplished (*sādhya*) and not an established entity (*siddha*). But he is to be asked: When the appropriate action has been done, does *niyoga* get established or not? On the first alternative, *niyoga* becomes an established entity; and the defect pointed out by the opponent in the case of *Brahman* would affect *niyoga* also.

NKL—*anuṣṭhānottarakālaṁ niyogasyā 'pi siddher ity arthaḥ.*

NTV—*kiñca vidyamānatvena brahmaṇi mānāntarānupraveśa-doṣo niyogepi samānaḥ, niyogasyāpi anuṣṭhānottarakālaṁ sattvābhyupagamāt.*

[719]

यागादिविषयासिद्ध्या न चासौ न प्रसिध्यति ।

विध्युक्तेस्तदसंसिद्धौ निष्फलत्वं प्रसज्यते ॥ ७१९ ॥

Nor may it said that this (*niyoga*) is not established because the content of the sacrifice, etc., has not been accomplished; for if that is not established, the statement of the injunction would be futile.

It is not possible for the opponent to put forward the second alternative. If *niyoga* is not accomplished through the performance of sacrifice, etc., that performance itself would be futile. This would result in the futility of the injunctive text.

AVS—*vidhi-vākyasya nairarthakya-prasaṅgāt.*

[720]

ऐकात्म्यवस्तुयाथात्म्यप्रकाशनपटीयसः ।

वचसस्त्वतिरेकेण किं मानं तद्धुरं वहेत् ॥ ७२० ॥

Other than the texts which clearly expound the true nature of reality as the one Self, what *pramāṇa* can accomplish that task ?

So far the argument has been that, assuming that *Brahman* is known through other *pramāṇas*, it is easy to show that *niyoga* too is the content of other *pramāṇas*. Now it is stated that in respect of *Brahman* no *pramāṇa* other than the Vedānta texts is possible. There is no evidence for maintaining that there are other evidences for *Brahman*.

NKL—*brahmaṇi māntarānupraveśam abhyupagamyā pratibandhyā vedānta-prāmāṇyam sādhitam, idānīm tat-sambhāvanā nāstīti āha—aikātmyeti.*

NTV—*na kimapi mānam aikātmya-bodhāya pravartate rūpādihīnasya tasya mānāntarāyogyatvāt.*

[721]

मात्रादिसव्यपेक्षं सद्यत्र ज्ञानं प्रजायते ।

तत्रैव मान्तरापेक्षा न तु विध्वस्तभेदके ॥ ७२१ ॥

Where knowledge is generated as depending on the knower, etc., it is only there that there is need for other *pramāṇas*; not where all difference has been destroyed.

It cannot be argued that *Brahman* is known through other *pramāṇas* because it is not what-is-to-be-done (*a-kārya*) like pot; for the argument would hold good only in the case of a thing whose knowledge involves the distinction of cognizer, etc. In the case of *Brahman*, however, this distinction is not possible.

NKL—*aikātmyam māntara-gamyam bhāvatvāt kuṁbhavad iti cet, na, jadatvopādheḥ.*

[722]

विध्यर्थाधीनसंसर्गाः पदार्था वैदिकोक्तिषु ।

लोके मान्तरसंसिद्धसंसर्गा रचनाबलात् ॥ ७२२ ॥

“In Vedic texts the senses of words are related as dependent on the sense of injunction (i.e., *liṅ*, etc.); in the world, the relations are as established by other *pramāṇas*, on the strength of the arrangement.

Here the opponent objects: Even though in the case of *Brahman* the application of other *pramāṇas* be denied, the Vedānta texts cannot become *pramāṇa* by themselves. For what causes the combination of words, making them meaningful, is not found in the case of the Vedānta texts. The words in a Vedic text can convey meaning only when they relate to an injunctive suffix, *liṅ*, etc. In the case of secular words, their combination is caused by other *pramāṇas*, as is made known by the order of their arrangement, etc.

NKL—vedānta-padārtha-saṁsargo niyogādhīnaḥ vaidika-saṁsargatvāt karmavākya-padārtha-saṁsargavat.

AVS—vede 'pi vidhyadhīnaḥ padārtha-saṁsargo loke pramāntarādhīno racanānyathānupapattyā.

[723]

रचना च पदार्थानां विवक्षापूर्विकैव तु ।

प्रमाणान्तरगम्येऽर्थे विवक्षा च व्यवस्थिता ॥ ७२३ ॥

“And the arrangement of word-senses is preceded by the intention of the speaker; and the intention has reference to the sense which is understood through other *pramāṇas*.

Here the opponent explains how the combination of secular words is dependent on other *pramāṇas*.

AVS—pramāṇāntareṇā 'rtham adhigamya vivakṣitvā para-pratipattaye vākya-viracanāl loke saṁsargasya pramāntarādhīnatva-siddhiḥ.

[724]

एवं च सति वेदान्तवाक्यार्थप्रत्ययो भ्रमः ।

उत्खातविधिको लोके तोयबुद्धिरिवोषरे ॥ ७२४ ॥

“This being so, to think that Vedānta texts yield knowledge in the absence of injunction is a delusion, as is the empirical knowledge of water in a mirage.”

The opponent concludes: What makes the Vedic words combine is injunction. In the case of secular words the combination is caused by other *pramāṇas*. As regards the Vedānta texts, they have no author and therefore are not secular and you do not accept an injunction. So, the knowledge of their sense must be illusory, even as the knowledge of water in a mirage is.

[725-726a]

इत्युक्ते परिहाराय शृणु यद्व्यप्यतेऽधुना ।

पदार्थसंगतेः कस्माद्विध्यधीनत्वमादृतम् ॥ ७२५ ॥

पदार्थान्तरतन्त्रत्वं कस्माद्धेतोर्न कल्प्यते ।

If this be said, listen now to what is stated in reply. Why do you say that the relation of word-senses is dependent on injunction? And on what grounds do you not assume that it depends on other word-senses?

Siddhānta.—What causes the Vedic words—in fact, any words—to combine is there in the case of the Vedānta texts also. Your assumption that injunction is the cause is groundless. What make words to constitute a sentence are compatibility, expectancy, and proximity. These do characterize the words of the Vedānta texts. Therefore, the knowledge of their sense cannot be illusory.

NKL—*yogyetarapadārthādhīnaḥ saṃsargo na liṅādyarthādhīnaḥ iti pariharati.*

NTV—na vidhis sākṣāt saṁsarga-sāmānyam tad-viśeṣam vā bodhayati, tasmāt padārtha-saṅgateḥ vidhyadhīnatvaṁ nādartavyam ... kiṁtu padārthāntara-tantratvam eva kalpayitavyam ... viśiṣṭārthaparatayaiva padānām prayogāt.

[726b-727a]

संसर्गश्चेत्पदार्थानां विनाऽपि विधिना भवेत् ॥ ७२६ ॥

अनर्थको भवेदेवं विधिर्निर्विषयत्वतः ।

“If the relation of word-senses be obtained even without injunction, injunction would then become useless, being without any purpose.”

Pūrvapakṣa.—If the relation of words in a sentence be effected by compatibility, etc., injunction would be futile.

[727b-728a]

ननु दोषः समानोऽयं विधेरन्यपदेष्वपि ॥ ७२७ ॥

विशिष्टार्थावगत्यर्थं प्रयुज्यन्तेऽपराण्यपि ।

Now this defect is common to words other than those of injunction; the others also are employed for the sake of making known some qualified sense.

Siddhānta.—If the relation of words depended on the injunctive verb, then, what about the other words like noun, etc.? Will they not become futile? So, all words are employed to signify a qualified sense.

NTV — prayujyanta ity upalakṣaṇam pratipadyanta ity api draṣṭavyam.

nahi loke padaiḥ svārthāḥ svarūpamātra-niṣṭhatayaiva pratipadyante, tathā sati śrotuḥ vyavahārānupapatteḥ, kiṁtu viśiṣṭhārtha-pratyaya-prayuktāḥ tathā sati vyavahāropapatteḥ.

tathā ca sati pratipadārtham saṁsargāpekṣa iti bhāvaḥ.

[728b-729a]

एवं सति विधिः कस्मान्नानर्थक इतीर्यताम् ॥ ७२८ ॥
योगक्षेमसमानत्वादविध्यर्थपदान्तरैः ।

This being so, say, how is not injunction futile? Because its fortunes are the same as of other words which do not have an injunctive sense.

The injunctive verb has no special virtue as against the other words. If you say that the injunctive verb would be futile if the other words are not related to it, we may as well reply that the same would be the fate of the other words.

NKL—ubhayor ānarthakyaṁ samam ity arthaḥ.

[729b-730a]

उच्यते विधिशब्दो हि मान्तराज्ञातगोचरः ॥ ७२९ ॥
न तस्य विषयाक्षेपं मुक्त्वाऽन्यत्र कृतार्थता ।

“This is the reply. The injunctive word, indeed, has for its sphere what is not known through other means of knowledge. Nor does it fulfil itself except through presenting its content (viz. relation).

Pūrvapakṣa.—The difference between the injunctive verb (with suffix *lin*, etc.) and the other words is this: Although the injunctive word has *niyoga* as its sphere, *lin*., etc., will not indicate *niyoga* in the absence of the latter’s content which is the relation (*samsarga*) of words.

[730b-731a]

मानान्तरप्रसिद्ध्यर्थवादित्वादनुवादकम् ॥ ७३० ॥
विधेरन्यपदं यस्मान्नाऽऽक्षेपोऽतः प्रतीयते ।

“A word other than injunctive words is a restatement, because it is explanatory of what is established by other means of knowledge; therefore implication is not seen in its case.”

Other words such as nouns are but re-statements; they do not bring in the relation, as the injunctive word does.

[731b-732a]

अव्युत्पन्नेऽपि संबन्धे विध्यर्थावगमस्तथा ॥ ७३१ ॥

अथ विज्ञातसंबन्धं सिद्धार्थं स्याद्विधायकम् ।

Then, the sense of injunction would be known even when there is no knowledge of the relation. Or, if the relation has been known, then the injunction would relate to what has been established.

Siddhānta.—Admitting that *liñ*, etc., have for their sense *niyoga* that is not known through any other *pramāṇa*, we ask, do *liñ*, etc., make known *niyoga* even when the relation between the two is not known, or not? If the first, there would be *niyoga*-prompted activity on the part of one who hears *liñ*, etc., but has not understood the meaning. If *liñ*, etc., make known *niyoga* when the relation has been understood, then it would result that they convey a sense that is already known; and there would be no difference between *liñ*, etc., on the one hand, and nouns, etc., on the other.

[732b-733a]

स्वधर्मं च पदं जह्यात्संबन्धज्ञाननिवृत्तौ ॥ ७३२ ॥

तस्माद्विज्ञातसंबन्धं पदं सर्वत्र बोधकम् ।

And, if the knowledge of relation is denied, a word would lose its nature (*dharma*); therefore, everywhere word conveys meaning only when the relation is known.

It is wrong to hold that *liñ*, etc., convey their sense, even when their potency remains unknown. A word conveys its sense only when the relation between the two is known, not otherwise. This applies to both secular and Vedic words.

NTV—saṁbandhajñānāpekṣayā bodhakatvaṁ pada-dharmah, tan-nirapekṣatayā bodhakatvaṁ vākya-dharmah.

tasmāt grhīta-saṁbandham eva loke vede ca padaṁ padārtha-bodhakam saṁsarga-bodhakam ca.

yady api mānāntara-siddhārthaṁ padam anuvādakam tathāpi loka-vedayoḥ pramāṇāntareṇa padārthānām saṁsarga-yogyatāvagame satyapi pūrvam eva saṁsargaṁ śrotā budhyate, apūrvāgamārthatvāt vākya-proyogasya, anyathā vākya-prayoga-vaiyarthya.

[733b-735]

इतोऽन्यथा कल्प्यमाने सर्वं स्यादसमञ्जसम् ॥ ७३३ ॥

वाक्यवाक्यार्थयोगश्चेद्वाच्यवाचकलक्षणः ।

तद्विशेषैकनिष्ठत्वान्न वः संबन्धधीर्भवेत् ॥ ७३४ ॥

न विशेषान्तरे वृत्तिर्विशेषस्यास्ति गोत्ववत् ।

नैराकाङ्क्षेण तत्सिद्धेः संबन्धोऽतो न गृह्यते ॥ ७३५ ॥

If it be assumed otherwise, everything will be inconsistent. If it be said that the relation of expression and expressed is as between a sentence and sentence-sense, then, since each sentence would refer to a distinct content, there would be no knowledge of relation. A particular content has no capacity for referring to another content, e.g., cowness. Since each is established independently, the relation would not be understood.

If it be said that, although in the world words require the apprehension of potency, in the Veda they do not require this, there would result a number of defects: (1) Words would go beyond their own nature, which is to convey their sense being dependent on the apprehension of the relation between them and their sense. (2) Words would play the role of sentences. (3) There would be transgression of the rule that the Vedic words are similar to the secular words in the matter of conveying their sense. These are the inconsistencies.

It may be said that the relation of expression and expressed is between sentence and sentence-sense, and not between word and word-sense, and that, since the sentence-sense which is *niyoga* is not made known by other *pramāṇas* there is not the said defect. But this statement is not sound. If each sentence has a unique sense, there would be no principle in language. The sentence 'Bring the cow' would have nothing in common with the sentence 'Tie the cow.' This, however, is not the case. 'Cowness' is meaningful only in dependence on particular cows such as *khaṇḍa*; and 'bringing' is significant because it occurs in other sentences such as 'Bring the horse.' Moreover, if the relation of a sentence to its sense is apprehended, then it must be admitted that that sense is made known through other *pramāṇas*. Therefore, the knowledge of relation is with reference to words and not sentences. And, when the relation remains unknown, a word cannot convey its sense.

[736-737a]

संबन्धं मन्यते योऽपि शाब्दबोधानुसारिणीम् ।

दृष्ट्वेहां श्रोतृगां सोऽपि न सम्यगभिमन्यते ॥ ७३६ ॥

श्रोतृस्थकार्यलिङ्गत्वात्कथं शब्दैकगोचरः ।

He who holds that the relation is after seeing the act of the hearer (intermediate elder) in accordance with the knowledge derived from words—he does not think

well; for since it (*niyoga*) is inferred from the act of the hearer, how can it be the sphere of words alone?

The *niyogavādin* may argue thus: The superior elder (grandfather) gives an order to the intermediate elder (father). The boy (son) sees the intermediate elder carry out the order. He connects the words he hears with the action he sees. Thus he understands the relation between *liñ*, etc., and *niyoga*.

Here it is to be pointed out that the argument is not valid. The argument would involve reciprocal dependence thus: The cognition of *niyoga* arises from the word whose relation has been known; and from the cognition of *niyoga* there takes place the knowledge of relation. Even if this defect be removed somehow, it would be impossible to show that *niyoga* is known through word alone, for according to the explanation given by the Mīmāṃsaka it is inferred from activity.

[737b-738a]

तस्यापि शब्दपूर्वत्वादिति चेद्विद्मपूर्वतः ॥ ७३७ ॥

कस्मान्न शब्दबोधोऽपि ह्यनुमानपुरःसरः ।

If that too is said to be understood from word before any inference, then why should not the knowledge of word also be preceded by inference?

If it be said that inference based on the activity of the intermediate elder is preceded by the *niyoga* understood from the words of the superior elder, we reply that for the hearer the knowledge of *niyoga* from the words is preceded by the inference. Thus there is parity between the inference and the words.

NTV—*śrotr-gataśabdajñānam api anumāna-pūrvakam ity anumānaika-gocaratā kiṃ na syāt.*

[738b-739a]

नियोगं शब्दतो बुद्ध्वा योऽपि श्रोता प्रवर्तते ॥ ७३८ ॥
तस्याप्यनुमितेरेव शब्दार्थप्रत्ययो भवेत् ।

The hearer who is active after knowing the *niyoga* from the word—for him also the knowledge of word-sense there will be only through inference.

We may even say that the inference has precedence over the words. Activity in respect of the sense of *liñ*, etc., at the time of learning does depend on the inference. So, the inference comes first.

NTV—sva-vyutpatti-kāle anumānād eva śrotuḥ niyogāvagamah na śabdāt.

[739b-740a]

प्रत्यक्षगम्यकार्येण नियोगस्यानुमेयतः ॥ ७३९ ॥
प्रत्यक्षकार्यवत्तस्य लौकिकत्वं प्रसज्यते ।

Since the *niyoga* is inferred from the *kārya* which is known by perception, there is the contingency of its becoming secular, like the perceived *kārya*.

Since the activity that is seen is the *probans* for inferring *niyoga*, verbal testimony (words) cannot be regarded as the only *pramāṇa* for *niyoga*, even as for a pot.

NKL—indriya-gamya-pravṛttirūpa-kāryaliṅgānumeyatvāt ghaṭavan na śabdaikagamyatvam.

AVS—ghaṭādivan niyogaḥ śabdaika-gamyo na bhavati.

[740b-741a]

न चेत्कार्यं नियोगः स्यात्कोऽर्थो यागादिसिद्धितः ॥ ७४० ॥
सिद्धवस्त्ववबोधित्वं विधेरपि तदा भवेत् ।

If the *niyoga* is not a *kārya*, then for what purpose is the accomplishment of sacrifice, etc.? And in that case, even the injunction would be making known an existent thing.

It may be urged that pot is no illustration for *niyoga*, as *niyoga* does not belong to the three-fold time and is not what is produced. But we reply: if *niyoga* is not what is produced, the performance of sacrifice, etc., is futile. Nor may it be said that the performance of sacrifice is for the sake of heaven, for that is not possible except through *niyoga*. Moreover, if *niyoga* is not what is produced, and as its unreality is not acceptable to you, you must necessarily admit that *niyoga* is an eternally established entity. If that be so, *lin*, etc., which convey knowledge of it must be taken as making known what is established.

[741b-742a]

प्राथम्यं चात्र दुर्लक्ष्यं बीजतत्कार्ययोरिव ॥ ७४१ ॥

शब्दानुमानयोर्नातः शब्दप्रथमतेष्यते ।

Between word and inference it is difficult to indicate the priority, as between seed and its effect; therefore, it cannot be stated that word is prior.

Verbal testimony and the inference from activity are related as seed and sprout. And so, it cannot be maintained that *niyoga* is understood from verbal testimony alone.

NTV — *bījāṅkurayor iva śabdānumānayor ekasya prāthamyam vyavasthāpayitum na śakyam śabdāvagatasyā 'numānād anumitasya viditasāṅgateḥ śabdāvagamāt.*

[742b-743a]

यद्वाऽनुमानमेवात्र शब्दात्पूर्वं हि युज्यते ॥ ७४२ ॥

नावित्तसंगतिः शब्दो गमकोऽतोऽनुवादकः ।

Or, it is proper to state here that inference alone is prior to word; for a word whose relation has not been understood does not make known (its sense); it will only restate.

Of the two, verbal testimony and inference from activity, the latter is primary; for, as has been shown already, words will convey their meaning only when their potency has been known. If *niyoga* is known through inference, *lin*, etc., must be regarded as re-stating it.

[743b-744a]

बुध्यते योऽनुमानेन शब्दबुद्धं न वेत्ति सः ॥ ७४३ ॥

भिन्ने भिन्नेऽपि मेये धीर्नानुवादोऽन्यबोद्धरि ।

He (the child) who understands through inference does not know what is revealed by the word; the knowledge of that or a different object of cognition is not a re-statement in the case of another knower.

Nor may it be contended that the inference may be a re-statement; for the child who hears the words does not understand the sense; it understands only as an inference from the intermediate elder's activity. It is true that the child's inference is subsequent to its hearing the words of the superior elder. But thereby the child's inference does not become a re-statement. When a pot has been seen by Caitra, and when subsequently Maitra sees the pot or some other, the knowledge that Maitra has is not of the nature of a re-statement.

NTV — sarva-pratipattirñām avyutpanna-sabdāt bodhotpatty anupapatteh.

[744b-745a]

प्रवृत्तिहेतुमात्रं च प्रवृत्त्याऽलानुमीयते ॥ ७४४ ॥

लौकिकेनापि तत्सिद्धेर्नास्ति मानमलौकिके ।

The mere cause of activity is here inferred from the activity; since that is achieved even through what is secular, there is no evidence for the supernormal (*niyoga*).

Admitting for the sake of argument that *niyoga* is inferred from activity, it was shown earlier that *niyoga* is on a par with other things. Here it is stated that *niyoga* is not even what is inferred from activity. He who hears the words and sees the activity infers only the cause of that activity, and not any supernormal *niyoga*.

NTV—vaidikīṣv api pravṛttiṣu laukika eva pravṛttihetur yuktaḥ lokāvagata-sāmarthyasyaiva śabdasya vede 'pi bodhakatva-niyamāt.

AVS—ayam arthaḥ-madhyamavṛddha-pravṛtṭyā pravṛttihetur iṣṭasā-dhanatvasyā 'numitatvāt tatraiva liṅādi-śabdasya śaktigrahaṇān nālau-kikaniyogasiddhir iti.

[745b-746a]

कार्यबुद्ध्यैव संव्याप्तिः प्रवृत्तेर्न च गम्यते ॥ ७४५ ॥

सर्पादिवस्तुबोधेऽपि प्रवृत्तिर्वीक्ष्यते यतः ।

There is no pervasion of activity exclusively by the cognition of what is to be done; for activity is seen also to follow the cognition of things like serpent, etc.

There is no rule that all activity with deliberation is caused by the cognition of what-is-to-be-done; for there is seen activity even in the absence of the cognition of what-is-to-be-done. The proper rule of pervasion is: that which is activity with deliberation is caused by the cognition that that activity is the means to what is desired. For example, the activity of removing a serpent from one's way is caused by the cognition that that activity will destroy something that is harmful.

NKL—palāyana-pravṛttau sarpādijñānasya ahetutvād ity arthaḥ.

[746b-747a]

पुंस्प्रवृत्तेः फलं कार्यं विध्यर्थश्चापि कारणम् ॥ ७४६ ॥

प्रवृत्तिहेतुर्न फलं भवतैवाभिधीयते ।

The fruit of human action is *kārya*; and the sense of the injunction is the cause. The cause of action cannot be the fruit (of action). This is stated by you yourself.

For this reason also, *niyoga* cannot be the cause of activity: you say that *kārya* alone is the prompter of activity, and not the fruit. And, at the same time you establish that *kārya* is the fruit of activity. It is also your view that the fruit cannot be the cause of activity.

NTV—*kr̥tyudddeśyatayā jñāyamānaṁ hi kāryaṁ pravṛtti-hetuḥ bhavati tadevacet pravṛtteḥ phalaṁ tadā virodhaḥ svakāryāt svayam utpadyata iti.*

NKL — *kr̥tiyogyatvopalakṣita-hitasādhanatvasya pravartakatvaṁ balād āpādayati.*

AVS—*ayam arthaḥ vidhyartha-śabdena kāryam ucyate, puruṣa-vyāpāra-phalaṁ kāryaṁ tvayocyate, tad eva kāryaṁ pravṛtтиhetur iti ca. atha ca phalaṁ pravṛtтиhetur na bhavātīty evaṁ vidho virodho bhavataiva vaktuṁ śakyate. ataḥ phalakāryayor ekatvam abhyupagacchatā siddhasya pravṛtti-hetutvaṁ svavācā 'bhyupagatam iti.*

nanu bhavatu phalakāryayor aikyam, tathāpi na phalāvasthāyām kāryasya pravṛtтиhetutvam, kiṁtu kāryāvasthāyam eva, ato na siddhasya pravṛtтиhetutvam iti cet, na tayor ekatve kālavibhāgakaraṇā 'yogād anyathā ekatvaṁ paribhāṣāmātraṁ syāt.

[747b-748a]

अपसर्प्यस्य सर्पादेर्न च कार्यं फलं मतम् ॥ ७४७ ॥

अनर्थाभावमात्रत्वान्नचाभावः फलं क्वचित् ।

The running away from serpent, etc., which is a *kārya* cannot be the fruit; because it is only the absence of evil; and nowhere is absence (*abhāva*) a fruit.

Assuming that *kārya* is the fruit of human activity, it was argued above that *niyoga* cannot be the cause of activity. Here it is shown that *kārya* is not at all the fruit of activity. The activity of removing the serpent from one's way cannot be cited as an instance of *kārya* being the fruit; for the fruit, there, is only the removal of misery. The absence of misery too is not directly the fruit; it becomes so by manifesting happiness.

NTV—*sarvatra sukhaprāptir eva phalaṁ nābhāvaḥ ato 'pasarpaṇād anarīhanivṛttāv api sukhaprāptir eva phalam ity arthaḥ.*

NKL—*duḥkhābhāvasyāpi sukhavyaṅjakatvena phalatvam ity arthaḥ.*

AVS—*tad duḥkhābhāvasyāpi na svarūpeṇa phalatvaṁ sukha-hetutvena ity arthaḥ.*

[748b-749a]

नियोगोऽथ प्रमारूपो विधिशब्दप्रकाशितः ॥ ७४८ ॥

मानान्तरानपेक्षः सन्नाक्षेपकतया प्रमा ।

“Now, the *niyoga* which is made known by the injunctive suffix has the nature of validity; because it does not depend on any other means of knowledge, it is valid by implying (relation).”

Pūrvapakṣa—What is expressed by *liṅ*, etc., viz. *niyoga* has validity; it is not expectant of any other *pramāṇa*; and it is not of the nature of a re-statement. *Niyoga* is not possible without the relation to instrument, etc. So, as implying that, *niyoga* is valid.

[749b-750a]

आक्षेप्तृत्वं न शब्दोत्थं न च मानान्तरात्तथा ॥ ७४९ ॥

अव्युत्पन्नप्रवृत्तिश्चेत्युक्तदोषप्रसङ्गतः ।

The nature of being the implier is not derived from the suffix (*liñ*, etc.), nor from any other means of knowledge. And, because of the contingency of the aforesaid defect, there would be activity on the part of one who has not understood (the word-sense).

Siddhānta—*Niyoga* implying the relation—is it established from word or from something else? Not the first: this is not known from *liñ*, etc., for these latter get exhausted after making *niyoga* known. Nor the second: for it is not seen that some other *pramāṇa* establishes the alleged implication by *niyoga*; if that were so, even *niyoga* would become the content of that *pramāṇa*. And, if *niyoga* were dependent on some other *pramāṇa*, there would be no *apūrvatā* for it.

[750b-751a]

स्वाभ्युपेतनयस्यैव त्यागः प्राप्नोत्यनीप्सितः ॥ ७५० ॥

प्रामाण्यं चास्य यत्नेष्टं श्रुतेस्तत्तास्त्वनेन किम् ।

Without your willing it, you will have to give up the position acceptable to you. The validity of the *niyoga*, where it is desired, there let it be on the basis of Scripture. Of what use is it?

If you say that activity is only for him who has not understood the meaning of *liñ*, etc., that he has heard, you will be contradicting the view that is acceptable to all schools of thought, viz., that the empirical usage based on verbal testimony is only for him who has understood the meaning.

NTV—*yatra niyogasya prāmāṇyam iṣyate śabdasyaiva tatrā 'stu prāmāṇyam kiṁ niyogena?*

[751b-752]

क चेष्टमस्य मानत्वं न यागादौ स्वशब्दमे ॥ ७५१ ॥

लौकिकोऽपि न संसर्गो विध्यायत्तः स्थितो यतः ।

विध्यभावे हि संसर्गः श्रोतुरस्त्यविधावपि ॥ ७५२ ॥

And, where is its validity desired? Not with reference to sacrifice, etc., where the evidence is the word setting it forth; nor is the relation known from secular usage dependent on injunction, for the hearer understands the relation even in the absence of injunction from a text which is non-injunctive.

Moreover, in respect of what is there validity for *niyoga*? It is not in respect of sacrifice, etc.; for these latter are known from such words as *yāga*, etc., themselves. Nor is it in regard to relation between words and senses; for the relation between the words such as *yāga* and their senses is not dependent on *niyoga*, as it is what belongs to worldly usage. Even in regard to sentences such as 'This is the king's man' which are not commands, the hearer understands the relation between the words and their senses. Since the relation is seen even in the absence of *niyoga*, the relation must be admitted as what is based on worldly usage.

NTV—*natāvad yāgādayo niyoge prameyāḥ teṣāṃ yajatyādi-śabda-mānatvād ity āha na yāgādau svaśabda iti. nāpy apūrve saṃsarge niyogaḥ pramāṇam ity āha laukiko 'pī 'ti. vidhipadarahiteṣu laukika-vākyeṣu vidhyarthābhāve 'pi śrotur anadhigatopūrvāḥ saṃsargaḥ pratiyate, devadatta diṣṭyā vardhase, putras te jātaḥ, ityādāv iti hetum āha yato vidhyabhāve 'pī 'ti.*

NKL—*yāgādi-padārtha-saṃsargo na vidhyadhīno laukikatvād ity arthaḥ rājñāḥ-puruṣaḥ ityādi-vidhivikalavākye saṃsarga-darśanād ity arthaḥ.*

[753]

फलसाधनशक्तिश्चेद्विध्यायत्ता भविष्यति ।

नैवं तत्रापि शब्दस्य सामर्थ्यं केन वार्यते ॥ ७५३ ॥

If it be said that the capacity to bring about the fruit depends on injunction, not so; for why should the capacity of the word even there be prevented?

Nor may it be said that *niyoga* is the evidence for sacrifice, etc., being the means to what is desired; for it can be shown even here that the words themselves may convey this meaning.

[754]

तस्मादितरतुल्यत्वान्न विध्यर्थनिबन्धनः ।

संसर्गः स्यात्पदार्थानां सुस्थमेवं विधिं विना ॥ ७५४ ॥

Therefore, because of similarity with others, the connection of word-senses is not dependent on the injunctive sense; this is thus well-settled without injunction.

It has now been established that an injunction is not necessary in the matter of knowledge through verbal testimony. And so, it is settled that there can be knowledge of texts such as 'The self is Brahman' even without an injunction.

NKL—niyogābhāve 'pi vedaprāmāṇyam sūstham ity arthaḥ.

[755]

तस्मात्सर्वपदार्थानामाकाङ्क्षायोग्यसन्निधेः ।

परस्पराभिसंबन्धाद्विशिष्टार्थावबोधिता ॥ ७५५ ॥

Therefore, all word-senses convey a qualified meaning by mutual relation, because of expectancy, competency, and proximity.

The relation of word-senses is thus not dependent on injunction. The word-senses get mutually related as conditioned by expectancy, etc. And, it is in this way that words cause the cognition of a qualified sense.

NKL—*ayam eti putro rājñah puruṣo 'pasāryatām ity atra rājña-padasya putra-padādinā 'nvyasya nirākāṅkṣasya puruṣa-padena anvayād ākāṅkṣā sambandhakāraṇam, agnīnā siñced ityādaḥ ayogyayor ananvayād yogyatā 'pi kāraṇam, bhinnavākyagatayor asaṁsargāt sannidhir api hetur ity arthaḥ.*

[756-757]

ननूत्पत्तिविधिर्यद्वत्कर्मबोधे व्यवस्थितः ।

आत्मज्ञानविधिस्तद्वदात्मबोधेऽवतिष्ठताम् ॥ ७५६ ॥

कर्माधिकारवच्चाल प्रवृत्तिरपि सेत्स्यति ।

अप्रवृत्तप्रवृत्तिश्च तथाऽबुद्ध्यर्थबोधनम् ॥ ७५७ ॥

“Now, as originaive injunction (*utpattividhi*) is established in the case of knowledge of rites, so also let there be established the injunction of self-knowledge in respect of knowledge of the self. And, like eligibility for rites, here activity will also result: the activity of one who has not been active, and likewise the knowledge of a sense not already known”.

Here the *pūrvapakṣin* seeks to show that there are two types of injunction in regard to the Vedānta texts: originaive injunction (*utpatti-vidhi*) and injunction of eligibility (*adhikāra-vidhi*) ‘He is to offer the *agnihotra* oblation’ is a case of originaive injunction; similarly there is the injunction of self-knowledge in the form, ‘The self is to be seen’ (*ātmā draṣṭavyaḥ*). There is also the injunction of eligibility in the text ‘He who desires release should be active in respect of knowledge’ (*mokṣa-kāmaḥ prajñāṁ kurvīta*). The originaive injunction makes known what is unknown; the injunction of eligibility makes one who is not active active.

NTV — vastusvarūpamātra - jñānaṁ kartavyatā - jñāna - rahitaṁ pravṛtti-nivṛtti-sūnyam anarthakaṁ, pravṛtti-nivṛtti-prayuktatvāt vākya-pravṛtteḥ, ato vākyaśyā 'rthavatvāya vidhiḥ prārthanīyaḥ, anyathā 'narthakyam iti tad anuvadati nanv ityādinā.

NKL—āgneyo 'ṣṭākapālaḥ kartavya ity utpattividhiḥ karma-kartavyatā-jñāne paryavasyati, na pravartayati evaṁ ātmā draṣṭavya iti vidhir jñāna-kartavyatāyām paryavasyati, na pravartayati.....āgneyo 'ṣṭākapāla-ityādinā utpannasya darśapūrṇamāsyām svargakāmo yajeta-ityanena pravṛttiḥ, tadvad vijñāya prajñāṁ kurvīta ity adhikārabalān mokṣakāmīno 'vahita-jñāne pravṛttiḥ.

AVS—yathā āgneyo 'ṣṭākapālaḥ kartavya ity utpattividhiḥ karma-kartavyatā-jñāne paryavasyati, na pravartayati, evaṁ ātmā draṣṭavya ity ātmajñāne vidhir ātmajñāna-kartavyatāyām paryavasyati, na pravartayati.

[758]

एवं विधिमिहेच्छन्ति विध्ययोग्येऽपि वस्तुनि ।

विधिरागवशात्केचित्तान्तप्रतीदमथोच्यते ॥ ७५८ ॥

Thus some people, because of attachment to injunctions, desire injunction even in a matter which does not admit of injunction. As against them, this is stated.

The *siddhāntin* introduces his reply.

[759]

कर्मस्वरूपबोधे हि व्यापारो नेष्यते विधेः ।

किंतूत्पन्नस्य सापेक्ष्यादधिकारेण संगतिः ॥ ७५९ ॥

The operation of the injunction is not desired for knowing the nature of ritual only; but also for the connection of what has been originated with the eligibility (*adhikāra*), since it depends on that.

It was stated by the *pūrvapakṣin* that the originaive injunction simply makes known what is unknown, i. e. that its function is merely to inform about the nature of a particular ritual. This definition is not satisfactory. The mere knowledge of the nature of a ritual carries no fruit. So, the originaive injunction will not stop till there is the application of the ritual through the instrumentality of relation with the *niyoga* leading to the appropriate fruit.

NKL—*utpannasya karmaṇaḥ phalākāṅkṣatvād adhikārasaṁbandha-niyogadvārā anuṣṭhāne paryavasyati.*

[760]

अधिकारप्रवेशित्वं नाऽऽत्मज्ञानस्य युज्यते ।

यस्याधिकारसंबन्धः स आत्मा न विधीयते ॥ ७६० ॥

Self-knowledge cannot properly be included in the eligibility. He who is related to the eligibility—the self—cannot be the enjoined.

It cannot be urged that the self-knowledge, whose nature is made known by the injunction ‘The self is to be seen’ is related to eligibility; for the self-knowledge which is said to be enjoined as what is to be gained cannot be the content of an injunction of eligibility. Self-knowledge is not a matter of faith, as heaven is; it has its *pramāṇa*; and also, as it is not dependent on human will or activity, it cannot be related to eligibility. Nor may it be said that since the self is the master, it is related to eligibility, and through that self-knowledge also gets related to eligibility; for it must be first stated which is the self that is so related? Is it the transmigrating soul, or the supreme Self? Although the transmigrating soul is related to eligibility, it cannot be what is enjoined, for it is an established entity. It cannot also be the content of the knowledge that is enjoined; for the transmigrating soul is not the object of knowledge for the text ‘The self is to be seen.’ As for the supreme Self, that is not at all subject to eligibility. How, then, could self-knowledge become related to eligibility through the supreme Self?

[761]

ब्रीह्यादिविषयं यद्वद्यत्नेनापि निरूपितम् ।

प्रत्यक्षं नाधिकारानुप्रवेशं प्रतिपद्यते ॥ ७६१ ॥

This is just as perception having for its content rice-grains, etc., howsoever carefully examined, is not seen to enter into the eligibility.

Perception of rice-grains, etc., does not enter into the eligibility for *Darśa-pūrṇamāsa*, through rice-grains, etc. Even so, self-knowledge does not enter into eligibility through the self. Thus, although there is a possibility of the originative injunction in the Vedānta texts, there is no possibility of the injunction of eligibility, etc. The Vedāntic injunction, if there is one, makes known what is unknown.

[762]

अन्योऽप्यनुभवोपायो मननध्यानलक्षणः ।

सोपायो विहितोऽस्त्येव प्रतिपत्तिविधिं विना ॥ ७६२ ॥

“Without there being an injunction to know, there is enjoined the other which is the means to experience consisting in reflection and meditation together with the auxiliaries.

(2) Here the *pūrvapakṣa* is that, although there is no injunction of self-knowledge, there is the injunction of the means thereto, and that this is required in order that the one who desires release may be active.

The means consists of reflection (*manana*) and meditation (*nidīdhyāsana*); the end is realization (*anubhava*, *sākṣātkāra*). The auxiliaries are calmness (*śama*), etc.

With this verse commences the consideration of the second alternative mentioned in the notes to v. 661. The view expressed in this alternative is that it is the contemplation of Brahman that is enjoined. (See also note to v. 461b-462a.)

NKL—śābdajñānasyā 'vidheyatve 'pi tad-abhyāsasya vidheyatvād vidhiparatvaṁ vedāntānām sāmādy-aṅga-sahitaḥ sākṣātkāraphalaḥ paśyed-ityādaḥ vidhīyate.

AVS—śābdajñānād anyah sākṣātkaraṇopāyah mananadhyānāt-makah paśyed-ityādaḥ vidhīyate.

[763]

दर्शनस्य विधेयत्वात्तत्संबन्धोपलक्षितः ।

प्रसंख्यानान्मकोऽत्रापि प्रयत्नोऽनुभवं प्रति ॥ ७६३ ॥

“Because seeing (*darśana*) is enjoined, that which is implied as related to that, viz. the effort called continued meditation (*prasaṅkhyāna*), is also here enjoined for the sake of experience.

He who sponsors the second alternative shows that the third alternative, viz. that what is enjoined is direct intuition (*sākṣātkāra*), is not sound. The intuition which is of the nature of the self cannot be enjoined, for that is eternal. Nor is it possible to enjoin the modification of the mind which is of the form of the self, for that is the fruit, being the intuition of happiness. Therefore, by implication, the text ‘Thou shalt see’ should be understood as enjoining that which is the means thereto, viz. continued meditation (*prasaṅkhyāna*).

NTV—darśanasya avidheyatvāt prasaṅkhyāna-lakṣaṇaḥ prayatno vidhīyata iti sambandhaḥ. apāstāśeṣaduḥkhā-'natisayānandā-'dvaya-brahmātma-darśanasya phalarūpatvāt svargādivan na vidheyatvam ity arthaḥ.

[764]

शमाद्यङ्गान्वितः सर्वमात्मेतिस्तुतिभूषणः ।

मननाद्यर्थवत्त्वाय पश्येदिति विधीयते ॥ ७६४ ॥

“That which is associated with the auxiliaries ‘calmness’, etc., and which is praised in the text ‘All this is the self’ is enjoined thus : Thou shalt see, in order that reflection, etc., may become meaningful.”

Therefore, the text ‘Thou shalt see’ enjoins meditation as endowed with its auxiliaries, calmness, etc. Texts like ‘All this is the self’ should not be understood in their primary sense; they are but eulogies. In the text ‘The self, verily, dear one, is to be seen, heard, thought about, and meditated on,’ the expression ‘is to be thought about’ is not an injunction; for, if it were to be taken as an injunction, there would be sentence-split. Even if it be regarded as an injunction, it would only be an originative injunction. An injunction of eligibility is necessary; and that we have in ‘Thou shalt see.’

NTV—samadamādayo yamanīyamādayaś ca āṅgatayā vihitāḥ.

[765]

पश्येदिति प्रयत्नश्चेत्फलं स्यादर्शनं तदा ।

लक्षणं न प्रयत्नस्य लक्षणं चेत्कथं फलम् ॥ ७६५ ॥

“If in ‘Thou shalt see’ the effort (*prasaṅkhyāna*) is enjoined, then seeing would be the fruit. It cannot be a characteristic of the effort; if it is a characteristic, how can it be the fruit?

Here the *siddhāntin* objects that the text 'Thou shalt see' cannot enjoin continued meditation (*prasaṅkhyāna*). If meditation is enjoined for the sake of 'seeing', then 'seeing' would be the fruit (*phala*) and not a qualification (*viśeṣaṇa*) of meditation. A fruit is that which is yet to be, whereas a qualification is that which already is. So, it is not possible to enjoin meditation as qualified by 'seeing.'

AVS—*siddham hi lakṣaṇam kākavad atha lakṣaṇam na phalam bhavet siddhatvād anyathā lakṣaṇāyogāt.*

[766]

लोके दर्शनसंबद्धं प्रसंख्यानं समीक्षितम् ।

वेदेऽपि किं तथा तस्यान्न वाऽतस्तद्विधीयते ॥ ७६६ ॥

“In the world, continued meditation is seen to be related to seeing (*darśana*); (as it is doubted whether) in the Veda too it is so or not, that is enjoined.

The *prasaṅkhyāna-vādin* replies: In the world it is observed in the case of Śāstraic learning, etc., that meditation is related to perception as means to end. The doubt arises whether in the case of the Veda too there is a similar relation or not. In order to remove this doubt meditation is enjoined in the text under discussion 'Thou shalt see'. Here we learn that 'seeing' is the fruit, and that, as indicated thereby, meditation is enjoined as the means.

NTV—*vede 'pi prasaṅkhyānād eva darśanam bhavati anyasmād ve 'ti prāpya-prāpti-sambhavāt tathaive 'ti niyama-vidhir ity arthaḥ.*

NKL—*śāstra-sravaṇādau darśanaprasaṅkhyānayoh sādhyā-sādhana-bhāvo loke siddhaḥ.....prasaṅkhyānam darśana-sādhanaḥ bhavati naye 'ti vicāre, darśanena prasaṅkhyānam upalakṣya darśana-phalena vidhīyate.*

[767]

सामान्येनौषधं यद्वज्जरनाशोपलक्षितम् ।

दृष्टं कष्टज्वरेऽप्येवं विशेषेणोपदिश्यते ॥ ७६७ ॥

“The medicine which is ordinarily prescribed for curing fevers, is seen to be taught specifically also in the case of typhoid.

An example is given to substantiate the statement made in the previous verse. A certain decoction is known to cure ordinary fevers. When a difficult case arises, say, of typhoid, there may be a doubt whether the decoction will cure or not. In such a situation, in order to remove the doubt, the decoction is explicitly prescribed.

NKL—*kaṣāya-pānaṁ sāmānyena jvara-nivartakaṁ dr̥ṣṭaṁ, tat kaṣṭa-jvarasya nivartakaṁ naveti sandehe tan-nivartakatveṇa aṅga-viśeṣa-viśiṣṭaṁ vidhīyate yathā, tathā loke darśana-sādhanaṁ prasaṅkhyānaṁ vede 'pi syāt na ve 'ti viśaye sādhanam syād eve 'ti veśeṣeṇa 'padiśyate.*

[768]

अप्यज्ञातफलं साक्षान्मान्तरैर्विधिसंश्रयात् ।

अभावनिश्रयाभावात्प्रसंख्यानं फलाय नः ॥ ७६८ ॥

“Though through other means of knowledge continued meditation may not be known to be related to the fruit, here to us continued meditation bears fruit, because it is dependent on an injunction, and there is not the certainty of its absence.

It may be argued thus: Meditation (*prasaṅkhyāna*) does not have intuition as its fruit, because it is meditation, like secular meditations. The *prasaṅkhyāna-vādin* replies to this argument

saying: although it is not known through *pramāṇas* other than Scripture that meditation has intuition as its fruit, we have to admit that it is so on the strength of the Vedic injunction. There is nothing wrong in this admission because it is not definitely known that meditation is not the means to intuition, and also the injunction of meditation which is transcendental is superior to any human argument.

NTV—pasyed ity atra niyogastāvat śrūyate, sa ca viṣayaṁ niyojyaṁ ca apekṣate, prasaṅkhyānasya ca svarūpaṁ loka-siddhaṁ, vede 'pi saguṇabrahma-vidyāsū 'pāsanādi-sabda-vācyam ihā 'dhyāharaṇīyam.

AVS—samāhito bhūtvā pasyed ity atra samāhita-sabdena prasaṅkhyāna-grahād ato darśana - phalatvena prasaṅkhyāna - vidhir atrā 'vakalpata eva, athā 'tra samāhita-sabdena prasaṅkhyānam na grhyate, tathāpy atra darśana-phalatvena vidhānaṁ sambhavaty eva. anyatra ātmā vā 're draṣṭavya ityādaū nididhyāsitavya iti darśanaphalatvena vihitatvāt.

[769]

पश्चादवेवमेव स्यात्संदिग्धेऽपि विनिश्चयः ।

खपुष्पे त्वनुपायत्वान्निश्चयोऽस्ति विपर्यये ॥ ७६९ ॥

“In the case of cattle, etc. (which are the fruit of the *Citrā* rite), even though there is doubt, there is certainty (of the fruit); in the case of sky-flower, however, because it is not (something to be attained by) a means, there is certainty as to the contrary.”

The *prasaṅkhyāna-vādin* completes the present argument: The fruit of meditation is to be assumed on the analogy of the fruit of the *Citrā* rite. Although immediately on the conclusion of the *Citrā* rite, its fruit consisting of cattle is not observed to accrue, it is assumed on the strength of the injunction that the fruit will result.

Similarly, even though meditation may not immediately lead to intuition, we presume that it would on the strength of the injunction.

It may be asked : Why not imagine, on the strength of an injunction, that a sky-flower exists ? But there is no point in this objection. The sky-flower is non-existent ; it cannot be brought into being by any means. As its non-existence is a settled fact, no injunction can cause its existence ; nor can there be any injunction for causing its existence.

NTV—khaṇḍapasya tucchatvād eva upāya-sādhyatvābhāvāt na bhavatyeva 'ti viparyaya-niścayopapattau na vidhibalāt tat-kalpanā.

NKL—na kārīryādi-tulyaṁ prasaṅkhyānaṁ kiṃtu citrādi-tulyam.

AVS—paśvādi-phalasya ca anantarādarśane tat-kiṃ janmāntare bhavati na veti vīkṣāyām, na bhavatyeva 'ty abhāva - niścaya - 'bhāvāt vidhibalācca bhavatyeva 'ti kalpyate.

[770]

एवं केचिद्व्यवस्थाप्य प्रसंख्यानविधिं पुनः ।

ऐकात्म्यज्ञानतात्पर्यं तस्यापीच्छन्ति युक्तिभिः ॥ ७७० ॥

Thus some seek to establish the injunction of meditation, and desire therefor, through reasonings, the purportfulness in respect of the knowledge of the oneness of the self.

According to the *prasaṅkhyāna-vādin*, the texts like 'That thou art' assert the nature of reality, and the injunction of meditation is auxiliary thereto.

[771]

विधिस्वातन्त्र्यपक्षे हि किलैकात्म्यं न सिध्यति ।

तच्छास्त्रं विधिनिष्ठत्वान्न स्वरूपेऽर्थवादतः ॥ ७७१ ॥

On the view that injunction is independent, indeed, oneness of self would not result; because Scripture has for purport injunction, it cannot have for purport the nature of self, as that would be *arthavāda*.

As between the assertive statements that set forth the nature of reality and injunctive texts, which are principal and which are subsidiary? The *prasaṅkhyāna-vādin* would say: In the ritual section of the Veda the injunctions are primary; but in the Vedānta it is the assertive statements that are principal, to which injunctive texts are auxiliary. If injunction is primary, the reality would not be established; and if the reality of the self were not established, there would be no meaning in enjoining meditation thereon. If importance be given to injunction, then the texts like 'That thou art' would have to be treated as eulogistic passages, and they would not mean the oneness of self.

NTV—*na tu iha vidhi- svātantryam asti tattvamasyādi-vākyaārtha-prādhānyāt, prasaṅkhyānasya tac-cheṣatvād iti vākyaśeṣaḥ.*

NKL—*bhūtaṁ bhavyāyo 'padiśyata iti nyāyād aikātmya-śruter eva vidhi-śeṣatvaṁ yuktaṁ na punar vidhes tac-cheṣatvam, atrāha-vidhīti.*

[772]

अपि शास्त्रात्प्रपन्नेऽस्मिन्नपरोक्ष्यानपहारतः ।

तत्साक्षात्करणायैव प्रसंख्यानं विधीयते ॥ ७७२ ॥

"Even though understood from Scripture, the mediacy of that (self) is not removed; in order to make it immediate, continued meditation is enjoined.

The *prasaṅkhyāna-vādin* argues still further: From the texts 'That thou art', etc., mediate knowledge results. In order to transform this into immediate experience, continued meditation is necessary.

[773]

मानेन विषयासिद्धौ तद्विद्वत्प्रवियोगतः ।

प्रसंख्यानविधिर्न स्यात्सहापि मननादिभिः ॥ ७७३ ॥

"If the reality is not established through means of valid knowledge, there would be no desire to know it; and there would be no injunction of continued meditation along with reflection, etc.

Mere injunction of meditation also is not enough. If the reality that is the self is not established through Scripture, there would be no desire for realizing it, and consequently there would be no injunction of meditation along with its auxiliaries, reflection, etc. Therefore, the real should be known through Scripture.

AVS—mānena viṣayasya brahmātma-lakṣaṇasyā 'siddau, tat-sākṣātkaraṇe icchā asambhavāt, prasaṅkhyāna-niyogo na sambhavet, ataḥ śāstreṇa brahmā 'vagantavyam iti.

[774]

श्रुतेर्ज्ञातात्मवृत्तान्तोऽननुभूतमपि स्वकम् ।

स्थानकं वाञ्छतः शास्त्रात्प्रसंख्यानं विधीयते ॥ ७७४ ॥

"For the sake of the one who has known the story of the self from Scripture, but has not experienced it,

and yet who desires to make it his own place, meditation is enjoined by Scripture.

If the self has been known from Scripture, what for is meditation, it may be asked. The reply is: Although he has understood the meaning of texts like 'That thou art', that meaning has not yet given him direct experience of the self. In order to gain this experience, he has to meditate.

NTV—aitihyamātreṇa anubhavātma-brahmarūpam śrutyā, na ca tāvata tad-bhāva-prāptiḥ, ataḥ svasthānaka-prāpti-vāñchāyām sāstreṇa prasaṅkhyānam vidhīyate.

[775]

स्वव्यापारमुखेनैव शास्त्रं स्वार्थावबोधकृत् ।

न तु व्यापारविहन्नातो द्विकरता श्रुतेः ॥ ७७५ ॥

“It is only through its own (intermediate) operation (of continued meditation) that Scripture makes known its own sense; and not without the operation; therefore there is no two-fold denotativeness for Scripture.

There is another objection: If Scripture were to instruct about reality and also enjoin meditation, there would be the defect of sentence-split (*vākyabheda*) for it. The reply is: no. Continued meditation is the intermediary operation through which Scripture reveals reality. So, there is no double sense for Scripture, and hence no sentence-split.

NKL—śāstrasya svārtha-pratipādanē prasaṅkhyānam avāntaravyāpārah, teṇa arthabhedābhāvān na vākyabhedaḥ.

[776]

स्वव्यापारतिरोधानं कारकाणां न च स्थितम् ।

तस्मादैकात्म्यतात्पर्ये प्रसंख्यानादि सुस्थितम् ॥ ७७६ ॥

“There is not for agents (here, Scriptural texts) obscuration by their own operation (continued meditation); therefore it is well-established that meditation, etc., have for purport oneness of self.

If meditation is the intermediary operation of Scripture, then, Scripture being obscured by it would not convey its sense. If thus it be objected, it is replied that what is auxiliary cannot obscure its principal. Without the injunction of meditation, there is not the intuition of reality. In the absence of a knowledge of reality gained through Scripture, there cannot be injunction of meditation thereon. Thus, even though the texts ‘That thou art’, etc., have reality for purport, there is required an injunction of meditation as auxiliary.

NTV—na hi kāṣṭhair odanaḥ pacyata ity atra pākasāadhanāny api kāṣṭhāni sva-vyāpāra-jvālāṁ tirodadhati, tadvat svavyāpāram api sādhayaty eva ity arthaḥ.

[777]

बोधयित्वाऽपि चैकात्म्यं नान्तरा पर्यवस्यति ।

आ पुमर्थावधेः शास्त्रमप्रामाण्यभयात्फुटम् ॥ ७७७ ॥

“Scripture, even after making known the oneness of self, does not end without the culmination of the human goal, for the fear that it may (otherwise) become invalid.

When from scripture the one Self has been known, there is the gaining of the human goal. Of what use, then, is intuition? And, why should there be meditation for the sake of that?

The reply is: Scripture imparts only mediate knowledge. With that the human goal is not gained. And without resulting in the attainment of the human goal, Scripture will not be finally valid. The attainment of the human goal, however, depends upon meditation. Hence the injunction of meditation.

NTV—pumarthaparyantaṁ sāstrasya asti vyāpārah.

NKL—parokṣadhīmātreṇa kaivalyāyogād aparokṣadhīdvārā kaivalyaparyantaṁ vyāpriyata eva sāstraṁ, itarathā apumartha-paryavasāyitvena aprāmāṇya-prasakter ity arthaḥ.

[778]

परोक्षवृत्त्या शब्दो हि वदन्स्वार्थं स्वभावतः ।

संभावयन्प्रमाणत्वं युक्तिं स्वीकृत्य वर्तते ॥ ७७८ ॥

“The word (Scripture) by nature expresses its own sense mediate, and in consideration of securing for itself validity, functions by taking the help of reasoning.

What, then, is the place of reason, one may wonder. Scripture takes the help of reasoning also, as it does that of injunction, in achieving for man his final goal; for reasoning too is auxiliary to validity.

NTV—yata evam atah sāstraṁ svaprāmāṇya-siddhyarthaṁ yuktim api svīkaroti, na kevalaṁ prasaṅkhyānam.

NKL—asaṁbhāvanā-nirāsaphalaṁ yuktim aṅgatvena svīkr̥tya aparokṣa-pramāṇ kurute ity arthaḥ.

[779]

याथास्यावगमेऽशक्ता धूमोऽस्माविव साऽपि च ।

स्वीकृत्यैव प्रसंख्यानं युक्तिर्वस्तुनि वर्तते ॥ ७७९ ॥

“That (reasoning) also is incapable in respect of understanding of the truth, as smoke is in respect of fire; reasoning functions in respect of the real only by taking the aid of continued meditation.

Then, why should it not be that Reasoning itself, as assisting Scripture, generates the cognition of truth. Where is the need for injunction of meditation ?

To this objection, the reply is: Reasoning, even as in association with Scripture, cannot give rise to the intuition of the real ; for both reasoning and Scripture can yield only mediate knowledge. In the typical syllogism of Indian logic ‘Wherever there is smoke, there is fire ; there is smoke on the hill; therefore, there is fire on the hill’, what we gain is only mediate knowledge of the presence of fire this would be so even if the inference is confirmed by the testimony of a trustworthy person. So, even reasoning has to depend on meditation for yielding direct experience.

NKL—*sā yuktir api ātma-sākṣātkāraṁ janayitum aśaktā parokṣadhī-hetutva-svābhāvyāt. tasmāt prasāṅkhyānaṁ sāstraṁ ca svīkṛt-yaiva pravartata ity arthaḥ.*

[780]

इत्यादिवर्त्मना शास्त्रं साक्षाद्वस्तु प्रसाधयेत् ।

विधिं प्रति प्रधानत्वं स्वीकृत्याभ्येति मानताम् ॥ ७८० ॥

“In this manner, Scripture, establishing the real directly, and by assuming primacy in relation to injunction, becomes the means of valid knowledge.

Scripture, in fact, seeks the aid of meditation, reasoning, and the self, in its function of revealing the truth. Its validity thus is four-fold (*catuspān-mānam*). In relation to meditation and reasoning, Scripture is the principal.

NTV—tadevaṁ krameṇa śabda - yukti - prasaṅkhyāna-pramāṭṛbhiḥ catuspādeva brahma pramāṇam iti vidhiṁ prati prādhānatvam iti, prasaṅkhyānavidhy-apekṣayā tattvam-ādi-sāstrasya prādhānyam svīkṛtya ity arthah.

NKL—śabdo yuktim ātmānaṁ prasaṅkhyānaṁ vā apekṣya vastu sākṣād bodhayan vidhiṁ-prati prādhānyena pravartamānaḥ pramāṇyaṁ labhate, tarkādeḥ pratibandha-vigamamātra-kāritvād ity arthah.

[781]

संसर्गकल्पनाशून्यमप्यैकात्म्यं प्रबोधयेत् ।

अनयैव दिशा शास्त्रं संसृष्टार्थाभिधाय्यपि ॥ ७८१ ॥

“Though Scripture expresses a related sense, it can make known the oneness of self, devoid of any assumption of relation, in this manner (i.e. through continued meditation, etc.).

Scripture can convey only a related sense, and that too mediately. How, then, can it reveal the pure reality, even as assisted by meditation, etc.?

The reply is: although Scripture conveys a related sense that is mediate, it can reveal, when helped by meditation, etc., the relationless absolute truth. The strength of an auxiliary may produce an entirely different effect.

NTV—yathā viśaṁ maraṇakaram api svabhāvato mantra-sambandhāt svabhāvaṁ parityajya puṣṭikaraṁ bhavati, yathā ca dadhi jvarakāraṇaṁ sac-cakkarā-sambandhāt puṣṭikāraṇaṁ bhavati, tathā sāstram apīty arthah.

यतो वाचो निवर्तन्त इति श्रुत्यैव दर्शितम् ।

व्यपास्ताशेषसंसर्गकल्पनं ब्रह्म निर्भयम् ॥ ७८२ ॥

“In the text ‘Whence words return,’ etc., Scripture itself shows the fearless Brahman from which the assumption of all relation has been removed.

A Scriptural text is here quoted to show that Scripture can impart knowledge of the relationless Absolute.

NKL—akhaṇḍāparokṣa-svarūpe śruti-tātparya-liṅgam āha-nirbhaya-iti. na bibheti kutaścane ’ti phala-śravaṇāt.

AVS—etaḍ eva vākyaṁ svabhāvat saṁsrṣṭa-parokṣabuddhiṁ janayati, ukta-sādhana-avato yathā-sāntyaiva jñānam utpādayatīty arthaḥ.

शास्त्रेणानभिधाने तु नियोगेऽपि न युज्यते ।

प्रवेशो विषयत्वेन तुल्यं चोद्यमतो द्वयोः ॥ ७८३ ॥

“If it is not expressed by Scripture, then it cannot enter into the *niyoga* also as its content; the objection is equal as regards both.

Now, if Scripture expounds in the text quoted above the reality that is distinctionless, where is the need for that reality to become the content of the injunction of meditation? To him who has known the reality from the text, of what use is the injunction?

Reply : If Scripture does not expound the distinctionless reality, there will be no content at all for the injunction of medita-

tion. We may well ask, says the *prasaṅkhyāna-vādin*, what is your reply to this objection ?

NTV explains the objection thus: Scripture which has a related sense cannot have as its content the relationless Brahman; and the reply thus: Brahman, then, cannot be the content of the injunction of meditation either. There would thus be the unintelligibility of both, viz., the injunction of meditation and the Scriptural teaching about Brahman.

nanu vyapāstā-'śeṣa-saṁbandha-kalpanam nirbhayam aparokṣam parambrahma na pratipādayati śāstram, tasya saṁsrṣṭa-parokṣa-buddhi-janana eva sāmartyāt, tasya ca abrahmatvāt, tataś ca śāstrasya prasaṅkhyānaniyoga-mātra-paratvena yukti-prasaṅkhyāna-pramātrṇām brahma-pramāṇapādatve 'pi na śabdasya tatpādate 'ti tripād eva brahmapramāṇam na catuṣpād, ata āha śāstreṇa 'nabhidhāne tu-iti.

niyoge'pi tadviṣaya - prasaṅkhyāna viśeṣaṇa - jñāna - viśayatvena brahmaṇaḥ praveśo na yujyate, na kevalam śabdaviśayatvenaiva śāstreṇa, tasya anabhihitatvāt, ataḥ prasaṅkhyānavidhi-brahmaśāstrayor anupapattis tulyā iti bhāvaḥ.

NKL—yathā śāstram prasaṅkhyānam vinā anupapannam, tathā prasaṅkhyānam apī 'ti tulyam parasparāpekṣatvam ity arthaḥ.

According to an alternative explanation given in *AVS*, this verse may be treated as setting forth an objection raised by the *niyogapara-vādin* as against the *prasaṅkhyāna-vādin*.

[784]

विधिं विना श्रुतैकात्म्यस्तदर्थानुभवाद्दते ।

उपायाज्ञतया कुर्यात्तच्छास्त्रस्यार्थवादताम् ॥ ७८४ ॥

“If there is no injunction (of meditation), he who has heard of the oneness of self, but is without the experience of its sense, would make of Scripture an *arthavāda*, because he is ignorant of the means.

Let not reality become the content of the injunction, because even without this there is knowledge of reality from Scripture and as a result the human goal is reached.

Reply : If an injunction of meditation be not admitted, the text expounding reality would become invalid. As the means to experience, viz. continued meditation, is not recognized, and as no other means is observed, Scripture which by itself does not yield intuitive experience would become an eulogy. Therefore, an injunction of meditation should be admitted.

NTV—sākṣātkāropāyā 'parijñānāt tattvamādi-sāstram arthavādam karoti, prasaṅkhyāna-niyogā- 'pekṣayām sākṣātkāropāya-parijñānān nārthavādo bhaved iti bhāvah.

[785]

विधिनिष्ठेऽपि शास्त्रे स्यादसिद्धेर्वस्तुनो मितेः ।

देवताध्यानवत्कल्प्यं फलमैकात्म्यवेदनम् ॥ ७८५ ॥

“Even if Scripture has for purport injunction, the knowledge of reality (*vastu*) would not be established, and as in the case of meditation on the deities, the knowledge of oneness of self will have to be postulated as the fruit.

If the fruit, viz. the intuitive experience of the self, be dependent on the said injunction, then that injunction should be regarded as the principal, and not the text setting forth the nature of reality.

The reply to this has been stated in v. 771. The same is explained here.

If the injunction to meditate be the principal and the texts 'That thou art', etc., be subsidiary, then the cognition of the reality would not be established, and would have to be postulated as the fruit. This would not be proper. Although the injunction may be the principal as it is the means to the fruit, the fruit itself in this case being the cognition of reality, the texts expounding the reality should be regarded as the principal, and cannot be taken as restatements.

[786]

प्रतिपन्नात्मयाथात्म्यः प्रसंख्यानादि नेक्षते ।

अज्ञस्तु श्रावितोऽप्यस्माद्विना नाऽऽप्नोति तत्फलम् ॥ ७८६ ॥

“He who has realized the truth of self does not need continued meditation ; but he who is ignorant, even after study of Scripture, does not attain the fruit thereof without this.

He who has realized the truth through continued meditation, etc., does no longer stand in need of meditation. But he who has only known of the truth from the texts should meditate in order to realize the truth. He who has not realized may hear the text 'That thou art' repeated nine times in the *Chândogya*; but no realization will come to him unless he meditates.

NTV—ajñō 'sākṣātkṛta-brahmaḥ tattvamasīti śrāvito 'pi śravaṇa-phalam sākṣātkāram na prāpnoti asmāt prasaṅkhyānād vinā.

[787-788]

शास्त्रेऽस्मिन्वस्तुनिष्ठेऽपि प्रसंख्यानविधिं विना ।

पुमर्थो लभ्यते नैवेत्यसावपि समाश्रितः ॥ ७८७ ॥

नान्वयव्यतिरेकाभ्यामैकात्म्यानुभवो भवेत् ।

तत्सिद्धावेव तौ स्यातां स च ताभ्यामिति श्रयः ॥ ७८८ ॥

“ Even if Scripture have for purport the reality (*vastu*), the human goal is not gained, without the injunction of meditation; so that also has to be resorted to. By co-presence and co-absence there does not come about the experience of oneness of self. Only when that is established, they would be ; and that from them; thus there is reciprocal dependence.

The argument that the Vedānta texts stand in need of the injunction to meditate is here concluded.

The reasoning based on co-presence and co-absence is not enough. Such reasoning cannot independently lead to realization. It is only when a thing is known that there can be reasoning about it. If it be said that reasoning results in knowledge, there would be reciprocal dependence thus: When there is the experience of reality, there is reasoning based on co-presence and co-absence; and when there is the latter, there is the former.

NTV — aikātmānubhave sati anvaya-vyatirekau bhavataḥ, tat-siddhau ca brahmātmānubhava siddhir ity anyonyāśrayaḥ.

[789-790]

यथैव विश्वजिद्यागपदे स्वार्थानुपालनम् ।

कुर्वती स्वर्गकामेन(ण) गच्छतः सह मानताम् ॥ ७८८ ॥

तथैव शास्त्रतद्युक्ती स्वाभिधेयार्थपालनम् ।

कुर्वत्यौ मानतां यातः प्रसंख्यानानेन नान्यथा ॥ ७९० ॥

“ Even as the words ‘*viśvajit*’ and ‘*yāga*’ (in the text ‘*viśvajitā yajeta*’), while preserving their own senses attain validity by (the assumed word) ‘desire-for-heaven’;

so also, Scripture and reasoning, while preserving the sense expressed by them, attain validity through continued meditation; not otherwise”.

Scripture and reasoning convey their meaning and bring about the realization of the truth only in dependence on continued meditation (*prasaṅkhyāna*).

This is explained here on the analogy of the text of the *viśvajit* sacrifice (*viśvajin-nyāya*).* The *viśvajit* is a part of the great sacrifice called *gavām-ayana* which lasts for a year. In the command which relates to the *viśvajit* sacrifice, viz. ‘Let him sacrifice with the *viśvajit*’ (*viśvajitā yajeta*), no mention is made of any fruit. Here the enquiry is whether this text enjoins a mere action, or an action that results in a fruit. The *prima facie* view is that, as no result is mentioned in the injunction, only an act is enjoined here. The *Pūrva-mīmāṃsā* view is that it is not true to say that the action in question is not conducive to any result. Although no fruit is declared in this text, the fruit is to be known by implication. What, then, is the fruit? The *prima facie* view suggests that it may be any fruit, since no specific fruit is mentioned. The *Mīmāṃsā* view is that heaven is the fruit, since all desire heaven. [See *PM*, IV, iii, 10-16.]

Now, in the text ‘*viśvajitā yajeta*’, the words ‘*viśvajit*’ and ‘*yāga*’ convey their respective meanings, no doubt. But they become *pramāṇa* only when the word ‘*svarga-kāma*’ is supplied. Similarly Scripture and reasoning, while having each its place, gain validity only in association with continued meditation.

NTV—*tatra hi sarvābhilaṣitatva-lakṣaṇa-yukti-siddhena niyojyā-kāṅkṣā-pūrakeṇa svargakāmena svābhidheyārtha-pālanam kurvati viśvajidyāga-padena saha mānatām gacchataḥ anyathā aprāmāṇya-prasaṅgāt.*

NKL—*viśvajitā yajete ’ti viśvajic-chabdasya tṛtīyāntasya karaṇa-bhūta-yāganāmadheyatvāt.*

* G. A. Jacob, *A Third Handful of Popular Maxims*, Pp. 127-8.

*viśvajidyāga-vākyasyāpekṣita-svargakāmi-kalpanayā svārthabodhakat-
vaṁ tadabhāve pravṛttyabhāvād viśvajidyāga-padayoḥ svargakāmena
svārthānupālanaṁ kurvato mānatvaṁ yathā.*

[791]

एवमैकात्म्यतात्पर्ये शास्त्रस्येष्टेऽपि युक्तिभिः ।

केचित्कार्यमपीच्छन्ति तदर्थं तन्न युज्यते ॥ ७९१ ॥

Admitting that Scripture has for purport oneness of self, some seek to establish *kārya* also through reasonings, for the sake of that, (the experience of oneness of self); that is not right.

The *prasaṅkhyāna-vāda* is here concluded. Those who sponsor this view, while admitting that Scripture has the one reality for purport, maintain through the aforementioned arguments that in Vedānta there is *kārya* also which is of the nature of *prasaṅkhyāna*.

Siddhānta—The *prasaṅkhyāna-vāda* is not sound.

[792]

प्रमात्रादित्रयं यस्मात्संविन्मात्रवपुर्भूतः ।

सिद्धायतेऽप्रसिद्धं सत्तत्सिद्धौ किमपेक्षते ॥ ७९२ ॥

The triad, cognizer, etc., constituted by pure consciousness as they are, look like the established though they are not established; what then is required for their establishment?

What for is *prasaṅkhyāna*? (1) Is it required for establishing reality? (2) Or, for removing the mediateness thereof? (3) Or, for warding off its non-establishment? (4) Or, for destroying the ignorance thereof? (5) Or, for making it immediate? (6) Or, for the sake of its release?

(1) The first alternative is not possible. The reality with which we are acquainted is of the triple form, cognizer, cognition, and object cognized. This triad has no reality other than that of pure consciousness, the self. Because of the self, the triad appears as if established. Nothing else is required for the establishment.

NTV mentions only the first two alternatives:

*kiṁ vastu-siddhyartham prasāṅkhyānavidhir apekṣyate, uta vastu-
naḥ pāroṁṣya-nivṛttyartham.*

NKL has these two alternatives:

*prasāṅkhyāna-niyogasya vastvāparokṣaṁ phalam, tat-pāroṁṣya-
nivṛttir vā.*

AVS has the same alternatives as *NTV*.

[793]

परोक्षमपि सद्वस्तु यत्साक्ष्यात्मस्वरूपतः ।

साक्षादात्मेव चाऽऽभाति तस्मिन्पारोक्ष्यधीः कथम् ॥७९३॥

The witness-self, the reality, by which even the mediate (objects) are made to appear as if immediate and as if the self—in respect of that, how can there be mediate knowledge?

(2) The second alternative is to be rejected. Egoity, etc., which constitute the not-self, are made manifest by the witness-self, although by themselves they are mediate; and because of this manifestation they appear as if they are the self. The witness-self, therefore, can never be mediate. It is the most direct and immediate reality. As there is no mediateness for it, how can there be removal of mediateness?

[794]

अप्यज्ञानादि निःशेषप्रमेयव्यवधानकृत् ।

स्वतः प्रसिद्धात्संसिध्येत्तदसिद्धिः कुतो भवेत् ॥ ७९४ ॥

Because by that self-established (reality) even ignorance, etc., which veil the entire object of knowledge, are established, from what can its non-establishment result?

(3) The third alternative is here rejected. It is the self that establishes even ignorance, doubt and erroneous knowledge that veil the world of objects. The self is, thus, ever-established; it is self-established. So, non-establishment is impossible in regard to it. Where is the need, then, for *prasaṅkhyāna* for the purpose of warding off non-establishment?

[795]

स्वमहिम्नैव यः सिद्धः सर्वप्रत्यक्तमश्च यः ।

तत्तमोहतितः कार्यं किमन्यत्तत्प्रमाणजम् ॥ ७९५ ॥

That which is established by its own glory and is innermost of all—what else than the effect of removing the darkness (of ignorance) can the means of knowledge relating to that produce?

(4) The self is established by its own right, and in its own greatness. Nothing else is required to establish it. All that we need is to recognize its eternally established nature. For this, ignorance has to be removed. But the removal of ignorance is the fruit of *pramāṇa*, and not of *prasaṅkhyāna*.

NTV—*na vastunaḥ sphuraṇaṁ pramāṇa-phalaṁ kiṁtu avidyā-nivṛttir ity arthaḥ.*

NKL—*avidyādi-nivartakatvena vākya-prāmāṇyam iti bhāvah.*

AVS—*na vastu-siddhiḥ pramāṇa-phalam, kiṃtu avidyā-nivṛttir
ity arthah.*

[796]

मात्रादित्रयहानेऽपि हानसाक्षितयेक्ष्यते ।

येनासावविलुप्ताक्षस्तत्पारोक्ष्यं कथं भवेत् ॥ ७९६ ॥

Even in the absence of the triad, cognizer, etc., that which sees the absence as the witness, because it never loses its sight—how can that be mediate?

(5) The inner self is eternal and self-luminous. It is the never-failing witness of the being as well as non-being of cognizer, etc., enjoyer, etc., and agent, etc. It is absurd to suggest that such a reality is not immediate. Nothing else is immediate. Hence, there is no need for an injunction of *prasaṅkhyāna* to render the self immediate.

NTV—*na svatas-siddhasya lopa-janmādayaḥ svato 'nyato vā
siddhy anupāpatteḥ.*

NKL—*svāpādaḥ pramātrāder abhāve tad-abhāva-sākṣitayā ātme-
syate yena kena kāraṇena avi^{plū}tākṣo nitya-caitanya-svabhāvāt.*

aviluptākṣo
[797]

भावनावर्त्मनैकात्म्ये विध्यर्थासंभवो यथा ।

अधिकारपरीक्षायां तथा प्राक्प्रतिपादितम् ॥ ७९७ ॥

The impossibility of injunction through the channel of *bhāvanā* in the case of the one self has already been explained in our examination of eligibility.

In the verses of the *Vārtika* (v. 20 f.) dealing with eligibility, it has already been shown that there is no need for the injunction of the practice of contemplation after knowledge has arisen from scriptural testimony.

NTV — *bhāvanā puruṣa-prayatnādih vedārtha iti bhaṭṭapādamatā-valambanena vidhir adhikāri-parīkṣāyām nirākṛtaḥ, idānīm brahma-dattādi-matāvalambanena niyogo vākyārtha iti vidhir nirākriyate.*

AVS puts v. 654 before the present verse, and v. 655a after the present verse. This is followed by the remark: *ity evaṁ vārtikānām kramo draṣṭavyaḥ, pāṭhakramād arthakramo balavān iti.....*

tasmāt tatra likhitavyaṁ vārtikadvayam atra likhitam upadeśataḥ śāstrārtho 'dhigantavya iti pratipādanāya. anye tu atraiva vārtikadvaya-sambandham varṇayanti.

[798]

नियोगपक्षमाश्रित्य विध्यर्थसंभवो यथा ।

ऐकात्म्यसिद्धौ यत्नेन तथाऽत्र प्रतिपाद्यते ॥ ७९८ ॥

As to how the sense of injunction is impossible following the doctrine of *niyoga*, in the matter of establishing oneness of self, is here explained with care.

Here, the view that is refuted is that of Brahmadatta, viz. that there is need for injunction in the matter of the practice of *jñāna*. Hence, this is no repetition.

[799]

ऐकात्म्यस्य स्वतो मुक्तेरज्ञानात्तस्य बद्धता ।

साध्येऽर्थे साधनापेक्षा सिद्धे तन्न व्यपेक्षते ॥ ७९९ ॥

Because oneness of self is itself release, bondage is from ignorance of that; there is need for means in the case of what is to be accomplished; that is not required in the case of what is already established.

(6) The sixth alternative is here shown to be unsound. Release is the very nature of the self. The self is not really bound. The sense of bondage is due to ignorance. A means is required for accomplishing what is not accomplished. In respect of what is eternally established, no means for its establishment is necessary.

NTV frames two alternatives, for the first of which the present verse gives the answer. The alternatives are: (1) Is the prompted person he who desires release? (2) Or, he who desires the experience of *Brahman-Ātman*? The second alternative is replied to in verse 801.

[800]

तमोमालान्तरायत्वादैकात्म्याख्यस्य वस्तुनः ।

असाध्यसाधने तस्मिन्काऽपेक्षा भावनां प्रति ॥ ८०० ॥

For the reality which is called oneness of self, the only obstacle is darkness; it is neither what is to be accomplished nor means; in regard to that there is no need of *bhāvanā*.

Release, it has been said, is self-established, and is not dependent on any means. What for is *jñāna*, it may be asked. The reply is that *jñāna* is required only for destroying ignorance. As the self which is the sole reality is devoid of the distinction of what-is-to-be-accomplished and what-accomplishes, there is no need for the injunction of practice.

NKL—*asādhyā-sādhane sādhyā-sādhana-bhāva hīna ity arthaḥ.*

[801]

यदाऽनुभवकामस्य कार्यं साध्यं प्रतीयते ।
प्रसंख्यानं तदैकात्म्यतात्पर्यं कथमुच्यते ॥ ८०१ ॥

If continued meditation is seen to be the *kārya* to be accomplished by him who desires direct experience, then how can oneness of self be said to be the purport?

It may be argued thus: Although there is no injunction of *prasaṅkhyāna* as the direct means to release, it becomes an auxiliary through *jñāna* to which it is subsidiary.

Reply: If *prasaṅkhyāna* is enjoined by the Vedānta texts for the benefit of those who desire realization, then those texts cannot have the oneness of self for purport.

AVS—sākṣātkaraṇakāmasya kāryam niyogaḥ prasaṅkhyāne viṣaye sādhyam pratiyate yadā, tadā prasaṅkhyāna-niyogasya aikātmya-paratvam katham, na kathamcit.

[802]

कार्यं चान्यपरं चेति द्वयमेतद्विरुध्यते ।
साध्यं हि सर्वदा कार्यमन्यत्तस्य प्रसिद्धये ॥ ८०२ ॥

Having the *kārya* for purport and having something else for purport—these two are contradictory. Indeed, the *kārya* is always what is to be accomplished; what is other is only for accomplishing it.

The same texts cannot contain an injunction as well as teach the oneness of self. If injunction is the purport of the Vedānta texts, then any other teaching must be for the sake of that, on the principle that “things that have already come to be are taught for the sake of what-is-yet-to-be” (*bhūtaṁ bhavyāyo ’padisyate*).

[803]

विशेषणं नियोज्यस्य भवन्ननुभवः फलम् ।

विषयः सत्प्रसंख्यानमनुभूतेर्न साधनम् ॥ ८०३ ॥

Being the qualification of what is prompted, if direct experience be regarded as the fruit, then continued meditation which is the content (of the injunction) cannot be the means to direct experience.

If it be said that continued meditation (*nididhyāsana*) is also enjoined, like 'hearing' (*śravaṇa*), as means to direct experience, and *prasaṅkhyāna* is only another name for *nididhyāsana*, true; but *prasaṅkhyāna* does not make known the reality by being the content of the cognition of *niyoga*; for the direct experience is the fruit of *pramāṇa*, and *prasaṅkhyāna* is not a *pramāṇa*.

AVS—*anubhava-kāmaḥ prasaṅkhyānaṁ kuryād iti niyojyasyā 'dhikāriṇo viśeṣaṇaṁ bhavann anubhavaḥ phalam iti tvayocyate niyoga-viśayaṁ sat prasaṅkhyānaṁ anubhūter na sādhanam, anubhavasya māna-phalatvāt, niyoga-viśaya-prasaṅkhyānasya apramāṇatvāt.*

[804]

भावार्थविषयं कार्यं प्रसंख्याने कथं भवेत् ।

आवृत्तिर्हि प्रसंख्यानं शब्दयुक्त्योरिति स्थितम् ॥ ८०४ ॥

How can the *kārya* which is the sense of the verbal root occur in the case of continued meditation? Indeed, continued meditation is the repeated reflection with the help of word and reasoning. This is settled.

So far we have argued that *prasaṅkhyāna* is not the means to experience, admitting for the moment that it is the content of *niyoga*. Now, we affirm that *prasaṅkhyāna* is not at all the content of *niyoga*.

The content of *niyoga* must be the sense of a verbal root, e. g., *yāga*. *Prasaṅkhyāna* is not so. It is of the nature of a repetition of 'hearing' (*śravaṇa*) and 'reflection' (*manana*). It is not an act; it is the repetition of an act.

[805]

अथ श्रवणभावार्थविषयं कार्यमिष्यते ।

तदा श्रवणमेव स्याद्विशिष्टो विषयस्तव ॥ ८०५ ॥

If the content of the sense of the verbal root of *śravaṇa* (hearing) be the *kārya*, then *śravaṇa* alone will be for you the specific content.

If it be said: "Let there not be in the Vedānta an injunction for meditation. Let hearing and reflection be the content of injunction", we reply that the opponent's thesis would then be destroyed. The *prasaṅkhyāna-vādin's* thesis is that meditation is enjoined. We on our part do admit that hearing, etc., are enjoined in order to make him who desires release turn to the Scriptural texts.

[806]

दाक्षायणादावावृत्तेर्यत्रापि फलमुच्यते ।

सगुणात्पौर्णमासादेः फलं तत्रापि नो गुणात् ॥ ८०६ ॥

Even in the *Dākṣāyaṇa* rite, etc., where repetition is said to bear fruit, the fruit is from the *Paurṇamāsa*, etc., as associated with the *guṇa* (repetition), and not from the *guṇa* alone.

The *pūrvapakṣin* may argue that repetition may be enjoined on the analogy of the *Dākṣāyaṇa* sacrifice. The *siddhāntin* replies that, on the same analogy, it is the act that is enjoined, not repetition.

In the context of the *Darśapūrṇamāsa*, we have the passage, ‘*dākṣāyaṇa-yajñena yajeta prajākāmah*’ (One desirous of offspring should perform the *Dākṣāyaṇa* sacrifice.) [See *Taittirīya-saṁhitā*, II, v, 4. 3.] Here the question to be settled is whether the passage speaks of a particular result following from the adoption of a particular accessory at the *Darśapūrṇamāsa* sacrifice, or whether the act mentioned is a distinct and independent sacrifice. The *prima facie* view is that it is the latter. The reasons adduced are that a particular name is attached to the act, that there is no mention of an accessory in the text, and that the text is complete with the mention of the result. The *Pūrva-mīmāṃsā siddhānta* is that the text in question speaks of a particular result following from the adoption of a particular accessory at the *Darśapūrṇamāsa*. From the context of the present passage we learn that the *Dākṣāyaṇa* falls within the purview of the *Darśapūrṇamāsa*, and that it is not an independent or separate sacrifice. There is a text which reads thus: ‘One should perform the *Darśapūrṇamāsa* for thirty years; if he is a performer of the *Dākṣāyaṇa* he should perform it for fifteen years only; even thus does it become accomplished; as the *Dākṣāyaṇa* contains two *Paurṇamāsa* and two *Darśa* sacrifices: thus is there accomplishment in fifteen years’. From this we know that *Dākṣāyaṇa* is not a separate sacrifice. The term ‘*ayana*’ means repetition. *Dakṣa* is the sacrificer who is quick and an expert. So, the expression *Dākṣāyaṇa* signifies the repeated performance of the *Darśapūrṇamāsa* by the expert sacrificer and priests. *Dākṣāyaṇa*, thus, connotes a certain accessory detail at the *Darśapūrṇamāsa*. And, the text in question speaks of the result following from the adoption of an accessory; it does not enjoin a distinct sacrifice. [PM, II, iii, 5-11.]

In v. 806, the *pūrvapakṣa* is that there is realization through the repetition of hearing, etc., even as in the case of the *Dākṣāyaṇa* it is repetition that brings in the fruit. The *siddhāntin*’s reply is that, even in the example cited, the fruit which is heaven does not result from the accessory by itself, but from the *Darśapūrṇamāsa* as endowed with the accessory which is repetition. Similarly, here

when it is settled that the fruit is gained through the act, viz. hearing, etc., as endowed with the accessory, it is not proper to hold that there is injunction of *repetition* too for the sake of intuiting reality.

[807]

गुणो यत्रापि दध्यादिः कार्यावच्छेदको मतः ।

धात्वर्थावेशतः सोऽपि प्राप्ते चास्मिन्न तु स्वतः ॥ ८०७ ॥

Even where curd, etc., are taken to be *guṇa*, they are so as distinctive of the *kārya*, having been entered into by the meaning of the verb-root. This has already been attained, and (the curd, etc.,) are not independently (enjoined).

It may be argued that, even though 'repetition' is not the sense of the verb-root, it may be the content of injunction, even as the accessory curds (*dadhi*) in '*dadhnā juhoti*' (With curds he offers the oblation), which are not the sense of the verb-root, are enjoined. The reply is that even the curds are enjoined only as influenced by the sense of the verb, and not independently. So, here also, repetition without the act (hearing, etc.) cannot be enjoined for the sake of the fruit.

There is the text '*agnihotram juhoti*', and then the texts '*dadhnā juhoti*, *payasā juhoti*', etc. The question with regard to those texts is this: Are the *homas* enjoined by the texts '*dadhnā*', etc., and are these collectively referred to in the text '*agnihotram juhoti*'? Or, is this latter sentence injunctive of an independent *homa*? The *prima facie* view is that this sentence refers to the *homas* enjoined in the sentences '*dadhnā*', etc. The *Pūrva-mīmāṃsā siddhānta* is that the injunctive text is '*agnihotram juhoti*', and that the other sentences specify the accessories, etc. The term '*agnihotra*' does not refer collectively to sacrifices already enjoined. In '*agnihotram juhoti*', the act of *homa* (i.e. offering into fire) is enjoined. The sentence

‘*dadhnā juhōti*’ cannot convey the notion that the *Agnihotra* should be performed; what it signifies is simply that the connection between the *dadhi* and the *homa* should be brought about. Thus it is settled that the repetition of the mention of *homa* in such texts as ‘*dadhnā juhōti*’ serves the purpose of indicating the accessory details. In other words, the use of the term ‘*juhōti*’ is a reference to the *homa* enjoined elsewhere in the text ‘*agnihotram juhōti*’. In the term ‘*juhōti*’ as appearing in the sentence ‘*dadhnā juhōti*,’ the conjugational affix serves the purpose of enjoining the material, *dadhi*, mentioned by the word *dadhnā*, and it is only the verbal root that contains the reference to the *homa* enjoined elsewhere. [PM, II, ii, 13–16.]

[808]

श्रवणादेर्न च प्राप्तिर्गुणान्न च फलं श्रुतम् ।

पश्येदिति हि धात्वर्थः केवलो विषयः श्रुतः ॥ ८०८ ॥

Hearing, etc., have not been enjoined ; nor is the fruit declared in Scripture for *guṇa*; in ‘Thou shalt see’, only the content, the sense of the root, is declared.

It cannot be said that in the statement ‘Let one become calm and collected and then see the self,’ meditation which is of the form of repetition is enjoined. Seeing is not the fruit of repetition which is an accessory; it is the fruit of hearing, etc. Nor is release the fruit of repetition; for that is the fruit of *jñāna*. Here the content of injunction is seeing (*darsana*,) and not repetition.

[809]

नापि तल्लक्षितावृत्तिर्विधेया श्रुतहानतः ।

कार्यं यन्नापि भावार्थात्तदावृत्तिगुणात्कथम् ॥ ८०९ ॥

Nor is the repetition implied by that (*darśana-vidhi*) enjoined, for there would be giving up of what is declared. That which is not accomplished by the sense of the verb, how can that result from the *guṇa* called repetition?

It may be contended that, as seeing cannot be enjoined, we should take repetition as what is enjoined by implication. But this contention is pointless. There is no reason for rejecting what is expressly taught and assuming what is not taught. If a fruit does not result from an act, it cannot result from repetition. If intuition does not arise from the knowledge that is born of Scriptural testimony, how can it arise from a repetition thereof? So, even if an injunction of seeing is to be rejected, there cannot be assumed an injunction of repetition for the sake of intuition.

[810]

स्वयं प्रबोधितेऽप्यर्थे यदि युक्त्याद्यपेक्षते ।

शास्त्रं सापेक्षमेवं स्यात्स्वतः प्रामाण्यवर्जनात् ॥ ८१० ॥

As regards the sense made known by it, if Scripture needs reasoning, etc., then it would become dependent, by relinquishing self-validity.

In v. 774 it was stated by the *pūrvapakṣin* that meditation is enjoined for one who has known the nature of the self from Scripture but has not experienced it. It was also contended in that context (see v. 778) that reasoning too is required. That is recalled here and refuted. If Scripture depends for its sense on reasoning, etc., its self-validity would be destroyed, and would become dependent and defective like secular statements.

[811]

युक्त्यादि मान्तरं नो चेन्मानांशत्वेन तत्स्थितेः ।

संभूय पादाः सर्वेऽपि ह्यैकात्म्यं बोधयन्ति नः ॥ ८११ ॥

“If reasoning, etc., are not different *pramāṇas*, because they are parts of *pramāṇa*, all the parts together, for us, make known the oneness of self.”

Pūrvapakṣa — Reasoning, etc., are not different *pramāṇas*. They, together with Scriptural testimony, constitute a single *pramāṇa*. It has already been stated that the self is to be realized through verbal testimony, reasoning, meditation, and the self.

[812]

न संभूय यतः पादास्तैलवर्त्यग्नयो यथा ।

मितेः स्वरूपलाभाय न तु मेयोपलब्धये ॥ ८१२ ॥

Not together (do they make known the self); for the parts, like oil, wick and fire, are for the sake of securing for *pramāṇa* its nature, and not for attaining the object of cognition.

Siddhānta — It is wrong to say that these four together reveal the reality. Just as oil, etc., together contribute to the flame, and the flame illumines the object, here too the four parts together make for the *pramāṇa*, and it is the *pramāṇa* that reveals the real. So, it is settled that the four parts are not the means to the intuition of reality.

[813]

संभूय यदि सर्वाणि फलमेकं प्रतन्वते ।

प्रत्येकं प्रमितेर्वृद्धिरित्येतत्स्यात्तदा मृषा ॥ ८१३ ॥

If all of them together produce a single fruit, then the view that each fosters the *pramāṇa* would be false.

If the parts by themselves reveal the real, then it cannot be maintained that the *pramāṇa* is strengthened by each of these. The *prasāṅkhyāna-vādin* does maintain this latter view. So, on his own testimony, it must be admitted by him that the parts are only contributory to the *pramāṇa*.

[814]

संभूय फलकारित्वं क्रियाकारकसंगतेः ।

स्वरूपलाभतो नान्यदभिव्यक्तावपेक्षते ॥ ८१४ ॥

The fruit of the coming together of *pramāṇa* and the causal agents is the accomplishment of its own nature as *pramāṇa*; in the matter of manifesting the object nothing else is required.

Thus, the parts accomplish the *pramāṇa*; and the *pramāṇa* reveals the real. In the matter of its coming into being, the *pramāṇa* does depend on the causative factors; but in the matter of revealing the object, it depends on nothing else.

AVS—śabdādi-pādacatuṣṭayaṁ jñānotpādakam eva nārthaprakāśakam ity etat sādhayati.

[815]

तैलवर्त्यमयो यस्मात्प्रदीपोत्पत्तिकारणम् ।

लब्धात्मलाभो दीपोऽर्थं स्वयमेव प्रकाशयेत् ॥ ८१५ ॥

For, oil, wick, and fire are the cause of producing the lamp; the lamp which has thus been brought into existence illumines the object by itself.

The illustration given in v. 812 is here explained.

Just as the lamp, which is the result of oil, wick and fire combining together, illumines the object by itself, so also the *pramāṇa*, which is given rise to by verbal testimony, etc., reveals its object independently without any further aid.

[816]

शब्देन ज्ञाप्यते यद्वत्तथैव यदि युक्तिभिः ।

व्यर्थताऽथ विशेषश्चेत्संप्राप्ता भिन्नमानता ॥ ८१६ ॥

That which is made known* by Scripture, if that alone is made known by reasonings, then there is futility; if there is some difference, then they (reasonings) would constitute a different *pramāṇa*.

It may be held that verbal testimony, etc., are not contributories to the rise of *pramāṇa*, but are themselves *pramāṇa*. Then, the question would be: Are they *pramāṇas* collectively, or individually? If the first, then we have to enquire: the sense that is conveyed by verbal testimony—is that itself made known by reasoning, etc., or some other sense? If it is the same sense, then there is futility for reasoning, etc. If it is a different sense, then reasoning, etc., would be separate *pramāṇas*, and there would be no collectivity.

[817]

स्वप्नादियुक्तिमिश्रेत्तल्लौकिकीभिः प्रसाध्यते ।

अवैदिकं भवेद्वस्तु स्याच्च शास्त्रानुवादता ॥ ८१७ ॥

If reality be established through empirical arguments based on dream, etc., then it would be non-Scriptural; and Scripture would be a re-statement.

If verbal testimony, etc., be regarded as *pramāṇas* individually, then we have to ask: Are the reasoning, etc., that are *pramāṇa* such as are empirically known or those that are known through the *Veda* alone? The enquiry into the three states of experience is empirical. By the rule of co-presence and co-absence, it is argued that the three states are illusory and that the self alone is real. But, then, this reasoning is not dependent on the *Veda*; and the texts 'That thou art' etc., would turn out to be dependent *pramāṇa*.

NTV—vedaika-samadhigamyam brahma na bhavet, sāstram ca yuktisiddhānuvādakam na pramāṇam ity arthaḥ.

NKL—avasthātrayasya vyabhicārād ātmano 'vyabhicārād avasthātraya-taddharma-sambandho na vāstava iti laukika-tarkād ātmasiddhau vedasya anuvādakatvam avaidikatvam ca ātmanah ity arthaḥ.

[818]

वैदिकत्वेऽपि युक्तीनामागमार्थप्रबोधतः ।

अनुवादत्वमेव स्यात्स्याच्च शास्त्रादभिन्नता ॥ ८१८ ॥

If the arguments be Scriptural, as they serve only to elucidate the sense taught by Scripture, then also those arguments would be re-statements, and they would be non-different from Scripture.

If the reasoning, etc., are those that are known through the *Veda*, then they would be of the nature of restatements, and not *pramāṇas*. Also, they cannot be regarded as different from the *Veda*; and the four factors will have to be reduced to three.

[819]

आवृत्तिश्च प्रसंख्यानं कुर्यात्सातिशयं कथम् ।

न ह्यावृत्तौ प्रमाणस्य प्रमेयेऽतिशयो यतः ॥ ८१९ ॥

Continued meditation is repetition. How can repetition (of *śabda*) endow an object with an excellence? There is no excellence brought about in the object of knowledge by repetition of the *pramāṇa*.

It has been shown that verbal testimony does not depend on reasoning. Now, we proceed to show that there is no dependence of verbal testimony on meditation (*prasaṅkhyāna*).

Prasaṅkhyāna is repetition. As applied to verbal testimony, it must mean a repetition thereof. But such repetition does not bring about any excellence in the object. In the case of the perception of a pot, for example, there is no excellence seen in the object by a repetition of the perception.

NTV — *prasaṅkhyānam nāma pramāṇāvṛttir ucyate, sā katham atiśayaṁ kuryāt.*

[820]

यत्नापि चान्धकारादिदोषात्क्रमविनिश्चयः ।

तत्तापि भिन्नमेयत्वान्नैव संभूयमानता ॥ ८२० ॥

Even where because of the defect of darkness, etc., there is determination (of the object) in sequence, there is no validity for the combination (of parts), for the object cognized (at each stage) is different.

It is true that in the case of the determination of an object that is in semi-darkness or at a distant place, repetition of a *pramāṇa* is useful. But, here, it must be realized that the determination is not the result of the collective operation of *pramāṇas*. In fact, the object is different each time.

[821]

पूर्वं वस्त्विति विज्ञानं प्राप्ययं मानुषस्तथा ।

पुरुषोऽयमथ श्यामो दित्य इत्यर्थभिन्नता ॥ ८२१ ॥

It is first known as a thing, then as a living being, then as a human being, as a man, as being dark, and then as so-and-so; thus there is difference in the object.

How the object of knowledge is different is shown here.

[822]

परिच्छेदफलत्वं हि मानत्वं तच्च भिद्यते ।

तदभावे तु पूर्वेषामुत्तरस्यैव मानता ॥ ८२२ ॥

To be a means of valid knowledge, indeed, is to have definiteness as its fruit; and that is different. When the earlier cognitions do not have that there is validity only for the last one.

The function of a *pramāṇa* is to define the object. As the definition of each object is different, the *pramāṇa* also is different. If the earlier cognitions have not defined the object, the last one alone should be regarded as *pramāṇa*.

[823]

अथ मेयप्रभेदेऽपि प्रमाणैकत्वमिष्यते ।

वस्तुग्राहितयाऽक्षादेरैकार्थ्येऽभिन्नमानता ॥ ८२३ ॥

If it be said that even though there is difference in the object of knowledge, the *pramāṇa* is one because the same reality is apprehended, then (for the same reason)

perception, etc., having the same object must be a non-different *pramāṇa*.

If it be said that, though there is a difference in the object when there is a series of cognitions, the *pramāṇa* itself is single because the thing itself is non-different, we reply: if that were so then the five *pramāṇas*, perception, etc., should be regarded as a single *pramāṇa* when they have the same content.

[824]

साध्यमानं प्रसंख्यानं यागवत्साधयेत्फलम् ।

कारकं ज्ञापकं शास्त्रं तयोः स्यादेकता कथम् ॥ ८२४ ॥

If continued meditation which is being accomplished were to accomplish the fruit, like sacrifice, then it would be what causes to act, and Scripture is what makes known; how could the two be one?

If meditation is like sacrifice, yielding its fruit through being performed, then it is a causative factor (*kāraka*), and cannot, therefore, be identical with Scriptural teaching whose function is to make known (*jñāpaka*).

[825]

प्रमाताऽऽत्मा न मानांशो यद्ययं व्यावहारिकः ।

परश्चेत्स प्रमेयः स्यात्कथं चानुभवः फलम् ॥ ८२५ ॥

The cognizer-self cannot be a part of the *pramāṇa*, if it be the empirical soul (that is meant); if it be the supreme Self, that is the object of knowledge (*prameya*); how then can experience be the fruit?

It was stated by the *pūrvapakṣin* that there are four factors constituting the *pramāṇa* for Self-realization. One of the factors is the self. Which self is this? Is it the empirical self? Or, the supreme Self? It cannot be the empirical self, because that self is the locus of *pramāṇa*, and cannot, therefore, be a part of *pramāṇa*. Nor can it be the supreme Self, for that Self is the object of *pramāṇa*. So, how can experience be the fruit of the said four factors?

[826]

स्वरूपं यद्यसाध्यं तत्स्वातन्त्र्येण प्रसिद्धितः ।

तज्ज्ञानं चेत्प्रमाणं तत्तच्च शास्त्रान्न कार्यतः ॥ ८२६ ॥

If experience is one's own nature (*svarūpa*), then it is not what-is-to-be-accomplished, as it is established independently by itself; if it be the knowledge thereof, then that is *pramāṇa*; and that is (i.e. arises) from Scripture and not from a *kārya*.

What is this experience? Is it the nature of *Brahman*? Or, is it the psychosis of the form of *Brahman*? If it be the former, it cannot be the fruit of *pramāṇa*. If it be the latter, then that is the result of the Scriptural texts 'That thou art', etc., and not of *prasaṅkhyāna* which is a *kārya*.

masyaādi

NKL—*tattvamādivākya-phalam vṛttirūpajñānam na prasaṅkhyāna-phalam.*

[827]

शास्त्रमावर्त्यमानं हि स्वभावं नैव मुञ्चति ।

परोक्षवृत्तिर्युक्तिश्च कथं ते मिति वर्धने ॥ ८२७ ॥

Scripture which is being repeated, verily, does not lose its nature; and how can reasoning and that which is mediate be for you the means of increasing validity?

According to you, Scripture can yield only mediate knowledge of the real. Reasoning is, no doubt, mediate. By merely repeating these, how can one get immediate experience?

[828]

प्रमितेश्च प्रमेयस्य वृद्धौ वृद्धिः स्वतो न हि ।

तस्य वृद्धिर्मितेर्वृद्धावित्यन्योन्यसमाश्रयः ॥ ८२८ ॥

The growth in validity depends upon growth in the object of knowledge; it does not occur by itself; and the growth of that (object) depends on the growth of validity. Thus there is reciprocal dependence.

If it be held that by the said repetition there is an increase in knowledge, there would be the defect of reciprocal dependence thus: when there is excellence brought about in the object of knowledge, there occurs similar excellence in the means of knowledge, and *vice versa*.

NKL — *prameyasya vṛddhau viśayasyātiśaya-siddhau pramiter vṛddhiḥ.....mitivaicitryam antareṇa meyavaicitryam nāsti mānādhi-
natvān meyasiddhir iti anyonyāśrayaḥ.*

[829]

उत्पाद्यापि मितिं शास्त्रं यदि युक्त्याद्यपेक्षते ।

स्वर्गादावेवमेव स्यात्सापेक्षं च भवेत्तदा ॥ ८२९ ॥

If Scripture, even after generating knowledge, should stand in need of reasoning, etc., then that would be so even in the case of heaven, etc.; and in that case it would become dependent.

You say that Scripture stands in need of reasoning, etc. Now, does Scripture expect help from reasoning, etc., after making known the real, for the sake of the fruit which is intuitive experience, or does it require help even in the matter of making known the real? If it be the first, then it must be said with regard to the text 'He who desires heaven should sacrifice,' etc., that it occasions the sacrificial activity of the person concerned by making known the relation between the means and end, and then requires help from reasoning for the accomplishment of the end which is heaven. But such is not the case. If the second alternative be sponsored by you, then Scripture would cease to be *pramāṇa*, being dependent on reasoning.

[830]

व्यपास्तानर्थसंदर्भमात्मानमवगच्छतः ।

किमाप्यमधिकं शास्त्राद्येन युक्त्याद्यपेक्षते ॥ ८३० ॥

What more from Scripture is to be attained by him who has known the self as free from the aggregate of evil—in which case there may be dependence on reasoning, etc.?

More than the realization of the pure self, there is nothing that is to be achieved through Scripture. Where is, then, the need to depend on reasoning?

[831]

का वा युक्तिः प्रदीपस्य सर्पाद्याकम्पनाशनम् ।

रज्ज्वादितत्त्वविज्ञानं कुर्वतः स्वेन तेजसा ॥ ८३१ ॥

What reasoning does the lamp require which by its own light dispels the serpent and the shudder (caused by it) and makes known the truth, viz. the rope, etc.?

An example is given for showing that Scripture does not depend on reasoning for making known its own sense. The example is the familiar one of the lamp dispelling the rope-snake illusion.

NKL—*vimatam adhyasta-nivarttakam tattvajñānatvāt rajjutattva-jñānavat.*

[832]

गुणप्रधानभावो हि विना नैवैकवाक्यताम् ।

वस्तुकार्यार्थतात्पर्यभेदान्नापीह सा भवेत् ॥ ८३२ ॥

The relation of subsidiary and principal cannot be without syntactical unity; and that cannot obtain here because of difference in purport as reality and *kārya*.

Scripture and *prasaṅkhyāna* are not related as principal and subsidiary, because there is no syntactical unity between them. And there cannot be syntactical unity, because their purports are different; the texts 'That thou art,' etc., have reality for purport, while the injunction of meditation has *niyoga* for purport.

AVS—*prasaṅkhyānavidhi-sāstrayoh śeṣaśeṣibhāva ekavākyatām vinā na sambhavati, sā caikavākyatā na sambhavati, tattvamāder vastu-paratvāt prasaṅkhyānaviddhāyaka-vākyasya niyogaparatvāt.*

[833]

न च प्रयोजनैकत्वलक्षणाऽलैकवाक्यता ।

अङ्गप्रधानवद्येन कल्पेतालैकवाक्यता ॥ ८३३ ॥

Nor is there here syntactical unity of the nature of identity of fruit, as between auxiliary and principal, in which case syntactical unity could be postulated.

It may be contended that there is syntactical unity for *prasaṅkhyāna* and Scripture because of the sameness of fruit, as for the texts relating to the *Prayājas* and the *Darsapūrṇamāsa*. In connection with the *Darsapūrṇamāsa* sacrifice, we read—‘*samidho yajati, tanūna-pātaṁ yajati, iḍo yajati, barhir yajati, svāhākāraṁ yajati*’ (*Taittirīya-saṁhitā*, II, vi, 1, 1). This text mentions the fore-sacrifices that are to be performed in connection with the *Darsapūrṇamāsa*. These fore-sacrifices have no independent fruit; they are auxiliary to the principal act which is the *Darsapūrṇamāsa*.

Now, if *prasaṅkhyāna* and Scripture are to be related in this way, what is the fruit, we ask? Is it heaven? Or, is it release?

The fruit cannot be heaven; and *prasaṅkhyāna* and Scripture cannot have syntactical unity because of having heaven as their fruit. A contrary example is given here. There are two sets of texts (A) one commencing with the words ‘*yadāgneṇyo’sṭākapālaḥ,*’ etc., and (B) the other with the words ‘*āghāraṁ āghārayati,*’ etc. They relate to two sets of sacrifices. The question to be settled is whether both the sets of sacrifices are equally primary, or whether the first set alone is primary, the second being auxiliary. It is argued by the *Mīmāṃsaka*, as against the *prima facie* view, that the first set comprises the principal acts constituting the *Darsapūrṇamāsa*, while the second set consists of auxiliary acts. It is also maintained by him that the text, ‘*ya evaṁ vidvān paurṇamāsīm yajate, ya evaṁ vidvān amāvāsyām yajate*’ (*Taittirīya-saṁhitā*, I, vi, 9, 1-2), does not enjoin two different acts, but prescribes the time of performance with reference to the first set of sacrifices. [See *PM*, II, ii, 3-8.] Here again we have syntactical unity because the texts are related as enjoining the principal and subsidiary acts. And, the fruit is heaven.

This contingency does not arise with reference to *prasaṅkhyāna* and Scripture, because even you do not hold that heaven is their fruit.

[834]

स्वतःसिद्धस्य मोक्षस्य न साध्यमुपकारकम् ।

न चान्यथाऽङ्गता दृष्टा प्रधानानुपकारिणः ॥ ८३४ ॥

For release which is self-established, what is to be established (*prasaṅkhyāna*) cannot be the helper; auxiliaryness is not to be found in any other way in the case of what does not help the principal.

In regard to the other alternative, namely, that *prasaṅkhyāna* and Scripture have syntactical unity because they have release as their fruit, we have to ask; does *prasaṅkhyāna* help Scripture in the matter of bringing about the fruit, or in establishing Scripture itself?

Not the first; for it has already been shown that in the matter of release which is the fruit of Scripture, the injunction of *prasaṅkhyāna* is of no use.

NTV—*kaivalyaṁ hi svataḥsiddham na ca tasya kṛtisādhayatayā 'nuṣṭheyam prasaṅkhyānaṁ sādhanopakāraḥ bhavati.*

[835]

आत्मलाभे न शास्त्रं च नित्यत्वात्कार्यमीक्षते ।

स्वतोऽभिधानशक्तत्वान्नापि चैकतम्यबोधने ॥ ८३५ ॥

Scripture does not need *kārya* for establishing itself, for it is eternal, nor for teaching the oneness of self, for it has the capacity to express by itself.

The second alternative too is not possible; Scripture is eternal, and so it does not require *prasaṅkhyāna* for its establishment; nor does it need *prasaṅkhyāna* for revealing its sense, for it has the ability by itself to make known the one self.

AVS—*vedasya nityatvāt svato bodhana-sāmarthyāc ca.*

प्रसंख्यानं च शास्त्रार्थं सकृदेव कृते भवेत् ।

ऐकस्यानुभवो नो चेद्विसंवादादमानता ॥ ८३६ ॥

If continued meditation be the sense of Scripture, when performed once, there should be experience of the oneness of self; if not, there would be failure of fruitfulness, and there would result invalidity (for Scripture).

Let *prasaṅkhyāna* be the principal or a subsidiary to Scripture. But we have to settle this question, viz. whether it has an unseen result or a seen result. It cannot have an unseen result; for that is unacceptable to both of us. If it has a seen result, does that result come about when *prasaṅkhyāna* is performed once, or only when it is repeated? If the first alternative be sponsored, then you will have to give up advocating *bhāvanā* which is prolonged and uninterrupted meditation. As for the second alternative, that too is unintelligible. If a single performance of *prasaṅkhyāna* does not yield the fruit, how can a repeated performance yield it?

न चात्र चोदितः कालः संख्या वा येन निश्चयः ।

तद्द्वारेण भवेन्नापि संदिग्धे स्यात्प्रवर्तनम् ॥ ८३७ ॥

Nor is there prescribed here time or number in which case there could be certainty about the result through that. Indeed, there cannot be activity in respect of what is in doubt.

In the injunction of *prasaṅkhyāna* there is not mentioned 'time' or 'number' by virtue of which it may be said to yield the fruit. Contrary examples may help in elucidating the point here. In the

case of the *Agnihotra* sacrifice, 'morning' and 'evening' are prescribed. In the text 'He takes hold of the seventeen *Prājāpatya* animals,' the number 'seventeen' is prescribed. In regard to *prasaṅkhyāna*, no similar prescriptions are there. When one is in doubt about the fruitfulness of an act, one would not perform it.

NKL—*asmin-kāle etāvat - saṅkhyākāṁ prasaṅkhyānād unubhavo bhaved iti ... na.*

[838]

आरुह्याप्यथवा दूरं विसंवादपराङ्मुखः ।

यत्किञ्चित्कामतः कुर्यादकृतार्थोऽथवा पतेत् ॥ ८३८ ॥

Or (i.e. even if he is active), having climbed up high, he will turn indifferent because of failure and do as he likes, or fall without gaining his objective.

Or, when in doubt, if one performs *prasaṅkhyāna*, no good would come out of it. After trying and failing, one may become indifferent or despondent and end in utter defeat.

[839]

अदृष्टफलता वाऽपि कल्प्याऽग्निष्टोमवद्भवेत् ।

कर्माङ्गता वा कल्प्या स्यादुद्गीथविधिवत्तदा ॥ ८३९ ॥

Or, unseen fruit will have to be assumed, as in *Agniṣṭoma*; or it should be assumed to be an auxiliary to rite, as the injunction of the *Udgītha* chant.

If it be said that there is no question of failure, because one is asked to do *prasaṅkhyāna* till the end of one's life, then we must assume an unseen result for it, as for the *Jyotiṣṭoma*. Or, *prasaṅkhyāna* must be regarded as an auxiliary to ritual, even as the *Udgītha* chant is.

[840]

ततश्च प्रातिलोम्येन कार्यं स्याच्छास्त्रबाधनात् ।

अश्रद्धा च मुमुक्षूणां कार्यबाधोऽपि च स्थितः ॥ ८४० ॥

Thence there would be the *kārya* contrary to what is taught and subverting Scripture; there would also be loss of faith for those who desire release and there would be sublation of the *kārya*.

If *prasaṅkhyāna* is an auxiliary to ritual, it cannot serve as a subsidiary of Scripture (that teaches the one self). If it has an unseen fruit, then it would be a principal act, like the *Jyotiṣṭoma*. That would mean that you have to give up your view that *prasaṅkhyāna* is subsidiary to Scripture. Moreover, if *prasaṅkhyāna* is an auxiliary to ritual and has an unseen result, then the one who desires release would not be interested in it even as he is not interested in the *Jyotiṣṭoma*. As realization is not seen to result from it, the one who desires release would not perform it; and so far as he is concerned, there could be no injunction of *prasaṅkhyāna*.

[841]

वस्तुतत्त्वानपेक्षत्वात्कार्यमात्रप्रधानता ।

शास्त्राच्च वस्तुनोऽलाभात्कार्यं किंविषयं भवेत् ॥ ८४१ ॥

The *kārya* alone would be the principal, because there would be no need of the truth of reality; and since from Scripture the real cannot be gained, what content will the *kārya* have?

Further, on the view of *prasaṅkhyāna*, we have to ask, what makes the reality known? Is it the text that enjoins *prasaṅkhyāna*? Or, is it the text 'That thou art,' etc.? Not the first, because the injunction

has *niyoga* for purport, and cannot, therefore, reveal the real. Nor the second; for if the text 'That thou art' has *niyoga* for purport, it cannot serve as *pramāṇa* in regard to its own sense. And, in the absence of the knowledge of reality, a repetition of that knowledge would be impossible, and the *niyoga*, thus, would be void of content.

[842]

यदि तद्वस्तुयाथात्म्यं शास्त्रं न प्रतिपादयेत् ।

वस्त्वसिद्धेस्ततः कार्यप्राधान्यादर्थवादता ॥ ८४२ ॥

If Scripture does not expound the true nature of reality, then since the real has not been established and as that text treats principally of *kārya*, there would be for that the nature of eulogy.

On the view of *prasaṅkhyāna*, does the sacred teaching about the one self, while having that self for purport, not expound it, or does it expound? If it does not expound, then it would not be *pramāṇa*.

[843]

अथैकात्म्यार्थनिष्ठं सच्छास्त्रं स्यात्प्रतिपादकम् ।

आपरोक्ष्यात्तदा कार्यं व्यर्थं पारोक्ष्यहानिकृत् ॥ ८४३ ॥

If Scripture does expound the oneness of self as its purport, then that oneness will be immediate, and so it is futile to assume a *kārya* which destroys the mediacy.

If the sacred teaching does expound the oneness of self, then the intuitive experience thereof would result from that text itself, and there would be no need for *prasaṅkhyāna* to remove mediacy.

[844]

शास्त्रात्कथं च तत्सिद्धिर्याथात्म्यानवबोधकात् ।

नानश्वरूपे सिद्धेऽपि गव्यश्वस्य प्रसिद्धता ॥ ८४४ ॥

How does that result from Scripture which does not teach the true nature (of the self)? When the cow which is non-horse is established, the horse is not established.

Now, it may be argued thus: From Scripture there does not result the immediate experience of the real; for it can convey only a related and mediate sense. In order to make it immediate, there is the injunction of *prasaṅkhyāna*.

Reply: There is the text which declares, 'That which is direct and immediate,' etc. If from this and similar texts there does not arise the direct experience of the one self, Scripture would become *apramāṇa*.

Objection: Scripture teaches a reality which is distinct from the relationless and direct self, and also as the counter-correlate thereof the relationless and direct self. So, there is validity for Scripture.

Reply: How is this possible? Suppose we see a cow which is distinct from the horse; do we thereby see the horse also?

AVS—*aśvād bhinne gavi siddhe 'pi pratyakṣādina na taj-jñānād aśvasiddhiḥ*.

[845]

शास्त्राच्छ्रवणमालेण कार्याच्चानुभवो यदि ।

वस्तुन्यनिश्चिते वार्ता साऽर्थवादेऽपि दृश्यते ॥ ८४५ ॥

If it be said that the self is only heard from Scripture, and that the experience thereof is from *kārya*, then

the real is not determined, and Scripture would be mere words as is seen in the case of eulogy also.

Objection: From Scripture, the relationless and direct reality is established. But a mere hearing of Scripture does not produce experience. In order to have this experience, one must do *prasaṅkhyāna*. Thus, there is validity for Scripture, and there is need for *prasaṅkhyāna*.

Reply: From Scripture, is there determinate knowledge of reality, or only doubtful knowledge? If there is determinate knowledge, then that is experience, and nothing more is required. If there is only doubtful knowledge, then that is no knowledge. To say that there is knowledge from verbal testimony would thus be a mere figure of speech. If this be so, the text 'That thou art,' etc., would be but an eulogy.

[846]

ततश्च कार्यनिष्ठत्वं मुधैव परिवर्जितम् ।

संपत्परं भवेच्छास्त्रं वस्तुतात्पर्यवर्जनात् ॥ ८४६ ॥

And so, the doctrine that Scripture has *kārya* for purport has been given up (by the *prasaṅkhyānavādin*) only in vain; Scripture would have *sampat* (meditation) for purport, since it ceases to have reality for purport.

You cannot say, "Let the text 'That thou art' be an eulogy. What is the harm?" If the text is an eulogy, then its purport would be *kārya*. But this is not acceptable to you, for you too hold that the one self is the purport of the text. Self-consistency would demand of you to say that *prasaṅkhyāna*, and not reality, is the purport.

NKL — *vastuparaṁ śāstram icchatā na prasaṅkhyāna-niyogā 'ṅgikārya ity arthaḥ.*

AVS — vastuparatvena vastuni mātram icchataḥ prasaṅkhyāna-niyogo nābhyupagantavyaḥ.

[847]

न चाप्याख्यायिकारूपमनुग्राहं श्रुतौ मतम् ।

आदिमत्त्वादिदुष्टत्वात्पुमर्थत्वेन वर्ण्यते ॥ ८४७ ॥

Nor is Scripture to be taken as of the form of story, though (stories are) heard; for there would be the defect of having a beginning, etc. Stories are related only as being subsidiary to the human goal.

There are stories related in the Upaniṣads. But they are not their purport; for by listening to them the human goal is not reached. If the stories were to constitute the purport, Scripture would have a beginning and cease to be eternal. The stories are there only as subsidiary aids to understanding.

AVS—tarhi kimartham ākhyāyikārūpaṁ śrutyā bhāṇyate ... abhyu-dayamokṣa-sādhana-stutyartham iti brūmaḥ.

[848]

पौनरुक्त्यभयाच्चात्र यद्यर्थान्तरकल्पनम् ।

ऐकात्म्योक्तौ विधिव्यर्थ इति द्वैतप्रकल्पनम् ॥ ८४८ ॥

If, for the fear of futile repetition, another sense be assumed here (for *uttara-kāṇḍa*), and it be stated to be oneness of self, then injunction would be futile, and so duality would have to be assumed (that there may be continued meditation).

For this reason also there cannot be the injunction of *prasaṅkhyāna* in the Upaniṣadic texts 'That thou art, etc.: if the Upaniṣads have *niyoga* for purport, like the ritual sections of the Veda, there would be futile repetition.

Objection: In the ritual sections, injunction is independent, whereas in the Upaniṣads the main teaching is about Brahman, and the injunction of *prasaṅkhyāna* is auxiliary thereto. Thus there is no repetition. Or in the ritual section, *niyoga* is the external means, whereas here it is the internal means. Or, the connection may be stated thus: if *prasaṅkhyāna-niyoga* is not admitted in regard to the text 'That thou art,' there would be release through knowledge generated by the text heard only once, and the repetition of the text nine times in the *Chāndogya* would be pointless. Therefore the injunction of *prasaṅkhyāna* as auxiliary to the sacred teaching should be recognized.

Reply: The first explanation offered is not sound. If there be admitted *niyoga* in the Upaniṣads, that would become the principal according to the rule that what is existent is for the sake of what is to be occasioned (*bhūta-bhavya-nyāya*). So, the proper distinction between the two sections should be stated thus: In regard to the Vedāntic texts there could be no injunction by any means. Injunction is pertinent only to the texts that relate to ritual.

The second explanation too is not proper. That explanation would obtain if the two sections constituted one teaching like the second and third chapters of a single book. But that is not the case. As there can be no injunction at all in regard to the text 'That thou art,' etc., the two sections must be regarded as two different teachings.

The third explanation is equally unintelligible. If it is urged that the injunction of *prasaṅkhyāna* is for the wise one also because the text 'That thou art' is repeated, then it would follow that duality is real, as without duality there could be no injunction. It cannot be said that only an apparent duality is required, for your view is that the *niyoga* is necessary even after there is knowledge. Otherwise, the *niyoga* too would become unreal. So, the reason for the repetition of the text 'That thou art' must be stated thus: it is for the removal of doubts that arise in the way of understanding the text.

Note: AVS introduces the second alternative in the *pūrvapakṣa* thus: *brahmadattādi-matānusārī kaścic codayati*.

[849]

न च मानेन विषये बोधितेऽन्वेषणं पुनः ।

कार्ययुक्त्योः कचिदृष्टं स्वतःप्रामाण्यबाधनात् ॥ ८४९ ॥

In a matter which has been known through means of valid knowledge nowhere is again seen enquiring through *kārya* and reasoning, for then, self-validity would be destroyed.

When is *prasaṅkhyāna* required—is it when the Scriptural teaching has been understood only superficially, or even when that teaching has been directly and determinately known? The first alternative is acceptable to us, not the second. On the evidence of the Scriptural teaching when a matter has been settled, there is no need either for *niyoga* or for reasoning. When the supreme truth has been seen, there is no room for the sense of agency. How, then, can there be scope for injunction, etc.? Moreover, if Scripture were to be dependent on them, its self-validity would be destroyed.

[850]

प्रत्यक्षेण घटे बुद्धे का युक्तिः कार्यमेव वा ।

अदुष्टकारणत्वं चेत्सिद्धं वेदे नृवर्जनात् ॥ ८५० ॥

When a pot has been known through perception, why reasoning and why *kārya*? If they are needed for having a defectless cause, that is already established in the case of the Veda, because it has no human author.

An illustration is here given for showing that Scripture does not depend on reasoning, etc. When a pot is directly perceived, there is no need to reason about it. Sometimes, in the case of perception, etc., there may be a defective cause, which may necessitate dependence on reasoning, etc. But as regards Scripture, there can be no defect at all, for it is not the work of a human agent.

NTV—tatra kācādidōṣasambhavād anveṣaṇam, sābdepi pauruṣeye puruṣadvāraka-dōṣa-sambhavād anveṣaṇā bhavaty eva, vedasya tu apauruṣeyatvād dōṣarahitatvaṁ svataḥsiddham iti nānveṣaṇam yuktam iti bhāvaḥ.

[851]

प्रत्यक्षादिविरोधश्च कार्यपक्षेऽपि तु स्थितः ।

ऐकात्म्यानुभवो हि स्यात्कथमक्षादिबाधनात् ॥ ८५१ ॥

As for contradiction with perception, etc., that remains even on the view of *kārya*. How can there be the experience of oneness of self, since it is contradicted by perception, etc.?

It cannot be maintained that, as the Scriptural knowledge of the oneness of self is opposed to perception, there is need for *prasaṅkhyāna-niyoga*. For, even then the opposition to perception would remain.

NTV — siddhavastu-bodhakatve vākyasya pratyakṣādi-virodhepi prāmāṇyaṁ yujyate, upakramādiliṅgaiḥ tatra tātparya-nirṇayāt, niyoga-paratve tu ādityo yūpa ityādivat na vastuni prāmāṇyaṁ pratyakṣādi-virodhād ity arthaḥ.

[852]

तन्निषेधात्तु या सिद्धिर्न सा कार्यप्रसादतः ।

प्रमाणादेव शास्त्रात्सा न मेयात्कार्यतो भवेत् ॥ ८५२ ॥

That which is established by the denial of that (perception, etc.) is, indeed, not a gift from the *kārya*; that is only from Scripture which is a valid means of knowledge, and not from the object of knowledge which is *kārya*.

The establishment of the non-dual reality through the rejection of the evidence of perception, etc., is not on the strength of *niyoga*, but on the testimony of Scripture which is a valid means of knowledge. *Niyoga* is not a means of knowledge; it is an object of knowledge.

[853]

का वा कार्येऽस्ति ते युक्तिः शास्त्रं चेदुभयोः समम् ।

अज्ञातज्ञापनादन्यच्छास्त्रान्नेति पुरोदितम् ॥ ८५३ ॥

If the nature of Scripture be the same for us both, then what argument of yours will justify *kārya*? That there is no Scripture other than that which makes known what has not been known, we have said already.

Both of us are agreed' that the Vedānta texts validly teach a sense which relates to the established reality. We have also defined *pramāṇa* as that which conveys a sense not already known. Thus, when it is shown that Scripture is the evidence for Brahman which is not known earlier, where is the need for dependence on *niyoga*?

[See vv. 561-b — 562-a f.]

[854]

पुमर्थं प्रतिपाद्यापि प्रकृत्यैव श्रुतिः पुनः ।

तमेव युक्तिभिः सार्धं वदन्ती स्वार्थमीक्षते ॥ ८५४ ॥

After expounding the human goal by the force of its own nature, Scripture in speaking of that again with the help of arguments, is expectant only of its own sense.

It may be argued that although *niyoga* is not needed, reasoning is required thus: Scriptural texts do contain arguments. The reasoning based on arguments is not possible before knowing a thing. So, it must be admitted that Scripture stands in need of reasoning for establishing what is taught by it.

Reply: Scripture teaches its sense which is the human goal. The arguments are adduced to remove possible doubts. Although the knowledge of the inner reality, Brahman, is given by Scripture, there arise doubts on account of the limitations of man. The arguments that are advanced are designed for the removal of these doubts. They are not the means for generating the intuitive knowledge of Brahman. For this, the Scriptural text alone is the cause.

NKL—śrutiḥ prakṛtyaiva svārasikaśāmarthyenaiva saṁvid-ānanda-vastu pratipādyā, sambhāvanā - viparītabhāvanā - 'bhibhūtam āpāta-darśanam utpādyā, tad asambhāvanādi-nirāsaphala-yuktibhiḥ saha vadantī svārtham akhaṇḍāparokṣam ikṣate sadyomuktiphalam anubhavam prasūta ity arthah.

[855]

नैतावताऽपराधेन युक्तयो मानकारणम् ।

शब्दमालादसंसिद्धेरनपेक्षत्वहानतः ॥ ८५५ ॥

On account of a fault such as this the reasonings are not the cause of a means of valid knowledge; for if the self would not be established from Scripture alone, there would be the destruction of the latter's independence.

Scripture teaches its own sense; here there is no dependence on reasoning. The latter helps only by way of removing doubts. Otherwise, Scripture would cease to be an independent *pramāṇa*.

NTV — *pauruṣeyavākyavat vedah sāpekṣaḥ prāpnoti, yuktyādy-upanyāsasyā 'nyathāsiddhau na sāpekṣaḥ syād ity arthaḥ.*

[856]

न वायोः क्षिप्रकारित्वाच्छेतालम्भो विभूतये ।

विध्युद्देशात्तु तत्सिद्धेः शैद्यं तूक्तं प्रवृत्तये ॥ ८५६ ॥

Not because Vāyu is quick in giving reward is the sacrifice of a white goat enjoined for attaining prosperity; for that is established as the aim of the injunction; and quickness is mentioned for the sake of performance.

Here an illustration is given to show that reasoning is only for the purpose of removing obstacles that lie in the way of determinate knowledge. There is the Vedic text (see note to v. 36): 'One desiring prosperity should sacrifice the animal *śveta* dedicated to Vāyu: Vāyu, verily, is the eṣṭest deity ... he leads the man to prosperity.' Here the relation of means and end as between sacrificing the white animal and gaining prosperity is not established on the strength of the words 'Vāyu, verily, is the eṣṭest deity.' That relation is known from the earlier part of the text 'One desiring,' etc. The other part of the text is for removing a possible obstacle by putting enthusiasm into the agent of the sacrifice.

Similarly, here, reasoning is given, not for generating knowledge from the text, nor for the sake of determining the sense of the knowledge that has arisen, but for removing the obstacles thereto.

NTV—*na vākyāt jñānotpattaye yuktyādy-upanyāsaḥ, nāpy utpanna-jñānasya svārtha-niścayāya, kiṃtu niścita-pratibandhavigamanāya.*

NKL — *vāyur vai kṣepiṣṭā devateti kṣiprakāritva-kathanam na svētāmbhasya vibhūti-sāadhanatva-jñāpanāya vidhita eva tatsiddheḥ, kiṃtu prarocanādvārā puṃ-pravṛttyarham. evam atrāpi jñānasyotpattau arthaniscitau ca na yuktyapekṣā apitu pratibandha vigame eva.*

AVS—*nanu jñānaphale pratibandho na bhavati 'ty uktam ācāryaiḥ evam muktiphalāniyama ity atra, ataḥ katham adhikaraṇaviruddham ucyate. naitatsāram, jñānasya dvividham phalam svaviśayaniścaya ekam phalam, aparaṃ niścayadvāreṇa avidyā-tatkārya-nivṛttiḥ tatra niścayā-khyam phalam pratibandhum sakyate.*

[857]

जाग्रदवप्नसुषुप्तेभ्यो यदि नामातिरेकतः ।

व्यक्तिभ्यो गोत्ववद्दृष्टं ब्रह्मत्वेऽस्य किमागतम् ॥ ८५७ ॥

If the self be seen as distinct from the states of waking, dream and sleep, as cowness is from the individuals, what bearing has it on the self being Brahman?

The determination of truth does not result from reasoning. For example, one may know through reasoning that the self is distinct from the three states of experience. But, with this much, it is not realized that the self is Brahman, that the sense of 'thou' is the sense of 'that.' This latter realization is got only from the Vedāntic text.

NTV—*tvaṃ-padārtha-śuddhir eva yuktibhiḥ bhavati na tasya brahmatvam avagataṃ bhavati, vākyād eva kevalāt tad avagamād ity arthaḥ.*

NKL — *tvaṃ - padārtha - viveko yukti-phalam brahmatvānubhavo vākya-phalam.*

[858]

असिद्धं शास्त्रयुक्तिभ्यामावृत्त्याऽपि न सिध्यति ।

नैव ह्यावर्तनं हेतुः प्रामाण्येऽन्येष्वनीक्षणात् ॥ ८५८ ॥

What has not been established by Scripture and reasoning cannot be established by repetition. Verily, repetition is not seen to be the cause of validity elsewhere.

The opponent may argue that, as knowledge is not seen to result from the text that has been heard or from reasoning, there is need for repetition (*prasaṅkhyāna*). The reply is that repetition is not a means of knowledge. Even as the repetition of perception is not the cause of validity, the repetition of verbal testimony is not the cause of validity.

NKL — ātmājñānam abhyasyamānam nāparokṣapramiti-janakam, jñānatvāt, pratyakṣādi-jñānavat.

AVS—jñānasya āvṛtyā niścayaajanakatvaṁ na dṛṣṭam ity arthaḥ.

[859]

न चेदृशं प्रमाणत्वं दृष्टमन्यत्र कुत्रचित् ।

अन्यादृक्षप्रमाणस्य न च नास्त्यत्र संभवः ॥ ८५९ ॥

Nowhere else is this kind of validity seen ; nor can it be said that there is no possibility here of a unique kind of proof.

It may be that secular statements convey a sense that is related and mediate. That does not mean that it is impossible for the Vedāntic texts to reveal Brahman that is unrelated and immediate. A *pramāṇa* must be in consonance with the real.

AVS — apratibandha-vijñānam svarūpalābhamātreṇa niścitiṁ avidyāatākārya-nivṛttiṁ ca karotī 'ty arthaḥ.

[860]

अलौकिकार्थवादित्वादात्मब्रह्माभिधानयोः ।

संबन्धाग्रहणादात्मा ब्रह्मेति कथमुच्यते ॥ ८६० ॥

“Because the names *Ātman* and *Brahman* are expressive of nonempirical senses, how can it be said that the *Ātman* is *Brahman* without knowing their relation?

Objection: You say that the text ‘That thou art’, etc., is the *pramāṇa* for *Brahman-Ātman*. Now, are the words ‘*Brahman*’ and ‘*Ātman*’ known through some other *pramāṇa* or not? If they are not known, the text cannot convey meaning.

[861]

ज्ञातार्थसङ्गतिः शब्दो वाक्यार्थावगमक्षमः ।

ब्रह्मात्मार्थप्रसिद्धौ च लोकान्मानप्रवेशिता ॥ ८६१ ॥

“The word whose relation to the sense is known is capable of conveying the sentence-sense. If the senses of *Brahman* and *Ātman* were known from empirical usage, then the knowledge would enter the empirical sphere.”

If those words are already known, then the text ‘That thou art,’ etc., would be but a re-statement.

[862]

नाऽऽत्मन्येवाऽऽत्मशब्दस्य प्रयोगात्स्यादलौकिकः ।

ब्रह्मार्थोऽपि महत्त्वेन प्रसिद्धो व्यवहारतः ॥ ८६२ ॥

Since the word ‘self’ is used only to refer to the self, it has an empirical sense; and the sense of ‘*Brahman*’ also is well known in empirical usage as greatness.

Reply : The two words are not unknown in empirical usage. The word 'Ātman' is employed to refer to self. The word 'Brahman' means 'that which is great.'

[863]

एवं पदात्परिज्ञाते पदार्थे लोकमानतः ।

वाक्यार्थोऽतीन्द्रियो वेदे वाक्यात्केन निवार्यते ॥ ८६३ ॥

When thus the word-senses have been known from the words through the empirical means of knowledge, who can prevent the super-sensuous sentence-sense from the sentence in the Veda?

Although the word-senses are known earlier, the sense of the text 'That thou art' is not empirical, in which case alone the text would be a re-statement. The impartite sense which the text conveys is not known through any other *pramāṇa*.

[864]

अपूर्वदेवतास्वर्गपदार्थेष्वपि लोकतः ।

सिद्धेष्वतीन्द्रियोऽप्यर्थो वाक्यादेवागम्यते ॥ ८६४ ॥

When through empirical usage the senses of words like *apūrva*, *devatā* and *svarga* have been established, the super-sensuous sense is understood from the sentence alone.

An example is given here from the ritual section of the Veda. Words such as 'apūrva,' 'devatā,' and 'svarga' carry their meanings even in empirical usage. But, as employed in the Vedic texts, they acquire a supernormal meaning.

NKL — *kṛtisādhyamātre saṁpradānakāṛakamātre sukhāmātre vā apūrvādi-śabdānām loka-grhīta-saṅgātikānām vede svargakāmādi-padāntara-samabhivyāhāreṇa viśiṣṭārtha-bodhakatvaṁ yathā tathā atrāpī 'ty arthah.*

[865]

नापेक्षापूर्णाशक्तेः प्रयोगे समवायिता ।

पदानां सपदार्थानां वाक्याद्वयवहतिर्यतः ॥ ८६५ ॥

There is no coherence when words along with the word-senses are used, as they have not the capacity to satisfy the expectancy ; for, empirical usage is from sentence.

The objector may say that there is no sentence-sense other than the word-senses put together. But he is wrong. On hearing a set of words without mutual expectancy, one does not make out any sense. In order to convey sentence-sense, a sentence has to be employed.

[866-867]

वाक्यार्थायैव वाक्यं हि सर्वदैव प्रयुज्यते ।

व्यवहारेषु वृद्धानां संबन्धस्तत्र गृह्यते ॥ ८६६ ॥

भागान्तरप्रवेशेन भागत्यागेन च स्फुटम् ।

वाक्यवाक्यार्थयोर्भेदे पदार्थानां निमित्तता ॥ ८६७ ॥

In the empirical usages of elders a sentence is always used for the sake of sentence-sense ; there the relation (of words and their senses) is understood clearly by the entry of other parts and leaving off of certain parts (i. e. *āvāpodvāpa*); for the difference between sentence and sentence-sense, the words and their senses are the cause.

Objection: Words make their senses known; from the word-senses there is knowledge of the sentence-sense, and not from the sentence.

Reply: Both in the state of learning and in the state thereafter it is only the sentence that is used. Never do the word-senses make sentence-sense known; for they are not *pramāṇa*. If it were not thus, knowledge of the sentence-sense would not be through verbal testimony. Moreover, in the empirical usage of elders it is the knowledge of the sentence-sense that is intended. It is from this that the relation of particular words to their senses is known through the method of insertion and elimination.

Objection: Insertion and elimination stop when the senses of words have been grasped. How, then, to account for the difference between sentences and between sentence-senses?

Reply: Words are the cause for the difference between sentences; and word-senses for the difference between sentence-senses.

AVS — na kevalam padārthajñānāya vākya prayogaḥ, kiṃtu vākya-rtha-jñānāya.

[868]

यद्भागस्याऽऽगमाद्योऽर्थभागः स्यादधिकः क्वचित् ।

तस्य भागस्य भागोऽसौ निमित्तं स्यान्न तु प्रमा ॥ ८६८ ॥

If by the in-coming of a part there is increase of a part in the sense, then of that (increased) part this (added) part is the cause, and not the means of valid knowledge.

When a word is inserted in a sentence, there is an addition in sense. Of this added sense, the inserted word is the cause. Thereby that word does not become *pramāṇa*.

[869]

अत एव सभागत्वं वाक्यवाक्यार्थयोर्मितम् ।

वाचकत्वेऽपि वाक्यस्य संसृष्टार्थमिधानतः ॥ ८६९ ॥

It is therefore held that the sentence and sentence-sense have parts; and the sentence, while conveying its meaning, expresses a composite sense.

Objection: Like word and word-sense, sentence and sentence-sense, you say, are related as expression and expressed. Then, even as for the former, for the latter too parts are not possible; and sentence must convey its sense even as word does. You would thus have to admit that sentence is not *pramāṇa*, even as word is not.

Reply: Although sentence expresses its sense, the sense that it expresses is a related one. So, both sentence and sentence-sense have parts. The relation thus is between word which is a part of sentence and word-sense which is a part of sentence-sense. The same does not obtain between sentence which is a collection of words and sentence-sense which is a collection of word-senses.

[870]

ततश्चैवं समूहस्य वाचकत्वमवस्थितम् ।

भागवत्त्वं च संसिद्धं वाक्यवाक्यार्थयोरतः ॥ ८७० ॥

And thus it is settled that the capacity to express meaning is for a collection (of words) (only); and it is also, therefore, established that sentence and sentence-sense have parts.

Word has capacity to convey its own sense as associated with other competent words. And, sentence and sentence-sense have parts. From this we conclude that sentence which is a collection of

words conveys a meaning which is not known earlier from the words themselves, and so it is *pramāṇa*, while word is not.

NKL—*yato vākya-tadarthayor bhāgavatvam eva tataḥ samūhasya vācakatvaṁ pramāṇatvam avasthitam ity arthaḥ.*

AVS—*ataḥ-sabdo yata ity asminn arthe ca-sabda evakārārthe.*

[871]

एवं च लोक्तः सिद्धो वाक्यार्थः स्याच्छ्रुतावपि ।
ॐ

लौकिका एव शब्दार्था न्यायेनोक्ताः श्रुतौ यतः ॥ ८७१ ॥

And thus, even in Scripture there would be the sentence-sense established in empirical usage; for, the empirical word-senses alone are declared in Scripture through reasoning.

Just as in empirical usage words have capacity to express a sense as construed with other competent words, so also do they have that capacity in the Veda. So far as the use of words in sentences is concerned, there is no difference between empirical usage and Vedic usage. As for the Vedānta texts conveying a sense that is impartite, that is made possible by secondary implication (*lakṣaṇā*).

[872]

नृविवक्षाव्यवायेन लोके शङ्का भवेदपि ।

वेदे त्वपौरुषेयत्वात्साक्षात्स्वार्थे प्रमाणता ॥ ८७२ ॥

Even though, due to the intervention of human intention, there be doubt in empirical usage, in the Veda, because it is not a product of any human agency, there is direct validity in respect of its own sense.

Objection: If empirical usage and the Veda do not differ in the matter of sentence-sense, then like empirical words, the Veda too should be a contingent *pramāṇa*.

Reply: Empirical words are contingent because they are uttered by fallible human beings. Not so is the Veda, because it has no human author.

[873]

न च कार्यपरत्वेऽपि पदानां संहतिः स्थिता ।

अन्यत्वावगमो न स्यात्संबन्धज्ञानवर्जनात् ॥ ८७३ ॥

Even if the Veda had *kārya* for purport, it does not follow that combination of words has that for purport; for if that were so, there would be no knowledge of sense elsewhere, because there is not the knowledge of relation (to *kārya*).

Even if the Veda had *kārya* for purport, it does not follow that every combination of words should have that for purport. For, we have already shown that words have capacity in conveying sense in combination with competent words. And, sentences are employed to convey a sense that has nothing to do with *kārya*, even as there are sentences relating to *kārya*. So, it must be admitted that a sentence can mean something which is already there. To the question how a sentence can convey a sense that is unrelated and impartite, we have replied that it is by secondary implication.

If *kārya* is said to be necessary for words or sentences to make sense, then, what about words and sentences which have no relation to *kārya* and yet make sense?

[874]

यथा च कार्ये तात्पर्यं कार्यं चापि न विद्यते ।

पूर्वमेव तथाऽस्माभिर्युक्तिभिः संप्रसाधितम् ॥ ८७४ ॥

How *kārya* is not the purport (of the Veda) and how there is no *kārya* at all we have already established through reasoning.

That *kārya* is not the purport of the Veda, we have established already.

[875]

अनादिवृद्धव्यवहृद्युत्पत्त्यैव च तत्स्थितेः ।

शब्दस्यार्थेन संबन्ध आदिमत्ता न शङ्क्यते ॥ ८७५ ॥

Because the relation of a word to its meaning is established by the immemorial usage of elders, the doubt cannot be raised that the relation has a beginning.

If it be objected that because the relation between words and meanings depends on convention and so has a beginning, verbal testimony cannot be an independent *pramāṇa*, the reply is that the usage of words is without a beginning.

NTV — cakṣurāder yathā rūpagrahaṇe sāmāthyam sahajam na sāṅketikam evam śabdasyāpīty arthaḥ.

[876]

प्रथमश्रवणे चैव न शब्दार्थावधारणम् ।

तत्ताव्युत्पन्नता हेतुः शब्दानां न त्वशक्तिता ॥ ८७६ ॥

Where on the first hearing the sense of a word is not determined, there the lack of learning (on the part of the hearer) is the cause and not the incapacity of the words.

Objection: If words have capacity to convey meanings, why is it that all who hear words such as 'cow' do not have the knowledge of their meaning? Is it not, then, reasonable to say that the relation between words and meanings is dependent on convention?

Reply: Those who have not learnt the meanings of certain words do not understand the meaning when they hear those words, not because the words have no capacity but because those persons are not aware of that capacity. There is no need, therefore, to assume a relation called convention over and above capacity.

[877]

चक्षुर्द्रष्टृपि बाह्यं हि न प्रकाशं विनाऽर्थदृक् ।

नैतावताऽस्य सामर्थ्यं हन्यतेऽन्यस्य वा भवेत् ॥ ८७७ ॥

Though seeing, the eye does not see the object in the absence of external light; but with this much its capacity is not destroyed, nor does the capacity belong to something else.

An example is given here. The eye has the power to see. But in the absence of external light it does not see. This does not mean that the eye has no power to see, nor that the power belongs to light.

[878]

व्युत्पत्त्या न च संबन्धः क्रियते ह्यर्थशब्दयोः ।

अवस्थिते हि संबन्धे वृद्धेभ्योऽसौ प्रजायते ॥ ८७८ ॥

The relation between word and sense is not created by learning; when the relation is there, learning results from the usage of elders.

On the view which says that the relation between word and sense is conventional, we ask, what is the origin of the convention? Is the convention due to what one learns? Or, is it created by someone who is parviscient? Or, is it fixed by the omniscient God?

Not the first; because it is only when the relation between word and its sense is there that learning arises on the strength of the empirical usage of elders. How can that which is posterior be the cause of that which is earlier?

[879]

संबन्धकरणाशक्तेस्तत्कर्तुश्चास्मृतेरपि ।

तद्विना व्यवहाराच्च सिद्धा संबन्धनित्यता ॥ ८७९ ॥

Because no one is capable of creating the relation, as no such creator is remembered, and because there is usage even without such remembrance, the eternality of the relation is established.

The second alternative is not sound. No one who is parviscient can be the author of the relation between word and sense which is endless.

Nor is the third alternative intelligible. We do not experience a God that is the author of the relation. No one remembers such an act of creating the relation by God. The empirical usage of words takes place even without remembering some one as the author of the relation between words and their sense. The relation in dispute is eternal, like the self, because no author thereof is remembered.

NTV—anena ayam kṛta ity asmaraṇāt.

*NKL—vimataḥ sambandho nityaḥ, vyavahārāvicchede saty asmar-
yamānakartṛkatvād ātmavad ity arthaḥ.*

*AVS—īśvara-sadbhāve pramāṇābhāvāt nā 'dhyakṣa-pramāṇam
anabhyupagamāt, tasya rūpādimad-vastu-viśayatvāc ca, īśvarasya
rūpādy-abhāvāt, adhyakṣāntarasya īśvara-samatvāt, nā 'numānaṁ
tad-vyāpti-liṅgābhāvāt, na kārya-liṅgena īśvarānumānam, tasya
kāraṇamātra-sādhakatvāt, ekatva - niravayavatva-sarvagatatva-sarva-
jñatva-sarvasaktitva-svapraṭiṣṭhitatvāder anumātum aśakyatvāt, tad-
vyatirekeṇa īśvarāsiddher ātmano 'nyatra. nāpy upamānaṁ mānam
īśvara-sadṛśasyā 'bhāvāt. nāpy arthāpattis tadvinā 'nupapannasya
kasyacid abhāvāt, na kāryasya tadvinā 'nupapattiḥ, kartranekatvepi
kāryasyo 'papatter gṛhādivat. nāpy āgamo mānam, āgamo dvividhaḥ
kṛtako nityaś ca, kṛtakastāvat uktaprakāreṇa mūlapramāṇābhāvāt
neṣvare mānam, nityo na sambandha-kartarī īśvaravādi-parikalpate
mānam, veda-siddhas tv īśvaro na sambandhaṁ karoti abhivyanakti
paraṁ nitya-siddhaṁ sambandham. evaṁ avaidikeśvara-sadbhāve
pramāṇābhāvāt na tat-kṛtaḥ sambandhaḥ.*

[880]

जीर्णकूपादिवत्कर्तुर्यदप्यस्मरणं न तत् ।

अभावगमकं नापि संबन्धेनास्य तुल्यता ॥ ८८० ॥

The non-remembrance of agent in the case of dilapi-
dated well, etc., does not convey that there was no
agent; it is not similar to the relation (between word and
sense).

Objection: One may not remember the person that built a well
that is now old and broken. Similarly, may it not be that one does
not remember the author of the relation between word and sense?

Reply: No; the relation is endless, and so it is not something
which can be made. The illustration of the well is not apt. A well
is a small structure, and may be constructed without much difficulty.

NTV—jīrṇa-kūpādeḥ kartur yadākadācit yasyakasycit smaraṇam asti, na tathā śabdārtha-saṁbandhasya kadācit kasyacid api smaraṇam saṁbhavati.

[881]

क्वचिज्ज्ञातेषु दूरादिकारणे संशयोऽपि च ।

नात्यन्तानुपलब्धेषु त्वभावोऽतोऽस्य निश्चितः ॥ ८८१ ॥

Where a thing has been known in some cases, there may be doubt because of distance, etc., and not in respect of what is absolutely unknown; hence the non-existence of this (creator of relation) is settled.

No creator or originator of the relation between word and sense is ever seen. So, not even a suspicion of the existence of such a creator can arise. On the contrary, it is quite certain that there is no such creator. Hence also, the relation is eternal.

NKL—deśāntare kālāntare vā dr̥ṣṭeṣu sthānvādiṣu dūratva-man-dāndhakārādi-kāraṇāt sthāṇur vā puruṣo veti saṁśayaḥ. natv atyantā 'paridr̥ṣṭeṣu saptamarasādiṣu, tena saṁbandhakartur atyantānu-palabdhasya na saṁśaya ity arthaḥ.

AVS—jñāteṣu padārtheṣu kartṛṣu ca saṁbhāviteṣu pakṣe kim idaṁ kenacit kṛtaṁ na veti saṁśayaḥ syāt, iha tu śabdārtha-saṁbandha-kartuḥ sarvātmanā 'nupalambhāt saṁbandhasya ca kāryatvānupapatteḥ śabdasyā 'rthabodhakatva-sāmarthyam cakṣurādivat sahajam iti.

[882]

संनिकृष्टार्थसंसृष्टस्वार्थमात्राभिधानतः ।

तस्मात्सिद्धोऽत्र वाक्यार्थो लोके वेदे प्रमाणवान् ॥ ८८२ ॥

Therefore, it has been established here, both in empirical usage and Veda, that the sentence-sense is

valid, as it expresses its own sense in relation to the proximate and connected senses.

It is now settled that words convey their senses as related to other senses characterized by proximity, etc., that the senses of the words may be *kārya* or what is not *kārya*, and that the sentence-sense, which is either the relation of word-senses or related word-sense, is valid testimony both in empirical usage and in the Veda.

[883]

अतोऽवबोधकत्वेन दुष्टकारणवर्जनात् ।

अबाधाच्च प्रमाणत्वं वस्तुन्यक्षादिवच्छ्रुतेः ॥ ८८३ ॥

Therefore, Scripture is valid in respect of the real, like perception, etc., because it conveys knowledge, because it is free from defective causes, and because it is not sublated.

The testimony of the Scriptural texts such as 'That thou art' is valid because it instructs the eligible person, and the knowledge that results from it is faultless. Neither doubt nor error is possible here because Scripture is not the work of any human author. Consequently, there can be no sublation of its testimony.

NKL—vedaḥ siddha evārthe pramāṇaṁ pramāṇatvāt cakṣurādivat.

[884]

पुरुषार्थोपदेष्टृत्वाद्यद्वैतकार्ये प्रमाणता ।

तथैकात्म्ये विशेषाद्वा पुमर्थातिशयत्वतः ॥ ८८४ ॥

Because Scripture teaches the human goal, as it is a means of valid knowledge in respect of *kārya*, so is it a

means of valid knowledge in respect of the oneness of self, or even more so, because of the excellence of the human goal.

Just as the texts of the ritual section of the Veda are valid, so are the Upaniṣadic texts valid. Especially the latter cannot but be valid because they make one realize the truth, and lead to the final human goal.

[885]

पुमानिष्टस्य संप्राप्तिमनिष्टस्य च वर्जनम् ।

इच्छन्नपेक्षते योग्यमुपायमपि तत्परः ॥ ८८५ ॥

Desiring to attain what is good and to avoid what is evil, and being devoted to that, man stands in need of the proper means also.

The human goal has two aspects—the attainment of what is desired, viz. happiness, and the avoidance of what is not desired, viz. misery. What is required is the proper means that would lead to this goal.

NKL—iṣṭāniṣṭa-prāptiparihāra-mātram apekṣate na sādhyatvam apī 'ty arthaḥ.

[886]

ग्रामादि किञ्चिदप्राप्तं प्राप्तुमिष्टमिहेच्छति ।

हेमादि विस्मृतं किञ्चित्करस्थमपि लिप्सते ॥ ८८६ ॥

One may desire to reach a village, etc., which have not been reached; or one may desire to regain gold, etc., which, though being in one's own hand, has been forgotten.

What is to be attained may be of two kinds: (1) that which is yet to be accomplished, e. g. the reaching of a village, and (2) that

which is already there, but only has been forgotten, e. g. a gold piece that is in one's hand.

[887]

परिहार्यं तथाऽनिष्टं कण्टकादि जिहासति ।

रज्ज्वां सर्पादि किञ्चिच्च त्यक्तमेव जिहासति ॥ ८८७ ॥

Likewise, one may desire to remove what is unpleasant like thorn, etc., or one may desire to avoid the serpent, etc., in the rope, which are already not there.

What is to be removed is also of two kinds: (1) a factual impediment to one's happiness, e. g. a thorn that has entered the flesh, and (2) an imagined source of pain, e. g. the serpent in the rope.

[888]

नियतोपायसाध्यत्वादवाप्यपरिहार्ययोः ।

विधितः प्रतिषेधाच्च साधनापेक्षता भवेत् ॥ ८८८ ॥

Because what is to be attained and what is to be avoided are to be accomplished by the allotted means, there is the need of means through both prescription and prohibition.

For attaining what has not been attained, and for removing what has not been removed, one has to follow the prescriptions and prohibitions taught by Scripture.

[889]

अज्ञानान्तरितत्वेन संप्राप्तत्यक्तयोः पुनः ।

याथात्म्यज्ञानतो नान्यत्पुरुषार्थाय कल्पते ॥ ८८९ ॥

But as regards what are already attained and already avoided, because they are veiled by ignorance, nothing but the knowledge of truth serves as the means for the human goal.

What stands in the way of attaining what is already attained and avoiding what is already avoided is ignorance. In order to remove ignorance what is required is knowledge.

[890]

अशेषानर्थविच्छेदं वाञ्छतः श्रुतितः श्रुतेः ।

त्वं ब्रह्मेति हताशेषक्लेशो मोहप्रहाणतः ॥ ८९० ॥

For one who desires the destruction of the entire host of evil, when he hears from Scripture 'Thou art Brahman', there is the removal of all sorrow because of the destruction of delusion.

When from the Scriptural teaching 'Thou art Brahman' the truth is known and ignorance is removed, misery and evil disappear, and the goal that is unexcellable and unsublatable bliss is gained. Hence the Vedānta texts have absolute validity.

[891]

वेदस्य सिद्धे प्रामाण्ये ह्यज्ञातार्थावबोधतः ।

कार्ये यथा प्रमाणत्वमैकात्म्येऽप्येवमिष्यताम् ॥ ८९१ ॥

When thus the validity of the Veda has been established on the ground that it makes known a sense which was not known, just as there is validity in respect of *kārya*, validity in respect of the oneness of self must also be admitted.

The Veda is *pramāṇa* in the sense that it reveals a sense that is unknown. Just as its ritual section is valid by making known *kārya* which is otherwise unknown, even so its knowledge-section is valid by making us realize the oneness of self.

NKL—*karma-jñāna-vākyayor ajñāta-jñāpanam tulyam ity arthah.*

[892]

कार्याद्यदि तु मानत्वं मानत्वात्कार्यनिष्ठता ।

अन्योन्याश्रयतैवं स्यादेकस्यासिद्धितोऽन्यतः ॥ ८९२ ॥

If there is validity for the Veda because of *kārya*, then the Veda would have *kārya* for purport because it is valid; thus there would be reciprocal dependence because either will not be established without the other.

It is not proper to say that the Veda is valid because it has *kārya* for purport. For, there would be reciprocal dependence thus: the Veda is valid *pramāṇa*, and so it teaches *kārya*; it has *kārya* for purport, and therefore it is valid.

[893]

औदासीन्यान्निषेधेषु न लभ्येत प्रमाणता ।

औदासीन्यं निवृत्तिर्हि स्वरूपालम्बनं च तत् ॥ ८९३ ॥

Because prohibitions are of the nature of indifference (and not *kārya*), they would not attain validity; and indifference, indeed, is withdrawal (from action, and not action); that is remaining in one's own nature.

Objection: What is in dispute, viz. the Vedānta, is not valid in regard to its sense, as it does not have *kārya* for purport.

Reply: The *probans* is inconstant. The prohibitory texts of the Veda, such as 'Do not kill', 'Do not drink', do not have *kārya* for purport; yet they are admitted to be valid. What such texts teach is not action, but indifference or withdrawal from action. And, withdrawal means remaining in the state of the immutable self.

NTV—audāsīnyaṁ nāma nivṛttiḥ na bhāvarthaḥ, sā ca ātmādināṁ svarūpam eva.

NKL — rāga - prāpta - brāhmaṇahanana - kalañjabhakṣaṇādi - kriyā - nivṛttir ity arthaḥ.

AVS—audāsīnyaṁ nivṛttir na kāryam, sā ca nivṛttir vastveva ity arthaḥ.

[894]

सोऽरोदीत्यादिवाक्यानां कार्यविशेषप्रमाणता ।

अपुमर्थोपदेष्टृत्वात्तच्च नात्रेत्यकारणम् ॥ ८९४ ॥

The texts 'He howled', etc., are valid by entering into *kārya*, because they teach what is not a human goal; but that is not so here, hence it cannot be the reason.

Objection: The texts 'That thou art,' etc., are valid in regard to what is auxiliary to *kārya*, because they are Vedic statements devoid of injunction, like the eulogistic texts (*arthavāda*).

Reply: There is no parity between the Vedānta texts and the *arthavāda* texts. While the latter do not have an end in view, the former have for purport the highest human end. So, the *probans* in the inference given above is vitiated by an adventitious circumstance.

NKL — vedāntāḥ kāryaśeṣatvena pramāṇaṁ siddhārtha-vedatvāt, sorodīdityādi-vākyavad ity āsaṅkya svārthe-phalavikala-vedatvam upādhir ity āha—sorodīd iti.

[895]

न चैकात्म्याभ्युपायस्य मिथ्यात्वमिह शङ्क्यते ।

उपेयाप्तौ कृतार्थत्वादुपायं प्रत्यनीक्षणात् ॥ ८९५ ॥

Nor may it be doubted here that the means to the oneness of self is illusory; for it is only when the object has been attained that the means is neglected, because the aim has been fulfilled.

Objection: The knowledge that results from the texts like 'That thou art' is not valid, because its cause is illusory, even as the inference of fire from the pseudo- smoke as *probans* is.

Reply: When the knowledge is gained, release is attained. After that there is no need to inquire into the ontological status of Scripture.

NKL—*upeyasyaikātmyasya satyatvena taj-jñānasya pratibimbajanya-bimbānumānasyeva prāmāṇyopapattau upāya-satyatvā-'nādaraṇād ity arthaḥ.*

AVS—*jñānopāyasya śrutyācāryāder mithyātvena taduttha-jñānasyā 'mātvam nāsaṁkanīyam, upeyasya kaivalyasya prāptau puruṣasya kṛtārthatvād upāyanveṣaṇābhāvād iti.*

[896]

ऐकात्म्यप्रतिपत्तेः प्राङ् मिथ्या हेत्वभावतः ।

पुरुषार्थावसायित्वान्नाप्यूर्ध्वमनपेक्षतः ॥ ८९६ ॥

Before the realization of the oneness of self, the means is not illusory, because there is no *probans*; nor after, because it is not required, as the human goal has been reached.

Before the fruit of release comes about, the means which is Scripture is not known to be illusory. After the goal has been gained, although the means is known to be illusory, there is no destruction of the validity of the knowledge gained; and as the end which is release has already been reached, there is no further dependence on *pramāṇa*.

AVS—vākyārthajñānodayāt prāk upāyo na mithyā nopāyasya mithyātva-jñānam ity arthaḥ. gamakābhāvat bādhapūrvakatvāt tasya. yadyapy uttarakālaṁ mithyātvam upāyasya gamyate na tat prāmāṇyaṁ vihani, pramāṇaphalasya prāptatvena pramāṇāpekṣā 'bhāvād iti.

[897]

उपेयबोधनं मुक्त्वा मितेर्नान्याऽस्ति सत्यता ।

सत्यादप्यनुपायत्वाद्घटान्नामिहि गम्यते ॥ ८९७ ॥

For a means of valid knowledge there is no reality other than revealing the object; nor is fire inferred from pot which is not a means, even though it is real.

A means, although illusory, may lead to true knowledge, e. g. a reflection. A means, although real, may not result in knowledge, e. g. a pot cannot serve as *probans* for inferring fire. What is required of a means of valid knowledge is that it generates that knowledge, and not that it must be absolutely real or that it must remain unsublated always.

[898]

धूमाभासात्तु बाष्पादेर्यदग्निर्नावगम्यते ।

हेतुस्तत्त्वानुपायत्वमसत्यत्वं पुनर्न तु ॥ ८९८ ॥

Where fire is not inferred from apparent smoke such as vapour, etc., there the reason is, that (vapour, etc.) being not a means, and not unreality.

As for pseudo-smoke not leading to the valid knowledge of fire, the reason is not that the pseudo-smoke is illusory, but that there is no pervasion between pseudo-smoke and fire. In other words, pseudo-smoke is not the means for inferring fire.

[899]

धूमवत्परमार्थत्वमुपायत्वान्न लभ्यते ।

वेदान्तानां तथैकात्म्यश्रुतिबाधः स्फुटो भवेत् ॥ ८९९ ॥

Th *Vedāntas* do not gain absolute reality, like smoke (in its field), because they are the means; for then clearly there would be the contradiction of the Scriptural text declaring oneness of self.

Nor may it be urged that Scripture must be real because it is the means to the knowledge of the absolutely real, viz. the oneness of self; for if Scripture were real, the declaration that the sole reality is the self would be contradicted.

[900]

बाष्पवन्नापि मिथ्यात्वादनुपायत्वमिष्यते ।

ऐकात्म्याबोधबाधेन सिद्धा तूपायसत्यता ॥ ९०० ॥

Nor can it be said that the *Vedāntas* are not the means, like vapour, because they are illusory; for the reality required for being the means is established by the sublation of the ignorance about the oneness of self.

Nor may it be said that Scripture is not the means to the knowledge of the self even as pseudo-smoke is not the means for inferring fire: for, it is seen that Scripture accomplishes the destruction of ignorance.

[901]

श्रुतेरैकात्म्यसंविन्नौ चरितार्थत्वतो मितेः ।

वृथोपायपरीक्षा स्यादुत्तीर्णस्य प्लवे यथा ॥ ९०१ ॥

When the oneness of self has been realized from Scripture and the means of valid knowledge has fulfilled its aim, an examination of the means would be futile, as it would be for one who has crossed (the river) in regard to the boat.

An example is given to show that after the end has been gained there is no need to worry about what happens to the means.

[902]

बाह्येष्वर्थेष्वनात्मत्वात्पुनः शङ्का भवेदपि ।

अत्राऽऽत्मत्वादुपेयस्य का शङ्का मानतां प्रति ॥ ९०२ ॥

Even though, in the case of the external objects which are not self, doubt may arise again, here because the object attained is self, what doubt can there be in respect of the means of valid knowledge?

In regard to external objects like colour, etc., there may arise doubt about their valid perception, for they constitute the not-self. What is known from Scripture, however, is the self. How can there be doubt in regard to that?

An alternative interpretation of this verse is as follows: The means for cognizing fire, etc., is of the nature of the not-self, and hence is illusory. But Scripture which is the means for realizing the one self is of the nature of the self; and so the doubt that it may be invalid

or illusory cannot arise. Scripture is the absolute reality. It is only by an assumed difference that it is spoken of as means.

NKL—ātmā mithyā kalpita-janya viṣayatvāt svapnadr̥ṣṭārthavad atrāha—bāhyeṣv iti—jādatvam upādhir ity arthaḥ.

[903]

अन्यत्रेव न चाप्यत्र वाक्यार्थो भेदलक्षणः ।

संसर्गलक्षणो वाऽपि ब्रह्मात्माभेदतो भवेत् ॥ ९०३ ॥

Unlike elsewhere, here the sentence-sense is not characterized by difference, nor by relation, because Brahman and self are non-different.

For the sentence 'Bring the cow' the sense is the difference in relation between the act and the agent. For the expression 'The blue lily' the sense is relation between two things expressed by words in apposition. Not thus is the case with the text 'That thou art,' which has an impartite sense.

NTV—bhedo viśiṣṭa-saṁsargi-saṁsarga eva vākyārtha iti naiva vedānte niyamah brahmātmanor abhedād ity arthaḥ.

[904]

ब्रह्मणोऽनात्मतारूपमब्रह्मत्वं तथाऽऽत्मनः ।

अज्ञानलक्षणं शास्त्राज्ज्ञानं हन्ति समुत्पतत ॥ ९०४ ॥

The non-self-hood of Brahman and the non-Brahmanhood of self are of the nature of ignorance; the knowledge arising from Scripture destroys that.

Objection: Brahman and the self are not non-different, because they are opposed to each other, like cold and heat.

Reply: No; there is no opposition that is validly known. The so-called difference is the work of nescience.

*NKL—vimatam ajñānakṛtaṁ jñānena samūlaṁ nivarttyamānatvād
rajju-bhujaṅgavat.*

[905]

नेहान्यत्राऽऽत्मनो ब्रह्म तथाऽऽत्मा ब्रह्मणोऽन्यतः ।

तादात्म्यमनयोस्तस्मान्नीलोत्पलविलक्षणम् ॥ ९०५ ॥

Here (in Scripture) Brahman is not other than the self, and so also the self is not other than Brahman. The identity of the two, therefore, is different from that between lotus and blue.

Brahman and the self are not related like 'blue' and 'lily'. If the self be other than Brahman, then like pot it would be non-Brahman; if Brahman be other than the self, then it would be not-self. Since these contingencies are not acceptable, it must be admitted that there is oneness (*ekarasyam*) of Brahman and the self, and not identity-in-difference (*tādātmya*) between them.

[906]

अब्रह्मानात्मते यद्वदत्राज्ञाननिबन्धने ।

आत्मताब्रह्मते नैवमन्यस्मादित्यतः स्वतः ॥ ९०६ ॥

As non-Brahman-hood and non-self-hood are conditioned by ignorance, not so are selfhood and Brahman-hood conditioned by that (ignorance); they are self-established.

The self-hood of Brahman and the Brahman-hood of the self are of the nature of the real; they are not the products of nescience.

NTV — jīva-brahmaṇoḥ pramāṇāntarāgocarātvena tad bhedasyāpi pramāṇāntarāviśayatvāt bhedasye 'taretarāśrayādi-doṣa-duṣṭatvāt tasyaiva kalpitatvaṁ nābhedasye 'ty arthaḥ.

[907]

नान्तोरेवं च संबन्ध ऐकात्म्यात्स्यात्क्रियां विना ।

षष्ठीं च न क्रियाषष्ठ्योर्विना भेदात्प्रवर्तनम् ॥ ९०७ ॥

Thus the relation between the two nouns is even without activity or the sixth case, because of the oneness of self; where there is no difference, activity and the sixth case cannot function.

The two nouns are not related as agent and act, substance and attribute or possessor and possession. There is not even a trace of difference. The two nouns signify the same reality; and the signification is by secondary implication (*lakṣaṇā*).

[908]

महत्ता यद्वृद्धाकाशे घटाकाशव्यपेक्षया ।

पराक्त्वापेक्षया तद्वत्प्रत्यक्ता नाऽऽत्मनीक्ष्यते ॥ ९०८ ॥

As greatness is in the ether in relation to the pot-ether, so is not inwardness admitted in the self in relation to outwardness.

Objection: Although there may not be difference between the inner self and Brahman, difference must be admitted as between the inner self and not-self. That would mean that being inner will be conditioned by what is outer. That would mean again that there is not impartiteness.

Reply: No: when a distinction is made in ether between pot-ether and great ether, there is conditioning. Not so is the case with the inner self. Here 'inner' does not mean 'what is not outer'; it means 'what is real', 'what is natural', 'what is not adventitious.'

[909]

प्रत्यक्त्वमद्वितीयत्वं बोधवन्नान्यबन्धनम् ।

अपाराध्यान्न बोधो हि स्यादबोधनिरासतः ॥ ९०९ ॥

Inwardness and non-duality, like knowledge, are not dependent on others (their opposites); knowledge which is not for the sake of another, is not the result of negating what is inert.

When it is said that Brahman-self is non-dual, no dependence on duality is meant, even as when it is said 'Brahman is consciousness' the exclusion of the non-conscious is not meant. 'Non-dual' means 'full'.

[910]

आत्माऽपि सदिदं ब्रह्म मोहात्पारोक्ष्यदूषितम् ।

ब्रह्मापि संस्तथैवाऽऽत्मा सद्वितीयतयेक्ष्यते ॥ ९१० ॥

This Brahman, though the self, is through delusion affected by the defect of mediacy; likewise the self, though Brahman, is looked upon as having a second.

How the Vedānta texts teach the impartite non-dual Brahman-self is shown here.

[911]

आत्मा ब्रह्मेति पारोक्ष्यसद्वितीयत्वबाधनात् ।

पुमर्थे निष्ठितं शास्त्रमिति सिद्धं समीहितम् ॥ ९११ ॥

Through the sublation of mediacy and duality, Scripture teaches that the self is Brahman and thus culminates in the human goal. Thus the desired end has been achieved.

By cancelling the mediacy of Brahman through apposition with the self, and the finitude of the self through apposition with Brahman, the Scriptural text culminates in teaching oneness which is the supreme bliss. Thus through the knowledge of oneness resulting from the text there is release.

[912]

ननु भेदाश्रितैर्वाक्यैर्विधायकनिषेधकैः ।

अक्षादिभिश्च नैकात्म्यं बाधितत्वात्प्रमाणवत् ॥ ९१२ ॥

“Now, oneness of self is not valid, because it is sublated by prescriptive and prohibitory texts which are based on difference and by perception, etc.

The *pūrvapakṣin* objects: The texts of the *karma-kāṇḍa* consisting of prescriptions and prohibitions as also empirical means of knowledge like perception are opposed to oneness. How, then, can the Vedānta texts validly teach non-difference?

[913]

न चाप्यैकात्म्यशास्त्रस्य तैर्विकल्पसमुच्चयौ ।

प्रामाण्येनापि बाध्यत्वं तेषां तेन कथंचन ॥ ९१३ ॥

“Nor is the teaching of oneness of self valid as an alternative to or in combination with them; nor even are they sublated by it in any manner.

The oneness that, you say, is taught by Vedānta cannot be taken as an alternative to the plurality revealed by the aforementioned evidence; nor may it be construed in combination therewith. Nor may it be held that the evidence of the *karma-kāṇḍa*, perception, etc., is sublated by the teaching of Vedānta.

[914]

विरुद्धमानभावेऽपि न हि वस्तु विकल्प्यते ।

भेदाभेदौ न च स्यातां विरोधाद्युपपत्कचित् ॥ ९१४ ॥

“Though they are opposed as means of valid knowledge, the real cannot have an alternative nature; difference and non-difference can nowhere exist together, because of contradiction.

Although Vedānta and the other *pramāṇas* may be regarded as alternative means of knowledge, a similar attitude is not possible in regard to the nature of reality. The real cannot be alternately one and many; nor can it be both one and many.

[915]

भिन्नाभिन्नं न वो वस्तु येन मानाविरोधिता ।

नेह नानेति भेदानां निषेधात्क नु भेदधीः ॥ ९१५ ॥

“For you the real is not different-cum-non-different, in which case there may be no opposition between means of valid knowledge. How can there be cognition of difference, since differences are denied in ‘No plurality here’ ?

Moreover the concept of difference-cum-non-difference is not acceptable to you. The Upaniṣad text ‘There is no plurality whatsoever here’ negatives plurality. The real, therefore, cannot be both

one and many. The other *pramāṇas* either imply or make known plurality. How can you accept them as equally valid means of knowledge?

[916]

वर्णादिग्रहणापायो नापीहाक्षादि बाध्यते ।

संस्काराय च यच्छास्त्रमात्मज्ञानोपकारकम् ॥ ९१६ ॥

“Nor are perception, etc., which are the means for cognizing letters, etc., sublated here (by Vedānta texts); nor Scripture (*karma-kāṇḍa*) which (according to you) is for purification and which helps self-knowledge.

Nor can you say that the evidence of the other *pramāṇas* is sublated by the Vedānta texts. Perception, etc., are necessary for cognizing letters, words, etc., of which the Vedānta texts are composed. The *karma-kāṇḍa*, according to you, is helpful in that it purifies and thus makes one eligible for self-knowledge.

[917]

उपचारार्थतः शास्त्रं सावकाशं जपेऽथवा ।

अक्षादेरकृतार्थत्वात्कथं स्यात्तेन बाधनम् ॥ ९१७ ॥

“Therefore Vedānta-śāstra has the sense of eulogy, or it has the purpose of repetition; perception, etc., do not have their aim fulfilled (except through teaching difference); how can they be sublated by that?”

What, then, is the fate of the Vedānta texts? Just as when we say ‘The headman of the village is without a second’, the phrase ‘without a second’ carries a figurative sense, the Vedāntic declaration of non-duality must be understood as a figure of speech. Or, meditation may be the purport of the Vedānta texts.

Without duality the other *pramāṇas* would have no place at all. How, then, could they be sublated by the Vedānta texts?

[918]

उच्यते लोकतः सिद्धं भेदमाश्रित्य चोदना ।

प्रवृत्ता पुरुषार्थाय न तु भेदावबुद्धये ॥ ९१८ ॥

This is the reply: Basing itself on the empirically established difference, the (Vedic) command functions for the sake of the human goal, and not for teaching difference.

The *siddhāntin's* reply: There is no opposition of the *karma-kāṇḍa* to what the Vedānta teaches; for it is not the aim of the *karma-kāṇḍa* to establish plurality. Basing itself on the empirical difference of agent, etc., it merely shows man the way to prosperity. So, its purport is not to teach difference or plurality.

AVS—yadi karmasāstraṁ bhedanīṣṭhaṁ tadā karmasāstra-virodhaḥ syāt, na tathā, lokasiddhabhedāṅgīkaraṇena puruṣārthāya pravṛttatvāt, iti.

[919]

भेदस्य चापुमर्थत्वात्तादर्थ्ये स्यादमानता ।

पुमर्थत्वेन चास्येष्टं प्रामाण्यं वेदवादिभिः ॥ ९१९ ॥

Because difference is not a human goal, if Scripture had that for purport, it would not be valid; and by those who follow the Veda, the validity of the Veda is accepted for the sake of the human goal.

For this reason also difference cannot be the purport of the Veda: difference is not a human end, and Scripture declares that difference is the cause of fear. Therefore, if the *karma-kāṇḍa* had difference for purport, it would cease to be valid.

[920]

वस्तुस्वरूपसंस्पर्शिचक्षुरादिभ्य उत्थितम् ।

भेदस्पृङ्नाक्षजाद्येवं न तेनैकात्म्यबाधनम् ॥ ९२० ॥

From the sense of sight, etc., which are in contact with the form of the thing, knowledge is generated; no idea of difference arises from perception; so by that there is no sublation of oneness of self.

Perception, etc., should not be taken as evidence against the teaching of the Upaniṣads. Does perception, for instance, reveal the identity of an object, or the exclusion from other objects, or both? If it be the first, then difference cannot be its content, and therefore it cannot sublate the Vedānta which reveals the absolute reality.

NTV—pramāṇasya vastubodhakatva-niyamān na bhedaspr̥h̥ mānam.

[921]

प्रमेयविषयं मानं वस्तुनश्च प्रमेयता ।

न च भेदस्य वस्तुत्वं वस्तुतत्त्वानपेक्षणात् ॥ ९२१ ॥

Means of valid knowledge has for its content the object of knowledge; and reality is the object of knowledge; difference is not reality, because the nature of reality is not to be dependent.

The second alternative is not possible. Perception has for its content an object. Difference or exclusion cannot be a content because it is not an object. It is dependent and illusory like the rope-snake.

[922]

लब्धे हि भूतलेऽलब्धो घटस्तत्र निषिध्यते ।

मानान्तरेण विज्ञातो नाज्ञातः शून्यतासितः ॥ ९२२ ॥

When the floor is cognized, the pot which is not cognized is denied there; that (viz. the pot) which is known by some other means of knowledge cannot be unknown, for otherwise there would be nullity.

It cannot be maintained that exclusion or denial is the content of perception. When the locus like floor is perceived, there is the exclusion or denial of the counter-correlate such as pot. Here, what is perceived, viz. floor, is not denied; for that would be to go against the evidence. Nor is what is unknown the content; for all that is unknown should then become the content, not pot alone.

NKL — pratipanne vastuni pratipannasya vastuno nedam idam nehedam iti vā niṣedhaḥ, anyathā nety eva niṣedhe sarva-niṣedha-prasaṅgāt.

[923]

व्यञ्जकस्य समायोगो वस्तुनो वस्तुनैव हि ।

नाभावेन निरात्मत्वाद्द्वयावृत्त्या वा मितेर्भवेत् ॥ ९२३ ॥

Of what is a manifestor (perception, etc.) there can be contact only with a thing, and not with no-thing; nor can there be contact of perception, with difference, for it (difference) is not an entity.

What does exclusion or denial mean? Does it mean non-existence (*abhāva*)? Or does it signify difference (*bheda*)? It cannot be the first; for perception is an existent, and cannot be related to the non-

existent. The latter is void of nature and cannot serve as the basis of any relation. The second meaning too is not possible; for difference too is a non-entity, and to that perception cannot be related.

NKL—pradīpāder ghaṭādisaṃyogo na śaśa-sṛṅgādīnā, iti dr̥ṣṭatvāt.

[924]

नातो वस्तुनि संभेदो वस्तुनोऽभेदरूपतः ।

न प्रमाणाद्विर्वस्तु न मानं वस्तुनो बहिः ॥ ९२४ ॥

Therefore, there is no difference in the real (self), for the real is of the nature of non-difference. The real is not outside the means of knowledge, nor is the means of knowledge outside the real.

Non-difference is the very nature of the real. Non-existence and difference cannot touch it. Even the difference of *pramāṇa* and object is apparent, and not real.

NKL—pramāṇa-prameya-bhedo vyāvahārika ity arthaḥ.

[925]

नाभावयोर्मिथो योगोऽवस्तुत्वाभेदतस्तयोः ।

अभावभावयोस्तद्वद्भाव रूपेषु का भिदो ॥ ९२५ ॥

Not between two non-existences is there relation (here, difference), for as non-entities they are non-different; nor likewise between non-existence and existence; between existents what difference is there?

Difference is unintelligible. What is the nature of the correlate and counter-correlate of difference? Are these two non-existents, existent and non-existent, or existents? They cannot

be non-existents; for there can be no relation in that case. Nor is relation possible between the existent and non-existent; for the latter cannot serve as the basis of relation. As between existents there can be no difference; for there is nothing that makes for the difference. 'Existence' cannot be the differentiating condition; for that is present in the counter-correlate also. Nor can 'non-existence' be the condition, because that is non-entity, and the counter-correlate would then become nothing.

[926]

अनित्यत्वस्य धर्मस्य घटादेर्धर्मिणस्तयोः ।

संयोगः समवायो वा तादात्म्यं वेह संगतिः ॥ ९२६ ॥

Between the attribute of non-eternality and the substances like pot, etc., the relation must be either conjunction (*samyoga*) or inherence (*samavāya*) or identity (*tādātmya*).

By denying difference non-existence has been denied. Now, by denying non-existence difference is being denied. Here, 'non-eternality' (*anityatva*) means non-existence. As between existence and non-existence, is there relation or not? If there is no relation, then existence would be without beginning and end, and non-existence would be independent. If there be relation, then that relation should be either conjunction, or inherence, or identity.

[927]

आधाराधेययोगेषु घटोऽवेति यथा मतिः ।

नाभावभावयोगेषु मितेर्धीः कस्यचित्तथा ॥ ९२७ ॥

Just as there is knowledge of the form 'Here is the pot' in regard to what are related as support and support-

ted, there is no such knowledge for any one in regard to non-existence and existence.

None of the three relations mentioned is possible as between existence and non-existence.

AVS—sarvathā 'bhāvasya bhāva-sāmbandho na ghaṭate, tataś cā 'meyatvam abhāvasya.

According to *AVS*, the impossibility of inherence (*samavāya*) is shown here.

[928]

नहि भावातिरेकेण भावाभावः प्रमाणभाक् ।

भावात्मनाऽप्यतो भावो व्यवहाराय कल्पते ॥ ९२८ ॥

Mere absence of existence cannot brook means of valid knowledge either as being other than existence or as being identical with existence; hence existence alone is fit for empirical usage.

Is non-existence different from existence, or non-different? If the first, there should be another non-existence, and then another, and so on *ad infinitum*. If the second, there would be non-difference whether non-existence be included in existence or *vice versa*.

[929]

अथाभावोऽपि वस्त्वेव नास्तीति मितिजन्मतः ।

द्वयोर्भावैकरूपत्वात्काऽतिशीतिर्मितेस्तयोः ॥ ९२९ ॥

If it be said that non-existence too is a real because, of the rise of cognition 'is not', then because the two

have the same nature as existence, what is the difference between the two cognitions?

If non-existence, like existence, be real, then what is the difference between the two? The two would be one, and no difference could validly be established between existence and non-existence. If they are not two, there can be no relation between them.

[930]

विश्वं सदेव यस्येष्टं तस्याभावः कुतो मितेः ।

न च भावातिरेकेण भाववत्सिद्धिमश्नुते ॥ ९३० ॥

He to whom the universe is existent, for him, how can there be valid cognition of non-existence? Nor can it be established, even as existence (cannot be established), as something other than existence.

Moreover, is non-existence real or unreal? If real, then as all is real there can be no non-existence and no relation thereof with existence. If non-existence is unreal, then since nothing is there to be distinguished non-existence is not established and much less any relation.

[931]

अभावयोगं भावश्चेत्सहते नीलयोगवत् ।

अविरोधादभावेन न भावपहुतिर्भवेत् ॥ ९३१ ॥

If existence admits of relation with non-existence as (lotus) with blue, then because of non-opposition to non-existence, there cannot be suppression of existence.

Just as there is the relation of inherence between lily and blue, if there be relation between existence and non-existence, then, since

there would be no opposition between the two, existence would not be cancelled by non-existence, and existence would be without beginning and end.

[932]

योगोऽयं वस्तुनोर्दृष्टः पृथक्सिद्धौ परस्परम् ।

मेषयोर्मल्लयोर्यद्वन्न भावाभावयोस्तथा ॥ ९३२ ॥

Relation is seen between things that are established separately, independent of each other as between two goats or wrestlers; and not so between existence and non-existence.

That there can be no relation between existence and non-existence is explained by means of examples.

According to *AVS*, the relation that is shown to be impossible here is conjunction (*saṃyoga*).

[933]

न योगोऽभावयोर्दृष्टो वन्ध्यासूनुखपुष्पयोः ।

न भावाभावयोरेवं विरोधादितरेतरम् ॥ ९३३ ॥

No relation is seen between two non-existences, e. g. between the barren woman's son and sky-flower; nor between existence and non-existence because each is opposed to the other.

There can be no relation between two non-existences. So also there can be no relation between existence and non-existence. The reason is that the two are opposed to each other.

NKL—*abhāvo na saṃyoga-samavāyayor anyatarādharah, abhāvatvāt, vandhyāputravat.*

[934]

क्षितिदेशे घटाभावो घटवन्न प्रमीयते ।

योगो वा समवायो वा नाभावक्षितिदेशयोः ॥ ९३४ ॥

In the region of the floor the non-existence of pot is not validly seen, like the pot. Neither conjunction nor inherence is there between non-existence and floor-space.

The pot that is on the floor can be visually perceived because there could be conjunction of the sense of sight with pot. But the non-existence of pot cannot be so perceived because no such relation is possible between sight and non-existence, and between the floor and non-existence.

[935-936a]

सदात्मतैवं सर्वस्य नाभावात्मकता सतः ।

अप्यभावात्मकत्वेऽपि सतोऽभावात्मकत्वतः ॥ ९३५ ॥

कुतो भेदावकाशः स्याद्भेदेऽसति कुतो युतिः ।

(If non-existence is included in existence) then all would be of the nature of reality. Nor can reality be of the nature of non-existence. Even if it be of the nature of non-existence, then because reality is of the nature of non-existence, where is room for difference? And if difference is unreal, how can there be relation?

Supposing there is identity between existence and non-existence, is non-existence to be included in existence, or is existence to be included in non-existence? If the first be the case, there would be only non-dual existence. The second alternative is not possible because

existence is opposed to non-existence. Even if this difficulty be waived, one would have to say that non-existence alone is. If this be so, there is no difference between existence and non-existence, and consequently no relation.

AVS says that the relation of identity (*tādātmya*) is rejected here.

[936b-937a]

यावत्किञ्चिज्जगत्यस्मिन्भेदकं वस्तु लक्ष्यते ॥ ९३६ ॥

अनापन्नादिमध्यान्तं सदेव तदितीष्यते ।

Whatever differentiating thing is found here in this world, all that is to be regarded only as the real without a beginning, middle and end.

Anything that is to be regarded as the condition of difference must be existence. But existence, we have shown, is without beginning, middle and end. So, how can difference be established?

[937b-938a]

सदेवेदमिति स्पष्टं सन्मूला इति चापरम् ॥ ९३७ ॥

श्रुत्योदाहारि नः साक्षात्सदैकात्म्यावबुद्ध्यते ।

To us in the matter of knowing directly the oneness of reality, Scripture is evidence which declares 'This is reality alone'¹ and again '(All have their) root in the real.'²

Scripture is quoted to show that all is existence alone. The first of these texts teaches the non-duality of existence directly, and the second by implication.

1. *CHU*, VI, ii, 1.

2. *CHU*, VI, viii, 4.

[938b-939a]

मानाभावस्य मानत्वं मेयाभावस्य मेयता ॥ ९३८ ॥

न्यायं न सहतेऽतीव यथा तदधुनोच्यते ।

Now will be explained how it is absolutely illogical to say that the absence of means of valid knowledge is a means of valid knowledge and the absence of object is an object.

The *siddhāntin* now turns to an examination of another *prima facie* view.

According to *NKL* the *prima facie* view here is that of the *Bhāṭṭas*.

[939b-940a]

बोधकं यदबुद्धस्य तन्मानमिति हि स्थितिः ॥ ९३९ ॥

न च प्रमाणतास्तित्वमीदृक्तस्मान्न युज्यते ।

That which makes known what has not been known is a means of valid knowledge. This is the position. Such nature of being a means of valid knowledge is not there (for absence of *pramāṇa*). So that is not proper (*pramāṇa*).

The absence of *pramāṇa* does not have the characteristic of *pramāṇa*. The characteristic of *pramāṇa* is to make known what is unknown.

[940b-941a]

मेयाभावः प्रमाणानां यद्यभावेन गम्यते ॥ ९४० ॥

प्रमाणानामभावस्य गमकः को भविष्यति ।

If the absence of object is cognized by the absence of means of valid knowledge, what is that which makes known the absence of means of valid knowledge ?

If the absence of *pramāṇa* should make known the absence of object, it must be as itself known. But what is it that makes known the absence of *pramāṇa*?

[941b-942a]

नाक्षादिपञ्चकं तस्य बोधकं सत्समन्वयात् ॥ ९४१ ॥

नयतस्तदभावो वा मेयत्वेनैव तत्स्थितेः ।

The five means of valid knowledge beginning with perception do not make it known ; for they are related to reality ; nor is their absence (the revealer) through reasoning (inference) for that itself stands as an object to be known (or proved).

Neither the five *pramāṇas*, perception, etc., nor their absence can make known the absence of *pramāṇa*. Perception, etc., can be related to only what exists. The absence of *pramāṇa* cannot become its own object.

[942b-943a]

नीलादिवदभावस्य यद्यक्षादिविशेषणम् ॥ ९४२ ॥

विशेषणेन तद्व्याप्तेस्तदभावः कुतो मितेः ।

As blue, etc., (are attributes of lily), if perception, etc., be the attributes of non-existence, then, since as attributes they qualify that, how can the absence thereof be validly known ?

Does non-existence have attributes or not? On the first alternative, does non-existence have means of valid knowledge or object of knowledge as its attribute?

If non-existence has *pramāṇa* as its attribute, even as lily has the attribute, blue, then non-existence cannot become the object of *pramāṇa*, perception, etc. The qualified does not become the object of its own quality.

[943b-944a]

अथाविशेषणोऽभावो भवद्विरभिधीयते ॥ ९४३ ॥

मेयाभावस्य मानत्वमविशेषात्प्रसज्यते ।

If it is stated by you that non-existence is without attribute, then, there is the contingency of the non-existence of object being a means of valid knowledge, because there is no distinction.

If it be held that non-existence is attributeless, then it cannot be stated that absence of *pramāṇa* is a *pramāṇa* and absence of object is an object; for absence or non-existence cannot be qualified that way. If non-existence is without qualification, how can such a distinction be made?

[944b-945a]

घटाद्यभाव इत्युक्तिर्न सम्यगिति मे मतिः ॥ ९४४ ॥

पदानामसमर्थत्वाद्विरोधाद्वस्तुनोर्मिथः ।

My view is that it is not proper to say 'The non-existence of pot', etc., because the words are not capable of being combined that way, as the things are mutually opposed.

As for the other possibility mentioned in v. 942b-943a, viz. that non-existence has the object as its attribute, our view is that it has no sense at all. The expression 'non-existence of pot', for instance, has no meaning if 'pot' be regarded as a qualification of 'non-existence'. How can existence and non-existence be combined in any manner? As they are opposed to each other, no relation is possible between them.

[945b-946a]

भावाभावाख्यपदयोः सामर्थ्ये चेत्समासता ॥ ९४५ ॥

घटादिनाऽनपेक्षत्वान्न समासः प्रसिध्यति ।

If two words expressing existence and non-existence could be combined provided they have capacity, then since pot, etc., are not expectant (of non-existence), the compound does not result.

If it be said that, although there is opposition between existence and non-existence, there may be combination of the words expressive thereof, even as in the case of the words 'darkness' and 'light', we reply: It is true that words such as 'pot' are expectant of other words to complete their meaning. Not so is the case with the words 'existence' and 'non-existence'. The words] 'darkness' and 'light' also are in a similar plight, and cannot therefore serve as examples.

NTV—samarthaḥ padavidhir iti smaraṇāt samarthānām eva samāso iṣyate. sāmārthyam ca sahaikārthībhāvaḥ, samāse ekārthībhāvo 'pi ākāṅkṣāyogyatā-sannidhibhiḥ sambandhe, nacātra yogyatā 'sti virodhād ity arthaḥ. kiṁca ākāṅkṣā 'pi nāsti.

[946b-947a]

भावस्याभाव इत्यत्र षष्ठ्यर्थः कतमो मतः ॥ ९४६ ॥

न कश्चिदपि संबन्धो नीरूपस्यासदात्मनः ।

In 'the non-existence of existence' what is the sense of the sixth case? No relation whatever is possible of the colourless non-entity!

The phrase 'non-existence of existence' has no meaning. There can be no relation whatever with the void.

AVS—na samyogo niravayavatvād abhāvasya, nāpi samavāya-tādātmye avastutvād abhāvasya, ata eva na sva-svāmi-sambandha iti.

[947b-948a]

वस्त्वन्तरमभावश्चेदन्यदन्यद्वेत्कथम् ॥ ९४७ ॥

अन्योऽपि चेद्वेदन्योऽविरोधो नीलवद्वेत् ।

If non-existence is another reality, how can one thing become another? If one thing can become another, then there would be no opposition as in the case of blue.

If it be contended that non-existence is not void but another existence, in reply we ask: why then call it non-existence? And, look at the consequences of your contention! Just as when it is said 'Pot exists' 'pot' and 'existence' are taken to be one, when it is said 'Pot does not exist' 'pot' and 'non-existence' must be regarded as identical. If 'non-existence of pot' means 'cloth', then it would amount to saying 'Pot is cloth', which is absurd. Or, if the non-existence as qualified by pot is cloth, even then it should be admitted that the qualification 'pot' is included in 'cloth'. In that case the expression 'Pot is cloth' should be as meaningful as 'Lily is blue'.

NKL—bhāvāntarābhāvapadayor aparyāyatvāt aikārthyam ayuktam ity āha—anyad iti. ghaṭābhāvaḥ paṭād anyah, paṭopi ghaṭābhāvāt, taylor abhedo na yukta ity arthaḥ. bhāvāntarābhāvau nābhinnāv aparyāya-sabda-vācyaṭvāt ghaṭapaṭavad ity uktam. vipakṣe bādhakam āha—anyopīti. nīlavād avirodho nīlakāmbalayor iva bhāvābhāvayos tādātmyam syād ity arthaḥ.

AVS—etad uktam bhavati—ghaṭābhāvaḥ paṭād anyah, paṭopi ghaṭābhāvād, atas tasyor ekatvaṁ na ghaṭata iti. athavā ghaṭo 'stīty ukte yathā bhāva-ghaṭayor ekatvaṁ bhavati, evaṁ nāstīty ukte'py abhāva-ghaṭayor ekatvaṁ tatra ghaṭābhāvasya bhāvāntaratve ghaṭaḥ paṭa ity uktam syāt.

[948b-949a]

संगतावविरोधी चेन्न संबन्धिनिवृत्तिकृत् ॥ ९४८ ॥

न संबन्धिग्रहाभावे संबन्धोऽयं प्रसिध्यति ।

If non-existence is said to be not opposed to some relation or other (though identity is impossible), then it cannot remove that with which it is related. If that with which it is related is not cognized, this relation will not be established.

If it be said that although there is no identity (*tādātmya*) between existence and non-existence, it is possible that there is some other relation, we reply: no. That no relation whatever is possible has already been shown. Moreover, does non-existence remove that with which it is related or does it not remove? If it does not remove, then there can be no opposition between non-existence and existence. If it does remove, then it must be opposed to the relation also. Further, does non-existence have a counter-correlate or not? On the first alternative, is the counter-correlate real or unreal? If the counter-correlate be real, then there is opposition between non-existence and its counter-correlate, in which case there can be no relation at all. If the counter-correlate be unreal, then since that is not cognized, how can there be relation of non-existence therewith?

[949b-950a]

संबन्धिविरहेऽसिद्धौ षष्ठ्यर्थत्वं न सिध्यति ॥ ९४९ ॥

विरोधाद्युपपन्नापि विधानप्रतिषेधनम् ।

Since the relation is not established in the absence of that with which there is to be relation, the sense of the sixth case does not result. Nor can perception affirm and deny at the same time because of contradiction.

On the view that non-existence has no counter-correlate, there is the following defect. If there be nothing with which non-existence is related, then it follows that there is no relation. If there is no relation, there is no sense in the expression 'non-existence of existence'.

In v. 920 three alternatives were set forth: (1) Does perception reveal the identity of an object, (2) does it make known the exclusion from other objects, (3) does it convey both?

If the first of these be the case, it was shown, difference cannot be the content of perception. The second alternative has been discussed so far and shown to be untenable. Now about the third.

The third alternative is that perception both affirms and denies. Here, does perception affirm and deny simultaneously? Or, does it first affirm and then deny? Or, does it first deny and then affirm? Not the first, because affirmation and denial are contradictory processes, and simultaneity is not possible as between them.

[950b-951a]

क्षणिकत्वाद्वियां नापि स्थायिधर्मः क्रमो भवेत् ॥ ९५० ॥

अनीलाभावपृष्ठेन नापि नीलस्य वेदनम् ।

Since cognitions are momentary, there is no sequence with permanent attributes; nor is there cognition of blue except through the basis of the absence of every colour but blue.

The second and third alternatives are rejected here. Cognitions are momentary; one and the same cognition cannot first affirm and

then deny. Nor can there be first denial and then affirmation; for the cognition of blue implies the absence of the other colours, and is not preceded by the denial of those colours.

[951b-952a]

नह्यदृश्यनिषेधः स्याद्घटादेरिव भूतले ॥ ९५१ ॥

नान्याभावविशिष्टत्वं कृत्स्नाभावगतौ भवेत् ।

There can be no negation of the unseen, as of pot, etc., on the ground. Nor can there be qualification by the non-existence of all other things, for that would require the knowledge of the entire existences and non-existences.

The cognition of blue does not arise from the denial of yellow, etc. The denial is possible only of that which can be perceived and is not perceived in a particular place, e. g. a pot on the ground. A similar phenomenon is not possible in regard to the atom, because the atom is imperceptible. So also there cannot be a general denial such as 'not-blue'. And it is not proper to say that through such denial there is the affirmation of blue.

Moreover, is the non-existence of non-blue (i.e. yellow, etc.) a qualification of blue or its nature? Not the first; if the qualification is the absence of all colours other than blue, then one must cognize the absence of all colours and only then it would be possible for one to cognize blue. This is certainly impossible for the parviscient individual to accomplish.

[952b-953a]

अन्याभावस्य भावत्वे स्यादभावः खपुष्पवत् ॥ ९५२ ॥

भावान्तरमभावश्चेत्सिद्धं वस्तु ततः स्वतः ।

If the non-existence of the other be existence,⁷ then the non-existence would be like sky-flower; if non-existence be another existence, the real would be self-established.

If the non-existence of yellow, etc., be the nature of blue, we ask, is blue, to be included in the non-existence, or is it the other way about? On the first of these alternatives, blue would be void like the sky-lotus. On the second alternative too, the non-existence would be void. If non-existence be taken to mean another existence, then, as already shown, difference and non-existence would not be established, and only the self-existent reality would have to be recognized.

NKL—bhedābhāvayor bhāvātirekeṇābhāvād advaitam āyātam.

[953b-954a]

तद्ग्राहीणि च मानानि व्यावृत्तिः केन गम्यते ॥ ९५३ ॥
चित्तेऽपि विषये चित्रमेकं वस्त्वेकमानतः ।

The means of valid knowledge reveal that (reality); by what is exclusion revealed? Even a multi-coloured object is a single object, since it is revealed by a single means of knowledge.

Exclusion, whether it be difference or non-existence, is not made known through any *pramāṇa*. Therefore, it must be admitted that the *pramāṇas* reveal the real which is untouched by difference and non-existence. Even if the real be varied or complex in nature, it is that real which is the content of *pramāṇa*, not difference or non-existence.

NKL—mānāni vastumātra-prakāśāni ato vyāvṛttir bhedābhāvaś ca na kenāpi gamyata ity arthaḥ.

[954b-955a]

प्रत्येकं नीलपीतादिग्रहणे चित्ता कुतः ॥ ९५४ ॥

वस्तुनो भेदरूपत्वे वस्त्वभावः प्रसज्यते ।

If blue, yellow, etc., are cognized each separately, how can there be multi-colour? If the real be of the nature of difference, there is the contingency of the non-existence of reality.

How can a multi-coloured object, for instance, be one reality? If thus it be objected, we reply: what are the many colours of the object? Are the colours severally cognized? Then, there is nothing like a multi-coloured object that is cognized. If the complex of colours is what is cognized, then it would be difficult to say whether there is difference or non-difference as between the various colours, blue, yellow, etc. Hence, as the so-called variety is not an entity, any exclusion that may be included in it would also be a void.

Exclusion cannot be regarded as the nature of blue, etc. The defect in so regarding we have already pointed out. Whether reality be included in difference or difference be included in reality, there would be defect.

[955b-956a]

अन्यधर्मे त्वभिन्नं स्यात्स्वतो वस्तु प्रमाश्रयम् ॥ ९५५ ॥

भिन्नाभिन्नं विरुद्धत्वान्नैकमानस्य गोचरः ।

If difference (*bheda*) be the attribute of the other (the unreal), then the real would be non-different, and it would be of itself the content of a means of knowledge. It cannot be both different and non-different, for, because of contradiction, it would not be the sphere of a single means of knowledge.

Now, it may be urged that difference is an attribute. If that be so, we ask, is difference an attribute of the real or of the unreal? It cannot be the first; for if the attribute too is a real entity, there would not result difference between the alleged relata, and if the attribute is a non-entity, there would be the non-duality of reality. If the second alternative, viz. that difference is an attribute of the unreal be sponsored, then the real remains untouched and its validity would have to be admitted.

The view that the real is both different and non-different is unacceptable because it involves a contradiction.

[956b-957]

वस्त्वात्मनाऽविरोधश्चेद्वस्त्वेव विषयस्ततः ॥ ९५६ ॥

सत्यं वस्तु कथं भिन्द्यात्पुंव्यपेक्षाविनिर्मितः ।

भेदः पुत्रादिभौवे तु जन्यत्वं वस्तुकल्पितम् ॥ ९५७ ॥

If it be said that difference and non-difference are not contradictory since they are of the nature of reality, then reality alone is the content; how can there be difference in the true reality—difference which is produced by human desires? In the matter of difference as son, etc., the nature of being generated is posited in an entity.

If it be said that difference and non-difference are not opposed to each other as they are of the nature of the real, then it is only in that form as not opposed that they would become the content of knowledge.

Moreover, since difference is dependent it cannot be real; it is illusory like the rope-snake. The difference of son, etc., too is not real. It is with reference to bodies that we speak of father, son, etc., the former being the generator, the latter the generated, and so on. The bodies, being dependent, are illusory.

NTV—ayam arthaḥ nāpekṣā nāma kascid vastu-dharmaḥ yena vastūni vyavasthāpyeran tasmāt puṁvyapekṣāvinirmita eva bhedo na vastu-svarūpaṁ bhidyād iti.

[958]

दाहपाकप्रकाशादिभेदेऽप्यग्नेरभिन्नता ।

कार्यतोऽपि न भेदः स्याद्वस्त्वभेदव्यवस्थितेः ॥ ९५८ ॥

Even though burning, cooking, shining, etc., are different, the fire is non-different; there is no difference even due to the effects, for the non-difference of the substance (fire) remains.

Inference and postulation may be adduced as evidence for difference. Inference: What is in dispute is different, since it gives rise to different effects, like clay. Postulation: The difference in effects is unintelligible without the difference in cause; so the difference in cause has to be postulated.

Reply: The reason given in the inference is inconstant. The postulation is not necessary because another explanation is possible. Although fire is one, different effects thereof are observed. So also, even though the effects constituting the world are different, the cause may be non-different.

AVS—dāha-pāka-prukāśa-kāryāṇāṁ bhede 'py agneḥ kāraṇasyā 'bheda-darśanād evaṁ jagad-bhede 'pi na tat-kāraṇa-bhedaḥ. ato nānumānam.

[959]

विभिन्नकार्यकर्त्रीणां शक्तीनां यद्वदाश्रयः ।

न विरुद्धोऽगिरेकोऽपि तद्वत्कार्येऽपि किं न ते ॥ ९५९ ॥

There is no contradiction in a single fire being the locus of capacities which produce different effects; even so why should it not be for you (a single cause) in the case of the effect?

Objection: Fire gives rise to different effects through different capacities. The capacities which are the causes are, therefore, different; and there is no non-difference of cause.

Reply: Fire must be admitted to be the cause of the capacities. It is one, although its effects, the capacities, are different.

[960]

घटाभावे घटः सिध्येत्पटाभावे पटस्तथा ।

अन्योन्याभावदृष्टेः स्यादन्योन्याश्रयता तव ॥ ९६० ॥

If there is non-existence of pot, pot will be established, and if there is non-existence of cloth, cloth will be established; if each is seen to be the non-existence of the other, there would be for you reciprocal dependence.

So far, assuming difference and non-existence in regard to effects, it was argued that these two are not possible in regard to cause. Now, it is shown that even in regard to effect they are not possible.

You look upon pot and cloth, for instance, as each the non-existence of the other. Then, it would be seen that if pot is established cloth is established, and *vice versa*. That would mean the defect of reciprocal dependence. And thus nothing would get established. If difference and non-existence are non-existent, there would be only the non-dual reality.

[961]

प्रत्यक्षत्वं पृथक्त्वस्य गुणत्वाद्यैरपीष्यते ।

तेषामपि गुणे मानं नीलवन्न त्ववस्तुनि ॥ ९६१ ॥

Even for those (Vaiśeṣikas) who hold that separateness (*pr̥thaktva*, i.e., *bheda*) is perceived because it is a quality, the evidence is in respect of a quality, like blue, and not in respect of non-entity (*avastu*).

It has been shown that difference and non-existence are not established in the view of the Mīmāṃsakas. Now is commenced an examination of the Vaiśeṣika position. According to the Vaiśeṣika, separateness (*pr̥thaktva*) which is difference (*bheda*) is a quality which is a real, and is perceived. Even thus perception is *pramāṇa* in respect of what is a real quality like blue, and not in respect of a non-entity which is difference.

[962]

अथ वस्तु पृथक्त्वेन विशिष्टं गम्यते तदा ।

शुक्लो गौरितिवन्मानं वस्तुन्येव न भेदगम् ॥ ९६२ ॥

If it be said that substance is made known as being qualified by separateness, then as in 'The cow is white' the means of knowledge reveals substance alone and not difference.

Objection: Separateness which is difference is not a non-entity since it is a qualification of what is real, like colour.

Reply: On the analogy of colour, if it is maintained that difference is perceived, then difference would be what is inherent in a single substance. Just as in the case of 'The cow is white' it is the

white cow that is perceived, even so in the case of 'The pot is different' it must be the pot that is different that is perceived, and not difference.

AVS—suklo gaur ity etan mānaṁ sukla-vastuny eva yathā, tathā bhinnno ghaṭa ity etad api mānaṁ bhinnavastuny eva na bhede.

[963]

अभेदेनैव वर्तेत पृथक्ता यदि वस्तुषु ।

वस्त्वेव तत्ततोऽन्या चेदपृथग्वस्तु तर्हि ते ॥ ९६३ ॥

If separateness resides in substances as non-different, then that would be a substance; if it is different, then substance would be non-separate for you.

Objection: The cognition 'The cow is white' is evidence for the cow and also for whiteness. Likewise, the cognition 'The pot is different' must be taken as evidence for both pot and difference.

Reply: Is difference which is separateness non-different or different from the thing? If the former, the non-duality of the thing results. If the latter, i.e. if difference is different from the thing, then the thing must be non-different or non-separate.

[964]

भावाभावपृथक्ताऽपि यद्यभिन्ना ततोऽपृथक् ।

भावाभावविभिन्ना चेत्पृथक्ता न परस्परम् ॥ ९६४ ॥

The separateness of existence and non-existence also, if it is non-different, it will not be separate from them; if it is different from existence and non-existence, then the separateness will not be mutual.

Moreover, is there separateness or not as between existence and non-existence? If there is separateness, is that separateness non-different from them or different? If non-different, then there cannot be difference between existence and non-existence, in which case there can be no exclusion at all from anything, and the non-duality of reality would result. If separateness is different from existence and non-existence, then the relation thereof with them is not possible. And, as there would be no mutual difference between existence and non-existence, there would be non-duality. If it be held that there is no separateness as between existence and non-existence, the same contingency would arise.

[965]

अन्यापेक्षं पृथक्त्वं चेत्स्वयं तर्ह्यपृथग्घटः ।

द्विधर्मत्वेऽपि वस्त्वेतदेकं स्यादुत्पलादिवत् ॥ ९६५ ॥

If separateness is dependent on another, pot by itself will be non-separate; if there be both features (separateness and non-separateness), the substance will be only one, like the lily.

Is the separateness of pot conditioned by pot itself or by another? If the former, the pot would turn out to be a void. If the latter, then the pot would itself be non-separate and non-dual; and what is conditioned by another is illusory, like the rope-snake.

If it be said that the pot by nature has the attributes of separateness and non-separateness, we reply that it would be difficult to determine whether the two attributes are different or non-different. In that case, the pot itself would be impartite and one, even as the lily is in spite of having many attributes.

[966]

धर्मबुद्धिप्रभेदेऽपि धर्म्यभेदः सदेष्ट्यते ।

अतो गवादेर्भेदेऽपि सन्मात्रमवसीयते ॥ ९६६ ॥

Though there are different attributes cognized, the non-difference of the substance is always admitted; therefore, though cow, etc., are different, the real *per se* remains.

Although the attributes seem to be different, there is no difference of the substrate. Similarly, cow, etc., may be different—but there is no difference of existence or reality *per se*. So, it is the real *per se* that is the content of knowledge. The non-dual alone is thus validly cognized.

NTV—yathā jalataraṅga-candraviśeṣāṇāṁ bhede 'pi candramātram avyabhicārat paramārtham, evaṁ gavādi-bhedānāṁ vyabhicārāt sanmātram vastv ity arthaḥ, tasmāt sad eva mānagrāhyaṁ netarat.

[967]

गोत्वादिमेयपक्षेऽपि सद्रूपस्यानपायतः ।

वस्त्वेव मेयं गोत्वादि शाबलेयादिवत्स्फुटम् ॥ ९६७ ॥

Even on the view that cowness, etc., are the objects cognized, the cognition of the reality-nature is not denied; therefore reality alone is the object of knowledge, as for cowness, etc., they are like spottedness. This is clear.

Even if it be admitted that cow, etc., are what are cognized, there can be no dispute about the fact that they are cognized as existing or being real. Existence is constant in 'The cow exists', 'The

pot exists', etc. Just as spottedness, etc., are not the meaning of the word 'cow', even so cow, etc., are not the meaning of the terms 'existence' and 'reality'. Cow, etc., vary; existence is constant. Hence the latter alone is validly cognized.

NTV—*gotvādeḥ meyatvāṅgikārepi sadrūpasyāpi meyatvam abhyupagantavyam tasya sarvatrā 'nusandhīyamānatvāt.*

[968]

सद्रूपत्वापरित्यागादवान्तरनिबन्धनाः ।

व्यवहाराः प्रतीयन्ते सत्तत्त्वं तेष्ववस्थितम् ॥ ९६८ ॥

The empirical usages conditioned by intermediate objects are seen to be even without relinquishing the reality-nature; for the reality-principle resides in them.

The empirical usage about things belonging to intermediate classes such as pillar and pitcher does not give up their form as real or existent. Hence in pillar, etc., there is reality. There is no generality other than reality which is the substrate of all assumptive natures; and there is nothing superior thereto wherein it may stand cancelled.

NKL — *kuṣa-palāśādi-viśeṣanimittā vyavahārāḥ saṁ kuṣaḥ saṁ palāśaḥ iti pratīyante tasmāt satvaṁ teṣv avasthitam avyabhicāri sthitam, itare vyabhicāriṇaḥ tatra kalpitā ity arthaḥ.*

[969]

सत्तातोऽपि न भेदः स्याद्द्रव्यत्वादेः कुतोऽन्यतः ।

एकाकारा हि संवित्तिः सद्द्रव्यं सन्गुणस्तथा ॥ ९६९ ॥

There is no difference of substance-ness, etc., from real-ness; from what else can they be different? Consciousness is of one form, as substance *exists*, quality *exists*.

Substance, etc., cannot be different from reality. If they are different, they would become unreal. What is real, viz. pure consciousness, is of one form, as evidenced by the usage, 'Substance is *real*', 'Quality is *real*', etc.

NKL—*sat-sāmānyād bhedābhāvaṃ sādhayati.*

[970]

समवायाच्च संबन्धे नैकरूप्यं विभिन्नयोः ।

तच्चेत्ततो न विश्वासो जातावप्येकबुद्धितः ॥ ९७० ॥

This oneness of form of what are different cannot be due to the relation of inherence; for if that were so, there would be no certainty, as there is the cognition of oneness in the class-nature also.

It cannot be said that the oneness of what are different as substance, quality, etc., is the result of inherence (*samavāya*); for as there would be the doubt whether the cognition of oneness is brought about by inherence or by the oneness of nature, it is not possible to assert that it is because of inherence alone. For instance, in the case of the cognition of oneness in 'Cowness is one', inherence is not the cause, as oneness is not inherent in cowness.

[971]

संसर्गधर्मता नापि भेदेनानुपलम्भनात् ।

समवायेन संबन्धे को हेतुरिति नेष्यते ॥ ९७१ ॥

Nor can there be relationness between reality and cow, etc., for no difference is seen. It is not determined what the cause is that relates inherence with the inherent.

Assuming inherence as between reality on the one hand and cow, etc., on the other, we have argued so far that the cognition of their oneness is not caused by inherence. Now, we proceed to show that the relation of inherence is not possible as between reality and cow, etc. Reality and cow are not seen to be different. So, there cannot be inherence as between them, even as there is no inherence as between the generality 'existence' and cow, etc. Moreover, is inherence independent or dependent? If it is independent of the relata, there is no meaning in using the possessive case 'inherence of'. If it is dependent, then the relation between inherence and the relata should be determined. This relation, however, cannot be either conjunction or inherence, as there is no evidence.

[972]

संयोगश्चेद्वियोगोऽपि समवायेऽनवस्थितिः ।

स्वतश्चेत्कल्पना व्यर्था द्रव्यस्याप्येकता स्वतः ॥ ९७२ ॥

If it is conjunction, there would be disjunction also; if it is inherence, then there would be endless regression; if (the relation of inherence with the relata be) self-established, then the assumption (of inherence) is futile, and the unity of the substance (and reality-nature) would also be of its own accord.

The relation of conjunction is impossible. If there be conjunction between inherence and its relata, there would be disjunction also at sometime hence, which would mean that quality, etc., are independent.

There cannot be inherence between inherence and its relata; for to say that there is would go against the Vaiśeṣika view that there is no inherence between the eternal substances and inherence.

Nor may it be held that the dependence of inherence on its relata is self-established; for in that case the assumption of inherence itself would be futile. Moreover, if the dependence of inherence on its relata be natural, then why should not the cognition of oneness of substance, etc., as existence be natural? If this is natural, then there is no need of inherence.

[973]

सत्तावगुणिताश्चैते सर्वे भावाः सदैव हि ।

व्यवहाराय कल्पन्ते भ्रान्तो भेदः सदैव तु ॥ ९७३ ॥

All these things being always encompassed by reality-nature, are fit for empirical usage; difference is always illusory.

It cannot be maintained that the particulars alone are real; for even to say that would show that it is reality that persists in them. It is as pervaded by reality or existence that the particulars become fit for empirical usage during the time of empirical affairs. In fact, the difference of the particulars is illusory appearance, like the difference in the reflections of the moon.

NKL—sarve viśeṣāḥ sattāvyāptā vyavahārayogyā bhavanti, ataś teṣāṃ bhāsamāno bhedo bhrānta ity arthaḥ.

[974]

येषामपि हि सामान्यभेदवद्वस्तु गृह्यते ।

तेषामपि कुतो भेदो वस्तुवैक्याद्वर्त्यभेदतः ॥ ९७४ ॥

Those who hold that a thing is made of both generality and particularity—for them also how can there be difference, as the thing is one and the qualified thing is non-different?

If it be held that what is called a thing has both generality and particularity, even then difference would not be established. The substrate which is of the nature of generality and particularity is non-different; and it is the real.

[975]

अपि भेदेन या बुद्धिः स्यात्सामान्यविशेषयोः ।

साऽपि तन्मात्रनिष्ठत्वाच्चैव भेदस्पृगिष्यते ॥ ९७५ ॥

The cognition of difference between generality and particularity—even that because of being in them alone is not true cognition of difference.

Objection: There is seen reciprocal difference between generality and particularity; that difference would devolve on the substrate also.

Reply: In your view, generality and particularity are not entities. Therefore, there cannot be cognition of difference in regard to them. In what is not an entity or thing, the cognition of difference is impossible. Even setting aside this difficulty, we ask, what is that cognition which, you hold, is of the difference between generality and particularity? Is that the cognition of generality, or of particularity, or of both, or some other cognition? On the first three alternatives, the cognition would be of generality, etc., alone, and not of difference. If it be held that that cognition is of something else, then that something else cannot be difference, because of the defects like reciprocal dependence, etc.

[976]

एकं चेद्विन्नता नास्ति भेदश्चेदेकता कुतः ।

चित्तेऽप्यनुगमाभावाच्च सामान्यविशेषता ॥ ९७६ ॥

If generality and particularity are one with a thing, there cannot be difference; if there is difference, how can unity be? Since there is no persistence in what are variegated, there are not both generality and particularity.

Are generality and particularity non-different from that which has them, or different? If they are non-different, then there would not be the relation of generality and particularity. If different, there is the contingency of there being three entities.

Although it is wished by you that the thing is of the nature of both generality and particularity, the thing can be only of the nature of a particular. The particular does not persist, e.g. the cow with broken horns (*khaṇḍa*) is not seen in the cow without horns (*muṇḍa*). The pure generality which persists, however, is not an entity.

[977]

स्वरूपपररूपाभ्यां यदा सदसदात्मकम् ।

वस्त्वेकं मानविषयमभावस्ते तदा कुतः ॥ ९७७ ॥

If the one reality be the content of means of knowledge as being and non-being, through its own form and other-form, how can there be non-existence for you?

Now, it is sought to reject difference through the rejection of non-existence.

If it be said that the same entity is real by its own nature and unreal as of the nature of something else, then it would result that, of that entity there is no unreality or non-existence since there is no evidence. In that case there would be no difference too which is dependent thereon.

[978]

प्रत्यक्षादिनिवृत्तिश्चेत्तस्याः किं रूपमुच्यताम् ।

स्तैमित्यमात्मनश्चेत्स्यात्तद्वस्त्वेवास्मदीहितम् ॥ ९७८ ॥

If the turning away of perception, etc., be the evidence for non-existence, say, what is the nature of that? If it is the non-activity of the self, then it is verily the reality which is acceptable to us.

If you say that the evidence for the non-existence of an entity is the non-rise of any of the five *pramāṇas*, we ask, what is the nature of the non-rise? (1) Does it mean that the self remains in itself without any activity? (2) Or, is there cognition of another entity? (3) Or, does it imply another existent?

(1) It cannot be the first; for there would then be the adoption of our position.

[979-980a]

अथ वस्त्वन्तरज्ञानं नितरां तस्य वस्तुता ।

भावान्तरमभावोऽपि निरुपाख्यः स नेष्यते ॥ ९७९ ॥

तस्माद्वस्त्वेकनिष्ठत्वान्न भेदोऽक्षादिगोचरः ।

If it (the turning away) is knowledge of some other entity, then by all means it is a reality. Even non-existence as another existence will not be admitted if it is

investigated into. Therefore, since perception, etc., relate only to the one reality, difference is not their sphere.

(2) If the non-rise of perception, etc., be the cognition of another entity, then also there is no non-existence, since cognition is an existence and its content also is an existent.

(3) The view that non-existence is another existence is untenable. If it is existence, the expression 'another' is meaningless. If it is non-existence, then the term 'existence' is inapplicable to it.

In any case, the so-called non-rise of the quintuple *pramāṇas* must be regarded as an entity; and the content or object of an entity must be an entity. An entity cannot establish the non-existence of entity; if this be not admitted, the establishing of one's own non-existence should be possible.

Rejecting difference through the rejection of non-existence, and accepting the view that generality alone is the real, it is concluded that difference has no evidence.

[980b-981a]

घटोऽयमिति संवित्तेर्घटो मेयः प्रतीयते ॥ ९८० ॥

न व्यावृत्तिः पटादीनामताद्रूप्यात्तथा पटे ।

In the cognition 'This is a pot' the pot appears as the object of knowledge, and not exclusion from cloth, etc., because it is not of that form; so also in the case of cloth.

If it be contended that the perception of a thing, say, pot, reveals also the exclusion of other things, such as cloth, we ask: is this done by the indeterminate perception or by the determinate perception? The indeterminate perception reveals only the object.

As for the determinate perception of pot, it is the pot alone that is the content, and not the exclusion of all other things; for this is an endless process and is not the sphere of the pot-perception. The same argument holds good with regard to cloth, etc.

[981b-982a]

घटाभावो विरोधित्वान्न घटेऽर्थान्तरेऽपि न ॥ ९८१ ॥

अषष्ट्यर्थतया तस्माद्विकल्पोऽयं न वस्तुगः ।

The non-existence of pot cannot be in pot because of contradiction; nor in some thing else, for it is not the sense of the sixth case; therefore, this is imagination and does not conform to reality.

Does non-existence of pot have no locus? Or, does it have one? If it is without locus, then it is independent. If it has a locus, what is that locus? Is it pot, or some other object? The pot cannot be the locus of its own prior non-existence, etc. As for reciprocal non-existence, that is another expression for difference which has been rejected. If the locus is something else, is that non-existence or existence? Not the first, because non-existence cannot be the locus of non-existence. Nor the second, for we have shown that no relation is possible as between existence and non-existence.

[982b-983a]

घटो हि संविदं कुर्वन्नात्माकारविशेषणम् ॥ ९८२ ॥

आत्मानं लभते तद्वद्व्यावृत्तिं न पटादितः ।

The pot, indeed, causing the cognition which has taken on the attribute of its form, makes itself known, and not its difference from cloth, etc.

The exclusion from cloth, etc., is neither the nature of pot, nor its attribute. In the pot-cognition it is pot alone that becomes the qualification of consciousness.

[983b-984a]

पटसंवेदनेऽप्येवं पटमालं विशेषणम् ॥ ९८३ ॥

ईक्षतेऽलाधिकं नान्यदभावादि यदुच्यते ।

So also in the cognition of cloth, cloth alone is the attribute; nothing more such as non-existence that is alleged is seen here.

Similarly, in regard to cloth. Just as in the pot-cognition the specification is pot alone, so also in the cloth-cognition it is cloth alone that is the specification.

[984b-985a]

संदिग्धनिश्चयाद्येवं ज्ञानधर्मो विशेषयन् ॥ ९८४ ॥

संविदं भिद्यते मेयात्प्रत्येकं भेदधीर्न तु ।

Doubt, determination, etc., which are the attributes of the internal organ, as they qualify the knowledge, differ due to the objects cognized and there is no independent cognition of difference.

Just as external objects like pot, cloth, etc., the internal contents such as doubt, determination, etc., do not import any difference into knowledge. Doubt, etc., constitute the qualification or attribute of knowledge, which here means the internal organ; hence we speak of doubtful knowledge, determinate knowledge, etc. These distinguish knowledge from the object known; but they do not convey any mutual distinction or distinction from knowledge.

AVS — saṁśaya-jñānaṁ mithyā-jñānaṁ pramāṇa-jñānaṁ ca jñānasyā 'ntaḥkaraṇa-dharmaḥ saṁvidam viśeṣayan saṁśayānubhavaḥ viparyāsānubhavaḥ pramāṇānubhavaḥ iti, meyaṁ na tu bhidyate.

[985b-986a]

तथाऽहमेव जानामि माता नान्य इतीदृशाः ॥ ९८५ ॥

मातृधर्माः प्रसिध्यन्ति विशिषन्तः स्वसंविदम् ।

Thus 'I alone, the cognizer, know, no one else'. This and similar ones are established as attributes of the cognizer, distinguishing one's own cognition.

Cognizer, hearer, seer, etc., are features that are superimposed on consciousness; so they are not different in reality. The same is the case with doubt, etc., and pot, etc.

NKL—jñātā mātā śrote 'tyādi mātṛ-dharmāṇām api parasparato 'nyataś ca bhedāsiddher anubhave 'dhyastāḥ sidhyantī 'ty arthaḥ.

[986b-987a]

संविदेका स्वतःसिद्धा प्रत्यग्रूपैकलक्षणा ॥ ९८६ ॥

भावाभावादिरूपाय व्यवहाराय कल्पते ।

Consciousness which is one, self-established, of the nature of the single inner reality, appears in empirical usage as existence, non-existence, etc.

Consciousness which is the self is the substrate of all appearances such as particularized existence, non-existence, etc.

NKL — adhiṣṭhānatvena rajjvādivad anyatrānādhyastatve hetum eketyādi viśeṣaḥair darsayati.

AVS—ahaṁ jānāmi mātāhaṁ draṣṭā śrotā mante 'tyādi mātṛ-dharmād yasmād anubhave 'dhyastam sarvaṁ tasmād anubhavo 'dvayaḥ kūṭasthaḥ prayagbhūtaḥ sarvavyavahārāspadaś ca siddhaḥ.

[987b-988a]

अतोऽनुभवमुल्लङ्घ्य न भेदो नाप्यभिन्नता ॥ ९८७ ॥

तत्पट्टेन तु मानानि विरोधः किंसमाश्रयः ।

Therefore, setting aside experience there will be neither difference nor non-difference; means of valid knowledge are only based on that; on what will contradiction be based?

What was premised earlier, viz. that there is no conflict of the Vedānta texts with other *pramāṇas* is here concluded.

The immutable inner experience is the substrate of all; transgressing that, neither the world nor its difference, etc., get established. The text 'That thou art', etc., teaches that experience; with that there could be no conflict of the other *pramāṇas*. The *pramāṇas* become valid only by being in conformity with experience. How can the Vedānta texts which conform to experience be in conflict with the other *pramāṇas*?

NTV—*tasmād anubhava eva pratyakṣādi-māna-meyah na bhedo nāpy abhedah ity upasaṁharati.*

NKL—*saṁvid atirekeṇa visvasya bhedo 'bhedo vā nāstīty arthah.*

[988b-989a]

अविज्ञातः प्रमाणानां विषयो वादिनां मतः ॥ ९८८ ॥

न तस्य मानतः सिद्धिस्तत्सिद्धेः प्राक्प्रमागमात् ।

Disputants believe that the object of means of valid knowledge is unknown before; but that is not *established* by means of valid knowledge, because that exists even before the functioning of means of valid knowledge.

It is experience that remains unknown and is the content of perception, etc. The Vedānta texts also relate to the same. How, then, can there be conflict between them and perception, etc.?

The *pramāṇas* do not produce the experience; they only reveal it.

[989b-990a]

अमानकं कथं च स्यादज्ञातत्वमिहोच्यताम् ॥ ९८९ ॥

कथं वा तद्विना मानं विषयासंभवाद्वेत् ।

“If the object exists even before the functioning of means of valid knowledge, then it cannot be known through means of valid knowledge. How then, can there be for it unknownness? This is to be explained”. (The reply is:) Without that how can there be means of valid knowledge, because it would be void of object?

Without the unknownness of the object, there cannot be the functioning of *pramāṇa*. If there be no unknownness, there will be no content indicated thereby; consequently *pramāṇa* would be void of content.

[990b-991a]

अज्ञातत्वक्षतिं कुर्वन्मानं मानत्वमश्नुते ॥ ९९० ॥

मानादज्ञातता चेत्स्यान्न सा तत्फलमिष्यते ।

Means of valid knowledge becomes means of valid knowledge by destroying unknownness; if there should be unknownness as a result of a means of valid knowledge the destruction of that cannot be the fruit thereof.

The unknownness itself is not the content of *pramāṇa*; for what the *pramāṇa* does is the destruction of unknownness. The lamp, indeed, does not have the darkness for its object!

[991b-992a]

अतोऽनुभवतौ लब्धमज्ञातं ज्ञापयत्सदा ॥ ९९१ ॥

प्रत्यक्षादि प्रमाणं स्यान्न स्वतौ नापि चान्यतः ।

Therefore, making known the unknown that has already been established in experience, perception, etc., become means of valid knowledge; not by themselves, nor by something else.

Perception, etc., are *pramāṇas* with reference to the pure inner self which is indicated by unknownness that is established by the experience which is the self that has neither a rise nor a setting. In other words, the self is the object of knowledge as well as that which establishes ignorance.

[992b-993a]

नाज्ञासिषमहं पूर्वमित्येवं प्रमिते घटे ॥ ९९२ ॥

पूर्वाज्ञातत्वविषयो भूयोऽप्यनुभवो यतः ।

“I did not know it before”. Thus with reference to a pot which has been known, the earlier unknownness as the content is experienced again.

The unknownness of a thing, say, pot, prior to the cognition thereof, is experienced thus: ‘Till this time I did not know the pot’. On the strength of this reflective cognition, we say, the unknownness is established by experience.

NTV—etāvantam kālam nājñāsiṣam iti jñānotpatteḥ prāg ajñātat-venā ’nubhūtasya punaḥ parāmarśa-darśanād ajñātatvam anubhava-siddham ity arthaḥ.

[993b-994a]

प्रवृत्तं विषये मानमवच्छेदफलं मतम् ॥ ९९३ ॥

ज्ञाताज्ञाते प्रति त्वस्य न व्यापारोऽप्रमाणतः ।

Means of valid knowledge is thought to yield the fruit of defining the object with reference to which it started functioning; as regards the knownness thereof it has no operation, for that would be invalid.

The *pramāṇa* which has the pot for content cannot establish its earlier unknownness, for that is not its function. The knownness as well as the unknownness of a thing are experience-established. What the *pramāṇa* does is only to define the object.

[994b-995a]

सर्वोऽप्यनुभवात्सिद्धां बालोऽप्यज्ञाततां स्वतः ॥ ९९४ ॥

न किञ्चिज्ज्ञान इत्येवं पृष्टो वक्ति प्रमां विना ।

All—and even children—give expression to their own experience-established unknownness. When asked about anything they say in the absence of evidence, “I do not know anything about it”.

That unknownness is experience-established is within the purview of everyone's experience.

AVS—prākṛtānām apy ajñātatvam anubhava-siddham.

[995b-996a]

निःशेषकरणग्रामलयेऽप्यनुभवः स्वतः ॥ ९९५ ॥

अलुप्तद्वक्सुषुप्तेऽपि जाग्रद्विधाविशेषतः ।

Even in sleep where the seer is not absent, though the entire host of instruments have resolved themselves, there is the self-same experience which is not different from the awareness in waking.

That unknownness is experience-established will be evident also when sleep-experience is analysed. On waking up one recalls 'I did not know anything in sleep'. The instruments of *pramāṇa* were not there in sleep. Yet there was the experience of unknownness. As between sleep and waking there is no difference so far as the experience or awareness of unknownness goes.

NTV — sakalamānopasañhārepi suṣuptāv ajñātatvam anubhava-siddham iti na mānāt siddham.

[996b-997a]

अत्यन्तानुभूतेषु हिमवत्पृष्ठवस्तुषु ॥ ९९६ ॥
जाग्रतोऽनुभवोऽप्येवं सुषुप्तान्न विशिष्यते ।

Thus is also the experience of one in waking, of the things on the top of the Himalayas which have never been experienced; so the waking experience (of unknownness) does not differ from the sleep-experience.

Here is a case of unknownness where the content cannot be validly cognized.

AVS—yathā suṣupte 'jñātatvā 'nubhavo 'nubhavād eva, tathā jāgraty apī 'ty arthah.

[997b-998a]

न चात्रानुभवो लुप्तो न जानामीति बोधनात् ॥ ९९७ ॥
अदृष्टमपि दृष्ट्वाऽस्ति बोधो नाज्ञासिषं त्विति ।

Here the experience is not lost, since there is the awareness 'I do not know', and even when what was unseen is seen, there is the experience 'I did not know it (then)'.

It is not right to say that experience itself is absent sometimes so that there is no question of its establishing unknownness during those moments; for experience could never be absent. Not during waking: witness such experience as, 'I do not understand the thing stated by you', 'So long I did not know this'.

[998b-999a]

पुमान्सुप्तोत्थितोऽप्येवं प्रमात्रादिलयं स्वतः ॥ ९९८ ॥

अनुभूत्यैव संधत्ते नान्तराऽतोऽस्य लुप्तता ।

Thus also the man who has risen from sleep remembers of his own accord the resolution of cognizership, etc., through experience alone; so in the interval there was no loss of this experience.

Nor is experience absent during sleep. On waking one says, 'I did not know anything in sleep'. There must have been experience then, even though there was not cognizership, etc.

NTV—sarvāntaḥkāraṇa-pariṇāmo-'paramasyaiva suṣupti-lakṣaṇat-vāt, nānubhavoparamaḥ suṣupti-lakṣṇam.

[999b-1000a]

न चेदानीतिनाद्धोधाद्धोधाभावगतिर्भवेत् ॥ ९९९ ॥

सौषुप्ती नहि बोधस्य कालभेदेन भिन्नता ।

Nor can the absence of knowledge in sleep be inferred from the present knowledge; knowledge does not become different, because of difference in time.

The absence of knowledge during sleep cannot be inferred on the strength of the knowledge that one has during waking. Experience does not become different because of differences in place, time and condition. The prior non-existence of experience can never be established.

The absence of that knowledge cannot be postulated on the ground of the awareness that is in sleep; for to say so would involve a contradiction.

[1000b-1001a]

बोधादेव प्रसिध्यन्ति कालावस्थादयो यतः ॥ १००० ॥

मातृमानादयश्चापि कुतस्तैरस्य विक्रिया ।

From awareness (*bodha*) alone are established time, states of experience, etc., and cognizer, means of cognition, etc. How, then, could that be a modification of them?

Experience is immutable, and is not altered by time, etc. Time, etc., are inert, and so are not self-established. They depend on consciousness for the manifestation of their existence. What is established earlier to them, viz. consciousness, cannot be modified by them. Experience which is self-nature, being without modifications earlier, cannot of its own accord get modified subsequently; for the self-nature cannot be destroyed.

[1001b-1002a]

प्रमातृमानतन्मेयेष्वागमापायिषु लिषु ॥ १००१ ॥

अलुप्तानुदितो बोधः प्रथते प्रत्यगेकलः ।

While the three, cognizer, means of cognition and object, come and go, knowledge which neither rises nor sets, shines as the one inner reality.

This is another reason for stating that the self which is experience is immutable. The inner self which is of one consistency shines without coming and going, and establishes the cognizer, etc., and their comings and goings. That self which is experience is not subject to change.

NKL—pramātrādi-bhāvābhāva-sādhakatvād ātmā svaprakāśaḥ.

AVS—ekaḥ svayamprasiddha ātmā na mā-siddha ity arthaḥ.

[1002b-1003a]

अभितोऽनुभवाक्रान्ता ज्ञाताज्ञातत्वभूमिषु ॥ १००२ ॥

नान्यत्तार्थाः प्रसिध्यन्ति लीयन्ते नाप्यनात्मनि ।

All things, everywhere, in the regions of the known and the unknown, are encompassed by experience; nowhere else are the things established, nor do they resolve into the not-self.

All objects, whether as known or as unknown, are pervaded by experience during the time of their empirical usage. It is thus that they gain their being. They do not stay elsewhere than in experience. Nor do they get resolved in something else. Therefore, cognizer, etc., —in fact, all things—arise from, stay in, and get resolved into experience which is the self.

[1003b-1004a]

अतोऽनुभव एवैको विषयोऽज्ञातलक्षणः ॥ १००३ ॥

अक्षादीनां स्वतःसिद्धो यत् तेषां प्रमाणता ।

Therefore, the one experience alone, which is of the nature of the unknown, is the object of perception, etc.; it is the self-established, in respect whereof they (perception, etc.) have validity (*pramāṇatā*).

It is experience alone that is the content of perception, etc.; and there is no other content. *Pramāṇas* become valid by removing unknownness in regard to experience. This is not incompatible with the self-luminosity of experience. Although experience is of one consistency and its luminosity is not other-dependent, *pramāṇa* is required to remove the nescience located therein.

NTV—yato 'nubhava-vyatirekeṇa kiñcin nāsti ato 'nubhavaśyaivā 'jñātātvaḍ anubhave sarvaṁ mānaṁ pravartata iti.

[1004b-1005a]

तेनानुभवसिद्धानां लोकेऽज्ञानविधातिनः ॥ १००४ ॥

मात्वमक्षादयो यान्ति नाज्ञातज्ञाततोऽन्यथा ।

Therefore, in the world, in respect of things which are established by experience, perception, etc., which destroy ignorance attain validity, not as otherwise than making known the unknown.

In the world, indeed, perception, etc., gain empirical validity only as removing the unknownness of pot, etc., which are established as superimposed on experience that is unknown.

NTV—anubhavāḍ ajñātātvena pratipannānāṁ ghaṭāḍīnam ajñāna-nivartakatvena ghaṭāḍāv akṣāḍīnāṁ prāmāṇyaṁ nā 'nyathā.

[1005b-1006a]

घटादयः प्रमासिद्धा मुञ्चन्त्यज्ञाततां न तु ॥ १००५ ॥

स्वतःसिद्धोऽपि वस्तुत्वान्मुञ्चत्यात्मा प्रमां विना ।

Pot, etc., having been established as valid through *pramāṇa*, leave off their unknownness; though self-established, the self, because of being an entity, does not leave off its unknownness without *pramāṇa*.

Just as pot, etc., being established by empirical *pramāṇas*, leave off their unknownness, so also the self, although self-luminous, becomes known only through *pramāṇa*, because it is also *vastu* (content of *pramāṇa*). Ignorance or unknownness is removed only by the luminosity that is the fruit of *pramāṇa*, and not by the self-luminosity of the self.

NKL — *ṛttivyāpta-ghaṭādīnām ajñāna-nivarttakatvād ātmanopī ṛttivyāptasya tan-nivarttakatvaṁ svarūpa-jñānasyā 'jñāna-sādhakatvād ity arthah.*

[1006b-1007a]

प्राग्बाधकागमात्सिद्धिर्लौकिकस्यापि वस्तुनः ॥ १००६ ॥

वस्तुतत्त्वबलादेव तत्तमोव्यवधानतः ।

Prior to the oncoming of the sublating Scriptural testimony, the empirical objects are established on the strength of the true reality (viz. the self)—and that, through the interposition of ignorance.

Just because the self becomes known through *pramāṇa*, it does not cease to be self-luminous. Before the final realization of the form 'I am Brahman' occurs, it is the self or experience that establishes all things as superimposed on itself by nescience.

NKL—*aham brahmā 'smīti jñānotpatteḥ prāg ajñāna-vyavahitā-nubhavād eva prapañca-siddher ātmā svaprabha ity arthah.*

[1007b-1008a]

कृत्स्नमात्राद्युपादानतमोबाधस्तु बोधतः ॥ १००७ ॥

तत्त्वमस्यादिवाक्योत्थात्पूर्णैकात्म्यस्वलक्षणात् ।

The sublation, however, of the ignorance which is the material cause of all things, cognizer, etc., is through the knowledge which is of the nature of the one plenary self, arising from the text 'That thou art', etc.

Perception, etc., are not the *pramāṇas* that will dispel the ignorance about the self. The knowledge that dispels it is the one that arises from the Scriptural text 'That thou art', etc.

[1008b-1009a]

तेनाऽऽगमस्य तत्र स्यादज्ञातत्वविधातिनः ॥ १००८ ॥

प्रमाणत्वं पुमर्थश्च स एव विदुषां मतः ।

Therefore, there is validity for Scripture, which destroys unknownness in respect thereof (the self); and that alone is regarded by the wise as the human goal.

The knowledge of what is conditioned is caused by perception, etc. In respect of what is unconditioned, Scripture alone is capable of functioning as *pramāṇa*. The knowledge of the conditioned cannot remove ignorance, for it depends on ignorance. The knowledge of the unconditioned dispels ignorance because the nature of the unconditioned reality is such. Therefore, it is through the knowledge generated by the Scriptural text alone that the root of all evil, ignorance, is destroyed. Thus it is clear that the text 'That thou art', etc., is *pramāṇa* in respect of the oneness of self. It is but proper that this should be so because the Brahman-self is of the nature of the supreme bliss and the final goal.

NTV—vākyottha-jñānād eva sakala-bandhopādānātmājñāna-nivṛttiḥ.

NKL—sukharūpatvād ātmaiva phalam ity arthaḥ.

AVS—yato vākyaṛtha-jñānād eva sakala-jāḍopādānā-'tmā-'jñāna-nivṛttis tenā 'gamasya tatra prāmāṇyam.

[1009b-1010a]

ननु दुर्वारसंसारदुःखसंदर्भहानतः ॥ १००९ ॥

किमन्यत्सुखमिष्टं स्याद्यस्याऽऽप्तेः पुरुषार्थता ।

“Now, other than the destruction of the host of misery consisting in the transmigration, difficult to avoid, what happiness is desired, the attainment of which is said to be the human goal?

The *pūrvapakṣin* (here the older Naiyāyika) objects: It is not right to say that the human goal is happiness or bliss. There is no happiness other than the removal of sorrow. Over and above the destruction of the entire host of misery which is called transmigration, nothing else is desired.

* *NKL* characterizes the *prima facie* view as that of the older Vaiśeṣika.

sukhasya duḥkhābhāvatvān nābhāvarūpātmatvam iti vṛddha-vaiśeṣikaś codayati.

AVS—duḥkha-nivṛttir eva sukham ity arthaḥ.

[1010b-1011a]

लोकेऽपि व्याधिसंतापविच्छिन्नौ सुखितेक्ष्यते ॥ १०१० ॥

व्यतिरिक्तसुखार्था च न प्रवृत्तिर्विरागिणाम् ।

“Even in the world, when the burning pain of disease is put out, happiness is seen; and for those who

are non-attached there is no pursuit of happiness other than that of release.

The destruction of sorrow alone is happiness. When a person, for instance, is afflicted with disease, he is said to be in misery. When he becomes rid of disease, he is considered to be happy. Even in the case of one who has renounced the world, seeking release, the goal is freedom from bondage which is misery.

[1011b-1012a]

असंवेद्यं सुखं नापि पुमर्थो न च कर्मता ॥ १०११ ॥

स्वरूपे वेद्यवेत्तृत्वायोगाद्द्वैतप्रसङ्गतः ।

“A happiness that is unknown cannot be the human goal, nor the object, for, in the self, the relation of the object of knowledge and the knower is not possible, as there is the contingency of duality.”

Moreover, if happiness which is an existent is said to be the goal, we have to ask: Is that happiness unknown or known? If it is unknown, like the hidden treasure, it cannot be the human goal. If it is known, then we should admit the duality of knower and known. This would militate against Advaita.

NKL—mandira-madhyā-nihita-dhananīcayavad ity arthah.

[1012b-1013a]

नैवं भेदेन संसिद्धे सुखदुःखे कथं तयोः ॥ १०१२ ॥

ऐक्यं सुखस्य विच्छेदो दुःखं वा किं न कल्प्यते ।

Not so. When happiness and misery are established as distinct, how can they be identified? Or, why should it not be assumed that the absence of happiness is misery?

The *siddhāntin's* reply: The destruction of misery cannot be the same as happiness, for in the case of a person who is half-immersed in water with the scorching sun above, there is simultaneous and separate experience of pleasure and pain.

Moreover, if the absence of misery be happiness, why cannot the absence of happiness be misery?

NKL—*nidāghe divākarakaravyāpta-sarīrasya mandākinī-hrade nimagnādhobhāgasya aparaparyāyam evā 'hlāda-duḥkha-saṁvedanāt.*

[1013b-1014a]

अदुःखिनोऽपि दृश्यन्ते सुखप्राप्तीच्छया यतः ॥ १०१३ ॥
तदुपाये प्रवर्तन्तस्तदभेदे न युज्यते ।

For, even those who have no misery are seen to be active in respect of the means of happiness, desiring to attain it. This will not be the case if the two were non-different.

It is observed in the case of some, e. g. the kings, that even though they have no misery they exert themselves in cultivating the means to happiness such as music and dance. This only shows that the destruction of misery and happiness are not identical.

AVS — *duḥkha-rahitasyā 'pi sukhecchayā tad-upāye pravṛtti-darśanāc ca na duḥkhābhāvaḥ sukham.*

[1014b-1015a]

चन्दनादिसुखोपायसंपन्नाः सुखिनोऽप्यलम् ॥ १०१४ ॥
पुत्रजन्मादिवार्ताभिः प्राप्नुवन्ति सुखान्तरम् ।

Even those who are endowed fully with the means of happiness such as sandal (paste), etc., and are suffi-

ently happy, attain more happiness through the words about the birth of a son, etc.

There are also different happinesses. A person becomes happy through means such as sandal-paste, etc. He gains happiness again on hearing that a son has been born to him.

AVS—sukhinām anīhamānānām api putra-janmādi-vārtā-śravaṇāt sukham dr̥syata ity arthah.

[1015b-1016a]

पुत्राद्यप्राप्तिरूपं च दुःखं तत्र न कल्प्यते ॥ १०१५ ॥

असंवित्तेरवेद्यं हि न दुःखं वैरिदुःखवत् ।

It cannot be assumed there that there is misery of the form of the non-birth of a son; for that is not known; what is unknown is not misery as the misery of an enemy.

It cannot be said that, in the case of the man who hears the birth of a son, what is called happiness is the destruction of the misery that was caused by the non-birth of a son; for, he was not thinking earlier of the fact that a son was not born to him, and so how could he have had misery? A misery that is not experienced is not misery. If an enemy feels miserable, do we feel that misery?

NTV—na hi puruṣāntara-gata-duḥkham puruṣāntarasya duḥkham bhavati.

NKL—ananubhūyamānaṁ na duḥkham puruṣāntaragataṁ duḥkham puruṣāntarasyā 'nanubhūyamāntvād yathā na duḥkham ity arthah.

AVS—yatra putra-janma-śravaṇāt sukham utpadyate na tatra duḥkham asti duḥkhānubhavābhāvāt, ananubhūtam api duḥkham astīti na śakyate vaktum, avedyasyāduḥkhatvāt puruṣāntara-gata-duḥkhavat.

[1016b-1017a]

तिर्यञ्चोऽप्यत एवेह कामयन्ते सुखं तथा ॥ १०१६ ॥

अप्रियं विजिहासन्ति न तु जानन्ति साधनम् ।

Therefore, even animals, here, desire happiness and want to avoid the unpleasant; but they do not know the means.

Even animals and birds seek pleasure as well as the destruction of pain. The only difference between them and the humans is that for the latter the proper means as taught in the Veda is available.

NTV — pasvādīnām sukha-prāpticchā duḥkha-parihārecchā ca vibhāgena dṛśyate yataḥ.

[1017b-1018a]

वेदोऽपि शुद्धमात्मानं सुखं मुख्यं प्रदर्शयन् ॥ १०१७ ॥

अनात्मानं तथा दुःखं पुमर्थत्वेन संमतः ।

And, the Veda is admitted to be the means of human goal, as it exhibits the pure self as the supreme happiness and the not-self as misery.

The Veda becomes *pramāṇa* by revealing the supreme happiness that is the self, free from all characteristics such as hunger, etc., and by showing up the misery that is the not-self.

[1018b-1019a]

तदेतत्प्रेय इत्यादिवाक्येभ्योऽनेकधा श्रुतम् ॥ १०१८ ॥

तथाऽऽत्मनस्तु कामाय तस्मान्नान्यत्सुखं भवेत् ।

It is declared in Scripture, in many ways, thus: 'This is dear',¹ and 'For the love of the self'² etc. Therefore, there is no other happiness.

Here are cited texts from the Veda which declare that the self is the supreme happiness.

1. BU, I, iv, 8.

2. BU, II. iv, 5 *et seq*;
IV, v, 6 *et seq*.

[1019b-1020a]

पुरुषार्थाभिसंबन्धाद्विरागित्वं यथाऽऽश्रितम् ॥ १०१९ ॥

परानन्दाभिलाषोऽपि तथा चेत्किं निषिध्यते ।

Just as, being related to the human goal, renunciation is depended upon, so also is the desire for the supreme bliss (depended upon). That being so, why is it prohibited ?

It cannot be said that, if he who seeks release desires happiness which is identified with the self, he would be subject to transmigration; for, just as it is admitted that he should have non-attachment because that is necessary for attaining the goal which is release, so also it must be conceded that he should have desire for the supreme bliss if it can be shown that it is for the sake of gaining release.

NKL — virāgitvaṁ saṁsārāsāratā-darśana-niṣpannaṁ saṁsāra-dveṣitvaṁ puruṣārthābhisāmbandhāt sādhanatvena mokṣasāmbandhāt tadadhīnā pravṛttiḥ na saṁsārāyeti bhavadbhir abhyupagataṁ yathā, tathā parānandābhilāṣopi puruṣārthābhisāmbandhīcet tan-mūlā pravṛttiḥ kasmāt saṁsārakāraṇatvena niṣidhyata ity arthaḥ.

[1020b-1021a]

आत्यन्तिकसुखेच्छायां यदि रागित्वमुच्यते ॥ १०२० ॥

विविक्तदेशसेवादाविच्छायां किं न रागिता ।

If the desire for absolute happiness is said to be attachment, then how is there not attachment in the desire for a solitary place, etc.?

In fact, what is called the desire for the supreme happiness is not really attachment; it is the interest (*śraddhā*) evinced in the supreme happiness. Attachment is born of delusion; the interest which we

speak of is caused by discrimination. This interest is exactly in the same position as the desire for solitude, attending on a teacher, etc.

NKL—virāgitvaṁ na dveṣaḥ kiṁtu saṁsāra-darśana-janyo-'dvegaḥ iti cet tarhi paramānandecchāpi śraddhaiva na rāgaḥ.

AVS—yad avidyākṣiptam abhūtaguṇābhiniveśaṁ rāgam ācakṣata iti rāga-lakṣaṇaṁ kṛtam.

[1021b-1022a]

अथ ये शतमित्यादिवाक्यैरेतत्प्रपञ्चितम् ॥ १०२१ ॥

एष ह्येवेति च व्यक्तं तैत्तिरीयश्रुतावपि ।

This has also been clearly explained in the *Taittirīya* texts, 'Now, that which is a hundredfold of the pleasure',¹ etc., and 'This alone gives happiness',² etc.

Two texts from the *Taittirīya Upaniṣad* are quoted here to show that the self is of the nature of the supreme happiness.

1. *TU*, II, viii, 1.

2. *TU*, II, vii, 1.

[1022b-1023a]

स्वानन्दाभिमुखः स्वापे बोध्यमानोऽत एव च ॥ १०२२ ॥

पीड्यते रूयादिसंपर्कसुखविच्छेदतो यथा ।

And, therefore, a man who in sleep enjoys the bliss of self, when awakened, is afflicted even as when interrupted in the enjoyment of contact with woman, etc.

The experience of sleep is also evidence for the bliss-nature of the self. When a person's sleep is interrupted he does not like it,

even as he dislikes a hindrance to the enjoyment of pleasure in the waking state. From this it is to be concluded that in sleep there is bliss.

[1023b-1024a]

आनन्दैकस्वभावत्वाद्बोध्यता तत्र नाथ्यते ॥ १०२३ ॥

निःसंबोधेऽथ्यते सा हि न तु बोधैकलक्षणे ।

Because it (viz. the self) is of the nature of pure bliss, knowability (*vedyatā*) is not required there ; that, indeed, is required in what is not of the nature of intelligence, and not in the case of that which is solely of the nature of intelligence.

Objection—If Brahman-bliss is an object of knowledge, there would be duality; if it is unknown, it would not be the human goal.

Reply—Although the self is of the nature of the one consistency of happiness, it is not an object of knowledge. It is only what is inert that may become an object of knowledge. The self, on the contrary, is pure consciousness. For understanding the bliss-nature of the Brahman-self, therefore, the Vedānta may well be the *pramāṇa*.

[1024b-1025a]

अधिकारस्य सौलभ्यप्रतिपत्त्यर्थमीरणम् ॥ १०२४ ॥

सर्वपुंसामिति तथा पूर्वमेव प्रपञ्चितम् ।

The words “for all men” (of the commentary) are stated for the purpose of teaching that the eligibility is simple. This has already been explained.

Having explained the meaning of the word “the entire Veda”, etc., the implication of the words “for all men”, etc., is here indicated.

There is the wish on the part of every one thus: 'Let happiness be to me; let not misery come to me'. *Mokṣa* is pure unconditioned bliss. He who desires that is the eligible person in respect of knowledge. Therefore, the eligible person here is easily secured. In order to remind us of that, the commentary says, "for all men".

*NTV—sukhaṁ me syāt duḥkhaṁ me mābhūt iti viṣaya-viśeṣā-
'navacchinna-sukhamātre duḥkha-nivṛttimātre ca sarva-puruṣāṇām
abhilāṣā darśanāt.*

[1025b-1026a]

स्वर्गादिकाम्यपि यतो मुक्तिं कामयते न तु ॥ १०२५ ॥

मुक्तिं कामयमानोऽन्यत्कटाक्षेणापि वीक्षते ।

For, even he who desires heaven desires release ; but he who desires release does not even cast so much as a side-glance at the other.

The pleasures of heaven are small as compared with the supreme bliss which is release. He who seeks release will never court them.

[1026b-1027a]

सर्वेषामपि च नृणामधिकारोऽनिवारितः ॥ १०२६ ॥

यतोऽतः सर्वतो नृणामिति भाष्यकृदब्रवीत् ।

And, to no man may the eligibility be denied ; therefore, the commentator said " for all men ".

When it is said that all are eligible for knowledge, what is meant is that no one is barred therefrom provided he is endowed with the fourfold means consisting of discrimination, etc.

[1027b-1028a]

शुक्लां गामानयेत्युक्ते कांचिद्भोक्त्रिकां क्रियाम् ॥ १०२७ ॥

कुर्वाणमभिवीक्ष्याज्ञः कुरुते कारणानुमाम् ।

“ When it is said ‘Bring the white cow’ a certain person performs the act having the cow as its object ; an ignorant person seeing this infers the cause (of the action).

Next is commenced the explanation of the commentary beginning with the words, “in the matter of what is seen”, and ending with the words “investigation of Scripture”.

Here there is a *pūrvapakṣa*.

When the superior elder says, ‘Bring the cow’, the intermediate elder performs the appropriate act in relation to the cow. The child observes this and infers the cause of the intermediate elder’s act.

[1028b-1029a]

ज्ञातं ध्रुवमनेनैतद्यद्भो कर्म कमीक्ष्यते ॥ १०२८ ॥

प्रागज्ञातस्य निर्वृत्तिर्न यतो वीक्ष्यते क्वचित् ।

“This has certainly been known by him—this which is seen as having cow for its object ; for nowhere is it observed that one who does not know earlier does something.”

This is how the child infers: The activity in question is caused by the cognition of what prompts, since it is a conscious activity.

*AVS—suklām gām ānaya iti kaścid vadati, tad-vākya-śravaṇānanta-
taraṁ śrotā pravartate, tataḥ goviṣayāṁ pravṛttiṁ drṣṭvā anuminoti.*

[1029b-1030a]

यद्यर्थं कारकाधीनं दृष्ट्वा तत्कारणानुमा ॥ १०२९ ॥

प्रमाणान्तरगम्यत्वाल्लौकिकत्वं तदाऽऽपतेत् ।

If the cause is inferred by seeing the thing (viz. the activity of the hearer) which depends on the causal agent (*kāraka*), then since that (i.e. *niyoga*) is understood through some other means of valid knowledge, there is the contingency of its being empirical (*laukikatva*).

Is that which prompts something other than *niyoga*, or is it *niyoga* itself? It cannot be the first; for, if it is admitted that words have capacity to get related to other words, the view that all words have *niyoga* for purport will have to be given up.

As regards the second alternative, this is the defect: If on seeing the activity of the hearer that is generated by causal agents one were to infer *niyoga* as the prompter thereof, then *niyoga* would be on a par with pot, etc., ceasing to be that which is special to the Veda.

[1030b-1031a]

न चेत्कारकतन्त्रोऽर्थो ज्ञातस्यानुष्ठितिः कथम् ॥ १०३० ॥
न सिद्धो नापि चाभावः कारकापेक्ष ईक्ष्यते ।

If the thing does not depend on the causal agent, how can there be the performance of what has been known? Neither what has been established nor what is non-existent is observed to require a causal agent.

Moreover, *niyoga* which is the sense of *lin*, etc.,—is it not accomplished through causal agents, or is it accomplished? The first alternative is not possible. Although *niyoga* is known somehow through *lin*, etc., it cannot be accomplished through performance, and so the performance of the stem-sense (sacrifice) would be fruitless and futile. On the second alternative, viz. that *niyoga* is accomplished through causal agents, is it as existent, as non-existent, or as

both? It cannot be the first, for neither the existent nor the non-existent depends on causal agents. For example, the self which is existent is not caused, nor the human horn which is non-existent.

NTV says that we may so split the words of the first line that we may read *ajñātasya* instead of *jñātasya*. Then the meaning would be that the performance of *niyoga* does not take place because *niyoga* is unknown.

ajñātasya iti vā padacchedaḥ. dr̥ṣṭa-viśaye ca iṣṭāniṣṭa-prāpti-parihāro-'pāya-jñānasyaiva pratyakṣānumānābhyām siddhatvāt, niyogasyā 'siddhatvāt vyutpattyabhāvena abodhakatvāt nāgamānveṣaṇā ato 'nuṣṭhānaṁ tasya na sidhyet.

[1031b-1032a]

आरभ्ये कारकत्वे न बलात्प्रामाण्यमापतेत् ॥ १०३१ ॥

व्यङ्ग्ये तु कार्ये वेदस्य सिद्धेऽर्थे मानता भवेत् ।

If the *niyoga* were originated by Scripture, then Scripture would be causal agent and therefore would not be *per force* a *pramāṇa*; if the *kārya* were only manifested, then the Veda would be *pramāṇa* in respect of what is established already.

On the view that *niyoga* is existent, is *niyoga* originated by Scripture, or is it manifested? If it be the first, Scripture would be a causal agent, and not a *pramāṇa*. If it be the second, Scripture becomes *pramāṇa* in respect of what is already accomplished; for manifestation or revelation is possible only of what is already there.

AVS—*na śabdārabhyo niyogaḥ kiṁtu vyañya iti cet tarhi siddha-vastuni mātvaṁ vedasya bhavet.*

[1032b-1033a]

वाक्यस्य च प्रमाणत्वं नाप्यभावैकगोचरम् ॥ १०३२ ॥

न चेदभावः कार्योऽर्थः सिद्धेऽर्थे मानता भवेत् ।

The validity of verbal testimony cannot have for its sphere what is non-existent ; if the sense of the *kārya* were not non-existence, there would be validity in respect of what is already established.

If *niyoga* be non-existent, there is no question of Scripture being a *pramāṇa* in respect thereof; for knowledge is never *pramāṇa* in regard to what is non-existent. If *niyoga* be existent, as was shown above, Scripture would become *pramāṇa* in respect of what is already accomplished.

[1033b-1034a]

अथोभयात्मकं कार्यं सिद्धासिद्धस्वभावकम् ॥ १०३३ ॥

उक्तदोषद्वयासक्तिर्न च वस्त्वीदृशं क्वचित् ।

If the *kārya* be of the nature of both, the established and the non-established, both the aforesaid defects would result ; nor is there anywhere such a thing.

If *niyoga* be both existent and non-existent, then the defects pointed out in both the alternatives would result. Moreover how can such a thing be which is existent as well as non-existent?

[1034b-1035a]

सिद्धस्य व्यञ्जकं मानं न मानं कारकं क्वचित् ॥ १०३४ ॥

चोदना मानकं चेत्तत्कथं कार्यं तदुच्यताम् ।

Pramāṇa is that which manifests what is already established; *pramāṇa* is never a causal agent; if injunction be *pramāṇa*, how can it be *kārya*? That must be explained.

Perception, etc., make known what is already accomplished. Such is the function of *pramāṇas*. If *niyoga* which is said to be *kārya* is revealed by Scripture, it must be an established entity, i. e. it cannot be *kārya*.

NTV—*evam liṅādi-yukta-vākya-pramāṇam api siddhārtha-bodhakam pramāṇatvāt anyathā ukta-prakāreṇa kārye prāmāṇyāyogāt.*

NKL—*vidhi-vākyaṁ siddhe mānaṁ mānatvāt pratyakṣavat.*

AVS—*pratyakṣādi-mānam akārakam vidyamāna-prakāśakam ca dṛṣṭam. evaṁ yadi niyogo 'pi vidhi-vākya-pramāṇakah tadā tasya kāryatvaṁ na siddhyati.*

[1035b-1036a]

मतं विषयसंसिद्ध्या कार्यमित्यभिधीयते ॥ १०३५ ॥

यागसिद्धेः पुराऽसिद्धेः कथं चोदनया मितम् ।

If it be thought that by way of establishing the object (*viṣaya*) it is designated as *kārya*, then since it is not established prior to the establishment of the sacrifice, how can it be known through injunction?

Is *niyoga* accomplished only after the performance of the stem-sense (viz. sacrifice), or even earlier? If the first, then *niyoga* cannot be known from Scripture before the performance of the sacrifice. What is non-existent, like the human horn, cannot be known.

NKL—*yāgānuṣṭhānātprāg asatve niyogasya nṛśṛṅgasyeva na vedagamyatvam.*

प्राक्प्रयोक्तृभिसंसिद्धौ किं फलं यागसिद्धितः ॥ १०३६ ॥

यागसिद्ध्याऽपि तत्सिद्धौ प्रयोज्यत्वं कुतो यजेः ।

If, even before the performance of the sacrifice, *niyoga* be established, then, of what use is the performance of the sacrifice? If *niyoga* is established through performance of the sacrifice, then, how can the sacrifice be such as to be performed (by *niyoga*)?

If *niyoga* is accomplished even before the performance of sacrifice, then since it is not achieved through sacrifice, the performance of sacrifice would be futile. It is not possible to accomplish what is already accomplished. So, where is the need for performing sacrifice?

NKL—*siddhasya sādhyatvā-'yogāt niyogaprayuktānuṣṭhānavatvaṁ yāgasya hīyeta.*

AVS—*yāgānuṣṭhānaṁ niṣphalaṁ, niyogāsādhakatvāt.....siddhasya siddhy ayogān niyogaprayuktaṁ yāgasyā 'nuṣṭheyatvaṁ na ghaṭata ity arthaḥ.*

यागाद्यनुष्ठितेरस्य घटादेरिव चेन्मतः ॥ १०३७ ॥

उपकारो नियोगस्य कथं न घटतुल्यता ।

If the performance of sacrifice, etc., is to be regarded as an aid (in bringing about the *niyoga*) even as the operations of the potter are in relation to the pot, then how is there no similarity between *niyoga* and pot?

If the performance of sacrifice is said to be helpful in the accomplishment of *niyoga* even as the operations of the potter are in regard to the production of a pot, then *niyoga* would be an empirical phenomenon like the pot.

[1038b-1039a]

अपुमर्थे नियोगे च तात्पर्यं स्यात्तथा सति ॥ १०३८ ॥

प्रत्यर्थिनि पुमर्थे तत्सुधीभिर्गृह्यते कथम् ।

And if that were so, Scripture would have for purport the *niyoga* which is not a human goal; and when the human goal is inimical to it, how can the wise grasp it?

If *niyoga* be on a par with the pot, then it cannot be the human goal. And, if it is not the human goal, the wise would not seek it.

[1039b-1040a]

लिङ्गदिश्रवणात्पुंसः कार्यं यत्प्रसमीक्ष्यते ॥ १०३९ ॥

उपकाराद्यपेक्षं तद्वक्तृकलोः प्रसिध्यति ।

The *kārya* which is looked forward to by the man who hears the potential mood (*liṅ*), etc., depends for its coming into being on some benefit (resulting) to the speaker or the doer.

When an injunction is heard, the hearer seeks to fulfil it in order to accomplish happiness either for himself or for the one who gave the injunction, or in order to avoid pain for either. If that were so, the sense of *liṅ*, etc., is the instrument to what is desired, and not *niyoga-kārya*.

[1040b-1042a]

न चेत्संभाव्यते कर्त्ता पुमर्थः कस्यचिद्विधेः ॥ १०४० ॥

आज्ञोक्तेरेव न तदा कश्चिज्जगति चेष्टते ।

आज्ञार्थमात्रसिद्ध्यर्थं न कश्चित्स्ववशो नरः ॥ १०४१ ॥

दुःखात्मके मनो धत्ते यागादौ चोदनावशात् ।

If from the injunction no human goal is understood to be accomplished by the agent, then in the world no one would be active merely because of the injunctive statement.

No man who has an independent will, for the mere sake of fulfilling the sense of the injunction, sets his mind to the difficult tasks like sacrifices by virtue of the injunction.

In all cases, the sense of *liñ*, etc., is instrumentality to what is desired. When some one hears the command 'Bring the cow', if he does not understand that the execution of the command will result in an advantage either to himself or to the one who issued the command, he would not proceed to act. The sense of *liñ*, etc., thus, is only the instrumentality to what is desired. This is true of both injunctions and prohibitions.

Even in the case of a servant obeying the orders of a king, etc., the obedience is for the sake of avoiding pain.

The performance of sacrifice involves an enormous amount of effort and labour. No one would voluntarily undertake to perform such tasks if there be no advantage. So, even in the Veda the sense of *liñ*, etc., is instrumentality to what is desired.

NKL—*prayojanam anuddisya na mando 'pi pravartata iti nyāyāt.*

[1042b-1043a]

पुमर्थमभिसंधाय यागादावथ चेष्टते ॥ १०४२ ॥

फलं प्रवर्तकं प्रापन्न नियोगस्तथा सति ।

If for the sake of the human goal one is active in respect of sacrifice, etc., then the fruit which impels him to activity has come in and not *niyoga*.

If it is granted that one performs sacrifice only after knowing that it is the means to the accomplishment of what he desires, then it must be admitted that what prompts activity is the instrumentality to what is desired, and not *niyoga*.

AVS—tadā rāga eva pravartako na niyoga ity arthah.

[1043b-1044a]

मन्त्रोक्तेरिव लोडादेः प्रवृत्तिरिति चेन्मतम् ॥ १०४३ ॥

प्रायश्चित्ती भवेन्नैव तत्पराधीनवृत्तिः ।

If activity as a consequence of the imperative mood (*lot*), etc., is thought to be like that which is due to incantations, then since one would be entirely governed by it in his actions, there would be no need for expiation.

If activity in obedience to a command be on a par with the activity of a person who is under a spell, then the agent would have no responsibility for his actions. Even if he transgresses, that would be no fault of his, and there would be no need for any expiation.

NTV — kiṁ mantravat puruṣecchām anapekṣya niyogaḥ puruṣaṁ pravartayati utā 'napekṣya uttarātra rāgasyaiva pravartakatvaṁ prāpnoti pūrvatra niyogātikramāt na doṣabhāk puruṣo niyoga-paratantratvāt.

[1044b-1045a]

प्रवर्तकत्वं मन्त्रस्य न प्रवर्त्यवशाद्यथा ॥ १०४४ ॥

स्वत एव न यागादेः कार्यसिद्धिस्तथा भवेत् ।

If it be said that *mantra* (incantation) causes activity not through the object to be set to act but of its own accord, then from sacrifice, etc., there will be no attainment of *kārya*.

If it is said that the incantation or spell prompts activity of its own accord, and that the prompted person is helpless, and if it be maintained that the Vedic command also functions in the same way, then it would be meaningless to talk of any accomplishment through sacrifice.

AVS—yathā mantra-prerito mantra-paratantraḥ pravartamāno yadī kathamcin mantram atikrāmati na kaścīd doṣaḥ evam atrāpīty arthaḥ.yadi niyogātikramān na doṣaḥ tathāśati niyoga-viṣayaṁ yāgādikaṁ na ko'py anutiṣṭhed ato yāgāder na niyoga-siddhir iti.

[1045b-1046a]

कारकं वा क्रिया वा स्याद्यदि वा स्यात्क्रियाफलम् ॥ १०४५ ॥

तस्य लौकिकमासिद्धेर्लौकिकत्वं प्रसज्यते ।

Whether it is causal agent or activity or fruit of activity, there would be secular nature for *niyoga*, because it is established through secular *pramāṇas*.

Whether *niyoga* be a causal agent, or act, or the fruit thereof, since it is known through other *pramāṇas*, it would be a secular phenomenon, like a pot, which would mean that it is not something which is known from the Veda alone.

[1046b-1047a]

ऐकोत्म्यवस्तुनिष्ठे तु यथोक्तन्यायवर्त्मना ॥ १०४६ ॥

न कश्चिदपि दोषः स्याद्वचस्यस्मिन्मनागपि ।

As for the texts which have for purport the one self, there is not the slightest defect, as we have already explained through reasoning.

A similar contingency does not arise in the case of Brahman. We have already shown that the Upaniṣad texts such as 'That thou art' are *pramāṇa* for the Brahman-self. So, there is not even the least parity between *niyoga* and Brahman.

[1047b-1048a]

नेति नेत्यादिवाक्येभ्यो योऽर्थोऽनन्यानुभूतिगः ॥ १०४७ ॥

लौकिकत्वं कथं तस्य सर्वमेयातिलङ्घिनः ।

The sense which is understood from the texts like 'Not this, not this'¹, and which is not got through any other experience—how could it be secular, since it transcends all objects of knowledge?

Brahman is not what is known through secular *pramāṇas*, because it is without any quality, as is taught by the negative texts of Scripture such as 'Not this, not this', and because it is self-luminous, as is declared in the text 'Consciousness is Brahman', etc.

¹ BU, II, iii, 6; III, ix, 26.

[1048b-1049a]

इत्युक्तमभिसंधाय दृष्टादिवचनं जगौ ॥ १०४८ ॥

लौकिकत्वप्रसिद्धयर्थं नियोगस्य घटादिवत् ।

Bearing in mind what has been stated above, the Commentator wrote the words 'the seen (*dr̥ṣṭa*)', etc., for establishing the secular nature of *niyoga*, as of pot.

The words of the commentary, "the seen", etc., show that Brahman alone is the purport of the Veda, not *niyoga*. *Niyoga* is secular like a pot, and is known through other *pramāṇas*.

[1049b-1050a]

आस्तां वेदान्तमानत्वं त्यक्तं तत्कामतस्तव ॥ १०४९ ॥

वस्तुन्युक्तेर्न चेन्मात्वं कर्मकाण्डेऽपि तद्ववेत् ।

Let alone the validity of the Vedānta which you have rejected at your pleasure; but if the Veda were not *pramāṇa* in respect of the self (*vastu*), the same fault will affect the ritual-section.

You do not admit that the Veda is *pramāṇa* in respect of Brahman-self on the ground that the self is an existent entity. But this prejudice of yours will result in the destruction of your own *siddhānta*. In order that *karma-kāṇḍa* may be meaningful, you must *per force* admit that the Veda teaches a self that survives death and gets related to another body, etc., and a heaven to which it can go through acquiring merit. The transmigrating self and heaven are existent entities. If the Veda can teach these, can it not teach Brahman?

NKL—*tattvamādeḥ prāmāṇyaṁ tāvat tiṣṭhatu tad asmābhir api tvad-icchayā uktam siddha-vastuni vedasya prāmāṇyaṁ na cet karma-vāk-yānām api prāmāṇyaṁ na syāt. dehāntara-sāmbandhy ātmano prāmāṇi-kasyā 'siddher ato bhaviṣyad-dehasāmbandhy ātmani vākya-prāmāṇyo-pagame tattvamāder api siddhe prāmāṇya-siddher ity arthaḥ.*

AVS — tattvamādi-vākyaṁ pramāṇam ity etat tāvat tiṣṭhatu. siddhavastuni vedasya mātvaṁ naced iṣyate karma-vākyaṇām api na mātvaṁ sidhyet. ataḥ karma-vākyaṇām mātvaṁ icchatā siddha-vastuni bhaviṣyad-deha-sambandhiny ātmani svarga-devatādi-svarūpe ca vedasya mātvaṁ abhyupagantarvam. ataḥ kārya eve 'ti niyamābhāvat vedāntānām api svārthe mātvaṁ bhavet.

[1050b-1051a]

भविष्यदेहसंबन्धी वाक्यादात्मा न चेन्मितः ॥ १०५० ॥

मानान्तराच्च कः कुर्याददृष्टार्थाः क्रिया सुधीः ।

If the soul to be related to the future body is not known validly from the text or through some other *pramāṇa*, which wise man will perform the sacrifices which have unseen fruit?

If the transmigrating self were not known through Scripture and other *pramāṇas*, no one would perform the sacrifices. Thus the commentary says, “if not”, etc. It is the transmigrating self that is the enjoyer of the fruit of sacrifices. In the absence of a knowledge of that, who would undertake to perform the sacrifices?

[1051b-1052a]

नापि सांख्यप्रमासिद्धमात्मानमवगच्छतः ॥ १०५१ ॥

देहाद्यनभिसंबन्धात्प्रवृत्तिः स्यात्क्रियास्विह ।

Nor can there be activity in respect of rites, here, on the part of those who understand the self as established by the *pramāṇa* given by the Sāṅkhyas, for that self is not related to the body, etc.

The self that is established through inference by the Sāṅkhyas is of no use in the performance of ritual; for, that self is without activity and unrelated to a body.

[1052b-1053a]

कर्मकाण्डेऽधिकार्यस्मिन्याद्वक्संभाव्यतेऽञ्जसा ॥ १०५२ ॥

ताद्वक्संप्रतिपत्त्यर्थं न चासतीति भण्यते ।

The commentator says, “Nor if it were not so”, for the purpose of making us understand quickly the nature of the eligibility for the ritual-section.

The words of the commentary which indicate the nature of the eligibility for the ritual-section are now explained.

[1053b-1054a]

कर्मभ्यः फलमिच्छद्भिरदृष्टं दृष्टमेव वा ॥ १०५३ ॥

देहावस्थान्तरावेशे प्रमाणं वाच्यमात्मनः ।

Those who desire fruits, seen or unseen, from rites must state the evidence for the self entering into a different state of the body.

Although the self is self-established, the *pramāṇa* should be stated for its taking on another body after leaving off the present one. Otherwise the transmigrating self will not be established. Without that there would be no agent and enjoyer for the Vedic rites.

[1054b-1055a]

कथं च तस्य कर्तृत्वं व्यापित्वान्निष्क्रियत्वतः ॥ १०५४ ॥

न चाकर्तुः फलं गौण्या वृत्त्या चेत्सुतरां न तत् ।

And how can there be agency for it, since it is all-pervading and actionless? Nor can there be fruit for the non-agent; figuratively also it cannot be.

The self that is established through argument by the Vaiśeṣikas is of no use here; for that self, being all-pervading and without action, cannot be the agent of sacrifices.

Nor may it be said that although the self is not an agent, it is the enjoyer, as in the Sāṅkhya system; for the fruit can accrue only to the one who is prompted to act by Scripture. Moreover, the self is not the enjoyer in the principal sense of the term; for its true nature is to be unattached and indifferent. If the self is not the enjoyer in the principal sense, it cannot be the enjoyer in the figurative sense also.

[1055b-1056a]

मुख्यकर्तृत्वपक्षेऽपि ह्यनिर्मोक्षः प्रसज्यते ॥ १०५५ ॥

मानेन नाश्रयतेऽज्ञानं ज्ञापकं हि न कारकम् ।

On the view that agency is principal, there is the contingency of non-release. Through *pramāṇa* ignorance is destroyed; *pramāṇa* is what makes known, and not what causes one to act.

If the enjoyership is in the principal sense, then agency also must be for the self in the principal sense. If that is so, then there can be no release.

Nor may it be said that, although agency is real, it is removed through *pramāṇa*, for *pramāṇa* can never remove what is real; it can only reveal the real.

[1056b-1057a]

देहान्तराभिसंबन्धो भावित्वान्नाक्षगोचरः ॥ १०५६ ॥

लिङ्गसादृश्यविरहान्नानुमा नोपमा तथा ।

Relation to another body, because it belongs to the future, is not an object of perception; nor of inference and analogy, because there are no *probans* and similarity.

Perception, inference, and analogy cannot serve as *pramāṇas* in respect of the self that is related to a future body.

[1057b-1058a]

शब्दादात्मनि संसिद्धे पूर्वोक्तन्यायतो न च ॥ १०५७ ॥

श्रुतार्थापत्तिरप्यत्र नाभावो मानभावतः ।

When the self is established from Scripture, it is not established through the aforesaid reasoning; there is not even presumption from what is heard here; nor non-cognition, since there is cognition.

Presumption from what is seen (*dr̥ṣṭārthāpatti*) is not the evidence; nor presumption from what is heard (*śrutārthāpatti*). Nothing is seen that is unintelligible without presuming the self. And there is no unintelligibility either in what is heard from Scripture in regard to this matter.

As there is the *pramāṇa* of Scripture in respect of the self, there is no scope for non-cognition too to function as *pramāṇa*.

[1058b-1059a]

न चाहंप्रत्ययात्सिद्धिरात्मनः स्यात्कदाचन ॥ १०५८ ॥

बोधानुभवसंवित्तिवित्तयो ह्यात्मवाचिनः ।

Nor is even the self established through the cognition 'I', for the words expressive of the self are awareness, experience, consciousness, knowledge.

As the self is self-luminous, it is not grasped through the cognition 'I' also.

NTV — *ātma-pratipādaka-sabda-buddhiṣu vipratipatti-darśanān nāhaṁ-pratyaya-gamya ātme 'ty arthaḥ.*

AVS—*svayaṁprakāśatvād ātmano nāhaṁ-pratyaya-gamya ātmā.... ātma-prasādād ahaṁ-pratyaya-siddhes ca nāhaṁpratyayād ātma-siddhiḥ.*

[1059b-1060a]

यस्यानुभवसिद्धयैव सिद्धिः स्याद्घटसिद्धिवत् ॥ १०५९ ॥

ततोऽहंप्रत्ययात्सिद्धिमीक्षतेऽनुभवः कथम् ।

That whose establishment, like the establishment of pot, is through the establishment of experience—how from that cognition 'I' can experience expect its own accomplishment ?

Moreover, the cognition 'I' cannot grasp the self, because it is grasped by that, like the cognition of pot. Just as the pot-cognition which is a psychosis requires to be established by experience which is the self, so does the cognition 'I' require the self for its establishment. How can that establish the self?

NKL—*ahaṁ-pratyayo nātmasādhako dr̥śyatvāt ghaṭavat.*

[1060b-1061a]

मानादनुभवः सिद्धो जडः स्याद्घटवन्न चेत् ॥ १०६० ॥

नैरपेक्ष्यं चिदात्मत्वे स्याच्चान्योन्यसमाश्रयः ।

If experience is established through *pramāṇa*, it would be inert like pot; if not (inert), it will be independent, and the self is intelligence; also there would be reciprocal dependence.

If the 'I' cognition were to apprehend the self, the self would become inert like pot. If the self were not inert—as it is not inert—it must be admitted that it is pure consciousness, not requiring the 'I' cognition for its apprehension. And, if the self which is pure consciousness were to be apprehended by the 'I' cognition, there would be reciprocal dependence as between the two.

[1061b-1062a]

आत्मनोऽहंधियः सिद्धिरात्मसिद्धिरहंमतेः ॥ १०६१ ॥

अन्योन्याश्रयतैवं स्यादहंबुद्ध्यात्मनोर्ध्रुवम् ।

Through the self the establishment of the cognition 'I', and through the cognition 'I' the establishment of the self—thus there would surely be reciprocal dependence as between the cognition 'I' and the self.

How there would be reciprocal dependence is explained.

[1062b-1063a]

अहंधीरात्मनः कार्यं कारणेनाऽऽप्यते सदा ॥ १०६२ ॥

तया तस्य कथं व्याप्तिरव्याप्तौ मेयता कथम् ।

The cognition 'I' is an effect of the self; and it is always accomplished through the cause. How can by that (cognition 'I') the self be pervaded? If it is not so pervaded, how can the self be the object of knowledge?

The 'I' cognition is not what apprehends the self, as it is an effect of the latter, like desire.

The self is not what is apprehended by the 'I' cognition, since it illumines that; whatever illumines another is not illumined by that, even as the lamp which illumines a pot is not illumined thereby.

As the 'I' cognition does not prevade the self, the self cannot be the content thereof.

NTV—saṁvid-balād evā 'haṁ-pratyayasya sadbhāva eṣṭavyaḥ, saṁvid evā 'smākam ātmā, tasyā api saṁvidāḥ sad-bhāvo 'haṁ-pratyayād eva cet sādhyate tadā 'haṁ-pratyayā-'tmano vyāpya-vyāptṛtva-lakṣaṇa-viruddhārtha-pratipatti-darśanād vādinām iti.

NKL—ahaṁ-pratyayo nātmagrāhakaḥ tat-kāryatvāt sukhādivat..... ātmā nāhaṁ-pratyaya-vyāpyas tad-vyāpakatvād yo yad-vyāpako nāsau tad-vyāpyo yathā paṭa-vyāpakas tantur na tad-vyāpyaḥ.

[1063b-1064a]

क्रियाकाले गुणीभावात्क्रियासिद्धावसंभवात् ॥ १०६३ ॥

कर्तुः प्रमेयता न स्यादहंबुद्ध्या कथंचन ।

The agent is by no means the object known through the cognition 'I', for at the time of action he is the attribute, and when there is no action he is not established.

Moreover, is the self apprehended as the agent by the activity which is the 'I' cognition? If so, is it at the time of the act, or before, or after? It cannot be at the time of the act; for at that time the agent-self is subsidiary to the act, and therefore cannot be the object of the act. Nor is the self as agent apprehended either before or after; for either before or after there is no act, and in the absence of the act there cannot be the agent. Also, if the agent were to be the object of the act which is the 'I' cognition, it might as well be its own object which is absurd.

[1064b-1065a]

संविद्रूपे प्रमेये च संविदन्या फलं भवेत् ॥ १०६४ ॥

न च संविद्बुद्ध्याभासो नानुमेयं फलं क्वचित् ।

If consciousness be the object of knowledge, there would be another consciousness as the fruit ; but there cannot be the appearance of two consciousnesses ; nor is the fruit to be inferred by any means.

If the self which is of the nature of consciousness be the object of knowledge, then another consciousness should be admitted as the fruit of knowledge. But this is not what is experienced. In the consciousness-self there is not experienced another consciousness. Nor may it be said that although the other consciousness is not experienced, it is to be inferred; for in regard to the unconditioned self-luminous consciousness there can be no inference.

[1065b-1066a]

घटाद्याकारसंविद्वच्छ्रुद्धायामपि संविदि ॥ १०६५ ॥

संविद्विशिष्टा संवित्स्यान चासावात्मनीक्ष्यते ।

As in the case of the consciousness of the form of pot, etc., even in the case of pure consciousness there would be consciousness qualified by consciousness ; but this is not observed in the self.

The fruit-consciousness is intelligible in the case of inert objects like pot, but not in regard to pure consciousness which is the self.

[1066b-1067a]

प्रमातरि च मेये स्यात्फलं कस्येति भण्यताम् ॥ १०६६ ॥

न मातुस्तस्य मेयत्वान्नापि मेये फलं क्वचित् ।

And if the cognizer is the object of knowledge, it is to be stated, of whom is the fruit? It cannot be of the cognizer for he is the object of knowledge ; nor is there fruit anyway in the object of knowledge.

If the cognizer is the object of cognition, then for whom is the fruit which is cognition? It cannot be for the cognizer because the cognizer, you say, is the object of cognition. Nor may it be said that the fruit may belong to the cognizer as the object, even as it does to objects such as pot; for, we ask, what is this fruit—is it luminous or non-luminous? If it is luminous, it cannot belong to the non-luminous pot, etc.; if it is non-luminous, it cannot illumine pot, etc.

[1067b-1068a]

जडत्वात्तत्र मेयस्य फलं मातरि चेन्मतम् ॥ १०६७ ॥

मेयतो जडताऽत्रापि संविच्चेन्न प्रमाणजा ।

If it be thought that since pot, etc., which are objects of knowledge are inert, the fruit is in the cognizer, then since the cognizer is the object here, there would be inertness ; if there is consciousness, then, it would not be the result of *pramāṇa*.

If it be said that the fruit is not in pot, etc., because they are inert, but in the cognizer, because there is no inertness there, we reply: if the cognizer is the object of knowledge, inertness would result there also. If the self is admitted to be of the nature of consciousness, then it cannot be the result of a *pramāṇa*.

AVS—saṁvid-rūpaśced ātmā na pramāṇajā saṁvid-ātmani saṁvid-dvayādarśanād ity arthah.

[1068b-1069a]

धर्मत्वेनाप्यहंबुद्धेर्न भेदो धर्मिणाऽऽत्मना ॥ १०६८ ॥

रूपं द्रव्यात्मनो नान्यद्रसादेस्तद्विभिद्यते ।

Even as an attribute the cognition 'I' has no difference from the substance, the self; colour is not different from the substance, though it differs from taste, etc.

If the cognition 'I' be considered to be an attribute of the self, then there can be no difference between the two. Substance and attribute are not different from each other, as, for instance, a cow and a horse are. Colour cannot be different from the coloured substance. If colour appears as distinct, it is with reference to another attribute or another substance.

Thus if the 'I' cognition be an attribute of the self, then the two would be non-different, and therefore the self cannot be the object with reference to that cognition. If the two be different, then there cannot be the relation of attribute and substance as between them.

NTV—na hy ahaṁ-buddheḥ pramātuḥ ca bhedo 'sti rūpasyeva dravyāt, ataś caikasya jñāna-jñeya-rūpatvaṁ virudhyata ity arthaḥ.

[1069b-1070a]

द्रव्यादि चाऽऽत्मनो रूपं प्रमेयं यदुदीरितम् ॥ १०६९ ॥

घटवत्तदहंबुद्धेः प्रत्यग्वृत्तेर्न गोचरः ।

Substance, etc., which are stated to be the nature of the self and to be the objects of knowledge,—they are like pot, and are not the sphere of the cognition 'I' which has for its scope the inner self.

If it be said that the self as substance is the object of knowledge, and as consciousness is the cognizer, we reply: the self which as substance is regarded as the object of knowledge cannot, then, be the sphere of the 'I' cognition, because the sphere of this cognition is the inner self.

NTV—yadyat prameya-rūpaṁ tasya tasye 'daṁ-buddhi-gocaratva-niyamād dravya-rūpasyāpi 'daṁ-buddhi-gocaratvenā 'nātmatvam eve 'ti bhāvah.

[1070b-1071a]

अस्मत्प्रत्ययसंभिन्नं प्रत्यकर्तरि वेदनम् ॥ १०७० ॥

ज्ञानस्य यदुपन्यस्तं विशेषस्तत्र नेक्ष्यते ।

The apprehension, in which the cognition 'I' is mixed up, of the inner agent by knowledge as taught by you is not different (from the Bauddha position).

You reject the Bauddha view of momentary cognitions on the ground that one and the same cognition cannot be both apprehender and apprehended. But that defect would result for you also, if you were to hold that the self is of the nature of both apprehended and apprehender and that it is apprehended by the 'I' cognition.

AVS—nahi gami-kartā gami-kriyā-viṣayaḥ, ato bauddha-pakṣāt pakṣasya viśeṣam abhyupagacchatā nāhaṁpratyaya-grāhya ātme 'ty upaganta...

[1071b-1072a]

ज्ञानबोधेन नैवाऽऽत्मा मितो नाप्यात्मसंविदा ॥ १०७१ ॥

ज्ञानं न च द्वयं भेदादभेदेऽनुभवः स्वतः ।

The self is not known by the awareness of knowledge, nor knowledge by the awareness of the self; nor is knowledge twofold, for there would be difference; if there is non-difference, experience is self-established.

By the manifestation of the knowledge-element, the self, the substance-element is not manifested, since the two are different. If the self were manifested by the manifestation of the knowledge-

element, then the two would be non-different. Nor is the knowledge-element made manifest by the manifestation of the self, for the same reason. Since the two elements are differently manifested, it must be admitted that the twofold self is not established through the 'I' cognition.

If you agree that there are not two elements and that the self is one, then you must necessarily accept the view that the self which is of the nature of experience is self-established.

NTV—dravya-rūpa ātmeti naiyāyikādayaḥ, bodha-rūpa ātmeti vedāntinaḥ, dravya-bodha-rūpa ātmeti bhaṭṭamatānusārīṇaḥ, itthaṁ vādi-vipratipatti-darśanāt nāhaṁ-pratyaya-vedya ātmeti, tasmād dravya-rūpa eva vā bodha-rūpa eva vā ātmā, na dravya-bodha-rūpaḥ, tasmān mām ahaṁ jñāmi 'ti vikalpa-mātram.

[1072b-1073a]

किं प्रमाणमहंरूपमुताऽऽत्मैवेति कथ्यताम् ॥ १०७२ ॥

प्रत्यक्षत्वान्न तन्मानं नाऽऽत्मा स्वार्थजडत्वतः ।

This must be stated: Is the cognition 'I' the *pramāṇa* or is it even the self? It (the 'I' cognition) is not the *pramāṇa*, because it is directly perceived; nor the self, because of the difference between being its own end and being inert.

You hold that the self is cognized through the 'I' cognition. What is this 'I' cognition—is it a *pramāṇa*, or is it the self itself? It cannot be a *pramāṇa*, for it is directly apprehended like desire, etc., and *pramāṇa*, according to you, is what is inferred. Nor is the 'I' cognition the self, for it is other-dependent and inert whereas the self is independent and non-inert.

NTV — *natāvat pramāṇatvam ahaṁrūpasya ghaṭate icchādivat aparokṣatvāt. na hi pramāṇam aparokṣam icchanti nityānumeyatvā 'bhyupagamāt. nāpy ātmatvam ahaṁ-rūpasya parārthatvāt jadatvāc ca.*

[1073b-1074a]

न चाप्यात्मन्यविज्ञातेऽहंबुद्धेः सिद्धता तव ॥ १०७३ ॥

येनाऽऽत्मा स्यादहंबुद्धेरनुमेया हि सा स्थिता ।

When the self is not known the cognition 'I' is not established for you ; the self is not established through the cognition 'I' which is not itself known ; that (cognition 'I') is established as what is inferred.

The 'I' cognition cannot be what establishes the self, for in the absence of the manifestation of the self, it itself is not established. And, if you still insist that the 'I' cognition establishes the self, there would result the defect of reciprocal dependence. The 'I' cognition, according to you, is what is inferred on the strength of the *probans*, the manifestation of the self. This would mean that there is the 'I' cognition when the self is known; and at the same time if you hold that the 'I' cognition manifests the self, there would be reciprocal dependence.

[1074b-1075a]

निरंशस्य न चाप्यंशकल्पनाऽप्युपपद्यते ॥ १०७४ ॥

स्वात्मतन्त्रे च विषये मानबोधः सदा भवेत् ।

And, it is not proper to assume difference of parts in what is partless ; if the cognition 'I' be the object dependent on the self, there would be knowledge through *pramāṇa* always.

Admitting for the sake of argument that there is distinction of elements in the self, we showed that the 'I' cognition cannot be that which establishes the self. But the truth is that there is no distinction in the self. Twofoldness is not seen in the self; nor is there any need to assume such a distinction. Scripture declares that the self is without parts.

It is not proper to say that the self alone is the cause of the 'I' cognition; for if that be so, there should always be the 'I' cognition, which is not the case. In sleep, for instance, there is not the 'I' cognition.

NKL — niṣkalam niṣkriyam śāntam ityādi śruti-virodhāc ca nātmano rūpadvayam.

AVS—ātmana evāhaṁ-pratyaya-kāraṇatve ahaṁ-pratyayasya sadā-bhāva-prasaṅgāt.

[1075b-1076a]

अज्ञातत्वं विना मानं नाहंप्रत्यय आत्मनः ॥ १०७५ ॥

अज्ञातत्वमतो वाच्यमात्मनोऽत्र घटादिवत् ।

The cognition 'I' cannot be the *pramāṇa* in respect of the self without its being unknown; therefore as for pot, etc., unknownness must be predicated of the self.

Without recognizing unknownness in respect of the self which is the cognizer, it is not possible to show that the 'I' cognition is *pramāṇa* for the self. In order that *pramāṇa* may function in the case of the self, it must be admitted, therefore, that the self is unknown. Is this unknownness self-established, or established through some other? It cannot be the first, for that would be a self-contradiction. If it be the second, is the unknownness established through *pramāṇa*, or through the cognizer, or through the eternal experience? The unknownness cannot be established through *pramāṇa*, for that would

involve infinite regress, and also that would mean that no *pramāṇa* could remove the unknownness. Nor can the cognizer establish the unknownness, for the cognizer which is an object of knowledge, like pot, cannot establish anything.

[1076b-1077a]

तस्याप्यनुभवात्सिद्धिर्यद्युच्येत घटादिवत् ॥ १०७६ ॥

सिद्ध आत्मा पृथङ्मातुर्नो चेन्माता न सिध्यति ।

If it be said that the establishment of even that is by experience, as of pot, etc., then the self is established to be different from the cognizer; if not, the cognizer is not established.

If the third alternative, viz. that the unknownness of the cognizer is established through the eternal experience is accepted, then it must be admitted that the self which is the eternal experience is different from the cognizer. That being so, even if the cognizer be apprehended through the 'I' cognition, it does not follow that the self is so apprehended.

And, if the witness-self is not recognized as that which establishes the unknownness of the cognizer, there would be no functioning of *pramāṇa* in respect thereto, and the cognizer would not be established.

NTV—ātmani nāhaṁpratyayaḥ pramāṇam kimtu yeyam prete ityādyā śrutir eva pramāṇam ity arthaḥ.

[1077b-1078a]

प्रमाणसंश्लवोऽप्युक्तो दूरादेव निवर्तितः ॥ १०७७ ॥

अन्यत्रापि हि मानानां नैव संश्लव इष्यते ।

As for the cumulation of *pramāṇas* (being evidence for establishing the self), that has been removed far away ; even elsewhere (in the view of the logician) the cumulation of *pramāṇas* is never admitted.

So far, the view of the Bhāṭṭas that the self is apprehended through the 'I' cognition was examined and rejected; now, the Prābhākara view that the cognition of all objects is *pramāṇa* for the self is considered.

When it has been shown that even the 'I' cognition is not *pramāṇa* for the self, it goes without saying that the cognition of sound, etc., cannot establish the self.

The Naiyāyika contends that the self is not known exclusively through Scripture, as perception, inference, and Scripture are equally *pramāṇas*. But even according to the Naiyāyika, there is no cumulation of these *pramāṇas*. If, as shown already, the self is not the object of the 'I' cognition, how can it become the object of inference, etc.?

[1078b-1079a]

अज्ञातावगमे यद्वत्प्रमातर्यर्पितं फलम् ॥ १०७८ ॥

न मेये पूर्वमानेन तद्वन्मानान्तरैरपि ।

Just as the earlier *pramāṇa*, in knowing the unknown, offers the fruit to the cognizer, and not in the object of knowledge, even so should be the case with the other *pramāṇas*.

How is there the cumulation of the *pramāṇas*? Is it because each subsequent *pramāṇa* causes the fruit, viz., knowledge, in the same object? Or, is it because the knowledge so caused is for the same cognizer?

The first alternative is not possible ; for the object is inert, and knowledge cannot be caused in it. So, the *pramāṇas* in sequence bring in knowledge only in the cognizer.

AVS—meyāśritaṁ yadi phalaṁ tadā saṁplavaḥ śakyetāpi mātrāśrayaṁ jñāna-phalam atha suddhe vastuni pūrvamānavad uttara-mānānāṁ praveśān na saṁplava iti.

[1079b-1080a]

अतोऽनधिगतावेशात्सर्वेषां संप्लवः कुतः ॥ १०७९ ॥

मान्तरैरवबुद्धेऽपि ज्ञातेऽप्यज्ञाततोऽन्यतः ।

Thus, since the other *pramāṇas* relate to the unrecognized, how can there be the cumulation of all *pramāṇas* ? Even if it be known through other *pramāṇas* it would be other than that which was unknown and then known (by the previous *pramāṇas*).

Just as the earlier *pramāṇa* makes known what is unknown, the later *pramāṇas* too should do likewise. How then can there be the cumulation of *pramāṇas*?

Nor is there such cumulation because the knowledge caused is for the same cognizer; because the content of each *pramāṇa* being different, there is nothing like all the *pramāṇas* combining to produce knowledge.

[1080b-1081a]

अथाप्यवगमो मेये तथाऽपि स्यान्न संप्लवः ॥ १०८० ॥

पूर्वोऽनधिगते वृत्तः प्रत्ययोऽधिगते परः ।

Even supposing the object is understood (by these *pramāṇas*), there will be no cumulation ; the earlier

cognition took place in regard to the uncognized, the later in regard to the cognized.

Even if the fruit be admitted to occur in the object of knowledge, there is no cumulation of *pramāṇas*; for while the first *pramāṇa* makes known what is unknown, the subsequent *pramāṇas* relate to what is already known.

[1081b-1082a]

पूर्वेण निश्चिते चेत्स्यान्नोत्तरस्य प्रमाणता ॥ १०८१ ॥

तथा संदेह एकस्मादन्यस्माद्घि विनिश्चयः ।

If the object has been determined by the earlier, there will be no validity for the later ; if from the one there is re-statement, then from the other there is certitude.

If the object has been ascertained through the earlier *pramāṇa*, the later *pramāṇas* cannot be *pramāṇas*; they can only serve as restatements. Hence also there is no cumulation.

[1082b-1083a]

निःसामान्यविशेषेषु नातः संप्लव इष्यते ॥ १०८२ ॥

यथाऽन्यत्र तथेहापि वेदान्तेष्वभ्युपेयताम् ।

Therefore, in what are devoid of generality and particularity, cumulation is not admitted ; as elsewhere so here also, in the case of the *Vedāntas*, let it be admitted.

If even in the case of objects that have generality and particularity the cumulation of *pramāṇas* is not possible, how is that possible in the case of the souls which have no distinctions?

It may be said that since cumulation is possible in respect of Brahman-Ātman, the Upaniṣads are not the only *pramāṇa*. But this is not sound. If there can be no cumulation in respect of objects and souls, it goes without saying that that is not possible in the case of Brahman-Ātman. Thus it is settled that the Vedānta texts alone are *pramāṇa* here.

[1083b-1084a]

यतो मानानि सिध्यन्ति जाग्रदादित्यं तथा ॥ १०८३ ॥

भावाभावविभागश्च स ब्रह्मास्मीति बोध्यते ।

It is taught : 'I am that Brahman' from which result the *pramāṇas*, as also the three states, waking, etc., and the distinction of being and non-being.

Brahman becomes the content of other *pramāṇas* through adjuncts. The pure Brahman, however, is known through Vedānta alone.

Perception, etc., are inert, and are not self-established. They shine by virtue of the Brahman-self. How can the self be their content? Surely, colour, etc., which shine by the light of the lamp cannot make the lamp shine.

It may be asked: how can the inner self which is endowed with the states of experience, waking, etc., be identical with Brahman? The reply is: the inner self is the witness of those states, and is not, therefore, endowed with them.

Objection: How can there be identity between the dual and the non-dual? Reply: Duality is illusory; therefore, the non-dual reality is not affected thereby.

Restating the pure self which is the sense of the word 'thou', the text 'I am Brahman' declares that the same is the sense of Brahman.

*NKL—avasthātrayādi-śākṣitvād ātmanah sad-brahmatvam upapan-
nam ity arthah.*

[1084b-1086a]

यतोऽसिद्धानि सिध्यन्ति भावाभावौ यदाश्रयौ ॥ १०८४ ॥

योऽनन्यार्थो यदर्थं च सर्वं योऽनन्यदृक्सदा ।

प्रमेयादित्रयं यस्मात्परस्परविलक्षणम् ॥ १०८५ ॥

आत्मानं लभते सत्यः सौऽध्यक्षोऽलाभ्युपेयताम् ।

That whence what are non-established are established, whereon are grounded being and non-being, which is not for the sake of anything else, and for the sake of which all is—the non-different ever-seer; whence the three, object of cognition, etc., which are mutually distinct, attain their nature—let that true witness-self be admitted.

Having stated the sense of the text 'That thou art' by explaining the meaning of the term 'thou', the same is taught by expounding the meaning of 'that'.

The supreme Self is that by whose grace the inert things are established; it is that wherein the existents and non-existence stay; it is that which, Scripture declares, is of the nature of happiness; it is that which eternally shines without depending on any causal factors. With that supreme Self, the witness is identical. This is the meaning of the text.

The witness is that by virtue of which are established the mutually distinct cognizer, etc., agent, etc., and enjoyer, etc.; it is that which does not depend on anything else for its own existence; it is the unsublated immutable reality which is of the nature of pure consciousness: this witness it is not possible to deny, for it is most immediate.

NKL—dehādini jadāni yataḥ sidhyanti ajaḍātmavad ābhāsante pramātrādinām bhāvābhāvau ca yadāśrayau yadadhīnau sidhyataḥ yo 'nanyārthaḥ sarvaṁ ca yadartham iti sukha-lakṣaṇa-lakṣitatvena sukha-rūpo ya ātmā sa brahmeti tattvamādi-vākyena bodhyata ity arthaḥ.

AVS—yat-prasādād akhila-vastu sphuratīva tasya sākṣiṇaḥ kūṭasthasya nityasiddha-nirviśeṣa-niratiśayānanda-brahmaṇaikatvaṁ bodhyate tattvamādinā.

[1086b-1087a]

असंकुचितचित्पद्मः प्राज्ञे स्वप्नप्रबोधवत् ॥ १०८६ ॥

तथा प्रफुल्लबोधाब्जः प्राज्ञवत्स्वप्नबोधयोः ।

As in dreams and waking, so in sleep there is the unclosed lotus of intelligence; likewise, as in sleep, so in dream and waking there is the lotus of knowledge in full bloom.

The witness-intelligence is never absent; it ever shines.

NTV—kūṭasthānubhavasya nirākaraṇaṁ na sambhavati tasyāpi nirākaraṇasyā 'nubhavād ity arthaḥ.

[1087b-1088a]

साक्ष्यसंबन्धतः साक्षी न स्वतः साक्षिताऽऽत्मनः ॥ १०८७ ॥

प्रत्यङ्मात्रैकदृष्टित्वाद्वियां वाचामगोचरः ।

It is the witness in relation to the seen; for the self there is no inherent witness-nature. Because it is of the nature of pure inner consciousness, it is not the sphere of mind and speech.

The self is said to be the witness only in relation to the objects. In itself there is not for it the witness-nature too. The witness-nature

which is a product of nescience cannot destroy the pure nature of the self which is distinctionless. The self is beyond the reach of speech and mind.

[1088b-1089a]

अस्मत्पक्षे हि कर्तव्यमविद्यामात्रकल्पितम् ॥ १०८८ ॥
तदभावान्न संसारो भूतो भावी न वर्तते ।

In our view, agency is fabricated by nescience; in its absence there is no transmigration, in the past, in the future, or in the present.

Agency, etc., are not real: they also are the products of nescience. When nescience which is the basis of all projections is destroyed through knowledge, there is no bondage at any time.

NTV—ajñānasya jñānān nivṛttau tat-kāryatvāt saṁsāropi nivartata ity arthah.

[1089b-1090a]

स्वाभाविक्यप्यविद्येयमनुभूत्याऽवभासिता ॥ १०८९ ॥
तमः सूर्योदयेनेव ज्ञानेनोत्कृत्य नाशयते ।

Though natural and manifested by experience, this nescience is destroyed, root and branch, by knowledge, as darkness at sun-rise.

Nescience is removed completely by knowledge.

NKL—brahmājñānaṁ jñāna-nivartyam ajñānatvāt śukty-ajñānavat.

[1090b-1091a]

अनादिकालमज्ञानं ज्ञानेनाऽऽदिमता क्षणात् ॥ १०९० ॥
दृश्यते नाशयमानं हि न चास्याऽऽवृत्तिरीक्ष्यते ।

The beginningless ignorance is seen to be destroyed in a moment by knowledge which has a beginning; and of this (knowledge) repetition is not required.

Knowledge destroys nescience without residue; there is no need for repetition of knowledge.

[1091b-1092a]

एवंभूतोऽप्ययं प्रत्यक्स्वात्मानुभवसंश्रयात् ॥ १०९१ ॥

व्युत्पत्तेः प्रागविज्ञातः सर्वाज्ञानादिसाक्ष्यपि ।

Though this inner self is of such nature and is the witness of all knowledge, prior to the understanding based on self-experience it is unknown.

Although the self which is the witness of all cognitions is self-luminous, it is not known through self-experience prior to the rise of true knowledge; therefore, the functioning of *pramāṇa* in respect thereof is intelligible.

[1092b-1093a]

तत्त्वमस्यादितस्तस्मादागमादेव नान्यतः ॥ १०९२ ॥

ऐकात्म्यवस्तुनः साक्षाद्व्युत्पत्तिरविचालिनी ।

Therefore, from the Scripture, 'That thou art,' etc., alone, and from nowhere else, is there the unwavering direct knowledge of the reality, the one self.

It is only the Vedāntic texts, 'That thou art', etc., that are *pramāṇa* in respect of the self. In regard to what is without adjuncts viz. the self, perception, etc., cannot serve as *pramāṇas*. The immediate knowledge that results from the Vedāntic texts destroys all bondage along with its cause and yields the fruit of non-return to *samsāra*.

NKL — yasmāt tattvamādi-vākya-janya-jñānāt prāg ajñātatvaṁ tasmād aupaniṣadatvaṁ siddham.

[1093b-1094a]

तस्यास्य कर्मकाण्डेन सम्बन्ध इति यः पुरा ॥ १०९३ ॥

प्रश्नस्तन्निर्णयार्थाय, सर्वथेत्यादिरुत्तरः ।

The previous question ‘Of that this is the relation to the ritual section’,—for the sake of settling that the reply is stated in ‘By all means,’ etc.

The commentary thus explains the relation between the two sections of the Veda: through the performance of the Vedic duties one gets one’s mind purified and develops a sense of detachment, etc., which pave the way for the rise of knowledge.

AVS—karmataḥ suddha-satvasya vairāgyādi-paramparayā jñānot-pattiḥ sambandhaḥ.

[1094b-1095a]

ननु सिद्धे यथोक्तार्थे नाऽऽस्मिन् हेतुरीक्ष्यते ॥ १०९४ ॥

कृत्स्नप्रयोजनावाप्तेः पूर्वोक्तैरेव कर्मभिः ।

“Now, since the object (goal) has been accomplished as stated above, there is no reason for commencing (the Vedānta); for by the aforesaid rituals the entire fruit has been obtained.”

Pūrvapakṣa—If the *karma-kāṇḍa* teaches the means to the human goal, where is the need to commence the *jñāna-kāṇḍa*? As the goal in its completeness can be gained by the performance of the duties enjoined in the *karma-kāṇḍa* the Vedānta is of no use whatsoever.

[1095b-1096a]

नैतदेवं सुखेप्साया जिहासायाश्च दुःखतः ॥ १०९५ ॥

निदानस्यानिषिद्धत्वात्पूर्वोक्तैः कर्मभिः पुरा ।

It is not so ; for the cause of the desire for happiness and for avoiding misery has not been removed earlier by the aforesaid rituals.

Siddhānta—The cause of all evil is ignorance. This is not destroyed through works, for they are not opposed to ignorance. It is only knowledge that can destroy ignorance. The commencement of Vedānta is thus intelligible, as it is required for the sake of gaining knowledge.

[1096b-1097a]

निःशेषाह्लादसंप्राप्तिः सर्वानर्थानुतिस्तथा ॥ १०९६ ॥

सर्वेषां प्राणिनामेतत्स्वत इष्टं प्रयोजनम् ।

The attainment of happiness without residue and the avoidance of all evil—this is the natural aim desired by all beings.

All beings desire plenary happiness and freedom from misery.

[1097b-1098a]

आत्मनस्तत्त्वमेतच्च सिद्धं चैतन्यवद्यतः ॥ १०९७ ॥

अथैष यो वै भूमेतिश्रुतिमानानुभूतिः ।

That this is the true nature of the self is established, like intelligence, from Scriptural texts like ‘This which is the supreme bliss,’¹ ‘That which is great,’² etc., from inference and from experience.

The twofold fruit which is desired by all is the very nature of the self, and is eternally accomplished. The desire to gain it is, therefore, born of ignorance, which is responsible for all *karmas*. The statement that the goal is to be attained is but figurative.

Scriptural texts are quoted as evidence. There is also the inference: the self is happiness, as it is the supreme object of love like pot. The experience of sleep too is *pramāṇa* for understanding the truth that the self is of the nature of happiness and the absence of misery.

1. *BU*, IV, iii, 32. 2. *CHU*, VII, xxiii, 1.

NKL—*prāpte icchāyā vastuto 'nupapatter ajñānād eva icchatīty arthaḥ.*

AVS—*sarvaprāṇibhir iṣṭobhaya-vidha-prayojanasyā 'tmasvarūpatvena prāptatvāt prāpte cecchāyogād ajñānam evecchākāraṇam karmādi nimittakāraṇam iti.*

[1098b-1099a]

स्वर्गशब्दाभिधश्चायं पुमर्थो यो यथोदितः ॥ १०९८ ॥

स्वर्गमित्यादिभिर्वाक्यैस्त्रयन्तेष्वपि गीयते ।

That which is declared as the human goal by the term '*svarga*,' is also declared in the *Vedānta* by the texts '*svargam*,'¹ etc.

The term *svarga* which is employed in the Veda to indicate the human goal signifies the self.

An Upaniṣadic text where there is such usage is cited.

1. *CHU*, VIII, iii, 3.

[1099b-1100a]

स्वर्गं पुमर्थमुद्दिश्य सर्वप्राणभृतामियम् ॥ १०९९ ॥

वाङ्मनः कायचेष्टा स्याद्याऽपि तत्साधनोपगा ।

“Having *svarga*, the human goal, as the aim, whatever vocal, mental and physical activity of all living beings is there—that is the means.”

Pūrvapakṣa—If *svarga* be the human goal, it is gained through works alone; for the Veda teaches the performance of sacrifices for the sake of that. That being so, the commencement of Vedānta is futile.

[1100b-1101a]

उत्पत्त्याद्यर्थनिष्ठानां सर्वेषामपि कर्मणाम् ॥ ११०० ॥

स्वर्गे नैवाधिकारोऽस्ति तस्य सिद्धत्वतः स्वतः ।

Of the various *karmas* which have as their aim origination, etc., there is no application to *svarga*; for that is self-established.

Siddhānta—Works can bring about origination, attainment, modification, and purification. They have no function in regard to the self which is immutable, eternal and unexcellable bliss. This, we have seen, is the true *svarga*, which is self-established, and, therefore, does not require to be accomplished. Works have use only in regard to the pseudo-*svarga* which is non-eternal.

NKL—*karmanām svargābhāsa-sādhakatvaṁ na mukhya-svarga-sādhakatvam.*

[1101b-1102a]

स्वात्मसाध्यातिरेकेण सर्वमेव हि साधनम् ॥ ११०१ ॥

नालं साध्यान्तरायेह किम्बसाध्यार्थसिद्धये ।

No means is capable of accomplishing another object beyond its own end; what to speak of accomplishing an end which cannot be accomplished?

A means can accomplish only the end that is appropriate to it, and not some other end. It goes without saying, therefore, that no means functions in relation to what is not accomplished, viz. the true *svarga*.

[1102b-1103a]

यथोक्तपुरुषार्थस्य यद्यप्याप्तस्वभावता ॥ ११०२ ॥

आत्मस्वभावतो नाऽऽप्तिस्तथाऽप्यज्ञानहेतुतः ।

Though the aforesaid human end is of the nature of the attained, since it is of the nature of self, yet it is not attained because of ignorance.

Although the self which is the true *svarga*, the human goal, is what is eternally accomplished, it seems to be unaccomplished because of ignorance. Hence the need for Vedānta.

[1103b-1104a]

अविद्याव्यवधानस्य नाऽऽत्मज्ञानातिरेकतः ॥ ११०३ ॥

प्रध्वस्तिः कर्मभिः कर्तुं शक्या तेषाममानतः ।

Except by self-knowledge, the interposition of nescience cannot be destroyed by *karmas*, since they are not *pramāṇas*.

Since what makes the self unattained, as it were, is nescience, what is required to remove nescience is knowledge, and not works.

[1104b-1105a]

व्यञ्जकं विरहय्यान्यत्साधनं कारकात्मकम् ॥ ११०४ ॥

तदभिव्यक्तये नालं स्वतःसिद्धस्य वस्तुनः ।

For manifesting a self-established reality, other than a manifestor, a means which is of the nature of producer (*kāraka*) is not fit.

What is required in the case of the self that is veiled by nescience is a manifestor, viz. knowledge, not a producer like *karma*.

[1105b-1106]

कर्मभिर्नर्पिनीतोऽतः प्रत्यङ्मोहोऽप्रमाणतः ॥ ११०५ ॥

यावच्च सम्यग्विज्ञानवह्निनाऽसौ न दह्यते ।

न तावत्किञ्चिदप्याप्तं सुखं दुःखविवर्जितम् ॥ ११०६ ॥

Therefore, the delusion about the inner self is not removed by *karmas*, since they are not *pramāṇas*. As long as this is not burnt by the fire of true knowledge, so long happiness free from sorrow is not attained.

Release, which consists of the attainment of happiness and the removal of sorrow, results only when ignorance is destroyed through knowledge.

[1107]

नालं विमुक्तये काम्यं यदि नाम तथाऽपि तु ।

पुंसो वैराग्यहेतुत्वादुपकार्येव तन्मतम् ॥ ११०७ ॥

Even though the optional (and obligatory rites) are not sufficient for (effecting) release, they are to be regarded as helpful in that they cause non-attachment in man.

Although *karmas* are not the direct means to release, they are helpful in that they purify the mind.

[1108-1109]

असह्यदुःखफलतः स्वकार्यविनिवृत्तिकृत् ।

विरक्तिहेतुतः कर्मप्रतिषिद्धं यथा तथा ॥ ११०८ ॥

अपि काम्यं कृतं सर्वं दुःखात्मकफलत्वतः ।

आविरिञ्च्यात्स्वकार्येभ्यः स्यादेव विनिवृत्तये ॥ ११०९ ॥

Just as the prohibited act causes non-attachment by making one turn away from itself because it results in unbearable misery, so also, since all optional rite yields fruit which is of the nature of misery, it makes for driving one away from its effects including attainment of the world of Brahmā.

Even as the knowledge of the evil effects of prohibited acts makes one turn away from them, the knowledge of the fact that optional rites are responsible for the continuance of transmigration creates non-attachment and paves the way for the dawn of wisdom through study, etc., which results in release.

NKL—garbhavāsādi-phalatvāt kāmyam api puṁso vairāgya-kāraṇam.

[1110]

इत्युक्तप्रतिपत्त्यर्थमाजगामोत्तरं वचः ।

एकवाक्यत्वमेवं च वेदस्य स्यादसशयम् ॥ १११० ॥

In order to teach what has been stated above, the words that follow came from the commentator. Thus without doubt, there will be syntactical unity for the Veda.

The commentary thus teaches that true knowledge alone is the means to *mokṣa*, and not works; the latter, however, are helpful indirectly through purifying the mind, etc.

In this manner the syntactical unity of the two *kāṇḍas* should be understood.

[1111]

दक्षिणोदगधोगत्या प्रत्यगज्ञानमूढधीः ।

बम्भ्रमीत्यनिशं दुःखी पुमान्कर्मपुरःसरः ॥ ११११ ॥

The man who goes after rituals, whose intellect is clouded by the ignorance of the self, and who is sorrow-stricken, wanders eternally by the southern, northern and downward paths.

The ignorant person who does not know the self performs *karmas* and reaps the consequences thereof which constitute *samsāra*.

[1112]

काम्यैर्दक्षिणमन्वेति ज्ञानयुक्तैस्तथोत्तरम् ।

निषिद्धैश्चाप्यधोजन्म कर्मसंभारसंभृतः ॥ १११२ ॥

He who is laden with the burden of ritual goes to the southern path by optional rites, to the northern path by those rites combined with meditation, and to low birth by prohibited acts.

By performing the optional rites one goes along the southern path, the path of the manes characterized by smoke, etc. By a combination of works with meditation one goes along the northern path, the path of the gods characterized by light, etc. By doing the prohibited deeds, one is reborn in the lower species.

[1113-1114a]

धर्माधर्मांशसाम्ये च मनुष्यत्वं प्रपद्यते ।

ब्रह्माद्या स्थावरान्तैवं प्रत्यगज्ञानहेतुजा ॥ १११३ ॥

नामरूपेहचिन्ताऽऽद्या स्वप्नमायेन्द्रजालवत् ।

When there is equality of merit and demerit, he attains the state of man. Thus the primeval transmigration (of beings) from Brahmā down to stationary objects, which is variegated on account of name, form, and action, is born of the ignorance of the self, like dream, delusion and magic.

When merit and demerit are equal, one is reborn as a human being.

Thus the variegated transmigratory tract is the result of ignorance.

[1114b-1115]

धर्माधर्माद्युपादानसाधना नश्वरी गतिः ॥ १११४ ॥

व्याकृतं नामरूपाभ्यां यद्यपीदं श्रुतौ श्रुतम् ।

आत्मतत्त्वानभिव्यक्तेर्नाभिव्यक्तं तदुच्यते ॥ १११५ ॥

This perishable process is brought about by the performance of good and bad deeds. Though it is declared in Scripture that the world is made manifest through name and form, it is said to be unmanifest because the truth of the self is unmanifest.

The aforementioned threefold fruit of *karma* is what makes for evil, since it is the product of nescience.

If it be said that *samsāra* cannot be illusory because it is established through perception, etc., we reply: no. The reality of the world is the self, for the world is a superimposition thereon. When the self is unmanifest, the world seems to be manifested through perception, etc. But in truth, the world is unmanifest, and its illusoriness cannot be disproved.

NKL—vimatam anityam karma-phalatvāt ghaṭavat.

[1116]

अविद्यातिमिरोच्छित्तौ नानाविष्कृतमण्वपि ।

कार्यकारणवद्वस्तु नानपास्तं तमोऽप्यतः ॥ १११६ ॥

When the darkness of nescience is destroyed, not even an atom, whether cause or effect, remains unmanifested, for the darkness has been removed from this (knowledge of self).

When the self is manifest, everything is manifest. It is only the ignorance of the self that conceals the truth. When ignorance is removed, truth is revealed.

NKL—tattva-sākṣātkāre vidvān sarvajñāḥ syād ity arthaḥ.

[1117]

यत एवमतः प्रत्यग्याथात्म्यप्रतिपत्तये ।

प्रारब्धेयं प्रयत्नेन वेदान्तोपनिषत्परा ॥ १११७ ॥

Because this is so, for the sake of understanding the truth about the inner self, this supreme Vedānto-paniṣad (viz. the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka*) is begun with care.

When the self is known, all human ends are achieved ; when the self is unknown every evil results. Therefore, in order that there

may be self-knowledge, the Upaniṣad is commenced for the sake of the eligible person who is endowed with the fourfold qualification.

NKL.—upaniṣatpadasya vidyāyām mukhyatvād vedāntopaniṣad iti viśeṣaṇam.

AVS—yata ātmani jñāte sakalapuruṣārthāhvāptir ajñāte ca sarvānarthāhvāptir ata ātmajñānārthatvena yathoktādhikāriṇaṁ prati vedāntopaniṣad ārabhyata iti.

[1118]

यथोक्तफलसिद्धयर्थमारब्धोपनिषद्यदि ।

ब्रह्म वा इदमित्यादि कस्मान्नाऽऽरभ्यतेऽधुना ॥ १११८ ॥

“If the Upaniṣad is begun for the sake of accomplishing the said fruit, why is it not now begun thus : ‘Brahman, verily, thus,’ etc.?”

Objection—If the Upaniṣad is commenced for the sake of imparting Brahman-knowledge, it must begin with an exposition of the nature of Brahman; but, here, the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka* starts with the topic of the *Aśvamedha*.

[1119]

येषामनधिकारोऽत्र ह्यश्वमेधकृतौ भवेत् ।

इत एव तु विज्ञानात्तेषां तत्फलकीर्तनम् ॥ १११९ ॥

For those who are not eligible for the *Aśvamedha*-rite, it is declared here that the fruit results even from the knowledge (i.e. meditation on it).

Reply—The commencement relates to *upāsanā*. Those who are not eligible for performing the *Aśvamedha* may gain its fruit through meditation.

कर्मगोचरतैवात्र विज्ञानस्यापि चेन्मतम् ।

विकल्पश्रवणान्मैवं कर्मणा विद्ययाऽथवा ॥ ११२० ॥

If it be said that this meditation is included in the ritual, not so, for these are declared to be alternatives thus, 'Through the ritual, or through the meditation.'

The meditation is not a part of the ritual; for it is declared that the fruit may be gained *either* through the ritual *or* through the meditation.

यजते योऽश्वमेधेन यश्चैवं वेद तं क्रतुम् ।

फलं तुल्यं तयोर्युक्तं कर्मिणो विदुषस्तथा ॥ ११२१ ॥

He who sacrifices with the *Aśvamedha* and he who knows that rite thus—it is proper that the fruit is the same for both the man who performs the rite and the man who knows.

The fruit is the same for him who performs the *Aśvamedha* sacrifice and for him who knows its significance and meditates.

उपास्तेरपि कर्मत्वादश्वमेधक्रतोरिव ।

नातो धियोऽर्थवादत्वं तद्विधोर्नितरां न च ॥ ११२२ ॥

Because the meditation is also a *karma* like the *Aśvamedha* rite, the knowledge (*phala-śruti*) is not an *arthavāda*; still less is the injunction thereof.

The declaration of fruit in the case of the meditation is not an *arthavāda*; for the meditation, like the rite, is an act. Nor is the meditation an auxiliary to the sacrifice; for option is declared as between the sacrifice and the meditation.

[1123-1124a]

एतावदेव चेदत्र भवतैवं विवक्षितम् ।

प्रयोजनं तत्सुकरं विध्युद्देशेऽपि भाषितुम् ॥ ११२३ ॥

विद्याप्रकरणे तस्य त्वाम्नायः किमितीर्यताम् ।

“ If this much alone is thus intended by you here, that result can easily be said to come about even if it were taught in the context of injunction ; say, why it is then declared by the Scripture in the context of knowledge ? ”

Objection—You say that the meditation on *Aśvamedha* is for the sake of gaining the human goal, and not for the sake of accomplishing the sacrifice, and that it is taught for the benefit of those who are not eligible to perform the sacrifice. Granting that it is so, why should the meditation find a place in the *jñāna-kāṇḍa* and not in the *karma-kāṇḍa*?

[1124b-1125a]

सौऽपि ज्ञानेन संयुक्तो ह्यमेधो महाक्रतुः ॥ ११२४ ॥

संसारफल एवेति प्रवृत्त्यङ्गतयोच्यते ।

Even that great sacrifice, *Aśvamedha*, combined with meditation results only in *samsāra*. This is stated so that there may be incentive to begin (the study of Vedānta).

Reply—Of all the sacrifices, the *Asvamedha* is the greatest. Even as combined with meditation, it yields only a perishable result. This is declared at the commencement of the Upaniṣad so that the need for self-knowledge may be realized.

In Ānandagiri's gloss there occurs the following line: *ucyate 'śeṣayajñānām kraturād eṣa ucyate*. This seems to be a part of the *Vārtika*. *AVS* puts it between 1124a and 1124b.

[1125b-1126]

प्रत्यग्बोधातिरेकेण साधनान्तरनिःस्पृहाः ॥ ११२५ ॥

निर्ज्ञाताशेषकर्मोत्थफलफल्गुत्वबुद्ध्यः ।

मुमुक्षवः प्रवर्तेरन्कथं नामाऽऽत्मवेदने ॥ ११२६ ॥

Those who have no attachment to means other than the knowledge of the inner self, those who know the vanity of the fruit resulting from the entire host of *karmas*—how would those who desire release be active in respect of knowing the self (is declared by Scripture).

The declaration of the fact that even the *Asvamedha* results only in *samsāra* helps him who seeks release turn away from rituals.

He who realizes the smallness of the fruit of sacrifices cultivates the fourfold means which equip him for acquiring *jñāna*; renouncing all works, he engages himself in *śravaṇa*, etc. It is to teach this that the Upaniṣad begins with a discourse on *Asvamedha*-meditation.

[1127]

संसारफलता काममस्तु काम्यस्य कर्मणः ।

नित्यानामफलत्वात्तु मुक्तिरेवास्तु तत्फलम् ॥ ११२७ ॥

“Let *samsāra* be the fruit, as you please, of the optional rites ; of the obligatory rites, however, since there is no fruit, let release alone be the fruit.”

Objection—It is only the optional rites that result in *samsāra* ; the obligatory and occasioned rites are not said to yield any particular fruit. So, let us take release to be their fruit.

[1128]

नह्युत्सर्गेण सर्वेषां फलवत्त्वस्य संश्रवात् ।

कर्मणा पितृलोकादि नित्यानामेव तत्फलम् ॥ ११२८ ॥

No ; because all *karmas* are declared to bear fruit ; in “By *kurma* the world of the manes, etc.,” that fruit (is declared) of the obligatory rites alone.

Reply—There cannot be any *karma* without a fruit. Scripture declares that the fruit of obligatory rites is the world of the manes.

NKL—*nityakarma samsāra-phalaṁ bāhyakarmatvāt kāmya-karmavat.*

[1129]

फलवत्त्वे हि नित्यानां काम्यत्वमिति चेन्मतम् ।

नैवं शुद्धिप्रमाणत्वाद्भोगनिष्ठस्य काम्यता ॥ ११२९ ॥

If it be thought that since the obligatory rites have fruit they will become optional, not so ; for their principal aim is purification, while optional rites have as their aim enjoyment.

Although the obligatory rites too have a fruit, they are distinct from the optional rites in that their main element is not enjoyment, as it is in the case of the latter, but the elimination of demerit or sin.

NKL—*phalavatvepi pāpakṣaya-pradhānam nityam bhogapradhānam kāmiam iti vibhāgaḥ.*

[1130]

काम्येऽपि शुद्धिरस्त्येव भोगसिद्ध्यर्थमेव सा ।

विङ्गराहादिदेहेन न ह्येन्द्रं मुज्यते फलम् ॥ ११३० ॥

Even in the case of optional rites there is purification, but that is for the sake of accomplishing enjoyment; the fruit of the status of Indra, indeed, is not enjoyed through the body of a hog, etc.

It is true that even the optional rites purify; but this purification is for the sake of procuring fitness for enjoying their fruit. For instance, one cannot enjoy the pleasures of the world of Indra with the body of a hog. That requires a divine body which can come to one only after purification.

The purification that is effected by the obligatory rites, however, is of a different order. It helps in the acquisition of knowledge.

[1131]

नित्येषु शुद्धेः प्राधान्याद्भोगोऽप्यप्रतिबन्धकः ।

भोगं भङ्गुरमीक्षन्ते बुद्धिशुद्ध्यनुरोधतः ॥ ११३१ ॥

Because in obligatory rites purification is the principal, even enjoyment is not an obstacle; enjoyment is considered to be perishable in accordance with the purification of the intellect.

Although the obligatory rites yield their fruit which is enjoyment in the world of the manes, etc., this enjoyment does not serve as an obstacle, for purification is the principal element here. In

fact, the purification creates a sense of non-attachment to enjoyment, through facilitating the rise of discrimination.

[1132]

तमेतमित्यतश्चोच्चैर्वेदानुवचनादिना ।

विरक्ताः सर्वसंसाराज्जिज्ञासन्ते परं पदम् ॥ ११३२ ॥

Therefore, through hearing the texts, "This self through reciting the Veda,"¹ etc., they become deeply non-attached to the entire *samsāra* and seek to know the supreme goal.

They, whose mind has been purified through the performance of the obligatory rites, become non-attached to *samsāra*, get endowed with virtues such as calmness, etc., and pursue the path of inquiry into the nature of Brahman.

1. BU, IV, iv, 22.

[1133]

आरादेवोपकुर्वन्ति नित्यान्यात्मविशुद्धितः ।

आत्माज्ञानाविरोधित्वात्साक्षान्न त्वात्मबोधवत् ॥ ११३३ ॥

The obligatory rites help through purifying the mind while being remote ; because they are not opposed to ignorance of the self, they are not the direct means, like self-knowledge.

The obligatory rites are remote auxiliaries ; they do not constitute the direct means to release because they cannot destroy ignorance. The direct means is knowledge.

[1134]

त्यक्त्वा कर्मण्यतोऽसङ्गाः प्रत्यक्प्रवणबुद्धयः ।

अपास्तरागादिमला ईक्षन्ते ज्ञं स्वमात्मनि ॥ ११३४ ॥

Renouncing *karmas* and thereby being non-attached, being devoted, in their minds, to the inner self, and leaving off the impurities like passion, etc., they see pure consciousness (i.e. the self) in themselves.

They, whose minds have been purified through the performance of the obligatory rites, acquire the eligibility for *śravaṇa*, etc. Being non-attached, they renounce all works. Renunciation of works without non-attachment is no good at all. They who are non-attached and have renounced become endowed with calmness, etc., and gain the intuition of the inner immutable self.

[1135-1136a]

अतोऽशेषमहानर्थहेत्वात्माज्ञानहानिकृत् ।

प्रत्यग्याथात्म्याविज्ञानभास्करोदयहेतवे ॥ ११३५ ॥

आरब्धेयं प्रयत्नेन वेदान्तोपनिषत्परा ।

Therefore is begun, with care, this supreme *Vedāntopaniṣad*, which will destroy the ignorance of self, the cause of the entire great evil, so that the sun of the true knowledge of self may rise.

As the knowledge of the truth alone is the means to release, the Upaniṣad is begun for the sake of that. It is true that the meaning of the Upaniṣad is difficult to grasp. With a view to making the meaning clear, the commentary has been written.

NKL—evam kaivalyasya dhīmātra-phalātve saty ātmāvidyā-nivartaka-jñāna-janmane vedāntārambhe nigamayati.....vijñāna-bhāskarodayo hetur ajñāna-nivṛttes tadartham ity arthah.

*AVS—yato jñānameva kaivalya-sāadhanam ato jñānārthatveno-
'paniṣad ārabhyata iti.*

[1136b-1137a]

शतानि दश चैकं च चत्वारिंशत्तथाऽष्ट च ॥ ११३६ ॥

श्लोकाः संबन्धभाष्येऽस्मिन्संङ्ख्याताः संख्ययाऽखिलाः ।

The verses of this *Sambandha-bhāṣya* are altogether one thousand and one hundred and forty eight in number.

Including the half verse mentioned in the note to verse 1124b-1125a, and omitting the present verse which is not part of the *Vartika*, the actual number of verses in the extant text is one thousand one hundred and thirty-six.

BRHADĀRANYAKOPANIṢAD-
BHĀṢYA-VĀRTIKA

(BUBV 1.1)

Aśvabrāhmaṇa

तत्राश्वविषयं तावदादौ दर्शनमुच्यते ॥

प्राजापत्यत्वहेतोश्चाप्यश्वनामाङ्कितत्वतः ॥ १ ॥

To begin with, there is in the beginning of the Upaniṣad discussed (lit. mentioned) the worship (lit. seeing¹) which has the horse as its object, because it is the means, firstly, for being the means to obtain the nature (or the status) of Prajāpati² and, secondly, because it is marked by the name 'a horse'. [1]

¹This refers to the Upāsanā connected with a horse, viz. the Aśvamedha sacrifice, and consequently with Fire in its various forms which are mentioned in the last portions of BUBV 1.2. Cf. also BUBV 1.2.1 ; 220.

²This is a reference to the first manifest form, the most minute one, of the Brahman, viz. Hiraṇyagarbha, which is discussed in BUBV 1.2 at length.

अश्वस्य यच्छिरः साक्षात्तदुषा इति चिन्तयेत् ॥

हरेरवयवेष्वेवं योज्याः कालादिदृष्टयः ॥ २ ॥

[This gives the meaning of the Upaniṣadic sentence *uṣā vā aśvasya śiraḥ* (BU 1.2.1). The second line explains the BU sentence *sūryaś cakṣur...*]

One should think (i.e. meditate on) that what is (i.e. knows as) the head of a horse¹ is the directly perceptible Uṣas. (Thus) should one² entertain (further) the notions of *kāla* etc.³ in respect of the (different) limbs of the horse (of the sacrifice). [2]

¹The horse refers to the horse of the Aśvamedha sacrifice.

²It is known in the Upaniṣad that while getting to know the Brahman one has first to understand some manifest object as the Brahman and later does one gradually come to realize the nature of the nameless, formless, qualityless Brahman. Therefore, there is in the beginning mention made of the worship of some object, e.g. Aśvamedha etc., which is to be connected with the knowledge of the Brahman (*jñānakarmasamuccaya*). Cf. BUBV 1.3.1-3; BS 4.1.6. Read: *utkr̥ṣṭadr̥ṣṭir hīne syāt*—BVS p. 181, verse 19. Also BSB 4.1.5: *brahmadr̥ṣṭir evādityādiṣu syāt—kasmāt[utkarṣāt]evam utkarṣeṇādityādayo dr̥ṣṭā bhavanti*.

³The word 'etc.' refers to other aspects connected with the Aśvamedha sacrifice.

संस्कार्यत्वात्पशोरेवं दृष्टीरङ्गेषु योजयेत् ॥
कालादावमखाङ्गत्वान्नाश्वदृष्टिर्विधित्स्यते ॥ ३ ॥

Since the animal (viz. horse) is to be sanctified (for the performance), one should entertain such notions (as *kāla* etc.) in respect of its (different) limbs. (However) since *kāla* etc. are not the parts of the sacrifice, therefore entertaining the notion of them as a horse (or its limbs) is not sought to be prescribed (by the Śruti).¹ [3]

¹Such notion is set aside by BS 4.1.6: *ādityādimatayaś cāṅga upapatteḥ*.

सत्स्वश्वादिषु कालादिदृष्टीरङ्गेषु योजयेत् ॥
असत्स्वात्मानमेवाश्वं कल्पयित्वा नियोजयेत् ॥ ४ ॥

One should entertain the notions of *kāla* etc. in respect of the limbs of the horse (of the sacrifice) when the horse etc. are present (i.e. actually connected with the ritual¹). But when there is no presence of a horse and its limbs² one should entertain (the notions) only after imagining one's own body³ as that of a horse. [4]

¹SP points out that this has a reference to the performance of the Aśvamedha by one who is entitled to undertake it.

²This is in respect of one who is not entitled to the performance of the sacrifice.

³The word *ātman* refers to the body (SP). Read BVS p. 181, verse 18:

*upāsanasya svātantryāt karmānadhikṛto 'pi ca/
manasā kalpayitvāśvam virāḍrūpeṇa cintayet||*

कर्तारमश्वमेधिनं च चित्तं सर्वं प्रजापतिम् ॥

अश्वमेधफलं चार्कं वेत्ति मृत्युं यथोदितम् ॥ ५ ॥

अकर्ताऽप्यश्वमेधस्य ब्राह्मणश्चेह बुद्धिमान् ॥

ऋत्वात्मा मृत्युरस्मीति तादात्म्यं सोऽधिगच्छति ॥ ६ ॥

And the wise Brāhmaṇa¹, even though a non-performer of the Aśvamedha, who knows about the performance of the sacrifice, the horse and the fire which is to be collected (from whatever house of (a fire worshiper)—all (this) as Prajāpati, Arka, the result of the (performance of the) Aśvamedha sacrifice), and Mṛtyu as stated (in the later portion of the text) secures oneness with him (Mṛtyu or the Sūtrātman)² on (knowing) 'I am the soul of the sacrifice, Mṛtyu'. [5-6]

¹Brāhmaṇa indicates Kṣatriya and Vaiśya who also are eligible for the performance of the Aśvamedha.

²SP refers to the view that entertaining the various notions which are considered as the objects of different Upāsanās would bring in here a *vākyabheda* 'prescription of more things than one by only one sentence' and then it points out that since these (so called Upāsanās) have but one result and not various results, there is no *vākyabheda*; all these notions go to form but one Upāsanā.

अश्वसंज्ञपनात्पूर्वं तथोर्ध्वं चापि हाटक-

राजतात्मकपात्राभ्यां गृह्येते तत्र यौ ग्रहौ ॥

महिमाख्यौ तयोरेतदहर्वा इति दर्शनम् ॥ ७ ॥

The sentence in the Śruti (lit. in what is heard text) *ahar vā...* has a reference to the two cups (in the performance of the

Aśvamedha sacrifice containing the offering material), one made of gold and the other of silver, which are taken¹ before and after molesting the horse in the sacrifice, and called Mahiman. [7]

¹Read SP: *graho havaniyadravyayuktapātraviśeṣaḥ|taylor graho mantrasamiskṛtayor upādānam|* (*graho* is *grahaṇam* 'drinking (from it)')

व्यत्ययेनावबोद्धव्या प्रथमार्थे च सप्तमी ॥ ८ ॥

समुद्र ईश्वरो ज्ञेयो योनिः कारणमुच्यते ॥

सर्वस्य जगतो यस्मादीश एवेह कारणम् ॥ ९ ॥

(In the sentence *samudra eva*) the locative case is to be understood by interchange for the nominative [8]
(thus giving rise to the sense:) 'Let the sea¹ be known as the Lord.' The word *yonī* is used here for (conveying the sense:) the source or cause. (This is so) because the Lord himself is, for this Śāstra, the source of all (the universe). [9]

¹SP gives the derivation of *samudra* thus: *samutpadya bhūtāni dravanty asminn iti*. Incidentally, after explaining the meaning of *yonī* 'source', SP adds: *bandhuśabdasyāpy ayam evārthaḥ| tatra* (i) *yonitvam utpādakatvam* (ii) *bandhutvam sthāpakatvam* (iii) *samudrātā vilāpakatvam iti bhedaḥ|* He thus refers to *utpatti*, *sthi* and *pralaya*. Cf. BS 1.1.2: *janmādy asya yataḥ|*

|| iti prathamādhyāyasya prathamam aśvabrāhmaṇam samāptam||

BRHADĀRANYAKOPANIṢAD- BHĀṢYA-VĀRTIKA

(BUBV 1.2)

Aśvamedha Brāhmaṇa

अथाग्नेरुच्यते जन्म ह्यमेधोपयोगिनः ॥

तद्दर्शनविधित्सायै स्तुत्यर्थोत्पत्तिरिष्यते ॥ १ ॥

Now is stated the origination of fire which is useful for (the performance etc. of) the Aśvamedha. (Then) with the intention to prescribe the worship (lit. seeing) of it, it is desired (to state) its origination for the sake of praise. [1]

After stating the Upāsana 'worship' connected with the Aśvamedha and particularly the two Mahimāgrahas, the text now states about the worship of fire; cf. SP 1.1.1 and BUBV 1.2.220 below. The philosophical purpose is pointed out here. The words of the BU *naiveha*...do not have any reference to fire, yet it indicates the worship of fire. We do not take fire in the sense of the element. What is meant is the fire used for the performance of the Homa. Read SP: *agnidarśanasya vidhātum iṣṭasya vidhyartham agnistutiphālā tadutpattir iṣṭā*/śuddhajanmatvād utkr̥ṣṭatvenāyam upāsyo rājādivad ity arthaḥ/

नामवद्रूपवच्चेह कारणं यावदीक्ष्यते ॥

नाभूत्तत्प्राक्समुत्पत्तेः प्राणाद्युत्पत्तिसंश्रवात् ॥ २ ॥

(Verses 2-5 are an objector's view on the non-existence of both the cause and the effect. Verses 2 and 5 are the opinion of the Śūnyavādin and verses 3 and 4, of the Asatkāryavādin.)

Whatever is here accepted (lit. thought) as the cause has a name and a form. (But that) did not exist before its origi-

nation, (this we say) since there is a mention (in the Śruti) of the origin of Prāṇa etc.¹ [2]

Here the Śūnyavādin, who holds that there is total absence of any cause and its effect, argues that the Śruti says: 'Prāṇa was born', cf. verse 142 below. This means that it was not existent before for the reason that formerly the cause and the effect were not existent.

¹SP: *prāṇaḥ sūkṣmaḥ prapañcaḥ/ādisabdaḥ sthūlaprapañcārthaḥ/*

कार्यमुत्पत्तिमत्त्वाच्चेत्प्रागुत्पत्तेर्निषिध्यते ॥

कारणस्य त्वनुत्पत्तेरनिषेधस्तथा सति ॥ ३ ॥

[Verses 3 and 4 are views of the Asatkāryavādin and verse 5 makes an answer to these two by the Śūnyavādin.]

If, on account of its having origination, an effect is rejected (as existing) before its origination, then the cause could not be rejected just because it has not originated. [3]

A view of another Pūrvapakṣin, who is Asatkāryavādin—a follower of Kaṇāda—is stated in this verse. He holds that the cause and the effect both did not exist before the creation of the effect; only the cause existed; this points to the purposelessness of the Śruti statement: *naiveha...*; cf. SP: *siddhasādhyatvenāsatkāryavādī dūṣayati*. According to this Pūrvapakṣin, Agni's origination is acceptable, because it did not exist before. However, its cause did exist, since its origination has not been mentioned.

तथा चानुपलब्धेश्च कार्यस्यैवास्तु नास्तिता ॥

कारणस्य न नास्तित्वमुक्तहेत्वोरसंभवात् ॥ ४ ॥

So also, owing to the non-perception (of the effect), let there be (accepted) the non-existence of the effect alone. The absence of the cause however does not follow, because of the impossibility of these two reasons (in respect of it)¹. [4]

¹Anupalabdhi 'non-perception' is another Pramāṇa for acce-

pting the non-existence of fire before its origination. However, in respect of its cause, *Anupalabdhi* does not hold good; the Śruti clearly states its existence in *vāyor agniḥ* etc.

सर्वस्यानुपलब्धेस्तु मैवं वोचो यतः श्रुतिः ॥

नैवेह किंचनेत्याह कारणेतरनिहनुतिम् ॥ ५ ॥

(The Śūnyavādin says:) 'But on account of the non-perception of all this (viz. both the cause and the effect), do not say so, since the Śruti passage *naiveha kimcana*...has declared the absence (lit. concealment) of (both) the cause and the other (viz. the effect). [5]

Though the followers of Kaṇāda said that only the effect did not exist before its origination and the cause did exist, the Śruti contradicts their view on the basis of the Śruti *naiveha kimcana*. This is the answer of the Śūnyavādin.

This concludes the statement of the view(s) of the Pūrvapakṣins.

नैवं यतः श्रुतिः साक्षात्सत्त्वमेवावदत्स्वयम् ॥

कार्यकारणयोः स्पष्टं मृत्युनैवेति सादरा ॥ ६ ॥

[Verses 6-10 are an answer to the views of the Pūrvapakṣins.]

(This is) not so, because the Śruti¹ itself which has (full) regard (for the following statement:) *mṛtyunaiva*..., has declared the existence of (both) the cause and the effect in clear terms. [6]

¹The Śruti pertains to the object which is unmanifest and which has no name and form. Further that Śruti, which is controverted by the Pūrvapakṣins, and the subsequent Śruti, viz. *mṛtyunaiva*..., declare the existence of both the cause and the effect. In the earlier part of the Śruti is stated the non-existence of the cause and the effect but in the later, the existence of both.

मृत्युना कारणेनेदं कार्यं सर्वं समावृतम् ॥

इति नावश्यद्यद्येतदुभयं नाभवत्पुरा ॥ ७ ॥

If both of these (i.e. the cause and the effect) did not exist before, the Śruti would not have declared all this (that is called) effect as covered by the cause, viz. Mṛtyu.¹ [7]

¹This verse explains BUB *yadi hi kimcid api nāsid yenāvriyate yac cāvriyate tadā nāvakṣyan mṛtyunaivedam āvṛtam iti* / This points to the existence of both the cause and the effect even before the latter originated from the former. The next verse explains the significance of the word *mṛtyu*.

प्राणपिण्डादिकार्याणां समुद्रः परमेश्वरः ॥

बन्धुः कारणमात्मोक्तो मृत्युरत्र स एव तु ॥ ८ ॥

ज्ञानमात्रसतत्त्वं यद्ब्रह्माज्ञातसतत्त्वकम् ॥

मृत्युर्जनिमतः साक्षात्तत्र कार्याप्ययत्वतः ॥ ९ ॥

In the case of the effects such as Prāṇa, body¹ etc., the Supreme Lord (i.e. the maker) is Samudra. It is also (the great) relative, the cause, the Ātman—it is only He who is mentioned here by the term Mṛtyu. [8]

The Brahman, which is of the nature² of mere knowledge and whose nature is not known, is indeed but Mṛtyu in the case of whatever has birth, since there in that occurs the merger of all that is effect. [9]

Verses 8 and 9 explain the significance of the term Mṛtyu. It does not mean 'Death' as commonly understood. Reference is made here to *samudra evāśya bandhuḥ samudra evāśya yoniḥ* which is at the end of 1.1 above. The words *bandhu* and *kāraṇa* are synonymous.

¹*prāṇa* and *piṇḍa* refer to the collective and the individual forms.

²The word *satattva* means *yāthātmya* (NKL).

सद्बीजं सत्प्रतिष्ठं च सदायतनमेव च ।

प्रत्यक्षमेव सत्सिद्धं सदन्यस्याप्रसिद्धितः ॥ १० ॥

Whatever existent obtains under our eyes (i.e. is directly perceptible) has an existent as its origin, an existent as its support and an existent as its abode,¹ because anything else than the existent² is not known. [10]

¹The verse seeks to establish that all that is existent has originated in some existent. Thus it affirms its acceptance of Satkāryavāda.

²This is non-existent (*asat*) which could be imagined by one as the origin of what is directly perceptible existent.

असत्सदतिरेकेण यदि वाव्यतिरेकतः ॥
व्यतिरेके सदेवासदसद्वा तत्किमुच्यते ॥ ११ ॥

[Verses 11-16 explain why there does not obtain any non-existent which is the origin as hinted in verse 10 above.]

Here one would ask whether or not a non-existent stands apart from (i.e. is distinct from) an existent and?, in case it is distinct, is the non-existent itself not extant or what is (called) non-existent is extant¹? [11]

¹If a non-existent is considered to be distinct from an existent, then it must have some distinguishing property which does not allow it to remain a non-existent: cf. SP : *asad api sad eva syād bhedadharmitvād ghaṭavat* /

नेह सद्वाव्यतिरेकेण स्वमहिम्ना प्रसिध्यति ॥
सर्वस्य सदपेक्षत्वात्सत्तु नान्यदपेक्षते ॥ १२ ॥

Here (in this world) there does not obtain a non-existent apart from an existent on its own strength (lit. greatness), since all (that is existent) expects (i.e. depends upon) another existent¹ (as its origin, its support and its abode). But whatever is existent does not expect any other (origin, support or abode).² [12]

¹This is said with the view that there is no possibility of

accepting any such discrete objects as existent and non-existent.

²This argument proceeds from the notion: An existent is different from a non-existent, which is different in nature. The answer refers to the existent, viz. the Brahman, which is self-luminous; it does not expect the denial (*apoha*) of any non-existent.

मतमव्यतिरेकेण सतोऽसत्सत्तदिष्यताम् ॥

कुतोऽदो लभतेऽसत्त्वं यत्सदात्मनि निष्ठितम् ॥ १३ ॥

If it is held that the non-existent does not exist apart from the existent, then let that be accepted as an existent. Why does it get the character of a non-existent, since (i.e. if) it is supported¹ in what has the nature of the existent. [13]

¹This more or less means 'is identical with'.

अन्योन्यव्यतिरेकित्वान्नान्योन्यात्मकता तयोः ॥

विरोधित्वाच्च नान्योन्यं संबन्धस्तापशीतवत् ॥ १४ ॥

(Then) since they exist apart from each other, the two are not of the nature of each other and, since they are opposed to each other (in nature), they do not have any mutual relation as (there does not exist any) between heat and cold. [14]

In the previous verse, it was pointed out that the existent and the non-existent cannot be described as distinct from each other. Now it is stated that the two cannot be described as non-distinct either.

स्फुरताऽपि सतो नान्यदभिधातुं घटादिवत् ॥

शक्यते नाभिधानेन ह्यसद्वस्तु निरुच्यते ॥ १५ ॥

Even if there were to exist (according to someone¹) some relation, it is not possible for anyone to mention any non-existent by name as (one would be able to mention)

a pot. Indeed, a non-existent is never (or can never be) described by any name. [15]

This proceeds from the fact that use of words is possible only in the case of objects having some distinct characteristic or form. A non-existent cannot have it and therefore no words can be used to refer to any of its relation to the existent.

¹Literally, *sphuratā* = *prājñēna* 'some one very intelligent (who might see such a relation)'.

वस्तुनोऽतिशयः कश्चिदभाववचसोच्यते ॥
तस्य तेनाभिसंव्याप्तेर्न कथंचिदपह्नुतिः ॥ १६ ॥

An excellence of a thing is described by the statement of non-existence (of some defects etc.); since that (excellence) pervades that (thing), there cannot be concealment of the same (excellence) in any way. [16]

क्रिया वा तत्फलं वा स्यादभावो नात्महेतुहा ॥
यो यतो लभते सत्तां निरुणद्धि स तं कथम् ॥ १७ ॥
न नाशो हन्ति नष्टारं गन्तारमिव तद्गतिः ॥
यो यतो लिप्सते सिद्धिं स तं हन्ति कथं वद ॥ १८ ॥

[Verses 17-19 deny destruction of the cause of this (apparently) existent world. Verses 17-18 refer to Logicians who follow Kaṇāda and verse 19 refers to the Vijñānavādin (Yogācāra view) (NKL).]

Non-existence could be either an action or its result. But it would not destroy its own cause. (For) how can a thing which requires its existence from whatsoever (source), destroy (lit. stop) that? [17]

Destruction does not destroy the destroyer even as the going of one does not (destroy) the goer. (Just) tell me, how it can destroy that from which it wishes to obtain some acquisition (viz. existence.) [18]

Earlier the author set aside the existence of any non-existent beside the existent. And now he disputes even the destruction of some existent cause which could possibly be posited by someone. The verse intends to set aside the Logicians' notion that an existent pitcher—an effect—did not exist before and that it originated through *dhvaṁsa*. The author shows that *dhvaṁsa* can be either an action or a result and cannot therefore destroy its cause (*ātmahetuhā*). The second line hints at the presence of clay etc. even when the effect, viz. a pot, has come into existence.

विज्ञानाव्यतिरेकी चेदभावः स्यात्सहेतुकः ॥

ध्वंसादव्यतिरेकेऽपि धियो नित्यत्वमापतेत् ॥ १६ ॥

If destruction is not distinct from Idea (*viññāna*), then how could it have a cause¹? If (on the other hand) Idea were to be considered distinct from destruction, there would follow only eternity². [19]

The whole argument is based on the view that *dhvaṁsa* (= *abhāva*) has an origin (*hetu*) and it is eternal. This sets aside a possible opposition by the *Vijñānavādin*, who would equate *dhvaṁsa* with Idea. There are two possibilities: (a) *dhvaṁsa* is non-distinct from Idea, and (b) Idea is not distinct from *dhvaṁsa* either.

(1) This is to answer away (a). *dhvaṁsa*, being (pre-) *dhvaṁsa* of something, has some origin (i.e. cause). Therefore, it cannot be like Idea, without any cause, and therefore momentary.

(2) An answer to (b). If Idea (*dhi*) were to be non-distinct from *dhvaṁsa*, it would be permanent like *dhvaṁsa*—an unacceptable proposition for the *Vijñānavādins*.

अतोऽभावत्वसिद्धिचर्थमभावेनाप्यपेक्ष्यते ॥

स्वहेतुसिद्धिः कार्योऽर्थो न दृष्टः कारणं विना ॥ २० ॥

धर्म्यसिद्धिः प्रतिज्ञायां हेतुश्चानाश्रयो भवेत् ॥

न चास्ति कश्चिद्दृष्टान्तः सर्वशून्यत्ववादिनः ॥ २१ ॥

[The argument in these verses is against the *Mādhyamika*

view: *sarvaṁ śūnyam*—in other words: *sarvasya dhvaṁsasiddhiḥ*.]

Therefore¹ in order that there results non-existence, non-existence also² would expect the existence of its cause³; for, a thing, which is an effect, is not seen (to have come into existence) without a cause.⁴ [20]

If one were to state the enunciation ('All this world was absolutely non-existent'), there is not established any (subject⁵) having any property; then the reason⁶ would be without any basis and also there is not any example⁷ for the Śūnyavādin who negates everything. [21]

¹This means 'since an *abhāva* (= *dhvaṁsābhāva*) is some effect.' This argument proceeds from answers to (a) and (b) in the preceding verses.

²*api* points to the *dr̥ṣṭānta* of a pot which is necessary for understanding the *vyāptivākya*. See note 4 below.

³*svahetusiddhi* means *svakāraṇasattā*.

⁴This is a form of *vyāptivākya*: *sarvaṁ kāryaṁ kāraṇapūrvakam*. One can understand: *yathā ghaṭādi*—cf. reference to *ghaṭādi* in verse 15 above.

Verse 21 answers the argument of the Mādhyamika regarding *sarvasya dhvaṁsa* (= *abhāva*) owing to the momentariness of everything. It raises two questions about the absence of everything: (i) Is it grasped by Direct Perception? or (ii) is it inferred? Consequently, the purport of the verse is that the Mādhyamika cannot make any argumentative proposition.

⁵The Śūnyavādin could not state a proposition (*pūrvam*) *asya sarvasya nāstitvam*, since the *pakṣa* (= *idaṁ sarvaṁ*) was at that time not directly perceptible and therefore nothing could be predicated of it.

⁶This is *hetu* or *liṅga* in an *anumānavākya*. Where could one notice any characteristic of what did not exist? or, how could one postulate any characteristic of what did not exist? This means the *āśrayāsiddhi* and *svarūpāsiddhi* of the *hetu*.

⁷No example could be cited in respect of a proposition whose *pakṣa* itself is non-existent and therefore devoid of any property. Consequently, it would not help establish any conclusion (it would be *sādhyaavikala*).

विज्ञानमात्रं यस्यापि जगदेतच्चराचरम् ॥

प्रतिज्ञाहेतुदृष्टान्तैर्ज्ञानं तेनापि दृष्यते ॥ २२ ॥

मानाभेदाच्च मेयस्य नाज्ञातार्थः प्रसिध्यति ॥

तादात्म्येऽपि न चेज्ज्ञातो मानात्कोऽतिशयो मतः ॥ २३ ॥

अज्ञाताधिगमं कुर्वन्मानं स्यात्सर्ववादिनाम् ॥

न चेच्छुक्तितमोजस्य ज्ञानस्यापि प्रमाणता ॥ २४ ॥

विज्ञानाव्यतिरेकित्वादसिद्धादेस्तथैव च ॥

प्रामाण्यवत्प्रसङ्गः स्यादप्रमात्वेऽपि ते ध्रुवम् ॥ २५ ॥

(Now, the inability of the Mādhyamika to make any proposition regarding *dhvamsa*, as pointed out in the previous verse, is stated of the Vijñānavādin also.)

Similarly (lit. also) the person for whom all this universe, moving and non-moving, is but Idea (*vijñāna*), would render his own knowledge faulty thanks to stating faulty (or false) enunciation, reason and example¹. [22]

(Again,) owing to the non-difference (i.e. oneness) of the means of knowing with the object to be known, there does not become known (to a knower) any object that was unknown². Also, if it were not known, even in case (one accepted) their non-difference, (it has to be pointed out as to) how what is produced or accepted is distinct³ from the means of knowing. [23]

It is accepted among all thinkers that an authoritative means of knowing is what makes (the knower) know what was (earlier) unknown.⁴ If this were not so, the knowledge produced from darkness (i.e. ignorance) about a shell would also be valid (i.e. authoritatively true). [24]

So also there would arise the contingency of accepting as the authoritative means of knowing what are not properly established as such,⁵ in case they were not considered as distinct from Idea. [25]

¹Verse 21 above pointed out three faults, viz. (i) *dharmyasiddhi*

in *pratijñāvākya*, (ii) *anāśraya hetu* and (iii) *drṣṭāntābhāva*, in the argument of the Mādhyamika. This is a statement that these same three faults occur in the argument of the Vijñānavādin. This is *jñānadoṣa*. Also there is reference to *hetvābhāsas*.

²This has a reference to *Pratyakṣa* 'Direct perception'. Any means of knowing is known to grasp what was not grasped before. Now, if knowledge and its objects are both Ideas, the means of knowing has no purpose to serve, i.e. it does not grasp what was not grasped.

³This is on the supposition that the means of knowing and the object of knowing are distinct—the latter has either (i) its unknownness removed or (ii) the character of having become known, produced by the means of knowing. The intention is to point out the impossibility of the function of any means of knowing in respect of an object of knowing which is the same as the knower.

⁴An argument of the Vijñānavādin could be: What makes something known is a means of knowing—not one which makes only an unknown known. This is answered away by pointing out that what produces invalid or false knowledge would also be considered as proper means of knowing.

⁵*asiddhādi* are *asiddha* (either *āśrayāsiddha* or *svarūpāsiddha*) and *viruddhahetus*.

अजमेकं स्वतःसिद्धं प्रत्यग्रूपमनन्यदृक् ॥

वस्त्वेवं चेदिहाभीष्टं किमर्थं साध्यतेऽपरम् ॥ २६ ॥

[Verses 26-31 are an argument regarding opposition to Advaita resulting from the statement of the existential character of both the cause and the effect.]

(An objector asks:) If in this Śāstra (of Advaita) you have accepted (lit. desired) (only) one existent which is unborn, self-established, having the form of the inner self (of an individual), and unlike any other (thing), for what purpose is anything else¹ being established? [26]

¹This refers to the effect, viz. the *jagat*, which comprises

variety and would point to duality or absence of the uniqueness of the Brahman.

एवंभूतात्मसिद्धचर्थं कारणादि प्रसाध्यते ॥

उपायः सोऽवताराय तथा तज्ज्ञैश्च सूत्रितम् ॥ २७ ॥

Cause etc. are established (as existent) (only) with a view to establishing the Ātman of such nature; for, that is a means to introduce (the philosophical doctrine of the uniqueness of the Ātman)—so it is said (declared) by the knowers¹ of that. [27]

This verse is a reply to verse 26 above.

¹Reference to Gauḍapāda in the plural is indication of Sureśvara's great regard for him. Cf. *Gauḍapādakārikā* 3.15:

mṛllohavispṛhulīṅgādyaiḥ sṛṣṭir yā coditānyathā|
upāyaḥ so 'vatārāya nāsti bhedaḥ kathamcana||

कारणादिनिषेधेन न चाद्वैतमभीप्सितम् ॥

एकात्म्यबोधमात्रेण निषेधस्याप्यपह्नवात् ॥ २८ ॥

(Only) by the rejection of the cause etc. is not established (lit. obtained) non-duality (of the Brahman), for, by the knowledge of its uniqueness alone (is secured) the rejection (of the cause and the effect etc. as real). [28]

So far, it has been pointed out that the existent pot etc. has an existent for its cause. How does it prove the non-duality of the Brahman? To answer this, the verse points out the uniqueness of the Brahman being established.

सत्तत्त्वकमिदं सर्वमिति संसाध्य यत्नतः ॥

तस्यापि संविन्मात्रेण पूर्णतैवोच्यते सतः ॥ २९ ॥

Having thus established with effort that all this is of the nature of (the existent)¹, the Śruti now declares the wholeness of that existent on account of only sentiency. [29]

¹NKL reads the text as *sat-tattvakam* and not *sa-tattvakm* as in BUBV. According to this latter, the translation would be: 'all this that can be described as the cause and the effect etc. is but having the existent Ātman as its basic reality.' The reading in NKL seems better than that in BUBV, though we have rejected it.

सदेवागमतः सर्वं प्रत्यक्षाच्च सदीक्ष्यते ॥

अनुमानाच्च सत्सर्वं यथा तदधुनोच्यते ॥ ३० ॥

[This verse explains *anumeyatvāc ca...* (BUB p. 20)]

Now (i.e. hereafter) is stated (how) only the existent is all this, as declared by the Āgama (i.e. Śruti¹), and also (as experienced) by direct perception as existent. Also, it is (proved) by inference as to how all (this) is that existent. [30]

¹SP and NKL points to the Śruti text *mṛtyunaiva* in the BU and therefore the meaning of Āgama here cannot be 'tradition'.

अनुमेयं च सत्पूर्वं कारणं कार्यमेव च ॥

जगत्प्रसूतेस्तच्चेह प्रयोगेण प्रदर्श्यते ॥ ३१ ॥

[This verse explains *anumiyate ca* (BUB 1.2.1, p. 20)]

And both the cause and the effect can be inferred as preceded by the existent even (prior to) the creation of this universe; this is shown here (i.e. in what follows) by application (of the method of inference).

Verses 32-56 prove the existential character of both the cause (viz. Brahman) before creation and its effect with reference to kāryasya hi... (BUB p. 20).

विवादगोचरापन्नं सत्कारणमिदं भवेत् ॥

कार्यात्मकं मनोऽवादि कार्यत्वात्कटकम्भवत् ॥ ३२ ॥

This (world) which has for its cause the existent is what has become the subject of dispute¹. (And) *manas*, water etc.² of

the nature of the cause³, have been an effect comparable to a mat or a pot. [32]

¹The word *dispute* affirms the nature of all effects as the *pakṣa*, viz. it is *sandigdhasādhyaavat*, since, later, the word *kaṭakumbhavat* serves as the *drṣṭānta* in the proposed *prayoga*—cf. verse 31 above.

²Cf. BU 1.2.1 and 2.

³*kāryātmakam* puts *idam* (*jagat*) on par with *kaṭakumbha*.

हेतुमज्जनिमत्सर्वं कार्यत्वात्पटकुम्भवत् ॥
वियदादि च नः कार्यं तदप्येवं प्रतीयताम् ॥ ३३ ॥

All that has a birth has a (previously existing) cause, because it is of the nature of effect just like a piece of cloth or a pot.¹ May it be understood that the sky etc. is² for us effects, for that also³ is like this⁴. [33]

¹It is held by some that the world comes into existence, of itself, not from any cause (*svabhāvavāda*). This is here referred to.

²This is collective singular.

³Also can be understood for *samuccaya*: the first line refers to *anumāna* and the second to *Āgama*; refer to *antarikṣa* in BU 1.2.3—this (as also the translation) is according to the second alternative in SP.

⁴That is to say; *hetumat*.

The first alternative in SP (also in NKL) supplies *vibhaktatvāt* as the *hetu* for the affirmation in the second line; it means *svānyūnasattākabheda-pratīyogitvāt* (NKL).

असत्कारणकं कार्यं तद्विनाश्यास्य जन्मतः ॥
सर्वं स्वहेतुमुन्मूल्य जायतेऽङ्कुरकुम्भवत् ॥ ३४ ॥

[This presents a counter-argument in the form of a *prayoga*.]
Every effect has a (previously) non-existent cause because it originates after having destroyed that; (for) all is born (only) after uprooting (i.e. destroying) its own cause in the same way as a sprout and/or a pot.¹ [34]

¹It is argued thus: Being an effect should not be taken to mean that it has a cause necessarily existing before it. This is based on the common-place experience of the disappearance of a seed before the appearance of a sprout. The example of a sprout is not *sādhyavikala* 'deficient in respect of what is concluded'.

स्वकारणं चेदुत्साद्य कार्यं सर्वं प्रजायते ॥

तत्कारणविनाशाय तत्सूतेः प्राक्क्व ईर्यताम् ॥ ३५ ॥

स्वहेतूच्छित्तयेऽलं चेदजातमपि सद्यदि ॥

द्वयमप्यभ्युपेतं स्यान्न ह्यसद्वन्यतेऽसता ॥ ३६ ॥

[Verses 35-43 explain the meaning of *na* in *na mṛdādeḥ*.. (BUB p. 20). The next two verses (viz. 35-36) answer the counter-argument by pointing out how the example is *sādhyavikala*.]

If all effect¹ originated (only) after having destroyed its own cause, (then) let it be told as to where it was before its production for destroying its cause. [35]

If it were capable of destroying its own cause even while it had not originated and if it was then existent also, then you have accepted both of them (i.e. the cause and the effect) as existent before. Indeed, no non-existent can be destroyed by another non-existent. [36]

¹This is collective singular.

विनाशस्यापि कार्यत्वात्सोऽपि सत्कारणो मम ॥

न चेत्कार्यो विनाशः स्यान्नाशोऽकार्येण नेष्यते ॥ ३७ ॥

Since destruction also is an effect, even¹ that has, in my opinion, an existent cause. If destruction were not to be considered as (something) to be effected, then (I should say) destruction by what is not an effect (itself) cannot be entertained.² [37]

¹*api* shows that destruction has, like each of *paṭa*, *kaṭa*, and *kumbha* some existent cause.

²In other words what has not originated does not (or cannot) destroy.

स्वकारणविनाशाय सिद्धं वासिद्धमेव वा ॥

अङ्कुरादि मतं कार्यं नोभयत्रापि युज्यते ॥ ३८ ॥

If a sprout etc. is accepted (by you) as an effect, be it that the established (i.e. what has originated) or the non-established in respect of effecting the destruction of its own cause; both ways this¹ does not stand to reason. [38]

¹'This' means the character of an effect as the destroyer of the cause.

सिद्धं चेत्कारणात्सिद्धमुपमर्दं विनैव तु ॥

उत्पन्नेन च तन्नाश उत्पन्नत्वादन्तर्यकः ॥ ३९ ॥

[The two ways mentioned in the previous verse are discussed in verses 39 and 40.]

If it is argued that what is established (i.e. has originated) has come into existence from its cause, without having destroyed it and the destruction of it is effected by the established effect, then (this) destruction would be purposeless¹ since the effect has already come into existence. [39]

¹The reason is : The objector has posited the destruction of the seed etc. for purposes of the sprout's appearance (i.e. coming into existence).

उपमृद्नाति चेत्कार्यमथासिद्धं स्वकारणम् ॥

तत्कारणं कथं तत्स्यान्न चेत्तस्मात्प्रजायते ॥ ४० ॥

If it is said, 'an effect that is not established (i.e. has not originated) destroys its own cause', (then the question is:) how can that (cause) be its cause when it (viz. the effect) does not originate from it (viz. the cause)? [40]

उपमदोऽपि कार्यत्वात्किं न हन्यात्स्वकारणम् ॥

हन्तर्यसति हानोक्तिर्लक्ष्यते शिशुवक्तृका ॥ ४१ ॥

And, destruction also, being an effect, would it not destroy its own cause? (Indeed), in the absence of a destroyer, any statement about the destruction (of something) appears to have been made by a child (i.e. an ignorant person.) [41]

नष्टृतन्त्रो विनाशोऽपि गन्तृतन्त्रा गतिर्यथा ॥

नास्तीह कश्चिद्धात्वर्थो यः स्वहेतुं विनाशयेत् ॥ ४२ ॥

Destruction also depends on some destroyer, in the same way as any movement depends on someone who moves. There is not here (i.e. in worldly language) a single meaning of any verbal root (viz. action) which would indicate the destruction of its agent¹. [42]

¹The meaning of any verbal root is some action which is performed by an agent and which therefore cannot destroy that agent.

निर्हेतुनाशसंव्याप्तेर्न स्यात्कुम्भजनिर्मदः ॥

न बीजादग्निसंव्याप्तादङ्कुरोद्भूतिरीक्ष्यते ॥ ४३ ॥

It would not be possible that there is production of a pot from clay when there is pervasion (of that production) by the absence of the cause, viz. clay.¹ Indeed nowhere is seen the rise of a sprout from a seed which is pervaded (i.e. burnt) by fire.² [43]

¹SP explains: This is as an answer to the Kṣaṇikavādin, according to whom everything is momentary. There, in his view, clay which is considered as the cause of a pot, is yet momentary. Consequently, he cannot say that a pot etc. comes into existence from nothing.

²This is an example to prove : *nāśavyāptāt kāraṇāt kāryānutpattiḥ*.

घटादेः कारणं पिण्ड इति नाभ्युपगम्यते ॥

मृदेव कारणं यस्मात्पिण्डादेरवगम्यते ॥ ४४ ॥

It is not accepted (by anyone) that the cause of a pot etc. is a lump etc.; (they hold) only clay as the cause since it is understood (to be existent) from (its form as a lump). [44]

यदेव कारणं मानैरिह साक्षाद्विनिश्चितम् ॥

तदेवोत्तरकार्येषु न कार्यं कारणं मितेः ॥ ४५ ॥

[This is to explain the second line of the preceding verse.]

Whatever cause, which is established here¹ by various means of knowing² (only) clearly³, is itself (the cause) in respect of the later effects. (Indeed) it can be argued that an effect is not the cause of (any other effect of the same cause), thanks to (proper) way of knowing.⁴ [45]

¹That is to say; in respect of a lump (of clay) etc. which is the first form of an effect.

²These are: *anvaya*, *vyatireka*, *anusaṁdhāna* and *pratyaya*.

³That is to say; by direct perception, in the first instance.

⁴Form of the material cause (of clay) does not remain permanent and also that form, being an effect itself, does not persist in the effect; this is (i) *anvaya* of clay in a pot, and (ii) *anavasthāna* (non-existence) of the lump etc. in the pot etc. *miti* is *māna* = *jñāna*.

विनाशोऽतिशयः कश्चिद्वदि पिण्डादिवन्मतः ॥

प्रत्यक्षात्तद्वयं सत्स्यान्नो चेदस्तु ध्रुवो घटः ॥ ४६ ॥

If it was held that destruction of clay is some excellence of it just like the lump etc., then, since both of them (viz. destruction and clay), being directly perceptible, would be (ever) existent.¹ (And) if (it were) not so², (then) let the pot be (considered as) permanent.³ [46]

¹The argument in this verse proceeds to refute a possible

counter-objection. Like the lump of clay (i.e. a form of it), clay also is liable to destruction. This objection entails a doubt whether destruction of clay is some excellence (i.e. modification) of it. The answer is: Excellence of a thing and the thing must both be directly perceptible; therefore, clay and its so-called excellence, viz. destruction, must also be directly perceptible and consequently ever-obtaining.

²This is another part of the doubt, viz. destruction is not any excellence of clay, it is different from it.

³This is so, because destruction (which is *abhāva*, i.e. non-existence) is in no way related to the pot which is an existential entity. The pot is clearly an effect and a form of clay. And further, the nature of destruction is thus not in any way ascertained.

क्रिया वा तत्फलं वा स्याद्वस्त्वन्तरमथापि वा ॥

नाशोऽथ वा न किञ्चित्स्यात्सत्त्वं नैवमपोद्यते ॥ ४७ ॥

Or, whatever be (the nature of) destruction (e.g. of clay), either some action or the effect of the same something distinct from it or some non-entity, its existence cannot be declined. [47]

The nature of destruction could be understood in any of the four ways, but that (viz. the nature of destruction) would not establish the non-existence of an existent, which still continues to exist.

क्रियाप्यस्ति फलं चास्ति तद्वस्त्वन्तरं च सत् ॥

अथ नाशोऽपि नैवास्ति तं विना सदिदं जगत् ॥ ४८ ॥

[The second line of the preceding verse is explained here.]

Now destruction may be some action or some result (or modification) or some thing other (than an existent e.g. clay) or some non-entity. Even then this universe is existent despite its absence.¹ [48]

¹This is to be explained thus: If destruction is some action, the agent of the action has to be declared as existent and this

would not negate the existential character of a thing like clay. If it is some result (or modification), then what has undergone this change has to be considered as an existent. If it is another (existential) thing, it does not affect the nature of things like clay etc. Being a non-entity also, it does not affect the status of the same.

सन्नेव नाशोऽपीष्टश्चेत्सत्सता न विरुध्यते ॥

ऐकात्म्येऽपि विरोधश्चेन्नाशो नाशेऽपि शङ्क्यते ॥ ४६ ॥

If one were to accept destruction also as an existent, then (it has to be pointed out) the existent (clay) is not opposed (i.e. disproved as existent) by (another) existent (viz. destruction). And, if one were to say that even there is unity of nature (of the two, viz. destruction and clay), then (it would mean that) one would have to doubt that there is destruction (in the case) of destruction also. [49]

The last line implies that, like destruction of clay, there can be destruction of destruction also. Thus, the nature of destruction being unestablished, clay has to be declared as an existent.

पिण्डादिना विनापीदं मृदादेः केवलादपि ॥

घटाद्युत्पद्यमानं तु कार्यं दृष्टमतो ध्रुवम् ॥ ५० ॥

मृदाद्येव ततो ग्राह्यं करणं ह्यन्वयान्मृदः ॥

कार्यमेव तु पिण्डादि तस्य कार्येऽनन्वयात् ॥ ५१ ॥

[Verse 50 is an amplification of the idea in verse 45. Verse 51 gives the outcome of the argument of verse 50.]

It is invariably seen that the effect, a pot etc. is produced, even without (the form of) a lump (of clay) but from clay alone (i.e. clay having no form). Therefore, it (i.e. clay) is ever existent.

[50]

Therefore,¹ only clay etc. has to be accepted as the cause, indeed from its continued existence (in the effect, viz. pot). As against this (*tu*), the (form of a) lump etc. is but an effect, for it does not continue to exist in the effect.

[51]

Earlier, in the explanation of *miti* in verse 45, reference was made to *anvayavyatirekasambandha*. That is explained here. *piṇḍādinā* etc. is the amplification of *asati api*.. (BUB p. 20). The lines *dhruvam* etc. are the explanation of *tasmān na*.. (BUB p. 20).

¹'Therefore' has reference to 'it is invariably seen'.

विरुद्धानेककार्याणां युगपज्जन्म नेष्यते ॥

एकस्मात्कारणात्तस्मात्पिण्डाभावे घटोद्भवः ॥ ५२ ॥

It is not accepted that there is simultaneous production (lit. birth) of many mutually opposed effects from one single cause. Therefore, there is production of a pot (even) while there is absence of (the form) of a lump. [52]

This is a comment *sarvaṃ hi kāraṇam*.. (BUB p. 20). This is to explain why there does not originate a pot together with a lump which forms from clay. True, the lump is clay, but it is an effect of clay, a pot is not the effect of the lump.

पिण्डादिव्यतिरेकेण कारणानुपलब्धितः ॥

असत्त्वं चेन्मृदादेः स्यान्न मानानुपपत्तितः ॥ ५३ ॥

If one were to argue: Since one does not find the cause (as existent) apart from lump etc., therefore clay etc. have non-existence.¹ (The answer is:) No, that is not so, because there is invalidity of that means of knowing.² [53]

¹The objector means to add 'and therefore clay etc. is not the cause of a pot etc.'

²This means: The lump etc. cannot form without the presence (or existence) of clay etc. (*mṛdādyanugatava*). Therefore, the reasoning of the objector stands invalid.

पिण्डादिव्यतिरेकेण यदि मानं भवेत्ततः ॥

मृदादि कारणं लब्धं न मानं स्यान्मृदा विना ॥ ५४ ॥

पिण्डादिव्यतिरेकेण पिण्डादाविव चेत्प्रमा ॥

सिद्धं कारणमेवं स्यान्न मा मेयं विना यतः ॥ ५५ ॥

[This explains further what is stated in the previous verse.]

If (one were to say: The argument of the Vedāntin appears to be that) the means of knowing (the existent cause) obtains even apart from (i.e. in the absence of) a lump¹ etc., then (in that case, we answer that) there does obtain clay etc. as the cause; (for) there would not obtain any means (of knowing, i.e. ascertaining, the cause) in the absence of clay.² [54]

If (one were to say:) As in (the absence of) a lump (of clay) etc. there results the knowledge of the cause, apart from the lump,³ then (one has to declare that the existence of) the cause is proved this way (also); for, there results no knowledge in the absence of an object of knowledge.⁴ [55]

¹SP points out the argument of the objector thus: Clay and the form of a lump (of that clay) co-exist. Therefore, the form being destroyed, clay also must be said to cease to exist.

²The Siddhāntin answers that the *anugatatva* 'continued existence' of clay etc. decides the conclusion. This is stated by *vyatireka* mode of answer.

³The objector has this in mind: Clay (not in the form of a lump) and a lump of it cannot easily be distinguished from each other, therefore, it is difficult to say that the clay, which continues to exist even in the absence of the form of a lump, is the cause of a pot.

⁴The objector's argument is not really any objection. The knowledge of the continued existence of the clay etc. is the reason to prove it as the cause of the existing pot. A second proposition about the knowledge and its means points to this.

असाधारणरूपेषु व्यावृत्तेष्वितरेतरम् ॥

बहुष्वेकं यदाभाति प्रत्यक्षं कारणं तु तत् ॥ ५६ ॥

The one, that is directly perceptible in those many (of its forms), each of which has a distinct form and gets destroyed (lit. disappears) (in the process of the creation of some effect), is the cause.¹ [56]

¹Translation follows the latter of the two alternative explanations given by SP. The former alternative is: They recognize that as the cause of some effect which is preceded by those many forms that have mutually differed and ceased to exist. Of course, there is very little material difference between these two.

In verses 57-73, the topic pertains to the doubt about the perception of continued existence of something which results from its similarity with what could be the real cause.

सादृश्यादन्वयभ्रान्तिस्तन्निवृत्तावपीति चेत् ॥
नैवं पिण्डस्थदृष्टानां घटादावपि दर्शनात् ॥ ५७ ॥

If one were to hold that, there would be on the part of one an error as regards the continued existence (of the cause in what is held as its effect) on account of the similarity of any or (many of its so-called products with it) even when they have (gradually) ceased to exist (when the effect exists), then (we say:) This is not so¹, since the parts (of clay etc.) which are seen in its various forms are noticed even in the pot etc. [57]

¹This is denial of *bhrānti* 'error', for our experience of a clay-pot is thus; 'this is a pot of clay'. This experience does not get stultified as any *bhrānti* does.

प्रत्यभिज्ञायमानेऽर्थे तदेवेदमिति ध्रुवे ॥
लिङ्गमाभासतामेति प्रत्यक्षार्थविरुद्धमित् ॥ ५८ ॥

In the object (viz. the pot) that is being recognized as 'this is the same as that', while that object has remained unchanged, (what the objector holds as) the cause becomes apparently perceptible in the form (only) (to him)¹ but this (his) knowledge is opposed to the directly perceived object.² [58]

¹This is an argument of the Kṣaṇikavādin. He holds that all these so-called existent objects are but momentary even like a

lamp that illumines its surrounding only for a while (i.e. for a moment). Therefore, what is considered as the experience of the continued existence of clay etc. (*anvayadr̥ṣṭi*) is positively an error. This is actually some kind of inference of the oneness (or, the continuance) of the cause.

²This refers to the recognition of clay etc. In the momentary appearances of the objects of the Kṣaṇikavādin's knowledge, there is never such recognition. There is thus opposition of the objector's *anumāna* and the (*pratyabhijñā*) *pratyakṣa* of the Siddhāntin.

विरुद्धाव्यभिचारित्वं न च प्रत्यक्षलिङ्गयोः ॥

प्रत्यक्षापाश्रयान्नित्यं नानपेक्षं तदक्षवत् ॥ ५९ ॥

[A further argument in respect of *anumāna* in the face of *pratyakṣa* or (even) *pratyabhijñā*.]

And between Direct Perception and Inference¹, there is not any invariable opposition², for, it (*liṅga*) ever rests on Direct Perception; it is not independent (i.e. without any expectation of Direct Perception³). [59]

¹*liṅga* stands for *anumāna*. Cf. also the preceding verse.

²This is explained in the first line of the next verse.

³*akṣa* = *pratyakṣa* 'Direct Perception'.

विरुद्धाव्यभिचारित्वं समानवलयोर्यतः ॥

दृष्टं सर्वत्र लोकेऽस्मिन्न तु सिंहशृगालयोः ॥ ६० ॥

(And also) because the relation of being mutually opposed invariably (can) obtain (only) between two reasons of equal strength.¹ This is seen everywhere in this world, but it (i.e. such invariable opposition) is not noticed to exist between a lion and a fox (which are of unequal strength).²

[60]

Translation uses the word reasons for conveying the idea of *hetu* in *Anumāna*.

NKL clarifies the meaning of *viruddhāvyabhicāritva*; it consists in invariable association of something with what is opposed to it. Cf. the well-known idea expressed in the Nibandhas belonging to Prācīna Nyāya: *viruddhārthadvayabodhakahetvoḥ prayoge satpratipakṣā-paraparyāyatayā 'viruddhāvyabhicāri' iti vyavahārah*. Here *Liṅga* = *Anumāna* leads to the knowledge that there is no existent cause of a *ghaṭa*, and, as opposed to it, *Pratyakṣa* leads to the knowledge that the existent clay is its cause. Thus, the two means of knowing lead to *sādhyābhāva* and *sādhyā* both. Therefore, either of these two means of knowing (i.e. two *hetus*) can be called *satpratipakṣa* 'inconclusive or ambiguous' *hetus*. The argument in this verse is based on the dependence of *Anumāna* on *Pratyakṣa*. The continued presence of clay, therefore, shows the invalidity of the *Anumāna* so-called.

¹This explains the inequality (i.e. degree of adequacy) of the two *hetus* mentioned in the preceding verse. The two alleged *hetus* (i.e. the mutually opposed *Pratyakṣa* and *Liṅga*) are not equally strong.

²The statement in the first line is supported by citing a similar example from common life. There can be opposition worth the name between the two lions or two foxes, but not between a lion and a fox.

क्षणिकत्वे च भावानां प्रत्यभिज्ञाद्यसंभवः ॥

न ह्यन्यदृष्टं वस्त्वन्यैः प्रत्यभिज्ञायते क्वचित् ॥ ६१ ॥

[One more argument against *kṣaṇikatva*; *pratyabhijñā* etc. would be impossible.]

In case one holds that things of existence are momentary, there would be impossibility of recognition (of those things) etc.¹ (on the part of the onlookers of those things). Indeed, a thing which is seen by someone is not recognized by any other person.²

[61]

¹SP explains *ādi* 'etc.' on the basis of BS 3.2.9: *sa eva tu karmā-nusmṛtiśabdavidhibhyaḥ* which refers to some action that had remained incomplete at an earlier moment (or on an earlier day) to re-

collection or remembrance of what was seen or done earlier and also to scriptural passages such as BU 4.3.16 and CU 6.9.3. and 8.3.2. NKL follows suit. Better, however, refer to BS 2.2.25 which refutes the Buddhist's notion of momentariness of things (and also of knowers of them).

²This implies that the unity of a seer is denied by the Kṣaṇikavādin—this is amplified in the next verse.

क्षणिकं चेदिदं सर्वं प्रत्यभिज्ञाप्रमाणकम् ॥

अन्यतद्बुद्ध्यपेक्षत्वं तद्बुद्धेर्वः प्रसज्यते ॥ ६२ ॥

If all this, which has recognition as the means of knowing it, is (held by the Kṣaṇikavādin as) momentary, then he¹ will have to face the contingency of accepting that it (i.e. recognition of some object) is dependent on the knowledge (of it on the part) of another. [62]

¹'He' refers to the Kṣaṇikavādin, who is directly addressed in the verse.

इदं क्षणिकमित्येतत्क्षणिकत्वे न सिध्यति ॥

इदं क्षणिकताबुद्ध्योभिन्नाधिकरणत्वतः ॥ ६३ ॥

[This verse states the reason why momentariness of things etc. cannot hold.]

(Further) in the view that everything is momentary the proposition 'this is momentary' does not get established, because the knowledge 'this one' and 'momentariness' of (it) belong to two different substrata¹. [63]

¹Substrata:

(a) (reference to cognisers, i.e. individuals): This proposition, 'This is momentary' is said to imply the non-momentariness of the one who makes it, for one requires to live two moments to have two cognitions of (i) this, and (ii) its characteristic momentariness. If this implication is not accepted, it would mean two cognisers for the two cognitions which turn into one cognition.

And already, the second line of the 61st verse has pointed out the impossibility of such a happening in the case of a cogniser, viz. the second cogniser (of momentariness).

(b) (reference to cognitions, i.e. time): (a) entails that there are two cognitions (let us say, on the part of even one cogniser (and not two of them). And these two cognitions cannot obtain in just one moment—there would be two moments necessary. Consequently, there cannot be the cognition of this form: 'This is momentary.' !

अज्ञातं ज्ञायते यस्य तथाजातं च जायते ॥

प्रत्यभिज्ञामृते तस्य प्रतिज्ञार्थो न सिध्यति ॥ ६४ ॥

[This verse shows how even the Kṣaṇikavādin has to accept recognition as a means of knowing.]

For him, in whose opinion what was not known (before) becomes known and what was not born becomes born, the thing enunciated (i.e. mentioned as the subject of any of the propositions) cannot get established, unless it is recognised.

[64]

To say, 'This was not and is (now) born' or 'This was unknown and is (now) known' implies two moments for the one who says it. That should force the Kṣaṇikavādin to accept recognition as a proper/authoritative means of knowing.

अनवस्था च दुर्वारा ह्यविश्वासश्च जायते ॥

मृषात्वात्सर्वबुद्धीनां न क्वचिन्निश्चितीर्भवेत् ॥ ६५ ॥

(If the holder of the view of momentariness says that, 'we do not say: an unknown is known or an unborn is born',¹ then) there would follow inevitable *infinite regress* and further there would arise (among the people) want of faith (in the doctrine of momentariness). (Thus) on account of all knowledges (in that system or view) being false² (i.e. invalid), there would not be any definite decision.

[65]

¹This would mean 'what is (already) known is being known' or 'what is (already) born is being born'. Who could believe this as a reasonable talk?

²All statements made by the Kṣaṇikavādin will be held unauthoritative. The purport of philosophical inquiry would thus be defeated !

संबन्धानुपपत्तिश्च तदिदंज्ञानयोर्ध्रुवम् ॥

संबन्धकर्तर्यसति न च सादृश्यसंश्रयात् ॥ ६६ ॥

And certainly that relation between the two knowledges of that and of this would be unreasonable (or invalid), when there does not exist one who would relate them¹. And also, (that relation could not obtain) on the support of similarity² (between that and this). [66]

This argument proceeds from the fact that the statement of the cognition 'This is that' would require two moments of time or two places as the substratum of the cognition. Alternatively, it would require at least the knowledge of the similarity between this, and that and this knowledge would require the continued existence of the knower.

¹This means 'who is the knower of the relation.'

²This is explained in the next verse.

ध्वंसिनोरिव सादृश्यं स्थायिनोरपि नेष्यते ॥

ग्राहकेऽसति तद्भिन्ने बुद्धीनां चैकरूपतः ॥ ६७ ॥

That there is similarity is not accepted in the case of two objects that continue to exist as in the case of those which get destroyed (in a moment) when there is not a perceiver of them who is different from the two.¹ (This is so) also because the knowledges of two (or more) similar objects are held to be of but one form. [67]

¹Translation follows the reading *tadbhinne* whose variant reading *tad-bhitteḥ* is supported by NKL. In that case, the word *tad-*

bhitti means difference between the two knowers of the two. SP remarks that the difference in the reading does not change the conclusion. The thought is: There is need of but one knower who continues to live (at least) the two moments of the cognition of two similar things, whether they are momentary or permanent. *tadbhitti* means difference between two knowers of the two similar objects. This causes the difficulty: Similarity cannot be spoken of, in case there are two different cognitions of two different knowers! Cf. *aikyabuddher bhrāntitvabhaṅgena bhāveṣu kṣaṇitvam abhāṅkṣit*—the introductory remark in SP on the next verse.

नाशभेदविरुद्धार्थप्रमेये च व्यवस्थिते ॥

प्रत्यर्थिनि हि प्रत्यक्षे तद्विरुद्धः कुतोऽमितेः ॥ ६८ ॥

[This verse states yet another argument against *kṣaṇikatva*.]

When there exists thus an object of knowledge which is opposed (in nature) to destruction or discreteness (from one another) and (further) Direct Perception is an opponent (of the two¹), how could there be what is opposed to that²?—because there is (really) the absence of any (other) means of the knowledge (of the two). [68]

Here, the verse refers to the Buddhist view of *nirvikalpaka pratyakṣa*. *nirvikalpaka pratyakṣa* is opposed to destruction etc., it grasps only what exists. Yet this also does not prove momentariness of objects (NKL).

Translation follows the reading adopted by SP which reads: *amiter iti padacchedaḥ*. However, NKL reads *kutaḥ miteḥ*. Accordingly, translation of the second line would be: Whence, i.e. by what means could there be... (*kasmān mānād ityarthāḥ*) (NKL).

¹These are: destruction of what is considered as the antecedent, the cause, and discreteness of two cognitions which form the basis of *sādrśya*.

²'That' refers to Direct Perception.

अनुत्पन्नोत्पित्सूत्पन्नोऽनष्टो नाशादिकृत्तथा ॥

एवमष्टक्षणावस्थो भावोऽवश्यं त्वयेष्यते ॥ ६९ ॥

[Yet another argument about self-contradiction in the view of the Kṣaṇikavādin.]

(Do remember) even you have necessarily to accept that a thing exists for eight moments, for, (in your view) it is (i) not produced, (ii) wanting to be produced, (iii) being produced, (iv) produced, (v) not-destroyed, i.e. existent, (vi) wanting to destroy (itself), (vii) destroyer¹ (of itself), and (viii) destroyed.² [69]

¹This stands for *nāśakṛt*. It is difficult to say what *ādi* in *nāśādikṛt* means.

²This is comparable to six modifications of a thing (*ṣaṭ bhāva-vikāras*) mentioned in *Nirukta* 1.2: *jāyate, asti, vardhate, pariṇamati, apakṣiyate, vinaśyati*.

अन्योन्याविषयत्वे तु कुतः सादृश्यधीरियम् ॥

सदृशार्थं विनैवेयं क्लृप्ता सादृश्यधीर्यदि ॥ ७० ॥

[So far, Sureśvara has explained the meaning only of *na* in *na tadidambuddhyaḥ* ... (BUB p. 22). Now he explains the remaining part of the statement.]

In the first instance¹, since you hold that (in a cognition of similarity, the two similar objects) do not grasp each other², whence³ does this knowledge of similarity (arise) then? And, (you entertain that), if there is this knowledge of similarity, then (you have entertained that, viz. the notion of that knowledge) even without the existence of similar objects³. [70]

The Buddhists hold that knowledge occurs of itself (i.e. it is *svayamvedya*). Therefore, the question arises as to who grasps the similarity between 'this' and 'that'. The notion of *svayamvedyatva* stands therefore in the need of explanation of the problem: Do they, i.e. this and that, grasp each other as similar? It cannot be answered? Therefore, the question: 'Who grasps this similarity?' remains unanswered.

¹This is the meaning of *tāvat*.

²It literally means 'do not have the each other as the object of its knowing.'

³If both this and that are momentary then the notion of the knowledge of similarity between themselves on the part of each of them is baseless. This is so, because similarity can be grasped only when both the subject and the object co-exist and are not *svayam-vedya*.

मृगाम्बुधीवन्मिथ्यात्वं स्यादेवं तदिदं धियोः ॥

असद्विषयतैवेह सर्वासामपि चेद्वियाम् ॥ ७१ ॥

नैवं बुद्धेरपि तथा ह्यसद्विषयता भवेत् ॥

अस्त्वेवं सर्वबुद्धीनां मृषात्वमिति चेन्मतम् ॥ ७२ ॥

नैवं स्यात्सर्वबुद्धीनां मृषात्वे मित्यसंभवात् ॥

कारणस्यास्तित्ता तस्मात्सिद्धा कार्योद्भवात्पुरा ॥ ७३ ॥

[This is the refutation of the three Buddhist schools: In line 1 of verse 71, the Bāhyārthavādins; line 2 of verse 71 and line 1 of verse 72, the Vijñānavādin; and the line 2 of verse 72 and line 1 of verse 73; the Śūnyavādin—finally, line 2 of verse 73 states the Siddhānta.]

Thus¹, there would be two false knowledges: (i) of this and (ii) of that exactly as that of a mirage². (If it is said;) let all knowledges have (only) non-existent objects, [71]

this is not so, for in respect of momentary knowledge also, the situation would be that there is a non-existent object of knowledge. If it were held that all knowledges are but false, [72]

this would not be so, because there would then be no possibility of any knowledge. Thereby is established the existence of the cause before the production of the effect. [73]

¹It means to say: It follows from the above argument.

²The mistake in respect of a mirage lies in wrongly apprehending water in the place of thin air.

In verses 74-107 Sureśvara has undertaken to prove the previous existence of the cause and the effect before the latter came to be produced. In the earlier portion, he explained the existence of the cause; now, he explains how the effect (also) existed. This is an explanation of *kāryasya cābhivyakti-lingatvāta* . . (BUB p. 22).

कार्यस्यापि यथाऽस्तित्वं तथेदानीं प्रपञ्च्यते ॥
सत्त्वपूर्वमिदं कार्यं तमोन्तस्थघटादिवत् ॥
तस्याभिव्यक्तिधर्मत्वादन्यथा स्यान्नृशृङ्गवत् ॥ ७४ ॥

Now is explained in detail¹ how there is existence of the effect. This² effect has existence (even) before (it is produced) like that of a pot which remains in darkness,³ for it has the characteristic of being revealed⁴. If this were not so, it would be like the (never existing) horns of a human being.

[74]

¹The denominative root *prapañcaya-* means 'to explain in detail'.

²The word *idam* refers to what is directly perceptible, or, being revealed as the so-called effect.

³The example a pot that was covered in darkness before it came to be noticed is an alternative exposition of *abhivyaktidharmatvāt* which SP has explained as *sammatābhivyaktavaśād abhivyaktatvāt* (*anumeyam*).

⁴SP paraphrases: *abhivyajyamānatvāt*.

सत्यामपि च सामग्र्यां बन्ध्यापुत्राद्यसत्त्वतः ॥
विज्ञानालम्बनत्वं नो न कदाचित्प्रपद्यते ॥ ७५ ॥

Even while there exist the means¹ of knowing, the son of a barren woman etc.², they owing to their non-existence (are not seen); but (in respect of the knowledge of the cause and its effect) it does not stand to reason (to say that) there is no basis for knowing (these)³.

[75]

¹That is to say, eye, light etc.

²The word *ādi* refers to *nṛśṛṅga*, *khapuspa*, and other such falsely conceived existents (!).

³Idea (*viññāna*) is the basis for knowing them.

सर्वं सदेव चेदिष्टमुपलभ्येत ते सदा ॥

सामग्र्यां घटवत्सत्यां सर्वं सद्वादिनो ध्रुवम् ॥ ७६ ॥

[This is an objection.]

(One might object): If you accept that all this (world of effects, viz. objects of knowledge) ever obtains as existent, then, so long as there exist the means of knowing (the same), in the same way as a pot, everything would be for the Siddhāntin invariably existent. [76]

न विद्यमानमात्रेण ह्यभिव्यक्तिरपीष्यते ॥

सदेव वस्त्वभिव्यक्तं च तथाऽव्यक्तं लक्ष्यते ॥ ७७ ॥

[This is the answer to the objection in the previous verse.]

(We say:) (No, it is not so.) Indeed¹ we do not accept even² manifestation (of an object as previously existent) by its mere existence; (in our opinion); an existent object is noticed to become manifest and also (that which can remain) unmanifest.³ [77]

This argument is in answer to two doubts: (1) Whether being existent at this moment is alone the basis of the ever existence of the cause; and (ii) whether it is mere existence of the means of knowing it.

¹The word *hi* is paraphrased by SP thus: Accepting that all are ever existent (read: *sarvasammatidyotanārtho hiśabdaḥ*).

²The word 'etc.' refers to the existent object's use in human dealings.

³Only existent can manifest itself in various forms (*āvirbhāva*) or withdraw (i.e. conceal) some (or all) of its forms (*tirodhāna*).

अङ्गीकर्तव्यमेतच्च भवद्भिरविशङ्कितैः ॥

न चेद्वः सर्वसिद्धान्तो नश्येत्सैकतकूपवत् ॥ ७८ ॥

And this view is to be accepted by you without having any doubt.¹ If you do not do so, your entire doctrine would topple down (lit. get destroyed) like a well of sand.² [78]

¹The argument is: An effect cannot be said to exist while all the factors which cause it are noticeable, since (according to the Naiyāyika) there is a relation between the two as the antecedent and that which follows it. This sets aside the possibility that only a previously existent effect comes to get manifested.

²The Naiyāyika is a realist and, therefore, by accepting what is said in the previous line, he has to give up realism and accept the unreality (or, non-existence) of an effect—that is, he would be reduced to the position of a Kṣaṇikavādin.

प्रमाणव्यतिरेकेण प्रमेयोऽर्थो भवन्भवेत् ॥

मानादव्यतिरेके हि मानमेयौ न सिध्यतः ॥ ७९ ॥

An object of knowledge exists (only if it exists) apart from the one who knows (it)¹; (and) if the knower were not apart from the means of knowing, it would not be possible to hold that there exists knowledge and the means of knowing.² [79]

The verse has a basis in the Vijñānavādin's view that both the knowledge (of an object) and the object of knowledge are but Ideas and it answers in two separate lines, two questions: (i) Should one include knowledge in the means of knowing? and (ii) Should one include the means of knowing in knowledge?

¹This is the answer to the first question. It is possible to say that there is some object of knowing, if it were different from some knower of it.

²This is the answer to the second question. One cannot posit two entities as knowledge and the means to it, if they were but one idea.

कारणस्यापि नास्तित्वं कार्यासत्त्वे प्रसज्यते ॥

न हि कार्यमनाश्रित्य कारणं जगतीक्ष्यते ॥ ८० ॥

And, further, in case one accepted the non-existence of an effect (before its effect was produced), there would follow the contingency that the cause also did not exist, for indeed nowhere in the universe is seen any cause which is not related to an effect. [80]

This has a reference to the Asatkāryavāda of the Naiyāyikas, who hold that an effect did not exist before its production. There are two possibilities as to how this is so: (i) There never existed any effect, and (ii) there were no means of its production. The second question only has to be answered. This is done in this verse. The second line points out how cause and effect are only inter-related and, therefore, one cannot exist in the absence of the other.

सत्तामात्रेण किं कार्यसमवाय्यादि कारणम् ॥

साधयेद्व्यापृतं वेदं तथाऽपीष्टं न सिध्यति ॥ ८१ ॥

[The edition of NKL correctly reads *samavāyyādi* and *kāraṇam* as two words.]

[Up to verse 80 Sureśvara refuted Satkāryavāda represented by the Tārkika and some Buddhists who also are good logicians. Now, verse 81-87 are *anukta* portion in the comments of Saṅkara, but implied by him.]

(The question is:) Is it that causes, beginning with the invariable antecedent cause¹, produce any effect by mere existence of them? or (would they produce that), being active²? (Whatever be it), the desired³ (absence of relation between the cause and the effect) does not get established.

[81]

There are two possibilities which would be thought by the Tārkikas; viz. (i) the cause does not operate, yet it produces the effect by its mere existence; and (ii) the cause operates and then produces the effect. In verses 81 onwards, Sureśvara refutes Ārambhavāda of the Tārkika.

¹The Tārkika enunciates three causes, *samavāyi*, *asamavāyi* and *nimitta*.

²*vyāpṛtam vā* implies *avyāpṛtam*; this latter is the basis for verse 85.

³The Tārīkika wants to establish the absence of the effect.

सत्तामात्रेण चेत्कुर्यात्कारणत्रितयं तदा ॥

कार्योत्पत्तिस्थितिलयाः प्राप्नुयुर्युगपत्सदा ॥ ८२ ॥

अविशेषाच्च सत्तायाः सर्वतः सर्वसंभवः ॥

सर्व एव न संसिध्येद्व्यवहारश्च लौकिकः ॥ ८३ ॥

त्रीण्येव कारणानीति निष्फलावधृतिर्भवेत् ॥

यथा त्रयं तथा सर्वं सत्तया किं न कारणम् ॥ ८४ ॥

If the three causes would produce effects (i.e. results) by their mere existence, then (i.e. in that case) production, existence and merger of effects would ever be occurring (lit. obtaining) simultaneously¹. [82]

And (in this case), since (mere) existence (of the causes) has not undergone any change,² there would be the possibility of the production of all (kinds of) things from all other things and consequently all the worldly dealings of (cause and effect) would not be possible).³ [83]

(Furthermore) (the emphatic) assertion (i.e. enunciation) that there are only three causes would be meaningless. As you accept the three causes as mere existent (and responsible for the production of effects), why would you not accept (i.e. mention) that all things can together be the cause by their mere existence?⁴ [84]

¹This refers to the impossibility of making one cause from another.

²This means that each of them would remain as some existent and would be incapable of giving rise to any effect (that is change). There would be these causes existing in mere name—and not meaningfully so !

³NKL points out how one, who is desirous of obtaining oil, would not avoid using milk as the material for producing oil.

⁴This has reference to the statement *sarvataḥ sarvasambhavaḥ* in verse 83.

संभूय कार्यं कुर्याच्चैत्कारणत्रितयं तदा ॥
मेलनस्यापि कार्यत्वात्कथं तत्स्याचयं विना ॥ ८५ ॥

If the three causes would operate together¹ (i.e. produce an effect), then their coming together² also being an effect, (one should have to explain) how that would be possible without the three. [85]

¹See note 4 under verse 81 above.

²A variant reading is noted in NKL: *melaka* for *melana*. But this reading does not seem in any way significant. The text of NKL accepts *melaka*. In case the reading of NKL is accepted, the *melaka* should be distinct from the three causes, either related or unrelated to the three causes. But the words *melakasyāpi kāryatvāt* do not get explained satisfactorily. And NKL is silent about the same !

कारणत्रितये नाथ एकैकस्य प्रसिध्यति ॥
तस्य तस्य तथैवेति सानवस्था प्रसज्यते ॥ ८६ ॥

Also the (operation) of any one among the (group of the) three causes cannot stand to reason (i.e. cannot produce an effect), (for), then it would each require in the same way (an operator bringing the three causes together) (and) thus¹ there would result *infinite regress*. [86]

SP explains that the absence of Saṁdhi in *nātha ekaikasya* is purely the author's choice: *vivakṣito hi saṁdhir bhavatīti manyate*. The edition of NKL reads: *kāraṇatritayeṇātha*. Translation, in that case, would be difficult. Translation here follows the AnSS text. Further, SP shows *atho* as a variant for *atha* and points out that it would be the sense of *api ca*.

The argument in this verse would set aside the Ārambhavāda.

¹SP points out that *sā anavasthā* 'such *infinite regress*' would follow also if Kṣaṇikavāda is accepted.

वस्तुनः सदसत्त्वाय ह्यभिव्यक्त्येकहेतुतः ॥

ऐश्वर्यं न प्रमाणस्य सत्त्वं वस्तुबलाद्यतः ॥ ८७ ॥

The means of knowing does not indeed have any strength (i.e. capacity) for (establishing) the existence or non-existence of a thing, because it is only the cause of revealing the thing (and also) because the existence (of a thing gets established) in its own right.¹ [87]

¹SP points to the instance of a hidden treasure, which is not seen by one and yet exists in its own right. This sets aside a possible argument: *yad upalabhyate tad eva sat* 'only perceptible is existent'.

द्वैविध्यादावृतेः कार्यं नेक्षते तेन संवृतम् ॥

लब्धात्मकस्य कुड्यादि प्राक्सूतेः कारणावृतिः ॥ ८८ ॥

[Upto verse 87, Sureśvara explained the meaning of the word *na* in *na dvividhatvāt* of BUB (p. 23). Now follows the explanation of *vidyamānasya prāg anupalabdhinimittam dvividhatvāt*.]

Since what covers¹ effect (a thing) is of two types, one does not see the effect which is covered by that (viz. the covering).² (The two-fold covering is thus explained: (i) Thatched wall etc. (is the cover) for what has come into existence³ and (ii) (there is) covering (of the effect) by the (material) cause before the production.⁴ [88]

This explains why an (earlier) existent effect is not perceived (*anupalabdha*) before it is (said to be) produced.

¹This means 'It keeps the cause and the effect obscure'.

²There is a variant *neksyate*, whose translation could be 'an effect is not perceived covered as it is by that (covering).' It is possible that this variant could be the correct word intended by Sureśvara—cf. *kimartham nopalabhyate* in verse 90 below. However, both the AnSS edition and the NKL edition ignore this variant.

³A pot, for instance, or anything within a hamlet.

⁴That remains unseen and therefore *anupalabdha*.

मृदात्मनोपसंश्लिष्टं कार्यं कारणतामितम् ॥
कारणत्वाद्वि तत्स्थं तत्तदृते कारणं कथम् ॥ ८६ ॥

(Indeed) an effect (viz. a pot) which is covered by clay was (at that time) in the state of the cause¹. Because (clay) is its cause, that (viz. the pot) is abiding in it (viz. clay²). How indeed could (clay) be the cause without that (viz. the effect) (that was not in existence)?³ [89]

¹In normal life one notices a wall etc. as covering a pot etc. That means: The two exist apart from each other.

²Before the production of the pot, it does not have any shape and also the name pot. It remains in the form of clay—this is its being covered by the latter.

³Unless there was clay etc. (i.e. cause), the pot etc. (i.e. the effect) could not be produced.

यदि कारणसंस्थं सत्तन्निमित्तं च कारणम् ॥
व्यवधानान्तराभावात्किमर्थं नोपलभ्यते ॥ ८७ ॥

One might ask: If (an effect) is existent in (the state of) the cause and the cause is for (the manifestation of) the thing, then, in the absence of any other covering, why is it that it (viz. the effect) is not perceived¹? [90]

This means 'both the cause and the effect, being ever existent, the effect should be noticeable (*sadopalabdha*)'.

¹Cf. note 2 under verse 88 above.

कार्यान्तरेण संस्थानान्मृदादेर्नोपलभ्यते ॥
सदात्मनोपलब्धिस्तु न कदाचन हीयते ॥ ८९ ॥

[Now Sureśvara introduces the thought regarding *abhibyakti* 'manifestation' and *tirobhūti* 'concealment' of an effect.]

(A pot etc.) is not perceived since other effects (of clay etc.) are in existence, but the perception (of the effect) as of the nature of an existent is never wanting (lit. lost). [91]

The basis for this verse is a doubt as to whether a pot etc. has some other particular form at the time of its existence prior to its production. The answer is: A pot etc. existed only as clay etc., even though this latter took the shape of a lump etc. before it finally took the shape of a pot etc.

नष्टोत्पन्नसदभावशब्दप्रत्ययभेदधीः ॥

अभिव्यक्तिरोभूतिद्वैविध्यापेक्षयैव तु ॥ ९२ ॥

The various knowledge (about an effect, e.g. a pot) arises from the meanings of words, 'destroyed, produced, extant and (its) absence owing to its dependence on two-fold state, viz. manifestation (of the form) and the concealment (of the same, or of some of its parts). [92]

The linguistic usages do not cause the destruction etc. of an effect; they indicate the states in which the ever-existent effect has become perceptible.

कुड्याद्यावरणं दृष्टं भिन्नदेशं सदावृतात् ॥

कुम्भाद्यभिन्नदेशस्थं पिण्डाद्यावरणं कथम् ॥ ९३ ॥

(An objection is raised:) A covering such as wall etc. is ever seen to be abiding in a region different from that of what is covered.¹ Therefore, how can the cover, viz. lump etc. be said to exist in the same region as that of a pot etc.?

[93]

¹The idea is: We notice that a thatched wall, which can cover (i.e. conceal) a pot, can exist in a place where there is no pot etc.—that is to say: The thatched wall and the pot are perceived to be in two different places. So, what covers (*tirodhāyaka*) and what is covered (*tirohita*) should be perceived in different places.

नैवं पयोघृतादीनामेकदेशत्वदर्शनात् ॥ ९४ ॥

अनावरणता चेत्स्यात्कपालादेर्घटात्मनि ॥

अन्तर्भावान्न साध्वेतद्विभक्तानां भवेद्यतः ॥ ९५ ॥

आवृतत्वमथ मतं भङ्ग एव प्रसज्यते ॥

यत्नो न तु घटोत्पत्तौ नैवमप्युपपद्यते ॥ ९६ ॥

न हि लोकेऽस्ति नियमो घटाभिव्यक्तिहेतुकः ॥

अनेकसाधना यस्मादभिव्यक्तिरिहेक्ष्यते ॥ ९७ ॥

(In verses 94-97, Sureśvara discusses whether what covers and what is covered abide in the same place (*samānadeśatva*) or whether they are related to only one (common) cause (*ekakāranatva*). Verse 93 sets aside *samānadeśatva* and verse 95 refers to *ekasrayatva*.)

(The answer is:) This is not so, for we notice (different forms such as) milk, ghee etc. (of an existent) as abiding in just one region¹. [94]

If (one were to say that) a potsherd etc., that rests in (clay which is) the material cause² of the pot, does not have any covering (for the pot); then (we say;) it would not be proper (to say so), for there could be (in a potsherd etc.), the character of a cover³ (for the pot) only when they are different⁴, (from the pot etc.). [95]

If it is held that (what they call an effort (for producing a pot) is really an effort for destroying its covering (viz. potsherds) and not for the production of the pot; that also does not stand to reason, because there is not in this world [96]

only one particular rule⁵ with regard to the manifestation of the pot; and indeed that manifestation is noticed to result from many means (of production).⁶ [97]

The idea is: According to the objector's view, *mṛd* 'clay' first undergoes a change and becomes *kapālas* 'potsherds' and these later on go to make a pot. Thus both the potsherds and the pot

have but one material cause, i.e. they are *ekāśraya*. This objection is answered on two counts: (i) The potsherds are considered as the cause of the pot, while they persist only in that the clay that has formed the pot (and not any (other) clay)—that is, the objector's view suffers a defect called *siddhasāadhanatā*. (ii) While the pot is yet to be produced, the potsherds are also not there and, therefore, it could be easily understood that they cannot cover the pot—this is the fault called *hetvasiddhi*.

¹Milk and water (better, however, 'curds') are, contrary to the example cited by the objector, seen to obtain in but one place. The two have a capacity to cover each other (*parasparāvara*).

²*ghaṭātmani* = *ghṭāvasthamṛnmātravṛttitva*.

³Translation follows NKL reading *āvṛtitvam* for BUBV reading *āvṛtatvam* (in verse 96), for the author intends to convey the sense of *āvaraṇatva*.

⁴*vibhakta* = *bhinna* = *ghaṭasya kapālādeś ca svāśrayamṛdavavabhinnatā*.

⁵This is stated in the next verse.

⁶SP notes the variant which is not noted by the editors of both the AnSS edition and the NKL edition; viz. *ghaṭābhivyakti hetutaḥ* which means: 'Since there are more than one cause for the manifestation of the pot.'

āvaraṇabhāṅga alone is not sufficient for the production of a pot. This is clarified in the following verses.

दीपेनान्यो मथा चान्यस्तथा चक्रादिना परः ॥

अभिव्यक्तिं प्रयात्यर्थः पुरा सन्नेव सर्वदा ॥ ९८ ॥

Indeed some object becomes manifest by a lamp, some other (viz. butter) by the churning rod and yet another (viz. a plate made of clay) by a wheel etc., (each of these) being ever in existence before.¹

[98]

This refers to the removal of what obscured the perception of the so-called effect, not to its production.

¹This is to stress that, despite the different types of mani-

festations (mentioned here), there is but one single fact noticeable: *pūrvam sann evārtho vyajyate/na tatsattve bhedaḥ* (SP).

तमोविनाशनायैव प्रदीपोऽपीति चेन्मतम् ॥

नष्टे तमसि कुम्भोऽपि स्वयमेवोपलभ्यते ॥ ९९ ॥

If it is held that a lamp etc. are (used) only for the destruction (i.e. removal) of darkness, then even a pot etc.¹ would of itself be perceived (i.e. revealed) when darkness (etc.) is removed.

[99]

This verse refers to a possible objection by someone. He implies that the lamp etc. merely destroys darkness etc. and it does not make the pot etc. manifest; this implication is specifically brought out in the next verse.

¹The word *api* after *pradīpa* in the verse indicates to the other *sādhana*s, viz. *manthana-daṇḍa* and *cakra* which are mentioned in the preceding verse. So also, *api* after *kumbha* refers to *navanita* and *tamaḥ* indicated in that verse.

किमेवं भवतः सिद्धं यदि नाम तमोहनुतिः ॥

सदेव व्यज्यते सर्वमिति नैवापनुद्यते ॥ १०० ॥

What indeed do you have established, if it is held that there is (merely) removal of darkness (etc.)? (Indeed the rule, viz.) all that is ever existent before becomes revealed, cannot be set aside.

[100]

This verse answers the implication of the objector of the previous verse. It points to that the objector has unwittingly accepted Satkāryavāda.

अज्ञातत्वापमाष्टर्चर्थमुपादित्सन्ति मानिनः ॥

मानानि मानसंबन्धादज्ञातत्वं च नश्यति ॥ १०१ ॥

Those who have (i.e. employ) the means of knowing wish to take up (i.e. employ) the means for wiping away

(i.e. removal of) the unknownness (of the object that is unknown.) (Only) when there is a connection (of any object of knowledge) with a means of knowing, the unknownness (of that object) is removed (lit. destroyed).

[101]

The preceding four verses called for explanation of the function of manifestation of some object which is different from its actual production.

यतः सति क्रियाभेदे किं पूर्वमिति चोदना ॥

क्रियाभेदे न च न्याय्यं ध्वान्तनाशः क्रियाफलम् ॥ १०२ ॥

ज्ञातुर्ज्ञानाभिनिष्पत्तिर्निष्पन्नं मेयमेति सत् ॥

मेयाभिसंगतं तच्च मेयाभत्वं प्रपद्यते ॥ १०३ ॥

[These verses explain that it is not proper to raise the question of *paurvāparya* in respect of the manifestation of an object vis-a-vis its production. There is behind this discussion the following implied doubt that can be raised by someone: The previous verse refers to the connection of a means of knowledge with an object of knowing and also to the removal of ignorance in respect of that object. Which is earlier, knowledge of the object (e.g. a pot) or the removal of ignorance in respect of it?]

For, the question 'what is prior?' is raised (only) where there are different actions, and it is not proper (to ask that question) where there is non-difference in respect of them. (Now, in respect of the illustration of the lamp etc.), the removal of darkness is the result of the action. [102]

First, there is on the part of a knower the rise of the knowledge (that there is an object)¹ then it² touches (lit. goes to) the object of knowledge³ and then, coming into contact with the object, it assumes the form of the object.⁴ [103]

It is only clear that only after the removal of ignorance (in respect of a lamp etc.) there occurs the knowledge of it (on the part of one.) This is clarified in the next verse.

¹This is *viṣayābhāsa* 'appearance of (an earlier existing) object.'

²Translation follows the reading *tat* of BVS for *sat* in BUBV and NKL.

³The appearance of the object to one.

⁴This refers to *viṣayākāratā* of the intellect of the knower. This is to say: Intellect (*Buddhi*) grasps the appearances of an object before the knower and assumes its shape. Thus, it removes the cover on the object (i.e. manifests it) that is *ajñānahāni*. This is to say: *ajñānahāni* and *ghaṭajñāna* are not two actions or happenings—and that explains the significance of *kriyābheda* = *kriyā-abheda* in verse 102. All these make up a knowledge-situation. Cf. *jñānasya utpatti-viṣayasambandha-viṣayākārabhajana-ajñānahānānām kramah suprasiddha ity arthah* (NKL).

व्यवधानं तमो यस्माद्वटोज्यमिति संविदः ॥

प्रकाशवद्वटं चर्ते कुतस्तत्तमसो ह नुतिः ॥ १०४ ॥

Since darkness¹ is an obstacle to (i.e. the curtain over) the knowledge 'this is a pot', (there is no knowledge of it).² Whence can there be concealment (i.e. removal) of darkness, if there does not exist a pot which is pervaded by light?³ [104]

¹This means 'ignorance'.

²This is implied. Only then, the meaning of the first line becomes clear.

³There is need of light which manifests a pot. Thus, it is a means of knowing the pot. Knowledge of the pot is the result and that is equivalent to the removal of the ignorance about it—this was pointed out by *kriyāphalam* in verse 102 and is clarified in verse 105.

प्रमाणव्यापृतेर्ज्ञातोऽज्ञातत्वहानिकृत् ॥

घटोऽवगत इत्येतत्ततः संपद्यते फलम् ॥ १०५ ॥

A pot which was formerly unknown now becomes known thanks to the operation of the means of knowing and

therefore becomes the destroyer of its own unknownness. Thereafter follows this result, viz. (the awareness that) this pot is (now) known.¹

¹SP reads *tataś cādānādivyavahārasiddhiḥ*. Further, NKL makes a note-worthy observation: *ato vyañjakasya nāvaraṇabhaṅga eva yatnaḥ*—this refers to verses 96 and 97 above.

यद्यावरणभङ्गाय यत्नः स्याद्वटवित्तये ॥

कार्यान्तरं भवेद्भङ्गात्तेनाप्यावृतता घटे ॥ १०६ ॥

[Here follows further discussion of *āvaraṇabhaṅga*.]

(This is an objection:) The effort for destroying the cover (on a pot) were to be made (only) for knowing the pot, then there would arise another result (or effect¹) from the destruction (of the cover) and thereby also would there be the state of being covered (in respect of that) pot (yet further). [106]

¹This refers to the powdered clay of the lump etc. (*vidala-cūrṇādi*). And that would still cause the concealment of the pot.

व्यवधानान्तरं तस्मादन्यदप्यापतेत्तदा ॥

अतो नियत एवात्र व्यापारः फलवान्भवेत् ॥ १०७ ॥

Then there would follow from that yet another obstacle (to the perception of the pot) and therefore only a specific activity (of the means of knowing) would have here¹ the (desired) result. [107]

If one still persisted to hold *āvaraṇabhaṅga* in respect of *vidala-cūrṇādi*, there would follow further obstacles in the form of yet other effects in *infinite regress*. NKL adds: *tasmād arthavyaktyartho vyañjakavyāpāro 'rthavān*.

¹This means 'knowing a pot'.

अतीतैष्यद्घटज्ञानं सद्घटालम्बनं भवेत् ॥

घटज्ञानत्वतः साक्षादिहत्यघटबोधवत् ॥ १०८ ॥

अतीतोऽनागतोऽर्थोऽस्यदि वाभ्युपगम्यते ॥

अतीतानागतज्ञानं मिथ्येशस्य प्रसज्यते ॥ १०९ ॥

प्रत्यक्षं नापि चेशस्य केनचित्प्रतिहन्यते ॥

अपविद्धातिशीत्येव तज्ज्ञानं केन हन्यते ॥ ११० ॥

घटसत्त्वे पुरोत्पत्तेरनुमा च प्रदर्शिता ॥

तस्मात्सदेव कार्यं स्यात्प्रागुत्पत्तेरपि ध्रुवम् ॥ १११ ॥

[Verses 108-111 explain another reason for holding all-time existence of the effect. They explain *atitānāgatapratyayabhedāc ca* (BUB p. 25). Before verse 108, Sureśvara has refuted the arguments regarding (i) non-perception of a pot which had not been produced, and (ii) inference related to the non-manifest pot. But, since they make effort towards the production of a pot that will come into existence and also they accept the knowledge on the part of Yogins of the pots in the past and also of the future, he proceeds to discuss the same.]

The knowledge of a pot which has been existent in the past and of that which will be existent in future would be dependent on (only) an existent pot, since it is the knowledge of a pot comparable to the direct perception of a pot that exists here (in front of us). [108]

If one were to accept an object as non-existent in the past¹ and (also) in the future², there would follow the contingency that the knowledge of the Lord in respect of the past and of the future² is (or, has to be) held as false !³ [109]

And the direct perception by the Lord (of any object) is not objected to by any one. Who then can object to His knowledge which has set aside (the possibility of) any excelling (knowledge)? [110]

And we have (already) adduced the reason for proving the existence of a pot (even) before the production (of it).

Therefore, it is certainly that an effect exists even before its production. [111]

¹This means 'Before its production.'

²This means 'After it is destroyed.'

³The Tārkaika accepts that the Lord is possessed of *atīta-anāgata-jñāna* and, therefore, the knowledge of an object non-existent in the past and in the future which he has attributed to Him would have to be declared as false (*mithyā*). This should mean that the Tārkaika is involving internal contradiction in his philosophy (*bhrāntatva*).

एष्यद्घटनिषेधे च विरोधोऽपि प्रसज्यते ॥

भविष्यति न भाव्यर्थो वर्तमाननिषेधवत् ॥ ११२ ॥

[Verses 112-119 are refutation of the argument of those of who posit the non-existence of an effect.]

And¹ in case one rejects (the existence of) a pot which is going to come into existence also,² there forcefully follows opposition; to say that a forthcoming object will not be in existence is like denying the existence of an existent pot.

[112]

This argument pertains to the state of a pot at the time when one is active in producing it.

¹This connects the argument of the verse with that in verse 109 above.

²This implies the existence of a pot that existed in the past.

गृह्यमाणो घटो नासन्निति यद्वद्विरुध्यते ॥

अतीतैष्यन्मितघटप्रतिषेधस्तथाविधः ॥ ११३ ॥

As a pot which is being grasped (i.e. seen) cannot be denied by (saying that) it is not existent, so also there cannot be the denial of a pot known as of the past or as one coming into existence (in future).

[113]

This pertains to *atha prāg utpatter ghaṭo 'sann iti....* (BUB p. 26).

This first line of the verse has to be construed thus: *yadvad grhyamāṇo ghaṭo asann iti na virudhyate*. SP notes *no 'sanniti* as a variant for *nāsann iti*; this is confirmed by the edition of NKL.

प्रागभावादयोऽभावाः सन्तः स्युरतिरेकिणः ॥

व्यपदेशाद्धटेनैषामन्योन्याभाववद्ध्रुवम् ॥ ११४ ॥

(One might object:) The non-existences, viz. prior non-existence etc.¹, which are existents distinct² (from a pot etc.) would certainly be existents on account of their mention apart from that of a pot (etc.) just as in the case of mutually exclusive objects.³ [114]

The argument is based on two considerations: (i) *prāgabhāva* etc. are mentioned as distinct *padārthas*, and (ii) the notion of *anyonyābhāva* can be entertained (only) if there are two distinct *padārthas*.

¹There are in addition: *dhvaṁsābhāva*, *atyantābhāva* and *anyonyābhāva*.

²The word *atirekiṇaḥ* literally means 'having an existence apart from or over and above (a pot).'

³The idea is: As *ghaṭe paṭo nāsti* and *paṭe ghaṭo nāsti* point to two mutually exclusive existents, so also would *ghaṭe prāgabhāvo nāsti* and *prāgabhāve ghaṭo nāsti* show the two as distinct existents.

एवं च सति संबन्धो न भावाभावयोर्मिथः ॥

विरोधाद्भावयोर्यद्वदेकत्वान्नाप्यभावयोः ॥ ११५ ॥

[This is the answer to the objection above.]

In case this is so, there would be no mutual connection between an existent and its (previous) non-existence owing to their mutual opposition. (So) also, there cannot be any connection between two non-existences like that between two existents since these two are of but one nature. [115]

The idea is : When there is *prāgabhāva* (or any other *abhāva*) of a pot, there is no *bhāva* 'existence' of it and, consequently, any connection between them (e.g. *anyonyābhāva* of them) cannot be established.

असतश्च न संबन्धोऽकारकत्वात्कथंचन ॥

संबन्धश्च क्रियात्मत्वान्न सिध्येत्कारकं विना ॥ ११६ ॥

Further, what is non-existent does not have any connection whatever (with an existent), because it (viz. the connection) does not have a cause¹ for producing it. And since (bringing about) a connection has the nature of an action, it would not be brought about in the absence of any agent.²

[116]

This is yet another argument as to why the non-existence cannot get connected with an existent.

¹*akāraakatva* = *akāraṇatva*.

²*kāraka* = *kartr*. The idea is based on the explanation of *sambandha* which is either *samavāya* or *saṃyoga* and which gets established owing to some factor determining it (*kāraṇa*) or by the effort of some agent (*kartr*).

प्रागभावो घटस्येति घट एवोच्यते यदि ॥

घट एव घटस्येति व्यपदेशो न युज्यते ॥ ११७ ॥

If (one might argue:) By saying 'there is previous non-existence¹ of a pot, we refer only to that pot itself, then (our reply is:) In that case, the mention (which is tantamount to saying) 'there is a pot of a pot' would not stand to reason.

[117]

¹Previous non-existence is indicative of other *abhāvas* of the pot.

न चासत्त्वं घटस्यैवं प्रागभावो घटो न च ॥

अवध्यवधिमद्भूदे प्रागभावोऽपि सिध्यति ॥ ११८ ॥

And this cannot prove the (previous) non-existence of a pot; so also is not the prior non-existence of the pot the pot (itself), for when distinction is accepted (between a limiter¹ and the limited (viz. the pot) the prior non-existence (of the pot, for instance,) also gets established. [118]

¹NKL: *avadhiḥ pratiyogī, tadvān abhāvaḥ*. This points to a pot and its prior absence.

अथ प्रकल्प्य संबन्धं घटस्येत्यभिधीयते ॥

क्लृप्तस्यैव ह्यभावस्य व्यपदेशः प्रसज्यते ॥ ११६ ॥

Now, having imagined the relation of the prior non-existence (of a pot) and the pot, (one says) that there is prior non-existence of the pot, then it will be contingent that there is the name (pot) for even (this) imaginary non-existence. [119]

The argument in this verse is based on an imaginary connection between previous non-existence (of a pot) and the pot and which is similar to the imaginary connection between an individual (body) and sentience. SP significantly points to such a connection as is understood in the phrase 'Rāhu's head,' which, in reality, does not belong to a full intact body.

अर्थान्तरमभावश्चेदुक्तं संस्मर्तुमर्हसि ॥

शशशृङ्गादिकल्पस्य घटस्य स न युज्यते ॥ १२० ॥

स्वहेतुसत्तासंबन्धः संबन्धस्य सदाश्रयात् ॥

(If it is said:) non-existence is (altogether) a different object, then you (i.e. who say this) should remember our argument made earlier,¹ viz. that (connection) of the pot which is (imaginary) like the horns of a hare, [120]

with the existence of its own cause is not logically understood, since (such) connection rests (always) on what are existent objects. [121^{ab}]

¹This is verse 11 above : *vyatireke sad evāsat*. One cannot say that one of the two connected things is real and the other, unreal, for, in so saying, one makes a positive mistake.

अथास्त्वयुतसिद्धानां नासतोऽयुतसिद्धता ॥ १२१ ॥

[Verses 121^{cd}-122 are a discussion of the Tārkaika's notion of *janma* of an object which was non-existent before. It consists in either *sattāsamavāya* or *svakāraṇasamavāya*.]

Now if (someone were to say:) let that connection obtain between things which are inseparably associated, (our answer is:) There is no inseparable association of a non-existent (with an existent).

[121^{cd}]

न भावाभावयोर्योगो नापि चायमभावयोः ॥

सतोरेव यतो योगः सिद्धं कार्यमतः सदा ॥ १२२ ॥

[This explains *asmāt sad eva kāryam prāg utpatteḥ* (BUB p. 29).]

There is no connection between existence and non-existence; not also is there a connection between two non-existences, since there is a connection only between two existent things; therefore, the effect is ever an established entity.

[122]

द्वैतैकत्वात्मकं रूपं वैराजं कार्यमात्मनः ॥

समुद्र एव ह्यस्येति विराट्कारणमब्रवीत् ॥ १२३ ॥

[Verses 123-124 explain the meaning of the word *mṛtyu* in *mṛtyunaivedam āvṛtam āsit* (BUB 1.2.1).]

The form which is of the nature of oneness in duality is (the form of) Virāj and (also) an effect of the Ātman; (the Śruti¹) has declared Virāj as the cause of this (world) in the words 'just the Samudra...'

[123]

¹SP points to *agnir mūrdhā* . . as the Śruti passage and shows that it is followed by the Smṛti : *apa eva sasarjāda* . . (*Manusmṛti* 1.8^{cd})

संभूय कार्यभूतानि भूतयोनिं यतो विभुम् ॥
जन्मस्थितिलयान्यान्ति समुद्रस्तेन विश्वकृत् ॥ १२४ ॥

Since all the beings which have been effects, having attained their birth, sustenance and destruction in the all pervading source of the elements, merge (in it)¹, therefore, Samudra is called the maker of all (that exists). [124]

¹Cf. *janmādy asya yataḥ* (BS 1.1.2) and BSB on it.

Verses 125-148 explain how the notion about the Lord as the creator etc. of the world is but a product of Nescience.

तत्समुद्रं परं ब्रह्म संविन्मात्रसतत्त्वकम् ॥
अविज्ञातात्मयाथात्म्यं हेतुत्वेनेह शब्द्यते ॥ १२५ ॥

That highest Brahman, Samudra¹, which is merely of the nature of Sentience, and whose real nature has not been known, is mentioned here² as the cause (of the world). [125]

¹The use of the word *samudra* in the neuter is to be noted—that refers to the Brahman.

²In the sentence *mṛtyuneva*... (BU 1.2.1).

इदं जगदुपादानं सर्वशक्त्यजमव्ययम् ॥
स्वात्मैकाज्ञानवृत्तेन ग्रसिष्णु प्रभविष्णु च ॥ १२६ ॥

This, one who has this universe for the material cause (of its creation), who is omnipotent, unborn and imperishable, is, on account of the effect of its own ignorance¹ of itself, the devourer and the ruler (of this world).² [126]

¹This is to strengthen the notion of *avijñātātmayāthātmya* in the previous verse—the power of Nescience.

²Refer to the unborn Prakṛti which is the same as *avidyā*; see *Śvetaśvataropaniṣad* 4.5^{ab}: *ajām ekām lohitaśuklakṛṣṇām bahviḥ prajāḥ sṛjamānām sarūpāḥ*; *Sāṃkhyakārikā* 1^{ab}: *ajām ekām lohitaśuklakṛṣṇām bahviḥ prajāḥ sṛjamānām namāmaḥ*. However, the Brahman is not, like Prakṛti, to modify itself in reality. It appears that it has modified itself. The verse refutes a notion of those who would compare the modification of the Brahman to the modification of milk into curds.

स्वाभासवर्त्मनैवैतत्स्वात्माज्ञानजभूमिषु ॥

इतं बहुत्वमेकं सद्वियद्यद्वद्धटादिषु ॥ १२७ ॥

This unique existent has assumed multiplicity (i.e. multiple forms) in the different forms¹ (which are) produced from Ignorance of its own nature, through (its own) appearances²—(this happens) in the same way as the sky (appears) in (the form of) a pot etc. [127]

¹These are Hiranyagarbha, Virāj etc.

²This emphasises the unreal character of the worldly objects, or rather the notion that the variety of the world arises out of Nescience.

अकारणं सदज्ञानात्कारणत्वं यथैत्यजम् ॥

सर्वकारकतामेवं क्रियातत्फलतामपि ॥ १२८ ॥

As the existent which is not (in reality) a cause¹ becomes the cause² on account of Ignorance,³ in the same way it attains the character of the maker of all and the nature of all activity and its results. [128]

Here SP refers to the Śruti passages which seem to show that the Brahman is the cause.

¹The word *akāraṇa* can be alternatively translated as 'not having a cause (for its own existence),' but we prefer the translation above since the verse goes further to mention it thus:

kāraṇatvam and *sarvakāraṇatām ejati*. See also *tad etad brahmāpūrvam anaparam...* (BU 2.5.19).

²That is the origin of the world.

³This is the brief expression of the contents of the preceding verse.

साध्यसाधनतां तस्मादज्ञानैकव्यपाश्रयाम् ॥

उचैरनूद्य तत्तत्त्वं वेदान्ताः प्रत्यपीपदन् ॥ १२९ ॥

Therefore, having clearly (lit. loudly) declared time and again¹ the nature (of the Brahman) as the cause of the effects² which rests solely on ignorance (about the true nature of the Ātman), the Vedāntas have established the true nature of the same (i.e. the Brahman). [129]

This verse intends to point out the true significance of the Śruti passages which refer to the creation of the world by the Brahman (*śṛṣṭyādiśrutivākyāni*).

¹This is the force of *anu* in *anūdyā*.

²This means 'the world full of variety'.

अकारणमकार्यं सत्कार्यकारणतामगात् ॥

मोहादेव ततः शास्त्रं तदुच्छित्तौ प्रवर्तते ॥ १३० ॥

The existent which is neither a cause¹ nor an effect has attained the nature of a cause of an effect owing only to ignorance (lit. delusion); therefore, the (Upaniṣadic) lore proceeds to destroy that.² [130]

¹Cf. note 1 (on *akāraṇa*) in verse 128 above. This is supported by NKL which points to *Taittirīyopaniṣad* 2.6: *sac ca tyac cābhavat* and adds *iti sattārthabhavatiprayogāt pāramārthikam eva kāraṇatvam atrāha*.

²Read: *asyānarthahetoḥ prahāṇāya* (*ātmaikatvavidyāpratipattaye*) *sarve vedāntā ārabhyante* (BSB p. 45).

अपीताशेषसंसारं शुद्धसंस्कारसंश्रयम् ॥

अव्याकृतमिदं ब्रह्म ह्यन्तर्यामीति चोच्यते ॥ १३१ ॥

And this (very) Brahman which has withdrawn (lit. swallowed¹) the entire universe, which alone² affords support for (various) modifications,³ (and) which has not differentiated itself, is called the entrant within.⁴ [131]

¹BUBV reads *apitāśeṣasamsāram* but NKL edition reads *āpitāśeṣasamsāram*. The latter is possibly simplifying the text. Whatever be the reading, meaning remains the same.

²The word *śuddham* means *kevalam*, i.e. all by itself.

³SP rightly observes: *samśrayaśabdo bhāvapradhānaḥ samskārasya samśrayaḥ samśrayaṇam svasminn iti vā samśāradaśāto viśeṣam āha*.

⁴That which resides in every individual—the individual self. It is affected by the limiting adjuncts.

अज्ञानानुपमर्देन व्याकृतिर्यास्य जायते ॥

स्वप्नविज्ञानवन्नासौ सत्यमयव्यपाश्रया ॥ १३२ ॥

सम्यग्ज्ञानसमुत्पत्तौ हेतुत्वं तु निगच्छति ॥

निद्रां हत्वा यतः स्वप्नज्ञानादपि विबुध्यते ॥ १३३ ॥

Whatever modification¹ of this (world) is produced on account of the non-removal (lit. non-destruction) of ignorance has no basis in the true (existent) object of knowing² in the same way as the knowledge obtained (by one) in one's dream has no basis (in true objects).³ [132]

But it⁴ becomes⁵ the cause for the rise of the correct knowledge (of the true nature of the Brahman), since one is brought to reality (lit. is awakened) from the knowledge acquired in the dream after it has removed (lit. destroyed) one's sleep. [133]

¹It means appearance of the world.

²That is, the Brahman.

³This argument is similar to that in the *vaitathya-prakarana* of the *Gauḍpāḍakārikā*.

⁴SP refers it to some Śruti which might be false and can yet

become the cause for one's becoming aware of the true nature of the Brahman. This is like the argument in BSB (pp. 40 ff.) where Śruti, a false *pramāṇaprameyavyavahāra* is discussed as a means for removing ignorance.

It appears, nevertheless, that it here refers to *vyākṛti* mentioned just in the preceding verse and can include the *pramāṇaprameyavyavahāra*. It is not necessary, therefore, to follow SP.

⁵In *nigacchati*, the preposition *ni* causes no change in the sense of the root *gam*.

उपेयप्रतिपत्त्यैव प्रमाणानां प्रमाणता ॥

वस्तुस्थित्या न सत्यत्वमिति पूर्वमवादिषम् ॥ १३४ ॥

The means of knowing can really serve as the means of knowing by bringing about (the knowledge of) what is sought to be known (lit. approached). And I have said earlier that there is not (in these means) validity, owing to factual state of reality.¹ [134]

Cf. verses 126-128 and 132 above.

नामरूपादिना येयमविद्या प्रथतेऽसती ॥

माया तस्याः परं सौक्ष्म्यं मृत्युनैवेति भण्यते ॥ १३५ ॥

[Now follows the meaning of the word *mṛtyu*.]

The most minuteness of this one¹, viz. what is called Ignorance, and what (though) non-extant, amplifies itself by (bearing various) names, forms etc.² is (and is also called) *Māyā*³, is mentioned (here in the BU) by the word *Mṛtyu*.⁴ [135]

¹This refers to the commonly known ignorance also, not merely the one that is inferred from the apparent effects (as discussed in the preceding verses).

²The word 'etc.' stands for *karman*.

³The author has brought in *māyā* for showing that *avidyā* and *māyā* are but one.

⁴SP explains this as *avyaktanāmarūpa*, *adhyakṣādyayogya* and *apañcikṛtamahābhūtāvasthātirikta* and *māyārūpa*.

मृत्युर्वै तम इत्येवमाप एवेदमित्यपि ॥

अविद्या प्रथते मौली व्यक्ताव्यक्तात्मनानिशम् ॥ १३६ ॥

In the sentence 'Mr̥tyu is indeed darkness'¹ and also in the sentence 'Waters themselves are this universe'², there ever reveals the basic Ignorance³ in its form of the manifest and the non-manifest. [136]

¹*Taittiriya Brāhmaṇa* 1.4.7.5 and 7—this refers to an individual's natural (i.e. common) knowledge and activity.

²BU 5.5.1 ; this refers to it as the origin (*kāraṇa*) of waters.

³Here Sureśvara intends to convey that the two sentences refer only to *mūlāvidyā*.

एतेभ्योऽसौ समुत्थाय स्वाभासानात्मजन्मना ॥

याति क्षेत्रज्ञतामीशः कूटस्थोऽपि ह्यविद्यया ॥ १३७ ॥

[This verse shows how the Lord Himself appears as an individual self.]

Indeed, having arisen from these (known five) elements, i.e. through the rise of the modifications, that Lord¹, though immutable, becomes the knower of a field²—(this is) on account of Ignorance. [137]

¹The word *asau* refers to the one called Mr̥tyu, the Lord.

²A field is a body and the knower of a field is an individual self.

आपो ह्यणुतराः सत्यमसृजन्तेति हि श्रुतिः ॥

क्रियाविज्ञानशक्त्यात्मा सोऽपि ब्रह्मासृजत्परः ॥ १३८ ॥

Indeed the Śruti (has declared:) 'More minute (i.e. subtle) waters¹ created Truth². And that highest Lord,

who was (possessed) of the nature of knowledge for activity, created the Brahman. [138]

This verse refers to a *śṛṣṭivākya* in the Śruti which proves that the origin of the world is in fact the unmanifest and not Hiraṇyagarbha (or Mṛtyu) who is said to be overpowered by desire for food etc.

¹Read BU 5.5.1 : *satyam brahma* and BUB on it : *satyam brahma prathamajam, tad etad dhiranyagarbhasya sūtrātmano janma*—this refers to the most minute state of the waters, viz. *apañcikṛtapañca-bhūtātmakeśa*.

²This refers to the *apañcikṛta* state of them.

विराड्ब्रह्माथ ससृजे मनुं देवं प्रजापतिम् ॥

मनुर्देवान्मनुष्यांश्च स्थास्तु कृत्स्नं चरिष्णु च ॥ १३९ ॥

Then Virāj, the Brahman, created¹ Manu, the divine Prajāpati ('Lord of subjects') and Manu created Gods and human beings, the entire non-moving (lit. standing) and moving world (of objects). [139]

¹The word *sasṛje* is Vedic Ātmanepada for Parasmaipada. Possibly the Vedic passive sense is purposely conveyed by Sureśvara—that is to say; this creation is to be understood as appearance of creation.

साध्यसाधनवत्कृत्स्नकार्यरूपविवक्षया ॥

श्रुतिः प्रववृते सेयं नैवेहेतीह यत्नतः ॥ १४० ॥

This well-known (*sā*) Śruti passage, beginning with the words *naiveha* has commenced (to convey its contents) with the desire to declare specifically (the manifestation of) all the effects (comprising of) what is to be produced and what are the means of producing the same. [140]

NKL points out that Sureśvara intends to refer to BU 1.2.1—1.4.7.

अशनायापिपासाभ्यां मृत्यो रूपं प्रचक्षते ॥

प्राणस्य तत्र संवर्गाद्वागाद्यध्यात्मदैवयोः ॥ १४१ ॥

By the words *aśanāyā* and *pipāsā*, they declare the nature of Mr̥tyu. (that is) Prāṇa, owing to the absorption¹ into Prāṇa² of the different parts of the body such as speech etc.³ and of the deities superintending over them. [141]

¹The word *saṁvarga* refers to 'absorption'; cf. the story of Raikva in *Chāndogyopaniṣad* 4.3.1-3 (4.3.1 on *adhyātman* and 4.3.3 on *adhidaiva*).

²Prāṇa conveys two senses: (i) the Ātman and (ii) the wind.

³*vāgādadhyātma-* of AnSS edition is to be corrected *vāgādya-dhyātma-*

The word *adhyātmadaiva* is a peculiar compound; *adhi* is to be compounded with each *ātman* and *daiva*.

एतस्माज्जायते प्राणो मनः सर्वेन्द्रियाणि च ॥

खं वायुर्ज्योतिरापश्च पृथ्वी विश्वस्य धारिणी ॥ १४२ ॥

सृष्टिमेतां समुद्दिश्य तन्मनोऽकुरुतेति या ॥

श्रुतिः प्रवृत्ता निर्वक्तुं यावदव्याकृतं परा ॥ १४३ ॥

"From this one is born Prāṇa, *manas* and all sense-organs, sky, wind, fire, water, and further, the earth which is the supporter of all."¹ [142]

Keeping in view (the purport of) this (account of) creation (in the Śruti just quoted), the other Śruti (viz. BU 1.2.1) has proceeded to explain the same in (the passage beginning with the statement: *tan mano akuruta* etc. up to the later statement) this (world) was (then) not manifest (viz. BU 1.4.7). [143]

¹This is a quotation of the statement of creation in *Muṇḍako-paṇiṣad* 2.1.3.

यद्वा विराजमुद्दिश्य संकल्पमकरोन्मनः ॥

आत्मन्वी स्यामिति तथा साकूतः सृष्टिकारणः ॥ १४४ ॥

[This explains *tad iti manaso nirdeśaḥ* (BUB p. 29). It presents another explanation of *tan mano akuruta.*]

Or, (Hiraṇyagarbha) the cause of (this) creation, who had a thought (in mind): 'Let me be possessed of (a) self (or, a body¹), ' created *manas*, the one which collects impressions² in an orderly way (*saṁ*), having the intention of creating Virāj. [144]

¹*ātmanvi*—*ātmavān*—*aham anenātmanā manasā manasvi syām ity abhiprāyaḥ* (BUB p. 29); this should signify the sense 'possessed of a body'.

²The word *saṁkalpa* is used in apposition to *manas*; it means *saṁkalpaka*.

स्वविभूतीक्षणं सृष्टौ विभोरचनमुच्यते ॥

आपोऽजायन्त इति च सर्वभूतोपलक्षणम् ॥ १४५ ॥

[Now follows the explanation of *so 'rcan* (BUB 1.2.1).]

(This) thinking¹ about his own manifold form (lit. expansion) (on the part) of the (all-)pervader, in respect of the (proposed) creation, is called, (his) Arcana (worship). And (the Śruti sentence) *āpo 'jāyanta*² is indicative of all elements³ (to be created later). [145]

¹The root *ikṣ* means 'to think'; cf. *ikṣater nāśabdam* (BS 1.1.5). But read BUB (p. 30): *arcann arcayan pūjayan...arcataḥ pūjayataḥ* (*āpo rasātmikāḥ pūjāṅgabhūtā ajāyantotpannāḥ*) ! Also, cf. the derivation of the name Arka in verse 147 below from root *arc* 'to think'.

²SP holds the absence of *Samdhi* of *āpo 'jāyanta* and *iti* as an indication of Sureśvara's regard for the Śruti text. That is to say; one should not expect to have *āpo ajāyanteti* by mixing Vedic speech with the popular parlance.

³These are: *ākāśa*, *vāyu*, *tejas* and *prthivi* which were *pañcīkṛta*. But SP refers to *ākāśāditraya*, since the *Taittirīyopaniṣad* refers to *ākāśādiṣṛṣṭi* and Śaṅkara and Sureśvara belonged to the Taittirīya school. Read : *atrākāśaprabhṛtinām trayāṇām utpattyanantaram iti*

vaktavyam śrutyantarasāmarthyād vikalpāsambhavāc ca (BUB p. 30).
That means : *āpaḥ* is not intended.

विद्योत्पत्तिप्रधानत्वात्सृष्टिर्वा न विवक्ष्यते ॥
तथा च प्रतिवेदान्तं सृष्टिर्नानाविधेक्ष्यते ॥ १४६ ॥

[This is Sureśvara's comment on BUB p. 30 quoted above. Therefore, NKL's remark: *vārtikatvasiddhyartham vidyati*. It is to be understood, therefore, the verse 146 is a Vārtika in the sense of *duruktacintā*.]

Or (perhaps) (making any statement about) creation is not intended, owing to (the intent of the Vedānta on) considering the rise of knowledge as the principal (purpose). So indeed in the different texts of the Vedānta is noticed various (description of) creation.¹ [146]

¹SP points out that the account of creation in the *Taittiriya-paniṣad* begins with *ākāśa*, in the *Chāndogya-paniṣad*, with *tejas*, and in the *Muṇḍaka-paniṣad* with *prāṇa*. Then it remarks that the *Aitareya-paniṣad* does not have any specific order. Probably, this fact prompted Sureśvara to offer an alternative (and, perhaps, better) explanation.

अर्चतो मे यतो जज्ञे कमम्भः सुखकृत्ततः ॥
अर्काभिधोऽथ संवृत्तः प्राणो मृत्युः प्रजापतिः ॥ १४७ ॥

Because (he thought:) 'While I am thinking (i.e. offering worship) there was produced water which brought (me) pleasure', therefore *Prāṇa*, *Mṛtyu* and *Prajāpati* became known by the name *Arka*. [147]

This is derivation of the name *Arka* from root *rc > arc* 'to think' (cf. *arcana* in verse 145 above) and *ka* 'water'. A peculiar derivation from a verbal root and a noun !

उपासनमतोऽस्यापि नाग्नेरेवेति निश्चितिः ॥
अर्कनामाभिसंबन्धो नोपासनमृते यतः ॥ १४८ ॥
यदि वाऽग्नेरिदं नाम तस्य प्रकरणित्वतः ॥

[The verse states the purport of this derivation.]

Therefore, the decision is that there is (prescribed) the worship of this one (i.e. Arka) also and not only of Agni, since there cannot obtain any connection of the name of Arka (with worship) without the worship (offered to him).¹ [148]

Or rather this name (viz. Arka) belongs to Agni, for he is the subject of the section.² [149^{ab}]

¹This has a reference to the Śruti: *kaṁ ha vā asmai bhavati ya evam etad arkasyārkatām veda* (BU 1.2.1). This *phalaśruti* would have become meaningless if the name Arka did not mean Hiranyagarbha or Prāṇa or Mṛtyu.

²Arka as Agni could suggest itself on the basis of another derivation of that name, viz. from the root *ṛc* 'to shine'. But that does not seem to have attracted Sureśvara's attention !

आपो वा अर्क इति तु चित्यनामार्थमेव तत् ॥ १४६ ॥

[Verses 149^{cd}-162 pertain to BU 1.2.2.]

And (the Śruti statement) *āpo vā arkah* is for (conveying) the name of one which is to be collected (viz. fire)¹ (according to the dictate of the scriptures). [149^{cd}]

Cf. verse 145 above on this verse. Yet, worth noting is BUB p. 30: *āpo vā arkah/kaḥ punar asāv arka iti/ucyate/āpo vāiyā arcanāṅga-bhūtās tā evārko 'gner arkasya hetutvāt/apsu cāgniḥ pratiṣṭhita iti/na punaḥ sākṣād evārkaś tāḥ/tāsām aprakaraṇāt/agneś ca prakaraṇam/vakṣyati cāyam agnir arka iti/* And yet more worth noting is that Sureśvara has left this portion of BUB unconsidered !

¹The name here mentioned is Arka.

शर आसीदिति गिरा शक्त्यवस्था विवक्ष्यते ॥
सा पृथिव्यभवच्चेति विराजो जन्मशब्दनम् ॥ १५० ॥

In the statement of the Śruti *śara āsīt*,¹ it is intended to

convey the state (of the Brahman, the Sūtrātman) having the capacity² (for creation). And the statement *sā prthivy abhavat* is the assertion of (the fact, viz.) the birth of Virāj.³ [150]

¹The sentence reads: *tad yad apām śara āsit.*

²The word *śaktyavasthā* means *śakti-mad-avasthā*.

³This sentence completes the meaning of *tat samahanyata* 'it became consistent'.

तपोऽप्सु तप्यमानासु ह्यण्डं जज्ञे हिरण्मयम् ॥
इति श्रुतिर्जगादर्थं यथैवेह प्रपञ्च्यते ॥ १५१ ॥

Here¹ is explained the idea of (the fact, viz.) creation as another Śruti has declared it in the words 'while the waters were performing penance...in (the waters) being heated there was born a golden egg'.² [151]

¹That is; in BU 1.2.2.

²This is a quotation from the *Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa* which, in full, reads thus: *āpo ha vā idam agra āsuh|salilam eva tā akāmayanta katham nu prajāyemahiti|tā aśrāmyantās tapo 'tapyanta, tāsu tapas tapyamānāsu tāsu antar hiraṇmayam aṇḍam sambabhūva.*

एवं व्यष्टिसमष्ट्यात्मा वैराजं देहमात्मनः ॥
प्राचीक्लृपदथेदानीं सृष्टिस्तस्य विवक्ष्यते ॥ १५२ ॥

Thus the Brahman of the nature of individuality and collectiveness fashioned its own body in the form of Virāj. And now¹ it is intended to explain (this) creation by him.² [152]

¹That is; after the creation of the gross creation.

²To add hereafter: In the passage *tasyām aśrāmyat...niravartatāgniḥ* (BU 1.2.2). In this is established the connection of the Sūtrātman and the world of experience.

श्रान्तस्येति तु देहस्य कर्मयोग्यत्वमुच्यते ॥
श्रमहेतुरतस्तापस्तप्तस्येत्यभिशब्ध्यते ॥ १५३ ॥

But in (the adjective) *śrāntasya* is expressed the unsuitability of the body for the act (of creation), viz. the cause of fatigue (and), therefore, in the adjective *taptasya* is expressed *tāpa*, i.e. heat. [153]

This explains *tasya taptasya śrāntasya* (BU 1.2.2).

भास्वज्ज्ञानं भवेत्तेजो रसः प्राणो विवक्षितः ॥

क्रियाविज्ञानशक्तित्वात्प्रकृतस्य प्रजापतेः ॥ १५४ ॥

[Now, the significance of *tejo rasaḥ* is mentioned.]

tejo rasaḥ means brilliant knowledge—(by that) is intended Prāṇa—this is used of Prajāpati¹ (who is) the subject of this section, on account of his being possessed of the capacity for activity and knowledge. [154]

¹Prajāpati is the Sūtrātman, the creator.

अनवच्छिन्नवपुषः पिण्डावच्छेदहेतुतः ॥

खस्य कुम्भादिनेवासोर्निरवर्तत शब्दनम् ॥ १५५ ॥

Because of the delimitation in a body of Prāṇa¹, whose body was not delimited, in the same way as (the expanse) of the sky by a pot etc.², there is the use of the word *niravartata* 'came forth'. [155]

¹Sureśvara uses the word *asu* (normally used in the plural) in the sense Prāṇa, the Jīvātman.

²As sky is only one and yet becomes varied or divided as *ghaṭākāśa*, *karakākāśa*, *grhākāśa* etc.

नामरूपादिमद्देहसंबन्धात्तद्विधर्मकः ॥

अरूपोऽपि हि सूत्रात्मा लक्ष्यते रूपवानिव ॥ १५६ ॥

On account of his connection with a body that has a name, form etc.¹ the Sūtrātman, though possessed of their

(entirely) opposite properties² and even without a form³,
is seen like one possessed of some form. [156]

¹The word *api* implies *karman*.

²That is to say; it is *anāmaka*, *arūpaka* and *akāraka*.

³This indicates *anāmaka* also (SP); this justifies the reference to *nāmarūpādimattva*.

सूक्ष्मस्थूलशरीराभ्यां चिदाभाभ्यामविद्यया ॥

संवृतः परमेशोऽपि त्रैलोक्यात्माग्निरुच्यते ॥ १५७ ॥

The highest Lord, the self of the three worlds though he is, is called Agni, since he is wrapped by ignorance and by the two-fold bodies, viz. the subtle and the gross, which have the appearance of Sentience. [157]

अशरीरं शरीरेष्वनवस्थेष्ववस्थितम् ॥

महान्तं विभुमात्मानं मत्वा धीरो न शोचति ॥ १५८ ॥

“A wise man (then) pondering over (the nature of) Ātman which is without a body, which is (somehow) delimited in impermanent (i.e. perishable) bodies, the great one and the all-pervader, does not have to sorrow.” [158]

This is quoted from *Kaṭhapaniṣad* 2.22.

विराड्देहावनद्धोऽसुरध्यात्माद्याधिगः खवत् ॥

व्यष्टितामेति तद्धीनः समष्टित्वेन तिष्ठति ॥ १५९ ॥

Prāṇa, (when) bound by the body of Virāj, (thus) coming under (lit. entering into) limitations¹, viz. *adhyātma* etc.² comes to possess individuality³, just in the same way as a sky (becomes manifold in form)⁴. (But) (when it becomes) devoid of them (i.e. limiting adjuncts), it remains as collectivity. [159]

¹*ādhi* is short for *upādhi* ‘adjunct’.

²The word 'etc.' stands for *adhidaiva* and *adhibhūta*; cf. verse 127 above.

³Cf. note under verse 155.

⁴That is to say; comes to exist as many discrete individuals.

A man does some work, he gets exhausted, wants to rest and feels that he has done something. In the same way, Sureśvara points out, there are doings of Prāṇa, i.e. embodied Brahman.

उर्व्यामुत्पादितायां तु श्रमात्तापात्प्रजापतेः ॥

निरवर्ततेवास्यात्मा परिच्छेदाभिमानतः ॥ १६० ॥

Owing to the fatigue and heat (which he experienced) when the earth¹ was created, the self of Prajāpati became happy², as it were, on account of the (egoistic) feeling for the limitation (viz. the body). [160]

¹Sureśvara at times uses a synonym (or, synonyms) for the word in the Śruti. Thus, we come across the words *śṛṣṭi*, *prthivī*, *urvi* which signify the entire creation—not merely the earth.

²The word *niravartata* here has a sense different from that in verse 155 above. *niravarta* here is related to *nirvṛti* 'absolute joy or great joy', cf. also *nirvāṇa*, *niravartata* in that verse meant 'came forth'.

स्थूलदेहपरिच्छिन्नः स एवाद्यः प्रजापतिः ॥

अग्निरेष यतस्तस्मादुपास्योऽयं प्रयत्नतः ॥ १६१ ॥

[This verse reaffirms the thought in BUB on *teja eva rasa...*]

Since the very first Prajāpati, being delimited by a gross body¹, is this Agni², therefore, he has to be worshipped by one with (every) effort. [161]

¹Even the minutest (i.e. the most subtle) body could be considered as gross because it has some magnitude.

²See verse 157.

स वै शरीरी प्रथमः स वै पुरुष उच्यते ॥

आदिकर्ता स भूतानां ब्रह्माग्रे समवर्तत ॥ १६२ ॥

“Verily he is the first embodied form (of the Brahman); verily he is called Puruṣa; he is the first creator of elements¹, (for) the god Brahmā existed in the beginning (of creation²).”

[162]

SP and NKL report this to be a verse from a *Purāṇa*. This verse is (i) identical with *Mārkaṇḍeya Purāṇa* 45.64 and *Vāyu Purāṇa* 1.4.69 and (ii) closely similar to:

Brahmāṇḍa Purāṇa 1.3.25:

sa vai śarīrī prathamah purā puruṣa ucyate|
ādīkartā sa bhūtānām brahmā'gre samavartata||

and *Saura Purāṇa* 21.22:

sarvaiḥ śarīraiḥ prathamah sa vai puruṣa ucyate|
ādīkartā sa bhūtānām brahmāgre samavartata||

Sureśvara mixes up Purāṇic names of the creator with the name Sūtrātman, the Prajāpati.

¹These are thus various names/descriptions of but one creator.

²That is to say; before the creator attained individuality in every being.

अनुपाख्यतनुः सोऽयं व्यवहारप्रसिद्धये ॥

आत्मानं व्यभजत्स्थूलैस्त्रिधा वाय्वग्निभानुभिः ॥ १६३ ॥

[Verses 163-168 explain BU 1.2.3: The threefold division of Prajāpati and (his) worship.]

The known one, this (Ātman), who is possessed of an indescribable form (lit. body), differentiated (i.e. multiplied) himself into three forms, viz. in the three gross (form), the wind, the fire and the sun, in order that worldly dealings¹ became possible.

[163]

¹These are Upāsanā etc. SP mentions that Prajāpati's subtle body did not comprise of five gross elements, and was therefore incapable of worldly dealings.

स्वरूपानुपमर्देन स विराड्देवतात्मभिः ॥
उपासनादिसिद्धयर्थमात्मानं व्यभजत्स्वयम् ॥ १६४ ॥

[This is the first, viz. *prima facie*, view on the preceding verse.]

That Virāj divided itself on his own, in the form of various divinities¹, without destroying its own nature in order that different (sorts of) worship etc.² become established. [164]

¹Cf. *vāyvagnibhānubhiḥ* in the preceding verse.

²The word 'etc.' refers to various activities connected with worship.

मूलात्मैव त्रिधात्मानमभिनत्स प्रजापतिः ॥
इत्यस्य प्रतिपत्त्यर्थं स एष इति भण्यते ॥ १६५ ॥

[This is the other view, viz. Siddhānta view, on verse 163.]

It is stated in the Śruti: *sa eṣa...*¹, that, in order that one understands that it is Prajāpati, the prime Ātman, who, on his own, differentiated himself. [165]

¹This part of the Śruti together with the initial part, viz. *sa tredhātmānam vyakuruta* points but to two complementary views regarding creation.

तस्य प्रथमजस्याग्नेर्विराजोऽर्कस्य वाजिवत् ॥
दर्शनस्य विधानार्थं तस्य प्राचीति कीर्त्यते ॥ १६६ ॥

(Now) it is stated (in the Śruti) *tasya prāci...* for the purpose of laying down the worship of that first born Agni, (also called) Virāj (and) Arka, as (that) of the horse¹. [166]

¹*vājivat* = *vājinaḥ darśanam iva* (= *upāsanaṁ iva*); cf. Pāṇini: *tatra tasyeva-darśana* is equivalent to *upāsana* (cf. BUBV 1.1), and therefore, *vājinaḥ upāsana* means *vājimedha*, i.e. *aśvamedha*. This refers to *agnau vājidr̥ṣṭiḥ* (as discussed in BU 1.1).

यस्मात्कारणमुल्लङ्घ्य कार्यं नान्यत्र वर्तते ॥

अप्सु कारणभूतासु तस्मादग्निः प्रतिष्ठितः ॥ १६७ ॥

[This explains *sa eṣo 'psu pratiṣṭhitah* in BU 1.2.3.]

Since an effect does not (ever) exist elsewhere, going beyond its own cause, therefore, Agni has established himself (i.e. stays) in the waters¹ which have been its cause. [167]

AnSS edition needs correction of *ulaṅghya* to *ullaṅghya*.

¹SP points out that *apsu* stands for *bhūtāntarasahitāsu apsu*, i.e. in waters together with other elements, and *sūtrarūpāsu* 'in those having (now) the form of the Sūtrātman'.

अप्रतिष्ठागुणं देवमुपास्ते योऽनिशं नरः ॥

यत्र क्व चैति तत्रासौ प्रतिष्ठां लभते शुभाम् ॥ १६८ ॥

[This is the *phalaśruti* in *yatra kva ca...* in BU 1.2.3.]

Whichsoever a man ever worships the god whose characteristic is his being firmly established in waters, obtains auspicious steadiness¹ (in life) wherever he might go. [168]

¹'which is uncensured, i.e. praise-worthy, and also unopposed (even) in the yonder world' (SP).

योऽबादिपरिपाट्यैवं विराजमसृजत्स्वयम् ॥

कीदृग्व्यापारसंयुक्तः सोऽस्त्राक्षीदिति भण्यते ॥ १६९ ॥

[Now follows the narrative of the birth of Āditya as Saṁvat-sara.]

(Now) it is stated in the Śruti, 'he created...' ¹ in order to

explain with what kind of activities is connected he² who, on his own, created Virāj³ in the succession of waters etc.⁴ [169]

¹This is reference to the connection of BU 1.2.3 and BU 1.2.4 as stated in BUB. BUBV uses *asrākṣit* for *asrjata* in BUB.

²This refers to Mr̥tyu who has not differentiated himself in the five-fold elements (*apañcīkṛtaprapañcātman*).

³Virāj is of the nature of the five-fold elements and their effects (*pañcīkṛtabhūtapañcakatatkāryasṛṣṭīkramātmaka*).

⁴The word 'etc.' refers to Pṛthivī.

अतृसर्गोऽथवोक्तः प्रागन्नसर्गोऽधुनोच्यते ॥

अशनायावतो यस्मान्नास्त्यन्नविरहात्स्थितिः ॥ १७० ॥

[Now follows some *udbhāṣya* writing of Sureśvara regarding the connection between BU 1.2.3 and BU 1.2.4.]

Or there has been stated in (the earlier part of) the Śruti the creation of Eaters (viz. the divinities, Agni etc.) and now is stated the creation of the eatable(s) since there is no existence possible of one who has hunger in the absence of food.¹ [170]

¹This explanation keeps in view the sentence *kaniyo 'nnam kariṣye* in BU 1.2.5—this is for the Eater (*attr*) who was mentioned in *tejo raso niravartata* in BU 1.2.2 above.

त्रेधा व्यभजदात्मानमित्येतद्वा प्रदर्श्यते ॥

अग्निप्राणौ पुरैवोक्तावथ संवत्सरोद्भवः ॥ १७१ ॥

Or now is shown (the completion of the meaning of) the sentence 'He differentiated himself into three (forms)'¹ (thus:) Agni and Prāṇa (as being born of the Sūtrātman) have been mentioned before² and now (is mentioned) the birth of Samvatsara³. [171]

¹Cf. verse 163 above.

²Cf. *niravartatāgniḥ* in BU 1.2.2 and *vāyam tṛtīyam* in BU 1.2.3.

³This signifies Āditya owing to his most intimate connection with the year. This refers to BU 1.2.3: *ādityam tṛtiyam*.

मनसा ज्ञाननिर्देशस्त्रयी वागिति भण्यते ॥

सर्गक्रमं स वेदोक्तं ज्ञानेनालोचयत्प्रभुः ॥ १७२ ॥

[Now (i.e. after two different explanations of the connections between BU 1.2.2-3 and BU 1.2.4), follows the meaning of *sa manasā vācam mithunam samabhavat* (BU 1.2.4).]

In the word *manasā* there is reference to Knowledge (and) in the word *vāk* to the three Vedas. That Lord (viz. the Sūtrātman) thought¹ with (the power of) His (excellent) knowledge of the successive order of creation that is mentioned in the Veda.

[172]

¹Cf. BU 1.2.5: *sa aikṣata...*

ज्ञानेनाप्रतिघेनासौ वेदोक्तां सृष्टिपद्धतिम् ॥

समन्वालोचयच्छंभुः सिसृक्षुर्विविधं जगत् ॥ १७३ ॥

[This is a paraphrase of Manu's verse.]

(Indeed) that origin of bliss¹ well (*sam*) thought about the successive order of creation, mentioned in the Veda, by means of his unobstructed² (power of) knowledge, (when he became) desirous of creating (this) manifold universe. [173]

¹*sambhu* is said of the Lord in order to convey the idea of His compassion for the beings. He proposed to create.

²Cf. SP. *jñānam apratigham yasya...* (quotation not traceable)

आलोच्यालोचकयोर्हि योगो मिथुनमुच्यते ॥

प्रसिद्धं मिथुनं चात्र न कथंचन युज्यते ॥ १७४ ॥

(By the use of) the word union (lit. couple)¹ is mentioned the connection of what is to be thought about and the

thinker. The union (lit. couple), which is so well known in this (world) is in no way connected in this context.² [174]

¹In the sentence *sa manasā vācam mithunam samabhavat*.

²Here the context is of the embodied self (*adhyātmaprakaraṇa*); the idea of man and woman is entirely irrelevant in this context.

अनन्तराग्निसंबन्धप्रसङ्गविनिवृत्तये ॥

अशनायेति हि प्राह मूलकारणसंगतिम् ॥ १७५ ॥

[The verse explains the association of Mr̥tyu and Aśanāyā.]

The Śruti has used the word *aśanāyā*¹ as going with the prime cause (of creation) for warding off the contingency of the connection with Agni² which is immediately (mentioned) before. [175]

¹The word *aśanāyā* (f.) 'desire for food' is used in apposition to *mṛtyu* (m.) as its qualifier. This is in the Vedic style. Also cf. *aśanāyayā lakṣito mṛtyuḥ* (BUB p. 34).

²The reference to Agni is to emphasize the connection of *aśanāyā* with only the prime cause, the Sūtrātman, and not with Virāj.

जगतः प्रक्रियाबीजं यदवैषीत्पुरा गृही ॥

द्वैतैकत्वात्मकं ज्ञानं कर्म च ज्ञानसंभृतम् ॥

भावना च तयोरेतत्त्रयं रेतोऽभिधीयते ॥ १७६ ॥

[This verse explains the word *retah* of the sentence BU 1.2.4: *tad yad reta āsit*.]

The seed in the process (of creation) of the world¹ which the householder has understood formerly², is mentioned (in the Śruti passage, *tad yad retah*) as the generative seed, viz. this triad (i) knowledge of the oneness in duality, (ii) activity performed together with (possession of) knowledge, and (iii) the impulse caused by the two. [176]

¹This is *sr̥ṣṭikāraṇa* 'the cause of creation'.

²While he was trying to get to know the origin of creation with the help of Śāstra, that is to say; in his *sādhakāvasthā* (SP).

सृष्ट्यालोचनहेत्वेतत्सृष्टावाविरभूद्विभोः ॥

तद्भावभाव्यपः सृष्ट्वा रेतोबीजेन स प्रभुः ॥ १७७ ॥

सर्वलोकैकबीजेन गर्भ्यण्डेन बभूव ह ॥

अप एव ससर्जादौ तासु वीर्यमवासृजत् ॥ १७८ ॥

तदण्डमभवद्वैमं सहस्त्रांशुसमप्रभम् ॥

इत्येवं मनुनाप्युक्तः श्रौतोऽयं सर्गविस्तरः ॥ १७९ ॥

This (triad), the cause for His thinking about the creation, dawned on the All-pervader at the time of creation. Then, by means of that generative seed, that Lord, who was going to effect the creation, having (first) created waters, became possessed of a foetus within him by the unique seed of all the worlds, viz. the egg. [177]

Thus, viz. this long (narrative of) the creation mentioned in the Śruti, is stated by Manu¹ also: "Verily he first created waters and in them he released his generative seed; that golden egg became possessed of a lustre similar to that of the Sun (lit. one of thousand rays)." [178-179]

¹Cf. *Manusmṛti* 1.8^{cd} and 1.9^{ab}.

आपो ह वा इति तथा ह्ययमेव क्रमः श्रुतौ ॥

ज्ञानकर्मादिबीजस्य गर्भ एव प्रजापतेः ॥ १८० ॥

So also, this very successive order of creation is (stated) in the Śruti¹ which begins with (the words) *āpo ha vā...*, and in the same way is the foetus within Prajāpati formed from the seed for knowledge, activity etc.² (described). [180]

¹The verse is once again a reference to *Śatapathabrāhmaṇa*; cf. verse 151 above. Also cf. Taittirīya Br. 1.1.3.5; 1.5.2.5 and Jaiminīya Br. III. 318; Jaiminīya Upa. Br. I.56-1.

²The word 'etc.' stands for *bhāvanā* 'impulse' mentioned in verse 176 above.

स संवत्सरोऽभवदिति परिमाणोऽयमुच्यते ॥
अशनायादिमत्त्वात् स्वभावबलचोदितः ॥ १८१ ॥

सृष्ट्वाद्यं घस्मरः पुत्रं तमभिव्याददात्क्षुधा ॥
भिनत्ति सर्वमर्यादां नान्वयाद्यप्यपेक्षते ॥ १८२ ॥

अस्य दग्धोदरस्यार्थे को न कुर्यादसांप्रतम् ॥ १८३ ॥

In the sentence *sa samvatsaro 'bhavat*, this one is stated to be the measurer (of the products). (Then), on account of having hunger etc.¹, (and) being impelled by the force of his own nature, [181]

the devourer (lit. voracious) first created his first son, (and), out of hunger, opened his mouth towards him (i.e. to devour him). (Let it not be understood that) he sets aside all bounds of morality, (for) he does not pay heed to (lit. expect) what follows etc.² [182]

(Indeed) what man would not do wrong for the sake of this wretched stomach³? [183]

¹The word 'etc.' refers to thirst.

²The word 'etc.' refers to food and various enjoyments which are to follow.

³This is to justify the creator's voracity. SP remarks: *kṣutpipā-sāpiḍitaḥ putram api bhakṣayati* and also *vivekinām api paśvādibhir aviśeṣo vyavahāradaśāyām iti bhāvah*.

अन्न एव यतो वृत्तिरत्तुरन्नाद एव च ॥
अन्नस्य युक्तमेवातस्तमभिव्याददादिति ॥ १८४ ॥

Since existence of an eater (depends) on food and (the purpose of) food also (depends) on the eater¹, it is only proper, therefore, (that the Śruti) has stated 'he (the creator) opened his mouth towards him (i.e. son)'. [184]

¹The purpose is achieved by satisfying his hunger.

जन्मान्तरसमभ्यस्तविद्याकर्मादिहेतुतः ॥

जन्यकर्मप्रयुक्तः सञ्जिशुर्भाणित्यथाकरोत् ॥ १८५ ॥

(Then¹), on account of the lores and action etc.² which he has studied in his previous birth(s), the baby boy, being impelled by the activity to be performed,³ uttered the sound *Bhān*⁴. [185]

¹Or, at that time.

²The word 'etc.' refers to the impressions or desires of the previous birth(s).

³In the explanation here the baby boy which was produced by the Sūtrātman is described as any young one of human species who is wrapped in ignorance caused by action in the past lives.

⁴Cf. SP: *asaṁskṛtaśabdakarāṇe hetvantaram āha śiśur iti*.

यथोक्तहेतुवशगः स्वभावप्रहितोऽप्यसुः ॥

कुमारोत्थरवत्तस्तः स्वभावं चिच्छिदे भयात् ॥ १८६ ॥

And *Prāṇa*¹, being under the sway of the already stated cause and also being urged by (his own) nature, was disturbed by the cry coming from the young boy, and turned away from² his own nature³, out of apprehension. [186]

¹Or, *Mṛtyu*.

²That is to say; gave up or lit. cut himself away from.

³Namely, his cruelty.

अत्यन्तमपि शूराणां स्वस्वभावैकहेतुतः ॥

तित्तिरादिसमुत्पाते वेपथुर्जायते भयात् ॥ १८७ ॥

[This states the reason for the apprehension mentioned in the preceding verse.]

Verily (do we see that) even singularly brave men go in

tremor, out of fear, only by dint of their very nature², when there suddenly comes a Tittira¹ or another (similar) bird. [187]

¹This refers to the superstition that the note of a Tittira (or some such) bird portends evil.

²That is, by the deep-rooted fear which is so natural to human beings.

एवं स शिशुसंरावसंलब्धालोचनक्षणः ॥
ऐक्षतेह न कामार्तः कश्चिदालोचने क्षमः ॥ १८८ ॥

[Verses 188-196 explain BU 1.2.5: *sa aikṣata.*]

Thus he, who had now got (lit. obtained) a moment for thought owing to the cry of the baby boy, thought¹ (i.e. paused to think). Indeed no person who is overcome by desire (for food) is capable of (waiting for) a thought.² [188]

¹Sureśvara emphasizes that the Sūtrātman paused to think even if he was hungry.

²Cp. the popular adage: *bubhukṣitaḥ kiṁ na karoti pāpam* 'what wrong would he not do who is hungry?' Sureśvara suggests Prajāpati's great power of thought and also the great force in the young one's cry.

मन्यतिश्चाभिपूर्वोऽयं हिंसार्थः स्यात्प्रसिद्धितः ॥
यदीममभिर्हिंसिष्ये कनीयोऽन्नं भवेद्ध्रुवम् ॥ १८९ ॥

[This is on the Bhāṣya: *abhipūrvo manyatiḥ.*]

This (use of) root *man* preceded by (the preposition) *abhi* is in the sense of *himsā* 'destroying, violence'—for, it is (so known) from the established (usage).¹ (Therefore, the Śruti statement means:) 'If I shall kill this one, food will certainly be less.'² [189]

¹NKL remarks that this meaning of the root *abhimān* is not sanctioned by (grammatical) authority. Both SP and NKL

point out (as the basis for this usage) the Śruti statements: *rudro 'sya paśūn abhimanyeta/nāsyā rudraḥ paśūn abhimanyate/paśūn nābhima-nyate/paśūn nābhimaṁsyate*, and *tato vai rudraḥ paśūn nābhyamanyata*.

²This is the meaning of *yadi vā imam abhimaṁsyē kaṇīyo 'nnam kariṣye* (BU 1.2.5).

कारणादल्पमेव स्यात्तद्व्याप्तेरदितिर्यतः ॥

अन्नमल्पं ततोऽप्यल्पात्कनीयोऽन्नं भवेदतः ॥ १९० ॥

[This supplies consideration in Prajāpati's remark in the second line of the preceding verse.]

(Again), that (food)¹ would be positively less than its cause, on account of its pervasion (by the Sūtrātman), since (the Sūtrātman) is 'Unbound'². And therefore food would be less than that, (viz. the baby boy) who is already small. As such, food will indeed be less. [190]

¹Though *tat* is translated here as food, it really refers to its cause, viz. Virāj. As such, if the Sūtrātman were to devour Virāj, then there would not follow its product, viz. food. Therefore, it is smaller than what is already small—Virāj who is, as compared to the Sūtrātman, smaller since that is an effect and therefore smaller than the cause.

²The Sūtrātman is called also Aditi as known from the Śruti: *adirir dyaur aditir antarikṣam...* (SP). We have 'unbound' (i.e. limitless) as the translation of the word *aditi* and we thereby refer to the Sūtrātman which amplifies itself into all products, i.e. the universe. Yet Sureśvara seems to derive the name *aditi* from root *ad* 'to eat' to signify 'eater, devourer', cf. verse 194 below. Śaṅkara says regarding the derivation of Aditi at the end of BUB 1.2.5: *mṛtyoḥ prajāpateḥ sarvasyādanād adititvaṁ veda tasyaitat phalaṁ*

लोकेऽपीदं सुप्रसिद्धमाङ्गनाबालपण्डितम् ॥

जग्धनिःशेषबीजस्य तत्फलं नाप्यतेऽण्वपि ॥ १९१ ॥

[This is to justify the less quantity of food as stated in verse

190. That is to say: in the absence of Virāj, no food could be possible (cf. *sthūṇānikhanananyāya*).]

Even in the common-place world, among all people—right from women and children upto the learned—it is well known that the product of what has its entire seed eaten up (i.e. destroyed) would not be obtained even in the least measure. [191]

कुमारवक्त्रोद्गतया वाचर्गादीन्ससर्ज सः ॥

पञ्चादींश्च कुमारेण ह्यात्मनाजीजनज्जगत् ॥ १६२ ॥

[This explains *sa tayā vācā*... (BU 1.2.5.).]

He (i.e. the Sūtrātman) produced *rc*¹ etc. by the word uttered from the baby boy's mouth and also (produced) animals etc.² (and) this universe from the self, viz. the baby boy³. [192]

¹This seems to indicate the origin of all expressions of speech in the baby boy's cry *Bhāṇ*.

²This refers to birds, crawling beings and other creatures.

³The identity of the cause and the effect is implied in the *sāmānādhikaranyā* of *kumāreṇa ātmanā* 'the self, the baby boy'. This explanation is Sureśvara's variance with Śaṅkara. Read footnote 2 on NKL (p. 50): *...bhāṣyavyākhyānam kliṣṭam iti matvā kleśam anudbhāvya/vārtikakāraiḥ 'vācā' ity asya prakṛtakumāramukha-nirgataavākparatvam/ātmanā' ity asya prakṛtakumārāparatvam ca varṇitam iti bodhyam.*

स्रष्टृत्त्रोः कार्यभक्ष्याभ्यामन्योन्याव्यतिरेकतः ॥

स्रष्टृत्वात्स सृजत्येव खाद्यतेऽन्नं सदाद्यतः ॥ १६३ ॥

Since the creator and the eater, as also the effects produced (by the creator) and the food to be eaten (by the eater), do not exist apart from each other, he (the Sūtrātman), because of his capacity of being the creator, does create the food and it (also) is ever eaten while the eater is eating. [193]

This brushes aside a possible doubt that the creator and the eater are different—the doubt implies that, if they were one, there would not be any increase in food. But the Upaniṣadic description does emphasize the apparent paradox.

सर्वमस्ति यतः सृष्टं तस्माददितिरुच्यते ॥

नामज्ञस्तमुपासीनः सर्वस्यात्तादितिर्भवेत् ॥ १९४ ॥

[This explains *aditer adititvam* (BU 1.2.5).]

Since he devours all that is created, he is called Aditi. One who knows the (significance of this) name, worshipping him (lit. seated nearest unto him) would himself become Aditi, the eater of all.¹

[194]

¹This points to the significance of Upāsanā, as SP points out in *yathopāsanam hi phalam*. Also read NKL (last note on p. 50): *sarvasyaitasya jagato 'nnabhūtasya attā sarvātmanaiva bhavati/anyathā virodhāt/na hi sarvasya kaścid eko 'ttā dṛśyate/tasmāt sarvātmā bhavatīty arthaḥ*

सर्वतृत्वेन सिद्धेऽर्थे सर्वान्नोक्तिः किमीर्यते ॥

अन्नमेव भवेदन्नं नान्नमन्नस्य कुत्रचित् ॥ १९५ ॥

[This explanation averts the notion of repetition in respect of *sarvasyaitasyāttā bhavati/sarvam asyānnam bhavati* (BU 1.2.5).]

Why is there the statement: 'all (becomes His) food,' when (that) fact is (already) established by (the mention of Him as) capable of being the eater of all? (The purpose of so saying is to affirm:) Food alone becomes the food for the eater and nowhere does the food become the eater of this one (viz. the eater).

[195]

प्राणात्मातैव सोऽवश्यमुपासनबलाद्भवेत् ॥

य एवमभिधानज्ञ उपासीतादिति सदा ॥ १९६ ॥

[This is reaffirmation of the *phalaśruti* (cf. verse 194 above) as in *ya evam...* (BU 1.2.5).]

He, who is thus the knower (of the meaning) of the name Aditi, should ever worship Aditi; (for) certainly he will be (i.e. become possessed) of the nature of Prāṇa, the very eater (of every eatable), owing to the excellence of the worship.

[196]

अश्वाश्वमेधनाम्नोऽथ कारणप्रतिपत्तये ॥

सोऽकामयत इत्यादिः परो ग्रन्थोऽवतार्यते ॥ १९७ ॥

[Verses 197-205 explain the meaning of the word *aśva* (BU 1.2.6).]

Now is introduced the later section (of the Upaniṣad), beginning with (the words) 'he desired...'¹ in order that one comes to know the reason (why Prajāpati has) the name *Aśva* and *Aśvamedha*² (for Prajāpati). [197]

¹Sureśvara does not intend the Saṁdhi of *so 'kāmayata* and *iti* (as *°yateti*).

²These names are explained etymologically in verses 208 and 209 below. The use of the singular form *aśvāśvamedhanāmnah* indicates the oneness of *aśva* and *aśvamedha* which is implied and emphasized.

यज्ञेन भूयसा यक्ष्य इत्येवं स प्रजापतिः ॥

अश्वमेधो भवेद्भूयान्भूयोदक्षिणको हि सः ॥ १९८ ॥

'Let me perform the great¹ sacrifice,' thus (thought) that Prajāpati; that great (sacrifice) could be (only) the *Aśvamedha* since (it) involves great (i.e. amount of) *Dakṣiṇā* 'fees to be given to the priest'.² [198]

¹'great', because it is *bhūyodakṣiṇāka* as BUB explains and the next line points out. This is use of *significant* adjective (constituting the figure of speech *Kāvyaṅga*).

²SP refers to the prescription of *Āpastamba Śrauta Sūtra*: (where?) *prācyādidikcatuṣṭayasyādhvaryuprabhṛtibhyaś caturbhyo bhūmya vacchinasya cāvaśiṣṭasya dhanasya sadasyebhyo dakṣiṇātvena deyatā*.

यजेय भूयोऽपीत्येवमकामयत भावितः ॥

ऋत्वात्मेत्यभिमानेद्धः पूर्वजन्मन्यभूत्प्रभुः ॥ १९९ ॥

Prajāpati, inspired (by the performance) desired, 'Let me perform (that sacrifice) once again', since in his previous life the Lord was kindled with the pride: 'I am the soul of the sacrifice.'

[199]

This presupposes the continued cycle of births for Prajāpati; since he had an Ego that he was the performer or maker of the sacrifice. This naturally leads to the Upaniṣadic idea of the working of *mayā* in the form of one's entertaining the notion that one is the agent of so many ritualistic activities. Also it entails the notion of the Liṅgātman for every human being, just as Hiraṇyagarbha, the sacrificer, continued to have the Liṅgātman.

पूर्वजन्माभिनिर्वृत्तप्रयोगापेक्षयोच्यते ॥

भूयो यजेयेति वचः सदा तद्भावभावनात् ॥ २०० ॥

ऋत्वात्मैवाभिसंपन्नो द्वैतैकत्वात्मकः प्रभुः ॥

इह तत्फलतां यातो भूयोवाग्युग्यते ततः ॥ २०१ ॥

The statement (in the Śruti) *bhūyo yajeta* 'let me again sacrifice' is made with reference to the performance of a sacrifice accomplished in a previous life, for there would ever be its inspiration by the thought (i.e. the pride) of (having performed) it.

[200]

The Lord, having only the nature of oneness in duality, became (possessed of the thought that he was) 'the soul of the sacrifice'. Thus he has here become the result of that (sacrifice) and, therefore, the word *bhūyāḥ* 'again' is used (in the Śruti)¹.

[201]

¹SP well brings out the purport of these two verses thus: *sādhakāvasthāyām dirghakālam ādareṇa nirantaratayā hiraṇyagarbho 'smiiti bhāvanāvaśād ubhayavidhakatvātmā prajāpatir eva samaṣṭivyaṣṭy-*

*ātmā sampannaḥ sann etatkalpādaḥ kratuphalatām yato yātas tato
bhūyaḥśabdo yuktimān ity arthaḥ.*

कारणप्रवणं सर्वं कार्यं दृष्टं जगत्यपि ॥
प्रकृतिं यान्ति भूतानि निग्रहः किं करिष्यति ॥ २०२ ॥

In the universe¹ also it is seen that all effect is dependent on the cause²; (so it is said in *Gītā* 3.33³;) 'all beings act under the influence of nature, what (then) can restraint do?' [202]

¹This refers to *vyavahārāvasthā*.

²That is; Prakṛti is responsible for every performance of a human being. So then, it impels even Prajāpati to perform a sacrifice.

³This is the Smṛti support for the philosophical thought.

यशोवीर्यैकहेतुत्वात्प्राणा यश इहेष्यताम् ॥
यशः प्रकाशरूपेण वीर्यं तद्वलहेतुतः ॥ २०३ ॥

[This explains *prāṇā vai yaśo vīryam* (BU 1.2.6).]

Let it be understood here that *prāṇas*¹ are fame, since they are the only cause of fame and potency; fame they are, because of their being in the form of lustre or glory (i.e. known everywhere) and potency, thanks to being the cause of their strength.² [203]

¹Prāṇas are organs of sense, viz. eye etc.; cf. *prāṇas cakṣurādayaḥ* (BUB p. 39).

²*tadbalaheṭutaḥ* is *tadbalaheṭutvataḥ*, cf. SP *asti ca dehe teṣām balaheṭutvam...*

उदक्रामद्यशो वीर्यं विराजः श्रमकर्शितात् ॥
लिङ्गात्मेह यशो वीर्यमुभयं हि तदुद्भवम् ॥ २०४ ॥

[This explains *tad evaṁ yaśovīryabhūteṣu...* (BUB p. 39).]

Fame (and) potency (as well) departed from Virāj who was weakened by fatigue; for both fame and potency, originating from it, are here¹ the Lingātman 'the subtle self'.²

[204]

¹The word *iha* refers to the gross body.

²Read NKL: *sthūladehe prāṇasambandhe saty eva yaśo viryam nāśati ityanvayavyatirekasiddham ity arthah.*

पूर्वदेहेऽभिषङ्गोऽभूदपविद्धतनोरपि ॥

सङ्गत्यागो ह्यसंभाव्यो विनैकात्म्यावबोधनात् ॥ २०५ ॥

[This explains *tasya prajāpateḥ...śarīre mana āsit* (BUB p. 39).]

(Even at this time¹) Prajāpati had an attachment to the body of the previous life even though he was devoid of (i.e. removed from that former) body. Indeed giving up an attachment cannot be possible (for one) without becoming aware of the oneness (of the two bodies²). [205]

¹This is to be added in view of verses 199-200 above.

²These are: The body of the previous and the present birth. This really means the continuation of the same life in different bodies. But, even though the objects enjoyed in the earlier life do not any more exist, the longing for them persists (even in the subtle body). This is supported by SP which refers to *Gītā* 2.59: *viṣayā vinivartate nirāhārasya dehinaḥ/rasavarjam...*

जातदेहाभिषङ्गः संस्तादात्म्यप्रतिपित्तया ॥

मेध्यमित्यादिकं कामं सोऽकामयत कामुकः ॥ २०६ ॥

[Verses 206-227 explain BU 1.2.7. And this verse clarifies *sa tasminn eva śarīre...* (BUB p. 39).]

Having an attachment to the body that arose (in him), he, full of longing entertained a desire for what is fit for a sacrifice etc.¹, owing to his wish to obtain oneness in nature with it.

[206]

This verse stresses further the notion of *saṅga* mentioned in the preceding verse.

¹The word *medhya* has here a reference to the body and not to offerings of sacrifice, because already a reference is made to Prajāpati's wish for becoming *ātmanvi*—it is repeated here in BU 1.2.7 also.

अपविद्धयशोवीर्यं शरीरं कवियोगतः ॥

यतोऽश्वयदतोऽश्वोऽसुः संवृत्तः स प्रजापतिः ॥ २०७ ॥

(And) since the Prāṇa then swelled¹ (his) body, which was devoid of fame and potency on account of His separation from Prajāpati², he became a horse; (he became) Prajāpati.³

[207]

¹The word *aśvayat* is for a Vedic form *aśvat* from root *śvi* 'to swell, grow, increase'. Or, is it, by any chance, an archaic form of *aśvayat* from the denominative root *aśvaya* 'to act like a horse' (i.e. 'to enter like a horse')?

²The words '(his) body' refer to the gross manifest form of an individual sacrificer who is far removed from the status of Prajāpati, the Hiranyagarbha—this has reference to the disappearance of Prāṇas mentioned in verse 203 above. The verse uses the word *ka* in *kaviyogataḥ* for conveying the sense of Prajāpati in keeping with later (Upaniṣadic, or perhaps post-Upaniṣadic) tendency to do so. *kaviyoga* is understood from verse 204 above.

³This is said with a view to averting the idea of the non-identity of the horse in the form of the body and Prajāpati. This suggests that the horse, being Prajāpati, is worship-deserving.

व्यपेतसद्यशोवीर्यममेध्यं मेध्यतामगात् ॥

तत्प्रवेशाद्यतोऽतोऽयमश्वमेधोऽभवत्प्रभुः ॥ २०८ ॥

[This explains the reason for Aśvamedha to be Prajāpati's name.]

Since the body, from which (the earlier) extant fame and potency had disappeared and which had thus become unfit

for sacrifice¹, (now) became fit for sacrifice owing to the entry of that (i.e. Prajāpati) (into it); for this reason, the Lord has become this² Aśvamedha³. [208]

¹Cf. *medhya* in verse 206 above.

²That means 'well-known'.

³Cf. SP: *śarīram hi prāṇaviyogāt*.

अश्वाश्वमेधावेवं च प्राजापत्यात्मनाञ्जसा ॥
अभिष्टुतौ कथं नाम भवेतामिति भण्यते ॥ २०६ ॥

(The above) is stated with a view to (explaining) how the Aśva 'horse' and Aśvamedha 'the horse-sacrifice' would become praised in a proper manner, on account of their being of the nature of Prajāpati. [209]

काललोकादिवपुषस्त्वश्वस्याग्नेश्च सांप्रतम् ॥
समस्योपासनं वाच्यमित्यर्थो ग्रन्थ उत्तरः ॥ २१० ॥

[This explains the purpose of *eṣa ha vā aśvamedham* (BU 1.2.7).]

(Now) it is proper to prescribe (lit. state) the worship together of the horse, which has a body comprising of time, region etc.¹, and Fire together—therefore, for this purpose, follows the subsequent (part of the) work.² [210]

¹This refers to the contents of BU 1.1.1. The word 'etc.' refers to the deity (of the sacrifice).

²In BU 1.1.1 there was discussion of the worship of the horse; there was no mention of the worship of fire. Therefore, the section in BU which begins with *na ha vā aśvamedham* has the purpose of showing that the two so-called worships are not different and that they together form but one worship.

विधायकपदाभावादसंगानं परस्परम् ॥
पदानामिति मा प्रापदित्यर्थेयं परा श्रुतिः ॥ २११ ॥

[This verse explains the purpose of the injunction *aśvamedham veda* (BU 1.2.7).]

This later Śruti¹ proceeds indeed for the purpose of averting the undesirable contingent situation that the words (Aśva and Agni), which might not go together with each other owing to the absence of such words as prescribe (the worship of) Aśva.² [211]

Hereby is bridged over the apparent distance between ritual and philosophy. The purpose of the following passages is to assert that the worship of Aśva and the worship of Fire are not two different worships.

¹The injunction: *aśvamedham veda*.

²SP and NKL point out that, though the words *adititvam veda* are noticed in respect of the worship of Aśva (BU 1.2.5), they are not *pradhānavidhi* which is desired to be stated. Cf. also Ānandagiri on BUB: *pūrvatra kriyāpadasya...iti bhāvaḥ* (p. 39).

एष एवं यथातत्त्वमश्वमेधं विवेद यः ॥

वक्ष्यमाणेन रूपेण वेद विद्यादतस्तथा ॥ २१२ ॥

[This verse connects *ya enam evam veda* with the injunction kept in view by the preceding verse and gives the full meaning intended, viz. 'he should know the Aśvamedha according to the description which follows.']

He, who has thus known the Aśvamedha in its true nature and also as having that nature which will be described (hereafter), should therefore know (the same) accordingly¹. [212]

¹According to the description which follows.

आत्मानमश्वं संकल्प्य काललोकादिधर्मिणम् ॥

तथाविधशरीरः सन्सर्वलोकपितामहः ॥ २१३ ॥

यजेयमश्वमेधेन भूयोऽपीत्यभ्यमन्यत ॥

भूर्लोकाद्यात्मकं सोऽश्वमात्मानं निरवग्रहम् ॥ २१४ ॥

यावदब्दं मुमोचाश्वं स्वच्छन्दं मुक्तबन्धनम् ॥

ततः संवत्सराद्धर्वं तं चाप्यालभतात्मने ॥ २१५ ॥

[The following well compares with *aśvadr̥ṣṭi* etc. in BUBV 1.1—this is *aśvamedhadṛṣṭi* on the same pattern.]

Having formed a notion about his own body¹ as the horse, possessed of the properties of *kāla*, *loka* etc.² and being possessed of that kind of body³, the grandfather of all the world thought to himself, [213]

‘Let me perform the *Aśvamedha* once again.’ Then he let loose himself, a horse, who is possessed of the nature of earth, *lokas* etc. (and) who has no restraint whatever, [214]

till the end of the year, (to move about) according to its sweet will and without any check. Then, after a year was over, he killed that (horse) also for his own sake. [215]

¹The word *ātman* here means ‘body’.

²The word ‘etc.’ refers to the deity as in verse 210 above.

³A body on which are imposed the characteristics of *kāla*, *loka* etc.

स्वात्मावयवभूताभ्यो देवताभ्यो यथायथम् ॥

ग्राम्यारण्यान्पशून्प्रादादन्याभ्यः स प्रजापतिः ॥ २१६ ॥

[This is a comment on *paśūn devatābhyah...* (BU 1.2.7).]

That *Prajāpati* (then) offered domestic and wild animals to the other deities as had become the limbs of his own body in one way or the other as is laid down (in the scriptures). [216]

[There follows a comment on *tasmāt sarvadevatya...* (BU 1.2.7).]

यतोऽकरोद्विराडेवं तस्मादेवेह याज्ञिकाः ॥

प्रोक्षितं सर्वदेवत्यं प्राजापत्यं तुरंगमम् ॥ २१७ ॥

आलभन्ते यतस्तस्माद्यथाव्याख्याततत्त्ववित् ॥

कुर्यादेवं यथोक्तार्थं मृत्युत्वप्रतिपित्तया ॥ २१८ ॥

[There follows a comment on *tasmāt...sarvadevatya...* (BU 1.2.7).]

Since Virāj did thus, therefore, only do the ritualists in this world kill a horse dedicated to Prajāpati (and understand as one) made up of all deities, when it is sprinkled over with water.

[217]

Since (this is so,) therefore one, who knows the truth that is thus explained (in the Upaniṣad) should, with a wish (to obtain the nature of) Mr̥tyu, perform the said (ritual) accordingly.

[218]

कर्मोपासनमुक्त्वाऽथ तत्फलोपदिदिक्षया ॥

एष वा इति यत्नेन ह्याजगामोत्तरा श्रुतिः ॥ २१९ ॥

[Verses 219-227 are the explanation of the result of the worship of Aśvamedha.]

Having enjoined (lit. described) the nature of the activity of worship (i.e. performance of the ritual), now proceeds the later (portion of the) Śruti, with the specification: *eṣa vā...*,¹ indeed with a desire to state its result (lit. fruit). [219]

¹That is, *eṣa ha vā...*; the word *ha* is dropped in the verse for the sake of metre.

दर्शनाद्यभिनिर्वृत्तो यस्त्वेवं ह्यसाधनः ॥

प्रत्यक्षं फलरूपेण स एष इति दर्श्यते ॥ २२० ॥

And (in the Śruti beginning with) *sa eṣa...* is directly pointed out as the result the one¹ that is secured by *darśana*² etc. and has the horse as its means (for accomplishing the desired result³).

[220]

¹This refers to the Sun in the sky. That is to say, the performance of Aśvamedha results into the actual worship of Āditya.

²The word *darśana* is nothing but *upāsana* as seen in the be-

ginning of this Brāhmaṇa, viz. in 1.2.1 and also in 1.1.1, and the word 'etc.' means *manana*. This refers to the identification of the different parts of the ritual as the objects in the worship of fire.

³This refers to the actual performance of Aśvamedha.

अश्वमेधक्रियापूर्वपरिणामैकवर्त्मना ॥

अश्वमेधो रविः साक्षादुषा इत्यादिनोदितः ॥ २२१ ॥

In the Śruti beginning with *uṣā* is stated that the Sun itself is the Aśvamedha (which is accomplished¹) by the only way of (viz. creating) *apūrva* through the performance of the Aśvamedha. [221]

SP supports the meaning of the verse by a line from *Manu-smṛti*, viz. 3.76: *agnau prāstāhutih samyag ādityam upatiṣṭhataḥ...*

¹Accomplishing the performance of the Aśvamedha is performing the worship of the Sun and thereby becoming one with Him. This signifies the oneness of the *darśana* and *karman* (as in the preceding verse). Cf. NKL: (on that verse) *aśvamedhopāsanam aśvamedhaś cāditya evety arthaḥ*.

तस्य संवत्सर आत्मा तस्याऽऽदित्यैकहेतुतः ॥

तस्य कृत्वात्मनश्चित्यो योऽङ्गभूतः पुरोदितः ॥ २२२ ॥

फलात्मकः स एवैष पार्थिवोऽग्निः प्रदर्श्यते ॥

आत्मान एते तस्यापि त्रयो लोका यथोदिताः ॥ २२३ ॥

Year is the nature of that (Sun) because it has only Āditya as its cause and that fire, which was to be collected and which has been described before as an aspect of that (Āditya) who is the form of the sacrifice, as said before, [222]

is of the nature of the result, i.e. this very terrestrial fire. So are these three worlds the forms¹ of that (Āditya) as said before. [223]

¹*ātmanah* = *śarirāvayvāḥ*; the very body which has the worlds as its limbs.

क्रतुतत्साधनात्मानावादित्याग्नी यथोदितौ ॥

निर्वृत्तात्माधिकारौ तावेकैवासौ भवेदसुः ॥ २२४ ॥

As said before, Āditya and Agni, who are two forms (of the Aśvamedha), (of the sacrifice) being its means¹ and also the sacrifice, have, on performing their own duties², become but one, viz. the Prāṇa³. [224]

¹It signifies 'by producing the result of the performance'.

²Even these two deities have to perform their role in the Aśvamedha and then they attain the higher status of Prāṇa etc.

³The word *asu* is used here in feminine to indicate *prāṇadevatā* (f.) 'the deity of the name Prāṇa'. Or, is this a case of double sandhi?

अशनायावती योक्ता मृत्युः सर्वान्नघस्मरा ॥

सैवात्मा विदुषः साक्षादात्मा स्यादजरोऽमरः ॥ २२५ ॥

[This explains *apa punar mrtyum jayate* (BU 1.2.7).]

(And) Mr̥tyu¹, who is described as possessed of hunger and devourer of all foods, is himself the self of one who has known (the Brahman) and (also) the Ātman that would be without old age and without death. [225]

¹Like the word *asu* in the previous verse, the word *mr̥tyu* here is used in the feminine thereby to indicate *mr̥tyudevatā* that is identical with the Ātman.

नैनमाध्यात्मिको मृत्युस्तन्मृत्युत्वादवाप्नुयात् ॥

सकृन्मृत्वासुदेहेन मुच्यते सर्वबन्धनात् ॥ २२६ ॥

[This explains *mr̥tyur asya* (BU 1.2.7).]

And since he (the learned man) is (that) Mr̥tyu (himself), bodily death would not affect him¹. Once he dies (in the usual sense), he is liberated from all bonds by his form of Prāṇa. [226]

¹This is further described in the style of the *Brāhmaṇas* as *etāsāṃ devatānām eko bhavati* at the end of BU 1.2.7.

अग्न्यादिभेदभिन्नानां देवतानामशेषतः ॥
आत्माभिन्नो भवत्येष यथोक्तोपासनाद्बुधः ॥ २२७ ॥

[This explains *etāsāṃ devatānām...*]

By the performance of the worship as described (herein), a wise man becomes this Ātman which is non-distinct from all the deities which are differentiated by the variety (of names) Agni etc. [227]

[/ iti prathamādhyāyasya dvitīyam aśvamedhabrāhmaṇam samāptam]/

BRHADĀRANYKOPANIṢAD- BHĀṢYA-VĀRTIKA

BUBV 1.3

Udgītha Brāhmaṇa

शास्त्रोक्तज्ञानयुक्तानां कर्मणां ज्ञानतस्तथा ॥

सर्वत्र वेदशास्त्रेऽस्मिन्मृत्युभावः फलं श्रुतम् ॥ १ ॥

[In these verses Sureśvara, following Śaṅkara's Bhāṣya, points to the connection between the preceding portion of the BU and this Brāhmaṇa.]

Everywhere in this Vedic lore is heard (that) the result of the (various ritual) activities, joint with the instruction imparted by the scriptures as also (that which results) from knowledge¹, is becoming (one with) Mṛtyu². [1]

This verse aims at pointing out the distinction between the Udgītha Upāsanā and every other Upāsanā, as understood in this Brāhmaṇa. Though *mṛtyubhāva* is said to be the result of any of the other Upāsanās, it is not absolute liberation. This is the first point of distinction between the Udgītha Upāsanā and other Upāsanās. NKL says: The Brahman is called the Udgītha, because it refers to meditation on, or pondering over, the nature of Prāṇa (=Brahman) and not to any ritual.

¹This refers to *jñāna* about the true nature of the ritual activity which leads to non-eternal reward; this knowledge leads to *mukti*. But, there seems to be here only concessional acceptance of *jñānakarmasamuccaya*. The Udgītha Upāsanā is distinct from every other Upāsanā, for it is not *śāstroкта-karman* but it is a means to the acquisition of *jñāna* mentioned just before. The word *jñāna* mentioned in the first line refers to the instruction of the Śruti (*vijñāna*).

²Refer to BUBV 1.2. See Introduction to Sureśvara's *Vārtika*

on *Aśva- and Aśvamedha Brāhmaṇa* (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1990), pp. xv-xvii; and the next verse.

आध्यात्मिकपरिच्छेदव्यावृत्तिर्यत्समाश्रयात् ॥

स मृत्युर्मृत्युशब्देन फलभूतोऽत्र भण्यते ॥ २ ॥

That Mṛtyu, by resorting to which there results cessation of bodily limitations, is mentioned here¹ by the word *mṛtyu*² which has been the result³. [2]

¹In the word *ādhyātmika*, *ātman* means 'body', cf. 1.1.4; 144; 213; 223.

²This is a reference to BUBV 1.2 (cf. Introduction to *Sureśvara's Vārtika on Aśva- and Aśvamedha Brāhmaṇa*, pp. xvii-xviii) and also *mṛtyvātmabhāva* in BUB.

³Namely, the result of ritual activity performed after knowing its true nature as worship of Prāṇa, the inner self.

या त्वश्वमेधगत्युक्तिः सोपलक्षणसिद्धये ॥

कर्मज्ञानान्तराणां स्यान्नाश्वमेधगृहीतये ॥ ३ ॥

As to the statement of the result of the Aśvamedha, it is for effecting the indication of the various knowledges of (different) activities (i.e. worships); it is not for (understanding the result of) the Aśvamedha (only). [3]

NKL states that the Upāsanās other than the Aśvamedha Upāsanā (viz. Agni Upāsanā) do not bring about the same result, viz. *mṛtyuprāpti*; that is to say: they do not effect *brahmaprāpti*.

अल्पीयःफलसंप्राप्तिरल्पीचोज्ञानकर्मतः ॥

अल्पत्वमभिभूतेः स्यात्तयोरामुरपाप्मभिः ॥ ४ ॥

Accruing of a lesser¹ reward (results) from lesser activities and knowledge. Smallness comes from the overpowering (of those two²) by (their contact with) the demoniac sins³. [4]

¹The first 'lesser' refers to such an Upāsanā as implies subject-object relationship and the latter 'lesser' refers to anything else

than the worship of the knowledge of (the nature of) the Brahman.

²Namely, activity and knowledge.

³Such as *rāga*, *lobha* etc. These are defects of individuals; in other words, there is no purification (i.e. purging of the sins) of an individual's *citta*.

कुतस्तस्याभिभूतस्य रागाद्यामुरपाप्मभिः ॥

उद्भूतिः कर्मणोऽत्यर्थं ज्ञानस्य च निगद्यताम् ॥ ५ ॥

[An objection is being introduced:]

Be it told as to whence there originate the activity and the knowledge which are overpowered by the demoniac sins such as attachment etc. above (*ati*)¹ the desired end.

[5]

¹That is, setting aside. This refers to *pitṛlokaprāpti*; cf. CU 5.10.4; BU 3.1.8; *Jaiminiya Upaniṣad* 2.8.11.

मृत्युं साक्षादवाप्नोति ज्ञानयुक्तेन कर्मणा ॥

इत्येतद्बहुशोऽश्रावि पूर्वग्रन्थेषु चागमैः ॥ ६ ॥

That one obtains *Mṛtyu*¹ itself by means of activity joint with knowledge was declared on several occasions² by earlier Śruti texts³.

[6]

¹This *Mṛtyu* is *Prāṇadevatā* connected with various *Upāsanās*; viz. the status of *Hiraṇyagarbha*.

²This refers to *mṛtyur asyātmā* (cf. BUBV 1.2.225) etc., and other sentences connected with other (prescribed) *Upāsanās*.

³BU 1.2.7; 1.3.9; *Jaiminiya Upaniṣad* 3.12.5.

तज्ज्ञानोत्पत्तिविघ्नाय (? प) ध्वस्तिकृज्ज्ञानलब्धये ॥

उद्गीथदेवतावाप्त्यै प्रारब्धेहोत्तरा श्रुति ॥ ७ ॥

Now here starts the later (portion of the) Śruti in order that one is able to obtain the knowledge that destroys the obstacle¹ to the rise of the knowledge of that (*Sūtrātman*), and that one obtains (the knowledge of) the deity of the *Udgītha*.

[7]

¹The text of AnSS reads *vighnāya....labdhaye*, but it should read *vighnāpadhvasti...* as shown by the edition of NKL and by SP's explanation. The first line in AnSS text as it is is understood as an instance of *sāpekṣa samāsa*.

ननु मृत्योरतिक्रान्तेरुद्गीथज्ञानकर्मणोः ॥
फलस्य संश्रवान्नातो मृत्युप्राप्तिस्तयोः फलम् ॥ ८ ॥

[Now an objection is raised on the basis of BU 1.3.12: *mṛtyum atikrānto dīpyate*.]

But, since one hears that the result of (ritual) activity and Udgītha-*jñāna* (joined together) is transcending¹ Mṛtyu², therefore, obtaining Mṛtyu (i.e. oneness with it) from them (viz. Udgītha-*jñāna* and ritual activity) is not the reward of the two. [8]

¹Cf. *so 'gnir abhavat*, (BU 1.3.12)... *sa vāyur abhavat* etc.

²That is to say: becoming one with Mṛtyu = Sūtrātman.

नाग्न्यादिदेवतात्मत्वतत्फलावगमाच्छ्रुतेः ॥
स्वाभाविकासङ्गमृत्योरतिक्रान्तिः पृथक्फलम् ॥ ९ ॥

[This is an answer to the preceding.]

(This is) not (so), because (one hears) from the Śruti¹ that (the knowledge of) the result of that is oneness with the deities, Agni etc.² As for transcending Mṛtyu, (it consists in transcending) natural attachment (to bodily and other pleasures) (and) is (thus) a distinct reward. [9]

¹Sp cites: *etāsāṃ devatānām eko bhavati* (BU 1.2.7) and *so 'gnir abhavat* (BU 1.3.12) etc. mentioned in note 1 on the preceding verse.

²These are already mentioned in BUBV 1.2.

कोऽसौ स्वाभाविकः पाप्मा तस्योद्भूतिस्तथा कुतः ॥
तस्मान्निवृत्तिः केन स्यात्कथं वेत्येतदुच्यते ॥ १० ॥

[This verse states in brief the purpose of the narrative.]

What (then) is that natural defect (lit. sin)? so also, whence does it come into existence? by what would there be keeping away from it possible? and how? — all this is discussed (in what follows.) [10]

यथोक्तार्थप्रसिद्धयर्थं श्रुतिराख्यायिकात्मिका ॥
द्वया हेत्येवमाद्येयं प्रचक्राम परोक्षितुम् ॥ ११ ॥

In order to establish the things mentioned (thus)¹, this Śruti passage, which is of the nature of a narrative, proceeds to discuss (lit. examine or explain) (the nature of Prāṇa)², beginning with (the words) *dvayā ha*. [11]

¹This refers to the questions mentioned in the preceding verse.

²It is the Udgithadevatā, so-called in verse 7 above, the real nature of Prāṇa as pure, unaffected by any attachment to worldly objects and pleasure.

प्राजापत्यं पदं यो यो ह्यधिकारी परोक्षति ॥
तन्निर्धारयानया श्रुत्या पदमाप्नोत्युपासनात् ॥ १२ ॥

Verily, whosoever, entitled (to the Udgitha worship)¹, wishes to get the status of Prajāpati, attains it, having first ascertained that² by means of this Śruti³ and then by performing the worship⁴ (of Prāṇa). [12]

¹SP seems to refer this to the one who is entitled to perform Soma sacrifice.

²The nature of Prāṇa having the qualities like purity etc.

³BU 1.3.

⁴For the word *upāsanā* we use 'worship', since BU, BUB and BUBV appear to use it in different places with different nuances which are covered by this word. We shall specify the exact nuance wherever desirable. Cf. Introduction.

Sureśvara's discussion on BU 1.3.1 begins here and continues up to verse 126, touching various allied topics in passing.

पूर्वजन्मनि यद्वृत्तं वर्तमानप्राजापतेः ॥
तदवद्योतको हेति निपातोऽत्र प्रयुज्यते ॥ १३ ॥

The particle *ha* here¹ is used as indicative² of what happened in the previous life of the present day Prajāpati. [13]

Sureśvara refers to the changing cycle of Kalpas and, accordingly, even to the merger of Prajāpati into the Brahman for being born again as Prajāpati in every subsequent Kalpa.

¹The word *atra* is an adverb in locative sense and refers to the statement of the first line.

²SP points out that particles do not express any meaning, they only indicate the same. This refers to the view mentioned in *Nirukta* 1.4: *nāmākhyātaḥ tu karmopasaṁyogadyotakā bhavanti*.

भविष्यद्वृत्तिमाश्रित्य यजमानः प्रजापतिः ॥

इहाभिधीयतेऽन्यस्तु न कश्चित्सप्रयोजनः ॥ १४ ॥

Here is mentioned (as) the sacrificer Prajāpati, with his future status¹ in view, and not any other (sacrificer) who has (some other) purpose.² [14]

¹This is literally 'modification or transformation of a human sacrificer into Prajāpati (= Prāṇa)'.

²An ordinary sacrificer who wishes to achieve results of ritual actions such as riches etc., but not the status of Prāṇa. Those results are only temporary!

ज्ञानकर्मोपदेशो हि नरं प्रत्येव सर्वथा ॥

सर्वः श्रौतो यतस्तस्मात्स एवेहाभिधीयते ॥ १५ ॥

Since, everywhere the instruction of the Śruti¹ for (every) individual is in every way in respect of knowledge and activity, therefore, it is only that (individual sacrificer)² who is mentioned here. [15]

¹NKL understands *sarvaḥ* in the sense of both the Śrauta and the Smārta instruction; cf. *śrautaḥ smārtaś ca sarvaprakāra ity arthaḥ*.

²That sacrificer means such a sacrificer as wishes to know both the nature of the diet as Prāṇa and the procedure of the performance.

तत्कर्मज्ञानजत्वाच्च तत्प्राणाः शुद्ध्यशुद्धिजाः ॥
प्राजापत्या इहोच्यन्ते वागाद्युक्तेश्च लिङ्गतः ॥ १६ ॥

[This explains *tasyaiva prajāpateḥ*...(BUB p. 44).]

Further, here are mentioned the very *prāṇas* (sense-organs)¹ of that (sacrificer), produced as they are by his (ritual) activities and knowledge (in the earlier life or lives) as also from purity and impurity, as the off-springs of Prajāpati, because there is an indication (of the same) from the statement of Speech and others². [16]

This verse explains the significance of the suffix which forms the word *Prājāpatya* from *Prajāpati*.

¹For *prāṇa* in the sense of organs cf. BSB 2.4.1; 2.4.5 (and also in later verses of this Brāhmaṇa).

²They refer to BU 1.3.3ff. referring to Nose, Eye, Ear, *manas* etc.

उद्गीथोपास्तिसंबन्धाद्व्या हेत्यादिकस्य च ॥
उपास्यार्थविशुद्ध्यर्थं प्रवृत्ताख्यायिका ततः ॥ १७ ॥

And, therefore, because of the relation of the words *dvayā ha...* to the worship of the Udgītha, the narrative (here) has begun with the purpose of explaining clearly the nature (lit. the meaning) of the object of worship. [17]

Both SP and NKL point out that the narrative has inherent connection with the worship of Udgītha.

अभ्यारोहजपस्येह प्राण एवास्तु देवता ॥
कस्माद्वागादयो नेति तत्परीक्षात ईर्यते ॥ १८ ॥

Therefore, there follows (lit. is put forth) an examination (of the thought as to) why *Prāṇa* should be (accepted) in this section (as) the deity of (the *Abhyāroha-japa* =) the recitation for elevation¹, and not Speech and others. [18]

¹This refers to BU 1.3.28: *asato mā sad gamaya....mrtyor mā amṛtaṁ gamaya*. This recitation forms a part of the Udgīha worship as will be clear later.

अन्वयव्यतिरेकाभ्यां प्राणप्राधान्यसिद्धये ॥

प्रवृत्ताख्यायिका यत्नाद्वागादीन्द्रियनिन्दया ॥ १९ ॥

Therefore, with a view to establishing the pre-eminence of Prāṇa by means of (the method of) Anvaya and Vyatireka¹, the narrative has begun specifically with the censure² of the organ of speech and others. [19]

¹Read SP: *sati prāṇe vāgādivyāpāro nānyathā*.

²This is a literal translation of *nindā*, but the word *nindā* indicates here rejection.

शास्त्रस्वभावजज्ञानकर्मसंस्कारहेतुतः ॥

देवासुरत्वं प्राणानां नि (? वि) रुद्धोपाधिकारणात् ॥ २० ॥

The *prāṇas* (i.e. sense-organs) become possessed of the nature of gods and demons on account of the impressions of knowledge and activity which have resulted from (the teaching of) the scriptures and from their own nature, i.e. thus owing to the limiting adjuncts which are opposed¹ (in nature to one another). [20]

¹Translation follows the edition of NKL and SP which read *viruddhopādhi*...even though AnSS reads *niruddhopādhi*, obviously it is a mis-reading.

सहस्रादिर्यथा भेदः प्राणस्यैकस्य शब्दते ॥

भूयोधिकारभेदेन वागादीनां तथा भिदा ॥ २१ ॥

[Reference is made to *kati devā yajñavalkya iti* (BU 3.9.1), a question put to Yājñavalkya, the seer of BU.]

As it is said of one and the same Prāṇa that it has distinct forms (which are) counted (in) thousand etc., so also (is there) the division¹ of Speech and others, owing to the difference in their manifold (i.e. varied) capacity². [21]

¹The words 'into different forms' are to be supplied.

²This refers to the *upādhis* mentioned in the previous verse, *śāstriya* and *itara* (= *svābhāvika*) *jñānakarmāṇi*.

सहजं सर्वभूतानां वृत्तमासुरमिष्यते ॥

यत्नाधेयं यतो देवं ज्यायांसः स्युस्ततोऽसुराः ॥ २२ ॥

Since the natural behaviour (lit. activity) of all beings is described (as) demoniac (and) any divine activity has to be performed with effort, therefore, the demons are elders (lit. larger) in number. [22]

It is everyone's experience that the demoniac activities outnumber the divine activities, because it is in the nature of human beings to turn to the former, whereas the latter require special efforts.

इह वागादयः शब्दा देवतार्थाभिधायकाः ॥

मर्त्यत्वान्न तु गृह्यन्ते करणस्थानगोचराः ॥ २३ ॥

Here (i.e. in this section) the words *vāc* 'Speech' and others are expressive of (their relevant) deities and they are not taken to have the specific organs (of their activity) as their object (as their primary meaning), on account of their perishability (lit. mortality). [23]

देवतैकात्म्यमेवेह देवज्ञानक्रियाफलम् ॥

अध्यात्मादिपरिच्छेद आसुरत्वान्न गृह्यते ॥ २४ ॥

Here (i.e. in this Brāhmaṇa) only (attaining) oneness with the deity¹ is accepted as the result of the knowledge of the divine and the activity directed towards the divine. Limitation in the form of the body etc.² is not (so) accepted, because it is demoniac (in its origin)³. [24]

This is one more argument for understanding *devatā* from the words *vāc* and others.

¹This refers to the sentences like *so 'gnir abhavat* (BU 1.3.12 ff.)

²The word 'etc.' refers to *rāga*, *lobha* etc.

³It is *āsaṅgaja*.

हिंसाभिप्रवणं चेतः प्रायेण श्रेयसामपि ॥

भूयांसोऽतोऽसुरा देवाः कनीयांसोऽतियत्नजाः ॥ २५ ॥

Generally, the mind even of the elite is prone to violence. Therefore, the demons are larger¹, in number and the gods, who originate from the (necessary) great effort (towards the activities prescribed by scripture), are smaller (lit. younger) in number. [25]

¹Larger and smaller in translation contrast with each other. Cf. verse 22 above.

धर्माधर्मैकसाध्यत्वाद्ब्रह्मादेः स्थावरावधेः ॥

अस्पर्धन्त ततोऽन्योन्यं दैतेया विबुधैः सह ॥ २६ ॥

[This explains *lokeṣu nimittabhūteṣu...* (BUB p. 45)]

Since (the origin of this universe), beginning with the Brahman and ending with all that is steady, is effected from only (the practice of) merit and demerit, therefore¹, the sons of Diti and the gods rivalled with one another. [26]

¹This is explained by SP as *svābhāvīketarajñānavaśāt*.

आसुरेभ्योऽधिकारेभ्यो व्युत्थाप्येह प्रजापतिम् ॥

दैवीर्भूमीर्नयामैनमिति देवचिकीर्षितम् ॥ २७ ॥

[Verses 27-29 are the explanation of verse 26 above.]

What the gods wished to do was: 'Let us raise Prajāpati here (in the manifest universe) from his demoniac dispositions¹ and lead this one to the levels² of the divine.' [27]

¹Prajāpati (Hiraṇyagarbha) is conceived as the first sacrificer. In this regard, cf. BUBV 1.2.205-6. The word *adhikāra* literally means 'capacity for activity enjoined on the sacrificer (Prajāpati) by scripture', but here is meant his proneness to undertake the sacrificial activities.

²The plural is used in view of many sacrificers, each of whom is a Prajāpati.

दैवेभ्य एनमाच्छिद्य कामक्रोधादिसाधनाः ॥

आनयामासुरीर्भूमीरिति दैतेयनिश्चितिः ॥ २८ ॥

(As against this), the decision of the sons of Diti was: Let us, who are possessed of various means such as *kāma*, *krodha* etc., cut this one, viz. the sacrificer, (away) from his divine (dispositions) and bring him to the levels of the demons.' [28]

यत्नायत्नसमुत्थाभ्यां वृत्तिभ्यां देवदानवाः ॥

दैव्यासुरीभ्यामन्योन्यमस्पर्धन्त विरोधतः ॥ २९ ॥

[This explains *devānaṃ ca* (BUB p. 45).]

(Thus) the gods and the demons, who were possessed of the divine and the demoniac temperaments respectively (for) activities (which can be accomplished) with effort and without it (i.e. the effort¹), rivalled mutually, owing the opposition (in respect of their ends.) [29]

¹This refers to men's *svābhāvika karman*; cf. *svabhāvaja* in verse 20 above.

भूयो बलेन ते देवा आसुरेण निराश्रयाः ॥

अर्द्यमाना न शरणं लेभिरेऽल्पत्वकारणात् ॥ ३० ॥

[This explains *evam kaniyastvād abhibhūyamānāḥ* (BUB p. 45).]

Those gods, who were much (*bhūyaḥ*) oppressed by the demoniac strength¹ on account of the smallness (in their number), were without any support, (and) they did not find a shelter (i.e. protection). [30]

¹Or alternatively, 'who were oppressed by the greater strength of the demons...' (read *bhūyobalena*).

अनीक्षमाणास्ते शर्म संभूयोचुः परस्परम् ॥

क्रियतामविचारेण हन्तेत्यनुमतौ पदम् ॥ ३१ ॥

They (gods), not finding (lit. seeing) any shelter¹ assembled together and talked among themselves—(in this con-

text) the word *hanta* (in the Śruti sentence *hantāsurān...*) is expressive of the agreement (amongst them thus): 'Let (this) be done without a (moment's) thought²— [31]

¹Or alternatively, 'happiness (in store for themselves)'.

²This is parenthetical; the next verse is the gods' speech.

अस्मज्जिगीषूनसुराञ्जित्वोद्गात्रात्मसंश्रयात् ॥
अतिलङ्घ्यासुरं भावं देवतात्मानमाप्नुमः ॥ ३२ ॥

'Let us, having conquered the demons who wish to conquer us, by resorting to the nature of the Udgātr¹, overcome the demoniac state (that has befallen us) and attain the divine status.' [32]

¹This explains *udgīthena* (BU 1.3.1), following BUB on it, viz. *udgīthakarmapadārthakartṛsvarūpāśrayeṇa* 'resorting to the agent of the ritual called the Udgītha' (BUB p. 46). This emphasises the superior mystic power of the Udgātr priest, who is (later on shown as) identical with Prāṇa.

उद्गीथदेवतावाप्तिर्ज्ञानकर्मसमुच्चयात् ॥
अभ्यारोहजपः कर्म ज्ञानं त्विह परीक्ष्यते ॥ ३३ ॥

The attainment of the (nature of) the deity of the Udgītha becomes possible on account of the combination of the knowledge and the activity (i.e. performance of the Udgāna). Here (i.e. in this regard), the recitation for elevation is the activity.¹ But here (i.e. in what follows) is examined (only) knowledge². [33]

¹Cf. verse 18 above.

²It is the knowledge of the nature of Prāṇa, the deity of the Udgītha.

विधिशेषार्थवादत्वान्नेदं ज्ञाननिरूपणम् ॥
इति चेन्नैतदेवं स्यादेवं वेदेति तद्विधेः ॥ ३४ ॥

[Verses 34-40 refute the supposition that the narrative *dvayā ha...* does not intend to be an exposition of knowledge.]

If (one were to say:) ‘This is not a discussion of knowledge, for it is a eulogistic statement (Arthavāda) about the remainder of the injunction.¹’, (we say:) ‘This could not be so (understood), for there is an injunction (regarding the recitation) in (the sentence) *evam veda*.’ [34]

¹Injunction regarding recitation of the formula for elevation; this means: *evam veda* (= *evam vidyāt*), itself being formally an injunction, cannot be a statement eulogistic or ancillary to any other injunction. The objection is to be understood thus: “Is this narrative to be considered as ancillary to *japavidhi*? or to *udgīthavidhi*?”, as pointed out by NKL.

उद्गीथविधिशेषश्चेदुद्गीथप्रकृतौ श्रवात् ॥
नातत्प्रकरणान्याय्यमितोज्यत्र च तद्विधेः ॥ ३५ ॥

(Then) if (one were to say:) ‘This is an ancillary to the performance (which is meant) in the injunction regarding the Udgītha, i.e. the recitation of the Udgītha, on account of its being heard (i.e. stated in the Śruti) with reference to the injunction regarding the Udgītha’, (our answer is:) It is not reasonable (to say so), since the context is not of that (viz. the Udgītha); and also because the injunction regarding that is prescribed elsewhere.’ [35]

According to NKL, the first alternative which is discussed in verse 34 was regarding Abhyārohaṇa and the other regarding *udgīthavidhi*, in verse 35. SP points out the purport of this objection thus: The statement *dvayā ha...* is made in the nearness of the prescription of the activity of the Udgātr which is the principal action and therefore *dvayā ha...* does not form a part of the exposition of knowledge.

विद्याप्रकरणत्वाच्च नेहोद्गीथो विधीयते ॥
जपस्य चाप्यनित्यत्वात्स्यादेवंवित्प्रयोज्यता ॥ ३६ ॥

(And) because there is here the context of knowledge, the Udgītha is not prescribed here. Yet (*ca*) the recitation (for elevation), not being compulsory, it has to be enjoined for one who knows¹. [36]

SP points out that Abhyārohaṇa is prescribed also for one who has the knowledge of the nature of Prāṇa. It is not a compulsory requirement for such a knower. This implies that, even before the recitation, one may have known the nature of Prāṇa.

¹‘One who knows the purpose of the Udgītha Upāsana.’

उदारफलवद्यस्मादपि ज्ञानमिह श्रुतम् ॥

तद्वैतदित्यतो ज्ञानं फलवत्त्वाद्विधित्सितम् ॥ ३७ ॥

Also because here is heard knowledge as yielding abundant fruit, therefore, in the statement *tadd haitat*,....it is intended to prescribe knowledge owing to its having (an excellent) result¹. [37]

The prescription for knowledge means prescription of the Upāsana of the Udgītha.

¹The variant noted in SP in the AnSS *tasmāt tatphalavattvāt* is better and therefore it is followed in the translation.

शुद्धचशुद्धचुक्तितश्चेह प्राणोपासा विवक्षिता ॥

वागादिनिन्दया मुख्यप्राणोपासा न चेदिह ॥ ३८ ॥

विधित्सिताथ तन्निन्दा स्तुतिश्चानस्य किंफला ॥

अतोऽर्थवादाद्धि विधिर्लिङ्गादत्रानुमीयते ॥ ३९ ॥

And it is intended here to state the Upāsana of Prāṇa as there is the statement about purity and impurity (regarding Prāṇa and others). If, by the censure of Speech and others, the worship of the principal Prāṇa [38]

was not sought to be prescribed, then (the question is:)

‘What is the result of the censure of that (Speech)? and of the praise of Prāṇa¹?’ Therefore, in this context², we infer

the injunction (regarding knowledge) from Arthavāda³

‘the statement of (its) ancillary,’ the cause of (or reason for) inference. [39]

The argument uses the method of Anvaya and Vyatireka.

¹The word *ana* means Prāṇa.

²The word *prakaraṇe* is to be supplied after *atra*.

³Namely, *vāgādinindā*.

प्राणस्वरूपापत्तिश्च यतोपासाफलं श्रुतम् ॥

उपासनमतोज्ञस्य विधित्सितमितीक्ष्यताम् ॥ ४० ॥

Since¹ the result of the Upāsanā is heard (to be one's) coming to obtain the nature of Prāṇa, therefore, it should be understood (lit. seen) that (in this context of the narrative) the worship of Prāṇa is sought to be prescribed. [40]

¹SP points out that there is double Saṁdhi in *yatopāsāphalam* which is equal to *yata upāsāphalam*; this indicates the archaic tendency in Sureśvara's composition.

Verses 41-48 refute the supposition that Prāṇa, the object of an Upāsanā is 'possessed of properties like purity etc.' (like any other object)—this implies opposition to the idea of nirguṇa Brahman.

उपासनमसौः काममस्तु सूक्तोपपत्तिः ॥

शुद्ध्यादिगुणवत्ता तु न मानादुपपद्यते ॥ ४१ ॥

[This explains *bhavatu nāma prāṇasyopāsanam* (BUB p.47).]

(One might oppose thus:) 'Granted that the worship of Prāṇa is (understood here) on the basis of the supporting reason (which is) well adduced (lit. stated) above, yet (in the case of Prāṇa) being possessed of excellence such as purity etc.¹ does not follow from the authoritative means (adopted by you)².' [41]

¹Cf. verse 38 above.

²The word *māna* in the last part of the verse stands for *sūkta* which is mentioned in the earlier half; it refers to the *śabdapramāṇa*, i.e. Śruti.

गुणवत्ताप्यसोरस्तु यथास्योपासनं तथा ॥

प्रामाणिक्युभयत्रापि प्राप्तिर्यस्मादिहेक्ष्यते ॥ ४२ ॥

(The answer to this is:) 'Let it be (understood in the case) of Prāṇa that there is excellence also (as stated in the Śruti), since its worship (is understood); and also because,

in respect of both¹, the authoritativeness (of the Śruti) is desired (i.e. accepted) here (i.e. in the injunction regarding the worship of Udgītha).’ [42]

This argument is based on *devatādhikaraṇanyāya* (BS 1.3.26-33).

¹It means *upāsanā* and *prāṇadevatāśuddhi*. A well-known verse, viz. “*vigraho haviṣām bhoga aiśvaryaṁ ca prasannatā/phalapradānam ity etat pañcakam vighrahādikam*||” justifies this argument.

ननु स्युत्यर्थतैवास्य शुद्ध्यादेरवगम्यते ॥

उपासाविधिशेषत्वादर्थवादोऽत ईक्ष्यताम् ॥ ४३ ॥

[This explains *sa syāt* (BUB p. 47) in answer to the objection *syāt śrutatvāt*.]

(A counter argument is:) One might say: ‘From purity etc. is understood only the praiseworthiness of this (Prāṇa), since it is subsidiary to the injunction regarding the Upāsanā. Therefore, let it (viz. the statement of purity etc.) be understood as Arthavāda.’ [43]

प्रामाणिकोऽभिसंबन्धो यस्मात्प्राणस्य गम्यते ॥

किं बलं समुपाश्रित्य शुद्ध्यादेरर्थवादता ॥ ४४ ॥

(We answer:) ‘Since the relation of Prāṇa (to excellence etc.) is understood as authoritative, (then tell us) resorting to which strength¹ (you understand) the statement of purity etc. as Arthavāda.’ [44]

¹It means ‘strong proof’.

नहि मानं विहायेह साध्यसाधननिश्चितौ ॥

चक्षुरन्यत्रपश्यामो यद्वलात्स्यादयं मूषा ॥ ४५ ॥

‘Indeed we do not know (lit. see or find) here (in Śāstric dealings) any eye¹, leaving aside the means of knowing (viz. the Śruti) for purposes of deciding what is to be proven and what the means of proving it, whereby this one² could be considered as false.’ [45]

¹That is to say: the means of knowing.

²It means 'the Śruti which we have adduced as a proof of knowing that Prāṇa is possessed of excellence etc.'

आसन्यत्वादयोज्यस्य न च योषाग्निवद्यतः ॥

तेषां प्रत्यक्षतः सिद्धेरतः शुद्ध्यादिमानसुः ॥ ४६ ॥

Since the qualities such as (ever) abiding in the mouth¹ do not belong to anyone else (than Prāṇa) in the same way as (the character of) fire in a woman, because that (matter) is established (in its true nature) by direct perception; therefore, Prāṇa is (established as) possessed of purity etc. [46]

¹This is the force of the suffix *ya* added to *āsan*.

अक्षाद्यविषया ये तु गुणा आगतो मताः ॥

मानाविरोधात्केनैषां शुद्ध्यादीनां मृषार्थता ॥ ४७ ॥

By (what reason then) can these, viz. purity etc., as qualities of Prāṇa, though not the object of the eyes etc. (and) known from Āgama, be false, when there is no opposition to the (authoritative) means (viz. Śruti)? [47]

श्रोत्रादिवत्प्रमाणानामसाधारणमेयता ॥

तन्मेयप्रथने मानं न किञ्चिदनुभूतितः ॥ ४८ ॥

Like the ears etc., the various other means of knowing (also) have their own special objects of knowledge. (Consequently), there is nothing else than (one's own) experience which serves as a means of knowing which can reveal the object to be known¹. [48]

¹*tanmeyaprathane* of AnSS edition (also SP agrees) is read in the NKL as *tanmeyagrathane*. NKL paraphrases it as *mānameyasambandhe* (which is *viṣayaviṣayisambandhe*, following the note by the editor of NKL). Translation follows SP.

Verses 49-65 explain that, since falsity is difficult to explain, purity etc. of Prāṇa are not false.

परमार्थातिरेकाद्वाभेदाद्वा परमार्थतः ॥

वस्तुनः स्यान्मृषात्मत्वं नैवमप्युपपद्यते ॥ ४६ ॥

(A questions is asked:) 'Whether the nature of falsity of the existential entity, viz. Prāṇa, would be in addition to (i.e. besides or apart from) the ultimate reality, or as non-distinct from that reality.' (The answer is:) 'Thus also, it cannot be explained.' [49]

The qualities attributed to Prāṇa, viz. purity etc. are disputed. There are two alternatives posited: (i) Prāṇa is distinct from the ultimate reality; and (ii) Prāṇa is not distinct from it.

लभते व्यतिरेकं चेत्परमार्थात्ततोऽपरम् ॥

स्वमहिम्नैव तत्सिद्धेः किमिव स्यान्मृषार्थता ॥ ५० ॥

If it has distinction from the ultimate reality, then (this) other¹ has its proof (i.e. gets established) by its own strength.² What would (then) be 'being false object'? [50]

This answers away the first alternative.

¹Namely, Prāṇa which is posited as false.

²This falsity has to be declared as self-established, for there is not seen any connection of it whatever with either the Reality or a non-existent.

परमार्थात्मकत्वे तु न किञ्चिद्विषयं क्वचित् ॥

असत्यस्याप्यसत्यत्वं परमार्थसदात्मना ॥ ५१ ॥

As against this, no thing which has the nature of the ultimate reality can anywhere (or ever) be untrue because the untruth of the untrue also would be of the nature of the ultimate reality. [51]

This answers away the second alternative mentioned in verse 49 above.

This points to the Reality which is explained by SP thus: *asatyasyāpi svarūpaṁ sadvastvātmanā vācyam ato bhedapakṣānu-papatteḥ sad advaitam ity arthaḥ.*

सत्यासत्यविभागोऽयमविभागात्मवस्तुनि ॥

प्रत्यगज्ञानहेतूत्थस्तद्विधादेव तद्धतिः ॥ ५२ ॥

This division of the true and the false is in respect of that thing which is of the nature of what is partless (and) it (viz. the division) arises from the cause, viz. ignorance, regarding (the nature of) the inner self. On knowing (the nature of) that¹ (viz. the inner self), there occurs the destruction of that (viz. ignorance). [52]

This verse is an answer to the possible objection: Even the Siddhāntin holds the division of the universe into true and false; (cf. *satyānrte mithumikṛtya...vyavahāraḥ* in Śaṅkara's BSB (*adhyāsabhāṣya*).)

¹The first *tat* 'that' refers to the *pratyak* and the second to ignorance about its nature.

This explains the effect of the knowledge of the real absence of division into true and false.

स्वाभासफलकारुढस्तदज्ञानजभूमिषु ॥

तत्स्थोऽपि तदसंबद्ध ईश्वराद्यात्मतां गतः ॥ ५३ ॥

(The Self) which has mounted on the plank in the form of its own appearance¹ in the states resulting from the ignorance of itself (*sva*) is not connected with them, even while existing in them, and has (later) become identical with Īśvara and others.²

This is an explanation of *tadbodhāt eva taddhatiḥ* in the preceding verse.

¹This refers to Sureśvara's theory of Ābhāsa 'appearance'.

²The word 'etc.' stands for *sākṣin*, *kāraṇa*, *antaryāmin* (SP); cf. *avidyākṛtanāmarūpopādhyanurodhīśvaro bhavati* (BSB 2.1.14). In other words, the expressions Īśvara etc. also are owing to the ignorance about the Reality.

तदज्ञानं तदुत्थं च जगत्कृत्स्नं तदात्मकम् ॥

यतोऽतस्तदनूद्याह ह्यात्मैवेति श्रुतिः स्फुटम् ॥ ५४ ॥

Since ignorance about that (ultimate reality) and the entire world which, having the nature of that (Īśvara), has arisen from that, therefore, having restated that, indeed, has the Śruti clearly said 'ātmā ...eva'¹ [54]

This verse points to an authoritative Śruti in support of the argument in the preceding verse, viz. *seśvaram jagad āvidyam*.

¹This should refer to *ātmety evopāsīta....*

ऐकात्म्यमेव मानानां सर्वेषां मेयमिष्यते ॥
यथा तथा प्रवक्ष्याम उदर्कज्युपपत्तिभिः ॥ ५५ ॥

Even¹ in later portion², we shall explain with cogent arguments (and) in such a way as shows that all the means of knowing can be said to have only the oneness of the Ātman as the object of knowing³. [55]

¹The word *api* 'even' refers to what is said in SV.

²The word *udarke* refers to the discussion of *vyākṛta* according to SP and *avyākṛta* according to the editor of NKL!

³Cf NKL: *dvaitasya mithyātve pratyakṣāder anālambanasyā-mānatvam* (the editor explains: *anālambanasya* as *vastvaviṣaya-kasya*).

मिथ्येतिप्रत्ययोत्पत्तिस्तथा कारणदोषतः ॥
बाध्यज्ञानस्य हेतुः स्यान्नातोऽन्यद्बाध्यकारणम् ॥ ५६ ॥

So also the rise of the knowledge, that the notion of (Prāṇa's purity etc.) is false, would be, owing to (some) fault in reasoning¹, the cause of knowledge to be stultified. There cannot, therefore, be anything else than this as the cause² (of the knowledge) to be stultified. [56]

This verse is intended to explain the need of knowing the uniqueness of the Reality (*aikātmya*) because the objector would raise an objection: 'Since the Śruti expressive of the uniqueness of the Reality is false, there is no means to prove it, viz. the uniqueness.' It explains the cause of the unauthoritative knowledge. This has a basis in verse 50 above.

¹This refers to reasoning (*jñāpaka*).

²This refers to the so-called productive cause (*kāraka*).

न चेहोभयमप्यस्ति कुतो मिथ्येति भण्यते ॥

मितेर्मये समाप्तत्वान्मिथ्यात्वं न मितेर्भवेत् ॥ ५७ ॥

(One would then ask:) 'In this case¹, both of them² are not noticed (to exist); why is it then said to be false? (The answer is:) Knowledge (is said to) have occurred when the object of knowledge is obtained;³ whatever is knowledge cannot be false.' [57]

¹The word *iha* stands for *śrutijanya-aikātmya-jñāna*.

²This means 'there is no *kāraṇadoṣa* and no *svarūpadoṣa*'; cf. note on the preceding verse.

³This obtaining is in reality the becoming one of the so-called knower and the so-called object of his knowing; cf. SP: *miter aikyabodhasya meye paramārthasatye paryavasānāt*.

तस्मादविपरीतार्थज्ञानाच्छ्रेयो ह्यवाप्यते ॥

विपरीतार्थतायास्तु न हेतुर्जगतीक्ष्यते ॥ ५८ ॥

[*aviparītārthapratipatteḥ*...(BUB p. 47) is explained.]

Therefore, bliss is certainly¹ obtained from the knowledge of the (Real) object which is not otherwise (grasped). However, no purpose is known (lit. seen) in this world for (the Real) object being known as otherwise.² [58]

¹It seems from SP that the verse read as...*cchreyo avāpyate* (without the Samdhi of *o* and *a*; but only without any purpose! *hi* 'certainly' makes it quite emphatic. Read SP: *samyagbodhā-dhīnā śreyovāptir iti sthāṇvādaḥ prasiddham iti vaktum hiśabdah, viśamdhīpāṭhas tv aphalatvād upekṣitaḥ*.

²Earlier it was pointed out that the purpose of the knowledge of the Real as it is securing liberation. There is however no purpose served by understanding it otherwise. Read in this context BUB (p. 47): *yo hy aviparītām artham pratipadyate loka sa iṣṭam prāpnoty aniṣṭād vā nivartate, na viparītārthapratipattyā*.

वस्तुनिष्ठैव मा यस्मान्न तदज्ञानजाश्रया ॥

तस्मात्तन्मोहविध्वस्तौ ध्वस्तिः स्यान्मोहजस्य च ॥ ५९ ॥

Since valid knowledge¹ depends only on (the knowledge of) the (Real) object itself and not dependent (lit. resting) on what is produced from the ignorance about it,² therefore, when there is destruction of the ignorance of that, there follows the destruction of what is produced from (that) ignorance. [59]

The argument in this verse is based on the acceptance even by the Siddhāntin that knowledge arising from words is *viparīta* 'false', for it has for it an object that is connected with (i.e. affected by) *upādhis* and that which is not directly experienced by one. Cf. SP: *asaṃsr̥ṣṭāparokṣaṃ vastv ekam evādvitīyaṃ yatsākṣyād ityādiśruteḥ...*

¹*mā*=*pramā*.

²It refers to *vastu* 'Real object'. Here we feel the cryptic or terse way of Sureśvara's writing: *vastuniṣṭhā*=*vastu(yāthārthya)-niṣṭhā*. In *tadajñāna...tat* refers only to *vastu*.

न चैवं सति मानानां द्वयवर्थता स्यात्कथंचन ॥

यथाभूतार्थबोधित्वमेवमेव मितेर्भवेत् ॥ ६० ॥

This being the situation, the means of knowledge would not in any way give rise to the knowledge of twofold nature (viz. both real and unreal)¹. Only thus there would be the character of the knowledge as informing about the object as it is. [60]

¹This is to say: the word is used in the sense 'this is right and this is not right'. Cf. SP: *saṃvidekarase mānapravṛttiḥ*.

ईश्वरादिविकल्पानां प्रत्यग्वस्त्वविकल्पितम् ॥

विषयो न मृषाबुद्धिः परमार्थं विना यतः ॥ ६१ ॥

Among the various notions of Īśvara and others, the inner self stands uniform¹ (i.e. not variously understood), since an object of knowledge would not be that about which

there arises false knowledge, unless there is some one Reality (to prove that as false). [61]

So far, i.e. from verse 58 up to this verse, Sureśvara refuted the falsity in respect of the purity of the Ātman as understood or implied by the opponent of Vedānta. Now, this verse aims to point out how the Siddhānta differs from Śūnyavāda.

¹That is to say: various notions cannot be formed about it.

यावत्किञ्चिन्मितेः प्राप्तं न तन्मिथ्या मितत्वतः ॥
मिथ्येति ग्राह्यच्छास्त्रमनर्थार्थं यतो भवेत् ॥ ६२ ॥
नास्मि ब्रह्मेति दृष्टं चेन्न भेदप्रतिपत्तिः ॥
प्रतिमावद्धि नामादौ ज्ञाते ब्रह्मेति धीरियम् ॥ ६३ ॥

[Sureśvara now states in verses 62-65 a second (i.e. an alternative) meaning of the word *prakaraṇa* (BUB p. 47): *nāviparītārtha* ...in respect of the falsity associated with Prāṇa by an opponent. The second line of verse 63 explains *na pratimāvad*... (BUB p. 48).]

‘Whatever is obtained from the knowledge of the means of knowing (viz. the Śruti)¹ cannot be false on account of its being known (from the Śruti), because scriptures would be (considered as) conveying some undesirable information, if it informed (about the purity of the Ātman) as false.’ [62]
(It might be argued:) ‘We have already known that the name (etc.) is the Brahman.’ (We reply:) ‘No, because of the knowledge of the distinction (between the two). This knowledge, viz. (it is) Brahman, (which arises) when a name (etc.) is known, is like (that) when (the true nature of) an image² (is known).’ [63]

¹This is in consonance with the Siddhānta position that the knowledge of the Ātman is obtained by only one means, viz. Śruti.

²This is explained fully in the following verse.

यथा निर्जातभेदे हि विष्णुधोरुपलात्मनि ॥
विधीयते तथा नास्मि ब्रह्मबुद्धिविधीयते ॥ ६४ ॥

‘As (in common life) they entertain the notion of Viṣṇu in what is in reality a stone, even though the distinction between the two is known, so it is enjoined (in the Śruti to entertain that) a name is to be taken as the Brahman.’ [64]

अज्ञातरज्जुतत्त्वो हि रज्जुं सर्पधियेक्षते ॥
नामादौ तु यतो नैवं तस्मादसदिदं वचः ॥ ६५ ॥

Indeed, one who has not known the true nature of a rope sees (the rope) with the notion of a serpent. As against this (*tu*), since it is not (i.e. one does not do) so, this (your) say is incorrect (*asat*). [65]

ब्रह्म नैवेह वस्त्वस्ति दृष्टिरेवेति चेन्मतम् ॥
नर्गादिषु सतामेव सत्सु दृष्टिसमन्वयात् ॥ ६६ ॥

[Verses 66-68 state and refute the object that the Brahman does not exist and yet is seen in name etc.]

If it is held: ‘There does not at all exist an entity (called) the Brahman, it is merely seeing (something as the Brahman).’¹ (We reply:) ‘Not so, because in respect of a *rc*² etc., which are existent (things) indeed, there is seeing connected only with what are existents.’³ [66]

¹The opponent implies similarity between *nāmni brahma-drṣṭi* and *rajivām sarpadrṣṭi* where (in the pairs) are involved one real and another non-existent.

²Cf. CU 1.6.1: *iyam evarg agniḥ sāma*.

³SP: *rgādiṣu satsu satām prthivyādīnām āropadarśanān nāmā-dāv api saty eva sato brahmaṇo drṣṭir āropanīyety arthaḥ*. Also SP points to a number of Śruti passages (CU 6.2.1; Kaṭha U 6.13; TU 2.6.1) which declare the reality of the Brahman, and to the discussion on this point in SV.

गौणस्य मुख्यापेक्षत्वान्मुख्यं ब्रह्म विना न सत् ॥
गौणं ब्रह्म यथा गौणो वह्निर्मुख्याग्निपूर्वकः ॥ ६७ ॥

‘Since what is metaphorically conceived is dependent on what is primarily (intended), therefore, the metaphorically

conceived Brahman is like the metaphorically conceived fire which (fire) has necessarily pre-existed (the man).¹ [67]

¹This point is clarified in BUB (p. 49-50): *pañcāgnyādiṣu cāg-nitvāder gaṇatvān mukhyāgnyādisadbhāvavan nāmādiṣu brahma-tvasya gaṇatvān mukhyābrahmasadbhāvopapattiḥ kriyārthaiś cāviśeṣād vidyārthānam*. This is an instance of *gaṇamukhyādhi-karaṇanyāya* (Mīmāṃsā Sūtra 3.2.1.1). The commentary cites the known example of metaphorical speech *agniḥ māṇavakaḥ* whose truth depends on the existence of a real fire already known or seen by a speaker.

न चासद्विषया काचिद्बुद्धिर्जगति वीक्ष्यते ॥

सर्वार्थव्यभिचारेऽपि संविदव्यभिचारिणी ॥ ६८ ॥

‘And there is not known (lit. seen) in the world any knowledge which has some non-existent as its object. (Contrary to this) Sentience (i.e. the knowing one) is ever invariably existent even while all objects¹ (of knowledge) have variance’². [68]

¹This indicates the structure of any worldly understanding or the so-called knowledge situation, viz. the knower, the object of knowledge, the means of knowing and the decision in knowing; they are time and again referred to in BUBV etc. as *mātrādi*. Sentience is *saṁvid* or *cidvastu*.

²That is to say: the so-called objects might or might not exist.

न चापीहागमाभासोऽचोदनालक्षणत्वतः ॥

क्रियार्थैरविशिष्टत्वाद्विद्यार्थोक्तेः परात्मनि ॥ ६९ ॥

[Verses 69-77 pertain to the objection that ‘the Vedānta sentences are unauthoritative, since they do not have injunctive force’ and its refutation.]

And further (one should) not (argue that) ‘there is not here (merely) the semblance of a (scriptural) text, because the text is not characterised as injunction(s) and because the statement of the lore in respect of the Ātman is not

marked by (or, does not refer to) some object(s) to be achieved by some action.' [69]

SP points out that the objection in the above is raised by one who is not aware of the portion of the SV (viz. 672ff.) pertaining to his argument: The instruction regarding the knowledge of the Brahman is not authoritative scripture owing to the lack of injunctive force in it.

ज्योतिष्टोमादिका यद्वद्विशिष्टानेकसाधना ॥

एवंक्रमप्रयुक्ताङ्गा तथा चैवंपला क्रिया ॥ ७० ॥

अन्यप्रमाणाविषया वाक्यादेवावगम्यते ॥

यथा तथेहापूर्वादिवस्तुक्तेरेव गम्यते ॥ ७१ ॥

As the (ritual) activity such as Jyotiṣṭoma etc. which has the means specified (in the scripture) and consists in parts with their order (enjoined) in some way¹ and also has some particular reward, [70]

is not the object of (any) other means of knowing and is known only from the Vedic sentence, so also here (in Vedānta) the (existential) entity (which is described as *apūrva* and so on² becomes known from the statement (in the Śruti). [71]

¹Literally it means 'such and such'.

²Cf. *tad etad brahmāpūrvam anaparam anantaram abāhyam* (BU 2.5.19)

न च वाक्याद्विपर्यस्ता यदि वा संशयात्मिका ॥

बुद्धिरुत्पद्यतेऽस्माकं यथाभूतार्थबोधिः ॥ ७२ ॥

And from the Vedic sentence that informs (us) about 'the existential entity as it is, there does not arise on our part the knowledge which is either otherwise (than right) or¹ beset with any doubt. [72]

This verse has a basis in the possible doubt that knowledge gained from the Vedic (=Vedāntic) sentence, being like any other knowledge, could be false or subject to doubt.

¹*yadi vā=atha vā.*

कार्याभावादयुक्तं चेन्नोक्तिबुद्धेस्तथार्थतः ॥

भावनार्थस्य नैवेह भाव्यर्थत्वात्तथार्थता ॥

किंतु मानापितत्वात्सा यथाभूतार्थतेष्यते ॥ ७३ ॥

If (it is said by the opponent:) ‘It is not proper (to hold a *jñānaparavākya* as an injunction) since there is absence of (any) effect to be produced.’, (the Vedāntin answers:) ‘This is not so, because the knowledge (which arises) from the statement (of the Śruti) has for its object (that which has that nature)¹. Since the thing conveyed by the impulse² here³ is a thing to be produced (in future), it does not at all have the nature of that kind (of the thing).’ Yet (the Vedāntin answers:) ‘That (nature of) the thing conveyed by the (so-called or formal) impulse is the nature of the thing as it is⁴, because it is conveyed by the authoritative means (viz. the Śruti)’.

[73]

The argument concerns and answers an alternative question regarding the nature of the thing conveyed by an injunction.

¹*tathārthataḥ* is for *tathārthavattvataḥ*—an instance of Sureśvara’s cryptic style, or rather, use of unusual forms in place of the right/precise ones; it stands for *yathābhūtārthavattvataḥ*.

²This means ‘the force behind any injunction’.

³*iha*=*karmakāṇḍe*—SP and NKL.

⁴The Brahman, as it is or in its true nature, is made known by the so-called injunction, or alternatively, any matter conveyed by any injunction. The injunction is understood here as *ajñātārthajñāpaka*.

नापि तद्विषयायाश्च कार्यत्वात्स्यात्तथार्थता ॥

प्रमाणाभिजनादेव यथाभूतार्थता धियः ॥ ७४ ॥

Not also is there authoritativeness¹ of the knowledge arising from that² as what is to be produced; (indeed) knowledge has the nature of what has for its object a thing as it is only when it has its origin in what is an authoritative means of knowing.

[74]

The argument pertains to what makes the impulse in the Śruti about *jñāna* authoritative.

¹*tathārthatā=pramāṇatā* (SP), *prāmāṇyam* (NKL).

³*taddhiṣaṇā=tasyāḥ* (*śruteḥ janitā*) *buddhiḥ*.

अन्योन्याश्रयतादोषः कार्यप्रमाण्यवादिनः ॥ ७५ ॥

प्रमाणाधिगतौ सत्यां पुंसो मेयानुरोधतः ॥

अनुष्ठेयोऽननुष्ठेय इति पञ्चान्मतिर्भवेत् ॥ ७६ ॥

In the case of him who understands the authoritativeness (of the Śruti sentences) on the basis of what is to be performed, there is the fault, called interdependence, (viz. thus:)—

[75]

(Only) after (one has understood a Vedic sentence) in consonance (with the knowledge of) what is to be known (viz. what is to be accomplished), there is the acceptance of (that sentence as) the means of right knowledge; (and, at the same time, it is held that) there results (only) later the knowledge (of what is prescribed as) something to be accomplished or not to be accomplished.

[76]

Verse 76 explains the mutual dependence of *pramāṇavākya* and *pramāṇavākya*janitārtha.

एकरूपं यतो मानं विरुद्धानेकरूपिणाम् ॥

भानुबद्धोधकं दृष्टं नातोऽनुष्ठेयतो मितिः ॥ ७७ ॥

Since an authoritative means (of knowing) is, like the Sun, a uniform conveyer (of the objects) which have many mutually opposed forms, therefore, knowledge does not arise (only) from (a rule regarding) what is to be performed. [77]

The nature of an authoritative means of knowing does not depend upon the various or opposed natures of the objects. This is seen from the Sun's revealing objects of all kinds. Therefore, the Śruti can, in the same way, be authoritative in respect of what is to be accomplished and what is not to be accomplished. The important character of the Śruti is that it should be informative of what is not known (from any other source).

नन्ववाक्यप्रमाणत्वमननुष्ठानतो भवेत् ॥
पदानां संहतिर्यस्मान्न दृष्टेह क्रियां विना ॥ ७८ ॥

[Verses 78-83 discuss whether the Brahman is the meaning of word(s) or that of sentence(s).]

It might be argued: 'On account of the absence of effecting (a product), (the statement about the Brahman) would have unauthoritativeness, since no construe of words is seen (as possible) here¹ without (any reference to) any action (connected with the same)'.² [78]

This is the argument of the objector: the Brahman is not the meaning of the word(s).

¹In the Vedic sentence. Such is the view of the Mīmāṃsaka.

²This implies the presence of a verb which expresses some action in conjunction with various words in the sentence. In Vedāntic sentences, it is argued, the Brahman which is the subject in them is not connected with action and, therefore, with verbs.

पदार्थत्वे च तत्सिद्धिर्लिङ्गप्रत्यक्षसंश्रयात् ॥
आगमैकप्रमाणत्वान्न पदार्थत्वमिष्यते ॥ ७९ ॥
अस्यस्मीत्यभ्युपेतत्वान्नैवमप्युपपद्यते ॥
अस्ति मेरुर्यथा वर्णचतुष्टयविशेषणः ॥ ८० ॥
अकार्येऽपि हि मेवादावस्ति मेरुरिति श्रुतेः ॥
सम्यग्धीर्जायते यद्वत्तथा तत्त्वमसीत्यतः ॥ ८१ ॥

'And that¹ would be established (only) if it² were accepted as the meaning of the word(s), by resorting to inference³ and direct perception; it cannot (however) be accepted that (the Brahman is) the meaning of the word(s) (without any connection with action) having only Śruti as the authoritative means of knowing it.' [79]

'(And) this objection also cannot be considered as reasonable since the verbs *asi* and *aṣmi* are accepted (as verbs connected with the subject of the sentence, viz. *tat* and *aham* for Brahman). (To explain:) This is (so) because there

occurs in a sentence (the subject) Mt. Meru only qualified by (a word expressive of) four colours (and it is taken as connected with *asti* 'is'). [80]

'As, indeed, in respect of Mt. Meru etc., which is not what is to be accomplished⁴, there arises from the Śruti the right knowledge (of it), viz. 'There is Mt. Meru.', so will there arise right knowledge from the statement 'That you are.'. [81]

Verses 79-81 concern the argument of the objector regarding that the Brahman is not the meaning of the word(s).

¹Namely, connection of words.

²Namely, the Brahman.

³The word *liṅga* stands for *liṅga-liṅgi-parāmarśa* 'inference'.

⁴The emphasis on *akārye* has be noted.

मेवादिज्ञानवच्चेत्स्यान्निष्फलत्वादमानता ॥

नैवं तत्फलसाक्षात्त्वाज्ज्ञानोद्भूतेरनन्तरम् ॥ ८२ ॥

If one were to say: 'There is unauthoritativeness (of the Śruti sentence in this case also) as in the case of the knowledge about Mt. Meru etc. owing to their being devoid of any effect', this is not so, since the effect of them (viz. such sentences) has been directly experienced¹ subsequent to the rise (of the knowledge of the Mt. Meru). [82]

¹The Siddhānta emphasises on the direct experience as an unfailing means to right knowledge; this is in contrast with inference.

भिद्यते हृदयग्रन्थिर्ब्रह्माप्येतीति च श्रुतेः ॥

न चार्थवादतैतस्यां जुह्वामिव फलश्रुतेः ॥ ८३ ॥

And (thus we see, in this respect) from the Śruti (statements); 'The knot of heart is broken'¹ (and) '(Becoming the Brahman) he merges into the Brahman'.² Also, there is no nature of Arthavāda in this (Śruti)³ in the same way as in the Śruti statement regarding the reward of the use of a ladle (made of Palāśa wood).⁴ [83]

¹Muṇḍakopaniṣad 2.2.9.

²BU 4.4.6: *brahmaiva san brahmāpyeti*.

³SP controverts the variant reading...*vādataitasyāh* for *tasyām*; NKL and AnSS editions agree in respect of the latter reading.

⁴This *phalaśruti* has a reference to some subordinate or secondary reward in a ritual. In respect of the Śruti regarding *brahmāpyaya* (cf. *brahmāpyeti* in the preceding verse), there is no notion of primary and secondary rewards, i.e. results.

Verses 84-95 explain that the Mahāvākyas 'That you are.' etc. as authoritative just like any prohibitive statement even when they merely refer to certain things as they are and not to the things that are to be accomplished.

निषिद्धानिष्टसंबन्धो वाक्यादेवावगम्यते ॥

न चानुष्ठेयता तस्य मनागप्युपपद्यते ॥ ८४ ॥

Connection of what is prohibited and/or what is undesirable (with action) is understood only from a Śruti statement and its character as what is to be accomplished¹ cannot be proved by any reason, even to a little extent. [84]

¹This is to emphasise that there can be authoritative Śruti statements even if they pertain to what is not to be accomplished (or) effected.

निषेधसंस्कृतधियो निषिद्धविषये न च ॥

पलाण्डादावकरणादन्या धीर्जायते श्रुतेः ॥ ८५ ॥

And, indeed, in the case of one whose intellect¹ is impressed by a prohibitive rule in regard to what is prohibited, there does not arise from a Śruti statement any knowledge¹ other than that of not taking an onion etc.² [85]

¹The first *dhī* stands for the sense-organ (*buddhi*) and the second for the impression on it (*jñānākāra*).

²Cf. *Manusmṛti* 5.19: *palāṇḍum grñjanam caiva laśunam grāmakukkuṭam/chatrākam viḍvarāham ca matyā jagdhvā paten narah* (quoted in NKL); this is an example of a prohibitive sentence.

यथा निषेधवाक्येभ्यो नान्याकरणतो मतिः ॥

तत्त्वमस्यादिवाक्येभ्यस्तद्वदेवेति निश्चयः ॥ ८६ ॥

[Verses 84-86 refer to the agreement between Vedānta-sentences and Brāhmaṇa-sentences as regards prohibitions.]

As from the prohibitive Śruti statements there does not arise any thought other than of not doing (certain things), so also from the sentences 'That you are.' etc. (there does not arise....doing)—this is the decision.¹ [86]

¹Verse 85 stated the illustration and verse 86 explained its application to the Vedāntic sentences—and thus established the conclusion.

मृगतोये प्रवृत्तस्य तृडार्तस्योषरेक्षणात् ॥

तमोध्वस्तौ निवृत्तिः स्यात्तथात्मज्ञानतोऽपि नः ॥ ८७ ॥

As in the case of one afflicted by thirst, who moves towards mirage (for drinking water), (there results only his turning back) when his ignorance (about it) is removed on his seeing the marshy land, so also (is removed), according to us, the turning back of one (from the false transmigratory world when one's ignorance is destroyed) by knowing the Ātman. [87]

तस्मान्निषेधशास्त्रस्य यथा भूतार्थनिष्ठता ॥

पुंव्यापारस्य गन्धोऽपि न तत्रास्तीति निश्चयः ॥ ८८ ॥

आत्मयाथात्म्यविज्ञाननिष्ठता तद्वदीक्ष्यताम् ॥

तत्त्वमस्यादिवाक्यानां नानुष्ठानं मनागपि ॥ ८९ ॥

Therefore, the decision is such that, as in the prohibitive scripture there is no reference to even a little of human activity, and that it is based on an existential entity, [88]

so, be it accepted (lit. seen) that in the case of sentences 'That you are.' etc. they pertain (only) to the knowledge of the true nature of the self and that there is no reference to any activity, even to a little extent. [89]

कलञ्जभक्षणस्येव ननु न श्रौतकर्मणः ॥

अज्ञानहेत्वन्तार्थकारिता गम्यते मितेः ॥ ६० ॥

(The objector answers:) 'But, as in the case of eating of *kalañja*,¹ it does not become known from the Śruti that the knowledge of a ritual activity, which is prescribed by scripture, has the nature of being the cause of ignorance and of some undesirable result.'

[90]

This is an argument of the Mīmāṃsaka who holds that every sentence must have relation to some activity; it is not merely *ajñātajñāpaka*.

¹It refers to poisoned meat.

नैवमज्ञानहेतुत्वानर्थार्थत्वेन तुल्यता ॥

कलञ्जभक्षणेनातस्तन्निवृत्तौ निवर्तते ॥ ६१ ॥

(We answer:) 'There is no similarity¹ between (knowledge of the Brahman arising from the Śruti) and that about a *niṣiddha-karman*, like the eating of *kalañja*, in being the cause of ignorance and of some undesirable result². (A person) desists (from every ritual activity) when his ignorance is removed (lit. warded off)³.'

[91]

This is the Siddhānta, an answer to the argument in the preceding verse.

¹It literally means 'equality'.

²The eating of *kalañja* is owing to ignorance about its true nature and it brings about an untoward result, viz. death. So does the performance of a ritual activity proceed from ignorance about the nature of the self and brings about the continuation of the cycle of transmigration.

³*tannivṛtti* refers to *tamodhvasti* in connection with the knowledge of the Brahman, cf. verse 87 above.

शास्त्रमात्रनिमित्तत्वान्नित्यानां नैवमिष्यते ॥

मिथ्याज्ञानादिहेतुत्वं काम्यानामिव चेन्मतम् ॥ ६२ ॥

नाविद्यारागद्वेषादिदोषदुष्टस्य तद्विधेः ॥

स्वर्गादिकामिनो यद्वदग्निहोत्रविधिस्तथा ॥ ६३ ॥

मोहकामादिदुष्टस्य नित्यं कर्म विधीयते ॥

न स्वतः काम्यनित्यत्वविवेकोऽस्तीह कर्मणः ॥ ६४ ॥

If it is held: 'We do not accept such nature of being the cause of false knowledge (about the self) etc. in the case of obligatory (rites) known only from the Śruti, as in the case of desired rites.' [92]

(To this the answer is: 'This is not so), since the injunction regarding them¹ is affected by the fault of ignorance, hankering (for some reward), hatred etc., as, for example, there is an injunction (for the performance) of Agnihotra for one who is desirous of heaven etc.'² [93]

'(Even) an obligatory rite is enjoined on one who is affected by ignorance, desire etc. (And) here (in Veda) there is not held any essential³ distinction between rites being desired and obligatory.'⁴ [94]

¹This is a reference to the obligatory rites.

²Desire for heaven etc. signifies the undesirable identification of the self with a body, its pleasure and its transmigration etc. This explains *yathā ca darśapaurṇamāsādikriyedaṃphalā...* (BUB p. 50)

³This literally means 'of their own'.

⁴This is to say: the nature of the fourfold injunction, viz. *utpattividhi*, *vinīyogavidhi*, *prayogavidhi* and *adhikāraavidhi*, remains the same in the case of both kinds of rites.

कर्तृस्थेन हि स्वर्गादिकामदोषेण काम्यता ॥

अतो नान्येन काम्यत्वं कर्मणः स्यात्कथंचन ॥ ६५ ॥

'The desirable nature of a ritual activity is on account of the faults such as the desire for heaven etc. which abide in a performer¹ (and) there would not be (in any rite) the nature of what is desirable on account of anything else, in any way.'² [95]

¹NKL observes here: *kāmaprayuktaṃ kāmyam, jīvanaprayuktaṃ nityam*.

²SP supports this by citing a line from Manu Smṛti: *yad yadd hi kurute jantus tat tat kāmasya ceṣṭitam* (2.4).

Verses 96-111 explain the distinction between two types of persons, those eligible for knowledge and those for action.

आविरिञ्चाद्विरक्तस्य तद्विविक्तात्मकामिनः ॥

मोक्षे पुंसोऽधिकारः स्यान्न कामापहृतात्मनः ॥ ९६ ॥

(As against the above, only) that man is eligible for liberation who has turned averse to (the world) beginning with the creator (Viriñca) and who has a desire for (knowing) the Ātman¹ which is distinct from that (world); but not he whose mind² is carried away by desire. [96]

¹This refers to the Supreme Self.

²This refers to the inner self, identical with a human body, this is the meaning of the (second) ātman.

पराचः कामानित्येवं कामानित्यपरं तथा ॥

योऽकाम इति तद्वच्च श्रुतिः कामनिषेधनी ॥ ९७ ॥

There is a Śruti statement¹: *parācaḥ kāmān*; so also another, viz. *kāmān* and likewise yet another: *yo'kāmaḥ* (all of) which are prohibitive of (entertaining) desires. [97]

¹Refer to *Kaṭhopaniṣad* 3.2: *parācaḥ kāmān anuyanti bālās te mṛtyor yanti vitatasya pāśam*; *Muṇḍakopaniṣad* 3.2.2: *kāmān yaḥ kāmāyate manyamānaḥ sa kāmabhir jāyate tatra tatra*; BU 4.4.6: *athākāmāyamāno yo'kāmo niṣkāma āptakāma ātmakāmo na tasya prāṇā utkrāmanti*—this is *niśedhaśruti* (NKL).

अविद्याया न चोच्छित्तौ ज्ञानादन्यदपेक्ष्यते ॥

ज्ञानोत्पत्तौ न चैवान्यच्छमादिभ्यो ह्यपेक्ष्यते ॥ ९८ ॥

And for securing the removal of ignorance nothing else than the knowledge of (the true nature of) the Ātman is expected and for securing the rise of (that) knowledge is expected nothing else than tranquillity etc. (which are the effects of purification (of one's mind) etc. [98]

शमाद्युत्पत्तये नान्यद्बुद्धिशुद्धेरपेक्ष्यते ॥

बुद्धिशुद्धौ च नित्यादिकर्मभ्यो नान्यदिष्यते ॥ ९९ ॥

For achieving (lit. effecting) tranquillity etc. is expected nothing else than purification of intellect and for the purification of the intellect is desired nothing else than (the performance of) the obligatory and other rites. [99]

आत्माज्ञानैकहेतुत्वाद्वाङ्मनःकायकर्मणाम् ॥
आत्मज्ञानेन तद्वाधात्कर्मपिक्षा कुतो भवेत् ॥ १०० ॥

The activities of speech, *manas* and body which originate from (only) ignorance about the self that is (within) and gets stultified¹ by the knowledge of the self, whence can there be the expectation (i.e. need) of any ritual activity? [100]

¹Or alternatively, 'which has its stultification...', that is to say: the effects of these performances are removed.

यदज्ञानात्प्रवृत्तिर्या तज्ज्ञानात्सा कुतो भवेत् ॥
प्रत्यग्ज्ञानोद्भूते तस्मात्समाप्तिः सर्वकर्मणाम् ॥ १०१ ॥

How can an activity (= *pravṛtti*) that (proceeds) from the ignorance about something continue after (the rise of) the knowledge of that (thing)? Therefore, on the rise of the knowledge of (the true nature of) the inner self, (there occurs) the cessation (lit. securing the end) of all activities.¹ [101]

¹SP refers this to *Bhagavadgītā* 6.3: *yogārūḍhasya tasyaiva (=karmanah) śamaḥ kāraṇam ucyate.*

न चोच्छिन्नात्ममोहस्य सदैवात्मधियः स्थितेः ॥
प्रतीच्यवसरोऽस्तीह वाङ्मनःकायकर्मणाम् ॥ १०२ ॥

And since in the case of him, whose ignorance about the Ātman is destroyed, there ever abides in his inner self the awareness of (the true nature of) [the Ātman, there is no occasion for the activities of speech, *manas* and body. [102]

कर्मणोऽवसरश्चेत्स्यात्त्वद्भिक्षावसरो यथा ॥
नात्मवस्तुनिमित्तत्वात्सम्यग्बुद्धेः सदा स्थितेः ॥ १०३ ॥

If (the objector would say:), 'As there is an occasion for you to accept (going for) begging,¹ so there would be an occasion for activity (in the case of the knower of the Brahman).', (our reply is:) 'That is not so, since the right knowledge does ever remain², caused as it is by the Reality, viz. the Ātman³. [103]

¹Begging is understood to be a duty of a Saṁnyāsin; cf. *Manusmṛti* 6.55 (note on verse 107 below).

²NKL states: *prāvāharūpeṇeti śeṣaḥ* (at the end of the verse).

³This refers to the condition of *jīvanmukti*.

न वस्त्ववसरापेक्षं स्वतःसिद्धत्वकारणात् ॥

क्रियैवावसरापेक्षा तस्याः कारकतन्त्रतः ॥ १०४ ॥

Reality does not expect (i.e. depend on) any occasion for its existence, since it has the nature of a self-established (thing). (Contrary to this) an effect¹ (lit. activity) expects an occasion, dependent as it is on some agent.² [104]

¹Read SP: *kāryamātraṁ kriyāśabdena grhyate*.

²It could as well be thus: on some means of production, time for it etc. connected with the verb (*kāraka*).

सम्यग्ज्ञानशिखिप्लुष्टं कुतोऽज्ञानं पुनर्भवेत् ॥

शुद्धदोषोद्भवत्वाच्च न तु कर्मैवमिष्यते ॥ १०५ ॥

How could the ignorance which is (once) burnt by the fire of right knowledge arise again? An activity, however, is not accepted (lit. desired) to be such (viz. of such nature¹), since it has its origin in the faults (that affect) what is (essentially and originally) pure. [105]

¹Namely, what would not arise again.

क्षुधादिदोषहेत्वेव त्वस्मद्भुज्यादि नो मतम् ॥

नियतानेकहेतुत्वान्नातो भुजिसमा क्रिया ॥ १०६ ॥

[Here Sureśvara explains *śāstranimittakāldyapekṣatvāt*...(BUB p. 55)]

Our activity of eating etc. is, as we know, what merely

arises out of the faults, hunger etc. Therefore, here¹ there is no action of ours² which is similar to the common eating of food etc., because it has arisen from various causes, viz. specified (rules of conduct). [106]

Here is the amplification of the idea of verse 105 above. A Saṁnyāsin's eating is not for satisfying hunger. See note on verse 103 above.

¹It means 'in the state of *jīvanmukti*'.

²i.e. performed by us.

दोषहेतावपि तथा कालादिनियमस्तथा ॥
भवद्भिक्षाटनादौ स्यादिति चेन्नैतदेव तु ॥ १०७ ॥

If (it is still argued:) 'Even in the case of (an act which is) effected by faults, there are rules regarding time etc., so they are there in your going abegging etc.'¹, (our reply is:) 'It is indeed not just this.' [107]

¹That is to say: Such rules as *cāturvarṇyam cared bhaikṣyam* (untraceable); *ekakālam cared bhaikṣyam* (*Manusmṛti* 6.55); *yaśnām tu caturguṇam* (*Śaṅkhasmṛti* 16.24; *Viṣṇusmṛti* 60.26 and *Manusmṛti* 5.137 which uses *ca* instead of *tu*).

नैवायं नियमोऽस्माकं परिसंख्या हि सा यतः ॥
क्रियाप्रयोक्त्री नाप्येषा तस्माद्विषममुच्यते ॥ १०८ ॥

'Indeed, this is not our rule; because it is, according to us,¹ a rule of exclusion.² And this rule (of exclusion) is not promotive of any activity.³ Therefore, what you have said is only an indication of disagreement (between the two activities under reference).⁴' [108]

¹It literally means 'for us'.

²*parisaṁkhyā* is a rule which is thus defined: (*vidhir atyantam aprāptau niyamaḥ pakṣike sati*,) *tatra cānyatra ca prāptau parisaṁkhyeti gīyate* (*Śloka-vārtika*).

³Sureśvara points out that what seem as rules regarding the time etc. for 'a Saṁnyāsin's going abegging do not promote his activity but they intend to exclude any other point of time for him, if at all he intended go for it.

⁴The objector's comparison of a ritual activity with a Samnyāsin's going abegging is only inapt. The two are totally dissimilar.

नातोऽपवादकृत्सा स्यादैकात्म्यज्ञानजन्मनः ॥
 सर्वकर्माधिकाराणां निषेधायात्मधीभवः ॥ १०६ ॥
 निषेधविधिवत्तस्मात्प्रत्यग्याथात्म्यधीविधिः ॥
 प्रत्यङ्मोहैकहेतुत्वाद्वाङ्मनःकायकर्मणाम् ॥ ११० ॥

‘Therefore, it (viz. *parisaṁkhyā*) does not cause any fault, since there is the rise of the knowledge of the uniqueness of the self. (Indeed) the rise of the knowledge of the Ātman results into (lit. is for) the removal (lit. annihilation) of all the sources of eligibility for (ritual) activity.’ [109]
 ‘Therefore, the (so-called) injunction in respect of (acquiring) the knowledge of the true nature of the inner self is like the prohibitive rule, because (all) activities of speech, *manas* and body have only ignorance about the inner self as their cause.’ [110]

These two verses point to the similarity of between *pratyagyāthātmya-vidhi* (which is granted to be a *parisaṁkhyā-vidhi*) and *niṣedha-vidhi* and yet emphasise the real nature of the so-called *parisaṁkhyā-vidhi*.

तस्माद्वस्त्वेकनिष्ठस्य प्रामाण्यं वचसो ध्रुवम् ॥
 प्रतिषेधविधेर्यद्वदुभयोरविशेषतः ॥ १११ ॥

Therefore, the authoritativeness of the statement (of the Śruti) resting only on the Reality is positively certain, exactly in the same way as of a prohibitive rule, since there is no difference between them. [111]

Sureśvara summarizes the argument given so far: The prohibitive rule causes the rise of knowledge of what one should not do and does not promote (i.e. enjoin) any activity. Similarly, a rule regarding obtaining the knowledge of the self only gives rise to the knowledge and does not promote any activity.

स्वाभाविकैकदोषोत्थो व्यवहार इहासुरः ॥

शास्त्रैकहेतुर्देवः स्यात्तयोः स्पर्धा विरोधतः ॥ ११२ ॥

[The meaning of BU 1.3.2 beginning with *te ha vācam* is taken up, by referring to the myth of the fight between the gods and the demons who represent different tendencies of the twofold doings of individuals.]

In this (legend), the demoniac activity has arisen from the faults which are related only to their nature and that connected with the gods would have only the scripture as its basis.¹ Thus, the rivalry of the two² occurred on account of the conflict (of their natures). [112]

¹The notion of gods and their favour of gifts etc. becomes known only from the scriptural texts.

²This is a reference to the gods and the demons, mentioned in the myth.

The story of the rivalry between the gods and the demons, given in BU and CU, is supported by the division of qualities as *daiva* and *āsura* in the *Bhagavadgītā*, i.e. the *Mahābhārata*.

प्राकृतासङ्गविज्ञानकार्ये ह्यधिकृतिः स्वतः ॥

सुरद्विषां सुराणां तु शास्त्रोत्थज्ञानदीपितः ॥

कर्मज्ञानाधिकारः स्यात्संग्रामस्तद्विरोधतः ॥ ११३ ॥

Indeed the haters of the gods have by their very nature an inclination (lit. eligibility) towards activity which is the effect of (such) knowledge (as is) rooted in natural attachment.¹ Contrary to this, the gods' inclination towards activity and knowledge is revealed (lit. illuminated) by knowledge arising from the Śāstra.² Therefore, there ensues³ a conflict (between the gods and the demons) from the conflict between the same.⁴ [113]

¹This means 'the innate ignorance of an individual about the true nature of the inner self'.

²The scriptural texts give rise to such knowledge and activity as is (in almost every case) opposed to natural tendencies of an individual.

³The word *syāt* '(lit.) would be' is freely translated thus.

⁴That is, natural tendency and Śāstric impulse.

उत्कर्षो मानुषादूर्ध्वं पुंसः केवलधर्मतः ॥

अधोभावस्त्वधर्मात्स्याद्वाभ्यां मानुष्यसंभवः ॥ ११४ ॥

The ascendance of a man above the status of a human being is¹ on account of only *dharma*,² but his descendance from that (status) is on account of *adharma*.³ On 'account of both of these, there is (in store for one) the status of a human being. [114]

¹It literally means 'would be'.

²It refers to 'the performance of duties according to the scriptural prescriptions (Śāstra)'.

³It refers not to 'the absence of the performance of prescribed duties' but to 'doing what is opposed to *dharma*'.

आग्रजस्थाणुपर्यन्तशरीरग्रहणान्यतः ॥

लोकेष्विति श्रुतिर्वक्ति विरोधस्तन्निबन्धनः ॥ ११५ ॥

Therefore, the Śruti declares, '(There occurs) assuming of (different) bodies beginning from that which was born first¹ and ending with a pillar (lit. an immovable). The conflict² is then based on that³.' [115]

¹This refers to Prajāpati Hiranyagarbha who was the first embodied being and sacrificer.

²The words 'of the gods and the demons' are to be supplied.

³It means 'variously assuming bodies'.

अधोलोकफलेष्वेव प्राकृतज्ञानकर्मसु ॥

यत्नादासञ्जनीयोज्यं पितेत्यसुरनिश्चयः ॥ ११६ ॥

प्राकृतासङ्गतो मुक्त्वा पितायं दैवसाधनैः ॥

उत्कृष्टव्यो यथाशक्ति विबुधानां चिकीर्षितम् ॥ ११७ ॥

The decision of the demons was this: 'Let us with an effort get our father¹ attached to the activity and knowledge which arise from his very nature and which have the lower world(s)² for their result.' [116]

What the gods wished to do was, 'Having freed³ this our

father from his natural attachment, let us, to the best of our ability, have him raised⁴ (above the low levels) by divine means⁵ (of activity and knowledge).’ [117]

¹That is, Prajāpati.

²*prākṛtasaṅgavijñānakārye* of verse 113 above.

³*muktvā* is for *mocayitvā*—the casual sign is suppressed.

⁴*utkr̥ṣṭavya* is for *utkar̥ṣṭavya*.

⁵That is, Śāstric activity and knowledge.

नरप्रजापतितनावेवं देवासुरा मिथः ॥

स्वस्वभावानुरोधेन तेऽस्पर्धन्त स्ववृत्तिभिः ॥ ११८ ॥

[This confirms what is explained in verses 116-117.]

Thus, the gods and the demons in the body of the human¹ sacrificer rivalled with one another, following their own inclinations. [118]

¹This refers to the status of the Brahman, viz. Prajāpati, the subtlest human form, which was the first manifest form of the Brahman.

यदोद्भवति शास्त्रोत्था देवी वृत्तिस्तदासुरी ॥

व्येति यस्मात्ततोऽशेषं देवानां स जयः स्मृतः ॥ ११९ ॥

आसुरी तु यदा सेना कामक्रोधपुरःसरा ॥

जायते ह्यजयस्तेषामसुराणां जयस्तु सः ॥ १२० ॥

Since, when the divine inclination¹ that arises from (learning and following) scriptures prevails,² the demoniac (inclination¹) disappears entirely;³ therefore that is known to be the victory of the gods. [119]

As against this,⁴ when the demoniac army, led by desire and anger, appears, there follows the defeat of them (=the gods). And⁵ that is the victory of the demons. [120]

¹Or alternatively, ‘activity’.

²It literally means ‘appears’.

³Or alternatively, ‘in its entirety’.

⁴This *tu* refers to ‘contrary to the statement above’.

⁵This *tu* means *ca*.

स्वाभाविकत्वादासुर्या भूयस्या सेनयादिताः ॥

न शर्म लेभिरे देवाः स्वात्मत्राणासमीक्षणात् ॥ १२१ ॥

Afflicted by the army of the demons, which was very large on account of its being prompted (i.e. produced) by (their) nature,¹ the gods, not finding (lit. seeing) any protection for themselves,² did not find peace. [121]

¹That is, natural inclination. Cf. verses 22 and 25 above.

²In other words, as they could not find a way to protect themselves.

स्वभूमेश्चाव्यमानानां सुराणामसुरैस्तदा ॥

प्रादुरासीन्मतिः साध्वी दैतेयभयनाशिनी ॥ १२२ ॥

[Here is stated the purpose of BU 1.3.2: *te ha...udgītheti.*]

Then¹ there arose a good thought (in the mind) of gods who were being shaken from their own state by the demons—(a thought which, they felt or considered) could ward off the fear of the sons of Diti (=demons). [122]

¹Or alternatively, 'At that juncture'.

उद्गीथं समुपाश्रित्य ज्योतिष्टोमकृताविह ॥

तिरस्कृत्यासुरं दैवं भावं यामोऽधुना वयम् ॥ १२३ ॥

'Having resorted to Udgītha¹ in this Jyotiṣṭoma sacrifice and having (suppressed) the demoniac nature, let us now attain² (our) divine nature³.' [123]

¹This refers to the deity of the Udgītha—SP, note of the editor of NKL.

²The Present Indicative *yāmaḥ* is used for Present Imperative.

³The word *bhāva* can be connected with the demoniac and/or the divine.

कर्तृत्वादीह यत्सिद्धं वागादिद्वारमीक्ष्यते ॥

आत्मनस्तदविद्योत्थं निरविद्ये निषेधतः ॥ १२४ ॥

लौकिको वैदिकः सर्वो व्यवहारश्च वक्ष्यते ॥

अन्नत्रयाधिकारे हि मनआदावनात्मनि ॥ १२५ ॥

भूतेहानुविधायित्वात्क्षेत्रज्ञस्य तमस्विनः ॥

कूटस्थात्मातिरेकेण रूपमन्यन्न लक्ष्यते ॥ १२६ ॥

[Verses 124-26 explain that the daily dealings exist in Speech and others.]

Whatever is known here in an individual¹ as the capacity for activity etc. (and) is noticed to have come to exist (lit. got established) through Speech and others, has (really) arisen from ignorance (about the true nature of it²) —for,³ there is a denial (in the Śruti) of (the existence of that) in one who is free from ignorance.⁴ [124]

And (every) dealing,⁵ (be it) worldly or Vedic, will be declared in the section referring to three foods⁶ (to be resting) on *manas* etc.⁷ (which are) the non-Ātmans. [125]

A form of the knower of the field who is overpowered by darkness⁸ (viz. ignorance) on account of its following (lit. imitating) the activities⁹ of the elements is seen as apart from the immutable Ātman; (in reality) no other form (i.e. distinct from it¹⁰) is noticed. [126]

¹The words *iha ātmanah* refer to the inner self of an individual being.

²It means 'the inner self'.

³Or alternatively, 'the reason for saying so is that...'

⁴Cf. *yatra vā asya sarvam ātmaivābhūt tat kena...tat kena kam paśyet...* (BU 2.4.14)

⁵Cf. BSB (*adhyāsabhāṣya*): *tam etam avidyākhyam ātmānātmanor itaretarādhyāsam puraskṛtya sarve pramāṇaprameyavyavahārā laukikā vaidikāś ca pravṛttāḥ...* (p. 40)

⁶TU 2.8.

⁷Speech and Prāṇa are meant (SP).

⁸The Ātman is referred to in verse 124 as qualified by the word *niravidya* and here by *kṣetrajña* and *tamasvin*.

⁹The word *bhūteha* generally stands for *bhūta-icchā*, but Sureśvara uses it in the sense of 'activity' (= *bhūta-ceṣṭā*); cf. the note of the editor of NKL.

¹⁰Or alternatively, 'the other, viz. real, (form of the Ātman as such) is not noticed'.

Verses 127-153 explain BU 1.3.2.

एवं ताः संप्रधार्योचुरुद्गीथं साधनं परम् ॥

तत्परीक्षां प्रयत्नेन चक्रुः संभूय देवताः ॥ १२७ ॥

Having thus thought, those deities, coming together, said, the 'Udgītha (is) the best means' and then they tested it¹ with care.² [127]

¹It means 'wished to ascertain the potence/usefulness of it'.

²SP explains *prayatna* as an *anvayavyatirekākhyā-vyāpāra*. Possibly it meant: The gods feel that, not resorting to the Udgīthadevatā, they have lost (i.e. not succeeded) in the strife with the demons—this is Vyatireka. Now they would like to find if resorting to the same would bring them success—this is Anvaya.

वाचं संभावयामासुरियं ह्युद्गीथकर्मणि ॥

अत्यर्थं व्यापृता दृष्टा वाचमूचुस्ततः सुराः ॥ १२८ ॥

त्वं न उद्गाय उद्गानं त्वत्प्रधानं भवत्वित्दम् ॥

उद्गीथ इति चोद्गानं कर्मवेहाभिधीयते ॥ १२९ ॥

They thought (about) the Speech (thus): "Indeed, this one is seen to be the most active¹ in the ritual connected with the Udgītha."² (And) those gods then addressed the Speech: [128]

Do you sing aloud for us.³ May this singing aloud have you (as) the prominent (singer). Here the activity of singing aloud is mentioned by the word *udgītha*.⁴ [129]

¹*vyāprta*=*vyāprtavati*, i.e. *vyāpāravati*.

²This refers to one of the divisions of a Sāman (= *sāmbhakti-viśeṣa*); cf Introduction.

³Note the absence of Saṁdhi in *udgāya udgānam*—an archaic tendency in Sureśvara.

⁴This refers to the *sāmbhaktiviśeṣa*. This is according to the view of the objector.

स्तोत्रेणास्याभिसंबन्धाद्भक्तिमात्रं न तु क्वचित् ॥

वाग्भिगानिनी चेह वाक्शब्देनाग्निरुच्यते ॥ १३० ॥

On account of the close connection of this one with the (entire) prayer,¹ (we must understand that) this (word) does not refer merely to a part (of the Sāman) anywhere (in this context) and further by the word *vāc* is mentioned Agni, the superintending deity of speech.² [130]

This is the Siddhānta; an answer to the objector's view in the preceding verse. Accordingly, the Udgītha refers to the activity of the Udgātṛ priest.

¹This is a reference to the Pavamāna Stotra in the Agniṣṭoma. Cf. *athātaḥ pavamānānām...sa yatra prastuyāt tad etāni japet* (*Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa* 14.4.1.30; BU 1.3.28). Also, since the prayer contains a request, the addressee must be a sentient being who is capable of granting the request.

²Cf. *Aitareya Brāhmaṇa* 1.2.4: *agnir vāg bhūtvā mukham prāviśat...*

विषयोऽध्येषणाया हि चेतनावान्यतो मतः ॥

उपासिक्रियया योगो देवताया इहेष्यते ॥ १३१ ॥

Because it is indeed one, who is possessed of Sentience, can be the object of some impulse; therefore, here¹ is required the connection of a deity with the act expressed by the verbal root *upa√ās*. [131]

This verse is an address to those who consider the deities such as Speech, Eye and others as non-sentient.

¹Namely, in this context, i.e. in respect of the section on *upāsti* 'worship'.

अतोऽपि देवतैवेह वाक्शब्देनाभिधीयते ॥

तद्भूतेः पुरुषार्थत्वाद्देवता हीश्वरा परा ॥ १३२ ॥

For this reason also, here it is only the deity that is expressed by the word *vāc*. Since becoming¹ that (deity in the end) is the goal (or reward) of human activity,² the deity here³ is the highest ruler. [132]

¹*bhūti*=*bhāva* 'becoming'.

²The words 'which is connected with the Udgītha' are to be supplied.

³It means 'in this Upaniṣad, Agni is the highest'—cf note 2 on verse 130 above.

सैवातः प्रतिपत्तव्या सर्वासु ध्यानभूमिषु ॥

न त्विह प्रतिपत्तव्याः करणस्थानगोचराः ॥ १३३ ॥

Only that (deity) has therefore to be understood (lit. accepted) in all the phases of the meditations; and not (those deities) which have various organs of activities as the objects (of their superintending)¹;

¹The deity of any particular meditation—here Agni. [133]

पाराथ्यचित्तनत्वाभ्यां मर्त्यत्वाच्चापि कारणात् ॥ १३४ ॥

since they serve the purpose of another and have insentience as their nature, and also for the reason of their mortality. [134]

एवं वागादयः शब्दा देवतार्थाभिधायिनः ॥

सर्वत्र प्रतिपत्तव्या यत्रोपासा विवक्षिता ॥ १३५ ॥

Thus, the words Speech and others are to be understood as expressive of the meaning, the deities, wherever it is intended to state about meditation. [135]

जपमन्त्राभिधेयेयं वागित्येवं विनिश्चिताः ॥

उपासांचक्रिरे देवा एषैवोद्गीथदेवता ॥ १३६ ॥

Those gods who had thus decided that this deity (of) speech, addressed (lit. expressed) in the Japamantra,¹ worshipped (it), and, also (they decided) 'This is the deity of the Udgītha.' [136]

¹This is: *asato mā sad gamaya...*; the Abhyārohaṇajapa.

देवाभ्युदय उद्गानं देवेभ्योऽर्थाय वागियम् ॥

यथाशक्त्युदगायत्तं यो भोगो वाङ्निबन्धनः ॥ १३७ ॥

[Here is the purpose of BU 1.3.2: *tatheti tebhyo...vadati tadātmane.*]

(Then) this Speech sang aloud, with whatever was her might, the Udgītha¹ for securing the rise of the gods,² (yes,) for (securing) the purpose of the gods—that (enjoyment) which was the enjoyment resting in Speech.³ [137]

¹The *udgāna* is for Udgītha, referring to the *sāmabhaktiviśeṣa*.

²This use of the locative is for expressing the purpose.

³That is to say: which would arise from the employment of Speech; this explains *yo vāci*...

येन भोगेन वाग्देवांश्चक्षुरादीनहन्तिशम् ॥

साक्षादवति तं भोगमुदगायदशेषतः ॥ १३८ ॥

With what enjoyment, Speech directly favours the deities Eye etc. day and night, that enjoyment it sang aloud in its fullness. [138]

पवमानेषु सोद्गात्री याजमानं यथाविधि ॥

फलमुदगाय शेषेषु ह्युदगायदथात्मने ॥ १३९ ॥

Speech, being the Udgātṛ (priest), and having sung the (Sāman-)song for (securing) the end of the sacrificer,¹ in the Pavamāna Stotras, according to the procedure, (towards securing) the reward,² sang in the remaining (chants) (for a reward) for itself.³ [139]

¹Namely, the gods.

²That is to say: having sung to the effect that the reward was secured.

³Among the twelve Stotras that are sung in the Agniṣṭoma, there are three Pavamāna Stotras which produce a reward for the sacrificer. The nine others are the Udgātṛ Stotras: The singing of these Stotras secures a reward for the Udgātṛ. Here Speech is the Udgātṛ, and therefore it brings a reward for itself.

स्तोत्रेषु परिशिष्टेषु वागागायदथात्मने ॥

यत्कल्याणं वदत्येषा ह्यात्मने तदचीकल्पत् ॥ १४० ॥

[The word *śeṣeṣu* in the preceding verse is explained here.]

Then Speech sang in the remaining Stotras (a reward) for itself, viz. whatever auspicious (*kalyāṇa*) it speaks (in these nine Stotras), it secures (the same) just¹ for itself. [140]

¹The purpose of the word 'just' (*hi*) is explained by SP thus: *uktakāryasya karaṇāntareṣu asambhavaprasiddhyartho hiśabdaḥ*.

यथाशास्त्रं यथायोगं वर्णदोषविवर्जितम् ॥

वर्णोच्चारणसामर्थ्यं ममैवास्तु तदीदृशम् ॥ १४१ ॥

It is thus: 'May I indeed have the capacity of pronouncing different letters, thus: It should be in accordance with the science (of rituals) and in accordance with (the science of language¹), i.e. in language free from faults in respect of letters.'

[141]

¹This refers to the science of etymology.

कल्याणवदनोत्थं यत्कृत्स्नं देवेभ्य एव तत् ॥

फलं वदनमात्रं तु वाच एव न दैविकम् ॥ १४२ ॥

Whatever reward arises from the utterance of (the) auspicious is all of it for the sake of gods, but (that which arises) only from the pronunciation is for Speech is not (intended) for the deity.

[142]

तमस्युत्सार्यमाणे तु वाचोद्गात्रा सुरद्विषाम् ॥

स्वाधिकाराच्चयाव्यमानास्ते विदुर्देवहृद्गतम् ॥ १४३ ॥

[*te viduḥ* (BU 1.3.2) is explained.]

And when the darkness (in the form) of the haters of the gods¹ was (thus) being dispelled by Speech, the Udgātr, they, being thrown away from their own position (of superiority)², understood what had passed (i.e. the thought) in the mind (lit. heart) of the gods.

[143]

¹*suradviṣām tamah* is explained fully in the next verse.

²The gods became strong by the purity of speech etc. (= *śāstravihitakarman*) and, therefore, the natural tendency of the sacrificer for securing worldly pleasure became weaker and weaker. This was the beginning of the defeat of the demons, who were described in verse 22 above as *jyāyāmsaḥ*.

अनेन वाचोद्गात्रा नो बलं ध्वान्तं तु देवताः ॥

ज्योतिषा स्वेन निजित्य यास्यन्त्यग्न्यादिरूपताम् ॥ १४४ ॥

(Thus did they understand:) 'These gods will have won by their own lustre¹ our strength², this darkness, through, (the

help of) this Speech, the Udgāṭṛ, and will attain the forms³ of the deities Agni and so on.' [144]

¹This symbolises their knowledge of the rituals etc. from Śāstric works.

²Or alternatively, 'army', by way of pun.

³That is to say: Their true nature as deities. Or, excellence; cf. *svaṁ vapuḥ* (mentioned in verse 146 below).

महन्नो भयमायातमिति बुबुधिरेऽसुराः ॥

कर्मण्यनुचिते तेषां प्रहीणमनसां तदा ॥

वदनादावभिष्वङ्ग आत्मसंभावनादभूत् ॥ १४५ ॥

The demons knew that a (matter of) great fear had come to them. Then they, of minds given to bad inclinations, came to have addiction to the improper deed, speaking etc.,¹ out of their pride for themselves. [145]

¹This means 'speaking bad words, and so on'. This is in opposition to *kalyāṇavadana* of Vāc mentioned in verse 140 above.

यत्कल्याणमिति चिद्राद्विदुः सुरचिकीर्षितम् ॥

अनेन वै न उद्गात्रा वाचात्येष्यन्ति स्वं वपुः ॥ १४६ ॥

(Indeed) they¹ understood from the loop-hole,² expressed in their³ words, 'whatever is auspicious...' (BU 1.3.2)⁴ what the gods wished to do. (Thus:) 'Indeed they⁵ will attain through Speech, the Udgāṭṛ, their own form, despite us⁶.' [146]

¹It means 'the demons'.

²The word *chidra* is 'short coming' (according to Roer) and it is 'some spot through which you understand'; cf. NKL: *chidrāt kalyāṇavadanāsaṅgarūpād ity arthaḥ*.

³That is, of the gods.

⁴*yat kalyāṇām...vadati tad ātmane*.

⁵That is, the gods.

⁶We construe thus: *eṣyanti svaṁ vapuḥ naḥ ati* where *ati* is a *karmapravacanīya* which governs the accusative form *naḥ*.

इति ज्ञात्वा ह्यभिद्रुत्य स्वैरासङ्गशरोर्मिभिः ॥

विविधुस्तानथोद्गातृं स्ते विद्धास्तत्यजुः क्रियाः ॥ १४७ ॥

[*tam abhidrutya...*(BU 1.3.2) is explained.]

Indeed, having known thus, they attacked (the gods) by means of the surging waves of their arrows (made up of) attachment (to worldly pleasures), first pierced them (the gods) and then the Udgātr̥s.¹ (Subsequently) they,² (thus) pierced, gave up their ritual activity. [147]

The intention of this verse is to emphasise the conflict between the natural tendencies of a human being and the knowledge acquired from Śruti—and not what really happened. Therefore, reference to the giving up of ritual activity of the Udgītha refers merely to the activity of the sense-organs. This means Prāṇa 'vital force' remains, in reality, unaffected, i.e. it alone can resist and overcome the natural tendencies.

¹They are the priests chanting the Udgītha.

²It refers to the gods.

नानादन्यस्य सामर्थ्यं विद्यतेऽसुरनाशने ॥ १४८ ॥

अनेनाप्रतिरूपेण वचसा कार्यशायिना ॥

पाप्मादिदोषसंपर्कः कारणस्थोऽनुमीयते ॥ १४९ ॥

(Indeed) none else than Prāṇa¹ has the capacity for destroying the demons. [148]

The association with faults, viz. sin etc., that abides in the cause,² is inferred by the matchless Prāṇa from this speech which is noticed as extending into (lit. lying in) the effect. [149]

This reference to the activities of the sense-organs is only indicative of the basic ignorance, sin etc. on the part of an individual who does non-scriptural activities.

¹ana=Prāṇa.

²This stands for the different sense-organs which performed various activities that are their *kārya*.

व्युत्थायाख्यायिकारूपाच्छ्रुतिः स्ववपुषाधुना ॥

आचष्टे कारणे वृत्तं कार्यगेणामुरात्मना ॥ १५० ॥

[sa yaḥ sa pāpmā...sa eva sa pāpmā (BU 1.3.2) is explained.]

Having risen above (i.e. given up) this form of the narrative, the Śruti itself¹ now informs about the behaviour in the cause, (viz. the sense-organs), (inferring it) from the effect which is the demoniac nature. [150]

¹That is, in the form its own statements.

दृष्टेनाप्रतिरूपेण कार्यगेणानुमीयते ॥

कारणे पाप्मवेधोऽभूद्यो वाचि प्राक्प्रजापतेः ॥ १५१ ॥

The affliction (lit. piercing) caused by sin which earlier (or formerly) occurred in the case of the cause, viz. the speech of Prajāpati, is inferred from what is seen as a singular (characteristic) in the effect.¹ [151]

¹This is to state the result of usual inference. In fact, the Brahman (or Prāṇa), which is the cause, is never affected by any fault. Cf. CU 8.12.1: *na vai saśarīrasya sataḥ priyāpriyayor apahatir asti; apāpaviddham....* (Īśopaniṣad 8); *na ha vai devān...* (BU 1.5.20) (SP).

स यो वाच्यसुरैः क्षिप्तः पाप्मा कार्ये स दृश्यते ॥

प्रमाविरोधि यद्वाक्यं तत्तत्कार्यसमाश्रयम् ॥ १५२ ॥

That sin which the demons had put into Speech is seen in the effect. Whatever statement is opposed to the right knowledge (about the true nature of the Ātman) is all related to the effect (viz. ignorance).¹ [152]

¹The second line of this verse explains: *sa yaḥ sa pāpmā....* (BU 1.3.2). This means, ill or false speaking is noticeable in the descendents of Prajāpati.

स एव स इति ह्युक्तिः कार्यकारणसंस्थयोः ॥

प्रजासु साक्षाद्यः पाप्मा यश्च तत्कारणाश्रयः ॥ १५३ ॥

[Verses 154-163 convey the purpose of BU 1.3.3-6.]

For the statement in the Śruti *sa eva saḥ* is related to the two states of the cause and the effect, namely that whatever sin is actually seen in offsprings and that which has a basis in its cause. [153]

घ्राणं चक्षुस्तथा श्रोत्रं मनश्चैवमनुक्रमात् ॥
वब्रुर्देवा यथा वाणीं विद्धाः सर्वे तथासुरैः ॥ १५४ ॥

All the gods (then) chose the sense of smell,¹ the sense of sight, the sense of hearing and *manas*, one after another, as they (first) chose Speech when they were pierced by the demons; (they chose these others) in the order (mentioned in the verse). [154]

¹The NKL edition reads *prāṇam* in the place of *ghrāṇam*! NKL also cites *prāṇam iti* as the *pratika* of the Mantra, but does not comment on the same!! Possibly this is a reference to the principal among five breaths.

कर्मेन्द्रियाणां सर्वेषां वागेवात्रोपलक्षणम् ॥
चक्षुःश्रोत्रे धीन्द्रियाणां मनो बुद्धेस्तथैव च ॥ १५५ ॥

In this,¹ only Speech is indicative of all the organs of activity. Eyes and ears (are indicative) of the sense-organs and likewise *manas* (is indicative) of the intellect.² [155]

¹Context of the narrative of the gods and the demons: the sin which affects divine nature of the deities superintending over the sense-organs.

²SP accepts from *buddhi* the implication of *citta* and *ahamkāra* also, but NKL does not. It is difficult to say if *citta* is meant by Śaṅkara.

कृत्स्नं जगदनादाय नैकस्यापीष्यते क्रिया ॥
प्राणस्य किमु वक्तव्यं कृत्स्नाध्यात्मेन्द्रियग्रहः ॥ १५६ ॥

They do not accept even in the case of a single (organ) any activity without having (lit. taking up or making use of) all of (this) world.¹ What then can be said about Prāṇa? There is (on the part of it) the use of the entire (group of) the organs abiding in the body. [156]

¹SP refers to *iyam pṛthivī sarveṣām bhūtātām madhu* in BU 2.5.1 and adds *iti śrutau sarvasya sarvatra kāraṇatāyā vakṣya-māṇatvāt*.

यद्यपीदं जगत्कृत्स्नं गृह्यते संहतत्वतः॥

तथापि चोदितोऽत्रार्थ उपास्यो नागतोऽर्थतः ॥ १५७ ॥

Even if this entire world is taken up (for use) owing to its being one collected (mass)¹, yet here (i.e. in this context) only that object which is put forth in the Śruti² is (alone) to be worshipped and not the one which is understood by implication.³ [157]

¹This has a basis in a possible doubt originating in the need of the entire world for any activity (as said in the preceding verse).

²This refers to *vāgādi* as the objects of worship.

³Both SP and NKL point to the rule of interpretation: *yaś cārthād artho na sa codayitavyaḥ*.

कल्याणतरूपेण परिशिष्टेष्वपीक्ष्यते ॥

विभाग आसुरो वेधस्तेन तेष्वनुमीयते ॥ १५८ ॥

In (the case of) the remaining (i.e. other, organs¹ also) is accepted (i.e. inferred) the demoniac part (or aspect)² obtaining in the form of what is other than auspicious; therefore, the piercing (by demoniac inclination) of them also is inferred. [158]

¹That is, *tvac* etc. which are not mentioned in the Śruti.

²This has a reference to *daiva* and *āśura* categories among all objects of creation as in the case of Prajāpati's offsprings.

अतस्तदर्थमाहेयमेवम्विति पुनः श्रुतिः ॥

यथा वागादयो विद्धास्तद्वज्जोयास्त्वगादयः ॥ १५९ ॥

Therefore, in order to convey that (happening), the Śruti once again stated (the words) *evam u ...* (BU 1.3.6). (That is to say:) as Speech and others were pierced, in the same way, the sense of touch and others (also) are to be understood (as pierced). [159]

सिद्धान्वागादिदृष्टान्तान्पुरस्कृत्यात उच्यते ॥

एवम्वित्युक्तशेषाणां पाप्मविद्वत्त्वसिद्धये ॥ १६० ॥

Therefore, having brought forth the well-proven examples of Speech and others, the Śruti states *evam u ...* (the piercing by sin) (in the case) of the remaining (organs also), in order that their being affected by that sin is proved. [160]

अविध्यन्निति योऽर्थोऽस्य तद्व्याख्यानाय यत्यते ॥

स्वैः स्वैस्तानिन्द्रियासङ्गैः पाप्मभिस्त उपासृजन् ॥ १६१ ॥

And now we make an effort to explain that, which is expressed by the verb *avidhyan*. (This is to say:) they (viz. the demons) attacked them (viz. the gods)¹ by their own attachments to the organs, their sins. [161]

¹This refers to the gods which superintend over the sense of touch etc. Mark the masculine form *tān*.

यत्संसर्गं पुरा चक्रुरविध्यंस्तदिहोच्यते ॥

या विद्धा देवतास्तासां प्रक्रियासंहतिः पृथक् ॥ १६२ ॥

Since they first became attached to (the pleasures of the sense-organs), (therefore) it is stated here: *avidhyan* 'They pierced'; whichever of the deities were pierced had each a different (statement about) the happening and its end.¹ [162]

¹Namely, being attached to pleasures in the case of them, first being pierced and later getting freed. This is stated with a view to pointing out the purposefulness of the Śruti statement, *evam u khalu devatāḥ...*

आसङ्गपाप्मभिविद्धा यस्माद्वागादयोऽसुरैः ॥

वर्जनीयास्ततस्ताः स्युर्नोपास्याः श्रेय ईप्सुभिः ॥ १६३ ॥

Since Speech and others were pierced by the demons by means of the sins in the form of attachment, therefore, they are to be avoided; they are not to be worshipped by those who wish for bliss.¹ [163]

¹It would look better if *śreyā ipsubhiḥ* is read as a compound word. AnSS edition and NKL edition however read two words; *śreyāḥ* and *ipsubhiḥ*—such (rare) use of this latter word as an unbound form is noticed in *Mahābhārata* 12.84.44: *tasmāt sarvair*

*guṇair etair upapannāḥ supūjitāḥ/mantriṇaḥ prakṛtijñāḥ syus trya-
varā mahad īpsavaḥ//; Nilamata Purāṇa 493.760 (which belongs
to a period between 500—1000 A.D.): umāsampūjanam kāryam
tasyām saubhāgyam īpsunā.*

Verses 164-93 explain BU 1.3.7.

एवं निराशाः पूर्वासु देवतास्वसुरार्दनात् ॥
पारिशेष्यादथाजग्मुर्मध्यमं प्राणमादरात् ॥ १६४ ॥

[*atha heman* is explained.]

Thus, feeling despair in respect of the previously mention-
ed (superintending) deities (of organs), on account of the
afflictions inflicted by the demons, (the gods) then respect-
fully approached the individual self (= *madhyama prāṇa*)¹,
as the remaining (i.e. last possible, resort). [164]

¹Between the heavenly wind and the earthly wind, there is the
middle one (viz. *madhyama*), called *Prāṇa*.

अथेत्यनन्तरोक्तिः स्यात्तथाभिनयवृत्तये ॥
इममित्यप्रसिद्धत्वात्प्राणस्येह त्वगादिवत् ॥ १६५ ॥

The word *atha* is expressive of the sense 'then'; so also
does the word *imam* (serve) the purpose of conveying the
(symbolic) activity¹ (of them), because the *Prāṇa* is not
(primarily or easily) known (in daily life) like the sense of
touch and others.² [165]

¹*abhinaya* is explained in SP as *vivakṣitārthadyotako dehatada-
vayavavyāpāraviśeṣaḥ* and in NKL as *saṁketavaśāt vivakṣitārtha-
prakāśakaḥ kāyāvayavavyāpāraḥ*.

²SP explains *iha* as *dehe*. Our translation 'in daily life' has the
force of 'in the life of the embodied state'. The idea is: *Prāṇa* is
not known to have one particular organ as its abode. Also, it is
not necessarily known to be abiding in their ensemble.

अस्ति यस्मादसुनित्यमासन्योऽयमतो मतः ॥
वागादिभ्यो विभागार्थं विशेषणमसोरिदम् ॥ १६६ ॥

Since Prāṇa is ever abiding (in the mouth), therefore it is known as this (viz. having the name) Āsanya and this (*āsanya*) is an adjective of the Prāṇa for making it from Speech and others. [166]

Prāṇa is the life principle and moves in the whole body.

जपमन्त्राभिधेयोऽत्र पारिशेष्यात्प्रतीयताम् ॥
उद्गीथदेवता प्राण इत्यभूत्सुरनिश्चयः ॥ १६७ ॥
मन्त्रप्रयोगे सर्वेषां संनिधौ तत्प्रकाशितम् ॥

Finally, let it be known as the remaining possible conclusion that the decision of the gods was thus: 'Here,¹ Prāṇa is the deity of the Udgītha and (it is) addressed in the Japamantra.² [167]

That³ is revealed in the employment of the Mantra⁴ in the presence of all.⁵ [168^{ab}]

¹This is a reference to 'the ensemble of organs of sense and also other organs in the body and their activities.'

²See note 1 on verse 136 above; *abhidheyaḥ* 'one (to be) addressed'.

³This means 'the fact about Prāṇa as the deity of the Udgītha'.

⁴Namely, in the Japamantra *asato mā sad gamaya...*

⁵It appears to us probable that Sureśvara made verse 167 a verse of three lines—the third line is read in the printed editions as the first line of verse 168. For such a construction, cf. verse 145 above. This last line of the verse 167 then justifies the first word of the verse.

भारमुत्सहते वोढुं योजनो यामस्तमाश्रयम् ॥ १६८ ॥

We shall approach him, that Prāṇa, who can bear the burden (of protecting us)¹, (as) our resort. [168^{cd}]

¹It is possible to read the second line of verse 168 as one full verse. For such a verse of one line, cf. verses 134 and 148 above.

परीक्षमाणास्ते त्राणं यथोक्ताख्यानवर्त्मना ॥
क्रमेणासेदुरासन्यं प्राणं पाप्मपराभवात् ॥ १६९ ॥

Looking around¹ for protection (against defeat²) in their course (of search), as described in the course of the narrative, they found (lit. arrived at) Prāṇa that resides in the mouth, after overcoming the sin. [169]

¹It is necessary to read the literal meaning of *pari-īkṣamāṇāḥ*.

²That is the defeat by the demoniac tendency, viz. sin etc.

श्रेयोर्थिनां मनुष्याणामुपास्यप्रतिपत्तये ॥

इयमाख्यायिका चक्षुर्नान्यथोपास्यनिश्चितिः ॥ १७० ॥

This narrative is an eye for men who wish for bliss, (that is to say:) in order that they understand (the real) object of the worship; the object of worship cannot (indeed) be decided otherwise.¹ [170]

¹That is, to be other than Prāṇa.

यः प्राणे भोग इति न पूर्ववद्भूष्यतेऽत्र किम् ॥

वागादीनामिव यतो नासोर्भोगो विशिष्यते ॥ १७१ ॥

(A question is asked:) 'Why is it not stated in the Śruti here *yaḥ prāṇe bhogaḥ*....as (it did) before?'.¹ (Our answer is:) 'Because the enjoyment of Prāṇa cannot be distinguished (from any other) as (that) of Speech and others (from any other enjoyment)'. [171]

¹The argument proceeds from the notion of *prakaraṇabhaṅga*. This is to say: The Śruti does not state here *yaḥ prāṇe bhogaḥ tam devebhya āgāyat*....This is thus not in continuation of the tenor of the whole argument.

अकृत्स्नभोगतो युक्तं वागादिषु विशेषणम् ॥

सर्वस्यैवासुभोगत्वात्किं कुतोऽत्र विशिष्यते ॥ १७२ ॥

‘(Such) distinguishing of enjoyment in the case of Speech and others is proper, since theirs is not full enjoyment.’. (To this the answer is:) Since all (enjoyment) is (but) the enjoyment by the Prāṇa, from what¹ (enjoyment) then can that be distinguished here?². [172]

This contains the answer which began in the second line of the preceding verse.

¹The word *kutaḥ* can be alternatively translated as 'for what reason?'.
²SP supports this (last line) by verse 165 above: *aprasiddhatvāt ...tvagādivat*.

अभिसंधिरविव्यत्सन्नित्यभूत्सुरविद्विषाम् ॥
 अनिष्ठितक्रियारम्भोऽविव्यत्सन्निति भण्यते ॥ १७३ ॥

There arose in the mind of the haters of the gods a thought (lit. an intention) which was (finally) not going to pierce (them¹). The word *avivyatsan* is used (to bring out the sense of) the beginning (or undertaking) of an activity which is not finally accomplished. [173]

¹Namely, a thought which did not materialize; this is explained in the second half of the verse. The word 'them' refers to the gods.

विव्यत्सोद्देशमात्रेण प्राणो हन्ता सुरद्विषाम् ॥
 इत्यर्थप्रतिपत्त्यर्थमीदृग्दृष्टान्त उच्यते ॥ १७४ ॥

On account of (the) mere desire to pierce (the gods),¹ Prāṇa is the destroyer of the haters of the gods. (Now), in order to convey this is given an illustration which is as follows: [174]

This explains the meaning of *saḥ* in *sa yathā*....(BU 1.3.7).

¹The words 'which was entertained by the demons' are to be supplied.

बिभित्सायै यथा वेगाल्लोष्टः क्षिप्तोऽश्मनोऽन्तिकात् ॥
 नश्येत्स्ववेगाच्छतधा ह्याख्यानाश्मसमागमात् ॥ १७५ ॥
 अप्रधृष्यं तथा प्राणमृत्वा नेशुः सहस्रधा ॥
 दैत्यास्तन्नाशतो देवा देवा एवाभवन्सदा ॥ १७६ ॥

[*yathāśmānam ṛtvā*...(BU 1.3.7) is explained.]

As a sod of clay is forcefully thrown with the desire of breaking¹ (a stone²), even from nearness to it, would (itself) get destroyed, by its own force, into a hundred (pieces), at the very contact with the unbreakable³ stone. [175]

In the same way, (the demons) having attacked the invulnerable Prāṇa got destroyed into thousands (of pieces), then, on account of their destruction the gods could ever remain gods. [176]

¹NKL reads *bibhitsayā* instead of *bibhitsāyai*.

²An unbreakable stone is meant.

³Read NKL: *na khanitum śakyate ṭaṅkādibhir iti akhaṇa eva ākhaṇaḥ*.

अत एव मनुष्यत्वहेतवोऽप्यसुराः समम् ॥

विनेशुर्विष्वगतयो लोष्टः क्षिप्तो यथाश्मनि ॥ १७७ ॥

For this very reason, the demons who are the cause of manhood,¹ fleeing into all directions, got at once destroyed, in the same way as a sod of clay (when) thrown on a stone. [177]

¹This refers to any gross or subtle form of a human sacrificer, viz. any manifest form of Prajāpati.

प्राणस्वभावसंपत्तेः प्राणवद्देवता अपि ॥

देवा एवाभवन्दैत्यकृत्स्नपाप्मविनाशतः ॥ १७८ ॥

[*tato devāḥ abhavan* (BU 1.3.7) is explained.]

On attaining the nature of Prāṇa,¹ the deities also, like Prāṇa,² became gods³ on account of the destruction of all the sins (inflicted on them) by the demons, [178]

¹Read NKL: *asmād upāsanāt prāṇabhāvāt*.

²That is to say: as it retained its nature of a deity (by remaining unaffected by the demoniac sins).

³Read NKL: *cakṣurādayaḥ evaṁ cādityādibhāvaṁ gatā ity arthaḥ*.

वागादीन्द्रियसंघातो यजमानो यथा पुरा ॥
प्राणात्मभावाद्धत्वागो वैराजं रूपमाप्तवान् ॥ १७६ ॥

[*bhavaty ātmanā* (BU 1.3.7) is explained.]

as formerly the sacrificer, who was a conglomeration of the organs, speech and others, obtained the form of (=became) Virāj after having struck down sin¹ by becoming possessed of the nature of the Prāṇa. [179]

This verse is a continuation of the sentence in the preceding verse.

¹*āgaḥ* = *pāpam* (as paraphrased in the next verse).

तथा यस्तमुपासीत यथोक्ताख्यानवर्त्मना ॥
विराजैवात्मना हत्वा पापं भवति सोऽचिरात् ॥ १८० ॥

[*tathā purā kalpena varṇitaḥ*....(BUB p. 63) is explained.]

In the same way, whosoever worships that (Prāṇa) in the manner stated in the narrative that is told soon becomes (identical with Prāṇa) after having struck down sin by having the nature (i.e. strength) of Virāj.¹ [180]

¹Read SP: *virāḍātmanopāsako bhavati*.

जीवाविष्ट उपास्योऽत्र देवताविग्रहः सदा ॥
प्राणो हिरण्यगर्भत्मा यावत्तदभिमान (?) नितः ॥ १८१ ॥

In this context, what is to be worshipped is ever the body of a deity which is pervaded by Sentience, i.e. Prāṇa of the nature of Hiraṇyagarbha, so long as there remains (or exists) consciousness on its part of being that.¹ [181]

¹We follow translations and the reading *abhimānitā* which the NKL edition has adopted and shown by the AnSS edition as a variant because that makes a better sense.

भावनोपचयाद्धत्वा परिच्छेदं स्वमासुरम् ॥
देवतात्मानमेत्याशु सदा तद्भावभावितः ॥ १८२ ॥

Having (first) destroyed his own demoniac limitation by increase in devotion,¹ (that sacrificer) soon² attains the nature of the deity, ever full of thought of becoming that.³ [182]

¹*bhāvanā* = *bhakti* '(awareness) of being that'. SP invites attention to *Bhagavadgītā* 8.6: *yaṁ yaṁ vāpi smaran... tam tam evaiti kaunteya*. The Upaniṣad has this sense of *bhakti*: One becomes what one thinks about at the time of death; therefore, one thinks of becoming a deity at the time of death and becomes that.

²That is, within very short time.

³Or alternatively, 'ever devoted'.

तत्तमोमात्रविध्वंसान्तु प्राणादिराप्यते ॥

कार्यत्वात्कारणं मुक्त्वा न हि तत्कार्यसंभवः ॥ १८३ ॥

देवो भूत्वेह देवोऽसौ भावनोपचयाद्भवेत् ॥

पुंव्यापारोद्भवत्वं नः श्रुत्यापि प्रतिपादितम् ॥ १८४ ॥

(The state of) *Prāṇa* etc.¹ is not obtained by mere destruction of ignorance about (the nature of) it, because that (viz. being *Prāṇa* etc.) is itself an effect. Indeed, leaving aside the cause, there does not follow (what is) an effect (of it).² [183]

The worshipper becomes a god (i.e. the deity) in this (mundane existence) and becomes the god (i.e. that deity) owing to the increase in devotion; (this so happens) thanks to human activity—so it is told us even by the Śruti.³ [184]

SP reiterates the importance of the statement of the *Bhagavadgītā* noted under verse 182 above.

¹This is the purport of 'Prāṇa etc.' which is the literal meaning.

²This verse anticipates an objection: As the knowledge of the Brahman is attained by mere destruction of the ignorance about it, so does one obtain the knowledge of (the deities) *Prāṇa* (and others) by mere removal of the ignorance about them and consequently there is no need of any worship (*upāsana*) of the same. The answer is: Attaining the nature of *Prāṇa* etc. is itself an effect (*kārya*) and therefore it needs some means, i.e. cause (*kāraṇa*); this *kāraṇa* is, it is implied, worship (*upāsana*).

³SP cites the purport of the Śruti passage: *ihaiva dehe bhāvanā-prakarṣād devabhāvam anubhūya dehapātād ūrdhvam upāsyō devaḥ*

syāt. Becoming Prāṇa etc. is thus pointed out as what is attainable by human effort or activity (*puruṣatantra*)—this implies the short-time-lasting nature of the result which is unlike the attainment of the nature of the Brahman which is irrespective of human effort or activity (*vastutantra*). This is expressed in the following verse.

ब्रह्मैवाप्येति ब्रह्मैव प्रागप्यासीद्यतोऽद्वयम् ॥

तन्मोहमात्रविध्वंसादित्यपि श्रुतिशासनम् ॥ १८५ ॥

And also there is instruction (i.e. declaration) in the Śruti: 'By mere destruction of ignorance about it, he merges into the Brahman itself, since he was, even before, only the unique Brahman'.¹ [185]

¹*Nṛsiṃhottaratāpanī* U. 5.

स्वतःसिद्धौ तदन्येषां श्रुतिकोपः प्रसज्यते ॥

अतोऽन्यदार्तं तद्वच्चाप्येकमेवेति च श्रुतिः ॥ १८६ ॥

If (it is held that) those others (viz. the deities who are other than that Brahman) are self-established, there would arise the contingency of the opposition to (lit. anger of) the Śruti. (Indeed, there is a statement in) the Śruti: 'Everything else than this is affliction'; so also '(it is) but one'.¹ [186]

¹NKL cites the following Śruti passages: *ato 'nyadārtam* (BU 5.4.2): *neha nānāsti kiṃcana* (BU 6.4.19); *sarvaṃ khalv idam brahma* (CU 3.10.1). Cf. SP: *eko devaḥ sarvabhūteṣu gūḍhaḥ* (Śvetaśvararopaniṣad 6.11) and *eka [eva tu bhūtātmā* (Brahma-bindu U.12)

नाव्याकृतादेः संसिद्धौ परमात्मातिरेकतः ॥

ब्रह्मवन्मानमस्तीह तथा निर्मोक्षतापतेत् ॥ १८७ ॥

There is no proof here¹ for establishing (the existence of) the unmanifest (Prāṇa) etc. apart from the highest Reality as there is one² in respect of the Brahman. (If that were) so,³ there would result absence of liberation. [187]

¹That is, in *pramāṇaprameya* relation which is accepted in the discussion.

²This refers to *anubhava*, cf. BSB (*adhyāsabhāṣya*):....*sarvo hy ātmāstīti pratyeti* (pp.79-81)

³That is, if the unmanifest were self-established.

अथात्माविद्याव्यक्तादिरूपेण प्रथते तदा ॥

तन्निवृत्तौ निवृत्तिः स्यान्निवृत्तिः केवलात्मता ॥ १८८ ॥

If (it were argued that) ignorance about (the true nature of) the Ātman reveals itself in the form of the unmanifest etc., then, in case ignorance ceases to be, there would be the ceasing to be (of even the unmanifest); but cessation (of ignorance) consists indeed in the Ātman's being alone. [188]

In the preceding verse, the argument was based on the assumed reality of Prāṇa etc. Now, in this verse, the argument proceeds from the assumption that the ignorance about Prāṇa etc. consists in the ignorance about the Brahman—this latter ignorance being removed, the former ignorance also would be removed only naturally. The removal of the latter ignorance is but the absence of duality.

प्राणस्येव पराभूतो द्विषन्प्राप्तासुरोऽखिलः ॥

उपासीनस्य तं प्राणं कृत्वो नश्येत्तथासुरः ॥

द्विषंश्चाप्यद्विषञ्छत्रासुरादन्य इष्यते ॥ १८९ ॥

[*parāsyā dviṣan bhrātrvyo bhavati* is explained.]

The entire demoniac sin, hating Prāṇa as it were, was defeated. In the same way, the entire demoniac (sin), (hating) him who is worshipping that Prāṇa, would perish (i.e. get destroyed). (A person) who is (actually) hating and even he who is not, is considered as an enemy, (but he is) other than the demoniac sin. [189]

नित्यविघ्नकृदेवैष प्राणाप्तावासुरो मतः ॥

अतो विशेष्यते श्रुत्या द्विषन्भ्रातृव्यरूपया ॥ १९० ॥

In respect of attaining (i.e. becoming one with) Prāṇa, this demoniac (sin) is known to be a cause of obstacles forever. Therefore, the word '(who is) the hating' is specified (by the Śruti) in the form of the word 'rival'. [190]

This explains how the word *dviṣan* in the phrase *dviṣan bhrātrvyah* is significant.

उक्तासुरपराभूतौ नान्योऽरिरवशिष्यते ॥

य एवं वेदेति विधिः फलोक्तेरर्थवादतः ॥ १९१ ॥

When there occurs the defeat of the demoniac (sin) as mentioned (in the narrative), there does not remain any other enemy. Then the words: *ya evaṃ veda* are an injunction,¹ since there is the statement of the result, (i.e. there is) an Arthavāda.² [191]

¹Regarding the worship of Prāṇa, or rather the Sūtrātman.

²The argument is: There cannot be any Arthavāda unless it is connected with some injunction already laid down. The statement of a reward becomes meaningful, only if a performance has been already prescribed by some injunction.

आनुषङ्गिफलोक्त्या वा तदुपासा विमुक्तये ॥

आत्मविद्याधिकारेऽस्मिस्तदुपासाविधानतः ॥ १९२ ॥

Or by the statement of the incidental reward is prescribed the worship of that (viz. the Ātman) so that liberation is achieved; for, in this discussion on the topic of the knowledge (of the Ātman), there is prescription of the worship of that (viz. Sūtrātman). [192]

आत्मविद्योपकारित्वं तस्माद्वाक्याच्च गम्यते ॥ १९३ ॥

And from that statement (in the Śruti)¹ is understood the usefulness (of that) for the lore of the Ātman.² [193]

¹SP quotes BU 6.2.1: *uktopeniṣatkah ito vimucyamānāñḥ kva gamiṣyasi* which refers to *kramamukti*, i.e. first there occurs the *sūtrātmatvaprapṛti* and later *mokṣaprapṛti*.

²The significance of the Śruti is clarified in the next verse.

Verses 194-197 state the purpose of BU 1.3.8-1.3.16.

अथायास्याङ्गिरोद्भिर्विशिष्टमसुकर्मकम् ॥

उपासनं विधास्यामीत्यारब्धेषोत्तरा श्रुतिः ॥ १९४ ॥

This subsequent section of the Śruti has begun with the intention: 'Now let me prescribe the worship which has the

Ātman as its object that is specified by (the names) Ayāsyā, Āṅgiras and Dūr.'. [194]

अनुवादाद्विधिर्जयाननुवादे वृथा श्रमः ॥
पुरुषार्थाभिसंबन्धादतो विधिरिहाश्रितः ॥ १९५ ॥

(One might say:) 'An injunction is more important than its Anuvāda (re-statement); therefore, there is a futile effort in stating an Anuvāda.' (Our answer is:) 'Here (i.e. in the Anuvāda) is taken an injunction as its basis, because of its close connection with the purpose of human activity.' [195]

श्रूयते फलसंबन्धो यासूपासासु तास्विह ॥
दध्नेन्द्रियादिवज्ज्ञेयो विधिर्गुणसमाश्रयः ॥ १९६ ॥
प्रधानफलसंबन्धो यत्र तु स्याच्च्छुतेर्मुखात् ॥
विशिष्टः स विधिर्ज्ञेयो यथाग्नेयादयस्तथा ॥ १९७ ॥

[Verses 196 and 197 clarify the characteristics respectively of a Guṇavidhi and (Guṇa-) Viśiṣṭavidhi.]

In those various worships, in which is heard (in the Śruti) the connection of a reward (with the knowledge about the nature of the Ātman), an injunction related to some subordinate aspect of it is to be understood in the same way as (in the subordinate injunction) 'by curds, (one desirous of) organs etc.' [196]

Where, however, the connection of a reward with the principal reward is heard directly from the statement in the Śruti, that (injunction) has to be understood as a Viśiṣṭavidhi, like (the injunctions) pertaining to Āgneya (*aṣṭākāpāla*) etc. [197]

This example from the ritual-procedure is introduced for explaining how Ayāsyā Upāsanā is to be considered as a means towards the Ātman Upāsanā. Curds are a means towards the principal rite, viz. that prescribed in *juhuyāt svargakāmaḥ*. The sentence *dadhnā indriya*...refers to the pouring of curds into fire by the use of the instrumental form *dadhnā* in *dadhnā juhoti* and it is somehow related to the principal rite by (1) prescribing the *yāga* and (2) prescribing the material for the *yāga* in addition.

SP refers to the discussion of *pradhānānuvādena guṇavidhiḥ* in the SV. NKL states the similarity between *bhartā śreṣṭhaḥ purogantā* (which is relevant here) and *dandhnā...juhuyāt*.

Verses 198-208 explain BU 1.3.8.

अवाप्तान्यादिरूपास्ते प्राणालिङ्गनसंश्रयात् ॥

कृतोपकारं स्मृत्वोचुः प्राणा वागादयस्तदा ॥ १९८ ॥

Those *prāṇas*,¹ viz. speech and others, which obtained the nature of Fire etc. by resorting to Prāṇa, remembered the good turn done to them (by it) and said (to themselves). [198]

¹The word *prāṇa* refers to the Sūtrātman in its various manifest forms (viz. the various organs), not to the principal Prāṇa; cf. BSB 1.1.23.

अनन्ताग्न्यादिभावेन यो नः सञ्जितवानसुः ॥

क्व न्वसौ वर्तते ह्यात्मा योऽस्मच्छद्ब्रविनाशकृत् ॥ १९९ ॥

“Where indeed is that Prāṇa who won (i.e. united) us together by granting perennial nature of Fire etc., (the Sūtrātman), the Ātman, which has destroyed our enemies?” [199]

वितर्कयन्तस्ते प्राणा उक्तवैवं प्रत्यगात्मसु ॥

कुर्वाणमुपकारं तं द्दृशुः प्राणिवादरात् ॥ २०० ॥

Thus wondering (about Prāṇa), those *prāṇas* (=sense-organs) said this to themselves and then, as before, respectfully looked upon him, who had done good turn to them, in (i.e. connected with) all the inner selves (i.e. individuals). [200]

लोकेऽपि हि विचार्यार्थमथ संविदते जनाः ॥

यथा वागादयस्तद्वद्विज्जुः प्राणमात्मनि ॥ २०१ ॥

As in worldly life also,¹ people indeed first think about things and then come to realize (their nature etc.), so also did Speech and others come to know the Prāṇa² within themselves.³ [201]

Here is stated the basic principle which guides people's behaviour.

¹The word 'also' implies the ritualistic activities.

²This is *mukhya prāṇa*, the Ātman.

³The word *ātmani* refers to the body; cf. SP: *kāryaka*(v.1. *kā*)-*raṇasaṁghātaḥ*.

सामान्योक्तावास्य इति तद्विशेषणमुच्यते ॥

अन्तरित्यन्यथा मा भूत्प्रसङ्गः प्राणनिश्चितौ ॥ २०२ ॥

After stating (merely) *āsye*, in order to convey the general sense, there is used in the Śruti a modifier *antaḥ*¹ with a view to that, in respect of ascertaining (the exact) *Prāṇa*,² there might not arise any contingency (viz. difficulty). [202]

¹After the word *āsye* wherein the locative case-suffix was otherwise sufficient to convey the sense of the location.

²The word *āsye* alone would refer ever only to the sense of touch that occupied the place in the mouth. This is *clearly stated* in the next verse.

त्वगादयोऽपि सन्त्यास्ये यतोऽतस्तद्विशेषणम् ॥

विशिनष्टि ततः प्राणमास्यान्तर्बिलचारिणम् ॥ २०३ ॥

Since the sense of touch etc. also are (seen to abide) in the interior of the mouth, therefore, there is the modifier of that (*Prāṇa*)¹, that specifies the *Prāṇa* which moves in the hollow within the mouth. [203]

¹Namely, *antaḥ* after *āsye* as referred to in the preceding verse.

आस्यपर्यन्तशायीनि त्वगादीनि न मध्यतः ॥

प्राणस्तु मध्य आस्यस्य तस्मादन्तर्विशेषणम् ॥ २०४ ॥

The sense of touch etc. (are seen to) abide only up to the (farthest visible) end within the mouth, but (they are) not (seen occupying) the interior (hollow) of it; contrary to this, *Prāṇa*¹ (abides) in the interior (hollow) of the mouth (also). Therefore, there is here the use of modifier *antaḥ*. [204]

¹This is *mukhya prāṇa*.

सर्वेन्द्रियाणामथवा प्राण आत्मेति कथ्यते ॥

अयमास्येऽन्तरित्येवमरनाभिनिदर्शनात् ॥ २०५ ॥

Or 'the nature¹ of all organs is (finally that of) Prāṇa'; this is said (in the words) 'this one in the interior (hollow) of the mouth'. This (is stated on the basis of) the example of the spokes of a wheel (fixed in the hub²). [205]

¹This is an alternative explanation of *antaḥ*; cf. NKL: *antaḥśabdena vāgādīnaṃ svarūpam prāṇa ucyate*.

²Cf. BU 2.5.15. The intended comparison is: As the spokes lie within (i.e. inside) the rim of a wheel, being firmly fixed in the hub, so do the organs, being firmly fixed (i.e. dependent) on the Ātman, lie within the circle of worldly existence.

अयमास्येऽन्तरित्येवं प्राणं दृष्ट्वा यतः पुरा ॥

व्याजह्, रुमरास्तस्मात्प्राण आयास्यसंज्ञितः ॥ २०६ ॥

[The meaningfulness of the name Āyāśya for Prāṇa is explained.]

Since, (on that occasion) in the past, the gods thus saw Prāṇa to be abiding in the interior of the mouth and affirmed it, therefore Prāṇa is named Āyāśya.¹ [206]

¹Sureśvara cites the name as Āyāśya, this can be explained thus: *ayāśya eva āyāśyah*.

अङ्गानां करणानां च रसः सारो यतस्ततः ॥

प्राण आङ्गिरसः प्रोक्तस्तद्विद्विस्तन्दगुणाश्रयात् ॥ २०७ ॥

Since it is the essence, i.e. strength, of the limbs, i.e. organs; therefore Prāṇa is called Āṅgirāsa by them who have known that, (and as such) basing (the name) on that property (of that). [207]

कथमाङ्गिरसः प्राण इत्यस्य प्रतिपत्तये ॥

अन्वयव्यतिरेकाभ्यामुपरिष्ठात्प्रवक्ष्यते ॥ २०८ ॥

In order that it may be known as to why Prāṇa is called

Āṅgīrasa, there will be stated (an argument) later by the method of Anvaya and Vyatireka. [208]

तथान्योऽपि गुणोऽनस्य दूरिति प्रतिपाद्यते ॥
उदारफलसिचचर्थे सा वा एषेत्यतः श्रुतिः ॥२०६॥

[Verses 209-218 explain BU 1.3.9 which states that Prāṇa is away from having any property.]

In the same way, another quality of Prāṇa also is conveyed in (the name) Dūr. (And the statement) in the Śruti *sā vā eṣa* (proceeds) to establish the excellent reward (accruing from Prāṇa). [209]

उपास्तिक्रमसिद्धचर्थं क्रमभङ्गोऽयमिष्यते ॥
यतोऽतोऽङ्गिरसं त्यक्त्वा दूरित्येवाभिधीयते ॥ २१० ॥

Since this deviation from the order¹ (in the names of Prāṇa stated in the Śruti) is accepted with a view to establishing the process in worship,² therefore (the name) Dūr is expressed (i.e. explained) earlier, having set aside (the name) Āṅgīrasa. [210]

¹This refers to the *Pāṭhakrama* in the *Brāhmaṇa* (i.e. the Upaniṣad).

²It literally means 'order in the various acts which comprise worship'.

विशिष्टोपास्तिरेवेयं प्रधानफलकीर्तनात् ॥
नायं गुणविधिर्ज्ञेयस्तत्फलस्याश्रुतत्वतः ॥ २११ ॥

This (worship of Dūr) is but the worship of what is qualified, since there is the mention of the principal reward (as accruing from it). (Indeed) this should not be taken as a Guṇavidhi, for there is no mention (lit. hearing) in it of its reward.¹ [211]

¹That is to say: the reward for the worship alone is going to accrue to the worshipper; there being no separate reward for the worship of Dūr, which is but the same as Prāṇa, merely qualified by the name. This is explained in the next verse.

क्रियायां गुणभूतोऽर्थो देवतेत्युपदिश्यते ॥

अस्त्युपासिक्रियायोगो देवतातोऽन उच्यते ॥ २१२ ॥

A live being (lit. thing) which has been subordinate¹ in any activity is called the deity and since here (in respect of the act of worship to Dūr) there is such a connection with the act of worship, therefore, it is Prāṇa that is mentioned as the deity. [212]

Rites comprise *dravya* 'material', *devatā* 'deity (to whom material is offered)' and *ḥarman* '(towards which) the act (is directed)'. These three and the pleasure of the gods are regarded as subordinate; i.e. they contribute to make the rite full.

¹That is, of secondary importance. Read SP: *yāgādau kartra-tirekeṇa cetano guṇo'gnyādir devatā*.

दूरमेवंविदः पाप्मा कथमध्यवसीयते ॥

एवंवित्त्वविरोधित्वाद्दूरं पाप्मा भवेदतः ॥ २१३ ॥

(A question may be asked:) 'How is it decided that the sin of the knower of this (is sent) afar?'. (The answer is:) 'Since the sin goes away on account of its being opposed to the state of one's being the knower of such (a name of Prāṇa).' [213]

विषयेन्द्रियसंबन्धजो हि पाप्मासुरो यतः ॥

श्रौतानन्तादहंमानात्परिच्छिन्नो विरुध्यते ॥ २१४ ॥

Since the demoniac sin is what results from the contact of organs and their objects, (therefore, that sin), limited as it is, is distinguished from (lit. opposed to) the infinite Ego (which is) heard in the Śruti.¹ [214]

¹This refers to the (so-called) Ego (*aham brahmāsmi*) which arises from the knowledge of the Śāstra.

चक्षुरादिपरिच्छेदः प्राकृतज्ञानहेतुतः ॥

युक्तोऽध्यात्मैकरूपस्य बाधः शास्त्राभिमानतः ॥ २१५ ॥

Being limited by the eye etc.¹ is on account of the

ignorance which is natural to human beings. Therefore, it is only proper that there is the removal of it which has the form only of some bodily organs by coming to have the awareness (of the true nature of the inner self) by (knowing i.e. with the help of) the Śāstra. [215]

¹This refers to *cakṣurādyabhimāna* on the part of the deities other than Prāṇa.

परिस्पन्दात्मिका वृत्तिः श्रोत्रादिष्वपि विद्यते ॥
 प्राणस्याथेन्द्रियाणां तु शब्दाद्यर्थावलेहिनी ॥ २१६ ॥
 शब्दादिग्राहिणी वृत्तिः स्वैरासङ्गात्मपाप्मभिः ॥
 दूषिता न परिस्पन्दो दूरं मृत्युरसोस्ततः ॥ २१७ ॥

The function of Prāṇa which is of the nature of throbbing is noticed to exist in the case of the ear etc. also.¹ But the function of the organs relates to (lit. touches, i.e. is connected with, various) objects, viz. words and others.² [216] (Yet,) the function, viz. getting connected with the objects, viz. words etc., is affected by the sin in the form of wanton attachment (to these objects); not so the throbbing of Prāṇa. Therefore, death is far (from that).³ [217]

¹This explains how Prāṇa would be noticed as connected with sin.

²This is an expression of doubt against the said connection. The argument is: Ear etc. are connected only with their own objects—not with sins!

³Verse 217 answers away the doubt. The reason for the said connection is attachment to the objects. The throbbing Prāṇa does not get attached to any of the objects and is therefore away from death.

मृत्युर्दूरं यथा प्राणात्तदात्मत्वात्तथासुरः ॥
 तद्विदश्च भवेन्मृत्युर्दूरमित्युपदिश्यते ॥ २१८ ॥

As death is far from Prāṇa, so also is the demoniac (sin far from it¹) since it is the nature of that (viz. death). And it is declared here that death would be far from him who is the knower of that (viz. Prāṇa).² [218]

¹Namely, Prāṇa.

²This indicates the purity, freedom from the fear of death etc. of the worshipper of Prāṇa, even as Prāṇa is away from death etc.

Verses 219-227 explain BU 1.3.10.

दिशामन्त इह ग्राह्यो मध्यदेशोपलक्षितः ॥

अनन्ताकाशदेशत्वान्नाञ्जसान्तो दिशां यतः ॥ २१९ ॥

[This explains *yatrāsām diśām antaḥ*...(BU 1.3.10). Here the explanation given by Śaṅkara—and Sureśvara following him—is not wholly philosophical; it is socio-philosophical, since it reveals some of the bias of their times as is noticed from SP.]

Here the end of quarters is to be taken as that which is defined (or indicated)¹ by the middle region,² since it is not reasonable to say that there is the end (i.e. boundary) of quarters, for the region is very wide in space. [219]

¹The word 'indicated' shows that the division of regions is not so rigid; it only points to two regions of people of two different tendencies.

²Region described in the Smṛtis as *Āryāvarta*, viz. the region between Mt. Himalaya and Mt. Vindhya (rather the plains of the Gaṅgā). People of those times believed that the people of *Āryāvarta* followed the religion prescribed by the Śruti and the Smṛti. Therefore, they were pure in their mind and activity and the people other than these did not follow the religion (prescribed by the Śruti and the Smṛti). Therefore, they were impure. Thus there is a division of persons of divine tendencies and those of demoniac tendencies. Consequently, Mṛtyu or death is for them who did not follow the religion of the Śruti and the Smṛti—this religion prevailed in the form of (worldly) religion.

श्रुतिस्मृतिसदाचारसंस्कृताशयवज्जनम् ॥

अवधीकृत्यान्तत्वोक्तेर्नतु दोषो मनागपि ॥ २२० ॥

Since there is a statement (made in the Śruti) about the boundary, after having marked out the people who has

thoughts purified by (the study of) the Śruti, the Smṛti and the exemplary conduct (of the elite), there is not even a little defect.¹ [220]

NKL states the purpose of this verse: A Smṛti text reads; *vindhyasya dakṣiṇe bhāge kalau vāsaḥ praśasyate/tatra vedāś ca yajñāś ca yatra godāvarī nadī ||* (untraceable); and this indicates that the middle region is the one which is a suitable abode for the learned men (*śrautas-mārtakarmasamśkrītabuddhīnām puruṣāṇām vāsayogyah*). This is the purpose of *upalakṣita* in *madhyadeśo-palakṣita*; cf. verse 219 above.

¹This stands for 'defective doing'.

मध्यदेशावधिस्तस्माद्दिगन्त इति गृह्यते ॥
 प्रात्यन्तिकजनोद्देशः पापीयोजनसंश्रयात् ॥
 वर्ज्यतेऽतः प्रयत्नेन तद्विद्विरधुनातनैः ॥ २२१ ॥

Therefore, by the boundary of the middle region is understood the boundary of the quarters. (And) because the region of the people residing beyond that boundary is resorted to by people that are full of sin(s), it is hence carefully avoided by (even) the moderns who know (that). [221]

This underlines the significance of the contents in the note on the previous verse.

तेषु प्रत्यन्तदेशेषु तन्निवासिषु चासुरान् ॥
 यतो विन्यदधात्प्राणस्तस्मात्तद्वर्जयेद्द्वयम् ॥ २२२ ॥

Since Prāṇa fixed the demons down there in those regions beyond the limits (of the middle region) and also in the people residing there, therefore, one should avoid the two of them. [222]

This explains the reason (briefly) stated in the preceding verse.

जनो विशिष्टो देशेन देशो जनविशेषितः ॥
 पाप्मोषस्पृष्टमुभयं शिष्टास्तद्वर्जयन्त्यतः ॥ २२३ ॥

A people is marked out by (its own) region and (so also) is a region marked out by the people (residing in it). Therefore, the elite avoid them both, both of them being affected by sin. [223]

This makes the word *dvayam* 'the two of them' in verse 222 doubly clarified.

समाहारोऽथवा भेदो नेदित्येतत्पदं भवेत् ॥
अनीप्सितानिवृत्तिः स्यात्समाहारेऽविवक्षिते ॥ २२४ ॥

The word *net* could be either a compound or two different words (joined in Saṁdhi). When the compound (i.e. a single word) is not intended, it would be (in the sense:) 'not desisting from some undesired (activity or tendency)'. [224]

इत्थं न चेदहं कुर्या प्रतिषेधश्रुतीरितम् ॥
अन्ववायानि पाप्मानं प्रतिषेधातिलङ्घनात् ॥ २२५ ॥

(In that case, the meaning of the sentence would be:) If I shall not do this way (i.e. behave in this manner), as is declared by the prohibitive Śruti,¹ I might incur (lit. follow) sin by transgressing the prohibition. [225]

¹The prohibitive rule is *tasmān na janam...* (BU 1.3.10).

इति भेदविवक्षायां व्याख्या कार्या पदद्वये ॥
माङ्गर्थस्तु तथाभेदे व्याख्येयः प्रतिषेधकृत् ॥ २२६ ॥

Such should be the explanation given of the two words, if it is the intention to understand (*net*) to be two different words. So also, if there is (intended) non-difference, (i.e. there are not two words),¹ it is necessary to bring forth the meaning of the prohibitive particle *mā* which conveys the sense of prohibiting.² [226]

¹That is, (if) '*net*' (is accepted) only as one word.

²That is, it should mean 'let me not follow sin'.

सामान्यविषयश्चायं निषेधो नानविद्गतः ॥

बलवत्प्रक्रियातो हि वाक्यं सामान्यमात्रगम् ॥ २२७ ॥

And this prohibition pertains to (individuals in general), it does not pertain to the knower of Prāṇa, because the sentence of the Śruti pertains only to individuals in general, thanks to the (accepted) procedure in respect of a strong (proof which determines the meaning). [227]

Mīmāṃsā holds relative strength of proofs for determining the meaning of scriptural texts: *śruti*, *liṅga vākya*, *prakaraṇa*, *sthāna* and *samākhyā*. Here *prakaraṇa* 'context' or 'topic' is in conflict with *vākya* and is considered inferior to its precedents, in accordance with the rule regarding the weakness of the subsequent in comparison with its preceding (*pāradaurbalya*).

The basis for the verse is the following (possible doubt): 'What does the prohibition (*māṇārtha*) in the preceding verse pertain to, to the worshipper of Prāṇa (the subject of the *prakaraṇa*) or to the worshipper of all deities (the subject of *vākya*)?' The answer is: 'to the latter'.

आसुरेणावरुद्धांस्तान्वागादीन्हृतपाप्मनः ॥

देवत्वं प्रापयत्प्राणः कथमित्येतदुच्यते ॥ २२८ ॥

[Verses 228-236 explain the purpose of BU 1.3.11-16, i.e. worship of Speech and others secures the reward, viz. becoming the deities, Agni etc.]

(An objection is raised:) 'How has Prāṇa brought to (the divinities) Speech and others who were (first) overpowered by the demoniac (nature) and who had their sins later destroyed?'—this is (now) answered. [228]

ज्ञानतोऽज्ञानहानिः स्याद्देवत्वं भावनाबलात् ॥

आनन्तर्ये क्रियाद्वित्वादथशब्दो भवेद्ध्रुवम् ॥ २२९ ॥

'From (the acquisition of) knowledge there follows the destruction of ignorance, and, owing to the strength of devotion, there would be divine character (secured). (As

such), the word *atha* (here in this context) is certainly for (conveying) the sense 'then' or 'later', for there are two actions¹. [229]

This explains: *athainā mrtyum atyavahat*.

¹Namely, meditation (or worship) and knowing.

मृत्युमत्यवहत्प्राणः सामान्योक्तेर्विशेषतः ॥

विशिष्टदेवतावाप्तिर्वागादीनां प्रपञ्च्यते ॥ २३० ॥

By the general statement (is conveyed the meaning:) 'Prāṇa took (them) beyond (or over) Mrtyu' and by the particular statement is explained in detail the attainment of (the nature of) some particular deities by Speech and others. [230]

नेदीयसी यतोऽन्यभ्यो वागेवोद्गीथकर्मणि ॥

प्राणस्य तेन सोद्गातुः प्रथमेत्याभिधीयते ॥ २३१ ॥

Since, in the Udgītha ritual, Speech is, in comparison with others, nearer to Prāṇa,¹ therefore, it is described as the first (among the deities of the organs) of the Udgātr. [231]

This explains the qualifier *prathamām* of *vācam* in *sā vai vācam eva prathamām atyavahat*.

¹SP significantly adds: *audgātre karmaṇi sādihakamatvena prāṇasyodgātur atyantasaṁnihitatvāt*.

वागाद्यन्याद्यवाप्त्यैवं पाप्मनोऽपास्य सर्वतः ॥

वैराजं पदमेत्येवं यजमानः सुभावितः ॥ २३२ ॥

Having wholly separated (lit. thrown away) Speech and others from the sin by the attainment of (the nature of) Agni etc. (who are their deities), the sacrificer, who is thus well developed in devotion,¹ attains to the status of Virāj. [232]

¹That is, who has strengthened the devotion, or who is ardently devoted.

कल्याणासङ्गसंबन्धाद्वागाद्यधर्मकारणम् ॥
 त्यक्त्वानं मुख्यमात्मानमाश्रयेन्मृत्युवर्जितम् ॥ २३३ ॥
 वागाद्यैः पञ्चभिर्युक्तं विराजं साधिभौतिकम् ॥
 हित्वाध्यात्मपरिच्छेदं ततस्तं प्रतिपद्यते ॥ २३४ ॥
 साधिभूताधिदैवं च नामरूपक्रियात्मकः ॥
 सूत्रं प्राणोऽङ्गिराः सत्यमृक्सामेत्यन उच्यते ॥ २३५ ॥

Having abandoned (i.e. thrown away) the cause, viz. impiety of Speech and others, (which had resulted) from the connection (of them) with an attachment to the (so-called) auspicious, (the sacrificer) should resort to the Ātman, the principal Prāṇa, who is free from death, [233] (that sacrificer), having abandoned the limitation of the body, (resorts to) that Virāj, together with what has a basis in the elements (viz. body) which is connected with the five (sense-organs) speech and others,¹ attains Prāṇa.² [234] Sentience³ is called the Sūtrātman,⁴ the (principal) Prāṇa, Aṅgiras, Satya, Ṛc and Sāman, having the nature of name, form and activity and being connected with the elements and divinities. [235]

¹SP and NKL point out; 'this indicates the inclusion of the sense of touch etc.'

²That is, status of Prāṇa.

³Translation distinguishes *ana* from *mukhya Prāṇa*. Sentience is for *ana*.

⁴Read SP: *napuṃsakam sūtrenādhyāhṛtaprapaṇcena ca pumān sambadhyate*.

तमेकं सर्वभूतेषु ज्ञानकर्मफलाश्रयम् ॥
 आस्वभावात्मविज्ञानादुपास्ते यः स तं व्रजेत् ॥ २३६ ॥

He, who worships that one, the unique, who alone exists in all beings, who is the support of knowledge, (ritual) action and rewards, till (he acquires) the knowledge of (his own) nature (as that) of the Ātman,¹ becomes one with it.² [236]

¹The editor of NKL writes the following note: *sūtram prāṇa iti ābhyām padābhyām kriyātmavām uktam, aṅgirāḥ satyam ity*

ābhyāṁ rūpātmakatvam, ṛksāmapadābhyāṁ nāmātmakatvam ca prāṇasyoktam bodhyam.

²It literally means 'attains to that'.

Verses 237-245 explain BU 1.3.17.

उक्तमभ्युदयार्थं यद्वागादीनामथाधुना ॥

आगानमवशिष्टेषु स्तोत्रेषूद्गातुरुच्यते ॥ २३७ ॥

As to what was stated in the case of speech and others, (viz. the singing of the Udgītha) is for the material prosperity (for them, i.e. the sacrificer); (now) is stated, in respect of the remaining prayers, (that which is for the sake) of the Udgāṭṛ (priest). [237]

Among the twelve prayers (*pavamānas*) earlier referred to, the first three are said to bring the reward to the sacrificer, viz. material prosperity. The remaining prayers stand in similar connection with the Udgāṭṛ priest.

सामान्यभोज्यविषयस्त्वन्नशब्दो यतस्ततः ॥

आद्यमित्युच्यते तस्य विशेषणतया वचः ॥ २३८ ॥

Since the word *anna* refers to the commonly accepted eatable (foods), therefore, a statement is made about that in the word *ādya* 'fit to be eaten'¹ (which is) its qualifier. [238]

This verse explains the second member *ādya* in the compound *annādya* and sets aside the possible doubt of repetition.

¹Cf. SP: *tasyaiva (=annasya) saṁskṛtatvam viśeṣam*.

यत आदाविदं वृत्तमन्नागानमनात्मनि ॥

तस्मात्तत्कार्यभूतासु प्रजास्वद्यापि दृश्यते ॥ २३९ ॥

Since this incident, viz. the singing for food, first¹ occurred in respect of the non-Ātman,² therefore that³ is noticed even today in the case of people (lit. the offsprings of that Prāṇa) who are but the product of the same. [239]

¹This refers to Prajāpati who was connected with Speech and others. Therefore, there is a reference to this as the first occurrence. Prajāpati is understood as other than the Ātman.

²This emphasises the notion about Prajāpati as non-Ātman.

³It signifies people's satisfying their own desire for food (cf. the note of the editor of NKL: *svārtham annasvikaraṇam iti śeṣaḥ*).

यद्धि किंचेति सर्वार्थमेवेत्यत्रावधारणम् ॥

प्राणेनैव तु तत्सर्वं लोकोऽन्नं ह्यति सर्वदा ॥ २४० ॥

In the words *yadd hi kiṃ ca* (in the Śruti statement), there is the specification: 'for the sake of all', (expressed) in the word *eva*. (The sense of the sentence is:) Therefore, people ever eat all food only through Prāṇa indeed. [240]

अन्नोपकारः सर्वेषामविशिष्टः समीक्ष्यते ॥ २४१ ॥

अथावधारणं कस्मादनेनैवेति भण्यते ॥

प्राणद्वारक एवेषामुपकारो न तु स्वतः ॥ २४२ ॥

This benefit (resulting) from food is noticed to be the same¹ for all. [241]

Now (a question could be asked:) 'Why then is this specification "only through Prāṇa"?'. Therefore, (to answer this, it is said:) 'This benefit for (all) these (people) occurs only through Prāṇa and not on (the basis of merit or strength) of their own.' [242]

¹It means 'not specified or distinguished as different for different individuals'.

कथं तद्द्वारकस्तेषामुपकार इतीर्यते ॥

ननु दूरिति हि प्राण उक्तो वागादिवत्कथम् ॥

आत्मार्थान्नाद्यसंगीतेविद्धो नासुरपाप्मभिः ॥ २४३ ॥

Now is stated¹ as to how this benefit (accrues) to them (i.e. the people) through that (Prāṇa). (A question is asked:) 'How indeed is Prāṇa, who is called Dūr was not, like

Speech and others, pierced by the demoniac sins, on account of the singing for food for its own sake²?’ [243]

¹This refers to the sentence: *iha pratitiṣṭhati*.

²The word *ātman* in the compound *ātmārtham* is a reflexive pronoun.

स्थितिमात्राभिसंबन्धान्नायं दोष इहेष्यते ॥ २४४ ॥

(The answer is:) ‘It is understood here¹ that this is not a fault, for there is connection (of food etc.)² merely for the sustenance (of worldly life.)³’ [244]

¹The word *iha* means ‘in the statement of the Śruti’: *ihānnam pratitiṣṭhati* where *iha* stands for *Prāṇa*.

²The words ‘with *Prāṇa*, the inner self called *Dūr*’ is to be supplied.

³There is no common ‘desire’ for food and, therefore, no sin.

असावन्नं स्थितं यस्माद्देहं प्राणानवत्यतः ॥

यत्नाच्छ्रुतिरतो वक्ति त्विहान्नं प्रतितिष्ठति ॥ २४५ ॥

Since food is resting on the *Ātman*,¹ therefore, it protects *prāṇas* (the sense-organs) (and) the body—therefore, the Śruti states, with emphasis (or special care): *ihānnam pratitiṣṭhati*. [245]

A first interpretation is made here of *ihānne pratitiṣṭhati*. Read SP: *iha prāṇe doṣo nodbhāvyah sarvasādhāraṇasthityarthatayā tenānnasvikārāt prāṇasthityadhīnā hi vāgādisthitiḥ*. Or NKL: *tasmin prāṇe pratiṣṭhitam sad annam deham prāṇānś cāvati*.

¹That is *mukhya prāṇa*.

Verses 246-252 explain BU 1.3.18.

स्थितिमात्रं ह्यसोरन्नं यद्वासङ्गो न शङ्क्यते ॥

भर्ता श्रेष्ठः पुरो गन्ता ह्यन्नादोऽधिपतिस्तथा ॥

इत्यादिगुणविधयर्थं परो ग्रन्थोऽवतार्यते ॥ २४६ ॥

Or rather, food (for the *Prāṇa*) is merely for the sustenance (of the body); any attachment to food (and the consequent

sin) cannot be thought of (in the case of Prāṇa).¹ (Now) the subsequent Śruti is introduced for prescribing the Guṇavidhi: 'the supporter, the best of them, the one who marches ahead, the eater of food and the Lord etc.'² [246]

¹A second interpretation of *ihāṇne pratitiṣṭhati*. Read SP: *sarvasādhāraṇasthityarthānnayogāt prāṇasya pāpmavedho na*. This is Śaṅkara's alternative explanation: *iha dehākārapariṇate āṇne prāṇaḥ tiṣṭhati*.

²The word 'etc.' refers to gold and other belongings. This is the ultimate result of the Śruti statement: *te devā abruvan/etāvad vā idaṁ sarvaṁ yad annam ātmana āgāsīḥ/ anu no annam ābhajasva*.

अयं गुणविधिर्ज्ञेयः प्रत्येकं तत्फलश्रुतेः ॥ २४७ ॥

जग्धमन्नं यतो देहलिङ्गभावेन याति नः ॥

परिणामं व्रजत्तस्मादेतावदिति भण्यते ॥ २४८ ॥

Let this¹ be understood as a Guṇavidhi, because there is heard a reward in the case of each (of the two sentences).² [247] Since the food that is eaten by us becomes transformed into the body and (also) its subtle form, thus developing its monification(s); therefore, is the word *etāvat* 'this much' stated in the Śruti.³ [248]

¹Refer to *te devā abruvan*...quoted in note 2 on the preceding verse. But this verse explains the significance of *etāvat*.

²The second sentence (i.e. *vidhi*) is: *so ayāsyā*...(BU 1.3.19).

³This refers to *etāvad vā idaṁ sarvaṁ yad annam ātmana āgāsīḥ*.

त्वयैवात्मार्थमागीते त्वय्येवान्नमतोऽखिलम् ॥

वयं चान्नमृते स्थातुं नालं क्षणमपीश्वर ॥ २४९ ॥

When you yourself have sung for your own sake, all food is (resting, lit. obtained) in you. And, as for us,¹ we cannot live without food even for a moment, O Lord! [249]

This explains: *tad ātmana āgāsīḥ*.

¹Refer to the word *ca*. And the popular maxim: *svāmini bhṛt-*

yenātmīyāpan nivedyā; simile of master-servant relationship, viz. the feeder-fed or the supporter-supported relationship'. (cf. *Lauki-kanyāyāñjaliḥ*. vol. 2, Bombay, Nirnaya Sagar Press, 1925, p. 90)

संतर्प्यातः स्वमात्मानमन्नेनास्मानपीश्वर ॥

आभाजयस्व क्षुधितांश्छान्दसत्वाणिचोऽश्वरः ॥ २५० ॥

Therefore, 'O Lord! Having satisfied yourself by this food, make us, the hungry ones,¹ also share of that food. (In the Śruti) is not heard the causal form, owing to its character of Chandas.² [250]

This verse explains: *anu no 'sminn anna ābhajasva*.

¹The use of 'O Lord' and 'us, the hungry ones', which are used in contrast, points to the relation of one who favours and the one who is favoured. 'The Lord' is a reference to the sacrificer(s); (cf. note by of the editor of NKL: *īśvaraśabdaḥ yajamānaparaḥ*). The hungry ones are then the priests.

²The Śruti uses the verbal form *ābhajasva* which Sureśvara has paraphrased as *ābhājayasva* (a causal form). Then, he points to the practice of Chandas, i.e. Veda, of using primitive verbal forms in the place of causal ones.

मामृतेऽन्नं न वः शक्तं पोष्टुं क्षणमपि क्वचित् ॥

अन्नार्थिनोऽतो मां सर्वेऽप्यभिसंविशताशु वै ॥ २५१ ॥

"Without me (i.e. in my absence) food cannot, by any chance (*kvacit*)¹, nourish you even for a moment, therefore, all of you, who desire for food, (do you) enter into me quickly indeed." (So said Prāṇa to them). [251]

This explains: *te vai mābhisaṁviśateti/ tatheti taṁ samantam pariṇyaviśanta/ tasmād yad annenānnam atti tenaitās tṛpyanti*.

¹Or alternatively, 'anywhere'.

Verses 253-280 explain how the deities of Speech and others are satisfied when Prāṇa has eaten the food.

तेनेता देवताः सर्वास्तृप्यन्त्यन्नेन सर्वशः ॥

इत्यर्थस्य कुतः सिद्धिरिति चेदुच्यते यतः ॥ २५२ ॥

त्रिधा जग्धं भवत्यन्नं परिणामविशेषतः ॥
 स्थवीयान्मध्यमोऽणीयानित्येवं कालतोऽग्नितः ॥ २५३ ॥
 स्थवीयान्यात्यधोभागो रसादिक्रमशोऽपरः ॥
 स्थूलं ह्युपचिनोतीमं कुड्यं मृत्स्नेव सर्वदा ॥ २५४ ॥
 यस्त्वणीयान्त्रसः सूक्ष्मः स ऊर्गमृतमुच्यते ॥
 नाडीः सूक्ष्माः प्रविश्यासौ देवताः प्रीणयत्यथ ॥ २५५ ॥

[SP states that verses 253 ff. are an explanation which has no basis in both BU and BUB. NKL states: there is *udgrantha* (-*parihāra*).]

(The Śruti says:) 'All these deities ever¹ become satisfied by that food²'—whence³ can this meaning be established?' If (this is asked), here is given the answer: 'Since [252] food that is eaten becomes threefold owing to the particular (and different) modifications of it: digested in the forms: gross, subtle and of middle size, owing to passage of time and to the fire (within the belly). [253] The gross (modification) goes as the lower part⁴ (i.e. bodily excretion) and the other as *rasa* etc. in order and that (all these being together) ever forms 'this (gross body) like the soft clay⁵ which forms a thatched wall. [254] And⁶ that (part) which is thinner (than the first two), is the subtle (*rasa*) that is called *ūrj* (or, 'energy'), the nectar, after it has entered (these) very thin veins, it pleases the deities⁷ also.⁸ [255]

This has a basis in some other Śruti: *annam aśitam tredhā vidhīyate* (CU 6.5.1), (NKL).

¹Translation follows the variant *sarvadā* for *sarvaśaḥ* 'in every way' as read in the in AnSS and NKL texts.

²That is, through Prāṇa's eating of food.

³That is, on what basis...

⁴This should be *adhobhāgam* 'to the lower part (as excretion)'.
⁵Cf SP: *praśastā saṁskṛtā mṛn mṛtsnety ucyate*.

⁶Or alternatively, 'As for, that...(two), it is...'

⁷This signifies the different sense-organs.

⁸This is for *atha* in the sense of *api* (SP).

स्वाम्यर्थ एव चोत्तम्भस्तृप्तिरापूर उच्यते ॥

ततस्तु या सुखोद्भूतिर्विज्ञानात्मन एव सा ॥ २५६ ॥

The sustenance (of the body) is only for the sake of the master (i.e. Prāṇa)¹. Satisfaction is what is called filling and, whatever happiness then results is for (i.e. accrues to) only the knowing Ātman (the inner self, viz. Prāṇa)². [256]

¹The stress on the *svāmi-bhṛtya* (or *sva-svāmi*) relation is for ruling out the elemental nature (*bhautikatva*) of Prāṇa. *svām-yartha* is *kāryakaraṇasaṃghātārtha* (i.e. *dehārtha*).

²This sets aside the possible doubt that happiness also belongs to the *kāryakaraṇasaṃghāta*.

ता एता देवताः सप्तदश ज्ञानक्रियात्मिकाः ॥

सोऽयं सप्तदशग्रामो भोक्तुः करणलक्षणः ॥ २५७ ॥

Thus, these are the seventeen deities, having the nature of knowledge and activity and this is the group of the seventeen, having the form of the organs of the enjoyer. [257]

This explains the nature of the deities pleased by *rasa* (mentioned in verse 255 above).

बुद्धीन्द्रियाणि पञ्चैव तथा कर्मेन्द्रियाण्यपि ॥

वायवः पञ्च बुद्धिश्च मनः सप्तदशं विदुः ॥ २५८ ॥

They¹ know (the group of) the seventeen thus: The five organs of sense and also (the five organs) of activity, the five winds, intellect and *manas*. [258]

This refers to the *lingaśarīra* 'subtle body' (SP).

¹Namely, those who can make out (i.e. who are knowers).

अपास्ताध्यात्मरूपाणां देवतानां समाश्रयः ॥

भूतपञ्चकमेवेदं साधारण्याद्भूतेऽसदा ॥ २५९ ॥

(And) ever¹ this group of five elements itself became the support of the deities which have (thus) given up their

bodily forms, owing to its being (shared by them) in common. [259]

¹This stresses the idea of the support available for both the gross and the subtle bodies.

पयोम्भोवदिदं लिङ्गं नानारूपैः समन्वितम् ॥
आविर्भावतिरोभावैः कारणात्मनि वर्तते ॥ २६० ॥

This subtle body, which is possessed of many forms on account of the manifestations and concealments (of some of them), remains (permanently) in the nature of its own cause,¹ just like milk and water.² [260]

¹This is a reference to the manifestation of the Ātman in the collective and individual (*samastavyasta*) forms.

²That is to say: As milk appears in the form of curds etc. and water, in the form of ice etc. The illustration and terminology reveal the basic Sāṃkhya notion about the so-called creation.

कूटस्थबोधतन्मोहचिदाभासैकमात्रया ॥
जाग्रत्स्वप्नावयं पीत्वा ह्यास्ते प्राणात्मना प्रभुः ॥ २६१ ॥

[The stress on the word *ābhāsa* may be noted. This is of cardinal importance in Sureśvara's writing. Verse 261 is the description of the deep sleep state of the Ātman, viz. Prājñā, verse 262 of the Sūtrātman and verse 263 of the waking state of the Ātman. These verses are *anukta* portion 'not in Bhāṣya but implied elsewhere'.]

By means of the unique *mātrā*,¹ which is but the appearance of Sentience owing to the widely known ignorance or knowledge about (then ature of) in respect of the immutable (i.e. Ātman), this Lord first absorbs into Himself (lit. drinks) the waking and dream states of Himself and then remains in the state of Prāṇa alone. [261]

¹*mātrā*=Prājñā state of the Ātman. It seems that NKL holds this verse as an explanation of *m* in *aum*; it symbolises sleep.

अपास्ताशेषबाह्यार्थस्तज्जवासनयाञ्चितः ॥
अध्वस्तप्रत्यगज्ञानो विरिञ्चः पर उच्यते ॥ २६२ ॥

(And Prāṇa) who is beyond this (i.e. the inner self etc.) is called Viriñca (=the first sacrificer), the one who has thrown away all of the external objects, who is marked by the impressions produced by them¹ and whose ignorance about the inner self is not (yet fully) destroyed. [262]

NKL holds this as an explanation of what is symbolised by *u* in *aum*, viz. the Sūtrātman.

¹This refers to *aśeṣabāhyārtha*.

जाग्रत्काले विशेषेण स्थित्वा हृदयसञ्चनि ॥
द्वासप्ततिसहस्राणि नाडीर्व्याप्यावतिष्ठते ॥ २६३ ॥

Residing in the home, viz. the heart, at the time of the waking, in some particular way, (the Lord) remains there occupying the seventy-two thousand veins. [263]

This is, according to NKL, referring to *a* in *aum*.

स एष परमात्मैव स्वात्ममोहसहायवान् ॥
प्राणात्मना करोत्येष पश्यत्यग्न्यात्मना तथा ॥ २६४ ॥

And this one¹ is but (i.e. none other than) the highest Ātman Himself—He, who has a companion in² the ignorance about His own nature. He does His functions, being in the form of *prāṇas* (organs) and also sees (all), being in the form of Agni. [264]

¹This one who is described in verses 261-263 above. It asserts the oneness of all the three mentioned in those verses.

²In other words; who is aided by.

इन्द्राग्नी ताविमावुक्तौ प्राण इन्द्रस्तयोर्मतः ॥
प्रकाशकत्वाद्वाग्निरेवमेकः प्रजापतिः ॥ २६५ ॥
अन्त्राद्यभेदतो द्वौ वा यदि बाध्यर्ध उच्यते ॥
यदि बायं त्रयांस्त्रिंशद्द्वासप्ततिरथापि वा ॥ २६६ ॥

These two¹ are called Indra and Agni and *prāṇa* is understood to be Indra of the two on account of his illumining.² Thus is Speech Agni³—thus, there is (but) one Prajāpati⁴. [265] If he is declared to be two owing to (the existence of) the two discrete individual objects, viz. the eater and the eatables, or (perhaps as) one and half,⁵ or thirty-three⁶ or seventy-two⁷ (he is just one yet). [266]

¹*prāṇa* 'organs' and Agni mentioned in the preceding verse.

²That means 'bringing sensation etc. or knowledge'.

³Cf. verse 324 below.

⁴Read SP: *uktanītyā kriyāśaktimadrūpeṇa kartā jñānaśaktimadrūpeṇa jñātety ekaḥ paramātmānaiva sūtradeham āpannaḥ san kartrādyātmāna tiṣṭhatīti*.

⁵*Prāṇa* is one and the world is half—thus one and half (NKL).

⁶These are eight Vasus, eleven Rudras, twelve Ādityas, Indra and Prajāpati—these are the *vibhūtis* 'special manifestations' of *Prāṇa*.

⁷The same as in the preceding note with minor divisions of them, so that they correspond to the number of the veins in a body.

अनन्तभेदभिन्नो वा एक एवान उच्यते ॥

सर्वोऽप्येष विकल्पश्च पुनरेकैकशस्तथा ॥ २६७ ॥

Or, even though only one, *Prāṇa* is differentiated in innumerable discrete individual objects and each of all these is further divided in the same way (infinitely). [267]

देवासुरादिभेदेन जातिरूपक्रियागुणैः ॥

एकैकोऽनन्ततां याति पुनरेकात्मतामतः ॥ २६८ ॥

(Thus) by (such) division into the gods and the demons, on the ground of the (different) genera, forms, activities and qualities, each one (of these distinct objects) becomes infinite and finally once again attains the nature of only one (*Ātman*). [268]

समस्तव्यस्ततैवेह प्रत्यगज्ञानभूमिका ॥

न त्वपास्तसमस्तान्ध्ये नेति नेति परात्मनि ॥ २६९ ॥

Here unity and multiplicity¹ is but the phase of the ignorance (about the nature) of the inner self, but (it does) not (exist) in the highest Ātman from whom all darkness (i.e. ignorance) is removed (as expressed) in the words *neti neti*. [269]

¹Or alternatively, 'collectivity and individuality'.

सर्वेणैव विकल्पेन यथोक्तेनावतिष्ठते ॥
यथाधिकारं सर्वत्र परो जगति सर्वथा ॥ २७० ॥

At all events (then), the highest one abides in the world in the form of all these discrete objects etc., as described before, according to the requirement of each (of them). [270]

न हि कृत्स्नमनादाय जगदेतन्मनागपि ॥
क्रियायै कारकं किञ्चित्स्मात्सर्वात्मनेहते ॥ २७१ ॥

Indeed, no agent is capable of any activity without taking even a little of this entire world, therefore (it is said: it is the highest Ātman) who, assuming the forms of all of these, acts.¹ [271]

¹The verbal root *ih* has the sense 'to act'; cf. the word *ihā* in verse 126 above.

कारणात्मा जगत्कृत्स्नं श्रौतदर्शनसाधनः ॥
यतः प्रागकरोत्कर्म तत्कार्येऽपि तथा ततः ॥ २७२ ॥

Since the Ātman, who is of the nature of the cause (of everything and) who has as his means what is prescribed (lit. seen) in the Śruti, has formerly produced (lit. made) the whole of the world (consisting in varied objects), therefore, there exists similar activity in his products (viz. in the world) also. [272]

एकापूर्वप्रयुक्तत्वात्समस्तव्यस्तरूपिणाम् ॥
सर्वः सर्वमुपादाय सर्वत्रातः प्रवर्तते ॥ २७३ ॥

Since they are impelled by the unique *apūrva* 'not preceded

by anything' (viz. the Sūtrātman), therefore, all of (those who have the) forms of unity and of multiplicity proceed to act everywhere, taking up all (other things as the means of activity). [273]

अध्यात्माद्यधिभूताधिदैवतं सर्वदाखिलम् ॥
सर्वं सर्वक्रियाः कुर्यादिकापूर्वप्रयुक्तितः ॥ २७४ ॥

All of it,¹ viz. what begins with bodily forms² and what rests on elements and what on deities, would ever³ perform all activities, thanks to the impulse by the unique *apūrva* (viz. the Sūtrātman), [274]

¹This refers to the agents of various activities noticed in the world.

²The word 'etc.' indicates minor divisions of these forms (SP and NKL).

³SP remarks: *sarvadety ādāne karaṇe ca sambadhyate*. This should require the following translation: '...would ever perform all activities, always taking up the various means, thanks...'

यतः प्रजापतिः पूर्वमेतस्मिन्दर्शने स्थितः ॥
यज्ञेन कर्मणास्त्राक्षीज्जगदेतच्चराचरम् ॥ २७५ ॥

since, in this lore (of this Upaniṣad), Prajāpati, who has appeared earlier (than all creation), has therefore produced by his activity (viz. the performance of sacrifice) this world, movable and immovable. [275]

नाड्योऽस्य रश्मयोऽनन्ता हृदयं मण्डलं रवेः ॥
अहोरात्राणि तावच्च शतसंवत्सरायुषः ॥ २७६ ॥
एतया संपदा पूर्वं यजमानेन तद्विदा ॥
अग्नयोऽर्काश्रिता आसन्षट्च त्रिंशत्सहस्रशः ॥ २७७ ॥

The innumerable veins of this one¹ are rays, this one's heart, the orb of the Sun. Of him,¹ who has the life of a hundred years, the days and nights are also as many; [276] as the thirty-six thousand (bricks), (called) Agni and Arka, were earlier collected with this amplitude² (of trans-

formation in the sacrifice performed) by him, the sacrificer who knows that (amplitude). [277]

¹Namely, the sacrificer.

²This refers to *saṁkhyāsāmānyayoga* 'connection with similarity in number'.

एकैकस्मिन्परिस्पन्द एवं सर्वापि देवता ॥
एका चानेकरूपा च ह्यध्यात्मादिविभागतः ॥ २७८ ॥

Thus, the deity in its fullness was present in each of the activities (of that first sacrificer) of one (particular form) and of many forms on account of the division based on bodily forms etc.¹ [278]

¹Cf. verse 274 above and the next.

विभ्वी सर्वगतानन्ता समाप्ता च प्रतिक्रियम् ॥
प्रतिद्रव्यफलं कृत्स्ना खण्डादौ गोत्ववत्स्थिता ॥ २७९ ॥

(That) one deity, all-pervading, residing in many, infinite and fulfilling¹ its purpose in every activity, abides in its full form (in all the effects) in the same way as cowness abides in various parts (i.e. bodies of cows). [279]

¹The word *samāptā* is for *samāptavātī* (= *samāpayantī*).

एष प्रजापतेरुक्तो महिमा तद्वदेव तु ॥
यजमानोऽपि तादात्म्यात्तथैव भवति ध्रुवम् ॥ २८० ॥

Thus is described (here) the greatness of Prajāpati. And, indeed, just in the same way does the sacrificer also become possessed of similar greatness owing to his (attaining) oneness with him (=Prajāpati). [280]

Verses 281-285 explain *evam ha vā enam...ya evam veda* (BU 1.3.18).

गुणोपास्तिफलोक्त्यर्थमेवं हेति श्रुतिः परा ॥
यथोक्तार्थमुपासीनं प्रति प्रववृतेऽधुना ॥ २८१ ॥

The subsequent Śruti text *evam ha...* now proceeds with the purpose to state the reward of the subordinate (form of) worship with reference to a worshipper of him (i.e. Prajāpati), who has been described (before). [281]

वागादयोऽभिसंविष्टा जीवनाथमनं यथा ॥

ज्ञातयोऽभिविशन्त्येवं तद्विदं जीवनाथिनः ॥ २८२ ॥

As Speech and others entered into Prāṇa from all sides (*abhi*) for their life, so do the relatives enter (him) who knows that (viz. Prāṇa) from all sides, having a longing for life. [282]

भर्ता च संनिविष्टानां श्रेष्ठश्च गुणतो भवेत् ॥

यथोक्तगुणवैफल्यं पुरेता न चेद्भवेत् ॥ २८३ ॥

And he would be the supporter of those who have resorted to him (and) the most prominent (among them)¹ because of his excellence (only) if he does not go at the head (of them)² and if there does not result (from that doing) futility of excellence which is stated earlier. [283]

¹SP points out the significance *bhartr* and *śreṣṭha* as the qualifier of a Kṣatriya and a Brāhmaṇa sacrificer respectively.

²This implies; marching at the head of others is permissible in the case of a king; a Brāhmaṇa, though possessed of excellence, should not march ahead of the king; if he does so, his excellence would be useless.

सर्वमेतद्वृथैव स्यान्न चेद्दीप्ताग्निमान्भवेत् ॥

अन्नाद इत्यतो वक्ति साफल्यप्रतिपत्तये ॥ २८४ ॥

All this would be futile indeed, if he would not have enkindled the fire,¹ therefore, (the Śruti) states: 'He is the eater of the food', in order that one understood (thereby) the fruitfulness of his activity. [284]

¹The words 'for the performance of a sacrifice' are to be supplied.

द्विषत्सु स्वेषु च न चेदाधिपत्यं तथापि च ॥
प्रोक्तवैफल्यमाशङ्क्य ह्याहाधिपतितां फलम् ॥ २८५ ॥

And, indeed, (the Śruti) declared rulership as the result, because it feared that there might be failure¹ in respect of what was said earlier and if (the sacrificer) would not have mastery over his relatives and those who are his haters. [285]

¹It literally means 'fruitlessness or inutility'.

Verses 286-289 explain the purpose of *ya u haivam...bhārye-bhyo bhavati*.

प्राण आत्मेत्युपासीनो यथोक्तं फलमश्नुते ॥
तज्ज्ञातयोऽपि फलिनो यथा वागादयस्तथा ॥ २८६ ॥

One, who has performed worship with the notion that Prāṇa is the Ātman, enjoys the reward as stated in the Śruti (and) his relatives also would have received rewards in the same way as Speech and others (have received that reward through Prāṇa). [286]

प्राणसंस्पर्धिनो यद्वद्विनेशुरसुरास्तथा ॥
प्राणविद्विद्विषः सर्वे नालं भार्येभ्य एव च ॥ २८७ ॥

And as the demons who had rivalry with Prāṇa perished, so do (perish) all those who hate the knower of Prāṇa and they are not capable of (offering protection to) their dependents.¹ [287]

¹The word *bhārya* means 'who is to be supported, a dependent'. SP justifies this by citing *brāhmaṇebhyo vedavidbhyo dive dive namaskuryān nāślilam kīrtayet* (Taittiriyaṛaṇyaka 2.15.1).

उद्बुभूषति यो द्वेषात्स्वेषु प्राणविदं प्रति ॥
प्रतिस्पर्धी न सोऽलं स्याद्भूरणाय कथंचन ॥ २८८ ॥

[Here is the explanation of *pratibubhūṣati*.]

Whosoever amongst his relatives would seek to be superior to the knower of Prāṇa,¹ owing to his hatred (towards him), and (also) to be his rival would not in any way be able to support (them²). [288]

¹That is, who would try to overpower the knower of Prāṇa.

²It means 'his own relatives'; the word *bhārya* from the preceding verse is understood.

नासौ श्रेष्ठः पुरोगन्ता नान्नादोऽसुरवद्भवेत् ॥
न च ज्ञातिष्वधिपतिः स्पर्धमानोऽनवेदिना ॥ २८६ ॥

He, the one moving at the head of them, would not be the most prominent, and the eater of food; he would be like a demon. He would not be the overlord among his relatives; (he) who is vying with the knower of Prāṇa.¹ [289]

¹It means 'the worshipper of Prāṇa' (*ana-vedin*).

सोऽयास्याङ्गिरसः प्रोक्तस्तत्रायास्यो यथा तथा ॥
निर्णीतः प्रागथेदानीमाङ्गिरस्त्वविनिर्णयः ॥ २८७ ॥

[Verses 290-294 explain BU 1.3.19; Prāṇa is Āṅgīrasa.]

That one (i.e. Prāṇa) was mentioned earlier as Ayāśya Āṅgīrasa¹ and the word *ayāśyaḥ* there was herebefore (i.e. in the above) explained somehow.² Now (follows) the decision regarding his being Āṅgīrasa.³ [290]

¹This refers to the Śruti passage *so 'yāśya āṅgīrasaḥ āṅgānām rasah...*; in this verse, Sureśvara adopts double Saṁdhi of *ayāśyaḥ āṅgīrasaḥ*.

²For *yathā tathā*.

³It is noticeable that Sureśvara made no difference between Āṅgīrasa and Āṅgīras. And also between Āṅgīras and Āṅgīrasa.

पूर्वोक्तस्यानुवादोऽयं सोऽयास्येत्याद्युपक्रमः ॥
श्रुत्याङ्गिरस्त्वसिद्धयर्थमुच्यते न्यायपूर्वकम् ॥ २८९ ॥

This introductory *so 'yāsyā...* is Anuvāda (=re-statement) of what is said earlier. (Now) the (following) is stated by the Śruti, putting forth first an illustration for establishing the nature (of Prāṇa) as Āṅgiras. [291]

This is to justify how *so 'yāsyā...* (BU 1.3.19), though far from *ayam āsye antar iti so' yāsyā āṅgirasō 'ṅgānām hi rasah* (BU 1.3.8) is connected with the former.

सिद्धोऽङ्गानां रसः प्राणः प्राणोऽङ्गानां रसः कथम् ॥
हीति हेतावतः प्राह तद्व्याख्यानाय चोत्तरः ॥ २९२ ॥

(A question is asked: '(You say), "it is established that Prāṇa is the essence of the limbs." (Tell me then) how Prāṇa is the essence of limbs.' (The answer is:) 'The word *hi* is expressive of the reason; therefore, the subsequent (part of the Śruti follows, with a view to explaining that (viz. how etc.)'. [292]

यस्मात्कस्माच्चिदङ्गाद्धि प्राण उत्क्रामतीह नुः ॥
नीरसं सत्तदेवाङ्गमाशु शुष्यति तत्र च ॥ २९३ ॥

'Because, in this world (*iha*), only that limb of a man, from whichsoever Prāṇa departs, dries up very soon, then and there, becomes devoid of the essence.' [293]

यत एवमिदं दृष्टमन्वयव्यतिरेकतः ॥
तस्मादाङ्गिरसः प्राणो ज्ञेय आत्मेति पण्डितैः ॥ २९४ ॥

Since this is so seen (i.e. understood) by the method of Anvaya and Vyatireka, therefore, the learned have to know the Āṅgirasa Prāṇa as the Ātman. [294]

Verses 295-300 explain BU 1.3.20-21. [Prāṇa is Bṛhaspati and Brahmanaspati.]

कार्यस्य रूपभूतस्य कर्मणः करणस्य च ॥
न केवलं प्राण आत्मा नास्नोऽप्यात्मेति भण्यते ॥ २९५ ॥

Prāṇa is the Ātman not merely of the product¹ which has been (his) form and of the activity of his organ; but he is called the Ātman of the name also. [295]

Thus begins the explanation of *eṣa u eva brhaspatiḥ*...

¹This is a reference to the word *jagat*. The use of the singular forms *kāryasya* and *karmaṇaḥ karaṇasya* is in the sense of the plural.

एवं सर्वात्मकत्वेन स्तुवन्प्राणं प्रयत्नतः ॥

आदरं कुरुते शास्त्रमुपास्यत्वाय देहिनाम् ॥ २६६ ॥

Thus specially praising¹ the Prāṇa as being the nature of all (that makes up the world), the Śruti shows great regard (for Prāṇa), in order that it becomes the object of worship for human beings. [296]

¹In other words; praising with particular care.

बृहस्पत्यादिभिर्धर्मैरसोरन्यदुपासनम् ॥

विशिष्टमभिधित्स्वाह शास्त्रं पूर्ववदेव च ॥ २६७ ॥

(Now), even as before, the Śruti states (what follows), wishing to prescribe some other special¹ (form of) worship (of Prāṇa) by (referring to) the other properties, viz. (his being) Brhaspati etc.² [297]

¹That is, as having reference to the properties of Brhaspati and others.

²SP observes that these injunctions are not Gaṇavidhis; they are Viśiṣṭavidhis. The reason for this is: All of them have but one (viz. the principal) purpose—*sāmnāḥ sāyujya*.

वाग्व्यापृततमा दृष्ट्वा यत उद्गीथकर्मणि ॥

देवता सैव न प्राण इत्याशङ्क्येवेदमुच्यते ॥ २६८ ॥

This is so stated after keeping in view the doubt “Since Speech is the most active (lit. functioning) in the ritual of the Udgītha, therefore it is the deity (of that service), not Prāṇa.” [298]

This is another purpose served by the Śruti. Since Vāc is but Prāṇa (i.e. not different from it), therefore, Prāṇa itself is the deity of the Udgītha.

कौष्ठ्याग्निप्रेरितो वायुर्नानास्थानसमाहृतः ॥

वर्णतामेति येनातः प्राण एव बृहस्पतिः ॥ २६६ ॥

Since the wind (which is) sent up by the fire in the belly, (being) obstructed at different places (in the body) becomes one Varṇa¹ (or another), therefore, Prāṇa is Bṛhaspati.² [299]

Bṛhaspati means Lord of Bṛhatī metre which is a form of speech; therefore, Prāṇa which controls speech, is called the Lord of speech, i.e. Bṛhaspati.

¹It signifies 'syllable or letter'.

²This is to explain the oneness of Vāc and Prāṇa, though these two are not synonymous.

यजुर्ब्रह्मेति श्रवणादन्ते साम्नो ग्रहादपि ॥

ऋग्यजुःसामनिर्वेशः क्रमेणेति प्रतीयते ॥ ३०० ॥

Because in the text *yajur brahma* is heard (in the beginning and) in the end and also there is a mention¹ of Sāman; therefore, it is understood that there is the mention (of Prāṇa) in the order (of the names) Ṛc, Yajus and Sāman.² [300]

This is to explain why Bṛhaspati in the passage under discussion is not one who is the priest of the gods.

¹It literally means 'inclusion of the word *sāmnaḥ*'.

²This refers to the earlier statement *sa evarkpatiḥ* and the following: *eṣa u eva brahmaṇaspatiḥ/ vāg vai brahma tasyā eṣa patiḥ/ tasmād u brahmaṇaspatiḥ*; in this passage, *brahman* means *yajus*. The tenor of the passage ends with *eṣa u eva sāmna.....sāmatvam*.

Verses 301-316 explain BU 1.3.22.

सेति वाचोऽभिधानं स्यादमः प्राणाभिधा तथा ॥

सामोभयं समुदितं गुणप्राधान्यरूपतः ॥ ३०१ ॥

एकार्थवृत्तिता यस्मात्तेनैकवचनं कृतम् ॥

शब्दयोः सामयोस्तस्मात्प्राणः सामाभिधीयते ॥ ३०२ ॥

[Prāṇa is of the nature of Śāman.]

sā is¹ the name of speech; in the same way, *ama* is the name of Prāṇa. Then the two (viz. *sā* and *ama*), uttered together, are, on account of the prominence of their quality (of creating), 'Śāman'.² [301]

And since (there is in them) the capacity to function (together) for conveying a unitary sense, therefore, (the compound of) the two words *sā* and *ama* is made into (*sāma*) expressive of one (individual). (It is) for this reason that Prāṇa is called 'Śāman'. [302]

¹*syāt*=*asti*, but it is literally 'would be', Sureśvara has used this word in this sense earlier also.

²Though this is *Sāma*, the verse uses the neutre form 'Śāman'.

इतरस्यापि सामत्वं प्राणनिर्वर्त्यतो मतम् ॥

प्राण एव ततः साम युक्तो वागुपसर्जनः ॥ ३०३ ॥

The character of being *Sāman* of the other¹ is also accepted because it is brought about by Prāṇa. Therefore, Prāṇa himself is *Sāman* (and thus) it is reasonable to mention it as accompanied by the modifier, 'Vāc'². [303]

That is to say: Since a *Sāman* can exist depending upon Prāṇa, the latter can be called *Sāman*.

¹The word 'other' refers to Prāṇa and that is other than the song (*gīti*). Cp. the Mīmāṃsā rule: *gītiṣu sāmākhyā* (*Mīmāṃsā Sūtra* 2.1.36).

²This is the metaphorical use of the word Prāṇa, i.e. not in its primary sense: '*mukhya prāṇa*', but in the secondary sense: *vāgyukta prāṇa*. SP points to the example *mañcāḥ krośanti* which means *mañcasthāḥ krośanti*. Those who occupy the bedsteads, viz. the children, are the principally intended subject, yet the secondarily intended bedsteads stand for them.

निःशेषभूतसाम्याद्वा साम प्राणोऽभिधीयते ॥

प्रत्यगज्ञानहेतुत्वात्तज्जस्यानन्त्यमुच्यते ॥ ३०४ ॥

Or¹, Prāṇa is called *sāma* because of its being the same (or, similar)² to all the beings without exception. This infinity (in respect of the number) of what is produced from Prāṇa is stated on account of the ignorance about (the nature) of the inner self. [304]

¹It shows an additional explanation, on the basis of the Upaniṣad: *yad v eva samaḥ pluṣiṇā samo maśakena...*

²By this is meant 'similar in size'. Cf. the next verse. Or perhaps the following grammatical explanation is meant: *sama eva sāmaḥ* (like *prajña eva prājñah*).

अतिसूक्ष्मशरीरा हि पुत्तिका प्लुषिरुच्यते ॥
पुत्तिकादिशरीरेण समः प्राणस्तदाश्रयात् ॥ ३०५ ॥

Indeed an ant, which has a very small body, is called *pluṣi* 'a gnat' (and) Prāṇa, because it can reside in it, is similar (in size) to the body of a gnat etc.¹ [305]

¹This supports the suggestion above that Sureśvara has in mind the grammatical explanation *sama eva sāmaḥ*.

मशकेभविराड्देहैः समः प्राणो यथोदितः ॥
तथा हैरण्यगर्भेण लिङ्गात्मा सम एव तु ॥ ३०६ ॥

As Prāṇa has been described in the Śruti (to be) similar (in size) to (the bodies of) a gnat, an elephant and the Virāj, so is Prāṇa known to have the most subtle manifest from, viz. that of Hiraṇyagarbha. [306]

This stresses the fact that Prāṇa is both *kriyāśaktimat* and *jñānaśaktimat*.

वाय्वात्मनि समाप्तत्वात्करणानामशेषतः ॥
सर्वदेहसमत्वं स्यात्प्राणिकर्मानुरूपतः ॥ ३०७ ॥

Since there has been a fulfilment (of the functions) of all the organs, without exception, on account of Ātman in the form of the wind (in the body), therefore, (Prāṇa has)

similarity (in size) with all bodies, according to the deeds of (those) beings (in their previous lives). [307]

प्रतिप्राणिपरिच्छेदो ज्ञानकर्मानुरोधतः ॥

धर्माधर्मानपेक्षः सन्नानन्त्येनावतिष्ठते ॥ ३०८ ॥

The (defined or limited) dimension (of the body) of each being is in accordance with the knowledge and activity (of the self residing in it in an earlier life). Therefore, Prāṇa exists in infinite number (of them) irrespective of (their) merit and demerit. [308]

साम्न आप्नोति सायुज्यमैकात्म्यं प्राणरूपताम् ॥

समानलोकतानेन सालोक्यमिति शब्दते ॥ ३०९ ॥

It is said (in the Śruti) that one obtains through a Sāman union (with Prāṇa), oneness (with it), viz. the nature of Prāṇa; this is belonging to the same region as of Prāṇa, that means being in the same world as that of Prāṇa. [309]

The world would comprise multiplicity of forms. This indicates the existence of different products/transformations of Prāṇa together with it.

विकल्पासंश्रवाद्विद्वानश्रुतेस्तः फलद्वयम् ॥

वैचित्र्याद्भावनादेर्वा त्रिविधं फलमुच्यते ॥ ३१० ॥

Therefore, owing to the non-mention of any further division,¹ there is only the twofold reward.² But, on account of the variety of the impulse to activity etc., the same is described as threefold.³ [310]

¹Basic division (*bheda*) is Prāṇa(= Hiraṇyagarbha) and individuals, and there is no further mention of anything beyond Prāṇa and its products/transformation, the individuals.

²They are Sāyujya and Sārūpya.

³This reference (as the third) is to Sālokya in the preceding verse.

भूयोल्पीयःफलत्वं चेत्तुल्यसाधनयोर्न तत् ॥

योगैश्वर्यात्समा सिद्धिः कालादेरीश्वराद्यतः ॥ ३११ ॥

(If someone would argue:) ‘In the case of the two causes¹ which are equal, would not there result the state that there are greater and smaller reward?’. (To this our answer is:) ‘It is not so, because the reward is equal on account of the excellence of Yoga,² as coming from the Lord, the beginning³ of time’.

[311]

¹It means ‘knowledge and activity’.

²It means: ‘which stands for knowledge and activity functioning: together’.

³Could the word *kālādi* be alternatively translated as ‘coming from Time, the first (of life), i.e. the Lord, viz. Hiraṇyagarbha’?

एकमेव जगद्वीजमीशाभिप्रायाहेतुतः ॥

भूरिनानाप्रभेदेन प्रत्यात्मं व्यवतिष्ठते ॥ ३१२ ॥

Only one seed (i.e. cause) of this world abides in each of the bodies¹ in the numerous and various forms (in the same), owing to the (varied) intention of the Lord.²

[312]

This explains the idea of *samānalokatā* mentioned in verse 309 above.

¹Or (better) alternatively ‘in each individual self’.

²Or alternatively, as SP and NKL state, ‘on account of the (various) appearance of the Lord’.

कुर्यान्मेरावणुधियमणौ मेरुधियं तथा ॥

सर्वत्राप्रतिघात्येव प्रत्यगज्ञो महेश्वरः ॥ ३१३ ॥

As one (who is ignorant) would entertain the notion of an atom in the case of Mt. Meru or the notion of Mt. Meru in the case of an atom, (so also) the great Lord (Prāṇa), though everywhere unobstructed, is (in that embodied state) ignorant of (itself as) the inner self.

[313]

This explains how variety in the world exists through *Māyā*, the Lord remaining unchanged.

अतत्त्वज्ञस्य तमसो रज्ज्वज्ञानोरगादिवत् ॥
अष्टावस्थाप्रभेदेन मिथ्याज्ञानं प्रजायते ॥ ३१४ ॥

In the case of that one, who does not know the true nature (of the self within), there arises, owing to ignorance, false knowledge, (which one is) in the variety of eight states,¹ like the knowledge (that there is a) serpent etc. from the ignorance about (a real) rope (etc.) [314]

This verse continues the thought of *pratyagajñā* in the preceding verse.

¹According to the editor of NKL, these eight states are: *śarīra, indriya, manas, buddhi, viśaya, virāj, sūtra* and *antaryāmin*. In SP, these are mentioned as: *piṇḍa jāti, virāj, sūtra, daiva, avyākṛta, antaryāmin* and *sākṣin*.

प्रत्यगज्ञानविध्वस्तौ रज्ज्वज्ञानहताविव ॥
तत्कल्पितनिवृत्तिः स्यादष्टावस्थस्य बोधतः ॥ ३१५ ॥

When the ignorance about (the true nature of) the inner self is destroyed thanks to the knowledge about the one having eight states, there is removal of (the awareness of) whatever is imagined (as the modification) of it, just as (the cognition of a serpent arising from a rope is struck down) when the ignorance about the (true) rope is removed. [315]

अनात्मवस्तु सकलं प्रत्यगज्ञानहेतुजम् ॥
यथा तथोत्तरत्रापि युक्तिभिश्चाभिधास्यते ॥ ३१६ ॥

As (is said here) all the non-Ātman (i.e. the world) is born of the ignorance (on the part of an individual) about (the true nature) of the inner self, so also will it be explained in later portion, and with reasons. [316]

There is reference to SV, where Śruti and reasoning are used for proving *anātmajñāna* as *pratyagajñānaja*. In the Śruti passage, *tadd hedam...*, the same mode of reasoning is employed.

Verses 317-320 explain BU 1.3.20.

औद्गात्रमेव चोद्गीथो भक्तिर्वा काचिदिष्यताम् ॥
प्रसिद्धेरिति चेन्मैवमुद्गीथो ह्यसुरेव तु ॥ ३१७ ॥

[Prāṇa is the Udgītha.]

(If one were to say: 'Tell us) if the Udgītha should be taken as only the activity of the Udgātr priest or as any one of the divisions of the Udgītha song, because it is so known.'. (Our answer is:) 'Let it not be so¹ (understood); the Udgītha is indeed only Prāṇa.' [317]

¹It means: 'let it not be in two ways'.

उपसर्ग उदित्येष स चात्यन्तक्रियाश्रितः ॥
संयोज्य क्रियायास्तत् व्याचष्टे श्रुतिरञ्जसा ॥ ३१८ ॥

This *ut* (element in the word *udgītha*,) is a preposition and it is connected with a vigorous action. Therefore, the Śruti, after connecting (it) with (the verb expressive of) action, has explained it smoothly (clearly). [318]

उत्तब्धं विधूतं यस्मात्प्राणेन जगदित्वरम् ॥
उत्प्राणोऽतः प्रसिद्धस्तु गुणादुद्गीथ उच्यते ॥ ३१९ ॥

Since this flitting world is supported, i.e. held up, by Prāṇa, therefore *ut* has become known as Prāṇa and (*tu*) is on account of (this) property, called Udgītha. [319]

NKL and the text of BUBV with NKL read *prasiddhiḥ* for *prasiddhaḥ*! In that case, the translation could be: '...*ut* is Prāṇa; the (commonly) accepted (knowledge about is:), owing to its excellence, it is called Udgītha.' Not a satisfactory reading!

अनया गीयते यस्माद्गीथा वाक्तेन भण्यते ॥
उच्च गीथा च तद्योगादुद्गीथ इति शब्द्यते ॥ ३२० ॥

Since (the song) is sung by this (speech), therefore speech is called Gīthā. (Thus there are these two words) *ut* and

gīthā and by the joining of them there is uttered the word *udgītha*.¹ [320]

¹Sureśvara derives the word *udgītha* from *ut*+*gīthā*.

Verses 321-322 explain BU 1.3.24: *tadd hāpi...*

उद्गाता नैमिषीयाणामयास्योपासनादभूत् ॥
अयास्यनामा सोऽगायद्वाचा प्राणप्रधानया ॥ ३२१ ॥

(Some Ṛṣi) Ayāśya by name became, on account of his worship of Ayāśya (Prāṇa), the Udgātr of the dwellers of Naimiṣa¹ forest; he sang (the Sāmans) by his speech devoted to Prāṇa. [321]

¹NKL edition reads *naimiaśa*! Not so in verse 328 below.

बृहस्पत्यादिभिर्धर्मैरुपास्यानमनो भवेत् ॥
भावनोत्कर्षतोऽतोऽयं विचारस्तं प्रतीष्यते ॥ ३२२ ॥

One would become mindful of Prāṇa after having worshipped Prāṇa with its appellations Bṛhaspati etc. Therefore, on account of the excellence of devotion (*bhāvanā*), this (=the following) thought about it is discussed (hereafter).¹ [322]

¹SP adds: *śastrārthadārḍhyārtham*.

हृदयेनाभिसंबन्धाद्देवतात्र प्रजापतिः ॥
उद्गीथदेवतेहास्तु सविता वा मनःश्रितः ॥ ३२३ ॥
वागीश्वरत्वादिन्द्रो वा यदि वा वर्णदेवता ॥
पदवाक्यस्वरस्थाननादादिविषयापि वा ॥ ३२४ ॥

(One might say:) 'Because there is a connection of the heart (with this activity of the Udgātr), therefore, the deity here (would be) Prajāpati. Or, let the deity of the Udgītha be Savitr who rests in the mind.' [323]

'Or, (may the deity be) Indra, because he is the Lord of speech.

Or, (may the deity be) that of each of the letter, the word,

the sentence, the accent, and the place of articulation, and sound etc.¹. [324]

These two verses refer to different views about 'who is the deity of the Udgītha?. These are the different deities: Prajāpati, Savitr (=the Moon; cf. SP and NKL), Indra (refer to verse 265 above) and other linguistic features.

¹The word *ādi* at the end refers *sūkta*, *prakaraṇa* and *kāṇḍa* etc.

एवं विप्रतिपक्षेषु नानावादिषु निश्चितः ॥
 प्राणप्रधानया वाचा ह्यास्यास्योजायदित्यतः ॥
 ब्रह्मदत्तश्चकारोच्चैः शपथं वादिनः प्रति ॥ ३२५ ॥
 यदितोऽनप्रधानाया वाचो ह्यन्येन केनचित् ॥
 देवान्तरेण सोजायदयास्यः प्राणविग्रहः ॥ ३२६ ॥
 सर्वप्रमाणभूतोऽभूदुद्गाता सत्रिणां पुरा ॥
 विसंवादस्त्वभूत्तेषामुद्दिश्योद्गीथदेवताम् ॥ ३२७ ॥

When there are thus variously speaking opponents; (Brahmadatta) was decided as to that; since Ayāśya, with his speech devoted to Prāṇa, sang aloud. Therefore, he loudly announced this (i.e. he is Ayāśya Prāṇa) with an oath to those who held a contrary view [325]

(thus:) 'If he, Ayāśya, in the form of Prāṇa, recited the song through a deity other than speech, which was devoted to Prāṇa¹— [326]

There was, formerly, for the sacrificers (of Naimiṣa forest) an Udgātr priest, (who was) accepted by all (of them) as the authority, (and yet) there arose a dispute among them as regards the deity of the Udgītha.² [327]

¹This is to be connected with (i) verse 328 below and (ii) the principal clause in verse 329 below, though some details of the narrative intervene between this line and the principal clause.

²This verse should really serve as introductory to verse 324 above.

उद्गाता नैमिषीयाणां मदभ्युपगताद्यदि ॥
 प्राणवाग्द्वयोऽन्येन देवेनासौ प्रयत्नवान् ॥ ३२८ ॥

उदगायत्तदा सोमो भक्ष्यमाणः शिरो मम ॥

मिथ्याभिवादिनः साक्षाद्विपातयतु सत्वरः ॥ ३२६ ॥

‘If, for the dwellers of the Naimiṣa (forest), an Udgātṛ (other) than the one known to me (viz. Ayāśya), exerting, sang through a deity other than the pair of Prāṇa and speech,¹ [328]

then may this Soma, which I am drinking, (itself), hastening, cut off the head of me who am speaking untruth.’. [329]

¹This is the restatement of the contents of verse 326.

श्रुतिः समर्थयामास वाचेति शपथक्रियाम् ॥

शपथस्यापि मानत्वमस्मादेव तु कारणात् ॥ ३३० ॥

The Śruti has justified this announcement with an oath (of Brahmadatta) by the word *vācā* ‘through speech’; therefore, just for this reason, an oath also can be an authoritative means (even today).¹ [330]

¹This is, in a way, an expression of what is known as Bandhutā philosophy of the Brāhmaṇas adopted by Sureśvara in his explanation of the narrative. Cf. SP for a little longer discussion on an oath as an authoritative means of knowing or ascertaining the truth, based on *Mīmāṃsā Sūtra* 1.3.1-2; 15-16.

वाचः प्राणस्य च यत उद्गीथे व्यापृतिः स्फुटा ॥

प्राधान्येन तदन्येषां न तथा लक्ष्यते सदा ॥ ३३१ ॥

Since the functioning (lit. activity) of speech and Prāṇa (together) is ever clearly visible as the predominant, therefore, (the activity) of others¹ is not noticed in a similar way. [331]

¹It means ‘organs and their superintending deities’.

आकृत्यर्थाभिसंबन्धादभिधानस्य न श्रुतेः ॥

ब्रह्मदत्ताभिसंबन्धादनित्यत्वं प्रसज्यते ॥ ३३२ ॥

Since a name has connection only with the shape (of what is named), therefore, (in the narrative of Brahmadatta),

there does not forcefully follow the contingency of impermanence (i.e. unauthoritativeness) (in respect) of the Śruti (statement) on account of¹ its connection with Brahmadata. [332]

This is in answer to the implied objection: 'Since Brahmadata is, like us human beings, liable to perish, the statement of the Śruti about his doing, viz. announcing with an oath, is not authoritative.' Cf. *Mīmāṃsā Sūtra* 1.3.33: *ākṛtis tu kriyārthatvāt* '(a name mentioned conveys) the shape only (of an individual), and nothing else' ('nothing' includes the name also!), for that serves the purpose of *kriyā* 'what is to be done'—Sureśvara bases his answer on this. [For relevant details on the application of the Mīmāṃsā rule, cf. SP].

¹That is, though it has connection...

Verses 333-338 explain BU 1.3.25.

उद्गीथदेवतामेवं परीक्ष्याथाधुना श्रुतिः ॥
स्वादिधर्माभिसंबन्धं प्रचक्राम प्रभाषितुम् ॥ ३३३ ॥

Having thus fully considered¹ (as to who is) the deity of the Udgītha, the Śruti now proceeds to explain the relation (of the sacrificer) to (him, who is) his own beginning (i.e. Prāṇa)². [333]

¹It literally means 'examined'.

²*svādi* = *syasya ādi*; cf. *kālādi* in verse 311 above (one of the alternative explanations).

याजमानमिदं ज्ञानं स्वादेः प्राग्यत्समीरितम् ॥
पञ्चमाद्युक्तिदृष्ट्यास्य ह्येकवाक्यत्वहेतुतः ॥ ३३४ ॥

What has been stated before, viz. this worship¹ (offered) by the sacrificers, is the knowledge of his own beginning (viz. Prāṇa)², because it forms unity (of sense) of the statement with what is stated in the beginning of the fifth chapter.³ [334]

¹It means *jñāna* (of the Ātman) and (also) *viññāna* (of the procedure of ritual service) in this context; this is *upāsanā*; cf. note 1 by the editor of NKL (p. 131) *atra praghaṭṭake jñanaviññānaśabdau upāsanaparau vācyau*.

²Cf. the word *svādi* (and note thereon) in the preceding verse.

³This is traditional reference to BU ch. 3. This is to say that the sentence *kena yajamāno mṛtyor āptim atimucyate* (BU 3.1.3) has connection with *yajamāna* and the meaning is: 'worship offered by a sacrificer'.

स्वमुवर्णप्रतिष्ठाधीरुद्गातुरिति गम्यते ॥

ऋत्विङनामाभिसंबन्धान्न त्वसौ यजमानगा ॥ ३३५ ॥

It is understood that the property,¹ (viz.) gold, steadiness, and intelligence belong to (i.e. are obtained by) the Udgātr; and² not³ to the sacrificer, because of its connection with the name of the *rtvij*.⁴ [335]

¹It literally means 'his own (belongings)'.

²The word *tu* is understood in the sense of *ca*.

³Cryptic for 'it does not go'.

⁴Namely, the Udgātr, this is understood from *tasmād ārvijyām kariṣyan*.

एष एवंविदुद्गातेत्यमुतो लिङ्गतो भवेत् ॥

उद्गातुरपि विज्ञानं दृष्टार्थत्वाच्च कारणात् ॥ ३३६ ॥

From this indication, viz. *eṣa evaṁvid udgātā*, follows that the worship¹ is by the Udgātr, also (it is his) for the reason, viz. the purpose, (already) seen. [336]

¹This is for *viññāna* 'knowledge of the procedure of worship, viz. ritual'; cf. note 1 on verse 334 above.

कर्त्राश्रितं स्वं विज्ञेयं माधुर्यादीह सामनि ॥

यतस्तद्धनवत्तस्मात्स्वरार्थं यत्नमाचरेत् ॥ ३३७ ॥

Since the sweetness etc. in the Sāman (in the Udgāna¹) is to be known as his own (wealth²), (and) that (Sāman) is

full of riches,³ therefore, (the Udgātr) should make an effort for (uttering) that sound. [337]

¹This is meant by the word *iha*.

²It means 'the property belonging to the agent'.

³Cf. SP: *tat sāma sausvaryopetaṁ dhanavad bhūṣitam rddhimat*.

धनवन्तं यथा यत्नाद्दृक्षन्तीह संघशः ॥

तथा यत्नात्समीक्षन्ते स्वरसंपत्समन्वितम् ॥ ३३८ ॥

As, in this world, people, in flocks, wish to see with effort¹ someone possessed of wealth, similarly,² they³ see with effort¹ him who is possessed of the wealth of speech.⁴ [338]

¹It means 'being devoted to'.

²But read SP on *tathā*: *athośabdo yathārthaḥ*. Further, SP adds, after *yathārthaḥ*, *tasmācchabdas tathārthaḥ*. Should this indicate that SP reads the first line as *dhanavantam atho yatnād...*?

³Namely, sacrificers.

⁴This is Udgātr who can sing sweet Sāman(s).

Verses 339-344 explain BU 1.3.26.

बाह्यवित्तेन संबन्धमुक्त्वाथान्तर्धनात्मना ॥

संबन्धं वक्तुकामेयं प्रचक्रामोत्तरा श्रुतिः ॥ ३३९ ॥

Having (thus) stated the relation (of the Udgātr or Prāṇa) to the external wealth, this subsequent Śruti has now proceeded with a desire to state the relation (of the same) to the internal wealth. [339]

बाह्योऽस्य धर्मः सौस्वर्यं सौवर्ण्यं त्वान्तरं धनम् ॥

तदन्तरतमोऽनस्य प्रतिष्ठागुण उच्यते ॥ ३४० ॥

Sweetness (of pronunciation) is the external property and the richness of good syllables, (viz. the pronunciation of good syllables), the internal property of this one (i.e. the Udgātr, Prāṇa). However, for Prāṇa, the property of steadiness is the innermost (as compared to them).¹ [340]

¹Namely, *sausvarya* and *sauvarṇya*.

जिह्वामूलीयकादीनि ह्यष्टौ स्थानानि वागिह ॥
गानप्रतिष्ठाहेतुत्वाद्धीति हेतुवचस्तथा ॥ ३४१ ॥

Here¹ speech means the eight places (of articulation), the root of the tongue etc.² themselves (*hi*), on account of their being the cause of the steadiness of the (Sāman-)song. And *hi* in the (Śruti) statement is expressive of the cause (viz. the steadiness). [341]

¹That is, in the Śruti sentence under discussion.

²The word 'etc.' refers to *uras*, *śiras*, *kaṇṭha*, *danta*, *oṣṭha*, *nāsikā* and *tālu*.

अन्नप्रतिष्ठमागानमेक आहुर्विपश्चितः ॥
अनिषेधाद्द्वयोरेका प्रतिष्ठेहावसीयताम् ॥ ३४२ ॥

Some learned men have declared that singing (of the Sāman) is steady in food.¹ (However) let this be concluded here that there is here² the one basis of the two,³ since there is no rejection (of it). [342]

¹That means 'steady on account of it'.

²That is, in Prāṇa.

³It means *anna* and *āgāna*.

अन्नस्य परिणामेऽनः स्थितो गीतित्वमेति हि ॥
अनप्रतिष्ठा देहोऽतः श्रुत्येह प्रतिपाद्यते ॥ ३४३ ॥

Indeed Prāṇa becomes the (Sāman-)song when it becomes steady in the digested form of food, therefore; (thus) it is declared by the Śruti here that the body is the basis for Prāṇa. [343]

उपासनं विकल्पेन वागन्नाख्यप्रतिष्ठयोः ॥
वाक्प्रतिष्ठमुपासीत यदि वाग्नप्रतिष्ठितम् ॥ ३४४ ॥

(Therefore) the worship prescribed here is alternatively of

the two which have their bases in what are called speech and food; (that is to say:) one may worship Prāṇa resting in speech or Prāṇa resting in food. [344]

Verses 345-377 explain BU 1-3-28: explanation of Abhyāroha-japa and the meanings of its Mantras.

यदर्थमतियत्नेन महिमानस्य कीर्तितः ॥
अभ्यारोहजपः सोऽथ प्राप्तावसर उच्यते ॥ ३४५ ॥

Now, as there is occasion for it,¹ (here) is stated that Abhyārohajapa with reference to which the greatness of Prāṇa has been so far stated with great effort. [345]

There is reference to the sentence *athātaḥ pavamānānām...*
¹This is meant by the word *atha*.

यथोक्तज्ञानवत्तायामिदं कर्म विधिस्त्यते ॥
कात्स्न्येन तस्य चोक्तत्वादतस्तदभिधीयते ॥ ३४६ ॥

This (ritual) activity will be described (in the following) when (one is) in possession of the knowledge as stated (before). And since it is (earlier) described in its fullness, therefore, that is (now) discussed (hereafter)¹. [346]

¹This is meant by the word *ataḥ*.

एवं विद्वत्प्रयोज्यत्वादत एव न सूत्रितम् ॥
नित्यकर्मैव सूत्रेषु तेन विद्वत्प्रयोज्यता ॥ ३४७ ॥

Only, therefore, it is not mentioned in the Sūtra texts, in the same way as an obligatory rite (is not mentioned), since it is prescribed for one who has thus known; hence the nature of it as what is prescribed for the knower.¹ [347]

¹That is, as optional, or not invariable.

उद्गीथलिङ्गसंयोगाद्गानमात्रेऽस्य शक्तिः ॥
नियमोऽस्यैवकारेण पवमानेषु कथ्यते ॥ ३४८ ॥

Since this one¹ has potence (or capacity) in respect only of the singing (of the Udgītha part of the Sāman-)song on account of its² association (lit. connection) with the characteristics³ of the Udgītha, therefore there is stated a restriction⁴ of it in relation to the Pavamāna Stotras, by the word *eva*.⁵ [348]

This is the significance of *pavamānānām*.

¹That is, Abhyāroha-japa.

²It means 'the association of the prescription of Abhyāroha-japa'.

³Refer to *udghītena atyayāma*. This is indicative of the relation of the Abhyāroha-japa to the Udgītha.

⁴This is in point of time, that is to say: It should be recited only at the time of singing the Pavamāna Stotras.

⁵If such a restriction was not stated, one could understand that the Udgāna 'loud singing' would be necessary at the time of (all Parts of Sāman:) Udgītha, Pratihāra Prastāva etc.

ततोऽपि कालसंकोचं स वा इत्यादिनावदत् ॥

प्रस्तोता प्रस्तुयाद्यत्र तदैतानि जपेदिति ॥ ३४६ ॥

And, yet further, the Śruti mentioned a restriction in respect of time¹ in the passage beginning with *sa vai*...and ending in *prastotā...japet*. [349]

This refers to the purpose of the sentence *sa vai khalu....*

¹Cf. note 4 on the preceding verse.

एतानीति च निर्देशाद्यजूंषीत्यवगम्यते ॥

श्रुतावेव च दृष्टत्वात्स्वरः शातपथो जपे ॥ ३५० ॥

And from the use of the word *etāni* it is understood that the *yajus* (formulas) are also (to be recited). And, since this is seen only in the Śruti, therefore, the accent in the recitation (of the Abhyāroha-japa Mantra) should be that seen in the *Śathapatha Brāhmaṇa*.¹ [350]

¹Though there is a reference to a Mantra, one should recite

in accordance with the rules of accent of the Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa whose concluding portion is BU. The Samhitā accent should not be followed.

जपकर्माभिधा चेयमभ्यारोह इतीष्यते ॥

यौगिकी चाभिधा ज्ञेया क्रियायोगस्य संभवात् ॥ ३५१ ॥

And, this mention of the act of recitation is known as Abhyārohajapa; this name is, it should be remembered (lit. known), one based on etymology, for it is possible to connect it (i.e. the etymology) with action. [351]

हित्वाध्यात्मपरिच्छेदं देवं बीजमतः परम् ॥

अभ्यारोहत्यनेनातो ह्यभ्यारोहो जपः स्मृतः ॥ ३५२ ॥

(To explain the above:) Having thrown away the limitation of the body, (the worshipper) thereafter rises to (the status of) the cause (lit. seed) of the divine (form), by means of this (Mantra); therefore,¹ the recitation (of it) is called Abhyārohajapa. [352]

¹That is, on account of this explanation of the etymology.

तिरोहितार्थरूपत्वान्मन्त्राणां न नृधीगतिः ॥

मन्त्रार्थं स्वयमेवातो व्याचष्टे श्रुतिरञ्जसा ॥ ३५३ ॥

Since the Mantras are of such nature that they have a meaning-form which is concealed, therefore, there is no approach to them for human intellect.¹ Therefore, the Śruti itself clearly explained the meaning of that Mantra. [353]

¹This is a general statement about the Mantras and, therefore, the second line justifies the name and significance of the Abhyārohajapa.

पूर्वं पदार्थान्वयाख्याय पश्चाद्वाक्यार्थमब्रवीत् ॥

फलं पश्चाद्यथोक्तस्येत्येष व्याख्याक्रमः श्रुतेः ॥ ३५४ ॥

Having first explained the meanings of the words, it later declared the meaning(s) of sentence(s); then (it stated) the

reward of what was explained—this is the order of (the items in) the explanation given in the Śruti. [354]

यत्स्यात्स्वाभाविकं ज्ञानं यच्च कर्म स्वभावजम् ॥
तदधःपातहेतुत्वान्मन्त्रेऽसदिति भण्यते ॥ ३५५ ॥

Whatever might be the natural¹ knowledge and whatever, the natural¹ activity (for one), they are, owing to being the cause of one's fall; stated in the Śruti Mantra² as *asat*. [355]

This verse explains the purpose of the use of the word *asat* in the Abhyārohaṇa.

¹That is *svabhāvataḥ prāpta (-jñāta)*; not *śāstrataḥ jñāta*.

²In the Mantra: *asato mā sad gamaya*.

सदेवभावहेतुत्वाच्छास्त्रीये ज्ञानकर्मणी ॥
सत्पदेनाभिधीयेते मन्त्रेऽस्मिन्प्राग्यथोदिते ॥ ३५६ ॥

Since knowledge and ritual activity, prescribed or declared in the Śruti, have *sat* as the cause for their rise to the (eternal) state of the divine being, (therefore), the two, as explained before, are mentioned in this Mantra by the word *sat*. [356]

असन्मृत्युस्तथोर्ज्ञेयः पूर्वयोर्मृत्युहेतुतः ॥
अमृतं मृत्युघातित्वाच्छास्त्रीये ज्ञानकर्मणी ॥ ३५७ ॥

asat should be understood (in the sense of) the death of the first two,¹ because it is the cause of the death for one (in the world), and knowledge and ritual activity, which are prescribed in the Śāstra, (are to be understood as) imperishable, because they avert (lit. destroy) death. [357]

¹These are *aśāstriya*, i.e. *svabhāvataḥ prāptejñānakrmanī*; cf. *āsurañjñānakarmans* mentioned in just the next verse.

आसुरज्ञानकर्मभ्यां मां व्युत्थाप्याथ तज्जिते ॥
गमयाशु ततो दैवे शास्त्रीये ज्ञानकर्मणी ॥ ३५८ ॥

Having raised me up above the demoniac knowledge and activity, then, by the victory over them, reach me quickly (away from them) unto the divine knowledge and activity, which are prescribed by the Śruti. [358]

This is the meaning/paraphrase of the Abhyārohajapa-Mantra.

मन्त्रार्थं यत्नमाहाथ ह्यमृतं मामिति श्रुतिः ॥
द्वितीयमन्त्रानूक्तिः स्यात्तमसो मेत्युदीरणम् ॥ ३५६ ॥

The Śruti *amṛtam mām* (for *mā*) has stated the specific (purpose) in (i.e. of) the meaning of the Mantra. (And) the statement *tamaso mā...* should be understood as a re-statement (in the explanation) of the earlier Mantra. [359]

आपेक्षिकत्वान्यृत्युः स्याच्छास्त्रीये ज्ञानकर्मणी ॥
स्वार्थं फलमपेक्ष्यैते परार्थत्वात्तमो मते ॥ ३६० ॥

Knowledge and activity, prescribed in the Śruti, would be (i.e. would result into) death (for one), since they are rooted in some desire(s). Since these two (viz. the knowledge and activity prescribed in the Śāstra) serve (now as a means) to the acquisition of the highest,¹ (only) after they have first expected² their own result, they are considered to be darkness.³ [360]

¹The knowledge of Prāṇa or Ātman.

²That is, secured.

³Namely, ignorance.

साधनात्तमसो मां त्वं ज्योतिः साध्यं नयामृतम् ॥
फलाप्त्यैव तमोर्ध्वंसादमृतं मेत्यतोऽवदत् ॥ ३६१ ॥

Therefore (the Śruti) stated: From the means, the darkness, do you lead me to the goal, the imperishable lustre by securing for me the fruit, by destroying the darkness. [361]

पूर्वयोर्मन्त्रयोर्योऽर्थो विस्तरेणोदितः पुनः ॥
मन्त्रेण स तृतीयेन संक्षेपेणाभिधीयते ॥ ३६२ ॥

The meaning of the first two Mantras which is stated in the Śruti at length is again stated in brief by the third Mantra. [362]

This re-statement of a thought, in brief, should not be taken as repetition. This holds good in respect of verse 359 which is a re-statement of what is stated in 356 above. Such is the procedure of the Śruti followed by later writers of Śāstra—cf. SP: *ata eva hi saṁgrahavivaraṇarūpaṁ grantham āracayanti śāstrakṛtaḥ*.

प्रसङ्गमुत्तरे मन्त्रे पूर्वयोरिव वीक्ष्य हि ॥

तिरोहितार्थतामाह नात्रेत्यादिवचः श्रुतिः ॥ ३६३ ॥

Having seen that, in the case of the subsequent (i.e. the third) Mantra, there would be a contingency, viz. the obscurity of its meaning, as in the case of the two previous (Mantras), the Śruti states the words *na atra...* [363]

यथाप्रार्थितमागाय याजमानं फलं परम् ॥

त्रिष्वेव पवमानेषु यथा वागादिभिः पुरा ॥ ३६४ ॥

After having first sung only three Pavamāna (Stotras), according to the request (by the sacrificer¹), the highest (as the) reward for the sacrificer,² as did Speech and others in former times, [364]

The paraphrase in SP and NKL shows that they regard this verse as difficultly worded.

¹The compound *yathāprārthitam* is *sāpekṣa samāsa*, therefore *yajamānena* has to be supplied.

²The word *yājamāna* is understood as *yajamānāya phaladam*.

अथ यानीतराणीति ह्युद्गातान्नाद्यमात्मने ॥

आगायेद्वचनात्कर्तुः कामयोगोऽपि गम्यते ॥ ३६५ ॥

‘Let the singer (now) sing *yānitarāṇi* ‘which are others’,¹ (viz. resulting in) food and the eatable for his own sake.² (Here) from the mention of the agent is understood also his connection with a desire. [365]

This verse explains *atha yānītarāṇi stotrāṇi* (BU 1.3.28).

¹i.e. remaining verses.

²Read SP: *yājamānam pavamāneṣūdḡānam ārtvijyam anyatrety arthah/ āgānasya dvaividhyaprasiddhyartho hiśabdah.*

कस्मादात्मन आगायेदिति हेतुरिहोच्यते ॥

यस्मात्स एष एवंविदुद्गातातोऽन एव सः ॥ ३६६ ॥

Now here is stated the reason as to why he should sing for himself: Since the one who is that (viz. the singer), viz. a knower of such (nature of the Udgāna), therefore, he is Prāṇa himself. [366]

Sureśvara refers to BU: *sa eṣa evamvid...* in accordance with the maxim, *pragīta-mantrasādhyagunabuddhistotram arthāc ca* (SP).

अतोऽलमात्मने कामानागातुं स्वामिने तथा ॥

यस्मादीश्वर उद्गाता कामावाप्तावतः शुभम् ॥ ३६७ ॥

तस्मात्तेषु वरं कामं यजमानो यथारुचि ॥

नवसूद्गीयमानेषु तं वृणीताविचारयन् ॥ ३६८ ॥

Therefore, he is capable to sing for himself as also for his (worldly) master; since the singer (of the Sāman) is the Lord in respect of obtaining the reward, therefore from him (comes) the auspicious (reward). [367]

Therefore, may the sacrificer choose without any hesitation whatever excellent desire, as he likes, while the (other) nine (prayers) are being sung. [368]

प्रयोगानुगमे चैतद्दर्शनं येन चोद्यते ॥ ३६९ ॥

तस्मात्स्याद्देवतावाप्तिर्ज्ञानिकर्मसमुच्चयात् ॥

तस्मान्न काचिदाशङ्का कर्मिणं प्रति विद्यते ॥ ३७० ॥

[Here is the explanation of *evam tāvad...* (BUB p. 87)]

And since¹ this worship (*darśana*) is enjoined in respect of the performance (of the Jyotiṣtoma sacrifice), [369]

therefore, there would be the attainment of (the nature of) the deity, through the combination of knowledge and ritual activity. As such, there is not (to be entertained) any doubt as regards the one who performs the rite.² [370]

¹It literally means 'by which'.

²That is to say: as regards his attainment of the nature of the deity.

कर्महीनेऽपि विदुषि स्यान्न वेत्यतिशङ्क्यते ॥
तदाशङ्कापनुत्त्यर्थं तद्वैतदिति हि श्रुतिः ॥ ३७१ ॥

It is (now) doubted further, whether (the attainment of the reward) would be possible in the case of one who knows (this importance of the Udgāna and is yet) without the performance of the ritual; therefore, for removing that doubt, indeed, proceeds the Śruti *tadd haitat...* [371]

इहैव देवभूतत्वादाशङ्का किंनिबन्धना ॥
जपकर्मानबोधाभ्यां लोकप्राप्तौ हि शङ्क्यते ॥
ज्ञानादेव भवेन्नेति तद्वैतदिति हि श्रुतिः ॥ ३७२ ॥

(The Siddhāntin asks:) 'With what basis is this doubt (entertained) when (the knower) has already become the deity here itself?'. (A possible answer to this question is:) 'Indeed, the doubt is entertained because (the Śruti has conveyed that) there is the attainment of the (higher) world by means of the recitation of the Abhyārohaṇa(-Mantra) and the knowing about the (nature of) Prāṇa.'. (But, there is this answer:) 'No. That¹ would follow merely knowledge, because the Śruti *tadd haitat...* (averts that opinion).'. [372]

¹Namely, attainment of the higher world.

जीवतो देवभूतस्य भावनोपचयात्कुतः ॥
देवावाप्तौ भवेच्छङ्का मनुष्यस्य तदाप्तिवत् ॥ ३७३ ॥

Since (it is thus clear that the singer) has become the deity on account of the increase in (his) devotion, while a man

is leading this very life, therefore, whence should there be the doubt entertained as regards his attaining the nature of the deity just as (one could entertain a doubt) as regards his attaining that.¹ [373]

¹An ardent worshipper of the Udgītha becomes in this very life one with the deity Prāṇa. Therefore, there cannot be any doubt about his final attainment (viz. *brahmajñāna=brahma-bhūtatva*). The word *tadāpti* refers to this final attainment which it is impossible for a human being to achieve so long as he remains (only) a human being. Cf. *devāpti* in the next verse.

कर्मिणोऽपि हि देवाप्तिर्ज्ञानादेव न कर्मणः ॥
समुच्चयात् तत्प्राप्तावागमादेव निश्चितिः ॥ ३७४ ॥

In the case of one who performs the ritual also, the attainment of the nature of the deity is only from knowledge but not from (mere) ritual performance. And there is (already) the decision known from, or made by, the Śruti itself as regards the attainment of that,¹ viz. (it can be) from the combination of (the two). [374]

¹It means 'the nature of the deity as stated before'.

तद्वैतप्राणविज्ञानं यथाव्याख्यातरूपकम् ॥
भवेत्लोकजिदेवेह कर्मशून्यमपि ध्रुवम् ॥ ३७५ ॥

The words *tadd haitat* (mean:) This knowledge about Prāṇa, whose nature has been thus explained, will certainly be the winner of the (higher) world¹ here,² even if it is without the performance of any ritual. [375]

¹That is, it will win for the worshipper the state of desirelessness.

²That is, in this life itself. This holds good in the case of one who has acquired that knowledge.

न हैवालोक्यतायै नुरस्याशापीह विद्यते ॥
इहैव लोकभूतत्वादप्राप्तेऽर्थे हि शङ्क्यते ॥ ३७६ ॥

Here,¹ in the case of this man there is not any hope indeed for fame, because he has in this very (world) become one with the world (beyond²). (Having a hope) can be thought of, when the end³ is not attained. [376]

¹It means 'When one has attained the knowledge of the deity, viz. Prāṇa'.

²That is, the higher world or the state of desirelessness.

³This refers to the state of oneness with Prāṇa.

इहैवासुरभावस्य प्राणोऽस्मीत्यभिमानतः ॥

प्रध्वस्तत्वात्कुतः शङ्का तन्मूलासंभवाद्भवेत् ॥ ३७७ ॥

Since, in this very life, there is the destruction of the demoniac (sort of) existence on account of the strong feeling 'I am Prāṇa', whence could there arise a doubt (regarding hope etc. as stated in the previous verse), while there cannot be its root cause? [377]

इदमत्र विचिन्त्यं स्याज्ज्ञानकर्मसमुच्चयात् ॥

देवभावः किमुद्गातुर्यजमानस्य वाथ किम् ॥ ३७८ ॥

Yet, this should be considered here (i.e. at this juncture): 'Is oneness with the deity (viz. Prāṇa), which results from the combination of knowledge and ritual activity (of the Udgāna), obtained by the Udgātr? or is it obtained by the sacrificer? [378]

Verses 379-383 are an objector's view and verse 384 disproves the same.

न समुच्चय उद्गातुः कर्माभावादिहेष्यते ॥

परकर्मप्रवेशात्स्यादुद्गाता न स्वकर्मणि ॥ ३७९ ॥

It is not held here (i.e. in this regard) that the (said) combination is possible on the part of the Udgātr, for there is absence of (his performance of) ritual activity; (the reason is:) if he had participated (lit. entered upon) an activity of another, i.e. the sacrificer, (he would not be engaged) as the Udgātr in his own activity. [379]

There is exception to the idea of the worshipper's becoming one with Prāṇa.

क्रियायोगाच्च तन्नाम्नो ज्ञानाभ्यासोऽपि दुर्लभः ॥
साक्षात्कृतिश्च संतत्या संततिश्च न विद्यते ॥ ३८० ॥

Further, owing to the association with activity of the one of that name,¹ even repeated (attempt for obtaining) knowledge is very difficult. Direct acquisition (of knowledge) results only from continuity, and this continuity² is not, however, seen here. [380]

¹That is, the Udgātr.

²This refers to knowing and meditating on what is known.

न च धीजन्ममात्रेण परमात्मप्रबोधवत् ॥
संभाव्यो देवभावोऽस्य देवो भूत्वेति च श्रुतेः ॥ ३८१ ॥

Further, from the statement of the Śruti *devo bhūtvā*, 'having become one with the deity'¹ becoming the deity is not possible (in the case of this one, i.e. the Udgātr) only by the rise of the knowledge (about the deity²), as by (the acquisition of) the knowledge about the highest Ātman.³ [381]

¹That is, attaining the nature of the deity.

²It means absence of repetition mentioned in verse 380.

³This knowledge results from the repetition of hearing, pondering over and meditating.

उद्गातुर्विदुषो नापि परकीयेन कर्मणा ॥
समुच्चयप्रसिद्धिः स्यात्तयोर्भिन्नाश्रयत्वतः ॥ ३८२ ॥

And also in the case of the Udgātr, who has become a knower (of the nature of Prāṇa), there would result the combination of knowledge and ritual activity by the performance (to be done) by another, for the reason that the two have (two) different supports.¹ [382]

¹That is, knowledge on the part of the Udgātr and performance on the part of sacrificer.

यजमानस्य कर्मास्ति ज्ञानं तूद्गातृसंश्रयम् ॥
समुच्चयोऽतस्तस्यापि भिन्नाधिष्ठानतो न च ॥ ३८३ ॥

(Now), ritual activity belongs to¹ the sacrificer, whereas knowledge rests in the Udgāṭṛ. Therefore, there does not follow the combination (of knowledge and ritual activity) in the case of him (i.e. the sacrificer) also, owing to their different supports.² [383]

¹That is, is performed by.

²As explained in note 1 on the preceding verse.

मतं तद्याजमानं स्याज्ज्ञानं यत्प्रागुदीरितम् ॥
स्वयमेव कृतार्थत्वात्कापेक्षास्यर्त्विजं प्रति ॥ ३८४ ॥

Therefore (*tat*), it is held that the knowledge, which has been discussed earlier, belongs to the sacrificer. (Here an objector asks:) 'Then, since he has acquired his end, why should he have expectation about the assistance of the (Udgāṭṛ) *rtvij*?' [384]

The second line is one more question put by the objector.

कर्मण्युद्गात्रपेक्षावज्ज्ञानेऽपीति मतं यदि ॥
उद्गातुरपि तत्तुल्यं नोद्गातर्ते क्रियां यतः ॥ ३८५ ॥

If it were held that, like the assistance of the Udgāṭṛ in the performance, (assistance) is expected in acquiring knowledge also; then that (condition) is commonly shared by the Udgāṭṛ also, since there is no Udgāṭṛ without a (ritual) activity. [385]

याजमानं यथा कर्म ह्याश्रित्य फलवद्भवेत् ॥
अन्नाद्यागानमुद्गातुस्तज्ज्ञानं तद्वदाश्रितम् ॥ ३८६ ॥

As the singing of the food and eatables by the Udgāṭṛ becomes rewarded only after resorting to the performance by the sacrificer, his knowledge also is likewise dependent (on the same). [386]

समुच्चयाच्चेदुभयोरुद्गातृयजमानयोः ॥

देवभावः किमर्थं तद्वैतदिति हि श्रुतिः ॥ ३८७ ॥

If becoming one with the deity would result from the combination (of knowledge and ritual activity) for both the Udgāṭṛ and the sacrificer, for what purpose does there occur the Śruti statement *tadd haitat*? [387]

सर्वाश्रमाणां तर्होदं सामान्येनाभिधीयते ॥

तद्वैतदिति सिद्धत्वादुद्गातृयजमानयोः ॥ ३८८ ॥

Indeed, then, the statement *tadd haitat* is uttered for all the Āśramas in general, since it has been already established for the Udgāṭṛ and the sacrificer (together). [388]

देवभावेन विज्ञानं संस्करोत्येव तद्वियम् ॥

परार्थमपि सत्कस्मादनपेक्षं न सिद्धये ॥ ३८९ ॥

The knowledge (about the Udgāṇa), though being used for another (sacrificer), does purify his intellect,¹ by (bringing unto him) the nature of the deity. (Then,) how would it not acquire that end without expectation (of anything else)? [389]

¹This leads him to the knowledge of Prāṇa.

iti udgīthabrāhmaṇam samāptam

BRHADĀRANYAKOPANIṢAD-
BHĀṢYA-VĀRTIKA

(BUBV 1.4)

Puruṣavidha Brāhmaṇa

ज्ञानकर्मफलं चैतत्कर्मकाण्डप्रचोदितम् ।
आत्मैवेत्यादिशास्त्रेण सृष्ट्यादौ कर्तृतोच्यते ॥१॥

And,¹ this reward of knowledge and² (ritual) activity is what is told (lit. prescribed) in the section on ritual activity. (Now) in the scripture (beginning with the) words 'Ātman alone' is told (i.e. discussed) the nature of the agent in respect of creation etc.

[1]

¹This is for *ca* which is merely stylistic flourish.

²This can be alternatively taken as *vā* 'or'. SP and NKL both explain the compound *jñānakarmaphala* as *kevalasya jñānasya* and (*jñānasya*) *karmasamuccitasya phalam*. The earlier portion of BU up to the end of 1.3 spoke of the fruit of the combination of knowledge (about the nature and effect of rituals) and ritual activity, viz. attaining the nature of Prajāpati (or the Ātman, the Sūtrātman). This is so understood in BUBV 1.5.11.

SP points out: This portion, viz 1.4ff. is intended to convey that Prajāpati is in respect of the act of creation etc. of the world an independent agent — this is clear from *tad dhedam* ... (1.4.7). (Actually this is stated in the very next verse).

जगदुत्पत्तिसंहारस्थित्यादौ जगदात्मनः ।
क्रियाधीफलभूतस्य स्वातन्त्र्यमुपवर्ण्यते ॥२॥

(That is to say:) Here is described the independence of the Ātman of the world, who has become the very fruit of activity and knowledge¹, in respect of the origin, destruction and sustenance etc.² of the world.³

[2]

¹The inversion *kriyādhī* for *jñānakarman* is due to metrical exigency; cf. *kriyājñāna* in just the next verse.

²The word *ādi* means: control (*niyamana*) etc., according to SP.

³NKL states that *parātman* as understood from *tad ddeham* is the Prajāpati (i.e. Sūtrātman) and therefore the statement in this verse holds good — this is the meaning of *jagadātman* mentioned earlier.

स्तुत्यानया च वेदोक्तक्रियाज्ञानस्तुतिर्भवेत् ।
 कृता विवक्षितं त्वत्र सर्वमप्येतदीरितम् ॥३॥
 वैदिकं साधनं ज्ञेयं ज्ञानकर्मात्मकं पुरा ।
 महानर्थफलायैव न मोक्षायेति निश्चितिः ॥४॥

By this (statement of) praise is to be understood the praise of the ritual activity and knowledge which is taught in the Veda¹. However, the intended (meaning) here is that all this which comprises knowledge and ritual activity and the means (towards happiness etc.), as (earlier) stated in Veda (i.e. this scripture), (viz. it) culminates (in reality) in great calamity and not in liberation — this is the decision. [3-4]

¹This has a reference to *tad dheham* in 1.4.7 which follows, though a general term *veda* is used. This is the purpose of the statement about the independence of the Ātman mentioned in note 2 on verse 1 above.

वैदिकं साधनं सर्वमविद्योत्थत्वकारणात् ।
 तीव्रानर्थफलायेति ब्रह्मविद्याधिकारतः ।
 विवक्षितो ऽर्थो यत्नेन तद्वैराग्यविधित्सया ॥५॥
 यतो ऽविरक्तः संसारान्नात्मज्ञानाय कल्पते ।
 तदेतदात्मतत्त्वं हि पदनीयमितीरणात् ॥६॥
 पुत्रादिभ्यस्तथा प्रेयानिति वक्ष्यति सादरम् ॥७॥

Since every means (to happiness etc.), which is taught in Veda, results into acute calamity on account of its having an origin in ignorance (and) since this is a topic of the knowledge of the Brahman, therefore, the purpose is to state (the nature

the agent), specifically with a desire to advise (lit. prescribe) aversion to that¹; [5]

since one, who is not averse to transmigratory existence, is not eligible (lit. able) to acquire the knowledge of the Ātman and (there is in this Śruti) the statement 'This very truth of the Ātman is to be known ...';² [6]

and also the Śruti will say with great regard that (that Ātman) is dearer (to one) than a son etc.³ [7]

¹Namely, ritual activity. SP refers to CU 5.3.8: *tasmāj jugupsata*.

²The first line of verse 6 states a pre-requisite for acquiring the knowledge of the Ātman, viz. aversion to transmigratory existence and the second line implies a question: Does not *vairāgya* arise on acquiring the fruit of *jñāna* and *karman*? Where then is the need to state what is said in the first line? Cf. BU 1.4.7: *tad etat padanīyam* ... The word *padanīya* can be translated as 'to be attained', i.e. *ātmatattva* is considered to be related to *puruṣārtha*. But, verbal roots in the sense of movement convey the sense of knowing also; cf. *tad etad eva prakṛtaṁ gamanīyam* (BUB p.134).

³Cf. BU 1.4.8.

Verses 8ff. refer to the *sādhana*catuṣṭaya as stated in BSB: They are *nityānityavastuviveka*, *ihāmutrārthabhogavirāga*, *śamadamādisādhana*sampat and *mumukṣutva*.

वेदोक्तं निखिलं पुंसः सत्त्वशुद्धिफलं स्मृतम् ।
कर्म ध्यानादिकं यत्नाच्छ्रेयो ऽर्थभिरनुष्ठितम् ॥८॥

The entire activity such as meditation etc. that has been stated in the Veda is known to result into the purification of the mind¹ of a man (and) it is performed by those who wish for happiness, with every effort.² [8]

Verse 8 states that *karmakāṇḍa* etc. does not directly lead one to liberation, yet it is indirectly conducive to it — thus, meditation etc. (even its impression or desire, as the word etc. points out) causes the purification of one's mind.

¹SP states that *sattva* is *antaḥkarana*. Yet, it is better under-

stood as *citta*.

²SP supports this by citing some passages from Śruti and Smṛti respectively: *yena kenacana yajeta* and *yasyaite catvāriṃṣat saṃskārāḥ* (both untraceable).

सम्यक्संशुद्धधिषणः संसारं वेत्ति तत्त्वतः ।
दृष्टसंसारतत्त्वश्च वैराग्यं संसृतेर्ब्रजेत् ॥९॥

He, who has fully purified his mind¹, knows the transmigratory world in its true nature and he, who has known (lit. seen) the true nature of the transmigratory world¹ comes to have aversion to worldly life. [9]

The verse states the process of *karman* → *tattvaśuddhi* → *saṃ-sāratattvadrṣṭi* → *vairāgya*.

¹The word *dhīṣaṇa* means a sense-organ with which one comes to know and it is used here as a synonym for *sattva*. See note 1 on the preceding verse.

आविरिञ्चाद्विरक्तो हि संसारान्निविवृत्सति ।
न चोक्तज्ञानकर्मभ्यः सा निवृत्तिः प्रसिद्ध्यति ॥१०॥

Indeed, he who has turned averse to transmigratory world, beginning with Hiranyagarbha, wishes to turn away from it. And this turning away is not possible to achieve from knowledge and action as stated (in the preceding sections).¹ [10]

¹SP supports by citing *nānyaḥ panthāḥ vidyate 'yanāya* (Śvetāśvataropaniṣad 3.8; 6.15): *nāsty akṛtaḥ kṛtena ...* (Muṇḍakopaniṣad 1.2.12).

वाङ्मनःकायकर्मभ्यस्तत्साध्यकटुकत्वतः ।
व्युत्थायानर्थीनिःसारसाधनान्यनुमार्गीति ॥११॥

After rising above the actions of speech, *manas* and body for the disagreeableness in what is acquired through them, he looks for the means of warding away the undesirable (results). [11]

This is a statement of the means to liberation. It is the right knowledge (*samyagjñāna*) which arises on one's hearing etc. that is preceded by renunciation.

नित्यान्यपि च कर्माणि तत्संस्कारफलाश्रयात् ।
परित्यजति सर्वाणि कृत्स्नसंसारदोषदृक् ॥१२॥

(And) also, seeing the undesired effects in the entire transmigratory world, he gives up all the obligatory rites, for they are related to the fruits produced from (even) their impressions (or desire). [12]

Activity prescribed in scriptures is useful for liberation only at certain stages; it does not function as a direct means; rather, it causes defects or undesirable effects. Therefore, it has only to be given up.

संसारवह्निजं दुःखं संभावयति ना परम् ।
भूयो दुःखं किमन्यत्स्यान्नित्यानुष्ठानहानितः ॥१३॥

A man¹ considers misery resulting from the fire in the form of transmigratory world to be very great; indeed, what other misery can there be if not (that which results) from abandoning (the performance) of the obligatory rites? [13]

As the Smṛti says *akurvan vihitam karma ...* (*Manusmṛti* 11.44), it is not proper to keep from performing the obligatory rites, because that would cause obstruction (*pratyavāya*) to one's collecting merit.

¹The word *nā* is understood in the sense of *śuddhadhīḥ*, *viraktaḥ*, and therefore *adhikārī* for acquiring the knowledge of the Brahman.

मुक्तेर्बिभ्यत इत्यादि तथा च श्रुतिशासनम् ।
तन्मूला च स्मृतिः साक्षाद्वेदानित्यादिका स्फुटा ॥१४॥

And, to this effect, there is an instruction in the Śruti, *mukter bibhyataḥ* 1... Moreover, there is (a statement in) some Smṛti,

which has its root in the Śruti,² that clearly states (the same) in the words: to the Vedas etc. [14]

¹The quotation is untraceable.

²This shows equal authoritativeness of the Smṛti.

अविज्ञातं परं तत्त्वं जनिमत्कारणं श्रुतौ ।
आन्त्यात्कार्यात्तदेव स्यात्सर्वकार्यविशेषणम् ॥१५॥

[Verses 15-21 refer to the Brahman, the cause of the world.]

In the Śruti (it is said) that the highest Reality, which is (generally) not known,¹ is the cause of what has a birth (or origin) and that alone would be the producer of all effects ending with the final of them². [15]

¹Because the highest Brahman is in reality *avikārya* 'not undergoing any modification' and it is really the ultimate cause.

²This refers to the earth. See SP: *antyam kāryam pṛthivī tat-paryantam sarvasya kāryasya vyāvartakam sūtrādyātmanā param eva brahmety arthaḥ*.

तेन तेनात्मकार्येण स्वात्माभासतमोवधिः ।
विशिष्टः ससृजे विष्णुस्तेजोबन्नादि मायया ॥१६॥

Viṣṇu,¹ affected by the limiting adjunct² of ignorance (lit. darkness) in the form of the semblance of Himself³ (and) distinguished (lit. qualified) by each one of His own products, has created⁴ fire, water, food etc. by his own power (Māyā). [16]

This verse describes the creation by Viṣṇu. Viṣṇu, affected by *upādhis*, is the creator (*sraṣṭṛ*), the protector (*pālayitr*) and the withdrawer (*saṁhatṛ*) of the universe. This is a verse expressive of Sureśvara's Ābhāsavāda.

¹According to SP, only Viṣṇu is mentioned here for avoiding the notions of different gods being responsible for each of creation, sustenance and destruction. Only He is the creator etc. It should

be noticed that Sureśvara, under the influence of his time, mentions Viṣṇu for the Brahman. Or, possibly, he resorts to the etymological explanation of Viṣṇu from the verb root $\sqrt{\text{viṣ}}$ 'to pervade', in the sense of 'pervader'.

²In *tamovadhiḥ* 'having the limiting adjunct of darkness', *avadhi* is to be taken to mean *upādhi*; cf. *avadhiśabditopādhinā* (SP) and *svasya ātmanaḥ avadhiḥ yasmin ajñāte tad eva tamaḥ* (NKL).

³SP explains the word *svātman* as *cid-dhātu* 'one's own (basic) element, viz. *cit*', which is Self. This is an indication of Sureśvara's Ābhāsa-vāda.

⁴The use of the Ātmanepada in *sasṛje* is in Vedic fashion. This reflexive use shows how the creation is but illusion (*mithyā*)—it indicates absence of any object apart from the creator.

अविद्ययास्य स्रष्टृत्वं कूटस्थस्यापि सर्वदा ।
यथावस्तुधियः सूतेः प्राङ्नित्यं तेन तन्मतम् ॥१७॥

On account of ignorance is this One said to be the creator, even though He is ever immutable. And since the production of (the universe) is from this thought of the things as are going to be, it is for that reason (known to be) ever eternal.

[17]

ज्ञानकर्मादितन्त्रं सत्सुत्रं जज्ञे ततो विभोः ।
ज्ञानक्रियाशक्तिमद्यद्यत्रेदं जगदाहितम् ॥१८॥

[Here follows in verses 18-21 a statement of the process of creation from the Brahman.]

Being controlled¹ by knowledge and action etc.², the existent Sūtrātman³ was born from the (all-)pervading⁴ — that which was possessed of the powers of knowledge and activity⁵ (and) in which rests this world.⁶

[18]

¹It literally means: dependent on ...

²The word *ādi* means *vāsanā* (SP).

³The Sūtrātman is *apañcīkṛtapañcamahābhūtataatkāryātmakam liṅgam*.

⁴The word *vibhu* means *avyākṛta brahman*.

⁵*jñānaśaktimat* is Hiraṇyagarbha and *kriyāśaktimat* is Prāṇa — these two are the aspects of the Sūtrātman.

⁶The Sūtrātman is minute and cannot be a substratum of the world; but cf. *vāyunā vai gautama sūtrenāyaṃ ca lokah* (BU 3.7.2) which states that the Sūtrātman — identified there as Vāyu, viz. Self (Ātman) — supports everything. That the Sūtrātman is a substratum is made known by the visible gross effects.

विराडपि ततो जातस्त्रैलोक्यात्मकदेहवान् ।
यथोक्तज्ञानकर्मभ्यां मनोर्जन्म ततो ऽपि च ॥१९॥

Also, from that (Sūtrātman) was born Virāj¹ having a body in the form of the three worlds. And there was the birth of Manu also² from that (Virāj), on account of (his) knowledge and activity as stated before. [19]

¹Virāj is *pañcīkṛtāpañcamahābhūtataatkāryātmaka*. Cp. note 3 on the preceding verse.

²The word *ca* implies all the creation which proceeded from Manu and also that it is controlled by knowledge and action.

या महाप्रलयात्सृष्टिः सा विरिञ्चस्य वक्ष्यते ।
आन्तरप्रलयाद्या तु विराजो ऽधीयमुच्यते ॥२०॥

Whatever creation arises from the great dissolution (lit. deluge), is said (to be) from Viriñca (the Sūtrātman¹); (and) that after the intermediate dissolution is said to arise from Virāj.

[20]

Verses 18-19 clarified the relation of the Sūtrātman and Virāj to a certain extent. But the origination of Virāj mentioned in verse 19 from the Sūtrātman was already explained in BUBV 1.2 (Aśvamedha Brāhmaṇa). But where can we see the origination of Manu etc. from Virāj? — to this an answer is given in the second line. Also, BU 1.4.3: *sa imam evātmānam dvedhāpātayat* 'He (Virāj) parted this very body into two.' is also expressive of the same.

¹Viriñca is the Sūtrātman who has two powers; see verse 18 note 4.

स वै शरीरी प्रथमः स वै पुरुष उच्यते ।
आदिकर्ता स भूतानां ब्रह्मा ऽग्रे समवर्तत ॥२१॥

It is said: He is the first embodied being, he is Puruṣa. The (god) Brahman, the first creator of all beings, existed before.¹

[21]

This is *Mārkaṇḍeyapurāṇa* 45.64; *Vāyupurāṇa* 1.4.68; *Brahmāṇḍapurāṇa* 1.3.24.

¹That is, in the beginning of all creation.

प्रत्यग्भूतः परार्थेभ्यो यो ऽनन्यानुभवं प्रति ।
प्रथते स इहात्मेति जगत्यस्मिन्निगद्यते ॥२२॥

[Verse 22-30 are *udbhāṣya*; Sureśvara's addition to what Śaṅkara said on *ātmaivedam agra āsīt*.]

That is described in this world as the Ātman who, residing in each being¹ apart from other objects², reveals himself in the experience of every being as in none other.

[22]

¹Translation follows the reading in the AnSS edition. The NKL edition reads: *pratyag-rūpaḥ* instead of *pratyag-bhūtaḥ*. Possibly that is better, meaning; 'who has the form of the inner self of every being'.

²These stand in the relation of cause and effect.

आत्माभासैकसंसिद्धेस्तदज्ञानसमुद्भवम् ।
आत्मैव भण्यते मोहात्तदात्माव्यतिरेकतः ॥२३॥

On account of the existence of only the semblance of the Ātman, all that results from the ignorance about that Ātman is called the Ātman on account of illusion itself and not apart from that Ātman.

[23]

This is yet another indication of Sureśvara's Ābhāsavāda; cf. verse 16 above.

एवेत्यवधृतावेतदात्मीयार्थनिषेधकृत् ।
मन्वादि जन्मनः पूर्वमात्मैवेदमभूज्जगत् ॥२४॥

The word *eva*, which is used for the sake of restricting the meaning, is expressive of the denial (of the world) of things which have the nature of the Ātman. This world whose beginning¹ is Manu was before its origin only the Ātman. [24]

The first line explains the intention of the word *eva* of *ātmai-vedam* and the second line paraphrases *ātmā eva idam āsīt*.

¹SP explains *ādi* of *manvādi* as *ākāśa* etc. and also takes *manvādi* as the qualifier of *jagat* ! The NKL edition reads *manvādi janmanah* as one word. In that case, *ādi* can stand for *ākāśa*; but this seems to be unintended, for Sureśvara refers to the creation beginning with Manu is clear also from verse 30 below.

अध्यात्मादिविभागे स्यादात्मात्मीयादिभेदधीः ।
तस्मिन्नसति सा न स्यादपेक्षाविरहाद्विभोः ॥२५॥

Cognition of distinction such as Ātman and what belongs to Ātman would be (possible) when, there is division made of things as those resting in body etc. But in the absence of that (division, such creation) would not be there, for in the case of the all-pervading (Ātman) there is (total) absence of any relationship (to another). [25]

At the initial stage there are no distinct entities as the Ātman and *idam* (viz. *jagat*) and therefore the Ātman does not know the existence of *jagat*. If the Ātman were to know it as some existent, that would mean the Ātman has *bhedadhī*, i.e. the Ātman is the knower and *jagat* is the object of its knowing. Then there would be duality even at an initial stage. Here Sureśvara emphasises that *bhedadhī* is possible only with reference to *adhyātmādivibhāga*.

मिथोपास्तव्यपेक्षं हि नामरूपादिमज्जगत् ।
प्रत्यङ्मात्रप्रमाणं स्यात्परागेवैति चित्रताम् ॥२६॥

This world, which is made up of name, form etc. and as such has set aside any mutual relationship, would indeed have (only) the inner/individual self as the means of knowing it. Or rather, outside (the Self¹) only, it assumes variety. [26]

¹Following the preceding verse, this verse explains the relation of the Ātman and the objective world (if it existed). Also it explains away the possible argument that the absence of any variety of objects before creation meant nihilism (Sūnyavāda). Also note that NKL reads *parāḡ evaiti citratām*. The AnSS edition does not present a happy reading. The word *parāṇ* is an adjective.

अपामार्गलतेवायं विरुद्धफलदो भवः ।
प्रत्यङ्दृशं विमोक्षाय संसाराय पराङ्दृशाम् ॥२७॥

This mundane world¹ yields, like the *apāmārga* creeper², fruits of opposed nature. For those who consider it as only the inner/individual self, (this transmigratory world) ends in liberation (and) for those who see it apart from the self it results in (further) transmigratory existence. [27]

¹*bhava* 'mundane existence' is *samsāra* according to SP. It means existence in this world which might end either in liberation or in rebirth.

²Refer to SP and NKL regarding *apāmārgalatā* (*Achyranthes aspera/bidentata*). Better NKL: *apāmārgamañjarī yathā agrata ārabhya adhaḥ sprśyamānā susparśā sukhakarī bhavati vaiparītyena duḥsparsā duḥkhakarīty arthaḥ*.

व्याकृताव्याकृतं विश्वं प्रत्यक्प्रत्ययमात्रकम् ।
मोहोत्थाहमितिज्ञानाद्भयारत्यादिमद्भवेत् ॥२८॥

All this (i.e. world), manifest and unmanifest, is only to result into the awareness of the individual self, but on account of the awareness, 'I (am this).'¹, which arises from infatuation,

it comes to have fear, displeasure etc.

[28]

This verse restates the latter case, resulting into *samsāra*.

¹'I am this.' implies 'This is mine.'; cf. *aham mameti vijñānam* in the next verse.

अहंममेतिविज्ञानं विद्यया ध्वंसितं यदा ।
तदा ऽद्वये दृशौ दृष्टे न भयादि तमोहतेः ॥२९॥

When this awareness¹, 'I am this (and) this is mine.', is destroyed by the lore (of the Ātman)², then, the seer, who is without any duality,³ being seen, there does not exist fear etc., for there has been the removal of darkness. [29]

¹This is knowledge based on subject-object relationship.

²The word *vidyā* is for *ātmavidyā*.

³Or alternatively, who does not have a second.

इदं धीनामगम्यं यच्चित्रं सत् प्रथते हिरक् ।
मन्वादि सृष्टेस्तत्पूर्वमात्मैवाभूदिदं जगत् ॥३०॥

This (world), which is understood as the object of knowledge and (as having a) name (etc.), extends afar, being full of variety. This world, beginning with Manu¹, is, before (its) creation, only the Ātman.² [30]

¹Cf. verse 24 note above.

²This implies: and nothing else.

एतावद्वास्तवं वृत्तं मोहोत्थं भण्यते ऽधुना ।
कोशपञ्चकतां यातः प्रत्यगज्ञानतो यतः ॥३१॥
स एष परमो ऽप्यात्मा कामाविद्याद्युपप्लवात् ।
संवृत्तः पुरुषाकार इत्यनुक्रोशतीव नः ॥३२॥

[Verses 31-34 are the explanation of the word *puruṣavidhah*. Here, Sureśvara explains Ātman as Paramātmān 'Supreme Self'.]

This much is described as the nature of the thing¹ (which

is) (ever) existent. Now is described (the nature of) what arises from ignorance, since the individual self has assumed the five sheath state². [31]

This³ highest Ātman also becomes possessed of the shape of a man because of the obstructions of desire, ignorance etc. and therefore shows compassion on us, as it were.⁴ [32]

The Śruti *puruṣavidhaḥ* helps us in getting release from bondage — in this way, it emphasises that whatever man experiences is nothing but the appearance of the Ātman.

¹This refers to the Ātman, i.e. Brahman.

²The five sheaths are: *ānanda*, *prāṇa*, *manas*, *viññāna* and *anna*.

³Translation follows the reading *sa eṣa* in the AnSS edition. The NKL edition reads *sa eva*. But both SP and NKL do not give any indication about the reading.

⁴This indicates that *puruṣavidhatva* of the Ātman is not real (*mithyā*).

आनन्दाद्यन्नपर्यन्तान्कारणेतररूपिणः ।

पुरुषादिप्रकारांस्तान्प्रत्यक्तत्त्वानलक्षयत् ।

पुरुषविध इत्युक्त्या ह्यूर्ध्वं चैवं प्रवक्ष्यते ॥३३॥

Since (the Śruti) has pointed out (or described) in the statement *puruṣavidhaḥ* the (various) forms, beginning with a Puruṣa, of the one who assumes those forms of things, viz. the causes and others (i.e. effects), beginning with *ānandamaya* (and) ending with *annamaya*,¹ as having the nature of the individual self; (and) that this (is so) will be explained later². [33]

¹*puruṣavidha* = *puruṣākāra* = *kōśapañcaka*; cf. note 2 on the preceding verse. And among the five sheaths, the first *ānandamaya* is a causal sheath, the last *annamaya* is a sheath of the nature of an effect, and the three sheaths (*prāṇamaya*, *manomaya*, *viññānamaya*) are sheaths of the nature of both cause and effect.

²This refers to the context of *anna* in the next Brāhmaṇa (traditional scholars call it Saptāṇna Brāhmaṇa), viz. BU 1.5.3.

वाङ्मनःप्राणकोशास्त्रीन्विराडन्नमयः स्वयम् ।
तद्वेदमिति चानन्दो नैवेहेति तथोच्यते ॥३४॥

[The words *ūrdhvaṃ ca* of the preceding verse are clarified in verses 34-36 below.]

(In the Śruti it is later stated that) the three sheaths of *vāk*, *manas* and *prāṇa* are (but) Virāj, who himself comprises food. It is said (already) in the Śruti passage *tad dhedam* that this is referred to as *ānanda(maya)*; and so also in the passage *naiveha*. [34]

The Śruti passages and *pañcakośas* can be thus co-related: *mano vācam prāṇam ...* (BU 1.5.3) refers to *manomaya*, *vijñānamaya* (*vijñāna* = *vāk*) and *prāṇamaya*; *ānandamaya* to *tad dhedam* (BU 1.4.7) and *naiveha kimcanāgra āsīt mṛtyunaivedam āvṛtam āsīt* (BU 1.2.1).

अग्निर्मूर्धेति च तथा मन्त्रेणापि प्रकाशितः ।
सामानाधिकरण्यं च तद्वेदमिति युक्तिमत् ॥३५॥
पृथिव्याद्यक्षरान्तश्च प्रश्नो वाचकनवस्तथा ॥३६॥

In the Mantra *agnir mūrdhā ...*¹ is explained (the nature of the Ātman) to be likewise (viz. *annamaya*). And this mention (of the Ātman and the five sheaths) in the same substratum² as stated in *tad dhedam* is (supported) with reason. [35]

So also the question of Vācaknavī, which begins with the word *prthivī* and ends with the word *akṣara*³, (will state) the same.

[36]

The Vārtikas on *ātmaivedam ... puruṣavidhaḥ* are concluded here. It is Virāj that is understood by the word *ātman*, and, before getting another body, it only existed and from that are created all discrete beings and things; the beings take human forms (in particular), (thus) having a head, hands etc.

¹Cf. *agnir mūrdhā cakṣuṣī candrasūryaṃ diśaḥ śrotre vāg iva vṛtās ca devāḥ* (Muṇḍakopaniṣad 2.1.4).

²The word *sāmānādhikaranyā* is explained in SP: *bhinna-*

pravṛttinimittānām śabdānām ekasminn arthe pravṛtṭiḥ sāmānādhikaranyam iti sthiter ity arthah.

³BU 3.8.8-9.

प्रत्यग्दृष्ट्यनुविधाहंप्रत्ययैकप्रमाणकः ।

सो ऽनुवीक्ष्यात्ममोहोत्थदृष्ट्याविद्योत्थरूपकम् ॥३७॥

[Verses 37-39 are the explanation of the words *so 'nuvīkṣya* of BU 1.4.1.]

(Virāj¹) has the only (one) authoritative means of knowing in the experience of 'I' which is permeated by the awareness of the inner self. The words *so 'nuvīkṣya* is a metaphorical form of expression arising from ignorance, i.e. the awareness originating in the ignorance (about the nature) of the Ātman.

[37]

¹Śaṅkara has used Virāj in the sense of the Ātman, viz. individual/inner self. In this verse, Sureśvara adopts Śaṅkara's view. Already, Sureśvara has explained Ātman as Paramātmān 'Supreme Self' (NKL). Cf. introductory note to verses 31-34 above.

यदभ्यस्तं पुरास्याभूदहमेवेदमित्यदः ।

दर्शनं तदपेक्षायामनुशब्दः प्रयुज्यते ॥३८॥

This prefix (lit. word) *anu*¹ is used (in the Śruti) with reference to whatever was then, i.e. earlier, repeatedly uttered (in the state of a sacrificer) in the awareness, 'I myself am this (Virāj).'

[38]

¹*anu* requires something to have occurred before; but there did not exist such a knowable object before Virāj. Hence this explanation is given. Sureśvara has thus answered away a difficulty on linguistic ground: The word *anu* expresses either the subsequence or nearness of something to another; how then was this expression *anuvīkṣya* used by the Śruti *so 'nuvīkṣya nānyad ātmano 'paśyat so 'ham asmīty agre vyāharat tato 'hamnāmā- bhavat ... athānyan nāma prabrūte yad asya bhavati* (BU 1.4.1)?

अहमेवेदमस्मीति दर्शनं यत्सुभावितम् ।
तत्फलं यत्तदन्वीक्ष्य नात्मनो ऽन्यद्दर्श सः ॥३९॥

After having thought about whatever was the fruit of that which was well thought over, i.e. awareness 'I myself am this.', he did not see anything else than the Ātman itself. [39]

Here is described the fruit or result of *anvīkṣaṇa*; *anvīkṣaṇa* is only *īkṣaṇa*.

तस्मादर्थान्तरासतेरेकपिण्डात्ममात्रतः ।
नापश्यदपरं किञ्चित्सो ऽहमित्यभ्यधादथ ॥४०॥

[Verses 40-42 are the explanation of *anyad ātmano 'paśyat so 'ham asmīty agre vyāharat.*]

Due to non-production of anything other than that (Virāj¹), he (Virāj) did not see anything else than merely himself as one whole (lump) and, therefore, in that instant,² he uttered so 'ham 'I am he.' [40]

¹ *tasmād arthāntarāsūter is virāḍdehād bhinnasya dehasyānupa-patteḥ* (NKL).

² SP: The word *atha* refers to *agre* in the Śruti. Cf. SP: *sva-vyatiriktādarśanānantaryam athaśabdārthaḥ*.

त्रैलोक्यात्मकदेहात्मा नापश्यदपरं पृथक् ।
भिन्नार्थानभिसंबन्धात्प्रतीच्येवास्य धीरभूत् ॥४१॥

The embodied Ātman having the form of the three worlds¹ did not see any other (thing) as distinct. On account of the absence of contact with any distinct thing (i.e. object), he became aware of the inner self. [41]

This is the explanation of the word *atha* in the previous verse.

¹ Variant reading in AnSS -*dehāt sa nātmāpaśyat*; accordingly, the translation would be: That Ātman did not see anything else

(as) different from his own body in the form of the three worlds ...

सशब्दं दर्शनं यादृक्प्रागभ्यस्तं तथैव सः ।
व्याजहार फलावस्थो ह्यहमित्यात्मवाचकम् ॥४२॥

[The preceding verse is explained further in the first line.]

(And) in the same way as he was earlier used to see himself, viz. possessing (the capacity for) the word¹, he, who resided in the state of the result², declared about himself, 'I (am) he, (the sacrificer).'. [42]

There is an attempt here to explain as to how there was on the part of Virāj the awareness of himself, viz. the inner self, and his own body (the last *pāda* of verse 41, *prāṇi dhīr ābhūt*).

¹NKL reads: *śaśabdadarśanam*; translation follows this reading. The reading in AnSS would lead to this translation: He is just like that as is repeatedly studied (in the Śruti).

²*phalāvastha* = *yajamānāvastha*, identified with Prajāpati.

उपासनार्थं नामास्य तस्योपनिषदित्यतः ।
अतो ऽहमित्यनेनैव ह्यात्मनात्मानमभ्यधात् ॥४३॥

From the Śruti (statement) *tasyopaniṣat* (is understood the word) *aham* for the name of him (viz. Prajāpati); (which is so used) for the sake of (recitation in) worship.¹ Therefore, in this statement 'I am he.', 'he' refers to himself of his own accord. [43]

'How is the name *aham* used for Prajāpati?' — this is explained in this verse. The name comes from Upaniṣadic usage (NKL puts it as *rahasya*). This means: No word other than *aham* can express or refer to the Ātman.

¹For *upāsana*(ā), see our book [Vol.4:1991] Introduction.

अहमित्यभ्यधादग्रे यस्मादात्मानमात्मना ।
अहंनामाभवत्तस्माद्विराडेष प्रजापतिः ॥४४॥

Since, in the beginning (i.e. in the earliest/first moment) he expressed himself by (the word) *aham*, of his own accord, therefore, this Virāj, Prajāpati became known by the name *aham*. [44]

This is the explanation of *ahamnāmābhavat*.

तत्कार्यगेण लिङ्गेन ज्ञापयन्कारणाभिधाम् ।
तस्मादपीति वक्त्येतां प्रसिद्धिं लोकसाक्षिकीम् ॥४५॥

The Veda, which informs about the name of the cause by means of (i.e. citing, the) characteristic of his (=Prajāpati's) effect, utters the words *tasmād api* (and thereby) expresses the popularly accepted notion in this statement.¹ [45]

This is the explanation of *tasmād api*.

¹BU, which follows *tasmād api*, viz. *etarhy āmantrito 'ham ayam ity evāgra ukvāthānyan nāma prabrūte yad asya bhavati* 'Being addressed, one first says 'It is me.', and then conveys one's other name (which one might bear).'

यथोक्तमहिमः कस्मात्संवृत्तः पुरुषो विराट् ।
इति हेतूपदेशाय स यदित्यादि भण्यते ॥४६॥

In order to explain as to why Virāj of the greatness thus described¹ became a man, there follows the statement *sa yat ...* [46]

Since it is difficult to explain why the word is used in a Smṛti for Virāj, though it contradicts the Śruti *sa vai puruṣa ucyate*, therefore, the verse answers away that difficulty.

¹The word should have been *yathoktamahimā* ! Cf. SP: *nakāralopam vaikalpitam manyante*.

मिथो जिगीषतां पुंसां ज्ञानकर्मादिसाधनैः ।
पुरा देवात्मतां यो ऽगात्प्लुष्टास्तेनेतरे जिताः ॥४७॥

Whosoever amongst the men, formerly wishing to conquer one

another by means of knowledge, action etc., became for them *deva*¹ and by him were others burnt (as it were)² and conquered. [47]

This gives the meaning of the Śruti passage *sa yat puruṣo ... tasmāt puruṣaḥ*.

¹The definition of Puruṣa is understood here thus: *pūrvam auṣat* which conveys the meaning of the Śruti *sa yat ... auṣat* (BU 1.4.1). And this Puruṣa is Virāj. This is Brāhmanical derivation from the verb root *purā-√uṣ* 'to burn'!

²Cf. SP: *dagdhavaj jitāḥ*. See the next verse.

वैराजपदसंप्रेप्सोर्यजमानमहाजनात् ।
एनांस्यौषधतो ऽग्ने ऽतः संवृत्तः पुरुषाभिधः ॥४८॥

Since he formerly burnt (all) sins of (lit. amongst) a multitude of sacrificers that was wishing to secure (*prepsu*) the status of Virāj, therefore, later he became known by the name Puruṣa.

[48]

The meaning of *tasmāt puruṣaḥ* is stated; this supports the etymology given in the preceding verse.

औषत्स्वान्पाप्मनः पर्वं ज्ञानाद्यतिशयाग्निना ।
वैराजपदलिप्सुभ्यस्तेनासौ पुरुषाभिधः ॥४९॥

(Since) having first burnt his own sins by the fire of the excellence of knowledge etc. (he did so afterwards) for the sake of those who wanted to get the status of Virāj, he became known by the name of Puruṣa.

[49]

Now this verse also goes to support it on the basis of the Śruti. It takes into account the Śruti *sarvān pāpmana auṣat* (BU 1.4.1) and seeks to affirm that the name *puruṣa* for Prajāpati was not merely a fancy or metaphor.

यथोक्तोपासनफलं वक्ष्यामीत्युत्तरं वचः ।
ओषतीत्यादिकं ज्ञेयं वेदोपासीत यः सदा ॥५०॥

[Verses 50-52 are the explanation of *oṣati ha vai sa tam yo 'smāt pūrvo bubhūṣati ya evaṃ veda.*]

With the intention, 'Let me declare the result of the worship already stated.', there follows the later statement *oṣati ...* (In this) it is to be understood that one who knows the object of knowing is one who ever worships it. [50]

This verse states the purpose of the Śruti, *oṣati ... ya evaṃ veda.*

यो ऽसावतीन्द्रियो ऽग्राह्यः सूक्ष्मो ऽव्यक्तः सनातनः ।
सर्वभूतमयो ऽचिन्त्यः स एव स्वयमुद्भवः ॥५१॥

He himself¹ appeared (in a human form) by his own wish (*svayam*), who is beyond the sense-organs, imperceptible, subtle, unmanifest, eternal,² comprising all beings and incomprehensible. [51]

¹This is following the reading *eva*; also one in the *Manusmṛti*. The variant reading *eṣa*, followed by NKL, would entail the translation: This, thus known, (Virāj) appeared ... The nature of Virāj is thus clarified by a citation from *Manusmṛti* 1.7. This one is so subtle that he is beyond the sense-organs ...

²Alternatively, existing from the days of yore.

पुरुषो ऽस्मीत्युपास्त्यर्थं पुरुषार्थो ऽयमुच्यते ।
ओषतीत्युक्तिः साक्षाद्गुणोपास्तिफलश्रवात् ॥५२॥

[This is the concluding Vārtika on BU 1.4.1.]

This end of human endeavour is stated for the sake of worship, in 'I am Puruṣa.'. (This is so,) on account of the statement '(He) burns.' which is the direct statement (lit. hearing) of the result of the worship of some qualities etc. [52]

The purpose of this verse is to point out that the worship of Virāj, that possesses the qualities of Puruṣa, leads one to become

one with the Sūtra (i.e. Virāj) itself.

Verses 53-104 are regarding BU 1.4.2 and verses 53-70 in particular are the explanation of that the fruit (i.e. result) of knowledge and action is transmigratory.

अभिष्टुतं प्रयत्नेन फलं यज्ज्ञानकर्मणोः ।
एवमहिममप्येतत्संसारं नात्यवर्तत ॥५३॥

Whatever fruit of knowledge and action has been praised with effort/care as having this potentiality¹ has not transgressed/overcome the transmigratory existence. [53]

The purpose of BU 1.4.2: so 'bibhet is stated. The fruit of knowledge and action may be anysoever great; it is related to transmigratory existence! Not to liberation.

¹The word *evammahima* is, like *yathoktamahima* in verse 46 above, ending in a vowel.

प्रत्यग्याथात्म्यविज्ञानविरहादन्यसाधनः ।
यावत्किञ्चित्फलं नादः सर्वानर्थनिवृत्तये ॥५४॥

On account of the absence of accurate knowledge of the real nature of the inner self, Prajāpati has taken to other means of knowing; whatever be its fruit, (viz. transmigratory existence), that is (indeed) not for warding away all evils/disasters.¹ [54]

¹There ever remains the fear/sorrow of transmigration, even if a person has become the Sūtra or Virāj.

निरस्तातिशयं कर्म ज्ञानं चाप्यापि बालवत् ।
यतो ऽबिभेदविद्यावानतो ऽसावस्मदादिवत् ॥५५॥

Since, even after accomplishing action and acquiring knowledge, (both of) which surpassed excellence, he became afraid like a child; therefore, he was possessed of ignorance like (all of) us. [55]

A view like the following could be held: The status of Prajāpati which is of the nature of the fruit of knowledge and action is characterized by pure knowledge and, therefore, there cannot be transmigration. To this, there is an answer in this verse.

न ह्यविद्यामनादाय वस्तुयाथात्म्यसंश्रयात् ।
कश्चिद्विभेत्यविभेच्च तैनाविद्वान्प्रजापतिः ॥५६॥

No person would be afraid, since he has taken resort to the (knowledge) of the true nature of the thing (viz. Ātman), unless he had taken to ignorance; and (it is said) 'He was afraid.', therefore Prajāpati must be (taken as) an ignorant being.¹

[56]

¹SP comments: That Virāj was afraid was stated, in pursuance of the method of Anvaya. The present verse states the same thing, following the method of Anvaya.

प्रत्यग्याथात्म्यविद्यैव निःशेषपुरुषार्थकृत् ।
इत्येतत्प्रतिपत्त्यर्थं विराट्स्थानस्य कुत्सनम् ॥५७॥

In order to understand that only the knowledge of the true nature of the inner self brings about the fulfilment of all human aims, there is blame given to the state of Virāj .

[57]

This verse answers one's fear that the preceding verse might appear contrary to the statement (which was made before) about the excellence of Virāj and what gives blame to the same Virāj.

यतो ऽविभेद्विराट्पूर्वमेकाक्यस्मीति मृदवत् ।
तस्मात्तत्कार्यभूतो ऽज्ञ एकाक्यश्च विभेति ना ॥५८॥

Since, like an ignorant person, Virāj became afraid, feeling thus 'I am alone.', therefore, a person, who is only a product of him and ignorant, becomes afraid (when) alone (even) today.

[58]

The meaning of *tasmād ekākī bibhēti* is stated. This leads one to infer that the fear in the effect (i.e. a human being) leads

to the conclusion that fear is found in the cause, viz. Prajāpati.

एवं भयाभिभूतः स ईक्षाचक्रे ऽथ लोकवत् ।
भयाहेतु यथातत्त्वदर्शनं कृतवान्विभुः ॥५९॥

Thus, overpowered by fear, he then thought in the manner of a person in the world. (And) then the pervading Ātman acquired¹ that knowledge (i.e. sight) of the truth as what is not the cause of fear. [59]

This is the meaning of *sa hāyam īkṣāmcakre*. The second line conveys that Prajāpati becomes possessed of the knowledge of the truth, that which cannot be the cause of fear.

¹That is, understood.

स्रजीव कल्पिताहिर्ना तत्त्रासादाकुलेन्द्रियः ।
आलोचयेद्यथातत्त्वं भीष्टवस्तौ तद्वदीश्वरः ॥६०॥

As a man, who has first taken (or seen) a serpent in the place of a garland, is, owing to fear, disturbed in (all) his sense-organs and would later find out the true nature of the thing (which he really saw) when there is removal (lit. destruction) of (his) fear; so also did the Lord (Virāj, Prajāpati).

[60]

The simile *lokavat* (of the preceding verse) is explained here with an illustration.

आलोचयन्यथातत्त्वमपास्तध्वान्ततद्ववम् ।
अनन्यानुभवं साक्षाद्दर्शैकात्म्यमात्मनि ॥६१॥

Thinking well about (or finding) the truth as it is and having (thereby) removed the ignorance (lit. darkness) and its effect, (he) directly perceived the uniqueness in respect of (himself or) the Ātman, the experience of which was unique. [61]

The result of *ālocana* stated in the preceding verse is explained.

प्रत्यग्याथात्म्यविज्ञानशिखिप्लुष्टमहत्तमाः ।
आप्ताशेषपुमर्थो ऽथ सो ऽमन्यत ततो विराट् ॥६२॥

When¹ that Virāj, who had consumed (i.e. burnt) the great darkness (of ignorance) by the fire of the knowledge of the truth about the inner self and who had thus acquired all the ends of human endeavour, (then) thought (of having achieved the end of human endeavour)². [62]

The result of *aikyasākṣātkāra* above is stated.

¹The words *atha*, *tataḥ* can be replaced by *yat*, *tat* respectively.

²Read SP: (*amanyata*) *ātmānaṁ kṛtārtham*.

देहेन्द्रियमनोबुद्धिभावाभावादिसाक्षिणम् ।
प्रत्यञ्चं मदिति प्राह तदृष्ट्या नेक्षते द्वयम् ॥६३॥

Virāj declared in the sentence *mad* ... that the inner self, who is the witness of the origin and the loss of the body, sense-organs, *manas* and the intellect, is (not different) from himself. (And) on account of that sight (i.e. knowledge), he does not see duality (*dvaya*)¹. [63]

The meaning of *yat mad anyan nāsti* 'since there is nothing else than myself,' is stated in the first three *pādās*. The last *pāda* conveys the fruit of the knowledge of the meaning of the word *mat*.

¹It literally means: pair, i.e. himself as the seer and another thing as the object of seeing.

प्रतीच्येव यदेहात्मा प्रत्यगात्मानमीक्षते ।
अन्वयव्यतिरेकाभ्यां ब्रह्मास्मीति तदेक्षते ॥६४॥

When a person¹ here² sees himself (i.e. the individual self) in his inner self by the method of Anvaya and Vyatireka, he comes to think 'I am Brahman.' [64]

¹The word *ātman* refers to one who is eligible for the knowledge of Truth.

²That is, in his pursuit of the knowledge of the truth.

प्रत्यग्दृष्ट्या तदज्ञानतज्जं नैवेक्षते स्वतः ।
ब्रह्मप्रतीचोरैकात्म्यात्तद्वरीकृत्य गर्जति ॥६५॥

By the sight of the inner self¹ he does not at all see in himself any ignorance about that and the result thereof; on account of the oneness of the Brahman and the inner self, he drives it (ignorance) away and speaks aloud ('I am Brahman.'). [65]

The purport of *kasmān nu bibhemi* 'what am I afraid of?' is thus stated.

¹That is, on acquiring the knowledge of the true nature of it.

प्रत्यक्तां मदिति प्राह त्वन्यन्नास्तीति चैकताम् ।
कस्मादिति च हेतूक्तिर्भीत्याचिक्षिप्यसया परम् ॥६६॥

(Prajāpati declared in the words) 'from me' (originates) 'characteristic as the inner self' and¹ (in the words) 'there is nothing else', the uniqueness (of himself). Further, in the word 'on what account', (he made) a statement of reason — with a wish to avert any fear. [66]

This explains the sentence *mad anyan nāsti*.

¹*tu = ca*.

प्रत्यक्ता ब्रह्मणो यस्माद्ब्रह्मता चात्मनः स्वतः ।
एवं सति कुतो मे भीरिति विद्वांस्त्रपायते ॥६७॥

Since the characteristic of the inner self (originates) from the Brahman and the characteristic of the Brahman (only) from itself, therefore, i.e. such being the case, the knower (Prajāpati himself) feels ashamed at the thought, 'whence can there be my fear?'. [67]

ब्रह्मविद्यामृते नान्यद्व्यहेतुविनाशकृत् ।
संभाव्यमिति नः प्राह तत एवेति च श्रुतिः ॥६८॥

And¹ the Śruti has thus declared to us in the words, *tata eva* ... that anything else than the knowledge of the Brahman could not be considered as a (possible) destroyer of the cause of fear. [68]

Here is clarified *tata evāśya bhayaṃ vīyāya*.

¹SP understands *ca* as implying the *anubhava* of the learned but NKL adds the Smṛti (*Gītā* 18.12) to this effect: *aniṣṭam iṣṭam miśraṇ ca trividhaṃ karmaṇaḥ phalam*— this latter is somewhat difficult to explain.

प्रत्यगज्ञानमेवैकं भीतिहेतुर्भवेद्यदि ।
तत एवेति वचनं तदेवं स्यात्समञ्जसम् ॥६९॥

The statement *tata eva* ... would thus be reasonable, if only ignorance (about the true nature) of the inner self is the sole cause of fear. [69]

कस्माद्ध्यभेष्ट्यदिति च पूर्वोक्तार्थसमर्थनम् ।
श्रुत्याकारि कुतो भीतिर्ध्वस्ताज्ञानतदुद्धवे ॥७०॥

The Śruti has justified the earlier stated purport in the words 'Of what indeed was he afraid?',¹ (since there would have been a doubt:) whence could there be fear,² when ignorance and its effect were destroyed?'. [70]

¹*kasmād dhy abheṣyat* is justified by *tata eva*; thus there is no repetition — it is merely a reaffirmation.

²SP adds 'in the case of a knower of the Brahman (or, of the true nature of the inner self)'.

प्रजापतेराविरभूत्कृत एकत्वदर्शनम् ।
शास्त्राचार्यादितद्धेतोरसत्त्वात्तदसंभवः ॥७१॥

[Verses 71-76 put a possible objection with various reasons that the knowledge of the truth cannot dawn on Prajāpati.]

How could (there come to Prajāpati) the awareness of the uniqueness, for it would be impossible in the absence of the cause of it (viz. that awareness) such as scriptures, teacher etc.¹ [71]

It has been so far stated that the fear is destroyed by the knowledge of the oneness of Prajāpati and the Brahman. Yet, the objector says that the knowledge does not dawn on Prajāpati, for there is no cause of it.

¹The word etc. refers to renunciation, *śamadamādi*.

अन्यानपेक्षं तदभूदिति चेन्नैवमिष्यते ।
अस्मदादेरपि तथा प्रसङ्गः स्यान्न चेक्ष्यते ॥७२॥

If it be held that (the awareness) resulted without an expectation of any other (factor), this is not acceptable, for such an awareness would then result in the case of us all; and it is not so held (by anyone). [72]

A possible view could be thus: The knowledge of Prajāpati does not depend on any other factor, viz. Śruti, teacher etc. But it does not sustain, since the knowledge of the truth is held as arising from hearing the Śruti; only for this reason, it is differentiated from our ordinary knowledge.

मतं जन्मान्तराभ्याससंस्कारोत्थमिदं यदि ।
नैरर्थक्यप्रसक्तिः स्यात्सम्यग्ज्ञानस्य सर्वतः ॥७३॥

And if it be accepted that this awareness has arisen from the impression of repeated thought about it in the previous life¹, there would result total uselessness of the proper knowledge². [73]

¹The opponent's argument could be: A sacrificer rises to the state of Prajāpati and becomes aware of the uniqueness of his own. This is the effect of the impression of hearing the Śruti etc. in his previous life while he was a sacrificer.

²Namely, knowledge arising from hearing the Śruti sentence etc.

in the case of all, for that would mean this knowledge does not produce its immediate effect, viz. removal of ignorance and consequent liberation.

दग्धाशेषान्तरायस्य विराजो ऽपि महत्तमः ।
नाधाक्षीदात्मविद्या नः काशाविद्यापनुत्तये ॥७४॥

If even in the case of Virāj who had consumed all the obstructions (to the knowledge of the true nature of the Ātman), the lore of Ātman did not burn away the great darkness, what hope¹ (could we entertain) for the removal of ignorance? [74]

This entails the uselessness of *vākyārthajñāna*.

¹That is, certainty.

अन्त्य एव तमोघाती प्रत्ययश्चेन्मतं यदि ।
स्यादनैकान्तिको हेतुरन्यान्त्येष्वसमीक्षणात् ॥७५॥

If only the final knowledge (or experience) is held to be the destroyer of darkness, this cause would lead to diverse conclusions since it is not noticed in other final (experiences). [75]

If what occurs to one as the final knowledge is alone held responsible for liberation, then any knowledge which occurs to one finally would be *mokṣaphalada* (that which brings about the fruit of liberation); but this is not so. Liberation has not resulted in the case of the sacrificer from the final experience of his previous life. Thus *antyatva* in *antyajñāna* is *anaikāntikahetu*, i.e. it would lead to diverse effects, not to some one definite effect.

नान्त्यो ऽविद्यापनुद्धोध इति सर्वत्र गम्यताम् ।
ऐकात्म्यवस्तुबोधित्वाद्दुपान्त्यप्रत्ययो यथा ॥७६॥

Let it be noted everywhere that the final knowledge (at the end of one's endeavour) is not the remover of ignorance, exactly in the same way as its previous knowledge; also the final

knowledge, being informative of the uniqueness of the thing (viz. Ātman), (cannot be the remover of ignorance in the same way as its previous knowledge). [76]

While verse 75 has refuted *antyapratyaya* as the remover of ignorance, thanks to its finality, this verse refutes its *jñānatva* to be the remover of ignorance, that knowledge (*jñāna*) of the last moment cannot be the cause of liberation, for it is similar to its other previous knowledges which, as knowledge, have not resulted into liberation.

Verses 77-90 are *Sureśvara's* answer to the objection.

स्याद्वा सत्साधनोत्पत्तेर्लोकवज्ज्ञानमात्मनः ।
यथेह कार्यकरणैः पुण्यकर्मोद्भवैर्नृणाम् ॥७७॥
प्रज्ञा मेधा स्मृतिः स्थैर्यं ज्ञानादाववसीयते ।
वैशारद्यं तथैव स्याद्विराजो ऽपि महाधियः ॥७८॥

(This is to the contrary:)¹ There might be the knowledge of the Ātman due to the rise of good means, as (is noticed) in the world; as in the case of men, intelligence, power of grasping, memory, firmness and clarity culminate into knowledge etc. through the instruments of action which have originated from (earlier) holy acts, so also (would they be) in the case of the highly intelligent Virāj. [77-78]

The first line of verse 77 is explained in the following three lines (viz. the second line of verse 77 and verse 78). The first line of verse 77 refutes the objector's view that there does not arise any knowledge on the part of Prajāpati.

¹ *vā* is *pakṣavyāvṛttyartha* (cf. SP).

ज्ञानमप्रतिघं यस्य वैराग्यं च जगत्पतेः ।
ऐश्वर्यं चैव धर्मश्च सहसिद्धमिति स्मृतिः ॥७९॥

Thus it is stated in a Smṛti¹ 'In the case of the Lord of the world, (the four, viz.) *vairāgya*, *aiśvarya*, *dharma* and unbounded (or, unobstructed) knowledge are born together

with him.'

[79]

Here is a citation to prove the clarity of Prajāpati's knowledge. Prajāpati and his knowledge etc. co-exist.

¹Though Sureśvara calls it, it is *Vāyuprāṇa* 1.1.3: *jñānam ... dharmaśca siddhicatṣṭayam* (cp. also the same text 1.5.23-24).

सहैव सिद्धं चेज्ज्ञानं भीतिहेतोरसंभवः ।

ध्वान्तापध्वंसिरविणा न तमः सह जायते ॥८०॥

If (one said that) knowledge is natural to (or inborn for) Prajāpati, (the situation would be:) There is no possibility of the rise of (any) fear, for darkness never comes into existence together with the sun that destroys darkness. [80]

If knowledge is already existing together with Prajāpati there cannot be any room for fear. The objection is based on the Smṛti (viz. Purāṇa) which declares the *sahasiddhatva* of ignorance, viz. there would be the contradiction of the Śruti so 'bibhed ... Cf. *Raghuvamśa* 5.13: *sūrye tapaty āvaraṇāya dṛṣṭeḥ kalpeta lokasya katham tamisrā*.

नैवमन्योपदेशार्थप्रतिषेधपरत्वतः ।

सहसिद्धगिरस्तस्मान्नैष दोषः प्रसज्यते ॥८१॥

This is not so since the statement about the natural origination of Prajāpati's knowledge is intent (only) on denying the (possibility of) instruction by any other person (to him); therefore, this fault¹ does not become contingent. [81]

The intention of the description in the Smṛti about the *sahasiddhatva* of Prajāpati's knowledge is properly explained (by the Siddhāntin); he holds that the Smṛti also is as much authoritative and purposeful as the Śruti. Thus, he nullifies the supposed contradiction of the Śruti and the Smṛti.

श्रद्धातात्पर्यशुश्रूषाप्रणिपातादि साधनम् ।

विद्याजन्मैकहेतूनां वैफल्यं चेन्न तद्यतः ॥८२॥

गुणवद्दोषवद्रूपविकल्पितसमुच्चितम् ।

विद्याजन्मैकहेतुत्वाल्लोकवत्स्यात्समञ्जसम् ॥८३॥

If (one said:) Faith being devoted (to the teacher), desire to hear (from the teacher), salutation (to him) etc.¹ are the means (and therefore) there is uselessness of various (productive) causes (that are adduced as) giving rise to knowledge; (we say:) That is not so, because — [82]
the entire combination (of the means) made up of what has merit, what has demerit and what is understood (lit. imagined) by its form is reasonable, as in the common world, for it gives rise only to knowledge.² [83]

Verse 82 implies opposition to Śāstras, e.g. *gurum evābhigacchet, tad viddhi pranipātena* ... as the basis of the objection to be discussed.

¹The word etc. refers to *śama* and others, viz. *śamadamādi-sādhanaśampat*.

²*vidyā* = *vijñāna* 'common knowledge'. This conveys the usefulness of instruction in the practical life; that is the purpose of *gurūpadeśa*.

रूपादिज्ञानसंभूतौ तद्वेतुनामनेकधा ।
विकल्पो दृश्यते लोके तथेहापीति निश्चितिः ॥८४॥

For the rise of the knowledge of form etc. there is noticed in the world variety (lit. numerous divisions) of causes of it (viz. knowledge of form etc.) So also (it is noticed) here (in the case of the knowledge of the uniqueness); this is the decision. [84]

The word *lokavat* in the previous verse is clarified here.

गुणवद्दोषवत्त्वं च तथैव च समुच्चयः ।
प्रबोधोत्पत्तिहेतूनां दृष्टो बोधादिकार्यकृत् ॥८५॥

It is noticed that in the case of the causes for the rise of the knowledge (of the uniqueness of the Ātman) there is merit, fault and (also) combination of them¹ which are the causes of the rise of the knowledge² etc. [85]

Not only *vikalpa* (stated in the preceding verse) but *guṇavat-tvādika* are seen (NKL).

¹This refers to *śraddhā*, *tātparya* etc. mentioned in verse 82 above.

²*rūpādidhikāryānurodhī ca samuccayādiḥ* (SP); i.e. the word *ādi* means: behaviour (*vyavahāra*).

वृषदंशादयो रात्रौ नेत्रगोचरसंगति-
मात्रेण रूपं वीक्षन्ते नापेक्षन्ते ततो ऽपरम् ॥८६॥

A cat etc. do see the form (of an object) during night by mere contact of that which falls in sight.¹ They do not expect any (means) other than that. [86]

This has a reference to *vikalpa* mentioned in verse 84. SP refers it to the option regarding the performance of a *homa* before or after sunrise.

¹This is based on the experience of the cats' catching mice etc. even in the dark of the night. The cat stands for other beings who are active in the night. Not a properly scientific reason!

अतीतानागताद्यर्थज्ञानोत्पत्तौ च हेतुताम् ।
योगिनां मन एव स्यादस्माकं सर्व एव तु ॥८७॥

In the case of the Yogins it is *manas* that becomes the cause for the rise of the knowledge of the objects of the past, the future etc.; but in our case, all (viz. the combination of all the means of knowing is the cause). [87]

vikalpa 'variety (or, numerous divisions)' in the above discussion is clarified by reference to the Yogins as against common men.

दोषवद्गुणवत्त्वेन विकल्पो ऽनेकधा पुनः ।
मातृमानप्रमेयाणां गुणवद्दोषवत्त्वतः ॥८८॥

Variety is multifold on account of (the common knowers) being possessed of merit, demerit etc. and also on account of the knower, the means of knowing, the object of knowing being

possessed of excellence and fault.

[88]

Yet further explanation is offered of *vikalpa*. NKL explains merit etc. of *mātr*, *māna* and *meya*.

नातिक्रान्तभवे त्वासीद्ब्रह्मविद्या प्रजापतेः ।
इत्येतद्गम्यते ऽविद्याभयारत्यादिमत्त्वतः ॥८९॥

Indeed, Prajāpati did not have the knowledge of the Brahman in his past life — this is inferred from his being possessed of ignorance, fear, want of delight etc.¹ [89]

When Prajāpati was a sacrificer (*yajamāna*), there was not on his part the knowledge of the true nature of the inner self (or the Brahman). This is clarified by citing the reason for it in the second line.

¹The word etc. stands for hunger and the like.

विद्यायां चेन्न मोक्षो ऽभूत्कस्याशा नो वृथा भवेत् ।
मोक्षे भयश्रुतेर्नार्थस्तत्र को मोह इत्यतः ॥९०॥

If there did not result liberation (for one), after one acquired the knowledge of the true nature of the Brahman, whose hope (for it) would not be in vain? If there was heard (the existence of) fear¹ in (the state of) liberation, what would be the purpose (served by the Śruti) 'What ignorance (would) there (be) ...?'²?

[90]

¹NKL reads *mokṣe 'bhayaśruteḥ* ! Also, NKL's construe of the verse is difficult to follow.

²*Īsopaniṣad* 7.

The destruction of fear on the part of Virāj has resulted from the knowledge of its oneness with the Ātman. On the contrary, the objector holds that the destruction of fear in Virāj is caused by the knowledge of the uniqueness of itself. Now will follow the objection in verses 91 to 102 and the answer to it in verses 103

and 104.

एकाकिनो विराजो वाविद्यासंवीतचेतसः ।
पूर्वजन्मोत्थसंस्काराद्भयमाविरभूदिह ॥९१॥

(Or perhaps such is not the case:¹ Here) in the case of the lonely Virāj,² whose mind was wrapped (lit. woven) with ignorance, there arose fear on account of the impression arising (i.e. continuing) from (its) previous life. [91]

Firstly, the objector states the purpose of *so 'bibhet*.

¹The word *vā* is there to object to Sureśvara's view and to declare the beginning of an objection.

²That is, which existed without the manifestation (of any second object).

भयप्रद्वंसिनं हेतुमीक्षाचक्रे ऽथ जातभीः ।
मत्तो यन्नान्यदस्तीति ह्यथ कस्माद्विभेम्यहम् ॥९२॥

He, who was overcome with fear, thought over the cause which would destroy (his) fear, (viz. thus expressed in the sentence:) 'Since there is nothing else than myself, what then I am afraid of?' [92]

The first line states the meaning of *sa hāyam* etc. and the second line states that of *yan mad anyan nāsti*.

एक एवाहमस्मीह द्वितीयाद्वि भयोत्थितिः ।
द्वितीयो न मदन्यो ऽस्ति कस्माद्वेतोर्भयं मम ॥९३॥

Here (i.e. in this world) I am the only one. (And) there (can be) the rise of fear (only) due to the existence of some second (person). A second person other than myself does not exist. Therefore,¹ what should I be afraid of? [93]

This is the paraphrase of the thought in the second line of verse 92 above.

¹This is for *iti* which is explained by SP as *īkṣāsamāptiyartha*.

तत एव विराडैक्यविज्ञानादेव तद्वयम् ।
वीयाय न परज्ञानादतो ऽरतिरपीष्यते ॥९४॥

Only from that, i.e. by means of the knowledge of (his own) uniqueness, Virāj overcame that fear, not by means of the knowledge (the non-existence)¹ of another apart (from himself). Therefore, (his) want of delight is also understood (i.e. expressed). [94]

The meaning of *tata evāśya* ... is stated.

¹This can also mean the highest, i.e. Ātman = Paramātmān.

एकाक्यस्मीतिविज्ञानात्त्रैलोक्यात्मैकगोचरात् ।
अगाद्धयं यतो ऽतो ऽभूदरतिस्तस्य कामिनः ॥९५॥

Since he was afraid on account of that knowledge 'I am all alone.' which has within purview himself as the only object, in the three worlds; therefore, there was want of delight on the part of him, who had desire, [95]

The fear-removing knowledge of the oneness of Virāj with the Ātman might also remove his want of delight; yet it was not there! Only the feeling of loneliness caused the want of delight.

सम्यग्विज्ञानविध्वस्तावविद्यायाः कतो ऽरतिः ।
ध्वस्तान्धयस्यापि सा चेत्स्यादनिर्मोक्षः प्रसज्यते ॥९६॥

(This was so because,) where could (at that time) be there the want of delight which would result from the destruction of (ignorance) by the right knowledge (viz. knowledge of the true nature of the Ātman)? And if it be said that (want of knowledge) was there even in the case of the one, whose darkness was destroyed, then it would be contingent that there is no liberation ! [96]

This verse answers a possible doubt that there can be want of delight on the part of Prajāpati owing to his not keeping from

sacrificial activity. That is to say, the knowledge of the oneness (cf. verse 94 above) does not remove Prajāpati's fear.

नाविद्याघातिविज्ञानाद्व्यध्वस्तिरभद्विभोः ।
अरत्युद्धूतिलिङ्गेन ह्ययमर्थो ऽवसौयते ॥९७॥

In the case of the all-pervading (Virāj), the removal of fear did not follow from the knowledge which destroyed (his) ignorance; indeed, this thought can be gathered from the characteristic, viz. the rise of the want of delight. [97]

It is concluded that the removal of the fear of Prajāpati does not result from *parajñāna*.

न चेहावसरो ऽस्त्यस्य सम्यग्ज्ञानस्य कश्चन ।
पिण्डसृष्टौ प्रवृत्तायां नाकस्माज्ज्ञानगीः शुभा ॥९८॥

Also, there is not any chance for (the rise of) of the right knowledge (of the true nature of the Ātman) whatsoever. When there has begun (the statement about) the creation of beings,¹ a sudden statement about the rise of knowledge is not welcome. [98]

The first line says that it is not the case that the removal of fear on the part of the Virāj has resulted from *parajñāna*. Then, the second line says that there is no scope for the statement of *parajñāna* when the matter of creation of Manu etc. is on hand.

¹The argument pertains to avoidance of discontinuity of the topic (*prakaraṇaviccheda*)— this is thus clarified: *piṇḍaśabdena manvādideho grhyate; akasmāt prakaraṇavicchedam vinety arthah* (SP).

प्रक्रियानुचितं वस्तु सुसाध्वपि समीरितम् ।
अकालकुसुमानीव नैव प्रीतिकरं सताम् ॥९९॥

Indeed, even an extremely well-expressed (idea) which is unsuitable in some (particular) process of thought¹ does not

bring delight to the good, (even) as untimely blossoming flowers
(do not bring delight.) [99]

¹That is, context.

²Sureśvara thus illustrates the thought of BUB: *viśiṣṭaphalam
api paraikyajñānam avasaradustham viduṣām na hṛdayaṃgamam.*

मिथुनारतिमोहादेः प्रत्यग्याथात्म्यवेदिनः ।
आगमैस्तु निषिद्धत्वात्कुतस्तस्येह संभवः ॥१००॥

Since it has been denied by the Śrutis that, in the case of the knower of the true nature of the Ātman, there exists a couple (pair/duality), viz. want of delight and ignorance etc.¹, how can there be then the existence of that (i.e. of one who has desires etc.) here (in the state of Prajāpati/Virāj)?² [100]

¹The word etc. stands for a second object, its characteristics and so on.

²That is, when there is the context of the origin of Prajāpati.

आत्मक्रीड आत्मरतिः क्रियावानिति चागमः ।
तथात्ममिथुन इति यस्त्वात्मरतिरित्यपि ॥१०१॥

And there is the Śruti statement 'He (viz. the knower of the real nature of the Ātman) plays with himself, takes delight in himself, and thus acts (alone); and also he is paired only with himself.'; so also there (the Śruti statement) *yas tv ātma-ratiḥ* ... [101]

कार्यकारणसंबन्धः साविद्यस्यैव युक्तिमान् ।
अपूर्वानपराद्युक्तेर्न ध्वस्तान्ध्यस्य युज्यते ॥१०२॥

The cause and effect relation can reasonably be spoken of in the case of only the one who is overpowered by ignorance. It is not mentioned (lit. employed) in the case of one whose darkness (viz. ignorance) is destroyed; (this is so,) on the basis of the statements (in the Śruti) about *apūrva*, *anapara* etc.

There is another reason why it is said that the knowledge of Virāj is the destroyer of fear; but not *parajñāna* (is the destroyer of it).

अप्युत्पन्नात्मबोधानामधिकारासमाप्तिः ।
 अरत्यादि यथा दृष्टं तथैव स्यात्प्रजापतेः ॥१०३॥
 अप्रविष्टस्वभावस्य सशब्देन परिग्रहात् ।
 स एष इत्यत्र वाक्ये नैवाकस्मिकशब्दनम् ॥१०४॥

[To the elaborately stated view of the objector, Sureśvara makes an answer in the following two verses.]

(The answer to this is:) The fact is that, as we see want of delight etc. in the case of those who have not acquired the knowledge of the Ātman up to the end of the period of their performing duties which are enjoined (on them), so also it is that it could be in the case of Prajāpati as well.

[103]

Since in the sentence, *sa eṣa* ..., the word brings in (the idea of the Brahman) which has not entered into (i.e. undergone a change into) its own modification, there is thus not a sudden¹ mention (of the Brahman).

[104]

SP points to Vaśiṣṭha and Vāmadeva and others who continued to perform their duties, even after attaining the knowledge of the Ātman.

There was a reference to 'untimely blossoming flowers' (verse 99); that meant untimely or uncalled-for discussion. This verse answers away that point. The Brahman, stated in *yan mad anyan nāsti*, intends to praise the Brahman. By the word *sa* of *sa eṣa iha praviṣṭaḥ* (1.4.7) there is praise of the Brahman. So also in *tad dheham* (1.4.7) — this is *prastutaparāmarśa* (eva) (NKL).

¹It means: unreasonable.

असंतोषाक्षमाहेतोश्चेतसो या ऽनवस्थितिः ।
 सा विध्वस्तात्ममोहस्याप्यरतिः संबभूव ह ॥१०५॥

[Verses 105-118 are Sureśvara's Vārtika on BU 1.4.3. The creation of Manu and human beings is explained.]

That unsteadiness of mind (of Virāj) which had its cause in the absence of satisfaction, the absence of forbearance, (in other words), the want of delight did¹ result in the case of him (Prajāpati) whose ignorance of the inner self was destroyed.

[105]

The meaning of the word *arati* in the beginning of BU 1.4.3: *sa vai naiva reme* 'he did not feel pleasure at all' is explained.

¹This is the force of *ha* which is *avadhāraṇārtha* (SP).

यतो ऽरतिग्रहस्तधिषणो ऽभूत्प्रजापतिः ।

एकाकी तेन तत्सृष्टावेको न रमते नरः ॥१०६॥

Since Prajāpati had his intellect overpowered by (the clutches of) the evil being, viz. *arati* 'want of delight', a man¹ in his creation (also) does not feel delight when he is alone. [106]

This explains *tasmād ekākī na ramate*. Note NKL: *kāryagatam aramaṇam kāraṇasthasya gamakam*.

¹*naraśabdenāvidvān manuṣyatvādyabhimānavān ucyate* (SP).

श्रौत्यानया प्रसिद्ध्या तु कार्यलिङ्गैश्च कारणम् ।

सदानुमिन्वते सांख्यास्तथा चान्ये ऽपि वादिनः ॥१०७॥

The Sāṃkhyas (even) infer (the existence of Puruṣa or Prajāpati) the cause from the characteristics of the effect and also from this well known statement of the Śruti. And the propounders of different views also¹ (infer) in the same way.

[107]

In verse 106, it is said that *arati* found in the effect is derived from that which had occurred in the cause. Such a view is held by others (i.e. the Sāṃkhyas and the Naiyāyikas etc.) who hold that the cause is inferred from its characteristics persisting in its

effects.

¹The word 'also' refers to the thinkers who do not hold *svabhāvavāda* in respect of creation (SP). This is, according to the Vedāntin, *bhrānti* 'wrong understanding' (NKL).

अरत्यपनुत्सुः सन्स द्वितीयं यथारुचि ।
विराडैच्छदृते ऽविद्यां नेच्छेशस्योपपद्यते ॥१०८॥

Virāj, who was desirous of driving away the want of delight, wished for (some) second according to his choice; (for) indeed, without ignorance, a desire cannot be (considered as) reasonable on the part of that Lord. [108]

Here is stated the meaning of *sa dvitīyam aicchat*. It is before the rise of the knowledge of the Ātman that the ignorant has any desire.

सो ऽरत्यतिग्रहाविष्टस्तदपध्वस्तये विराट् ।
संसक्तजायापुंमानो यावांस्तावान्बभूव ह ॥१०९॥

That Virāj, who was overpowered by the evil being (in the form) of the want of delight became possessed of that measure which a man and wife together in union (are known to have) in order that the want of delight be destroyed. [109]

This explains *sa haitāvānāsa*.

स्त्रीपुमांसौ परिष्वक्तौ यावन्मानौ बभूवतुः ।
स तावत्परिमाणो ऽभूद्योगेन परमेश्वरः ॥११०॥

By his Yogic power¹ that highest Lord became possessed of that measure which a man and wife have, when engaged in union. [110]

This explains *yathā strīpumamsau sampariṣvaktāu*. The NKL edition reads *strīpumsau sampariṣvaktāu*.

¹The word *yoga* is explained in SP: *dhyānakarmatadvāsanāśahita-saṃkalpasāmarthya*; in NKL: *upāśanakarmasāmarthya*.

इच्छामात्रमरत्युत्थं पुंस्यलब्धस्थिति स्त्रियम् ।
प्रयुङ्क्ते योग्यतस्तस्यास्तदलब्धवारतिः प्रभोः ॥१११॥

Mere desire, which has arisen from the want of delight, does not find (its fulfilment) in a man and, then, employs a woman because of her suitability (for effecting the fulfilment); therefore, there was want of delight on the part of the Lord when (i.e. since) he did not find that (viz. woman). [111]

An answer is given to the possible question: How is it possible to say he wished for a woman on the basis of the Śruti 'He wished to have a second one.'? Also, how is there the example of a woman?

उपस्थिते च मनसि तस्य योषिदभूत्क्रतोः ।
सत्यसंकल्पहेतोः स स्त्रीसक्त इव चाभवत् ॥११२॥

When (such a desire) appeared in his mind, there appeared (i.e. came out) a woman from the very thought of him whose thought (i.e. desire) always proves (i.e. shows to be) true and he became attached to the woman, as it were¹. [112]

An argument can be made thus: There is the removal of the want of delight due to the contact with a woman — then why is not mentioned the birth of a woman? The first line answers it. The second line then states the reason, viz. the ever coming true of Prajāpati's desire. Therefore, after a woman was born from his mind, he has attachment towards her, as seen in the world.

¹The words *strīsakta iva* can be alternatively translated as 'like one attached to a woman'.

मिथुनद्वारिका यास्य सृष्टिः सैवाधुनोच्यते ।
यतो ऽसाविममेवाथ द्विधात्मानमपातयत् ॥११३॥

Now is described that creation of his which came through the creation of a couple, because that one later on made this body¹ itself into two. [113]

This explains *sa imam evātmānam dvedhāpātayat*.

¹ *ātmānam = ātmadeham*.

इममेवेत्यवधृतेर्न विराजो द्विधाभिधा ।

यः स्त्रीपुंस्परिमाणो ऽभूत्स एवातो द्विधाकृतः ॥११४॥

Since there is the assertion *imam eva*, there is no mention of Virāj as divided into two.¹ And what was his modification in the form of woman and man itself became his division into two.

[114]

In the case of the act of parting into two, a single Virāj being the *karṭṛ* 'agent' cannot have the nature of both *karṭṛ* and *karman* 'object'. Hence, in order to answer away that difficulty the first line points to his being the *karṭṛ* and the second line to the *piṇḍa* (viz. body — cf. the preceding verse) as the *karman*; and, therefore, there is no contradiction involved therein. This is the purpose of *sa imam eva dvidhā (ātmānam) apātayat*.

¹That is (i) Virāj as he was born and (ii) Virāj who assumed the form of a couple in union (as referred to above in verse 110).

पातनादेव निर्वृत्तेः पतिपत्न्यौ जगत्यपि ।

योषिद्विदलवद्भाति पुंसः शक्त्यादिभागवत् ॥११५॥

Because there was the creation of man and woman from the division (of Virāj), therefore, in this world a husband and a wife (come into existence as two persons); (and) the woman appears as a part divided from the man like two parts of a shell etc.¹

[115]

This is the meaning of the word *tataḥ* in BU 1.3.4.

¹The word etc. refers to a bamboo and the like.

स्त्र्याकाङ्क्षो हि तु भागो ऽयं पुमाकाशस्ततः स्त्रिया ।

सम्यगापूर्यते व्योम शक्तिसंपुटवद्ध्रुवम् ॥११६॥

This part of (Virāj) is indeed desirous of a woman and therefore it¹ is satisfactorily filled by a woman like the hallow

of a shell.

[116]

This explains *tasmād ayam ākāśaḥ* in BU 1.3.4.

¹The word *vyoman* means *pumākāśa* (NKL).

विराजमसृजद्ब्रह्मा सो ऽसृजत्पुरुषं विराट् ।
पुरुषं तं मनुं विद्धि यस्येयं मानवी प्रजा ॥११७॥

The Brahman created Virāj (and) that Virāj created a man. You should know that man to be Manu from whom¹ has proceeded this creation of human beings. [117]

In *dvedhā 'pātayat* it is intended to say that there was the creation of Manu and Śatarūpa. One should not doubt that the creation of them was not mentioned (*anukta*).

¹Translation follows the reading in the AnSS edition, viz. *yasyeyam*. The NKL edition reads instead: *kasyeyam mānavī prajā* (to be translated as) 'The human race is (thus) the offspring of Prajāpati (= Ka)'.

तां स्त्रियं मैथुनेनाथ मनुः समभवत्तदा ।
स्वकर्मभिर्नियुक्तः संस्तथा चोत्पाद्य कर्मभिः ॥११८॥

Then¹ Manu united with that woman in a sexual intercourse, enjoined as he was in (the performance of) his own duties and also having created (offsprings) as his duties¹. [118]

This explains *tām samabhavat, tato manuṣyā ajāyanta* in BU 1.4.3.

¹The word *atha* means: when Manu was together with Śatarūpa, i.e. after Prajāpati made himself into two: Manu and Śatarūpa.

²To tell the truth, we are not sure of our translation of *tathā cotpādya karmabhiḥ*.

भूरिजात्यभिसंबन्धो जन्यकर्मवशात्स्त्रियाः ।
मनोश्चैवं ससर्जेदमापिपीलिकमात्मनः ॥११९॥

[Verses 119 and 120 briefly state the meaning of BU 1.4.4.]

There is the connection of a woman as also of Manu with various species on account of the action(s) to be produced. Thus he (Virāj) created from himself this (world) up to an ant. [119]

The intention of *sā gauḥ* is thus brought out. And *evam ... ātmanah* states the meaning of *evam eva yad idaṃ kiṃ ca mithunam ā pipīlikābhyah tat sarvam asṛjata*.

द्वंद्वयुक्तं जगत्स्मिन्यावत्किञ्चित्समीक्ष्यते ।
तदस्राक्षीन्मनुः सर्वं स्त्रीपुं द्वंद्वप्रयोगतः ॥१२०॥

Whatever is seen in this world as made up of pairs, all that has Manu created by employing the pair of man and woman. [120]

This explains the contents of the preceding verse. The creation of a cow etc. as said above is alone not meant. The creation of man and woman also is intended.

मनोः सशतरूपस्य पिण्डसृष्टिरिहोदिता ।
सोमाग्नीन्द्रादिका यापि साप्युक्तवदपेक्ष्य सः ॥१२१॥

[Verses 121-124 are the explanation of BU 1.4.5.]

Here is mentioned the creation of all beings (of this world) from (lit. of) Manu, who was united with Śatarūpa, (that creation) beginning with Soma, Agni, Indra etc.; (for) he (created) that also, having thought about it (in the manner) already stated. [121]

जगत्सृष्ट्वात्मनः साक्षाज्ज्ञानकर्मादिसाधनः ।
अवेत्सृष्टं जगत्स्रष्टा ह्यहं वावाखिलं जगत् ॥१२२॥

He (Manu/Virāj), who was possessed of the means (of creation), viz. knowledge and action, created the world from himself. He (fully) knew the world that was created and (thought to himself) I, the creator, am indeed (this) entire world. [122]

This explains *so 'vet ... sarvam asṛkṣīti*.

अहं वाव जगत्सृष्टं यतो ऽसृक्ष्यहमेव तत् ।
सृष्टिनामा मनुर्जात एतस्मादेव कारणात् ॥१२३॥

Indeed I am this world which is created, since I myself have created that. For this very reason, Manu became known by the name *sṛṣṭi*. [123]

This explains *tataḥ sṛṣṭiḥ abhavat*.

यथा मनुरिदं सृष्टमहमस्मीत्यबुध्यत ।
एवमन्यो ऽपि यो वेद सृष्टिकृत्स्यादसावपि ॥१२४॥

As Manu knew 'I am all this creation.', similarly would another person also, who (thus) knew, be the creator of (some) creation. [124]

This explains *sṛṣṭyām ...*, i.e. *phalavacanaśruti*.

BU 1.4.6 is to be explained hereafter. Verses 125-142 are the explanation of the creation of favouring fire etc.

सृष्टानामथ भूतानामग्न्यादिप्रमुखा इमाः ।
अनुग्रहीत्रीर्वक्ष्यामीत्यतः प्रववृते श्रुतिः ॥१२५॥

And then proceeded the Śruti (statement) 'I shall describe these helpful ones, viz. Agni etc. who are the principal (deities and) would be helping (the created beings).' [125]

The first line conveys the meaning of *athety abhyamanthat ... antataḥ*.

भेदादधिकृतेरेषामग्न्यादीनामनेकधा ।
भेदो वर्णेषु सर्वेषु ब्रह्मक्षत्रादिलक्षणः ॥१२६॥

Since in the case of Agni and others there is various distinction in respect of their fields of activity enjoined on them, therefore, in the case of them also, there is differentiation into all castes characterized as Brāhmaṇa, Kṣatriya etc. [126]

We see here the mythological trends: Gods also have among them division as the human beings have among themselves, viz. Brāhmaṇa etc. SP and NKL refer to Śākalya Brāhmaṇa as a pointer to this.

अनुग्राहकदेवानां सर्गो ऽयं प्रस्तुतो महान् ।
तत्राग्नेरुदितोत्पत्तिर्न त्विन्द्रादेरिहोच्यते ॥१२७॥

This extensive creation of the favouring deities is begun (i.e. introduced) here. In that, the origin of Agni is stated, but (that) of Indra etc. is not so expressed. [127]

The creation of Indra etc. is not stated in that Śruti passage. The intention for so doing is stated in the next verse.

अविद्याधिकृतौ तेषां सृष्टिरूध्वं प्रवक्ष्यते ।
कर्माधिकृतिसंबन्धप्रतिपत्त्यर्थमेव तु ॥१२८॥

Creation of them will be stated later at the time of enjoining some ritual activity (influenced by) ignorance (and that will be) in order to convey their relation to the injunction of action. [128]

Gods are subordinate to action which is of the nature of ignorance, therefore, some information about them is necessary for the performance of their action; they are not so related to knowledge.

तं सर्गमुक्तवत्सर्वमपेक्ष्येहोपसंहतिः ।
अविद्वद्देवताभित्तिप्रतिषेधाय सांप्रतम् ॥१२९॥

Having kept in view that creation as the one stated (before)

there is here the conclusion (of the *kaṇḍikā* in the Śruti). It is proper (to have it there) for denying the notions of the not-knowing about the deities. [129]

An objection could be: If it is intended to state the creation of Indra etc., the concluding statement *eṣa u hy eva sarve devāḥ* would not be proper. The first line is an answer, viz. the Śruti statement *tad yad idam āhuḥ ... eṣa u hy eva sarve devāḥ* intends to deny multiplicity of gods — rather, it asserts the existence of only one deity in various forms.

गुणोत्पत्तिक्रियारूपस्तुतिनामाद्यपाधिभिः ।
बिभित्सन्ति स्वतो ऽभिन्नां दैवतां मूढदृष्टयः ॥१३०॥

Those, whose sight is blinded (i.e. who do not see), seek to differentiate (into multiplicity) the god, who is not differentiated (into many deities), by means of (a number of) limiting adjuncts, viz. quality, origin, activity, form, praise, name etc.¹

[130]

There is the differentiation of but one god into many gods due to various factors responsible for distinction such as *guṇabheda* in *agnaye pāvakāya*, *agnaye śucaye* etc.; cf. SP: *karmabhedavat tad-antarbhūtadevatābhedaḥ*.

¹The word etc. refers to some particular attribute, repetition etc.

यदिदं कर्मिणः प्राहुः कर्मभूमावमेधसः ।
अमुमग्निममुं सोमं यजेति यजिसंश्रवात् ॥१३१॥

What the ritualists, the ignorant ones,¹ have said in relation to ritual, viz. 'Offer to this Agni, to this Soma etc.', is on account of their resorting to the action of ritual or to the use of the verb root \sqrt{yaj} . [131]

The words *amum yaja amum yaja* are explained.

¹They are ignorant about the real nature of one god or the highest Ātman.

यजेति लिङ्गान्निन्दैषा कर्मिणामेव गम्यते ।
न तु विध्वस्तमोहानां प्रत्यङ्मात्रैकशायिनाम् ॥१३२॥

It is understood from the characteristic word *yaja*¹ that this is merely a censure of the ritualists,² but not of them who have their ignorance destroyed and thus rest only in the inner self. [132]

¹This stands for *amum agniṃ yaja, amum indraṃ yaja*.

²Because they understand the Ātman as otherwise, viz. differentiated in multiplicity of gods; cf. SP's reference to the Smṛti passage *yo 'nyathā santam ātmānam ...* (*Mahābhārata* 1.68.26).

यस्त्वात्मरतिरेव स्यादात्मतृप्तश्च मानतः ।
आत्मन्येव च संतुष्टस्तस्य कार्यं न विद्यते ॥१३३॥

But there is nothing to be done by that man, who would take delight in himself¹, who would be pleased in himself, and who would be satisfied with himself.² [133]

¹The word 'himself' stands for the inner self which is not different from the Ātman (Supreme Self).

²This is a citation from *Gītā* 3.17. SP points out that this verse follows another, viz. *na hi kaścit kṣaṇam api ...* which could be misunderstood as a censure of those who possess knowledge about the Ātman.

उत्पन्नैकात्म्ययाथात्म्यभास्वद्विज्ञानभास्कर-
संप्लुष्टाविद्याबहुलतमसां कर्मनिहृतिम् ॥१३४॥
सर्वकर्माधिकाराणां निषेधं प्रत्यपीपदत् ।
पुराणः शाश्वतो विष्णुः प्रपन्नाय किरीटिने ॥१३५॥

The Lord, the ancient eternal Viṣṇu, declared to Arjuna the absence of action in the case of them whose thick darkness of ignorance is fully removed (lit. burnt) by the bright sun of knowledge whereby the awareness of the uniqueness, viz. of the true nature, has arisen and the complete denial of

all action and injunctions¹.

[134-135]

One would object: In the *Gītā* passage cited in the previous verse, it is said that there is no action in the case of the liberated, but such is not the case with a knower. To this, these two verses are an answer; they bring out the purport of the *Gītā* passage.

¹This indicates the various qualifications of a sacrificer.

मिथो भिन्नं यदाहुस्त एकैकं देवमध्वरे ।
तदसत्प्रतिपत्तव्यं यतो ऽभिन्नैव देवता ॥१३६॥

It should be taken as untrue (i.e. wrong) that they have described each of the deities of the sacrifices as different from another, since that deity is (in reality) not distinct (from the one divinity).¹

[136]

This explains *tan na* in BUB. This has a reference to *yad idaṃ karmināḥ* ... in verse 131 above.

¹The basis for this argument is: *viśvam bhūtam bhuvanaṃ citraṃ bahudhā jātam jāyamānam ca yat sarvo hyeṣa rudraḥ* (*Taittirīya Āraṇyaka* 10.16.1) and *ātmaiva devatāḥ sarvāḥ* ... (*Manusmṛti* 12.119 (SP)).

भेदग्राहि न नो मानं घटादावपि विद्यते ।
किमु निःशेषभिन्नार्थव्यापिन्यात्मन्यसौ मयि ॥१३७॥

In the case of even a pitcher etc., we do not have such an authoritative means of knowing as grasps its distinction from another. How then can there be that in the case of the Ātman which pervades all the (so-called) different entities? That one (viz. Ātman) exists in me, (thus does one understand). [137]

The question is: There is difference in the individual selves in different bodies, how then could it be said that there is oneness of deities? There is no differentiation in the case of individual selves that could ever be grasped, since there is no authoritative means for grasping it.

नाभावरादिवद्विश्वमध्यात्मादिभागवत् ।
ओतप्रोतात्मना तस्थौ विराट्सूत्रादिवस्तुषु ॥१३८॥

As the spokes (of a wheel) etc. rest in the hub (of it), so also does (this world) which comprises division into bodily forms etc. remain in the things (lit. the existents), viz. Virāj, Sūtra etc., that run through it as woven length-wise and cross-wise. [138]

The Śruti alone can be the authority for accepting the absence of differentiation; here the Śruti intended is: *tad yathā arā nābhau samarpitāḥ* (Cp. BU 2.5.15; CU 7.15.1; *Kauṣītakyupaniṣad* 3.8).

विविधास्यैव सा सृष्टिरिति हेतुसमीरणम् ।
कारणं न विहायेह कार्यमन्यत्र वर्तते ॥१३९॥

There is a statement of a cause, viz. the varied creation is his; for here an effect does not exist apart from (lit. leaving) its cause. [139]

There is the assertion which explains the non-distinction of the deities: *eṣa u hy eva sarve devāḥ*. Here is stated a reason for this.

यत एवमतो देवाः सर्वे ऽपि स्युः प्रजापतिः ।
तस्यां तस्यामधिकृतौ तत्तद्रूपं प्रपद्यते ॥१४०॥

Since this is so, all the gods also are (lit. would be) only Prajāpati¹, (and) in respect of each injunction, (Prajāpati) assumes a different form². [140]

¹This is the sentence of assertion (*pratijñānāvākya*).

²All the world of gods in various forms is the effect of Prajāpati, i.e. not different from him — this clarifies the assertion.

एक एव तु विश्वात्मा मायया मोहयञ्जगत् ।
एकतां बहुतामेति कुम्भवन्मणिसंश्रयात् ॥१४१॥

Indeed one single Ātman (resting) in all, causing by his own power a sense of wonder in the (whole) world (remains) single or becomes many in the same way as a pitcher (appears one or many) by resorting to¹ some jewel. [141]

When Prajāpati is in contact with the effect here and there he takes the forms of this or that, viz. Indra, Varuṇa etc.

¹That is, reflecting itself in its various cuts.

अभिन्न एव भूतात्मा प्रतिभूतसमाप्तिः ।
एकधा बहुधा चैव दृश्यते जलचन्द्रवत् ॥१४२॥

The Ātman (of all beings)¹, not being distinct (from them), is (yet) seen as one or many as it has assumed the form of that (or those) being(s), in the same way as the moon in water (in different places).² [142]

¹This is Virāj.

²NKL cites a similar verse of the *Yogavāsiṣṭha*:

*eka evānubhūtātmā bhūte bhūte vyavasthitah /
ekadhā bahudhā caiva drśyate jalacandravat //*

[variant of first pāda = *eva hi bhūtātmā*] Not traced. But see in *Yaśastilakacampū*, vol.2, p.273, line 9 (by Somadevasūri, <a Jain work of the 10th cent. A.D.> *Kāvya-mālā* 70, 2 vols., Bombay: Nirnayasagar Press, 1903 & 1916)

अत्र विप्रतिपद्यन्ते तदन्यात्मनिषेधिनः ।
हिरण्यगर्भ एवात्मा यः परात्मेति गीयते ॥१४३॥
संसार्येवेह स इति तथान्ये ऽपि प्रचक्षते ।
पक्षयोरनयोः श्रेयान्कः पक्ष इति चिन्त्यते ॥१४४॥

[Verses 143-148 confirm the nature of Prajāpati who is said to be of the nature of all gods. Prajāpati is understood in two alternatives: (i)He is transmigratory *samsārin*), (ii)he is non-transmigratory (*asamsārin*).]

In this regard, (thinkers) who (want to) deny the (existence of any) other Ātman, hold different opinions: Hiranyagarbha

himself is the Ātman who is described (lit. sung) as the highest Ātman; so also others say that he is but a transmigratory (being). (Therefore) it is now considered as to which of these two views is better (i.e. acceptable). [143-144]

The first alternative occurs in second half of the first and the second lines of verse 143, and the second alternative in the first line of verse 144.

विरिञ्च एव तु परो मन्त्रब्राह्मणवाक्यतः ।
इन्द्रमित्यादिमन्त्रोक्तिरेष ब्रह्मेति च श्रुतिः ॥१४५॥

From the sentence in the Mantra Brāhmaṇa (it is indeed¹ known that) Viriñca himself is the highest (Ātman). The statement of the Mantra is *indram* ...and the Śruti *eṣa brahma*.² [145]

¹This is for *tu*.

²These are the basis for the first alternative: Cf. *indram mitram varuṇam agnim āhuḥ* (*Rgveda* 1.164.46) and *eṣa brahmaiṣa indra eṣa prajāpatir ete sarve devāḥ* (*Aitareyopaniṣad* 5.3), cited in BUB.

एतमेके वदन्त्यग्निं यो ऽसावितिस्मृतेरपि ।
संसार्येव स विज्ञेयः श्रुतिमन्त्रस्मृतीरणात् ॥१४६॥

And¹ some state that he is Agni, (this) on the basis of (a verse in) a Smṛti² which begins with the words *yo 'sau* ...³ They state that he has to be known as a transmigratory being, for there is the statement in Śruti, Mantra and Smṛti⁴. [146]

The second line supplies the basis for the second alternative mentioned above.

¹This is the meaning of *api*.

²*Manusmṛti* 12.123ab: *etam eke vadanty agniṃ manum anye prajāpatim*.

³*Manusmṛti* 1.7.

⁴Śruti and Mantra are cited in the previous verse; Smṛti in this.

पाप्मदाहारतिभीतिमर्त्यत्वादिश्रुतेर्मितेः ।

हिरण्यगर्भमिति च स्मार्तान्यपि वचांसि नः ॥१४७॥

(This is to be said) on the basis of inference from the Śruti statement about the evil, burning want of delight, fear, mortality etc.¹; (and also there are known) to us the statements of the Smṛti (such as) *hiranyagarbham* ... [147]

The first line shows the Śruti and the words signify the Śruti, *sa dvitīyam aicchat*. And the second line cites the Mantra, *hiranyagarbham* ...

ब्रह्मा विश्वसृजो धर्म इति कर्मफलात्मता ।

स्मृत्याप्यभाणि बहुशः कस्य संसारिरूपता ॥१४८॥

Also, the Smṛti has declared in many ways¹ the nature of Prajāpati² to be transmigratory existence, the result of (ritual) activiti(es), viz. Brahman, the creator of this world³, and Dharma⁴. [148]

The basis of this verse is *Manusmṛti* 12.50ab: *brahmā viśvasrjo dharmah mahān avyaktam eva ca*. The word *mahān* stands for Prakṛti and *avyakta* for the Sūtrātman; but these last two are not mentioned by Sureśvara (though SP and NKL cite the full line and explain the same).

¹Or alternatively, so many times.

²This is Ka.

³This is Manu and others (SP and NKL).

⁴This is Yama.

मिथोविरुद्धवादित्वाद्द्वयोरगमयोरपि ।

अप्रामाण्यप्रसक्तिश्चेन्न क्लृप्त्यन्तरसंश्रयात् ॥१४९॥

[In verses 149-153, in contradiction to the objector's view: Virāj is transmigratory, the Siddhānta is explained.]

If it is argued that there results in the case of the two sets

of Āgamas unauthoritativeness, on account of their making mutually contradictory statements,¹ (we say) 'no,' by resorting to another² mode of construing them. [149]

¹The mutual contradiction lies in saying that Virāj, though non-transmigratory, undergoes transmigration on his own.

²That is, proper.

प्रत्यगज्ञानजानेकविविधोपाधिसंगतेः ।

विरुद्धार्थत्ववचसां स्यादेकत्रापि संभवः ॥१५०॥

It is possible that statements expressing contradictory senses¹ can occur together (in a smooth construe) on account of the association of numerous and various adjuncts (in them) which have been understood (lit. resulted) from ignorance about the inner self. [150]

This is an explanation of *klptyantarasaṁśraya* in the preceding verse or of *kalpanāntaropapatti* in BUB. Either phrase can be called *saṁgrahavākya* i.e. *siddhāntasya saṁgrahena pratipādakavākya*.

¹That is, they seem to convey contradictory senses.

अपास्ताविद्यातज्जत्वदस्थूलाद्युक्तिगोचरः ।

स्वाभासाविद्योपाधिः सन्साक्ष्यन्तर्यामितां व्रजेत् ॥१५१॥

Being within the purview of the statement 'not gross' etc., on account of having set aside ignorance and its effect and also being possessed of the limiting adjunct, viz. ignorance, which is but his own appearance¹, the seer can become one² within (a body). [151]

¹This refers to Sureśvara's theory of Ābhāsa.

²It can be literally expressed thus, 'can attain the state of the one within'.

तथा हिरण्यगर्भत्वं बुद्ध्युपाधिः स एव तु ।

तमःसत्त्वरजोयोगाद्याति क्षेत्रज्ञतामजः ॥१५२॥

So also is the character of Hiranyagarbha possible, for he is only possessed of the limiting adjunct, viz. intellect and thus on account of his possessing (lit. contact with) *tamas*, *sattva* and *rajas*,¹ the unborn one becomes *kṣetrajña* 'knower of the field (i.e. body)'. [152]

¹Cf. note on verse 148 above where reference is made to *mahat* (*mahān*) or *Prakṛti*.

अभिन्नबुद्ध्याभिन्नत्वं भिन्नधीभिश्च भिन्नताम् ।
एति चित्स्वतमोहेतोर्न किञ्चिदपि दुःस्थितम् ॥१५३॥

Sentience becomes (known as) non-different (from a person's self) and becomes different through knowing that it is not different (from that person's self) — (this happens) on account of the darkness (i.e. ignorance) of its¹ own; (in this) there is nothing like a bad statement (about the Truth). [153]

¹It means: of sentience.

Verses 154-184 explain the Śruti 'atha yat kiñca ...' (BU 1.4.6).

अशनायावदुत्पत्तेरुत्पन्नाः प्राणिनो ऽखिलाः ।
अत्तारो ऽतो ऽन्नविरहान्नालं स्थानाय संहताः ॥१५४॥

Since the (entire) creation has proceeded from the one who had felt hunger, therefore all the beings have become eaters, and, in the absence of food, they are not able to stand intact¹. [154]

¹This is for *saṃhatāḥ*; though it could be alternatively translated as 'together', yet the togetherness of the beings is not intended.

तस्मात्सोमान्नसृष्ट्यर्थं परो ग्रन्थो ऽवतार्यते ।
यत्किञ्चेदं जगत्सिमन्नार्द्रं वस्तुपलक्ष्यते ।
रेतसस्तत्ससर्जेश उत्पन्नस्थितये ऽशनम् ॥१५५॥

Therefore, the subsequent portion (of the Śruti)¹ is introduced for the sake of (stating) the creation of Soma and (other) food. Whatever liquid (lit. moist) thing is (noticed) in this world, that the Lord has created from His semen, as food for the sustenance of the created (beings). [155]

This is: *atha yat kimcid ārdram tad retaso 'srjata tad u somah ... agnir annādaḥ* (BU 1.4.6).

जगत्कारणरूपिण्य आपो रेतोभिधा इह ।
सोम एवेत्यवधृतेरग्नीषोमव्यवस्थितिः ॥१५६॥

Here,¹ waters, which are of the nature of the cause of this world, are called the semen; from the restrictive words² *soma eva*, it is established that Agni and Soma (were created).³ [156]

An objection on the basis of the Śruti *tā annam asrjanta* (CU 6.2.4) is taken into account. The verse establishes that the universe is of the nature of Agni and Soma.

¹That is, in the Śruti statement *tad retaso 'asrjata*; cf. *apa eva sasarjādaḥ* (*Manusmṛti* 1.8cd).

²Or alternatively, from the assertion.

³Supply: as the eater and the food.

नानाक्रियाभिसंबन्धादग्निः सोमश्च गम्यताम् ॥१५७॥
सोम एवेति तं विद्याद्यद्यग्निरपि हूयते ।
सोमो ऽप्यग्निरिति ज्ञेयो यदि तत्रापि हूयते ॥१५८॥

(And) let it be known that Agni is (called) Soma as well, on account of its relation to different (ritual) activities. [157]

One should know that when Agni also is offered (*hūyate*) it is to be taken as Soma and Soma also is to be taken as Agni if (Soma oblation) is offered in (i.e. unto) him. [158]

This argument rests on the position of Agni or Soma as the grammatical object in the statement about a ritual.

द्वेधा भिन्नं जगत्सर्वमन्नमन्नाद एव च ।
अन्नं चराचरं कृत्स्नमन्नादः प्राण उच्यते ॥१५९॥

This whole universe is divided into two, viz. food and eater of food; all the movable and immovable is food and Prāṇa (i.e. Hiranyagarbha) is called the eater of food. [159]

This verse intends to emphasise that the twofold world (viz. food and eater) culminates into being the Sūtra (Ātman) and, therefore, one who understands all this world as the Ātman is free from every blemish.

फलाभिधित्सयेदानीं देवसृष्टिविदः श्रुतिः ।
प्रवर्तते ऽथ सैषेति तत्स्तुतिस्तावदुच्यते ॥१६०॥

Now proceeds the Śruti about the knower of the creation of the god(s)¹ with a desire to state the fruit (of the Upāsanā²) (and) to begin with, there is made the statement *atha saiṣā* ... as the praise of it (*devasṛṣṭi/phala*). [160]

The verse states the purport of *saiṣā brahmaṇo 'tisṛṣṭih ... bhavati ya evaṃ veda* (latter half of BU 1.4.6).

¹ *deva* = *anugrāhakadeva* 'favouring gods' (already mentioned in verse 127 above).

² That is, worship of the favouring god(s).

अनुग्राहकदेवानां या सृष्टिरुदिता पुरा ।
अतिसृष्टिरनुग्राह्यसृष्टेः सा स्यात्प्रजापतेः ॥१६१॥

The creation of the favouring gods which was earlier mentioned is (lit. would be) Prajāpati's *atisṛṣṭi* 'superior creation' in comparison with the creation of those who are to be favoured. [161]

This is the literal meaning of the sentence *saiṣā brahmaṇo 'tisṛṣṭih*.

अश्रेयोभ्यो ऽनुग्राह्येभ्यः ससर्ज श्रेयसः सुरान् ।

यतो ऽतिसृष्टिस्तेनेयं यैषेहाग्न्यादिरीरिता ॥१६२॥

Since he creates the gods as superior to those who are to be favoured and as such inferior, therefore, this is superior creation (produced) by him, the one which is stated here with the word *agnyādi* in the beginning. [162]

This explains why the creation of favouring gods is superior creation (*atisrṣṭi*).

मर्त्यो वा यजमानः सन्नस्राक्षीदमृतान्सुरान् ।
अतिसृष्टिरतः प्रोक्ता सातिसाध्वीति निश्चिता ॥१६३॥

Or rather¹, the sacrificer (viz. Hiranyagarbha/Virāj), (though) being mortal, created the immortal gods (i.e. this creation of immortal gods); therefore, it is called a superior creation and is decided as extremely good (i.e. excellent). [163]

This meaning of *atha martyaḥ sann amṛtrān asṛjata tasmād atisrṣṭih*.

¹This is an alternative explanation for the superiority of the creation of gods.

प्रजापतिरिवैतस्यां सृष्टौ स्यात्सर्गकृन्नरः ।
यथोक्तसृष्टिविद्यः स्यात्तस्यैतत्फलमीरितम् ॥१६४॥

A man would be a creator as Prajāpati is in respect of this (superior) creation; he would be possessed of the knowledge of (effecting) creation — this is stated as the fruit of that¹. [164]

This states the meaning of *atisrṣṭyām hāsyaitasyām*.

¹Namely, worshipping (or being devoted to) Prajāpati, thereby knowing 'I am Prajāpati.'

अविद्यापटसंवीतचक्षुषामियदेव तु ।
वैदिकं साधनं ज्ञेयं ज्ञानकर्मस्वभावकम् ॥१६५॥
कर्त्रादिकारकापेक्षं विरिञ्चान्तफलप्रदम् ।

व्याकृतं तदशेषेण श्रुत्या व्याख्यायि यत्पुरा ॥१६६॥

It is to be known that, for those whose eyes are covered with the band of ignorance, only this much is the Vedic means having the nature of knowledge and action; [165]

it is expectant of the means of producing (effects), such as an agent etc., and it yields the result up to (the status of) Viriñca. That is expounded in its entirety in the Śruti, as is explained before. [166]

SP and NKL together point out that the knowledge and ritual activities (that is to say, knowledge about the ritual activities and the performance of them as well) would lead only to an impermanent result, i.e. the state of Hiranyagarbha, since they depend on a person (i.e. they are *kāraśādhya* or *puruṣatantra*). They do not lead to liberation which is *mānatantra* or *vastujñānatantra* 'dependent on the knowledge of the nature of Reality'. Also it is known that the state of Hiranyagarbha is affected by fear, want of delight etc. whereas liberation is not so affected.

अथैतस्य यथोक्तस्य साध्यसाधनरूपिणः ।
जगतो व्याकृतस्याभूद्वीजावस्थाविनश्वरी ।
तन्निर्दिदिक्षया यत्नात्प्रवृत्तैषा परा श्रुतिः ॥१६७॥
संसृत्यनर्थस्य यतो निदानं सैव नापरम् ।
यतो मूलमनर्थानामात्माज्ञानं जगत्यपि ॥१६८॥

Then, this subsequent Śruti passage now¹ begins with a specific effort with a wish² to say that this manifest universe which appears in the form of the ends (*sādhya*) and the means (*sādhana*), as stated before, came to attain the imperishable³ state as the seed⁴, [167]

since⁵ that⁶ itself is the root-cause of the undesirable result in the form of transmigratory existence and nothing else, and also since, in the world as well, the root of all untoward events is one's ignorance of about oneself⁷. [168]

Now is introduced BU 1.4.7, viz. *tad dhedam ... tarhy avyākṛtam āsīt*.

¹That is, after stating the result (fruit) of knowledge and ritual.

²SP affirms that the state cannot be pointed out, though spoken of; (cf. *na sākṣān nirdeśyatvam anirvācyatvāt*).

³That is, endless, in the absence of knowledge of the Ātman. SP explains *avinaśvarī* could have an alternative reading *vinaśvarī* which meant *vidyayā naśvarī* 'perishable through knowledge (of the true nature of the Ātman)'(!).

⁴This is ignorance about the true nature of the Ātman and responsible for transmigration. It has the form of 'I am this body etc. ...,' which has the inner self as the semblance of the Ātman (*sābhāsapratyagavidyā*).

⁵In order to justify the preceding verse two reasons are mentioned here using twice *yataḥ*.

⁶This refers to *bījāvasthā* mentioned in the preceding verse.

⁷This is to say: Not knowing one's own status etc., one commits mistakes or follies.

तद्धवसादेव निःशेषपुमर्थीप्तिरतो भवेत् ।

जिहासितस्यानर्थस्य हेतुः स्यात्सशरीरता ॥१६९॥

Therefore¹, there would follow acquisition of all of the ends of human endeavour only by the destruction of that (ignorance); (for) the condition of having a body² would be the cause of the undesirable end which is sought to be given up.³ [169]

¹That is, as understood from scriptures and worldly life also.

²Supply: as one's own (cf. *dehābhimāna*).

³This phrase precludes the involuntary absence of *karṣṇā* 'agency' etc. in sleep.

न वै सशरीरस्येति श्रुतेरध्यवसीयते ।

धर्माधर्मौ च देहस्य योनिरित्यागमाश्रयात् ॥१७०॥

(This) is concluded from the Śruti beginning with *na vai sa-śarīrasya* ... and by resorting to the Āgama¹: Merit and demerit are (understood to be) the origin of this body. [170]

Once again there is a stress on the absence of the knowledge

about the nature of the Ātman; this sets aside the notion of temporary ignorance in sleep.

¹CU 5.10.7: *tad ya iha ramanīyacaraṇāḥ ...*

विहितं प्रतिषिद्धं च कर्म मूलं तयोरपि ।
न ह्यक्रियस्य संबन्धो धर्मैणास्तीतरेण वा ॥१७१॥

(Again) action, both prescribed and prohibited, is the origin of them¹. Indeed, in the case of one who is without action, there is no connection (whatever) with merit or the other (viz. demerit). [171]

¹Namely, *dharmādharmau* of the preceding verse.

नाकारकस्य जगति क्रियया संगतिस्तथा ॥१७२॥
तद्भावभावहेतुत्वात्कारकत्वस्य कारणम् ।
रागद्वेषौ न तौ मुक्त्वा जगत्यन्यत्प्रवर्तकम् ॥१७३॥

So also, in this world, there is no association with any action of what is not instrumental to action, [172]
since the existence of that¹ is the cause of its² becoming³. Attachment and hatred are the cause of a thing being instrumental to some action, because, leaving them (aside, one finds) in this universe nothing else as productive of action. [173]

Verse 173a completes the sentence begun in the one-line verse 172. It implies the method of Anvaya and Vyatireka. Verse 173b and the word *rāgadveṣau* in the following line form the principal clause to become meaningful by the subordinate clause in the remaining part of the verse (*na tau ...*).

¹This means: which is instrumental.

²This means: of an effect.

³That is, coming into existence.

स यथाकाम इत्युक्त्वा कृत्वादेः प्रसवं श्रुतिः ।
कामाभावे च तद्भानि यो ऽकामश्चेति चावदत् ॥१७४॥

Having stated the words *sa yathākāmaḥ*, the Śruti¹ declares the origin of sacrifice etc. and then in the words *yo 'kāmaḥ* (it² has declared) the loss of it (viz. the sacrifice), in the absence of desire. [174]

¹BU 4.4.5: *sa yathākāmo bhavati tatkratur bhavati, yatkratur bhavati tat karma kurute.*

²BU 4.4.6: *yo 'kāmo niṣkāma āptakāmaḥ ... brahmaiva san brahmāpyeti.*

साधवसाधिवति चाध्यासौ मूलं विद्यात् तयोरपि ।
रागद्वेषौ यतो दृष्टौ नैवर्ते साधवसाधुनी ॥१७५॥

That (a thing is) good and (another) bad¹ are but superimpositions and² one should know³ attachment and hatred to be the root(-cause) of them, for two things, viz. good and bad, are not at all known (lit. seen) without (them⁴). [175]

¹It literally means: not-good.

²The word *api* is used in the sense of *ca*.

³We follow the reading in the NKL edition and not *mūlam vidyā tayor api* in the AnSS edition, for it does not convey a meaning which is suitable in the context — unless, of course, *vidyā* is taken for *viññāna* (= *avidyā*).

⁴Namely, *rāga dveṣau*. This is understood by repetition of the word which stands midway between the two lines of the verse (*dehaśīdīpanyāya*).

अन्तरेण प्रमेयार्थं नापि ते साधवसाधुनी ।
साधवसाधिवति वा ज्ञानं ज्ञातमेयस्य जायते ॥१७६॥

And (those two superimpositions this is) good and (this is) bad are not (possible) without any object to be known; or rather, even the knowledge of something as good or bad arises (only) in respect of some known object of knowing¹. [176]

¹'Object of knowing' for literal 'object to be known' for avoiding clumsy repetition of words in the translation, cf. NKL editor's

note: *jñātatvaviśiṣṭārtha*.

प्रमातृत्वादिसंबन्धो नासदात्मकवस्तुनि ।
नञ्घटाद्यर्थविज्ञानं सत्येव जगतीष्यते ॥१७७॥

In the case of a thing which is of the nature of non-existence there cannot be any connection of a knower etc.¹ in this world, the knowledge of an object as a non-existent pitcher etc. is entertained (i.e. understood) while there has/had been some existent (object). [177]

¹*pramātrtvādi*— *ādi* refers to *pramāṇa*, this is possible when there exists some *prameya*.

प्रत्यग्याथात्म्यसंमोहमृते सत्त्वं न कुत्रचित् ।
प्रत्यग्याथात्म्यसंबुद्धौ न सत्तन्नासदुच्यते ॥१७८॥

There is no existence (of an object)¹ possible anywhere² except without ignorance of the true nature of the inner self. (And) when there is the awareness of the true nature of the inner self, there is a statement that there is no existent and no non-existent.³ [178]

¹This signifies non-existence also. SP points out: *sattvam asattvam ceti cchedaḥ*; for both these are intended as indicated in the second line.

²That is, at any time or place.

³This is to say: The expressions existent and/or non-existent would be possible only in worldly dealings (*vyāvahārikaḍaśāyām*).

असाधारणमज्ञानं प्रतीच्येव यतः स्थितं ।
एतत्प्रमेयमेवातः प्रमाणं नान्यदिष्यते ॥१७९॥

Since incomparable ignorance remains/exists only in the case of the inner self, therefore it has to be known¹ and no other means than this is accepted. [179]

¹That is, it is indeed the object to be known.

एवं प्रमेयसिद्ध्यर्थं प्रवृत्तैषोत्तरा श्रुतिः ।
 क्रियाकारकरूपे ऽस्मिन्व्यवहारे तमोन्वयात् ।
 अक्रियाकारकं वस्तु पारोक्ष्यान्नैव लभ्यते ॥१८०॥

This subsequent Śruti proceeds to establish the object thus to be known, for there is connection with darkness¹ in this dealing² which comprises action and the means of (effecting it) and because the thing which is not of the nature of action and its means cannot be obtained (i.e. known) on account of its being beyond direct perception.³ [180]

¹That is, ignorance about the true nature of the inner self.

²This signifies the common world where, Śaṅkara has already pointed out in his Adhyāśabhāṣya (p.40), worldly dealings comprise *śāstriya* and *laukika* dealings based on *pramāṇa* and *prameya*.

³It means: because of (its) imperceptibility; SP cites *parāṇci khāni vyatṛṇāt svayambhūh ... (Kāthopanīṣad 4.1)*.

तद्ध्यदृष्टम् सदज्ञानकार्यं स्रगिव पन्नगम् ।
 सर्वं बिभर्त्यसक्तं सदसक्तमिति च स्मृतेः ॥१८१॥

That, indeed, not being¹ seen, is (but) the product of ignorance and it bears (i.e. gives the impression of) all that is not attached to it like a garland (which gives the impression of) a serpent. (This becomes clear) from the Smṛti *asaktam* ...² [181]

¹It means: no being perceptible.

²*Gītā* 13.14: *asaktam sarvabhṛc caiva nirguṇam guṇabhoktr ca*.

अपूर्वाद्यात्मकं वस्तु यत्र साक्षात्प्रसिध्यति ।
 तत्कात्स्न्यर्याल्लभ्यते तत्र व्यवहारो न मोहजः ॥१८२॥

Where (however) the existent entity which is of the nature of *apūrva* etc.¹ is directly established (i.e. obtained) and that (an existent thing) is obtained (=grasped) in its fullness, there is no dealing produced from ignorance. [182]

SP says *asambhāvanādi-tiraskāreṇa* 'by setting aside the notion of impossibility'.

¹This has a reference to the Brahman (= Ātman/inner self) which is *apūrva*, *anapara* etc.; cf. BU 2.5.19.

यथासिद्धानुवादेन पूर्वं नो ह्यभ्यधात्स्फुटम् ॥१८३॥

(This subsequent Śruti, viz. BU 1.4.7 now proceeds) ¹ because the Śruti has not clearly declared to us earlier ² (the nature of the thing for avoiding) it as a repetition of what is already established (in worldly dealings). ³ [183]

The objector's argument is: When BU 1.1-2 have already declared the nature of the thing (which is *upāśya*), why now the subsequent Śruti? To this, this is an answer.

¹We have to understand *pravṛttaiṣottarā śrutiḥ* from verse 180 above.

²Namely, in the Aśva and Aśvamedha Brāhmaṇas which pertained to the worship of fire, cf. our book [Vol.3:1990].

³This implies: acceptance of duality in *upāśya* and *upāśaka*.

पदानीह तदर्थान्च प्रसिद्धानेव लोक्तः ।

आदाय कर्मशास्त्रं तन्निषेधविधिबोधकृत् ॥१८४॥

(Now) here ¹ (we should remember that) the science of ritual takes words and the things signified by them as they are known from the world itself and then prescribes (for us) the prohibition or performance of the same. ² [184]

¹That is, while accepting instruction regarding the true nature of the Ātman.

²This is to say: The science of ritual does not pertain to *vastu* 'Reality'.

इतः परं वस्तुतत्त्वपरीक्षणकृतक्षणा ।

श्रुतिः प्रवृत्तातस्तावत्प्रमेयो ऽर्थो ऽत्र चिन्त्यते ॥१८५॥

[Verses 185-190 explain the purport of BU 1.4.7.]

Hereafter begins the Śruti¹ which has decided to examine the true nature of the thing²; therefore, here is considered the object to be known, to begin with³. [185]

¹Namely, *tad dhedam* ...

²That is, Reality.

³SP points out: *tadadhīnatvād upaniṣatprāmāṇyasya*.

संसारारुख्यमहाव्याधेः किं मूलमिति चिन्त्यते ।
तद्धवस्तये चिकित्सेयं तदा फलवती भवेत् ॥१८६॥

It is (now) considered as to what is the root of the great disease called transmigratory existence (and) this desire to discuss (lit. to know), (viz.) for the sake of the destruction of that (root). Only then it¹ would be fruitful.² [186]

¹It means: the Śruti which disusses the root of transmigratory existence.

²Cf. NKL: *saṃsāraroganirāsāya nidānajñāne sati śravaṇādicikitsā phalavatī syāt*. Further, SP quotes *Caraka Saṃhitā* 1.2.36:

*smṛtimān yuktihetujño matimān prtatipattimān /
bhiṣag auśadhasaṃyogaiś cikitsām kartum arhati //*

and NKL joins by quoting *Suśruta* 1.21.36:

*saṃcayam ca prakopam ca prasaram sthānasaṃśrayam /
vyaktibhedam ca yo vetti doṣāṇām sa bhaved bhiṣak //*

ऊर्ध्वमूल इति तथा मन्त्रवर्णो ऽपि विद्यते ।
गीतास्वपि तथैवैतदूर्ध्वमूलमितीरणम् ॥१८७॥

So also, (to this effect) there is the text of a Mantra¹, viz. *ūrdhvamūlaḥ*. In the *Gītā*² also, there is statement in the same way, viz. *ūrdhvamūlam* ... [187]

¹*Kāthopanīṣad* 6.1: *ūrdhvamūlo 'vāksākha eṣo 'śvattaḥ sanātanaḥ*.

²*Gītā* 15.1: *ūrdhvamūlam adhaśśākhā aśvattham prāhuravyayam*.

अशेषानर्थमूलस्य प्रत्यगज्ञानरूपिणः ।

ध्वस्तौ ध्वस्तिरनर्थानां पुमर्थश्च समाप्यते ॥१८८॥

There occurs the destruction of all the undesirables when there is the destruction of the root of all the evils that is in the form of ignorance of the individual self¹ (and thereby) is obtained the end of human endeavour.² [188]

¹Now *pratyak* is translated as the individual self wherever there is reference to a human being. Elsewhere it is translated as the inner self in contrast with the Supreme Self.

²The thrust of this is well brought out by SP thus: *jñānād ūrdhvam bandhadhir bādhitānuvṛttir ity uktatvāt* and also *na kevalam anarthadhvastir eva ... ānandaprāptir api*.

निरस्तातिशयानन्दरूपता प्रत्यगात्मनः ।

अथैष यो वै भूमेति श्रुत्यैव प्रतिपाद्यते ॥१८९॥

The Śrutis *athaiṣa...*; *yo vai bhūmā* ... itself¹ asserts the nature of the individual self as the essence of joy that has surpassed every (other) excellence. [189]

¹In reality, these are two different statements in two different Śrutis *athaiṣa eva paramānandaḥ* (BU 4.3.32), and *yo vai bhūmā tat sukham* (CU 7.23.1).

स्वत आनन्दयाथात्म्यात्कुतो दुःखेन संप्लुतिः ।

तथापि निहृते शास्त्रं न लिप्यत इतीरणात् ॥१९०॥

Because, in its own right¹, it has the true nature of (only) joy, how then can it (viz. Ātman) be overpowered (lit. inundated) by misery? Even then,² the Śruti statement *na lipyate* ...³ negates (the existence of sorrow). [190]

¹That is, independently of any other cause.

²That is, despite this.

³*Kāthopaniṣad* 5.11: ... *na lipyate lokaduḥkhena bāhyah*.

अज्ञातात्मैकसंसिद्धबीजावस्थमिदं जगत् ।
तदित्यनेनाभ्यधायि परोक्षार्थाभिधायिना ॥१९१॥

[Verses 191-210 explain the meanings of words of BU 1.4.7: *tad dhedaṃ tarhy avyākṛtam āsīt.*]

This world in the state of a seed that existed only in the form of the Ātman¹ and is referred to by the statement *tat* ..., which expresses an object beyond senses.² [191]

This verse intends to explain the Śruti-idea conveyed by words *tad dha*. This world already exists in the form of the seed though not known to people. The word *tat* is used to convey the world beyond sense perception.

¹This has a reference to *sābhāsapratyagavidyā* understood in verse 167 above; it pertains to the Ātman, not known in its true nature.

²That is, *parokṣārthakena sarvanāmasamjñakena* (NKL editor's note on the basis of SP and NKL).

अव्याकृतस्य जगतो भूतकालाभिसंगतेः ।
सुखावबुद्धये हेति निपातो ऽत्र प्रयुज्यते ॥१९२॥

The particle *ha* is used here (in this sentence) for the easy understanding of the undifferentiated world which has been¹ through the time in the (long) past. [192]

¹It literally means: which has gone together with ...

नामरूपादिविकृतं पराङ्मानैकगोचरः ।
सहस्रभेदवत्साक्षादिदमा जगदुच्यते ॥१९३॥

This world (which is) differentiated by name, form etc.,¹ is in the purview of² only that means which is operative in respect of objects beyond perception³ (and) composed (lit. possessed) of thousand (and one) differences, is directly expressed by the pronoun *idam*⁴. [193]

¹The word etc. refers to action (*karman*).

²Or alternatively, is the object of.

³This means Anumāna 'inference', for that grasps distant objects. Or alternatively, it might refer to the self-illuminating Ātman (*parān*).

⁴Cf. the well-known *kārikā*: *idamaḥ pratyakṣagatam samīpavartī caitado rūpam, adasas tu viprakṛṣṭam tad iti parokṣe vijānīyāt* (quoted by NKL editor). This justifies understanding Anumāna earlier, for that pertains to what is *parokṣa*.

सामानाधिकरण्यस्य तदिदंपदयोः श्रुतेः ।
कार्यकारणयोर्नित्यमभेदो ऽध्यवसीयते ॥१९४॥

Here is noticed the capacity for referring to one and same object (*sāmānādhikarāṇya*) in the two words (viz. pronouns) *tat* and *idam*; for the oneness of (the two as) the effect and the cause¹ is (easily) understood. [194]

¹These are *idam* (= *jagat*) and *tat* (= *brahma*); cf. the usually accepted notion of *kāryakāraṇayor abhedah*— this *abheda* here is *sāmānādhikarāṇya*, viz. suitable to be expressive of only one object.

न क्रियाकार्यविरहे कारणं सिद्ध्यति क्वचित् ।
निष्क्रियं कारणं चेत्स्यात्तद्वन्नित्यं फलोत्थितिः ॥१९५॥

Indeed, nowhere is there any cause established (as existent) when the performance of an action (viz. production of an effect) by it is absent.¹ If it be said that a cause is (i.e. can be) non-operative, then there would ever be the existence of the effect. [195]

This verse denies the existence of a *niṣkriya-kāraṇa* 'cause without any action'.

¹NKL edition reads *na kriyākāryavirahāt* and explains it as *kriyārūpakāryābhāvāt*. AnSS edition shows no awareness of this reading. Translation follows AnSS edition (*sati saptamī*).

तयोश्च युगपद्भावे न स्यात्कारणनिश्चितिः ।
क्रियान्तरप्रसक्तेश्च तत्कार्यत्वे ऽनवस्थितिः ॥१९६॥

If the two (viz. the cause and the action)¹ are held to be simultaneously existing, one would not be able to decide which (exactly) is the cause. And because it would involve the contingency of (accepting) another action (of the cause for producing the action). Further, that (itself) being an effect, there would result *infinite regress*. [196]

This verse denies *sakriyakāraṇa* 'cause accompanied by action'. This is possible in two ways: (i) Both cause and action exist simultaneously, and (ii) there is a sequence of them. The first possibility is discarded on the ground stated in the first half of the verse. The second possibility is considered in the second half. The argument here is: If the sequence is understood to be first the cause and then the action, even then the (later) action would expect some earlier action which, in its turn, would expect yet earlier action and so on — this is *infinite regress*!

¹Cf. *kāryakāraṇa* in verse 194 above and *kriyākārya* in verse 195.

कार्यं चाक्रियमाणं सन्न कार्यत्वं समश्नुते ।
अकर्तृकं चेत्कार्यं स्यात्कारणं कार्यतां व्रजेत् ॥१९७॥

An effect (lit. action), (which is said to be) not being produced (lit. done), cannot attain the status (i.e. nature) of an effect. (And) if it were held that an effect is (produced) without (there being) an agent, then the cause itself would be (considered as) the agent. [197]

कारणत्वात्सदन्यस्य कार्यत्वाच्च सतस्तथा ।
अन्योन्याव्यतिरेकाच्च कुतो नाशादिसंभवः ॥१९८॥

Since it is the cause, it is real; since the other is an effect of that real (it also) is real. And since these do not exist apart (from each other), where (or whence) could there be their destruction etc.? [198]

It was earlier argued that the Brahman and the world are related as the cause and the effect. Therefore, their reality has to be argued. There should be *samānaguṇavattva* between a cause and its effect. If there would be *asamānaguṇavattva* between them, then it is not possible that an *asat* effect arises from a *sat* cause. Therefore, to say that there comes into existence the *asat* (=perishable) *jagat* (=effect) from the *sat* (=imperishable) Ātman. The second line of the verse expresses rejection of the idea of their *real* difference (as two distinct things). The difference is merely indescribable or imaginary.

क्रिया वा तत्फलं वा स्यात्कारकं वा न किञ्चन ।
निरन्वयो ऽयं नाशः स्यादेषामन्यतमो ऽपि न ॥१९९॥

(An argument is made:) If action or effect or agent or any instrument of action does not exist, that would mean¹ destruction which does not have any subsequent to it.² (The Siddhāntin answers: In reality) there exists none of them. [199]

¹The words 'that would mean' is 'there would be'.

²This is an argument of the Vaiśeṣikas. In this, they would imply an all-time existing absence of every thing. But, the Siddhāntin holds that *tad idam* suggests the continuous existence of the Brahman, i.e. permanence of the Brahman. This is in opposition to the Vaiśeṣikas' Asatkāryavāda.

क्रियायाः फलरूपेण दृक्स्तिर्नावस्थितेर्भवेत् ।
तेन तेन विशेषेण कारणं प्रथते सदा ॥२००॥

Since there is continued existence of a certain action in the form of its effect, therefore, there cannot be destruction. Ever does a cause extend itself¹ (in the form of its effect). [200]

The argument in the preceding verse is stated in this and the following verses (up to verse 203).

The first line explains away the first alternative of the Asatkāryavādins. In the second line, it is stated that the same

result (viz. *na abhīṣṭā dhvastih*) would follow in the case of the other alternatives also. Only the real appears to be existing in one form or another — this is the Siddhāntin's view.

¹That is, it extends its existence.

यथा जन्मादिकर्तृत्वाद्बीजं नैव विनश्यति ।
नाशो ऽपि तस्य नष्टत्वाच्च नष्टः स्याद्विनाशिता ॥२०१॥

As the seed does not at all perish, by its being an agent of the birth etc.¹ (of a plant) and it (viz. the seed) is the destroyer (also) even in respect of its destruction², therefore, there is no perishability in (this) destroyer. [201]

This verse reaffirms the argument in the preceding verse by an illustration.

¹The word etc. refers to the continued existence or growth of the plant.

²That is to say: The plant would perish but not the seed. It seems to be called the destroyer because the seed remains even when the plant perishes.

एवं चेन्न सतो नाशो नोत्पत्तिरसतस्तथा ।
अव्याकृताभिधानाच्च कार्यस्य स्यात्कदाचन ॥२०२॥

Such being the case, there cannot be the destruction of the existent (*sat*), nor (can there be) the origin of the non-existent; likewise, in the case of the effect, which has the name of what is not differentiated, also there cannot ever be perishability. [202]

The verse implies the non-manifest existence of the *sat* when its so-called effect has (it is said) perished.

तत्त्वबोधातिरेकेण न नाशो ऽन्यो यथा तथा ।
महतातिप्रयत्नेन ह्युदर्के ऽपि प्रवक्ष्यते ॥२०३॥

It will be stated with great care in the later portion of the text also, (as stated here before), that there is no other

destruction beside (that, viz.) the knowledge of the truth. [203]

Destruction is for the Siddhāntin *svarūpajñapti*. But there is no *niranvayanāśa* 'destruction involving no subsequent' as understood by the Asatkāryavādin. It is held that there is destruction only of bondage, together with desires, of the individual self. There is no destruction subsequent to *svarūpajñapti*; the *vastu*, viz. the Brahman continues to exist.

नामरूपाद्यभिव्यक्तेः प्राक्तनः काल उच्यते ।
तर्हीति ह्यनभिव्यक्तमव्याकृतगिरोच्यते ॥२०४॥

[The words *tarhi* and *avyākṛta* are explained.]

Time preceding (the moment of) manifestation (of Reality as having) of name, form etc. is mentioned (by the word) *tarhi* (and) by the word *avyākṛta* is mentioned the unmanifest. [204]

अविद्याकर्मसंस्कारास्तेजोऽक्षमासूत्रसंश्रयाः ।
खे लीनास्त्वस्तितामात्रा अव्यक्ताख्याः सहात्मना ॥२०५॥

Impressions originating in ignorance and (ritual) activity, which have resorted to fire, water, earth and wind¹ and² merged in sky, with mere existence (as their character)³, have, together with the Ātman, the name of the unmanifest. [205]

¹This is the meaning of Sūtra, cf. verse 148 above; cf. *vāyur vai gautama tat sūtram* (BU 3.7.2). NKL states: Sūtra signifies two elements!

² = *tu*.

³That is, in their subtle form.

कार्यकारणभेदेन प्रपञ्चो यः पुरोदितः ।
यश्चोर्ध्वं वक्ष्यते तस्मात्परस्तादेतदुच्यते ॥२०६॥

It is this (Brahman) which was explained earlier as this world comprising differences (such as) the cause(s) and the effect(s) and which will be later described as beyond that.¹ [206]

¹Namely, the world.

प्रथते वैश्वरूपेण यतो ऽविद्यैव सर्वथा ।
अविद्यामात्रयाथात्म्यादतस्तद्धेदमुच्यते ॥२०७॥

Because only ignorance extends itself everywhere in a variety of forms¹, (therefore) on account of (its manifest) nature being mere ignorance, there is stated *tad dhedam*. [207]

¹This verse states one more argument for establishing the identity of the cause and the effect; cf. verse 194 above.

¹This is *prapañca* mentioned in the preceding verse.

मा भूद्व्याकृतधीः पुंसां नामरूपात्मवस्तुनि ।
ऐकात्म्यव्यक्तितो ऽन्यत्र तस्मादेवेति गौरियम् ॥२०८॥

Lest there be apprehension by men of the (variously) modified (Reality which appears before them) in the objects having the nature of name and form, i.e. elsewhere than in the manifestation of the uniqueness of the Ātman, there is made the statement *tasmād eva*. [208]

This justifies the restriction (*avadhāraṇa*) in *nāmarūpabhyām eva*.

सामानाधिकरण्योक्तिर्व्यक्तस्याव्यक्तसिद्धये ।
न हि कात्स्नर्यमभिव्यक्तेर्व्यक्तस्याकात्स्नर्यदर्शनात् ॥२०९॥

The Śruti statement, which contains two words, expressive of only one object, is intended for establishing the unmanifest becoming the manifest; indeed, fullness is not (understood) of the manifest, since the manifest is seen (in it) to be not full. [209]

This is to support the *sāmānādhikarāṇya* of *tat* and *idam*, even though *idam* refers to what is *parimita* and *tat*, to *aparimita*.

तद्वित्तिसाधनाभावात्कथं तदवगम्यते ॥२१०॥

The Śruti mentions the differentiated (world) by negating (the notion of) the knower etc.¹ (And) how can that become known since there is absence of the means of knowing it? [210]

The verse presupposes an objection regarding the means of ascertaining the nature of the unmanifest. There are alternatives; (i) *mānam asti* and (ii) *mānam nāsti*. The first and the second lines have refuted the first and the second alternatives respectively.

¹This refers to *pramāṇa*.

विधूताशेषसंबन्धमनन्यानुभवात्मकम् ।
कूटस्थसंविन्मात्रैकं ब्रह्मास्मीतिस्वभावकम् ॥२११॥
अतिरोहितसंवित्कं सदानस्तमितोदितम् ।
निःसामान्यविशेषं तत्प्रत्यगात्मैकनिष्ठितम् ॥२१२॥
स्वतो ऽवबुद्धं तद्यस्मान्निरविद्यमतः सदा ।
संगतिर्निरविद्यस्य नाविद्याहेतुर्जैर्मलैः ॥२१३॥

[Verses 211-214 describe *nityānubhavasādhana*.]

That (Brahman) is such as has shaken off all relations (to various worldly objects), as is of the nature of having experience of none else (than itself)¹, as is immovable and mere sentience, and is aware of its own state (in the form) 'I am Brahman.', [211]

has its sentience never concealed (i.e. overpowered) by anything else²; as has never perished or originated; as is not possessed of any general or particular character³; as has remained only in the inner self⁴; [212]

(and) as is ever awake and is, therefore, without (any influence of) ignorance (on it). As such, there cannot be any association of it, that is devoid of ignorance, with sins/taints caused by ignorance. [213]

¹The first line stresses that there exists nothing else than the Brahman.

²That is, since there exists none else than the Brahman

³This is the same as *avyāvṛttānanugata*.

⁴That is, it is not different from the inner self.

एवंसवभावमप्येतदविज्ञातं स्वभावतः ।
तमोवृत्तमपेक्षयैतन्न तु यद्वास्तवं स्वतः ॥२१४॥

Though it is of this nature, yet, only by its very nature, it remains unknown. This is (so said) keeping in view the effect of darkness (i.e. ignorance) but it is not a real situation. [214]

There can be an objection: 'The Brahman is *nityabuddha*, then how is it that no one knows it?'. The answer is: Though the Brahman is *nityabuddha*, yet due to ignorance it remains usually unknown.

स्वानुभूत्यनुसारेण यथोक्तो ऽर्थो ऽवसीयताम् ।
मानहैत्वतिवर्तित्वान्नेह मात्रादिसंभवः ॥२१५॥

[Verses 215-220 explain that the unknownness of the Brahman is established by our usual experience.]

Let this thing, (which is) thus described, be ascertained in accordance with one's own experience. There is no possibility of having the means of knowing etc., because the Ātman is beyond the (usual act of) knowing. [215]

तस्मिन्नपहतध्वान्ते ऽप्यविद्या स्वानुभूतिः ।
स्वानुभूतिर्न वेद्मीति प्रागैकात्म्यप्रबोधतः ॥२१६॥

There is ignorance even on the part of that (Ātman) whose darkness (i.e. ignorance) is (by its very nature) far-removed (lit. destroyed); there is ignorance (as understood) from one's own (i.e. the individual self's) experience. There is on the part of one the experience, 'I do not know.', (but this is so) before (i.e. so long as there is not) the awareness of the uniqueness of the Self. [216]

ज्ञातात्मतत्त्वो जानाति त्रिकालं तदसंभवम् ।

अन्यतः संगतिः सेयमविचारितसिद्धिका ॥२१७॥

One who has known the true nature of the Ātman knows that it is in all the three periods of time impossible (to think 'I do not know myself.');

[217]

¹ *anyah* = *anyena* (NKL), i.e. *ajñānena*.

स्वभावव्यतिरेकाभ्यां ध्वान्तसिद्धेरसंभवात् ।
न चेत्प्रमाणतः सिद्धिरस्याव्याकृतरूपिणः ।
न चैकात्म्यस्वभावेन कुतस्तन्मानगोचरः ॥२१८॥

Because there is no possibility of existence of darkness (i.e. ignorance) unless (one accepts the existence of) the Ātman and the other. Also, if it is not possible to establish the existence of what has not appeared (manifested) in discrete forms or by its nature of uniqueness, how would it be within the ken of knowing?

[218]

This asserts the inutility of the *mātrādi* in respect of Ātmajñāna.

तद्धेदमित्यनेनोक्तिर्व्याकृताव्याकृतात्मनोः ।
प्रमाणयोग्यतैवोक्ता न त्वैकात्म्यमितात्मता ॥२१९॥

By the sentence *tad dhedam* there is the statement of the two of manifest and unmanifest natures. (But) here is thus stated the possibility of its becoming known by some means of knowing and (there is) not (stated) the uniqueness (of the Ātman) and the limitedness (of the non-Ātman).

[219]

The universe (*jagat*) was unmanifest and it is manifest now. The words *tad dhedam* are not for conveying the possibility of knowing the oneness of what is unmanifest (= Ātman) and what is manifest (= non-Ātman).

अव्याकृतमविज्ञातं प्रमाणाविषयं मतम् ।

प्रमाणानभिसंबद्धं प्रमाणाच्चेति साहसम् ॥२२०॥

(The Brahman) is understood to be unmanifest, unknown, non-object of the means of knowing, not connected with any means of knowing. And still to say that (it is understood) by the means of knowing is (but) folly¹. [220]

¹The word *sāhasa* means: thoughtless statement. SP does not explain it and NKL says *vyāhata* which means paradoxical.

अविज्ञातार्थगन्तृणि प्रमाणानीति वादिनाम् ।
सर्वेषामभ्युपेतो ऽर्थः कुतो ऽसाविति चिन्त्यते ॥२२१॥

Now is considered (a question:) By what¹ does it (become known) (even though) it is an object understood (lit. accepted) by all who state that the means of knowing pertains to (lit. reaches up to) object(s) that are not known?² [221]

¹Or, 'on account of what?'. SP makes this clear thus: *sa ca kutah sphurati svato vā parato vā parataś cen mānād vā sākṣiṇo veti vicārya nirdhāryam*.

ज्ञातो वा ऽर्थो ऽथवा ऽज्ञात उभयं वा न चोभयम् ।
प्रमाणानां प्रमेयः स्यात्सर्वमेतद्विचार्यते ॥२२२॥

All this is discussed, viz. whether the object is known or not known or both (known and not known) or not both could be the object knowable by the means of knowing. [222]

There are here four alternatives mentioned regarding the nature of the object sought to be known. These are discussed in the verses hereafter.

मेयमानत्वसंभितौ न पश्यामो ऽत्र साधनम् ।
ज्ञातस्याव्यतिरेकित्वादज्ञातस्याप्यमानतः ॥२२३॥

As regards *meyatva* 'the character of an object to be known' and *mānatva* 'the character of a means of knowing', (we have

to say that) we do not see here any means of distinguishing (between the two), because what is to be known does not exist apart (from the means) and what is not known does not have any means of knowing it. [223]

In the case of the Ātman, there is no distinction between *meya* and *māna*, unlike in the normal knowing-situation.

As intended by verse 221 above, there follows a discussion as to how an object to be known becomes known. First, the views of the Vaiśeṣikas and other logicians. The argument of the Vedāntins is: If they hold *meya* as *jaḍa* (and they do so), then, *māna* also being *jaḍa*, how could one distinguish between the two? If again the *meya* and *māna* are accepted by them as *viṣaya* and *viṣayin*, a question can be asked: Whether the *meya* is already known or unknown? The first half of the second line of the verse answers away the first alternative and the second half, the second. The answers are clarified in the next two verses.

जगत्तथो हि यः कश्चिज्ज्ञात एव स बुद्धिर्वत् ।
मानादेव स विज्ञात इत्येतत्स्यात्कुतो ऽमितेः ॥२२४॥

In this world,¹ whatever be the object of knowing, that has got to be known (i.e. existent for becoming known) even like the intellect (itself)²; that³ would become known only by that knowing one⁴ (— hence we ask:) How can it be (objected to) on the ground of the absence of the object of knowing? [224]

This explains *jñātasyāvyatirekitva*.

¹This refers to worldly dealings (*vyavahārabhūmi*).

²*buddhi* 'intellect' reveals itself; it does not remain unknown, for it is in contact with the inner self.

³This refers to the object of knowing which is mentioned earlier.

⁴= *māna*— this refers to the knower, the inner self.

मानातिरेकासंसिद्धेर्मेय एव तथा न किम् ।
न हि दीपान्तराद्दीपो भारूपत्वं प्रपद्यते ॥२२५॥

So also, since it cannot be established that the object to known exists apart from knowing, why should it not become similarly known¹? Indeed, a lamp does not attain the nature of a lamp from another lamp. [225]

¹That is to say: Like *jñāna*; it is self-evident; it cannot remain unknown.

ज्ञातरूपातिरेकेण नान्यद्रूपं समीक्ष्यते ।
एवं चेन्मानतो मेयो विज्ञात इति का प्रमा ॥२२६॥

They do not accept (or grasp) any form apart from the form which has been known. If this is so, how can it be right knowledge (to hold) that an object to known is known from knowledge? [226]

न चापर उपायो ऽस्ति मेयसद्भावसिद्धिकृत् ।
मानेभ्यस्तत्फलासूतेरन्धकारप्रनृत्तवत् ॥२२७॥

There is no other means¹ of establishing the existence of what is (the object) of knowing (in Vedānta) since there would not result any fruit from the (known) means of knowing, exactly as (from) the act of dancing in darkness.² [227]

This verse presupposes an objection that the *jada* object can be known by some means of knowing.

¹That is, other than the usually accepted means of knowing.

²This would lead to the absence of any dealings (*sarvavyavahāralopa*).

स्वत एव प्रसिद्धश्चेत्प्रमेयो ऽर्थस्तथा ऽपि न ।
अनन्यायत्तसंसिद्धेर्मेयत्वं किंनिबन्धनम् ॥२२८॥

If it be held that the object to be known is established as existent on its own (i.e. in its own right), (we answer:) Even that is not the case; (for we ask:) In what is rooted the character of the objects' capacity to be known whose existence does not depend on another? [228]

Here is denied another alternative objection, viz. the *jaḍa* can be known in its own right or, by itself.

निःसाधनो न साध्यो ऽस्ति नासाध्यं साधनं क्वचित् ।
तुल्यशक्तिमतां नापि मिथो ऽपेक्षा ऽस्ति कुत्रचित् ॥२२९॥

There cannot be any *sādhya* (object) which is without a *sādhana*, nor can be there any *sādhana* which is without its *sādhya* (object). And, there is no mutual expectancy on the part of two (*sādhya* objects) having equal capacity also.¹ [229]

¹SP points out that *api* 'also' suggests *anavasthā* as the result if a knowledge of some *sādhya* is held to depend upon that of another.

नासिद्धयोः स्वतो ऽपेक्षा सिद्धयोश्चापि नेष्यते ।
नापेक्ष्यापेक्षकत्वं हि लोके ऽप्यतिशयं विना ॥२३०॥

Two objects which are not self-established do not have expectation (of each other¹); so also two objects which are self-established do not expect (anything) of each other. For, in this world, we do not indeed find the relation of something as expected and something (else) that expects, unless there is a certain excellence (in the object desired.) [230]

This verse answers a question whether two *jaḍa* objects get established by each other, be they *svataḥsiddha* or *svato 'siddha*. Two possibilities are discussed here, the third is considered in the next.

¹It literally means: of themselves. SP refers to the son of a barren woman and a sky-flower as instances.

नापि सिद्धः स्वतो ऽसिद्धं नृशृङ्गवदपेक्षते ।
तथा ऽसिद्धः स्वतः सिद्धं नात्यन्ताभावरूपतः ॥२३१॥

So also, one self-established¹ (object) does not expect another (object which is) not established², like a man (expecting) a

(non-existent) horn. Similarly, what is not self-established does not expect what is established because it itself has the form of absolute non-existence³. [231]

¹This refers to an existent object.

²That is, non-existent object.

³For example, a man's horn.

अपेक्षते चेत्सिद्धो ऽसौ नासिद्धो ऽपेक्षितुं क्षमः ।
येनातो ऽज्ञानतः सिद्धिं स्वतःसिद्धो ऽप्यपेक्षते ॥२३२॥

If it is held that if a (self-established) thing expects (some *māna*), then (it has to be said that) a non-existent (object) does not expect (it). Therefore, since (this is so), even a self-established (object) expects to be established by ignorance.¹

[232]

¹NKL reads: *yenāto jñānataḥ* for the reading of the AnSS edition *yenato 'jñānataḥ(?)*. Possibly, *ajñānataḥ* suggests that falsely conceived *pramāṇaprameyavyavahāra*?

विश्वेश्वरो ऽपि प्राहैतत्प्रपन्नाय किरीटिने ।
भावाभावत्वमज्ञानादतद्वत्येव कल्पितम् ॥२३३॥

The Lord of the world declared this to Arjuna who (approached) Him (as a pupil), viz. that the state of Reality and non-reality is experienced (i.e. imagined) (by all) in what does not possess (the character of) that, due to ignorance.

[233]

SP points out that all *pramāṇaprameyavyavahāra* is like *raju-sarpa(jñāna)*.

नासतो विद्यते भावो नाभावो विद्यते सतः ।
उभयोरपि दृष्टो ऽन्तस्त्वनयोस्तत्त्वदर्शिभिः ॥२३४॥

The non-existent has no being (and) the existent never ceases to be; the truth of both has been seen by the seer of the

truth.

[234]

This is *Gītā* 2.16.

ज्ञेयं यत्तत्प्रवक्ष्यामि यज्ज्ञात्वा ऽमृतमश्नुते ।
तथा न जायत इति विध्वस्ताशेषकल्पनम् ॥२३५॥

‘I shall explain the nature of that which is to be known and, having known which, one attains immortality.’¹ So also, (the statement of the Lord), *na jāyate*² ... declares the entire (cluster of) imaginary suppositions (that are) destroyed (i.e. set aside). [235]

¹ *Gītā* 13.12.

² *Gītā* 2.20.

वासुदेवः सर्वमिति प्रत्यक्षश्रुतिपूर्वकम् ।
अहं कृत्स्नस्य जगतः प्रभवः प्रलयस्तथा ॥२३६॥

(So also He declares) ‘(I), son of Vāsudeva, am all this.’¹, which has a direct statement of the Śruti as its forerunner² and, later, (He states), ‘I am the origin and merger of the entire universe.’³ [236]

Kṛṣṇa described in these verses of the *Gītā* is the Paramātmā. And, according to SP, the statement of Kṛṣṇa is preceded by the direct statement of the Śruti (*pratyakṣaśruti*), viz. *aitadātmīyam idaṃ sarvaṃ* (CU 6.8-16).

¹ *Gītā* 7.19.

² This refers to *idaṃ sarvaṃ yad ayam ātmā* (BU 2.4.6).

³ *Gītā* 7.6.

सत्यज्ञानादिरूपस्य प्रत्यगात्मन एव च ।
कारणत्वं सुविस्पष्टं श्रुतौ हि बहुशः श्रुतम् ॥२३७॥

Indeed, in the Śruti, it is many times clearly heard that it is only the individual self, which is of the nature of truth, knowledge etc., that is the cause of the universe. [237]

In the preceding verse, the CU is taken into account and here the *Taittirīyopaniṣad*, for pointing out the *śrutimūlatā* of the statement of Kṛṣṇa. In other words, the *Taittirīyopaniṣad* is the Śruti conveying the same idea as in the *Gītā*. That is: Kṛṣṇa declares *aham* (*pratyagātman*) as the creator, sustainer and destroyer and this same idea is already conveyed by the Śruti (*Taittirīyopaniṣad*:) *satyaṃ jñānam anantam brahma, yo veda nihitaṃ guhāyām* (2.1); *tasmād vā etasmād ātmana ākāśaḥ sambhūtaḥ* (2.1); *idaṃ sarvaṃ asṛjata* (2.6); and *yato vā imāni bhūtāni ...* (3.1).

अज्ञातात्मातिरेकेण ब्रुवतः कारणं तथा ।

सम्यग्ज्ञानान्न मुक्तिः स्यान्न ज्ञानं वस्तुनृत्ववचित् ॥२३८॥

There cannot be liberation (which results from) the right knowledge in the case of one who states that the cause (of this universe) is apart from the Ātman that is not known (to him). Nowhere does (such) knowledge (as his) negate the existence of the real (object)¹. [238]

This is a remark about those, like the Sāṃkhyas, who hold, in opposition to the Śruti, that the world is caused by some other thing, like Pradhāna etc.

¹Namely, the Ātman.

कर्मभ्यो ऽपि न मुक्तिः स्यात्कर्मापि न हि वस्तुनृत् ।

तस्यानित्यफलोत्पत्तौ प्रभविष्णुत्वकारणात् ॥२३९॥

Even by ritual activities there cannot be (attainment of) liberation. Indeed, action also cannot negate the real object, for it is capable of causing the rise of the impermanent fruit.¹

[239]

¹This implies the incapacity of *karman* for effecting the permanent result, viz. liberation.

कूर्मलोमादिवच्चेत्स्यादबुद्धत्वं तथा ऽपि वः ।

स्वतः सर्वज्ञतैव स्यान्न वस्त्वज्ञातमस्ति हि ॥२४०॥

(If the objector says:) As in the case of the hair of a tortoise etc.¹ there could be unknownness (i.e. absence of the knowledge) (about the nature of the Ātman), in your (view); (we answer:) There is (lit. would be) only omniscience (of the Ātman which is) on its own account²; for, the (real) thing³ is not unknown.⁴ [240]

¹The word etc. implies the milk of the tortoise; this signifies non-existent objects.

²That is, not caused by any other thing.

³Namely, the Ātman.

⁴Cf. Śaṅkara's assertion in the Adhyāśabhāṣya (p.81): *sarvo hy ātmāstitvam pratyeti* ... This sets aside the idea of holding Anumāna as necessary for knowing the Ātman in the way of the Sāṃkhyas who require it for knowing the Pradhāna.

न च मानात्प्रसिद्धिः स्यात्कूर्मलोमादिवस्तुनः ॥२४१॥
ज्ञातार्थव्यतिरेकेण मानानां मानता यतः ।
मेयार्थापह्नुतिश्च स्यान्नाज्ञातमिति जल्पतः ॥२४२॥

And one would not be able to establish a thing like the hair of a tortoise etc. with (the help of) the means of knowing since (it would mean that) the means of knowing the character of the means of knowing (even) in the absence of the known (i.e. existent) object(s) and also there would result the negation (lit. concealment) of the object to be known for one who states that there is not (any object which is unknown).

[241-242]

The argument regarding the hair of a tortoise is still the basis for argument. The question is: 'How can this non-existent object become known?' Neither knowledge nor false impression about it is possible.

ततश्च वेदसिद्धान्तसंत्यागः कारणादृते ।
न भिद्यते प्रमेयो ऽर्थो मानाद्येषां च वादिनाम् ।
तेषां दुःशकमत्यन्तमबुद्धार्थावबोधनम् ॥२४३॥

From that there follows, without any reason,¹ abandoning of the doctrine of the Veda². And, in the case of those who argue that the object to be known cannot be distinguished from the means of knowing³, it is extremely difficult to get to know what is not known.⁴ [243]

Earlier, as implied in verse 222 above, there was a discussion about the view that the object to be known by philosophical query is a directly perceptible object. This was the view of the realists, viz. the Sāṃkhyas. Now, follows a discussion of the views which are like the Buddhists' opinions — the third alternative. In this verse, there is reference to the view that there is no distinction between *māna* and *meṃya*.

¹Or, for no reason.

²The authoritativeness of the Veda is accepted in the field of Dharma. Therefore, the contingency would be in denying the authority of the Veda which is accepted as *ajñātārthajñāpaka*.

³This is the view of the Yogācāra Buddhists.

⁴It is implied that every argument is based on the relation between *māna* and *meṃya* as two distinct objects.

ज्ञानमेयप्रभेदो ऽपि मानस्य स्वार्थरूपिणः ।

बौद्धराद्धान्तसक्तिः स्यात्स्वार्थस्य क्षणिकत्वतः ॥२४४॥

And, when a distinction (is accepted) between the means of knowledge and the object to be known even while that means of knowing has (i.e. is) to be taken as having the form of its object, there would result inevitable acceptance of the Buddhist doctrine, on account of the fact that its (viz. of the *māna*) object of knowing has (only) momentary-existence. [244]

The argument is: *māna* and *meṃya* are distinct, but the latter was not known (as existent) until the *māna* became operative. But while there results the knowledge of the object, the means of knowing has ceased to exist. Thus there results *kṣaṇikatvavāda*, as acceptable even to one who holds the *māna* and *meṃya* as reals.

This argument is adduced after accepting the need of vyava-

hārasiddhi.

स्वार्थं प्रत्येव संसिद्धेः परार्थस्येह वस्तुनः ।
स्वप्नादिवदनात्मार्थो मृषा स्यात्क्षणिको ऽपि वा ॥२४५॥

Since, in worldly dealings, every object which exists for the sake of another¹ gets established (only) with reference to its own object², the object which is non-Ātman would be either futile like one in a dream etc. or (it would be) momentary.³ [245]

¹The word *padārtha* is paraphrased by SP as *meya artha* and by NKL as *jaḍa artha*. Possibly this refers to the view that *jñāta* and *jñāna*(=*māna*) are both *jaḍa*— cf. the concept of the Sāṃkhyas: *saṃghātasya parārthatva*.

²This refers to the object of knowing. (Or, *ajaḍa* Ātman).

³The argument is: If this *svārtha* also were *jaḍa*, then it has to be considered at the time of its being known by the means as non-existent, and that would resemble the view of the Sautrāntika and Vaibhāṣika Buddhists.

न च सौगतसिद्धान्तस्तत्तिसिद्धौ मित्यभावतः ।
मेयमानैकतो ऽभावादज्ञातत्वस्य तत्क्षणे ॥२४६॥

And (in this regard we do) not (hold) the doctrine of the Buddhists (as correct) owing to the absence of the knowledge which leads to establish that,¹ on account of (the fact that) there could not be oneness of the object of knowing and the means of knowing² there would be unknownness of the object at the moment (time)³. [246]

¹Namely, the object to be known (*jñāta* which is also *jñeya*).

²*meyamānaikataḥ* = *meyamānaikatvataḥ*.

³Supply: of knowing it.

अथाभ्युपेयते ऽज्ञातः प्रमेयाव्यतिरेकतः ।
एकत्रापि प्रमाणत्वप्रसिद्ध्यर्थं क्षणात्मनि ॥२४७॥

Well then (*atha*) it is accepted that the character of being unknown is apart from the object to known, in order that its nature of being the means of knowing becomes established even while it is as momentary in nature. [247]

This is the argument of a Vijñānavādin — a concessional acceptance for the sake of arguing that the means of knowing is informative (*jñāpaka*) of an earlier unknown object.

मानात्मके ऽपि मेये ऽर्थे यद्यबद्धत्वमिष्यते ।
अज्ञातत्वापनुन्मानात्किमन्यदिति कथ्यताम् ॥२४८॥

If, in respect of the object to be known which is of the nature of the knower (lit. a means of knowing), it is held that it cannot be known, then let this be told: What else is there, apart from the means of knowing, (so that it is capable of) removing the unknownness (of the object to be known)? [248]

This is in answer to the Buddhist concessional argument stated in the preceding verse.

स्वतो वा परतो वेदमज्ञातत्वं भवद्भवेत् ।
स्वतश्चेत्तत्तमोवत्स्याज्ज्ञातत्वं रज्जुसर्पवत् ॥२४९॥

This character of being unknown would be either self-established or established by another (means). Then, if it is self-established, it would be (ever) accompanied by (lit. possessed of) darkness¹ (and) the character of being known (would be) like that of the serpent in a rope. [249]

¹That is, what is *ajñāta* would ever remain so.

²It means: it would be false apprehension.

अथान्यतस्तदज्ञातं किंरूपं वस्त्वतीर्यताम् ।
मानादवगतं तच्चेन्मैवमव्यतिरेकतः ॥२५०॥

Now, if (it is held that) it remains unknown owing to another (factor), let it be told me as to what form it¹ has? And

if it is (said to become) known by some means, let it not be said so, for it does not exist apart (from the thing). [250]

This has a reference to the fourth alternative: *na cobhayam* mentioned in verse 222 above. It means: the object of knowing remains unknown owing to non-knowing and also becomes known owing to knowing — not on account of its own nature!

¹It means: the object of knowing, viz. Reality.

अन्वयव्यतिरेकाभ्यां यथोक्तो ऽर्थः प्रसिध्यति ।
ताभ्यां विना कुतो ऽज्ञायि त्वेवंरूपमितीर्यताम् ॥२५१॥

The object which has been so far discussed gets ascertained by the method of Anvaya and Vyatireka¹ (and) from what other than these two (viz. Anvaya and Vyatireka) is known such a form (of object) — tell me. [251]

This is the explanation of the verse 250. The theory of an opponent does not establish the nature of Reality. This method is not applicable to the means of ascertaining the nature of Reality. AnSS reads *tvevaṃ rūpam* (!)

¹Cf. see our book [Vol.1:1982] Introduction, for the method of Anvaya and Vyatireka.

न चेह वास्तवं रूपं तदध्यासेन बाध्यते ।
रज्जुसर्पीधिया लोके न रज्जुरिति धीवृत्तिः ॥२५२॥

And further, here,¹ the real form of the thing is not stultified by a superimposition (of anything on it). In this world, the knowledge 'this is a rope' is not anywhere concealed² by the knowledge 'there is a serpent' in the place of a rope.

[252]

This verse refers to two possible views regarding the nature of the object which is not known: Its unknownness is (i)imaginary, or (ii)real. The first possibility has not to be considered at all! The second is answered by the whole verse.

¹That is, in *vyavahāra*.

²That is, stultified.

स्वसंवित्त्वमात्रे च न तमःसंभवः क्वचित् ।
तथाभ्युपगमे तस्य नापनुत्तिः कुतश्चन ॥२५३॥

And, there cannot be any time¹ a possibility of ignorance when the object to be known is held to be what has the nature of mere sentience of one's own; for, that view being accepted, there cannot be its stultification on account of anything.² [253]

According to SP, this refers to the view of the Yogācāra Buddhists, incidentally.

¹ = *kvacit*.

²Or, for any reason.

दुर्बलानां विरुद्धानां बलवद्विरपाक्रिया ।
विरुद्धैरेव दृष्टा सा तदैकात्म्ये कथं भवेत् ॥२५४॥

It is noticed that removal¹ of the weak in opposition is effected only by the strong ones (who are) opposed (to them). How can that² be in the case where there is uniqueness of that³?

[254]

It seems that the verse refers to the view that real ignorance is removed by some sudden knowledge of Reality; but this does not have to be answered since the generally accepted maxim is not relevant upon matter in hand.

¹That is, setting aside or disproving.

²This refers to *apākriyā* explained in note 1.

³It means: self-illuminating Reality or sentience.

बाध्यबाधकयोर्योगः स्वशक्त्यनपहारतः ।
यो ऽन्यथा संगतिं ब्रूते चर्मवद्वेष्टयेत्स खम् ॥२५५॥

Whatever connection we notice between *bādhyā* and *bādhaka* knowledges occurs on account of the non-removal of their own essence (i.e. strength); (and, therefore) he who holds that

the connection (between unknownness and knownness) can exist in some other way would be trying to wrap the sky with some skin.¹ [255]

¹It refers to an impossible task. A skin does not lose its capacity to cover something and the sky also does not get covered (i.e. does not lose its expanse) — yet the connection between the two as the wrapper and the wrapped is not at all possible.

नच जाड्यातिरेकेण ह्यविद्या काचिदिष्यते ।
अविद्यां गमयित्वेति श्रुतितो ऽप्यवसीयताम् ॥२५६॥

Ignorance¹ (or any absence of proper knowledge) is not understood (to be) apart from (some) non-sentience. Let this be concluded also from the Śruti 'Having dispelled (i.e. overcome) ignorance ...'. [256]

This verse adduces one more argument for holding any association of the unknownness of the real with sentience.

¹It literally means: non-sentience; but the second line refers to it as *avidyā*.

²Cf. BU 4.4.3: *evam evāyam ātmedaṃ śarīraṃ nihatya avidyāṃ gamayitvā anyam ākramam ākramyātmānam upasaṃharati*.

अज्ञातं न यथा मानान्मिथ्याधीसंशयौ तथा ।
न्यायः पुरोदितः सर्वो यस्मादस्ति तयोरपि ॥२५७॥

As what is unknown does not get established by any means of knowing, so also do not wrong knowledge and doubt get established (by any means of knowing), since, in the case of these two also, there holds good the method of thought¹ already stated. [257]

¹Namely, the object to be known (in this case) is not such as can be established by any means of knowing.

अपि सर्वप्रमाणानामज्ञातत्वादिसिद्धये ।
नेक्ष्यते ऽन्यतमं मानं स्वतःसिद्धं न चापि तत् ॥२५८॥

Further, not any one of all the means of knowing is capable of establishing the unknownness etc.¹, so also that, viz. any of the means, is not self-established. [258]

This is to argue that *avidyā* is not self-established (*svataḥsiddha*) either.

¹The word etc. refers to *mithyādhī* and *saṁśaya* mentioned in the preceding verse.

न तावदिह संभाव्यं प्रत्यक्षं तदसंभवात् ।

विषयेन्द्रियसंबन्धविरहात्तदसंभवः ॥२५९॥

Here (i.e. in this inquiry), the direct perception (of Reality) is just not to be considered (as the means of knowing it), since the possibility of direct perception cannot arise — (this) impossibility of that is owing to the absence of any connection between the object of reality and the sense-organs. [259]

Reference was made to the means of knowing (in verse 257 above). Therefore, there is yet further discussion whether that means is external (*bāhyapratyakṣa*) or mental (*mānasa*) or inferential. This verse is to deny the first alternative.

न च दुःखादिधीवत्स्याज्ज्ञातस्यैवानुभूतितः ।

प्रत्यक्षार्थवदेवैषा मिथ्याधीरनुभूयते ॥२६०॥

And (that unknown thing) would not be (possible) like the experience (i.e. awareness) of misery etc.¹ for the reason that there is experience of only that which is known. This knowledge, which is (according to us) false, is experienced entirely like an object of direct perception.² [260]

Here are discussed the second and third alternatives mentioned just before.

¹This is to say that *mithyādhī* is not imaginary.

²Experience is the result of some knowledge. At the most, the object known in that knowledge can be inferred from it, but not

anubhūti which is *pratyakṣa* 'direct perception'.

प्रत्यक्षादिफलं ज्ञानं कथं तस्य प्रमेयता ।
माफलं न च मेयस्थं क्रियाफलवदिष्यते ॥२६१॥

Knowledge¹ is the result (lit. fruit) achieved by direct perception etc. How can that have the character of an object to be known? The result of right knowledge is not taken to exist in the object to be known like the result of an action.²

[261]

¹Namely, the character of what is known (*jñātatva*).

²For example, the act of cutting results into a thing's division into two (at least); this division is seen in the thing cut.

अपि मानाभिसंबन्धो मेयार्थेनैव युक्तिमान् ।
नाफलस्य तु मात्रैव ह्यतो ऽन्यत्र वृथा श्रमः ॥२६२॥

And, further, it is reasonable to hold a relation of a means of knowing to only an object to be known. As against this, the result of knowing (has connection) indeed only with the known; (accepting it¹ to exist) elsewhere (than in the knower) would mean an effort (of knowing) for nothing.

[262]

¹That is, the result of knowledge.

माफलस्य तु मेयत्वे प्राप्नोतीहानवस्थितिः ।
प्रमाफलाभिसंबन्धः किंमान इति कथ्यताम् ॥२६३॥

But, (if it is accepted that) the result of knowledge has the character of an object to be known, then here follows *infinite regress*. It has to be explained¹ as to what is the means (that brings the awareness of) the relation between knowledge and its result.

[263]

¹It literally means: let this be pointed out.

इहापि चानवस्थेति नानुमातो ऽत्र युज्यते ।

न च रागादिसंसिद्धौ मानव्यापार ईक्ष्यते ॥२६४॥

Therefore, it is not proper to employ inference¹, since, here (in this case) also, there arises *infinite regress*. And, indeed, in the case of the rise of attachment etc. one does not expect any function of the means of knowing. [264]

¹Namely, to understand from the characteristic in the form of some effect (called the result) its relation to some means (which has produced it).

रागादेर्नापि चाभावो भावात्तदनुभूतितः ।
न च कश्चित्फले भेदो मेयमानप्रमातृषु ॥२६५॥

As for attachment etc. also, there is no non-existence of the same, as it proceeds from experience. And, in respect of a result, there is no difference (in relation to) the object of knowing, the means of knowing and the knower. [265]

मानकार्यं फलं चेत्स्यान्न स्यात्तन्मातृमानयोः ।
तदभावे च माभावात्कुतस्तत्स्यात्प्रमां विना ॥२६६॥

If the result¹ were (to be taken as) the effect (or product) of knowing (activity), then it would not exist in the knower and the means of knowing since, in the absence of them, there is the absence of knowledge. How could that (effect of knowing) follow (exist) when there is no knowledge? [266]

¹Namely, knowledge.

प्रमात्रादेरभावे च नाप्यभावः प्रमेष्यते ।
सुषुप्ते मातृपूर्वत्वात्सर्वमाव्यापृतेरिह ॥२६७॥

And, while there is the absence of the knower etc., one would not entertain non-existence to be *pramā*, because in deep sleep everything of knowing activity is preceded by a knower (etc.).¹

[267]

¹That is, even if there is no apparent activity of any knower there is a complete process of knowing.

न प्रत्यक्षानुमानाभ्यामतो ऽर्थापत्तितो ऽपि न ।
न हि दृष्टं श्रुतं वर्ते सार्थापत्तिः प्रसिद्ध्यति ॥२६८॥

It cannot be known by direct perception and inference, not also by *arthāpatti*, for *arthāpatti* cannot get established (lit. be effective) indeed without what is seen or heard. [268]

सादृश्यासंभवाच्चेह नोपमानस्य संभवः ।
मिथ्याज्ञानादिसंसिद्धौ न चाभावो ऽपि शङ्क्यते ॥२६९॥

Because there is no possibility of (there being) its¹ similarity (with any other thing); there is no possibility of any analogy (for knowing it). And (the idea of) its absence also cannot be entertained in respect of the experience of false knowledge etc. [269]

¹This means: of what is unknown.

अत्यन्तापूर्वदृष्टे ऽर्थे प्राङ्नाद्राक्षमिमं नगम् ।
प्रत्यभिज्ञायते साक्षाद्दृष्टपूर्वो यथा तथा ॥२७०॥

As in the case of an object which was never seen before (there arises only such awareness as) 'I have not seen this mountain.' and there arises the recognition, this one is like that as one had directly perceived earlier. [270]

This verse intends to point out how some unknown thing becomes known even if it cannot be established by any known means of knowing, its existence and non-existence.

न च मात्रादिसद्भावस्तस्यात्यन्तमदृष्टतः ।
न प्रमाणान्न चाभावात्प्रत्यभिज्ञात इष्यते ॥२७१॥

There does not exist any knower etc., for it is absolutely unseen; nor is there any recognised means of knowing¹; not can it be taken (as a thing to be) recognised just because of the non-existence (of any directly perceptible object).² [271]

This verse denies recognition of the unknown as implied by the preceding verse.

¹The NKL edition reads *na prāmāṇyāt* for *na pramāṇāt* of the AnSS edition. But NKL itself does not offer any help to decide if this is correct.

²Which is responsible for recognition as in the illustration of the preceding verse.

तस्मात्प्रमाप्रमाभासाप्रमाणानामशेषतः ।

स्वार्थानन्यप्रमाणात्स्यात्प्रसिद्धिस्तमसस्तथा ॥२७२॥

Therefore, (right) knowledge, what appears as knowledge¹ and absence of (right) knowledge — all of these can get established only on account of the unique means (of knowing) itself²; so also is darkness (i.e. *avidyā*) established (by that).

[272]

This is the conclusion: *avidyā* can be known only through experience, because it is not knowable by any accepted means of knowing and has the character which is not known (as similar to that of any other thing known); cf. SP: *ajñātātīvāder aprameyatīvād anubhavād eva taddhir ity upasamharati*.

¹ = *ābhāsa*.

²It means: the inner/the individual self which is that means.

आन्तरं मेयमाश्रित्य स्वतःसिद्धमनन्यमम् ।

भावाभावादिमद्विश्वं सर्वमेतत्प्रसिध्यति ॥२७३॥

All this universe¹ which is made up of existence and non-existence etc.² gets established only by resorting to the object to be known which is within (every being or thing), self-established, and having matchless knowledge. [273]

¹It means: the universe under discourse, viz. *mātr*, *meva*, *māna*

²The word etc. refers to their modifications (*parināmas*).

मेयार्थानभिसंबन्धान्न यथावस्तुधीरियम् ।

ज्ञातत्वात्तदभावो ऽपि प्रात्यक्ष्यान्नेष्यते स्मृतिः ॥२७४॥

[Verses 274 -280 discuss that false knowledge is established by experience in case knowledge does not correspond to the object.]

This knowledge of the thing, not arising in the absence of the contact (of intellect) with the knowable things and the absence of them,¹ is not taken as remembrance on account of their being known and directly perceptible.² [274]

¹That is, their character as non-essence.

²Hereby is discarded the Ākhyātivāda.

इदं रजतमित्येवंरूपं वस्तु न कुत्रचित् ।

न शुक्तौ रजतज्ञानं नेदंता रजते ऽस्ति नः ॥२७५॥

(There is) not anywhere a thing which is taken as 'this is silver.', for, there is no knowledge of silver in a shell and, for us, the character of being this thing (viz. thisness) does not exist in silver. [275]

An example of *mithyājñāna* is *idaṃ rajatam*. The questions raised are: This form (*rūpa*) qualified as it is, — does it belong to (i)the shell?, (ii)silver itself?, (iii)only the speaker's mind (*buddhi*)?, (iv)some other place?, or (v)some other moment? The second line answers the first two questions. The next verse answers the rest. This refers to the Anyathākhyātivāda.

तदन्यत्र द्वयाभावात्साक्ष्यादावपि नेष्यते ।

न नेहार्थावबोधो ऽस्ति मिथ्याज्ञानत्वकारणात् ॥२७६॥

Elsewhere than in those two (viz. silver and shell), (i.e.) where the two are absent, is it not taken to exist in the knower¹ etc.² also. Again, it is not that there is no knowledge of the

thing which has the nature of being the cause of false knowledge.³ [276]

¹That is, *buddhi*.

²The word etc. means: place and time.

³This is according to the Anirvacanīyakhyāti.

मिथ्याज्ञानादिसंसिद्धौ क उपाय इतीर्यताम् ।
सम्यग्धीतो ऽथ तत्सिद्धिर्न तस्या मेयसंगतेः ॥२७७॥

(The opponent remarks:) Let it be told as to what is the means of establishing this as false knowledge etc. (If¹ it is asked:) Is it established by (lit. from) right knowledge?², (then the answer is:) No, since that³ is related to (or associated with) what is to be known.⁴ [277]

¹This is to be understood thus: *atha ... cet*— this refers to the possibility of *mithyājñāna* being *mānasa pratyakṣa*.

²It means: knowledge of the thing as it is.

³It is *samyagdhī*.

⁴False knowledge cannot be associated with it (i.e. any object to be known)! For, if it were so, false knowledge would also be right knowledge — it would cease to be false.

मेयप्रमामृते कार्यं मानानां नान्यदिष्यते ।
न च सत्त्वादिमात्रेण रूप्यादिमितिसंभवः ॥२७८॥

No other purpose than the right knowing of the objects of knowing is expected of the means of knowing¹; and also there is no possibility of the knowledge of silver etc. by mere existence (of them) etc.² [278]

This further clarifies the thought in the preceding verse.

¹This presupposes an objection that even *mithyājñāna* could be an object of *samyagdhī*.

²This means the capacity of an existent shell which arouses the impression of its similar, viz. silver, and also its shining.

तस्यासाधारणात्मोत्थविज्ञानविषयत्वतः ।

तस्माद्रजतसंस्कारसंस्कृतात्स्वान्ततः स्मृतिः ॥२७९॥

That (false knowledge)¹ being an object of specified knowledge² that has arisen from what has the unusual nature³, there is a remembrance from that which has acquired the impression of silver etc.⁴ within.⁵ [279]

This is the reason for the statement in the preceding verse.

¹*idam rajatam iti jñānam.*

²Knowledge requiring subject-object relation (*prapañcajñāna*).

³This is not the knowledge of common experience.

⁴This is *bhrānti*. SP points out that this *mithyājñāna* cannot be considered as some kind of *anumāna*. It cites:

svīkāre vibhramāṇām syāt svīyasiddhāntabādhana /

anabhyupagame teṣām āśrayāsiddhir uddhatā //

Tattvapradīpikā p.63, lines 1-2. (*Tattvapradīpikā* = *Citsukhī* with *Nayanaprasādinī* of *Pratyagrūpa*. ed. by Raghunāth Kāshīnāth Shāstrī, Bombay: Nirnayasagar Press, 1931)

⁵There is no such cognition as 'This is like silver.'; but it must have been within and therefore the cause of *mithyājñāna*.

प्रथते ऽविकृतात्मैकनित्यदृष्टेः परात्मनः ॥२८०॥

ज्ञानज्ञात्रतिरेकेण तमस्यपि न विद्यते ।

मेयं वस्तु ततो ऽज्ञानं प्रत्यक्षं सप्रमातृकम् ॥२८१॥

False knowledge becomes evident on account of the highest Ātman which has ever the knowledge of himself as unmodified¹ (by anything else). [280]

An object of knowing does not exist as apart from knowledge and the knower even in darkness. Therefore, ignorance is an object of direct perception and has a knower (of it). [281]

¹That is, unaffected.

न हि संविदनारूढः प्रमात्रादिः प्रसिध्यति ।

संविन्मात्रैकयाथात्म्यात्प्रमात्रादेरनात्मनः ॥२८२॥

[Verses 281-299 discuss that ignorance along with the knower is established by experience.]

A knower etc. that has not mounted (=is not connected with) knowing does not get established for the reason that the true nature of knowing consists only in knowing itself, and also on account of the fact that the knower etc. are (but) the non-Ātman(s). [282]

This verse explains how while knowing the immutable Ātman there is existence (or need) of the knower etc. (*mātrādi*) which are declared as *jadapadārthas*.

ज्ञातो ऽयमर्थो ऽज्ञातो वा धीरियं कर्तृसंश्रया ।
स्मृतिः सा न यथावस्तु तेनासावप्रमोदिता ॥२८३॥

That this thing has become known or remained unknown — this knowledge has its basis in its agent and that (basis) is not memory¹ (of it) as the thing is; therefore, that is called ignorance. [283]

¹SP paraphrases *smṛti* as *bhrānti*, i.e. superimposed *karṭṛtvādi*.

न हि वस्त्वनुरोधयेतज्ज्ञाताज्ञातत्वलक्षणम् ।
रूपं वस्त्वपरिज्ञानसमुत्थं ज्ञातृसंश्रयम् ॥२८४॥

This form which is characterized as being known and/or unknown does not follow (=is not in accordance with) the thing (=Reality) as it is, it has (really speaking) arisen from the absence of the (right) knowledge of the thing and has the support in the knower¹. [284]

¹To whom the act of knowing is attributed.

ज्ञाताज्ञातविभागो ऽतः स्वतःसिद्धात्ममातृकः ।
संविदा ज्ञाततासिद्धिर्मितेरपि न मात्मना ॥२८५॥

Therefore, the division (of things) into known and unknown

has its origin in the self-established Ātman. It is on account of knowledge that its character (as a thing known) gets established; and knowledge also does not (get established)¹ by what is (called) right knowledge. [284

¹That is, become known as knowledge.

वस्त्वज्ञातं समुद्दिश्य तत्प्रमित्सन्ति मानिनः ।
ज्ञातत्वकार्यतश्चातः सिद्धं तत्फलतो ऽथवा ॥२८६॥

Keeping in view the unknown thing, those (persons), who have the means of knowing, seek to know it (and) (that unknown thing) gets established by its being known (by some means of knowing) or by its being the effect¹ (of its knowledge by some means of knowing it) but (ca) that is not so;² (it is known) by its being the result of experience. [286

The idea is: *jñātatva* and *ajñātatva* would belong to two moments of time and the Brahman cannot be said to be related to them. Therefore, only *anubhavagamyatva* has to be accepted.

¹*jñātatvakāryatvataḥ* is cryptic for *jñātvataḥ kāryatvataḥ* (ca).

²Cf. SP: *uktakalpadvayadūṣaṇadyotanārthaś cakāraḥ*.

यतो ऽज्ञातत्वसंसिद्धिर्ज्ञातत्वस्यापि चाञ्जसा ।
तत एव च मानत्वं संविदते न तत्त्रयम् ॥२८७॥

Since unknownness and also, of course, knownness (thus) get established smoothly, there follows from the same their being the means of knowledge; there cannot indeed be the three without the (real) knowing one. [287]

¹Cf. NKL: *ajñātatvam jñātatvam mānatvam ca*.

षष्ठगोचरवन्नेदमज्ञातत्वं समीक्ष्यते ।
न च प्रत्यक्षवत्सिद्धं स्वानुभूतिसमाश्रयात् ॥२८८॥

This character, viz. being unknown, is not considered to be like what is (within the scope of) the sixth (sense organ).¹

Nor does it get established like what is directly perceptible, since it has resorted to one's own experience. [288]

¹The object of the sixth organ means a non-existent object, for there is no sixth organ and also its object. See our book [Vol.1:1982] p.280.

प्रमात्रादिविविक्तार्थमनुभूयोत्थितस्ततः ।
नावेदिषमिति प्राह स्वानुभूत्यनुसारतः ॥२८९॥

A person, who has awakened from (sleep) after having experienced various objects, viz. the knower and others, as discrete (objects), says in accordance with his own experience 'I did not know.' [289]

¹This verse explains how, in deep sleep, one sees various objects only to find after waking that there was in reality nothing whatever experienced.

प्रमात्राद्युत्थितेः पूर्वं चिदन्यानन्वयात्तमो-
विशेषणां चिदेवैका स्वानुभूत्यैव गम्यते ॥२९०॥

Before the rise (from ignorance), with ignorance as its attribute, since there was no connection of anything else than sentience that persisted, there was the knower etc. which in reality was sentience itself, (and) that (sentience) becomes known by experience alone. [290]

This explains the difference between experience of Reality and experience even in the waking state.

आसीदिदं तमोभूतमप्रज्ञातमलक्षणम् ।
अप्रतर्क्यमविज्ञेयमित्येतत्स्वानुभूतितः ॥२९१॥
प्रथते यः स्वयं साक्षादज्ञातत्वादिभूमिषु ।
स प्रमेयः स्वयंज्योतिः प्राक्प्रसिद्धेः प्रमातृतः ॥२९२॥

This (world) was (only) darkness, unknown, not having any characteristics (which would help any inference), beyond any

guess, unknowable¹ — this (is known as true) from experience. [291]

The one, who himself continues to be present, in (all) those states of unknownness etc., is to be known; the self-illuminated, (as existent even) before there was awareness of the knower etc. [292]

¹This is Manu's statement; *Manusmṛti* 1.5a-c.

एष एवानवगतः स्वतो ऽवगततत्त्वकः ।
एतावन्मात्रसंख्याप्तेरज्ञानादेः पुरा मितेः ॥२९३॥

Before right knowledge (occurs), this one whose real nature is understood from itself is itself unknown on account of ignorance etc. whose extent is only this much. [293]

यथेह घटविज्ञाने घटाकारो ऽनुभूयते ।
ज्ञातृतत्साक्षिणौ चैवं नाज्ञाने साक्षिणो ऽपरम् ॥२९४॥

As here¹ the shape of a pitcher is experienced (i.e. becomes known) when there is a specified knowledge² about the pitcher, so there are not in ignorance a knower and the experience of it (existing) apart from the experiencer himself. [294]

¹That is, in our worldly dealings.

²Namely, information known.

अज्ञातत्वं न मानेभ्यो ज्ञातत्वं तत्कृतं यतः ।
तैरप्यज्ञातता चेत्स्यात्कातिशीतिर्मितेर् भवेत् ॥२९५॥

Because the nature of being unknown (in the case of the Ātman) does not (originate from) the means of knowing and the nature of being known is caused (i.e. effected) by the same, therefore, what could be the excellence of the right knowledge if with those means of knowledge also the Ātman continues to have unknownness? [295]

स्वानुभूत्यैव संसिद्धेर्नाज्ञातः खरशृङ्गवत् ।

संवित्तेरप्यसंबोधात्स्यात्तन्मानव्यपेक्षिता ॥२९६॥

(Therefore,) the Ātman gets established on account of its own experience; it is not unknown like the horn of a mule; in the case of knowledge also, there is absence of it before (its rise) and there will be its dependence on the means of knowing it. [296]

This stresses the need of hearing etc. the Śruti-sentences like *tat tvam asi* (NKL).

प्रत्यक्षकुम्भवत्साक्षात्सुषुप्ते ऽनन्यबोधगम् ।
आत्मा ह्यात्मानमैकात्म्यादात्मना वेत्यकारकः ॥२९७॥

As (in the waking state one knows) directly an actually existent, so also does one know (the pitcher) in deep sleep which arises from none elser¹. But, it is the Ātman indeed who, because of its uniqueness, knows itself (even though) it does not have any means of knowing (lit. activity). [297]

¹In both the states, viz. waking and sleep (signifying dream), one sees an object through the so-called means of seeing.

पराक्प्रवणया दृष्ट्या धीस्थो ज्ञो ज्ञानमात्मनि ।
व्योमकाष्ण्यादिवत्तज्जं सम्भावयति न स्वतः ॥२९८॥

The knower¹, who has resorted to intelligence acquires (lit. sees) in himself some knowledge by an eye, which is directed outwards, as (they see) the dark of the sky etc.² and its products; but indeed not (what comes from) itself.³ [298]

The idea of the verse is to explain our everyday experiences of objects. These proceed when sentience has on it the superimposition of an individual, his sense-organs etc. — this superimposition is *anādisiddha* for that individual.

¹This refers to sentience (within an individual).

²Cf. the Śruti passage *devātmaśaktim svaguṇair nigūḍhām ...* (Śvetāśvataropaniṣad 1.3).

³Cf. Śaṅkara's Adhyāśabhāṣya (p.39): *apratyakṣe 'py hy ākāṣe bālās talamalinatādy adhyasyanti.*

नैवाज्ञानं मृषाज्ञानं संशयज्ञानमीक्ष्यते ।

प्रत्यक्प्रवणया दृष्ट्या जाग्रत्स्वप्नसुषुप्तिषु ॥२९९॥

Not indeed is ignorance, false knowledge, or doubtful knowledge obtained by the eye which has turned within,¹ in (all) the (three) states of waking, dream and deep sleep. [299]

This answers away a doubt if the Self also could be ignorant like the Self with the superimposition of a body etc. on it.

¹Or, the seer within, viz. the Self.

न सुषुप्तगविज्ञानं नाज्ञासिषमिति स्मृतिः ।

कालाद्यव्यवधानत्वाच्च ह्यात्मस्थमतीतभाक् ॥३००॥

[Verses 300-319 discuss that the knowledge arising after deep sleep in the form 'I did not know the real things for all this time.' is not dream.]

The specified knowledge¹ obtained in a dream, (which is later) memory² in the form 'I did not know.'; for it has no delimitation³ by time etc. (and therefore) does not belong to the Ātman. [300]

¹*vijñāna* which has the usual complex of a knower etc. (*mātrādi*).

²Memory of the basic *ajñāna*, since every experience of the state(s) of waking (etc.) gets sublated — basic *ajñāna* however gets sublated only after one has obtained the knowledge of the Self.

न भूतकालस्पृक्प्रत्यङ्गं चागामिस्पृगीक्ष्यते ।

स्वार्थदेशः परार्थो ऽर्थो विकल्पस्तेन स स्मृतः ॥३०१॥

The individual self does not belong to (lit. touch) the past and not also to the future¹. On that account,² an imaginary thing which exists in itself (lit. own region) is remembered

by him as another object.

[301]

The verse points out that the concepts of time and place are rooted in the superimposition of a body etc. (*adhyāsa*) on the Ātman.

¹Cf. *Kāthopanīṣad* 2.14: *anyatra bhūtāc ca bhavyāc ca*.

²That is, owing to *adhyāsa*.

न हि प्रत्यक्षविज्ञानादतीतत्वं समीक्ष्यते ।
न चानागतता मेये मिथ्याज्ञानमतो भवेत् ॥३०२॥

Indeed the quality of belonging to the past (in the case of things) is not grasped by direct perception and so also the character of not having come into existence in respect of an object to be known¹. And, therefore, there would be false knowledge.

[302]

¹That is to say: The Ātman that was never produced or will never be produced (*aja*).

यत्तत्त्वकं स्याद्यद्वस्तु न तत्तदतिवर्तते ।
नाज्ञातरज्जुजः सर्पो रज्जुमुल्लङ्घ्य वर्तते ॥३०३॥

Of whatever nature a thing is, from that it cannot be apart.¹ A serpent, born of a rope (whose nature is) not known, does not exist beyond the rope.

[303]

¹Or alternatively, that it does not abandon (lit. transcend) it.

तस्मात्तिसृष्ववस्थासु ह्यागमापाधिनीष्वजः ।
स्वतो ऽलुप्तदृशा यस्मादात्मात्मानं सदेक्षते ॥३०४॥

Therefore, in all the three states which arise and end, (there exists) the unborn, since the Ātman forever sees itself by its sight which is never losing (lit. lost).

[304]

देहान्तरेष्वपि तथा ह्यन्योन्यव्यभिचारतः ।
प्रत्यक्प्रत्यय एवैकः सर्वत्राव्यभिचारवान् ॥३०५॥

In the same way, even in different bodies which are discrete from one another, the experience of the inner/individual self is but one,¹ (and) everywhere certain. [305]

¹That is to say: There is no means by which one could ascertain that the Ātman in each body is different.

चैतन्यमात्ररूपं सत्प्रथते ऽज्ञानमात्मनि ।
प्रत्यक्कूटस्थनिष्ठत्वात्तद्वाध्यं कारणेतरत् ॥३०६॥

In the Ātman there exists (lit. extends) knowledge (even) being in (or having) the form of mere sentience (and) since it permanently exists in the individual self, the cause and the other¹ are stultified by it.² [306]

¹That is, effect.

²The cause and effect relation belong to worldly dealings — for the Ātman has remained ever unchanged (*kūṭhastha*).

नैवं तत्स्यात्स्वकार्येषु तेषां ताद्रूप्यहेतुतः ।
जडस्वभावतो नान्यद्रूपं कार्येषु गम्यते ॥३०७॥

That would not have been so (as described before) for the reason that they¹ attain the sameness of nature with theirs. (This is so because) in respect of their own effects, there is not experienced a form (=nature) other than what is non-sentience. [307]

¹They refer to *kāraṇas* mentioned in the preceding verse — these are *indriyas*, *antahkaraṇa* etc., which assume the shape of their objects (*tadākārabhavana*).

एवं चेत्को ऽनयोर्भेदः कार्यकारणयोर्मितेः ।
अन्वयव्यतिरेकाभ्यां न जाड्यमतिवर्तते ॥३०८॥

If this be so, what difference is there in respect of the knowledge of the two which are the cause and the effect?

Non-sentience does not transgress the method of Anvaya and Vyatireka. [308]

It was shown that in respect of the inner self there is no means by which one could ascertain the difference between the cause and the effect. Now, in this verse, is stated that the difference arose only from ignorance.

कार्यकारणरूपाभ्यामतद्वत्तत्त्विका ततः ।
आत्माविद्यैव सर्वत्र प्रथते स्वात्मसाक्षिका ॥३०९॥

Therefore¹, in the form of the cause and the effect there extends everywhere ignorance about (the nature of) the Ātman which has (in reality) the nature of what does not have that (Ātman)², (and) has the Ātman as its experiencer (= witness). [309]

¹That is, because it is impossible to entertain the existence of the cause and the effect (as discussed before).

²Cf. NKL: *kāryakāraṇanirmuktātmatattvikā*.

नैवात्मना स्वभावेन स्वात्मानं लभते जडः ।
यतो ऽतः स्वार्थदेशः स स्वार्थश्चानन्यसिद्धिकः ॥३१०॥

Since the non-sentient does not of itself ever come into existence, possessing its nature; therefore, the region of its own nature and itself are not produced by another. [310]

स्वतो बुद्धे कुतो ऽविद्या तामृते संसृतिः कुतः ।
इति बुद्धात्मतत्त्वस्य गीरियं न तमस्विनः ॥३११॥

How could there be ignorance in the case of the one (who is) self-awakened and how could there be transmigratory existence without ignorance? This is the speech about (i.e. description of) the one who has known its own true nature (to be) thus, (and) not of one who is possessed of darkness.

[311]

यथोच्छिन्नात्ममोहस्य निहोतुरपि निहुतिः ।
एवं प्रागात्मसंबोधादद्वयैकात्म्यनिहुतिः ॥३१२॥

As in the case of the one whose ignorance about the Ātman is destroyed there follows the concealment of the one who conceals,¹ so, before knowing about/of the Ātman, there remains the concealment of the uniqueness of the (Ātman) without duality. [312]

¹This refers to *avidyā* and its effect(s).

काकोलकनिशेवायं संसारो ऽज्ञात्मवेदिनोः ।
या निशा सर्वभूतानामित्यवोचत्स्वयं हरिः ॥३१३॥

For an ignorant one and for the knower of the Ātman, true existence is like the night for a crow and an owl¹ (respectively); Lord Hari himself has declared (this) in the words *yā niśā* ...² [313]

¹A crow sleeps at nightfall, while an owl begins its activity then.

²This is *Gītā* 2.69.

तस्मान्न वास्तवं रूपं तद्धवान्ताद्यपनोदकृत् ।
तस्मिन्सत्येव मोहादि व्युत्पत्तेः प्रागभूद्यतः ॥३१४॥

Therefore, it is not the real form which is the remover of darkness etc. because ignorance etc. existed before that (true) knowledge (of the inner self occurred) even while it existed. [314]

This verse reaffirms the usefulness of *mānameyādivyavahāra*, i.e. ignorance/*adhyāsa*, before and for the rise of the knowledge of the nature of the Ātman.

प्राणारूढमेवैतद्वन्त्यविद्याद्यशेषतः ।
ब्रह्मविद्विरतो यत्नात्प्रमाणमिह संश्रितम् ॥३१५॥

This (sentience), which has resorted to the means of knowing

etc.,¹ fully destroys ignorance etc. Therefore, in this respect, the knowers of the Brahman² have resorted to the means of knowing with effort. [315]

¹This refers to *tattvamasyādivākyavicāra* which involves *mātrādi* (i.e. *śāstrīya vyavahāra*).

²That is, the seekers of the knowledge about the Brahman.

उताविद्वानिति तथा प्रश्नपूर्वं स्वयं श्रुतिः ।
निर्णेनेक्ति स्फुटं वस्तु यथोक्तेनैव वर्त्मना ॥३१६॥

And, further, the Śruti itself clearly decides the truth by first asking the question *utāvidvān*¹ in the way we have stated before.² [316]

¹Cf. *Taittirīyopaniṣad* 2.6 and 2.7 for the relevant question and answer.

²Namely, by the accepting sentience as having the means of ascertaining what is Reality.

आत्मासाधारणार्थोत्थरूपमात्रसमाश्रयात् ।
तन्मानमपि मानत्वं लभते न तु केवलम् ॥३१७॥

(It is) on account of resorting only to that form which has become (=arisen) from the unique nature of the Ātman that the means of knowing it becomes a means (of removing ignorance) but not by itself.¹ [317]

¹That is, when unaided by sentience. This is asserting once again how only sentience is responsible for the acquisition of right knowledge about the Ātman.

तावन्मात्रैकयाथात्म्यप्रत्यगात्मत्वकारणात् ।
पराक्षिवव न भेदो ऽत्र मात्रादेः प्रत्यगात्मनि ॥३१८॥

On account of their having only that, viz. the inner self in its true nature as their cause, the knower etc. do not have mutual distinction among themselves with regard to (knowing)

the inner self as (they have the same) in respect of the objects outside. [318]

स्वचिदाभासवन्मोहपृष्ठेनैवेति कर्तृताम् ।
कूटस्थो ऽपि स्वतः प्रत्यङ्नात्मवृत्तव्यपेक्षया ॥३१९॥

The individual self, even though immovable (by nature), becomes the agent, (riding) on the back of ignorance which has the form of the appearance of sentience¹, that is its own, and not by resorting to its own activity. [319]

¹This is the state of having lost the original state, owing to ignorance.

सर्वधीविक्रियासाक्षिण्येवं सिद्धे स्वतो दृशौ ।
कार्यं ये ऽनुभवं प्राहुर्वाच्यं तैः कार्यसाधनम् ॥३२०॥

[There now follows up to verse 348 a discussion whether *anubhava* is an effect.]

When the experiencer, the witness of all the modifications of intellect, himself a seer — is thus established, those, who have described experience as (some) effect, should (i.e. have to) declare (what) is productive of the effect¹. [320]

¹The effect is 'knowledge of the sentience' and the cause 'its means'.

न जायते ऽज इत्यादि विज्ञानघन इत्यपि ।
कृत्स्नपुंविक्रियोत्सारि वाक्यं कस्मादुपेक्ष्यते ॥३२१॥

(Our question is:) Why ignore the statements of the Śruti (i) *na jāyate*,¹ *ajah*,² and (ii) *viññānaghanah*³ ..., which set aside (= disregard/reject) all modifications of Puruṣa? [321]

The verse makes the following argument: *anubhava* of the sentience (as an individual) is not merely without any cause but also is opposed to the thought in the Śruti.

¹Cf. *Kāthopanīṣad* 2.18.

²Cf. BU 4.4.2.

³Cf. BU 2.4.12.

प्रमात्राद्युत्थितेः पूर्वं कारकं दुर्लभं मितेः ।
तदभावात्क्रियाभावस्तामृते कार्यता कुतः ॥३२२॥

Before the rise of a knower etc., it is difficult to get (=posit) any means (of knowing); then, in the absence of it, there would be absence of any action and, without that (=action), how could there be anything like an effect? [322]

एतच्चानुभवादेव भवताप्यभ्युपेयते ।
कारकव्यापृतिस्तत्र निपुणेनापि नेक्ष्यते ॥३२३॥

And this is accepted by yourself also on the basis of (=from) experience only; (for) in that connection, no activity of any means is seen by even a well-observing person. [323]

अकुर्वत्कारणं चेत्स्यात्तद्वत्कार्यं सदा भवेत् ।
कार्यैतरानवसितिः संभूतौ युगपत्तयोः ॥३२४॥

If there is a cause which is not functioning, an effect would be always there likewise, and there would not be any decision with regard to making between an effect and a cause, while they are existing together.¹ [324]

¹This refers to the case when the cause and the effect co-exist.

विरुद्धानेककार्याणामेकस्मादेव कारणात् ।
अकुर्वतः प्रसक्तिः स्यादकुर्वत्त्वाविशेषतः ॥३२५॥

There would follow the contingency that mutually opposed defects would result from one and the same (non-operative) cause, since there is no specific non-operation (for their rise). [325]

This refers to the case when there is a sequence, of course,

first the cause and then the effect.

अथ कुर्वदभीष्टं तत्तत्कार्यं तर्हि भण्यताम् ।
अकार्यं कारकमिति सुप्तोन्मत्तप्रभाषितम् ॥३२६॥

If it is accepted that that (viz. a cause) is operative, then it has to be pointed out as to what is its effect. (For, a statement) that there is a cause without any effect would be the speech of one who is either in sleep or mad. [326]

मयाध्यक्षेण प्रकृतिः सूयते सचराचरम् ।
इति श्रीमत्सुरेशस्य वाक्यमेवं समञ्जसम् ॥३२७॥

(In this situation) the statement of the Lord of gods: 'As the superintending one, I urge Prakṛti (consisting in) the movable and the immovable.'¹; becomes only thus reasonable. [327]

¹Cf. *Gītā* 9.10

प्रमेये च क्रियायां च प्रमाणे ऽथ प्रमातरि ।
तच्छक्त्युपाधिहेतुत्वाज्जायमानेव चिद्ध्रुवा ॥३२८॥

In respect of an object of knowing, an activity (of getting to know), the means of knowing, and also the knower, it is the immovable sentience, that is, as it were, being born (variously) on account of the limiting adjuncts consisting in its own power. [328]

यथा सद्व्यतिरेकेण न किञ्चिद्वस्तु सिद्ध्यति ।
तद्वदव्यतिरेकेण घटाभावाद्यसंभवात् ॥३२९॥

As nothing apart from the existent¹ can get established, so also the absence of a pot etc. as non-apart from it cannot (get established).² [329]

¹Namely, *cit* mentioned in the preceding verse, the Brahman.

²Be it *bhāva* or *abhāva* of the discrete objects of the world.

it cannot have an existence independent of *cit*, i.e. unless through *adhyāsa*.

न हि सद्व्यतिरेकेण त्वसद्वस्त्वपि सिद्ध्यति ।
तस्यापि सदपेक्षत्वात्किमन्यत्स्यात्सता विना ॥३३०॥

Indeed not even a non-existent thing gets established¹ as apart from the existent thing,² since even that (non-existent thing) has the expectancy of³ some existent (thing). Therefore, what else could there be than the existent? [330]

¹That is, can get established.

²Namely, *cit*.

³That is, depends on.

यथैवं संविदते ऽसन्नैति संभावनामपि ।
सदप्यभावरूपं वा तद्वदव्यरितेकतः ॥३३१॥

As this is so, without knowledge¹ no non-existent could possibly come to exist and likewise even an existent², having the nature of non-existence, (could not come to exist), if apart from it¹. [331]

¹That is, the existent or *cit*.

²Namely, that which is accepted in the world as existent.

अविद्या वाथ तत्कार्यं नाभेदान्नातिरेकतः ।
सिद्धायते यतो ऽतः स्यादविचारितसिद्धिकम् ॥३३२॥

Since ignorance or its effect would not get established as non-distinct or apart from it¹, therefore, let that be (considered) as established without reasoning.² [332]

¹This is sentience, *cit*.

²Or, call it indescribable (*anirvācyā*).

नीलोत्पलदलाभं खं द्विरेफोदरवत्तमः ।
अविचारितसिद्ध्येवं तमस्तज्जं च वीक्ष्यताम् ॥३३३॥

That sky is of the colour of the petal of a blue lotus (and) darkness is like the belly of a bee gets established without any reasoning, in the same way, let this darkness and its effect (also) be seen (as established). [333]

The verse refers to two popularly known instances of two figures of speech which involve attribution of some property of one thing to another — these are, in Vedāntic context, instances of *adhyāsa*; they help to establish the Vedāntic doctrine of *adhyāsa*. Incidentally, this refutes the Bhāṭṭa view that the sky has blue/dark colour.

स्वमहिम्ना न संसिद्ध्येत्स्वतो ऽनवगतात्मकम् ।
भावाभावौ न वस्त्वेति प्रत्याख्यातं यदात्मना ॥३३४॥

What is by nature not known in its own right would not get established by its own extent (=greatness). Existence or non-existence (of any worldly thing) is not an existent thing, since this thing gets disproved (as real) owing to (the existence of) the Ātman. [334]

तस्मादजायमानैव जायमानेव लक्ष्यते ।
अनूभूतिस्तदज्ञानहेतूत्थानात्मजन्मना ॥३३५॥

Therefore, experience which, though it does not arise (lit. it is born), appears like arising (i.e. being born) on account of the rise of (i.e. awareness of) the non-Ātman which springs from the ignorance about that (=Ātman, viz. *cit* above); [335]

तद्विनाशे ऽपि तत्साक्ष्याद्विनश्यन्तीव लक्ष्यते ।
यतो ऽतः कार्यतां तस्या नेश्वरो ऽपि प्रसाधयेत् ॥३३६॥

since, when that¹ gets destroyed, it² also gets destroyed on account of the character (of the Ātman) as the seer. Therefore, even the Lord would not be able to establish experience as an effect. [336]

¹This means: the awareness of the non-Ātman.

²This means: the experience.

स्वात्मसाक्षिकतां मुक्त्वा भावाभावात्मवस्तुनः ।
यतो ऽसिद्धिरतः प्रत्यङ्गनिरस्ताखिलविक्रियः ॥३३७॥

Since a thing of the nature of existence and non-existence cannot get established except with the capacity of one's own Ātman (=the inner self) to be the witness, therefore, the inner self is completely devoid of all modifications. [337]

कार्यं सर्वं यतो दृष्टं प्रागभावपुरःसरम् ।
तस्यापि संवित्साक्षित्वात्प्रागभावो न संविदः ॥३३८॥

Since every effect is seen¹ to have a preceding non-existence of it and that (preceding non-existence) has the character of being witnessed by the knowing one², there is (therefore) no non-existence of *samvid* 'the knowing one'. [338]

The argument is: The thing and its *prāgabhāva* are both knowables for *samvid* which exists now and which existed before also. Therefore, it is ever-abiding.

¹ = *samvidavagata*.

² *samvid* = *cit*.

प्रमात्राद्यतिरेकेण ह्यसंविदितरूपकम् ।
मेयं सिद्धमिहैवैतन्न वेदादन्यतः क्वचित् ॥३३९॥

Only here (=in the *samvid*) is established this object to be known¹, (viz. that) whose form (etc.) is *indeed* not known as apart from its knower etc.; not from anywhere else than in the Veda (viz. Vedānta). [339]

¹It means: the uniqueness of the Ātman.

वस्तुवृत्तमपेक्षयैतन्न स्वतः परतस्तमः ।
तज्जं वा तत्तमो ऽपेक्ष्य ह्यव्याकृतगिरोच्यते ॥३४०॥

With this happening of things in view it is that this darkness

(=ignorance) or its effect (gets established) in its own right or on account of another (and), therefore, only with that darkness kept in view it is expressed by the word *avyākṛta*.

[340]

This verse rejects the *anirvācyatā* 'indescribability' of *tamas* on the ground that it was mentioned in the Śruti as 'difficult to explain (ineffable) — *durnirūpa*'. NKL points to earlier statement to this effect in SV 176.

चिदाभासं तमो ज्ञेयं नाज्ञासिषमितीक्षणात् ।
जगज्जनिस्थितिलया एवंभूते परात्मनि ॥३४१॥

Darkness is to be known as the appearance (or semblance) of sentience, since there is the experience 'I did not know.'. Origin, sustenance and merger of the world (can be postulated) when the highest Ātman has been (accepted as) such. [341]

तमःप्रधानः क्षेत्राणां चित्प्रधानश्चिदात्मनाम् ।
परः कारणतामेति भावनाज्ञानकर्मभिः ॥३४२॥

The highest, who is principally darkness and who is principally sentience, becomes the cause respectively of the fields¹ and of those who have sentience as their nature² on account of (thier earlier) impression(s), ignorance and actions. [342]

This verse explains why there originated this varied world (*viṣamā sr̥ṣṭi*).

¹They means: inanimate things, or bodies.

²These are beings or knowers of the fields.

यावत्कार्यगतं किञ्चिद्भावनादि समीक्ष्यते ।
तमसा बीजभूतं तद्व्यज्यते संस्कृतेः पुनः ॥३४३॥

Whatever (viz.) impression(s) etc. belonging to the effect is seen here becomes the seed and it becomes revealed again thanks to darkness because of the impression(s). [343]

This refers to *pralayasarga*.

तमो नियामकं यस्मात्स्वकार्याणां तदन्वयात् ।
ऊर्ध्वं व्यक्तेः पुरा चैव तदेवातो नियामकम् ॥३४४॥

Since ignorance is the determining factor in respect of its products — for it continues to be in them — therefore the same (viz. ignorance) is the determining factor after the products have become manifest and also before (they appear).

[344]

नियम्यं कार्यमापेक्ष्य नियन्तैष तमोवधिः ।
तेष्वेव चित्स्वभावः सन्साक्षितां प्रतिपद्यते ॥३४५॥

In those very (products), this controller which has the nature of sentience attains the character of a witness, limited as it is by darkness, with respect to the products to be controlled.

[345]

निगीर्णं सज्जलकादि दुष्टं देशं यथाश्रयेत् ।
भावनाज्ञानकर्माणि तथा यान्ति तमस्विनम् ॥३४६॥

As wasps which have sucked (blood in one part of the body) resort to another (part), that is a spoilt part¹, so do impressions, ignorance and actions accompany (lit. go to) one who is possessed of darkness.

[346]

¹SP and NKL quote: *samprktād duṣṭaśuddhāśrāj jalūkā duṣṭa-śonitam, ādatte prathamam haṁsaḥ kṣīram kṣīrodakād iva* (untraceable).

उत्पत्तिस्थितिनाशेष कारणं नातिवर्तते ।
कार्यं सर्वं यथा लोके तथेहाप्यवसीयताम् ॥३४७॥

Let this be concluded that in origin, sustenance and destruction (of the world) the cause does not vary, but as all products in this world (vary) here also (do impressions, ignorance and actions vary) as well.

[347]

कार्येष्वपि च सर्वेषु कर्तृत्वं यत्समीक्ष्यते ।
अस्यैव तद्विजानीयादतः सर्वकृदुच्यते ॥३४८॥

And the agency which is seen here in respect of all these activities, that may one know as of this one only; therefore he is called the maker of all (of them). [348]

तत्तेज ऐक्षत इति तेजोदेहं सदेव तु ।
उत्तरोत्तरकार्याणां श्रुत्या स्रष्टृतयोच्यते ॥३४९॥

In the Śruti *tat teja aikṣata* that cause itself, being the existent and having *tejas* as its body is declared as the creator of every subsequent product. [349]

तथा संवर्गविद्यायामप्राणः प्राणतां गतः ।
अध्यात्ममधिदैवं च प्राणवायुतयोदितः ॥३५०॥

So (also), in the (context of) the lore of *saṁvarga*,¹ (some) non-*prāṇa* (i.e. non-sentience) has become *Prāṇa* with reference to the embodied self, and with reference to the deities, the same is called *prāṇavāyu* 'the vital breath'. [350]

¹Cf. CU 4.3.3.

नामोपक्रममाशान्तामरनाभिनिदर्शनात् ।
ओतप्रोतं जगत्सर्वं प्राण एवोपदिश्यते ॥३५१॥

By citing the example of the spokes and the hub (of a wheel), the Śruti has declared that this whole world, (whose description has) the beginning (in) *nāma* and the end in *āśā*, is only *Prāṇa*, fully woven by it length-wise and cross-wise. [351]

¹Cf. CU 7.1.3; 7.15.1.

तथैवाकाशशब्देन तत्र तत्रैष एव तु ।
तदेतत्सत्यमिति च सबीजः पर उच्यते ॥३५२॥

So also, only this one, the highest one, is mentioned at various places by the word *ākāśa*¹ and in the passage *tad etat satyam*² as possessing the seed (of creation). [352]

¹Cf. CU 1.9.1.

²Cf. *Muṇḍakopaniṣad* 1.2.1; 2.1.1.

प्राणो ह्येष सर्वभूतैरिति चाथर्वणे वचः ।
प्राणबन्धनं सोम्येति सर्वकारणमुच्यते ॥३५३॥

There is a statement of the *Ātharvaṇopaniṣad* also: *prāṇo hy eṣa sarvabhūtaih*¹ and in (the Śruti passage) *prāṇabandhanam somya*² (also) it is described as the cause of everything. [353]

¹*Muṇḍakopaniṣad* 3.1.4.

²CU 6.8.2.

एष स्वकार्यं संश्रित्य नानाभेदान्प्रपद्यते ।
स्वोत्सृष्टतोयधाराद्यैर्वैश्वरूप्यं रविर्यथा ॥३५४॥

Having resorted to its own effect (which is varied) this (Ātman) transforms into a number of varied objects as the sun transforms into variety of forms by means of (i.e. having resorted to) showers etc.¹ of waters sent down by itself. [354]

¹The word etc. refers to a mirror and other bases of reflections.

प्राणभूतादिजन्मैव जन्मात्मन इहोच्यते ।
वियतौ ऽजन्मनो जन्म यथा कुम्भादिजन्मना ॥३५५॥

Here¹, the origination of *Prāṇa* and *bhūta(s)* etc. itself is called the origination of the *Ātman* (=individual self), as the birth of ether, which does not (really) become born (is described as such) on account of the pitcher etc. having a birth. [355]

¹That is, in scriptures and among people.

एतस्माज्जायते प्राणो मनः सर्वेन्द्रियाणि च ।
नाव्याकृतं परादन्यदागमादवगम्यते ॥३५६॥

From this (Ātman) are born Prāṇa, *manas* and all sense-organs and the unmanifest is not anything else than the highest (Ātman) — (so) is known from the Śruti. [356]

स्वकार्याण्येव संश्रित्य मृदसाधारणा यथा ।
सामान्यरूपतामेति स्वकार्यैः कारणं तथा ॥३५७॥

As clay is uncommon (i.e. single), with reference to its own effects, so also does a cause become the common characteristic with (i.e. by becoming) the effects. [357]

तदेतन्नित्यमज्ञानं तज्जकालाद्यनाप्लुतेः ।
सर्वकालानुवर्त्येव लोके नित्यमितीर्यते ॥३५८॥

This ever existing ignorance is described in this world as eternal and existing at all times on account of the non-destruction of time etc. which are its effects. [358]

नित्यस्यानुच्छित्तिरिति चोद्यस्यापि न संभवः ।
नित्याज्ञानसमुच्छित्तौ यतः प्रामाण्यमाश्रितम् ॥३५९॥

There is no possibility of also the hypothetical argument, viz. whatever is eternal does not get destroyed ..., since in respect of the destruction of this eternally existing ignorance is accepted the authority (of the Śruti). [359]

प्रमान्तरैरविज्ञातं प्रमेयं वस्तु भण्यते ।
तत्तत्त्वमात्रं तत्स्थध्वान्तनुन्मानमुच्यते ॥३६०॥

What is called (by us as) the object of knowing (in the Vedānta) is what is unknown by any other (forms of) right knowledge (and) what exists only in the reality (described therein¹) and removes the darkness residing in it² is called the means of knowing that (object). [360]

¹This refers to the Vedānta.

²This means: by superimposition.

आगन्तु चेदिहाज्ञानमनिर्मोक्षः प्रसज्यते ।
पुरेवानागतं भूयो नैष्यतीत्यत्र का प्रमा ॥३६१॥

If ignorance (is considered) here as adventitious, there would result the contingency of the absence of liberation. What right knowledge could there be, viz. holding that it will not come (once) again — the one which had not come (earlier)? [361]

¹Namely, the Ātman and the world.

कार्यकारणरूपेण द्वयोरव्यतिरेकतः ।
गुणप्रधानरूपेण कार्यकारणगीरियम् ॥३६२॥

On account of the non-difference of the two¹ apart from (that they are) the cause and the effect, (the Śruti makes) this statement of the effect and the cause in the form of the subordinate and the principal. [362]

न कारणं विना कार्यं न कार्यं कारणं विना ।
अन्योन्यापेक्षतः सिद्धेर्विनान्योन्यं न तद्वयम् ॥३६३॥

There cannot be any cause without an effect (and) there cannot be any effect without a cause. Thus, on account of their existence with mutual expectation, the pair of them does not exist as either without the other. [363]

भावनाज्ञानकर्मादि कार्योत्पत्तेः प्रयोजकम् ।
तद्वृत्तौ तदभिव्यक्तेस्तत्स्वापे ऽव्याकृतात्मता ॥३६४॥

Impressions, ignorance and actions etc.¹ is conducive to the rise of the effect.² There is the manifestation of that (viz. the effect), when that (viz. impressions³ etc.) has manifested. (Therefore,) during the sleep of that³, there is the character of (the world) being unmanifest. [364]

¹The word etc. stands for Īśvara, atoms, Prakṛti, effort etc.

²This refers to the various beings principally.

³That is, impressions etc. not manifesting.

स्वकर्तृरुपभोगार्थं कर्माव्याकृतरूपकम् ।
व्यक्तीभूतं प्रयुङ्क्ते क्षमाबग्न्यन्तं साधनत्रयम् ॥३६५॥

When activity, which had not manifested for its own agent's enjoyment, becomes manifest, then it produces (lit. employs) the triad of the means (of activity), viz. earth, water and fire.

[365]

वाय्वाकाशौ समाश्रित्य पूर्वेषां साधनात्मता ।
त्रयाणामप्यतस्तानि वाय्वाकाशौ प्रयुञ्जते ॥३६६॥

The nature of being the means (of further manifestation/production) which obtains in the earlier (mentioned) three also, after they have resorted to wind and ether. Therefore, (it is held that) they¹ produce them².

[366]

¹Namely, impressions etc.

²That is, earth, water and fire.

प्रयोजकप्रयोज्यत्वं कर्मसाधनयोर्भवेत् ।
स्वस्वामिभोगसिद्ध्यर्थमेवं व्याकृततेष्यते ॥३६७॥

The character of being the impeller (i.e. productive force) and being what is to be impelled would belong to activity and its means (respectively). Thus is accepted (lit. expected/desired = explained) the manifestedness (of the activity etc.) for (securing) the enjoyment of their own master.

[367]

व्यक्तिर्नियतकालैव जगतो ऽव्यक्तरूपिणः ।
अन्तर्यामिकृता चैषा नान्यः संभाव्यते प्रभोः ॥३६८॥

(This) manifestation (of the world), which is (in the early stage) unmanifest, is bound by a definite time (for it) and it is caused by the inner self. Nobody else than that master (viz. the

Ātman = the inner self) can be (the cause/producer). [368]

वायोरिव प्रवृत्तिः स्यात्तथा चैवोपसंहतिः ।
निर्निमित्तात्तथैवेशाज्जगज्जन्मस्थितिक्षयाः ॥३६९॥

As there would be (produced) an activity (in a body) as well as its cessation by the wind, even when there is no cause for it, in the same way, origin, sustenance and destruction of the world (would be produced) by the master. [369]

This sets aside the possible notion that the creator is an embodied being.

न प्रयोज्यो यदा भोगः स्वाम्यर्थः कर्मणस्तदा ।
हित्वा कर्माखिला व्यक्तीरविशेषात्मतां व्रजेत् ॥३७०॥

When there is no enjoyment for the master to be produced by activity (etc.), then, having given up activity and all these manifestations, (the master) goes (back) to the state of being qualitless. [370]

अस्य द्वैतेन्द्रजालस्य यदुपादानकारणम् ।
अज्ञानं तदुपाश्रित्य ब्रह्म कारणमुच्यते ॥३७१॥

Having resorted to that ignorance, which is the material cause of this magic show of duality (=manifest or patent to each one of us), it is said that the Brahman is the cause of it. [371]

अज्ञानमात्रोपाधित्वादविद्यामुषितात्मभिः ।
कौटस्थ्यान्निर्द्वयो ऽप्यात्मा साक्षीत्यध्यस्यते जडैः ॥३७२॥

The dull-witted, whose (consciousness of the) Ātman is overpowered (lit. robbed) by ignorance on account of (their Ātman having) the limitation of ignorance alone, superimpose the character of the witness on even this Ātman who is unique, being immovable (=unchangeable). [372]

ज्योतिषामपि तज्ज्योतिरसद्दीपरिमोषणात् ।
तमोरूपमिवाभाति भानुर्नक्तंदृशामिव ॥३७३॥

It is the light of all lights on account of (its) removing (lit. robbing away) the false notion (and yet) it appears to be having the form of darkness as the sun (seems to be dark) for those who see (only) at night. [373]

¹Cf. BU 4.4.16.

मोहतत्कार्यनीडं यत्कूटस्थाभासरूपकम् ।
ज्ञानं तदविनाभूतः परः साक्षीति भण्यते ॥३७४॥

The highest one, who is not separated from the knowledge¹, which is the nest (basis/support) of ignorance and its effect and has the appearance of the immovable (Ātman), is described (in the Śruti) as the highest witness.² [374]

¹This is *vijñāna*.

²Cf. Śvetāśvataropaniṣad 6.11.

इदं तत्सर्ववेदेषु यथाभूतार्थवित्तये ।
सदेवेत्यादिभिर्वाक्यैः कारणं ब्रह्म गीयते ॥३७५॥

This is that known Brahman, (the one which is) declared (lit. sung) in all the Vedas, in such statements as *sad eva ...*¹ in order that there is (on the part of the hearers) the acquisition of the knowledge of Reality as it is. [375]

¹For instance, CU 6.2.1: *sad eva somyedam agra āsīd ekam evādvitīyam ...*

सर्वज्ञः सर्वशक्तिश्च सर्वात्मा सर्वगो ध्रुवः ।
जगज्जनिस्थितिध्वंसहेतुरेष सदेश्वरः ॥३७६॥

This Lord is ever omniscient, omnipotent, self of all, present in all, immovable, and the cause of origin, sustenance and destruction of the world.¹ [376]

Cf. *Muṇḍakopaniṣad* 1.1.9.

यः पृथिव्यामितीशो ऽसावन्तर्यामी जगद्गुरुः ।
हरिर्ब्रह्मा पिनाकीति बहुधैको ऽपि गीयते ॥३७७॥

The Lord, who is thus, on this earth¹ the one existing inside, (everyone) and the teacher of the world, is, though one, variously sung as Hari, Brahmā, Pinākin (etc.) [377]

¹Or, is it possible that Sureśvara cites *yaḥ pṛthivyām* ... as the *pratīka* of some verse to the effect that the Lord is *īśo 'sav* ...'?

कूटस्थस्य न साक्षित्वं द्वितीयासंगतेर्भवेत् ।
नाशिनो ऽपि न साक्षित्वं नाशेनाव्यतिरेकतः ॥३७८॥

The immovable could not have the character of a witness unless it has association with another; so also the perishable cannot have the character of a witness, on account of its not being apart from destruction.¹ [378]

¹That is to say: A perishable is associated with some other which is perishable.

अज्ञानमात्रहेतौ तु सर्वमेतत्समञ्जसम् ।
कर्तृत्वाद्यन्यथाज्ञानहेतुत्वादात्मरूपिणः ॥३७९॥
प्रत्यग्रूपस्य स्थास्नुत्वाज्ज्ञातुर्मोहेन चान्वयात् ।
कूटस्थस्यापि साक्षित्वमागमापायिनं प्रति ॥३८०॥

But all this is reasonable when it is (accepted that the world) is caused by ignorance alone, since agency etc. of what is the inner self has false knowledge as the cause for it; [379] (and) since what is of the nature of the inner self is perennial (lit. ever-abiding) and has association with ignorance; even the immutable has the character of a witness with respect to what originates and perishes. [380]

आत्मात्मवत्त्वसंबन्ध आत्मात्माज्ञानयोर्मतः ।

परो ऽविवेको भूतानामात्माविद्येति कथ्यते ॥३८१॥

The relation between the Ātman and what has the Ātman is held to be that which obtains between the Ātman and ignorance about the Ātman. It is (therefore) that the highest (degree of) non-discrimination among (i.e. about one and the other of) the elements is called ignorance about the Ātman.

[381]

ईशादिविषयान्तं यत्तदविद्याविजृम्भितम् ।
मायां तु प्रकृतिं विद्यान्मायिनं तु महेश्वरम् ।
इति वेदशिरःसूक्तिस्तथा चोदघृष्यते स्फुटा ॥३८२॥

Whatever (is described as) beginning with īśa 'Lord' and ending with (various) objects is (but) the effect of ignorance (because) the most predominant statement of the Veda, which is extremely clear, is expressed in the passage 'One should know Prakṛti as Māyā and Maheśvara as māyin.'¹

[382]

¹Cf. Śvetāśvataropaniṣad 4.10.

दैवी ह्येषा गुणमयी मम मायेति च स्मृतिः ।
वैष्णवी खल्वियं मायेत्यपि लोके ऽपि गीयते ॥३८३॥

Also there is the Smṛti text 'This divine Māyā is but mine, which is made up of three qualities, ...'¹ That this Māyā which in fact belongs to Viṣṇu is sung even in the world.

[383]

¹Gītā 7.14

मानान्तरानधिगतं मेयं तावन्निरूपितम् ।
स्वानुभूत्यनुसारेण प्रत्यङ्मात्रसतत्त्वकम् ॥३८४॥

So far (=thus or to begin with), what is to be known and is not known by any other means of knowing is explained according to one's own experience, viz. as consisting in only the inner self together with its true nature.

[384]

¹That is: *ātmana evā jñātatvam ajñātatvam cānubhavaikagamyam iti 'tad dhedaṃ' ityādinoktam* (NKL).

एतन्निदानमधुना मिथ्याज्ञानं निरूप्यते ।
यतो बिभ्यति भूतानि संसारानर्थलक्षणात् ॥३८५॥

Now is discussed the cause of this,¹ viz. the false knowledge about (that one) having the character of the undesirable end, viz. the transmigratory existence, which (all) the beings fear.

[385]

¹ Cf. SP: *karmavyutpattyā jñānaśabdo viṣayam api viṣayīkaroty etad ajñānam vastu*.

यदेव नित्यमज्ञानं मिथ्याज्ञानं तदेव तु ।
कारणैतरूपेण तयोरव्यभिचारतः ॥३८६॥

Only that, which is ever ignorance about the (nature) of the Ātman, is false knowledge alone, since they, in the form of the cause and the effect, cannot be apart from each other.

[386]

हेत्वन्तरानपेक्षं सत्तदव्याकृतरूपकम् ।
व्यक्तां स्वयमेवैति निमित्तं नास्त्यसंहतम् ॥३८७॥

That existent, which has not manifested itself in any form, does not depend on any cause other than itself (for becoming manifest). Of itself, it becomes manifest. There is no cause, (for it is) not brought in.¹

[387]

¹Activity of any *indriyas* etc. which were mentioned earlier are not necessary for *avidyā* or *ajñāna* which can by itself create the world. Also, at the time of *pralaya*, activity of *indriyas* was completely withdrawn.

सुषुप्तादुत्थितो राज्ञः स्वयमेव यथा तथा ।
जग्धाशेषजगन्मूर्तेरव्यक्तादव्याकृतिर्मुहुः ॥३८८॥

As a king awakens from his sleep, of himself, so also there is the manifestation (once again) from the unmanifest of one that had devoured the entire (collection of) worldly things.

[388]

अनिश्चिता यथा रज्जुरिति न्यायोपबृंहितम् ।
स्फुटार्थं गौडपादीयं वचो ऽर्थे ऽत्रैव गीयते ॥३८९॥

It is only in this context (sense) that there is the clear statement of Gauḍapāda made (lit. sung) – and it is accompanied by an example – viz. ‘As a rope, not definitely ascertained, ...’

[389]

Cf. Gauḍapādakārikā 2.17:

*anīcitā yathā rajjur andhakāre vikalpitā /
sarpadhārādibhir bhāvais tadvad ātmā vikalpitaḥ //*

तदिदं नामरूपाभ्यामनामकमरूपकम् ।
एवं व्याक्रियताज्ञानहेतुमात्रव्यपाश्रयात् ॥३९०॥

Thus, this one, having no name and no form, was thus manifested by name and form by resorting to only one cause, viz. ignorance.

[390]

अभिधानाकृतिर्नामशब्देनेहाभिधीयते ।
अभिधेयाकृतिस्तद्वद्रूपमित्युपदिश्यते ॥३९१॥

Here the word *nāma* expresses what is called *abhidhāna*¹. In the same way, the word *rūpa* is used (lit. enunciated) for conveying what is described.²

[391]

¹Namely, *śabda* ‘a word, signifier’.

²Namely, *artha* ‘meaning, the signified’.

एवं द्वाभ्यां प्रकाराभ्यामीशो व्याकृतजन्मनाम् ।
व्यवहाराय पर्याप्तो न त्वव्यक्तात्मना यतः ॥३९२॥

Thus, by these two ways is the master capable of the dealing

related to the things that have become manifest; since he is not (able to do so) in his own unmanifest form. [392]

This verse clarifies the idea that *nāmarūpābhyām* (dual form) can be related to multitude of objects created because the two members of the compound word necessarily signify two linguistic categories.

नाम्नः सामान्यमात्रस्य त्वसाविति समीरणम् ।
विशेषनाम्ना संयोज्य देवदत्तादिनोच्यते ॥३९३॥

The word *asau* is expressive of a name which has only general (character); it is uttered after connecting it with a proper name such as Devadatta. [393]

This explains BUB: *devadatto yajñadattaḥ iti vā nāmāsyā ity asaunāmāyam*.

¹Cf SP: *nāmasamānyam devadattādinā viśeṣanāmnā saṃyojya*.

तद्वद्रूपस्य सामान्यं रूपमित्युपदिश्यते ।
तदुपात्तविशेषं सच्छुक्लकृष्णादिनोच्यते ॥३९४॥

In the same way, the general character of a form is expressed by the word *rūpa* (and) that, which has assumed particularity, is mentioned (lit. uttered) as white, black etc. [394]

एवेत्यवधृतावेतदात्मवृत्तव्यपेक्षया ।
आत्माविद्यासमुत्थाभ्यामेव व्याक्रियते परः ॥३९५॥
न तु विध्वस्तनिःशेषप्रत्यगज्ञानतद्भव-
सामान्यभेदैकात्म्याख्यतदनन्यप्रमात्मना ॥३९६॥

In the use of the restriction by the word *eva*, (it is emphasised that), the highest (Ātman) is differentiated only by (name and form which have) arisen from ignorance about (the nature of) the Ātman — (yes, only) after keeping in view the unique nature of the knowledge which is called oneness of collectivity and particularity that have arisen from that one who has destroyed the entire ignorance about the inner self.¹ [395-396]

¹Cf. verse 208 above; the thought in that verse is here clarified further.

आदावव्याकृतं तत्त्वं नामरूपक्रियात्मना ।
स्वयं तद्व्याकृतिमगाद्यथैतर्हि तथैव तत् ॥३९७॥

As, in the beginning, Reality which was undifferentiated, became differentiated as having the nature of name and form; so that is even today.
This is the meaning of *tad idam*. [397]

नामरूपाभ्यामेवेति न समुच्चयनिश्चितौ ।
समस्तव्यस्तरूपाभ्यां लोके ऽपि व्याकृतिर्यतः ॥३९८॥

The words *nāmarūpābhyām eva* are not for determining that there is the ensemble of the two (responsible for the creation of the world), since there is in the world the manifestation (of things by both of these) in collected and differentiated forms. [398]

This is to say that differentiation of the worldly things can be either by name or by form or by both of them together.

जातितो बधिरस्येह व्यक्तिः स्याद्रूपमात्रजा ।
जात्यन्धादेश्च नाम्नैव तथा चोभयथाप्यसौ ॥३९९॥

As appearance (of the things) would be for one, who was born deaf, only in respect of their form and for one, born blind etc.¹, merely in respect of name (etc.), so also is the Ātman (manifest) in two ways: (That is) by name and form (only). [399]

This explains the thought in the preceding verse.

¹Cf. NKL: *ādipadena utkhātanetrasamgrahaḥ*.

अज्ञातात्मैकहेतूनां मिथोपेक्षात्मनां श्रुतौ ।
नेयत्तास्तीह तत्त्वानामानन्त्यान्न क्रमस्तथा ॥४००॥

Here (in the world of things), which have only the unknown Ātman as their cause, there is not any limit in respect of hearing about such things as have the nature of expectancy of one another¹ and also there is no specific order in them because of their infiniteness. [400]

This verse explains why there is no mention of the number and order of the things differentiated among themselves.

¹That is, being dependent on.

प्रक्रियानियमो नापि पुंव्युत्पत्तिप्रधानतः ।
प्रतिश्रुति विगीतिश्च प्रक्रियाणां समीक्ष्यते ॥४०१॥

So also there is not any definite process (of creation meant in the Śruti statement) for the reason that importance (is accepted only) of the knowledge of the Puruṣa (=Ātman); also in every Śruti text, there is noticed varied exposition (lit. singing) of the processes (of creation)². [401]

This rests on an objection, arising from the preceding verse, that there is no definite form of 'creation'.

¹This mention of the Ātman as Pum (=Puruṣa) is significant in the context of the name of the Brāhmaṇa, viz. Puruṣavidha Brāhmaṇa.

²*prakriyāṇām vigitiḥ* is for *prakriyāṇām vigīṭayah*; so also *samīkṣyate* for *samīkṣyante*. SP points out: *kvacid ākāśādikā sṛṣṭiḥ kvacid agnyādikā kvacid akramaiveti vipratipattiḥ* and also refers to the reason for it, viz. *sṛṣṭer avivakṣitatva*.

यया यया भवेत्पुंसां व्युत्पत्तिः प्रत्यगात्मनि ।
सा सैव प्रक्रियेह स्यात्साध्वी सा चानवस्थिता ॥४०२॥

By whichever (of the processes of creation) there might (dawn) on men the knowledge about the inner self; each process (among them) would, in this context¹, hold good (and) that would not be firmly established which refer to creation. [402]

This verse presupposes a question: Which among these various statement in the Śruti regarding creation [cf. note 2 on the preceding verse] should be considered as authoritative? The answer is implied: Not any of them, since creation is merely imagined; this becomes clear from the next two verses.

¹That is, in these Śruti texts.

²That would be contradicted by some other.

उद्धृतिस्थितिहानीनां न क्वचित् संभवो यथा ।
मुख्यां वृत्तिं समाश्रित्य तथोदके ऽपि वक्ष्यते ॥४०३॥

As (explained here that) there is at no time (*na kvacit*) any possibility of origin, sustenance and dissolution (lit. loss) (of the world), when we resort to the primary purport (lit. function) (of the Śruti passages), so will it be explained in the later portion as well. [403]

न जायते जन्यते वा नापि हन्ति न हन्यते ।
तमःसंवृतदृष्टीनां षड्विकारादिवीक्षणम् ॥४०४॥
यदर्थं सर्वशास्त्राणां प्रवृत्तिरतिविस्तरा ।
आत्मज्ञानावतारार्थः सर्वशास्त्रसमुद्यमः ॥४०५॥

That is not born, nor is it produced; neither it kills, nor does it get killed; (it is only) on the part of those whose sight is wrapped by darkness that there is seeing (viz. the thought) of six modifications etc.¹ [404]

(The word He in 'He has entered here.' is that) for the explanation of which² there is an extensive activity of all³ Śāstras — (indeed) the effort of all Śāstras⁴ is for introducing the knowledge of the Ātman . [405]

Verse 405 presents what is expected by the word *saḥ* in *sa eṣa iha praviṣṭaḥ*. It explains *yadārthaḥ sarvaśāstrārambhaḥ* in BUB.

¹SP points out that the word etc. refers to the entire *anātmavarga* 'all the objects which are non-Ātman'.

²*yadartham* (adv.) replaces *yadārthaḥ* (adj.) in BUB. It can be translated alternatively as: for explaining the meaning of which. That is, for the explanation of which.

³The word all signifies all the different systems of philosophy, Vedic and non-Vedic.

⁴NKL only refers to the Śāstras of 'Vātsyāyana etc.', but offers no comment. Yet, it is interesting to note Madhusūdhana Sarasvatī on *Mahimnastotra* verse 7: *kāmaśāstram apy āyurvedāntargatam eva ... tatra vātsyāyanena pañcādhyāyātmakam kāmaśāstram prañītam, tasya ca viṣayavairāgyam eva prayojanam, śāstroddīpitamārgenāpi viṣayabhoge duḥkhamātraparyavasānāt*. Also see verse 408 below.

विरोधः सर्वशास्त्राणां स्वाभिधेयव्यपेक्षया ।

निवृत्त्यर्थे ऽविरोधित्वादत एतत्समीरितम् ॥४०६॥

Mutual opposition among all Śāstras (occurs) owing to (their giving prominence to) their own subject matter; (but) on account of (their) being non-opposed to the purpose, viz. cessation of transmigratory existence, therefore this¹ is stated (in the Bhāṣya). [406]

¹Namely, BUB: *yadarthah sarvaśāstrārambhah*.

स्वत एव यतः पुंसां प्रवृत्तिः स्वार्थसिद्धये ।

तत्रानुवादि शास्त्रं स्यान्ननिवृत्तावेव तन्मितिः ॥४०७॥

Because activity of men is of itself for the achievement of what is desired by themselves, the Śāstra (merely) follows that (lit. is only repetitive in that respect); but the knowledge (acquired) from that (ends) only in withdrawing (from activity). [407]

The verse proceeds from this idea: While the Śāstras prescribe various activities towards some purposes of men, they are only following men's desires — they are to be performed for some result, which cannot, therefore, be permanent. Therefore, the Śāstric prescriptions are in reality towards the purpose of withdrawing from attachment etc.

अपि वात्स्यायनादीनां शास्त्राणामुक्तहेतुतः ।

प्रामाण्यमविरुद्धं स्यादैकात्म्यज्ञानजन्मने ॥४०८॥

In the case of the Śāstra(s) of Vātsyāyana (etc.) also, their authority is unopposed owing to the reason (already) stated; viz. (their teaching is) for the rise of the knowledge of the Ātman.¹ [408]

¹Cf. note 1 on verse 405 above.

प्रवर्तमानः पुरुषः शास्त्रोद्दीपितवर्त्मना ।
प्रवृत्तिविषयं दुष्टं दृष्ट्वातो विनिवर्तते ॥४०९॥

A man proceeding to activity by a path illumined (for him) by Śāstra, recedes from it on seeing the object towards which is his activity (directed) as affected by impurity. [409]

This clarifies how Śāstras propounded by Vātsyāyana and others lead one to cessation from activity described in them. Cf. the remark of Madhusūdhana Sarasvatī mentioned in verse 405 note 1 above. SP has a longish explanation with citations, to the same effect, viz. *śāstrāntarāṇy api ... brahmaṇi paryavasyantīti bhāvaḥ*.

अनित्यदुःखशून्यत्वं पदार्थानां ब्रुवन्स्फुटम् ।
बुद्धो ऽपि रागाद्युच्छित्तौ यतते नात्मनिहुतौ ॥४१०॥

Even the Buddha attempts towards (i.e. preaches to bring about) the destruction of attachment etc., declaring clearly that objects of desire are impermanent (and also causes of) misery, and void; (and thus) he does not (attempt) for concealing (the nature of) the Ātman.¹ [410]

This verse shows how Sureśvara views the Buddha's Nihilism. That is in reply to an opinion expressed in *nairātmyamārgam adhi-gamya bhavanti muktāḥ tasmād asāv atīsayena vicāryate 'tra* (cited by SP-untraceable). Also, *yathāha: sarvajñavacanārtho nāma kṣaṇi-kanairātmyādicāturārthysatyatattvaparijñānena sakalasamsāraduḥkha-nivṛttyākhyāḥ paramapuruṣārtha iti* (cited by SP).

¹That is, negating the Ātman. NKL points out: *nirākartur*

ātmatvena tannirākaraṇāsiddheh.

त्याग एव हि सर्वेषां मोक्षसाधनमुत्तमम् ।
त्यजतैव हि तज्ज्ञेयं त्यक्तुः प्रत्यक्परं पदम् ॥४११॥

All the Śāstras verily hold only renunciation (of desires) as the best means towards (achieving) liberation and, therefore, one who renounces alone can find (lit. know) it; for the highest one is the inner self of the renouncer.¹ [411]

This emphasises the unity of all Śāstras in holding renunciation (of desires) as the means to liberation. Thus, any possible notion regarding Digambara Jainas' opposition is averted.

¹ = SV 215. SP under this explains: Liberation implies knowledge (of Reality). Also, the second line of the verse is intended to set aside the notion that (ritual) activity can be the means to liberation, for it has differentiation of things as its basis.

एकवाक्यत्वतो तद्वा ऐकात्म्यज्ञानजन्मने ।
वेदशास्त्रस्य कृत्स्नस्य तथा पूर्वमवादिषम् ॥४१२॥

Or rather, the entire Vedic Śāstra is for (giving) rise to the knowledge of the uniqueness of the Ātman on account of its having (only) one purport of it; so have I declared before¹.

[412]

This is another interpretation of BUB: *yadarthah sarvaśāstrā-rambhah.*

¹ Cf verse 401 above.

प्रमाणानि च शास्त्राणि तत्प्रामाण्यं न चान्यतः ।
अज्ञातात्मावबोधित्वात्तथा पूर्वमवादिषम् ॥४१३॥
यस्मिंश्चाविद्ययाध्यासः संसारानर्थलक्षणः ।
स्वाभाविक्या कृतो मिथ्या श्रुत्यादौ रजतादिवत् ॥४१४॥

Śāstras are authoritative and their authoritativeness is not from anything else¹, for they are informative about the Ātman that is not known before; so have I declared before.² [413]

(That Ātman) on which there is superimposition that has the characteristic of the undesirable (end, viz.) transmigratory existence, is caused by the natural (i.e. beginningless) ignorance as (also by the false superimposition of) silver etc. on a shell etc.³ [414]

¹Supply: (than the teaching about the uniqueness of the Ātman).
Cf. *Kāthopaniṣad* 1.2.15: *sarve vedā yat padam āmananti*.

²Cf. verse 405 above.

³Cf. *Adhyāśabhāṣya* (p.32): *sarvathāpi tv anyasyānyadharmāva-bhāsatām na vyabhicarati*.

ननु सामान्यविज्ञानविशेषाज्ञानसंश्रयात् ।
जातरूप्यस्मृतेर्लोके मिथ्याज्ञानं प्रसिद्ध्यति ॥४१५॥

Indeed one might say:¹ In this world, false knowledge can occur on account of the remembrance of gold (which originates) from one's resorting to (some) general (characteristic of it) (and) ignorance of some particularity of some object. [415]

¹The objection to accepting the superimposition of non-Ātman on the Ātman proceeds from the following reasons: Absence of any *sāmānya* and *viśeṣa* as related and also the remembrance (i.e. memory) of an object that was seen earlier.

यत्राध्यासो यदध्यस्तं भेदसिद्धौ तयोर्मृषा ।
ज्ञानं जगति संसिद्धं सा चैकात्म्ये ऽतिदुर्लभा ॥४१६॥

There is in this world known (lit. established as existent) false knowledge for establishing the difference between two things, viz. that on which there is superimposition (of another) and that which is superimposed (on it). But¹ that² is extremely difficult (to find/obtain) in respect of the uniqueness of the Ātman. [416]

This argument proceeds on the ground that every superimposition is based on existence of differences, but they do not exist if one

accepted *aikātmya*.

¹*ca* is literally 'and', here meaning 'but'.

²This is for *sā* referring to *saṃsiddhi* 'getting established or known' (of *mithyājñāna*) in contrast with *mṛṣājñānam saṃsiddham*.

समस्तव्यस्तमैकात्म्यं येषां चापास्तभेदकम् ।
चोद्यमेतत्समानं स्यादुभयोरपि पक्षयोः ॥४१७॥

This objection is also in the case of (to be held against) those for whom the uniqueness of the Ātman consisting in totality as well as severality (of things) and (also such) as has cast off these distinctions. In the case of both the views, (the objection) is the same. [417]

The argument is extended, i.e. directed towards also those who hold *bhedābheda* in respect of Reality.

न नः परिहृतेनार्थश्चोद्येनानेन कश्चन ।
प्रत्यङ्मोहैकहेतुत्वात्सर्वानर्थमृषामतेः ॥४१८॥

(The Siddhāntin answers:) No. We have nothing to do with any matter which is set aside¹ by this objection, on account of² (our) opinion that all the undesirable things are false and having the cause, only in ignorance about the inner self. [418]

¹In Māyāvāda, the three causes of *adhyāsa*, which are earlier referred to, are not accepted and therefore the objection is untenable.

²That is, because of the strength in (our) opinion ...

अज्ञानमेव बाध्यं नो मानस्येह यतस्ततः ।
तच्चोद्यपरिहारो ऽतः क्रियते नाफलत्वतः ॥४१९॥

Since here (i.e. in this inquiry) ignorance (about the knower¹) alone is to be set aside by knowledge², therefore, there is no refutation, by this,³ of the objection to that (knowledge), that being purposeless. [419]

¹That is, the Ātman.

²It means: which is not apart from the knower.

³*ataḥ* 'by this argument'. SP: *ataḥ aprāptaparāmarśī* (?)

मिथ्याज्ञानातिरेकेण नान्यदज्ञानमिष्यते ।

येषां तान्प्रति चोद्यं स्यान्न त्वज्ञातात्मवादिनाम् ॥४२०॥

The objection could be (valid) in the case of those who hold that there does not exist ignorance apart from false knowledge; and (*tu*) (it would) not (be valid against) those who hold the (usually) unknown Ātman (as Reality). [420]

नन्वज्ञानमवस्तुत्वात्कथं संसारकारणम् ।

मिथ्याज्ञानस्य वस्तुत्वात्तदेवास्तित्वह कारणम् ॥४२१॥

तथा च युक्तिमद्यत्नान्महद्भिरपि भाषितम् ।

अप्रामाण्यं पुनस्त्रेधेत्यत एतत्सुसंस्थितम् ॥४२२॥

Now a question is asked: How can ignorance, being a non-real entity, be the cause of transmigratory existence? (Therefore), since false knowledge is an entity, is it to be (considered as) the cause here (in respect of transmigratory existence)? [421] So also is it stated, with specific effort and with the support of reasoning, by even the great; viz. unauthoritativeness is three-fold¹? Therefore, this (objection) is well-adduced. [422]

In this verse, the objector points out how he derives support for his argument from the learned authority Kumārīlabhaṭṭa according to whom, unauthoritative knowledge has three forms: *ajñāna*, *mithyājñāna* and *saṁśaya*.

¹Cf. *Ślokovārtika* 2.54:

*aprāmāṇyam tridhā bhinnam mithyātvājñānasamśayaḥ /
vastutvāt dvividhasyātra sambhavo duṣṭakāraṇāt //*

SP and NKL quote *Ślokovārtika* 2.55:

*avijñāne tu doṣāṇām vyāpāro naiva vidyate /
kāraṇābhāvatas tv evaṁ tatsiddham nas taduktivat //*
[NKL reads *vijñāne*]

किं भोः सदपि मानेन वस्तु साक्षान्निरस्यते ।
तस्मिन्निरस्ते किं शेषं यस्मिन्मानस्य मानता ॥४२३॥

(The Siddhāntin replies:) Tell me, if an existential entity, which is directly perceptible, is also discarded (by you). If it is discarded, what remains there and, in respect of what is there authoritativeness of the means of knowing? [423]

व्यञ्जकत्वात्प्रमाणानां मेयाभिव्यक्तितो ऽपरम् ।
कार्यान्तरं न संभाव्यं नितरां वस्त्वपाक्रिया ॥४२४॥

Since there is revealing (i.e. manifestation/making known) an object to be known by a means of knowing on account of its nature (or natural function) of revealing (it), there cannot be thought of any other purpose (or effect) of the same, be it superior or inferior¹. Indeed, negating an existential object (is altogether impossible). [424]

This is one more argument: A means of knowing cannot negate an existential entity.

¹Cf. *aparam nikṛṣṭam utkrṣṭam vety arthaḥ na tv aparāśabdo 'nyaviśayo 'ntarāśabdena punarukter iti draṣṭavyam* (SP).

मिथ्याज्ञानं कथं वस्तु न हि मिथ्येति वस्तु सत् ।
मिथ्या तद्वस्तु चेत्युक्तिर्महतामेव शोभते ॥४२५॥

Since an entity which is taken as false cannot be existent, how can false knowledge be an entity? (Therefore,) a statement, viz. that is false and that is also an existential entity, can befit only the great.¹ [425]

¹This refers to Kumārilabhaṭṭa's argument meant in verse 422 above. Cf. NKL: *bhrāntijñānasya svarūpabādhābhāvāt viśayamātra-bādhāt tasya (= bhrāntijñānasya) vastutvam uktam bhaṭṭapādaiḥ*.

स्वतो ऽपि यदि सा वस्तु रज्ज्वां सर्वादिका मतिः ।
रज्ज्वात्मना तथापीयमवस्त्वेवात्र बाध्यते ॥४२६॥

While the cognition in a rope that it is a serpent etc. and also that it (rope) is an existential entity, in its own right, even then that (serpent) in the form of a rope is a non-existential entity; and that gets negated. [426]

This sets aside the argument that a thing itself is negated when the wrong acceptance of another thing for it is negated.

मिथ्याज्ञानस्य कार्यत्वात्किं तत्कारणमुच्यताम् ।
अकारणं सत्कार्यं चेद्भिम्भकैरपि हस्यते ॥४२७॥

If false knowledge is taken as an effect, let it be told as to what is the cause of that. If you were to say, there is an existential effect and that is without a cause, even children would laugh (at that)!¹ [427]

There is discussion here whether *mithyājñāna* is some effect.

¹The second line presupposes an objector's view that *mithyājñāna* is an effect without any cause.

रागादिकारणं चेत्स्यात्कार्यं सत्कारणं कथं ।
अवस्त्वपि च वस्त्वेव वस्तुरूपात्तदन्यतः ॥४२८॥

If (*mithyājñāna* as) an effect were to have its cause in attachment etc.¹, how could it be said to have an existent as its cause? Further, even a non-thing would be the thing itself on account of its having the form of some (other) thing as apart from it. [428]

This verse considers the nature of *mithyājñāna* either as an effect or non-effect.

¹NKL edition and the *pratīka* in NKL read *rogādi* for *rāgādi*!

उपात्तमेयरूपत्वं मानानां सत्यतोच्यते ।
तद्वलेनैव मेयस्थं घनन्ति मोहादि नान्यतः ॥४२९॥

It is said that being possessed of the form of the objects of knowing¹ that are grasped is the true nature of the means

of knowing² (and) only by the strength of that they destroy false knowledge (= ignorance³) etc. connected with (lit. abiding in) the object of knowing; not in any other way. [429]

The verse presupposes the objection: What is the nature of *ajñāna* as a real/existential means?; is it like that of any means of knowing?, or of any object of knowing? There is here an answer to the first doubt.

¹This is *mānānām meyakārabhavanam*.

²Namely, *meyakārabhavane eva satyatvam*.

³It means: of the true nature of the object of knowing. Hereafter, the word ignorance is used in such context.

तद्विपर्ययतो मिथ्या सर्वं मोहादि भण्यते ।
वस्त्वसाधारणं रूपं मोहादेर्न प्रमीयते ॥४३०॥

Ignorance etc. is all held (lit. called) as false because of its contrariness to that¹. The particular form of a thing² is not understood with (or by) ignorance etc.³ [430]

¹Namely, the means of knowing; the contrariness lies in its not assuming the form of the object of its knowing (*meyarūpākārabhavanasya abhāvaḥ*)— this is explained in the second line.

²It means: the object of knowing.

³This is to say: Ignorance does not operate like any other means of knowing.

न च वस्तुसत्त्वं तद्वाधात्तस्य प्रमाणतः ।
मेयप्रबोधनं मुक्त्वा न मितेः सत्यतान्यतः ॥४३१॥

Again (ignorance etc.) is not of the nature of the object of its knowing¹ on account of its² stultification by the means of knowing it³, for (any) knowledge could not have validity except from that it has caused knowing of the object (of its knowing); (it) cannot be for any other reason. [431]

This is an answer to the second doubt, mentioned under verse 429 above.

¹We follow NKL reading. That means: *vastusvarūpam*; this means: real or existential entity. The explanation *vastuvat satattvam satyam* in SP suggests the use of the compound word. (And, usually, *satattvam* in this sense does not occur uncompounded.)

²It means: of ignorance etc.

³It means: of a real/existential entity.

Verses 432-445 state that mithyājñāna is removed by the knowledge of Reality.

कारकाणां हि सत्यत्वं स्वकार्यापेक्षयेष्यते ।

इतो ऽन्यथा तत्सत्यत्वं निष्फलं न च लभ्यते ॥४३२॥

[Verses 432-436 point out, on the strength of inference, that *moha* etc. are *mithyājñāna*.]

The validity of productive causes is accepted (lit. desired) indeed (only) with reference to their own effects. (Validity) other than such as this would be futile and (that kind of validity) is not noticed (anywhere). [432]

The first line of this verse states the Siddhāntin's acceptance of the reality of ignorance etc. as the means of knowing the Ātman on account of its usefulness in achieving the purpose (*arthakriyā-kāritva*). In the second, he discards its absolute usefulness (*pāramārthikatva*).

यद्वस्तु स्वात्मनैवास्ति तत्परार्थं न बोधकृत् ।

पारार्थ्येनैव सद्यच्च तत्परस्माद्विरुद्धं सत् ॥४३३॥

Whatever thing exists on its own strength (=in its own right) does not cause knowledge¹ for the sake of another. But,² whatever, accepted as existent, is for serving the purpose of another is apart from the highest (Ātman) — it is not real.³

[433]

¹We accept for translation the variant reading *bodhakṛt* noted in the AnSS edition, despite both the AnSS and NKL editions.

Of course, *bodhavat* can be paraphrased as *bodhayukta*: Also, there can be only one such thing, viz. the Ātman.

²*ca* for *tu*.

³This is to declare ignorance etc. as unreal.

सर्वमन्यानपेक्षं सदीक्ष्यमाणं स्वमात्रया ।
स्वात्मरूपात्पृथग्रूपं न वस्तूत्प्रेक्ष्यते ऽण्वपि ॥४३४॥

Every thing, not dependent on not another¹ (and) experienced (lit. seen) by (i.e. through) its own essence is an existential entity². Even a small thing, having a nature different from what is its own,³ cannot be imagined (as an existential entity).

[434]

¹This implies the Ātman which is really the essence of the real thing. NKL edition reads: *ananyāpekṣam* for *anyānapeṣkam*.

²*svamātrayā*, paraphrased as *svātmanā*, refers to the all-encompassing Ātman; naturally, of an existential entity.

³This again refers to the Ātman.

आत्मनैव स्वभावेन वस्त्वात्मानं बिभर्ति हि ।
नात्मनो विद्यते ऽपेक्षा वस्तुनो ऽन्यसमाश्रया ॥४३५॥

The (existential) thing¹ sustains itself by itself, viz. its own manifestation — so it is heard.² There is on the part of the Ātman, the existential thing, no expectation which depends on another.

[435]

¹It refers to Ātman, Reality.

²Cf. SP: *ātmanah svamahimapratisthitatvam śrautam iti hiśabdārthah*.

तस्मादविद्यासंभूतं नानात्वं प्रत्यगात्मनि ।
ब्रह्मास्मीति हि तद्धवंसान्न क्वचिद्वेदधीर्यतः ॥४३६॥

Therefore, (has arisen) variety in the inner self as produced from ignorance (and) owing to its destruction (which comes from¹ the awareness) 'I am Brahman.'; there is nowhere any

awareness of differentiation (as various things).

[436]

¹We have taken *yataḥ* as Ablative singular together with *taddhvamsāt*.

मित्युत्पत्तावनुत्पत्तिर्विरोधाद्वाध्यते यतः ।

तद्वाधे नाप्यपेक्षास्ति मिथ्याधीबाधनं प्रति ॥४३७॥

Since, on the rise of the knowledge (of the Ātman), there is no rise (of duality) owing to (their mutual) contradiction, therefore (it follows that), on the removal of that (ignorance), there is no need (lit. expectation) of the stultification of false knowledge.

[437]

मिथ्याधियो ऽपि बाध्यत्वमज्ञानैकसमन्वयात् ।

मूलध्वस्तौ हतं तच्चेन्मिथ्याधीः किं करोति नः ॥४३८॥

In the case of false knowledge also, there is the (possibility of) stultification owing to its congruence¹ with ignorance; if that² becomes stultified, when its root³ is destroyed, what would false knowledge do to us (i.e. what misery will it bring to us)?

[438]

This verse anticipates a question in the light of the preceding verse: Is false knowledge never stultified then?

¹Congruence is more for *tattādātmya* 'having the nature of it'; or, this could signify *tatkāryatva* 'being its effect' also.

²It means: the congruence of ignorance and false knowledge.

³It is ignorance.

मेयरूपानुरोधित्वं मिथ्यासंशययोर्यदि ।

सम्यग्ज्ञानात्तयोर्भेदो गम्यतां केन हेतुना ॥४३९॥

If (then) false knowledge and doubt accord with the form of the object of knowing, let it be pointed out; on what ground there is distinction of the two from right knowledge .

[439]

अज्ञानं संशयत्वान्नो मिथ्याज्ञानात्तथैव च ।

तयोस्तत्त्वविवक्षायामज्ञानं तत्त्वमुच्यते ॥४४०॥

Ignorance does not arise from being a doubt, so also (not) from being false knowledge; since, while ascertaining the true nature of the two¹, their true nature is called ignorance. [440]

¹Namely, ignorance and doubt.

अज्ञात एव यद्यत्र ज्ञाते तस्मिन्न तद्वेत् ।
सर्वत्रासिद्धिरूपत्वान्मिथ्याज्ञानमिदं मतम् ॥४४१॥

That¹, which exists when what (viz. the other²) is not known, would not exist when that (other) is known and that (false knowledge) does not exist when that (viz. the Brahman) is known. Therefore³ this false knowledge is, in every way⁴, held (or known) as having the nature (that has) no basis.⁵

[441]

This verse states by the method of Anvaya and Vyatireka that false knowledge is not an existential entity.

¹ = *mithyājñānādi*.

² = *sat* 'existent', viz. the Ātman.

³ That is, by the method of Anvaya and Vyatirteka adopted in the first line.

⁴ Cf. NKL *sarvatra* = *sarvaprakāreṇa*.

⁵ It literally means: whose form cannot be or is not proven (i.e. established) — i.e. non-existent.

मिथ्याज्ञानस्य वस्तुत्वं येनैव स्यात्सदात्मना ।
अज्ञानस्यापि तेनैव सत्यत्वं केन वार्यते ॥४४२॥

Who could ward off the existential character of ignorance by means of that thanks to which, viz. the existential Ātman, is (established) the existential character of false-knowledge? [442]

This is based on a doubt whether *mithyājñāna*, being a form of the inner-self, would be a non-product (i.e. permanent) — whether by its own nature or by being real! This verse answers

away the first alternative.

रज्जुसर्पो यथा रज्ज्वा सात्मकः प्राग्विवेकतः ।
अवस्तु सन्नपि ह्येष इति पूज्यैरपीरितम् ॥४४३॥

As the serpent seen in a rope is taken as real, owing to the rope, before (there arises non-discrimination (the two)), so also this (duality) is (real) [on account of the immutable Ātman]¹ — thus is it said by our respectable (teacher). [443]

The statement of Śaṅkara; 'Ignorance is real, because it is based on the Ātman.' is established with an example.

¹SP points out to this part in square brackets as necessary.

स्वतस्तु सत्यता साक्षान्नोभयोरपि विद्यते ।
अविचारितसिद्धित्वान्न स्वतः परतो ऽपि ते ॥४४४॥

The truth of the two¹ does not obtain in their own right (i.e. on account of themselves) and, on account of their being established only without thought. (The truth is) that they (do not exist) on their own account or on account of another. [444]

This answers away the second alternative mentioned under verse 442 above.

¹*mithyājñāna* and *saṁśaya*.

तदेवानुप्रविश्येति तत्त्वं यत्पारमार्थिकम् ।
सच्च त्यच्चादिकां भित्तिं मोहात्प्रापदिति श्रुतिः ॥४४५॥

[Verses 445-449 point to *sāmānyajñāna*, *viśeṣajñāna* and *smṛti* (cf. verse 415 above) as not the cause of any error.]

The Śruti states: 'What is absolute Reality (truth) itself first entered that (and afterwards, attained that which is) the existent and it secured that differentiation¹ on account of ignorance.'²

[445]

This verse refers to BU 1.4.7: *tat sṛṣṭvā tad evānuprāviśat tad anupraviśya sac ca tyac cābhavat.*

¹*bhitti* = *bheda* (NKL).

²The argument is: The Śruti points to the imaginary character (*kalpitatva*) of the distinction between the Ātman (on one hand) and ignorance and false knowledge (on the other).

न चापि त्रयसद्भावे मिथ्याज्ञानं जगत्यपि ।
मोहमात्रप्रयुक्तत्वान्न सामान्यात्स्मृतेश्च तत् ॥४४६॥

And, further, false knowledge cannot be said to exist in this world while the three exist, for that¹ is caused only by ignorance and not by the common characteristics and remembrance. [446]

This is an argument pertaining to what is said above with reference to the knowledge of some general characteristics, ignorance about some peculiarity and memory of it as the basis. There is thus justification of Anirvacanīyakhyāti.

¹That is, false knowledge.

सामान्यान्तरनिर्मक्तं तथासाधारणैरपि ।
असामान्यत्वमेवैति शैवल्यमन्यानपेक्षतः ॥४४७॥

Whiteness, which is distinct (lit. free) from any other(s) (as a common (characteristic(s)) and also from any uncommon (characteristic(s)), attains uncommon nature, because it is independent of (any) other (whiteness).¹ [447]

This verse points out that whiteness (in a shell), that is responsible for *mithyājñāna* 'false knowledge', is not related, in any way, to *sattva*, *jaḍatva* etc. which are the common characteristics (among things, or particularly between things of the world) and also some particular characteristics, viz. the shell-ness, the triangular shape etc. As such the whiteness of the shell itself becomes the common characteristic between the shell and silver which is conceived in its place — it does not depend upon any other whiteness for this mistaking of silver.

¹According to SP, any common characteristic, being observed, cannot be the cause of error (*bhrānti*).

न चेदं स्मरणाज्जातं नापि सामान्यहेतुजम् ।
शुक्लस्य गृह्यमाणत्वात्पुरोदेशावलम्बिनः ॥४४८॥

Not again is this (whiteness) produced from (lit. born of) memory; nor does it originate from some common (characteristic), because the whiteness is being grasped as belonging to an object (lit. the region) existing before one. [448]

This purports to deny that ignorance comes from memory.

एवं प्रत्यक्ष एतस्मिच्छुक्तिकोदरवर्तिनि ।
तद्विरुद्धमभूज्ज्ञानं रजताभमबोधजम् ॥४४९॥

Thus, in what actually exists inside of a shell and is directly perceptible, there has arisen a knowledge which is opposed to that which resembles silver and is born of non-knowing. [449]

This is reaffirmation of the statement: There is ignorance as regards this (*idam*) in the cognition: 'This is silver.' (*idam rajatam*).

Verses 450-465 discuss how other *khyātis* are unreasonable, thereby confirming the correctness in holding the *Anirvacanīyakhyāti*.

अप्रत्यक्षं मतं येषां ज्ञानं तान्प्रति भण्यते ।
इदं रजतमित्येतज्ज्ञानं शुक्तौ कुतो ऽन्वभूत् ॥४५०॥

Now, (the following) is stated for them in whose opinion this knowledge is not directly perceptible: 'On what basis did this knowledge (having the form) 'This is silver.' arise in the (object which is) a shell?' [450]

The purpose of this verse is to show that the opponents cannot hold ignorance (*bhrānti*) in respect of 'This is silver.'

विशिष्टाकृतिदेशेहाकालधर्मं प्रतीयते ।

शुक्तिकाज्ञानतो नर्ते वस्तुवीकृक्साध्यते ऽन्यतः ॥४५१॥

A thing which has some specific form, region, activity¹, time and property², cannot be understood (as silver) unless from ignorance about a shell; such a thing (as described) cannot be established by another. [451]

The argument is: Even if it were granted that the false knowledge 'This is silver.' was produced by a similar/common characteristic; such an one cannot be established by the opponent.

¹ *ihā = ceṣṭā* (SP, NKL).

² Each of silver and shell has its own specific properties (*vastu-dharmas*).

असाधारणधर्मोत्थो न साधारणकारणः ।

रजतं शुक्तिकेत्यादिव्यपदेशो ऽप्रसिद्धितः ॥४५२॥

This cognition,¹ viz. (this) shell is silver, is one that arises from some particular (lit. uncommon) properties and not caused by general (lit. common) properti(es); because (that) is not established.² [452]

¹ *vyapadeśa = pratyaya* (SP, NKL). But it could better be: This mention of that shell as silver arises from ...

² It is possible to treat the two lines as two different sentences. Thus: Cognition (of any particular thing) arises from ... properties. (Therefore) cognition such as (*ādi*) '(this) shell is silver.' does (not arise from any other cause), on account of its being unknown. Cf. *atrāpi pūrvārdhān nañanuṣaṅgaḥ* (SP).

न चेह राजता धर्माः कुतो ज्ञानं तदाकृति ।

न ह्याकारमनालिङ्ग्य ज्ञानमाकारवत्क्वचित् ॥४५३॥

Further, there are here¹ no properties belonging to silver. Whence then would there be the knowledge having that shape of it? Indeed, without touching (lit. embracing) a shape, there is nowhere any knowledge having a shape.² [453]

¹In the cognition of a shell as silver.

²This has a reference to the sense-organ assuming the shape of the object of its knowing (*viṣayākārabhavana*).

शुक्तिकानुविधायित्वान्नेदं स्मर्तव्यसंश्रयम् ।
अनालिङ्गितबाह्यार्था बुद्धावेव स्मृतिर्यतः ॥४५४॥

This (cognition) is not dependent on an object of memory since it is related ¹ to a shell, for memory arises only in intellect and does not touch (lit. embrace) any external object. [454]

¹That is, a basis in.

धर्मादिहेतुकं ये ऽपि परिणामं प्रचक्षते ।
सम्यग्ज्ञाने ऽपि तुल्यत्वादनाशवासस्तथा सति ॥४५५॥

And (we say), also those who say that (the cognition 'This is silver.') is a modification (of intellect) arising from some property etc. (have to hold that) in the case of right knowledge also, there is similarity (of the modification of intellect) and, that being so, there is want of satisfaction.¹ [455]

¹That is, satisfactory explanation.

भूतकालोपलब्धो ऽर्थः स्मृतेश्चेद्गोचरो मतः ।
नासौ भूतात्मनाज्ञायि भूतज्ञानमनाश्रयम् ॥४५६॥

If it is held that it is an object that is obtained in the past which is within the purview of memory; then (we say that) it is not known as having the nature of (the thing of) the past; for (in that case) the knowledge of (the thing of) the past is baseless.¹ [456]

¹To say that it is the knowledge of the thing of the past would have no basis in a shell/silver in the past.

स्वोत्पत्तिव्यतिरेकेण ज्ञानकालो ऽपि नेष्यते ।

is a shell.'.

[464]

न च प्रत्यक्षविज्ञानात्स्मृतेर्भेदं लभेमहि ।
प्रध्वंसात्तस्य चार्थस्य नातो ऽर्थस्पर्शिनी स्मृतिः ॥४६५॥

Nor do we ascertain the difference of memory¹ from direct perception on account of the destruction of its object. Therefore, memory does not touch the object. [465]

¹Memory here signifies false knowledge (*bhrānti*).

किं न्वेतदिति जिज्ञासोर्निषिद्धे ऽप्यन्यथाग्रहे ।
तावतो व्यवधानत्वाद्बुभुत्सा च न युज्यते ॥४६६॥
शुक्तिकेयमिति ह्युक्ते यथार्थं प्रतिपद्यते ।
रजताद्यन्यथाज्ञानप्रतिषेधादृते ऽपि हि ॥४६७॥

[Verses 466-475 seek to establish *ajñāna* as apart from *mithyā-jñāna*.]

Even after the apprehension (of a thing as) another — by one who is seeking to know (the nature of it) — is denied/declined, there (still) remains an obstacle¹ (of that desire to know ...) and it is not proper (that there remains) the desire to know. [466]

Indeed, one obtains the right knowledge when one is told 'This is a shell.'; even without the denial of wrong cognition² of silver etc. [467]

In the AnSS edition the verse begins with *kim tu* ... But, in the NKL edition and the *Bṛhadāraṇyakavārtikasāra*, it begins with *kim nu*. We follow this latter, for that yields a better construe and meaning.

¹*tāvato vyavadhānāt* is very cryptic! This suggests the necessity of knowing the real nature of the thing (*vastuyāthātmyajñāna*).

²It means: cognition of a thing to be otherwise than what it is.

नीलोत्पलदलाभं खं सामान्येतरवर्जितम् ।

न पश्येयुस्त्रयासत्त्वान्न हि तच्चाक्षुषं यतः ॥४६८॥

(Indeed) they would not (be able to) see the sky, which has the hue of a petal of a blue lotus and is devoid of (any characteristic) common or another.¹ They do not see them owing to the absence of the three, for the triad is not verily an object of the eye. [468]

¹*sāmānyetara* could be *sāmānya* and *viśeṣa*, but the force of *trayāsattva* reminds one of *sāmānya*, *viśeṣa* and *smṛti* mentioned in verse 405 above.

दिग्विभागादिवद्ध्योम प्राग्यानं च रवौ तथा ।
स्वप्ने नानाप्रपञ्चाद्भ्यं मिथ्याज्ञानमृते त्रयात् ॥४६९॥

Similarly, there occurs even without this triad (the knowledge of) the sky having a division into quarters, the movement to the east in the case of the sun and (this universe) full of variety in a dream. [469]

The argument is: All these three are cases produced by ignorance; not by the three mentioned above (or in verse 405).

यत एवमतो ग्राह्यं शुक्तिकाज्ञानमेव तु ।
रजताद्यन्यथाज्ञानकारणं युक्तिगौरवात् ॥४७०॥

Since this is so, therefore it should be accepted that the knowledge of the shell itself¹ is the cause of the wrong cognition (of it) as silver etc. — this on the strength of reasoning (so far adduced). [470]

This concludes: *ajñānam eva bhramakāraṇam*.

¹*tu* for *eva*.

कर्मज्ञानादिहेतुत्वान्नियमस्य यथा तव ।
सामान्याद्यविशेषे ऽपि नियमो ऽप्येवमिष्यताम् ॥४७१॥

As in your opinion there is (accepted) a rule that the activity,

knowledge¹ etc.² are the cause of wrong knowledge,³ even while there is not any specific (one/two) among the common characteristics)⁴; so also should it be accepted (by you, in the same way as that obtains in my opinion). [471]

¹Knowledge stands for memory or experience in the past (referring to silver that was seen earlier).

²The word etc. refers to the desire for having silver (and the like of it).

³This wrong knowledge is 'mistaking a shell for silver'.

⁴*sāmānyādyaviśeṣa*— not any specific among *sāmānya*, *ajñāna* or *smṛti* which were discussed earlier; cf. verse 447 above. This leads to the acceptance of *adrṣṭa* as the cause for mistaking a shell for silver and not for an elephant.

भूरिसामान्यविज्ञानाच्छ्रौक्त्वमेव करोति किम् ।
सदप्यन्यदुदास्ते किं स्वाश्रयग्रहणं प्रति ॥४७२॥

What does only whiteness do in preference to knowledge of greater similarity? Does any other property, even though existent (there), remain inactive towards its own substratum?

[472]

The purport of the verse is: Why does only whiteness in a shell cause the error?, why not any other property which is (or, can be) similar? and why is there apprehension only of silver? and not of anything else? Therefore, the Siddhāntin also can hold likewise that only Dharma (etc.) can be the cause of *ajñāna*. Such is the thought in verses 472ff.

अनेकार्थाभिसंबन्धाच्छ्रौक्त्वस्य रजते च कः ।
पक्षपातो विना हेतुं बलाकाज्ञानकृन्न किम् ॥४७३॥

(Tell me) again, what partiality (or particular inclination) is there of whiteness towards silver, despite its connection with many (other) objects, (and) without any reason? why should not a crane cause the wrong cognition?

[473]

This is an illustration of what is stated in the preceding verse in general terms.

स्वाकारमात्रनिष्पत्तेर्नालं कार्यान्तराय हि ।
सामान्यं वा विशेषो वा नातः स्याद्वाजती स्मृतिः ॥४७४॥

Be it a common¹ or particular property of a thing, it is not sufficient for (lit. capable of) for giving rise to a cognition (lit. an effect) other than producing the shape of the thing itself; therefore, there would not (arise) the memory of silver.²

[474]

This is one more reason why *sāmānya* etc. do not cause error.

¹That is, in common with another thing.

²What arises is ignorance about the real nature of the shell.

न ह्यसंनिहितं बोद्धुर्वस्तु बुद्धौ करोति हि ।
ज्ञानमाकारवल्लोके सर्वाकारप्रसक्तिः ॥४७५॥

Cognition, which has a shape (of the object of its knowing) does not indeed, in this world, put into the intellect of the knower a thing which is not in the vicinity (of him)¹; (if it were otherwise) there would follow the contingency of all shapes (appearing in his intellect).

[475]

This is one more reason why silver, existing in another place, does not cause the error of shell-silver.

¹There is no impression (*ākāra*) on the intellect of a person of a thing that is not present before him.

पदार्थान्तरसद्भावमपेक्ष्यान्यस्य वस्तुनः ।
यस्य सिद्धिर्मृषा तत्स्याद्रज्जुसर्पीद्विचन्द्रवत् ॥४७६॥

That (thing) whose existence follows from¹ its dependence on the existence of some other object(s) should be false like in the case of a rope-serpent and two moons.²

[476]

This and the next verse state that this world is false (*mithyā*),

since the cognition of its existence depends upon the acceptance of cause-and-effect relation.

¹It literally means: is established by.

²As silver in a shell depends for its cognition (in other words, for being an object of someone's cognition) on a shell and is, therefore, false, so is this world false because it depends on the Ātman. Or, the moon is only one, but owing to some defect in the eye of one, seems to be accompanied by another. Cf. also Adhyāśabhāṣya (pp.32-34): *śuktikā hi rajatavad avabhāśate and ekaś candrah sadvitiyavad iti.*

प्रमात्रादीह यत्किञ्चित्प्रत्यगज्ञानहेतुजम् ।
अन्योन्यापेक्षसिद्धित्वान्मिथ्या तदपि पूर्ववत् ॥४७७॥

Whatever, viz. a knower etc., (is understood here) has originated from the cause, viz. ignorance about the inner self; (but) that is, as (shown in the illustrations) before,¹ false since there is mutual dependence of them for their existence. [477]

¹This is a reference to *rajjusarpa* and *dvicandra* in the preceding verse.

आत्मन्यध्यासरूपो ऽयं संसारः प्रतिपादितः ।
अध्यासश्च विना हेतुं न लोक उपपद्यते ॥४७८॥

This transmigratory world is explained to be having the nature of superimposition (of certain things and properties) on the Ātman and it does not stand to reason that this superimposition is without any cause. [478]

This introduces the discussion of BUB: *yaḥ kāraṇam sarvasya jagataḥ.*

तस्माद्धेतुपदेशाय यः कारणमितीर्यते ।
यस्मिन्न्विद्ययेत्येवं ननु कारणमीरितम् ॥४७९॥

Therefore is made (lit. uttered) the statement *yaḥ kāraṇam* ... in order to explain the cause (viz. the superimposition of

that). But (the objector asks:) In the statement *yasminn avidyayā* ... (the nature of) the cause is (already) stated. [479]

The verse contains an objection: BUB contains repetition, for already the sentence *yasminn avidyayā* ... has explained what is now being introduced in *yat kāraṇam* (these are two successive statements!) — the first is explained in verse 414ff.

प्रधानवादमाशङ्क्य यस्माद्भूयो ऽपि भण्यते ।
अज्ञात आत्मा जगतः कारणं न गुणत्रयम् ॥४८०॥

Since this is so said (now) once again, with the apprehension about the theory of Pradhāna (as the origin of this world), (therefore, it should not be considered as repetition). (The correct view is:) The unknown Ātman is the cause of this world and not the three *guṇas*. [480]

This explains why one should not entertain the idea of repetition.

श्रुतितो युक्तिश्चापि स्वयमेव प्रवक्ष्यति ।
उदर्क इममेवार्थं नातो ऽन्यत्कारणं ततः ॥४८१॥

He¹ himself will say about this matter later² on the basis of the Śruti³ and also of reasoning. There is no cause (of the world) other than this⁴. [481]

¹This is Śaṅkara, the Bhāṣyakāra.

²In the Madhu Brāhmaṇa etc.

³SP cites: *ātmana ākāśaḥ sambhūtaḥ* (Taittirīyopaniṣad 2.1); *etasmā jāyate prāṇaḥ* (Muṇḍakopaniṣad 2.1.3); *yaḥ sarvajñaḥ sarvavid* (Ibid. 1.1.9).

⁴This refers to the Ātman.

यदात्मके नामरूपे इत्यज्ञानात्मता तयोः ।
भण्यते ऽतो ऽप्रमाणत्वं शुक्तिकारजतादिवत् ॥४८२॥

(Since) it is stated (in the Bhāṣya) *yadātmake nāmarūpe* that the two are of the nature (of the products) of ignorance,

therefore, (the knowledge of the two) is not authoritative¹ like (that of) silver in a shell etc. [482]

This explains BUB: *yadātmake nāmarūpe salilād iva svacchāt malam iva phenam avyākṛte vyākriyate*.

¹SP points out the purpose of this word as *bādhyatā* 'liability to be stultified'. NKL explains this as *bādhyatva*.

न कारणातिवर्त्यस्ति कार्यं जगति कुत्रचित् ।
स्वकारणाविशिष्टत्वे सलिलादिति हेतुगीः ॥४८३॥

In this world, there nowhere abides an effect apart from (lit. beyond) its cause. There is a statement of the reason, viz. 'from waters' (which is) expressive of the state (of the world) as non-distinct from its own cause. [483]

This is the purport of the illustration in *salilād iva* ...

वस्तुवृत्तं न पर्याप्तं तदज्ञानापनुत्तये ।
अनुपात्तप्रमाणं सदित्यर्थप्रतिपत्तये ॥४८४॥

The nature of the thing¹ is not by itself sufficient for the removal of ignorance (about it) unless it has taken (the support of) an authoritative means (viz. the Śruti statements) for establishing that it is existent. [484]

This explains the meaning of BUB: *yaś ca tābhyām nāmarūpābhyām vilakṣaṇaḥ svato nityaśuddhabuddhamukta- svabhāvaḥ*.

¹Namely, the Ātman which is *nitya* ...; but *buddha* = *bodhaikarasa* (having only knowledge as its essence) though it is, it by itself cannot remove ignorance.

स्वतो बुद्धमिदं यस्मादतः शुद्धमसद्वयम् ।
द्वितीयसंगतिर्यस्माल्लोके ऽशुद्धेः प्रयोजिका ॥४८५॥

Because this itself has knowledge as its essence¹, it is pure and is without duality in it²; for, in this world, association of a second is a bringer of impurity to one. [485]

¹See the note on the preceding verse.

²SP notices a variant reading ... *śuddham ato 'dvayam* (not noticed by the AnSS edition). Following that, the translation would be: 'Because ... pure, and therefore, without duality.' But that hardly serves any better purpose. *asaddvaya* literally means: that in which there is no pair, i.e. which is (one) without duality (in purport).

यथोक्ततत्त्वे नाविद्यामृते स्याद्द्वयसंगतिः ।
अतो ऽशुद्धिनिषेधोक्तिस्तदविद्यानिषेधतः ॥४८६॥

In respect of the Reality which is thus explained, there cannot be its associatin with duality (lit. a pair) except without ignorance.¹ Therefore, the statement for the denial of impurity (follows) from (the statment of) the denial of ignorance about it.

[486]

¹That is, such association can be only when there is ignorance.

ईश्वराव्याकृतप्राणविराड्भूतेन्द्रियादिकम् ।
नाविद्योपाश्रयं मुक्त्वा संभाव्यं प्रत्यगात्मनि ॥४८७॥

It is not possible to entertain (that there exists) in the inner self (the group of what are called eight states, viz.) Īśvara¹, Unmanifest, Prāṇa, Virāj, element(s)², sense-organs³ etc.⁴, without (having the support of) ignorance.

[487]

This is based on an objection: How can one deny duality in Reality (= Ātman) whose eight states are mentioned in the Śruti? — such is the view of Bhartṛprapañca.

According to Sureśvara, the eight forms are (1)Īśvara, (2)Avyākṛta, (3)Prāṇa, (4)Virāj, (5)Bhūta, (6)Indriya, and the remaining two (not mentioned). Regarding this, SP describes in 1.3.314 or 1.4.1043 that they are *sākṣin*, *antaryāmin*, *avyākṛta*, *daiva*, *sūtra*, *virāj*, *jāti*, *piṇḍa*. SP refers to the relevance thus (as given in the notes): *īśvara* = *antaryāmin/sākṣin*, *indriya* = *daiva*, *prāṇa* = *sūtra*, *ādi* = *jāti*, *bhūta* (= *vyakti*) = *piṇḍa*; thus is Sureśvara's enumeration justified.

But NKL enumerates in a confusing way as *antaryāmin*, *sūtra*, *virāj*, *viṣaya*, *buddhi*, *manas*, *indriya*, *śarīra* (in 1.3.314) and *avyākṛta*, *antaryāmin*, *sūtra*, *virāj*, *piṇḍa*, *deha*, *indriya*, *antaḥkaraṇa*, *viṣaya* (in 1.4.1043). Even considering the explanation as given in the notes below, some vagueness remains.

¹SP points out: *Īśvara* is for the inner self and the witness. But cf. NKL: *jagato 'ntaḥ sthitvā niyantā* 'the inner controller'.

²This stands for the world in the form of Tanmātras – *bhavanayogyā vyaktayaḥ* (SP).

³That is, deities (SP).

⁴The word etc. stands for *jāti* (SP) but *śarīra viṣaya saṁgraha* (NKL).

प्रत्यग्याथात्म्यदृष्ट्या तन्निपुणो ऽपि न वीक्षते ।
न च प्रत्यग्धिष्यं मुक्त्वा पराबुद्धिर्मितिर्भवेत् ॥४८८॥

Even a clever person, (when) with the vision of the true nature of the inner self, would not (be able to) see that¹, (for) the knowledge of the outside world of objects, (which arises only) after giving up the knowledge of the inner self, cannot be right knowledge. [488]

¹Namely, the world in its eight forms, as understood above in the preceding verse.

पराञ्चि खानीत्येतच्च साटोपमभिधीयते ।
प्रत्यङ्मानैकमेयत्वं वेदान्तेष्वात्मवस्तुनः ॥४८९॥

And it is stated in Vedānta sentences (such as) *parāñci khāni* ...¹ with the purport² that the thing (called) *Ātman*³ is to be known only by one means of knowing, viz. (seeing it as) the inner self. [489]

This verse presupposes an opponent's argument the knowledge of the inner self occurs through the help of external sense-organs since it (viz. the inner self) is described as knowable from all experiences (*sarvapratyayavedya*).

¹*Kāthopanīṣad* 4.1; cf. verse 180 note 3 above.

² *sātopam* = *satātparyam* (SP).

³ This is the inner self.

इतो विरुद्धमानत्वं स्वतो ऽपास्तद्वयात्मनः ।
शक्यं वैश्वानरवरात्प्रवक्तुं न तु मानतः ॥४९०॥

It is possible to state that the Ātman, which has of itself given up duality, has (a means for knowing it) which is opposed (to the Śruti) only on the strength of the boon of Vaiśvānara¹; but not on the strength of an authoritative means! [490]

¹ This is an oft-mentioned fact about Bhartṛprapañca. He is said to have obtained a boon from Agni Vaiśvānara for excellent knowledge. Cf. our book [Vol.2:1988] p.25 for *vaiśvānaraprasādāt* ... SP states that this is jeopardizing Bhartṛprapañca.

नित्यशुद्धश्च बुद्धश्च यस्मादात्मा परः स्वतः ।
मुक्तश्चातो ऽवसेयो ऽसौ सद्बेदान्तोक्तिमानिना ॥४९१॥

Because that highest Ātman is ever pure, having knowledge as its essence, and, of itself liberated, it is therefore to be ascertained (to be thus) by one who respects that authoritative statement of Vedānta.¹ [491]

¹ NKL points to sentences such as ... *na lipyate lokaduḥkhena bāhyah*. (Kāthopaniṣad 5.11).

एवंभूतो ऽप्यसंबुद्धस्वात्मतत्त्वो महेश्वरः ।
आपेदै कारणात्मत्वं नामरूपादिसर्जने ॥४९२॥

The great Lord¹, even though of such nature, was (yet) ignorant (lit. not enlightened) about his own nature (and therefore) became the cause of creation of name, form etc. [492]

¹ SP points out the significance of the word *maheśvara*; *sraṣṭuḥ*, *saṃhartuś cābhedam abhipretya maheśvaragrahaṇam*.

स एष इत्यनेनापि सुविरुद्धात्मतां ब्रुवन् ।
विरुद्धवस्तुसंसृष्टिं ब्रूते ऽज्ञानैककारणम् ॥४९३॥

Bringing out the nature of the mutually very much opposed (cause and effect) in words *sa eṣa* ...¹ also, (the Bhāṣyakāra) declares that the creation of the mutually opposed things has only ignorance as its cause. [493]

व्याकुर्वन्निति वाक्येन स्वतो ज्ञो ऽपि तमोन्वयात् ।
ब्रह्मादिस्तम्बपर्यन्तम् कार्यं प्राविशदुच्यते ॥४९४॥

By the statemnt *vyākurvan* ... is declared that (the highest Ātman), though knower in its own right, entered the effect (lit. products) beginning with the Brahman and ending with the blade of gross on account of its association with darkness. [494]

स्वानुभूत्यनुरोधेन यो ऽज्ञातार्थः पुरोदितः ।
प्रकृतार्थावलेहित्वात्सर्वनाम्ना स उच्यते ॥४९५॥

That unknown thing, which was earlier spoken of, in consonance with one's own experience is mentioned by the pronoun *sa*, owing to its capacity to refer to the thing under discussion. [495]

परामृश्य स इत्येवमव्याकृतसतत्त्वकम् ।
तथारूपः स्वकार्यस्थः प्रात्यक्ष्यादेष उच्यते ॥४९६॥

Having referred to (the highest Ātman) which was of the nature of the essence of the unmanifest, this one is (now) called (=referred to) as *eṣa* on account of its direct perceptibility, abiding as it is in its own effect, in that form (i.e. still unknown). [496]

विरुद्धरूपयोरेवं निर्द्वयद्वयरूपतः ।
स एष इति निर्देशः कथं स्यात्कृष्णसर्पवत् ॥४९७॥

(An objection could be raised:) Thus, since there are two

things of mutually opposed nature and also because they have the forms of non-duality and duality, how could there be the reference *sa eṣaḥ* which is like (the reference) 'a black-serpent'? ¹ [497]

¹In the word black-serpent we notice its two elements: black and serpent in *sāmānādhikarāṇya* 'referring to the same substance'; therefore the question is: How could mutually opposed qualities obtain in one and the same substratum? That is, it is impossible to hold the identity of *saḥ* and *eṣaḥ*.

कारणान्नान्यतः कार्यं तथा कार्याच्च कारणम् ।
इत्युक्तन्यायहेतुत्वान्न विरोधो ऽत्र कश्चन ॥४९८॥

Because of the maxim which has been already stated, viz. that the effect is not different from the cause, nor is the cause different from the effect, there is not any contradiction (involved) here. [498]

अज्ञातवस्तुतत्त्वस्य दुष्करं नास्ति किञ्चन ।
नीलीकृतं नभः पश्येच्चक्षुषा नीलवस्त्रवत् ॥४९९॥

For the one to do who has not known the true nature of the thing ¹ there is nothing difficult. For example, one would see the sky as painted with blue just like a blue piece of cloth. [499]

Here is an answer to the question in the preceding verse.

¹Namely, the real nature of the Ātman.

योग्यायोग्यव्यपेक्षेयं मानव्यवहृतौ भवेत् ।
कल्पनामात्रनिष्पत्तेर्नापेक्षाज्ञानभूमिषु ॥५००॥

Such (lit. this) specific vision of (what is) proper ¹ and (what is) not proper would be (possible) in dealings which involve the use of various means of knowing; (as against this) there will be no such vision (lit. expectation) in dealings (based

on) ignorance, since they have proceeded from only imagination. [500]

¹Namely, the thing in its real nature.

इत्युक्तप्रतिपत्त्यर्थं हेतुरेषो ऽभिधीयते ।
प्रविष्ट इत्यनेनात्र स्वाभासैकतमोन्वयात् ॥५०१॥

In order to confirm (establish firmly) what is thus¹ stated, this reason is (now) stated (in the words) *praviṣṭaḥ* ..., for there is here² association of darkness (i.e. ignorance) which is only a appearance of one's own inner self. [501]

¹That is, in the statement with the *sāmānādhikarāṇya* in *sa eṣaḥ* (noted above).

²This means: in respect of *parasya praveśaḥ*.

ब्रह्मादावित्यनेनापि जनिमत्सर्वमुच्यते ।
कृत्स्नसंसारधर्मार्थं देहेष्विति च भण्यते ॥५०२॥

By the statement *brahmādaḥ* ...¹ also is stated the entire (group of things) that has an origin (lit. birth)² and (the word) *deheṣu* is stated (lit. expressed) for (referring to) all the properties of transmigratory existence.³ [502]

This verse has a reference to BUB: *brahmādistambaparyanteṣu deheṣv iha karmaphalāśrayeṣu āśanāyādimatsu praviṣṭaḥ*.

¹This stands for *brahmādistambaparyanteṣu*.

²This clarifies the word *iha*.

³This is for justifying the plural for *deheṣu*.

ब्रह्मादिस्तम्बपर्यन्तं देहेष्विति तथोच्यते ।
क्रियाफलाभिसंबन्धो देहेष्वेवेति नात्मनि ॥५०३॥

So also is stated in the sentence *brahmādistambaparyantaṁ deheṣu*, that the relation of action and result (lit. fruit) can exist only in the case of bodies and not in the Ātman. [503]

प्रत्यङ्मोहमरुद्धुद्विचक्षुर्देहादिरूपिणाम् ।
प्रविष्टवचसैकात्म्यं गुणप्राधान्यमुच्यते ॥५०४॥

By the expression *praviṣṭa* is conveyed the uniqueness (of the Ātman and) the relation of the principal and the subordinate (in the case) of those that have (the various) forms (of the inner self¹), viz. wind,² intellect,³ eye,⁴ body,⁵ etc. owing to ignorance about the inner self. [504]

¹These are the limiting adjuncts of the Self.

²This is Prāṇa, the limiting adjunct of the Sūtra.

³This is the limiting adjunct of Hiranyagarbha.

⁴Eye stands for all sense-organs.

⁵This stands for individuality, activity etc.

न द्वौकते पराचीनं प्रत्यक्त्वासङ्गतः परः ।
नेहाज्ञामनादाय ह्यात्मानात्मानमीक्षते ॥५०५॥

The highest Ātman, who is not associated with characteristics of the inner self, does not push ahead what is external. Indeed, here (in worldly existence), the Ātman does not see the non-Ātman without having resorted to ignorance. [505]

स्थाण्वज्ञानमनादाय न चोरादीक्षणं यथा ।
आत्माज्ञानमनादाय तद्वन्नानात्मवीक्षणम् ॥५०६॥

As there is no awareness (lit. seeing) of a thief etc. without having developed (i.e. resorted to) ignorance about a pillar (etc.), so (also) there is no seeing of the non-Ātman without (the Ātman) having been enveloped by ignorance. [506]

This is strengthening the thought in the preceding verse by an illustration.

येनान्वितो ऽयं संसारी सुषुप्ते कर्मणः क्षयात् ।
तत्स्वाभाव्यावशेषः स्यात्तत्कार्यत्वाद्घटादिवत् ॥५०७॥

This transmigratory being (viz. the inner self) would in sleep

come to have only a remnant of the quality of the one by whom he is accompanied, since there is the cessation of activity. (This is so) because he is a product (lit. effect) of that (i.e. him), in the way as a pitcher etc. (of clay). [507]

This is a very cryptically expressed verse! The illustration in it is also somewhat strained. A pitcher made of clay retains the qualities of clay. In the same way, a transmigratory being, a product of the Self, is in sleep inactive and yet retains the capacity (really that of the Self) to know. Thus, though related to the Self as its product, it is non-distinct from it.

स्वात्माभासप्रवेशो यः प्रत्यङ्मोहनिबन्धनः ।
तज्जेष्वपि स एव स्यान्मरुद्बुद्ध्यादिरूपिषु ॥५०८॥

That entry, (of the Self), viz. really the semblance of its own nature, which is rooted in (lit. based on) ignorance about the inner self, would be the same in (the case of) its products also, (viz. those) which have the form of wind, intellect etc. [508]

Read SP: *na cābhāsasyābhāsino 'nyatra sattvam ity aikye praviṣṭaśabdaḥ paryavasyatīty arthaḥ.*

पयोम्भोवत्सूत्ररूपं क्रियाविज्ञानशक्तिमत् ।
कर्तृस्थभावकं स्थास्नु चलं कर्मस्थभावकम् ॥५०९॥

[There now follows a description of the various products of the Self's entry into the manifest, the inner self.]

Like (the mixture of) milk and water is the form of (the Brahman that has become) the Sūtra; it is possessed of (the capacity for) knowledge and action, it is residing in an agent and yet immutable and it is residing in activity (also) and (therefore) unsteady.¹ [509]

¹SP: *ādyantavat* 'having a beginning and an end'.

बुद्ध्यात्मनो ऽभिनिर्वृत्तिर्व्यवसायात्मनस्ततः ।
हिरण्यगर्भं यं प्राहुरपादानं जगद्धियाम् ॥५१०॥

From that¹ there comes to be produced the one who is of the nature of the knowledge (and) who has the nature of the activity; (the one) whom they² call Hiraṇyagarbha, the material (cause) of the various notions of the world.³ [510]

This presupposes an objection: Since Hiraṇyagarbha is without any gross body and, as such, devoid of absence of sentience, the Upaniṣadic sentence *hiraṇyagarbham paśyata jāyamānam* (*Mahā-nārāyaṇīyopaniṣad* 8.12) is contradicted! In other words, it cannot be said to be born from the Supreme Self.

¹ *tataḥ* stands for *ajñātāt paramātmānaḥ*.

² SP states: These are Śruti and Smṛti.

³ Hiraṇyagarbha (or Sūtrātman) is the cause of the manifest effects; cf. SP: *kāryalingakam anumānam sūcayati*.

वैराजं स्थानमासाद्य क्षमादिदेशविभागवान् ।
देवताकरणो देव एष एवोच्यते विराट् ॥५११॥

This shining one¹, the maker of deities, after having resorted to the status of Virāj², and (there) being possessed of the differences such as regions, earth etc.³, he is called Virāj.

[511]

¹ For this translation of *deva*, as 'shining *deva*' cf. *Gauḍa-pāḍakārikā* 2.12.

² The status of the gross world (*sthūlaprapaṇcātmaka sthāna*).

³ This refers to Agni, sun and others.

तथा च मन्त्रवर्णो ऽत्र ह्यग्निर्मूर्धोति दृश्यते ।
तदुपादानमात्राः स्युर्देवताः स्वाभिमानजाः ॥५१२॥

To that effect there is seen the text of a Mantra, viz. *agnir mūrdhā ...*¹ (and the various) deities which are born of his ego (are) just his material (for creation). [512]

¹ *Muṇḍakopaniṣad* 2.1.4. But SP refers this Mantra to Smṛti — cf. *Vāyupurāṇa* 1.9.112: *dyaurmūrdhānam yasya viprāḥ stuvanti*.

आधिभौतिकभूतानां तथैवाध्यात्मरूपिणाम् ।
पूर्वोक्तानां परिच्छेदो ह्यविद्याकामकर्मभिः ॥५१३॥

The differentiation of the beings originating from him, viz. the elements and also those having the form of embodied beings, which are mentioned earlier,¹ is indeed owing to² ignorance, desire and actions. [513]

¹ See verses 504 and 508 above.

² Or, on the basis of.

सूत्रादिस्थाणुपर्यन्तं जगत्सृष्ट्वात्ममायया ।
स्वाभासैकसहायात्मा तदेव प्राविशद्वरिः ॥५१४॥

Having created by his own power this universe beginning with Sūtra up to a tree, Hari¹, the Ātman, who has only one helper in his own semblance, entered into that (creation) itself. [514]

¹ This reference to the Lord as Hari = Viṣṇu is an indication of the effect of popular Vaiṣṇavite religion on Sureśvara.

ननु व्याक्रियतेत्युक्तं स्वयमेव जगत्परा ।
कर्मकर्त्रुक्तितो ऽकस्मात्कथं कर्ताभिधीयते ॥५१५॥

[In verses 515-528, there is a discussion if there is involved a self-contradiction in the Upaniṣadic reference to the creator's entering into the creation.]

(There is an objection:) But, indeed, it is said before that the world became manifest of itself, as understood to Impersonal Absolute construction. How then suddenly there is mentioned the agent of the activity (of manifesting it)?¹ [515]

Similarly, in *idam* (*jagat*) *vyākriyata* it is meant that 'it became manifest' (of itself). There was no need therefore of the mention of any agent. But there is a reference to an agent of that creation now! Therefore, the objection has been raised.

परात्मनः प्रवेशो ऽपि न्यायं संगच्छते न च ।
नेहासौ प्रकृतो यस्मादतो नासौ प्रवेशभाक् ॥५१६॥

So also, the entry of the highest Self does not follow logically. (Thus) since that one¹ is not relevant (in the context of the creation), therefore he is not the one who enters.² [516]

This is the additional part of the objection.

¹This refers to the agent.

²That is, who can or should enter. Not also, into the discussion!

नैष दोषः परस्यापि ह्यव्यक्तजगदात्मना ।
विवक्षितत्वादाक्षिप्तनियन्त्राद्यभिधीयते ॥५१७॥

(The Siddhāntin answers:) This is not a fault. Because it was intended¹ to refer also to the highest Ātman (as the origin) of the unmanifest world, therefore the role of the controller etc., which is objected to, is mentioned here. [517]

¹SP points out: There was in the Impersonal Absolute construction stress only on creation; there was not the mention of any controller etc. of the same. Yet that was implied.

इदंशब्दाभिधानेन ह्येकाधिकरणश्रवात् ।
अव्याकृतपदस्यातो यथोक्तो ऽर्थो ऽत्र युज्यते ॥५१८॥

(And) because the word *avyākṛta* is heard as referring to just one substratum (expressed) by the expression in the word *idam*, therefore, in this context, the meaning, as already stated, is reasonably understood. [518]

इदं जगन्नियन्त्रादिविभिन्नानेकरूपवत् ।
यथाधना निश्चिनमः प्रागप्येतदभक्तथा ॥५१९॥

As we now determine that this world possesses many varied forms such as the controller etc., so was it (determined) then (i.e. in the initial stage) also. [519]

नामरूपाद्यभिव्यक्तेः प्राग्व्यक्तापह्वे ऽप्यभूत् ।
अव्यक्ताद्यक्ष एकाकी व्यक्तं यत्साक्षिकं जगत् ॥५२०॥

For the reason that (there followed) manifestation of name and form etc., the unmanifest witness, all alone, was (the cause) for the concealment of the formerly manifest, the one with whom the witness this world became manifest. [520]

जगज्जनिस्थितिध्वंसनृत्तसाक्ष्यतिरेकतः ।
शिष्टस्येह प्रवेश्यत्वात्पर एवाविशेदतः ॥५२१॥

Because what is to be entered here is to be mentioned as apart from the witness of this world's origin, sustenance, destruction and dance, therefore, the highest (self) alone would enter that. [521]

Read SP: *sākṣiṇo bhedena śrutam dṛṣṭam vā yad avaśiṣṭam tasya sarvasya praveśaviśayāntarbhāvāt parātmaiva jagati praveṣṭā.*

विवक्षातश्च शब्दानां प्रयोगो जगतीक्ष्यते ।
यथा ग्रामादिशब्दानां तथेहाप्यवसीयताम् ॥५२२॥

And it is seen that in this world the employment of words proceeds from some (particular) desire to state (something), as, for example, (in the employment) of words, village etc.¹; so also let it be understood (i.e. concluded) here. [522]

¹The word etc. signifies cities etc. (NKL).

निवासश्च निवासी च तथा चोभयमुच्यते ।
ग्रामशब्देन लोके ऽस्मिस्तथेहापि जगद्गिरा ॥५२३॥
क्वचिदात्मैव निर्देश्यो ऽनात्मैव क्वचिदुच्यते ।
तथोभयविवक्षापि व्याकृताव्याकृतोक्तिः ॥५२४॥

In this world, a (place of) residence and a resident are both expressed by the word *grāma*; so also here by the word *jagat* is to be mentioned in some places (or at some time) only the Ātman and at other(s) the non-Ātman. Thus, there is a desire to mention by the Vedāntic statement both *vyākṛta* and *avyākṛta*. [523-524]

यत्र नाशादिमद्वस्तु प्राधान्येन विवक्ष्यते ।
तत्रानात्मैव वाच्यो ऽर्थः प्रत्यगात्मोपसर्जनः ॥५२५॥

Where it is intended to express principally a thing, which is liable to destruction etc., there the expressed sense is only the non-Ātman, with the inner self as its subsidiary. [525]

अस्थूलो ऽजो ऽजरः शुद्धो यत्र चाप्यभिधीयते ।
प्रत्यगात्मविवक्षैव तत्र ज्ञेयाभिधानतः ॥५२६॥

And where the non-gross, unborn, ageless (and) pure one is stated, there is the desire to express there only the inner self as the expression of the object of knowing. [526]

अव्यक्तं व्याकृतं विश्वं यत्र चाप्यभिधीयते ।
आत्मानात्मद्वयार्थैव विवक्षा तत्र गम्यते ॥५२७॥

And, further, where there is expressed the world both as unmanifest and manifest, there is understood a desire of expressing (both) what has the meaning of the Ātman and what, the non-Ātman. [527]

यन्मदन्यदिति चोक्तेः परस्य प्रकृतत्वतः ।
सशब्देन परामर्शः परस्येह भवेदतः ॥५२८॥

Further, from the statement *yan mad anyat*¹ (it is understood that) the highest Ātman is meant²; therefore, there would be reference made (only) to the highest Ātman by the word *sah*. [528]

¹This is BU 1.4.2.

²Or, principally intended.

Now follows, up to verse 633, a detailed discussion about 'entry' of the Ātman into the manifest.

अव्यावृत्ताननुगतयाथात्म्यादात्मवस्तुनः ।
ननु प्रवेशस्तस्येह कथं श्रुत्योपदिश्यते ॥५२९॥

[Verses 529-548 state the *prima facie* view: It is the inner self (*jīva*) that has entered the manifest.]

(There is an objection:) How indeed does the Śruti declare the entry of that existent thing, viz. the Ātman, for the true nature of it is that it is not differentiated¹ from (any other) and not followed by² (any other)? [529]

¹It is not distinguished (*aviśeṣa*).

²That is, not similar to (*āsāmānya*).

अप्रविष्टं यतो वेश्म परिच्छिन्नेन शक्यते ।
प्रवेष्टुं पुरुषेणैवं न खेनैतद्विधर्मतः ॥५३०॥

(We ask this) because (we notice that) it is possible for a person (who is) limited (in size) to inhabit an (earlier) uninhabited house, not by the sky which has the opposite property.¹ [530]

¹Namely, which is unlimited in size.

सर्वगाणामपि यथा भूतानां परिणामतः ।
सर्पादीनां प्रवेशः स्यादुपलादौ मतं यदि ॥५३१॥

If it is held that like the entry into stones etc. that is possible for the serpent etc.¹ on account of (their) being the modification of elements which have entered into all things, (it is possible for the highest Ātman to enter into all things). [531]

¹This refers to the then-accepted belief that a serpent could be produced in a stone as a modification of the elements that entered into it from outside it!

युतसिद्धनिवृत्त्यर्थं सहजोक्त्याभिधीयते ।
अश्मनः परिणामत्वात्सर्पादेः परिपाकतः ॥५३२॥

(The answer is:) The statement (that the serpent entered into a stone) is made by the word *sahaja* in order to establish the two as existing apart from each other — (this) for the reason that the stone etc. are (one) modification (of the elements) and the serpent etc. are modification (of another modification). [532]

दृश्यते ऽन्तःस्थतोयानां बहिष्ठः परिपाकतः ।
परिणामः पदार्थानां क्रिमिसर्पादिलक्षणः ॥५३३॥

It is noticed that waters which are inside¹ have their modification outside; so also are noticed substances which have the characteristics of insects, serpents etc. (inside some others). [533]

This points to the modification of the five elements into serpent etc.; and implies the entry of the highest Ātman into beings by assuming the form of the inner self.

¹This refers to the waters inside a coconut, a modification of waters. But we feel that the illustrations are not wholly apt.

नैवं यस्मादनापन्नधर्मान्तर इहोच्यते ।
कार्ये प्रविष्टः स्रष्टैव पुमान्वेशमेव तत्कृतम् ॥५३४॥

(The objector persists:) Because here is stated that one, who has not developed any other¹ properties, has entered into a product² like a man that enters into a house built by himself.³ [534]

¹This is literal translation of *dharmāntara*; but it should not be forgotten that the highest Ātman has no property. All that

can be understood is: It, of its own accord, wished to create and did create the world.

²Namely, creation.

³This refers to the voluntary acceptance of the limiting adjuncts by the highest Ātman.

यथा भुक्त्वैति नगरं भुज्येतिक्रिययोर्नरः ।
अविशिष्टो भवेत्कर्ता भिन्नकालस्थयोस्तथा ॥५३५॥
सृष्ट्वेदं सकलं विश्वं पश्चात्तत्प्राविशद्विभुः ।
अनुपात्तान्यधर्मः सन्न तु पाषाणसर्पवत् ॥५३६॥

As (in the sentence) 'A man, having eaten (his meal), goes to a town.', the agent of the two actions of eating and going is but one unchanged man, at two different points of time, so also has the all-pervading Lord, after having created this entire universe, entered into it later, not being possessed of any other properties; not indeed like a serpent into a stone.

[535-536]

This has a reference to *tat sṛṣṭvā tad evanuprāviśat* (*Taittirīyopaniṣad* 2.6).

न चानवच्छिन्नतनोर्निर्विभागात्मवस्तुनः ।
पूर्वस्थानवियोगेन स्थानान्तरसमागमः ॥५३७॥

Also, there is no going to any other place by leaving an earlier (occupied place on the part of) the existent thing (viz. the Ātman) which has not a body that is limited and which is of the nature of what is without any parts.

[537]

मतं प्रवेशश्रवणादस्तु सावयवः परः ।
इति चेन्नैतदेवं स्यादागमोक्तिविरोधतः ॥५३८॥

If it is held on account of the Śruti statement about its entry (into the world) that the highest Ātman comprises/has parts, that also would not be so, for that would be in contradiction to the statement in the Śruti;

[538]

दिव्यो ह्यमूर्तः पुरुषो नेति नेतीति चासकृत् ।
गीर्मनोगम्यधर्माणां सर्वेषामात्मनि हुतेः ॥५३९॥

also because, in the case of the Ātman, there is the denial (lit. concealment) of all properties which can be conceived by *manas*¹, as it has been several times² (declared in the Śrutis, for example in) *divyo hy amūrtaḥ puruṣaḥ*³, and *neti neti*⁴.

[539]

¹Or, understable for *manas*.

²It literally means: not once.

³*Muṇḍakopaniṣad* 2.1.3.

⁴*athāta ādeśo neti neti* (BU 2.3.6); *sa eṣa neti nety ity ātmā* (BU 3.9.26; 4.3.4; 4.4.22; 4.5.15).

रविबिम्बादिवत्तर्हि प्रवेशो ऽस्तु परात्मनः ।
नैतन्न्याय्यमसद्भावात्तत्संयोगवियोगयोः ॥५४०॥

(It may be argued:) Let the entry of the highest Ātman be like that of the reflection of the sun. (To this we say:) This is not in accordance with reasoning, since the union as well as the separation (of the highest Ātman) have the character of the unreal.

[540]

संयोगश्च वियोगश्च यस्य येनेह वीक्ष्यते ।
प्रतिबिम्बप्रवेशो ऽयं तत्र न त्विह युज्यते ॥५४१॥

Here¹, this entry of the reflection (of the sun) is noticed in that with whom (there is a) contact and from whom (there is its) separation. (But that is) not reasonably acceptable here².

[541]

¹That is, in this world.

²This means: in respect of the entry of the Ātman into the inner self.

गुणप्रवेशवद्द्रव्य इति चेन्नानपाश्रयात् ।
द्रव्यैकपरतन्त्राणां गुणानामेव युक्तिमान् ॥५४२॥

तादृक्प्रवेशो नेशस्य स्वातन्त्र्यादुपपद्यते ।

If it is said that (the entry of the highest Ātman into the inner self) is like the entry of properties into a substance, (then also, we say:) No, because of its not needing any support.¹ It is reasonable to hold (the entry into substances) by only properties which have a support in (lit. are dependent on) only the substances. [542]

That kind of entry by the Lord cannot be held reasonable, for it has his independence. [543ab]

¹Or, its non-resorting (anybody else).

एष सर्वेश्वर इति स्वातन्त्र्यं श्रूयते ऽसकृत् ॥५४३॥

(Also) in (such phrases as) *eṣa sarveśvaraḥ*, the independence (of the Lord) is heard many times (lit. not once). [543cd]

बीजवत्स्यात्प्रवेशश्चेन्नैवमप्युपपद्यते ।
जन्मादिविक्रियाधर्मप्रसक्तेरात्मवस्तुनः ॥५४४॥

If (it be said:) The entry (of the highest Ātman into the inner self) can be like that of the seed (into the fruit). (We say:) It also is not reasonable, for that would involve contingency of having properties of such modifications as birth etc. by the thing called Ātman. [544]

स्थलादिविक्रियाषट्कप्रतिषेधश्रुतेर्न च ।
प्रवेशो ब्रह्मणो ऽयुक्तः फले बीजादिवत्सदा ॥५४५॥

From the Śruti statement of denial of the six modifications¹ of the gross etc. also (it follows that) the entry of the Brahman (into its product) is not ever unreasonable like that of the entry of seed etc. into the fruit (etc.) [545]

¹These are six *bhāvavikāras* mentioned in *Nirukta* 1.2.

ननु पाषाणसर्पेण पुनरुक्तमिदं कथम् ।

फले बीजवदित्युक्तं नैष दोषो भवेत्कुतः ॥५४६॥

(One might ask:) Why indeed is this repetition of what is said by (the illustration of) the serpent in the stone, viz. the statement (that the entry of the Ātman into its product) is like that of seed (etc.) into a fruit etc.? (We answer:) This would not be a fault. 'Why is this so?', (the opponent asks.)

[546]

भागभाग्यभिसंबन्धः ख्यातो बीजफलात्मनोः ।
आधाराधेयसंबन्धस्तत्राश्मोरगयोः स्फुटः ॥५४७॥

(It might be said:) It is declared that there exists between what are of the nature of seed etc. and of fruit etc. the relation of a part and a whole¹, while there is a clear relation between a stone and the serpent (in the simile) of the supporter and the supported.

[547]

¹It literally means: what is made up of parts.

परस्मादन्य एवेह संसारी प्राविशज्जगत् ।
परिच्छिन्नस्य लोके ऽपि प्रवेश उपपद्यते ॥५४८॥

(On this, the objector says:) Here¹, (it is to be accepted that) a being different from the highest Ātman entered into the world. Even in this world, only the entry of one, who is limited (in size), is (accepted as) reasonable.

[548]

So far, there was a statement of the *prima facie* view in its extensive form, viz. with counter-questions and answers to them.

¹It means: in the passage under consideration.

स्रष्टृप्रवेष्ट्रोरेकत्वान्नैवमप्युपपद्यते ।
सृष्ट्वा जगत्सृष्टिमनु तदेव प्राविशच्छ्रुतेः ॥५४९॥

[Verses 549-559 present the Siddhāntin's answer.]

(The Siddhāntin answers:) This (conclusion) is not reasonable,

since there is oneness¹ of the creator and the entrant; (this is clear) from the statement of the Śruti 'having created the world, it later entered into that very creation.' [549]

¹That is, identity as one existential entity.

पर एव प्रविष्टश्चेत्प्रविष्टानामनेकतः ।
तदनन्यत्वतः प्रापन्महेशस्याप्यनेकता ॥५५०॥

(There arises a doubt:) If it be thus accepted that the highest Ātman has entered (into this world), then on account of the multiplicity of the substances, which are entered into, and on account of the entrant's being not different (from them), there follows manifoldness even of the great Lord. [550]

नैष दोषो यतो नेह भेदेनेशस्य संगतिः ।
आत्मत्वरूपतस्तस्य ह्यात्मा चाभेदसंगतेः ॥५५१॥

(The Siddhāntin answers:) This is not a fault, because there is no any association of the Lord with any differentiated (thing) on account of its¹ being (only) the Ātman. It is the inner self of that² on account of its¹ association with (the Ātman) as non-different (from it). [551]

¹It refers to 'differentiated thing'.

²Namely, the differentiated thing.

अनन्यत्वं प्रविष्टैः स्यान्नानात्वमिति दुर्भणम् ।
बहूनामेकयोगित्वादेकत्वं किं न चोद्यते ॥५५२॥

It is (lit. would be) difficult to say that here would be non-difference of the Ātman with those that are entered into and has also difference (from the same). (Our question is:) Why is it not said (by you) that there is oneness of those many which are united with only one (the Ātman) and, (their consequent) oneness (with it)? [552]

न च नानात्वकृल्लोके संयोगो ऽभेदकारणात् ।

तथागमविरोधश्च बहुत्वं चेत्परात्मनः ॥५५३॥

And, in the world, conjunction does not bring about maniness, since it is (only) the cause of non-difference (of the conjoined) and also there will be contradiction to the Śruti if maniness of the highest Ātman (were accepted.) [553]

एको देवो बहुधेतिमन्त्रब्राह्मणयुक्तिः ।

वियद्वेदकलस्तस्मादीश्वरो ऽभ्युपगम्यताम् ॥५५४॥

Therefore, from the argument in Mantra and Brāhmaṇa such as *eko devo bahudhā ...*¹, let the Lord be understood as alone (i.e. one without a second) like the sky. [554]

¹ *Taittirīya Āraṇyaka* 3.14.1.

आस्तां तावत्प्रवेशो ऽयं न्याय्यो ऽन्याय्यो यथा तथा ।

दोषान्तरमिह प्राप्तं तत्तावत्प्रविचार्यते ॥५५५॥

[Verses 555-559 discuss some counterargument.]

(One might yet say:) Well, let this entry (of the highest Ātman into many) be left aside, be it reasonable or unreasonable; there is (nevertheless) another fault, that is now considered.¹

[555]

¹That is, it is to be considered now.

संसारित्वात्प्रविष्टानां परस्य तदभेदतः ।

संसारित्वं प्रसक्तं चेन्न क्षुदाद्यत्ययश्रुतेः ॥५५६॥

On account of the transmigratoriness of those (objects) which are entered into and the non-distinction of the highest from them, there becomes contingent transmigratoriness (in the case of the highest Ātman also). (The Siddhāntin's answer is:) If (this is said), then (we have) to reject (this argument) on the (strength of) the Śruti about the cessation of hunger etc.¹

[556]

¹Cf. BU 3.5.1: *aśanāyāpipāse śokam moham jarām mṛtyum atyeti.*

सखिदुःखित्वमोहादिदर्शनान्नेति चेन्मतम् ।
नैवं वेदान्तवाक्येषु न लिप्यत इति श्रुतेः ॥५५७॥

If it is argued (against this) that (the highest Ātman is transmigratory) on account of the sight of the happy and miserable conditions and ignorance etc. (of it); (it has to be told that) this is not so in the Vedānta sentences, (as follows) from the Śruti statement *na lipyate ...*¹ [557]

¹*Kāthopanīṣad* 5.11.

ननु प्रत्यक्षमानेन साक्षाद्दुःखादिदर्शने ।
प्रत्यक्षबाधसिद्ध्यर्थं न न्याय्योक्तिपरंपरा ॥५५८॥

But, indeed, (it may be argued) the experience of misery etc. is patent to one by means of direct perception (and) therefore, it is not reasonable to quote Śruti passages for denying what is directly perceptible.¹ [558]

¹The argument is based on contradiction between Pratyakṣa and Śruti: What is proved by Pratyakṣa cannot (or, should not) be denied on the ground of Śruti.

नोपाध्याश्रयजनितविशेषविषयत्वतः ।
प्रत्यक्षाभासतासिद्धेस्तेन नोक्तिविरोधिता ॥५५९॥

(The Siddhāntin's answer is:) (this is) not so, because the character of (that) direct perception gets established by being some appearance of specific object (i.e. product) (which has) resorted to (some) limiting adjuncts (of the highest Ātman), and, therefore, there is not any opposition of the Śruti. [559]

दुःखी यदि भवेदात्मा कः साक्षी दुःखिनो भवेत् ।
दुःखिनः साक्षितायुक्ता साक्षिणो दुःखिता तथा ॥५६०॥

[Verse 560-572 argue that sentience cannot have misery.]

If the Ātman were miserable¹, (it has to be said as to) who would become a witness of the miserable. (Also) the character of a witness is not reasonable in the case of the one who is miserable and the character of being miserable, in the case of a witness. [560]

¹That is, an experiencer of grief.

नर्ते स्याद्विक्रियां दुःखी साक्षिता का विकारिणः ।
धीविक्रियासहस्राणां साक्ष्यतो ऽहमविक्रियः ॥५६१॥

Without any modification (in one), one cannot be miserable; how can there be then the character of a witness on the part of the one who undergoes modification? Therefore, the non-modifying 'I' is the witness of thousands of modifications of the intellect. [561]

सुखदुःखादिसंबद्धं यथा दण्डेन दण्डिनम् ।
राधको वीक्षते बुद्धिं साक्षी तद्वदसंहतः ॥५६२॥

A pursuer of knowledge sees intellect as associated with happiness, misery etc., (himself) remaining unaffected (thereby)¹ like an onlooker sees (another as) a holder of a staff by his holding a staff (himself not associated with him or not being a holder of it). So is the witness (of misery etc.) unassociated with it. [562]

¹It literally means: unassociated with it. This word qualifies all the three: the pursuer of knowledge, an onlooker and the witness (i.e. Ātman).

शरीरेन्द्रियसंघात आत्मत्वेन गतां धियम् ।
नित्यात्मज्योतिषा दीप्तां विशिषन्ति सुखादयः ॥५६३॥

Happiness etc. modify (lit. distinguish) intellect which has

attained the character of the Ātman¹ in the collection of body and sense-organs and which has been illuminated by the eternal lustre of the Ātman.² [563]

¹That is, the character of the knower.

²Read SP: *ātmacaitanyavyāptabuddhidharmatvād ātmadharmatva-prasiddhir ity arthaḥ*.

पराञ्चयेव तु सर्वाणि प्रत्यक्षादीनि नात्मनि ।
प्रतीचयेव प्रवृत्तं तत्सदसीति वचो ऽञ्जसा ॥५६४॥

All these means of knowledge, viz. direct perception etc., exist outside — they do not abide in the Ātman. Therefore, the statement 'You are that *sat*.' which is applicable only in the case of the inner self (is thus understood) in a smooth manner.

[564]

विज्ञातारमरे केन न दृष्टेरिति च स्फुटम् ।
अन्यदेवेति वाक्याच्च प्रत्यक्षं नात्मगोचरम् ॥५६५॥

Also from the Śruti (statements) *vijñātāram are kena ...*¹ and *na dr̥ṣṭeḥ ...*² and also from the statement *anyad eva ...*³ it is clear that direct perception does not have Ātman as its object. [565]

¹BU 2.4.14; 4.5.15.

²BU 3.4.2.

³*Kenopanīṣad* 1.4.

किंतु बुद्ध्याद्युपाधौ तदात्मच्छायैककर्मकम् ।
तथा दुःख्यहमित्यादौ प्रत्यक्षमुपचारतः ॥५६६॥

But (direct perception) has for its object only what are the reflections of the Ātman in its limiting adjuncts such as intellect and, therefore, in the experiences such as 'I am unhappy.', direct perception is (merely) metaphorical.¹ [566]

¹That is, not true.

सामानाधिकरण्यस्य तथैवेहोपचारतः ।

अयं दुःख्यहमस्मीति विषयेण तदीक्षणात् ॥५६७॥

So also, because of the secondary usage here regarding the existence in the same substratum,¹ the phrases 'Here, I am unhappy.' etc. (arise) from seeing some object by that.² [567]

¹I am a Brāhmaṇa, I am fat, etc. show such superimposition of (or oneness between) a body and the Ātman.

²Namely, the Ātman.

नासिकाग्रे महद्दुःखं पादाङ्गुष्ठाग्र एव च ।

देहावयवदुःखादेः प्रात्यक्ष्यान्नात्मदुःखिता ॥५६८॥

There is great pain only at the tip of the nose, and also at the tip of the toe of the foot. (Thus) on account of the direct perceptibility of pain etc. of the limb of a body, there is no condition of misery on the part of the Ātman. [568]

प्रतीचि चेद्भवेद्दुःखं व्यापि चैतन्यवद्भवेत् ।

द्रष्टृस्थत्वान्न कर्मस्थं द्रष्ट्रा दृश्येत बोधवत् ॥५६९॥

If pain were to be on the part of the inner self, it (also) would have been, like sentience, pervading (all the body). On account of its abiding in the agent of seeing it, it would not be seen (viz. experienced) by the seer as what is abiding in some object (of that seeing)¹, even like knowledge (that occurs to one and cannot be seen by the one). [569]

¹The object has a limited dimension. Therefore, misery affecting it, i.e. modifying it, can be witnessed by the witness. If, then, misery is said to have affected the witness, the Ātman, who could see it? and how?, for, it also has become all-pervading like the Ātman?

स्वात्मनस्तवेव कामाय ह्यात्मार्थत्वश्रुतेर्भवेत् ।

आत्मैकविषयं सौख्यमिति चेन्मन्यसे न हि ॥५७०॥

'If, on the basis of the Śruti *ātmanas tu kāmāya* ...¹ which explains the nature of the Ātman, you think that happiness would become the only object for the Ātman,' (we have to say:) 'No, not indeed (so)!' [570]

¹BU 2.4.5; 4.5.6. *sva* is prefixed to *ātmanah* with a view to stress the idea of the inner self (of one's own).

यत्र वा अन्यदित्युक्तेरविद्याविषयं तु तत् ।
दुःखित्वं नात्मनि ज्ञेयं यत्र त्वस्येति निहुते ॥५७१॥

Indeed, on the basis of the Śruti *yatra vā anyad* ...,¹ that is only the object of ignorance. The character of being miserable should not be held in the case of the Ātman, since there is a denial (of the misery etc. by the Śruti) *yatra tv asya* ...² [571]

¹BU 4.3.31.

²BU 4.5.15.

मम तावदिदं बुद्धौ भवद्भ्यो यन्न रोचते ।
प्रत्यक्प्रवणया दृष्ट्या संसारो नात्मनीक्ष्यते ॥५७२॥

This is, in my (opinion), what obtains in intellect and what you do not like (i.e. accept). Yet the fact is: Transmigratory existence is not seen in the case of the Ātman by the sight (viz. knowledge/acceptance) of (it as) the inner self. [572]

This purports to say that the Ātman is not connected with any sorrow for that is so directly perceived/experienced by the knower of the Ātman.

Verses 573-596 discuss how it is not proper to hold, on the basis of logic that the Ātman is transmigratory.

मतं तार्किकसमयविरोधश्चेत्प्रसज्यते ।
इच्छाद्वेषादिमानात्मा यतस्तैरभ्युपेयते ॥५७३॥

If (it be) held that there would be contingent the opposition to the on-all-hands-agreed opinion among logicians, since they also accept that the Ātman possesses desire, hatred etc., [573]

नैवं निःशेषतर्कैश्चेदविरोधो ऽभ्युपेयते ।
सिद्धान्तो दुःस्थितो ऽत्यर्थं तदा वः प्राप्नुयाद्ध्रुवम् ॥५७४॥

(then, we answer that) this is not so. Your conclusion would indeed be in an extremely precarious condition, if it were accepted that it should be in non-disagreement with all the modes of reasoning.¹ [574]

¹This argument refers to the mutual opposition among those thinkers who base their opinions on logical reasoning. It is noticed that the Jaina logicians do not agree with the Naiyāyikas. It is pointed out that the logicians themselves are not at one. Thus, the possible opposition to the logicians cannot be a valid ground for opposition to the Siddhāntin's view.

न च तार्किकयुक्त्यापि प्रतीचीहासुखात्मता ।
यतो ऽवगम्यते तस्मान्निर्भीतिः सुखमास्यताम् ॥५७५॥

And also, since even by the (logic-based) argument of the logicians it cannot be accepted that there is in the case of the inner self any unhappiness, therefore may you stay happily, devoid of any fear.¹ [575]

¹Need for agreement with all logicians is not thus any weighty argument.

पराक्प्रत्ययगम्येन दुःखेन स्याद्विशेषणम् ।
न प्रत्यङ्मात्ररूपस्य विरोधादुष्णशीतवत् ॥५७६॥

By the misery experienced by what is outside (the inner self)¹ there would not be any modification of what has only the inner self as its form; (for this happening so) would be like opposition existing between hot and cold in but one thing.²

[576]

¹Namely, transmigratory body etc.

²As both the properties of hot and cold cannot belong to something at one and the same time, being immutable and transmigratory on the part of the inner self cannot be possible.

प्रत्यक्षाविषयत्वं च प्रतीचः प्रागवादिषम् ।

तच्छायापाश्रयाद्यस्मात्प्रत्यक्षस्यापि मानता ॥५७७॥

And I have already¹ stated before that the inner self has not the nature of an object of direct perception, since even direct perception has the character of a valid means of knowing on account of its resorting to the apparent reflection of that (viz. the inner self).

[577]

¹Cf. SV 150.

यो यतो लिप्सते नासावकिञ्चित्को ह्यनर्थिने ।

भिक्षां दातुमलं तद्वज्ज्ञेयं स्वार्थपरार्थयोः ॥५७८॥

Since he, who wishes to get from whomsoever (he comes across) that has nothing, would indeed not be able to give any alms to the one who does need any thing, in the same way, should be known (the relation) between one's own self and the highest (Ātman).¹

[578]

¹One's own self refers to an individual possessed of a body, sense-organs etc. These owe their origin to the Ātman, whose nature cannot be grasped by them or the usual means of knowing. Cf. *na hi citprakāśyam jaḍam pratyakṣam tatprakāśakam ity arthah* [tat = Ātman] (SP); cf. *svātmanah* in verse 570 above.

प्रत्यक्षमन्तरेणापि भवेद्दुःखविशेषणः ।

वियच्छब्दगुणं यद्वत्प्रत्यक्चेन्नैवमिष्यते ॥५७९॥

एकमानानधिगतेर्न सुखग्राहिणात्मनः ।

नित्यानुमितरूपस्य गृहीतिः स्यान्मनागपि ॥५८०॥

If it be argued that the inner self would become modified

by misery even without being an object of direct perception just as the sky (can become) possessed of sound as its property, it is not so accepted (lit. desired) by us. [579]

It is not possible for a person who holds that happiness belongs to the Ātman whose nature is (in his view) ever inferred to grasp even a little (of the nature of) it since he has not accepted the one means of knowing it (viz. the Śruti). [580]

¹This is an argument against the Sāṃkhyas. They infer the existence of the Ātman and hold it to be ever happy. They do not accept the Śruti as the authoritative means to getting to know about the Ātman.

एकत्वादात्मनश्चैवं विषयीकरणे सति ।
असंभवात्तदन्यस्य द्रष्टृभावः प्रसज्यते ॥५८१॥

Also, owing to the uniqueness of the Ātman, if one were thus to make it an object of knowledge there would be contingent the absence of the seer (of it) owing to the absence of anyone else than it. [581]

¹This is an argument against the Vaiśeṣikas for whom the Ātman is an object of knowing by the usual means of knowing. Their view suffers the fault that the knower and the object to be known are but one entity. Argument against the Vaiśeṣikas continues in the next two and half verses.

विषयित्वमथैकस्य विषयत्वं च दीपवत् ।
मतं चेन्नैतदेवं स्याद्युगपद्भूत्यसंभवात् ॥५८२॥

If it be held that only one individual becomes the subject as well as the object like a lamp, this also would not be so on account of the impossibility of the simultaneous occurrence of both. [582]

न व्यनक्ति प्रदीपो ऽपि स्वतो भास्वरूपतः ।
विषयत्वाच्च पुंबुद्धेर्न दीपस्योभयात्मता ॥५८३॥

The lamp also does not reveal (itself) as an object, though it is by its own nature bright¹ and also because it is an object of man's intellect; thus, there does not belong to the lamp the nature of both (the subject and the object). [583]

¹That is, illuminating.

प्रतीचश्च निरंशत्वान्न दीपेन सधर्मता ।
ग्राह्यग्राहकतैतेन विज्ञानस्याप्यपोदिता ॥५८४॥

And the inner self does not have (any) similarity with a lamp because it (=the inner self) is devoid of any parts. Hereby is explained away the character of Vijñāna also, viz. it can be both the object and also the subject (of knowledge). [584]

¹The second line sets aside the Vijñānavāda of the Buddhists.

तथा गुणगुणित्वेन ह्यक्षलिङ्गाधिगम्ययोः ।
दुःखात्मनौर्मिथोयोगे नानुमानप्रमाणता ॥५८५॥

So also in the case of the conjunction of misery and the Ātman who are to be grasped by the sense-organs and (by their) characteristics there is no authoritativeness of inference for understanding them as a property and its substratum. [585]

¹Cf. *samyoga* in verses 587-588 below.

नित्यमक्षजगम्यत्वाद्दुःखस्योत्पलनीलवत् ।
रूपाद्यक्षजगम्यैश्च सामानाधिकरण्यतः ॥५८६॥

And since misery is ever experienced through perception by sense-organs, like the blue of a lotus (it is not a property of the Ātman) for (this is) on account of its being in the same substratum along with (other objects which are) perceptible by sense-organs such as form etc. [586]

This points out the fault in holding the Ātman as perceptible like misery which, like form, burning etc., is noticeable only in

a body. This entails that the Ātman does not have a body as its necessary substratum.

दुःखस्यात्मनि संयोगजत्वाभ्युपगमे ऽपि च ।
सभागविक्रियानित्यत्वादिदोषः प्रसज्यते ॥५८७॥

And even if it is accepted that misery can affect the Ātman as it is produced from its conjunction (with *manas* etc.),¹ then also would necessarily follow the fault that it is made up of parts, it is subject to modification and it is non-eternal etc.,
[587]

This is the view of the Vaiśeṣikas.

¹Supply: of an individual self.

नाविकृत्य हि संयोगि गुणो द्रव्यं कदाचन ।
उपयन्नपयन्वेह लोके दृष्टः प्रमाणतः ॥५८८॥

because, in this world, there is not seen (i.e. known) by any means of knowing a property approach or separate from a substance, with which it is united, without having modified it.
[588]

This controverts the Mīmāṃsakas' (i.e. Bhāṭṭas') view.

न चानवयवं वस्तु क्वचिदप्युपलभ्यते ।
विक्रियामाप्नुवन्नापि नित्यं द्रव्यसिगुणाश्रयम् ॥५८९॥

Further, there does not obtain anywhere a thing which is not made up of parts (and) which undergoes modification also; so also, (there is no) eternal thing that is the basis of perishing properties.
[589]

The views of Bhāṭṭas and the Vaiśeṣikas are controverted.

आकाशस्य च नित्यत्वं नेष्टमागमवादिभिः ।
तत्कार्यश्रवणान्नापि दृष्टान्तो ऽस्ति ततो ऽपरः ॥५९०॥

And those, who hold the authority of the Āgamas, do not accept that the sky is eternal and also there is hearing about its being product.¹ And there is not any other example.² [590]

¹The followers of the Vedānta do not hold, like the Vaiśeṣikas, that Ākāśa is eternal, because there are the Śruti statements like *ātmana ākāśa sambhūtaḥ*.

²This points to that the *paramāṇus* (which are held by the Vaiśeṣikas as eternal) are also products and, therefore, not eternal; this is so because *paramāṇus* are to have belonged to (i.e. they are the products of) some earlier moments of time (before any element came to exist) and time is according to the Vedāntins not eternal — cf. *sarve nimeṣā jajñire*.

विक्रियावदपि द्रव्यं तत्प्रत्ययसमन्वयात् ।
नित्यमेवेति चेन्नैवमन्यथात्वातिरेकतः ॥५९१॥

If it were argued that any substance which undergoes modifications is permanent because there is continued awareness of that, (it has to be observed that) it is not so, because there are then its modifications (lit. changes) in addition (to itself). [591]

This is the refutation of view of the Pariṇāmavādins (viz. the Sāṃkhyas).

अनित्यत्वम् क्वचिन्नास्ति यथान्येषां प्रवादिनाम् ।
सन्नेवाभावरूपो ऽपि त्विष्टः शून्यत्ववादिनाम् ॥५९२॥

(Also), as in the opinion of other disputants, viz. the Mādhyamikas, there is nowhere (what is called) non-eternity.¹ It is, nevertheless, desired by the Śūnyavādins as (that what is of the nature of absence² is an existent (only). [592]

This is the view of the Mādhyamikas.

¹This stands for Atyantābhāva.

²The argument is: If it is established by some means of knowing, as a pitcher is, then it ought to be existent, though not

actually present.

संवित्प्रमाणसत्त्वेन विना वस्तु न लौकिकम् ।
प्रमाणवादिभिर्दृष्टमनन्यायत्तसिद्धिकम् ॥५९३॥

Those who hold the validity of the means of knowing have not seen any worldly thing unless it has the characteristics of being known by sentience, (for) that is not established by (its) dependence on any other (means of knowing). [593]

That Atyantābhāva 'absolute non-existence' which reveals itself is thus refuted.

भागान्यथात्वाद्द्रव्यस्य नानित्यत्वं क्वचिन्मितम् ।
निर्भागत्वात्प्रतीचस्तत्कया युक्त्योपपद्यते ॥५९४॥

Impermanence is not understood anywhere (i.e. in any thing) unless its parts have not undergone a change (or modification). (And) since (the inner self is) devoid of any parts, by what reason could it be understandable in respect of the inner self? [594]

अथ सावयवत्वे ऽपि नित्यं स्यात्कुलिशादिवत् ।
संयोगपूर्वतो नैवं तद्विभागावसानतः ॥५९५॥

Now (one might argue:) Even while a thing is made up of parts, it can be permanent, like the *vajra* 'thunderbolt'¹, since it² is preceded by conjunction. (To that we say:) This is not so, for it ends into division (of the parts again).³ [595]

This is an argument of the Jainas who hold that the Ātman changes its shape in accordance with the body it occupies. Also there is its refutaion.

¹It is made up of parts and is yet held as having permanent existence. Translation, viz. 'thunderbolt', is merely convenient!

²Namely, its being made up of parts.

³This means: The example of *vajra* for proving the permanence of the Ātman, which undergoes modification in size, is not proper.

As counterexample one could point to a pitcher.

वज्रादेरविभागश्चेत्तस्यासंयोगपूर्वतः ।

नानुमेयत्वतो ऽस्त्येव तस्यावयवसंयुतिः ॥५९६॥

If (it be argued that) in the case of *vajra* etc. there would not be division (into parts again) since that *vajra* (having parts) is not preceded by any conjunction (of the parts); this also is not so, on account of the inferability (of that conjunction) — there certainly is the conjunction of its parts.¹ [596]

¹The argument is: A pitcher, which is made up of parts and is therefore like *vajra*, has first its parts assembled when it came into existence. This is clarified in the next verse.

न हि सावयवं किञ्चिदृते ऽवयवसंयुतिम् ।

घटादिवद्यतो दृष्टमतो ऽदुःखित्वमात्मनः ॥५९७॥

Indeed, there is not seen any such thing as is made up of parts and has come to exist without its parts being brought together (lit. conjoined) as (for example there is seen) a pitcher (that is produced only by joining of parts). Therefore, the Ātman does not have misery. [597]

निर्दुःखित्वे परस्येष्टे तदन्यस्याप्यभावतः ।

कस्य दुःखनिवृत्त्यर्थं प्रारब्धोपनिषत्त्वया ॥५९८॥

[Verses 598-604 establish the *raison d'être* of the Upaniṣad and refute any possible notion of transmigratory character of the Ātman.]

(A doubt is raised:) When you have accepted (lit. decided) that the state of the highest Ātman consists in being free from misery (and also) owing to the absence of anything else than that (= Ātman), then (the question is:) Why have you begun (the discussion of) this Upaniṣad for effecting cessation of misery? and whose? [598]

प्रत्यगज्ञानहेतूत्थदुःखित्वमतिविभ्रम-
ध्वंसमात्रस्य सिद्ध्यर्थमारब्धोपनिषन्मया ॥५९९॥

(The answer is:) I have begun (the discussion of) the Upaniṣad for establishing that there is only destruction of the error concerning the (worldly) awareness of the miserable state (of the Ātman) arising from ignorance about (the nature of) the inner self. [599]

नवसंख्येयमात्रेक्षी दशमो विभ्रमाद्यथा ।
न वेत्ति दशमो ऽस्मीति स्वीक्षमाणो ऽपि तान्नव ॥६००॥
निःशेषानात्मदृक्तद्वदनिर्ज्ञातात्मतत्त्वकः ।
न वेत्त्यैकात्म्यमस्मीति वीक्षमाणो ऽप्यनात्मनः ॥६०१॥
दशमो ऽस्मीतिवाक्योत्थसम्यग्ज्ञानानलार्चिषा ।
प्लुष्ट्वात्मदशमाज्ञानं दशमो ऽस्मीति वीक्षते ॥६०२॥
यथा तत्त्वमसीत्यादिवाक्योत्थज्ञानवह्निना ।
प्लुष्ट्वेहात्मतमस्तज्जं तथैकात्म्यं प्रपद्यते ॥६०३॥

(This is) like a person who sees that the number of objects (before him) is (but) nine, though he is the tenth individual (and yet) and does not know 'I am the tenth.', owing to (his) error, even though he is well seeing those nine (objects), [600] in the same way, the person, who has not known the truth regarding the Self and sees (i.e. accepts) the entire (world as full of) non-Ātman(s) (and thus) even while seeing (i.e. experiencing) the non-Ātman (objects) does not know the uniqueness (of the Ātman) in the form 'I am (that Ātman).'; [601]

(and) having burnt the ignorance about himself being the tenth one by means of the flame of fire in the form of the true knowledge which arises from the sentence, 'I am the tenth.', he sees (i.e. understands) 'I am the tenth.', [602]

as when one has burnt the ignorance about one's own self and the effects thereof by means of the fire, arising from the (Śruti) sentence 'That you are.' etc., one apprehends the uniqueness of the Ātman. [603]

प्रत्यगज्ञानहेतूत्थशास्त्राचार्यादिसाधनः ।
तद्विरुद्धमथैकात्म्यं प्रत्यपद्यत मायया ॥६०४॥

One, who has such means as Śāstra and teacher etc. which have arisen out of the ignorance about (the true nature of) the individual self, becomes aware by means of Māyā (i.e. by false means)¹ the uniqueness of the Ātman which is opposed to (all) that. [604]

¹That is, *śāstrāder utpannā brahmadhī* (SP, NKL).

शास्त्राचार्यादयो यद्वन्मोहोत्थत्वान्न वस्तुतः ।
प्रवेशो ऽप्यस्य तादृक्स्यादैकात्म्यप्रतिपत्तये ॥६०५॥

As (the notions of) Śāstra, teacher etc. have arisen out of ignorance and (are not there) as a matter the Reality, so also is the entry of this (Self into its product, ignorance, but only) for the sake of one's acquiring the knowledge of the uniqueness of the Ātman. [605]

This clarifies the purpose of the Śruti regarding the really false entry of the Self into its so-called product. Also it justifies verse 549 above.

व्याकृताव्याकृतावस्थे जगतो ऽस्य स्वभावतः ।
अनूद्य लोकतो दृष्टे तद्याथात्म्यं प्रबोध्यते ॥६०६॥

(Only) after the two states of this universe, viz. the manifest and the unmanifest, which exist by their nature, are stated and after (the two) are seen (i.e. understood) the knowledge of the true nature of the same is acquired (by the people).¹ [606]

¹This is, on the basis of the popularly known example of a pitcher.

यत एवमतो ऽपास्तरागद्वेषादिधीमलः ।

उदारधिषणः प्राह भाष्यकृन्न्यायवद्वचः ॥६०७॥

As this is so, the Bhāṣyakāra, who has cast off all dirt of attachment, hatred etc. off his intellect and who is very intelligent, has spoken words which are (supported) with proper reason. [607]

अप्रविष्टस्वभावस्य दिग्देशाद्यनभिप्लुतेः ।
प्रवेशो व्याकृते क्लृप्तो जलपात्रार्कबिम्बवत् ॥६०८॥

Like (the entry of) the orb of the sun into a pot of water, the entry into the manifest (universe) of (the Ātman) which is of the nature of one that has (really) not entered and which is not covered by quarters and regions etc., is also imaginary. [608]

This has reference to BUB: *jalasūryādipratibimbavad ātmapra-
veśaś ca pratibimbavad vyākṛte kārya upalabhyatvam.*

बिम्बात्मना प्रवेशस्य ननु दूषणमीरितम् ।
विप्रकृष्ट्याद्यभावोक्त्या भूयः कस्मात्स आश्रितः ॥६०९॥

[Verses 609-622 justify the statement about the entry of the Ātman into the products, having the form of its reflection.]

(It might be argued:) You have found fault with (the statement) that there is the entry (of the Ātman into its products) in the form of a reflection, stating that there is absence of its being far from other objects etc.¹; then, why do you resort to the notion of the reflection again? [609]

¹This has a basis in the earlier verses 540-543 which occur in the refutation of the objector's view.

संभवाद्विप्रकृष्ट्यादेरदुष्टो दूषितः पुरा ।
कथं तदिति चेदत्र युक्तिलेशो मिधीयते ॥६१०॥

(The answer is:) On the earlier occasion, the faultless (Ātman)

was given a blame, because of the possibility of being in the distance etc. Now, if you ask, 'How could that be?', then here is stated some reason in brief.¹ [610]

¹This refers to BUB: *ātmapraveśaś ca pratibimbavad vyākṛte kārya upalabhyatvam.*

निर्धूताशेषनानात्वतद्धेतुरविभागवान् ।
 अनन्यसाक्षिकः प्रत्यङ्ङासीन्नामादिजन्मतः ॥६११॥
 द्रष्टादिरूपतस्तावद्व्यतिरेको ऽभवत्पुरा ।
 नामादिजन्मनि द्रष्टेत्यादिरूपान्वयो ऽप्यभूत् ॥६१२॥

The inner self was that which was wholly devoid of (lit. had shaken off) the entire variety (of worldly objects) and all its causes¹, which was not possessed of parts, which had none else as the seer (of itself) and which existed before (the production of) name etc. [611]

Formerly (i.e. earlier), there was absence of the distinct forms of it such as the seer etc. and, when name etc. were produced there also occurred its association with the forms such as the seer etc. [612]

These two verses establish the object-reflection relation between the Self and the inner self. The Self and the inner self are really non-distinct. But, the Self is called the inner self owing to its association with body, sense-organs, objects etc. In the first line of verse 612 the Self is meant, and in the second, the inner self.

¹According to SP, it means: effects.

अप्पात्रत्थापिताद्धानोर्दिवि भानुर्यथेक्ष्यते ।
 सुषुप्तस्थस्तथा धीस्थात्कर्तृभोक्तृत्वलक्षणात् ॥६१३॥

As the sun is taken (i.e. understood) to be existent in the sky (as distinct from) the sun which has appeared from a pot of water, so also is the Ātman residing in the state of deep sleep taken to be existent (as distinct) from that Ātman residing in the intellect etc. by means of the characteristics of the agent and the enjoyer etc. [613]

This illustration brings out the real non-difference between the Self and the inner self; the apparent difference is owing to the difference in the states (*sthānabheda*).

द्रष्टृश्रोत्रादिरूपश्च यश्च द्रष्टृद्रादिसाक्ष्यपि ।
बुद्धितत्कारणोपाधी क्षेत्रज्ञेश्वरसंज्ञकौ ॥६१४॥

And he who is of the nature of the seer, the listener etc. and the one who sees the seer etc. are having (as their) limiting adjuncts such as the intellect and its cause, are called *kṣetrajña* 'the knower of the field' and *īśvara* 'the Lord'. [614]

स्वप्ननिद्रायुतावाद्यौ प्राज्ञस्त्वस्वप्ननिद्रया ।
इत्यादिस्थानभेदो ऽपि वेदान्तोक्तौ विनिश्चितः ॥६१५॥

And this distinction of their states (in the so-called worldly existence) is also decided¹ in the Vedāntic sentence:² The first two³ are associated with dream and deep sleep and the (one called) *Prājña*, with dreamless sleep. [615]

¹That is, decisively stated.

²This is *Gauḍapāḍakārikā* 1.14ab.

³This refers to the two names of the inner self, viz. *Vaiśvānara* and *Taijasa*.

जिघ्राणीममहं गन्धमिति यो वेत्यविक्रियः ।
तद्भावाभावसाक्ष्यात्मा हेतच्च श्रुतिमस्तके ॥६१६॥

The *Ātman* (alone) without undergoing any modification is the witness of the presence and the absence of the one who knows, 'I am experiencing this smell.' — and this occurs at the head (prominent place) of the *Śruti*. [616]

This is directed against the *Mīmāṃsakas* who do not accept that there is the Self beyond an individual self (NKL).

अर्थान्तरनिरासार्थं दूषणं चोदितं पुरा ।

तदभावाददुष्टत्वात्प्रवेशो मुखबिम्बवत् ॥६१७॥

We had earlier given blame to (the faultless Ātman) for the purpose of setting aside (the notion of) any object other (than it as existent). (The fact is:) On account of the absence of that¹ (and therefore) on account of its not having any blemish (in reality), the entry (of the Ātman into the manifest) is like the reflection of a face (in a mirror). [617]

¹Namely, any other object.

दर्पणाभिहता दृष्टिः पर्यावृत्य स्वमाननम् ।
व्याप्नुवन्त्यविभागेन भ्रान्ति नो जनयेद्यथा ॥६१८॥

(This is like) our sight, obstructed by a mirror, would turn back to our own face and, occupying (that, viz. the face) as not being apart from it, might cause some misconception (=wrong apprehension). [618]

इहापि कारणोपाधिः केवलो ऽप्यविवेकतः ।
बुद्ध्यदिकार्यगैर्धर्मैः प्रतिबिम्बवदीक्ष्यते ॥६१९॥

Here (in this example) also, the only (i.e. unique) Ātman, being delimited by the notion of its being the cause, is owing to the absence of discrimination noticed (i.e. grasped) like a reflection (of some object) on account of its properties which belong to its (so-called) effects such as intellect etc. [619]

यथोक्तार्थप्रसिद्ध्यर्थं वचांसि सुबहून्त्यपि ।
त्रय्यन्तेषूपपद्यन्ते तत्सृष्ट्वेत्यादिकानि च ॥६२०॥

And, there are noticed quite a number of statements in the Vedānta texts for establishing the argument which we had adduced, viz. *tat sṛṣṭvā* ... and others. [620]

दिग्देशकालशून्यस्य प्रवेशो बिलसर्पवत् ।
न त्वाञ्जसः परस्यास्ति तेनाविद्याप्रकल्पितः ॥६२१॥

But (in reality) the entry of the highest (Ātman), who is without¹ space, region and time, is like that of a serpent into a hole is not reasonable and therefore it is produced by ignorance. [621]

¹That is, not associated with any such concepts as space etc.

अग्निः सूर्यो मरुद्यद्वत्प्रविष्टो भुवनं तथा ।
अप्रविष्टस्वभावो ऽपि कार्यमात्माविशज्जगत् ॥६२२॥

As the fire, the sun and the wind have entered into the universe,¹ so also has the Ātman that, does not have the nature of one who has entered (the world), entered into it (which is) its effect. [622]

¹Cf. *Kāthopaniṣad* 5.9-11 which Śaṅkara has quoted in BUB.

प्रत्यग्याथात्म्यदृक्सिद्धिहेतुत्वाच्च भवेदिदम् ।
जगज्जनिस्थितिध्वंसप्रवेशानां प्रयोजनम् ॥६२३॥

And, on account of being the cause of acquiring the knowledge of the true nature of the inner self, this would indeed be the purpose of origin, sustenance and destruction of the world and the entry (into it by the Ātman). [623]

तद्वृष्टेः पुरुषार्थत्वश्रवणादसकृच्छ्रुतौ ।
ब्रह्म वेदेत्येवमादौ क्लृप्ताः सृष्ट्यादयस्ततः ॥६२४॥

[Verses 624-633 point out that the Vedāntic sentences convey the imaginary character of the creation etc. of the world.]

Since we have heard in the Śruti, time and again,¹ (that) the seeing of that (viz. the true nature of the Ātman²) is an end of human endeavour, therefore (the statements about) the creation etc. are imagined³ in such sentences as *brahma veda* ... [624]

¹It literally means ...

²Namely, its uniqueness.

³Or, thought of.

युक्त्या नैवोपपद्यन्ते जगत्सृष्ट्यादयो यतः ।
प्रत्यगज्ञानमात्रोत्था जगत्सृष्ट्यादयस्ततः ॥६२५॥

Because the creation etc. of the world are not justified by (any) reason, therefore, the creation etc. (must be declared to) have arisen from ignorance about (the true nature of) the inner self. [625]

नासतो जन्मना योगः सतः सत्त्वान्न चेष्ट्यते ।
कूटस्थे विक्रिया नास्ति तस्मादज्ञानतो जनिः ॥६२६॥

That which is non-existent has no birth (and) it is not accepted (as born) from an existent because of its (i.e. the latter's) character of an existent. There is no modification (whatever) in the immutable. Therefore, (the notion of) the creation arises from ignorance. [626]

तथा रूपं रूपमिति मन्त्रवर्णो ऽपि चात्मनः ।
याथात्म्यदर्शनायैव सृष्ट्यादि प्रत्यपीपदत् ॥६२७॥

So also does the text of the Śruti *rūpaṃ rūpaṃ ...*¹ state the creation etc. (of the world) for showing the true nature of the Ātman. [627]

¹BU 4.5.19.

व्याप्तिः प्रवेशशब्देन भण्यते कारणात्मनः ।
बुद्ध्यादिकार्यविषया व्यापिव्याप्यत्वमेतयोः ॥६२८॥

Pervasion (of the world) by the Ātman (which is understood to be) its cause is expressed by the word *praveśa*; and (this pervasion) pertains to intellect etc. as its product and (there is between these two, viz. the Ātman and the intellect etc.) the relation of what pervades and what is pervaded. [628]

This specifies that even the imaginary pervasion must have only the Ātman as the pervader.

असाधारणतो न स्यात्कालदिग्देशभिन्नयोः ।
मिथो ऽसंगतितो व्याप्तिर्हिमवद्विन्ध्ययोरिव ॥६२९॥

There would not be (a relation of pervasion) between two dissimilar things, in respect of time, direction and region (which they occupy) — that is, when they do not occur together, (as there can be no relation of pervasion between) Mt. Himalaya and Mt. Vindhya. [629]

मिथो ऽविभिन्नयोर्नासौ नापि सैकात्म्य इष्यते ।
भिन्नसामान्ययोस्तद्वत्तदसाधारणात्मनः ॥६३०॥

It¹ is not accepted in the case of the two things which are mutually distinct² and also in the case of those that have only one nature³; in the same way also between an individual and its species⁴ on account of their one (common) nature. [630]

¹This refers to *vyāpti*.

²Like Mt. Himalaya and Mt. Vindhya.

³In totally identical (*tadātma*) things.

⁴That is, between *jāti* and *vyakti*.

कार्यकारणयोरेवं भिन्नाभिन्नविकल्पतः ।
वस्तुवृत्तेन संव्याप्तिर्न युक्त्येहोपपद्यते ॥६३१॥

Also in respect of the cause and the effect there cannot be postulated here¹ with reason (the notion of) pervasion, either by the activity of the (two) things or by holding them optionally as distinct and non-distinct. [631]

¹This refers to *vyavahārabhūmi*. It is implied that, in addition to the differences as *kārya* and *kāraṇa* and *jāti* and *vyakti*, other differences also render pervasion unthinkable.

यत्र कात्स्न्येन वृत्तिः स्याद्रज्जुसर्पादिवद्द्वयोः ।
व्याप्तिर्मुख्यास्तु तत्रैव तथात्मानात्मनोरपि ॥६३२॥

Where there is (identity of) a form (or modification) in its entirety in two things, as in the case of a rope and serpent, let there be a pervasion (and) only there; so also (let it be) in the case of the Ātman and the non-Ātman. [632]

तमसैव यथा सर्पं स्रक्प्रविष्टा न तु स्वतः ।
प्रत्यगज्ञानहेतूत्थमात्मैवं मायया जगत् ॥६३३॥

As only on account of darkness (the character of) a garland has entered into a serpent and not in its real form, so does the Ātman enter into the world which has arisen from ignorance about the nature of the inner self, viz. Māyā. [633]

कया मर्यादया कार्यं मायावी माययाविशत् ।
आनखाग्रेभ्य इत्युक्त्या मर्यादातो ऽस्य भण्यते ॥६३४॥

(One might ask:) To what extent does the powerful Lord (lit. magician) enter the effect by means of his power (magic)? Therefore, (in answer) is stated the extent of it in the words *ā nakhāgrebhyah* ... [634]

नखाग्रावधिका यस्मात्संवित्पुंसो ऽभिजायते ।
अतः सामान्यवृत्त्यात्मा प्राविशद्देहमीश्वरः ॥६३५॥

Since sentience in an individual is noticed (lit. produced) up to the tip of the nails, therefore (it is held that) the Lord (viz. the Ātman) has entered into a body in a similar way. [635]

दृष्टान्ताभ्यामिमां वृत्तिं व्याचष्टे प्रत्यगात्मनः ।
कृत्स्नकारणतत्कार्यवृत्त्युपाधिसमाश्रयात् ॥६३६॥

(The Upaniṣad) declares this (twofold) activity (i.e. function) of the inner self with (i.e. in the light of) two illustrations, basing the same on the delimiting adjuncts, viz. the cause of

the entire (world) and the functions of its effects (=body).
[636]

मिथो विभक्ता एकत्र क्षुरधाने यथा क्षुराः ।
क्षुरधानाद्विभज्यन्ते तथात्मा नाडिभेदतः ॥६३७॥

As (many) razors, distinct from one another, are put into one place, i.e. in the razor-case and are distinguished from (that) razor-case, so also is the Ātman (distinguished from the bodies) on account of the distinction among (various) veins (etc.)¹
[637]

¹SP and NKL explain this thus: The Ātman is called the listener, the seer etc. by its contact with the ear, the eye etc.

ओतप्रोतात्मना तस्थुरर्वाग्या भूमयो ऽक्षरात् ।
तत्तद्विमिपरिच्छेदात्क्षेत्रज्ञः पर एव सन् ॥६३८॥

Whatever states, lower than the imperishable, remained on account of the Ātman which has woven them both length-wise and cross-wise, by limiting each one of those states, the highest Ātman is ever (eva) existing there as the knower of the field.
[638]

This verse refers to the subtle Ātman remaining in every gross product, after producing the same. This is based on *etasmin nu khalv akṣare gārgy ākāśa otaś ca protaś ca iti* ... (BU 3.8.11).

सूक्ष्मताव्यापिते ज्ञेये भूम्यादेर्यावदक्षरम् ।
पूर्वपूर्वप्रहाणेन तन्निष्ठा वियदात्मना ॥६३९॥

(In all things) beginning with the earth etc. and up to the imperishable (Ātman), one has to know the subtlety and pervasiveness (of the Ātman); by abandoning each preceding (of the earth etc., is noticed) its existence in the form of ether.
[639]

विश्वंभरो ऽग्निर्विज्ञेयो विश्वस्य भरणादिह ।

दारु कृत्स्नमभिव्याप्य यथाग्निर्दारुणि स्थितः ॥६४०॥
 संव्याप्य तद्वदखिलं देहमात्मा व्यवस्थितः ।

Because of his occupying the universe, Agni is to be understood as Viśvambhara, (for), fire resides in wood, pervading the whole of it, [640]
 in the same way, the Ātman exists, pervading the entire body. [641ab]

This explains the sentence in BU 1.4.7: *viśvambharo vā viśvambharakulāye*. The second line of this verse forms a syntactical whole, when together with the first line of the next verse.

तस्थावसंव्याप्य यथा क्षुरधानं क्षुरस्तथा ॥६४१॥
 श्रोत्रादिनाडीमध्यस्थ आत्माव्याप्य तनुं स्थितः ।
 वृत्ती द्वे प्राप्नुते ऽतद्वान्स्वप्नजाग्रदवस्थयोः ॥६४२॥

[In verses 641cd-644, there is description of the twofold appearance of the existent with reference respectively to a body and the outside world (*adhyātma* and *adhibhūta*).]

(Then) like a razor in a razor-case, which has not pervaded the whole (but one part) of it, the Ātman, not having pervaded the whole of the body, is residing (only) in some part, i.e. an ear etc. or the vein. (The Ātman) though really not having them, has two functions to perform, in the two states of waking and deep sleep. [641cd-642]

The second line of verse 641 and the first line of verse 642 together form one syntactical whole. The second line of verse 642 refers to the two states of the Ātman called Vaiśvānara and Taijasa in *Māṇḍūkyaopaniṣad* 3-5.

सामान्यमात्रवृत्तिं स सुषुप्ते प्रतिपद्यते ।
 प्रत्यग्याथात्म्यसंमोहान्न त्वसौ परमार्थतः ॥६४३॥

The Ātman performs the general function only while in deep sleep state; this, on account of the ignorance about the true

nature of the inner self. In reality, however, it is not that (viz. ignorance). [643]

महासत्ता वियज्ज्ञेयं कृत्स्नार्वागभूमिसंप्लुतेः ।
व्यक्तयो ऽन्त्या विशेषाः स्युस्तदसाधारणत्वतः ॥६४४॥

The sky¹, should be known as the absolute (lit. great) existent (on account of its) encompassing all lower regions; the manifold forms are (lit. should be known as) the last (i.e. lower) particulars on account of the uncommonness of them. [644]

¹The sky stands for the Ātman — NKL: *viyat brahman* and SP: *viyad akṣaram ṛco akṣare parame vyomann iti ...*

सामान्यानि विशेषाश्च तन्मध्यपतितानि च ।
सामान्यात्मविशेषत्वं तदुपाधिरगात्परः ॥६४५॥

The highest (Ātman), assuming such limiting adjuncts as are common, particular and those which fall between the two,¹ thus attained the character of (both) generality and particularity¹. [645]

In the preceding verse was stated that the sky (= Ātman), having the most pervading character, is called Mahāsattā. Now, a statement follows about other elements and their products — all these are but limiting adjuncts of the Ātman.

¹Namely, which can be both common and particular.

श्रोत्रत्वगादिनाडिस्थं शब्दाद्यालोचनादिभिः ।
चेष्टितं नामरूपाभ्यां देहे ऽमुष्योपलभ्यते ॥६४६॥

The activity¹ of that one (viz. the highest Ātman) is noticed in a body by various names and forms, (thus) in the sense of hearing, skin, etc. and the veins and by means of (hearing of) sound, etc. and seeing. [646]

¹See NKL, NKL edition and a variant reading: *veṣṭitam* for *ceṣṭitam*— quite an inferior reading!

असाधारणसामान्यरूपाभ्यामीक्ष्यमीक्षते ।

सर्वमानैः प्रसिद्धत्वादतो व्युत्थाप्यते ततः ॥६४७॥

The object of seeing¹ is seen² in its uncommon (i.e. particular) and common (i.e. general) forms with the help of all the means of knowing, since they are known (thereby). (And) therefore the (real experiencer³) is lifted up⁴ from them. [647]

This points out how this entire world has two parts; one seen and the other which cannot be seen (*vikāra* and *avikāra*).

¹This refers to the world, the so-called product of the Ātman.

²*īkṣate* in the original is understood as *īkṣyate*. Yet, alternatively one could translate: The Śruti sees or the people see the object of seeing in ...

³That is, the Ātman.

⁴This indicates that they do not see the one or they find it apart from all activity.

अयं मेयः प्रमाताहं मानमेतदितीक्ष्णे ।

मिथ्याज्ञाने जनस्तुष्टः स्वप्नमायेन्द्रजालवत् ॥६४८॥

[Verses 648-659 explain the meaning of *taṁ na paśyati*.]

This one is (the object) to be known, I am the knower and this is the means of knowing — in such (way of) knowing, viz. in false knowledge, are people satisfied as (one is satisfied) in a dream or a magic show. [648]

यतो मिथ्यावबोधो ऽयमतस्तदपनुत्तये ।

न पश्यन्ति तमित्याह ये पश्यन्ति यथोदितम् ॥६४९॥

As this (way of knowing) is (only) false knowledge, therefore, for the removal of the same, (the Śruti) has stated, 'They do not see ...' with reference to them who see him as described.

[649]

This verse establishes that a person who sees the Ātman as

possessed of varied forms is in reality ignorant about the same.

NKL edition reads: *-bodho 'yam matas ...*; accordingly the translation could be: this (way of knowing) is taken to be false knowledge ...; this hardly makes any difference.

वस्त्वज्ञानैकनिष्ठत्वान्मिथ्याधीर्न हि वस्तुनि ।
न पश्यन्तीत्यतो युक्तं नेक्षन्ते वस्तु तत्परम् ॥६५०॥

False knowledge, being dependent on ignorance about the real thing (does not belong) to the real thing. Therefore, it is proper to accept that they do not see it (viz. the real thing, the Ātman); they do not really see the highest thing (viz. Reality).

[650]

This sets aside the possible notion that the common man's knowledge about as object is not false. Since the Ātman has assumed the form of the object, therefore, the knowledge is really not true.

यद्यप्यत्राभिमानो ऽस्ति निष्क्रियाकारकात्मनि ।
पश्यामीत्ययथार्थत्वान्मिथ्याधिरेव सा मता ॥६५१॥

Even if, in this (state)¹, there is on the part of the Ātman, who is the actionless agent, the ego, viz. 'I am seeing.', there does not follow (the sight of) Reality, and so, that is to be understood as false knowledge.

[651]

¹This refers to worldly dealings.

नन्वप्राप्तनिषेधो ऽयं न पश्यन्तीति भण्यते ।
नैवं सृष्ट्यादिवाक्यानां प्रत्यग्बोधैकहेतुतः ॥६५२॥

(One might object:) When it is said (in the Śruti) 'They do not see.', this should be treated as rejection of what is not introduced.¹ (Our answer is:) This is not so, since the sentences (in the Śruti) about creation etc. have the only purpose of giving information about (the true nature of) the inner self.

[652]

¹ *aprāptaniṣedha* consists in denying or rejecting what was already not begun as a part of the statement. The objector would hold that *taddarśana* should have been earlier mentioned, should the Śruti *taṁ na paśyanti* become a meaningful *niṣedhavākya*.

मन्त्रो ऽप्याहेममेवार्थं रूपं रूपमिति स्फुटम् ।
तद्दर्शनात्समस्तस्य पुरुषार्थस्य सिद्धितः ॥६५३॥

Even the Mantra *rūpaṁ rūpaṁ ...*¹ has clearly declared this very thought, since there is complete accomplishment of the end of human endeavour from seeing that (viz. the Ātman).

[653]

¹BU 2.5.19: *rūpaṁ rūpaṁ pratirūpo babhūva tad asya ...*

पश्यन्तो ऽपि न पश्यन्ति विरुद्धं कथमुच्यते ।
मेयासंस्पर्शिदृष्टित्वान्न पश्यन्तीति भण्यते ॥६५४॥

(The objector asks a question:) How is this contradictory statement made, i.e. though seeing it, they do not see it¹? (To this we answer:) That 'they do not see it' is said because there is not (actual) seeing connected with any object of knowing.

[654]

¹The objector persists in holding the contradiction thus: *ātma-darśana* is taken up for discussion (*prakṛta*); therefore, *taṁ na paśyanti* is *niṣedha* of the same. That explains the apparent contradiction in the Śruti (*aprakṛtanīṣedha*).

सदेवेत्यादिवाक्येभ्यः कृत्स्नं वस्तु यतो ऽद्वयम् ।
संभवस्तद्विरुद्धस्य कुतो ऽकृत्स्नस्य वस्तुनः ॥६५५॥

Since from such sentences as *sad eva ...*¹ (it is understood that) there is only one whole thing without any duality, how could there be the possibility of (what is) opposed to it and is not (the) whole (thing)?

[655]

¹CU 6.2.1.

अव्यावृत्ताननुगतं प्रत्यग्वस्तु स्वतो मितेः ।
तद्विरुद्धेह या दृष्टिर्मिथ्यारूपा न सान्यथा ॥६५६॥

The inner self is the real thing, is not distinguished from another, (and) is not similar to (lit. followed by) another. Since it becomes known by itself, therefore, whatever knowledge in this world is opposed to that (viz. knowledge of the real) is false knowledge; it is otherwise (than real). [656]

This is another argument to convey the completeness/fullness of the inner self (Ātman) which is heard in the Śruti.

आत्मानात्मानमाप्नोति यतः प्रत्यक्तयाखिलम् ।
तदन्यानवशिष्टत्वादकृत्स्नः स्यादतो ऽन्यथा ॥६५७॥

Since the Ātman pervades¹ the entire non-Ātman by becoming the one within it; therefore, if (it were) different by being non-distinguished from that (creation),² (then) it would have been incomplete. [657]

This explains why the inner self (Ātman) is complete (*pūrṇa/kṛtsna*).

¹ *āpnoti = vyāpnoti*.

² This would disprove its *advitīyatva* 'singularity, being one without a second'.

अनात्मा नात्मरूपेण प्रत्यक्त्वात्सिद्धिमर्हति ।
प्रत्यङ्मात्रैकयाथात्म्यात्कुतस्तद्व्यतिरेकतः ॥६५८॥

The non-Ātman cannot be established as the Ātman, since that (viz. Ātman) is of the nature of one that resides within (a body) and since the truth is that the Ātman has only the inner self as its (delimited) nature. How can that be apart from that (i.e. the inner self)? [658]

This explains how duality (viz. non-Ātman) cannot exist as

identical with, and also apart from, the Ātman.

देशतः कालतो रूपाद्वस्त्ववस्थादितो ऽपि च ।
व्यभिचारो ऽस्य संसिद्धस्तद्विरुद्धात्मसाक्षिकः ॥६५९॥

And further, variance in the nature of this (non-Ātman/duality) is established by its region, time, form and (the different) states etc.¹ and has as its seer² what is opposite (to it in) character. [659]

It is stated that the varying character of the non-Ātman establishes it to be false.

¹The word etc. refers to change in properties.

²Namely, the inner self, the Ātman.

Verses 660-692 explain BU sentence 'akṛtsno hi sa prāṇann eva prāṇo nāma bhavati'.

प्रतिज्ञार्थस्य सिद्ध्यर्थं न पश्यन्तीति भण्यते ।
अकृत्स्नो हीति हेतूक्तिः सापि चैवं समर्थ्यते ॥६६०॥

The statement beginning with (the words); *na paśyanti* is made with a view to establishing what is enunciated.¹ The statement beginning with *akṛtsnaḥ* ...,² which is the statement of the reason (for the earlier statement), is also justified in this very way. [660]

This is the purport of *akṛtsno hi ... bhavati*.

¹That is, the uniqueness of the ever-existing Ātman.

²That is, *akṛtsno hi sa prāṇann eva prāṇo nāma bhavati, ... manvāno manah*.

तदकृत्स्नत्वसंसिद्ध्यै प्राणन्नेवेत्युदीरणम् ।
अन्योन्यव्यभिचारित्वं प्राणादेरीक्ष्यते यतः ॥६६१॥

The statement *prāṇann eva* has the purpose of establishing the incompleteness (in daily dealings) of that (i.e. the non-Ātman), since it is seen (i.e. experienced) that Prāṇa etc. have

existence¹ in the absence of one another.

[661]

¹That is, they are operative.

यस्मिन्दृष्टे ऽप्यदृष्टो ऽर्थः स तदन्यश्च शिष्यते ।
तथादृष्टे ऽपि दृष्टः स्यादकृत्स्नस्तादृगुच्यते ॥६६२॥

Such a thing (or object) is called incomplete when on its being seen¹ a thing, an unseen and other than itself (does) exist; (similarly) it would be seen even while that (former) is not seen.²

[662]

By this statement of the meaning of *akṛtsna*, Sureśvara suggests that Ātman being *kṛtsna* and known, everything else also becomes known.

¹That is, known.

²Sureśvara suggests that on the Ātman becoming known everything else becomes known and that the Ātman continues to exist while the other (apparent) thing is not seen (i.e. is no more in existence). This is how the Ātman is *kṛtsna*.

आविष्करिष्यन्हेत्वर्थमकृत्स्नत्वप्रसिद्धये ।
न ह्यसौ कृत्स्नतामेति चक्षुःश्रोत्रादिसंहतः ॥६६३॥

With a view to revealing the meaning of the (word expressive of) reason¹ and for establishing the incompleteness (of the non-Ātman, the Veda² declares) that the one, who possesses eye, ear etc., does not attain completeness.

[663]

¹Namely, the words *akṛtsno hi* ...

²Supply: *vedaḥ* in consonance with *āviṣkarīṣyan* (masculine form).

परस्परानभिव्याप्तेर्नामरूपक्रियात्मनाम् ।
व्यभिचारादकृत्स्नत्वं स्यादनात्मैकरूपिणाम् ॥६६४॥

There is incompleteness in the case of those (things) which are of the nature of name, form and action(s) and which have the form of only the non-Ātman and since they do not

pervade one another¹ and there is their mutual exclusion
(*vyabhicāra*). [664]

This verse states that all worldly things are *saṃghātas* and therefore *akṛtsna*.

¹That is, since they do not exist at one and the same time.

असंहतः संहतः सन्प्रत्यङ्मोहैकहेतुतः ।
प्राणनादिक्रियाः कुर्वन्प्राण इत्यभिधीयते ॥६६५॥

The one which is (in reality) not limited (in body etc.) is (taken as) limited (in a body) on account of the sole reason, viz. the ignorance about (the nature of) the inner self and is described by the word *Prāṇa*,¹ perform as it seems to do (various) activities beginning with breathing etc. [665]

¹SP suggests *prāṇa* should be understood for *prāṇanādi*.

तस्मिन्श्च प्राणने वायोर्व्यापारः करणात्मना ।
उत्सृज्यमानः कर्मत्वं विज्ञानात्मन एति सः ॥६६६॥

And in that action of breathing there is the function of the wind, in the capacity of an instrument (and), being released, it becomes the object of the activity of the knowing self¹. [666]

¹Namely, the inner self.

साक्षादात्मोत्सृजन्वायुं तस्मिन्प्राणनकर्मणि ।
अपेतकारकग्रामः प्रतीचैवानुभूयते ॥६६७॥

In that action of breathing, it is the *Ātman* itself who is far away from (i.e. is not possessed of) all the organs of activity (and), who, releasing the wind, is experienced by the inner self (as being within itself). [667]

कर्त्रादिकारकाण्यस्मिन्नसाधारणरूपतः ।

कर्त्रादिकारकाण्यस्मिन्नसाधारणरूपतः ॥६६८॥

All operative causes, viz. agent, means of activity etc., appear to be there in this witness of the coming and going (of wind etc.), (in that) who is not possessed of those (activities) as its properties. [668]

साक्षिरूपं स्वतःसिद्धं तेनैष्वव्यभिचारतः ।
कर्त्रादि तु तमोन्तस्य रूपं धर्माद्यपेक्षया ॥६६९॥

Therefore, its nature as the witness in these (activities) is self-established invariably; but, the form(s) as the agent etc. belongs to that which ends in ignorance (about the nature of the inner self)¹, owing to the dependence of the same on the property or activity (*dharma*) etc. [669]

¹ *tamonta* is not explained by both SP and NKL.

अनित्यहेतुतो ऽनित्यं तेन कर्त्रादि लक्ष्यते ।
निर्हेतु प्रत्यगज्ञानं लक्ष्यते तेन नित्यवत् ॥६७०॥

Therefore, owing to (its rise from) an impermanent cause, the character of the agent etc. is understood (by the knower, i.e. inner self) as impermanent. (And) for that (very) reason, ignorance about the inner self, having no cause for it whatever, is taken as permanent. [670]

प्रत्यगज्ञानमात्रैकनीडत्वान्नान्यरूपता ।
क्रियाकारकरूपाणां नित्यानित्यमतिः कुतः ॥६७१॥

Such things as are of the nature of activity and the means of activity, having a support (lit. nest) only in the ignorance about (the true nature of) the inner self, cannot have any other form.¹ How can (then) there be any thought² about (their cause),³ as permanent or impermanent? [671]

¹ They remain only as product of ignorance and therefore unreal.

² That is, discussion.

³ That is, the sky. What is meant is: The (so-called) knowers

in this world are the products of the sky. Therefore, the sky, their cause, also must be like them only non-eternal.

अतस्तद्व्यभिचारेण नामरूपक्रियात्मनाम् ।
अकृत्स्नव्यपदेशेन मिथ्याज्ञानत्वमुच्यते ॥६७२॥

Therefore (i.e. for that reason) is declared that those who are of the nature of name and form, varying in nature with that (inner self), are of the nature of false knowledge. (This is stated) in the mention 'incompleteness ...'. [672]

अज्ञातायां यथा रज्ज्वां तदध्यस्तैकरूपिणाम् ।
व्यभिचारः स्रगादीनां प्रतीच्येवमनात्मनाम् ॥६७३॥

As the wreath of flowers etc. has (i.e. shows) variance (with the rope (etc.)) when the rope (etc.) which has/have the form(s) of what is/are superimposed on the same is/are not known (in the real form), so also the non-Ātmans, being superimposed on the inner self, (show variance with it). [673]

प्राणाग्नयः पुरा बुद्धेः सुषेष्वन्येषु जाग्रति ।
अतस्तद्विषया तावत्कर्तृतेहोच्यते प्रभोः ॥६७४॥

Fires in the form of *prāṇas* exist (even) before one's awakening (from the state of deep sleep) while the others (i.e. other functioning organs) are asleep. Therefore, with reference to that (existence) is here stated the activity (of breathing) of the Lord. [674]

नामतो रूपतश्चैवं प्राणनादिषु कर्मसु ।
लक्ष्यते ऽविद्यया तद्वान्रज्जुः सर्पादिभिर्यथा ॥६७५॥

Thus, owing to name and also owing to form is experienced in the activities, viz. breathing etc. (the inner self) as the performer of them through ignorance, in the same way as a rope (etc.) is noticed (i.e. understood) as having the form of a serpent etc. [675]

प्राणन्नेवेत्यवधृतेस्तदर्थान्तररूपतः ।

प्राणाद्यकृत्स्नतासिद्ध्यै व्यभिचारः प्रदर्श्यते ॥६७६॥

(Therefore) in order to establish the incompleteness of (the agent of) breathing etc. there is shown by the restriction with the use of the word *eva* the variance of the same (lit. that) from other (functions).¹ [676]

¹For example, seeing, hearing and others. Cf. note 1 on verse 665 above.

कर्मैतदेव कुर्वाणः काले चात्रैव भण्यते ।

अत्रैव च क्रियायोगे तद्रूपाहः स इष्यते ॥६७७॥

(This Ātman) who is performing just this activity is described as '(he is) so and so at this point of time'. It is only here on account of (its) association with that (particular) function that it is accepted to have a name after that form. [677]

तद्वानसमकालं तु प्राणनादिक्रियोत्थितेः ।

प्रागूर्ध्वं च तदन्येषु प्राणासंभवहेतुतः ।

न तन्नामा न तद्रूपस्तदन्यत्र च कर्मणि ॥६७८॥

But doing (only) that activity, it does not have that name and that form while doing another activity, i.e. before and after the rise of the activity such as breathing, (and also) at another point of time, since there is no possibility of there being Prāṇa etc. [678]

प्राणनानन्तरं यस्मात्क्रियाशक्तेः समुद्भवः ।

वदन्वागित्यतः प्राह क्रमयोगानुरोधतः ॥६७९॥

Since the rise of any capacity for performing any function (only) follows breathing (by an individual), therefore, the Śruti declares 'speaking, (therefore) it is speech' etc., in accordance with the sequence (of the rise of other functions). [679]

तथोच्यते ऽनयेत्यस्मात्करणं वागुदाहृता ॥६८०॥

The Ātman, because it speaks, is called speech (= Vāc) When there is sound (produced), it is called Vāc. (Also) it is called Vāc, a sense-organ, because thereby is (sound) uttered. [680]

This verse has a purport to point out that there is in worldly dealings the division as the agent, the object and the sense-organs even while the Śruti has declared that all these are but the Ātman.

पश्यंश्चक्षुस्तथा द्रष्टा शृण्वञ्श्रोत्रं तथैव च ।
त्रिधा त्रिधा व्यवच्छिन्नं एवं सर्वत्र लक्षयेत् ॥६८१॥

So, (the Ātman) who is seeing is the seer, the eye, in the same way, listening, (it) is the ear. Thus limited in this threefold (function)¹ in three ways² is the Ātman — thus should one understand (the thought) everywhere. [681]

This verse describes the limitation of the Ātman under the influence of ignorance.

¹Seeing, hearing, feeling the touch.

²The agent, the object and the means of knowing.

चक्षुरालोचनायैव संशयं कुरुते मनः ।
बुद्धिरध्यवसानाय साक्षी क्षेत्रज्ञ उच्यते ॥६८२॥

Eye¹ is only for seeing² (an object), *manas* entertains doubt (about the nature of an object) [or options regarding the nature of the object], intellect is for deciding (its exact nature) and the witness (the Ātman) is called the knower of the field. [682]

¹SP: Eye stands for all the *indriyas* of *karman* and *jñāna*.

²SP: *darśana* indicates all other activities of the *indriyas*.

यैव ज्ञानविकाशेषु साक्षिता सैव नान्यथा ।
क्रियाशक्तिविकाशेषु ह्यन्योन्यव्यभिचारिषु ॥६८३॥

Whatever be the character of the witness it remains the same in respect of different flashes of knowing (i.e. awarenesses); (at all times), it does not vary (even) while there are flashes of the capacities of various functions, and while they differ with one another. [683]

निरस्तावयवे व्योम्नि मिथोभिन्नप्रदेशिनाम् ।
न संभाव्या यथा सिद्धिः प्रतीच्येवं तमोवताम् ॥६८४॥

As in the case of the sky which does not have any parts, (the notions of) parts in mutually distinct regions are not possible to posit; so it is in the case of them who have ignorance with respect to the inner self. [684]

प्राणन्वदन्नित्युक्तानि नामरूपाणि यानि तु ।
कर्मजान्येव तान्यस्य न तु चैतन्यवत्स्वतः ॥६८५॥
अन्योन्यापेक्षसंसिद्धेरन्योन्यव्यभिचारतः ।
अपराधीनसंसिद्धौ भानाविव तमो भवेत् ॥६८६॥

Whatever be the names and forms mentioned in the statements 'breathing, speaking, etc.', they have originated only in (different) functions of this one (i.e. the inner self). But (none of these) is, like (its own) sentience, on the strength of itself, [685]

because they get established through mutual dependence and because they occur in the absence of one another. In case (therefore, it is said that) they get established without depending mutually, it would be like (saying that) there is darkness in the sun. [686]

Verse 685 explains BU: *tāny aṣyaitāni karmamayāny eva*.

यत एवमविद्योत्थं प्राणाद्यस्यातदात्मनः ।
नामरूपमतस्ताभ्यां पश्यन्नपि न पश्यति ॥६८७॥

Since thus¹ (all this, viz.) Prāṇa etc. has thus originated from ignorance (about the true nature of the Ātman), therefore, from this one which does not have the same (lit. that)² as

its nature, (i.e.) from these names and forms, (therefore) this one (i.e. the inner self) does not see, even though it is seeing.

[687]

¹That is, for this reason, viz. being dependent (on another) and being without one another.

²Namely, the two factors mentioned in the preceding note.

तत्रैवं सति यो द्रष्टा प्राणनादिक्रियं परम् ।
उपास्त इति जानाति न स्वभावादुपासनम् ॥६८८॥

Then, this being so, whichever seer worships the highest (Ātman) as the one that performs such activities as breathing etc., does not really know worship in its own (i.e. real) nature.

[688]

This explains BU: *sa yo 'ta ekaikam upāste*. This is not an injunction, inasmuch as there follows a *nindā*: *na sa veda*.

न यतो युगपत्कृत्स्नवस्तुज्ञानं क्रमेण वा ।
अस्त्येकैकमतो ऽनूक्तिः प्राप्ता दृष्टिरनूद्यते ॥६८९॥

Since there does not arise the knowledge of all entities simultaneously or (gradually) in some sequence, therefore (in the statement of the Śruti) there is the mention of the word *ekaika* 'one after another'; thus is followed the nature of each as commonly observed in the world.¹

[689]

This explains the purpose of *ekaikam*. The Upāsana under reference cannot pertain to all objects together, i.e. simultaneously. One can infer from SP: *na svābhāvikajñānasya vidhāyakam idaṃ vākyaṃ*.

¹*prāptā = lokataḥ prāptā* (SP).

नानेकदृष्टिविध्यर्थमेकैकोपास्तिकत्सनम् ।
मृत्योः स मृत्युमित्येवं तद्दृष्टिरपि कुत्स्यते ॥६९०॥

This censure (implied in) this statement about worship of each of them, one after another, is not prescriptive of seeing many.

for, in the statement *mṛtyoḥ sa mṛtyuḥ* ... is censured that (kind of) seeing¹ also. [690]

¹That refers to *anekadr̥ṣṭi*.

सर्व एकमिति ह्युक्तेरिहाप्यैकात्म्यदर्शनम् ।
विधीयते यतो नातः समस्तव्यस्तदर्शनम् ॥६९१॥

Since here also is prescribed in words *sarva ekam*; seeing the uniqueness of the Ātman, therefore, there is no seeing of the aggregate and the several parts. [691]

This has a reference to *atra hy ete sarva ekam bhavanti*.

समस्तव्यस्ततां तस्मान्मानान्तरमितत्वतः ।
अनूद्यापूर्वमैकात्म्यं विधेयमुपपत्तिमत् ॥६९२॥

Therefore, having merely repeated the nature of the aggregate and of the several parts owing to their being known by other means of knowing, (the Śruti finds it proper) to state with reason the uniqueness of the Ātman which was not stated¹ (anywhere) before. [692]

¹That is, known.

समुद्रतरुगोपिण्डदृष्टान्तैः परमात्मनः ।
व्याचक्षते बलात्केचित्समस्तव्यस्तदर्शनम् ॥६९३॥

[Verses 693-703 state and refute Bhartṛprapañca's view on *atra ... bhavanti*.]

Some¹ emphatically² state that the highest Ātman is seen as an aggregate and as consisting of parts in the light of the illustrations of the ocean, the tree, and the body of a cow. [693]

¹SP and NKL refer some to Bhartṛprapañca. Cf. verses 947-950

²Cf. SP: *balād iti śrutyakṣarabāhyatvoktiḥ*, i.e. going against the Śruti.

नानावयवसंभेदभिन्नार्थश्चेन्नगादिवत् ।

सिद्धः कुतश्चिन्मानात्स्यादनुवादस्तथा सति ॥६९४॥

If (the Ātman) were somehow established by some means to be a thing characterized as a conglomeration of various parts like, for instance, a tree etc.¹, then there could have been a repetitive statement² about that. [694]

This verse refers to the idea that the Śruti mentions about the Ātman as a *samastavyasta vastu*.

¹The word etc. refers to an ocean, the body of a cow.

²That is, *anuvāda*. Cf. NKL: *brahma bhinnābhinnam upādānavāt samudravat ity anumānāt siddhaś cet tathā sati vākyam anuvādo 'pramāṇam ity arthah*.

निःशेषभेदसामान्यदृष्ट्यावृत्तिरुपासनम् ।

विधित्सतं चेत्तादृक्षं कल्पकोट्या ऽपि दुःशकम् ॥६९५॥

If it was intended to prescribe a worship (of the Ātman) by repeating the notion of (its being) identical with the common characteristic and all (variety of the things); then that kind (of worship) would be extremely difficult (to imagine) by every stretch of imagination.¹ [695]

This sets aside the possible view that there is some worship prescribed of the Ātman as a *bhinnābhinna vastu*.

¹Read SP: *teṣām (= viśeṣāṇām) ānanyāt kārtsnyenānusamdhānā-siddheḥ ...*

प्रत्यग्दृष्टेर्हि विषयः स्यादात्मैत्यनुभूतितः ।

तदबोधमृते तत्र कुतः पिण्डादिदर्शनम् ॥६९६॥

Indeed (the Ātman) would be an object of seeing by the individual self owing to its being experienced. Therefore, how could there be the sight (i.e. seeing) of a body etc. unless

(there is) ignorance of that (Ātman)?

[696]

तं परादादिति तथा प्रतीच्यज्ञानकल्पितम् ।
मिथ्याज्ञानापनुत्त्यर्थमात्मैवेत्यब्रवीच्छ्रुतिः ॥६९७॥

Also, what the Śruti has declared in the statement *taṁ parādād* ... is in respect of the inner self — a notion produced by ignorance and it is pronounced for removing (i.e. wiping away) completely the false knowledge that the Śruti stated *ātmaiva* ...

[697]

पराञ्चीत्यपवादाच्च न पिण्डादीक्षणम् श्रुतेः ।
प्रत्यग्दृष्ट्या विरुद्धत्वान्न परागर्थदर्शनम् ॥६९८॥

So also, on the basis of the denial in the statement *parāñci khāni* ...¹, (it may be said that) seeing the individual body etc. is not (acceptable) to the Śruti. There is no seeing of any outside object (possible), since that is opposed to seeing of the individual self.

[698]

¹ *Kāthopaniṣad* 4.1; cf. verse 180 note 3 above.

अनन्यमेयतन्मानमातृ वस्त्वविभागवत् ।
अमेयमानमात्रेकं तदात्मेति प्रचक्षते ॥६९९॥

They declare that as the Ātman, which is a thing that does not have any to be known (as associated with it), a means and the knower of knowing it — a real thing, which does not have parts, unique object, not (associated with any) means but the knower of itself.

[699]

This explains the nature of the Ātman.

संसारदर्शनाभ्यासात्तन्मुक्तिं ये प्रचक्षते ।
नाकार्यं विद्यते तेषां वैश्वानरवराश्रयात् ॥७००॥

For those who state that liberation of that (viz. the Ātman, as effected) by continued meditation on (the nature of) the

transmigratory existence, there does not exist any activity which cannot be performed; (that is so) on account of the support of Vaiśvānara's favour. [700]

वयं तु वरहीनत्वाच्चर्मवद्वेष्टितुं वियत् ।
न शक्नुमो विना युक्तीरतो न श्रद्धधामहे ॥७०१॥

As for ourselves, we are not able (to declare), without reasoning¹, (such a meaning of the Śruti)², in the same way as they (would), for the reason of not having received the boon (of Fire), (indeed, it would be like an effort) to cover the sky with some skin³ — therefore, we do not have faith (in that meaning). [701]

¹It literally means: reasons.

²Namely, that which Bhartṛprapañca has declared.

³Cf. *Śvetāśvataropaniṣad* 6.20: *yadā carmavad ākāśam veṣṭayisyanti mānavāḥ*; this implies opposition to scriptures.

उक्तं च वक्ष्यमाणं समस्तव्यस्ततां प्रति ।
श्रुत्यक्षरानुरोधेन दूषणं दूषितात्मनाम् ॥७०२॥

Thus is blame directed and also will be directed against those whose minds are affected (by wrong notions) with respect to the nature of the Ātman as an aggregate and what is made up of parts — this, in consonance with the statements (lit. words) of the Śruti. [702]

नादूषितात्मभिर्यस्मात्प्रतीचो ऽन्यन्मनागपि ।
प्रत्यग्दृष्ट्येक्षितुं शक्यं वस्तु स्वप्नदृशा यथा ॥७०३॥

And (this is so) because, for those whose intellect is not affected (by notions of duality), it is not possible to see even a little thing which is other than the Ātman as the inner self as by one who is seeing a dream. [703]

This gives the reason why Bhartṛprapañca, who sees duality (*samastavyastavastudarśana*) is blamed as *dūṣitātman*.

प्राणन्वदन्निति द्वाभ्यां क्रियाशक्तिसमुद्भवः ।
पश्यञ्छण्वन्निति तथा ज्ञानशक्त्युद्भवः कृतः ॥७०४॥

[Verses 704-710 explain BU: *prāṇann eva*.]

By the words *prāṇan* and *vadan*, (there is a statement made about) the rise of the capacity for activity and, by the words *paśyan* and *śṛṇvan*, about the rise of the capacity for knowing.

[704]

नामरूपातिरेकेण न ज्ञेयं वस्तु विद्यते ।
उपलब्धौ तयोरुक्ते कारणे श्रोत्रचक्षुषी ॥७०५॥

There does not exist an object to be known apart from (what has) name and form, and, for knowing these two, there are stated two means, viz. ears and eyes.

[705]

नामरूपप्रकाश्या च क्रिया प्राणात्मिका तथा ।
नामाभिव्यक्तिकृद्वाकस्यादेवं सर्वत्र योजना ॥७०६॥

Activity is what can be revealed by name and form and which has *Prāṇa* as its essence — (this is understood) from the sentence which reveals the name and form — such is the construe everywhere (in the present context).

[706]

श्रोत्रादिकरणैर्यद्यत्प्रथते तत्तदुच्यते ।
रूपं व्याक्रियते यत्तु तन्नामेत्युपदिश्यते ॥७०७॥

(In this context), whatever becomes revealed (to an individual) by organs such as ears¹ is called form; and (*tu*) whatever is specified is called to be name.

[707]

¹Organs such as ears refers to the eyes also. This indicates the flash of the knowing sentience (*viññānaśaktyudbhava*). It is sentience that is really capable of hearing, seeing etc. Therefore, SP rightly points out: *śaktidvayodbhavoktyā samastasamsārasya praticy adhyāsasyātra vivakṣitatvān na prasiddhanāpnarūpagraho 'tra*

yuktaḥ.

ज्ञानशक्तिविकाशानां मनः साधारणं मतम् ।
क्रियाशक्त्युद्भावानां च कारणं तत्त्रिकालदृक् ॥७०८॥

manas is held as common in (grasping) all the capacities for knowing and that is also the means for the rise of the capacity for activity — (thus) that is the seer (i.e. experiencer) in all the three periods of time.¹ [708]

This explains BUB: *manvāno mano manuta iti* ... But cf. SP: *atra ca bhāṣyānusāreṇa vyutpattitrayam āśritya kartṛtvāditrayam ātmano draṣṭavyam*.

प्राणनादिकृतां मध्य एकैकं यः समीक्षते ।
न स जानात्यकृत्स्नत्वात्पूर्णं वस्तु यतः स्वतः ॥७०९॥

Whosoever amongst Prāṇa etc. sees only each one of them does not know (the true nature of the inner self) because of the incompleteness (of each one of them); since Reality in itself is complete.¹ [709]

¹Read NKL: *ekaikakriyāviśiṣṭam (ātmānam) vidvān avidvān*.

यावदेवमयं वेद प्राणितीत्यादिकर्तृकम् ।
अक्रियाकारकं वस्तु न तावद्वेद तत्त्वतः ॥७१०॥

So long as this (individual) knows (this Ātman) as the agent of the action conveyed by (the verb root) *pra-√an*, he has not known the real thing which does not perform (or do) any activity. [710]

This explains away the paradox in *yaḥ samīkṣate na sa jānāti* in the previous verse.

Now is introduced a discussion of the sentence 'ātmety evopā-sīta' up to verse 940.

अव्याकृते ऽनभिव्यक्तेर्न चेतत्तत्त्वमीक्ष्यते ।
व्यक्तौ च हेतुकार्याभ्यां कथं तर्हीक्ष्यतां परम् ॥७११॥

If that Reality is not grasped in the unmanifest (form, viz. which is in deep sleep state¹), since it is not revealed (in various name(s) and form(s)), how then can that highest (Reality) be seen when it is manifest by means of the cause and the effect?¹ [711]

This verse refers to two states; deep sleep and waking.

¹SP: *svāpaviṣayo 'vyākṛtaśabdah*.

²Namely, by its various names and forms.

कार्यकारणबुद्धौ ताविष्येते विश्वतैजसौ ।
प्राज्ञः कारणबद्धस्तु द्वौ तु तुर्ये न सिद्ध्यतः ॥७१२॥

Those two, viz. Viśva and Taijasa¹ are understood as affected (lit. bound) by the effect and the cause²; as for Prājña¹, it is affected by the cause; and these two do not affect the Turya.¹ [712]

This is *Gauḍapāḍakārikā* 1.11.

¹These are names for sentience in the states of waking, dream, deep sleep and liberation.

²These refer to non-understanding of the Reality and consequent acceptance of duality as real.

विस्फारिताक्षो जानाति शब्दाद्येव न तत्परम् ।
अपीतकरणग्रामः शब्दाद्यपि न वेत्ति हि ॥७१३॥

One whose sense-organs¹ are wide-open² grasps only words etc., but not the highest Reality; for, indeed, he whose sense-organs have merged (into their own cause) cannot grasp even word etc.³ [713]

¹These imply organs of action also.

²That is, active or operative.

³The first line refers to waking state and the second line to deep sleep state.

sleep state.

कथं पश्यंस्तमात्मानं साक्षाद्वेदेति चोदिते ।
आत्मेत्येवेति नो वक्ति चोद्यहेतुनिवृत्तये ॥७१४॥

When it is asked, 'how does he, seeing, know the Ātman in its own form?', the Śruti announces to us, *ātmety eva ...?*¹, for the removal of the cause of the question (asked). [714]

¹Cf. BUB: *katham punaḥ paśyan vedety āha, ātmety eva ...*

अतिरोहितरूपं यज्जगत्यव्याकृते तथा ।
तत्साक्षित्वाच्च तद्व्यक्तौ यदक्षैर्व्यज्यते न च ॥७१५॥
प्रत्यक्तया यः प्रथते स्वयंज्योतिःस्वभावकः ।
मातृमानक्रियामेयविभागैर्न विभज्यते ॥७१६॥
जिघ्राणीममहं गन्धमिति यो वेत्त्यविक्रियः ।
स आत्मा तत्परं ज्योतिः शिरसीदं वचः श्रुतेः ॥७१७॥

That is the Ātman; that is the highest light — that whose nature is not concealed (even) while the mundane world in (it when it was) not manifest as well; and which is not revealed by the sense-organs because of its nature of being the witness of it in its manifestation; (the one) which reveals itself as the inner self, having self-luminous nature, and which cannot be divided into parts, viz. knower, means of knowing, function of knowing and objects of knowing, and (the one) which, without undergoing any modification, knows 'I smell this fragrance.'¹ — this is a statement at the head of the Śruti.

[715-717]

These verses explain what is Ātman.

¹Cf. CU 8.12.4: *atha yo vededam jighrāṇīti sa ātmā*.

अभिधाज्ञानगम्यत्वनिषेधार्थेतिशब्दनम् ।
यतो वाचो निवर्तन्त इति च श्रुतिशासनम् ॥७१८॥

The expression *iti* (in *ātmety evopāsīta*) is for denying the possible thought that (the Ātman has) the character of being

the object of knowing by its name and (for conveying this very idea) there is also a statement in the Śruti *yato vāco nivartante*¹. [718]

¹Cf. *Taittirīyopaniṣad* 2.3.1.

व्याकृताव्याकृतात्मत्वनिराकरणसिद्धये ।
एवेत्याहान्यदेवेति तथा चोच्चैः श्रुतीरणम् ॥७१९॥

The Śruti has used the word *eva* for effecting the refutation of (the idea that) the Ātman is (both) the manifest and the unmanifest; so also, there is a loud (i.e. prominent) statement of the Śruti *anyad eva* ...¹ [719]

¹*Kenopaniṣad* 1.4: *anyad eva tad veditād atho aviditād adhi*. This Śruti is also referred to in verses 873, 1117 below.

उपेति सामीप्यवचस्तन्निष्ठा प्रत्यगात्मनि ।
कार्यकारणभूताभ्यां प्रत्यङ्नेदीय ईक्ष्यते ॥७२०॥

(The preposition) *upa* is an expression for nearness; it has relation to (lit. rest on) the inner self. The inner self is seen to be in the nearness owing to what have become the cause and the effect.¹ [720]

¹These are intellect and false knowledge.

व्याकृताव्याकृतात्मभ्यां यो भिन्नो ऽज्ञानहेतुतः ।
प्रत्यक्त्वधिया हत्वा तावुपैत्यात्ममात्रताम् ॥७२१॥

The one who is distinct from what are of the nature of the manifest and the unmanifest (only) on account of the ignorance (about the same) becomes the Ātman, after it has destroyed the two¹ by the knowledge of the true nature of the inner self. [721]

¹This refers to the two limiting adjuncts mentioned as *kārya* and *kāraṇa* in the preceding verse.

व्युत्थाय कारणात्कार्यात्तत्त्वज्ञानवर्त्मना ।
उपेत्य कूटस्थमजमासीतापरिणामवान् ॥७२२॥

Having risen above the cause and (also) the effect by (following) the way of knowing the truth of that (i.e. inner self) and (thus) having gone nearest unto the immutable, unborn, (a person¹) should become unpossessed of (every) modification. [722]

¹That is, *sādhaka* 'worshipper of the Ātman'.

व्यक्ताव्यक्तविभागो ऽयं सिध्येदात्मन्यतद्वति ।
अहोरात्रविभागो ऽयं भानौ तद्वहिते यथा ॥७२३॥

This division (of the world) into the manifest and the unmanifest would stand established¹ in the case (of the Ātman), which does not possess the two, in the same way as the division of day and night, in the case of the sun who is without them. [723]

¹That is, is related to; cf. verse 720 above.

आत्मानात्मविभागो ऽपि नायमात्मस्पृगीक्ष्यते ।
अज्ञातात्मैकसाक्षित्वादज्ञानोत्थं न वस्तुगम् ॥७२४॥

Even¹ this division of the Ātman and the non-Ātman is not considered to pertain to (lit. to touch) the Ātman, because it has only the Ātman, not known before, as its witness; (in fact) whatever arises from ignorance does not pertain to (the real) thing. [724]

¹This implies: Like the division into the cause and the effect.

अनात्मसिद्धिवन्न स्यादात्मसिद्धिरनात्मनः ।
आत्मनो ऽनात्मसिद्धिश्च नैव स्यादात्मसिद्धिवत् ॥७२५॥
आत्मनो व्यतिरेकेण नैःस्वाभाव्यादनात्मनः ।
तथैवाव्यतिरेकेण रज्जसर्पखपृष्पवत् ॥७२६॥

The (existence of the) Ātman cannot get established¹ (with the help) of the non-Ātman in the same way as (the existence of) the non-Ātman gets established (with the help) of the Ātman². So also, the non-Ātman does not get established (with the help) of the Ātman as the Ātman gets established.³

[725]

(And this is so, also) because the non-Ātman stands apart from the Ātman owing to its not having a nature of its own and also since it is not apart from the Ātman as in the (instance of) a rope-serpent and/or a sky-flower.⁴

[726]

¹That is, cannot come into existence.

²Read SP: *vyavahāradaśāyām anātmano jaḍasyājaḍātmaprasādāt siddhivad anātmaprasādān nātmasiddhiḥ ...*

³The Ātman is self-established (*svayamprakāśa*). The non-Ātman cannot establish itself. Nor does the Ātman establish (i.e. really produce) it.

⁴This is yet another argument to point to the imaginary character of the non-Ātman. It does not exist in its own right or as apart from the Ātman. It is like a sky-flower or a serpent in the place of a rope!

तस्मान्नानात्मनो ऽस्त्यात्मा नाप्यनात्मात्मनः स्वतः ।
आत्मनस्तु स्वतः सिद्धिरात्मसिद्धेरनन्यतः ॥७२७॥

Therefore,¹ the Ātman does not exist on account of the (supposed existence of) the non-Ātman; so also does not the non-Ātman exist on account of the existence of the Ātman, or, on its own account. As against this, the existence of the Ātman is established on account of itself, for, the Ātman does not get established by anything else.

[727]

¹Or, thus.

यावानात्मनि वेदात्मा प्रतीच्यात्मानमात्मना ।
निरस्ताज्ञानतत्कार्यं पश्येत्तद्वदनात्मसु ॥७२८॥

As¹ the Ātman has known itself in the ...

i.e. by its own effort, so also should the inner self know itself (even) in the non-Ātman (taken as existent) to be the one who has cast off all ignorance and its effect(s). [728]

¹ *yāvan ... tadvat* are for *yadvat ... tadvat* (i.e. *yathā ... tathā*).

बुद्ध्यादेर्विषयान्तस्य निरस्तस्यात्मनो बहिः ।
अनात्मवस्तुनः प्रत्यङ्ङात्मा ह्यात्मीयतो भवेत् ॥७२९॥

The Ātman is inside (all) the non-Ātman, viz. what begins with intellect and ends with the objects of various sense-organs and which are set aside as external (to the Ātman); (this is so) because each of the things belongs to the Ātman (viz. the inner self). [729]

तद्याथात्म्यात्महेतुभ्यामनात्मार्थसमागमे ।
अव्यावृत्ताननुगतसंगती रज्जुसर्पवत् ॥७३०॥

Therefore, when the Ātman is in conjunction with the non-Ātman object(s) on account of its true nature (of pervading everything) and the things being caused by the Ātman, there follows the association of the non-differentiated and the unique Ātman like (in the illustration of) the serpent seen in the place of a rope. [730]

The idea is: As a rope appears to be a serpent, so does the inner self appear to have the various sense-organs, as it were.

प्रतीचो ऽव्यतिरेकेण तदन्यद्वस्तु सिध्यति ।
प्रतीचा तस्य जग्धत्वात्क्वानात्मा सिध्यतामयम् ॥७३१॥

A thing other than the inner self gets established as existent (only) as (really) not being apart from it because it is pervaded (lit. eaten, devoured) by the inner self; whence can the non-Ātman (originate) then? [731]

This stresses that the connection between the inner self and the non-Ātman is imaginary.

सहते ऽनात्मतां नात्मानात्मा तद्विरहे कुतः ।
वस्त्वात्मना न चेत्सिद्ध्येत्कुतः सिद्ध्येदनात्मना ॥७३२॥

The Ātman cannot tolerate anything of the nature of the non-Ātman, how then can there exist a non-Ātman in the absence of the Ātman? If Reality does not get self-established by itself, how could it get established by any non-Ātman? [732]

This is to strengthen the idea of the imaginary relation between the Ātman and the non-Ātman. Also, this is another reason to prove the imaginary character of the non-Ātman.

स्वात्मन्येव सदन्यत्र सर्ववस्तु प्रसिध्यति ।
तत्र चेत्तदसत्सत्स्यात्कथमन्यत्र निष्प्रमम् ॥७३३॥

All things appear elsewhere¹, remaining (unchanged) in their own nature², and in case it is non-existent there, how could the existent exist elsewhere as non-perceptible? [733]

This illustrates the thought in the preceding verse: The non-existent non-Ātman cannot really exist in what one might call as its effects.

¹That is, in many forms.

²For example, clay changing into a plate, a pot, a pitcher etc.

मातृत्वकञ्चुको यद्वदात्मानात्मानमीक्षते ।
दृष्टिमात्रैकरूपत्वान्न तथात्मानमीक्षते ॥७३४॥

As the Ātman, wearing a robe in the form of the character of a seer, sees the non-Ātman; in the same way does not the Ātman see itself on account of its being merely the seeing (one)¹. [734]

The idea is: The character of the inner self as the seer of outside world is only attributed to it; in that sense, it sees the objects in the world. But it cannot see itself and the real seer.

¹*dr̥ṣṭi* = *draṣṭr*. Also, cf. note on verse 745 below.

कर्तृत्वप्रतिषेधार्थं द्रष्टुर्दृष्टेरिति श्रुतिः ।
दृष्टिरेव तु यो द्रष्टेत्याह दृष्टिविशेषणम् ॥७३५॥

The statement in the Śruti *draṣṭur dr̥ṣṭer*¹ is for the purpose of the denial of any activity (on the part of the Ātman) and (the Śruti) has mentioned the distinguishing factor of seeing in the statement 'He is the seer who is the sight.' [735]

¹BU 4.3.23: *na hi draṣṭur dr̥ṣṭeh*.

प्रतीचो वस्तुनस्तावद्वस्तुवृत्तं यथोदितम् ।
शब्दवृत्तमथेदानीं यथावदभिधीयते ॥७३६॥

Thus is explained the nature of Reality in the case of the inner self,¹ so now is explained the purport of the word.² [736]

¹This refers to the discussion which was begun in verse 723 above.

²*śabdavṛtta* refers to the use and purpose of various words in relation to the Ātman.

यच्चाप्नोति यदादत्ते यच्चात्ति विषयानिह ।
यच्चास्य संततो भावस्तस्मादात्मेति कथ्यते ॥७३७॥

The Ātman is so called, since it pervades, takes up, experiences (lit. eats) objects (of pleasure) here (i.e. in this world) and has a continued existence. [737]

SP points out that this is a verse of Vyāsa. Cf. *Mahābhārata* 1.524* (2); this is inserted after 1.57.88ab in Poona critical ed.

यस्मादर्थे तु विज्ञेया यच्छब्दाः सर्व एव तु ।
समुच्चये चशब्दाश्च तथा सर्वत्र योजयेत् ॥७३८॥

Indeed all the four expressions, viz. *yat* (four times in the
(...)) should be understood only¹ in the sense of

yasmāt 'because' and the (three) *cas* also are in the sense of collection; in this way should one connect the words together everywhere. [738]

¹SP comments: First *tu* is for specification (*avadhāraṇa*) and the second, to indicate the absence of any other sense of the word.

व्याप्नोत्यनवशेषेण सर्पादीन्स्रगिवाखिलान् ।
प्रत्यक्त्यानात्मनो ऽतः प्रत्यगात्मेति भण्यते ॥७३९॥

[In verses 739-740, Sureśvara derives the word *ātman* from the verb root $\sqrt{\text{āp}}$ 'to pervade'.]

Since it pervades all the non-Ātmans in their entirety by being inside them, like a wreath of flowers (etc.) pervades (all) the serpents etc.,¹ it is called the inner self. [739]

This versre is the explanation of *yac cāpnoti tasmāt* in verse 737 above.

¹The word etc. refers to well-known instance of superimposition.

सावशेषात्मनो ऽकृत्स्नान्निःशेषात्मतया यतः ।
आत्मानात्मन आप्नोति तेनात्मेत्यभिधीयते ॥७४०॥

The Ātman is so called (i.e. Ātman) since the Ātman pervades (all) the non-Ātmans which are of the nature of some dependent things (and) incomplete, being entirely one with them. [740]

स्वचिदाभासमोहेन तदुत्थानखिलान्यतः ।
आदत्ते ऽनात्मनः प्राज्ञे ततश्चात्मेति तं विदुः ॥७४१॥

Since in *Prājña* (viz. form of the Ātman in the state of deep sleep) it receives within itself by a semblance of its own consciousness all the non-Ātmans which have arisen from it, therefore, they have known it as the Ātman. [741]

Here, Sureśvara derives the word *ātman* from the verb root $\sqrt{dā}$ 'to withdraw'.

पर आत्मनि सर्वे ऽपि संप्रतिष्ठन्त एकले ।
पृथिव्याद्या अनात्मान इति चार्थवणे वचः ॥७४२॥

All (objects) without exception (*api*) remain (dormant) in the highest Ātman, which is just alone (i.e. one without a second). And (i.e. for,) there is a statement in the Ātharvaṇa (Śruti) *pr̥thivyādyā anātmānaḥ* ... 'The earth etc., the non-Ātman ...'¹
[742]

Sureśvara confirms the deviation in the preceding verse by a statement in the Śruti.

¹ *Praśnopaniṣad* 4.9-11.

स्वात्माभासाः पराचीना धीवृत्तीर्विषयोन्मुखाः ।
प्रत्यगति यतो ऽतो ऽसावात्मैत्युक्तो मनौषिभिः ॥७४३॥

Since the inner self experiences (lit. eats) (all) the modifications of the intellect which are directed towards objects, which are of the nature of the semblance of its own self, and which have turned outwards; therefore, the wise ones have called it the Ātman.
[743]

Here, Sureśvara derives *ātman* from the verb root \sqrt{ad} 'to eat'.

विश्वो हि स्थूलभुङ्नित्यं तैजसः प्रविविक्तभुक् ।
आनन्दभुक्तथा प्राज्ञ इति चागमशासनम् ॥७४४॥

Indeed Viśva is ever the enjoyer of what is gross and Taijasa, the enjoyer of what is segregated (from the body itself), and similarly Prājña is the enjoyer of bliss — this is the instruction in Āgama 'Vedāntic tradition'.
[744]

This is *Gaudapādakārikā* 1.3a-c. It is called Āgama, i.e. raised to the status of the Veda.

अव्यावृताननुगतः पूर्णः स्वात्मन्यवस्थितः ।
यतो ऽस्य संततो भावस्तस्माच्चात्मेति सद्ध्यते ॥७४५॥

Since the Ātman is not distinguished (from anything else), not followed (by anything similar to itself), full (i.e. complete), resting in itself (i.e. independent of anything else) and since the existence of this is continuous, therefore, it is called the Ātman. [745]

This is the total meaning of *yac cāśya saṁtato bhāvas tasmād ātmeti kathyate* in verse 737 above. SP points out that every former adjective leads to the subsequent.

तद्विष्णोरिति मन्त्रो ऽपि विष्णोस्तत्परमं पदम् ।
चक्षुर्वदाततं व्योम्नि व्याचष्टे प्रत्यगात्मनि ॥७४६॥

And the R̥gvedic verse *tad viṣṇoḥ ...*¹ also declares (only) in respect of the inner self that the highest step of Viṣṇu is wide-stretched in the sky just like the eye. [746]

¹ *R̥gveda* 1.22.20; 1.154.5: *tad viṣṇoḥ paramam padam sadā paśyanti sūrayaḥ, divīva cakṣur āyatam ...* Also cf. *Subālopaniṣad* 6.1.

नानत्पन्नमतो ज्ञानं नानपास्तं तथा तमः ।
यथौक्तैकात्म्यसंदृष्टावतः कात्स्न्यं ममात्मनः ॥७४७॥

When there is the seeing of the uniqueness of the Ātman, as described before, it is not that knowledge is not produced in this one, so also it is not that ignorance is not removed from (it). Therefore, there is fullness of the inner self.¹ [747]

¹ Or, it literally means: of me, the Ātman. But see *pratyak* in the next verse.

द्रष्टृदर्शनदृश्यानां प्रत्यक्त्वं यतस्ततः ।
तद्दृष्टावखिलं दृष्टं रज्जुसर्पादिवद्भवेत् ॥७४८॥

Since the seer, the activity of seeing, and the object of seeing

have their true nature only in the inner self; therefore, on seeing that (viz. the inner self), all that is seen (before) would become (unreal) like the serpent in a rope etc. [748]

This explains, with illustration, the thought in the preceding verse.

स्रगज्ञानैकहेतूनां स्रग्धिया ज्ञातता यथा ।
प्रत्यङ्मोहजवस्तूनां प्रतीच्यवगते तथा ॥७४९॥

As by the knowledge of a wreath of flowers (in its true nature), there arises the knowledge of the sole cause of ignorance about (the true nature) of the wreath of flowers, so also, when the inner self¹ is known, there results the knowledge of the objects produced from the ignorance about (the true nature) of the inner self. [749]

¹That is, its true nature.

अत्र ज्ञाते यतः सर्व ऐकात्म्यं यान्त्यशेषतः ।
प्राणादयो ऽत आत्मैव द्रष्टव्यः सर्वदर्शनात् ॥७५०॥

Since, in the present context, (the true nature of the Ātman) being known, all (the non-Ātmans), without any exception, become (understood as) one with (the Ātman), therefore, Prāṇa etc. should be seen (i.e. understood) as the Ātman itself; (this is so), because of the statement about the seeing of all. [750]

केचिद्व्याचक्षते ऽपूर्वं विधिमेतं महाधियः ।
नियमं त्वपरे धीराः परिसंख्यामथापरे ॥७५१॥

[Now follows in verses 751-757 a discussion regarding *ātmety evopāsita* as Apūrva-vidhi as held by the non-Vedāntins.]

Some persons of great wisdom explain this (sentence)¹ as an injunction about what is not (known) before,² whereas other learned men call it a restrictive injunction, and, further, some others call it an injunction for exclusion.³ [751]

In this context, it is useful to remember *Tantravārtika* 1.2.4:
vidhir atyantam aprāptau niyamaḥ pākṣike sati /
tatra cānyatra ca prāptau parisamkhyeti gīyate //

¹Namely, *ātmety evopāsita*.

²Some translate *Apūrva-vidhi* as 'originating injunction' — conveniently to be used. This injunction is about some matter/procedure not known before; *pramāṇāntareṇāprāptasya prāpakah*.

³This can be translated as 'excluding injunction'; *pakṣe 'prāptasya prāpakah*.

नापर्वविधिरित्येष कदाचिदपि गृह्यते ।
 सर्वदैव तु तत्प्राप्तेस्तथा नान्यो ऽपि कश्चन ॥७५२॥

It is never to be accepted that this is an originating injunction, since that (viz. the *Ātman* about which the *Śruti* speaks) is ever acquired (i.e. understood), so also there is no other (injunction) ¹ possible. [752]

¹This refers to restrictive and excluding injunctions.

पुंव्यापारानधीनत्वान्नेह संभाव्यते विधिः ।
 स्वव्यापारैकविषयः सर्व एव यतो विधिः ॥७५३॥

(Further) here (in respect of the knowledge of the *Ātman*) there is no possibility of (the prescription of) any injunction, since (securing the knowledge of the *Ātman*) is not dependent on any human activity and since every injunction has for its subject an activity of one's own. [753]

संस्थेम्ने ऽस्यैव चार्थस्य पूर्वपक्षोक्तिपूर्वकः ।
 भाष्यकृद्भिः कृतो यत्नः स आविष्क्रियते ऽधुना ॥७५४॥

The revered author of the *Bhāṣya* has made an effort (to secure) firm postulation of this very idea ¹, having first stated the *prima facie* views. That (effort) is now explained. [754]

¹Namely, this is not a matter that can be the subject of any type of injunction.

यथा कार्यानपेक्षस्य प्रामाण्यं वचसः स्फुटम् ।
ऐकात्म्यवस्तुनिष्ठस्य तथा पूर्वमवादिषम् ॥७५५॥

As there is authoritativeness of the statement which does not expect any activity to be performed, so (is it there in respect of the statement) which pertains only to the uniqueness of the Ātman; so I have clearly explained earlier.¹ [755]

¹This has a reference to SV 20-31 in particular.

लिङ्प्रत्ययश्रुतेरत्र भ्रान्तिः समुपजायते ।
यजेतेत्यादिसामान्याद्विद्यर्थो ऽतौ विचार्यते ॥७५६॥

Since there arises here¹ some misunderstanding after one has heard the suffix of the potential mood, i.e. because of its similarity with (the suffix in the form) *yajeta* etc., therefore, the meaning of the potential mood is (now) taken up for discussion. [756]

This is to justify that this discussion is not any repetition; it is purposeful.

¹In respect of the sentence *ātmety evopāsita*.

सिद्धान्तोपक्रमः पूर्वं पूर्वपक्षः प्रदर्श्यते ।
सम्यग्निर्ज्ञातिसिद्धान्तो यतो वेत्ति बलाबलम् ॥७५७॥

First is stated the Siddhānta (and) the *prima facie* view is stated (later); since one, who has well ascertained the Siddhānta, (understands) the strength or weakness (in the same). [757]

In BUB, Śaṅkara has followed the unusual method of discussion; he has not stated the objector's view. Sureśvara explains and justifies his teacher's procedure of discussion. This is explanation of Anukta in the Bhāṣya

नापूर्वविधिरेष स्यात्पक्षेप्राप्तत्वकारणात् ।

पक्षे प्राप्तिर्विचारान्ते वक्ष्यते कारणाश्रयात् ॥७५८॥

[In verses 758-769 follows an exposition of the Uttarapakṣa-Siddhānta — as stated by the Bhāṣyakāra.]

This is not (lit. would not be) an originating injunction for the reason that it¹ is known as having the form of alternatives.² As to how there occurs (a possibility of) alternatives will be stated at the end of the discussion³ (on the question of an originating injunction) by resorting to (some) reason. [758]

¹Namely, knowledge about the Ātman.

²That is, not necessarily by this sentence *ātmety evopāśita*.

³SP: *prārabdhakarmavaśāt kṣutpipāsādidoṣodbhavād ātmano vi-smaraṇam anātmanah smaraṇam ca sambhāvitam iti vadan bhāṣyakṛj jñānasya pakṣe prāptim vicārāvasāna vakṣyatīty arthah.*

नित्यप्राप्तिमिहाचष्टे विद्यर्थपननत्सया ।
अप्राप्तांशानुपात्येव सर्व एव विधिर्यतः ॥७५९॥

With a view to setting aside the meaning (as conveyed by) an injunction, (the author of the Bhāṣya) stated here that the Ātman is ever known, because every injunction necessarily (*eva*) follows that part (of the object to be known) which is not known.¹ [759]

¹SP adds: *ato nityaprāpte jñāne na kaścid api vidhiḥ.*

पाक्षिक्युपासनप्राप्तिर्नित्या वेति च लिङ्गतः ।
विवक्षिता भाष्यकृतो नित्यप्राप्तिरितीक्ष्यते ॥७६०॥

On the basis of the characteristic mark¹ *nityā vā*, one gets that the intended (thought of the Bhāṣyakāra is about meditation (taken as) an alternative (to something else), and that it is understood as ever obtaining. [760]

There is a reference here to BUB: *yat sākṣād aparokṣād brahma ... na vidhātavyam prāptatvāt ... nityā veti.*

¹That is, the words.

यत्साक्षादितिवाक्योत्थप्रत्यग्याथात्म्यलेहिना ।
ज्ञानेन तमसो दाहात्कुतो विध्यर्थसंभवः ॥७६१॥

How can there be any possibility of an injunction since there is a removal of ignorance¹ by knowledge which leads to² (the knowledge of) the true nature of the individual self arising from the sentence (of the Śruti) *yat sākṣāt ...*³ [761]

¹It literally means: burning away of darkness.

²It literally means: licks or touches.

³Cf BU 3.4.1-2; 3.5.1.

कारकाण्युपमृद्नाति विद्या बुद्धिमिवोषरे ।
कारकत्वमविद्योत्थं स्वतश्चाकारकात्मता ॥७६२॥

Knowledge (of the Brahman) destroys (the notion of) the means¹ in the same way as (it destroys) the apprehension (of a mirage) in a desert place; since (the notion of) the character of the means arises from ignorance and not the nature of the means from itself.² [762]

¹It refers to the means of action such as the agent, the object etc.

²It is dependent on acceptance by someone of *vyavahārabhūmi*.

यदज्ञानात्प्रवृत्तिर्या तज्ज्ञाने सति सा कुतः ।
न हीहापास्तनिद्रो ऽपि सुप्तवत्स्वप्नमीक्षते ॥७६३॥

How can there be that activity from the ignorance about which activity arises when there has arisen the knowledge of that? Indeed, no one here¹ sees a dream like a sleeping man even when his sleep is over. [763]

¹That is, in this world.

यद्वि यस्य स्वतो रूपं न तत्प्राप्तावपेक्षते ।

क्रियां मोहनिमित्तत्वादपेक्षा कर्त्रपहवे ॥७६४॥

Whatever indeed be the form of whichever thing, in its own right, the obtainment (i.e. knowledge) of that (thing) does not depend on (lit. expect) any activity for its being known since (it is only) on account of ignorance that there is dependence (on activity) owing to the concealment of the agent. [764]

This verse sets aside the notion of any activity for *brahmaprāpti*.

न च संमोहविध्वस्तौ यथावस्त्ववबोधतः ।
समर्थमन्यत्पश्यामः क्रियाकारकरूपकम् ॥७६५॥

For effecting the destruction of ignorance, we do not see any effective means other than the knowledge of the thing as it is, (viz.) such a means as has the nature of activity and its agent. [765]

This is to discard the idea of any means for the removal of ignorance about the Brahman.

स्वाध्यायाधीतिविधिना ज्योतिष्टोमादिबोधवत् ।
सदा प्राप्तात्मविद्यापि नातो विधिरिहेष्यते ॥७६६॥

As by an injunction in respect of the recitation (or study) of one's own book of study there arises the knowledge of (the need of performing) Jyotiṣṭoma etc., so is known (from it) the lore of the Ātman. Therefore, here (i.e. in this sentence) an idea of injunction is not (to be) entertained. [766]

This verse implies and answers a question whether the injunction should pertain to the knowledge of the meaning of words or another knowledge, viz. direct perception. The first alternative is answered.

देहेन्द्रियमनोबुद्धिसर्वव्यापारभासिनः ।
लिङ्गतश्चावसेयत्वान्न संभाव्यो विधिस्ततः ॥७६७॥

Therefore, it follows that an injunction is not possible¹ as

(the Brahman) can be² inferred from the characteristic (of it) which reveals all the activity of the body, its organs, *manas*, and intellect. [767]

This verse points out as to why an injunction is not intended for a transmigratory being.

¹That is, necessary.

²That is, is.

तथाहंप्रत्ययात्साक्षादात्मयाथात्म्यनिश्चितेः ।
असम्भवादसंप्राप्तेः कुतो विधिरिहेष्यते ॥७६८॥

So also, on account of the awareness 'I (am).' and the consequent direct decision (or ascertainment) about the true nature of the Ātman, there is an impossibility of one's not getting that¹. How then can be an injunction expected on that behalf? [768]

This refers to a transmigratory being who has known about the nature of his own self.

¹That is, one's getting to know that.

नन्विहात्मार्थसंदृष्टावहंप्रत्ययगम्यता ।
पाक्षिकीति ततो ऽप्राप्तेर्भवेन्नैयमिको विधिः ॥७६९॥

(One might object:) Here (in this context), for the purpose of the knowing¹ the Reality (viz. the Ātman) its nature of being known by the awareness 'I am (the Ātman).' is variable² and since the knowledge of the Ātman may not therefore be obtained (necessarily), the sentence (*ātmety evopāsīta*) is a restrictive injunction. [769]

This refers to the argument that the injunction pertains to knowing of non-transmigratory Ātman.

¹It literally means: seeing.

²That isto say: It does not obtain invariably.

पाक्षिकी तावदत्रास्तामैकात्म्यार्थावलेहिनः ।

ज्ञानस्य प्राप्तिर्नित्या वेत्यस्त्वपूर्वो विधिः स्फुटः ॥७७०॥

[Verses 770 -791 discuss the view that the Upāsana of the Ātman has to be prescribed by an injunction.]

May the knowledge pertaining to the unique Ātman be obtained only optionally or let it be ever obtaining, there is to be clearly an originating injunction. [770]

This is the statement by one who accepts the injunction to be originating injunction.

एकार्थोल्लेखिवृत्तीनामातादात्म्याभिमानतः ।
आप्तेडनं हि शब्दार्थः सर्वत्रोपासनश्रुतेः ॥७७१॥

Indeed the meaning of the word *upāsana* in the Śruti statement means the repetition of such functions as (lit.) touch but one object (viz. the truth) up to the (moment when there arises) the awareness of oneness (with that, viz. the Ātman). [771]

This explains the meaning of *upāsana* in relation to the originating injunction.

न पश्यन्तीत्यतो लिङ्गाज्ज्ञानमेव विधित्सितम् ।
न तूपासनमिति चेन्मैवमैकार्थ्यकारणात् ॥७७२॥

(If one would say,) since they do not perceive (the Ātman directly), therefore only that knowledge which arises from its characteristic is intended to be prescribed (in the injunction), but not an Upāsana; (then we say:) Let this not be so, because of the oneness of the meaning (of the two words knowledge and Upāsana). [772]

The purpose is to point out the inutility of explaining the meaning of Upāsana — it should be understood in the sense of *jñāna* .

सर्वत्रैकार्थता दृष्टा वेदोपासनशब्दयोः ।
यथान्यत्र तथेहापि कस्मान्नाध्यवसीयते ॥७७३॥

We have seen the oneness of meaning in the case of the two words knowing (*veda*) and meditation (*upāsanā*), why do you not decide that to be here also, as this is the case elsewhere (i.e. in other passages)? [773]

SP points out an example: *dūram ha vā asmān mṛtyur bhavati ya evaṃ veda ...* (BU 1.3.9ff.)

रश्मींस्त्वं पर्यावर्तयादिति चावर्तनात्मकः ।
विधिः श्रुतः श्रुतौ स्पष्टस्ततश्च फलसंगतिः ॥७७४॥

'May you turn the strings.'¹ is a clear injunction heard in the Śruti and it is of the nature of repetition (of activity); therefrom follows the connection (of the activity) with the result. [774]

It is followed by a clear statement about the result of Upāsana, viz. *bahavo vaite putrā bhaviṣyanti* (CU 1.5.2).

¹CU 1.5.2.

देवो भूत्वेति देवांश्च सदा तद्भावभावितः ।
देवप्राप्तिं श्रुतिः प्राह भावनाबलसंश्रयात् ॥७७५॥

Depending on the strength of meditation, the Śruti has declared that one attains to a god (i.e. godhead) by becoming a god (oneself),¹ ever resorting to the strength of devotion.² [775]

¹BU 4.1.2-7: *devo bhūtvā devān apyeti*

²Namely, the thought of being/approaching some particular god(s). SP reports that *sadā ...* is the last quarter of a Smṛti verse (*Gītā* 8.6). Also, it states that the verse points to the support of Śruti and Smṛti both.

स यो ऽत इत्युपक्रम्य ह्युपासनगिरैव तु ।
अन्त आत्मेत्युपासीत तथैवोपासनश्रुतेः ॥७७६॥

(This is so) because of the Śruti in respect of meditation where

the words relating to Upāsana have begun with *sa yo 'taḥ* ... and ended with *ātmety evopāsita*. [776]

प्रवृत्तौ चोपसंहारे तथैवोपासनश्रुतेः ।
वेदेत्युपासनार्थत्वमस्याप्यभ्युपगम्यते ॥७७७॥

Thus, since we hear the word in respect of Upāsana in the beginning and in the end as well, therefore, we accept the meaning of the word *veda* also to be Upāsana. [777]

तथैतत्सर्वं वेदेति यत्र यत्र श्रुतिर्भवेत् ।
अभ्यासस्य तदाप्राप्तेरपूर्वविधिरिष्यते ॥७७८॥

Then, in this way, wherever there is a statement *etat sarvaṁ veda* (and) there does not occur (any word conveying) repetition, that is to be accepted as an originating injunction. [778]

वस्तुस्वरूपान्वाख्याने न च कश्चित्प्रवर्तते ।
तज्ज्ञानजन्ममात्राच्च पुरुषार्थो ऽपि नेष्यते ॥७७९॥

(For) nobody enters on an activity when there is a statement about the nature of a thing (already known or existent) and it is not accepted that from the mere origin of it they accept (the idea of the fulfilment of) the end of human endeavour (i.e. liberation). [779]

यादृक्कर्मविधे रूपामात्मध्यानविधेरपि ।
तादृगेव विशेषो ऽत्र न मनागपि गम्यते ॥७८०॥

Whatever is the form of an injunction regarding an activity, so should it be of an injunction regarding meditation on the Ātman. There is not even a little difference there (between the two injunctions). [780]

कुतो ऽविशेष इति चेदत आह यथा तथा ।
मानस्येव क्रिया यस्मादविशिष्टोभयोरपि ॥७८१॥
वषट्करिष्यंस्तां ध्यायेदिति यद्वद्विधीयते ।

(One may ask:) Whence (should one hold that) there is no difference (between the two injunctions)? Therefore, (the author of the Bhāṣya) answers: *yathā ... tathā ...* (thus to say:) Because there is only a mental activity which is not distinct in the two: [781]

(Thus, for example,) as only a mental activity is prescribed (in the injunction) 'One should meditate on that when one is about to utter the word *vaṣat.*', so also (it is prescribed) in respect of meditations on objects (that are identified with) the Ātman. [782]

भावनांशत्रयं यस्मादुपासनविधावपि ।
संभाव्यते ऽतो विज्ञेयो यजेतेत्यादिवद्विधिः ॥७८३॥

Since in an injunction regarding meditation also, it is possible to notice the three aspects of Bhāvanā 'impulse'¹, so let that be considered as an injunction like (the injunction) *yajeta* etc. [783]

These three aspects are explained in verse 785 below. These are *sādhya*, *sādhana* and *itikartavyatā*.

स्वाध्यायस्य विधिर्ब्रूते लिङाद्यात्मानमेव च ।
विधिप्रशस्तज्ञानाभ्यां कुरुध्वं पुंस्प्रवर्तनम् ॥७८४॥

The injunction regarding *svādhyāya* 'one's daily study of the Veda' mentions *liṅ* a verbal suffix expressing (potential mood of the verbal form) etc. and about (*svādhyāya*) itself; by the knowledge (of the injunction) and what is praised, proceed to activity, O men. [784]

See SP on this verse and the next for definition of *śābdī bhāvanā* 'verbal creative impulse' and *ārthī bhāvanā* 'purposive creative impulse'. These are well-known concepts of Mīmāṃsā.

करणांशो विधिज्ञानं किमंशः पुंस्प्रवर्तनम् ।

इतिकर्तव्यता चात्र ह्यर्थवादप्रशंसनम् ॥७८५॥

Knowledge of *vidhi*¹ is the aspect (called) the means²; the incitement³ (of one) to activity is the 'what'-aspect⁴; and the procedure of the activity⁵ is the *prasi*⁶ of (some) already done activity. [785]

¹This explains the *śābdī-bhāvanā*, the suffix of potential (or similar mood) which incites activity of a human being.

²This is *sādhana*.

³This indicates action towards some purpose.

⁴This is *sādhya*.

⁵It is literally the description 'thus this should be done'.

⁶Or alternatively, censure also.

प्रवृत्तस्य ततः पुंसः करणं याग इष्यते ।

स्वर्गादिश्च किमंशः स्यात्प्रयाजादिस्तथा परः ॥७८६॥

It is understood that Yāga 'sacrificial performance'¹ is some activity which a man has entered on, and the heaven etc. refer to the aspect 'what'² (the result, and) the Prayāja 'fore offering' etc. the later (i.e. last)³ aspect. [786]

This explains the *bhāvanāṃśatraya* mentioned in verse 783 above.

¹It means: sacrifice (is one aspect).

²What is to be effected.

³Namely, procedure.

यथा तत्र तथेहापि शास्त्रेणैव समर्प्यते ।

अंशत्रयमतो युक्तमपूर्वविधिरेव तु ॥७८७॥

As (this group of three is) there, so also are here the three aspects (of an injunction) presented by the Śruti; therefore, it is only proper (to hold that this is) only an originating injunction. [787]

किमंश आत्मा विज्ञेयः करणांशस्तथा मनः ।

इतिकर्तव्यता त्यागब्रह्मचर्यादिसाधनम् ॥७८८॥

The Ātman is to be known (i.e. taken) as the aspect 'what' (is to be effected), so also by the word *manas* (is clarified) the aspect 'with what' and abandoning (desires), practising celibacy etc. as the 'procedure, i.e. thus it should be done'.

[788]

This explains the three aspects of the injunction in relation to *ātmajñāna*.

कृत्स्नप्रकरणार्थस्य ज्योतिष्टोमादिगामिनः ।
विद्युद्देशतया यद्वदुपयोगस्तथैव च ॥७८९॥
उपासाविध्यपेक्षस्य प्रक्रियापतितस्य च ।
आत्मार्थोपासनविधिदेशे तद्विनियोज्यते ॥७९०॥

As there is the use of the whole chapter pertaining to Jyotiṣṭoma etc. owing to its being the subject matter of the injunction, so also

[789]

(the whole of this chapter) has been put to use in an injunction regarding meditation on the Ātman for one who expects an injunction regarding meditation that has occurred in the course (of discussion).

[790]

अत्रास्थूलादिवाक्यानामुपास्यार्थसमर्पणे ।
उपयोगः फलं मोक्षस्तमसो वस्त्वपहृतिः ॥७९१॥

In this (portion connected with the meditation of the Ātman) the sentences 'It is non-gross.', etc.¹ become useful by informing us about the object of meditation and the result is liberation, viz. keeping away (lit. concealing) Reality from ignorance. [791]

¹Also cf. *Muṇḍakopaniṣad* 3.2.9: *brahma veda brahmaiva bhavati*; CU 7.1.3: *tarati śokam ātmavit*.

संप्रदायविदस्त्वन्ये यथावच्छास्त्रचक्षुषा ।
व्याचक्षते महात्मानो यथा तदभिधीयते ॥७९२॥

[Verses 792-808 explain another view: This injunction pertains

to some specific knowledge — other than the meaning resulting from words — viz. that which results into liberation.]

But now is explained that in the way as other knowers of Vedāntic tradition, the respectable (authorities), explain (this matter) with their view (lit. eye) on the existing (statements of) the Śruti. [792]

विधिश्चान्यस्य वाक्यस्य न प्रामाण्यं किलेष्ट्यते ।
नियोगानुप्रवेशेन यतो वस्त्ववबोध्यते ॥७९३॥

Since, it is reported, that no authority is accepted of a Vedānta passage which is any injunction devoid of it (i.e. injunctive force); (therefore) Reality is made known by the inclusion (of the statement about it) into an injunction. [793]

This proceeds from the rejection of any injunction by propounders of the theory of the Brahman.

नानुवादस्वरूपस्य निरस्तविधिकस्य हि ।
सापेक्षस्येह वचसः प्रामाण्यमुपपद्यते ॥७९४॥

Indeed, here (i.e. in respect of the Śruti sentences) authoritativeness of any statement cannot be reasonable, if it is of the nature of repetition, has set aside (any idea of) injunction and is dependent on (lit. expects) another (injunction). [794]

क्रियैव ननु सर्वत्र तत्र तत्र विधीयते ।
स्वव्यापारे हि विधिना नियोक्तुं शक्यते यतः ॥७९५॥

Indeed, since it is possible to induce to (one) some activity by means of an injunction, therefore, everywhere, in each context, only (some) activity (or another) is enjoined. [795]

द्रव्यस्वरूपे ऽसाध्यत्वाद्विधिः कथमिहेष्ट्यते ।
न हि सिद्धस्य साध्यत्वं निपुणेनापि गम्यते ॥७९६॥

How can (an idea of) an injunction be entertained here since

the nature of the thing (to be known, lit. obtained) is not what is to be brought into existence (lit. obtained)? Indeed, the nature of an already accomplished thing, as a thing to be accomplished, is not entertained by even an intelligent person. [796]

This rules out the possibility that the Ātman is prescribed to be obtained.

न चात्मविषयं ज्ञानं वेदान्तेषु विधीयते ।
तस्य विध्यन्तरात्सिद्धेर्वेदान्तस्यानुवादता ॥७९७॥

Further, the knowledge regarding the Ātman is not prescribed (as what is to be obtained) in any Vedānta text, since that is already accomplished with the help of another injunction. (Therefore,) the Vedānta texts have the character of (mere) restatements (about what is already known). [797]

This sets aside the idea that knowledge about the Ātman has to be produced.

स्वाध्यायाधीतिविधिना ज्योतिष्टोमादिबोधवत् ।
वेदान्तार्थावबोधो ऽपि तेनैवेह समापितः ॥७९८॥

As by an injunction in respect of one's daily study of the Veda there arises the knowledge of (the need of performing) Jyotiṣṭoma etc., so also, the knowledge of the Vedānta (viz. the lore of the Ātman) is here obtained by that (*svādhyāya*). [798]

The first line is the repetition of verse 766 above.

स्यादेतत्फलसंबन्धो नियोगविरहाद्यदि ।
प्रत्यग्ज्ञानस्य लभ्येत न त्वसौ लभ्यते तथा ॥७९९॥

This might be argued: If it is possible to see the connection of the knowledge of the inner self with the result (viz. liberation, even) without any injunction — (then it is counterargued:)

But such a connection is not seen.

[799]

पुमर्थकारिता बुद्धेर्नियोगादेव लभ्यते ।
नातस्तन्निरपेक्षस्य प्रामाण्यं वचसो भवेत् ॥८००॥

Capacity of fulfilling the end of the human endeavour is obtained only by enjoining intellect through (the force of) an injunction; therefore, there could not be authoritativeness of a statement which does not expect (i.e. is not related to) an injunction. [800]

नैकात्म्यवस्तुसंव्याप्तिव्यरितिरेकेण किञ्चन ।
फलं स्यादात्मबोधस्य यथा कर्मफलं तथा ॥८०१॥

There would not be any result accruing from the knowledge of the Ātman over and above the attainment of the Reality, i.e. being one with the Ātman in the same way as the result accrues from ritual activity. [801]

अत्रोच्यते ऽन्यदेवेदं विज्ञानान्तरमात्मगम् ।
विधीयते सहोपायं वेदान्तोक्तिप्रबोधतः ॥८०२॥

In this regard (this) is said: This is an altogether different type of knowledge,¹ pertaining to the Ātman which is prescribed together with the means, as resulting from the statement(s) of Vedānta. [802]

This is in answer to the counterargument above.

¹The word *viññānāntara* suggests that this knowledge is different from that which arises from word(s).

न हि वाक्यसमुत्थेन ब्रह्मावाक्यार्थरूपकम् ।
विज्ञानेन परिच्छेत्तुं शक्यते कर्मवत्कवचित् ॥८०३॥

In no case¹ it is ever possible to delimit the Brahman, not of the nature of the sentence-meaning by the knowledge which arises from (mainly or only) the Vedānta sentences as in the case of ritual. [803]

¹Or, in no time or place.

नानापदार्थसंसृष्टरूपं शब्दात्प्रजायते ।
विज्ञानं तेनावाक्यार्थरूपं नैव च गम्यते ॥८०४॥

From (Vedic) word there arises knowledge, which is of the nature of composite meaning of different words (*padārthas*). Therefore, that can never be known which is not of the nature of the sentence-meaning. [804]

शब्दस्वभाव एवैष संसृष्टार्थावबोधनम् ।
ब्रह्मासंसृष्टरूपत्वात्तेनातो नावगम्यते ॥८०५॥

This is the natural function of words, viz. they convey to one such information as is of composite nature, (therefore), the Brahman, on account of its nature not being composite in form, cannot be understood from this one (viz. Vedic sentence). [805]

वाक्यं चातीन्द्रियार्थेषु प्रमाणमिति निश्चितम् ।
तस्याप्यविषयत्वात्तद्विज्ञानान्तरगोचरः ॥८०६॥

And it is decided that in respect of the objects which are beyond (the grasp of) the sense-organs, it is (Vedic) sentence that is the authoritative means of knowing. (And) since that ¹ is not the object (of the information from word), that is the subject (lit. object) of some other knowledge. [806]

¹Namely, the Brahman, which is not perceptible and connected with words, (like other objects).

न चेद्वाक्योत्थविज्ञानपरिच्छेद्यं तदिष्यते ।
नाम्नायार्थो भवेत्तर्हि नैवं वेदार्थ एव हि ॥८०७॥

(It may be argued:) If it is not accepted as comprehensible from information (lit. by knowledge), from (Vedic sentence), then the Brahman will not be the thing conveyed by Veda.

(The answer to this is:) It is not so. Indeed (that Brahman is) but the thing conveyed by the Veda. [807]

अपि चाधीयते ऽत्रार्थे वेदवाक्यान्यनेकशः ।
प्रज्ञां कुर्वीत विज्ञायेत्येवमादीनि यत्नतः ॥८०८॥

And, in this regard, they recite (a number of) Vedic sentences in various ways; (Vedic sentences) *viññāya prajñām kurvīta*¹ and others (have to be recited) specifically (or, with special effort). [808]

Here concludes the statement of the view of some (special) kind of knowledge about the Brahman from the Veda.

¹For metre, Sureśvara has changed the order of words. See BU 4.4.21.

Verses 809-847 are the Siddhāntin's view.

मुमुक्षुपुरुषार्थस्य मोहमात्रान्तरायतः ।
ज्ञानात्कार्यान्तराभावान्नैतत्साधवभिधीयते ॥८०९॥

Whatever has been said (by way of opposition to our Siddhānta) is not well said, because from the knowledge (of the meaning of Vedic sentences) there follows the absence of (any other) activity to be undertaken (and) because there is an obstacle only of ignorance in respect of the (ultimate) end of human endeavour in the case of a seeker of liberation.¹ [809]

¹NKL edition and NKL (*pratīka*) reads: *mumukṣoḥ* ...; an easier reading. But that does not make any difference of meaning.

विधेर्हि तत्र साफल्यं यत्र वाक्योत्थबोधतः ।
व्यतिरेकादनुष्ठेयः पदार्थः कश्चिदिष्यते ॥८१०॥
यथाग्निहोत्रयाथात्म्यविज्ञानव्यतिरेकतः ।
प्रयोगात्मा पृथक्तादृङ्नेह कश्चिदपीक्ष्यते ॥८११॥

There is meaningfulness¹ of an injunction only in that they understand some (other) thing over and above (that) which

is apart from the meaning arising from (Vedic) sentence and which is to be accomplished. [810]

(And) as, in addition to the knowledge of the nature of Agnihotra, they understand (from a Vedic sentence) another distinct (object) of the nature of performance; so they do not expect here (in Vedānta) any object whatever), similar in nature. [811]

¹That is, usefulness; or lit. fruitfulness.

उत्पत्त्यादौ हि साध्ये ऽर्थे पुंव्यापृतिरपेक्ष्यते ।
उत्पत्त्यादिविरुद्धत्वान्मुक्तेर्नान्यव्यपेक्षिता ॥८१२॥

They expect a man's performance of some activity in respect of accomplishment (of some thing like a sacrifice) etc. And since liberation is opposed to what is accomplishment etc., there is no expectancy of anything else. [812]

utpattyādi signifies four types of (ritual) activity related to objects, viz. *utpatti* 'origination/production', *āpti* 'obtaining/achieving', *vikṛti* 'modification/change', and *saṃskṛti* 'refinement/polishing'.

उत्पत्त्यादि स्वतो नो चेत्किं मुक्तौ कर्मणः फलम् ।
उत्पत्त्यादि स्वतश्चेत्स्यात्किं मुक्तौ कर्मणा वद ॥८१३॥

(One might ask:) If (any of) accomplishment etc. of liberation ¹ does not occur of itself, what is the use (lit. fruit) of activity? If again (any of) accomplishment etc. of liberation does occur of itself, what is the end of activity? Tell me. [813]

The objector takes his stand on the supposition that liberation can be achieved like heaven by activity. Hence, a double-edged argument.

¹*muktau* (Locative) is for *mukteh* (Genitive/Ablative as well); in the case of liberation.

उत्पत्त्यादौ तु यच्छक्तं हेतुमात्रमपेक्षते ।
तस्य कर्मव्यपेक्षा स्यान्नान्यथा तदपेक्षते ॥८१४॥

For *utpatti* etc. (of Agniṣṭoma) there is need of some able (individual) as the (efficient) cause and, in respect of that efficient cause (also), there is need of his (doing some) activity; (when it is) otherwise, it would not expect that (activity). [814]

The argument is: For achieving heaven, activity is necessary. Not for attaining liberation.

प्रवृत्त्या स्वात्मसिद्ध्यर्थं कारकं सदपेक्षते ।
कारकाणां क्रियापेक्षा नोभयापेक्षितात्मनि ॥८१५॥

In order that there is accomplishment (etc.) of an activity, it expects an existent agent etc. So also do agent etc. expect (i.e. depend on) some activity of them; but (in respect of) the Ātman, there is no expectancy (i.e. dependence on) both. [815]

संभावितात्मकर्तृत्वो ब्राह्मण्याद्यधिकारवान् ।
विधिश्रुतेः प्रवर्तेत न तु प्लुष्टतदन्वयः ॥८१६॥

On hearing an injunction, a person, who is eligible by being a Brāhmaṇa etc. and who has considered his own capacity to perform (a ritual activity), proceeds (to perform that activity); but not the one who has got rid of (lit. burnt) that relation (viz. association) with the same.¹ [816]

¹Namely, *kartṛtva* and *adhikāra*. These are not required in the pursuit of the Brahman.

अपूर्वानपराबाह्यं ब्रह्मास्मीति विजानतः ।
कारकत्वं न संभाव्यं तन्मोहविरहात्क्वचित् ॥८१७॥

It is not at all¹ to be thought of one, who knows 'I am Brahman (which is) not preceded by anything, not having any subsequent, and not outside anything.', that one has the desire (lit. capacity) to act, because there is an absence of ignorance about it.² [817]

¹Or rather, never or not anywhere (for *kvacit*).

²That is, in respect of any ritual activity.

आत्मनो ब्रह्मता यत्र ब्रह्मणो ऽप्यात्मता स्वतः ।
तत्त्वमस्यादिवाक्योत्थबोधाच्चेत्किमितीहते ॥८१८॥

When¹ the inner self is taken to be the Brahman and the Brahman is by itself taken to be the inner self, thanks to the understanding which has arisen from the sentences like 'That you are.' etc., what then does one wish for in this?²

[818]

¹This refers to one's state of having obtained the knowledge of the Brahman.

²That is, in this world full of ritual and other activities.

अब्रह्मानात्मविज्ञानमोहोत्थध्वंसहेतुतः ।
प्रत्यग्याथात्म्यबोधस्य कुतो ऽमूढः प्रवर्तते ॥८१९॥

Since the knowledge of the true nature of the inner self arises from the knowledge of that which is not the Brahman¹ or the Ātman and which is the cause of the destruction of ignorance, for what reason would one, devoid of (any) ignorance, proceed² to perform any (ritual) activity? [819]

¹These clauses negate the basis of any eligibility of a person for ritual performance.

²*pravartate* is for *pravarteta*.

तत्र को मोह इत्येवं मन्त्रवर्णो ऽपि नो जगौ ।
संसारासंभवं साक्षादेकत्वमनुपश्यतः ॥८२०॥

In that respect, the text of a Mantra has sung¹ to us the impossibility of transmigratory existence in the case of a person who directly experiences his own identity with the Brahman in the words, 'What ignorance is there?'².

[820]

¹That is, declared.

²Cf. *Īsopaniṣad* 7.

बाध्यबाधकभावाच्च प्रत्यङ्मोहप्रबोधयोः ।
सहावस्थानताभावात्प्रवृत्तेः स्यादसंभवः ॥८२१॥

And because there exists between ignorance and knowledge about the inner self the relation of the stultified and the stultifier, there cannot be their co-existence and (as such) there cannot be any activity (undertaken by the knower). [821]

मतं वाक्योत्थविज्ञानमात्राच्चेन्न निराकृतिः ।
अब्रह्मानात्मविषयमोहस्येति न तत्तथा ॥८२२॥
तत्त्वमस्यादिवाक्यानां तावन्मात्रावबोधनात् ।
अर्थान्तरं न संभाव्यं वाक्यवाक्यार्थवेदिना ॥८२३॥

If it is held: There is no removal of ignorance in respect of the objects which are non-Brahman and which non-Ātman by mere knowledge arising from the sentence (in the Śruti).; (we say:) It is not so. [822]

By knowing only that much¹ from (Vedāntic) sentences like 'That you are.', a knower of the meaning of the Vedic sentence and its meaning does not have to think of any other object. [823]

In verse 822, there is clarification of the objection raised in BUB: *vākya-janitavijñānamātrāt nābrahmānātmavijñānanivṛttir iti cet.*

अस्थलाद्यर्थशंसीनि द्रष्टव्यादिविधेर्यदि ।
समर्पयेयुर्विषयमित्येतदपि नेष्यते ॥८२४॥
मुक्त्यन्तरायसंमोहविध्वंस्यैकात्म्यवोधतः ।
न तदर्थान्तराभावादिति पूर्वमवादिषम् ॥८२५॥

If (it is argued) that the conveyers of such meaning as 'not fat' etc. from the injunction, 'That is to be seen etc.' would bring to the fore that object,¹ (then we say:) This also is not accepted, [824]

because, on account of the absence of any object other (than

the self) which results from the knowledge of the oneness (of the inner Ātman and the Brahman) which destroys ignorance (that acts as) an impediment to liberation, there is no possibility of the existence of another object — this is what I have said earlier.² [825]

In this verse there is clarification of another objection in BUB: *draṣṭavyavidheḥ viśayasamarpakāny etānīti cet*. The last quarter of verse 824 conveys the Siddhāntin's reply, viz. rejection of the objector's arguments — continued in verse 825.

¹Namely, the nature of the Ātman.

²Cf. SP: *siddhāntopakrame darśitam*.

प्रत्यग्याथात्म्यव्याख्यानमात्रेणैव विना विधिम् ।
न प्रवर्तेत वाक्यार्थसंबोधायेति चेन्मतम् ॥८२६॥
नात्मयाथात्म्यसंबोधिवाक्यश्रवणमात्रतः ।
प्रत्यक्तत्त्वधियः सूतेः किमन्यद्विधिनेष्यते ॥८२७॥

If it is held that (an individual) would not proceed for (acquiring) the knowledge of the sentence-meaning when there is not any injunction (regarding that) and by (i.e. under the impulse of) mere exposition of the true nature of the individual self, [826]

(the reply is:) No. (This should not be so considered) since on mere hearing the sentence expository of the true nature of the self there results the knowledge of the true nature of the inner self, what else is there to be expected from an injunction?¹ [827]

It is held by the objector that an injunction has to be known for the pursuit of the knowledge of the Brahman.

¹It means: by an injunction (*hetau tṛtīyā*).

अन्तरेण विधिं वाक्यश्रवणायापि नेहते ।
इति ब्रुवाणं प्रब्रूयादनिष्टं श्रूयते कुतः ॥८२८॥

To one who says: (No person) desires to hear a sentence (in the Śruti) unless there is an injunction in it, (a Vedāntin)

should say: For what reason is heard (a sentence conveying) the undesirable?'¹ [828]

¹SP explains: In common conversation one does hear many undesirable words. There is not any injunction for one to hear them. In the same way, one does not need to have an injunction so that one hears the Veda on the matter of the Brahman.

अनवस्थाप्रसक्तिश्च तत्र तत्र प्रसङ्गतः ।
विध्यन्तरस्येति ततो यथोक्तो ऽर्थो ऽवसीयताम् ॥८२९॥

And there would follow the contingency of *infinite regress*, in respect of every context (viz. in respect of every injunction), therefore, there would be the contingency of (expecting) another injunction. For this reason, may you accept what we have said. [829]

The argument is: If, for hearing the Vedānta sentence, one expects an injunction which is also conveyed by the words of the Śruti, then for hearing that injunction also one would expect another injunction and so on. And this is an endless series.

यथात्मवादिवाक्यार्थश्रुतये न प्रवर्तते ।
विधिवाक्यमृते तद्विध्यर्थश्रवणे ऽपि न ॥८३०॥

As (according to you) one does not proceed to hear a matter discussed in the Śruti sentence pertaining to the Ātman unless without an injunctive sentence, so also (would) not (one proceed) to hear a matter conveyed by an injunction. [830]

मतं वाक्योत्थविज्ञानस्मृतिसंतानता यदि ।
केवलोक्तिश्रवोद्धूतज्ञानादर्थान्तरं स्फुटम् ॥८३१॥

If it is held that there results a continuity of memory of some knowledge arising from the (Vedānta) sentence; it clearly means that there is another thing (which has resulted) from the knowledge that sprang up on mere hearing the statement. [831]

नैवं साक्षाद्यथावस्तुबोधस्यैवेह संभवात् ।
नित्यं संनिहिते तस्मिंस्तत्स्मृत्या किं प्रयोजनम् ॥८३२॥

(The answer to this is:) This is not so, because there is the possibility here of only the rise of direct knowledge of Reality; and since that (knowledge) is constantly possessed (by one), what then is the necessity of memory? [832]

अपि पाशुपतास्त्रेण विद्धश्चेन्न ममार यः ।
निष्फलेषुवितुन्नाङ्गो नङ्क्ष्यतीत्यतिदुष्करम् ॥८३३॥

If one pierced by the Pāsupata missile (also) did not die, it is extremely difficult that he should die when his limbs are sharply pierced by powerless arrows. [833]

अपि प्रत्यक्तमो नित्यं भास्वच्चैतन्यबिम्बितम् ।
बुद्धितद्वृत्तयश्चैवं तप्तायोविस्फुलिङ्गवत् ॥८३४॥

Also, ignorance about the inner self is the ever existing reflection of the bright consciousness; and also are intellect and its functions like sparks from a heated piece of iron. [834]

प्रागप्यनात्मसंपातात्प्रतीचैवाप्तमेयकम् ।
जन्मनैवाखिलं ज्ञानं फलवत्किमपेक्षते ॥८३५॥

Even before it came to exist (lit. fell) as a non-Ātman,¹ the inner self, by its very birth, (possessed) complete knowledge wherein (all) objects of knowing (were) obtained (i.e. known). What fruitful (activity) should (lit. does) it expect (then)? [835]

¹That is, an embodied individual.

मात्रादिव्यवधानेन यथान्यत्र मितेः फलम् ।
फलतो ऽवगतेरेव न तथेहात्मदर्शने ॥८३६॥

As there results elsewhere a fruit of (some) knowledge only as intervened by a knower etc., so it¹ is not here, i.e. in case there arises the knowledge of the Self, because knowing

itself is the result.

[836]

¹Such an intervention of a knower etc. (*māṭrmeyādī*) is not to be thought of.

खपूर्ण एव सन्कुम्भो द्रव्यैर्नानाविधैर्युतिम् ।
वियोगं वा यथा गच्छेच्चैतन्येद्वास्तथा धियः ॥८३७॥

Even if a pot, full of ether, becomes united with, or is separated from different sorts of things, so also are the intellects (of individuals) (ever) enkindled by sentience. [837]

Experience of individuals can be compared with the varied connections of a pot with numerous things. *caitanya* 'sentience' and individual bodies are exemplified by ether and different pots.

तस्मादावृत्तिपक्षे ऽपि स्वतस्तत्सिद्धितो विधिः ।
नापूर्वः कश्चिदत्र स्यादत एवापरो ऽपि न ॥८३८॥

And therefore even in the opinion regarding *āvṛtti*¹, the injunction (in respect of knowing the Ātman) cannot be the originating injunction. And, for this very reason, there would not be the other injunction³ as well. [838]

¹That is, even if the opinion regarding *āvṛtti* is accepted. *āvṛtti* refers to the view that an individual is enjoined to recollect again that he is pervaded by sentience — though that is not patent to him; this was implied in verse 834 above. Cf. SP: *sarvasyāparokṣacidvyāpter vastujñānasmṛtisamṛtatir vidheyeti pakṣe 'pi* for *āvṛttipakṣe 'pi*.

²Namely, restrictive injunction.

अशब्दाद्यात्मकं साक्षान्निचाय्यात्मानमेकलम् ।
मुच्यते मृत्युतो विद्वानिति नैगमिकं वचः ॥८३९॥

(And) there is a statement of the Śruti, viz. a knower is released from death on having directly observed the unique Ātman, which is of the nature of what is not word etc.¹ [839]

This explains why there should not be any notion of an injunction entertained in respect of the remembrance of what is known before.

¹Cp. *Kāthopanīṣad* 3.17. Sureśvara has given a sort of paraphrase of the verse, or rather the gist of the Upaniṣadic verse. His words *iti naigamikam vacaḥ* do not convey that there is a quotation.

आत्मन्यवगते साक्षात्प्रमाणार्थसमाप्तिः ।
किमन्यत्स्मृतिसंतानात्प्राथर्यते निष्प्रमाणकम् ॥८४०॥

What else is then desired from continuity of remembrance, that which has no authoritative means of knowing it, when one has already acquired the knowledge of the Ātman, by securing the object of direct perception? [840]

भविष्यत्कालसंबन्धि फलं चेह न नाकवत् ।
तज्ज्ञानजन्मकालत्वादग्निजन्मोत्थकार्यवत् ॥८४१॥

And here (in respect of this knowledge) there is not a result connected with any future time like the heaven,¹ (it is) like a product resulting from the churning of fire, known at the time of its production.² [841]

¹Supply: which is acquired after the performance of a sacrifice prescribed by injunction.

²The product of Agni's appearance is light. Both the production of fire and its flash are simultaneous. So is the knowledge of sentience — it has been existing simultaneously with it.

अविधिश्चार्थतः प्राप्तेस्तज्ज्ञानस्मृतिसंततेः ।
बोधाच्च ध्वस्तसंमोहः स्मृतिं नैव व्यपेक्षते ॥८४२॥

There is absence of an injunction then on account of an individual's obtaining the end¹ and the ever continuing memory of the knowledge of the same.² And also from that knowledge,³ which has destroyed ignorance, one does not expect any memory. [842]

¹ *artha* = *puruṣartha* (= *mokṣa*) consisting in being one with the Ātman. This indicates the absence of any other object of knowing.

² It is continued awareness of that, viz. 'I am Brahman.'

³ NKL edition and NKL: *bodhaś ca ...* for *bodhāc ca*. accordingly, the translation could be: And knowledge (of the Brahman) which has destroyed ignorance does not at all expect (or depend on) any memory.

सम्यग्ज्ञानाग्निनिर्दग्धे प्रत्यङ्मोहे सबान्धवे ।
यथावस्तुस्मृतिं मुक्त्वा स्मृतिर्नान्यावशिष्यते ॥८४३॥

(Indeed) when the ignorance of the individual self, together with its associates¹, is completely burnt down by fire in the form of right knowledge, there does not remain any memory other than that of the thing (viz. Reality or the Ātman) as it exists. [843]

This explains *smṛti* in *smṛtisamṛtateḥ* in the preceding verse.

¹ SP paraphrases *sabāndhave* as *sakārye*.

प्रमाननुविधानाच्च न स्मृतिर्बाधिकापरा ।
बाध्यत्वेनैव माबुद्धेर्निष्ठिताभूदनात्मधीः ॥८४४॥

And, owing to the discontinuity of right knowledge¹, (it should) not (be argued that) another remembrance is (its) stultifier, because the awareness of the non-Ātman had become steady only owing to the correct knowledge being obscured (lit. stultified). [844]

¹ The AnSS edition reads *pramā-ananuvidhānāc* and the NKL edition (and NKL also), *apramā-anuvidhānāc*. AnSS looks more probable.

बाध्यं तमो मितेः कृत्स्नं तज्जं चाप्यतिदुर्बलम् ।
मानं बाधकमेवासीत्स्मृतिरप्यनयोस्तथा ॥८४५॥

(Truly speaking) darkness and all of its products — (all of this) extremely weak — are stultified by right knowledge¹.

Indeed (right) knowledge¹ has been the only stultifier. And the remembrance of these two² also is likewise. [845]

The *bādhya-bādhaka* relation exists when there are one strong and the other a weak one.

¹The words *miti* and *māna* convey the same as *bodha* in verse 842 and *mābuddhi* in verse 844 conveys the same, viz. right knowledge which is nothing but *ātmajñāna*.

²This refers to *ātmajñāna* and *bhedajñāna*, or, *advaitasmṛti*.

न स्मृतिर्विस्मृतिर्वेह संभाव्येतापि केनचित् ।
सकृद्विभातो ह्येवैष रवौ रात्र्यहनी यथा ॥८४६॥

(In fact) nobody can imagine that in respect of the Ātman that there is any remembrance or forgetting, for (*hi*) this has shone forth just once. (This is) in the same way as day and night (have continued to exist) while the sun (has appeared just once). [846]

अनर्थहेतुदाहित्वाद्यथोक्तात्मस्मृतेरतः ।
आत्मस्मृतेः स्वतः प्राप्तिरितरस्यास्तु बाध्यता ॥८४७॥

Therefore, since the already stated remembrance of the Ātman has the character of a destroyer of the cause of undesirable (effects), let there be understood then the remembrance of the Ātman arisen on account of itself and let the other (*anātma-smṛti*) be what is to be stultified. [847]

निरोधस्तर्हि पूर्वोक्तान्मतमर्थान्तरं यदि ।
तन्त्रान्तरेषु तस्यापि कार्यत्वेन श्रुतत्वतः ॥८४८॥
न मुक्तिसाधनत्वेन तस्यानधिगमाच्छ्रुतेः ।
प्रत्यग्बोधात्परं नान्यन्मुक्तेरस्तीह साधनम् ॥८४९॥
अननुष्ठेयरूपत्वात्तत्सिद्धिश्चात्मबोधतः ।
प्रत्यग्ज्ञाने निरुध्यन्ते चित्ततद्वृत्तयो यतः ॥८५०॥

[Verses 848-852 discuss whether *cittavṛttinirodha* is prescribed for acquiring knowledge of the Ātman and continued memory of the same.]

If it is held that the other thing which is stated before is withdrawing (of functions of the sense-organs), (then we have to say:) That is not so; because that has been heard (i.e. prescribed) in the other Śāstra(s)¹ as some effect (activity),² [848]

and because it has not been heard from the Śruti as the means to liberation, therefore there is not here any means to liberation other than the knowledge of the inner self³; [849]
being of the nature of what cannot to be accomplished (by activity) and because it results from (acquiring) the knowledge of the Ātman, and since human intellect (*citta*) and its functions are checked when there has occurred the knowledge of the inner self. [850]

The argument in verse 850 is: Even granting that *cittavṛttinirodha* leads to liberation, it cannot be prescribed.

¹This is Yoga and others.

²Whatever are effects are perishable and therefore not eternal. And, as such, they are not prescribed for achieving.

³Cf. *nānyaḥ panthāḥ* (*Taittirīya Āraṇyaka* 3.1.2.7); *jñānād eva tu kaivalyam* (BUBV 2.4.26) (NKL).

अभ्युपेत्यैतदस्माभिरुच्यते संभवादिति ।
सम्यग्ज्ञानातिरेकेण न त्वन्यन्मुक्तिसाधनं ॥८५१॥
श्रुतौ स्मृतौ वा संभाव्यं ताभ्यां नान्यस्य मानता ।
प्रत्यग्याथात्म्यनिर्णायौ तार्किकोक्तात्मवस्तुवत् ॥८५२॥

Having accepted this (view of another Śāstra for arguments' sake), we had said *sambhavāt*, 'owing to possibility'; but there is not any means to liberation beside (lit. in addition to) right knowledge (of the individual self) [851]

possibly to be seen (or known, from) the Śruti and the Smṛti; from these two (authoritative texts) there does not become known the authoritativeness of anything other (than knowledge of the Ātman), in the same way as the thing, viz. the inner self,¹ cannot be accepted, among logicians², (as the means) in respect of deciding the true nature of the inner self³. [852]

These two verses offer an argument after giving up the acceptance for arguments' sake (*abhyupetyavāda*) in the three preceding verses.

¹The word *ātmavastu* refers to the accepted principle of inference among the Vedāntins. This word does not refer to the existential entity, the Ātman. See *yāthā tārīkaiḥ īśvarādaḥ svatantram anumānādīmānam iṣṭam naivam vaidikaiḥ* (SP).

²This refers not only to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas but also to the Sāṃkhyas and others. This justifies the reference to *etena yogaḥ pratyuktaḥ* below.

³Sureśvara compares the non-authoritativeness of the propounders of Yoga and those of logic. This is in the same way as BS 2.1.3: *etena yogaḥ pratyuktaḥ*.

सर्वाकाङ्क्षैकहेतोश्च प्रत्यग्विज्ञानहानतः ।

न भावनेह संभाव्या मोहे सत्येव सा यतः ॥८५३॥

[Verses 853-856 state that there is neither impulse (*bhāvanā*) nor injunction (*niyoga*) in Vedānta texts.]

And, here (in respect of the knowledge of the Ātman), impulse is not to be thought of (as possible) because of abandoning the awareness of the inner self which is the only cause for all (kinds of) expectations, since that obtains only while there exists ignorance.

[853]

मानान्तरानधिगतोक्त्यर्थाधिगम एव नः ।

विधिर्यतो नियोगो ऽपि नैव स्यादनृतन्त्रतः ॥८५४॥

(This is so) because, for us, injunction is only that where we get the knowledge of something which is not obtained from (by) any other means of knowing; (so) also there would not obtain any injunction while there is independence of human (effort).

[854]

In this verse, Sureśvara uses the term *vidhi* only to mean an injunctive text.

नियोज्यतद्विषययोर्यत्र भेदो ऽवसीयते ।

विषयः स नियोगस्य नात्मज्ञाने त्वभेदतः ॥८५५॥

There is a scope for an injunctive text where there is distinction understood between a person who is to be impelled (to an activity) and a thing in respect of which he is to be impelled, but not in respect of the knowledge of (the nature of) the inner self on account of their being non-difference (between them). [855]

शब्दो लिङादिशून्यो ऽपि ह्यविज्ञातार्थबोधकः ।
विधिर्भवति सामर्थ्याज्ज्ञाते ह्यर्थे ऽनुवादता ॥८५६॥

Indeed, a word which is informative of some unknown thing can become an injunctive text even though it is devoid of the potential suffix (*lin*) etc. and in respect of the thing which becomes known by means of its power (greatness or potence) there can be (only) the nature of description. [856]

यतो वाचो ऽभिधानानि प्रयुक्तान्युपलब्धये ।
सर्वाण्यनभिधायैव निवर्तन्ते ऽवबोध्य च ॥८५७॥
उदपादि च यच्छब्दैर्ज्ञानमाकारवद्वियः ।
स्वतोबुद्धं तदप्राप्य नाम्ना सह निवर्तते ॥८५८॥

[Verses 857-867 discuss that the Vedānta sentences are authoritative in respect of the knowledge of the Brahman.]

(That known thing) from which all expressions of speech that are employed for knowing (it) return¹ without having expressed (that) and having made (that) known; [857]
and that knowledge which was produced by words, possessing the shape of the intellect, does not touch (lit. reach) that self-known and returns together with the name (given to self-known). [858]

¹Cf. *Taittirīyopaniṣad* 2.4: *yata vāco nivartante*.

माहात्म्यमेतच्छब्दस्य यदविद्यां निरस्यति ।
सुषुप्त इव निद्राया दुर्बलत्वाच्च बाध्यते ॥८५९॥

This is the greatness of the Veda in that it removes ignorance. It is affected¹ owing to its weakness in the same way as a sleeping person (is awakened) from his sleep. [859]

¹Translation follows the reading *bādhyate* accepted by NKL edition and this is supported by the paraphrases in SP as *prabudhyate*. AnSS reads *bādhate*. Cf. verse 870 below.

दुर्बलत्वादविद्याया आत्मत्वाद्वोधरूपिणः ।
शब्दशक्तेरचिन्त्यत्वाद्विभ्रस्तं मोहहानतः ॥८६०॥

On the removal of ignorance, we know that one (viz. the inner self=the Ātman) on the removal of ignorance owing to its weakness, since the Ātman in the form of knowledge and (also) thanks to the incomprehensible (potence) of the words (in the Veda). [860]

अगृहीत्वैव संबन्धमभिधानाभिधेययोः ।
हित्वा निद्रां प्रबुध्यन्ते सुषुप्ते बोधिताः परैः ॥८६१॥

(Such is the wonderful potence of the words of Veda that), even without their having touched the connection between the expression and what is to be expressed, (the ignorant ones), who are awakened in their sleep (i.e. ignorance) by others, wake up having given up their sleep. [861]

¹This illustrates the observation in the preceding verses.

जाग्रद्वन्न यतः शब्दं सुषुप्ते वेत्ति कश्चन ।
ध्वस्ते ऽतो ज्ञानतो ऽज्ञाने ब्रह्मास्मीति भवेत्फलम् ॥८६२॥

(This is so said) since nobody in deep sleep knows (the meaning of) the word(s) as in the waking state. Therefore, when ignorance (about the nature of the Self) is destroyed by the knowledge (of the Self), there follows the result (in the form) 'I am Brahman.' [862]

अविद्याघातिनः शब्दाद्याहं ब्रह्मेति धीर्भवेत् ।

नश्यत्यविद्यया सार्धं हत्वा रोगमिवौषधम् ॥८६३॥

The awareness (=the shape of the intellect in the form) 'I am Brahman.', which arises from the word(s) of the Veda that destroys ignorance, also gets destroyed together with ignorance in the same way as a medicine (in the body of a diseased person gets destroyed) after it has destroyed the disease. [863]

This sets aside the notion of the continued existence of intellect after it has grasped the nature of the Ātman.

अवशिष्टं स्वतो बुद्धं शुद्धं मुक्तमतो भवेत् ।
नातः स्याद्भावनापेक्षा नापि मानान्तरं प्रति ॥८६४॥

Thereafter, there would remain the Self known, pure, (and) free; therefore; there would not be any expectation of an impulse and also with regard to any other means of knowing. [864]

क्रियाप्रभेदविरहाज्ज्ञानं वा निखिलं तमः ।
हन्त्यात्मलाभमात्रेण न तदन्या तमोहृतिः ॥८६५॥

Indeed knowledge destroys by mere appearance of itself entire darkness, for there is absence of any kind of action. The removal of darkness is not different from that (viz. appearance of knowledge). [865]

क्रियातत्फलयोर्भेदान्न भेदः क्रिययोरतः ।
प्रत्यग्ध्वान्तमतो ज्ञानं स्वात्मलब्धयैव हन्ति तत् ॥८६६॥

Therefore, since there is not any distinction between (the so-called) two actions¹ in accordance with the difference between the action and its fruit. As such, knowledge (of the true nature of the inner self) by its very appearance destroys that darkness (in the form of the absence of knowledge) about the inner self. [866]

¹One action is 'making effort to know' and the other is 'acquiring the knowledge'.

निष्पन्नो ऽपि कुठारादिः प्रयोगविरहाद्यथा ।
द्वैधीभावाय नैवालं तथा नैव प्रमाणधीः ॥८६७॥

As an axe etc., though (already) produced, cannot ever differentiate (between an action and its result) when there is absence of any operation (with it), so also the knowledge (about the Ātman resulting from) the authoritative means (i.e. Vedic sentence) does not at all (differentiate between the so-called two actions.) [867]

अलौकिकत्वाद्बोधस्य स्वतश्चावगमात्मनः ।
बोध्ये हि लौकिके ऽपेक्षा परतो ऽवगतौ तथा ॥८६८॥

(This is so) because of the non-worldliness of what is to be known and because of its nature of its being self-known, for, (only) in a worldly object of knowing, there is such an expectation of outside help so that it can be known. [868]

नद्यास्तीरे फलानीव प्रत्यक्षाद्यनपेक्षतः ।
किमिवेहान्यमानेषु तवापेक्षाभिधाश्रुतेः ॥८६९॥

[Now begins the discussion of the inner self's being beyond the scope of any other means. It is continued up to verse 875.]

What do you expect here (in respect of the knowledge of the Ātman) from other means of knowing when there is the Śruti statement (about it),¹ when there is no expectation of (any means of perception such as) direct perception as in respect of (a statement) 'There are fruits on the bank(s) of a river.'? [869]

This is to emphasise that *śabdapramāṇa* is stronger than any other means of knowing.

¹Sentences like *tat tvam asi*.

प्रमाता च प्रमाणं च प्रमेयो निश्चितस्तथा ।
यत्सांनिध्यात्प्रसिद्ध्यन्ति तत्सिद्धौ किमपेक्ष्यते ॥८७०॥

What is expected¹ for establishing that on account of whose presence (lit. nearness) (the structure of a worldly dealing) namely (that which comprises) the knower, the means of knowing, the object of knowing and the decision, gets established? [870]

¹Translation adopts variant reading *apekṣyate* which seems better for *apekṣate*. Cf. verse 859 above where *bādhyate* is preferred to *bādhate*.

जाग्रत्स्वप्नसुषुप्तेषु घटो ऽयमिति संविदः ।
व्यवधानं न चेहास्ति तद्भावाभावसाक्षितः ॥८७१॥

In the knowledge 'This is a pot.' (which occurs) in the states of waking, dream and deep sleep, there is some delimitation¹; (but such delimitation) does not exist here (in respect of the knowledge of the Ātman), since (the Ātman itself) is the seer of the presence and absence of that (thing). [871]

Cf. SP refers to the example of a lamp that manifests a pot.

¹Namely, this pot exists on such and such a thing for such and such a period.

इदमेवमिदं नैवमिति बद्धिर्विभागभाक् ।
अनात्मिकात्मवत्यत्र येनासौ किमपेक्षते ॥८७२॥

Since such a notion as 'This is so and this is not so.' effects distinction and is of the nature of the non-Ātman obtaining in one who has the Ātman within; (therefore) what does that (Ātman) expect (as a means of differentiation)? [872]

कर्त्रादिव्यापृतेः पूर्वमसंकीर्णमुपाधिभिः ।
अविक्षिप्तमसंसुप्तं ह्यनुभवन्किमपेक्षते ॥८७३॥

Indeed before the activity of the agent etc. what would (the individual self) expect while it is experiencing what is not characterized by delimiting ajuncts, what is not unconcealed to it, and what has not slept together with it¹? [873]

ātmā vā are draṣṭavyaḥ ... is not an injunction, for it lacks in *ākāṅkṣā* 'expectancy'. On this basis, Sureśvara develops his theory of *anubhava* 'experience', which is no doubt regarded as Anukta portion of the Vārtika.

Here, taking help of the deep sleep state, Sureśvara has discussed the experience of an experiencer: 'I am Brahman.'. The existence of the experiencer is however inferred from a thought on the part of the experiencer after his sleep is over; that is to say: Existence of the experiencer at the earlier moment could not be established by usual means of perception.

¹This argument has a basis in Upaniṣad: *anyad eva tad veditāt* ... (*Kenopaniṣad* 1.4).

प्रमाणमप्रमाणं च प्रमाभासस्तथैव च ।
कुर्वन्त्येव प्रमां यत्र तदसंभावना कुतः ॥८७४॥

Whence can there be the impossibility of existence of that resting on which they produce (the so-called) right knowledge as also what is authoritative, what is not authoritative, and what has the semblance of right knowledge? [874]

प्रामाण्यमेतत्पृष्ठेन कस्मान्नास्त्यभिधाश्रुतेः ।
नियोगस्यापि मानत्वं नानपेक्ष्य प्रमामिमाम् ॥८७५॥

Therefore, why should not there be authoritativeness of the statement of the Śruti (which is thus understood) through this (=experience)? Authoritativeness of an injunction also is not without dependence on this right knowledge. [875]

पश्येदात्मानमित्यादि वाक्यं यत्स्याद्विधायकम् ।
ज्ञानकर्तव्यतायां तन्नियोज्य पुरुषं प्रति ॥८७६॥

[Now, there is discussion in verses 876-894 that the statement

paśyed ... is not an injunction for knowing.]

The sentence 'He should see the Self within his own Self.'¹ and such others would be injunctive in respect of the activity of acquiring knowledge for a person after they had enjoined (him to undertake that activity). [876]

Read SP: *niyogarāgiṇām niyogavaśāt prāṇatyāgādāv api pravṛtṭiḥ sambhavati tasya śakyatvān nāśakye 'rthe tato 'pi pravṛtṭir astīty arthaḥ.*

¹CP. BU 4.4.23 where *paśyati* is used, not *paśyet*.

स्वव्यापारे ऽनपेक्ष्यैव वस्तुवृत्तं वचो यतः ।
नियुङ्क्ते पुरुषं तस्माद्वस्तुवृत्तं सुदुर्लभम् ॥८७७॥

(And) since (this) statement enjoins a person (to some activity) without having (any) reference to the state of the thing (viz. the Ātman), therefore the state of the thing is extremely difficult (to know or to establish). [877]

स्वशक्त्यननुरूपं चेत्कार्यं वाक्यशतैरपि ।
नियुक्तो ऽपि न तत्कर्तुमलं शक्ये स हीश्वरः ॥८७८॥

If an activity which is to be undertaken is beyond a person's capacity, that (person), even if he is enjoined (to undertake that activity) by even hundreds of (injunctive) sentences, will not be able to accomplish that activity, for (he) is capable (of doing) (only) what is possible. [878]

In verses 876-877, Sureśvara had, for the time being, accepted that there is an injunction in *paśyed* ... Now, he rejects that there is any injunction.

अभिधाश्रुतिश्चेत्तत्सिद्धौ व्यायच्छेत प्रयत्नतः ।
विधिवत्मानुगामित्वान्नार्थस्पृक्सास्वतन्त्रतः ॥८७९॥

If there were a statement of the Śruti that one should attempt with effort to accomplish that, then that statement does not

concern an existent object, because it follows the way of the injunctive statements and is not independent.¹ [879]

The purport is: The Śruti does not enjoin a person to create by his effort the inner self. Since the inner self is already a known thing, no sentence, which is injunction, can refer to the poroduction of the inner self.

¹It is *puruṣatantra* 'expecting human activity'. In an impossible task, there is never any human activity and in respect of that there is no injunction operative as well!

स्वमांसान्यपि खादन्ति नियोगानतिलिङ्घिनः ।
जहत्यपि प्रियान्प्राणाञ्शक्यत्वादेव नान्यतः ॥८८०॥

Those who do not transgress the injunction would eat even their own flesh; they would even give up their dear life, only because (these two acts) are possible for one to accomplish; not otherwise¹! [880]

¹In an impossible task, there is never any human activity and in respect of that there is no injunction operative as well!

अशक्ये विनियुक्तो ऽपि कृष्णलाञ्छपयेदिति ।
सर्वात्मनाप्यसौ कुर्वन्कुर्यात्तस्करकन्दुवत् ॥८८१॥

An injunction which enjoins on one an impossible activity as in (a statement) 'He should cook *māṣa* grains of gold.', then a person (who is so enjoined), making all efforts to do that, would do it like a thief called Kandu.¹ [881]

SP: *aśakye niyogād apravṛttir ity etad dṛṣṭāntenāha.*

¹The purpose is (in accordance with Mīmāṃsā Sūtra 10.2.2): 'Let there be no cooking of *māṣa* grains of gold, for in the attempt at that cooking there would be only loss of energy. In this context, a story is told of a thief, called Kandu, who, in order to escape arrest, entered into a kitchen and began to do some cooking, of course not knowing anything about it and, as a result, only fell into the hands of the pursuers. (Both SP and NKL do not give

नात्मोपास्यत्वावगमाद्वाक्यशेषे भवेदिदम् ।
पदनीयान्तरतरप्रियमित्यादिशेषतः ॥९३६॥

This is not so, because the knowledge that the Ātman is to be worshipped (arises) from the remainder of the sentence: This from the remainder (in the form of the words) *padanīya*, *antaratarā*, and *priya* etc. [936]

Now follows the answer. Translation follows the variant reading in the AnSS edition where *padanīyāntaratarapriya*, a *samāhāradvanda* compound is used.

आत्मानं प्रियमित्येतद्वाक्यशेषे ऽवगम्यते ।
तस्मादात्मैवोपास्यः स्यान्नानात्मोपास्य इष्यते ॥९३७॥

(This) is understood in the remainder of the sentence, viz. *ātmānam priyam*; therefore, Ātman alone is to be worshipped, it is not desired that the non-Ātman is the object of worship. [937]

अकृत्स्नत्वान्निषेधश्च न त्वात्मोपासनस्य सः ।
शब्दज्ञानातिवर्तित्वख्यापनायेतिशब्दनम् ॥९३८॥

And also there is rejection¹ (of worship) on the basis of incompleteness; that² is not desired in the case of the worship of the Ātman. The use of the word *iti* is for declaring the character (of the object, viz. Ātman, as) what transcends the knowledge from words. [938]

¹Cf. verse 935 above.

²Namely, the rejection.

यतो वाचो निवर्तन्ते नेति नेत्यादिकं तथा ।
एवम् सत्यर्थवत्सर्वमन्यथा तदनर्थकम् ॥९३९॥

So also words in the Śruti *yato vāco nivartante*¹, *neti neti*² etc. (indicate the same). This being (only) thus, all (that is stated in the Śruti) becomes meaningful and, if otherwise, that

would be meaningless.

[939]

¹ *Taittirīyopaniṣad* 2.4.1.

² BU 2.3.6 etc.; see verse 539 note 4 above.

अनात्मार्थापनुत्त्यर्थमात्मानमिति शब्दघटे ।
नातो वाक्यान्तरं तत्स्याद्यथोक्तार्थानुवादतः ॥९४०॥

With a view to rejecting the notion of any non-Ātman (it is that) the word *ātmānam* is uttered; therefore, that is not ¹ (considered as a) different ² sentence, for there is (in it) a restatement of what is said.

[940]

This verse has in view the word *priyam* in verse 936 above. The Śruti statement(s) in view is (or, are) *ātmānam eva priyam upāsīta* and/or *ātmānam eva avet*.

¹ It literally means: should not be.

² It should not be different in meaning. Two parts of a sentence under purview should form unity of thought. Cf. the NKL edition note: *arthaikatvād ekam vākyam arthabhede na ekavākyatvam ity arthaḥ*.

आत्मेत्येवोपासीतेति हेतुरत्रोपदिश्यते ।
अकात्स्न्यदोषहानाय प्रतीचः कृत्स्नतोच्यते ॥९४१॥

[Verses 941-950 explain the Śruti *atra hy ete sarve ekam bhavanti*.]

In (the statement) *ātmety eva* ... there is stated the reason (for worshipping the Ātman) and, for averting the fault of incompleteness that might attach to the individual self, there is stated its completeness.

[941]

आत्मनो ऽनवशेषेण संबन्धो ऽनात्मवस्तुना ।
रज्जुसर्पादिवन्नातः प्रतीचः शिष्यते पराक् ॥९४२॥

The Ātman has relation to the non-Ātman in its entirety ¹ exactly as there obtains (the relation between) a rope and a serpent; therefore, (the non-Ātman) is not stated as being

away from the inner self.

[942]

Translation follows the variant reading *parāk* supported by the NKL edition, because we expect in the verse the neuter from *parāk* to yield the adverbial sense. Contrary to this, the word *parān* is a Nominative singular (masculine) form and that does not seem to be correct because that does not qualify *anātmavastu* (neuter).

¹ *anavaśeṣeṇa* = *tādātmyena* 'being entirely identical'.

सर्वमज्ञातमेव स्याद्यस्मिन्नज्ञात आत्मनि ।

ज्ञाते ज्ञातं च कृत्स्नो ऽसौ तावत्त्वात्सर्ववस्तुनः ॥९४३॥

If this Ātman were to remain not-known, all of the world would have remained entirely unknown and (this) being known, (that) becomes known.¹ That one (viz. the Ātman) is complete (and) all the world (of objects) has only that much as its dimension.

[943]

¹This is similar to CU 6.1.3: *yenāśrutam śrutam bhavati ...*

युक्त्या निरूप्यमाणस्य ह्यात्मा तत्त्वमनात्मनः ।

प्रत्याख्यातः स चेत्तेन क्वानात्मा सिद्ध्यतामयम् ॥९४४॥

When this non-Ātman is examined with proper reason, its true nature (would be revealed as only) the Ātman; but if that one is rejected,¹ then how could this non-Ātman be established?

[944]

¹That is, not recognised.

अनात्मतत्त्वमन्वेति ह्यात्मासङ्गो ऽगुणो ऽद्वयः ।

स्वतः सिद्धौ न चेत्सिद्ध्येतिकमन्यद्वेषजं ततः ॥९४५॥

Indeed, the Ātman associates itself with the non-Ātman things, being (at the same time) unattached, qualitless and without duality, (and) if it does not get established by itself, what then would be the source¹ of (liberation)?

[945]

¹ *bheṣajam* literally means: medicine. The use of the word medicine is metaphorical; it expresses Sureśvara's intention to indicate cure of the malady of misery.

ज्ञातायां स्रजि तन्मोहकल्पितानां यथैकता ।
प्रतीच्येवं तदज्ञानकल्पितानामेकतेष्यते ॥९४६॥

As when (the true nature of) a rope is known, there is (understood) oneness of all the notions which had arisen out of ignorance about it, so also, in the case of the individual self, oneness of all the notions, resulting from the ignorance about that (individual self), is accepted (by us). [946]

आत्मशब्दाभिधेये ऽर्थे प्रत्यक्सामान्यरूपके ।
अन्तर्भवन्ति निखिला विशेषा इति केचन ॥९४७॥

[Verses 947-950 are the explanation of *atra hy eke sarve ekam bhavanti ...* by Bhartṛprapañca.]

Some¹ say: All particulars² are contained within the thing which is expressed by the word *ātman* and which has several and collective forms. [947]

¹ The word 'some' refers to Bhartṛprapañca. This view was earlier referred to in verses 693ff.

² This means: distinct individual selves, objects etc., i.e. *jagat*.

सामान्येन समस्तं तद्विशेषैर्व्यस्तमेव च ।
कृत्स्नमेवं परं ब्रह्म सदोपासीत यत्नतः ॥९४८॥

Being common (in those in collective form) that (Brahman is) whole; by its particular forms, it is several; thus, this highest Brahman should one ever worship with particular care. [948]

अवस्थावदवस्थाभिः क्वचित्कात्स्न्यं प्रचक्षते ।
कार्यकारणरूपेण क्वचिद्व्याचक्षते तथा ॥९४९॥

Sometimes they describe the completeness (i.e. the Brahman)

as possessed of different states by the different states¹; so also do they sometimes describe the same by its form (as made up of) causes and effects. [949]

¹This refers to the world in eight states of the Brahman; cf. verse 487 above.

भागभागिविभागेन नाभिनेम्यरवत्तथा ।
व्याचक्षते महात्मानः संप्रदायबलात्किल ॥९५०॥

And also (they describe the same) by resorting to its division of the parts and the whole as in the case of the hub, the rim and the spokes (of a wheel) — thus do the learned describe (the Brahman), indeed on the strength of the tradition (which they follow). [950]

This concludes Bhartṛprapañca's explanation of *atra hy ete sarve ekam bhavanti*.

अक्षराणामतात्पर्याद्युक्तितश्चाप्यसंभवात् ।
प्रतिपत्तुं वयं तादृक्शक्नुमो नाञ्जसा परम् ॥९५१॥

[Verses 951-968 are the refutation of Bhartṛprapañca's view on the sentence.]

We are not able to understand the highest (Brahman) to be that,¹ in a neat way, because the words² (of the Veda) do not have that as their purport and also because there is no possibility of it (being so) for reasons (shown below).³ [951]

¹That is, of that nature in Bhartṛprapañca's view.

²Sureśvara uses the word *akṣara* 'letters'.

³Sureśvara rejects the view of Bhartṛprapañca on the basis of *śrutisamanvaya* and *tarka*.

अज्ञातं जगदज्ञाते ज्ञाते ज्ञातं च यत्र तत् ।
तद्ब्रह्मैवंविधिं कृत्स्नं न गोवृक्षादिवन्मतम् ॥९५२॥

That Brahman is such that, if it is not known, the world (also) does not become known, and, when that becomes known, then does that (world also) become known — thus the Brahman is (described as) the whole, it is not understood as cows, trees etc.¹ [952]

¹Refer to verse 693 above. *ādi* refers to sea and clay. Reference to (i)cows indicates the *sāmānya-viśeṣa* relation; (ii)trees, parts and whole relation; (iii)sea, states and what has states relation; and (vi)clay, cause and effect relation.

सामान्यानि विशेषाश्च व्यावर्तन्ते परस्परम् ।
प्राणादिवदतः कात्स्न्यं न तेषां युक्तिमद्वेत् ॥९५३॥

The common properties (of different individuals) and the particular ones differ from one another in the same way as *Prāṇa*¹ etc.; therefore, the wholeness of them (being positive) does not² become reasonable. [953]

¹*prāṇa* = *prāṇana*. This refers to the functions of different organs of a human body such as breathing, speaking etc.

²It literally means: would not.

तदानन्त्याच्च तद्वेधो नेश्वरेणापि कात्स्न्यतः ।
क्रमशो ऽक्रमशो वापि शक्यः कर्तुं कदाचन ॥९५४॥

And, on account of the infinite number¹ of them², it would not ever be possible for even an able person³ to know them in their entirety or serially or otherwise.⁴ [954]

¹It literally means: the infiniteness of them.

²It means: '*sāmānya* and *viśeṣa*' mentioned in the preceding verse.

³The word *īśvara* is here a person who is possessed of parts or who has varied means of knowing at his command.

⁴In a sequential order, or in a desultory (or, random) manner.

तादात्म्यभावनायां तु पुंसां संभावनापि न ।

शक्या सुनिपुणेनापि कर्तुं तद्व्यापृतिः कुतः ॥९५५॥

With regard to their being possessed of the nature of that (=Brahman), it is not possible even for an excellent (thinker) to entertain an idea of them; how can there be any employment of the same (by him)? [955]

This refers to the notion of worshipping some object/being. Such worship becomes possible if only one knows/ascertains the nature of it and then tries to become one with it. Here there are difficulties; innumerable particulars and therefore the absence of the knowledge of the same. In brief, worshipping *samasta-vyasta* Brahman is not possible.

गङ्गावतारवन्नापि बहूपासितृकर्मता ।
भावनोपचयाभावादेकैकस्मिस्तथा सति ॥९५६॥

As in the case of the descent of the Ganges, there cannot be here¹ an object (of the activity) of many worshippers, for there would not be a collection of the devotions of (many distinct individuals) if there were devotion in each one of them. [956]

The basic idea is: The Ganges came to the world through the effort of many towards one goal; so also a number of individuals would, each of them, worship one form of the Brahman and the collected effort of them would suffice for getting to know the whole of the Brahman. (Yet the preceding verse has already pointed to the impossibility of the same!)

¹This means: in respect of knowing the Brahman of varied nature by many.

देवो भूत्वैति विबुधान्भावनोपचयान्नरः ।
इति सर्वपदार्थेषु पुंसो ऽशक्यं विधित्सितम् ॥९५७॥

A man (first) becomes a god and (then) becomes one among them owing to the increase (in the intensity) of devotion. (But) being so is impossible for a man, (even if) that is intended

to be achieved in respect of all objects (of the world). [957]

This verse points to the impossibility of worshipping the Brahman by a single individual and also by many of them coming together.

यज्ज्ञातमपि कात्स्नर्येन तत्तदन्यच्च नाञ्जसा ।
ज्ञानेन ज्ञायते तादृक्कृत्स्नं कथमिहोच्यते ॥९५८॥

How can a thing be called complete (or full) which, when seen, is not known in its fullness or by which, being known, any other thing is not known? [958]

In the case of *samastavyasta* Brahman, there are difficulties (as already pointed out) in getting to know the variety of the individuals/particulars and therefore there cannot be anything complete. Naturally then that is not like the Brahman of the Vedāntin.

परावस्तु विरोधित्वात्प्रत्यग्बुद्ध्या न गम्यते ।
पराञ्चीत्यपि हेतुत्तेर्नातः पिण्डादिकृत्स्नधीः ॥९५९॥

A thing which is away (from the inner self) cannot be understood by the knowledge of the inner self because it is opposed (in nature to the latter). (This is so,) because there is a statement about the reason for it in the Śruti *parāñci*...¹ Therefore, there cannot be the knowledge of the entire mass of objects such as a body etc. [959]

¹ *Kāthopanīṣad* 4.1; cf. verse 180 note 3 above.

तथात्मनि च विज्ञाते सर्वं ज्ञातं भवेदिति ।
येनाश्रुतं श्रुतमिति कस्मिन्निवति तथा परम् ॥९६०॥

Thus is the highest (Brahman known) from 'The Ātman being known, all would become known.'. 'By which being heard, everything else is heard.'¹ and 'In what ...'². [960]

¹ *yenāśrutam śrutam bhavati amatam matam avijñātam vijñātam*

(CU 6.1.3)

²*kasmin nu bhagavo vijñāte sarvam idaṃ vijñātam bhavati* (Munḍakopaniṣad 1.1.3). Or perhaps BU 3.8.7: *kasmin nu phalam*

...

आत्मसाम्यग्रहे ऽप्यात्मभेदमात्रगृहीतितः ।
नैवानात्मार्थसामान्यविशेषाणां ग्रहो भवेत् ॥९६१॥

Even when one has grasped that the Ātman is common (in all the non-Ātmans), there follows merely the grasp (of them) as different from the Ātman and, therefore, there would not really follow the grasp of the common and the particular properties of the non-Ātmans. [961]

The verse answers the following idea of the opponent: By knowing the common property, the particulars could be known. Hence, since Ātman is common to the non-Ātmans, the knowledge of the same would result in the knowledge of all the non-Ātman(s). This would avert the opposition to the Śruti *yenāśrutam śrutam ...*.

समस्तव्यस्ततादृष्टावेवमादि सुदुर्घटम् ।
अपूर्वानपरानन्तराबाह्योक्तिश्च दुःस्थिता ॥९६२॥

In the view (of the Brahman) as appearing in collective and individual (forms), this (argument stated just before) and any other (such argument), likely to be offered, would be very difficult to stand. Further, the Śruti statement (about the Ātman), viz. it is *apūrva*, *anapara*, *anantara* (and) *abāhya* would stand in danger (of being unauthoritative or false). [962]

पराक्प्रमेयमानानां प्रत्यगर्थीधियोदितः ।
बाधो ऽतो ऽसाध्वभिहितं समस्तव्यस्ततां प्रति ॥९६३॥

It is declared that there is a stultification or (denial of) the outside objects of knowing and the means of their knowing on account of the cognition of the inner (i.e. real) object; therefore; what you have said¹ about the character (of the Brahman) as collective and individual in forms is not well

said.

[963]

¹See verse 947 above.

तथोपास्यस्य ब्रह्मत्वे श्रुत्या साक्षान्निराकृते ।
नेदं यदिदमित्येवं समस्तव्यस्तता कुतः ॥९६४॥
स्थूलाद्यशेषापहुत्या चाक्षरे प्रत्यगात्मनि ।
कारणान्तस्य जगत ओतप्रोतोक्तितस्तथा ॥९६५॥

In that way, the nature of the object of worship is (already) expressly denied by the Śruti itself, viz. in the words *nedam yad idam ...*¹; this being so, whence can there be the collective and individual nature (of the Brahman)? [964]

and also, on account of the concealment² of the entire mass of gross things etc. into the imperishable inner self and from the statement that the world ends into its cause, since it is woven (in it) length-wise and cross-wise? [965]

¹*Kenopaniṣad* 1.5.

²That is, merger.

न च प्रत्यग्धिया द्रष्टुं परावस्त्वह शक्यते ।
समस्तव्यस्ततैवं च न मानादुपपद्यते ॥९६६॥

And it is not possible here (in our worldly dealings) to see an outside object by the knowledge of the inner self and thus the nature of the collective and individual forms of the Brahman does not arise from reason. [966]

This is to say: *samastavyastatā* cannot be established by any means of knowng.

मानभूमेश्च व्युत्थाप्य तथा विदितभूमितः ।
प्रत्यङ्मात्रस्य ब्रह्मोक्तेः समस्तव्यस्तता कुतः ॥९६७॥

Therefore, when we have raised¹ the Brahman above the level/area of knowing and also beyond what is known and stated that merely the inner self is the Brahman, whence can

there be (in the Brahman) the nature of collective and individual (forms)? [967]

This states further: *samastavyastatā* is opposed to the means of knowing, viz. Śruti.

¹It literally means: said about.

न समस्तं न च व्यस्तं नोभयं प्रत्यगात्मनि ।
प्रत्यक्प्रवणया बुद्ध्या वीक्ष्यतां यदि शक्यते ॥९६८॥

So there cannot be seen either as collective or as individual or both of the (forms) together (of the Brahman) in the inner self; so, with a mind inclined towards (understanding) the inner self, let this be seen, if it is possible (for you). [968]

कस्मात्पुनरिदं त्यक्त्वा दृष्टादृष्टार्थसाधनम् ।
आत्मेत्यैवोपासीतेति महान्यतनः श्रुतेरिह ॥९६९॥

[Verses 969-983 are the explanation of *tad etad padanīyam asya sarvasya* (BU 1.4.7).]

(Now, the question is:) Why should the Śruti make such a great effort and state abandoning this means of achieving every seen and unseen object¹ in *ātmety evopāsita*? [969]

¹This refers to Agnihotra and other ritual.

पदनीयमिदं यस्मादनात्मभ्यः परं पदम् ।
सर्वज्ञेयपुमर्थानां प्रत्यग्ज्ञाने समाप्तिः ॥९७०॥

(The answer is:) This should be obtained/known¹, since this one (viz. the Ātman) is a state/status above that of all the non-Ātman (objects) and because all the ends of human endeavour are known to have been obtained when the knowledge of individual self has occurred (to one). [970]

¹Generally verbs in Sanskrit which convey movement convey also the sense of knowing.

न हि प्रतीचि विज्ञाते कश्चिदप्यवशिष्यते ।
ज्ञेयो ऽर्थः पुरुषार्थो वा पदनीयमतो भवेत् ॥९७१॥

Indeed, since no known object or end of human endeavour remains (to be achieved) when the inner self is known, therefore that is to be obtained. [971]

This states the reason for the argument in the preceding verse.

अनात्मार्थे तु विज्ञाते स्वाध्यस्ताहिप्रबोधवत् ।
न किञ्चित्स्यात्परिज्ञातं नानात्मातः प्रमितिसतः ॥९७२॥

As against this (*tu*), when a non-Ātman is known nothing else would become known, as in the case of the cognition of a serpent which is superimposed on (the real thing) itself.¹ Therefore the non-Ātman is not sought to be known. [972]

¹Here Sureśvara's phrasiology is peculiar. In his use of *svādhyastāhiprabodhavat*, the first member of the compound, viz. *sva*, stands for a rope/garland of flowers. We understand this because of *ahi*. It means that we do not understand the true nature of the object present, viz. a rope or a garland and also we do not know the serpent. This leads to the following: When we say, we grasp the non-Ātman we have really grasped neither the non-Ātman nor the Ātman — there is just ignorance. Read SP: *yathā svaśabditā-dhiṣṭhāna- ... vā jñāyate*.

अस्येति शैषिकी षष्ठी कृत्स्नसंगत्यपेक्षया ।
प्रतीचा व्यतिरेकी सन्नानात्मा ह्येति संगतिम् ॥९७३॥

The Genitive case in (the form) *asya* is expressive of *śeṣa* 'remainder'¹, in view of its association with the whole (world of the non-Ātman)². For, non-Ātman gets connected with the inner self, though it remains apart from it. [973]

This verse justifies the use of the Genitive form *asya* together with *sarvasya*.

¹Cf. *ṣaṣṭhī śeṣe* (Pāṇini Sūtra 2.3.50). 'The Genitive case is expressive of relations between two words other than those which are not enumerated in other Pāṇini Sūtras'.

²This is to express the presence of the inner self in all the non-Ātmans. In other words, this is expressive of the association of all this world with the self.

नर्ते विभागं संबन्धः प्रतीचानात्मनो ऽस्ति हि ।
प्रत्यगर्थो ऽविभागात्मा नातः संगच्छते द्वयम् ॥९७४॥

Indeed, there is no connection of the non-Ātman with the inner self unless without (i.e. there has been an accepted) division. The thing, called the inner self, is undivided in nature, therefore, (the existence of) a pair (of distinctly existing inner self and the non-Ātman) does not stand to reason. [974]

This argument is based on the imaginary division of Reality into the inner self and the non-Ātman and the consequent *śeṣe ṣaṣṭhī*.

अतो दुःस्थितसिद्ध्येतत्पराग्वस्त्वन्तरात्मनि ।
तावन्मात्रैकयाथात्म्याद्बुद्ध्यदे रज्जुसर्पवत् ॥९७५॥

Therefore, this external object, viz. the non-Ātman, is very difficult to find while there exists (only the Ātman). The true nature of intellect etc. is only that much, viz. they are only the Ātman, as it¹ is in the case of a serpent (seen) in a rope. [975]

¹That is, the true nature.

पराक्त्यैष ज्ञातो ऽपि प्रत्यग्याथात्म्यहेतुतः ।
अनात्माज्ञात एव स्याच्छ्रुक्तिकारूप्यबोधवत् ॥९७६॥

Being an external object, the non-Ātman would remain only unknown even if it is (said to be) known through the true nature of the inner self;¹ the non-Ātman would remain (really) unknown, in the same way as there is the cognition of silver in a shell. [976]

¹That is, thanks to its Māyā (= *avidyā*) or *bhrānti*.

निर्धारणे वा षष्ठीयं ज्ञेयार्थस्यावधारणात् ।
प्रतीचो ह्यनधिगतान्नान्यो ऽनधिगतो यतः ॥९७७॥

Or rather, this (use of the) the Genitive case is to be known for specification since the object of knowing is specified (in the Śruti statement); for, a thing other (than the inner self) cannot become known when the inner self has not become known. [977]

This is the alternative explanation of the Genitive case *asya*.

ज्ञातो ऽपि तद्वदेवास्मान्नात्मनो विद्यते परः ।
प्रत्यगज्ञानहेतुत्वात्तदन्यस्येह वस्तुनः ॥९७८॥

(Supposing) it was known also, it would not, like that (unknown non-Ātman) exist as apart from this Ātman, because here (i.e. in worldly dealings, the existence of) anything other than that (viz. the Ātman) is possible only on account of the ignorance about the inner self. [978]

अनात्मनो ऽस्य सर्वस्य व्याकृताव्याकृतात्मनः ।
यस्मादात्मा परं तत्त्वं पदनीयमतो भवेत् ॥९७९॥

Since the Ātman is the highest truth (obtaining in) all this (world of) the non-Ātman which is of the nature of the manifest and the unmanifest, therefore (the highest Reality) should be known/obtained. [979]

This states the meaning of *yad ayam ātmā*.

खण्डादौ गोत्ववद्यस्मात्प्रत्यग्दृष्ट्यान्तरात्मनि ।
समीक्ष्यते हिरुङ्नापि तेनासावात्मतत्त्वकः ॥९८०॥

Since (the non-Ātman) is seen, through the cognition (of the real nature) of the inner self, in the inner self, in the same

way as cowness is seen in an individual cow¹, therefore (it) — one really of the nature of the Ātman — is not far (i.e. apart) from it². [980]

¹*khaṇḍādau* in the verse is a paraphrase for *gopiṇḍa*. The word etc. refers to the shape, colour etc., but cowness is not seen as distinct from any one of these.

²The verse implies that what are called the non-Ātmans are but the projections of (the superimpositions on) the Ātman.

ज्ञेय आत्मैव नानात्मा पदनीयत्वकारणात् ।
नन्वन्यज्ञाने नान्यस्य क्वचिदस्त्यवबुद्धता ॥९८१॥

What should be sought to be known is only the Ātman, not the non-Ātman, because it is (forever) of the nature of what should be obtained/known.¹ (The objector asks:) Let me say, when one thing is known another does not become known.²

[981]

¹See verse 970 note 1 above.

²Cf. SP: *na hi kvacid api deśādaḥ ghaṭādi jñānena paṭādi jñāya-mānam dr̥ṣṭam ity arthaḥ*.

सत्यमेवं भवेदेतद्यद्यात्माप्यन्य इष्यते ।
आत्मासावन्य इति च नानुन्मत्तस्य गीरियम् ॥९८२॥

(The answer to this is:) True, this could be so, if it were accepted that the Ātman also¹ is known as another (i.e. distinct object from the non-Ātman). That it is the Ātman and it is distinct (from the non-Ātman) is not a statement of one who is not mad.

[982]

¹The force of *api* 'also' is to emphasise the impropriety in comparing it with *ghaṭa*, *paṭa* etc.

अनेनेति तृतीयेयमित्थंभूतार्थलक्षणा ।
इदंधीशब्दगम्यस्य प्रत्यङ्मात्रसत्त्वतः ॥९८३॥

In the word *anena*, the (use of) the Instrumental case is for indicating an object of some (lit. what has become of such and such) particular nature, because whatever is understood from the word *idam* is of the nature of only the inner self.

[983]

घटो नास्तीति को ऽन्वस्मान्मानादर्थः प्रतीयते ।
संवित्तावदशेषेभ्यः प्रमाणेभ्यो ऽवसीयते ॥९८४॥

[Verses 984-990 explain that all this world is but of the nature of one's experience (*saṁvid*).]

(This is an objection:) What is the meaning acquired from this means of knowing (viz. our experience): 'There does not exist a pot.'? Insofar as *saṁvid* 'cognition' is concerned, it is obtained from all the means of knowing.

[984]

न संविदः पृथक्त्वेन नापि संविदि तद्विया ।
अनात्मवस्तूत्प्रेक्ष्यं स्याद्यथा संविदियं स्वतः ॥९८५॥

(The answer is given:) Not indeed should the non-Ātman be seen as an object distinct from *saṁvid* 'cognition' and not also with the cognition (i.e. notion) of that (viz. *saṁvid*). *saṁvid* can be understood as an object which is non-Ātman, since *saṁvid* (exists) in its own right.¹

[985]

¹That is to say: *saṁvid* is merely the Ātman itself.

उपलब्धो ऽस्ति सन्कुम्भो लम्बोष्ठो देशकालवान् ।
पूर्वपूर्वातिरेकेण नोत्तरार्थो ऽनुभूयते ॥९८६॥

A pot is known as an existing thing¹, having a broad brim (lit. long lip) and having a place and (some) period of time (for its existence) (and, in) every subsequent detail (of this cognition), is not experienced in supersession of every preceding detail.

[986]

This justifies the argument in the preceding verse. The non-Ātman

being seen in the *saṃvid* (=Ātman) in succession would not disprove its absolute existence.

¹Cf. NKL: *sann iti sattāsāmānyayogaḥ astīti svarūpasattvam iti bhedaḥ*.

कर्त्रादिव्यापृतेः पूर्वं संवित्स्वात्मन्यवस्थितेः ।
अविभागादनाख्येया तदुद्धृत्या फलायते ॥९८७॥

saṃvid 'cognition' is indescribable since, before the activity of the agent etc., it has remained in its own nature, owing to its non-differentiation¹ (which occurs through ignorance); (but) it shows the result(s) by the appearance of that (differentiation). [987]

¹Add: into a number of non-Ātman objects.

अक्रिये ऽपि यथा व्योम्नि ह्युत्पत्तिस्थितिहानिभिः ।
जगन्ननर्ति मय्येवं सदसद्विश्वरूपभृत् ॥९८८॥

As the world dances¹ by the rise, existence and loss (of the various forms etc.) in the non-active sky², so does this world which assumes all these forms of the existents and the non-existents dances within Me (i.e. the individual self possessing Ego)³. [988]

¹This metaphorical expression means: It appears to present various forms.

²SP points out that all thinkers accept the sky to be devoid of any activity.

³The sudden use of *mayi* 'in Me' is expressive of the association of *saṃvid* and *ahamkāra*; also (very possibly) of the influence on Sureśvara of some God-oriented philosophy.

नञ्घटार्थावपहृत्य संवित्सद्रूपमात्रया ।
अवगत्यात्मना सत्त्वं सर्वदृक्स्यादविक्रियः ॥९८९॥

The inner self (*sattva*),¹ which is free from (every) modification, would be the seer of all after having concealed (both) the

nañ (= *abhāva* 'absence') and the pot² by its knowledge that is merely its existent form of *saṃvid*, that is by its nature of knowing. [989]

¹That means *satya* 'Reality'.

²This refers to presence of the pot (*ghaṭasya bhāvā*). *nañ* stands for absence of it, as translation shows.

दिग्विभागो ऽविभागे ऽपि व्योम्नि यद्वत्प्रकल्पितः ।
प्रध्वस्ताशेषभेदे ऽपि मयि भिन्नधियस्तथा ॥९९०॥

As they have held (lit. imagined) in the case of the partless sky a division into quarters, so also (do they hold) different notions (in Me), in whom the entire (world of) differentiation is already destroyed (i.e. not existent). [990]

Verses 991-1019 explain 'yathā ha vai padenānuvindet'.

कथं पुनरबोधोत्थक्लृप्तोयेन तत्परम् ।
गमयते सत्यमित्यस्य परिहृत्यै परं वचः ॥९९१॥

Now, the subsequent statement (of the Śruti) is made with a view to setting aside this objection: How is that highest (Reality) make the truth known by a means arising (or derived from)¹ ignorance?² [991]

¹That is, devised on the basis of.

²It literally means: the absence of the knowledge of the Ātman, that is to say, we proceed to know the Ātman on the basis of the knowledge of the non-Ātmans. This latter constitutes ignorance (*abodha*).

परमार्थात्मनासत्यं पदं तदपि बोधकम् ।
स्वार्थस्यैवमुपायत्वमसत्यस्यात्मनीक्ष्यताम् ॥९९२॥

[Verses 992-993 are the first argument adduced by Sureśvara on the meaning of the word *padam*.]

Even that word (indicative/expressive of the Ātman), untrue (i.e. non-conveyer of truth) by nature (though it is,) is the conveyer (of the Ātman); thus should be seen or accepted the character of the means of knowing in the non-Ātman towards the meaning of its own essence, i.e. towards the Ātman.

[992]

उपायसत्यतां मुक्त्वा नान्यदृगुपयुज्यते ।
सत्यतात्र ह्युपायानामुपेये किं तयेष्यते ॥९९३॥

Leaving aside the trueness of the means of knowing,¹ there is not employed another (means) which sees another². Indeed, here is in respect of (knowing) what is there to be known — what (else) is desired by that (=trueness of the means)? [993]

The point made is: The acceptance of true means etc. is also imaginary (*kalpitatva*).

¹This means its character as the existent and refers only to the Ātman (i.e. the inner self). Its *satyatā* consists in its grasping the true nature of the objects, viz. their having no essence (=truth).

²We have accepted the variant in AnSS edition. *anyādrk* is in contrast with *upāyasatya*.

गवादिखुरबिम्बो वा पदमित्युपदिश्यते ।
अनन्वितार्थसिद्ध्यर्थं दृष्टान्तो ऽयं तथा सति ॥९९४॥

Or rather, the word *pada* is mentioned (here) in the sense of the footprint of a cow¹ etc. (There can be an objection raised here: But) that being so, this illustration (can be understood) for proving the object not connected (with the means of knowing).

[994]

¹This is another meaning of the word *pada* We have translated *go* as 'cow' because it is convenient, though *go* can stand for animals in general.

गवादिबोधनिर्वृत्तिः पदतज्ज्ञानहेतुतः ।
अनन्वितापदज्ञानगोपिण्डैकावसाधिनी ॥९९५॥

यथैवं नामरूपादिप्रपञ्चोपायहेतुतः ।

अप्रपञ्चात्मके भूमिनि प्रत्यग्बोधः प्रजायते ॥९९६॥

There results (the acquisition) of the knowledge of the cow etc. by means of a footprint and the knowledge of it; (the acquisition) ends into the knowledge of Reality, viz. the animal itself, (though) the footprint and the knowledge (of the animal) are not (in reality or directly) connected. [995]

As this happens, (so also) there arises the knowledge of the self in what is great and what is not of the nature of this (multifold) universe, with the help of the means in the form of this (multifold) universe which is made up of names, forms etc.¹ [996]

Verse 995 answers the objection in the preceding verse and verse 996 shows how the illustration is understood.

¹The word etc. refers to various activities.

प्रमाणभूमावैकात्म्यं विरोधान्न प्रतीयते ।

तमोन्वयाप्रमेयत्वात्तदभावे ऽपि नेक्ष्यते ॥९९७॥

The uniqueness of the Ātman is not experienced on the level of the various (worldly) means of knowing, on account of (their) opposition (to Reality); so also, it is not known (lit. seen) even in the absence of that (viz. the world of means), since the Ātman cannot be an object of knowing owing to the continued darkness (i.e. ignorance). [997]

The first line refers to the waking and the dream states and the second line to deep sleep state. In all these states, there continues ignorance and therefore the knowledge of the Ātman is obstructed.

न हि वस्त्वात्मनैवात्ममोहाद्युच्छित्तये क्वचित् ।

प्रमाणनिरपेक्षं सद्वस्त्वलं स्वप्रसिद्धये ॥९९८॥

संसारानवतारः स्यान्मानवैफल्यामेव च ।

(An objection would be raised:) Indeed, there does not exist

anywhere a thing which is by itself capable of destroying ignorance about itself. (The answer is:) (But) an existential entity which is independent of any means of knowing, is capable of establishing itself [998]

and there would not have come to exist this transmigratory world and so (also) there would have been (felt/experienced) the uselessness (or futility) of the means of knowing (viz. Veda). [999ab]

Here in 998ab, there is an objection that the knowledge of the Ātman is not necessary for the removal of ignorance about the non-Ātman, the non-Ātmans themselves would be capable of removing it. 998cd and 999ab are an answer to that objection. If the non-Ātman was capable of removing ignorance about itself, there would not have been the necessity of any means of knowing etc.

A thing known through the use of the means of knowing is not capable of removing wrong knowledge about itself; that is to say, worldly *pramāṇavyavahāra* is not itself useful in removing any ignorance.

इत्येतस्येह चोद्यस्य परिहाराय चोत्तरम् ॥९९९॥
 यथा गवात्मना साक्षाद्ग्रां विन्देद्गोपदानुगः ।
 प्रत्यक्चैतन्यसृत्यैवं विन्देत्तत्परमं पदम् ॥१०००॥
 प्रत्यक्तया यदाभाति ह्यागमापायिसाक्षितः ।
 देहेन्द्रियमनोधीषु चैतन्याभासरूपकम् ॥१००१॥

And (what now) follows is the answer to (or, for answering away) this objection (abode) raised. [999cd]

As one, following (the track of) a cow's foot(print), would find an individual cow itself as having the nature of a cow, so also would one get that highest object by following the course (i.e. activity) of the inner consciousness, [1000] which appears as being within (a body), on account of its being the witness of whatever comes and goes in various cognitions of the different organs by the body, and *manas* and which has the form of the flash of sentience. [1001]

जडेष्वेकमनेकेषु कूटस्थं क्षणभङ्गिषु ।
अनात्मसु तथा चात्मा संहतेष्वप्यसंहतः ॥१००२॥

The (only) one among many non-sentient, the immutable among the many that are perishable in a moment, and also the Ātman in the non-Ātmans, though not collected in a mass, (is) yet collected in a mass¹. [1002]

¹Or alternatively, *saṁhateṣv asaṁhatataḥ* 'The partless among those that are made up of parts'.

तस्यावाक्यार्थरूपस्य पदमेतत्प्रचक्षते ।
पद्यते ऽनेन तद्यस्मात्तेनेदं पदमुच्यते ॥१००३॥

This¹ they call as a word (expressive) of that which is of the nature of not the sentence-meaning; since by this is obtained/reached that; therefore, this is called word (expressive of that). [1003]

¹The description given in verses 1001-1002.

स्वमहिम्नैव चेत्सिद्धयेदुपायः परमार्थवत् ।
स्वतः सिद्धेर्न मिथ्यात्वं तस्य स्यात्परमार्थवत् ॥१००४॥
परमार्थादभिन्नश्चेन्नितराममृषात्मता ।
इत्यादि पूर्वमुक्तं यदनुसंधेयमत्र तत् ॥१००५॥

If the means were to get established, like the highest Reality, by its own potence; then, owing to its self-establishing, it would not have any falsity just like the highest Reality (would not have it). [1004]

If it is not distinct from the highest Reality, then it has certainly the nature of what is not (ever) false — all this, which we have said before, should be remembered here. [1005]

न सामान्यं विशेषो वा यथैकात्म्ये ऽवगम्यते ।
उक्तमप्युत्तरत्रैतदसंतोषात्प्रवक्ष्यते ॥१००६॥

in the case of the uniqueness of the Ātman will be said later (also) — though already stated (before) — (of course) owing to want of satisfaction. [1006]

प्रत्यगात्मनि विज्ञाते नाज्ञातमवशिष्यते ।
 अनेन हेतुदित्युक्त्या तत्पूर्वमुपवर्णितम् ॥१००७॥
 निःशेषपुरुषार्थसिद्धिर्दुःखहानिस्तु तत्फलम् ।
 यथा हेतुच्यते श्रुत्या साधनाभिन्नमात्मनः ॥१००८॥

When the inner self is known, there does not remain anything that is not known — that has been already explained by the statement *anena hetu*, [1007]

(and) obtaining the entire (group) of the ends of human endeavour, (consisting in) getting rid of grief, is the fruit of that (=knowledge of the inner self). This is said by the Śruti *tathā ha* ... where the Ātman is (understood as) non-distinct from the means.¹ [1008]

This is another meaning of *yathā ha*, expressed in *anena hy etat sarvam*.

¹That is, the means to liberation.

ननु प्रतीचि विदिते तदन्यद्विदितं भवेत् ।
 ज्ञानार्थे प्रकृते कस्माल्लाभार्थेनोपसंहृतिः ॥१००९॥

(An objection is raised:) Let me ask, 'It is said, when the inner self is known, everything else would become known, thus, you have introduced the topic of knowledge at the start, (and then) for what (reason) is there a conclusion with the (statement of the) object of gain?' [1009]

ज्ञानलाभार्थयोर्यस्मादेकार्थत्वं विवक्षितम् ।
 अविद्याध्वंसमात्रत्वात्तेनात्रास्त्वविरुद्धता ॥१०१०॥

(The answer is:) (This is so,) since it is intended to state the unity of meaning between the object of knowing and the object of gain. Let there be (understood) the absence of contradiction (in meaning) on account of (the latter) being

merely the destruction of the absence of knowledge. [1010]

नित्यलब्धैकरूपस्य नालाभो ऽज्ञानतो ऽन्यतः ।
यथैवं तस्य लाभो ऽपि तज्ज्ञानान्नान्यतो भवेत् ॥१०११॥

(In fact) there is no absence of gain as different from the absence of knowledge of what is ever of the nature of (a thing) obtained/known; therefore, this being so, the gain of it would also not be different from the knowledge of it¹ and not from any other (source). [1011]

¹That is to say: It is the same as that.

आत्मता ब्रह्मणो लाभो ब्रह्मताप्यात्मनः फलम् ।
व्यावर्त्यभेदात्तद्वित्तेरेकं वस्तु द्विरुच्यते ॥१०१२॥

The Brahman becoming the individual self¹ is the gain; so also, the self's becoming the Ātman is the result — (thus) is the unique thing stated twice (i.e. in two ways) on account of the basis, viz. their distinction from each other². [1012]

¹The word *ātman* here is used for individual self. Also we notice the pair the Brahman and the Ātman used in contrast — one of the rare occasions for such expression.

²This explains that the difference is purely linguistic, and not pertaining to Reality.

ब्रह्मता नात्मनो ऽन्यत्र नात्मता ब्रह्मणो ऽन्यतः ।
यत एवमतो ऽभेदो ज्ञानलाभार्थयोरिह ॥१०१३॥

The nature of the Brahman does not obtain elsewhere than in the Ātman, (as also) the nature of the Ātman¹ does not obtain elsewhere than in the Brahman. Since this is so, therefore here (in this Śruti passage) there is non-distinction of the two meanings expressed by the words *jñāna* and *lābha*.²

[1013]

¹That is, the individual self.

²Namely, the object of knowing and the object of gain; cf. verse 1010 above.

लब्धूलब्धव्ययोर्भेदो यत्राविद्योत्थभूमिषु ।
फलभेदः क्रियाभेदात्तत्र भिन्नार्थता तयोः ॥१०१४॥

Where (therefore), in the states which arise from ignorance, there is the difference between the one who obtains and the one that has to be obtained; there is (also) a distinction among the results on account of the distinction between (two) actions and there are two meanings of the two (words expressive of the actions as well.) [1014]

आप्तशेषपुमर्थो ऽपि प्रत्यग्याथात्म्यमोहतः ।
असर्वज्ञो भवेदात्मा तथानाप्तार्थ एव च ॥१०१५॥

An individual, though he has obtained the entire group of the ends of human endeavour, becomes, on account of ignorance in respect of the true nature of the inner self, a non-omniscient being and also one who has (really) not obtained (any) end of human endeavour. [1015]

तत्रात्मा लब्धाविद्वान्स्याल्लब्धव्यं च क्रियाफलम् ।
उत्पत्त्याद्यन्तरायं सत्कारकोपात्तिपूर्वकम् ॥१०१६॥

There (in that state) the individual self, who is a non-knower, is (lit. would be) the one who will obtain (the reward) and the reward which would be the result of (his) action of obtaining it is obstructed/hindered by (the process of creation etc.) and is preceded by taking up some effective means (of achieving it). [1016]

तादृग्लब्धो ऽप्यलब्धः स्यादविद्यामात्रहेतुतः ।
आद्यन्तयोरभावाच्च स्वप्नपुत्रादिलाभवत् ॥१०१७॥

(The Ātman), though obtained in such nature (as is described),¹ is (to be taken as) un-obtained for only one reason, viz. (its) ignorance and also owing to the absence of the beginning

and the end of itself, as in the case of the obtaining of a son in a dream. [1017]

¹Cf. verses 1015-1016 for qualifications of the ignorant individual self.

विपरीतस्वभावो ऽत आत्मलाभः स्वतः सदा ।
अज्ञानहेतोरन्यादृक्स च ज्ञानान्निवर्तते ॥१०१८॥

Therefore, the existence¹ of the Ātman is of an altogether different kind, viz. it is ever (existent) in its own right. It appears, on account of ignorance,² different and turns away from knowledge³. [1018]

¹It literally means: coming into existence.

²That is, being overpowered by ignorance.

³It ceases to be the witness and appears as a partial knower.

आरभ्य सर्वं वेदेति ज्ञानार्थेनोपसंहृतिम् ।
अतो ऽनुविन्देदित्याह लाभार्थेनैव तत्फले ॥१०१९॥

Therefore, having begun (the discussion) with the words *sarvam veda*, which convey the notion of knowledge, the Śruti stated the conclusion in the word *anuvindet* (and) has (thus) conveyed the reward, viz. knowledge and liberation as fruits, namely the only gain. [1019]

This explains away the contradiction conceived by the objector.

अप्रख्यातो यथैवात्मा व्याकृते ख्यातिमेयिवान् ।
एवं तदवबोधान्ना ख्यातिमेत्यविनश्वरीम् ॥१०२०॥

[Verses 1020-1024 explain *evam kīrtiṃ ślokaṃ vindate* ...]

As the unknown¹ Ātman came to have a name (lit. description) when it (had become) manifest; similarly, does a man come to have an ever-lasting name (i.e. fame) by knowing (the true nature of the Ātman). [1020]

¹This stands for *avyākṛta* 'non-manifest'.

संहतिश्चक्षुरादीनां श्लोकशब्देन भण्यते ।
यथात्मा संहतिं प्रापद्व्याकृतः करणादिभिः ॥१०२१॥
एवं विद्वानवाप्नोति पुत्रामात्यादिसंहतिम् ।
उक्तज्ञानप्रवृत्त्यर्थमर्थवादो ऽयमिष्यते ॥१०२२॥

Collection of eyes etc. is expressed by the word *śloka*. As the Ātman, when it became manifest by organs etc., obtained (the nature of) a collection, [1021] so does a knower (of the true nature of the Ātman) obtain a collection of sons, relatives¹, and others. Therefore, is this sentence accepted (or understood) as an Arthavāda for purposes of producing, i.e. urging, an effort towards (securing that) knowledge. [1022]

¹For *amātya*. It does not mean here a minister. This sense is noticed in Gṛhya texts.

निरेषणानां नेदृग्धि संसारं प्रजिहासताम् ।
फलं युक्तं प्रवृत्त्यङ्गमर्थवादो भवेदतः ॥१०२३॥

Indeed, such a result is not relevant (lit. necessary) in the case of those who do not have any desire and who wish to abandon transmigratory existence. Therefore, this Arthavāda is (only) for generating (in them) an activity towards getting knowledge.¹ [1023]

¹This refers to 'not towards acquiring worldly prosperity'.

कीर्तिं चैकात्म्यविज्ञानं श्लोकं चैकात्म्यसंगतिम् ।
यथोक्तवस्तुवेद्येतत्फलमाप्नोत्यभीप्सितम् ॥१०२४॥

(The knower obtains) fame, viz. knowledge of the uniqueness of the Ātman, and reward, viz. association with the uniqueness, i.e. the Ātman. Thus he obtains the desired result which informs him of the thing as described (above). [1024]

अव्याकृतव्याकरणं प्रत्यग्दर्शनसिद्धये ।
तदन्तरायस्तत्सक्तिस्तन्निवृत्तौ परा श्रुतिः ॥१०२५॥

[Verses 1025-1028 state the purpose of the Śruti *tad etat preyaḥ* ... (BU 1.4.8).]

(There has been stated earlier) the explanation of the division (or manifestation) of what has been (never) divided (manifested)¹ in order that there occurs the seeing (i.e. knowledge) of the inner self. (And) the obstacle to that² is one's adherence (lit. attachment) to that (notion of division). (And therefore) the subsequent Śruti (proceeds) with the purpose of the removal of that (viz. adherence to that). [1025]

SP reports that this verse conveys what Bhartṛprapañca has held.

¹This refers to *tad asya rūpam* ... BU 2.5.19 (*Rgveda* 6.47.18 and *Jaiminīyopaniṣad* 1.44.1). It is the purport of *tad etat preyaḥ* ...; cf. NKL: *sr̥ṣṭisaṃkīrtanam ātmajñānārtham kṛtam. sr̥ṣṭe ca jagati saktir ātmajñānapratibandhaḥ*.

²The first *tat* in the second line refers to *pratyagdarśana*, the second to *antarāya* and the third, (*pratyagdarśanāntarāya*-)śakti.

शब्दादिबडिशकृष्टचेतसः प्रत्यगीक्षणे ।
न सामर्थ्यं यतस्तेभ्यो व्यावृत्त्यर्थं परा श्रुतिः ॥१०२६॥

Because, on the part of one whose mind is attracted by the baits, viz. word etc.,¹ there is no capacity for seeing the inner self, the subsequent Śruti (proceeds) with the purpose of warding (one) from those (word etc.) [1026]

¹NKL points out that *śabdādi* causes obstruction to one's knowing the inner self.

हेत्वन्तरोपदेशो वा पदनीयत्व आत्मनः ।
तदेतदितिशास्त्रेण भण्यते तद्बुभुत्सवे ॥१०२७॥

Or, with reference to the Ātman being the object of knowing,

there is the statement (lit. instruction) of another reason in the statement of the Śruti *tad etat ...* (so that it becomes useful) to one who desires to know that. [1027]

The earlier portion of the Śruti pointed out why one should attempt to know the inner self, viz. because it has generally remained unknown to human beings. This verse points to how knowing the inner self is the most desired means to liberation.

सांख्यमुक्तिनिवृत्त्यर्थमथवास्तूत्तरा श्रुतिः ।
प्रेयोगिरात्मनो यस्मान्निष्ठानन्दस्य भण्यते ॥१०२८॥

Or, let the subsequent Śruti be for the removal of the notion of liberation posited by the Sāṃkhya(s); because the word *preyaḥ* with reference to the Ātman (viz. the inner self) conveys (that it, viz. the Ātman) is the basis of the (highest) delight. [1028]

SP quotes *Sāṃkhyakārikā* 57 and 68 as the basis for the argument. They purport to say that liberation consists in mere making between Prakṛti 'matter' and Puruṣa 'sentience'. They do not refer to the state as consisting in bliss. This verse controverts the Sāṃkhya(s)' position and lays emphasis on the state of being full of bliss — this alone is in consonance with the Śruti.

पुत्रात्प्रेय इदं तत्त्वं वित्तात्प्रियतरं तथा ।
पुत्रो वित्तं च लोके ऽपि प्रसिद्धं प्रियरूपतः ॥१०२९॥

This Reality is (to one) more dear than a son. So also (it is) more dear than wealth (of every kind); and it is well-known in the world¹ that a son and wealth are taken to be (very) dear (to one).² [1029]

This is the restatement of the contents of the Śruti in brief.

¹The force of *api* is that it indicates *abhivyāpti* (SP).

²See SP: *na vastuto 'sya priyatvam kiṃ tu pratītyā*.

ईर्यसुस्तमबर्थे स्यात्पुत्रादीनां बहुत्वतः ।

छान्दसत्वात्प्रियतमस्तथात्मा संभवत्यपि ॥१०३०॥

[Now starts the ascertaining of the character of the inner self as the most dear and continues up to the verse 1045.]

The suffix *īyasun* is in the sense of *-tamap*¹ because of (i) the maniness of sons etc.² and (ii) the character of (the words is) *chāndasa*³. Also, it means that the Ātman (alone⁴) can be in the same way the most dear to one. [1030]

¹The suffix *īyasun* expresses comparative degree and the second, viz. *-tamap* the superlative.

²The word *putrādi* refers to *vitta* already mentioned.

³In *chandasa* the usual rules of grammar do not hold as they are; that is, the comparative suffix may be used for the superlative. The suffix *-īyasun* is mentioned by Pāṇini as equivalent of *-tamap* in Pāṇini Sūtra 5.3.57: *dvivacanavibhajyopapade tarabīyasunau* and sanctions the option in Pāṇini Sūtra 3.1.85: *vyatyayo bahulam*.

⁴Cf. SP: *ātmaiva priyatamaḥ; apir avadhārane* ...

वित्तात्पुत्रः प्रियः पुत्रात्पिण्डः पिण्डात्तथेन्द्रियम् ।
इन्द्रियेभ्यः प्रियः प्राण आत्मा प्रियतमस्ततः ॥१०३१॥

A son is more dear¹ than wealth; one's own body is more dear than the son; also a (certain) sense-organ might be more dear to one than the whole body; Prāṇa (=the inner self²) is more dear than the sense-organs. Therefore, the Ātman is the dearmost (of all to one). [1031]

That the Ātman is the dearmost is shown by *pariśeṣya* 'what is left over and above others' and *anubhava* 'experience'.

¹The word *priyaḥ*, though not in the comparative or the superlative, is in the sense of *priyatarāḥ* and *priyatamaḥ*, according to the context, cf. *vyatyayo bahulam* quoted above.

²The difference between Prāṇa and Ātman has to be noted.

वित्तं द्विविधमप्यत्र वित्तशब्देन गृह्यते ।
देवलोकः फलं यस्माद्देवस्यापि न तत्पदम् ॥१०३२॥

In this (statement of the Śruti),¹ the word *vitta* is understood as *vitta*² of both the types to be. Even that from which results (the attainment to) the world of gods is not a place (to be attained) by the god.³ [1032]

SP refers to the Śruti *vidyayā devalokaḥ*— this *vidyā* should not be mistaken for Ātmavidyā; it is understood here in the sense of any Upāsanā as mentioned in an earlier part of the text.

¹The word *atra* is *saptamyaṛtha* 'in the sense of the Locative'.

²One is in worldly prosperity and the other is in the form of knowledge of some Upāsanā. Also this refers to the twofold means, viz. gold, cow (*karmasādhana*) etc. and Upāsanā which is related to some god or object of worship (NKL).

³Because it is impermanent. As against the knowledge of the Ātman is ever-lasting; (cf. *vidyayā devalokaḥ* (cf. BU 1.5.16); *na muktiḥ tatphalaṃ niṣedhaśruteḥ*— SP) *deva* here is the shining one, the Ātman. Its goal is liberation, not the world of gods.

प्रीतिसाधनहेतुत्वात्प्राणादौ प्रीतिरिष्यते ।
बन्धकीप्रीतिवन्मुख्या नैवानात्मसु युज्यते ॥१०३३॥
व्याध्याद्युपप्लुतौ यस्माद्वक्ति निर्विण्णमानसः ।
अद्यैव मरणं श्रेयो मम दुःखार्दितात्मनः ॥१०३४॥

In the case of the sense-organs etc.,¹ they entertain a liking² for them because they are the means to (acquiring) pleasure³; (but) the principal (pleasure³) is not at all (entertained) in respect of (any of) the non-Ātmans in the same way as a longing² for a courtesan,⁴ [1033]

because a person who is oppressed by disease etc. (and is therefore) dejected in mind, says (to himself) 'For me, who am afflicted with sorrow, death just today is more agreeable.'⁵ [1034]

Verse 1034 explains how *prāṇa* etc. are not dear as the principal objects.

¹*prāṇa* in the sense of 'sense-organ'; cf. our book [Vol.4:1991] p.128.

²*prīti* = *snehaḥ/saktiḥ*.

³*prīti* = *manasaḥ ullāsaḥ*.

⁴SP notes the variant reading *vardhakīprīvat* for *bandhakīprīvat* and explains the word *vardhakī* as an infidel woman. The editor of the AnSS edition does not have *vardhakī* as a variant reading in any manuscript consulted. NKL and NKL edition also do not support *vardhakī*.

⁵SP adds: *tasmāt prāṇādāv amukhyā prītir iti śeṣaḥ*.

प्रतीचि निर्निमित्तैव सर्वावस्थास्वपीष्यते ।

प्रीतिरग्न्युष्णवत्तस्मादात्मा प्रेयाननात्मनः ॥१०३५॥

During all the states of (one's life), a liking is entertained for the inner self, even if there is not any cause whatever (*eva*) for it — (this is) in the same way that heat ever abides in fire. Therefore, the Ātman is more dear than (any) non-Ātman.¹

[1035]

¹NKL points out the purpose of the verse: The Ātman is dear, because it is the cause of bliss (to an individual).

त्रैगुण्यात्सर्वभावानां मोहदुःखसुखात्मता ।

स्वत एव त्वनद्यस्ता ह्येवं कैचित्प्रचक्षते ॥१०३६॥

In this regard some¹ say: Since all beings and the objects² outside them, are (the combination) of the three qualities³, they are of the nature of (having been affected by) infatuation, misery and pleasure; this is so by their very nature and (this condition is) not superimposed on them.⁴

[1036]

¹SP identifies them to be the Sāṃkhyas and supports this idea with *Sāṃkhyakārikā* 55 and 60cd, together with a very brief comment thereon.

²The word *bhāva* refers to whatever undergoes a change or modification; therefore, both beings and things.

³Qualities are: *sattva*, *rajas* and *tamas*— the three constituents of Prakṛti.

⁴SP cites here *guṇavaty aguṇasya satas tasyāpārthakam carati*

(Sāṃkhyakārikā 60) and observes *ātmanah sattvādiguṇahīnatvāt svataḥ sukhādyabhāvaḥ*.

तत्तु नैवं यतः सत्त्वम् मोहादित्रयकृद्द्वयः ।
भानूदयं प्रपश्यामश्चोरदृग्गोदिग्दृशाम् ॥१०३७॥

But that is not so because it is only Sattva which causes the trio, infatuation etc.¹ (This is thus justified:) We see the sunrise (as the cause of confusion) for the thieves, (of sorrow) for those who are afflicted with disease(s) of the eye, and (of happiness) for those who want to find out (lit. see) the direction². [1037]

The idea is: *sattvam prakāśakam*— this is particularly true in the case of the sun, *nātra rajastamasī calanāvaranayor abhāvāt*.

¹That is, *moha*, *sukha* and *duḥkha*.

²NKL is more specifically helpful in ascertaining this.

समं त्रयं त्रिषु भवेत्त्रैगुण्यं चेद्रवौ मतम् ।
गुणान्तराधिकारो ऽपि न च भानूदये मतः ॥१०३८॥

If it were held that there is the combination in the sun of the three (qualities) in equal proportion,¹ then in all the three (viz. infatuation etc.) it would have been the same (i.e. equal in proportion to others) and it is not (i.e. cannot be) accepted that there is in the sunrise any scope/place² for any quality other (than Sattva). [1038]

The argument of the Sāṃkhyas could be: 'Being a *bhāva*, the sunrise could also be *triguṇātmaka*' and this would imply the impropriety of the illustration in the preceding verse. But this argument would go against the Sāṃkhya doctrine according to which the sun is only *sattvātmaka*, i.e. it cannot be at the same time *cala* or *āvaraka* in accordance with *rajas* and *tamas*— it can be only *prakāśaka*. As such, the illustration is only apt.

¹*samam trayam triṣu = guṇatrayasya sāmyaṃ sukhaduḥkhamoheṣu*.

²*adhikāra = praveśa* (SP); it is literally entry.

प्रमाणैर्गृह्यते प्रीतिर्व्यभिचारिण्यनात्मसु ।
रज्ज्वां सर्पादिवन्नैवं प्रत्यगात्मनि सैक्ष्यते ॥१०३९॥

(Thus) delight (lit. liking), which is not uniform (i.e. the same) is ascertained for (all) the non-Ātman objects, (with the help of) different means of knowing¹ as in the case of the (notion(s) of) a serpent etc. in respect of a rope² etc. But this³ is not so seen in respect of the inner self. [1039]

Here concludes the discussion of the Sāṃkhya view.

¹This stands for the means acceptable to the Sāṃkhyas: *pratyakṣa*, *anumāna* and *śabda*.

²The word *rajivām* should be understood for *rajivādau*, since the word *sarpādi* stands for *sarpa*, *śūktikā* and other well-known *upamānas* in illustrations.

³This refers to *vyabhicāriṇī prīti* 'variously changing liking'.

आत्मैव प्रिय इत्यत्र हेतुः स्पष्टो ऽभिधीयते ।
श्रुत्यान्तरतरोक्त्येह तद्वैतुश्चात्मतोच्यते ॥१०४०॥

In respect of this statement 'The Ātman alone is dear (i.e. dearer than others).', the reason is clearly stated by the Śruti in the words 'it is the nearest within'. In this (statement) is mentioned also the reason for that¹, viz. the nature (of all this universe is) the Ātman². [1040]

¹NKL reads *taddhetusthiti* for *taddhetuś ceti*. This is obviously misreading in the manuscript of NKL.

²This refers to the first sentence in BU 1.4.8, repeated by BUB: *yad ayam ātmā*.

यथान्तरतमः प्रत्यक्तथोदके प्रवक्ष्यते ।
वाचकनव्यक्षरान्तेन ग्रन्थेन प्रत्यगात्मनः ॥१०४१॥

It will be stated later as to how the inner self is the nearest within (*antarātama*), i.e. in the later portion of the text (beginning with) the word *vācaknavī* and ending with the word *ākṣara* that pertains to the inner self [1041]

Sureśvara's wording is cryptic; it stands for the beginning of Yājñavalkya's discussion with Vācaknavī and ending with his statement about *akṣara* (BU 3.8.8ff.)

The purpose of the verse is to say that the conclusions of the discussion in the earlier portion will be reaffirmed in the subsequent portion of the BU, viz. in the dialogue of Yājñavalkya and Vācaknavī Gārgi. This indicates that Sureśvara follows Śaṅkara's method of showing *ekavākyatā* (= *ekārthatā*) of the entire text.

NKL refers to *tātparyalinga abhyāsa* 'repetition pointing to but one purport'.

प्रत्यक्तान्यानपेक्षा हि तदन्यत्तदपेक्षया ।

यतो ऽन्तरतमः प्रत्यक्तस्मादेवावगम्यते ॥१०४२॥

Since the nature of the inner self does not indeed depend on any other (object etc.) and what is other than that¹ (exists) only depending on it, therefore, is the *pratyak* 'existing within' thus understood as the nearest within.² [1042]

¹Namely, the inner self

²The purport is: It is one with the Ātman; or, in other words, the inner self.

यस्य त्वष्टास्ववस्थासु प्रत्यक्त्वं सममिष्यते ।

तस्यान्तरतम इति दुर्घटं वचनं भवेत् ॥१०४३॥

But, in the case of him who holds that the nature of the inner self is the same¹ in all of its eight states², the word (lit. expression) *antaratamaḥ* would be very difficult (to explain or understand).³ [1043]

This and the next verse express the view of Bhartṛprapañca. In his theory the expression *antaratama* does not go well with the Ātman.

¹That is to say: It remains unchanged.

²See verse 487 and note thereon.

³According to Bhartṛprapañca, so Sureśvara intends to convey,

the inner self undergoes, i.e. gets modified into eight states and is yet unchanged. This does not stand to reason.

अन्यनाधिकरूपासु त्वष्टावस्थास्विहात्मनः ।
कं विशेषं समाश्रित्य ह्यात्मान्तरतमो मतः ॥१०४४॥

In this connection (we ask:) With reference to which distinctive feature does the Śruti hold that the Ātman is the nearest within, while it persists in the eight states of the same nature, viz. that none of them is not less or more than another? [1044]

¹It literally means: Having resorted to ...

भाक्तैवानात्मसु प्रीतिर्यस्मात्तस्मादनात्मनः ।
व्युत्थाप्य निखिलां प्रीतिं प्रतीच्येव निवेशयेत् ॥१०४५॥

Since liking for the non-Ātman objects is understood only in the secondary sense, therefore, having given up (lit. warded away) the entire liking for the non-Ātman, let one fix¹ delight only in the inner self. [1045]

Thus Sureśvara states his own view; after he has pointed out the defect in Bhartṛprapañca's view.

¹This means: entertain, find.

एवं व्यवस्थितौ सत्यां युक्तिलेशो ऽभिधीयते ।
पुत्रादि प्रियमात्मेति द्वयोर्विवदमानयोः ॥१०४६॥
आत्मनो ऽन्यत्प्रियमिति यो ब्रूते मोहसंप्लुतः ।
ब्रुवाणं तं प्रति ब्रूयादिति श्रुत्यनुशासनम् ॥१०४७॥
यस्ते प्रियतयाभीष्टः सो ऽचिराद्दुःखकृद्भवेत् ।
यतो नङ्क्षयति स क्षिप्रं नश्यन्चासुखकृत्प्रियः ॥१०४८॥

[Now follows the explanation of *sa yo 'nyam ātmanah priyam ...* (BU 1.4.8)]

Such being decision¹ (of what is liked and not liked), there is (now) stated some (more) argument: Between the two, who are arguing (against each other), holding the views (such as)

‘the son etc. is (more) dear’ and ‘the Ātman (alone is more dear)’, [1046]

to the one who, overpowered by ignorance, would say that a thing than the Ātman is (more) dear, should one say, ‘Such is the instruction of the Śruti: [1047]

That one, which is desired by you as the dear one, would soon be the cause of (your) misery, because the one will soon perish (and), thus perishing, will be the cause of unhappiness. [1048]

All these three verses together are an explanation of the Śruti statement *priyam rotsyatīti ... pramāyukam bhavati* (BU 1.4.8).

¹Or, division.

यथोक्तस्याविसंवादं तत्तथैवेति च श्रुतिः ।
आत्मैव प्रिय इत्येवं प्रतिज्ञां प्रत्यभाषत ॥१०४९॥

And the words in the Śruti *tat tathaiva (syāt)* (reaffirmed) in a way that it does not involve (any) contradiction with the statement of the proposition ‘The Ātman alone is dear.’, which was made earlier. [1049]

Translation is in agreement with the first explanation of SP, confirmed by NKL. This brings out the relation between the two sentences *ātmaiva priyaḥ ...* and *tathaiva syāt*. Or, as SP points out alternatively, the Śruti reaffirmed ‘the Ātman alone is dear’ in such a way that it is not contrary to what is stated earlier.

यस्मादेवमतो हित्वा प्राणादीनप्रियात्मनः ।
सर्वान्तरतमात्मानमुपासीत प्रियं सदा ॥१०५०॥

Since this is so, therefore, having abandoned *prāṇa* etc.¹ which are such as cannot be dear, one should ever consider as dear the Ātman, which is the most within of all. [1050]

This verse is the explanation of *ātmānam eva priyam upāsita*. Some explanation of SP, *sarvasmāt antaratā ... draṣṭavyaḥ*, though ingenious, is not acceptable.

¹The word *ādi* refers to the sense-organs.

स य आत्मानमित्युक्त्या प्राप्तदोषनिराक्रिया ।
प्रमायुक्तत्वं मर्त्यत्वात्प्राणादेर्न तु वार्यते ॥१०५१॥

In the statement of the Śruti *sa ya ātmānam*, there is the refutation of the evil that would affect (lit. reach) the self; but the perishable nature of *prāṇa* etc. is not (i.e. cannot) be warded away, since they are liable to death. [1051]

This brings out the purpose of *sa ya ātmānam* ... 'Though agreeable like other things, it (i.e. self) does not perish.'

व्यावृत्तसर्वबाह्यार्थप्रीतेस्तन्मुक्तिकामिनः ।
न हास्येति गिरा नातो मुमुक्षोः फलकीर्तनम् ॥१०५२॥

Therefore, in the words *na hāsyā*, there is not a statement of the fruit¹ for him who has withdrawn himself from any liking for all external objects² and who has a desire for freedom from that³ and for one who wants to be free from this (external world). [1052]

¹This is literal translation. It means the result, viz. liberation.

²They signify *prāṇa* etc. which certainly perish.

³That is, the bondage of it.

आविरिञ्चाद्विरक्तश्चेत्कम्भीपाकादिवेह यः ।
आप्ताशेषक्रियाकार्यो मुक्तौ स विनियुज्यते ॥१०५३॥

That person among them here¹ is eligible for securing² liberation, who is averse to (the entire universe) beginning with Viriñca, if at all, as from (the hell called) Kumbhīpāka³, after he has performed the entire mass of activity to be performed (according to the dictate of Śāstra). [1053]

¹Cf. SP: *iheti madhye 'dhikṛtānām iti yāvat*.

²It is literally 'is enjoined to acquire'.

³This is one of the *naraka*s enunciated in Purāṇic or old

tradition.

परीक्ष्य लोकानित्यादि तथा नैगमिकं वचः ।
त्यज धर्ममधर्मं चेत्येवमादि स्मृतेरपि ॥१०५४॥

To that purpose¹ is there the Śruti statement *parīkṣya lokān ...*² and also a similar one from the Smṛti, (such as) *tyaja dharmam adharmam ca*.³ [1054]

¹Or alternatively, so also is ...

²*Muṇḍakopaniṣad* 1.2.12.

³*Mahābhārata* 12.167.10.

Verses 1055-1165 pertains to BU 1.4.9.

आत्माविद्यापनुत्त्यर्थं प्रारब्धोपनिषत्परा ।
आत्मेत्युपक्रमं यच्च तत्सूत्रं प्रागुदाहृतम् ॥१०५५॥

The subsequent¹ Śruti begins (lit. has proceeded) with the purpose of removing ignorance about (the nature of) the Ātman and the Sūtra, which has its beginning in the words *ātmety*, has been already introduced. [1055]

The purpose of verses 1055-1068 is to show the connection of the foregoing discussion with *tad āhuḥ* in BU 1.4.9.

¹Read NKL: *paraviṣayatvāt parety arthaḥ*. This is because there immediately follows the (the Sūtra, viz. statement) *ātmety evopāsita*.

तद्वेदमित्यनेनास्याः प्रमेयो ऽर्थो निरूपितः ।
अकृत्स्नवचसा तद्वत्प्रमाभासो ऽप्यपोदितः ॥१०५६॥

The purport to be known from this¹ Upaniṣad has been explained in the statement *tad dhedaṁ ...*² So also is set aside by (the use of) the word *akṛtsna* what (would have) appeared as the knowledge of the truth. [1056]

¹Supply: which has been stated immediately before.

²BU 1.4.7.

आत्मैवैको ऽत्र द्रष्टव्यः कृत्स्नत्वान्नात्मनो ऽपरः ।
अकृत्स्न एव तावत्स्यात्तदन्यो यावदीक्ष्यते ॥१०५७॥

In (connection with the teaching of) this (Upaniṣad), the Ātman alone is to be known (lit. seen), because of its completeness and not what is other than the Ātman, (because) it is seen that what is other than that (viz. the Ātman) is¹ only incomplete. [1057]

¹It literally means: would be.

को ऽहं कस्य कुतो वेति कः कथं वा भवेदिति ।
प्रयोजकमतेरेष विध्यर्थो ऽत्रावगम्यते ॥१०५८॥

The meaning of the injunction which conveys the inciting thought is this: 'Who am I? or, to whom do I belong? whence (was I) born? or what shall I be and how?' [1058]

NKL here points out that the questions in the verse pertain to the exposition of *tvampadārtha* 'an individual mentioned by the word *tvam*'. Both SP and NKL point out the fuller significance of each question.

उत्पत्तिस्थितिविध्वंसाः कार्याणां स्युः कुतो न्विति ।
अन्वयव्यतिरेकाख्यो व्यापारो ऽत्र विधीयते ॥१०५९॥

Whence indeed would they be — origin, sustenance and destruction of the products (i.e. effects) — (to explain this) there is enjoined here the activity of applying (the method of) Anvaya and Vyatireka. [1059]

This is an explanation of the earlier verse where the injunctions *ātmety* ... and *ātmā* ... *draṣṭavyaḥ* expect one to think about the nature of the Ātman by the method of Anvaya and Vyatireka.

It is taken for granted here that an injunction is always about some ritual and therefore one is expected to begin to think, and this is taken as an activity.

तपसा तत्परं ब्रह्म विद्धीति वचनादतः ।
अन्वयव्यतिरेकाख्यो व्यापारो ऽत्र तपो मतम् ॥१०६०॥

Therefore, from the Śruti statement *tapasā tatparam brahma vidhī*,¹ *tapas* is understood to be an activity, called applying the method of Anvaya and Vyatireka. [1060]

¹ *Taittirīyopaniṣad* 3.2.

यतो वा इत्यतो वाक्यान्न तदन्यत्तपो भवेत् ।
लक्षणोक्तेर्य आत्मेति सो ऽन्वेष्टव्य इति श्रुतेः ॥१०६१॥

There would not be on the authority of the Śruti statement *yato vā imāni bhūtāni jāyante*¹ (the idea of) any *tapas* 'penance' other than that²; (this is so) owing to the statement in the Śruti which is the definition of (the Brahman), viz. *ya ātmā-pahatapāpmā* ... and which further enjoins *so 'nveṣṭavyaḥ*.³ [1061]

So far Sureśvara has made every effort to show the oneness of purport of various Śruti passages (from BU, CU and *Taittirīyopaniṣad*; viz. their *ekavākyatā*).

¹ *Taittirīyopaniṣad* 3.1.

² This refers to applying the method of Anvaya Vyatireka mentioned in the preceding verse.

³ CU 8.7.1 and 3.

त्यक्ताप्रियपरागर्थो ह्यमानित्वादिसाधनः ।
प्रियात्मानमुपासीत शक्रवद्ब्रह्मचर्यवान् ॥१०६२॥

One, who has abandoned all the unlikable external objects and is possessed of means such as being without attachment to the body¹, should, being a Brahmacārin like Śakra², think of the Ātman as the dear one. [1062]

¹ Cp. *Gītā* 13.7.

² Refer to CU 8.11.3.

आत्मेत्यनेन वाक्येन ब्रह्मविद्योपासत्रिता ।
 यदर्थोपनिषत्कृत्स्ना वृत्तिस्तस्या भविष्यति ॥१०६३॥
 आत्मेत्येकमिदं सूत्रं कण्डिकाद्वयमेव वा ।
 अध्यायो वा समस्तो ऽयमध्यायद्वयमेव वा ॥१०६४॥

In this statement, viz. *ātmety* ... is introduced the lore of the Brahman for (conveying) which the entire Upaniṣad (has proceeded). Now will be given a full explanation¹ of that; viz. one Sūtra *ātmety* ..., or two sections² (*kaṇḍikās*), or this entire chapter³ or these two chapters⁴. [1063-1064]

¹The Upaniṣadic sentence *tad āhuḥ* is the explanation of the lore of the Brahman. This, according to Śaṅkara (NKL).

²(i) *tad dha* ... and (ii) *tad etat* ... This, according to Sureśvara (NKL).

³That is, BU ch. 1.

⁴That is, BU chh. 1-2.

अव्याकृतव्याकरणप्रभृतीन्यपरे विदुः ।
 पञ्चैव किल सूत्राणि तथापीष्टं न बाध्यते ॥१०६५॥

[Verses 1065-1068 mention the view of Bhartṛprapañca.]

Others (however) have understood (the explanation to be) only the five Sūtras beginning with the statement of the division of what was unmanifest; but, even in that way, the desired purpose is not lost (lit. obstructed). [1065]

अव्याकृतं स एषेह तथात्मैवेति चापरः ।
 पदनीयं तथा प्रेयः पदार्थाः पञ्च सूत्रिताः ॥१०६६॥

(Thus, according to him,) there are (references to, or Śruti statements about the five Sūtras heard (or enumerated,) viz. *avyākṛta*, *sa eṣeḥ*,¹ *ātmaiva*,² *padanīyam* and *preyaḥ*, as the objects of knowing. [1066]

The first four references occur in BU 1.4.7 and the fifth in BU 1.4.8. Cf. SP: *ajñātam ātmatattvaṃ jagato nidānam, tad eva*

srṣṭe jagati praviṣṭam, tad eva cānātmano hitvā jñātavyam, tasyaiva jñātatvena padanīyatvam, tad eva ca priyatamam iti padārthapañcakam atra sūtram.

¹In BU it reads *sa eṣa iha*. Sureśvara has adopted double Samdhi in Chāndasa manner.

²This is *ātmety eva* for metre's sake.

यथोक्तानां च सूत्राणामा शास्त्रस्य सममपनात् ।
वृत्तिः स्यादुत्तरो ग्रन्थस्तत्र तेषां समन्वयात् ॥१०६७॥

(Let it be understood that) the subsequent portion of this text up to the completion of this Upaniṣad is the explanation of the Sūtras as stated (above), because, in that (portion), there is proper construing of them. [1067]

व्याचिख्यासुरथेदानीं सूत्रार्थाञ्श्रुतिरञ्जसा ।
प्रयोजनाभिधित्साया उपोद्धाते प्रवर्तते ॥१०६८॥

Now, the Śruti, desirous as it is to explain the thoughts in the Sūtras in a smooth way, proceeds to introduce the discussion with an aim to state their purpose. [1068]

Now follows the discussion of the meaning of *tad āhuh*.

For *upoddhāta*, cf. NKL: *cintām prakṛtasiddhyarthām upoddhātam pracakṣate*, i.e. the statement of the basic thought or the purpose of the discussion which is undertaken.

वक्ष्यमाणवचो वस्तु तच्छब्देनाभिधीयते ।
ब्रह्म जिज्ञासवो विप्रा आहुर्यद्गुरुसंनिधौ ॥१०६९॥

By the word *tat* is expressed the thing about which there is a discussion to be undertaken (in the subsequent portion of the text), viz. what the Brāhmaṇas, who were desirous of knowing the Brahman, said in the presence of the preceptor. [1069]

To begin with, the Vārtika explains the meanings of the words in *tad āhuh* ...

विज्ञाताशेषवेदान्तसर्वस्वं ब्रह्मणि स्थितम् ।
 उपसद्य गुरुं न्यायादाहुः केचिन्मुमुक्षवः ॥१०७०॥
 यज्ञाद्याहितसंस्कारा अपास्ताशेषसाधनाः ।
 सांसारिकपुमर्थेभ्यो विरक्ताः शुद्धबुद्धयः ॥१०७१॥
 त्यक्त्वा कर्माणि निःसङ्गाः कर्मणां चरितार्थतः ।
 ब्रह्मविद्याप्लवेनेमं संसाराब्धिं तृतीर्षवः ॥१०७२॥
 आ विरिञ्चात्पुमर्थानामकृत्स्नत्वादिदोषतः ।
 वितृषो ऽशेषतद्दोषद्विस्तृष्यः परीप्सवः ॥१०७३॥
 साक्षेपमाहुः श्रेयांसं गुरुं प्राप्य निरेषणाः ।
 गुरुद्वारैव विद्येह श्रेयःप्राप्तौ क्षमा यतः ॥१०७४॥

Having approached the preceptor who had known the essence of all the Upaniṣadic texts and who abided in the Brahman¹, some seekers of liberation addressed (him) in the prescribed manner², [1070]

— (the seekers) who had purified themselves by (lit. placed in themselves) some *saṃskāras* (by the performances of) sacrifices etc.³, who had discarded (lit. thrown away) all the means (of ritual performance etc.), who had become averse to the ends of human endeavour, and who were thus pure in intellect, [1071]

who were without any attachment, after having abandoned the ritual activities, since the purpose of (their) activities had been fulfilled, and who were desirous to cross over this ocean of worldly existence in a boat in the form of the lore of the Brahman, [1072]

who were without any desire owing to there being faults in all the ends of human endeavour up to Viriñca, such as incompleteness etc. and seeking to attain bliss (which consists in) the destruction of all of the faults in them, [1073]

devoid of any desire, having approached an excellent preceptor, with courage⁴ addressed him; since, here in respect of obtaining bliss, only knowledge through (the guidance of) the preceptor is an effective (means).⁵ [1074]

There description here of Brāhmaṇas who are seekers of liberation.

¹That is, who was given to constant meditation on the nature of the Brahman.

²There are statements in the Śruti and the Smṛti about the manner in which one should approach the preceptor. Refer to *Muṇḍakopaniṣad* 1.1.12.

³That is, who had purified their intellect by the performances of rituals.

⁴*sākṣepam* usually means: thoughtlessly (or, without much thought). Here the idea is: They made bold to address him.

⁵See CU 6.14.2: *ācāryavān puruṣo veda ...*

किमाहुरित्यपेक्षायामिदं तदभिधीयते ।
मन्यन्त इत्यनेनैव यच्छब्दो याति संगतिम् ॥१०७५॥
अव्यावृत्ताननुगतं वस्तु ब्रह्मगिरोच्यते ।
मुख्यार्थो ब्रह्मशब्दो ऽयमेवं सत्युपपद्यते ॥१०७६॥

(With a view to answering) the curiosity as to what they said, this is said in the statement: *manyante* ... and thus (i.e. in this way), the word *yat* gets properly construed. [1075]

By the word *brahman* is mentioned that (real) thing which is not differentiated from anything else and is not followed by (i.e. is not similar to) any other. This being the case, this word *brahman* becomes reasonable in its primary sense. [1076]

Here is introduced the Śruti *yad brahmavidyayā sarvam bhavi-
syanto manuṣyā manyante*.

तद्यथा वेद्यते बुद्ध्या तदसाधारणात्मना ।
ब्रह्मविद्येति तां साक्षाच्छेमुषीं प्रतिजानते ॥१०७७॥

They call that instruction as the lore of the Brahman by which the Brahman, in its uncommon nature, becomes known; they declare that itself¹ as devotion (to the Brahman). [1077]

This explains the word *vidyā*.

¹This refers to the lore of the Brahman.

सर्वं कृत्स्नं भविष्यामो मन्यन्ते ब्रह्मविद्यया ।
 यन्मनुष्या वयं तत्र विरोधमनुयुञ्जमहे ॥१०७८॥
 कृत्स्नमेव यतः प्रोक्तं वस्तु यत्पारमार्थिकम् ।
 तत्प्रमाणविशुद्ध्यर्थं चोदयन्ति मुमुक्षवः ॥१०७९॥

We hold an objection to that, viz. men think, 'We shall become by the lore of the Brahman all that is complete.', [1078] because the thing, which is the ultimate Reality, is described to be all this;¹ therefore, the seekers of liberation raise an objection with a view to ascertaining the clarity of the argument (lit. means of knowing): [1079]

Now, there is discussion of the meanings of the sentence. To begin with, verse 1078 expresses the intention of the disciples.

These justify the questioning by the seekers for liberation. They raise this question not because they desire anything, but they seek fuller clarification of the Reality which is described as 'all this'.

¹The entire mass of this world. Cp. *atra hy ete sarve ekam bhavanti*.

ब्रह्मविद्यैव कृत्स्नाप्तौ यस्मात्साधनमुच्यते ।
 तत्प्राप्तौ तत्तमोमात्रं व्यवधानमतो भवेत् ॥१०८०॥

Since the lore of the Brahman alone is declared to be the means to obtaining fullness (or completeness), therefore, only ignorance about that (Brahman) would be the obstruction to acquiring that.¹ [1080]

¹Namely, knowledge of the Brahman.

द्योतिकैव यतो विद्या न त्वसौ कारकं ततः ।
 उत्पत्त्यादिक्रियाकार्यं तस्माच्चेह न शङ्क्यते ॥१०८१॥

[The objector might emphasise the word 'arguing' which leads to the idea of 'producing' (the knowledge of the Brahman). The following verse answers away this objection.]

Since knowledge is only an indicator¹ (to Reality, i.e. the Brahman), indeed, it is not, therefore, a means of producing (that) and therefore, in this context², no doubt should be entertained as to any activity and its effect beginning with production.³ [1081]

NKL writes *karmasamuccitadhīphalatvam mukter arthān nirastam*; the editor of NKL points out that this remark is for setting aside the idea of the combination of knowledge and activity which Bhartṛprapañca has posited.

¹It means: what throws light on.

²It means: securing liberation.

³These are: *āpti*, *saṃskṛti* and *vikṛti* (beside *utpatti*).

सिद्धे ऽर्थे द्योतको दीपो न तु कार्ये यतस्ततः ।
सर्वात्मभावः सर्वेषां सिद्धः प्रागपि बोधतः ॥१०८२॥

Since a lamp is an illuminator of an already existing object and not of what is to be produced, therefore (let it be understood that), in the case of all (the persons), becoming (one with) the Ātman is accomplished even before (they have acquired) the knowledge¹. [1082]

This is to affirm that liberation (*sarvātmabhāva*) does not have to be produced.

¹It is the knowledge of oneness of the individual self with the Supreme Self.

अतो ऽकृत्स्ना वयं मोहात्कृत्स्नात्मानो ऽपि वस्तुतः ।
निहत्य विद्ययाविद्यां यामः कात्स्न्यं स्वतोगतम् ॥१०८३॥

Therefore, we are incomplete on account of (our) ignorance, even though we are in reality of the nature of (what is) complete¹ (and), having destroyed ignorance (by the knowledge of the Brahman), we shall attain fullness² which is already within us. [1083]

¹*sarvam kṛtsnam manyante*.

²Or, completeness. Mark the conceived motion in *kārtsnyam yāmaḥ*.

अधिकारविनिश्चित्यै मनुष्या इति गीरियम् ।
मनुष्याणां हि निःशेषत्रय्यर्थे ऽधिकृतिर्यतः ॥१०८४॥

This word *manuṣyāḥ* is for specifying eligibility, since men have eligibility with respect to the meaning of all the three Vedas. [1084]

दृष्टार्थतो वा विद्याया मनुष्यग्रहणं कृतम् ।
तावन्मात्रो ऽधिकार्यत्र नाग्निहोत्राधिकारिवत् ॥१०८५॥

Since the lore of the Brahman secures a 'seen'¹ purpose, therefore, there is a mention made of (all) men² (in the Śruti regarding the lore of the Brahman). Here, whosoever is man is eligible (for the study of the lore); not like only someone that is eligible for (the performance of) Agnihotra³. [1085]

Here is another explanaltion of *manuṣyāḥ*.

¹In the case of injunctions regarding rituals the results are unseen, since ritual does not directly lead one to the final result.

²*tāvanmātra* = *manuṣyamātra*.

³Regarding Agnihotra and other such performances, there is restriction of caste etc. of the performer. This is not so in the case of the lore of the Brahman.

प्रत्यबुध्यत यो यस्तदिति चोर्ध्वं प्रवक्ष्यति ।
नातः कर्माधिकार्यत्र दृष्टार्थत्वादपेक्ष्यते ॥१०८६॥

And (the Śruti) will later declare (in words) *pratyabudhyata yo yas tat*.¹ For this reason,² it is not found here necessary that one has to be eligible by (the performance of) some (ritual) activity, since (this lore of the Brahman) has a seen result. [1086]

Though the preceding verse has expressed this idea, it is repeated here purposely. One who performs a ritual activity becomes eligible

for the final result. This is indirectly known. In the case of the lore of the Brahman, the case is different, i.e. one knowing the Brahman becomes one with it. Read SP: *karmādhikārī tadvadviśiṣṭo 'dhikārīty arthah*.

¹This has a reference of BU 1.4.10 which reads *pratyabudhyata sa eva tad abhavat*. This justifies the second line of the preceding verse.

²In other words: Because there is a seen result.

कर्मभ्य इव च ज्ञानात्फलप्राप्तिं सुनिश्चिताम् ।
मन्यन्त उभयत्रापि श्रुतिमानाविशेषतः ॥१०८७॥

They hold that there results definitely the fulfilment of some end from knowledge as from the performance of (rituals), since, in the case of both¹, there is no difference in respect of the means of knowing them, viz. the Śruti. [1087]

This explains why they decide the lore of the Brahman as leading to liberation.

¹This means: the knowledge of activity and the lore of the Brahman.

यन्मन्यन्ते नरास्तत्र विरुद्धमिव लक्ष्यते ।
यतो ऽतश्चोदयामो ऽत्र यथा विप्रतिषिद्धता ॥१०८८॥

Since there appears here in the statement *manyante narāḥ* something which is opposed (to the acquisition of the result of the lore of the Brahman as explained above), therefore we are adducing how there is opposition. [1088]

¹This is to introduce the question *kim u tad brahmāved yasmāt tat sarvam abhavad iti*; (*parichinnam aparichinnam vā*).

किमु तद्ब्रह्म यद्वेद्यं यज्ज्ञानात्सर्वताप्यते ।
किंचापि तदवेदन्यद्यज्ज्ञानात्कृत्स्नतामगात् ॥१०८९॥

What is that Brahman, which is to be known (and) from the knowledge of which is obtained fullness (completeness)? And

further, what else did it know from whose knowledge it attained to fullness¹? [1089]

¹This is the paraphrase of *sarvatā*.

ब्रह्माकृत्स्नं मतं तच्चेदुक्तदोषानिराकृतेः ।
अनुपास्यं भवेत्तादृक्प्राणादिवदसंशयम् ॥१०९०॥

If that Brahman is held to be incomplete (=not full), then it would certainly not be what should be pondered over (lit. worshipped, or meditated on), in the same way as the sense-organs etc. which are similar to that,¹ because there is no removal of the fault (already) stated² before. [1090]

¹That is, *akṛtsna* like the *prāṇas*.

²Namely, pondering over 'that which is not full, would not lead to the result, viz. fullness'.

कल्पना नापि गौण्यत्र मुख्यार्थे सति युज्यते ।
न ह्यालभन्ते वाहीकं मुख्ये गवि सति क्वचित् ॥१०९१॥

In this context, it is not proper to hold a metaphorical notion while the principal meaning/object is acceptable¹. Indeed, they do not kill in any sacrifice a Vāhika (a man from the Punjab) when there (really) exists a bull². [1091]

Calling the Brahman incomplete, one cannot establish that the knowledge of the Brahman is the result called incompleteness.

¹That Brahman is full is a matter of experience, therefore it is not correct to consider that it is not full (as said in verse 1090 above).

²We have an example of *lakṣaṇā* 'metaphorical usage in language' in the oft-quoted sentence *vāhikaḥ gauḥ* 'A man from the Punjab is a bull.'; therefore, since a Vāhika is here called a bull, one should not proceed to kill him in a sacrifice where a bull is to be killed. Such an activity never takes place; it is only improper to do so. Metaphorical usage in language should not imply an actual action.

मुख्यं ब्रह्म न चेदस्ति गौणं स्यात्तद्विना कुतः ।
मुख्यमग्निं विना गौणं न लोको ऽप्यवगच्छति ॥१०९२॥

Supposing there did not exist the Brahman in the principal sense (of the word), how could there be a metaphorical Brahman without that? (Indeed,) unless there is a real fire, people do not entertain the notion some metaphorical fire. [1092]

This refers to the *lakṣaṇāvyāpāra* whose example is *agniḥ māṇavakaḥ* 'Young Māṇavaka is fire.'. Here, unless the speaker has known what is real fire — or, in other words, if there did not exist a real fire — he would not have employed the metaphorical statement mentioned above. In the same way, the real Brahman being unknown, nobody could hold it as metaphorically existent. Cf. Śaṅkara's statement in *Adhyāsabhāṣya* (p.81): *sarvo hy ātmāstitvam pratyeti ...*

अकृत्स्नज्ञानतो नापि पुरुषार्थो ऽवगम्यते ।
ब्रह्माज्ञानसमुत्थत्वाग्निमथ्याज्ञानत्वकारणात् ॥१०९३॥

And, further, the end of human endeavour is not obtained from knowing what is incomplete, because (that knowledge) has arisen from the ignorance about the Brahman, i.e. because it has arisen from false knowledge. [1093]

मेयमानादिसंभित्तिर्यदि नामेह लभ्यते ।
अयथावस्तुरूपत्वात्स्वप्नमेयादिवत्तु सा ॥१०९४॥

If at all we find here¹ the differentiation among the object of knowing, the means of knowing etc., that is like the objects of knowing in a dream since they are of the nature of what is not real. [1094]

This explains *mithyājñānatvakāraṇāt* in verse 1093.

This refers to the use of *pramāṇa-prameya-vyavahāra* in respect of the Brahman and in that is that *vyavahāra* based on unreality

of objects; the example of a dream makes the idea clear. For this, see *Gauḍapāḍakārikā* 2.1.

¹It means: in respect of knowing the Brahman .

अकृत्स्नस्य च ब्रह्मत्वं विरुद्धं भानुशैत्यवत् ।
तस्मादकृत्स्नं ब्रह्मेति न मानेनोपपद्यते ॥१०९५॥

And (holding) an incomplete thing as the Brahman involves internal contradiction as (in holding that) the sun is possessed of cold; therefore, by none of the means of knowledge is an incomplete object reasonably held as the Brahman. [1095]

ब्रह्मास्तु तर्हि तत्कृत्स्नमुक्तदोषासमन्वयात् ।
मुख्यार्थलाभतश्चापि तस्य च प्रकृतत्वतः ॥१०९६॥

Let then that Brahman be full (i.e. complete), since it is not inseparably associated with the faults stated earlier and, further, for the reason that it is the matter under description and from that we get to know the principal meaning of the word. [1096]

न कृत्स्नमिति तद्ग्राह्यं तत्प्रमाणाद्यसंभवात् ।
तदन्यवस्तुसद्भावे तद्ब्रह्मत्वं विहन्यते ॥१०९७॥

Let not that Brahman be understood as full, for there cannot be any means etc. of knowing that¹ (And) if there is held to exist another object, the nature of the Brahman would get disproved². [1097]

¹It means: its fullness.

²In the first half of the verse the objector points to the need of having some means of knowing for the nature of the Brahman and, if a means of knowing were accepted to exist, that should mean something else than the Brahman existed and therefore the nature of the Brahman as one without a second should get disproved.

न च मानानपेक्षस्य सिद्धिरभ्याप्यमाने ।

मानादियत्नानर्थक्यप्रसक्तिः स्यात्तथा सति ॥१०९८॥

And nobody accepts as proven what is not dependent on a means of proof; for, if that were so, there would result the contingency that there is uselessness of a man's effort to employ the means of proof etc. [1098]

सदानुदितालुप्तैकज्ञप्तिमात्रसतत्त्वकम् ।
यद्यपौष्टं तथापीदं नात्ममोहापनोदकृत् ॥१०९९॥

Even if it is held that (Reality) is ever unoriginated, unnegated, and of the nature that is merely knowledge, in that case also it cannot be the remover of ignorance about the Ātman. [1099]

न हि मानमनाश्रित्य वस्त्वात्माज्ञानहानिकृत् ।
स्रक्स्थाण्वादावदृष्टत्वादुक्तदोषो ऽपि चापतेत् ॥११००॥

Indeed, there cannot be a thing which is the remover of ignorance about the Ātman, unless without resorting to some means of knowledge; for this fault would occur when (the absence of any means of knowing) is not noticed in (the apprehension of) a garland, a tree etc. [1100]

मानाद्यनभ्युपेतौ हि न किञ्चिद्वस्तु सिद्ध्यति ।
तदभ्युपेतौ ब्रह्मत्वं व्यावृत्तेर्न प्रसिद्ध्यति ॥११०१॥

Indeed nothing can be proved if any means of knowing it etc. is not accepted and if that¹ is accepted then the nature of the Brahman cannot be established because it is then already differentiated (from something). [1101]

¹ = *mānādi*.

यथाकथंचिच्छदार्थो यदि नामाभ्युपेयते ।
तथापि दोषवद्ब्रह्म यथा तदधुनोच्यते ॥११०२॥

And, indeed, if the meaning of the Śruti (passage) is somehow accepted (as known), in that case also, the Brahman will have

(to be accepted as having) a fault — how that is so is now explained. [1102]

कृत्स्नं वा यदि वाकृत्स्नं यथेच्छसि तथास्तु तत् ।
ब्रह्मत्वं किं स्वतस्तस्य किंवा तत्परतो मतम् ॥११०३॥

(Well!) let that Brahman be complete or incomplete, in whatsoever (form) you may hold (lit. desire) that (to be). (We ask a question:) Does the nature of the Brahman exist in its own right or on account of (a thing) other than that? [1103]

यदि तावत्स्वतस्तस्याद्ब्रह्मविद्या निरर्थिका ।
न ह्युष्णत्वं हुताशस्य परतः कुर्वते बुधाः ॥११०४॥

If, in the first place, that would exist in its own right, then the lore of the Brahman would be meaningless. Indeed, the wise do not accept the hotness of fire as (coming) from another. [1104]

ज्ञानमर्तेर्न चाज्ञानमागन्तु सहजं तथा ।
भानौ तमोवत्तेनेद्ब्रह्म नैवोपपद्यते ॥११०५॥

Further, in the case of what has the form of knowledge, ignorance cannot be either adventitious or natural in the same way as darkness in the sun¹. Therefore, such² Brahman does not get reasonably explained. [1105]

¹That is, together with the sun.

²Namely, which is accompanied by ignorance.

शास्त्राद्यारम्भानर्थक्यदोषश्चापि प्रसज्यते ।
स्वानुभूतिविरोधो ऽपि ब्रह्मत्वं चेद्वेत्स्वतः ॥११०६॥

And there would also be contingent the fault of meaninglessness (or uselessness) of/in the effort of the Śāstra¹ and also contradiction with one's own experience, if it would be held that the state of the Brahman gets established by itself. [1106]

¹The Śruti text giving instruction on the nature of Brahman; ārambha 'activity' — cf. *vāmetaras tasya karaḥ prahartuś ... citrārpitārambha ivāvatasthe* (*Raghuvamśa* 2.31).

योषाग्निवच्चेच्छास्त्रं स्याद्दृष्टिमात्रविधायकम् ।
तथा सत्यविरोधः स्याद्विन्नाधिकरणत्वतः ॥११०७॥

(Again) if the Śruti would enjoin one merely to look upon (something as the Brahman), in the way as one should see fire in the place of a woman¹, there would be in that case no opposition, since the Brahman and the so-called other thing do not have (two) different bases. [1107]

¹Cf. CU 5.8.1: *yoṣā vāva gautamāgniḥ*. This pertains to the conflict between Śāstric sentence and direct perception.

सदसीति क्रियानिष्ठं प्रत्यक्षाद्यर्थनिष्ठितम् ।
विरोधः को ऽनयोरत्र मिथोर्थासंस्पृशोः सतोः ॥११०८॥

The sentence *sad asi* 'You are existent.' is based on (what is formally expressive of) action and is based on what is directly perceived etc. What contradiction could there be in this case where these so-called two are not touching one another? [1108]

This verse is the explanation of the second line of the preceding verse.

sad asi has the word *asi* which grammatically refers to some action, but being and action are here just non-different. They refer only to being, therefore there is no contradiction between the two.

नैतदेवं यतो वाक्यं वस्तुनिष्ठं पुरोदितम् ।
विरोध एव तेन स्यादेकाधिकरणत्वतः ॥११०९॥

But, this is not so, since there is already a statement made which pertains to Reality. Therefore, there is indeed contradiction in that (since the two are mentioned in that sentence) as having but one basis. [1109]

This refers to the earlier passage *sarvo 'py ayam ...* (SV 556).

अशक्या ब्रह्मदृष्टिश्च कर्तुं ब्रह्माप्रसिद्धितः ।
लोकसिद्धौ तु योषाग्नी तद्दृष्टिः सुकरेष्यते ॥१११०॥

Also, it is not possible to look upon something as the Brahman because of the non-knownness of the Brahman. As against this, a young woman and fire are already existing in the world¹ and therefore that (metaphorical) seeing is easily acceptable. [1110]

¹As two distinct entities.

अथाग्निवच्चेत्तद्ब्रह्म सिद्धं मानान्तरान्मतम् ।
तावतैव कृतार्थत्वात्किमन्यत्प्रार्थ्यते श्रुतेः ॥११११॥

If that Brahman were taken to be established by another means (of knowing) in the way as fire, then by that very (means of knowing) the purpose being served¹ what else is expected from the Śruti? [1111]

The argument is: Fire is seen and immediately known, there is no need of any other means of knowing it, i.e. a Śruti or a statement of somebody about it, for example. Similarly, if the Brahman is seen (i.e. experienced) by one, where is the need of such a Śruti?

¹Namely, that it becomes known.

तद्दृष्टावेव निःशेषपुरुषार्थसमाप्तिः ।
फलान्तराय तद्दृष्टिर्न च स्यादग्निदृष्टिवत् ॥१११२॥

Since there is the attainment of all the ends of human endeavour when the Brahman is seen, therefore there is no need to see it (in another object) for achieving (yet) another result; (and thus) this would not be like seeing the fire (in a woman). [1112]

Before one hears the statement about fire in a woman, one does really see the fire, and one's purpose is not fully served, viz. no *puruṣārtha* is obtained; therefore, that purpose has to be served by yet another means, viz. by accepting *lakṣaṇā* 'metaphor' and doing meditation on 'fire in the woman'. As against this, when the Brahman is seen every *puruṣārtha* is obtained, there remains no other purpose to be achieved whatsoever. It means, therefore, that seeing Brahman in some objects is entirely redundant. This argument in the verse is supported by the illustration of a dissimilar object (*vaidharmyadr̥ṣṭānta*).

परतो ऽपि च कृत्स्नत्वे ब्रह्मत्वं दुःस्थसिद्धिकम् ।
क्रियातो ज्ञानतो वा तद्यदि वोभयसंश्रयात् ॥१११३॥

And in the opinion that completeness (of the Brahman is established) on account of another, the character of the Brahman is difficult to establish.¹ One would entertain ideas about the nature of the Brahman as established from some action, or from the knowledge (of it)² or perhaps from both.³

[1113]

The argument, which is controverted in this verse, presupposes that the nature of the Brahman cannot become known from itself.

¹The Brahman would be determined as impermanent like heaven etc.

²Supply: by some means of knowing. This also points to its impermanent character.

³This is clarified in the next verse.

न ब्रह्मता क्रियातः स्यादुत्पत्त्यादिसमन्वयात् ।
न स्यादाद्यन्तवद्ब्रह्म ह्यपूर्वाजादिशास्त्रतः ॥१११४॥

Indeed the nature of the Brahman cannot be established on the basis of some action, because that (viz. action) is inseparably connected with an origin etc.¹ Further, the Brahman would not be having a beginning and an end, since there is a scripture saying that it is *apūrva*, *aja* etc.²

[1114]

The first line clarifies the argument in the preceding verse and the second offers the reason for not accepting it.

¹The word etc. stands for *āpti*, *saṃskṛti* and *vikṛti*; these would show its changeable nature and, consequently, its impermanence.

²BU 3.8.8.

अपवादश्च बहुशः कर्मकार्यस्य दृश्यते ।
मुमुक्षुत्वस्य तद्धेतोः कर्मकार्यं न तत्ततः ॥१११५॥

Many a time it is noticed that there is rejection of (lit. exception taken to) there being an effect of some action in respect of liberation¹; it has that (Brahman) as its cause and, therefore, it is not an effect of that (viz. an action). [1115]

¹Cf. *Muṇḍakopaniṣad* 1.2.12; BU 4.4.22.

अथ ज्ञानात्तदभवत्कृत्स्नं ब्रह्मेति चेन्मतम् ।
अन्यानन्यप्रमेयत्वे तथापीष्टं न सिद्ध्यति ॥१११६॥

If it is held that the Brahman became full¹, owing to knowledge, then, having accepted (that knowledge) to be different from it, not different from it, and different and non-different from it also would (i.e. does) not establish the truth (or get established). [1116]

If knowledge and the Brahman are accepted to be the source and the product, we can pose three different relations between the two: (1) the two are different, (2) the two are not different and (3) they are in part different and in another not different. This is the basic supposition in the word *jñānataḥ* of verse 1113. This verse points out very clearly that none of these three relations can be entertained and therefore the supposition gets disproved.

¹That is, produced — cf. *utpattyādi* mentioned earlier in verse 813.

क्रियाविरोधः प्राप्नोति यद्यनन्यस्य मेयता ।
श्रुत्यन्तरविरोधश्च प्रत्यग्दृष्टौ प्रसज्यते ॥१११७॥

If it is held that the unique Brahman is an object knowable from what is not different from it, then there results opposition to the activity¹ (viz. making it known) and, further, there becomes contingent the opposition to another Śruti² regarding seeing the inner self. [1117]

¹If the Brahman is understood as produced from what is not different from it, then there is opposition as regards what is the agent and what, the object of production.

²*Kenopaniṣad* 1.4: *anyad eva tad veditāt* . Or BU 3.5.2: *na dr̥ṣṭeḥ dr̥ṣṭāram paśyet*.

तथा च ज्ञानसाध्यत्वं ब्रह्मणः संप्रसज्यते ।
अन्यानन्यप्रमेये ऽपि दोषो ऽयं दुर्निवारणः ॥१११८॥

So also it would be contingent to accept the nature of the Brahman as what can be obtained or acquired by means of knowledge¹. And this fault² is difficult to avoid in that it is accepted as a knowable from another or not from another (i.e. from itself). [1118]

SP points out that the argument in the two verses is based on acceptance of the distinction and the non-distinction (obtaining) between knowledge and the Brahman.

¹It is accepted in the expression that knowledge and the Brahman are related as a means of knowledge and the result to be acquired thereby. This is against the Śruti which says that knowledge and the Brahman are not different.

²*kriyāvirodha* and *śrutyantara*.

बुद्ध्वाथान्यत्तदभवत्तदन्यत्किमबुध्यत ।
तदप्यन्यत्पुराज्ञासीदनवस्था प्रसज्यते ॥१११९॥

If (it is held that) the Brahman became complete on knowing a different thing, then what was that other that was known? Holding that it¹ also was yet another thing earlier would make *infinite regress* contingent. [1119]

¹Namely, that which was known.

निर्निमित्तस्य कृत्स्नत्वे ऽप्यस्मंदादेस्तथा न किम् ।
पक्षपातः श्रुतेर्नापि प्रामाण्यादुपपद्यते ॥११२०॥

In case (the Brahman), which did not have a cause (for becoming full), attained fullness¹, why should not this (be) in the case of persons like us²? (Indeed) such partiality on the part of the Śruti cannot stand to reason because it is the real means of knowing (Reality). [1120]

This verse has set aside the view beginning with the words: *etena kimcāpi tad aved iti*.

¹That is, becoming one with the Brahman.

²It means: Those who are required to know the nature of the Brahman by the study of the Vedānta.

समुच्चयनिषेधश्च युक्तिभिर्वक्ष्यते स्फुटम् ।
प्रधानगुणभावो ऽपि विरोधान्न तयोर्भवेत् ॥११२१॥

And¹ there will be clearly stated the rejection of the combination (of knowledge and activity²) by (adducing) reasons. Also, there cannot be the relation between the two as the principal and the subordinate, because of their (mutual) contradiction. [1121]

This refers to Bhujyu Brāhmaṇa (=BU 3.3).

¹By the word 'and' Sureśvara suggests (this is according to SP and NKL) the idea of the combination has been already rejected with reason in the SV 357-377. But this refers to BUBV 1708ff. — This justifies *vakṣyate*

²This refers to threefold combinations of knowledge and activity, according to SP and NKL; knowledge and activity in equal proportion, knowledge and activity in unequal proportion, knowledge principal and activity subordinate, or vice-versa).

इत्यादिबहुदोषत्वाद्दुःसंभाव्यं प्रमाणतः ।
विद्ययैवाप्नुमः कात्स्न्यमित्यादि यदुदीरितम् ॥११२२॥

Because there are these and many other fault, (attaining completeness) is difficult to occur on the strength of any means of (right) knowledge; (therefore) we shall obtain this wholeness etc., which was stated, only by knowledge. [1122]

This concludes the introductory to the Siddhānta which follows soon after.

न कश्चिदपि दोषो ऽत्र यथैतदुपपत्स्यते ।
अन्यथा कल्प्यमाने ऽस्मिन्नुक्तदोषपरंपरा ॥११२३॥

There is not be even a little of fault here¹ because (all) this will be stated with reason²; if this is understood otherwise,³ there follows a chain of faults stated (above). [1123]

¹According to NKL, this refers to Vivartavāda.

²It will be shown later that knowledge about the Brahman will effect liberation.

³This is a reference to Parīṇāma-vāda: According to some, the Brahman undergoes modifications. According to a note by NKL on verse 1160, Bhartṛprapañca's view resembles this view.

एवं तावदुपोद्धातो व्याख्यातो ऽत्र समासतः ।
भगवत्पादभाष्ये ऽस्मिन्नन्यदीयो ऽपि वर्ण्यते ॥११२४॥

Thus far, we have briefly explained the introductory¹ in the commentary of (our) revered teacher(Śaṅkara), to begin with, and now in this (i.e. in what follows, or 'here') another introductory is also being presented.² [1124]

¹The word *upoddhāta* has to be understood as words *tad āhuḥ* in the beginning of BUB 1.4.9.

²Earlier explanation has followed the argument of Śaṅkara and what now follows is the argument of the Vṛttikāra. According to SP and NKL, he is Bhartṛprapañca. SP states that Sureśvara finds the exposition acceptable.

Verses 1055-1124 presented an exposition of the introductory remark by Śaṅkara and now from verse 1125 the Vārtika discusses the meaning of BU 1.4.9 according to the Vṛttikāra.

तदेतद्ब्रह्मविद्याया आरम्भे फलमुच्यते ।
तत्प्रवृत्त्यङ्गतायै च तत्फलस्य प्रकीर्तनम् ॥११२५॥

With the words *tat* ... there is here¹, at the very beginning of the lore of the Brahman, the statement of the result (of the lore) and, the statement of the result of the same is made as an ancillary to the activity towards that (viz. acquiring the lore of the Brahman). [1125]

¹This is *etat*.

वक्ष्यमाण उपोद्धातो ब्रह्मविद्या ततः परं ।
ततो ऽप्यूर्ध्वं फलोक्तिश्चेत्तच्छब्देनोच्यते कथम् ॥११२६॥

(A question is asked:) If the introductory is going to be stated, and the lore of the Brahman (also will follow) later, and then thereafter (there is going to be) the statement of the result, then why is (that result) expressed by the word *tat*? [1126]

NKL clarifies the question thus: *tat* signifies the introductory statement; *tad ātmānam avet* is the lore of the Brahman and *tat urvam abhavat* is the mention of the result. Therefore, Bhartṛ-*ṛapañca's* view: *tat*, which is expressive of the result, is *dūrānvaya-
uṣṭa*.

अनन्तरेण संबन्धसामर्थ्ये सत्यमानतः ।
दवीयसाभिसंबन्धस्तच्छब्दस्योच्यते कुतः ॥११२७॥

(The answer is given thus¹:) When (in your opinion also) the word *tat* (is said to have) the capacity to be connected² with what has preceded, (though) it is in distance (from it) (and) though there is no authority for it, why do you object to our view? [1127]

¹Add: by a counter-question.

²It means: has a syntactical unity.

³In *kaṇḍikā* 8: *na hāsyā priyam pramāyukam bhavati*; the *vidyāphala*.

द्वैतैकत्वात्मकं साक्षाद्ब्रह्मविद्योदयात्पुरा ।
समाप्य तत्फलं कृत्स्नं जातकौतुहलाः परे ॥११२८॥
आहुरेवं द्विजाः केचिद्विरक्ताः पूर्वभूमितः ।
संभाव्यते ब्रह्मविद्विर्यत्तदर्थबुभुत्सवः ॥११२९॥

Having experienced (lit. obtained) that entire result which is of the nature of (knowing) only unity in duality before there arises the direct knowledge about the Brahman,¹ they, who have their curiosity about the highest aroused, [1128] (they) who have become averse to the earlier stage of their life — the persons of three castes², becoming desirous of knowing the meaning of that which is thought/pondered over by the knowers of the Brahman, thus said: [1129]

This is according to Bhartṛprapañca the meaning of *āhuḥ*.

¹The knowledge of the Brahman does not refer to the instruction about the Brahman but the knowledge about the nature of it.

²According to BUB it refers to the Brāhmaṇas. But translation follows SP which notes the significance of the word *dvijāḥ* according to one view; read: *dvijagrahaṇena traivarnikānām eva vedadvārā vidyādhikāram sūcayati*. However, SP does not keep from noting its view: *dvija* indicates the maxim of *manuṣyāṇām sahasreṣu* [... *kaścin mām vetti tatvataḥ*] (*Gītā* 7.3).

द्वैतैकत्वधिया नैव पूर्वया फल्गुकार्यया ।
संभाव्यते सर्वभूतिर्यतः सा ब्रह्मविद्यया ॥११३०॥

Becoming all (i.e. complete or full) is not at all possible by earlier (gained) knowledge of unity in duality, which produces (only) an insignificant result,¹ since that (becomes possible) by the lore of the Brahman. [1130]

¹This refers to earlier *upāsanā* which would lead only to

transmigratory existence; cf. SP: *upāstir hi saṃsāraphalā*.

द्वैतैकत्वमतिर्यद्वत्स्वानुरूपफलाप्तये ।

अलं सर्वमतिस्तद्वत्सर्वभावफलाप्तये ॥११३१॥

As getting to learn¹ unity in duality is capable of resulting into one's acquiring its own proper result, so is the knowledge of all (as the Brahman) is capable of resulting into one's acquiring (the result, i.e.) the becoming all (i.e. complete).

[1131]

¹This is *mati*, viz. *dhī* (i.e. *vijñāna*) already noted in the preceding verse.

ब्रह्मबुद्ध्या भविष्यामः कृत्स्नं ब्रह्मेति तद्विदः ।

यन्मन्यन्ते ऽथ तद्ब्रह्म किमवेदिति पृच्छयते ॥११३२॥

Since the knowers of that (knowledge of the Brahman or the Brahman itself) think (i.e. hold:) 'We shall become the complete Brahman by getting to know the Brahman.'; there is the question asked, 'What did that the Brahman know?' [1132]

This is the explanation of BU: *yad brahmavidyayā ... tat brahmāvet*.

किमवेदिति यः प्रश्नः स किं स्यात्कर्तृकर्मणोः ।

विद्यायाः पृच्छयते कर्ता कर्म वेह विवक्षितम् ॥११३३॥

Is the question, viz. 'What did it know?', with reference to the agent or the action of knowing?¹ That is to say: 'What is sought to be mentioned, the knower or the object of knowing?' [1133]

This verse seeks the specific matter under question.

¹*karṭṛkarmanoh* is an optional compound.

ब्रह्मणा चेतकृता विद्या निष्फलेयं प्रसज्यते ।

ब्रह्मविद्योदयाद्यस्मादभूद्ब्रह्म पुरापि तत् ॥११३४॥

If it is held that the Brahman obtained this lore, then it is futile (to say so); since that Brahman was that (viz. itself) even earlier, i.e. even before the rise of (the result of) the lore of the Brahman. [1134]

This sets aside the possibility that the Brahman was the agent in the act of learning the lore.

तस्मात्कर्मैव विद्यायाः पिपृच्छिषितमत्र तु ।
प्रमेयोपाश्रयादेव यतः प्रामाण्यमुच्यते ॥११३५॥

Therefore, it is only (*tu*) the object of knowing which is questioned about, since the authoritativeness (of a means of knowing) is said¹ (to exist) only by its connection with (lit. resorting to) the object to be known (that is becoming known). [1135]

This is suggested: As a result of the answer in the preceding, the Brahman is the object in that act.

¹That is, held.

वस्तुनिष्ठत्वतो ऽदोषः कर्तर्यपि विवक्षिते ॥११३६॥
सर्वं ब्रह्माभवद्यस्माद्विज्ञानात्तदिहोच्यते ।
ब्रह्मविद्येति सर्वाप्तावसाधारणकारणम् ॥११३७॥

And even if (the Brahman) were intended as the agent of the knowing, there would be no fault,¹ since (the character of the agent) is abiding in the thing (i.e. Reality)². [1136]

That is called the lore of the Brahman from which (there arises) the knowledge: 'All (this) became the Brahman.'; that is, therefore, the uncommon means of acquiring (the fullness) of all.¹ [1137]

¹Both SP and NKL rightly point out: *adoṣaḥ iti padacchedaḥ*. Also, read in this context, SP: *na ca kartṛpraśne vidyāvaiphalyam, svataḥ sadā brahmatve 'pi brahmaṇaḥ avidyādhvaṃsitvena tatsā-phalyād iti bhāvaḥ*. (This is accepted by NKL).

²Supply: which is the object of knowing. That means the Brahman.

सर्वैकत्वावबोधो ऽयं ब्रह्मविद्यागिरोच्यते ।
द्वैतस्याद्वैतयाथात्म्यात्क्लृप्तसर्पादितत्त्ववत् ॥११३८॥

This, namely, knowing about all (duality) merges into but one (Reality), is expressed by the word *brahmavidyā* because of one's knowing thereby about the duality as the real nature of non-duality (exactly) in the same way as the truth about a serpent etc. that was imagined (in the place of a rope was realised). [1138]

This states the purpose of Brahmavidyā.

सर्वैकत्वं परं ब्रह्म परमात्मेति यं विदुः ।
तन्मोहजानां सर्वेषां स तत्त्वं परमार्थतः ॥११३९॥

The unity of all (duality) is the highest Reality, the Brahman; that is what they have known as the highest Ātman, it is, in reality, the true nature¹ of all that are the products of ignorance about itself. [1139]

This is according to SP in consonance with the Bhāṣya on BU (of Bhartṛprapañca): *sarvaikatvam param brahma paramātmā yah ... sa ātmā*.

¹Both SP and NKL have rightly invited attention to *sa tattvam iti padadvayam*.

तदज्ञानैकहेतुत्वात्तेनैव परमात्मना ।
तदन्यान्यात्मवन्ति स्युः सर्पादीनि स्रजा यथा ॥११४०॥

On account of that very highest Ātman (and) on account of only one cause, viz. ignorance about that (Ātman), the things other than that come have their existence in the same way as the serpent etc. come to have their existence (really) on account of a wreath (etc.). [1140]

This is the meaning of the Bhāṣya (of Bhartṛprapañca?) on BU: *anenātmanātmanvanti*.

उक्तमच्युतदृष्टीनां तदबोधैकहेतुतः ।
आब्रह्मस्थाणुभेदो ऽयं नामरूपक्रियात्मकः ।
अविद्याकृत एवायं न यथावस्तुधीकृतः ॥११४१॥

On the part of those who have lost¹ the knowledge (lit. sight) of (the true nature of) the Ātman, as described before, there is (this world of) duality beginning with the Brahman up to a pillar that has nature of names, forms and actions on account of only one reason, viz. ignorance about that (Ātman) — this (world of discrete objects) is produced only by ignorance and not by the knowledge of the thing (viz. Reality) as it is. [1141]

¹It literally means: fallen from.

तमोहन्यैव ततो ब्रह्म प्राप्यते ब्रह्मविद्यया ॥११४२॥
यथोक्ततत्त्वकान्येव रज्ज्वां तत्कलृप्तवस्तुवत् ।
सूत्रं विराङ्देवता च यावत्किञ्चिच्च वस्त्वह ॥११४३॥

Therefore, the Brahman is obtained only by the lore of the Brahman which destroys darkness, [1142]
(and also) whatever things¹, viz. the Sūtra², the deity (called) Virāj etc. — the different elements³ that were mentioned are here the Reality⁴ as in the case of a rope there exists a thing (which) is imagined in its place.⁵ [1143]

This is how Bhartṛprapañca would hold the Brahman as *dvaitādvaitātmaka*. According to Śaṅkara and Sureśvara, this refers to *vyavahārabhūmi*.

¹*vastu* in singular stands for *vastujāta* 'all things'.

²It is for Hiranyagarbha.

³This refers to the five elements.

⁴This refers to the Brahman which really persists in all the eight states mentioned earlier.

⁵This refers to a serpent seen in the place of rope and temporarily as a real thing.

ब्रह्मैवेदं यथा सर्वं विद्यया तदबोधजम् ।
अविद्यया तथाकृत्स्नं ब्रह्म सूत्रादिरूपकम् ॥११४४॥

As by (securing) the knowledge (about the Brahman) it is understood that all this and whatever is produced by the non-knowing¹ (about the true nature of the Brahman) is only the Brahman, in the same way, is the Brahman (understood) by not securing (that knowledge) (to be) incomplete and possessed of forms, beginning with Sūtra. [1144]

This is another statement about how the Brahman, which is without any particulars, comes to have them; these particulars are the eight forms, Sūtra etc. Refer to note on verse 487 above.

¹That is, ignorance.

भावनाज्ञानकर्माणि साधनानीति यद्यपि ।
तत्सतत्त्वमविद्यैव यतो ऽतः सैव कारणम् ॥११४५॥

Even if (it is said that) devotion, knowledge and action are the means (of acquiring the knowledge of the Brahman), yet for the reason that their nature is, (ignorance) only, that itself¹ is the cause (of this multifold universe). [1145]

¹Namely, ignorance.

न हि साधनसापेक्षं वस्तु स्यात्पारमार्थिकम् ।
परमार्थं न वस्त्वस्ति यत्परायत्तसिद्धिकम् ॥११४६॥

Indeed, a thing, which depends on the means (of knowing it or for its becoming known), cannot be a real thing. The ultimate Reality is also not a thing which, for getting established, depends on another. [1146]

मोहोत्थाः पृथगात्मानः साधनायत्तसिद्धिकाः ।
सूत्रादयस्तृणान्ताः स्युरन्योन्यव्यभिचारिणः ॥११४७॥

The different individual selves have originated from ignorance

and they get established as existing through their dependence on (different) means; (those things/objects), beginning with the Sūtra and ending with (a blade of) grass, are things which have variance with one another. [1147]

सर्वे ऽप्येते यथादृष्टि ह्येकैकस्य तमस्विनः ।
सूत्रादयो ऽनुभूयन्ते यथाकर्म यथाश्रुतम् ॥११४८॥

All of these, viz. the Sūtrātman etc., are understood by each person, who is possessed of (i.e. overpowered by) ignorance, as he sees them, in accordance with his activity, and his learning. [1148]

अविद्यैव यतो ऽमीषां प्रागभावो न तत्परम् ।
भावनाज्ञानकर्मभ्यो जन्मैषां तेन नान्यतः ॥११४९॥

Since ignorance alone is the prior non-existence of these (multifold objects), (and) not the highest Reality,¹ the origin of these is from devotion, knowledge and action and not from any other thing. [1149]

¹This implies that one should not try to infer the cause of these, viz. Pradhāna (as the Sāṃkhyas would do) or the Brahman (of the Pariṇāmibrahmavādins).

यथैता दर्शनावस्थाः कार्यमासां तथाविधम् ।
उत्पाद्यमाप्यं संस्कार्यं विकार्यं च क्रियावशात् ॥११५०॥

As these are the different phases (or types) of their worship¹, the functions connected with these also are of those kinds; viz. they are things (i)which can be created, (ii)which can be obtained, (iii)which can be polished or improved and (iv)which can undergo modification(s), by some action. [1150]

This explains the result produced by Upāsanā-jñāna 'meditation/worship'.

¹This is literally seeing or notion or view. But these are: *bhāvanā*, *karmans* or *Upāsanās*.

पिण्डात्माहमितीक्षाणः पिण्डमेव प्रपद्यते ।
दैवं विराजं सूत्रं च मृतः सन्प्रतिपद्यते ॥११५१॥

One, who considers about oneself: 'I am this body.', becomes (only) body; being dead, that one becomes the divine Sūtrātman or Virāj. [1151]

This explains *piṇḍātmadarśī piṇḍātmānam evābhisampadyate. pretya* in the Bhāṣya (of Bhartṛprapañca? — SP and NKL editions).

संस्कारोपचयाद्ब्रह्मदेवो भूत्वैति देवताम् ।
संस्कारोपचयाद्धवंसस्तथा तासां न संशयः ॥११५२॥

As one becomes a certain deity after amassing together a number of impressions¹ and becomes that deity itself, so also, there occurs the destruction of one's status of the deity by the diminishing of the impressions — there is no doubt about this. [1152]

This is to emphasise that the result of the Upāsanā of Sūtra etc. is impermanent.

¹This is for *bhāvanajñānakarmaṇi* mentioned in verse 1145 above. Cf. SP: *bhāvanāprakarṣāj jīvaṇ eva devatābhāvam anubhūyānte yathopāsti pratipadyate.*

ब्रह्मणो ऽन्यद्यतो वस्तु ब्रह्मैव परमार्थतः ।
तदबोधात्तदन्यत्तद्बोधाद्ब्रह्मैव तत्त्वतः ॥११५३॥

Since a thing which is (known as) other than the Brahman is in reality the Brahman itself; that thing is other (than the Brahman) owing to ignorance about that (Brahman); so also it would become Brahman itself (just) on knowing that (Brahman). [1153]

This verse justifies the statement in verse 1143 above.

सत्त्वित्तराज्ञानां सृष्टात्सत्त्वित्तराज्ञानं यथा फलम् ।

परात्मदर्शनस्यापि तद्भावः स्यात्तथा फलम् ॥११५४॥

As the Sūtrātman etc. themselves would be the result of the worship of the Sūtrātman etc., similarly, in the case of looking upon (oneself as) of the nature of the highest (Reality), there would be the result, viz. becoming one with that. [1154]

Read SP: *paramātmadarśanāvasthāyāḥ paramātmabhāva eva kāryam iti bhāṣyenāha*; (possibly Bhartṛprapañca's Bhāṣya on BU).

ब्रह्मभावो ऽत्र नित्यः स्यात्कारणाद्यनपेक्षतः ।
अनित्यमितरत्सर्वं यदविद्याविजृम्भितम् ॥११५५॥

Here, becoming one with the Brahman would be permanent because that (becoming) does not have dependence on any (external) cause. Everything else (than the Brahman), viz. that which has proceeded (lit. spread out) from ignorance, is impermanent. [1155]

This sets aside an argument that Brahmanbhāva, being a product of *jñāna*, can be perishable/impermanent.

अनित्यं दर्शनं ज्ञेयं नित्यस्यापि परात्मनः ।
मोहमात्रान्तरायत्वात्कादाचित्कं हि दर्शनम् ॥११५६॥

In the case of even the perennial highest Ātman, consideration/seeing (of it to be such) is not ever-lasting. Indeed, seeing occurs only sometimes, because of the sole difficulty (in the form of) ignorance (about the nature of it). [1156]

This explains away the possible objection to the rise of trans-migratory existence.

अहमेव परं ब्रह्मेत्यस्यार्थस्याप्रबुद्धता ।
अविद्येति वयं ब्रूमो येह नास्ति सदात्मनि ॥११५७॥

We say that not knowing this truth, viz. 'I am the highest

Brahman.', is ignorance and which does not ever exist on the part of the Ātman. [1157]

This is Bhartṛprapañca's explanation of *avidyā*. Cf. SP: *yathoktam sāvidyāham evedam sarvam ity etasyārthasyāsambodha iti*.

परात्मनि तु संबोधो नित्यः स्याच्छशिशीतवत् ।
तदन्यात्मस्वनित्यो ऽसौ मोहसंवीतबुद्धिषु ॥११५८॥

As against this (*tu*), there is on the part of the highest Ātman perfect (*sam*) knowledge, permanent (or invariable) in the same way as there is cool in the moon. (But) in the case of those (beings), whose intellect is wrapped up in ignorance and who have a nature other than one of that (highest Ātman), it¹ is impermanent. [1158]

¹This refers to *sambodha* 'perfect knowledge'.

तत्रैवं सति यो ऽकात्स्न्यमित्वा ब्रह्माप्रबोधतः ।
सर्वात्मविद्ययाविद्यां हत्वा ब्रह्माभवत्पुमान् ॥११५९॥
पुरापि चात्मसंबोधाद्ब्रह्मैवायं स्वतो ह्यभूत् ।
यतो ऽतस्तत्त्वसंबोधाद्ब्रह्म ब्रह्म प्रपद्यते ॥११६०॥

This being so, the person who has become a limited being¹ on account of ignorance about (the nature of) the Brahman would become the Brahman after having struck down that ignorance by the knowledge about all that it is the Brahman. [1159]

And since even before knowing well (the nature of) the Brahman this person was only the Brahman, therefore (what really happens is that) the Brahman (itself) becomes the Brahman by knowing well the true nature (of its own). [1160]

¹It literally means: incomplete.

प्रत्यग्याथात्म्यसंबोधात्तदन्यत्रैव या मतिः ।
परार्था सा मतिर्ज्ञेया बाह्यकर्मव्यपाश्रया ॥११६१॥

If there is any thought about something else than the inner self, on account of well knowing the true nature of the inner self, then that thought is to be known as one about another (i.e. non-Ātman), dependent as it is on external activities. [116]

This points to that the knowledge about the inner self is not dependent on any means of knowing.

अहं ब्रह्मेति यज्ज्ञानं स्वार्थमेव तदिष्यते ।
 सर्वप्रयोगबीजात्मध्वान्तोच्छेदित्वहेतुतः ॥११६२॥
 निःशेषपुरुषार्थानां ज्ञेयानां चापि कृत्स्नतः ।
 प्रत्यक्तत्त्वपरिज्ञानसमुत्पत्तौ समाप्तिः ॥११६३॥

But that knowledge, which has the form 'I am Brahman.', is accepted as the knowledge for itself, because it is the cause of the destruction of the darkness which is of the nature of the seed of all activities¹, [116]
 because of its fullness in respect of the knowable objects which do not have left any end of human endeavour (to be achieved), and also because it has attained (completeness) at the rise of the all-sided knowledge about true nature of the inner self. [116]

This reiterates the point discussed in the preceding verse.

¹It includes ritual activities.

भर्तृप्रपञ्चप्रस्थानमेवमेतद्यथोदितम् ।
 इतो ऽन्यत्रापि तद्भाष्यं गमयेदेवमेव तु ॥११६४॥

This is the standpoint (or rather, view) of Bhartṛprapañca as stated above; so also is his explanation of passages other than this; it would inform about (the relevant) matters in this very way. [116]

According to SP, the theory of Bhartṛprapañca is really in agreement with Vivartavāda.

ब्रह्मभाविस्त्वं श्रुत्वा ये तु व्याचक्षते ऽन्यथा ।

तानुद्दिश्य विचारो ऽयं प्रारब्धो गुरुभिः स्फुटः ॥११६५॥

Keeping in view those (others) who explain (the thought of the BU) on hearing the word about (the inner self) as what is going to be the (known) Brahman, some other way, our teacher has begun to state his clear opinion (on the same).

[1165]

This is Sureśvara's view: Bhartṛprapañca had stated that, in the sentence *brahma vā idam* the word *brahma* signifies a human being who is going to be the Brahman. Therefore (SP observes:) some wrongly understand Bhartṛprapañca to be opposed to Vivartavāda of Śaṅkara. With these persons in view, Śaṅkara has introduced in BUB the opinion of Bhartṛprapañca, intending to remove their mis-conception.

Verses 1166-1589 are the longish explanation of BU 1.4.10.

यथोक्तसूत्रव्याख्यायां प्रयोजनविवक्षया ।

उपोद्धातौक्तदोषाणां परिहाराय यत्यते ॥११६६॥

An effort is (now) made to explain away the faults mentioned in the introductory with the intention to bring out the purpose of the explanation of the Sūtra¹ which is already stated. [1166]

This explains BU: *brahma vā idam agra āsīt ... tat sarvam abhavad* ti (BU 1.4.10).

¹This is understood to be the Siddhānta; *ātmety evopāsita* (or the two *kaṇḍikās*?); cf. verse 1064 above.

ब्रह्मविद्योपदेशस्य विषयश्चावधार्यते ।

साक्षाद्ब्रह्माथवाब्रह्म यदि बोभयरूपकम् ॥११६७॥

And the subject matter of the instruction in the lore of the Brahman is ascertained thus (in the form of three possibilities, viz.) whether the Brahman is directly perceptible Brahman itself, or that which is not Brahman¹ (viz. that which is the inner self) or that of both the types?

[1167]

¹Not perceptible. This is *antahkaraṇādyavachinna*. The NKL edition reads correctly *-athavābrahma* not like *-athavā brahma* in the AnSS edition.

समाशङ्कितनिःशेषदोषानागन्धितं स्फुटम् ।
श्रुतिः प्रतिवचः प्राह दोषमूलनिरासकृत् ॥११६८॥
ब्रह्मेति ब्रह्मशब्दो ऽयं मुख्यब्रह्मार्थवाचकः ।
अपूर्वादिश्रुतेर्ज्ञेयो ब्रह्मत्वं न ततो ऽन्यथा ॥११६९॥

Indeed, the Brahman is clearly untainted by the entire multitude of faults which are conceived (as affecting it) — the Śruti has given an answer that completely destroys (any idea of) fault. [1168]

This word *brahma* is to be known from the Śruti (statement) beginning with (the word) *apūrva* ...¹ as expressive of that object which is the principal Brahman. The nature of the Brahman cannot be anything else than that.² [1169]

¹Cf. the Śruti *apūrvam* ... BU (Mādhyandina) 3.8.8. This shows that the Brahman is principally known as non-delimited by *deśa*, *kāla* and *vastu* (= *vastvantara*). That is the principal purport of the Śruti texts.

²For example, a pitcher etc. But these would not really exist apart from the Brahman.

अविचारितसंसिद्धप्रत्यगज्ञानकारणात् ।
अब्रह्मेव तदाभाति मोहसंवीतचेतसः ॥११७०॥

That the Brahman appears to those whose minds are wrapped up in ignorance as the non-Brahman on account of the ignorance about (the nature of) the inner self which has somehow¹ come into existence. [1170]

¹This refers to the indescribability of ignorance. Here the NKL edition reads: *avicāritasamsiddhapratyagajñāna*- which is better than the AnSS edition reading *-samsiddhi*-, or even the variant noted by it, viz. *-samsiddheḥ pratyag*-. Translation follows the NKL edition

reading.

प्रत्यक्संबोधविध्वस्तप्रत्यङ्मोहः परात्मनः ।
संभावयति संबोधान्नान्यद्वस्त्वन्तरं यथा ॥११७१॥

One who has destroyed one's own ignorance about the nature of the inner self by knowing (the true nature of) the inner self understands from that knowledge that there is no other thing than the highest Ātman. [1171]

एवमेव महामोहसंवीतधिषणः पुमान् ।
ब्रह्मैवापि स्वतो मोहान्न तत्संभावयत्यपि ॥११७२॥

Just in this way, a man whose intelligence is wrapped up in great ignorance (about the nature of the inner self) does not even understand that, though he himself is the Brahman. [1172]

बुद्धतत्त्वस्य लोको ऽयं जडोन्मत्तपिशाचवत् ।
बुद्धतत्त्वो ऽपि लोकस्य जडोन्मत्तपिशाचवत् ॥११७३॥

For one, who has known the true (nature of the world), this world is like that unto an unintelligent, or madman or a goblin. And also for this one, who has known the truth (of the world), is this world like to an unintelligent, or a mad person or a goblin. [1173]

Though both SP and NKL mention that this is a verse from some Purāṇa, but we have not found it in the Purāṇa texts.

यदि नामास्ति संभेदः साक्षात्कल्पितसर्पयोः ।
भीतं प्रत्यविशिष्टो ऽसौ वास्तवत्वादनादृतः ॥११७४॥

If indeed there is a mixture of a real and an imaginary serpent, that (serpent) is for the one, who is afraid, not distinguished (by its real property) and is not ignored as out of the world of reality.¹ [1174]

¹A person who is afraid does not really know that there is

not a real serpent and the cause of his fear is but an imaginary serpent.

प्रत्यक्तत्वं तमोमात्रव्यवधानादिहोच्यते ।
ब्रह्मभावीति न पुनर्वस्तुतत्त्वव्यपेक्षया ॥११७५॥

Here¹, only on account of the obstruction of ignorance it is that the true element, viz. the inner self, is mentioned as what is going to be the (known) Brahman not on account of the view of the real nature of the thing (viz. Reality). [1175]

¹That is, in the Bhāṣya (of Bhartṛprapañca).

इदं धीशब्दगम्यं यद्ब्रह्मरूपाद्विशिष्यते ।
ब्रह्मैव तदुपाधीहेदंशब्देनाभिधीयते ॥११७६॥

Here¹, it is only that Brahman itself which is understood from the word (expressive of) the knowledge '(It is) this.', which is distinguished from the real form of the Brahman² and, being delimited by that (i.e. this world), that is here expressed by the word *idam*³. [1176]

¹In the sentence of the Bhāṣya: *idam iti nāmarūpavyākṛtaṃ jagan nirdīśyate*

²Namely, that which is in fact formless.

³SP points out this as the meaning of the word *idam* as stated in the Bhāṣya (of Bhartṛprapañca?).

यो ऽसावविद्योत्सङ्गस्थः प्राक्प्रविष्ट इतीरितः ।
स्वाभासान्तः स संमोहान्नामरूपात्मको ऽभवत् ॥११७७॥

That one, who, being on the lap of ignorance¹, was mentioned earlier as the one who entered, was really inside his own appearances (and) only out of complete (*sam*) ignorance came to be possessed of a name and a form.² [1177]

¹It means: being delimited by ignorance.

²SP cites Bhāṣya (of Bhartṛprapañca?): *sa idam jagad ātmatvenā-*

bhisampanno 'bhūd avidyayā.

अव्याकृतादिपिण्डान्तं पर एव त्वविद्यया ।
तदात्मत्वं समापेदे न त्वसौ परमार्थतः ॥११७८॥

It is only the highest self that has become possessed of the nature of that, which begins with the unmanifest and ends with a body, only owing to ignorance and not in reality. [1178]

प्रागात्मबोधादिपिण्डादौ यात्मेत्यासीन्मतिर्दृढा ।
सा तत्तत्त्वमसंप्राप्य सिद्धा स्रगहिबोधवत् ॥११७९॥

That firm consciousness, viz. there is only the Ātman, which existed in respect of a body etc. before one's knowing the true nature of the self, existed there because it had not obtained the form of the truth in the same way as (the knowledge of) a serpent in (the place of) a wreath. [1179]

अविद्याकल्पितांस्तस्मादन्वयव्यतिरेकतः ।
विधूयानात्मनो ऽशेषांस्तत्प्रत्यग्रूपमैक्षत ॥११८०॥

Therefore, having thrown away (the notion(s) of) all the non-Ātmans which were created by ignorance with (the help of) the method of Anvaya and Vyatireka, a person knows that (real) form of the inner self. [1180]

This refers to *tad ātmānam* (BU).

प्रत्यग्याथात्म्यविद्याग्निसंप्लुष्टाशेषतत्तमः ।
ब्रह्मैवात्मानमेवेति प्रत्यबुध्यत वाक्यतः ॥११८१॥

The person, who has completely (*sam*) burnt the entire darkness about that¹ by means of the fire in the form of the knowledge about the real nature of the inner self, knows himself as the Ātman by means of the Śruti statement². [1181]

¹This refers to the inner self.

²In the form 'I am the Ātman.'

न हि प्लुष्टाखिलाविद्यः प्रतीच्यन्यन्मनागपि ।
प्रत्यग्दृष्ट्येक्षते ऽन्यस्य तदविद्यैकहेतुतः ॥११८२॥

Indeed, one, who has burnt (one's) entire ignorance, does not see in the inner self even a little (thing) other than (the inner self) by adopting the notion that it is the inner self; because that other (thing) could thus be imagined only) on account of the ignorance about it (i.e. the inner self). [1182]

अद्वैतविषयं चेदमेकं ब्रह्मेति भण्यते ।
समस्तव्यस्तता यस्मान्नेह प्रत्यग्धिष्येक्ष्यते ॥११८३॥

And it is declared that only this unique Brahman is not the object of duality¹, since (its) collectiveness and individuality are not seen when there has occurred the knowledge (of the true nature) of the inner self. [1183]

¹It refers to existence of the Self without any second.

मिथ्याभिमानात्संपत्तिरविद्योत्थासु भूमिषु ।
यत्र वा अन्यदित्येवं श्रुतिश्चापि जगौ तथा ॥११८४॥

It is on account of false conception that there is becoming (manifold) in different states that have arisen from ignorance — so has the Śruti sung (i.e. declared) in the statement *yatra vā anyad* [*iva syāt tatrānyo 'nyat paśyet*] ...¹ [1184]

¹Cf. BU 4.3.31.

निरविद्य इहाद्वैते भेदहेतोरसंभवात् ।
स्वत एवाभिसंपत्तिर्यत्र त्वस्येतिशास्त्रतः ॥११८५॥

Since there is no possibility of any cause of effecting differentiation in non-duality, in which there does not exist any ignorance, there is (its) becoming (manifold) only on its own¹ — this (is known) from the scriptural statement *yatra tv asya* [*sarvamātmaivābhūttatkena kaṁ paśyet*]...² [1185]

This sets aside a possible argument that the individual self's becoming the Brahman is also a product of *avidyā*.

¹SP points to *iha punar advaite sarvabhāvānām ananyatvāt sarvam añjasaivātmatvenābhinsampadyata (iti bhāṣyeṇa)*— as the Bhāṣya of Bhartṛprapañca(?).

²BU 4.5.15.

तस्मात्तदिति विद्यायाः पूर्णता फलमुच्यते ।

तदन्यस्य त्वकृत्स्नत्वोज्जिहासाविषयत्वतः ॥११८६॥

Therefore, in the word *tat* is expressed the result, viz. the completeness of knowledge and, as against this, there is a desire of abandoning everything else than that (=the Brahman), because it is incomplete and not an object (of knowledge).

[1186]

This explains the meaning of BU: *tasmāt tat sarvam abhavat*.

यदिदंशब्दनिर्दिष्टं पूर्णविद्यैकहेतुजम् ।

अहं ब्रह्मेति तद्धवंसात्पूर्णमेवाभवत्स्वतः ॥११८७॥

That, which is mentioned by the word *idam* and which has originated from only one cause, viz. complete ignorance, became complete owing to the destruction of that (ignorance by knowing) 'I am Brahman.'

[1187]

This explains that the individual self was wrapped in ignorance and, therefore, incomplete and, then, on knowing 'I am Brahman.', became complete.

भर्तृप्रपञ्चभाष्यस्य प्रचारो ऽयं प्रदर्शितः ।

श्रुत्यक्षरानुसारेण तथानुभववर्त्मना ॥११८८॥

This one (i.e. thus) is shown (to be) the accepted purport¹ of the explanation, given by Bhartṛprapañca, in keeping with the wording of the Śruti and also with experience.²

[1188]

¹This means: It is in accord with Vivartavāda, according to Śaṅkara and Sureśvara.

²With reference to the second line, read SP: *kim ity evaṁ tadīyabhāṣyasya gatiṃ ucyate*; this is to state that his explanation is in accord with the Śruti and is supported by experience.

ब्रह्मेति ब्रह्मशब्देन द्वैतैकत्वात्मकं किल ।
भण्यते न परं ब्रह्म तस्य विद्यानपेक्षतः ॥११८९॥

They say (*kila*)¹: By the word *brahman* is mentioned that Brahman which is of the nature of duality and non-duality (both) and not the highest Reality, for that does not expect any instruction (about it). [1189]

This has a reference to verse 1165 above. The purpose of this and the following verses is to remove the misunderstanding on the part of some of Bhartṛprapañca's commentators on his interpretation of BU: *brahma vā* ... Sureśvara follows Śaṅkara, as implied in the preceding verse.

¹Cf. SP: *kilety ubhayor bhāṣyakṛtor atrānicchoktiḥ*.

परस्य ब्रह्मता यस्मादनन्यायत्तसिद्धिका ।
स्वत एव तु तत्सिद्धेर्नातस्तदभिधीयते ॥११९०॥

Because the highest Reality has the character of the Brahman which is not dependent on any other (thing or means) and is of itself established; therefore, it is not mentioned by (the word *brahman*). [1190]

This is the reason for the argument *na param brahma* in the preceding verse.

तथा कालानवच्छित्तेरासीदिति न तत्प्रति ।
घटते कालसंबन्धो विरिञ्चे तूपपद्यते ॥११९१॥

So also, because it is not delimited by time, there cannot be with reference to it the use of the word *āsīt* 'it was.'¹; in respect of Viriñca, however, it stands to reason. [1191]

This is another reason for saying that *para* is not understood by the word *brahman*.

¹Cf. *Kāthopanīṣad* 2.14: *anyatra bhūtāc ca bhavyāc ca*.

ननु तस्यापि विज्ञानं नोपदेशव्यपेक्षया ।
जन्मनैवास्य तत्सिद्धेर्न युक्ता ब्रह्मगीरियम् ॥११९२॥

One might say that the information about him (viz. Viriñca) also is not dependent on instruction¹, since that gets established at his very origin; therefore, this word *brahman* is not reasonable.

[1192]

Also Viriñca or Hiranyagarbha, though different from the Brahman, may not be the meaning of the word *brahman*; this is the thought of the questioner.

¹Namely, the statement *tasmāt tat sarvam abhavat*.

आसीदिति च निर्देशस्तस्मिन्नपि न युज्यते ।
विरिञ्चस्य त्रिकालत्वादासीदस्ति भविष्यति ॥११९३॥

So also the mention 'There he was.' is not reasonable in the case of that (viz. Viriñca), because Viriñca belongs to all the three periods of time; (that is to say:) 'He was, he is and he will be.'

[1193]

यत एवमसंतोषात्पक्षान्तरसमाश्रयः ।
मनुष्याधिकृतेर्वेति क्रियते पूर्वपक्षिणा ॥११९४॥

Since this is so, viz. there is dissatisfaction (about the answer), therefore, the other view is resorted to and the *prima facie* view is put forth *manuṣyādhikṛter vā ...*¹

[1194]

This verse gives the view of the Bhartṛprapañca's Bhāṣya as the basis for the doubt in verses 1192-94.

¹NKL cites: *manuṣyādhikārād vā tadbhāvi brāhmaṇaḥ syāt* as the Bhāṣya (of Bhartṛprapañca?).

मनुष्याः प्रकृताः पूर्वं ते च निःश्रेयसार्थिनः ।
ब्रह्मणो न त्वनर्थित्वात्तथा चाप्रकृतत्वतः ॥११९५॥

At mention was made first of men and they were described as desirous of the highest bliss; but the Brahman is not (intended to be) desirous of anything, because that is not the matter which was begun in the discussion. [1195]

This is to explain the other view.

ऋष्यादिवचसा चापि ब्रह्मविद्याविशेषतः ।
सर्वार्थैव समुद्दिष्टा नाग्रजन्मैकगोचरा ॥११९६॥

Also by the statement about the sages etc. it is not the lore of the Brahman that is distinguished and therefore it is introduced as one having the first-born (Hiranyagarbha)¹ as its subject. [1196]

¹This conveys by implication the Brahman also.

जन्मनैव तु तत्सिद्धेर्नोपदेशव्यपेक्षता ।
ज्ञानमप्रतिघं यस्य वैराग्यं चेति च स्मृतेः ॥११९७॥

It is already established at its very birth and has no dependence on any instruction; and this is based on the Smṛti statement *jñānam apratigham* ...¹ [1197]

¹As we have noted in verse 79, this is the *Vāyupurāṇa*.

द्वैतैकत्वात्मकब्रह्मविद्याकर्मैकसाधनः ॥११९८॥
अपरब्रह्मतापन्नो भोज्याद्व्यावृत्तमानसः ।
निःशेषप्राप्त्या चोच्छिन्नकामकर्मादिबन्धनः ॥११९९॥
परब्रह्मपरिज्ञानभावनोपचयात्परः ।
ब्रह्मभावी नरो ऽतो ऽत्र ब्रह्मशब्देन भण्यते ॥१२००॥

Therefore, by the word *brahman* is mentioned here a man who will be the Brahman — (he) who has the sole means (of achieving his ends) by activity connected with the knowledge

of the Brahman which is of the nature of unity in duality; who has become another Brahman¹, who has his mind turned averse to (all) enjoyable (objects), who has cut off the bonds in the form of desire, activity, etc. by obtaining the entire (multitude of desires), and who has become the highest by the increase of his devotion to all-sided knowledge about the highest Brahman. [1198-1200]

This is the view of Bhartṛprapañca, according to his commentators' explanation in respect of BU 1.4.9-10.

¹Namely, Hiranyagarbha.

भविष्यद्वृत्त्या लोके ऽपि प्रयोगो दृश्यते यथा ।
ओदनं पचतीत्यादि तथेहापि भविष्यति ॥१२०१॥

In worldly dealings also, we notice employment of a word with the notion of the function of the future, as for example, in the sentence 'He is cooking rice.'¹ etc.²; so also, here (the man) will be (the Brahman). [1201]

This is the explanation of the second line of the preceding verse in the light of linguistic usage.

¹What is cooked are grains and after they are cooked they become rice. Yet we say 'He is cooking rice.', so also here the employment of the word conveys the sense of the future.

²SP refers *ādi* to making a gift of village or weaving a carpet, while NKL refers it to shaping a pitcher.

गृहस्थो भार्यां विन्देत शास्त्रे चापि समीक्ष्यते ।
एवं व्याचक्षते केचिद्गम्भीरन्यायवादिनः ॥१२०२॥

In the Śruti text also it is seen (in the sentence) 'A householder should get a wife.'¹ — thus do some thinkers who talk about the profound rules (of interpretation)², explain (the purport of the Śruti). [1202]

¹It means: one, who wants to be (i.e. is going to be) a householder, should get married. Cf. *Gautama Grhya Sūtra* 1.4.1.

Sureśvara dropped the word *sadādrśīm* from the original Sūtra for the sake of metre; not because he ignores *varṇa*.

²SP says the word *gambhīra* indicates ridicule (of the Bhartr-prapañca's commentators).

Verses 1203-1234 refute the view of the commentator of the Vṛttikāra whose views are presented just before.

सर्वापत्तेरनित्यत्वदोषासक्तेर्न तत्तथा ।

साधनायत्तलब्धात्मा न लोके ऽस्त्यविनश्वरः ॥१२०३॥

(But) that is not so, because all beings will necessarily become (the Brahman). And also there will be contingent the fault, viz. impermanence (i.e. non-eternality of the Brahman). (Indeed, whatever¹) comes into existence owing to its dependence on some means is known even in the world² as non-permanent.

[1203]

¹This has a reference to liberation which has to be produced by certain men, as taught in the Śruti. This has a basis in the experience that things related as causes and effects are impermanent.

²This means: in the Śruti also.

अथाविद्योत्थाकृत्स्नत्वनिवृत्तिं चेदिहेच्छसि ।

कल्पनेयं वृथैव स्याद्ब्रह्मभावीति या कृता ॥१२०४॥

यतः प्रागपि तद्विधात्सर्वो जन्तुः स्वभावतः ।

ब्रह्मत्वादाप्ततद्भावो नित्यमेव न साधनात् ॥१२०५॥

Now if you understand here¹ (liberation to be) the cessation of the incompleteness that had arisen from ignorance, then this notion (which you entertain), viz. that (an individual) is what is going to be the (known) Brahman, would be just useless,

[1204]

since, even before (the rise of) the knowledge of that (=Brahman), every being had been by its very nature the Brahman, and therefore, having had already attained the nature of the Brahman, was therefore eternal, not by (any) means

(taught in the Śruti etc.).

[1205]

¹Namely, in this context.

केवलं तत्तमोमात्रव्यवधानैकहेतुतः ।

संभावयत्यकृत्स्नत्वं प्रत्यगात्मनि मूढधीः ॥१२०६॥

An individual, whose intellect is blurred in respect of the inner self on account of only one cause, viz. the covering of its true nature by mere ignorance about it, entertains the notion of insufficiency (or incompleteness).

[1206]

यद्विद्यैकहेतु स्यादब्रह्मत्वं न तु स्वतः ।

तद्यथावस्तुसंबोधान्मूलनाशात्प्रणश्यति ॥१२०७॥

That character of what is a non-Brahman, which has arisen from only ignorance (about the true nature of the inner self) and not by its own nature, gets destroyed by the knowledge of the thing (viz. the inner self) as it is, i.e. by the destruction of the root (of ignorance).

[1207]

एवं चेत्स्यादभिप्रायः किमर्थं निष्प्रयोजनम् ।

मुख्यार्थं संपरित्यज्य पुंसि ब्रह्मेति कल्पनम् ॥१२०८॥

If such is the intended thought, why then (entertain) the notion of the Brahman in an individual, having given up the primary meaning of the word without any reason?

[1208]

This amplifies the thought in verse 1204 above.

श्रुतार्थहानिरेवं स्यादश्रुतस्य च कल्पना ।

अपन्यायो वृथा च स्यात्पुमर्थासंभवादिह ॥१२०९॥

Thus there would be (i) abandoning what is heard in the Śruti and (ii) (entertaining) the notion of what is not heard; thus, this would be a bad way (or manner) of interpretation since there would be no possibility of (securing) the end of human endeavour, viz. liberation.

[1209]

अविद्योत्थातिरेकेण स्वत एवेति चेन्मतम् ।
अब्रह्मत्वं न तद्वानिरुपायासंभवात्क्वचित् ॥१२१०॥

If it is held that the character of what is a non-Brahman exists in its own right (*svataḥ eva*) as apart from what is arising from ignorance, then there is no possibility whatever of the existence of any means (of removing it) at all¹. [1210]

¹It means: at any time, at any region, and in any condition. Cf. SP on the next verse: *kvacid ity avasthādeśakāloktiḥ*.

अभिव्यञ्जकमेवेष्टं प्रमाणं न तु कारकम् ।
नापोद्गरी नापि कर्त्रीयं विद्यातो वस्तुनः क्वचित् ॥१२११॥

The means (for the removal of the notion of the non-Brahman) is held (by us) to be what reveals it and (*tu*) not what produces (it); then also, this lore (of the Brahman) is neither the remover nor the producer of anything at all¹. [1211]

The first line gives a general notion of what a means of knowledge should be, viz. it is merely informative, and the second line extends the notion to the means of knowing the Brahman (i.e. to the lore of the Brahman).

¹See the note on the preceding verse.

स्वप्रमेयाखिलाज्ञानध्वंसिनीति समीक्ष्यते ।
विद्या लोके तथेहापि तद्ध्वंसिन्येव गृह्यताम् ॥१२१२॥

In worldly dealings, (any) lore is desired to be what destroys the entire ignorance about the object to be known by it; so also here (in respect of the Brahman), let (the lore) be accepted as the destroyer of that¹ (ignorance about the Brahman). [1212]

This verse is similar to the preceding. In the first line is stated the general rule regarding any branch of knowledge and in the second is extended the general rule or procedure to the lore of

the Brahman. Cf. SP: *lokānusāritvād vedasyety abhiprāyaḥ*.

¹This refers to *svaprameyākḥilājñāna*.

सदानुदितानस्तमितभास्वद्विज्ञानमात्रतः ।

तद्विरुद्धतनुर्मोहः कुतो ब्रह्मणि चेन्मतम् ॥१२१३॥

(And) if it is (asked by the opponent:) How can there remain in the Brahman¹ (as you have understood) ignorance which is opposed to it in nature², since it is ever only bright knowledge³, which has ever been there⁴ and which will never disappear⁵?

[1213]

The idea in the first line is that of the sunrise and the sunset — these two occasions occur again and again, but knowledge on the part of the Brahman has ever been abiding.

¹*brahmaṇi* is *viśayasaptamī* and not *adhikaraṇasaptamī*; cp. *iha* in verse 1212 above on which SP: *brahma saptamyarthah* (for *iha*).

²The word *tanu* means *svarūpa*.

³*vijñāna* here stands for *jñāna*.

⁴*anudita* literally means: which has not arisen; i.e. which is beginningless.

⁵It literally means: which will never set.

नानुभूत्यैव तत्सिद्धेर्ज्ञातकुम्भानुभूतिवत् ।

न वैज्ञीत्यनुभूतिर्हि सर्वेषामात्मसाक्षिका ॥१२१४॥

(Our answer is:) No. (This is not so), because that¹ gets established by one's experience (of the cause) as a pitcher becomes known² by means of its experience. (Indeed) all of them have a personal experience, viz. 'I do not know (myself)'. .

[1214]

This verse states why the objection cannot be raised.

¹It refers to *moha* of the previous verse.

²That is, when ignorance about it is removed.

अव्याकृताधिकारे च यदुक्तं प्राक्समासतः ।

ब्रह्मण्यविद्यासंसिद्ध्यै स्मर्तव्यं तदिहाखिलम् ॥१२१५॥

Further¹, whatever was briefly said (by us earlier)² in connection with the topic of the undifferentiated — all that has to be remembered here in order to become aware of the ignorance in respect of the Brahman. [1215]

¹This is *ca*.

²Namely, the means of knowing convey information about what was not known earlier.

विद्याविधानाच्चाविद्या ब्रह्मण्यस्तीति गम्यताम् ।
विद्याविधानं विज्ञाते पिष्टपेषणवद्यतः ॥१२१६॥

And let it be understood in respect of the Brahman that there is ignorance about the Brahman, since there is a prescription of the lore of the Brahman; for such a prescription of the lore in respect of what is already known (would have been) like grinding what was already ground. [1216]

This is a further argument in confirmation of what is stated in the preceding verse. Also, it brings out why the Brahman is at the same time unknown.

SP and NKL refer to *tat tvam asi* (CU 6.8.7) but better understand *ātmā vā are śrotavyo mantavyo nididhyāsitavyaḥ* in this very Upaniṣad.

अज्ञानमेव मिथ्याधीः प्रमेयानभिसंगतेः ।
रूप्याध्यारोपणं तस्मादुदाहारि गरीयसा ॥१२१७॥

Ignorance (about the self) is itself false knowledge, because it is not connected with the object of knowing. Therefore, the elder one¹ had given the illustration of the superimposition of silver (on a mother-of-pearl). [1217]

In BUB we read *na hi śuktikāyām* ... this is justified by Sureśvara as pointing to how false knowledge is rooted in ignorance about a real thing.

¹SP makes out this to be Śaṅkara.

the Brahman. Cf. SP: *lokānusāritvād vedasyety abhiprāyaḥ*.

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विद्याविधानं विज्ञाते पिष्टपेषणवद्यतः ॥१२१६॥

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¹SP makes out this to be Śaṅkara.

अस्त्वविद्या परे भूमिन् यथोक्तन्यायगौरवात् ।
न तु ब्रह्मैव तां कुर्यात्सर्वज्ञं प्रत्यगात्मनि ॥१२१८॥

(Therefore), on the strength of the example stated before, let there be ignorance on the part of the highest pervader¹ (i.e. the Supreme Self). But let not the Brahman, which is omniscient, create that² in the inner self. [1218]

¹Sureśvara uses the word *bhūman* for the Brahman because of metrical exigencies. Cf. BS 1.3.8; CU 7.23-24 .

²It refers to *avidyā*.

न हि धीपूर्वकारी सन्निःशेषानर्थदायिनीम् ।
प्रतीच्यविद्यां विसृजेद्यान्यत्रापि न काम्यते ॥१२१९॥

Indeed, a human being who acts on thought would not create in the inner self ignorance which causes all kinds of undesirable results (and) that which is not desired elsewhere also. [1219]

Everyone knows that ignorance causes disasters and therefore would not create it anywhere.

यद्यविद्या भवेत्कार्यमस्त्वेतद्यदिहोदितम् ।
अकार्यत्वात्त्वविद्यायास्त्वदुक्तं तुषकण्डनम् ॥१२२०॥ -

If ignorance is (lit. would be considered as) an effect (lit. product), let there be this, viz. what is (already) said.¹ As against this, if ignorance does not have the nature of a product, then your making a statement² is (like) pounding the chaff.³

[1220]

The argument is: Though omniscient, the Brahman cannot be considered as the basis of *avidyā*.

¹It is already stated that the Brahman does not create ignorance in the inner self.

²Namely, the argument: *avidyā* is a product of the Brahman.

³This example means: it is useless for one to try to get any

grains out of chaff. The Brahman produces nothing. Cf. verse 1214 above.

अथोपचारात्कार्यत्वमविद्याविषयत्वतः ।

तथापि नापराधो नस्तदन्यासंभवादिह ॥१२२१॥

If again, the nature of a product (is attributed to ignorance) in a secondary sense, because it is affected by ignorance; then also this is not a fault on our part, as there is no possibility of the existence of anything else (than the Brahman). [1221]

The idea behind this verse is: We know that the inner self is affected by ignorance; i.e. there exists ignorance and therefore the Brahman must have created ignorance (viz. it is a *kārya*).

न हि ब्रह्मातिरेकेण ब्रह्माविद्याकृदिष्यते ।

न ह्यन्यो ऽतो ऽस्ति द्रष्टेति तथाच श्रुतिशासनम् ॥१२२२॥

Indeed, it is not held that there exists beside the Brahman (another) Brahman which creates ignorance. (For, there is) instruction in the Śruti to that effect, viz. there is not any other seer than this one.¹ [1222]

This sets aside the possibility about the existence of another sentient being apart from the Brahman.

¹Cf. BU 3.7.23.

क्रिया वा कारकं वेह सदसद्वेह यन्मतम् ।

अप्रज्ञातात्मयाथात्म्यं ब्रह्मैव तदितीक्ष्यताम् ॥१२२३॥

पुरुष एवेदं सर्वमात्मैवेदमिति श्रुतिः ।

नानुभूतेः प्रमाणाद्वा तदन्यद्वस्तु लभ्यते ॥१२२४॥

Whatever be here¹, whether action or agent of an action and² the existent or the non-existent, it is such that the truth of its nature is not known; (therefore,) let that be accepted (lit. seen) as only the Brahman itself, [1223]

for, (there are) the Śruti statements 'All this is only Puruṣa.' (and) 'This is only the Ātman.'. (And) neither from experience

nor from (any) means of knowing is known any object other than that (Puruṣa or Ātman). [1224]

This is to set aside the existence of even an insentient thing beside the Brahman and to establish the existence of the Brahman alone.

¹ Namely, in dealings worldly and Śāstric as well.

² *vā = ca* (so understood by us).

ननु शास्त्रोपदेशो ऽयमेवं सत्यफलो भवेत् ।
 नासौ ब्रह्मणि साफल्यं नाप्यन्यस्मिन्समश्नुते ॥१२२५॥
 उपदेशानपेक्षत्वाद्ब्रह्मत्वस्य परात्मनः ।
 असंभवात्ततो ऽन्यस्य ह्युपदेशो ऽफलो भवेत् ॥१२२६॥

(An objection may be raised:) But if this were so, this instruction in the Śruti would be fruitless (i.e. meaningless). (For) that (instruction) does not become fruitful with reference to the Brahman or anything other than that; [1225] (for), the nature of the Brahman abiding in the highest Ātman does not depend on (any means of knowing or another thing), since that is not possible¹. (And) instruction in regard to the other² would indeed be useless (lit. fruitless). [1226]

This would explain the thought arising from the preceding verse regarding the *aphalatva* of Śāstra.

¹ Namely, any other means of knowing or another thing does not have any existence.

² That is, non-*brahman*.

ब्रह्माकर्त्रपि संबोधात्प्रागभूतदसंसृति ।
 अविद्यातज्जसंबन्धात्कर्तृत्वे ऽपि न दोषभाक् ॥१२२७॥

(This is in answer to the doubt:) The Brahman, though a non-agent (of any action) was there existent even before¹; it has been non-transmigratory. (And if it is held) to be an agent of some action, thanks to its connection with ignorance and its products, it does not have (that) fault¹ even then.

[1227]

The Siddhāntin answers away the thought in the two preceding verses.

¹It means: before the transmigratory world came to exist.

²Namely, the character of being transmigratory.

प्रागज्ञातं तदैकात्म्यं यथैवानुभवान्मतम् ।
ब्रह्मास्मीत्यपि संबोधस्तथैवानुभवाश्रयात् ॥१२२८॥

As indeed (*eva*) the uniqueness of it, which was not known before, is understood (i.e. grasped) through experience, in the same way, there will be understanding of the knowledge, 'I am Brahman.' through experience. [1228]

प्रमेयाधिगमं कुर्वत्प्रमाणमफलं यदि ।
क्वान्यत्र फलवत्तत्स्यान्नातो ऽन्यत्स्यान्मितेःफलम् ॥१२२९॥

If any means of knowing, which brings about knowledge about the object of (its) knowing, were held as fruitless, (then we ask) where else¹ could it be fruitful? Therefore, there would not be any fruit other than the knowledge (of it²). [1229]

¹That is, in what other respect.

²It means: the object of its knowing'; here, the Brahman.

सोत्प्रासमिव चाहातो बाढमित्येवमादिना ।
अस्त्वेषो ऽवगते दोष इतो ऽन्यः कीदृशो गुणः ॥१२३०॥

Therefore (the Bhāṣyakāra) said, as if with a smile of ridicule, 'Well, let it be so ...'. Let there be this¹ fault, when the Brahman is being known; for, what excellence can there be other than this?² [1230]

¹This refers to the fruitlessness of instruction which brings about *ajñāna(-dhvasti)*.

²Namely, the knowledge of the Brahman brings about the destruction of ignorance, thereby declaring the fruitlessness of instruction in reality fruitfulness.

अथावगमवैयर्थ्यं भवता परिचोद्यते ।
तत्रापि चानवगमध्वस्तिः प्रतिवचो भवेत् ॥१२३१॥

Now, if you happen to posit fruitlessness of even the knowledge (arising from instruction of the Śruti), in that respect also our answer would be that there follows destruction of ignorance¹. [1231]

¹This means: not understanding the true nature of the Brahman; and that latter is conveyed by the Śruti.

ऐकात्म्ये तन्निवृत्तिश्चेदसम्भाव्येति चोद्यते ।
लब्धैकात्म्येन नैवेयं निवृत्तिः काम्यते श्रुतेः ॥१२३२॥
अप्रसिद्धे त्वथैकात्म्ये निवृत्तिरिह चोद्यते ।
तथा दृष्टविरोधो वः प्राप्नुवन्न निवार्यते ॥१२३३॥

(Now) if an argument is adduced (by the opponent:) The removal of that¹ is not possible even when the uniqueness of the Brahman is understood; (the answer to the objection is:) Indeed (this) removal is not desired (i.e. expected) by one who has acquired the knowledge of the uniqueness of the Ātman from the Śruti. But, this removal is here urged² by the Śruti in respect of the uniqueness of the Brahman when it is not known; then the (fault of) opposition to what is seen³ would come to you and it could not be averted. [1232-1233]

¹Namely, ignorance to which a reference is made in verse 1231.

²It literally means: enjoined to be destroyed.

³That is, experienced. Here, the uniqueness of the Ātman.

सर्वस्यानुपपन्नत्वं सिद्धं दृष्टबलाश्रयात् ।
दृष्टस्यानुपपन्नत्वं किमाश्रित्याभिधीयते ॥१२३४॥

The unreasonableness of whatever (was argued) is (thus established) on the support of what is seen. But, on the support of what can be established the unreasonableness of what is

seen?

[1234]

This is said for reaffirming the argument in the preceding verse which is related to *dr̥ṣṭavirodha*.

उक्तानि तावद्भूयांसि दूषणानि विभागशः ।
अब्रह्मविषये क्लृप्ते ब्रह्मभावी पुमानिति ॥१२३५॥

Thus are shown (lit. stated) a number of faults, one after another¹ in respect of the non-Brahman which is accepted to be what is going to be the (known) Brahman (in future).

[1235]

¹It means: part by part; as divided into various parts of the argument.

भूयो ऽप्यस्यैव दाढ्यार्थं पूर्वपक्षाय यत्यते ।
वाक्यार्थाभाससंजातभ्रान्त्युच्छ्रित्यै प्रयत्नतः ॥१२३६॥

Yet once again an attempt is made (in what follows) to offer more support to (lit. to strengthen) the *prima facie* view with a view to removing completely (i.e. disproving), with care, the mistake (in that view) caused by what appeared (to him) as the meaning of the Śruti statements.

[1236]

Now follows in verses 1237-1277 a discussion on the purport of BUB: 'punyo vai ... brahmabhāvī puruṣa ucyate iti cen na'.

पुण्यः पुण्येन भवति पापः पापेन कर्मणा ।
संसारिणं समुद्धिश्य श्रुतिरेतदुदाहरत् ॥१२३७॥

That 'He becomes holy by performing holy acts, he has become a sinner by performing sinful acts.'¹ is stated by the Śruti with reference to a transmigratory being.

[1237]

¹Cf. BU 3.2.13.

तथैष हीति विस्पष्टं संसार्येवाभिधीयते ।

तस्माद्विलक्षणस्तद्वदीश्वरो ऽप्यभिधीयते ।
स एष नेति नेतीति य आत्मेत्यादिना तथा ॥१२३८॥

[In verses 1238-1245, there is shown the difference between Īśvara and a transmigratory being.]

So also (in the Śruti passage) 'This one indeed ...'¹ only a transmigratory being is clearly mentioned (and) so also Īśvara, who is in nature opposed to him, is mentioned (in the Śruti statements) *sa eṣa neti neti ...*,² and *ya ātmā ...*,³ etc. [1238]

¹ *Praśnopaniṣad* 4.9.

² BU 3.9.26 etc., see verse 539 note 4 above.

³ CU 8.7.13.

तथाक्षपादकाणादतर्कशास्त्रेषु यत्नतः ।
उपपत्तिशतैरीशः साध्यते वादिभिः पृथक् ॥१२३९॥

So (also), other (exponents of philosophy) have severally made effort to establish in their works on logic (e.g.) by Gautama and Kaṇāda² with hundreds¹ of arguments the existence of Īśvara. [1239]

¹ This is hyperbolic number for saying 'numerous'. NKL cites some arguments; so also does the editor of NKL in his note.

² This may refer to even Seśvara Yoga that also seeks to establish the existence of Īśvara.

दुःखापनयनार्थित्वप्रवृत्तेर्दर्शनादपि ।
अत्यन्तभेदो विज्ञेयः संसारीश्वरयोरतः ॥१२४०॥

And also, on noticing the activity (of individuals) who have the desire of removing their sorrows, one has to know (i.e. accept) the extreme difference between a transmigratory being and Īśvara. [1240]

तं त्रिदिवैतमेवेति कर्मकर्तृविभागतः ।
क्षेत्रज्ञेश्वरयोरुक्तेर्मृगव्याधादिभेदवत् ॥१२४१॥

And also from the Śruti passages *taṁ viditvā ...*¹, *etam eva ...*² etc. on the basis of the division made between an agent and an object (of action), as also from the statement about a *kṣetrajña* 'knower of the field' and *Īśvara* (should one understand) the difference as that between a deer and a hunter.³ [1241]

¹BU 4.4.23.

²BU 4.4.22. Sureśvara's verse reads: *etam eva ...*; however SP and NKL, *etam vai taṁ ātmānam* which is BU 3.5.1. SP and NKL further refer to *etam itaḥ pretyāham abhisambhavitāsmi* (CU 3.14.4). It seems that Sureśvara intended some Śruti passages as the basis. But one may refer to *Gītā* ch. 14. It may be remembered that they held the *Gītā* as an Upaniṣad.

³This illustration is well in keeping with *karma-karṭṛ-vibhāga*.

ममक्षोर्गतिमार्गस्य देशभेदोपदेशतः ।

भेदे ऽसति गतिः केयं गन्तृगन्तव्ययोर्भवेत् ॥१२४२॥

(This is noticeable also) from different information (given) about the destinations in respect of the paths of journey for the one who is seeking liberation. (And therefore we ask:) If there were no distinction (between the individual self and the highest), why should there be the (twofold) movement with reference to the (individual who is) going and the destination? [1242]

This has reference to *śuklakṛṣṇagatī* or *devayāna* and *pitryāna* which are talked about in the Upaniṣads. (Cf. *Muṇḍakopaniṣad* 3.1.7; CU 5.3.2 and 5.10.2; BU 6.2.2; *Kauṣītakyupaniṣad* 1.3; *Praśnopaniṣad* 1.9.) Thus there are two different paths to two different goals, viz. *devaloka* and *pitṛloka* and men are supposed to go by this or that of the two paths. How could there be this talk in the Upaniṣad, if men were not taken as transmigratory? In the case of *Īśvara*, he does not have to take to (or travel by) any of these two paths or to go to any. This is understood in the following verse also.

दक्षिणोत्तरमार्गोक्तिस्तथा सति विरुध्यते ।
गन्तव्यदेशाभावाच्च गतिर्नैवोपपद्यते ॥१२४३॥

And in case that was so (viz. as you say¹), then the statement about the southern and the northern paths would be contradictory (lit. opposed) and, since there is no distinction to be reached, there would not be any movement reasonably to be accepted. [1243]

¹That is, the Brahman and the individual self are one, non-distinct.

तथाभ्युदयकैवल्यसाधनानां विधानतः ।
न हीश्वरस्य कैवल्यं साधनायत्तमिष्यते ॥१२४४॥

So also, on account of the prescription of various means to worldly prosperity and liberation (one has to accept that the individual self and the Brahman are different.)¹ Indeed they do not accept that the state of liberation of Īśvara is dependent on any means. [1244]

¹This idea has run through verses 1240-1244.

ब्रह्मभावी ततो नेशः किंतु तद्व्यतिरेकभाक् ।
संसार्येवाभिधीयेत यथोक्तन्यायगौरवात् ॥१२४५॥

Therefore,¹ what is going to be the (known) Brahman is not Īśvara but one who experiences the state(s) apart from the same (i.e. the state(s) of Īśvara). Thus it is only a transmigratory being who would be talked about here (as a seeker of liberation) on the strength of the argument(s) stated by us. [1245]

This is the concluding remark of the *prima facie* view about *brahmabhāvī puruṣa*.

¹That is, for these reasons. This is *samānādhikaraṇa* with *yatho-ktanyāyagaurava*, viz. the same arguments (SP).

नैवं ब्रह्मोपदेशार्थशास्त्रानर्थक्यसक्तिः ।
संसारिविद्ययैवास्य पुरुषार्थसमाप्तिः ॥१२४६॥

(The Siddhāntin answers:) This is not so; for that would invite the contingency¹ of the fruitlessness of the Śruti which is meant for the instruction regarding the Brahman and also because this (transmigratory) individual can obtain the end of human endeavour only by means of the lore (imparted to) transmigratory beings. [1246]

¹sakti is for prasakti (=prasaṅga).

न च ब्रह्मोपदेशस्य सर्वभावातिरेकतः ।
शक्यं फलान्तरं वक्तुं येनासावर्थवान्भवेत् ॥१२४७॥

And it is not possible to say that there is some other fruit (i.e. result) of the instruction regarding the Brahman beyond becoming all¹ and whereby² he would have obtained his desired end. [1247]

¹It means: to become the Brahman, cf. *tad āhur yad brahma-vidyayā sarvam bhaviṣyanto ...* (BU 1.4.9).

²It means: by that other fruit (if there existed any).

पुमर्थसाधने ऽन्यस्मिन्न चासौ विनियुज्यते ।
मन्त्रवत्तेन तच्छास्त्रं स्यादनर्थकमेव तु ॥१२४८॥

Further, an individual is not enjoined to acquire the end of human endeavour by any other means; (if it were thatwise), the instruction (i.e. the scriptural text) would have been fruitless (i.e. meaningless) in the same way as any other Mantra¹. [1248]

The argument of the Siddhāntin has run through verses 1246-1248.

¹A Mantra like *īṣe tvā ...* in *Yajurveda* is enjoined for recitation while a branch of some sacrificial tree is cut; that makes the Mantra fruitful. Now, Upaniṣadic Mantras do not have any relation to sacrificial activity — their employment towards that is not pre-

scribed. As such, one would call them fruitless/meaningless. But Śaṅkara and his followers have held that sacrificial purpose alone does not make Mantras meaningful. They can be (or rather, they are) meaningful in that they make one aware of the true nature of Reality, thereby effecting one's liberation.

मतं दुःखिन एवासौ संपदर्थं विधीयते ।
ब्रह्मास्मीत्यविनिर्ज्ञाते कथं ब्रह्मणि सा भवेत् ॥१२४९॥

If it is held that it (viz. instruction) is prescribed for the person who is sorrow-stricken in order that he looks upon the object of instruction¹ as the Brahman, then (the question is:) How could that² be possible in respect of the Brahman, when it is not known in the awareness: 'I am Brahman.' [1249]

Verses 1249-1250 pertain to a view of some other opponent: Instruction regarding the Brahman is subservient to Upāsanā.

¹The purpose of such looking is 'worship' (*upāsanā*).

²Namely, *sampad* which consists in looking upon some object as the Brahman (*upāsyajñāna*) and therefore Upāsanā also.

तस्मिंस्तु शास्त्राद्विज्ञाते शक्यते कर्तुमञ्जसा ।
ब्रह्मसंपदतः शास्त्रं तादर्थ्यादर्थवद्भवैत् ॥१२५०॥

But worship of the Brahman can be easily possible when that (Brahman) is known from the Śruti; thus the Śruti would become meaningful, being useful for that purpose. [1250]

The opponent's view is that, if a thing is taken as the Brahman, the Śruti statements talking about the *brahmasampad* 'looking upon (or viewing) something as the Brahman' would be meaningless.

ननु ब्रह्म यदि ज्ञातं तावतैव कृतार्थता ।
न चेत्तत्संपदा किं स्याद्येन तामनुरुध्यसे ॥१२५१॥

(The Siddhāntin puts a question:) But, let me say, if the Brahman becomes known, only in that lies the fulfilment of the goal. If such is not the case, what would be the use of

looking upon something as the Brahman, so that you adopt (lit. follow)¹ it? [1251]

¹We follow here the variant reading *anurudhyase* for *anurudhyate* shown in the AnSS edition of the BUBV (and not shown even in the NKL edition). The verse becomes meaningful, if we accept the variant. The word *tām* in the fourth quarter of the verse refers to *sampad* mentioned in the third quarter. Of course, alternatively (i.e. following the printed editions), the last quarter can be translated thus: ... so that (the seeker of liberation) adopts (lit. follows) it?

नैवं ब्रह्मावबोधस्य पाराथर्येन फलत्वतः ।
सर्वमेव यतो ज्ञानं परार्थं फलवन्मतम् ॥१२५२॥

(The objector persists to say:) This is not so because knowing the Brahman can be (said to be) fruitful only when it serves the purpose of another; for, all knowledge is accepted, on all hands, as fruitful if it serves some purpose of someone. [1252]

parārthatva of knowledge is the basic argument of the opponent. He means that *brahmajñāna* as understood by the Vedāntins cannot be taken as *parārtha*.

उक्तत्वात्परिहारस्य नैवमेतद्वेदिह ।
ब्रह्मज्ञानात्तदन्यत्र परार्थं ज्ञानमिष्यते ॥१२५३॥

(The Siddhāntin answers:) Since a counterargument (to this view) has been already stated¹, this would not (now) be an objection here²; (we hold that) except in knowing the Brahman, knowledge elsewhere³ is accepted to be serving the purpose of another. [1253]

¹This refers to *brahmajñānasya phalam nāsti* (verse 1248) above.

²That is, in respect of *brahmajñāna* and *brahmasampatti*.

³That is, in knowing any other branch of study.

सर्वत्रैव हि विज्ञानं संस्कारत्वेन गम्यते ।
पराङ्गं चात्मविज्ञानादन्यत्रेत्यवधारणात् ॥१२५४॥

Indeed knowledge¹ is everywhere accepted as an impression (on a learner's mind) and also as serving the purpose of another (i.e. some person) elsewhere than in the knowledge of the Ātman — such is the decision.² [1254]

¹Sureśvara deliberately uses the word *vijñāna*. This has a reference to the subject-object relationship in every knowledge situation of the world, that has duality at the basis. Sureśvara uses the word *ātmavijñāna* not *ātmajñāna* because he refers here to Śāstric instruction. Knowledge arising from it would work towards one's becoming one with the Brahman. But he really means *ātmajñāna* by *ātmavijñāna*.

²SP and NKL point out that this verse is from Kumārila's *Tantravārtika* p.240, line 15 (on Mīmāṃsā Sūtra 1.3.25, Benares Sanskrit Series No.3, 1882-1908, ed. by Gaṅgādhara Śāstrī) Cf. *śabda-sādhutājñānasya śabde puṃsi vā saṃskārakāritvena prayogaṅgatvam prakṛtya vyākaraṇādhikaraṇe vārtikakāroktim atra mānatvenodātarati*.

सामानाधिकरण्येन तथा ब्रह्मात्मशब्दयोः ।
श्रुतौ श्रुतेर्न संपत्स्यात्संपद्येष न हि क्रमः ॥१२५५॥

So also, by the scriptural use of the words *brahman* and *ātman* in the same case relation, there cannot arise from the Śruti the notion of looking upon something as (the Brahman); indeed in no such looking is this the manner (of the use of words).¹

[1255]

There is no use of *iti* here as in the case of *mano brahmeti* ... This is clearly *sāmānādhikarāṇya* and an indication of the absence of the notion of *sampad*; SP and NKL.

¹While looking upon something as another, someone who is the agent and the object of his looking (or obtaining) are not expressed in the same case relation. Thus *aham brahmāsmi* reveals *sāmānādhikarāṇya*, while *mano brahma iti jñānāti* do not show that; for, in this latter case, *manas* is the object and *brahma* is the

object. There is not the use of *iti* here as in the case of *mano brahmeti* ... This is a clear case of *sāmānādhikarāṇya* and an indication of the absence of the notion of *sampad* (NKL).

आत्मा ब्रह्मेत्येवमादौ सामानाधिकरण्यगीः ।
अन्यस्यान्यत्र संपत्स्यादद्वये सा कथं भवेत् ॥१२५६॥

In *ātmā brahma* ... and such other (Śruti texts), there is the expression (of two words) in the same case relation. Indeed, in *sampad* one would look something elsewhere (i.e. in some other); how can that¹ be there when there is absence of duality? [1256]

¹It means *sampad* 'looking upon a thing as another'.

द्रष्टव्यस्यात्मनस्तद्वदैकात्म्यं श्रुतिरब्रवीत् ।
ब्रह्मादि सर्वमात्मेति संपन्नातो ऽत्र युज्यते ॥१२५७॥

Likewise, the Śruti has declared a person's becoming one with the Ātman which is to be seen. So also in the Śruti 'The Brahman etc.¹ is all this.', it is not proper to entertain any idea of such looking upon one thing as another. [1257]

This affirms the *advayatva* of the Ātman.

SP here supports the *advayatva* of the Ātman by the Śruti passage *idaṁ sarvaṁ yad ayam ātmā* (BU 2.4.6).

¹The words in the first quarter have a reference to *kṣatra* and *vaiśya*, as SP points out, on the basis of *brahma tam parādāt* ..., *kṣatram tam parādāt* ... (BU 2.4.6).

तदापत्तिश्रुतेश्चेयं संपन्नेहोपपद्यते ।
ब्रह्मैव भवतीत्यादितदापत्तिवचांस्यपि ॥१२५८॥

And even on the basis of the Śruti statement about (a person's) becoming that, looking upon something as another is not acceptable here (lit. in this context), (for there are also) such statements as *brahmaiva bhavati*, referring to becoming that.

[1258]

The second line implies that, only on the similarity between the words *āpatti* and *sampatti*, one cannot rush to say that statements like the one about *sarvāpatti* can be taken as the basis for the theory of an individual being looked upon as the Brahman, thus indicating the acceptance of duality.

aapad with sampad !

वचनात्स्यात्तदापत्तिः संपत्तेरिति चेन्मतम् ।
नैवं प्रत्ययमात्रत्वात्संपत्तेर्न तदिष्यते ॥१२५९॥

If it is held that one can understand becoming the Brahman as an effect of looking upon something else as that (viz. the Brahman) on the basis of the Śruti statement, this is not so, because (becoming that) has the nature of only (one's) experience, and that (viz. *brahmāpatti*) is not accepted (as resulting from) looking upon something else as the Brahman.

[1259]

The Vedāntins hold that the Śruti statement about the Brahman makes one aware of its own meaning and this knowing itself is becoming one with the Brahman. There is nothing intervening between knowing the Brahman and becoming the Brahman. That is to say, there is no such process as: Śruti → *sampad* → *tadāpatti*.

तमोमात्रान्तरायत्वादाप्तमप्याप्यते न तत् ।
न च संपत्तमोहन्त्री मिथ्याज्ञानात्मकत्वतः ॥१२६०॥

(The fact is) that it (=the Brahman) is not obtained¹, even though it has been already obtained, because of its having the obstacle of mere ignorance about itself. And *sampad* is not the remover of ignorance, for it is itself of the nature of false knowledge.

[1260]

¹It means: not known.

तमोऽध्वंसातिरेकेण सम्यग्ज्ञानस्य नापरम् ।

फलमण्वपि संभाव्यं ज्ञानस्याकारकत्वतः ॥१२६१॥

It is not possible to think of even a little fruit in addition to destruction of ignorance (which results) from right knowledge; for, owing to its nature of being knowledge, not even a little of another fruit can be thought of. [1261]

This verse has in view an objector's notion: *śrutivacana* → *brahmasampatti* → *brahmāpatti*.

वस्तुनः शक्तिकृन्नापि वचनं ज्ञापकत्वतः ।
ज्ञापकानि हि शास्त्राणि कारकाणि न कुत्रचित् ॥१२६२॥

And a Śruti statement, being (only) informative (about the Brahman), does not produce (any) power in the real thing; for, the Śruti texts are only informative and nowhere productive (of any effects). [1262]

The second line of the verse is a general rule regarding informative means of knowing; it supports the specific statement about the Śruti sentences which declare the nature of the Brahman but not create it.

अभीष्टपुरुषार्थस्य बाधश्चैवं प्रसज्यते ।
निःशेषपुरुषार्थाप्तिकारि ब्रह्मावबोधनम् ॥१२६३॥

Thus¹, there will be contingent a difficulty in (achieving) the desired end of human endeavour for an individual; (as against this), informing (one) about the Brahman is capable of bringing about complete attainment of the end of human endeavour for an individual. [1263]

The verse brings about the difference in the attitude of the two sides, viz. the Vṛttikāra and the Siddhāntin. Also it points out why teaching about the Brahman is not a subsidiary to some prescription of worship (*brahmopāsana*).

¹Namely, by accepting that *sampad* which results from Vedānta sentences, and in turn, into liberation.

तादृक्षं संपदो न स्यान्न च दुःख्यात्मबोधतः ।
निःशेषपुरुषार्थाप्तिस्तद्बुद्धेरनृतन्त्रतः ॥१२६४॥

Similar (fruit) would not (result) from *sampad*, and also by knowing oneself as affected by sorrow; the complete achievement of the end of human endeavour for an individual is obtained from knowing that (viz. the Brahman), since it does not depend on man (i.e. man's effort). [1264]

The first line refers to *sampad* and the knowledge connected with it and the second line, with the knowledge of the Brahman and liberation.

Verses 1263-1264 emphasise that *duḥkhyātmabodha* (i.e. *sam-sāridhī*), is, because it is not *puruṣatantra*, ever obtaining and that would involve the contingency of all-time absence of liberation. If it were not so held, then there would ever be the state of liberation for an individual (NKL).

अपूर्वाद्यर्थ एवैकः प्राधान्येन विवक्षितः ।
काण्डद्वये ऽपि नैतस्मादन्यो ऽर्थः कश्चिदीक्ष्यते ॥१२६५॥

In both of the Kāṇḍas¹ there is only one thought to be expounded, viz. about that which did not have anything preceding it, as the principal matter; therefore, no other thought can be entertained (as the subject of discussion). [1265]

The verse emphasises how the Upaniṣad does not anywhere refer to an individual who later on becomes the Brahman as a subject of discussion in the Vedānta sentences discussed above.

¹These refer to the Madhu Kāṇḍa and the Muni Kāṇḍa which cover BU chh. 1-2 and chh. 3-4 respectively.

एतावदर इत्यन्त उपसंहारदर्शनात् ।
न चोपक्रमसंहारविरुद्धोक्तिः प्रशस्यते ॥१२६६॥

(And) there is seen in the end the conclusion (in the words)

etāvad are; (indeed) contradictory statements in the introductory and the concluding (parts of a work¹) are nowhere appreciated². [1266]

¹In the *upakarama* and *upasamhāra*.

²It means: acceptable.

तत्रैवं सति संसारी यद्यन्यो ब्रह्मणो भवेत् ।
इष्टस्यार्थस्य बाधः स्यान्न च ध्वान्तनिराकृतिः ॥१२६७॥

This being so, if there existed (according to one) a trans-migratory individual apart from the Brahman, there would result obstruction to the desired end¹ and not the removal of darkness². [1267]

¹It means: liberation.

²It means *avidyā*.

आरम्भे ऽवसितौ शास्त्रं परस्परविरोधतः ।
समञ्जसं न क्लृप्तं स्यात्संभवे ऽप्यविरोधिनः ॥१२६८॥

(Also) on account of the mutual contradiction between the beginning and the end of it, the Śāstra (i.e. scripture) would not be considered as reasonable — this, even when there is a possibility of (some scripture) that does not involve internal contradiction. [1268]

समाख्यानुपपत्तिश्च ब्रह्मणो ऽन्यस्य वेदनात् ।
नापि रुढिस्तदन्यस्मिन्नश्वकर्णादिवद्भवेत् ॥१२६९॥

If there is understood (from the Vedānta statement) information of something else than the Brahman, there would result impropriety (lit. unreasonableness) of the nature (of the lore¹). So also, there is not a convention (to use the word *brahman* as) some other thing (than the Brahman) as in the case of word *aśvakarṇa* etc.² [1269]

¹This is *brahmavidyā*, if the Brahman were taken to mean

manuṣya, then *brahmavidyā* would not be a significant name.

²The first line conveys the argument based on the significance (or, strictly speaking, etymology) of the name (*yoga*); the second line refers to the convention which can be impervious of *yoga*. To explain this, the example of *aśvakarṇa* is stated. *aśvakarṇa* literally means: a horse's ear; but, by *rūḍhi*, one can understand the word to signify somebody of that name, or, as NKL points out, a particular tree. The word *ādi* is not explained by SP or NKL. Though NKL writes *ādipadena karṇādisaṃgrahahāḥ*, one wonders if NKL understood by *karṇa*, which literally means an ear, the great hero of the *Mahābhārata* bearing that name. One can point out to the names *Śunaḥśepa*, *Śunaḥpuccha*, *Śunolāṅgūla* from the *Aitareya Brāhmaṇa*, all meaning 'a dog's tail', but actually standing for three brothers' names.

आत्मेति वेत्तुरन्यश्चेन्न ब्रह्माहमिति श्रुतेः ।

प्रतीचो ब्रह्मवत्प्रत्यग्ब्रह्मणो ऽपि विशेषणम् ॥१२७०॥

If by the word *ātman* is signified someone other than the knower, then there would not have occurred a specification by the Śruti of the inner self as the Brahman in (the words) 'I am Brahman.' with regard to the Brahman abiding (as) the inner self. [1270]

Identity of the inner self and the Brahman is here emphasised with a view to warding off the notion that Brahman signifies *manuṣya*.

ब्रह्मता न मदन्यत्र कौटस्थ्यान्मम नाशिषु ।

ब्रह्मणो नान्यतः प्रत्यक्साक्षात्त्वाद्ब्रह्मवस्तुनः ॥१२७१॥

The character of the Brahman is not elsewhere than in me (i.e. my inner self), on account of (hearing about) my immutability among perishable (objects); the inner self (also) is not (existing) elsewhere than in the Brahman, since the Reality, viz. the Brahman, is directly perceptible (in it). [1271]

SP refers to the Śruti passage *yat sākṣāt* ... (BU 3.4.1) which

mentions the Brahman and the the inner self as identical.

अव्यावृत्ताननुगतेर्मुख्यार्थश्च तथा सति ।
ब्रह्मविद्येति सिद्धः स्यादव्यपदेशो न चान्यथा ॥१२७२॥

That being so¹, the primary meaning of the word *brahmavidyā* gets established because of the Brahman not being distinguished (from any other object) and also not being followed (by any other object)²; also, it³ would not be improper. [1272]

¹The Brahman and the inner self are taken as identical.

²The word *vyāvṛtta* signifies what has differences in qualities like colour etc. with other objects in other class (*vijātīya*) and *anugata* signifies what shares a common (*sāmānya*) quality with the objects in the same class (*sajātīya*), i.e. similar to something else. The Brahman is neither of them. The word *avyāvṛttānanugati* points to two specific attributes of the Brahman and not of a man.

³Namely, the meaning of *brahmavidyā*.

भिन्नाभिन्नत्वगीर्यापि सापि दुःस्थितसिद्धिका ।
विरुद्धधर्मसंबन्धो न प्रतीच्यस्त्यधर्मणि ॥१२७३॥

(Now) as to the statement (about the Brahman and the inner self) being different and non-different; that also establishes a difficult situation. (Indeed) there is no connection of qualities which are opposed (to the Brahman) with the inner self which is (in reality) without any qualities. [1273]

This refers to the condition of the inner self as overpowered by ignorance. Only in this condition it seems to be different from the Brahman. This is the force of the word *duḥsthita*. By merely calling it *bhinnābhinna*, one cannot establish one's theory of *bhedābheda*. SP rightly points out BU passage (3.8.8) which describes the Brahman as only *asthūla* etc.

धर्मधर्म्यभिसंबन्धा गृह्यन्ते ऽनात्मवस्तुषु ।
प्रत्यक्षादिप्रमाणेन नामीषामात्मनि ग्रहः ॥१२७४॥

The relations of qualities and those who possess the qualities are understood in the case of objects other than the Ātman by such means as direct perception. One does not hold these (relations) in the case of the Ātman. [1274]

That is, the Ātman cannot be known by any means other than the Śruti and *dharmadharmisambandha* is understood only by *pratyakṣa*, *anumāna* and *upamāna*— those three *pramāṇas* are accepted in common life.

आत्मानात्मनिमित्ते ऽपि व्यपदेशो ऽपि दुर्घटः ।
विकल्पतो वा तत्सिद्धिर्ब्रह्मसंसारिणोर्भवेत् ॥१२७५॥

And (this) name (*brahmavidyā*) also would be difficult to explain even though it has both the Ātman and the non-Ātman as the subject-matter¹ of discussion. (One might argue:) Or, perhaps, that (name, viz. *brahmavidyā*) would get established with reference to the Brahman and the transmigratory being optionally. [1275]

¹This is the meaning of *nimitta* on the authority of SP and NKL which hold *nimitta* = *viṣaya*. The word *ātmānātmanimitta* would literally mean 'caused by (or arisen on account of) the Ātman and the non-Ātman'.

न चार्धवैशसं युक्तं तत्त्वज्ञाने विवक्षिते ।
संशयो हि तथा श्रोतुः स्यादनिश्चितवाक्यतः ॥१२७६॥

(The answer is:) It is not at all (*ca*) proper to adopt half-killing¹ when it is intended (to secure/expound) the knowledge of Reality, since, from a statement wherein there is no certainty,² there would be on the part of a listener (only) doubt about that (viz. Reality). [1276]

¹ 'One cannot cook one half of a chicken, keeping the other half alive for further regeneration.' This is *ardhavaśasa*.

²That literally means: where there is *vikalpa* 'option'.

निश्चितं फलवज्ज्ञानं यस्य स्यादिति शास्त्रतः ।
न तु संशयितं यस्मात्संशयात्मा विनश्यति ॥१२७७॥

(This is so) on the basis of the Śruti¹, viz. knowledge is fruitful (in the case of him) whose (knowledge) is ascertained (i.e. proceeds from decision)²; but not that which is beset with doubt, because (it is said in the Smṛti,) One who entertains doubts perishes ...³ [1277]

¹Cf. CU 3.14.4: *yasya syād addhā na vicikitsāsti*.

²The word *nīścitam* is misprinted in AnSS as *nīścittam*.

³Cf. *Gītā* 4.40.

परमात्मन्ययुक्ता चेत्साधकत्वादिकल्पना ।
शास्त्रोपालम्भतो नेवं शास्त्रीयेयं प्रकल्पना ॥१२७८॥

[Verses 1278-1283 point out that the word *brahman* signifies the Brahman (i.e. *mukhya-brahman*).]

If (one argues:) The notion of being an aspirant (for liberation) on the part of the Supreme Self¹ is improper, (our answer is:) No, it is not so, for that (argument) would give blame to the this Śruti; this is indeed a notion entertained² by the Śruti. [1278]

The argument is: The Śruti statement *tad ātmānam evāvet* (CU 1.4.10) points to the Brahman as the agent of *jānāti-kriyā* and, as such, it is unreasonable to hold that liberation results from knowing an agent of some action! This explains the word *akṣama* in the nextd verse.

¹Namely, *brahmabhāvī jīvaḥ iti kalpanā*.

²As will be clear: 'owing to ignorance'; cf. the next two verses.

अक्षमा भवतः केयं साधकत्वप्रकल्पने ।
किं न पश्यसि संसारं तत्रैवाज्ञानकल्पितम् ॥१२७९॥

(An objector argues:) What kind of (*kā*) inability is this on

your part, with respect to the notion¹ of (the Brahman itself) being an aspirant (for liberation)? (We answer:) Why! Do you not see this world which is imagined by ignorance resting as it is only on that (Brahman)²? — (this is what we hold!).

[1279]

¹It means: you cannot entertain.

²*tatra* is equal to *paramātmāni* in the preceding verse.

अनात्मवस्तु यत्किञ्चित्द्ब्रह्मानवबोधतः ।
ब्रह्मण्येव समध्यस्तं शुक्तिकारजतादिवत् ॥१२८०॥

Whatever is a non-Ātman object, is (what exists) thanks to non-knowing of (the nature of) the Brahman; (that) is superimposed on the Brahman itself, in the same way as silver on a conch-shell etc.,¹ (for example). [1280]

¹The word *ādi* refers to *rajjusarpa*, *mṛgaṭṛṣṇikā* and such other well-known examples.

यस्मादेवमतो ऽशेषसंसारानर्थकल्पना-
निदानबहुलाज्ञानसमुच्छ्रित्यै परा श्रुतिः ॥१२८१॥

Since this is so, therefore, the subsequent Śruti proceeds with the purpose of destroying the ignorance (about the nature of the Ātman) as a potent remedy against the undesirable notion of this entire transmigratory existence. [1281]

We take *aśeṣasamsāra* ... up to *samucchityai* as one word and not two, in this we follow the NKL edition of the BUBV not the AnSS edition. Also read SP: *-svāvidyādhvaṃsi brahma-vidyārthatvenārabdheti* ...

ब्रह्मेतिब्रह्मशब्देन कृत्स्नं वस्त्वभिधीयते ।
प्रकृतस्यात्मकात्स्न्यस्य वैशब्दः स्मृतये मतः ॥१२८२॥

(In the Śruti text referring to) the Brahman, it is the (one) whole object that is signified by the word *brahman* and the

word *vai* (in the same text) is understood for the remembrance of the wholeness of the Ātman which is the subject matter of discussion. [1282]

Cf. *brahma vā idam agra āsīt* (CU 1.4.10).

प्रकृतार्थोपरोधाच्च मुख्यब्रह्मार्थलाभतः ।
यथोक्तदोषाभावाच्च ब्रह्म कृत्स्नमिहास्त्वतः ॥१२८३॥

(Therefore), lest there should be opposition (*uparodha*) to what is taken up for discussion, (and) owing to the profit (which should accrue) from accepting the meaning of the principal Brahman and also because (in so doing) there should be absence of faults as stated before,¹ let here be (understood) the whole Brahman (as the thing meant). [1283]

The argument is: The word *brahman* signifies the Ātman without duality (*advaya*).

¹By Śaṅkara in BUB, viz. *prakṛtahānāprakṛtaprakriyāprasaṅga*, *mukhyārthabādha* and *upoddhātadoṣa*. Refer to verses 1203-1209 above.

In verses 1284-1311, Sureśvara states and refutes the argument against the wholeness of the Brahman.

ननु मानादिविरहादकृत्स्नमपि नेष्यते ।
कुतः कात्स्न्यं यतः सर्वं मानादेव प्रसिद्ध्यति ॥१२८४॥

(An objector argues:) But, even a thing, which is not whole, is not acceptable¹, if there is absence of any means (for proving its nature). Therefore, whence is this wholeness (of the Brahman proved)? Indeed, everything gets established (i.e. proven) on the basis of some means of knowing. [1284]

This verse, i.e. the objection, proceeds from resentment against *yathoktadoṣābhāvāt* in the preceding verse.

¹This literally means: accepted.

अभ्युपेतौ च मानादेस्तस्य कात्स्न्यं विहन्यते ।
न हि ब्रह्मातिरिक्ते ऽर्थे सति संभाव्यते ऽजडैः ॥१२८५॥

And, in case (such) means is accepted (as existing), the wholeness of that (Brahman) is stultified, because, when there exists an object in addition (to the Brahman), the intelligent do not hold that it is the Brahman. [1285]

The Advaitin is held as an intelligent person. There is obvious derision intended by the opponent, because, if the Advaitin were to accept that there are means of knowing the Brahman as apart from the Brahman, that would give lie to his proposition that the Brahman was alone.

भिन्नाभिन्नत्ववादे ऽपि ब्रह्माभिन्नात्मना भवेत् ।
व्यावृत्तेर्न तु भिन्नेषु ब्रह्मता स्याद्घटादिवत् ॥१२८६॥

Even in the theory that (the Brahman and the transmigratory world) are distinct and non-distinct, there would be the Brahman which remains undifferentiated in nature; and because of their distinction (from the Brahman) there would not be (in the dissimilar objects) the nature of the Brahman as established in the case of a pitcher etc. [1286]

In the case of a pitcher or a piece of cloth, we notice that though it may have some characteristics similar to those of a thing of its kind (*abhinna*) it is still distinct from it because of its peculiarity; some pitcher may be bigger than another, it may have a different colour; so also, a piece of cloth may be longer or shorter than another, it may be old or new in comparison with another and so on. This explains the word *ādi* 'etc.'.

वस्तुवन्तराभ्युपगमः प्रत्यक्कात्स्न्यविधातृकृत् ।
न तु मानाभ्युपगमो मितेस्तदवसानतः ॥१२८७॥

(And) acceptance (of the inner self¹) as something else than the Brahman would be an obstacle (to understanding) the wholeness/completeness of the inner self. However, acceptance

of the (different) means (does not obstruct) knowledge, because (their) end is that (viz. knowledge). [1287]

The first line reaffirms the oneness of the Brahman and the inner self. It emphasises that, if *bhedābhedavāda* were accepted, then the wholeness of the inner self (as seen in the sentence 'I am Brahman.') would be opposed. Thus *bhedābhedavāda* and Śaṅkara stand in opposition. The second line points out that the acceptance of the means of knowing does not bring about such an undesirable condition. Therefore, the means are understood to be there only up to the point when there results understanding of the nature of the Brahman or the inner self. That is to say: They do not really exist apart from the Brahman. There were notions of them held for the convenience of apprehension of their oneness.

¹Supply: which is held to be subject to transmigratory existence.

वस्तुवन्तरस्य सद्भावः सिद्धे कात्स्न्ये विरुध्यते ।
मानाद्यपेक्षा सिद्धस्य नानुन्मत्तेन चोद्यते ॥१२८८॥

The existence of an object other than the real object (viz. Brahman) would be opposed when the wholeness (of the latter) is established (and the existence of) the means etc.¹ in the case of (an object whose existence) is established is not upheld by one who is not mad.² [1288]

¹This stands for *mānameyavyavahārah* which was understood in the preceding verse where the word *mānābhyupagamaḥ* is used.

²This amounts to the discontinuation of the *mānādivyavahāra* when the Reality is established; cf. *miti* in the preceding verse. Both, this verse and its preceding, indicate Śaṅkara's idea — That *pramāṇādivyavahāra* (= *mānādi* ... here) is also understood as a product of superimposition.

न चापि वास्तवी सिद्धिः प्रमात्रादिविरोधिनी ।
सत्यामेव यतस्तस्यां संसारानर्थविभ्रमः ॥१२८९॥

Establishing of Reality is not opposed to (the acceptance of)

the knower etc., since only when that comes to be (i.e. gets) established, (there arises) the superimposition on it of the undesirable transmigratory existence. [1289]

वास्तव्या अपि संसिद्धेः स्वमहिम्नैव नेष्यते ।
प्रमाणविरहात्सिद्धिरेतच्च स्वानुभूतितः ॥१२९०॥

Also, in the case of the self-established Reality, it is not accepted as what gets established in the absence of the various means of knowing, i.e. on its own strength, and this is (clearly known) from one's own experience. [1290]

मेयकात्स्न्यविरोधित्वान्न मितेः शङ्क्यते भिदा ।
मेयस्वरूपावसितेर्नान्या मानस्य मानता ॥१२९१॥

Not any doubt is entertained in respect of knowledge that it has a distinction (from the Brahman) because of its character of not having any opposition to the wholeness of the object of knowing, viz. the Brahman. The character of the means of knowing as a means is not distinct from that it culminates into (grasping) the true nature of the object of knowing. [1291]

Cf. verse 1287 above.

न हि मेयप्रतिस्पर्धि तन्मानं मेयबोधितः ।
मानप्रसादात्सिद्धं सत्स्पर्धते मितिबाधितैः ॥१२९२॥

(Indeed) that means of knowing is not vying with (i.e. is opposed to) the object of knowing, because the existent being established by the favour¹ of the means of knowing, the existent stands in opposition to (all the objects) which are stultified by knowledge. [1292]

¹That is, power.

न हि वस्त्वन्पाश्रित्य मानत्वं लभ्यते मितेः ।
वास्तव्या अपि संसिद्धेर्न सिद्धिः स्यात्प्रमां विना ॥१२९३॥

Indeed, without having recourse to the real object (i.e. the Brahman), knowledge cannot get the character of (the authoritative) means of knowing. The knowledge about Reality (viz. the Brahman) cannot be (thought of) as an established means¹ without knowledge. [1293]

¹Supply: towards destruction of ignorance.

स्वप्रमेयार्पणं मुक्त्वा मानत्वे ऽन्यन्न कारणम् ।
अर्पितेन विरोधश्चेदस्तु कामं न दुष्यति ॥१२९४॥

There is no other ground for a means of knowing to be that (i.e. the means of knowing) unless it has yielded (i.e. led to the knowledge about) the object of its knowing (viz. the Brahman). If it is held that there is opposition to what is yielded (viz. knowledge), well, let it be so, it does not affect (our position). [1294]

प्राज्ञानाज्ज्ञानकाले च मानं मेयो ऽप्यपेक्षते ।
प्रमाणकार्ये निर्वृत्ते नान्यत्किंचिदपेक्षते ॥१२९५॥

Even the object of knowing (in Vedānta, viz. the Ātman¹) expects a means (of knowing it) before the knowledge (of it has dawned) and at the time of the knowing (of it); further, when the function of the means is accomplished², (the object of knowing) does not expect anything else (than itself). [1295]

¹This is in view of *meyah* in the masculine gender.

²That is, knowledge has occurred by using that means.

अज्ञातो ऽर्थः प्रमेयः स्याज्ज्ञाते को ऽतिशयो मितेः ।
अज्ञाते न विरोधो ऽस्ति ज्ञाते चान्यानपेक्षतः ॥१२९६॥

The object that is not known is taken to be the object of knowing. What excellence could there be in the knowledge when its object is already known? When (however) the object is not known, there does not exist any opposition¹ (of any kind); and when that (object) has become known, it has the

character of not being dependent on anything else (as the means of knowing it). [1296]

This reaffirms the thought in the preceding verse.

¹Supply: to the existence (and consequent acceptance) of the means.

मेयासाधारणात्मोत्थज्ञानस्यैव प्रमाणतः ।
तस्य वस्त्वनुरोधित्वादभेदादविरोधिता ॥१२९७॥

Since (here in the theory of Advaita) the means of knowing is only the knowledge which arises from the object of knowing, i.e. the unique Ātman, and it has conformity with Reality, therefore, there is non-distinction (between the means of knowing and the object of knowing) and consequent absence of opposition. [1297]

पश्येदात्मानमित्यत्र नियोज्यो विषयाद्विरुक् ।
न लभ्यते यतो नात ऐकात्म्ये स्याद्विरुद्धता ॥१२९८॥

In the statement 'He should see the Ātman.', the person to be enjoined is not (really) found to be away from the object (to be seen); therefore, for this reason also, there would not be any opposition to his oneness (with the object of his knowing). [1298]

ब्रह्मश्रुतेश्च मुख्यो ऽर्थः प्रतीचो ऽन्यत्र दुर्लभः ।
यथाकथंचिदित्येतदतो नैवाभ्युपेयते ॥१२९९॥

The primary meaning of the Śruti about the Brahman (i.e. the sentence such as 'He should see the Ātman.') is in every way difficult to fix elsewhere than in the inner self; therefore this (viz. the supposed absence of the whole of the Brahman) is not accepted. [1299]

स्वत एवात्मनः कात्स्न्यान्न कात्स्न्यं साधनाश्रयात् ।
साधनायासतः प्राक्च ब्रह्मैवासीदतीरितम् ॥१३००॥

Since the wholeness of the Ātman exists by its own nature, that wholeness is not on account of any means (of producing it). (For) it is said that the Brahman did exist there even before the means became operative (towards the purpose of knowledge)¹. [1300]

¹This is to say: Since the Brahman is already existent, the so-called means of producing the knowledge about it cannot be said to have produced that Brahman.

आसीदित्यपि यः शब्दः स तन्मोहाद्यपेक्षया ।
वस्तुवृत्तमपेक्षयैतन्नासीदस्ति भविष्यति ॥१३०१॥

And even that word *āsīt* (is used in the Śruti) with an eye on¹ (or keeping in view) ignorance about it. (The verbs) *āsīt*, *asti* and *bhaviṣyati* (are) not used (by one) depending upon the happening in the case of the real object. [1301]

Sureśvara uses the word *vr̥tta* in the sense of happening which requires cause the use of the verbs indicative of the past, the present and the future tenses while referring to the Brahman. There is no such happening in respect of the Brahman, i.e. it does not undergo any change; therefore, the indication of any tense in any proposition about it is ruled out.

¹It literally means: in expectation of.

सदानुदितालुप्तैकज्ञानमूर्तिरिति त्वया ।
कुतो ऽज्ञायि विना मानान्मानं नाज्ञाततां विना ॥१३०२॥

(A question is asked:) Whence have you known that (the real Brahman) has a form which has not come into existence, which will not disappear, and which has the form of knowledge, unless without any means of knowing? — (And indeed) there cannot be a means (operating) without (having to make known) something which has the nature of being unknown. [1302]

एकं ब्रह्म सदा बुद्धं यथा मानानुभूतितः ।

As from the means (in the form of Śruti), experience and instruction by the learned this formerly not-known Brahman becomes known as ever unique (i.e. one without a second), so also (does it become known) by resorting to (mere) one's experience.¹ [1303]

¹This experience takes the form of 'I do not know.'

व्युत्पत्तिफलमाश्रित्य तमो ऽसंभव उच्यते ।
व्युत्पत्तेः प्राक्तमस्वित्वं तत्साक्षित्वे ऽपि गम्यते ॥१३०४॥

Impossibility of (the existence of) ignorance is posited only after one resorts to the result of the knowledge arising from instruction. (This means:) Before knowledge from instruction (has occurred), there is understood (in the inner self which is really the Brahman) the state of having been overpowered by ignorance, even while it has the nature of the witness. [1304]

This has reference to SV 176.

This is to indicate the wholeness of the inner self that is equal to that of the Brahman and also to explain away the association of ignorance with the inner self.

AnSS reads *tamosambhava*, wrongly.

स्वसत्तयात्मनो मोहं न यतो वस्तु हन्त्यतः ।
शास्त्रानारम्भदोषो ऽपि नैवास्मान्प्रति ढौकते ॥१३०५॥

Since the real object does not destroy ignorance on the part of the inner self by its existence, therefore even the fault of not-beginning the study of the Śruti also does not affect us.

[1305]

This pertains to a fault pointed out earlier, viz. the inutility of Śāstric study.

SP refers to BSB 1.1.4 (cf. p.154): *śāstrotthajñānād ajñānadhvasteḥ śāstrārambho 'rthavān iti samanvayādhikarāṇe sthitam ity arthaḥ*.

अनादेरपि बाधश्चेत्तमसो नाभ्युपेयते ।
प्रमाणानां प्रमाणत्वं न क्वचिद्धः प्रसिद्ध्यति ॥१३०६॥

And if the removal of ignorance, which is beginningless, is also not accepted (by the opponent), (then, in that case, we have to say to him:) For you there will not be anywhere any means of knowing which has the character of the means of knowing. [1306]

The means of knowing informs one of something not known before, therefore, if the Śruti sentence is held as not capable of removing ignorance and thereby conveying the nature of the Brahman, then it has to be declared as totally non-productive of any effect.

अनुभूतेस्तदज्ञातं सिद्धं ब्रह्म पुरा मितेः ।
अपास्ताज्ञानतत्कार्यं तत्तु मानात्प्रसिद्ध्यति ॥१३०७॥

(One would say:) That Brahman, which was not-known before it was made known (by the Śruti), was (already or in reality) established by experience, but it can get (or gets) established by means of knowledge, as one from which is removed ignorance and its effect(s). [1307]

The thrust of the argument which is refuted is: There is no need of any *pramāṇa* (or Śruti) for getting to know the Brahman.

पूर्वोक्त्यैवोत्तरेषां च दोषाणां परिहारतः ।
परिहारान्तरं तस्मान्न वाच्यं तत्प्रसिद्धितः ॥१३०८॥

(And we answer thus:) Since there is (already) a refutation of these later (shown) faults by our earlier arguments,¹ therefore yet another argument (for their refutation) has not to be adduced (lit. stated), since that can be effected by the same (automatically). [1308]

¹Śaṅkara has in mind his argument against some doubt raised

by the opponent earlier in verse 1087 above.

प्रतीचो ऽर्थस्य ज्ञेयत्वादनवस्था च नेष्यते ।
अकारकस्य कौटस्थ्याद्विरोधो नात्मदर्शने ॥१३०९॥

Since the object to be known is the inner self, it is not possible (lit. accepted) that there is *infinite regress*. So also, there is no contradiction in (stating about the) seeing of the self since the Brahman/Ātman which is (in reality) not an agent of any action is immutable.¹ [1309]

¹Since the inner self is self-illuminating, there is not involved any contradiction (i.e. *svapprakāśatvān na svātmani kriyāvirodhah*).

घटादिमेयसाधर्म्ये निषेधो ऽपि श्रुतीरितः ।
यथोक्तावगमत्वं तु न कथंचिन्निवार्यते ॥१३१०॥

In respect of the similarity of (the Brahman/inner self) with a pitcher as an object of knowing also there is rejection stated in the Śruti. But, in no way, the character (of the Brahman) as what becomes known, as stated before, cannot be negated. [1310]

The objector compared the statement *ātmā vā are draṣṭavyo mantavyo śrotavyo nididhyāsitavyaḥ* ... to a popular statement *ghaṭo draṣṭavyaḥ*. Thereby he means to point out the contradiction involved in the Śruti statement. Thus, like a *ghaṭa*, the Brahman should be considered as impermanent, while the Śruti describes it as permanent! The answer is: Yet, the Śruti statement *vijñātāram are kena vijānīyāt* has negated any seeing of the object.

तस्मान्न कश्चिदप्यत्र कात्स्न्यर्यात्मावगमे भवेत् ।
दोषो ऽतः सांप्रतं भाष्यग्रन्थं व्याचक्ष्महे स्फुटम् ॥१३११॥

Therefore, here in understanding the wholeness (of the Ātman/Brahman) there is not (lit. would not be) any fault whatever. As such, we shall now clarify the text of the Bhāṣya.

[1311]

Verses 1312-1350 explain BUB: 'tat praviṣṭaḥ sraṣṭṛ brahma' with respect to BU 1.4.7: 'sa eṣa iha praviṣṭaḥ'.

यत्स्रष्टृ ब्रह्म पूर्वोक्तं स्वात्ममोहैकवर्त्मना ।
कार्यं चैतन्यबिम्बेन प्रविष्टं जलचन्द्रवत् ॥१३१२॥
ब्रह्मेति ब्रह्मशब्देन तदेवात्राभिधीयते ।
तस्य यो ऽतिशयः प्रोक्तो व्याकृताव्याकृतात्मकः ।
इदमित्युच्यते ब्रह्म तदुपाधिस्वभावकम् ॥१३१३॥

By the word *brahman* is here referred to that very Brahman which was earlier stated as the creator by following the way of ignorance about its own nature, (and which is now mentioned here as) the effect like the moon in the water that appears to have entered (into it) with her real orb.¹ [1312-1313ab] In the word *idam* is mentioned that Brahman² which has the nature of its delimiting adjuncts, viz. that excellence which was mentioned as having the form of the differentiated and the non-differentiated. [1313c-f]

tasya yo ... in verse 1313 explains BUB *idam śarīrastham ...*

¹This refers to *bimba-pratibimba* illustration; here the real entry is denied.

²Cf. NKL: *dehadvayāvacchinnam brahma idampadapratipādyam ity arthaḥ*.

वैशब्दो ऽवधृतौ ज्ञेयो ब्रह्मैव न तदन्यथा ।
अनिर्ज्ञातात्मतत्त्वं सदब्रह्मैवावभाति तत् ॥१३१४॥

(In the statement in the Bhāṣya), the word *vai* is to be understood in the sense of emphasis/specification. (That is to say that it conveys) only the Brahman and not anything else, being what has its true nature not-known, (and) it appears only as the non-Brahman. [1314]

This is another meaning as given by BUB *vaiśabdo 'vadhāraṇārthah*.

यदिदंशब्दधीगम्यं सम्यग्ज्ञानोदयात्पुरा ।

अपि ब्रह्मैव तत्कृत्स्नं तन्मोहादतथेक्ष्यते ॥१३१५॥

Whatever is understood from the meaning of the word *idam* is only that whole Brahman; even before the rise of the knowledge of Reality. But, owing to ignorance about it, it is seen as otherwise. [1315]

This is to re-iterate the meaning of the word *idam* and to explain the sentence in the Bhāṣya beginning with *prāk*.

रज्जुवत्तदविज्ञानात्सर्पदण्डादिनेक्ष्यते ।
ब्रह्मेदंमात्रश्रवणात्कुतो ऽग्र इति भण्यते ॥१३१६॥

That (viz. the Brahman) is understood through ignorance (about it) like a rope (being seen) as a serpent or a stick etc. Now only on hearing the word *brahmedam* (the question arises:) Why is it said (that there was the Brahman) before (*agre*)? It is (now) said (in answer): [1316]

सत्रान्तजगतो व्यक्तेः प्राक्तनः काल उच्यते ।
यद्वै तदिति तच्चापि स्पष्टमूर्ध्वं प्रवक्ष्यते ॥१३१७॥

Here is mentioned that time (which was) before the appearance of this transmigratory world that ends with the Sūtrātman (i.e. Hiranyagarbha) and that will again be clearly stated later in the words *yad vai tat ...*¹ [1317]

¹Cf. BU 4.3.26.

नाविद्यासंगतिस्तत्र तदकार्यत्वहेतुतः ।
तमोजस्यापि कार्यस्य न प्रतीच्यस्त्यकारणात् ॥१३१८॥

There, in that case there is no association of ignorance since it does not have the nature of an effect. Also, the effect of what is produced from ignorance is not (associated) with the inner self, because it is not its cause.¹ [1318]

¹The argument is: Ignorance is not the cause of the inner self

and therefore is ruled out its association with the latter which could be in accordance with the maxim regarding *kāryakāraṇa-samgati*.

प्रत्यक्तयात्मसंबन्धान्मोहादेशिचिन्निभात्मता ।

आचिच्छेषादतो नासौ मृषा स्याद्धर्मकार्यवत् ॥१३१९॥

Since, being within the body, ignorance etc.¹ has connection with the Ātman (and) has similarity of nature with sentience; therefore, till when there remains (only) sentience, it is not false in the same way as an activity in ritual (is not false).²

[1319]

¹The word etc. refers to the products of ignorance.

²On the *vyāvahārika* level, the ritual and all its pre-requisites such as qualification of a performer, the deity, the result are taken to be real. This is acceptance of *dvaita*. Similarly, *moha* etc. are taken to be real. This is only hypothetical acceptance!

प्रत्यग्याथात्म्यसंबोधान्नान्यो हेतुः समीक्ष्यते ।

निरन्वयविनाशाय यो ऽलं संसाररूपिणः ॥१३२०॥

There is no other cause than the knowledge of the true nature of the inner self to be seen as what is capable of destroying completely¹ all that exists in the form of transmigratory existence.

[1320]

This verse emphasises that only the knowledge of the inner self can remove ignorance.

¹It literally means: destroying it in such a way that there is no remainder left of it.

कौटस्थ्यासंगतो नास्य मोहतत्कार्यसंगतिः ।

स्वतः सेद्धुमशक्तत्वान्मोहादेरात्मसंगतिः ॥१३२१॥

On account of its immutability and non-association (with anything else),¹ this one has no association with ignorance and its effect(s). And, in the case of ignorance etc., there

is no association of them with the Ātman, because they have incapacity to establish themselves, on their own. [1321]

¹For there really does not exist that. *asaṅga* is for *asaṅgatva*.

काष्ण्येनेव वियद्योगः खवृत्तापेक्षया त्वसन् ।
आत्मनैवं तमोयोगो नात्मवृत्तानुरोधतः ॥१३२२॥

(As) in the case of the sky, there is association with darkness etc. though it (the latter) is not in existence by its (i.e. of the sky's) own doing, in the same way there is no association of ignorance with the Ātman; (indeed) not following its own doing. [1322]

Refer to Adhyāsabhāṣya (p.39): *apratyakṣe 'py hy ākāśe bālās talamalinatādy adhyasyanti*.

अन्यतः संगतिः सेयमविचारितसिद्धिका ।
अविज्ञातचिदुत्सङ्गसंस्थैवेयम् न वस्तुनि ॥१३२३॥

This so far talked about (*seyam*) association of the Ātman with another (viz. the non-Ātman) gets established by the absence of proper thought (reasoning); this is (indeed) supported on the basis (lit. lap) of sentience which is not known¹; (and) this is not (supported) by the real object. [1323]

¹It means: before the proper knowledge of it has arisen from the understanding of the Śruti.

अविद्याद्वारिकाप्यस्य संगतिर्नाञ्जसेष्यते ।
निरात्मकपरार्थत्वहेतुभ्यां शुक्तिरूप्यवत् ॥१३२४॥

And even the association of this (Ātman with the non-Ātman), though (understood) through ignorance, does not follow smoothly because (it is like the association) of a shell and silver¹ for two reasons, viz. (i)that it does not have any essence² and (ii)that it exists for the benefit of another.³

[1324]

¹This use of suffix *vat* after *śuktirūpya* is according to Pāṇini Sūtra 5.1.116: *tatra tasyeva*.

²It means: the character of a real thing.

³Like Prakṛti, every non-Ātman is *parārtha* as in the Sāṃkhya view.

प्रत्यग्रपातिरेकेण नान्यद्रूपमनात्मनः ।
वादिभिर्युक्तिभिः शक्यं क्वचित्साधयितुं सदा ॥१३२५॥

It is not at all possible for the opponents ever to establish with reasons that the non-Ātman has a form beside that of the inner self. [1325]

This is to explain the idea of *nirātmakatva* of the preceding verse.

कूटस्थादितमोन्तेन नित्यमव्यतिरेकतः ।
बुद्ध्यदेर्विषयान्तस्य नित्यमेतदतो जगत् ॥१३२६॥

Therefore, owing to its being non-different (*avyatirekataḥ*) from the immutable, the beginning (of all) and (the one) ending with ignorance, is eternal this transmigratory world, beginning with intellect and ending with the object(s). [1326]

This is to explain the Śruti *sad eva soṃyedam agra āsīt*; for justifying the pseudo-identity of the Reality and the world.

अतो ऽविद्यामहानिद्रासंवीतमनसामसौ ।
जन्मादिविक्रियाषट्कं स्वप्नदर्शनविभ्रमः ॥१३२७॥

For this reason, there is on the part of persons whose mind is wrapped up in deep sleep of ignorance, that error, viz. seeing dreams, consisting in six modifications beginning with the birth¹. [1327]

¹Cf. BSB 1.1.2. This refers to what Yāska has said about six *bhāvavikāras* (*Nirukta* 1.2).

यथा व्याख्यातबाह्यार्थप्रधानो ऽसंहतो ऽप्रमः ।
सर्वप्रमाणभाक्तद्वत्प्रमाणाभासभागपि ॥१३२८॥

As an individual, since he attaches¹ significance to all eternal objects, is not connected (with Reality/Ātman) (and) is without proper knowledge, experiences (i.e. uses) all the means of knowing; so (does he experience) the semblance of the means of knowledge (as well). [1328]

The NKL edition uses *yathāvyākhyātabāhyārthapradhānaḥ* as one word. Translation follows the AnSS edition: *yathā* and *vyākhyāta-* as two words.

¹It literally means: explains.

अविचारितसंसिद्धि तमोवत्स्यात्तदुद्भवम् ।
कृत्स्नं जगदतो मोहध्वस्तौ ध्वस्तं भवेच्चित्तिः ॥१३२९॥

Therefore, the entire transmigratory world is (lit. would be) like ignorance established in the absence of thought (reasoning), produced as it is from it (=ignorance). Therefore, when ignorance is destroyed the entire world would be destroyed and (become) knowledge. [1329]

¹Cf. SP: *jñānād ajñānadhvastau tajjatvād dhvastam jagac citir eva syād ity arthaḥ*.

भिन्नमातृप्रमाणादौ कार्यकारणवस्तुनि ।
अभिन्नमातृमानादिरात्मैवैको ऽद्वयः स्वतः ॥१३३०॥

While the things¹ are differentiated as the effects and the causes, viz. as various knowers and the means of knowing etc., only the Ātman, one without duality, is by its nature one that is not differentiated as knowers, the means of knowing etc. [1330]

¹In the text *vastuni* is *jātāv ekavacanam*; things refer to the world.

न देशकालावस्थादावपेक्षास्त्यात्मनः स्वतः ।
अनन्यापेक्षसंसिद्धेर्देशादेस्तदपेक्षतः ॥१३३१॥

On the part of the Ātman itself, there is not any dependence on region, time, condition etc.¹ since it is not established through dependence on any other (thing), whereas the region etc. depend on the same². [1331]

¹The word etc. stands for the producer and that which informs one of it.

²*tat* refers to *anya*.

देशकालनिमित्तादिव्यपेक्षं वस्तु यद्ववेत् ।
तदेव तदपेक्षं स्यान्न तु देशादिसिद्धिदम् ॥१३३२॥

Whatever thing would be (lit. is) dependent on region, time, condition etc.¹, would expect that² and (*tu*) it does not give rise to region etc. [1332]

¹See note 1 on the preceding verse.

²It refers to *deśakālādi*.

प्रमात्राद्युत्थितेरग्रे ब्रह्मैवासीद्यथोदितम् ।
यतस्ततो न साध्यं तज्ज्ञानकर्मादिसाधनैः ॥१३३३॥

Since, before the rise of (the notions) such as the knower etc.¹, there was only the Brahman in the beginning, as stated earlier, therefore, it is not what is to be accomplished by such means as knowledge, activity etc. [1333]

¹SP explains that by *ādi* is understood the intention of producing something (*bhāvanā*).

ब्रह्मापि तत्स्वतः साक्षात्तदबोधैकहेतुतः ।
इदंरूपं समापेदे रशनेवाहिरूपताम् ॥१३३४॥

And even that Brahman, on its own, transformed itself (into the form of this (transmigratory world) owing only to not-knowing about itself, like a girdle changes into the form of a serpent. [1334]

Such occurrence is due to ignorance on the part of a worldly knower.

अविद्याफलकारूढं तदेवंरूपकं परम् ।
ब्रह्म विद्याधिकारित्वं द्वैविध्यात्प्रतिपद्यते ॥१३३५॥

That highest (Brahman, when it has) mounted on the raft (in the form) of ignorance², comes to have (i.e. assumes) such forms¹, attains eligibility for (receiving) instruction³ because of its (assumed) dual nature.⁴ [1335]

¹The use of the compound *evam-rūpakam* refers to *rūpaka* in the contemporary world of drama.

²It is explained in the note on the preceding verse.

³It is the Śāstric instruction regarding the Brahman.

⁴See the next verse for the explanation of this.

स्वतो मुक्तं यतस्तस्माद्ब्रह्म विद्याम् तदर्हति ।
संसारित्वमविद्यातो मुमुक्षुत्वं ततो भवेत् ॥१३३६॥

Since it is by its very nature free¹, that Brahman is eligible for (receiving) that instruction. The state of transmigratory existence (in the case of the Brahman) is owing to ignorance (and), for that reason, there would arise a desire to be liberated. [1336]

The word *dvaividhya* used in verse 1335 is explained in the second half of this verse.

¹That is, in the state of release.

Up to the end of verse 1336 Sureśvara has explained the sentence 'brahmevedam agra āsīt' in BU. And now follows the explanation of the word *tat* in the subsequent sentence.

अध्यात्ममधिभूतं च तथा चैवाधिदैवतम् ।
परं तदभिमानेद्धं तच्छब्देनाभिधीयते ॥१३३७॥

That highest (Brahman), which is inflamed (i.e. affected) by Ego with reference to what is existing in bodies, what in elements, and what in deities, is expressed by the word *tat*. [1337]

हिरण्यगर्भतां नीत्वा कृत्स्नमध्यात्मरूपकम् ।
तस्मै हिरण्यगर्भाय ब्रूयाद्विद्यां तमस्विने ॥१३३८॥

Having led the entire (world) of forms in the bodies to the status of Hiranyagarbha, let one¹ declare that instruction² to that Hiranyagarbha who is wrapped by ignorance. [1338]

This has a reference to the earlier portions of BU talking about Hiranyagarbha existing in every individual sacrificer. Sureśvara has already referred to the *sūtrānta jagat* in verse 1317 above.

¹This refers to the knower of the Brahman.

²Regarding the nature of the Brahman.

एवं निःशेषसंसारप्रत्याख्यानेन निर्वृतिम् ।
सर्वाविद्यापनिहृत्या विद्यया प्रतिपद्यते ॥१३३९॥

Thus, one obtains the highest delight by discarding (the notion) of the entire transmigratory existence, and by (acquiring) the instruction which effects destruction (lit. concealment) of all ignorance. [1339]

आत्मानात्मात्मकं विश्वं प्रत्यक्षादिप्रमाणकम् ।
आत्मानमेव तदवेन्निष्ठां कात्स्नर्यात्मनः पराम् ॥१३४०॥

That (Brahman) knew (this) world consisting of Ātman and non-Ātman objects having for it the direct perception and other means, i.e. in fact itself, the highest basis of its nature of totality. [1340]

This explains the meaning of the sentence *tad ātmānam avet*. It is the Brahman which receives the instruction as said before and comes to realise only itself as the basis of all supposed duality.

अविचारितसंसिद्धि सर्वानर्थैककारणम् ।
 प्रत्यङ्मात्रैकसाक्षित्वात्तमस्तत्प्रत्यगात्मनि ॥१३४१॥
 प्रतीच्येव यतो ऽज्ञानमतस्तत्त्वविद्यया ।
 सकार्ये तमसि ध्वस्त आत्मैवैको ऽवशिष्यते ॥१३४२॥

Ignorance (lit. darkness) on the part of the inner self has got established (only) in the absence of thought (and) has been the sole cause of all undesirable effects, on account of its being experienced only by the inner self. [1341]

Since, ignorance rests only in the inner self, therefore, by knowing the true nature of that, there remains only the Ātman, when ignorance together with its effects, is destroyed. [1342]

विरक्तः सर्वसंसारान्निविवृत्सुः स्वतस्ततः ।
 संसारानलसंतप्तस्तद्विरुद्धं परीप्सति ॥१३४३॥

That individual, who has turned averse to all transmigratory existence, himself desiring to withdraw¹ from that (and) then tormented by the fire of the transmigratory existence, wishes to embrace fully what is opposed to that¹. [1343]

The metaphorical expression *samsārānalasamtaptaḥ* forces the use of embracing what is cool in opposition to the fire of transmigratory existence.

¹The word 'that' in both the cases refers to 'transmigratory existence'.

तस्याकृत्स्नापवादेन कृत्स्नैकात्म्यावबुद्धये ॥१३४४॥
 अन्वयव्यतिरेकाख्यो व्यापारो विहितः पुरा ।
 आत्मेत्येवेति विधिना पराक्प्रत्यग्विवेककृत् ॥१३४५॥

(Therefore), in order that the complete uniqueness of the Ātman is understood by explaining away (i.e. disproving) the incompleteness of that (transmigratory existence), [1344]

the Śruti has earlier made an effort¹, called (adoption of the method of) Anvaya and Vyatireka in the statement (lit. injunction) *ātmety eva* which makes difference between what is outside and what is within.² [1345]

¹It literally means: activity.

²This refers to the Brahman and the inner self.

ऐकात्म्यं वीक्ष्यते तेन त्यक्त्वा सर्वाननात्मनः ।
कृत्स्नमेव यतो वस्तु तदन्यत्तदबोधजम् ॥१३४६॥

Thereby is expressed (lit. seen) by one the uniqueness of the Ātman, after one has abandoned all non-Ātman (objects); for, Reality is one whole thing and anything else than that is (but) the product of the absence of knowledge. [1346]

¹The word *tena* refers to *vyāpāra* in the preceding verse.

कृत्स्नं पश्येदिति ततो वाक्यं वस्तुनि वर्तते ।
प्रविष्टो ऽकृत्स्नरूपत्वात्संसारानर्थचोदितः ।
आत्मेत्यनेन कृत्स्नात्मदर्शनाय नियुज्यते ॥१३४७॥

For that reason, the sentence 'He should see the whole.' has reference to the real thing¹ (and) the one that has entered into it and (therefore) is urged by the undesirable effects of the transmigratory existence, and, as such, on account of its own incomplete/defective form enjoined on one to be seen as the complete Ātman (viz. the Brahman) in (the sentence) *ātmetyeva* ... [1347]

This explains the *vyākṛtāvyākṛta* forms of the Brahman, or, in other words, *dvaividhya* of the Brahman mentioned in verse 1335 above.

¹Locative case is objective in sense (*viśayasaptamī*).

कृत्स्न आत्मेत्यतो वाक्यात्तथारूपं दिदृक्षति ।
अन्योन्यार्थसमाप्तित्वान्न भेदो ऽत्र पदार्थयोः ॥१३४८॥

Therefore, from the sentence *kṛtsna ātmā*,¹ an individual becomes desirous to see (the Ātman) of that nature; there is no difference between the two things,² since they satisfy the need of each other. [1348]

¹BU 4.5.13.

²These refer to the Ātman, i.e. the inner self and the Brahman, the highest Reality.

अकृत्स्नानात्मनः सर्वान्कृत्स्नांश्चानात्मनस्तथा ।
अन्वयव्यतिरेकाभ्यां तथा कृत्स्नानात्मनः ॥१३४९॥
निर्माल्यवत्परित्यज्य चैतन्याभासवर्त्मना ।
अनुमीयात्मनात्मानं कृत्स्नात्मानं प्रपश्यति ॥१३५०॥

Then, accordingly (*tathā*), an individual, (having first made between) all incomplete Ātmans¹ and all complete non-Ātmans by (adopting) the method of Anvaya and Vyatireka and then, [1349]

having abandoned all incomplete non-Ātmans like once-used-flowers, and then, following the path (shown by) the flash of sentience², thereby pleasing the Ātman (viz. Brahman) himself, finally sees himself (as) the full Ātman (viz. Brahman). [1350]

¹This refers to the individual selves.

²This refers to *prāṇopāsanā*.

उक्तदोषापनुत्त्यर्थं प्रत्युक्तिर्गौरवी त्वियम् ।
ब्रह्म वा इदमित्यादिर्नातो दोषो ऽत्र कश्चन ॥१३५१॥

[Verses 1351-1364 are an exposition of *tad ātmānam evāvet*.]

The weighty answer (of the Śruti)¹ which begins with the words *brahma vā idam* is (intended) for the removal of the fault stated (in the introductory) and, therefore, there is not any fault in this (statement) whatever. [1351]

¹This can be alternatively translated as: the teacher's statement —

this on the basis of a footnote by the editor of NKL. But the reply-sentence is: *brahma vā idam agra āsīt, tad ātmānam evāvet, aham brahmāsmīti, tasmāt tat sarvam abhavat.*

प्रमेयं यत्पुरा पृष्टं तद्ब्रह्म किमवेदिति ।
सर्वं चाप्यभवद्यस्माज्ज्ञानं ज्ञेयं च भण्यते ॥१३५२॥

In the question, 'What did the Brahman know?,' the subject (matter) of the discussion was first sought and in the statement 'And it became all.' is stated what is knowledge and the means of knowing (it). [1352]

तद्ब्रह्मात्मानमेवावेन्मेयं मानं च भण्यते ।
आत्मा मेयस्तथा मानमात्मप्रत्यय एव तु ॥१३५३॥

In the statement 'That Brahman knew only itself.', there are stated both the object of knowing and the (actual) knowledge. The Ātman is thus the object of knowing and the means of knowing is the awareness of the Ātman within. [1353]

नात्मज्ञानाद्यतो ऽज्ञानं विद्यते ऽनात्मनस्ततः ।
नात्मयाथात्म्यविज्ञानाज्ज्ञानमन्यदनात्मनः ॥१३५४॥

Since ignorance does not continue to be there on the part of a non-Ātman, after the knowledge of the Ātman has occurred to it, therefore, there is no knowledge for the non-Ātman other than the knowledge about the true nature of the Ātman (viz. Brahman). [1354]

This implies that a non-Ātman cannot exist apart from the Ātman.

प्रमात्रादिविभागेन यज्ज्ञानं प्रथते क्वचित् ।
तज्जन्मनः पुरेवार्थो न तेन ज्ञायते ऽज्जसा ॥१३५५॥

Whatever and wherever occurs (some) knowledge as divisible into the knower etc.,¹ even before the rise of that, the real object (has existed) and therefore it is not smoothly known by that (knowledge²). [1355]

¹This refers to knowledge and the means and the object of knowing.

²Namely, that which is mentioned in the first part of the verse.

तमोमात्रावसायित्वान्न यथावस्तु तत्ततः ।
प्रत्यग्वस्तवात्मकत्वे ऽपि चित्रमज्ञानचेष्टितम् ॥१३५६॥

Since that (knowledge¹) culminates into ignorance alone, it is not in accordance with the real thing; and, even if it is of the nature of the inner self, it is indeed the wonderful doing or effect of ignorance!

[1356]

¹Which is referred to in the preceding verse.

यत्प्रसादात्तमःसिद्धिस्तत्स्वसाक्ष्यप्यपहृते ।
तमो ऽप्यनुभवादेव प्राक्तद्व्युत्पत्तिजन्मनः ॥१३५७॥

That (knowledge¹), viz. its (own) witness (or seer) through whose favour (i.e. help) is ignorance (lit. darkness) established,² conceals even that; ignorance also results from (one's) experience and it occurs before the rise of the knowledge³ of that.

[1357]

This verse explains the power of darkness in concealing the nature of the inner self: (i)the experience of a worldly being and (ii)the knowledge of its true nature.

¹That which is mentioned in verse 1355 above.

²That is, becomes known; not through experience.

³The word *vyutpatti* means knowledge coming from instruction that is based on *mānameya* relation . Ignorance prevailed before *mānavyāpāra*.

प्राक्प्रवृत्तेः प्रमाणानामज्ञातं यदिहोदितम् ।
अक्षादि तत्तमोबाधान्न मानं रज्जुसर्पवत् ॥१३५८॥

Whatever is mentioned as sense-organs etc. was not known before the activity of the various means of knowing on account

of the obstruction by darkness¹ — (and) that² is not therefore the (correct/right) means of knowing like a serpent in (the knowing of) a rope. [1358]

¹That is, ignorance.

²It refers to *akṣādipramāṇa*.

न पश्यन्तीत्यतः प्राह बोद्धृत्वादिसमन्वयम् ।
न हि मोहैकनिष्ठेन तद्धीनं वस्तु मीयते ॥१३५९॥

Therefore, in the (sentence) *na taṁ paśyanti* the Śruti has declared the connection (of the Ātman) with the capacity of a knower etc.¹ Indeed, one who is given to² ignorance cannot see what is devoid of that³. [1359]

The verse explains the meaning of Śruti *taṁ na paśyanti* in BU 1.4.7.

¹The notion of this and others like, the object of knowing, the means of knowing etc. are based on ignorance.

²It means: overpowered by.

³Namely, the thing not wrapped up in ignorance, or Reality.

आत्मानं विरहय्यान्यो नालमात्मावबुद्धये ।
असाधारणतन्मातृमानमेयात्मकत्वतः ॥१३६०॥

A person (lit. Another, viz. a non-Ātman) is not able to grasp (the nature of) the Ātman by keeping the Ātman aside,¹ since (the Ātman) is of the unique nature of (the unity of) the ensemble, viz. the knower, the means of knowing and the object of knowing. [1360]

¹That is, by being *mohaikaniṣṭha* as said in the preceding verse, or not having received the favour of the Ātman.

असाधारणमात्रादि प्रत्यग्वस्तु यतस्ततः ।
नियोगो ऽपीह नायाति भिन्नकर्त्रीदिगो ह्यसौ ॥१३६१॥

Since the real thing, viz. the inner self, is (itself) the unique

(unity of the) knower etc.¹, therefore, here (i.e. in the case of this one, viz. the inner self) there cannot occur any injunction also for the reason that (injunction) has a reference to diverse (things) such as the agent etc. [1361]

¹As said in the preceding verse.

सर्वमज्ञातमेव स्याद्यस्मिन्नज्ञात आत्मनि ।
ज्ञाते ज्ञातं च तत्कात्स्न्योत्तावत्त्वात्सर्ववस्तुनः ॥१३६२॥

On account of all the objects forming a wholeness of that and being only of the dimension of that¹, all would remain unknown indeed (*hi*) if this Ātman (the inner self) remained unknown and (it would be) known when that (latter) was known. [1362]

¹That is, if we talk in terms of dimension and variety.

युक्त्या निरूप्यमाणस्य ह्यात्मा तत्त्वमनात्मनः ।
प्रत्याख्यातः स चेत्तेन क्वानात्मा सिद्ध्यतां ततः ॥१३६३॥

Indeed the Ātman is (known as) the truth (underlying) the non-Ātman when it is carefully observed with reason; (and) if that (Ātman) is discarded by that¹, on what basis can the non-Ātman get established? [1363]

¹It refers to the non-Ātman. Cf. *ātmānam virahayya* in verse 1360 above.

अनात्मतत्त्वमन्वेति ह्यात्मासङ्गो ऽगुणो ऽद्वयः ।
असिद्ध्यन्स स्वतःसिद्धौ सिद्धिं क्वान्यत्र लप्स्यते ॥१३६४॥

Indeed the Ātman, not-attached (to anything else), not having any qualities, and not having any duality, runs through¹ the nature of the non-Ātman (objects); (that same Ātman), not itself getting established, (i.e. unless it has existed) on which other basis does it get established? [1364]

¹It literally means: is associated with (all); i.e. is really the basis of all the world — this is because of *avidyā/māyā*/ignorance.

Verses 1365-1415 discuss 'anubhava' i.e. experience as a unique means of knowing Reality, a means undisputed by even mutually disputing theorists. Also, about their argument on that the beginningless ignorance is removed by knowledge (of Reality).

सर्ववादिविरोधे ऽपि संवादो ऽनुभवे यथा ।
वादिनामविसंवादस्तथाज्ञाने ऽप्यसंशयः ॥१३६५॥

And as there is concord among all the different exponents of theories in respect of experience, even while there exists opposition among themselves; so also is there absence of any discord among these opponents (lit. variously arguing persons) in respect of ignorance — there is not any doubt about this.

[1365]

तद्वद्बाधो ऽप्यबोधस्य बोधेनाभ्युपगम्यते ।
एतावतैव पर्याप्तमस्मद्राद्धान्तसिद्धये ॥१३६६॥

In the same way, it is accepted (by all of them) that the absence of knowledge (i.e. ignorance about Reality) is removed by knowing (the real object of knowing). This much (about the method of argument among debaters) would be (i.e. is) sufficient for establishing our doctrine.

[1366]

अस्मद्राद्धान्तसंसिद्धौ नान्यद्राद्धान्तसिद्धता ।
तत्सिद्धावस्य संसिद्धिर्न कथंचिन्निवार्यते ॥१३६७॥

When our doctrine is established there cannot be the establishment of the doctrine of another. And, even if the other's doctrine is established (we point out) the establishing of this (i.e. doctrine) can in no way be avoided.¹

[1367]

¹This is because the opponent also has to accept Jñāna as a *pramāṇa* or proof for his doctrine. And Jñāna is the nature of the Ātman, in our view. Therefore, our view is automatically proved.

अज्ञानं संशयज्ञानं मिथ्याज्ञानमिति त्रिकम् ।

अज्ञानं कारणं तत्र कार्यत्वं परिशिष्टयोः ॥१३६८॥

Absence of knowledge, knowing the doubt, and false knowledge are the triad (which characterizes other doctrines¹); among those three (*tatra*), the absence of knowledge is the cause, whereas the remaining two are of the nature of the effect (of the first). [1368]

This points to the importance of Jñāna in every doctrine; particularly in Vedānta.

¹We understand this from SP: *pratyagajñānavijṛmbhitāḥ sarve parasiddhāntā aprāmāṇikabhedāśrayatvād atas teṣāṃ bhrāntatvam iti bhāvah.*

कूटस्थज्ञानमात्रत्वान्न तमो ऽस्य स्वभावतः ।

नाप्यागन्तु तथाज्ञानं हिरुक्सिद्धेरसंभवात् ॥१३६९॥

This one (i.e. the inner self) does not, by its nature, have darkness¹, since it is only (of the nature of the) immutable knowledge. So also, ignorance cannot come to it, because there is no possibility of its existence apart from it.² [1369]

¹That is, ignorance associated with it.

²Ignorance has a basis in *avidyā* of the Ātman; it cannot be any characteristic of the same. Nor can it be a distinct entity.

अविद्यातज्जकार्याणामात्मना संगतिस्ततः ।

आत्मात्मवत्त्वरूपा स्यान्न तु सोभयकर्मजा ॥१३७०॥

For that reason,¹ the association of ignorance and the effects produced by it with the Ātman is only of the nature of the Ātman and what has (i.e. is possessed of) the Ātman; but it does not result from the activity of the two (Ātman and ignorance) together. [1370]

¹This is *tataḥ* = *nāvidyātirekeṇa* 'not apart from *avidyā*' (SP).

एकमेव हि सद्बस्तु यद्वेदान्तप्रमाणकम् ।
 तावन्मात्रैकनिष्ठत्वादात्मज्ञानं सदास्पदम् ॥१३७१॥
 सर्ववादिविरोधे ऽपि यत्तिसद्धान्तबलाश्रयम् ।
 साधनं दूषणं सर्वं न तन्निहुतिरिष्यते ॥१३७२॥

The existent thing which is known from Vedānta is but unique¹ (and therefore) the knowledge of the Ātman, supported as it is only by it (viz. the Ātman), has an abode in that existent, [1371]

even while there is opposition among all the opponents, that, on the strength of whose doctrine all the means (of knowledge) are seen as fault, cannot be denied (lit. concealed). [1372]

The verses convey that Jñāna cannot be unreal.

¹Or, all alone.

साधनं दूषणं सर्वं यस्य पादव्यपाश्रयात् ।
 सिद्धायते तीर्थदृशां कुतः स्यात्तस्य निहुतिः ॥१३७३॥

How can there be the concealment of that (means of knowing) by resorting to whose strength (lit. feet) all the means of knowing are proved as false for them who see the adorable (i.e. Reality)? [1373]

This is directed against the Śūnyavādin, who denies even the existence of experience.

अभावो येन भावेन भाव्यते ऽस्ति न नास्ति सः ।
 तस्य भावस्य सद्भावो वद केन निवार्यते ॥१३७४॥

That one exists and it is not that that does not exist — that (i.e. experience) on account of whose existence the absence of another (i.e. unreal) is understood. Tell me, 'Who can ward away the existential character of that existence?' [1374]

व्यभिचारि न यत्रास्ति प्रमाणं सर्ववादिनाम् ।
 स्वमहिम्ना च यत्तिसद्द्वं तदपह्नयते कथम् ॥१३७५॥

That, in respect of which there is not any contradictory means of knowing¹ (even) in (the opinion of) all disputants, and that which has existed (*siddham*), on its own strength — how can that be concealed (i.e. denied)? [1375]

The argument is: No one can deny *anubhava* as an authoritative means of knowing.

¹This stands for argument.

तस्यैवाव्यभिचाद्रित्वात्सर्वेषु व्यभिचारिषु ।
तदेवैकं प्रमाणं नः सर्ववाद्यविरोधि यत् ॥१३७६॥

Only that is for us (an authoritative) means of knowing (Reality) which, amongst all the disputants, is not disputed, namely that which has an invariable character¹ among all the variable means of knowing. [1376]

Sureśvara points out that (this indicates the Ātman, the experiencer — not distinct from experience) is accepted for *anubhava* 'experience' its greatness as an existent among all the changing forms etc.; it is not denied to be so existing and therefore is an authoritative means for establishing Reality and its nature.

¹That which invariably exists.

देहादावात्मबुद्धिर्नो न कदाचिद्विहन्यते ।
जाग्रत्स्वप्नसुषुप्तेषु शक्तिकारजतादिवत् ॥१३७७॥

In respect of the body etc., our awareness of the existence of the Ātman is not lost (lit. struck down) any time — (it continues to be there) in (all) the (states of) waking, dream and deep sleep, in the same way as the notion of silver in a conch-shell. [1377]

The word *dehādi* has reference to the next verse. The instance of silver in a conch-shell emphasises the effect of ignorance or *avidyā* and *tajja*. Thereby is indicated the false identification of body etc. with the Ātman/inner self.

देहान्तात्कर्तुरन्यो यो बुद्ध्यन्ताद्बोद्धुरेव च ।

प्राणान्तात्करणाच्चान्यः प्रत्यग्दृष्ट्या य ईक्ष्यते ॥१३७८॥

He¹ is understood as the inner self, who is other than the agent of the body etc.², so also from the knower, viz. intellect etc., and yet again from various operative organs ending with *prāṇa*. [1378]

Sureśvara mentions three different opponents though he has not mentioned them specifically. In the preceding verse also, he has vaguely referred to them and emphasised that the awareness of the existence of the inner self is acceptable even to them. The three opponents are: the followers of the Cārvāka, the Mīmāṃsakas and those devoted to Hiranyagarbha. (NKL refers to one called Gārgya.)

¹The use of 'He' is implied in the verse, for the verse uses *yaḥ*; on this SP and NKL rightly observe, one *yaḥ* stands for *sa*—we take the last to be that.

²It shows the nature of man who holds intellect, Ego and *manas* as identical with the Ātman. SP points to that the body, the sense-organs and *manas* are understood by *dehānta*. (This, we can say, is the view of Cārvākas.) *buddhyanta* indicates the function of *ahamkāra* also. And finally, *prāṇa* shows connection with Hiranyagarbha. Cf. NKL for this explanation.

अदेहतो ऽजरो ऽमृत्युरस्वान्तो ऽमोहशोकवान् ।

अबुभुक्षो ऽपिपासश्च प्राणकारणवर्जनात् ॥१३७९॥

Since it does not have a body¹, it never ages, it never dies, it never has any inner parts for itself, it never has infatuation and grief, it never has hunger (lit. desire to eat), it never has thirst (lit. desire to drink), never devoid as it is of the causes (of these, viz.) *prāṇa* (etc.) [1379]

¹*dehataḥ* = *adehavattvataḥ*.

अहीनो हीयते यो ऽसौ तथानागत एति यः ।

जानीयात्तमनात्मानं जाग्रत्स्वप्नसुषुप्तिषु ॥१३८०॥

One should know that as non-Ātman who, though not abandoned (in reality), is abandoned and also, though not coming, does come — in (the states of) waking, dream and deep sleep. [1380]

न हीयते हीयमान आगच्छति न चैति यः ।
आगमापायसाक्षित्वादात्मा सो ऽनुभवाश्रयात् ॥१३८१॥

(And) that is the Ātman which is not abandoned though being abandoned, which does not come and does not go, and has the nature of being the witness of coming in and going out (of the body etc.) — this is so on the basis of experience. [1381]

नाविद्यामनुपादाय प्रत्यक्कारकतां व्रजेत् ।
नाकारकः क्रियां कर्तुमलं जगति वीक्ष्यते ॥१३८२॥

(Indeed) the inner self does not become the agent (of any action) unless it has taken recourse to ignorance¹. Nowhere in the world is noticed a non-agent to be capable of doing any act². [1382]

¹The inner self is taken to be the agent of actions because of ignorance, as said earlier.

²This *vaidharmyadr̥ṣṭānta* 'example of opposite nature' is given with a view to pointing out that the Ātman does not in reality undertake any activity and, therefore, in the world no activity can be attributed to it. If it is so done, it is wrongly done!

द्रष्टुर्दृष्ट्या न चानाप्तो ऽनात्मा कश्चित्प्रसिद्ध्यति ।
मिथ्याज्ञानमतो ऽनात्मा ह्यात्माज्ञानसमुत्थितेः ॥१३८३॥

No non-Ātman whatever gets established, nor is it seen as it is by the sight of the seer. Therefore, seeing (i.e. accepting) (that there is) the non-Ātman is only false knowledge and that has arisen from ignorance about the (true nature) of the

Ātman.

[1383]

नाविद्यामनुपादाय जाग्रत्स्वप्नसुषुप्तिषु ।
अनात्मानं विजानाति तज्जज्ञात्राद्यनन्वयात् ॥१३८४॥

One does not know (any) non-Ātman in (the states of) waking, dream and deep sleep, unless one has taken recourse to¹ ignorance, for there is, in reality, no connection of one with the knower etc. which are products of that (viz. ignorance).

[1384]

¹That is, one is overpowered by.

न च ज्ञात्रनुरोधिन्या दृष्ट्याज्ञानासमन्वितम् ।
आत्मात्मानमलं द्रष्टुं रूपं श्रोत्रधिया यथा ॥१३८५॥

And the Ātman is not able to see, with a sight which follows (the notion of) a knower etc., the non-Ātman which is associated with ignorance, in the same way as one cannot see a form with an ear or intellect.¹

[1385]

For any seeing etc., which is a worldly experience, one requires an eye etc. This means that there must be association of the Ātman and the non-Ātman through ignorance — only then a proper mechanism of seeing etc. obtains. If such mechanism is wanting any seeing etc. does not become possible. Now, the Ātman has no such mechanism, this is reality; therefore, it cannot see any non-Ātman. For clarifying this, an example is given in the last line. An ear and intellect are not the proper means of seeing an object. Since the Ātman is not overpowered by *avidyā*, it is unable to see the non-Ātman.

¹*śrotradhiyā* is an optional Dvandva compound, meaning *śrotena dhiyā vā*.

उत्सार्यानात्मनः सर्वानन्वयव्यतिरेकतः ।
प्रत्यक्प्रधानया दृष्ट्या पश्येदात्मानमद्वयम् ॥१३८६॥

(Therefore) having set aside all the non-Ātman (objects) by

adopting (the method of) Anvaya and Vyatireka, and holding a proper view of the inner self, one should see the Ātman which is without any duality. [1386]

त्वं ब्रह्मेति गुरोर्वाक्यात्तन्निविष्टपदार्थयोः ।
उक्तान्वयादिनोत्पन्नविवेकः सन्नबुध्यत ॥१३८७॥

On hearing the preceptor's instruction *tvam brahma*, one, who had acquired discrimination between the two objects conveyed by the words mentioned in the instruction by (the method of) Anvaya and Vyatireka as stated earlier, became awakened (to Reality). [1387]

This reference is perhaps to Śvetaketu who learnt from Āruṇi the lore of the Brahman in the words *tat tvam asi*. Yet, by replacing the imperfect tense by the present, one could make this verse a general statement.

तद्ब्रह्मात्मानमेवावेद्यदनात्मेत्यभूत्पुरा ।
अविद्यया विद्यया तु ब्रह्मात्मैवाभवत्स्वतः ॥१३८८॥

That Brahman, which had formerly become a non-Ātman (as it were),¹ knew only itself. By *avidyā* and knowledge the Brahman itself became the Ātman.² [1388]

¹This is the force of *iti*.

²Cf. *Muṇḍakopaniṣad* 7.9: *vidyām ca avidyām ca ...*

एवेत्यवधृतौ ज्ञेयं ब्रह्मात्मार्थविशेषणम् ।
आत्मैव ब्रह्म विज्ञेयं ब्रह्मैवात्मेति संभवात् ॥१३८९॥

The word *eva* is to be understood in the sense of specification; (and) *brahman* as an attribute of the object, viz. of the Ātman, for it is possible to accept only the Ātman itself as the Brahman and only the Brahman itself as the Ātman. [1389]

ब्रह्मता नात्मनो ऽन्यत्र नात्मता ब्रह्मणो ऽन्यतः ।
तद्याथात्म्याप्रबोधात्तु तयोरेष विपर्ययः ॥१३९०॥

The character of the Brahman does not obtain elsewhere than in the Ātman; so also, the character of the Ātman does not obtain elsewhere than in the Brahman. But this differentiation between them (in language) is owing (only) to the non-knowing of the real nature of the two. [1390]

आत्मापि साक्षात्तद्ब्रह्म परोक्षं तदबोधतः ।
ब्रह्मैव तद्वदात्मापि सद्वितीयवदीक्ष्यते ॥१३९१॥

Also the Ātman is the Brahman itself and it is imperceptible on account of the absence of knowledge (about its true nature). In the same way, the Brahman itself is the Ātman and is yet seen to be having a second as it were. [1391]

वाक्योत्थसम्यग्विज्ञानप्रध्वस्ततमसो यतेः ।
विभागहेतोरच्छित्तेः सर्वमात्मैव शिष्यते ॥१३९२॥

All (this world) remains only as the Brahman for a person, who has renounced, (and) who has his ignorance destroyed by the right knowledge which arose from the Śruti statement, since there is the removal of the cause of the division (of the non-Ātman and the Ātman). [1392]

This conveys that even one who has renounced worldly connections gets to know about the Brahman from the Śruti.

विज्ञातारमरे केन विजानीयादिति श्रुतेः ।
ननु विप्रतिषिद्धार्थं तदात्मानमितीर्यते ॥१३९३॥

(Now an objection is raised:) On the basis of the Śruti *vijñātāram are kena vijānīyāt*,¹ the statement *tad ātmānam* ...² is stated indeed contrarily (to the earlier Śruti). [1393]

¹BU 2.4.14.

²BU 1.4.10.

दृष्टेर्द्रष्टेति विज्ञानान्नात्र विप्रतिषिद्धता ।

प्रत्यग्बुद्धिः प्रमात्रादौ सर्वत्रैवोपजायते ॥१३९४॥

(The answer is:) Here there is no contrariety on account of the knowledge (imparted by the Śruti in) *drṣter draṣṭā*,¹ (for) awareness of the inner self in respect of the knower etc. does arise everywhere. [1394]

¹Cp. BU 3.4.2: *na drṣter draṣṭāraṃ paśyeh*.

युष्मदस्मद्विभागाभ्यां यावद्वस्तिवह मीयते ।
तेन तेन विशेषेण प्रत्यगर्थः प्रतीयते ॥१३९५॥

Whatever be the things (here) known as divided in classes (marked by the awareness of) *yusmat* and *asmāt*, by each one (of them as) an attribute becomes known the inner self. [1395]

This refers to every knowledge situation wherein *yusmad-asmadvibhāga* is employed, but all that points to only one thing, viz. the inner self. This is in a way the essence of superimposition so well known from Śaṅkara's writing. *vastu* is *jātāv ekavacanam*.

प्रत्यगर्थमनालिङ्ग्य न परावर्ति जायते ।
विज्ञानं तेन तत्पूर्वं सर्वमन्यत्प्रतीयते ॥१३९६॥

(Verily) knowledge cannot touch¹ the object beyond,² without having referred to (lit. embraced) the object called the inner self. Therefore, everything else (than that) becomes known (only if) preceded by that³. [1396]

¹It literally means: turn to.

²It means: what is outside the body.

³It refers to *vijñāna*.

आब्रह्मास्थाणु चान्वक्षं सर्वेषु व्यभिचारिषु ।
प्रत्ययो ऽव्यभिचार्येकश्चैतन्यप्रतिबिम्बितः ॥१३९७॥

In the case of all the variable (objects), from the Brahman up to a pillar which are directly perceptible¹, only the

knowledge (of them all) which is reflected in the sentience (within) is invariable. [1397]

This refers to the commonly accepted notion about knowledge that every object of knowledge finds a reflection in the sentience within the body of the perceiver.

न च विप्रतिपद्यन्ते वादिनो ऽनुभवात्मनि ।
तत्र चेत्स्याद्विसंवादः केनान्येन चिकित्स्यते ॥१३९८॥

And (whoever may be among) the disputants, they do not hold different views as regards the nature of the experience of one; if they were to dispute about that¹ (also), by what other means could that (Reality) be² to be known? [1398]

¹It refers to *anubhava*.

²Or alternatively, by what other means is that (Reality) sought?

अन्योऽपि योऽत्र कल्प्यः स्यात्सोऽप्यस्मान्नैव भिद्यते ।
सर्वभेदात्मरूपत्वात्कः सन्स्यादात्मना विना ॥१३९९॥

And whosoever other¹ is to be understood as different is also not distinct from this one. Since that one is the nature of all the discrete objects, how can that be existent without the Ātman?² [1399]

¹Any other than the inner self, i.e. the object to be known.

²That is, unless it is one with the Ātman.

प्रत्यगात्मनि विश्वस्य ततो ऽनात्मनि तद्वशात् ।
आविद्वदङ्गनाबालं विश्वसित्यनपेक्षतः ॥१४००॥

Therefore, having depended¹ on the inner self, everyone, from the learned² to a women and to a young one, thereby depends on the non-Ātman, without having any expectation (from it). [1400]

¹That is, having accepted the existence of the Ātman as one

without a second.

²The AnSS edition says *avidvat-* while the NKL edition reads *āvidvat-*. We adopt this latter. The reading in *Bṛhadāraṇyaka-vārtikasāra* 10.38 supports this. The reading in AnSS edition is difficult to explain.

आत्मनैवात्मविज्ञानं ज्ञेयज्ञात्रादिवर्जितम् ।
स्वयमेव फलात्मत्वात्फलं चास्मान्न भिद्यते ॥१४०१॥

Since the knowledge on the part of the inner self (about itself occurs) only on its own and is devoid of (all differences) such as the knower, the object of knowing etc.¹; therefore, that (viz. the knowledge about the nature of the self), being of the nature of the fruit, and the fruit does not differ from this one (viz. Ātman). [1401]

¹The word etc. refers to the sense-organs.

प्रमाणव्यवहारो ऽयं सर्वेषामपि वादिनाम् ।
स्वतो ऽनुभूतनिष्ठः स्यान्न चेत्षष्ठेन्द्रियार्थवत् ॥१४०२॥

Also this dealing (involving various) means of knowing is for all the disputants resting on experience, by its nature; if it were not so, it would have been like the object of the sixth sense¹. [1402]

¹It refers to *manas*, therefore the object of this sense is only imaginary or meaningless. It is not real, and therefore, if a dealing involving various means of knowing were not rooted in one's experience, they also would be imaginary likewise. This stresses the importance of *anubhava*. Cf. Sureśvara's use of *ṣaṣṭhagocara* which (we believe) is a cyptic expression for *ṣaṣṭhendriyārtha*. See our book [Vol.1:1982] p.280.

चैतन्यमात्ररूपो ऽयं सदानस्तमितोदितः ।
अविद्यामस्पृशन्नास्ते निष्क्रियो ऽकारको ऽफलः ॥१४०३॥

This one (viz. the inner self) is of the nature of only sentience.

ever existent (lit. has never arisen), and never disappearing, nor touching ignorance¹ and ever non-active, non-agent, and non-productive and without any fruit. [1403]

¹That is, not being affected by it.

स्वतो ऽसङ्गस्वभावत्वात्खचरादि वियद्यथा ।
नाविद्या नापि तत्कार्यं प्रत्यक्स्थमपि ढौकते ॥१४०४॥

As a bird etc. does not touch¹ the sky, which by its own nature does not have connection with anything else, so also neither ignorance nor its effect, though abiding in the inner self, touches it. [1404]

¹The verb root \sqrt{dhauk} is 'to push/urge'; but here the *Ātmanepada* indicates its meaning of 'touching' without affecting the touched.

स्वतः सेद्धुमशक्तत्वात्खमृते वायुवत्सदा ।
प्रत्याख्यातस्वभावो ऽपि सिद्ध्यतीवाग्रहो दृशौ ॥१४०५॥

Since it cannot get established on its own, like the wind without the sky, ignorance¹ gets, as it were, established² in the seer³ even though its nature is (finally) discarded. [1405]

¹*agrahaḥ sakāryam ajñānam* (SP), ignorance is what is not being received by the *Ātman*.

²That is, seems to be existent.

³That is, in the inner self.

युतिं साधारणात्मा हि यात्यसाधारणात्मभिः ।
अनन्यवृत्तितो नात्मा संसर्गं प्रैत्यनात्मभिः ॥१४०६॥

Indeed, what is of the nature of a common property (of many) gets connected with (other objects or properties), which are objects of different nature, (but) the *Ātman*, which does not have existence elsewhere,¹ does not get connected with the non-*Ātman* objects. [1406]

विभज्यमानो ऽन्येभ्यो हि विशेषो ऽपि प्रसिद्ध्यति ।
एकत्वादात्मनो भेदो द्वयाभावान्न चेष्ट्यते ॥१४०७॥

Further, even an uncommon or a particular property gets established as such when it is distinguished from others; (but) in the case of the Ātman there is only uniqueness¹ and, therefore, in the absence of duality (associated with it), no (such) distinction is or can be accepted. [1407]

¹It alone exists, without a second.

भेदसंसर्गहीनत्वात्पदवाक्यार्थतात्मनः ।
दुःसंभाव्यात आत्मायमात्मनैवानुभूयते ॥१४०८॥

On account of (the Ātman), being devoid of any connection with discrete objects, it is difficult (to accept) that Ātman can be an object which is conveyed by words and sentences¹. Therefore, this Ātman is experienced by itself². [1408]

¹See, for example, *nīlam utpalam* where *nīla* and *utpala* are distinct from each other and therefore they stand in relation of *viśeṣaṇa* and *viśeṣya*; such cannot be the case of the Ātman on one hand and any other thing which is conveyed by some word on the other. In a sense, this entails the next part of the verse.

²We do not convey any particularity or distinction of the Ātman. It is the thing only to be experienced.

यादृगस्य द्वये तत्त्वमात्मनैवानुभूयते ।
निषिद्धाशेषभेदस्य तावदेवात्मसाक्षिकम् ॥१४०९॥

Whatever kind of truth is experienced by the Ātman in respect of its duality¹ — only that much is the object to be witnessed by the Ātman. [1409]

This refers to duality only on the level of words, though, by nature, the inner self and the Self are but one.

¹Namely the inner self and Supreme Self about which all (the

notions of) distinction are negated.

अपास्ताशेषतमसो यत्तत्त्वं प्रत्यगात्मनः ।
तदवच्छिद्यते नालं प्रत्यग्बोधादृते ऽन्यधीः ॥१४१०॥

Whatever be the truth obtaining in the inner self that has given up¹ entire darkness, no knowledge other than the knowledge of (the true nature) of the inner self is capable of grasping it. [1410]

¹That is, discarded.

प्रत्यङ्मात्रेक्षणादात्ममोहतज्जनिराकृतेः ।
असंभवाद्द्वितीयस्य स्यामपूर्वादिमानहम् ॥१४११॥

(Therefore one thinks:) Since there is no possibility for a second (to exist apart from the Ātman), let me be possessed of (the properties) *apūrva* etc. by seeing only the inner self and by removing ignorance about the inner self and also the product of it. [1411]

This verse states the outcome of the knowledge about the inner self which is evoked by the Śruti statement.

व्यपेततमसस्तत्त्वमागमापायसाक्षिणः ।
ज्ञानेन गम्यते साक्षात्तावन्मात्रानुरोधिना ॥१४१२॥

In the case of one whose ignorance is removed (and) who is the witness of the incoming and the outgoing (of trans-migratory objects), the truth becomes known by directly knowing (the inner self) (which) follows only that much (as Reality). [1412]

कालादिप्रविभक्तं सद्यद्ब्रह्माभूदविद्यया ।
तत्प्रत्यक्तत्त्वसंबोधाद्धवस्ते ध्वान्ते ऽन्तरात्मनि ।
आत्मानमेव तद्ब्रह्म ब्रह्मैवात्मेत्यवेच्छुतेः ॥१४१३॥

That existent, the Brahman, which had, through ignorance,

become differentiated by time etc.¹ knew itself to be the Brahman from (the statement in) the Śruti (saying) 'The Brahman itself is the Ātman.', on coming to know the true nature of the inner self, when the darkness in respect of the inner self was destroyed. [1413]

Here is concluded the exposition of the meaning of *tad ātmānam evāvet*.

¹The word etc. refers to *deśa* and other things (*vastvantara*).

अब्रह्मानात्मताहेतौ प्रत्यग्ध्वान्ते निवर्तिते ।
व्यावृत्त्यनुगमाभावात्सर्वं तदभवत्ततः ॥१४१४॥
व्यावृत्त्यनुगमौ यस्माद्द्वितीये सति वस्तुनि ।
दृष्टिमात्रात्मवस्तुत्वात्कार्यकारणवस्तुनः ॥१४१५॥

[Verses 1414-1415 discuss the meaning of *tasmāt tat sarvam abhavad*.]

When the ignorance on the part of the inner self, which was the cause of its not being the Brahman and the Ātman, was removed, it became all owing to the absence of (any) differentiation and similarity, [1414]
(and) since differentiation and similarity are possible (only) when there exists a second thing (and) since the real thing comprising causes and effects is merely the seeing one alone. [1415]

The cause-effect relation presupposes duality; so also do *vyāvṛtti* and *anugama* require duality. None of these is possible to be existing, for the Brahman alone is existent.

नाज्ञातं किञ्चिदप्यस्ति नानपास्तं तमो ऽप्यतः ।
सामानाधिकरण्यार्थमस्मीत्येतत्पदं भवेत् ॥१४१६॥

[Verses 1416-1436 explain the meaning of *aham brahmāsmi*.]

(Since) there is no thing which is not known and also there is no darkness that is not removed, therefore, the word *asmi*

(in the sentence *aham brahmāsmi*) is used for conveying the same-case-relation (of them). [1416]

This is the meaning of the word *asmi*.

Being in the same-case-relation can be possible of two words which have the same status and/or which do not exist apart from each other.

adhikaraṇa refers to grammatical case. Therefore, two words in the same case are taken to refer to (or signify) but one thing, e.g. *nīlam kamalam*. *adhikaraṇa* can also mean substratum. Therefore, two properties/words which refer to but one and same substratum are also mentioned in a sentence in the same case. Thus, here *aham* and *brahma* are both in the Nominative case. This is explained in the next verse.

ब्रह्माहंपदयोरर्थौ यौ तयोः संगतिर्मिथः ।
अहमर्थो विशेष्यो ऽत्र तत्प्राधान्यप्रसिद्धितः ॥१४१७॥
तद्याथात्म्यप्रसिद्ध्यर्थं ब्रह्मार्थस्तु विशेषणम् ॥१४१८॥

Those two objects, which are signified by the words *brahman* and *ātman*, have a close (*sam*) association between them; (and) here the object (signified) by the word *aham* is what is to be qualified (by the other), because of its pre-eminence (in worldly existence). [1417]

And (*tu*) the object (signified) by the word *brahman* is its qualifier for establishing the true nature of that (=the inner self signified by *aham*). [1418]

विशेषणानां संबन्धो विशेष्येण विशेषणैः ।
विशेष्यस्यापि संबन्धः स्वातन्त्र्यपारतन्त्र्यतः ॥१४१९॥

The relation of the qualifiers to what is qualified and (the relation) of what is qualified to the qualifier is owing to the independence and/or the dependence (of the signified). [1419]

There follows now a discussion on the relation between the qualifier and the qualified; particularly that between *aham* and *brahma*.

In verse 1419 Sureśvara gives us the philosophical basis of the qualifier-qualified relation which presupposes duality. So also does he imply that those that are qualified can at times become the qualifiers of others as well — this is their dependence so far as worldly existence is concerned. It is only the Brahman which is purely what is ever qualified. This (is implied) and explains its independence.

विशेषणविशेष्याणां साकल्येनैव संगतिः ।

उपात्तान्योन्यरूपाणां विशेषणविशेष्यता ॥१४२०॥

Those, that are (known as) the qualifier and the qualified, have a close association (between them) only in their entirety.¹ The relationship of the qualifier and the qualified obtains between such two things as have assumed the forms of each other.

[1420]

To explain: Now *aham* and *brahman* can stand as the qualifier and the qualified. This their relation requires complete identity of the two — those two which are assumed to be two different objects. This is possible owing to *avidyā*. This relationship is different from the relation of the qualifier and the qualified in worldly language and dealings.

¹That is, by being identical.

उपात्तद्रव्यकाण्येव विशिषन्त्युत्पलादिकम् ।

द्रव्यं विशेषणान्येति तथोपात्तविशेषणम् ॥१४२१॥

Only those which have come to occur¹ in substances (can) qualify a lotus etc. In the same way, a substance which has come to have qualifiers goes to them.²

[1421]

This refers to the qualifier and the qualified relation in language.

¹This has a reference to *utpannam dravyam ādye kṣaṇe nirguṇam tiṣṭhati*. Accordingly, *nīlatva* 'blueness', *sugandhitva* 'fragrance' come to occur in the lotus from the second moment of its existence.

²This is to say, becomes associated with them.

नायःशलाकाकल्पानां विशेषणविशेष्यता ।
परस्परानपेक्षत्वाद्विमवद्विन्ध्ययोरिव ॥१४२२॥

There does not occur the relation of the qualifier and the qualified between those which resemble two pieces of iron, on account of their not having any mutual expectancy as in the case of Mt. Himalaya and Mt. Vindhya. [1422]

The instances mentioned in the verse are of two pairs of substratums; one substance exists independently of the other. Thus there cannot be the relation of the qualifier and the qualified between the two.

Both SP and NKL point out the instance of *daṇḍa* 'staff' and (a man called) Devadatta. *daṇḍa* cannot be a qualifier of the latter, while *daṇḍin* 'one having a staff' can be.

एकदा निर्विभागेन कात्स्न्यसंगतिकारणात् ।
सामर्थ्यात्स्वविरुद्धानां न विशेष्ये ऽस्ति संभवः ॥१४२३॥

There is no possibility of what are opposed (in nature to), on account of their own propriety (or capacity), to be existent in a substantive only on the ground that they are (at least) at one time inseparably associated with fullness/completeness. [1423]

aham and *brahman* can be at some time realised/seen to be together but it does not mean that *aham* connected with *buddhatva* etc. can be a qualifier of the Brahman.

परस्पराविरोधेन विशिषन्त्यात्मसंश्रयम् ।
विशेषणानि येनातस्तद्विरुद्धं न ढौकते ॥१४२४॥

Since qualifiers qualify (the substance of) their own support, without mutual opposition, therefore, what is opposed to that¹ does not touch (it). [1424]

This points to the qualifiers of *aham*, viz. *samsāritva* etc. which can hold in the case of the inner self only, since these, viz. *ahamkāra*

and the inner self obtain in one substratum. But since *aham* etc. are opposed in nature to the Brahman, they do not qualify the Brahman.

¹Namely, the Brahman — this is implied. Yet, 'that' can signify the substratum which is already mentioned. Thus, the whole verse can be taken to state a general rule regarding *viśeṣaṇas* in *sāmānādhikaraṇa*.

विशेषणयुतिः शाब्दी तद्विरुद्धनिराकृतिः ।

मोहमात्रेण तत्प्राप्तेः सामर्थ्यात्स्यान्न शब्दतः ॥१४२५॥

The association of the qualifier (*aham* with the Brahman) is only on the word level; (it results into) setting aside of what is opposed to that, inasmuch as it has occurred only through ignorance and not from the meaningfulness (lit. capacity) of the word (to convey Reality). [1425]

Here, there is a specific statement about *aham* and *brahman*.

एकैकरूपासंसर्गबोधमात्रस्वभावतः ।

विशेषणानां संप्राप्तिर्नाञ्जसी प्रत्यगात्मनि ॥१४२६॥

Since the nature of (the inner self) consists only in knowledge that is without any association with any qualities, whether similar or dissimilar,¹ therefore, the qualifiers do not come into association with the inner self in a smooth way. [1426]

¹Cf. *sajātīyabhedavyudāsārtham ekapadam, vijātīyabhedāpavādārtham ekarūpety uktam* (SP).

विशेषणानां संबन्धो यतो न प्रत्यगात्मनि ।

लक्ष्यलक्षणता तस्मात्प्रतीच्यध्यवसीयते ॥१४२७॥

Since connection of qualifiers is not (possible) in the case of the inner self, therefore it is concluded that (in the case of the proposition) of the inner self there is the relation of the indicator and the indicated. [1427]

The words *aham* and *brahman* seem to be used as qualifiers of the Ātman (viz. inner self), but in verse 1426 it is pointed out that there cannot be any qualifier in the case of the inner self. Therefore, Sureśvara points out that, in the sentence *aham brahmāsmi*, *aham* is to be understood as the inner self which is *aśuddha* and *mugdha*; but since, in reality, the inner self is *śuddha* and *buddha* (as understood from *aham brahma*— in the same-case-relation), the relation between *aham* and *brahma* is to be understood as that between an indicator and the indicated. This is clarified in the next verse.

अनन्यापेक्षि प्रत्यक्त्वमहंरूपेण लक्ष्यते ।
तथैव ब्रह्मरूपेण प्रतीचो ऽप्यद्वयात्मता ॥१४२८॥

The nature of the inner self (which is) not dependent on anything else is indicated by the (word-)form *aham*; in the same way, (is indicated) the character of the inner self without duality in the form of the Brahman. [1428]

निवर्त्यभेदाद्विन्नो ऽर्थो ऽमानित्वादेर्यथा तथा ।
ब्रह्माहमर्थयोर्ज्ञेयस्तयोरैकार्थ्यहेतुतः ॥१४२९॥

As some entity from which all distinction (caused by ignorance) has to be removed on account of its not having any Ego etc. (has to be ascertained), so also (the non-distinction) has to be known between the two entities *brahman* and *aham* on account of their having reference to but one entity. [1429]

अनात्माब्रह्मताहेतौ प्रत्यग्ध्वान्ते निवर्तिते ।
पदार्थ एक एव स्याद्ब्रह्माहंपदयोः परः ॥१४३०॥

When darkness on the part of an individual self, which has been the cause of its being the non-Ātman and the non-Brahman, is removed, there would remain only one entity (and which would be) beyond the two words¹ *aham* and *brahman*. [1430]

¹That is, beyond the expression by the two words.

भेदसंसर्गनाशार्थो नात उक्तेरिहेष्यते ।

अहंब्रह्मश्रुतेः साक्षात्तादात्म्यमिह गम्यते ॥१४३१॥

Therefore, no thing like distinction or connection or negation¹ (in relation to things) is here desired (i.e. understood) from the (Śruti) statement. From the (Śruti) statement *aham brahma (asmi)* is understood here the direct oneness (or, identity) of the two. [1431]

¹ *bheda* here is a thing to be distinguished from another, i.e. it is a discrete object; *samsarga* means connection, but here it stands for a thing to be shown to be connected with another; and *nāśa* which means destruction stands for a thing to negate something else. *bhedasamsarganāśa* is an optional (*vaikalpita*) Dvandva compound word joined to *artha*.

कर्तुर्ज्ञातुर्हि या दृष्टिः साविद्योत्थार्थलेहिनी ।

तत्प्रत्यगात्मदृष्ट्या तां प्रत्याख्यायान्नुतेऽद्वयम् ॥१४३२॥

Whatever seeing on the part of the agent or the knower (is understood in the sentence) is the destroyer of the notions which have arisen from ignorance; therefore, having set aside¹ that² by (giving rise to) the seeing of the inner self as the Brahman, one obtains (i.e. experiences) non-duality³. [1432]

¹ That is, having negated or removed.

² Namely, ignorance.

³ *advayam* here refers to *advayatā*.

अस्मीतीहत्यनिर्देशाद्विद्याकालैव मुक्तता ।

सिद्धातोऽसौ न साध्या स्यादग्निहोत्रादिकार्यवत् ॥१४३३॥

By the mention here of *asmi* (it follows that) there is liberation achieved at the very time of (obtaining) instruction; therefore, it is not to be accomplished (later) like an effect, viz. Agnihotra¹ (ritual) etc. [1433]

¹The Śruti statement regarding Agnihotra etc. merely gives information about the same. Then the Agnihotra etc. has to be performed. As a consequence, there follows the result. Thus, there is a time gap between knowing the meaning of the statement regarding Agnihotra etc. and performing what is signified by it. As against this, instruction regarding the Brahman brings liberation along with itself; there is never any time gap or any intervention whatever.

प्रत्यग्याथात्म्यविज्ञानमात्रव्युत्पत्तिसिद्धये ।
तस्मादिति श्रुतिर्वक्ति ह्युत्पत्त्यादिनिवृत्तये ॥१४३४॥

The Śruti states the word *tasmāt* in order that there arises the knowledge (of the Brahman) from mere knowing (*vijñāna*)¹ about the true nature of the inner self (and) in order to ward off the idea of production² etc. (of the same at some later point of time). [1434]

¹It is mere information and not the knowledge of Reality.

²Sureśvara has still in mind *agnyādivākya* which expects some action to be performed after the resulting of *vijñāna* from the *vākya*.

अविद्यातज्जनिर्मुक्तौ ब्रह्म ब्रह्माभवत्स्वतः ।
सर्वः कृत्स्नस्तथा पूर्णः शब्दाः पर्यायवाचकाः ॥१४३५॥

The Brahman (i.e. the inner self) itself became the Brahman (viz. the Supreme Self), when there was release (of it from) ignorance and its effect. As such, the words *sarva*, *kṛtsna*, and *pūrṇa* are all synonymous.¹ [1435]

¹SP points out that they are synonyms of the Brahman.

आत्माविद्यासमत्थानामात्मयाथात्म्यमात्रतः ।
कर्मवत्काङ्क्षते ज्ञानं विशिष्टं नाधिकारिणम् ॥१४३६॥

[Verses 1436cd-1442 explain the sentence *tad yo yo devānām.*]

Since (the various things of the transmigratory world) which have arisen from the ignorance about (the true nature of) the Ātman are only of the nature of the Ātman (itself)¹, knowledge (about) the Ātman) does not expect any (particular) eligible person as does (a ritual) activity.² [1436]

¹The first half of this verse explains how *sarva* is a synonym of the Brahman.

²The second half of the verse begins the discussion on *tad yo yo devānām*.

देवादीनामतो यो यो यथोक्तेनैव वर्त्मना ।
प्रत्यबुध्यत तद्ब्रह्म स स तदभवत्परम् ॥१४३७॥

Therefore¹, whosoever among the gods came to know that Brahman by the very path stated (herebefore) became the highest (Brahman). [1437]

This is the substance of the sentence *yo yo ...*

¹This justifies *kāṅkṣate nādhikāriṇam* in the preceding verse.

प्रत्यबोधातिरेकेण साधनान्तरनिहुतौ ।
एवेत्यवधृतिर्ज्ञेया ज्ञानादेव ततो भवेत् ॥१४३८॥

From the word (*eva*) is to be understood specification of the denial (lit. concealment) of any other means beside knowing about (the true nature of) the inner self; then there results (liberation) only from knowledge. [1438]

आत्मयाथात्म्यविज्ञानाद्यदन्यत्साधनान्तरम् ।
ज्ञानाभावो ऽथवा सर्वमविद्यैवेति निश्चितिः ॥१४३९॥

Whatever means other than the knowing about the true nature of the Ātman has as its result either absence of knowledge or all that is only ignorance. This is the decision. [1439]

मनुष्या यदमन्यन्त साधवेवातस्तदीरितम् ।
न कश्चिदपि दोषो ऽत्र पूर्वो ऽतः प्रसज्यते ॥१४४०॥

Whatever men thought about (or, expected) was therefore only well said; there is in this no fault whatever that was pointed out¹ before that can become contingent. [1440]

¹Supply: by opponents. This refers to the faults pointed out in the introductory (*upoddhāta*).

प्रत्यक्त्यैव संबन्धादात्मनो ऽनात्मवस्तुना ।
विशिष्टेनाविशिष्टस्य क्लृप्तेनाकल्पितात्मनः ॥१४४१॥
यतो ऽतो लोकबुद्ध्यैव देवादीनामितीर्यते ।
तुल्यो देवादिसंबन्धो ब्रह्मणो मशकादिभिः ॥१४४२॥

Since the Ātman has connection with (all) the non-Ātman objects¹ only by being their inner self, viz. the connection between with what is qualified (by attributes) and what is not qualified, and that between what is imagined and what is not imagined, [1441]

therefore, only in accordance with worldly notions (lit. knowledge) it is said 'among the gods ...'; the connection of the Brahman with the gods etc. is similar to that with the insects etc. [1442]

This explains how the Brahman is understood from the Śruti statement as connected with all sorts of non-Ātman objects and beings.

¹This is *jātāv ekavacanam*.

अन्तरेणाधिकारं चेन्नात्मबोधस्य संभवः ।
न जन्मान्तरसंस्काराद्वामदेवस्य तद्ववेत् ॥१४४३॥

[Verses 1443-1457 explain *tad dhaitat*.]

If (it is said:) There is no possibility of (acquiring) the knowledge about the Ātman unless (one has) the eligibility (for it), (then we say:) That could not have become¹ possible as in the case of Vāmadeva, on account of the impression(s) of the previous life². [1443]

¹ *bhavet* = *abhavat* in Vedic style.

² 'Impression(s) of the previous life' here refers to *antaḥkaraṇa-suddhi* acquired by the performance of ritual etc. which are prescribed in the Śruti. Reference to previous life (or lives) points to the world of human beings. There is a reference here to a Vedic sage Vāmadeva verse whose 'I became Manu ...' (*Rgveda* 4.26.1) points to his excellent knowledge consequential to his knowledge about the Brahman.

श्रुत्युक्तार्थस्य वा स्थेम्ने मन्त्रोदाहृतिरिष्यते ।
प्रमाणान्तरसंवादात्पुंसां विश्वासधीर्यतः ॥१४४४॥

Or rather, it is for establishing more firmly the meaning of the Śruti that there is intended the citation of a Mantra¹, since there occurs the faith in men only by (pointing out) agreement of an argument with another (accepted) means of knowing.

[1444]

This justifies the meaningfulness of the citation of a Rgvedic Mantra.

¹ This refers to *aham manur abhavam* (*Rgveda* 4.26.1).

अव्यावृत्ताननुगतं तद्वैतत्प्रत्यगात्मनि ।
तद्दर्शनादृषिः साक्षात्पश्यन्सर्वम् प्रपन्नवान् ॥१४४५॥

This (Brahman) then (is existent) indeed in the inner self, the one undifferentiated (from others), not similar¹ (to anything else); on visualizing that, i.e. directly seeing that the seer obtained all.

[1445]

This is the meaning of the words in the Mantra quoted.

¹ It literally means: followed by.

सूक्तादिज्ञापनार्थाय ह्यहं मनुरितीरणम् ।
ऐकात्म्यं सर्वभूतेषु प्रतीचो ऽसौ ददर्श ह ॥१४४६॥

In order to convey the beginning of a (full) hymn, there is

the Śruti statement *aham manuh*¹. (The purpose is to say:) He indeed saw in all those beings² (only) oneness of the Self. [1446]

¹Sureśvara points out the significance of the beginning (*pratīka*) of the hymn, conveying thereby that the *ṛṣi* saw the whole of the hymn.

²This refers to the mention of the various beings and objects in the hymn *Rgveda* 4.26.

तत्पश्यन्नित्यनेनात्र ब्रह्मविद्या प्रदर्श्यते ।
अहमासं मनुरिति विद्यायाः फलमुच्यते ॥१४४७॥
पश्यन्प्रतिपेद इति प्रयोगादवसीयते ।
विद्याकालैव कृत्स्नाप्तिरिति तन्मोहहानतः ॥१४४८॥

By the phrase *tat paśyan* is here conveyed the lore of the Brahman; and by the sentence *aham āsam manuh* is stated the fruit of the lore (of the Brahman); [1447] (and) by the employment (of the words) *paśyan pratipede* it is brought out that the obtainment of all is just simultaneous with (the acquiring of) the lore, (resultant) from the loss (i.e. abandoning) of ignorance about it (viz. the Brahman). [1448]

ब्रह्मप्राप्त्यन्तरायस्य प्रत्यक्संमोहमात्रतः ।
प्रत्यग्विज्ञानतो ध्वस्तेस्तत्प्राप्तिर्नान्यसाधना ॥१४४९॥

Since the hindrance to the obtaining of the Brahman is merely total (*sam*) ignorance about the inner self, there is the obtainment of that (Brahman) only after the destruction of some particular knowledge¹ about the inner self, not by any other means. [1449]

¹This is *vijñāna*, viz. understanding the inner self as having various attributes etc. — this is in fact *avidyā*.

अविद्याध्वंसमात्रेण पुमर्थस्य समाप्तिः ।
तावतावसितेर्विद्या स्वार्थैवेति विनिश्चयः ॥१४५०॥

Because the end of human endeavour is acquired only by the destruction of ignorance, only therewith¹ is there the completion (of the lore of the Brahman). Therefore, indeed, the lore (of the Brahman) is for its own sake². [1450]

¹That is, only by effecting the destruction of ignorance.

²It is not for achieving any other purpose (*parārtha*).

सकृदात्मप्रसृत्यैव निरुणद्ध्यखिलं भवम् ।
ध्वान्तमात्रनिरासेन न ततो ऽन्यान्यथा मतिः ॥१४५१॥

By its rise only for once does (the knowledge about the nature of the Brahman) check (lit. destroy) entire (transmigratory) existence (and consequently) by removing merely the ignorance (about it,) therefore, there is not any knowledge other than that (to be sought). [1451]

देशकालाद्यसंबन्धाद्देशादेर्मोहकार्यतः ।
नानुत्पन्नमदग्धं वा ज्ञानमज्ञानमस्त्यतः ॥१४५२॥

Therefore, owing to (the fact that there is) absence of any connection (of the inner self) with region, time etc. and because region etc. are effects of ignorance, knowledge does not really get produced or ignorance does not get burnt. [1452]

नाबाधित्वेह बाधयार्थं बाधको बाधकात्मताम् ।
लभते मेययाथात्म्यहेतुमात्रव्यपेक्षतः ॥१४५३॥
यतो ऽतोऽविद्यातज्जानां बाधितत्वात्प्रबोधतः ।
सकृदेव च मायोगान्नोद्धर्षं तच्चोदनेष्यते ॥१४५४॥
सम्यग्ज्ञानशिखिप्लुष्टमोहतत्कार्यरूपिणः ।
सकृन्निवृत्तेर्बाध्यस्य किं कार्यमवशिष्यते ॥१४५५॥

Since, here (in the context of this lore), what stultifies does not acquire the nature of the stultifier without having removed the object which is to be removed, depend as it does only on one cause, viz. (acquiring the knowledge of) the true nature of object to be known (viz. the Ātman), therefore, ignorance and its effects being stultified by (that) knowledge and through

the connection (of the inner self afflicted by ignorance) with right knowledge just once, there is not required any impulse further. [1453-1454]

(Tell me then) what remains to be done of ignorance which is to be stultified and which has, once for all, ceased to be the one, which has the form of error and its effects which are burnt by the fire of right knowledge? [1455]

ध्वान्तादिघस्मरे प्रत्यक्चैतन्यात्मैकनिष्ठिते ।
प्रत्यर्थिनि स्थिते ऽनात्मधियां स्यात्सत्यता कुतः ॥१४५६॥

(When there has occurred knowledge) which is inimical (to ignorance), the destroyer of darkness etc., and which abides only in the sentience of the inner self, whence can there be truth in the knowledge of the non-Ātman (objects and beings)? [1456]

अज्ञातमिथ्याविज्ञाततत्त्वमात्रावलम्बिना ।
ज्ञानेन किं न विज्ञातं वद किं वा न बाधितम् ॥१४५७॥

What does not become known by knowledge which has taken resort to only the truth that underlies what is unknown (and) what is false?; (and) tell me, what is not stultified? [1457]

In verses 1456-57, the word knowledge stands for the knower also.

सर्वापत्तिरियं युक्ता देवादीनां महात्मनाम् ।
अस्मदादेस्तमस्वित्वान्न संभाव्येति चेन्न तत् ॥१४५८॥

[Verses 1456-1461 explain *tad idam apy etarhi.*]

This becoming all is reasonably acceptable in the case of gods etc., who have greatness of their own, but it is not possible (to be thought of) in the case of us and others. — if this is (the argument), (the answer is:) That is not so. [1458]

एतर्ह्यपि तु तद्ब्रह्म यो यः साक्षादबुध्यत ।

स एव तदभूद्यस्मान्नातो ऽभिजनकारणम् ॥१४५९॥

Since, even now, whosoever became directly aware (of the true nature of his inner self) is (i.e. becomes) the Brahman; (and) since he himself became that, therefore there is not (here) any cause in one's birth in some high family. [1459]

This emphasises that only knowledge about the nature of the Brahman (or inner self) is the pre-requisite for liberation. Being born as a god, or in a high family are not necessary for it.

अप्येतर्हि यथान्यायं यो वेदात्मानमद्वयम् ।
स इदं सर्वमात्मैव भवत्यज्ञानहानतः ॥१४६०॥

So also, even now, whosoever has, in the manner¹ (mentioned before), known the Ātman which is without any duality, becomes all this, viz. the Ātman itself, owing to the disappearance (lit. loss) of ignorance. [1460]

¹By applying the method of Anvaya and Vyatireka as in verse 1437 above..

न हीहोत्कृष्टसत्त्वेषु देवादिषु परात्मनः ।
नापि चात्यन्तमूढेषु विशेषः कश्चिदीक्ष्यते ॥१४६१॥
प्रत्यक्तत्त्वधियो वास्ति स्वतोबुद्धैकतात्मनः ।

Indeed, there is not seen any differentiating attitude on the part of the Supreme Self in the case of those who are excellent beings such as gods and those who are extremely ignorant; [1461]

and (not also) in the case of the one, who has acquired the knowledge of the true nature of the inner self; for, in the case of the Ātman, there is only the state of being knowledge.

[1462ab]

श्रेयांसि बहुविघ्नानीत्याशङ्क्यैतदथोच्यते ॥१४६२॥
तस्य ज्ञातात्मतत्त्वस्य प्रध्वस्ततमसो यतेः ।
इन्द्रादयो ऽपि नैवालं कैवल्यमिति निवारणे ॥१४६३॥

[Verses 1462cd-1466 explain *tasya ha devāś ca* in the light of the comments of Śaṅkara and Bhartṛprapañca.]

Now (what follows) is said with a fear in mind that all good things are beset with many obstacles. [1462cd]

In the case of that person, who has renounced¹, has known the (true) nature of the Ātman, and has his ignorance destroyed, even Indra and others are not able to ward away his obtaining liberation. [1463]

Verses 1463-1466 explain the meaning of *tasya ha devāś ca nābhūtyā īśate, ātmā hy eṣāṃ sa bhavati*, according to Śaṅkara. The purpose of verse 1463 is: The knower of the true nature of the inner self (viz. the Supreme Self) has a power higher than that of known high powers in mythology, such as Indra and others.

¹Cf. verse 1392 above.

देवाद्यैश्वर्यविषयव्यतिक्रान्तत्वहेतुतः ।
कैवल्यभूत्या उद्युक्ता ईश्वरा अपि नेशते ॥१४६४॥

Since the experience of the state of liberation has for its cause the state of being beyond all the objects of excellence (enjoyed by) gods and others, even the masters (of great wealth), though out (to possess, i.e. to acquire) it, are unable (to do so).

[1464]

The knowledge of the Brahman cannot be outdone by any so-called precious wealth of the world. Therefore, possession of riches would not enable a person to acquire liberation. It is only knowledge of the self that is a pre-requisite for achieving liberation.

ईशेशितव्यसंबन्धः प्रत्यगज्ञानहेतुजः ।
सम्यग्ज्ञानात्तमोऽवस्तावीश्वराणामपीश्वरः ॥१४६५॥

Relation of the controller and what is to be controlled proceeds from ignorance about (the true nature of) the inner self. Once when one has one's ignorance destroyed by right knowledge

(of the nature of self), one is the Lord of Lords.

[1465]

ईश्वराणामनैश्वर्यं कस्माद्ब्रह्मविदीति चेत् ।
आत्मा ह्येषामितीत्याह तद्धेतुप्रतिपत्तये ॥१४६६॥

If someone were to ask: Why are the Lords powerless in respect of the knower of the Brahman?', (the answer is: The Śruti) has pronounced the words *ātmā hy eṣām* in order that one knows the cause for that (happening).

[1466]

भोज्यत्वेन जगत्कृत्स्नं कर्मविद्यादिसाधनैः ।
उपात्तं तदभुक्त्वा तु कैवल्यं लभते न चेत् ॥१४६७॥
इत्याशङ्कापनुत्त्यर्थं परो ग्रन्थो ऽवतार्यते ।
कैवल्यवाप्तिविघ्नाय नालं देवा अपीश्वराः ॥१४६८॥
अविद्याविषये यस्मात्तेषामधिकृतिः स्मृता ।
न तु प्लुष्टात्मयाथात्म्यविज्ञानतमसामसौ ॥१४६९॥

[Verses 1467-1469 are Bhartṛprapañca's explanation of the same sentence.]

If it is said that one does not achieve liberation without enjoying this entire world as an object of enjoyment that is obtained through such means as (ritual) activities, (various) lores etc.,

[1467]

(then) for the removal of this doubt, the subsequent section (of the text) is introduced: Even gods of great powers are not capable of (causing) any obstacle to (one's) obtaining liberation,

[1468]

since their ability (lit. eligibility) is recognised (only) in the sphere of ignorance, and not in respect of them who have burnt their ignorance by the knowledge of the true nature of the self.

[1469]

ब्रह्मविद्याफलप्राप्तौ विघ्नं कुर्वन्ति देवताः ।
इत्यत्र किंनिमित्तेयमाशङ्केत्यभिधीयते ॥१४७०॥
युक्तासङ्का यतो मर्त्या देवान्प्रत्यृणिनः श्रुतेः ।
पशुलोकत्ववाक्याच्च पारतन्त्र्याच्च कर्मिणः ॥१४७१॥

[Verses 1470-1473 discuss whether the sentence *tasya ha devās ca nābhūtyā īśate* is *aprāptaniṣedha* 'denial of what is not already stated or prescribed'.]

What is the cause for this doubt, viz. in (respect of) the statement 'Gods cause obstacles to one's achieving the fruit of the lore of the Brahman.'? (In answer) it is said (now):

[1470]

The doubt is justified, since the mortals are debtors to the gods (as we hear) from the Śruti, the sentence about (the human beings) becoming the animals (for the sacrifice) and also (about the Ātman), the *loka* ('region' as the object of enjoyment) and also because of the dependence of the performer (of rituals).¹

[1471]

BU 1.4.10 and 16 are the basis of this argument, viz. the reference in the Śruti to *śreyāṃsi bahuviḥnāni bhavanti mahatām api* is uncalled for; it was necessary to explain away the same by *tasya ha ... (aprāptapratiṣedha)*. These verses answer that argument. Here we notice the mixture of mythology and philosophy in Sureśvara's writings, owing to the effort of the seer of BU to bridge philosophy and ritual together.

¹Cf. *paśur eva sa devānām* (BU 1.4.10) and *atho ayam vā ātmā sarveṣām bhūtānām lokah* (BU 1.4.16).

ब्रह्मवित्त्वे च पारार्थ्यं देवादीन्प्रति हीयते ।

तस्य ब्रह्मतमोहेतोस्तन्निवृत्तौ निवर्तते ॥१४७२॥

And in relation to a person's being the knower of the Brahman his dependence on the gods¹ gets lost; since caused by ignorance about (the nature of) the Brahman (that it is), that (dependence) comes to an end when that (i.e. ignorance) has receded.

[1472]

¹Namely, that which is mentioned in the preceding verse.

अप्रियारिष्टिवाक्याभ्यामयमर्थो ऽवसीयते ।

तस्माद्विद्याफलावाप्तौ विघ्नं कुर्वन्ति देवताः ॥१४७३॥

This matter is decided from the Śruti sentences regarding *apriya* and *ariṣṭi*, therefore (it is said that) the deities cause obstacles to one's obtaining the fruit of the lore (of the Brahman).

[1473]

The ritual activities are accepted by the Siddhāntin as necessary for *cittaśuddhi*. This *cittaśuddhi* is connected with the gods who would cause obstacle to one's liberation.

Now is introduced a new argument about the gods' causing obstacles to one's securing the result of ritual performances also. There is the counterargument also. Thus, verses 1474-1491 discuss these fully.

नन्वेवं तर्ह्यविश्रम्भो ह्यदृष्टफलसंपदि ।

प्राप्तो ऽभ्युदयमोक्षार्थसाधनव्यापृताविह ॥१४७४॥

[Verses 1474-1477 point out how gods' power which causes obstacles to men's doing would destroy their faith in ritual activity.]

(The objector says:) Indeed, this being so, there will be want of faith¹ (of the people) in respect of the rich of fruit called *adrṣṭa*, since a person of this world has set himself upon the activity which brings about worldly rise and liberation. [1474]

¹It literally means: disbelief.

तथेश्वरो ऽपि नो विघ्नं कुर्वन्केन निषिध्यते ।

कालमन्त्रौषधादीनामचिन्त्या शक्तिरिष्यते ॥१४७५॥

कर्ममन्त्रौषधितपःकालादीनां च विद्यते ।

महती शक्तिरित्यत्र युक्तमाशङ्कितुं फले ॥१४७६॥

And also how can a (mighty) lord causing obstacle to us be warded off? It is accepted that (he has) unthinkable power in respect of time, Mantras and herbs etc. [1475]

And there exists great power in (magical) activities, Mantras,

herbs, penances, time etc.; therefore, it is reasonable to entertain the doubt (which is stated above) in respect of the fruit (of the lore of the Brahman). [1476]

देवादयः स्वतन्त्रत्वात्फलप्राप्तिविधातयोः ।
सर्वं कुर्युरनाशवासस्तस्मात्प्राप्नोति कर्मसु ॥१४७७॥

Gods and others, because they are independent in respect of (causing the) obtainment of or obstruction to fruit, would do everything;¹ therefore, there occurs (in the mind of the people) want of faith in the rituals. [1477]

¹This refers to the obstacle to the lore of Brahman.

नैवं सर्वपदार्थानां नियतादानकारणात् ।
जगद्वैचित्र्यदृष्टेश्च स्वभावे तदसंभवात् ॥१४७८॥

(Now the Siddhāntin answers:) This is not so, because all objects and beings (in the world) take (i.e. require) some specific causes (for their origination or production); also because there is variety seen in respect of the worldly happenings; and because it is impossible that such is the happening in the nature of the things.¹ [1478]

This is in refutation of the Svabhāvavādins.

¹That is to say: Determined relationship of causes and effects and variety of the objects/things in the world could not occur if one accepted *svabhāvavāda* 'Naturalism'.

सुखादिफलदं कर्मेत्यस्मिन्पक्षे व्यवस्थिते ।
श्रुतिन्यायादिसंसिद्धेर्नातो विघ्नकृतः सुराः ॥१४७९॥

When the view that ritual activity brings about results such as happiness is (thus) established, (it has to be said that) gods cannot cause obstacles, since that view is established by Śruti, reasoning etc.¹ [1479]

This is an argument against those who do not hold Svabhāvavāda.

¹For 'Śruti', SP refers to *pūṇyo vai pūṇyena karmanā ...* (BU 3.2.13); *karma haivā ...* (BU 3.2.13), for 'reasoning', *jagadvaicitrya-dṛṣṭi* in verse 1478 above, and for 'etc.', *karmanā badhyate jantur ...* (*Mahābhārata* 12.233.7). SP further refers to a passage in *Kāma-sūtra* 23.2: *puruṣakārapūrvakatvāt sarvappravṛttinām avaśyambhāvino pyarthasyopāyapūrvakatvād eva na niṣkramiṇo bhadram asti.*

कर्मणैव स्वसिद्ध्यर्थं तेषां क्रोडीकृतत्वतः ।
नात्मानं लभते कर्म देवेशाद्यनपेक्षि सत् ॥१४८०॥

Since they, i.e. gods have been accepted (in its system) by the ritual activity in order that it gets established; therefore, ritual cannot come into existence if it is without any dependence on gods. [1480]

फलदाने ऽनुलोमत्वान्नामी स्युर्विघ्नकारिणः ।
यथा कर्म तथेशादि कर्मपेक्षयैव सिद्ध्यति ॥१४८१॥

(And) these would not cause obstacles (to the fruit of the ritual), since they are prone to yield suitable fruits. (This means:) As activity (depends on gods etc.); likewise, the deity of it etc. is dependent on that activity; only then (that activity) gets reward. [1481]

For *phalādāne* translation and text follow the variant reading of the AnSS edition and also the NKL edition, *phaladāne*. *Brhad-āranyakavārtikasāra* 1.4.1092 also follows this.

सर्वं सर्वमपेक्षयैव संहतत्वात्प्रसिद्ध्यति ।
प्रधानगुणभावश्च क्वचित्कस्यचिदिष्यते ॥१४८२॥

All these come into existence, only depending on all else, because they are closely knit together and the relation as the principal and the subordinate of someone to another is accepted at some or another place. [1482]

विघ्नकार्ये ऽपि चाप्येते नानपेक्ष्य प्रकुर्वते ।
तत्सामर्थ्याप्रणोद्यत्वात्सर्वेषां सर्वकर्मसं ॥१४८३॥

And further, in respect of obstacles to be caused, these (gods) do not cause (the same) without keeping in view¹ (some activity or reason), since all these are (effective) in respect of all activities such as are not to be impelled by their (own) strength (alone). [1483]

¹It literally means: without depending on ...

गुणप्रधानभावश्च देवकालेश्वरादिषु ।
कर्मस्वनियतो दृष्टो नान्यथा चोपपद्यते ॥१४८४॥

And the relation of the principal and the subordinate in the case of gods, time and a lord etc. is seen as not definitely fixed in point of activities and it does not get reasonably explained otherwise. [1484]

यदैकस्य प्रधानत्वं तदान्यस्याप्रधानता ।
एवं नृत्यज्जगन्नित्यमतद्वृत्त्यात्मनि स्थितम् ॥१४८५॥

When one has the status of being the principal, then the other has the status of being subordinate to it; thus is the world ever changing its states (lit. dancing up and down) and is abiding in the Ātman, without becoming that. [1485]

This verse clarifies the not-fixed change in the world.

The world continuously seems to change its states; but this is the effect of ignorance about the nature of the Ātman. It exists because it has the basis only in the Ātman.

गुणप्रधानभावश्च पदार्थानामनन्ततः ।
क्षेपीयस्त्वाच्च कालस्य दुर्ज्ञेयो मतिविभ्रमात् ॥१४८६॥

[It should be noted here that the NKL does not comment on verses 1486-1489 — i.e. NKL did not have the four verses before it!]

Further, since the relation of the principal and the subordinate

which obtains among various objects and beings is (of) infinite (variety), and since time is more quick than (everything else), it (i.e. the true nature of the relation) is difficult to understand owing to a chance of there being an error in thought (about the same). [1486]

The word *mativibhrama* is to be noted: This stands for error which is known in Sanskrit more commonly as *adhyāsa*. Maṇḍana-miśra is reported to have written a book *Vibhramaviveka* wherein he discusses various types of error. This name *vibhrama* could have also been at the basis of, the some-time-back-held equation of Maṇḍanamiśra and Sureśvara.

कर्मैव कारणं केचित्फलप्राप्तौ प्रचक्षते ।
दैवमेके ऽपरे कालं स्वभाव इति चापरे ॥१४८७॥

Some¹ point out (lit. declare) that, for the acquisition of the fruit (viz. liberation), the cause is only ritual activity; others² (declare that to be) fate. And yet others³ say it to be Time and (still others⁴), the nature of things. [1487]

¹This refers to the Mīmāṃsakas.

²This refers to the author(s) of *Devatākāṇḍa* (of ritual).

³This refers to the Astrologers.

⁴This refers to the Lokāyatas.

श्रुतयः स्मृतिवादाश्च कर्मप्राधान्यमेव तु ।
अङ्गीकृत्य प्रदृश्यन्ते प्रवृत्ताः सर्व एव हि ॥१४८८॥

But all Śruti texts and discussions in the Smṛti texts are seen to have put forth (their subject matter) after having accepted the principal significance (or greater importance) of the ritual activity. [1488]

पुण्यः पुण्येन भवति पापः पापेन कर्मणा ।
वचांस्येवं सुबहुशो लक्ष्यन्ते शास्त्रभूमिषु ॥१४८९॥

(Thus) in (various) portions of the Śruti are seen a large

number of statements like *punyaḥ punyena bhavati pāpaḥ pāpena karmaṇā*¹. [1489]

This has a reference to the Śruti mentioned in the preceding verse 1488.

Cp. BU 3.2.13: *punyo vai punyena karmaṇā bhavati pāpaḥ pāpeneti*; BU 4.4.5: *punyaḥ punyena karmaṇā pāpaḥ pāpena*.

यद्यप्येषां स्वविषये प्राधान्यम् कस्यचित्क्वचित् ।
अप्राधान्यं तदन्येषां तथापि तु न कर्मणाम् ।
फलप्राप्तावहेतुत्वं शास्त्रन्यायावधारणात् ॥१४९०॥

Though in the case of some of these statements (we notice that) some have attached in their sphere greater significance to some things in some places and less significance to others; yet they (have not attached) less significance to rituals in respect of their being the causes of the fruit — this, on account of the accepted principle of the Śāstra. [1490]

कर्मणः फलसंप्राप्तिरप्राप्तिश्चेह येक्ष्यते ।
साद्गुण्यविगुणत्वाभ्यां सा स्यात्कर्मण एव च ॥१४९१॥

And obtaining or non-obtaining of the fruit from certain activity, whatever it be, is seen here only on account of the excellence or shortcoming¹ of the activity itself. [1491]

¹The word *sādguṇyaviguṇatvābhyām* is an optional Dvandva compound.

विघ्नं कुर्वन्ति नो देवा विद्योत्थफलसंगतौ ।
उक्तं यदपनुत्त्यर्थं तत्र प्रतिविधीयते ॥१४९२॥

[Verses 1492-1505 refute the idea that gods cause obstacles to one's achieving the knowledge of the Brahman.]

As to what is said, viz. gods cause obstacle to us in respect of (our being associated) with the fruit (viz. liberation) which arises from the knowledge (of the inner self), the following

is said in answer:

[1492]

अविद्याहानमात्रत्वात्कैवल्यसिफलात्मनः ।
तत्प्राप्तेर्ज्ञानकालत्वान्नालं विघ्नाय देवताः ॥१४९३॥

Because what has the nature of fruit, viz. obtaining release has resulted only from abandoning of ignorance and because it has occurred at the same time (when there is the rise of) knowledge, therefore gods are not capable of (causing) any obstacle.

[1493]

चक्षुरूपाभिसंबन्धसमकाला यथेष्यते ।
रूपाभिव्यक्तिरेवं स्यादविद्यावस्तिरात्मनः ॥१४९४॥

As the appearance of a form is accepted to be simultaneously occurring with the connection of the eye and the form, so also it is accepted (by us) in respect of the connection of the destruction of ignorance and (the rise of the knowledge about) the Ātman.

[1494]

यथास्थितात्मयाथात्म्यज्ञानजन्मातिरेकतः ।
न तत्तमोनिवृत्तिः स्यात्तदुत्थस्य च वस्तुनः ॥१४९५॥

There would not be (lit. there is not) the cessation of darkness (i.e. ignorance) and also of that which has arisen from it (viz. darkness) in addition to the rise of the knowledge of the true nature of the inner self as it exists.

[1495]

सर्पात्मना गृहीतायां न दण्डादीक्ष्यते स्रजि ।
प्रतीच्येकतनुग्राह्ये तदन्यन्न तथेक्ष्यते ॥१४९६॥

In the place of a garland which is taken to be having the nature of a serpent, there is not seen a stick etc., so also in the case of the inner self which is noticed only in a body anything else than that is not seen.

[1496]

Both SP and NKL point out to *sarvātmana* as a variant for *sarpātmana* and explain the meaning accordingly. But that is not

convincing. However the texts in the editions of both AnSS and NKL do not show this variant!

अन्योन्यव्यभिचारित्वमज्ञाने ऽपि ह्यनात्मनाम् ।
किमु विध्वस्तनिःशेषघनाज्ञाने ऽन्तरात्मनि ॥१४९७॥

Even when ignorance prevails, there is noticed in the case of the non-Ātman objects mutual exclusiveness; what then to say about the same when there exists (only) the inner self from which is destroyed the entire mass of ignorance. [1497]

रूप्याभज्ञानवेलायां शुक्तिकाधीर्न बाधते ।
तदसूतेरिह त्वात्मन्यादिमध्यान्तबाधधीः ॥१४९८॥

At the time of having the knowledge of what appears as silver, the knowledge of the shell does not act as a stultifier, since there is no rise of it;¹ but, here in the case of the inner self, the knowledge of it as a stultifier (of ignorance) exists in the beginning, in the middle and in the end. [1498]

¹Namely, the knowledge of the shell as it is.

निर्निमित्तं प्रमात्रादेः प्रत्यग्रूपमनात्मनः ।
सन्निमित्तं प्राग्रूपमात्मनो मोहहेतुतः ॥१४९९॥

The knowers etc., (which are) the non-Ātmans, have the form of the inner self for no reason (whatever); (and) they have the form of what is outside world because of the ignorance (about the nature) of the Ātman. [1499]

एक आत्मेति विज्ञाने दोषो ऽप्यप्रतिबन्धकः ।
मूढात्मनामपि हेतन्न विसंवादमृच्छति ॥१५००॥

When there arises knowledge that the Ātman is one (without a second), that fault¹ is not obstructive, and in the case of those who have remained ignorant about the self also, this does not vary. [1500]

The verse is preceded by a possible doubt that the knowledge of the Ātman also is like every other knowledge affected by ignorance.

¹The fault of being affected by ignorance.

मिथ्यासंशयविज्ञानमनात्मानं प्रतीष्यते ।
प्रत्यगात्मानि तद्यस्मात्सम्यग्ज्ञानान्न भिद्यते ॥१५०१॥

False knowledge, doubt and (so-called) knowledge, on the part of (an individual) is accepted to be what refers to the non-Ātman, since that referring to the inner self does not get differentiated (likewise). [1501]

अज्ञानं चेच्चिदाकारं संशयादिषु का कथा ।
प्रमित्सते प्रतीच्यस्मान्न दोषो नापि बाधकम् ॥१५०२॥

If it were that ignorance had really the form of sentience, then where could one talk of doubt etc.? From this (it follows that) when the inner self is sought to be known there is no fault and it does not affect (as well). [1502]

महिमानो यदामी स्युरविद्याया न वस्तुनः ॥१५०३॥
काला देवादयस्तस्यां ध्वस्तायां तद्विनाशतः ।
देवेश्वरादयः के स्युर्विघ्नं वा कस्य कुर्वते ॥१५०४॥

When these great ones, viz. (periods of) time, gods etc., belong to ignorance and they do not belong to the real object, then, that ignorance being destroyed, these, viz. (its effects) gods, lords etc. also get destroyed; how then could they be what they are, and for whom will they cause obstacles? [1503-1504]

यत्र त्वस्येति श्रुत्यैव सर्वमेतत्स्फुटीकृतम् ।
इहापि हेतुसंसिद्ध्यै तत्स्पष्टमभिधीयते ॥१५०५॥
यतो विघ्नकृतामात्मा प्रत्यग्याथात्म्यविद्वेत् ।
तद्गोचरातिवर्तित्वं विद्याकाले तमोहतेः ॥१५०६॥

All this is made quite clear by the very Śruti statement *yatra tv asya ...*¹ (but) here also it is stated in clear terms with

a view to establishing the cause of (effecting) the release of the bound self— [1505]

Since the inner self of (each of) them who cause obstacle (to men) would be the knower of the true nature of the inner self thanks to the destruction of ignorance at the time of acquiring the knowledge of the Brahman, (there would be) the capacity to transcend the sphere (lit. object(s)) of that (viz. ignorance). [1506]

This is an additional argument about why it is said that gods etc. do not cause any obstacle to a man's pursuit of knowledge. Gods etc. are also, like men, some individual selves affected by ignorance and, therefore, in their case also, ignorance would be destroyed at the time of their acquiring the knowledge of the Brahman. This renders it impossible that they would cause any obstacles.

¹BU 4.5.15.

आत्मामीषां तदा ब्रह्म देवादीनां भवेद्वशी ।
कालाद्यन्तरितं यत्स्यात्प्राप्त्युत्पत्त्यादिलक्षणम् ॥१५०७॥
अनात्मैव फलं तत्र देवानामीशता भवेत् ।

At that time, the inner self of (each of) these gods etc. would become the all-powerful Brahman, which was earlier (obscured by) time etc. and was of the nature of having an origin etc. as its character. [1507]

That being so (*tatra*), the lordship of the gods is (but) the fruit, (viz. becoming) the non-Ātman. [1508ab]

In verses 1508cd-1527, there is discussion of the doubt of some Vedāntin (of the same school) regarding: What removes ignorance— the final moment of one's life or the continuous stream of that knowledge. The role played by the lore of the Brahman is also discussed.

अपि ज्ञातात्मतत्त्वानामभावाज्ज्ञानसंततेः ॥१५०८॥
अन्त्यो ऽविद्यापनुद्धो रागादिप्रत्ययोत्थितेः ।
इति चेन्नैतदेवं स्यादाद्ये ऽनैकान्तिकत्वतः ॥१५०९॥

If (it is argued:) Because in the case of them who have (later on) known the true nature of the Ātman also, there is noticed absence of continuous stream of knowledge [1508cd] (and) it is only the last moment (in their life), (viz. the moment) of knowing which removes ignorance, since (after every moment of knowing) there has arisen the feeling of attachment, (our answer is:) This is not so, because (even) at the first moment of knowing (the nature of Brahman) there would arise the fault of the argument having two (opposite) results. [1509]

नान्त्याविद्यापनद्विद्विरात्मैकविषयत्वतः ।
आद्यात्मबुद्धिवद्वैतोरनैकान्तिकतेक्ष्यते ॥१५१०॥

Not indeed (knowledge) at the last moment (in one's life) removes ignorance, because it has only the Ātman as its object and it would be like the first (earlier) moment of knowing the Ātman and thus here also is there the fault of having two (opposite) results. [1510]

अनैकान्तिकता हेतोस्तद्वत्संततिवादिनः ।
न चाभ्यासात्प्रमाणानि कुर्वन्त्यर्थावबोधनम् ॥१५११॥

This having two (opposite) results by means of knowledge (lit. cause of it) (would occur) in the same way in the case of one who argues the stream of (knowledge) also and the means of knowledge do not bring about the truth of the object of knowing (merely) by their repetition. [1511]

Once the knowledge of the Brahman is acquired, there is no need of repeated use of that means of knowing. The example of a lamp makes this clear. Once a lamp is brought to a place, it reveals the objects there. That is all! This is contrary to the example of taking food. It removes hunger, but not once for all. Hunger returns and, therefore, taking food has to be repeated.

संबन्धमात्राभिव्यक्तेर्व्यञ्जकत्वात्प्रदीपवत् ।
भोजनादौ न च सति ज्ञानसंततिरिष्यते ॥१५१२॥

Since (the means of knowing) has a capacity to reveal (the object) by its mere connection (with the same), as in the case of a lamp, and not as in the case of taking food etc.; therefore, continuity of knowing (in the case of a *jīvanmukta*) is not desired. [1512]

This continues the thought of the second line of the preceding verse. The purpose of the means of knowing is revealing the nature of the object of knowing. There should not be repetition of an attempt to know the Brahman.

तदन्तरायबाहुल्यात्सुषुप्तादौ च नेष्यते ।
प्रत्यक्प्रमेयपूर्वेवं सर्वासां नो यतो धियाम् ।
सूतिराम्रेडनं तस्मात्सिद्धमात्मधियः सदा ॥१५१३॥

And (i.e. but) in the state of deep sleep etc.¹ it is not accepted, because there are many hindrances to it. Since again there is impulse of all our cognitions (i.e. intellect) preceded by the inner self,² the object of knowing, therefore it is established that there is (the necessity of) repetition of the knowing of the Ātman. [1513]

This can yet be an argument against the thought of the preceding verses.

¹The word etc. refers to swoon, utter destruction of the world and *asamprajñāta samādhi*.

²This is characterized by *aham*, viz. Ego.

ज्ञानस्य वस्तुतन्त्रत्वान्न कर्त्रनुविधायिता ।
शीतोष्णज्ञानवत्तस्मान्नेष्यते ज्ञानसंततिः ॥१५१४॥

Since knowledge (of the Brahman) depends on the thing itself, it is not what is to be accomplished by (the performance of) some agent; and is like the experience of cold and heat; therefore, continuous stream of knowledge is not accepted.

[1514]

भोजनादिनिरोधेन संततिश्चेत्समर्थ्यते ।

उक्ता परिहृतिस्तत्र न भूयो ऽपि व्यपेक्ष्यते ॥१५१५॥

If continuity (of the knowledge of Brahman) is justified by (pointing out) obstruction (caused) by food etc.; then, in that respect (*tatra*), we have (already) stated the argument in refutation of it¹; it is not desired² (to be given) once again. [1515]

¹Cf. *jñānasya vastutantratvāt* above.

²Text and translation adopt the variant reading *vyapekṣyate*. The textual reading is rejected.

क्षुत्पिपासापरिम्लानचेतस्त्वान्नितरां न सा ।

भोजनादिनिरोधेन न च तस्याः प्रमेक्ष्यते ॥१५१६॥

That (=continuous stream of knowledge) is not at all (there) because the mind of the person is overpowered by hunger and desire, in the case of obstruction (caused by) food etc.; the awareness of it (i.e. nature of the Ātman) is not noticeable.

[1516]

संतत्यारम्भकधियामियत्तानवधारणात् ।

शास्त्रार्थानिश्चयो दोषः स चानिष्टः प्रसज्यते ॥१५१७॥

In the case of them who hold that there is a beginning of the continuous stream of knowledge, there is no specification (possible) of its magnitude and there follows the contingent fault, viz. indecision regarding the meaning of the Śruti; and that is not desired.

[1517]

मतं संततिमात्रत्वे निश्चितिः स्यात्तथापि च ।

अनैकान्तिकता हेतोराद्यसंततिवद्भवेत् ॥१५१८॥

If it is held that there would be decision at least in that there is the continuity (of the awareness); there would be the fault of having two opposite conclusions (from it) as in the case of the continuity of knowledge in respect of the first moment (of experience).

[1518]

समानविषयत्वे ऽपि नाद्याविद्यां निहन्ति चेत् ।
ज्ञानसंततिरन्त्या नः सेत्स्यतीत्यत्र का प्रमा ॥१५१९॥

When there is but one object of knowing and the first (posited stream of knowledge) does not destroy ignorance; then what correctness would there be in saying that the final moment of knowledge will result for us (into liberation)? [1519]

This verse explains *anaikāntikatā* of *hetu* as mentioned in the preceding verse.

मरणे ऽपि न विश्वासो हिकिकावशवर्तिनः ।
ज्ञानसंततिनिष्पत्तौ तमोमात्रसमाप्तिः ॥१५२०॥

In the case of a person who is overpowered by hiccups, at the time of his death, there is no decision about truth by (any) stream of knowledge, overpowered as it is by darkness (viz. ignorance). [1520]

कर्म्मच्छिद्रेषु कुर्वन्ति ये ऽपि सम्यग्धिद्यं बलात् ।
नूनं ते नासिकाग्रेण वीक्षन्ते सूर्यमडलम् ॥१५२१॥

And those, who achieve right knowledge (lit. the knowledge of the Brahman) even while there are shortcomings in their (performance of ritual) activities, are indeed looking at the sun's orb through the tip of the nose. [1521]

Thus the Siddhāntin proves the impossibility of achieving the knowledge of the Brahman and thereby the final release by ritual performance (even if they are defective).

वस्तुतन्त्रं न हि ज्ञानं नृतन्त्रं लोकवहिवत् ।
अनन्यज्ञातृकत्वाच्च प्रत्यग्ज्ञानस्य सर्वदा ॥१५२२॥

Knowledge (which) is indeed dependent on the thing (of Reality) is not like (the maintenance of) fire in the common world dependent on a man (i.e. his activity), because knowledge of

the inner self is to be acquired by no other knower.¹ [1522]

¹That is, none other than the inner self.

न चानिर्वर्तकं ज्ञानं प्रत्यङ्मोहस्य युज्यते ।
स्वानुभूतिविरुद्धत्वादग्निदाहादिबोधवत् ॥१५२३॥

Further, it is not properly argued that knowledge (on the part of an individual) is what does not ward off ignorance about the inner self, for (that would be) opposed to one's own experience which is similar to (the experience of) the burning sensation caused by fire etc.¹ [1523]

¹The word etc. refers to the cool touch of water.

सर्ववेदान्तवाक्यानामेतावन्मात्रनिष्ठतः ।
न चार्थवादता तेषामन्याशेषत्वकारणात् ॥१५२४॥

Since all the sentences of the Vedānta are related only to this much (viz. the exposition of the true nature of the inner self), they do not have the character of a eulogistic statement, for the reason that they are not subordinate to any other (ritual etc.) [1524]

This refutes the idea that the Vedānta sentences could be treated as eulogistic statements (Arthavāda). Cf. discussion on *sarvo 'py ayam vedah* ...; SV 556ff., particularly 568-575.

अहंधीविषयत्वाच्चेत्तेषां स्यादर्थवादता ।
नोक्तत्वात्परिहारस्य न चाहंगम्यतात्मनः ॥१५२५॥

If (one would say:) They have the character of a eulogistic statement, since they pertain to the sense of Ego. (The answer is:) No, because the refutation in respect of this has been already made (lit. stated) by us; indeed the Ātman is not to be known by the sense of Ego. [1525]

The answer has the following argument: *ahamdhigamyah pramātā*,

tatsākṣiṇo brahmatvaṃ vedāntā bodhayanti (NKL).

अहंबुद्ध्येक्ष्यते प्रत्यक्प्रतीचा चाप्यहंमतिः ।
अन्योन्याश्रयता दोषः स्यादहंवृत्तिविक्षणे ॥१५२६॥

(The answer is: In the above argument) the sense of Ego expects (i.e. depends on) the inner self and the inner self also (expects) the sense of Ego — thus there is the fault of mutual dependence in holding (lit. seeing) the theory of such functioning of Ego.¹ [1526]

¹That is, the function of Ego in seeing the inner self.

यत एवमतो यो नः प्रत्यक्संमोहहानिकृत् ।
आद्योऽन्त्यः संततो वासौ बोधो मुक्तिफलः स्मृतः ॥१५२७॥

Since this is so, therefore, that which is for us the first (i.e. an earlier) experience (of the inner self) or even the last one which brings about the destruction of ignorance about the inner self, and is continuous (and therefore) is accepted by us as the one resulting into liberation. [1527]

The Siddhāntin states that he does not make any distinction between the first or the last (=the one occurring at the time of death) experience in relation to liberation.

Verses 1528-1557 refute the argument that knowledge does not remove ignorance, for one notices attachment etc. on the part of knowers of Reality, by explaining the nature of a 'jīvanmukta'.

यत्तत्तं ज्ञाततत्त्वानामपि रागादिदर्शनात् ।
नाविद्याहानिकृज्ज्ञानमत्र प्रतिविधीयते ॥१५२८॥

As to what is said,¹ viz. there is noticed a feeling of attachment etc. on the part of them who have known the true nature (of the individual self) also¹ and their knowledge does not therefore effect the removal of ignorance — this is now refuted.

¹In verse 1509 above.

²The word also indicates: even the ignorant ones.

आरब्धफलशेषैकहेतुत्वाद्देहसंस्थितेः ।
रागादिप्रत्ययोद्धृतिरिषुचक्रादिवेगवत् ॥१५२९॥

(This is so)¹, because there remains the body on account of the mere remainder of the fruit (of the actions) which have begun (to show it) and the rise of the experience of attachment etc. there is just like the speed of an arrow or a wheel etc. [1529]

This asserts the known maxim: *prārabdhakarmanām bhogād eva kṣayaḥ*. The author refers to the well-known example of an arrow which when shot stops only after its speed is arrested; similar is the case of a rotating wheel.

¹This refers to *rāgādidarśana* in the case of those who have known the nature of the Ātman.

तस्य वृत्तफलत्वान्नो ज्ञानं स्यात्तन्निवृत्तिकृत् ।
अतीतत्वाच्च तद्धान्यै नालमात्मावबोधनम् ॥१५३०॥

Since the fruit has already occurred, in the case of that person (who has acquired the knowledge of the Brahman), his knowledge would not be the cause of the removal of that (ritual activity) and the knowledge of (the true nature of) the Ātman is not necessary (lit. capable) for the abandoning of that which has already occurred. [1530]

SP compares the thought in the first half of the verse to *Sāṃkhyapravācanasūtra* 3.82: *tiṣṭhatīsaṃskāravaśāccakrabhramaṇavaddhṛtaśarīrah*.

यत्तु स्वात्माश्रयं कर्म ह्यनारब्धफलं भवेत् ।
उत्पितस्वनागतं कृत्स्नं ज्ञानं हन्ति तदेव नः ॥१५३१॥

But whatever be (the action) related to the Ātman and has

not begun to show its fruits — the knowledge which is about to occur or the one which has not (yet) occurred will alone destroy all that for us. [1531]

अनारब्धफलं कर्म न त्वारब्धफलं यदि ।
निरुणद्ध्यात्मविज्ञानं तदानिष्टम् प्रसज्यते ॥१५३२॥

If the knowledge of (the true nature of) the Ātman does not obstruct (ritual) activity which has not begun to show its fruit (in the same way as) that which has begun to show its fruit, then there forcefully follows (the) undesired (result).¹ [1532]

¹That means opposition to the Śruti like *kṣīyante cāśya karmāṇi tasmin drṣṭe parāvare* (Munḍakopaniṣad 2.2.8).

प्रारब्धात्मफलं नो चेत्कर्म ज्ञानं निवर्तयेत् ।
अनारब्धफलं हन्तीत्यत्रापि स्यान्न निश्चितिः ॥१५३३॥

If knowledge of (the true nature of) the Ātman does not ward away (ritual) activity which has begun to show fruit, then there would not be any certainty that it would destroy (that ritual activity) also which has not begun to show its fruits! [1533]

न चेदारब्धकार्येषु ज्ञानस्वातन्त्र्यमिष्यते ।
अनारब्धेषु नितरां पुंसो ऽपि स्याद्यथेष्टता ॥१५३४॥

If it is not accepted that knowledge has freedom (i.e. capacity to destroy) in respect of those (ritual activities) which have begun to show their results, then in the case of a person there would certainly be wanton behaviour. [1534]

न च तेषु निरुद्धेषु किञ्चिन्नः स्यात्प्रयोजनम् ।
प्राङ्मृतेर्मुक्त्यसंसिद्धेरबीजत्वाच्च संसृतेः ॥१५३५॥

And in case they¹ are obstructed, we would not have any purpose whatsoever in life before death, so long as there has not occurred liberation and since (consequent upon death) transmigratory existence would not have any seed for it. [1535]

¹ *ārabdhakāryakarmasu* referred to in the preceding verse.

सर्वसंहारकाले च निरोधो ऽभूदशेषतः ।
तावानपि न पर्याप्तो निरोधो मुक्तये कथम् ॥१५३६॥
अल्पीयोहःसमभ्यस्तो निरोधो ऽलं विमुक्तये ।
भावनोपचयान्नापि मुक्तिः स्याद्भङ्गुरत्वतः ॥१५३७॥

And, further, at the time of destruction of all (beings and things), there has been cessation of (lit. obstruction to) (all activities) in their entirety.¹ How would not that much² obstruction (to ritual activity) be capable of effecting liberation?

[1536]

Obstruction (to performance of ritual activity) carried on (even) for few days (by acquiring the knowledge of the Ātman) is capable of leading to liberation; but there would not be liberation like (in the other case), since there is increase of desire for ritual activity and because of its being liable to perish.

[1537]

¹This is to oppose the view of the followers of Yoga who hold that *cittavṛttinirodha* leads to liberation. No importance is attached to the knowledge of the Ātman by them.

²This refers to the obstruction to ritual activity caused by the knowledge of the Brahman, acquired in one's life-time, before death (i.e. in the state of *jīvanmukti*).

दुःख्यस्मीत्यपि चेद्धवस्ता कोटिकल्पोपबृंहिता ।
अल्पीयोभ्यासजा साध्वी भावनेत्यत्र का प्रमा ॥१५३८॥

(One would ask:) What proof is there that there is produced a good impulse by short-time-application (to the activity of acquiring the knowledge of the Brahman), in case (the feeling) 'I am unhappy.', which has become strong in the large number of previous *kalpas* gets destroyed?

[1538]

शास्त्रार्थस्य समाप्तेश्च मुक्तिः स्यात्तावता मितेः ।
रागादयः सन्तु कामं न तद्भावो ऽपराद्ध्यति ॥१५३९॥

(This is said in answer:) There is liberation, because of the fulfilment of the purpose of the Śruti (to that effect), viz. liberation by that much right knowledge; let there be the feelings of attachment etc., their being there does not in any way affect the occurrence of liberation. [1539]

आगमाद्वेद चेद्ब्रह्म ब्रह्मैव भवतीति हि ।
फलावस्थस्य च सतः कुतो रागादिसंप्लुतिः ॥१५४०॥

Since if one knew the Brahman from tradition of the Veda (or from the Śruti) 'He would indeed be the Brahman.', how could there be overpowering by attachment etc. of the one who is in the state of liberation (which is) the fruit? [1540]

This verse explains the second line of the preceding verse.

न च ब्रह्मपरिज्ञानहुताशाप्लुष्टमण्वपि ।
संभाव्यते ब्रह्मधियः सर्वान्त्यत्वैकहेतुतः ॥१५४१॥

Further, there cannot be even a little thing which is not burnt by the fire in the form of complete knowledge of the Brahman on the part of one who has acquired the knowledge of the Brahman, for it is the one cause of the end of all (other things). [1541]

सम्यग्ज्ञानविरुद्धा धीर्न चैकात्म्यं विजानतः ।
उत्पद्यते निर्विषया विषयाशयहानतः ॥१५४२॥

And there does not arise on the part of one who has known the uniqueness of the Ātman any awareness which is opposed to right knowledge. There arises on the part of him a knowledge which has no object, since there has been abandonment of the contents of all objects. [1542]

लोके ऽनिर्ज्ञाततत्त्वस्य मिथ्याधीरुपजायते ।
प्रध्वस्ततत्त्वतमसः कुतः स्यात्कारणादृते ॥१५४३॥

In the world there arises false knowledge on the part of one

who has not determined the true nature of the Ātman; how could that (=false knowledge) be (on the part of one) who has destroyed the darkness which had earlier overpowered that truth, unless there was any reason?¹ [1543]

¹There is right knowledge, therefore that happening is not at all possible.

सम्यग्ज्ञाने ऽपि चेत्सा स्यादविश्रम्भः प्रसज्यते ।
एवं सत्यप्रमाणत्वं मितेश्चापि प्रसज्यते ॥१५४४॥

Supposing it¹ would be there even when was right knowledge (on the part of one), then there would be the contingency of disbelief in (the teaching of the Śruti) and, this being so, even right knowledge would cease to be an authoritative means of knowing. [1544]

¹It refers to *mithyājñāna* mentioned in the preceding verse.

सम्यङ्मिथ्याधियोऽर्थस्माद्विशेषो नोपलभ्यते ।
व्यवहारस्य लोपो ऽतः सर्वस्य स्यादसंशयः ॥१५४५॥

(And that being so),¹ since there would be no difference noticeable between right knowledge and false knowledge, therefore there would be a doubtless (i.e. decided) loss of the entire dealing (of human beings). [1545]

¹This means: if there is *miter apramāṇatva* (which is stated in the preceding verse).

सम्यग्ज्ञानसमुत्पत्तिसमनन्तरमेव च ।
शरीरपातः कस्मान्नेत्येतच्चाप्यपहस्तितम् ॥१५४६॥
पूर्वोक्तेनैव न्यायेन वक्तव्यं नावशिष्यते ।

As to the question, 'why there is no fall of the body immediately after the rise of right knowledge?', that also is refuted [1546]

by the very reason already stated.¹ (As such), there is nothing

left to be said.

[1547ab]

¹Namely, the argument already stated in verse 1529 above and note thereon, viz. *prārabdhakarmāṇām bhogād eva kṣayaḥ*.

ज्ञानोत्पत्तावतो ध्वस्तिः सर्वेषामपि कर्मणाम् ॥१५४७॥
यथैधांसि समिद्धो ऽग्निर्भस्मसात्कुरुते ऽर्जुन ।
ज्ञानाग्निः सर्वकर्माणि भस्मसात्कुरुते तथा ॥१५४८॥

Therefore, when there arises knowledge (viz. the true nature of the Self), there is destruction of all the (ritual) activities also. (The following is said by the Lord in this context:) As an enkindled fire renders fuel sticks to ashes, O Arjuna, so does the fire of knowledge render to ashes all actions of man.¹

[1547cd-1548]

¹*Gītā* 4.37.

सर्वदृष्टान्तसारूप्यप्रसक्तौ तन्निषेधकृत् ।
तावदेव चिरं तस्येत्यपवादः श्रुतीरितः ॥१५४९॥

Now there might follow contingently the similarity (or, the sameness) of illustrations in their entirety, therefore, there is stated in the Śruti an exception to that in the words, 'For him only that much delay.'¹ which negates that.² (Thus:) —

[1549]

¹For the sake of metre, Sureśvara changes the order of words from *tasya tāvad eva ciram* (CU 6.14.2).

²Namely, the contingent sameness of illustrations.

नेत्रबन्धविनिर्मोकादुपदेशः स्मृतिं प्रति ॥१५५०॥
ततस्तदर्थग्रहणमनुष्ठानं ततः परम् ।
स भूरिगत्युपचयाद्ग्रामाद्ग्रामान्तरं व्रजेत् ॥१५५१॥
सम्यग्ज्ञातोपदेशार्थः स्वयं च प्रतिभानवान् ।
द्राघीयसा स कालेन गन्धारान्प्रतिपद्यते ॥१५५२॥

There is (in CU instruction as to the memory of a country

lost to some person) after removing the bondage on the eyes (of him), [1550]

(and) thereafter, there is (or the part of that person) grasping of the meaning of that (=instruction) and, thereafter, there is some activity (on his part), namely that 'and (then) by going about here and there (lit. variously or a long way) he moves from one village to another — [1551]

(and) having well understood the meaning of the instruction, he himself becomes fully aware¹ (of Reality and) arrives, after some long span of time, at the region of Gāndhāra.' [1552]

This is the summary of CU 6.14.1-2. It seeks to answer away the contingent similarity with the illustrations in entirety.

¹Knowing fully the bearings of the country etc.

यथैवमेवेहापि स्याद्य इहाचार्यवानरः ।

निःशेषदृष्टान्तोक्त्यर्थप्रसक्तिविनिवृत्तये ।

अपवादं श्रुतिरियं तस्य त्विति जगाद नः ॥१५५३॥

As this (happens), so here also it would be (i.e. happen) (in the case of) a person who has a teacher.¹ And then, in order to ward away the contingent meaning of the (similarity with) illustration in its fullness, this Śruti declared to us *tasya tu ...*², as an exception.³ [1553]

¹He obtains the knowledge of the true nature of their inner self.

²*tasya tu ...* is for *tasya tāvad eva ciram ...* (CU 6.14.2); as seen in the next verse.

³A statement for excluding some contingent matter.

तस्य त्वेवंविदः पुंसस्तावदेव चिरं भवेत् ।

यावदैकात्म्यसंमोहपट्टको नापनीयते ॥१५५४॥

In the case of that person, who knows thus; there is only that much delay so long as the bondage of ignorance about the uniqueness of the Ātman is not removed (from his eyes).

[1554]

This is explanation of the last line of the preceding verse.

प्रत्यग्याथात्म्यविज्ञानजन्मनो नातिरेकभाक् ।
प्रत्यङ्मोहाभिनहनद्वंसश्चाप्यन्यथामतेः ॥१५५५॥

And the removal, lit. destruction of the bondage of ignorance about (the inner self) in the case of one, who had a notion (about it) as other (than what it really is), is not apart from¹ the rise of the knowledge of the true nature of the inner self. [1555]

¹It literally means: is not in addition to ...

तस्माद्याथात्म्यविज्ञानसमुत्पत्तेः पुरैव तु ।
आत्माज्ञानं सकार्यं स्यात्तस्य बाध्यत्वकारणात् ॥१५५६॥

Therefore, only before the rise of the knowledge of the true nature of, Self there exists (on the part of a person) ignorance about the inner self together with its effects, because there has existed (earlier) the cause of its obstruction. [1556]

यस्मिन्प्राप्ते यद्ववति तत्तस्मात्स्यात्कथं पुरा ।
अन्त्यं तस्मात्परिज्ञानं सर्वबाध्यस्य बाधकम् ॥१५५७॥

(The objector asks:) How could a thing exist before that which obtaining (only) it obtains? Therefore, knowledge which stultifies all that is to be stultified is what exists last. [1557]

This objection pertains to the dispute about the state of *jīvanmukti*, which results from acquisition of knowledge about the true nature of the Ātman at some moment in life, and the state after realising the nature of the Brahman at the time of death. The idea of the objector is that, in the state of *jīvanmukti*, there would not be any existence which is already stultified by the knowledge of the Brahman. It is only logical that the last moment in one's life stultifies every worldly thing.

This is the conclusion of the discussion.

ऋणिनो ऽप्यस्य देवाद्या नेशते ब्रह्मवेदिनः ।
इत्युक्तं किंनिमित्तं चेत्तत्र प्रतिविधीयते ॥१५५८॥

[Verses 1558-1562 state that even the gods cannot take liberty to stop one's attaining liberation.]

If (it is asked:) What is the reason for the statement that gods and others do not have control over this knower of the Brahman, even though he is bound in debt to them? (To this) an answer is given (now): [1558]

This question has a basis in verses 1507-1508 above.

न विज्ञातात्मयाथात्म्यं प्रत्यृणित्वं भवेद्यतः ।
अविद्याविषयं तत्स्यात्तस्य कर्तृत्वकारणात् ॥१५५९॥

The state of being indebted (to gods and others) would not be on the part of him who has known the true nature of the Self, since that (state) is within the purview of ignorance for the reason that his nature of an agent (of some activity is understood thereby). [1559]

यत्र वा अन्यदित्यादि तथा च श्रुतिशासनम् ।
द्वस्ताविद्यस्य तन्न स्यात्तस्यैकात्म्यस्वभावतः ॥१५६०॥

And to that effect is there the instruction in the Śruti *yatra* ...¹ or *anyad* ...² and so on. That³ would not be on the part of one whose ignorance is destroyed, since his nature is now that of the unique Ātman.⁴ [1560]

¹BU 4.5.15: *yatra tv asya sarvam ātmaivābhūt*. This is referred to in verses 571, 1185 and 1505 above.

²*Kenopaniṣad* 1.4: *anyad eva tad veditād atho aviditād adhi*. This is referred to in verses 565, 719, 873(note) and 1117 above.

³That is, *karṣṭva*.

⁴That is to say: He is one with the Ātman and, therefore, there

is nothing else that would govern him.

न चेहाविदुषो ऽपि स्यादृणित्वम् हेत्वसंभवात् ।
न किञ्चिन्नः सुरैः प्रत्तमृणित्वं येन नो भवेत् ॥१५६१॥

Further, there is not (in reality) on the part of even a non-knower of the Brahman the state of being bound in debt, because there is no cause (for his being so). Indeed, nothing is given to us by gods on whose account we would be in the state of being bound in debt. [1561]

वचनादिति चेन्नैवं तदुक्तेरर्थवादतः ।
अवदानविधेः शेषो ह्यर्थवादो हि तद्वचः ॥१५६२॥

If (it is argued:) (It is so) because there is a statement in the Śruti (about man's being bound to gods etc. in debt). (It has to be said:) No, that statement is but an Arthavāda¹. Indeed, that statement is an Arthavāda, since it is the remainder of the injunction about the cutting (of the oblation). [1562]

¹It means: the statement of some ancillary matter.

विद्वांसं प्रति नेशाना यदि देवादयो मताः ।
कस्मिन्विषय ऐश्वर्यं तेषां स्यात्सो ऽधुनोच्यते ॥१५६३॥

[Verses 1563-1589 explain the meaning of *atha yo 'nyām.*]

If the gods and others are considered as unable to control a learned man, (then the question is:) In what area do they have a capacity to control? That (particular area) is now stated: [1563]

In three quarters of the verse, the objector has asked a doubt about the meaningfulness or otherwise of the gods and others having a control over human beings. This doubt is answered in the verses which follow.

प्रामाण्यं कर्मकाण्डस्य यस्मिन्विषय इष्यते ।

अविद्याविषयः साक्षादथ यो ऽन्यामितीर्यते ॥१५६४॥

That area (viz. portion) of the Śruti in which its authoritativeness is accepted with reference to rituals is in reality (*sā-kṣāt*) the area of ignorance and that is stated in the words *yo 'nyām ...* [1564]

सम्यग्ज्ञानसमुत्पत्तौ कर्मकार्यसमाप्तिः ।
नापेक्षा कर्मकाण्डे स्यात्तत्प्रामाण्यकृतार्थतः ॥१५६५॥

When there arises right knowledge (about the nature of the Brahman) there is obtainment (of the result of) all the activity and, therefore, there is no expectation of the portions pertaining to rituals, because the purpose of its authority is already fulfilled. [1565]

This verse refers to *karmakārya*.

प्रकृतैकात्म्यविद्याया व्युत्थानायाथगीरियम् ।
न हि संगच्छते विद्याविद्यायोगं विरोधतः ॥१५६६॥

This (use of the word) *atha* is to express the rise of the knowledge of the uniqueness of the Ātman which is the subject matter under discussion, and indeed (that statement) does not go (well) with knowledge and ignorance together on account of their mutual conflict. [1566]

प्रतीच्यनन्य एकस्मिन्नविद्यापिहितेक्षणः ।
अनन्यो ऽप्यात्मनो भिन्नामुपास्ते देवतां नरः ॥१५६७॥

A man whose eye is covered by ignorance in respect of the inner self, which is one without a second, worships a deity other than his own self, even if he is not different from the Ātman. [1567]

अन्यो ऽसाविति वाक्येन व्याख्योपासापदस्य तु ।
भेददर्शनमेवात उपास्त इति भण्यते ॥१५६८॥

In the statement *anyo 'sau* there is the explanation of the term *upāsā*¹; therefore what is said in the word *upāste* is described only as seeing (that is accepting) duality. [1568]

¹See our book [Vol.4:1991] Introduction for a discussion on Upāsana/Upāsanā.

किं मूलं भिन्नदृष्टेः स्यादिति श्रुत्या तदुच्यते ।
न स वेदेत्यविद्येयं नामरूपप्रपञ्चकृत् ॥१५६९॥

(One would ask:) 'What is the root of this notion of distinction (between the Brahman and the other thing)?' and (to answer this,) it is said: The Śruti states *na sa veda*, 'Thus this is ignorance which creates variety in name and form.'. [1569]

आत्माविद्याग्रहग्रस्तः संहतस्तज्जवस्तुभिः ।
स एष पशुतामेति देवादीनां स्वकर्मभिः ॥१५७०॥

This one, who is oppressed by (lit. swallowed by) the evil spirit in the form of ignorance about (the nature of) the Ātman and bound by the objects that are the products of it, becomes by his own activity an animal for gods and others. [1570]

बहूपकारकृद्यद्वज्रवादिलौकिकः पशुः ।
देवादीनां तथाविद्वान्पशुः स्यादुपकारकृत् ॥१५७१॥

As an animal of this world, such as a cow, renders various service (to human beings), so also does an ignorant person, an animal, render service to gods and others. [1571]

एकैकस्वामिको लोके गवादिः पशुरिष्यते ।
ततो ऽप्यतिशयः पुंसां सर्वलोकोपकारिता ॥१५७२॥

In the world, they hold that an animal, such as a cow, has one master, but there is, in the case of human beings, some additional aspect of them, viz. they have usefulness for all the people. [1572]

एकैकक्रियया लोक एकैकस्वामिकः पशुः ।
अनेकैः संहतश्चैवं कदाचिदुपकारकः ॥१५७३॥

In the world, an animal which performs one activity and has one master (for itself) it could at some time be (variously) useful (to the master) as flocked with many others also. [1573]

भरिक्रियावांस्तु नरस्तथानेकेश्वरो ऽवशः ।
एकैको निखिलं विश्वं बिभर्त्यज्ञो दिवानिशम् ॥१५७४॥

As against this (*tu*), a human being, capable of doing many actions, not having one master, a servant, the ignorant one, performs day and night all (numerous duties) without exception, though even a single (person). [1574]

अस्यैवार्थस्य दृष्टान्तो यथा हेत्यभिधीयते ।
यत एवमतो युक्तं देवादेर्भृशमप्रियम् ॥१५७५॥

For conveying this very meaning is here stated the illustration in the words *yathā ha* ...; since this is so, it is reasonable (to hold that) this is very disagreeable to gods and others. [1575]

This is clarified in the next verse.

अपि भरिपशोः पुंस एकस्मिन्नपि तस्करैः ।
हियमाणे पशौ तीव्रं दुःखं समुपजायते ।
किमु सर्वस्वहरणे वक्तव्यं दुःखकारणम् ॥१५७६॥

For a human being who has a large stock of animals, there is a very intense sorrow even when a single animal is stolen away by thieves; how great a cause of sorrow there would be when the all-in-all of his life is taken away (from him)?

[1576]

This is the meaning of the sentence *yathā ca*.

सर्वस्वतुल्ये नृपशौ ब्रह्मधीपरिमोषिणा ॥१५७७॥
 हियमाणे महद्दुःखं तस्मादेषां तदप्रियम् ।
 यद्यथोक्तं परं ब्रह्म मनुष्या विद्युरञ्जसा ॥१५७८॥

Therefore, for these persons it is greatly disagreeable when the animal in the form of man, which is (for them) as good as all of (their) property, is (being) stolen away by the thief in the form the knowledge about the Brahman, for, as is already said, men knew the Brahman clearly. [1577-1578]

This is the meaning of *tasmād eṣām* ...

सर्वाधिकारहेत्वग्निब्रह्मज्ञानस्य जन्मनि ।
 अव्यावृत्ताननुगतात्प्रतीचो ऽन्यन्न शिष्यते ॥१५७९॥

At the rise of the knowledge of the Brahman, which is fire (that burns away) every ground of eligibility (for ritual activity), there does not remain anything else than the inner self which is undifferentiated and not similar to anything (else). [1579]

This explains why the knowledge about the Brahman is called a thief (in the preceding verse).

नावशिष्यत एतस्मात्तदविद्योत्थमण्वपि ।
 प्रध्वस्तत्त्वादविद्याया ब्रह्मात्मज्ञानवहिना ॥१५८०॥

For this reason, not even a little of what had arisen from ignorance about that (viz. the inner self) remains, since ignorance is completely destroyed by the fire in the form of the knowledge of the inner self as the Brahman. [1580]

This refers to the preceding verse.

क्रियावद्भिर्हि कौन्तेय देवलोकः समावृतः ।
 न चैतदिष्टं देवानां मर्त्यैरुपरि वर्तनम् ॥१५८१॥

For, the world of gods is all crowded, O son of Kuntī, by them who perform rituals and this, viz. rising of men above

(their normal condition), is not desired by gods. [1581]

This is *Mahābhārata* 14.19.54; it clarifies the word *apriya* in the text.

तस्मान्मुमुक्षुर्देवादीन्सम्यगाराध्य कर्मभिः ।
उन्मुक्तबन्धनस्तैः सन्नापित्सेज्ज्ञानमात्मनः ॥१५८२॥

Therefore, a person who is desirous of securing liberation should first please the gods through various services, and, having become free from ties (of worldly existence), he should seek to acquire the knowledge of Ātman. [1582]

तद्विपक्षस्तु यो बालो बलादेव मुमुक्षति ।
स्वर्गादेरपि विभ्रष्टो नरकं स निर्गच्छति ॥१५८३॥

But the one who, opposed to him (in nature or action), the ignorant one, would perforce seek to obtain liberation, would fall even from a heaven and go down to the hell. [1583]

प्रमादिनो बहिर्चित्ताः पिशुनाः कलहोत्सुकाः ।
संन्यासिनो ऽपि दृश्यन्ते देवसंदूषिताशयाः ॥१५८४॥

There are seen even ascetics who have mistaken¹, whose mind is prone outwards, who are wicked, who are ever ready to pick up quarrels and who have their minds spoilt by gods.² [1584]

¹Or, who falter or take wrong steps.

²That is, because they are not worshipped by the ascetics.

न कर्मणामनारम्भान्नैष्कर्म्यं पुरुषो ऽश्नुते ।
न च संन्यसनादेव सिद्धिं समधिगच्छति ॥१५८५॥

A man does not become free from *karman* by (mere) not beginning the rituals/activities. Also he does not obtain liberation (or better, *siddhi* 'fulfilment of his life') by only abandoning the same. [1585]

This is *Gītā* 3.4.

कषायं पाचयित्वा तु श्रेणीस्थानेषु च त्रिषु ।
प्रव्रजेच्च परं स्थानं पारिव्राज्यमनुत्तमम् ॥१५८६॥

And, having exhausted (lit. covered) the evil in the three stages of ascending¹, a person should take to the ultimate stage, viz. excellent renunciation. [1586]

This is comparable to *Mahābhārata* 12.237.3 where the second line ends in *parivrajyāmanuttamām*.

¹ *brahmacarya*, *gārhaṣṭhya* and *vānaprastha* are meant.

भावितैः करणैश्चायं बहुसंसारयोनिषु ।
आसादयति शुद्धात्मा मोक्षं वै प्रथमाश्रमे ॥१५८७॥

And this person who, having purified his inner self by means of his various sense-organs that are satisfied in the course of many births in transmigratory existence, indeed obtains liberation (even) in the first stage (of life). [1587]

This is *Mahābhārata* 12.313.26.

तमासाद्य तु मुक्तस्य दृष्टार्थस्य विपरिचितः ।
त्रिष्वश्रमेषु को न्वर्थो भवेत्परमभीप्सतः ॥१५८८॥

And (*tu*) in the case of the person, who has obtained that¹ and is liberated, who has seen the (real) thing, who is an excellent knower, what significance would there be in the three remaining stages when he is desiring for only the highest (bliss of Brahman)? [1588]

This is *Mahābhārata* 12.313.27.

¹ *mukti* stated in verse 1587.

इत्येवं भगवद्व्यासवचांस्यत्र सहस्रशः ।
श्रूयन्ते न्यायदृब्धानि तस्मात्तान्यादराच्छ्रयेत् ॥१५८९॥

This and such other thousands of (i.e. numerous) statements of venerable Vyāsa are heard and they are supported with reasoning; therefore, one should take recourse to them with respect. [1589]

The point of all the statements of Vyāsa is that a person should be worshipful to gods (as stated in BUB).

Now begins the explanation of BU 1.4.11-13.

शास्त्रार्थः सूत्रितस्तावदात्मेत्येवेति यत्नतः ।
उक्तश्च तस्य सूत्रस्य संबन्धः सप्रयोजनः ॥१५९०॥

[Verses 1590-1597 narrate the origination of the four Varnas.]

Thus, the meaning of the Śruti, has been carefully explained in brief in the words *ātmety eva* and its relation to the Sūtrātman (i.e. Hiranyagarbha), has also been stated together with the purpose of the same. [1590]

संसारानर्थहेतुत्वमविद्यायाश्च वर्णितम् ।
यो ऽन्यामित्यादिवाक्येन तत्कार्यमपि सूत्रितम् ॥१५९१॥

Further, there has been pointed out how ignorance is the cause of all the undesirable in the transmigratory world and its effect also is expounded by the statement *yo 'nyām ...* [1591]

विद्यावत्सह कार्येण ह्यविद्यापीह सूत्रिता ।
सामर्थ्याद्विस्तरस्तस्या आध्यायान्तादिहोच्यते ॥१५९२॥

Like the knowledge of the Brahman, ignorance, together with its effect also has been expounded here because of the propriety (of it in this context) — this is stated at length up to the end of this chapter. [1592]

यथोक्तात्मानभिज्ञो यो ऽविद्याकार्याभिमानवान् ।
पशुवद्देवताः पाति स जुहोत्यादिकर्माभिः ॥१५९३॥

He, who is a non-knower of the Ātman as already described and has the Ego that he does activity (which is really) ignorance,¹ serves², like animals, the deities by the performance of rituals of offering etc. [1593]

¹That is, which is really under the influence of ignorance.

²This is a peculiar use of the verb root $\sqrt{pā}$ (in the sense of *upa-√kr*) 'to render service to'.

आध्यायावसितेस्तस्मादविद्याया विभूतयः ।
वक्ष्यन्ते विस्तरेणातः परो ग्रन्थो ऽवतार्यते ॥१५९४॥

Therefore, up to the end of the chapter are described at length the various forms (lit. excellences) of ignorance; as such, now is introduced the subsequent (part of the) text. [1594]

अस्यैवार्थस्य सिद्ध्यर्थमग्निसर्गादनन्तरम् ।
इन्द्रादिसर्गः प्राङ्नोक्तो मोहकार्यविवक्षया ॥१५९५॥

In order to establish this very thought it is that after (the description of) the creation of fire (the description) of Indra and others was not stated earlier; this was with a desire to expound (the nature of) the effects of ignorance. [1595]

परिपूरणाय सृष्टेस्तु ह्यग्निसर्गः पुरोदितः ।
यत एवमतो ऽविद्याकार्यो ऽनर्थो ऽखिलो भवेत् ॥१५९६॥

Since the creation of Agni was mentioned earlier with a view to completing (the description of) the creation. Since this is so, the entire creation of undesirable effects, which is to be produced by ignorance, would be similarly (described). [1596]

इन्द्रादिसर्गस्तत्रैव तच्छेषत्वात्समीक्ष्यताम् ।
अविद्याकार्यसिद्ध्यर्थमिह त्वस्य प्रपञ्चनम् ॥१५९७॥

The creation of Indra and others should have been described just there, since it is subordinate to that¹ — thus this should

be accepted; yet, it is explained at length here for revealing fully the effects of ignorance. [1597]

¹ *sr̥ṣṭi* of the preceding verse.

स्रष्टृ यज्जगतः पूर्वमात्मैवेत्यभिनिर्दिष्टम् ।
तदग्न्याद्यभिमान्यत्र ब्रह्मेति व्यपदिश्यते ॥१५९८॥

[Verses 1598-1613 explain the meaning of *brahma vā*.]

That creator of the world, which was earlier mentioned by the word *ātman* itself¹, is here mentioned (now) as the Brahman, having the notion that it is fire etc. [1598]

This verse points to but one significance of the two words *ātman* used earlier and *brahman* now. Thus, there is continuity of but one thought.

¹Refer to BU 1.4.1.

ब्रह्मैकजात्यवच्छिन्नं यस्मादग्रे व्यवर्तत ।
नानेकजातिमद्वेतुकर्मणे ऽलं ततो भवेत् ॥१५९९॥

Since the Brahman existed in the beginning as marked by only one caste, viz. Brāhmaṇa, and was not having more than one caste; therefore it was not capable of activity. [1599]

This explains *ekam eva*.

The idea of the four castes as found in *Gītā* 4.13: *cāturvarṇyaṃ mayā sr̥ṣṭam guṇakarmavibhāgaśaḥ* is explained by Sureśvara.

चातुर्वर्ण्यप्रसाध्यं सन्नैकजातिप्रसाधनम् ।
कर्मांलं सिद्धये लोके शिबिकोद्वहनं यथा ॥१६००॥

Being what can be accomplished by four castes, activity, which has many castes as its agents, is not possible to come into effect like the bearing of a palanquin. [1600]

All the social functions are not carried out by one caste, viz.

the Brāhmaṇa caste; they were carried out by all the castes working together. This is clarified by the illustration of a palanquin which is borne by more persons than one.

गृहीतिरभिषिक्तानामिन्द्रादीनां श्रुतौ श्रुता ।
श्रेयोरूपप्रसिद्ध्यर्थं क्षत्रस्येत्यवगम्यते ॥१६०१॥

It is heard in the Śruti and it is understood that there is acceptance of Indra and others, who are consecrated, for declaring the excellent forms of the Kṣatriya¹ caste. [1601]

This conveys the purport of *yāny etāni*.

¹The Kṣatriya is recognised in society as the most excellent being. This is because Indra and others are also considered as the most capable of gods, the one who was consecrated.

धर्मान्तैः संहतैर्यस्मात्कर्म सिद्ध्यति नान्यथा ।
तेन तेन विना शक्तमतस्तत्तदचीकलृपत् ॥१६०२॥

Since activity is accomplished by all of them, ending in *dharma*, together and not otherwise; therefore, the Brāhmaṇa created everyone of them as capable (in a limited measure¹) without each one of them. [1602]

¹Translation follows the reading of the verse in both the editions NKL and AnSS, viz. *vinā śaktam* as separate words; but we suspect that the proper reading may be *vināśaktam* = *vinā aśaktam*. Therefore to justify the reading of the text we have added '(in a limited measure)' but we are still not happy with it. Further, it would have been better to accept the variant in the AnSS edition *saṃtataih* after *dharmāntaiḥ*, not *sahitaiḥ*.

ब्रह्मासृजद्यतः क्षत्रमात्मनो ऽप्यतिवीर्यवत् ।
बलवत्क्षत्रतस्तस्मान्नान्यद्वृत्तमिहेष्यते ॥१६०३॥

Since the Brahman created the Kṣatriya (caste), very much stronger than itself, therefore, no other being is known (lit. accepted) as stronger than the Kṣatriya. [1603]

This explains *tasmāt kṣatrāt*.

तस्माच्च ब्राह्मणो ऽध्यस्ताद्राजसूये महाक्रतौ ।
आसन्दीस्थमुपास्ते त्वं राजन्ब्रह्मेति संभ्रमात् ॥१६०४॥

And, for this reason, the Brāhmaṇa takes, in the great sacrifice (called) Rājasūya, his seat on bare earth (lit. below), with the notion¹ (about the king:) 'You are, O King, a Brāhmaṇa.'

[1604]

This explains *tasmād brāhmaṇah*.

¹The word *sambhrama* does not express doubt; it signifies uncertainty which is caused by ignorance.

ब्रह्मेति श्रावितो राज्ञा ब्रह्मा प्रत्याह तं नृपम् ।
त्वमेव राजन्ब्रह्मेति क्षत्रे तद्यश आत्मनः ॥१६०५॥
दधाति भास्वद्ब्रह्माख्यं यस्मिन्सर्वं प्रतिष्ठितम् ।
क्षत्रस्य योनिर्ब्रह्मेदं क्षत्रं ह्याविरभूततः ॥१६०६॥
यतो ऽतो यद्यपि क्षत्रं ब्राह्मण्यं प्रतिपद्यते ॥१६०७॥

The priest, who was addressed by the king 'O Brāhmaṇa', answered the king: 'You yourself are the Brāhmaṇa, O King.' In (doing) this, he places in the Kṣatriya his own bright lustre, called Brahman, in which everything is resting. Since this Brāhmaṇahood is the origin of the Kṣatriya, the Kṣatriya arose from that,

[1605-1606]

therefore, even though a Kṣatriya, he attains Brāhmaṇahood.¹

[1607]

¹In the Rājasūya sacrifice, the king is consecrated for the performance and he is taken to have become a Brāhmaṇa. He so remains till the completion of his sacrifice. This is clarified in the following verse.

परमत्वं तथाप्यन्ते राजसूयक्रतोः पुनः ।
उपनिश्रयति ब्रह्म गुणभावेन पूर्ववत् ॥१६०८॥

So also, at the end of the (great) sacrifice Rājasūya the state of the highest resorts to the Brāhmaṇa (clan/person) as his quality, once again, even as before. [1608]

ब्रह्मैव चान्ततः क्षत्रमुपनिश्रयतीत्यतः ।
ऋतुकालैव ब्रह्माप्तिः क्षत्रस्येत्यवसीयते ॥१६०९॥

Since, finally the Brāhmaṇa himself resorts to the Kṣatriya, therefore, it is concluded that obtaining the status of the Brāhmaṇa by a Kṣatriya is only for the duration of the sacrificial performance. [1609]

स्वां योनिमिति हेतूक्तिः कार्यं कारणसंश्रयम् ।
न हि कारणतो ऽन्यत्र वृत्तिः कार्यात्मनः क्वचित् ।
ब्रह्मैककारणो राजा तस्माद्ब्रह्मैव संश्रितः ॥१६१०॥

This Śruti statement *svām yonim* is a statement about the cause or origin, since an effect which depends on (its) cause is not any time present anywhere else than in the cause; therefore, the king who is brought into existence by the Brāhmaṇa resorts to the same. [1610]

यस्तु बाहुबलोन्मत्तः स्वां योनिं ब्राह्मणं नृपः ।
वाङ्मात्रेणापि सक्रोधो हिनस्तीह प्रमादतः ॥१६११॥
ब्रह्मोपमर्दनात्पापः प्रागपि क्रूरकर्मकृत् ।
ततो ऽपि पापात्पापीयान्स स्याद्ब्रह्मापवादतः ॥१६१२॥

But a king who, proud of his prowess, full of anger, would harm a Brāhmaṇa, who is his origin, even by this speech (or) through a fault [1611]
shall, by insulting the Brāhmaṇa, be a sinner, a doer of cruel act already¹ and, for that reason also, viz. by slighting the Brāhmaṇa he would be a greater sinner than any. [1612]

¹That is, by nature.

उत्तमाभिजनोपेतं भूर्युदारगुणं द्विजम् ।
यथा श्रेयांसं हिंसित्वा पापीयान्स्यात्तथैव सः ॥१६१३॥

Similarly, he would be greater sinner by harming his superior, a Brāhmaṇa, who was born in the highest family and who had many excellent qualities. [1613]

This clarifies the idea expressed in verses 1611-1612.

Now follows in verses 1614-1633 an exposition of BU 1.4.14, pertaining to the origin of Dharma etc.

सृष्ट्वापि चतुरो वर्णान्व्यवस्थाकारणं विना ।
कर्मणे नैव पर्याप्तं ब्रह्माभूत्पूर्ववत्ततः ॥१६१४॥
ब्रह्मक्षत्रादिरूपाणि यतो ऽतीत्यासृजत्प्रभुः ।
श्रेयोरूपस्ततो धर्मः सर्वानप्यनुशास्त्यसौ ॥१६१५॥

Even after creating the four castes, yet without (producing) the cause of governing¹ them, the Brāhmaṇa could not be sufficiently able to accomplish his (desired) duties²; (and) then, [1614]

since the great Lord created (Dharma) beyond the various forms, viz. Brāhmaṇa, Kṣatriya etc., therefore, Dharma which is of the best form governs all of them (created before). [1615]

The words *dharmāntaiḥ sahitaiḥ* in verse 1602 above appear to be justified here.

¹That is, the governing principle.

²The singular form *karmaṇe* stands for *karmabhyah*— these are duties/activities prescribed by Dharmaśāstra.

तदेतत्सृष्टं धर्माख्यं क्षत्रस्याधिपतेरपि ।
प्रशास्तृ तद्व्याघस्मात्क्षत्रं भीतं प्रवर्तते ॥१६१६॥

Thus is created this principle called Dharma governing even the ruler, the Kṣatriya; (and), for that reason, being afraid of it, the Kṣatriya, full of fear, proceeds (to do his duties).

[1616]

क्षत्रस्यापि यतो धर्मः साक्षादधिपोतेस्ततः ।

धर्मादन्यन्महद्भूतं न भूतं न भविष्यति ॥१६१७॥

Since Dharma is the actual ruler even of a Kṣatriya, therefore, there is no other thing greater than Dharma, (viz.) that which ever was and will ever be. [1617]

This explains *tasmād dharmād param nāsti*.

श्रेयोरूपप्रसिद्ध्यर्थं प्रसिद्धिरुपवर्ण्यते ।
अथो इत्यादिना धर्माविशिष्टत्वावबुद्धये ॥१६१८॥

Now with the words *atho* ... there is described the origin of Dharma in order that its excellent form is established and also that one knows the excellence of Dharma. [1618]

This is the purport of *atho abaliyān baliyāṃsam āśamsate dharmena yathā rājñāivam*.

¹ *dharmaviśiṣṭatva-* = *dharmasya viśiṣṭatva-*.

आशंसते बलीयांसमबलीयानपि स्वयम् ।
धर्मं बलं समाश्रित्य जेतुं लोके तथा यथा ॥१६१९॥
राज्ञा बलेनाल्पबलो बलीयांसं कुटुम्बिनम् ।
जेतुमाशंसते तस्माद्धर्मः स्याद्वलवत्तमः ॥१६२०॥

As a weaker person, expects to be successful in the world, resorting, on his own, to a stronger person, i.e. strength; so also having resorted to Dharma, viz. the *strength*, in order to overcome (lit. win), in (this) world, [1619]
one, who has small strength, seeks to prevail over a stronger family-man through the king, viz. the strength. Therefore, Dharma is the strongest. [1620]

This is another explanation of *yathā rājñāivam*.

बलीयसापि राज्ञेह स्पर्धमानो ऽबलो ऽपि सन् ।
जेतुमुत्सहते भूपं धर्मात्मकबलाश्रयात् ॥१६२१॥

(Therefore) a person, being weak and (yet) vying with even

a strong king, would dare to conquer that king by resorting to the strength in the form of Dharma. [1621]

एतदेव यतो ज्यायो रूपं धर्मेत्युदाहृतम् ।
रूपान्तरेभ्यः सर्वेभ्यस्तद्धि सत्यात्मकं यतः ॥१६२२॥

Since it is said that this very form, called Dharma, is greater than all other forms (of life), therefore, that¹ has the nature of the truth. [1622]

This is the purport of *yo vai sa dharmah ... ubhayam bhavati*.

¹The construe is: *tat (rūpam) hi ...* and the last word *yatah* is to be read for *tatah*.

तस्यास्य धर्मरूपस्य कार्यकारणतां मिथः ।
यो वै स धर्म इत्युक्त्या वक्तुं प्रवृत्ते श्रुतिः ॥१६२३॥

Therefore does the Śruti proceed with the words *yo vai sa dharmah* to declare the mutual relation of that¹ and this (which is called) Dharma, namely their being mutually the cause and the effect. [1623]

¹That is, truth; the construe is: *tasya (satyasya) asya dharmasya ... mithah ...*

प्रयोगलक्षणो यो ऽयं श्रुतिस्मृत्युदितो मतः ।
स धर्म इति विज्ञेयः सत्यं शास्त्रार्थलक्षणम् ॥१६२४॥

This one, which has *employment*¹ as its characteristic, as prescribed (lit. stated) by the Śruti and the Smṛti, is to be known as that Dharma, and truth is characterized as the thing conveyed by the meaning of the Śāstra.² [1624]

This verse points out that Dharma is a matter of performance and *satya* 'truth' of knowledge.

¹The word *prayoga* means: the employment or procedure in ritual performance.

²This refers to the meaning of the Vedānta sentences.

अक्षरानुगतो ऽप्यर्थो यदि संशय्यते तदा ।
नित्यप्रयोगरूपोत्थविज्ञानात्तद्विनिश्चितिः ॥१६२५॥

If the meaning conveyed by the letters (i.e. words in the Śāstra) is doubted, then it is determined from the knowledge that arises from its daily performances. [1625]

This and the next verse explain how Dharma and *satya* are mutually cause/effect.

¹See note 2 on the preceding verse.

प्रयोगे ऽपि च संशीतौ वाक्यार्थज्ञानसंश्रयात् ।
निर्णुदेत्संशयं प्राज्ञ एवमन्योन्यहेतुता ॥१६२६॥

And the wise one would remove his doubt, in case a doubt arises as regards *employment* by resorting to the knowledge which arises from the meaning of the sentence — thus is here mutual dependence. [1626]

यथा प्रयोगमुल्लङ्घ्य व्याख्यातुं शक्नुयात्सुधीः ।
यथाशास्त्रं तथोल्लङ्घ्य कर्तुं शक्नोत्यथापरः ॥१६२७॥

As a very intelligent person could explain (some ritual), without paying attention to ¹ (actual) *employment*, so can another person perform (ritual) without paying attention to (what is prescribed) according to the Dharmaśāstra (text). [1627]

This supplies the reason as to why they have accepted mutual dependence of Śāstra and *prayoga* as said in the preceding verse.

¹In other words, disregarding (actual) ...

अतथ्यान्यपि तथ्यानि दर्शयन्तीह वादिनः ।
समे निम्नोन्नतानीव चित्रकर्मविदो जनाः ॥१६२८॥

(For example) disputants present even untruths as truths as a person who knows the art of painting can show ups and

downs on even a flat (surface).

[1628]

शास्त्रार्थस्तत्प्रयोगश्च यदा त्वन्योन्यसंश्रयात् ।
प्रवर्तते तदा कर्तुर्न प्रमादो मनागपि ॥१६२९॥

But (ca) when the meaning of the Śruti and *employment* are operative, with mutual dependence, there is not even a little blemish on the part of a performer.

[1629]

नायं धर्म इति ज्ञेयो यो ऽयं सृष्टाविहेरितः ।
क्षत्रादिनियमाशक्तेस्तस्याचैतन्यरूपतः ॥१६३०॥

This, which is described in relation to this creation as Dharma, should not be (really) known as Dharma since it has no capacity for controlling the Kṣatriya and others and also because it does not have (for its purport) the form of sentience. [1630]

Now is introduced another meaning of the word 'dharma'—earlier it referred to ritual activity such as Agnihotra, prescribed by scriptural texts (shown by us as Dharma); this indicated apūrva or adrṣṭa. This was understood in 'tato dharmam śreyorūpam asṛjata'.

देवता तु ह्यधिष्ठात्री धर्मो ऽस्मीत्यभिमानिनी ।
सैवेह सृज्यते धात्रा नियमार्थप्रसिद्धये ॥१६३१॥

However, the superintending deity (of a ritual activity) has a strong feeling 'I am Dharma.' and that itself is created by the creator with a view to effecting control (over the creation).

[1631]

The Mīmāṃsā principle is that Dharma is insentient; it cannot act in the way described in the preceding verse. Therefore, they have acknowledged the need of a deity which superintends over a ritual activity.

धर्मस्यैव तु रूपेण देवता रूपिणी मता ।
तन्नाम्ना नामवत्येवं देवतान्तरयोजना ॥१६३२॥

And (*tu*) the deity is understood to be having a form, through that of Dharma (superintended over by it) has a form; so also, it has a name on account of the name of that — thus is the arrangement in respect of other deities. [1632]

This is to express the meaning of *dharma*.

एकैव देवता तस्मान्नामरूपाद्युपाधिभिः ।
आभाति बहुरूपेव तत्पराधीनचैतसाम् ॥१६३३॥

Therefore, there is (in reality) but one deity which appears to them whose minds are prone to it as having many forms on account of its having various delimiting adjuncts such as names and forms. [1633]

This establishes non-duality as the Reality.

Verses 1634-1779 explain the contents of BU 1.4.15.

यथोक्तार्थोपसंहार उत्तरार्थविवक्षया ।
ब्राह्मणस्य पुरानुक्तेस्तदुक्त्यर्था परा श्रुतिः ॥१६३४॥

(This is) the conclusion of the matter so far stated; (now), with a desire to explain the next (lit. subsequent) thought, proceeds the subsequent Śruti, since (the nature of) the Brāhmaṇa¹ is not stated before. [1634]

In the previous verse, there is concluded the discussion of *cāturvarṇya*. Now, this and the next three verses state the purport of *tad etad brahma kṣatram viṭ sūdraḥ*.

¹*brāhmaṇasya* = *brāhmaṇatvasya* (SP). Earlier, only the Kṣatriya among the gods was stated. Now, *agninaiva* ... will state Agni as the Brāhmaṇa among them.

दैववर्णविभागस्य मनुष्येष्वपि भण्यते ।
विनियोगो यथोक्तो ऽयं वर्णानां प्रविभागशः ॥१६३५॥

This so far described arrangement in respect of the division of castes of gods is mentioned in respect of men also by specifying the division of their castes. [1635]

In BU 1.4.6 was mentioned only the kindling of fire, not its Brāhmaṇahood. That is now stated in *tad agninaiva ...*

क्षत्रादीनां पुरोक्तत्वादनुक्तेर्ब्राह्मणस्य च ।
को न्वेषु ब्राह्मण इति चोदिते स्यात्परा श्रुतिः ॥१६३६॥

Since (the origin of) Kṣatriya and others was mentioned earlier and (that of) Brāhmaṇa was not mentioned, the subsequent Śruti proceeds (to state that), as urged by the question, 'Who amongst them is indeed Brāhmaṇa?' [1636]

देवतायाः समाख्यातो विभागो वर्णसंश्रयः ।
तत्पूर्वको मनुष्येषु विभागस्त्वधुनोच्यते ॥१६३७॥

Division of gods¹ with reference to castes is already enumerated; and now is stated the division among men², as preceded (or caused) by that. [1637]

¹This is *jātav ekavacana*. As such, *devatāyāḥ* = *devatānām*.

²The words 'into castes' are to be supplied after 'men'.

यदग्निनाभवद्ब्रह्म देवेष्वविकृतं नृषु ।
ब्राह्मणेन तदेवाभूद्ब्रह्मैवाविकृतात्मना ॥१६३८॥

That unmodified Brahman which appeared (lit. became) among gods as Agni itself appeared among men as Brāhmaṇa, in its unmodified nature. [1638]

Now follows the explanation of 'tad agninā ...'.

या जातिर्ब्राह्मणत्वाख्या साग्निरेवेति निश्चितिः ।
जातिरूपेण सा स्थित्वा जातिमेव नियच्छति ॥१६३९॥

What genus is called Brāhmaṇahood is but Agni itself — this

is the decision. Remaining in the form of the genus, it controls the (whole) class (of Brāhmaṇa). [1639]

This is to explain the *sāmānādhikarāṇya* of Agni and Brāhmaṇa in *agnir brāhmaṇaḥ*. Agni, the deity is the controller and the individuals in the Brāhmaṇa clan are the controlled. This relation justifies the *sāmānādhikarāṇya* in *agnir (eva) brāhmaṇaḥ*.

आग्नेयो ब्राह्मणश्चातस्तत्संबन्धाच्छ्रुतौ श्रुतः ।
अनुग्रहनियन्तृत्वे ब्राह्मणस्याग्नितो यतः ॥१६४०॥

Therefore, a Brāhmaṇa is heard in the Śruti text as a protégé of Agni, i.e. on account of his connection with that (Agni), since the capacity in a Brāhmaṇa for (doing) favour and (effecting) governance is from Agni. [1640]

Cf. *āgneyo vai brāhmaṇaḥ* (untraceable).

नियम्यमानो दैवेन क्षत्रियेण मनुष्यगः ।
इक्ष्वाकवादिरभूत्पूर्वः क्षत्रियस्तद्वदुत्तरः ॥१६४१॥

(So also), being controlled by (the divine Kṣatriya) there came into existence (Kṣatriyas)¹ among men, viz. Ikṣvāku and others; in the same way, later (two groups of castes came into existence). [1641]

ब्रह्मैवाविकृतं यस्मात्पूर्वयोर्विकृतिं पुनः ।
क्षत्रियादौ समापेदे तेनाग्निब्राह्मणाश्रयात् ॥१६४२॥
कामितार्थस्य संसिद्धिः कर्मिणां कामिनामिह ।
स्थित्वाग्नौ ब्राह्मणे चेह लोकमीप्सन्ति कर्मिणः ॥१६४३॥

Since the unmodified Brahman itself attains modification of the first two¹, viz. in Kṣatriya and others; therefore, by resorting to Agni and Brāhmaṇa, [1642]
there is attainment of the desired objects of those who, with desire, perform ritual activities. And,² here (i.e. in this world), persons who perform ritual activities desire (for enjoyment³) after depending on Agni and Brāhmaṇa. [1643]

This is the explanation of popular belief regarding importance of Agni and Brāhmaṇa in rituals on the basis of the philosophical position taken; *avikṛta brahman* is Agni in gods and Brāhmaṇa in human beings.

¹Namely, Agni and Brāhmaṇa.

²It means: Therefore.

³It literally means: the world full of objects of enjoyment for it.

कर्मकार्यश्च लोको ऽत्र ज्ञेयो ऽग्न्यादिसमाश्रयात् ।
प्रत्यग्याथात्म्यधीमात्रात्परलोकाप्तिरिष्यते ॥१६४४॥

[Verses 1644-1658 refute the view of Bhartṛprapañca in respect of the belief mentioned in the two preceding verses.]

Here¹, the word *loka* is to understand to be what is to be produced by ritual activity (performed) by resorting to Agni etc.² (And) attainment of the yonder world is sought only by (acquiring) the knowledge of the true nature of the inner self.

[1644]

¹This means: in respect of ritual performances.

²The effect of ritual activity indicates impermanence of what is achieved by men through their performances. This is in opposition to the view of Bhartṛprapañca, as reported by SP, viz. that the words *karmakāryaś ca lokaḥ* refer to the obtainment of the highest Ātman.

The word etc. stands for Brāhmaṇa; cf. *agnibrāhmaṇāśrayāt* in verse 1642 above.

अजातशत्रुजनकसुलभादिनिदर्शनात् ।
अविद्योत्थाधिकाराच्च लोकोक्तिर्न परात्मनि ॥१६४५॥

From the illustrations of Ajātaśatru, Janaka and Sulabha and others as also from (the statement of) the qualification (for the performance of rituals) which really arise from ignorance, (it follows that) the mention of *loka* does not pertain to the

highest Ātman.

[1645]

This justifies the argument against the view of Bhartṛprapañca which is mentioned in note 2 on the preceding verse. There are two arguments: (i) Illustrations of Ajātaśatru etc. and (ii) the mention of different qualification(s) which are, as already pointed out, based on ignorance.

अव्याकृतव्याकरणात्स्वाभिप्रायाच्च नेष्यते ।
अव्याकृतव्याकरणरूपाभ्यां छाद्यते परः ॥१६४६॥

(The view: *loka* means *paramātmān*) is not accepted (by the Siddhāntin for two reasons:) (i) (It) has a basis in differentiation of the undifferentiated; (ii) his own view, viz. the highest (Brahman) is wrapped by the two forms, viz the undifferentiated and the differentiation;¹

[1646]

¹Refer to BU 1.4.7: *tad dhedaṃ tarhi vyākṛtāvyākṛta- ...* and also BU 1.4.10: *atho yo 'nyām ...* This is accepted by Bhartṛprapañca also.

आविष्कृतिस्तन्निषेधादन्यदेवेति च श्रुतेः ॥१६४७॥
उत्तरत्र स्वशब्देन लोकस्य च विशेषणात् ।
कर्मणां फलमेवात्र लोकशब्देन भण्यते ॥१६४८॥

and also (iii) from (a statement in) the Śruti, viz. *anyad eva ...* (that is first) the expression (of modification) and then (there is) its negation (also);

[1647]

and (iv) yet later on there is the qualifying of *loka* by the word *sva*. Thus, here¹, the word *loka* expresses only the fruit of (the ritual) activities.

[1648]

This has a reference to *lokam icchate*.

¹Refer to the verse 1644 above.

लोकशब्देन संप्राप्तं कर्मकार्यमपेक्ष्य हि ।
स्वगिरानात्मनो लोकाद्विशिनष्ट्यात्मरूपकम् ॥१६४९॥

Keeping in view only the effect of ritual activity which is understood from the word *loka*, the Śruti (under consideration) distinguishes the form of the (Supreme) Self from the non-Ātman, by (using) the word *loka*. [1649]

This implies that, in Bhartṛprapañca's view, *sva* cannot and does not qualify *loka*.

स्वत्वेनाव्यभिचारित्वाद्यभ्यभिचारादनात्मनः ।
कर्मकार्यनिवृत्त्यर्थमर्थवत्स्याद्विशेषणम् ॥१६५०॥

That qualifying word (viz. *sva*) would be meaningful (i.e. useful) for setting aside the effect of ritual activity by its being invariably in its own form and by being variably associated with the non-Ātman. [1650]

त्रयाणामपि वर्णानां श्रुतौ संन्यासदर्शनात् ।
ब्राह्मणस्यैव संन्यास इति श्रुत्या विरुध्यते ॥१६५१॥

Since we notice in the Śruti (the mention of) renunciation with reference to all the three castes, therefore, (the view that) renunciation is only for a Brāhmaṇa is opposed by the Śruti. [1651]

This verse points out that Śaṅkara's view is opposed to the content of the Śruti.

SP refers to the Smṛti which is included by NKL edition as under verse 1651, without any number, because NKL cites it by the *Pratīka japyenaiva*. The editor of NKL invites attention to this. It may be possible that NKL has incorporated the full verse of the *Manusmṛti* into the main text because SP writes *nanu japyenaiva tu saṁsidhyet ityādismṛteḥ* ... The verse under reference is *Manusmṛti* 2.87. All this becomes relevant upon Śaṅkara's reference to Manu's verse in his Bhāṣya under 1.4.14 (almost towards the end) and also his remark there: *pārivṛājyadarśanāc ca. tasmād brāhmaṇa-va eva manuṣyeṣu lokam karmaphalam icchanti*.

लिङ्गं च न्यायरहितं प्रामाण्याय न कल्पते ।
ब्राह्मणोक्तिबलात्तस्मात्कामितो ऽर्थो न सिद्ध्यति ॥१६५२॥

And any indication, which is not in keeping with the accepted rule of interpretation, cannot become authoritative; therefore, on the strength of a statement about a Brāhmaṇa (in another Śruti), cannot be established the argument which you desire (to establish). [1652]

SP points to verses in the *Mahābhārata* which show that even a Kṣatriya can decide to renounce. Cf. 1.110.7-8 and also verse: *gatvā nāgapuram vācyam pāṇḍuḥ pravrajito vanam*. SP and NKL quote 7-8 and *pauravṛddhās ca ye tatra nivasanty asmadāśrayāḥ / prasādyā sarve vaktavyāḥ pāṇḍuḥ pravrajito vane //* (not in critical ed.).

उपलक्षणं वा तद्ग्राह्यं ब्राह्मणग्रहणं श्रुतौ ।
ब्राह्मणस्य प्रधानत्वाद्युक्तं तदुपलक्षणम् ॥१६५३॥

Or rather, that mention of the word *brāhmaṇa* (in respect of Saṃnyāsa) is to be accepted as an indication (of those who are eligible for renunciation); (and) that indication is reason- able for the reason that a Brāhmaṇa has the status of the principal (persons of among all the castes). [1653]

SP refers to *brāhmaṇaprādhānya* on the basis of *mukhajānām ayam ...*

NKL editor reads: *upalakṣaṇam ca tad ...*, thereby showing that this verse is syntactically connected with the preceding – as the part of a compound sentence.

ब्राह्मणत्वात्मलाभो ऽपि यः स्यात्क्षत्रियवैश्ययोः ।
स्वमहिम्ना तयोर्नासावग्निब्राह्मणसंश्रयात् ॥१६५४॥

(There can be an objector's view:) Even when there has been obtaining of Brāhmaṇahood on the part of a Kṣatriya and/or a Vaiśya,¹ that was on account of their own (great) capacity and not because they had taken recourse to Agni and Brāh-

maṇa.

[1654]

¹This refers to the performance of a Rājasūya and a Vaiśyastoma sacrifice by the two respectively.

ब्राह्मणं न ह्यनाश्रित्य राजसूयादिहेतुकः ।
ब्राह्मणत्वाभिसंबन्धः प्राधान्यं तेन पूर्वयोः ॥१६५५॥

(The objection is thus answered:) Connection with Brāhmaṇa-hood (of a Kṣatriya etc.¹) which results from the Rājasūya etc.² is not without taking recourse to a Brāhmaṇa; therefore, there has been greater importance (lit. principal significance) of the former two (viz. Agni and Brāhmaṇa). [1655]

This is a statement by Vyatireka.
In matters of sacrifice, Agni and Brāhmaṇa are considered as more important because Kṣatriya and others have to take recourse to them. Only this much is the principal significance.

¹Reference to Vaiśya is implied.
²Reference to Vaiśyastoma is implied.

वर्णान्तरगतापेक्षा नाग्निब्राह्मणयोस्तथा ।
ब्राह्मणः स्वमहिम्नैव पुरुषार्थं समश्नुते ॥१६५६॥

Such is not the case of Agni and Brāhmaṇa that they have to depend on any other caste; a Brāhmaṇa secures the fulfilment of the end of human endeavour by his own greatness. [1656]

अग्निब्राह्मणयोर्हेतुः प्राधान्ये भण्यते स्फुटः ।
एताभ्यामेव रूपाभ्यां यतो ब्रह्माभवत्स्वयम् ॥१६५७॥

(Now) is stated the evident reason for the principal significance of Agni and Brāhmaṇa, viz. in these very two forms, indeed did the Brahman reveal itself. [1657]

This explains *etābhyām* ...

अग्निब्राह्मणयोर्यस्माद्ब्रह्म साक्षादभूत्परा ।
विट्क्षत्रयोर्व्यवहितं प्राधान्यं तेन पूर्वयोः ॥१६५८॥

Since first the Brahman became manifest first to Agni and Brāhmaṇa remained, and for the Kṣatriya and Vaiśya it concealed, therefore, the former two (viz. Agni and Brāhmaṇa) have the principal significance. [1658]

This explains the purpose of *svayam*.

ब्रह्मेति जातिरेवात्र ग्राह्या न तु पराक्षरम् ।
तत्कारणत्वात्सर्वस्य हेतूक्तिस्तत्र दुर्घटा ॥१६५९॥

[Verses 1659-1666 refute Bhartṛprapañca's explanation of the word *brahman* in *etābhyām hi rūpābhyām brahmābhavat*.]

Here (in the word *brahmaloka*) it should be understood that the word *brahman* signifies only the class and not the highest immutable (Brahman), since it is the origin of all, it is difficult to make a statement in that respect (*tatra*). [1659]

This means that no particular quality of the Brahman can be established, though some particular qualities of Agni and Brāhmaṇa can be thought of. Therefore, when we have to talk about the origin of any thing, we have to refer to Agni and Brāhmaṇa, i.e. *jāti*.

सर्वेषां प्रत्यगात्मत्वात्पक्षपातो ऽपि नेष्यते ।
अग्निब्राह्मणयोर्विष्णोस्तावन्मात्रसमाप्तिः ॥१६६०॥

Owing to (the fact) that all beings are of the nature of the inner self, such a partial attitude¹ is not acceptable in respect of (the superiority) of Agni and Brāhmaṇa, for (already) the all-pervader² who has (already) obtained (it) by that much.

[1660]

¹That is, predilection for holding Agni and Brāhmaṇa as the most superior.

²This is based on the derivation of the word from the verb root \sqrt{vis} 'to pervade'.

ब्रह्मैवेदं विश्वमिति साक्षादाम्नायशासनम् ।
विद्याविनयसंपन्न इति च स्मृतिशासनम् ॥१६६१॥

That all this is only the Brahman is the direct affirmation of the Śruti and that 'one possessed of knowledge, modesty ...' is the affirmation in the Smṛti.¹ [1661]

This supplies the basis for saying that all is but the Brahman.

¹This is an adjective of Brāhmaṇa stated in *Gītā* 5.18.

क्षत्रादाविव तुल्याग्निविप्रयोर्विकृतिर्दृशेः ।
तेजोबन्नादिभूतानां तुल्या सत्कारणात्मता ॥१६६२॥

As there is the same modification of the seer¹ in Agni and Brāhmaṇa as in Kṣatriya and others, so also, in the case of the elements, viz. fire, water, food etc., there is the same nature of having the existent as the cause.² [1662]

¹The seer stands for the Brahman, all-knower and *sat* in *satkāraṇātmatā* refers to the Brahman.

²Cf. CU 6.8.4: *sanmūlāḥ somyemāḥ sarvāḥ prajāḥ*.

अग्निब्राह्मणरूपेण ब्रह्म साक्षाद्व्यवस्थितम् ।
तत्प्राप्तौ हेतुताग्न्यादेरिति निर्होक्वागियम् ॥१६६३॥

The Brahman has revealed itself directly in the forms of Agni and Brāhmaṇa; therefore, the statement that Agni etc.¹ are the cause of acquiring that² is but a statement (made) without any sense of shame. [1663]

¹The word etc. stands for Brāhmaṇa.

²Namely, the Brahman.

वर्णाश्रमादिसर्गो ऽयं कर्मार्थो ब्रह्मणः स्मृतः ।
धर्माख्यं कर्म च ज्ञेयं स्वाधिकारनियन्तृतः ॥१६६४॥

[Verses 1664-1669 explain *atha yo ha vā* according to both Bhartṛprapañca and the author.]

This creation of the castes and the stages of life is known to be for the sake of (accomplishing) the activity of the Brahman and that activity has to be known by the name Dharma, since it is the controller¹ of its own duty.² [1664]

¹This has a basis in the well-known Smṛti statement *dharmo dhārayate prajāḥ*; cf. verse 1631 above.

²*karman* is literally activity. Supply: enjoined on it.

तेनैव कर्मणा मुक्तिं प्राप्स्यामः शास्वतीं वयम् ।
अज्ञात्वैव परं तत्त्वमेवं प्राप्ते परा श्रुतिः ॥१६६५॥

Here (one might say:) We shall obtain eternal liberation by that very (ritual) activity, without (even) knowing the highest truth. This being the position, there is the subsequent Śruti (as an answer:) [1665]

नियन्ता चाभिमन्ता च ब्राह्मणत्वस्य हव्यवाट् ।
कर्मैवाग्नेर्नियन्तु स्यात्कर्मणो देवता तथा ॥१६६६॥

Agni is the controller of Brāhmaṇahood and also has the Ego of it; activity alone is the controller of Agni and so also (is Agni) the deity of the activity. [1666]

This is the view of Bhartṛprapañca whose devotion to Agni is well-known and very frequently mentioned by Sureśvara.

स्यादेतदग्निरेवैनं ब्रह्मभावाय वक्ष्यति ।
अदृष्टात्मतत्त्वमपि तच्च नैवोपपद्यते ॥१६६७॥

Let it be so; (but) Agni itself will lead¹ this one to attainment (of the status) of the Brahman and the truth, which has the nature of *adr̥ṣṭa*, does not stand to reason. [1667]

Here is a statement about the outcome of the relation of the controller and the controlled mentioned in previous verse.

¹Verb *vakṣyati* is from verb root \sqrt{vah} 'to lead'.

व्याचक्षते परं ग्रन्थमेवंसंबन्धपूर्वकम् ।
न कश्चित्फलभेदो ऽत्र तस्मादुभयथापि सन् ॥१६६८॥

They explain the subsequent part of this Śruti (also) as preceded by this kind of relation (to ritual activity); (but) there is not here any distinction of the fruit, be it (explained) in (this) twofold way. [1668]

This emphasises the ultimate end, viz. liberation, as resulting from knowledge; therefore, even the view of Bhartṛprapañca cannot be set aside as ununderstandable.

न कर्मणा भवेन्मुक्तिर्नापि चाग्निसमाश्रयात् ।
ज्ञानादेव तु कैवल्यमज्ञानादेव नास्ति तत् ॥१६६९॥

Liberation is not (achieved) through activity; not also by devotion (lit. resorting) to Agni; but liberation comes only from knowledge and only from ignorance¹ it is not (possible). [1669]

This is the purport of the Vedānta sentence under discussion, according to both the views.

¹It refers to *karman*, the result of ignorance.

आशङ्कितनिवृत्त्यर्थमथेत्यत्र प्रयुज्यते ।
ह वा इति प्रसिद्ध्यर्थं मुक्तिर्न ज्ञानतो ऽन्यतः ॥१६७०॥

In this context, the word *atha* is employed for warding off whatever could be expressed as doubt and the words *ha vā* (are used) for establishing that liberation does not come from anything else than knowledge. [1670]

कर्म कृत्स्नं समाप्यापि तत्त्वज्ञानाद्बहिष्कृतः ।
लभते निर्वृतिं नैव ज्ञानादेव हि सा यतः ॥१६७१॥

[Verses 1671-1691 explain the meaning of the sentence *atha yo ha vā ...*; verse 1671 states the meaning of *atha*.]

A person, who is kept away from¹ the knowledge of the true nature of Reality (i.e. Brahman), does not at all obtain the highest bliss even if he has accomplished all ritual activities, because that (liberation) results from knowledge alone. [1671]

¹That is, who has remained without the knowledge.

अस्वैः पिण्डादिभिर्योग आ विरिञ्चादविद्यया ।
प्रतीचस्तद्व्युदासार्थं स्वं लोकमिति शब्दघटे ॥१६७२॥

It is on account of ignorance that the inner self is in union with bodies etc., beginning with (the body of) Viriñca, which are not its own; therefore, in order to avert (the idea of) that,¹ it is said (in the Śruti) *svam lokam*. [1672]

¹Namely, *asvapinḍayoga*.

अज्ञानिनः स्यान्मरणं संसर्गः कारणात्मनि ।
ज्ञानाद्धवान्तनिवृत्तिस्तु मरणं स्याद्विपरिचिताम् ॥१६७३॥

In the case of an ignorant person, death would mean union with his own cause; but (*tu*), in the case of the knowers (of the Brahman), death is the remover of darkness by knowledge. [1673]

This is with a view to explaining *asmāt lokāt*.

In the case of ignorant persons, their bodies etc. merge into the elements; there is no liberation. In the case of the knower of the Brahman, the result is only liberation.

मृत्योर्मृत्यवपरिज्ञानादज्ञस्य मरणं तमः ।
अविद्वन्मृतिसिद्ध्यर्थमस्माल्लोकादितीर्यते ॥१६७४॥

In the case of an ignorant (person), since there is no knowledge

of death as *Mṛtyu*,¹ his death is only darkness; therefore, in order to explain the nature of the death of the non-knowing², it is said 'from this world'. [1674]

¹Refer to our book [Vol.3:1990] — but the stress is here on *ajñāna* — that is called *Mṛtyu*.

²That is, one who does not know the Brahman, ignorant person (already mentioned).

अज्ञात्वैव परं देवमागमापायरूपिणः ।
 अस्वभूताद्देहलोकान्म्रयते यो ऽवशो नरः ॥१६७५॥
 अज्ञाततत्त्वः स परो न भुनक्ति ह्यतद्विदम् ।
 कैवल्यफलदानेन प्रत्यगात्मापि सन्परः ॥१६७६॥

The helpless¹ person, who departs from (lit. dies) in this world of bodies which has not been his and which has been in the form of those coming and those going; without even knowing the highest Lord (thre Brahman), [1675] is he who has not known the true nature of that (viz. the Brahman). The highest (Brahman) does not protect² him who does not know the same by granting to him liberation, though the highest (Brahman) is (his) inner self. [1676]

This is the meaning of the sentence.

These verses explain the nature of the death of the common man who does not know the nature of the Brahman. Though the Brahman is within him as his inner self, it does not bring to him liberation.

¹It literally means: who cannot control himself.

²Verb root \sqrt{bhuj} has the sense: to protect (SP, NKL). Possibly *bhunakti* is equivalent of the suppressed causal form of the verb *bhojayantu* — a Vedic tendency in Sureśvara.

तद्दृष्टिमात्रतः सिद्धेर्नान्यतस्तदवाप्यते ।
 मोहमात्रान्तरायत्वात्तत्कर्माणि न मुक्तये ॥१६७७॥

That (highest Brahman) is obtained only by the seeing of that (i.e. acquiring the lore of the Brahman); this acquisition does

not result from (lit. is not secured from) any other thing. Therefore, a person's ritual activity is not sufficient (for effecting) liberation for him — there is the obstacle only of ignorance. [1677]

This is the meaning of *sā enam* ... This is to set aside a possible argument that the highest, even remaining unknown, would offer protection to a performer of rituals.

Seeing of the Brahman is itself the removal of ignorance.

वेदस्य ग्रहणं यद्वन्न स्यादध्ययनादृते ।
कृष्यादि वान्यदकृतं कर्म नालं फलाय च ॥१६७८॥

As one cannot grasp (the meaning of) the Veda without pursuing one's own (daily) study¹ of it, so also agriculture etc. or any other activity (which may not have been performed) cannot be the cause of the fruit. [1678]

¹This refers to the compulsory study of Veda according to the Vedic dictum (*svādhyāyo 'dhyetavyaḥ*). SP refers to *dharmajijñāsā-sūtra*, *vinādhyayanam na svādhyāyagrahanam arthavat*.

भूरि कर्म करिष्यामि तत्फलानन्त्यसिद्धये ।
कर्मणो ऽचिन्त्यशक्तित्वान्नैवमप्युपपद्यते ॥१६७९॥
अप्रज्ञातात्मतत्त्वः सन्यदि नाम दिवानिशम् ।
कल्पकोटिसहस्राणि कुर्यात्कर्म महच्छुभम् ॥१६८०॥
तदप्यस्य तथाभूतमन्तवत्त्वात्प्रतिक्षणम् ।
विध्वंसमेत्यपचयात्कोष्ठागारादिवद्ध्रुवम् ॥१६८१॥

(One might say:) I shall do quite a lot of (ritual) activity to secure great abundance (lit. infiniteness) of its fruit, because activity has unthinkable power. (In reply the following is said:) But this also does not stand to reason — [1679]

(A person), being a non-knower of the true nature of the Ātman, might well perform plenty of holy ritual for thousands of crores of *kalpas*; even then that kind of activity of this one meets destruction every moment, because of its perishability and, by (such) reduction, it certainly perishes as a store-house

of grains etc. (gets exhausted).

[1680-1681]

This sets aside the argument understood in *yad iha vā ... anevamvin mahat puṇyam karoti*.

Sureśvara emphasises the transitoriness and final loss of *karman* and its fruit by using the simile in the verse.

SP points out that this is the meaning of *tad yatheha karmajitaḥ ...* (CU 8.1.6) *iyādiśruter ity arthaḥ*.

कृतस्य हि क्षयो ऽवश्यमकृतस्याक्षयात्मता ।
प्रसिद्धातीव जगति श्रुत्यैवं तेन भण्यते ॥१६८२॥

Indeed whatever is made (i.e. produced as an effect) does necessarily (or, invariably) perish and what is not made (i.e. not effected) has the nature of permanence — this is well-known in the world and, as such, it is stated by the Śruti (also).

[1682]

उक्तदोषापनक्तिः स्यात्कथमस्येति चोदिते ।
आत्मानमिति निर्वृत्ति श्रुतिः परिहृतिं पराम् ॥१६८३॥

[Verses 1683-1691 discuss the meaning of *ātmānam eva loka upāsita*, by stating a question and its answer.]

(Therefore,) when it was asked as to how there could be the removal of the fault (earlier) stated,¹ the Śruti states the following refutation (in the words) *ātmānam ...*

[1683]

¹Namely, liberation would be impermanent, if it were the result of ritual activity; cf. verses 1680-1681 above.

निःशेषानात्मसंदृष्टिनिराकरणसिद्धये ।
एवेत्यवधृतिर्ज्ञेया प्रत्यङ्मात्रेक्षणाय तु ॥१६८४॥

The word *eva* is to be understood as specification (or, emphasising) of merely seeing¹ only (the true nature of) the inner self in order to secure the removal of the seeing of all non-Ātman objects.

[1684]

This explains the purposeful use of *eva* and its meaning which follows the Śruti.

¹Or, knowing.

प्रत्यङ्मात्रदृशः पुंसो न न्याय्यः स्यात्समुच्चयः ।
ब्रह्मात्मनि समाप्तस्य न तदन्यार्थशेषता ॥१६८५॥

(Further,) combination (of knowledge and ritual activity) would not stand as reasonable in the case of a person who sees only the inner self; (the end of human endeavour) being obtained (only) in the Brahman as the Ātman, there does not remain his dependence on anything else¹. [1685]

This is the meaning of *eva* at the verbal level (*ārthika*).

¹Or, it literally means: ... remain anything else to be obtained.

क्षयः कर्मफलस्योक्तः कृतकत्वसमन्वयात् ।
न क्षयो ज्ञानकार्यस्य कृतकत्वाद्यसंभवात् ॥१६८६॥
प्रत्यङ्मात्रैकयाथात्म्यात्क्षेत्रक्षेत्रज्ञवस्तुनः ।
तस्मिञ्ज्ञाते ऽखिलं ज्ञातं सर्वाज्ञाननिराकृतेः ॥१६८७॥

It is declared that the fruit of activity has an end because it has an inherent relation to being what is produced; but there is no end of what is effected by knowledge, since there is impossibility of its being what is produced; [1686]

since the thing called the knower of the field is in its true nature merely the inner self, therefore, that being known, all else is known, since there has been the removal of all ignorance.

[1687]

This argument is against the view that liberation, being a product of knowing (*dhikārya*), is impermanent.

सर्वसाधनसाध्यं च सुखं यच्चाप्यभीप्सितम् ।
सर्वानन्दैकहेतुत्वाद्ब्रह्माप्तौ प्राप्तमेव तत् ॥१६८८॥
यद्यत्कामयते कामी कर्मभूमाववस्थितः ।
अस्मादेवात्मविज्ञानात्तत्तत्सुखमुपाश्नुते ॥१६८९॥

And whatever (be the) happiness, that can be acquired by all the different means and is therefore desired, is all of it obtained when the Brahman, the source of all delight is known.

[1688]

Whatever a person, who is full of desires, longs for while he rests on the performance of activity, is all of it what he enjoys from this every knowledge of Self.

[1689]

This connects the sentence *yad yat kāmāyate* ... with the preceding statement.

सहस्रदशभागद्ध्या सुखानन्त्यं परात्मनः ।

वक्ष्यते सर्वसौख्याप्तिस्तस्मिन्दृष्टे परात्मनि ॥१६९०॥

It will be declared that the highest Ātman has¹ infinite happiness owing to its richness in thousands and tens (of the same) and that there is obtainment of all happiness when the highest (Ātman) is seen.

[1690]

¹That is, affords.

अन्तर्भावः परानन्दे सुखानामाविरिञ्चतः ।

अस्माद्ध्येवेति वाक्येन सर्वेषां नः प्रबोध्यते ॥१६९१॥

There is inclusion of all happinesses beginning from (that of) Viriñca in the highest delight (viz. in the Brahman) and this is made known to all of us all by the sentence *asmād eva*

...

[1691]

Verses 1692-1707 present the meaning of 'ātmānam eva lokam upāsita' as discussed by Bhartṛprapañca.

स्थिते ऽप्येवं प्रमाणार्थे केचिद्व्याचक्षते ऽन्यथा ।

प्रमान्तरविरुद्धार्थमिमं ग्रन्थं यथोदितम् ॥१६९२॥

[Verses 1692-1699 are the argument of the *prima facie* view in Bhartṛprapañca's discussion.]

Though the meaning conveyed by the means of knowing¹ is thus established, some (thinkers) explain this (portion which is so far discussed) otherwise — that is, in a way that shows a meaning which is opposed to right meaning.¹ [1692]

¹Namely, *jñānād eva muktiḥ*.

न कर्म कारणं मुक्तेः क्षयिष्णुत्वसमन्वयात् ।
कर्मस्वेव नियच्छन्ति देवताश्च न मुक्तिदाः ॥१६९३॥
कर्माधिकृतिहेतुत्वादग्न्यादेर्देवतात्मनः ।

Activity is not the cause of liberation, because of its inherent relation to perishability. The deities bind down the sacrificer only to activities and they do not grant liberation, [1693] since the nature of Agni and others originates one's eligibility for an activity. [1694ab]

This indicates that, by mere doing ritual activity, one does not secure liberation.

नाप्युत्थायेह कर्मभ्यो ब्रह्म ज्ञातुं क्षमो नरः ॥१६९४॥

Not also, even after rising above ritual activities is a man is able to know the Brahman. [1694cd]

There are two arguments: (i) *karman* is inseparably connected with perishability, and (ii) gods are related to rituals alone — i.e. not to liberation. Cf. SP: *devatās tāvat karmādhikṛtāḥ karmasv evainam niyacchantīti bhāṣyeṇa ... dūṣayati* which seems to quote from Bhartṛprapañca's comment. Now, Bhartṛprapañca's third argument: Since one cannot give up ritual activity till the end of one's life, knowledge also does not effect liberation — this refers to the Śruti *tasya tāvad eva ciraṃ* which implies *yāvajjīvaṃ karmācāraḥ*.

प्रत्यगात्माप्यसंदृष्टो मुक्त्या नैवोपतिष्ठते ।
देवताज्ञाकरत्वेन ब्रह्मविद्या विरुध्यते ॥१६९५॥

And the inner self, (so long as it is) not seen,¹ would not (of itself) attend upon one, thanks to (one's) liberation². (Verily) the lore of the Brahman is opposed by one's doing the deities' commands.³ [1695]

This is Bhartṛprapañca's fourth argument.

¹It means: known in its true nature.

²That is, will not behave like a kind deity who would of itself grant some favour.

³It literally means: by one's being devoted to the performance of ritual as the commands of deities. This implies the impossibility of the combination of knowledge and ritual activity.

कर्मिणः कर्मशेषत्वं स्वाराज्यम् ब्रह्मवेदने ।

नातः समुच्चयान्मुक्तिर्नापि स्यात्सा विकल्पतः ॥१६९६॥

A performer of rituals is subordinate to ritual activity, whereas in knowing the Brahman, there is *svārājya*.¹ Therefore, liberation is not possible owing to the combination (of knowledge and ritual) — not from any option (among the above). [1696]

This verse justifies the statement of the impossibility mentioned in note 3 on the preceding verse.

¹It literally means: kingdom of heaven and indicates complete freedom.

सति ज्ञाने तदुभयं तत्तु नैवोपपद्यते ।

ऋणानि चानपाकृत्य कर्म त्यक्तुं न लभ्यते ॥१६९७॥

ऋणानि त्रीण्यपाकृत्येत्येवं च स्मृतिशासनम् ॥१६९८॥

एवं न कर्मतो मोक्षः कर्मणः क्षयवत्त्वतः ।

ज्ञानाभावान्न विज्ञानान्नोभाभ्यां तदसंभवात् ॥१६९९॥

(One might argue:) While there is knowledge of the inner self (on the part of one), the two (viz. knowledge and ritual activity) can be (adopted as the course of one's action); but that is not reasonable, for (ca) it is not possible to give up action without repaying the debts; [1697]

(indeed) such is the dictate of the Smṛti *ṛnāṇi trīṇi apākṛtya* ... [1698]

Thus, liberation does not result from (the performance of) action, for the reason that action itself has its destruction (and), in the absence of knowledge, there is not any possibility of liberation and from *vijñāna* and not from both, i.e. *samuccaya*. [1699]

This explains the word *atah*.

वीक्ष्यापन्नस्य तस्यैवं सामर्थ्यं ज्ञानकर्मणोः ।
उद्विभावयिषुः साक्षात्प्रवृत्तैषा परा श्रुतिः ॥१७००॥

Having thought (about) this thus distressed (person who desired liberation), the subsequent Śruti (becoming) desirous of creating (in him) the strength (or potentiality) of knowledge and ritual activity (for his achieving liberation) has itself proceeded further. [1700]

This begins Bhartṛprapañca's answer.

लोकमात्मानमेवेममुपासीतात्मविद्यया ।
इति स्यादर्थवत्त्वाय समाधिर्ज्ञानकर्मणोः ॥१७०१॥

One should worship this *loka* as the very Ātman, by securing the lore of the Ātman. Thus would be meaningful a proper combination of knowledge and ritual. [1701]

The idea is to point that one should perform the rituals but with the idea that it is for the pleasure of the Ātman, i.e. for securing oneness with the Ātman.

¹*samādhi* is usually translated as meditation. But here it stands for a proper (combination) — a purely etymological sense from the verb root *sam-ā-√dhā*.

द्वैतैकत्वात्मिकावस्था विरिञ्चाख्या परात्मनः ।
विज्ञानकर्माभिव्यङ्ग्या द्वैतत्वात्सा क्षयात्मिका ॥१७०२॥

There is the state of having oneness and duality (both) of the highest Ātman which is called Viriñca, which can be revealed by knowledge (*viññāna*) and (ritual) activity, and it is perishable because of duality. [1702]

अवस्था यान्भिव्यक्ता तस्यैव परमात्मनः ।
अविशेषात्मिका सास्य कारणत्वात्त्वनश्वरी ॥१७०३॥

But that condition of the same highest Ātman, which is not manifest and which does not have any differentiation as its nature, is imperishable owing to its being the cause of this (transmigratory world). [1703]

तत्रैवं सति लोके ऽस्मिन्द्वैताद्वैतात्मसंस्थितौ ।
द्वैतावस्थामुपास्ते यस्तस्यासौ क्षीयते ध्रुवम् ।
द्वैतत्वाद्यः पुनर्धीमान्कर्मावस्थां यथोदिताम् ॥१७०४॥
अव्यक्तावस्थामापाद्य सदोपास्ते परात्मना ।
न क्षीयते कर्म तस्याद्वैतत्वादेव कारणात् ॥१७०५॥

This being so, in this (world) consisting in duality and unity, he who worships the condition of duality of that (viz. the highest Ātman) certainly perishes. However, the intelligent one, who has effected the state of uniqueness from his (own) state of duality (viz.) the state of performing action,¹ as described (before), ever worships the same as the highest Ātman, does not perish, thanks to (his) action (proceeding) from only that non-duality (which is) the cause. [1704-1705]

The first two lines of verse 1704 point out the fault of the worshipper of duality; its third line and verse 1705 state the excellence of the worshipper of non-duality.

¹This is the same *dvaitāvasthā*.

ब्रह्मोपास्तिर्भवेदेवं कर्म चानुष्ठितं भवेत् ॥१७०६॥
व्यक्तं ससाधनं कर्म ब्रह्मभावेन पश्यतः ।
न क्षीयते कर्म तस्य सदैकात्म्यावसानतः ॥१७०७॥

Thus, there would be proper worship of the Brahman and

there would be the performance of action in the case of one who sees action together with all its means as the Brahman. The action of that (person) does not perish, since it has culminated into the uniqueness of the existent. [1706-1707]

The second line of verse 1707 explains away a possible objection, viz. the sentence *na hāsyā karma kṣīyate* is opposed to the entire Śruti teaching.

Verses 1708-1779 are the refutation of the meaning as proposed above by Bharṭṛ- prapañca in its various details.

हिरण्यगर्भविज्ञानकर्मणोः प्रथमः किल ॥१७०८॥
समुच्चयस्ततो ऽन्यो ऽयमव्यक्तब्रह्मविद्याया ।
व्यक्तसूत्रात्मविद्यायाः परो ऽप्येष समुच्चयः ॥१७०९॥

[In verses 1708-1737 there follows the refutation of Bharṭṛ-prapañca's theory of two *samuccayas*.]

The first combination is said to be (*kila*) that of the worship¹ of Hiranyagarbha and (ritual) activity. [1708]

And there is this another (secures) by knowing the Brahman as the unmanifest (Ātman) and this is another combination, viz. the knowledge about the Ātman as the manifest form of Sūtra (viz. Hiranyagarbha).² [1709]

These verses, viz. 1708-1709, state about the two *samuccayas*.

¹ *viññāna* here stands for Upāsanā.

² This is suggestive of the question: Which combination is understood in the sentence *ātmānam eva ...?*

द्वयोर्यथोक्तयोर्मध्ये कतरो ऽयं समुच्चयः ।
प्रथमो ऽथ द्वितीयो वा न न्यायो ऽस्त्युभयोरपि ॥१७१०॥

(The Siddhāntin observes:) There is no leading principle¹ for deciding which of the two combinations thus described is the first² (combination) or the second (combination). [1710]

This is to say: It is not clear as to which of the two combinations Bhartṛprapañca would like to hold as correct (or satisfactory).

¹ *nyāya* is here the leading principle.

² That is, superior or more significant.

प्रथमश्चेत्त्वयैवोक्तं क्षीयेते कामकर्मणी ।

निःशेषभोगभुक्तत्वात्कृत्स्नप्राप्त्या द्वयात्मनः ॥१७११॥

If (you were to hold) the first combination¹ (as more acceptable), then (remember what) you yourself have said, viz. desire and action perish, because there is fulfilment of all of the enjoyments² and (also) the obtainment of the entire fruit (viz. completeness) in the case of what comprises duality.³

[1711]

¹ Cf. verses 1714-1715ab below for the internal contradiction of the argument (*vyāghāta*).

² This refers to attaining to the status of the Sūtrātman.

³ This has a reference to Bhartṛprapañca's comment in respect of BU 3.2.12: *kim enaṃ na jahāti nāma*.

विशीर्यते ततः कार्यं कृत्स्नं च कारणं तथा ।

ततः क्षेत्रज्ञरूपस्य सर्वभोज्यातिलङ्घिनः ॥१७१२॥

केवलाज्ञानमात्रेण व्यवधानं परात्मनः ।

अप्राप्य परमात्मानमन्तराले व्यवस्थितिः ॥१७१३॥

Then, on account of that, the entire (world of) effect(s) perishes and so also the cause (of the same). Then there is the obscurity of the highest Ātman which is of the nature of the knower of the field, that transgresses all the enjoyables, owing to ignorance alone. And then, when one has not attained the highest Ātman, there is (for the devotee) the state which is (only) mid-way (i.e. between this transmigratory world and liberation).

[1712-1713]

इह त्वक्षितिरेवोक्ता भवता ज्ञानकर्मणोः ।

न हास्य क्षीयते कर्मेत्यस्माद्ध्येवेति चोक्तिः ॥१७१४॥

पूर्वोक्तरोक्तवचसोर्व्याहतिर्वः प्रसज्यते ।

But you have stated that there is here only absence of the destruction of knowledge and action on the basis of the statement of the Śruti *na hāsyā kṣīyate* ... [1714]

And thus there results contradiction between your earlier and later statements. [1715ab]

अथ द्वितीयो ऽभिमतो न तथाप्युपपद्यते ॥१७१५॥

Now, if you refer to the second (combination), then also, that does not stand to reason.¹ [1715cd]

¹This is explained in the few following verses.

फलं त्वयैव व्याख्यातं द्वितीयस्याः समुच्चितेः ॥१७१६॥
 द्वैतैकत्वधिया मृत्युं कामकर्मस्वलक्षणम् ।
 तीर्त्वात्मविद्यया विद्वानमृतत्वं समश्नुते ॥१७१७॥
 न हास्य क्षीयते कर्म यद्यत्कामयते ऽक्षरात् ।
 तत्तत्सृजत इत्युक्त्योः पूर्वोत्तरविरुद्धता ॥१७१८॥

You yourself have declared the result of the second combination, [1716]

(viz.) (in the statements:) (i) Having overcome death whose characteristic is in desire and actions by (securing) the knowledge of the uniqueness, oneness in duality, the knower obtains immortality by the lore of the Ātman,¹ [1717]
 and (ii) (the Śruti:) 'Indeed, his action does not perish.' (and) 'Whatever he wishes (for) from the imperishable, each of that it created.'² Between the two statements of the Śruti, there is contradiction between (what is said) earlier and (what) subsequently. [1718]

¹In the second line of the verse, Sureśvara uses the idea of *Īsopaniṣad* 11cd: *avidyayā mṛtyuṃ tīrtvā vidyayāmṛtam aśnute*.

²Sureśvara refers in verse 1718 to the text under question, i.e. BU 1.4.15; though he seems to quote, he is merely condensing the thought — this is noticed in his adding the word *akṣarāt* which does not at all occur in the passage under reference.

कामकर्मक्षये यस्मादमृतत्वं फलं श्रुतम् ।
यदा सर्वे प्रमुच्यन्त इत्येवं बहुशः श्रुतौ ॥१७१९॥

Since it is heard that immortality is the result when there is destruction of desire and action (as) in passages (like) *yādā sarve pramucyante ...*¹; thus it is many times declared in the Śruti. [1719]

¹ *Kāthopaniṣad* 6.14: *yādā sarve pramucyante kamā ye 'sya hr̥di śritāḥ*.

कथमेति स कैवल्यमक्षितौ कामकर्मणोः ।
कैवल्यावाप्तौ च कथं तयोरक्षितिरुच्यते ॥१७२०॥

How will he attain liberation (*kaivalya*), if there is no destruction of desire and action, and, if there is obtainment of liberation, how could there be stated non-destruction of the two (viz. desire and action)? [1720]

इतश्च व्याहतिः स्पष्टा ब्रह्मविद्या विरुध्यते ।
देवताज्ञाकरत्वेनेत्युक्तं यत्प्रणिधानतः ॥१७२१॥

From this also becomes clear the contradiction: It is stated (by you) that (a seeker) has to be following the dictates of the gods,¹ by devotedly doing which the lore of the Brahman is opposed. [1721]

This is another contradiction in the view of Bhartṛprapañca.

¹ Cf. verses 1582, 1664-1665 and 1695ff. above. The argument pertaining to the opposition between ritual performances and the lore of the Brahman.

ससाधनमिदं कर्म ब्रह्मभावेन पश्यतः ।
तदेव ब्रह्मविज्ञानं कथं नेह विरुध्यते ॥१७२२॥

How does the knowing about the Brahman not become contradicted while one is seeing this ritual activity together

with its means as becoming the Brahman?

[1722]

पूर्वं कृत्वाथ तत्कर्म पश्चाद्ब्रह्मात्मनेक्षते ।
व्युत्थाय कर्मणः कृत्स्नान्मोक्षाशंसेति चेन्मतम् ॥१७२३॥
एवं समर्थ्यमाने ऽपि न मुक्तिः कर्मणो भवेत् ।
व्युत्थितस्यैव कर्मभ्यो मुक्त्यभ्युपगमत्वतः ॥१७२४॥

If it is held: Having first done (ritual) activity, one sees later the Brahman in the form of one's own inner self and then after having risen above all action there is the expectation of liberation,

[1723]

(then the answer is:) Even when (this opinion) is being justified thus, there would not be effected release from ritual activity, because liberation is held to result only for one who has risen above ritual activities.

[1724]

These verses pertain to the contradiction between ritual performance and achieving liberation in relation to time.

अथ गार्हस्थ्य एवायं कर्मकाले विभिन्नधीः ।
कर्म कृत्वाथ तच्छान्तौ कर्म ब्रह्मेति वेत्स्यति ॥१७२५॥
एवं समादधानस्य कामितो ऽर्थो न सिध्यति ।
पराधीनमृतेर्जन्तोर्मुक्तिः स्यात्पाक्षिकी यतः ॥१७२६॥

(One would argue:) In the state of a householder only, this one entertains different notions¹ at the time for ritual activity and later, having performed (that) ritual activity (and having secured) the removal of that², he will know that ritual activity is the Brahman.

[1725]

The counterargument is: (But even) while you are thus explaining, your desired end will not be secured; since there would be the only optionally (possible) liberation for one who has come into being on account of a death that is dependent on another.³

[1726]

¹It literally means: possessing notion of the differentiated world.

²*tacchāntau = vibhinnadhīdvamse sati.*

³This is explained in the following verse.

भेदं पश्यन् यदि मृतो बद्ध एव भवेन्नरः ।

कर्म ब्रह्मेति संपश्यन् मृतश्चेद्ब्रह्मसाद्भवेत् ॥१७२७॥

If a man dies while seeing (this) duality, he will be only tied (to the transmigratory world); (but) if he died seeing the ritual activity as the Brahman, he would be one with the Brahman.

[1727]

भेददृष्टेर्बलीयस्त्वात्तस्याः स्वाभाविकत्वतः ।

इच्छातश्चापि भाव्यत्वात्तदापि स्यान्न निर्वृतिः ॥१७२८॥

Because seeing of duality is stronger (than seeing of that oneness); because (that is only) natural (for one) and that seeing would be resulting from desire, therefore, then also there would not at all be liberation (possible).

[1728]

This sets aside the possibility of an optional achieving of liberation.

कुर्वाण एव चेत्कर्म कर्म ब्रह्मेति पश्यति ।

देवताज्ञाकरत्वेन ब्रह्मविद्या विहन्यते ॥१७२९॥

इत्युक्तिर्वो विरुध्येत पूर्वोत्तरविधाततः ।

अपास्तदेवतात्यक्तद्रव्यं कर्मापि दुर्घटम् ॥१७३०॥

If he sees action as the Brahman, indeed while performing ritual activity; his knowing of the Brahman would be obstructed by (his) following the dictates of the god(s) — this your statement would stand opposed owing to the contradiction between (your) earlier and subsequent (statements) and ritual activity, wherein the material offered to the deity is set aside, would also be difficult to perform.

[1729-1730]

त्यक्तद्रव्यादिसंभेददृष्ट्यैव नियततवतः ।

यागादिकर्मणस्तस्मादसमीचीनमुच्यते ॥१७३१॥

ससाधनमिदं कर्म ब्रह्मैवेति समीक्षणम् ।

ईदृङ् न लोके वेदे ऽपि प्रसिद्धं कर्म कुत्रचित् ॥१७३२॥

Since the (varied) action in sacrifice and (any other) activity is controlled only with their differences regarding the offered material etc. in view; therefore, what is stated in (your view) is unreasonable.

[1731]

And this view, viz. (all) this action, together with its means, is the Brahman itself, is not known anywhere in the world and in the Veda also.

[1732]

आत्मानमित्यतो वाक्यात्कर्मैदृक्चेत्प्रसेत्स्यति ।
वाक्यभेदप्रसङ्गत्वान्नैवमप्युपपद्यते ॥१७३३॥

Therefore, if from the statement of the Śruti *ātmānam* ... the seer of such an action is established (as successful in achieving liberation), there would result the (undesirable fault called) Vākyabheda, therefore, this way also¹ (your view) would not stand to reason.

[1733]

¹Vākyabheda 'diversity of statements'; the fault occurs when a sentence conveys two senses against the accepted principle that one sentence must convey only one particular sense. Jaimini's rule is: *arthaikatvād ekam vākyaṃ*. The next verse explains the Vākyabheda.

एवंविधस्य कर्मत्वमपास्ति चात्मनस्तथा ।
उभयं विदधद्वाक्यं भिद्येतैव न संशयः ॥१७३४॥

The sentence, which is (seen) prescribing both, viz. the nature of ritual activity of this type and also the worship of the Ātman, would be a split sentence.¹ There is no doubt about this.

[1734]

¹For, it conveys two diverse statements at one time.

ब्रह्मार्पणमिति वचो यथोक्तेनैव वर्त्मना ।
निर्धारितार्थं जानीयात्स्फुटन्यायसमाश्रयात् ॥१७३५॥

One should know that the statement *brahmārpaṇam* ...¹ will have its meaning established by the very way stated.²

has resorted to the very clear leading principle.³ [1735]

¹Cf. *Gītā* 4.24ab: *brahmārpaṇam brahma havir brahmāgnau brahmaṇā hutam*.

²That is, without involving a Vākyabheda.

³Cf. verse 1733cd above.

पूर्वाभ्यामन्य एवायं तृतीयश्चेत्समुच्चयः ।
श्रुतौ स्मृतौ वा लोके वा सिद्धश्चेदस्तु नान्यथा ॥१७३६॥

If one were to say that there is this third combination (which is) different from the first two (that you have posited), let the combination be such as is accepted, i.e. known, in the Śruti or Smṛti or the world; (it can) not (be accepted as) otherwise. [1736]

This has a reference to the third *samuccaya*, viz. the combination of ritual and worship of the Ātman. It is implied that such a combination is totally unknown.

तस्मादसदिदं गीतमात्मानमिति यद्वचः ।
तत्समुच्चयसिद्ध्यर्थमित्येतच्चोक्तयुक्तिः ॥१७३७॥

Therefore, what you have said (lit. sung) is all false and also the statement *ātmānam* ... (which you had adduced) for establishing that combination is wrong just on account of the reason (already) stated.¹ [1737]

This concludes the refutation of Bhartṛprapañca's explanation of the sentence *ātmānam eva* ... by resorting to the different *samuccayas* mentioned above.

¹This refers to the fault of Vākyabheda.

कार्यलिङ्गसमुच्छित्तिः फलं नाद्यसमुच्चितेः ।
युक्त्या कल्पयितुं शक्यं श्रुतिवाक्यविरोधतः ॥१७३८॥

It is not possible, by any reason, to think that from the first combination follows the result, viz. the destruction of the *linga*¹

or the effect², because of the opposition (to that) by the statement in the Śruti.³ [1738]

¹That is, *sūkṣmadeha* 'subtle body'.

²That is, gross body.

³This is explained in the next two verses.

द्वैतैकत्वात्मविज्ञानकर्मानुष्ठायिनः पितुः ।
पुत्रे न्यस्तात्मभारस्य मरणात्परतः फलम् ॥१७३९॥
पृथिव्यै चैनमित्यादि त्र्यन्नात्मावाप्तिलक्षणम् ।
श्रूयते स्पष्टवचनं देहादेर्नाशनं कुतः ॥१७४०॥

[Verses 1739-1752 refute Bhartṛprapañca's theory about the destruction of gross and subtle bodies of an individual by the first *samuccaya* posited by him.]

In the case of a father, who is performing ritual activities from the knowledge about the uniqueness of the Ātman in all this duality and also who has transferred his own responsibility unto a son, the result (viz. liberation) is far away, it is (obtained) after death. [1739]

And a very clear statement is heard in *pr̥thivyai cainam* ...¹ which indicates the obtainment of the nature of the three foods; how can then there be the destruction of the body etc.? [1740]

¹This refers to BU 1.5.18: *pr̥thivyai cainam agneś ca daivī vāg āviśati*.

न चाप्यतिक्रमार्थत्वं जय्य इत्यस्य युक्तिमत् ।
तस्याविशतिवाक्येन विरोधादेव कारणात् ॥१७४१॥

And the statement *jayya* ...¹ is also not reasonable in the case of a person for transgressing (the worldly existence) lest it might be contradictory with the statement *āviśanti* ...² [1741]

¹Cf. BU 1.5.16: *putreṇaivāyam loko jayyah*.

²Cf. *agneś ca daivī vāg āviśati*. This points out that the word *jayya* does not refer to only 'transgressing', but it means 'obtaining'

or 'reaching up to'.

मतं त्र्यन्नात्मसंप्राप्तेरुर्ध्वं भोगस्य भुक्तिः ।
 सामर्थ्यात्कल्प्यते कार्यं प्राणानां नाशनं पितुः ॥१७४२॥
 नैवं स्याद्ब्रह्मबोधस्य निष्फलत्वप्रसङ्गतः ।
 विद्याफलस्य संप्राप्तेः प्रागपि ब्रह्मबोधतः ॥१७४३॥

(One might argue: It is) held that the destruction of the father's¹ *prāṇas*² is (i.e. can be) imagined with propriety after the enjoyment of pleasure after (a sacrificer first) attained the nature of the three foods. [1742]

(In answering, this is said: It would) not (be) so, because there would arise the contingency that the knowledge of the Brahman becomes purposeless, for (in that case) one would have achieved the fruit of knowledge³ even before one had (actually) obtained the knowledge of the Brahman. [1743]

¹That is, Prajāpati's.

²These are subtle sense-organs, signifying his body.

³That is, the destruction of two bodies, viz. subtle and gross.

संसारानर्थनाशो हि विद्यायाः प्रार्थ्यते फलम् ।
 विद्यामृते ऽपि तच्चेत्स्याद्ध्रुवं विद्या निरर्थिका ॥१७४४॥

They desire from the lore (of the Brahman) the destruction of the undesirable transmigratory world as the fruit, if that would be obtained even without knowing (the Brahman), it is certain that the lore (of the Brahman) becomes purposeless. [1744]

ध्वान्तनाशो ऽथ विद्यायाः कार्यं चेदभिधीयते ।
 सर्वानर्थस्य नष्टत्वात्किमन्यत्स्यात्तमोहुतेः ॥१७४५॥

If it is said that destruction of darkness is to be the effect (to be achieved by) the knowledge of the Brahman, (we ask,) what else would there remain after the absence (lit. concealment) of darkness, for, already all the undesirable would have been destroyed? [1745]

This verse presupposes the argument that the destruction of ignorance is the second result of the lore of the Brahman, the first being the acquisition of the knowledge about the Brahman.

उत्खातदन्तोरगवदविद्या किं करिष्यति ।
विद्यमानापि विध्वस्ततीव्रानर्थपरंपरा ॥१७४६॥
कामकर्मादिविध्वस्तौ नाविद्यानर्थभुक्तये ।
प्रतीचो ऽलमृते कार्यं कारणं न हि कारणम् ॥१७४७॥

What would darkness do, (when it is) like a serpent whose tooth has been extracted? The one,¹ even though existing, would have its strong chain of undesirables destroyed, [1746] (for), ignorance is not able to produce experience of the undesirable in the case of an individual when desire, action etc. are destroyed. (Indeed) there is not any such means (of enjoyment) as is a means without an effect. [1747]

These verses presuppose an objection: Knowledge about the Brahman is obtained from the lore of the Brahman but ignorance has still remained. Would it not cause transmigration for a student of that lore?

¹Namely, *avidyā*.

विद्यमाना पुनः कामं कर्म चापि प्रवर्तयेत् ।
अविद्येति मतं चेत्स्यान्नैवमप्युपपद्यते ॥१७४८॥
अविद्या विद्यमाना चेच्छक्तोत्पादयितुं बलात् ।
नाशकद्रक्षितुं नाशात्कथं ते कामकर्मणि ॥१७४९॥

If it be held that when ignorance continues to exist, it would incite desire and also action; (then the answer is,) this also is not reasonable — [1748]

If ignorance that continues to exist (or, were to be able) to create (desire and action) per force, how then it was not able to protect the desire and action from being destroyed? [1749]

This means: *avidyā* cannot again produce *kāma* and *karman* which

are destroyed by the knowledge of the Brahman.

अथ कारणसंसर्गो नाशशब्देन भण्यते ।

सर्वान्प्रत्यविशिष्टत्वात्फलं तन्न समुच्चिते ॥१७५०॥

Now, if it is held that the contact (of an effect) with the cause is expressed by the word *nāśa*,¹ then, that would not be the (real) result of (the first) combination, since (that) would not be unrelated to all, not specified (with respect to some objects only). [1750]

¹This presupposes that the first combination does not bring about complete destruction of *kāma* etc., some of it combining to exist.

तस्मात्संघातविध्वंसो निर्युक्तिक इहोच्यते ।

अथ सत्यपि संमोहे संघातश्चेद्विशीर्यते ॥१७५१॥

देहहेत्वन्तराभावाद्भूयो ऽपि विफलैव धीः ।

आनर्थक्यं ब्रह्मधियो न च युक्तं कथंचन ।

निःशेषोपनिषत्काण्डनैरर्थक्यप्रसङ्गतः ॥१७५२॥

Therefore, the destruction of an aggregate is here postulated without any (logical) reason. Now if (it is held) that an aggregate it would get destroyed while there is ignorance, then, owing to the absence of any other cause (for a creation of a) body, once again, the knowledge (of the Brahman) would (have to) be (considered as) useless. But the uselessness of the knowledge of the Brahman is in no way accepted as reasonable; for, (if that were accepted), there would be the contingency (of accepting) the meaninglessness of an entire section (of the Veda called) the Upaniṣad.¹ [1751-1752]

¹This refers to all the Vedānta texts among the Vedic works.

अपि च ध्वस्तनिःशेषकार्यप्राणादिसाधनः ।

श्रवणादि कथं कुर्याद्ब्रह्मविद्योपलब्धये ॥१७५३॥

[Verses 1753-1763 present Sureśvara's refutation of the opinion

of Bhartṛprapañca that, being, which is mid-way between liberation and transmigratory existence after the destruction of its subtle and gross bodies, undertakes *śravaṇa* etc. (or worship of the Ātman).]

And, further, how can one, whose entire means of ritual activities, viz. *prāṇa* etc. are destroyed, perform hearing etc. for obtaining the knowledge of the Brahman? [1753]

वैराग्यातिशयार्थत्वाद्गौणं चेन्नाशनं मतम् ।
स्वव्याख्यानविरोधित्वान्नैवमप्युपपद्यते ॥१७५४॥

If it is held (by you) that, owing to its being (necessary) for (effecting) the excellence of detachment, there is (posited the opinion regarding) the destruction (of two bodies); that (lit. thus thinking) also, it is not reasonable because (that would involve) contradiction to your own explanation. [1754]

अत्रैव संनिमज्जन्ति प्राणाः सर्वे स्वकारणे ।
मृतः शेते स आधमातो जीवतैतद्विरुध्यते ॥१७५५॥
फलं चैतत्त्वयैवोक्तं प्रथमायाः समुच्चितेः ।
तस्मान्न जीवतो वाच्यं गौणं विशरणं त्वया ॥१७५६॥

Here all the sense-organs (*prāṇas*) merge into their own cause and then a human being lies dead; then he is inflated by a living one¹ — (all) this is contradictory. And (listen), you yourself have stated this as the result of the first combination; therefore, it should not be argued by you that the destruction of a living body is (but) secondary. [1755-1756]

¹SP and NKL report that the principal part of this verse (up to *jīvata*) is Bhartṛprapañca's comment on the third chapter.

अत्रैवेति फलं चोक्त्वा प्रथमायाः समुच्चितेः ।
व्युत्थितस्याखिलाद्भोज्यान्नाममात्रावशेषिणः ॥१७५७॥
परमात्मापरिज्ञानमात्रयानाप्तनिर्द्वयः ।
ब्रह्मविद्यात आरब्धा ब्रह्मविद्यानिवृत्तये ॥१७५८॥
एतत्त्वदीयम् व्याख्यानं तद्विरुद्धमिदं वचः ।

संघातस्य विशरणं जीवतश्चेति दुःस्थितम् ॥१७५९॥

Having stated in the words *atraiva* the result of the first combination in the case of the one who has risen above the entire (collection of) the enjoyables (or eatables); i.e. who has remained only in name; [1757]

one who has not obtained the (Ātman) without duality through only ignorance about the highest Ātman, the lore of the Brahman, is begun for the removal of the ignorance about the Brahman — [1758]

This is your explanation and opposed to that is this your statement, viz. there is disintegration (or flittering) of the aggregate (of *prāṇas*) and, at the same time, of a living one — all this is ill-stated. [1759]

Verses 1757-1758 present a gist of Bhartṛprapañca's comment on the third chapter — this is according to SP and NKL.

निषिद्धषड्विकारस्य श्रुत्यैव परमात्मनः ।

अविद्या तद्विकारश्च न युक्तस्तूषरादिवत् ॥१७६०॥

But it is not reasonable (to hold) that ignorance and this modification belong to the highest Ātman whose six modifications are denied by the Śruti itself — it¹ is like (ascribing the existence of water in) a barren land etc. [1760]

¹ Namely, saying that *avidyā* is a modification of the Ātman (as holds Bhartṛprapañca), will be like saying 'there is water', even while there is only a barren land.

हिरण्यगर्भद्वारैव मुक्तिरित्यपि यद्वचः ।

तस्यापि दूषणं ज्ञेयं यथोक्तन्यायवर्त्मना ॥१७६१॥

As to the statement, viz. there results liberation through (the knowledge of) Hiranyagarbha, there also is to be understood a blemish in the way of the leading principle which was argued. [1761]

This is explained in the next verse.

¹This has a reference to the Śruti *tad yo yo devānām ...*

हिरण्यगर्भवद्यस्मात्क्रिम्यादेरपि संगतिः ।

ब्रह्मात्मलक्षणासाधवी तेनेयं कल्पना कृता ॥१७६२॥

Since in the case of insects etc. also there would be the same situation, viz. they are characterized by being of the nature of the Brahman, as in the case of Hiraṇyagarbha, therefore (you have) conceived a wrong notion. [1762]

In first three *pādas* of this verse, there is, according to SP, the leading principle mentioned earlier in SV.

संसारिताविशिष्टैव मोक्षादर्वाक्षु भूमिषु ।

ब्रह्मा विश्वसृजो धर्म इत्यादिवचनान्मनोः ॥१७६३॥

In the lower states (of beings) before the state of liberation the nature of being transmigratory is not something special (or uncommon with Hiraṇyagarbha) — this, on the basis of Manu's statement *brahmā viśvasṛjo dharmah ...*¹ [1763]

This refutes the possible argument: All *jīvās*, except Sūtra, cannot attain liberation. But all of them have to be experiencing the results of the performance of Dharma.

¹*Manusṛti* 12.15.

विद्यां चेत्यादिमन्त्रो ऽपि न समुच्चयबोधकः ।

परस्परविरोधित्वान्न सहावस्थितिस्तयोः ॥१७६४॥

[Verses 1764-1770 point out that *vidyām ca* and *sambhūtim ca* do not have *samuccaya* as their purport.]

And even the Mantra, *vidyām ca ...*¹ is not conducive to the understanding of a combination; they (*vidyā* and *avidyā*) cannot exist together, for, (their stay together would) involve mutual contradiction. [1764]

¹Cf. *Īsopaniṣad* 11ab; *Maitrāyaṇyupaniṣad* 7.9.

क्त्वायोगात्पूर्वकालत्वमविद्यायाः प्रतीयते ।
 स्वाभाविकं कर्म मृत्युर्विद्या शास्त्रीयमुच्यते ॥१७६५॥
 मृत्युः स्वाभाविकं ज्ञानं शास्त्रीयं संभवस्तथा ।
 शास्त्रीयेणेतरत्तीर्त्वा विद्ययामृतमश्नुते ॥१७६६॥

From the use of suffix *-ktvā* it is understood (or seen) that ignorance belongs to some earlier moment of time. Performance of natural action is called Death. And (actions) prescribed by Śāstra is called *vidyā*. [1765]

Death consists in natural knowledge and birth in that (which is) acquired from Śāstra; one, having crossed over everything else (than Śāstra) by means of Śāstra, obtains immortality.

[1766]

The first line explains the word *mṛtyu* in *vināśena mṛtyum tīrtvā*; the second, the word *sambhūti* in *sambhūtim ca vināśam ca*; cf. *Īsopaniṣad* 14.

नाविरतो दुश्चरितादिति चागमिकं वचः ।
 तपसा कल्मषं हन्ति विद्ययामृतमश्नुते ॥१७६७॥

It is not that a person has not stopped from ill-action — such is the statement from the Āgama.¹ He destroys the ill by means of penance and attains immortality by knowledge. [1767]

¹This is *Kaṭhopanīṣad* 2.24.

तस्मात्समुच्चयाशेह कार्या नाक्षरसंश्रयात् ।
 अप्रमाणं ब्रुवाणस्तु नास्माभिर्विनिवार्यते ॥१७६८॥

Therefore, one should not entertain here¹ a hope (to prove that there is combination) by resorting to Śruti (texts, lit. letters) as the authority, and, one who declares unauthoritative (these) theories, is not refuted (lit. warded off) by us.² [1768]

This concludes the refutation of *samuccaya* proposed by Bhartr-
 prapañca.

¹That is, in respect of liberation.

²That is, we pay no heed to him.

तस्माद्व्युत्थाय कर्मभ्यः प्रत्यक्प्रवणबुद्धयः ।

प्रत्यग्याथात्म्यविज्ञानान्निर्वान्तीत्येष निश्चयः ॥१७६९॥

Therefore, having risen above ritual activities, those who have their intellect inclined towards the inner self, put an end to (the transmigratory existence) by means of the knowledge of the true nature of the inner self. This is the decision. [1769]

This is Sureśvara's assertion of his own positing consequent upon the few preceding verses.

अपुण्यपुण्योपरमे यं पुनर्भवनिर्भयाः ।

शान्ताः संन्यासिनो यान्ति तस्मै मोक्षात्मने नमः ॥१७७०॥

Salutation to him whose nature is liberation and whom approach they who have renounced all action, who are calm (in mind), who are not afraid of re-birth and (who are in the state) in which merit and demerit have ceased to exist.

[1770]

न चेह लोकशब्देन कश्चिदन्यो ऽभिधीयते ।

परात्मनः स्वशब्देन विशेषणसमन्वयात् ॥१७७१॥

[Verses 1771-1779 point out the want of reason in understanding from *ātmānam eva lokam upāsita* the world of Hiraṇyagarbha as the result of ritual activity.]

Further, none else (than the Ātman) is expressed by the word *loka* in this (passage), for, there is the proper connection of the qualifier, the word *sva*, (only) with the highest Ātman.

[1771]

SP and NKL point out that, by not understanding the word *loka* in the sense of the highest Ātman, one would invite two undesirable faults: *prakṛtahāni* and *aprakṛtaprakriyāpāta*.

आत्मानमेवेति तथा चात्मशब्दो विशेषणम् ।
 लोकस्य ग्रहणं तस्मान्न कर्मसमवायिनः ॥१७७२॥
 विद्याप्रकरणे चोर्ध्वमात्मनैव विशेषणात् ।
 येषां नो ह्ययमात्मेति कार्यलोकनिवृत्तये ॥१७७३॥

And also (the phrase) *ātmānam eva* ... and the word *ātman* are qualifiers.¹ Therefore, the use of (the word) *loka* is not in respect of one who is inseparably associated with ritual activity [1772]

and because, later,² in the context of knowledge, there is specification by the words *ātmaiva* and by the phrase *yeṣāṃ no hy ayam ātmā*, with a view to the removal of (the word) *loka* which (has the sense of what is) of the nature of some effect.³ [1773]

¹ Add: of *loka*. SP gives reason for this: (In language) *sva* and *ātman* are synonymns.

² Cf. BU 4.4.22: *sa vā eṣa mahān* and *yeṣāṃ no* ('*yam ātmāyam lokah*).

³ This doing avoids *pūrvāparavirodha* (internal contradiction). Here SP adds: *saṃdigdhasya vākyaśeṣān nirṇayo bhavatīti nyāya(h)*— this is implied by *hi*.

अस्माद्ध्येवेति लिङ्गाच्चेल्लोको ऽन्यः स्यात्परात्मनः ।
 स्वलोकस्यार्थवादत्वान्नैवमप्युपपद्यते ॥१७७४॥

If it be held that *loka* is distinct from the highest Ātman on the basis of the *liṅga*, viz. *asmād dhy eva* ..., this also is not reasonable, because the word *svaloka* is an Arthavāda 'eulogistic statement'. [1774]

The basis of this verse is an argument: The word *loka* is not in the sense of the highest Ātman, since it occurs in the context of the origin of the desired fruit and is therefore a *liṅga* 'indicator' of the fruit). This is refuted on the ground that the sentence *asmād dhy eva* ... is an Arthavāda and therefore the word *loka* is an 'indicator' in the Arthavāda and, as such, it cannot prove

stronger than the context, viz. that of *mokṣa* 'liberation'. Cf. SP: *arthavādaṣṭhaṃ liṅgaṃ na prakaraṇād balavat[taram]*.

साधनान्तरसंभाव्यं यावत्संभाव्यते फलम् ।
कृत्स्नं तदात्मनो लोकात्सिद्धमस्येति नूयते ॥१७७५॥

Whatever result is imagined as what is to be produced by other means (also), all that gets established from *loka*, the Ātman (for this one¹) — so is it² praised. [1775]

This explains the character of *asmād dhy eva ...* as an Arthavāda.

¹Namely, the knower of the Ātman.

²That is, *svaloka*.

यो ऽकाम वाक्येन ह्ययमेवार्थ उच्यते ।
सर्वं कर्माखिलमिति स्मृतेरपि शुभं वचः ॥१७७६॥

This very thought is expressed by the sentence *yo 'kāmaḥ ...*¹ and, further, there is also an auspicious² statement of the Smṛti *sarvaṃ karmākhilam (pārtha jñāne parisamāpyate)*.³ [1776]

¹Cf. BU 4.4.6: *yo 'kāma āptakāma āptakāmaḥ*.

²*śubham* indicates the sense of it: All action is significant (lit. great).

³*Gītā* 4.33cd.

यद्यकृत्स्नो ऽपरिज्ञानाज्ज्ञानात्कात्स्न्यं समश्नुते ।
आत्मशब्दप्रयोगो ऽयं तदा लोके समञ्जसः ॥१७७७॥

If (*loka* is incomplete owing to the incomplete) knowledge (about its meaning) and which attains completeness by means of (complete) knowledge (of its context), (only) then this use of the word *ātman* would be reasonable in relation to *loka*.

[1777]

This explains the purpose of the *sāmānādhikarāṇya* of *loka* and *ātman*, for, that (viz. *sāmānādhikarāṇya*) makes the meaning of *loka* clear.

अन्यथाव्याकृतावस्थाल्लोकदिति वदेच्छ्रुतिः ।
ब्रह्मलोकनिरासार्थं वचः स्यात्सविशेषणम् ॥१७७८॥

Otherwise, the Śruti would have said 'from the *loka* in the unmanifest state' and the statement would have been worth specification for setting aside the thought of the sphere (i.e. state) of the Brahman. [1778]

This is later on mentioed in BU BU 4.3.32 and 33.

नान्यस्मिन्प्रकृते ऽन्यो ऽर्थो विरह्य्य विशेषणम् ।
ग्रहीतुं सुधिया शक्यो वैश्वानरवरादृते ॥१७७९॥

It is not possible for an intelligent person to accept any meaning other than that which is relevant by setting aside its qualifier except with the boon (received through) the favour of Agni¹. [1779]

¹This is once again a reference to Bhartṛprapañca's having won a boon from Fire. But, this time, Sureśvara is more penchant. He almost ridicules Bhartṛprapañca for having understood *loka* in the sense of Sūtrātman and this involved internal contradiction — through Agni's favour(!)

Verses 1780-1805 explain the meaning of BU 1.4.16.

उक्तेन वचसा तावत्स्वाराज्यं विदुषो ऽवदत् ।
कथं नूपकरोत्यज्ञो देवतादीनिति भण्यते ॥१७८०॥

[In verses 1780-1793, Sureśvara explains how a non-learned person serves gods etc.]

To begin with, the Śruti has declared the *svārājya* 'kingdom of heaven' (for a knower of Brahman) by the earlier portion of the text (lit. statement¹). Now is stated (an answer to the question:) 'How indeed does an ignorant person serve gods and others?'. [1780]

¹That is, *ātmānam eva* ... This points to what is discussed in the previous section of the Vārtika, viz. 'the learned attains *svārājya*'.

वर्णाश्रमाभिमानी सन्नतत्त्वज्ञः पराङ्मतिः ।
कानेषो ऽवति पशुवत्कर्मभिः कैश्च सर्वदा ॥१७८१॥

How does this person who has a pride in his caste and order of life and who does not know the true nature of that (Brahman) and whose thought (mind) is directed away (from the Brahman), ever render service¹ like an animal? (and) by what actions? (and) whom? [1781]

The question in the second line of verse 1780 is amplified here.
¹This is the meaning of the verb root \sqrt{av} 'to favour, to be of service to' (Vedic usage).

सर्वेश्वरेशिता तावत्पूर्वश्रुत्योपवर्णिता ।
यथा त्वज्ञस्य पारार्थ्यं तथेदानीं प्रपञ्च्यते ॥१७८२॥

As regards the mastery of the ruler of all, it is declared in (lit) the earlier Śruti;¹ now, in the same way is explained at length the subservient character of an ignorant man. [1782]

¹Cf. BU 1.4.10; BUBV 1571ff.

अज्ञातात्मा ह्यविद्योत्थसंघातो देहलिङ्गवान् ।
आत्मलोकाभिधानाभ्यां देहान्तो ऽत्राभिधीयते ॥१७८३॥

This one, who has not known the true nature of the Ātman, who is a conglomeration which has arisen from ignorance and is, as such, possessed of a (gross) body and a subtle (body), and is inside all these bodies, is mentioned here by the two names Ātman and *loka*. [1783]

यागादिकार्यं देवादेर्देहलिङ्गद्वयादृते ।
नान्यथा युज्यते यस्मादतस्तद्वानिहोच्यते ॥१७८४॥

Since the performance of action such as a sacrifice etc. cannot be extended unto the gods except with the two bodies, gross and subtle, therefore, here is mentioned here¹ the one who is possessed of that². [1784]

¹That is, in the sense *atho ayam vā*.

²This refers to *dehalingadvaya*.

कर्मणानार्जितो यस्मान्न कश्चिदुपकारकृत् ।
गृही देवादिभिस्तस्मादार्जितो ऽभूत्स्वकर्मभिः ॥१७८५॥

Since no householder that renders service (to gods and others)¹ is obtained by gods and others, unless he is obtained² by (his earlier) ritual performance, therefore (the sacrificer) came to exist by his own performances. [1785]

This points out: *aśeṣaprāṇikamārjito dehadvayavān eva sarvabhogasyatayā lokādiśabdārthaḥ* (SP).

¹That is, a sacrificer, others refer to the *pitṛs* and the *ṛṣis*.

²That is, he has come to exist as a human being possessing a gross body (after he possesses) a subtle body.

देवादयो ऽपि गृहिणा तद्वदेव स्वकर्मभिः ।
आर्जिता एव विज्ञेयास्तन्निमित्तफलेक्षणात् ॥१७८६॥

And gods and others also are obtained¹ by a householder in the same way; i.e. by his own performances; this should be known since there is noticed the result of that cause².

[1786]

¹*ārjitāḥ* = *ā-arjitāḥ*; *ā* is not absolutely necessary.

²That is, *svakarma*.

कर्त्रेह यत्कृतं कार्यं तद्भोगायावकल्पते ।
अकृताभ्यागमो यस्मात्कृतनाश्च नेष्यते ॥१७८७॥

Whatever action is performed by an agent, it results into his¹

enjoyment because it is not desired to accept what is not produced and the annulment of what is produced. [1787]

This explains the word *tannimittaphalakṣaṇāt* in the preceding verse.

¹It refers to gods, men.

कर्तृत्वं चास्याविद्यातो न स्वतः कर्तृतात्मनः ।
कर्तेव भोक्ताप्यज्ञः स्याद्विद्यायां द्वयमप्यसत् ॥१७८८॥

And, on the part of this (Ātman¹), the character of an agent (of some action) comes from ignorance; Ātman does not become an agent (of some action) on its own. This ignorant one is also the enjoyer², as he is an agent (of some action); but when there is knowledge (of the Brahman) both these³ are unreal. [1788]

¹This refers to *dehalingavān* mentioned in verse 1783 above.

²The enjoyer of pleasure and pain which are the result of his activities.

³It refers to *kartr̥tva* and *bhoktr̥tva*.

अभुक्तस्याप्युपात्तस्य ह्यविद्यापिहितात्मनाम् ।
आत्मयाथात्म्यविज्ञानात्कर्मणो ऽतः क्षयो भवेत् ॥१७८९॥

There is therefore the destruction of ritual activity in the case of them who are wrapped in ignorance — even of that activity which one has performed and whose fruit one has not enjoyed by (one's having acquired) the knowledge of the true nature of the Self. [1789]

This answers away a stand taken on a Smṛti passage *nābhuktam kṣīyate karma kalpakośitair api* [a variant in line no. 2200 (in app. 1, no. 16) under *Mahābhārata* 13.37.17-19 in Poona critical ed.].

सर्वं सर्वस्य कार्यम् स्यात्सर्वं सर्वस्य कारणम् ।
असंहतं मिथो नालं जडं वस्तु प्रवर्तितुम् ॥१७९०॥

All can be (related to) all as the effect, all can be (related to) all as the cause; no non-sentient things can perform activity unless they are mutually combined. [1790]

The Sāṃkhya idea of *saṃghāta-parārthatva* may be noted here. The NKL edition reads text as *sarvaḥ sarvasya ... syāt, sarvaḥ sarvasya kāraṇam ...* but this does not make specific difference in interpretation. However the reading in AnSS edition may be preferred, because of the reference to *jaḍa vastu* in the second half.

सर्वः सर्वस्य भोक्तैव चित्प्राधान्यविवक्षया ।
बाह्योपरक्तबुद्धीनां भोगश्चिदवसानता ॥१७९१॥

All beings are enjoyers of all (other) beings and things, since there is a desire (on the part of the Śruti) to point out the principal significance of the sentience. (And) an enjoyment of those, the knowledge about whom is tinted with that notion of (them as) external and ends in (their acceptance by) sentience. [1791]

मधुब्राह्मणविद्यायामिदमेव प्रवक्ष्यते ।
वस्तुवैकात्म्यप्रसिद्ध्यर्थं प्राधान्यातियत्नतः ॥१७९२॥

In the lore of the Madhu Brāhmaṇa this very thing will be stated in order carefully to establish the uniqueness of the (real) thing as the principal (in significance). [1792]

एवं सत्ययमात्मेति संहतो जगदात्मना ।
लोको भोज्यः पशुर्ज्ञेयो देवादेरुपकारकः ॥१७९३॥

This being so, the statement *ayam ātmā ...* means that the entire conglomeration of the world is an object of enjoyment by the Lord of the universe and it is (to be considered) an animal subservient to gods and others. [1793]

देवादिभिरुपात्तो ऽयमित्येतद्गम्यते कृतः ।
अस्यार्थस्य प्रसिद्ध्यर्थं स यदित्यादि भण्यते ॥१७९४॥

[Now follows in verses 1794 -1799 the explanation of *sa yaj juhoti*.]

(A question may be asked:) How is it understood that this¹ is taken up by gods and others (for enjoyment)? In order to establish this matter, it is said *sa yad* ... [1794]

In verse 1792 above, reference was made to a passage in the Madhu Brāhmaṇa so that one compares the thought of this Brāhmaṇa with one in that Brāhmaṇa; but here is adduced a statement from the Brāhmaṇa itself, viz. *sa yaj juhoti* ...

¹This refers to *ātmā lokah* in verse 1783.

यो देवतां समुद्दिश्य द्रव्यत्यागः स उच्यते ।
याग आसेचनाधिक्याद्धोमाख्यः स्यात्स एव तु ॥१७९५॥

That which is being given away as sacrificial material intended for a deity is called *yāga*; but the same is known by the name *homa* when there is more of pouring (into the fire) etc. [1795]

yāga is merely giving and may be connected with all objects, *homa* seems to refer to what is liquid and poured into the fire.

लोकत्वस्य विधेयत्वाद्यज्जुहोतीत्यनुद्यते ।
नानूक्तिं केचिदिच्छन्ति देवाद्यार्जितसिद्धये ॥१७९६॥

The words *yaj juhoti* ... are an Arthavāda, since the state of being a *loka* is to be effected by this (performance). (Yet) some¹ do not accept (lit. desire) Anuvāda for the sake of establishing that (the result of the sacrifice) is what is acquired by gods and others.² [1796]

¹This refers to Bhartṛprapañca and his followers.

²Add: through the performance.

नावश्यकार्यता चैषां सिद्धातो ऽन्यत्र मानतः ।
नित्यत्वाद्धेतुवचनं न युक्त्यातो ऽवगम्यते ॥१७९७॥
यच्चाप्यहरहर्वेदमनुब्रूते प्रयत्नवान् ।

ऋषीणां तेन लोको ऽयं गृहस्थो भोज्य उच्यते ॥१७९८॥

(The answer to this is:) These do not have to be performed necessarily since they are obtained from (i.e. heard¹) elsewhere as obligatory; therefore there is no statement of them as the cause is under- stood by reasoning [1797]

and that a person, making every effort, repeats the Veda day after day² (and therefore) thereby are expressed the *loka* of the *ṛṣis* and the householder as an object of enjoyment.³

[1798]

The verse 1798 explains *yad anubrūte tena ṛṣīṇām*.

¹Cp. *Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa* 5.2.2.1, also CU 8.15.1: *sa khalv evaṃ vartayan yāvadāyusaṃ brahmalokaṃ sampadyate*.

²This refers to the recitation of the Brahma-yajña formula, it is for the repayment of the debt to the *ṛṣis*. This explains 'and others' in verse 1796.

³*bhojya* explains *loka*.

उत्तरेष्वपि वाक्येषु समाना योजनेक्ष्यताम् ।

अक्षराणां न तत्रास्ति वस्तु किञ्चित्तिरोहितम् ॥१७९९॥

In the subsequent sentences (of the Śruti) also should be accepted (lit. seen) similar employment¹. There is not any thing² kept concealed in the Vedic texts (lit. letters). [1799]

There is no other purport in those words. One cannot doubt that it is so. This has reference to the Śruti *yat pitṛbhyaḥ ...*; again to justify 'and others'.

¹Supply: of words. That is, the use of the words in the same sense.

²Namely, other import.

यस्मात्सर्वाणि भूतानि सर्वदोपकरोत्ययम् ।

अविनाशमतस्तानि तस्येच्छन्त्यात्मदेहवत् ॥१८००॥

[Verses 1800-1805 are an explanation of *yathā ha vai svāya lokāya ...*]

Since this¹ (person) ever renders service to all beings and the elements; therefore, they wish for him non-destruction like that of their own bodies. [1800]

The idea is that of give-and-take between men and gods and others — all is indicative of *avidyājanitavyavahāra*.

¹It refers to sacrificer.

स्वकर्माजितसंभोगदायित्वे ऽस्ति न कश्चन ।
देवादीनां विशेषो ऽत्र गृहस्थस्वात्मदेहयोः ॥१८०१॥

There is not any particular distinction (or speciality) among gods and others in respect of bodies of their own and those of the sacrificers, with regard to granting (i.e. producing) whichever enjoyment is obtained by their own activities. [1801]

This justifies the word *svadehavat* in the preceding verse.

ब्रह्मविद्याहुताशेन विनाशो ऽस्याप्यकर्तृता ।
अयं नाशो महानस्य ह्यन्यः शक्यश्चिकित्सितुम् ॥१८०२॥

The destruction of this one (viz. the sacrificer) by fire in the form of the lore of the Brahman is also (of the nature of) his becoming a non-agent (of any activity); this destruction of this (sacrifice) is indeed great; any other (destrunction) can be thought of (as curable). [1802]

अतः श्रुतिवचो न्याय्यं तस्मादेषामितीरितम् ।
मा भूत्सर्वस्वहानिर्नो ब्रह्मयाथात्म्यविद्यया ॥१८०३॥

Therefore is declared the statement in the Śruti, (and) that is justifiable, viz. *tasmād eṣām* ...; (this is intended to convey:) Let there not be the loss of all of his (means etc.) by (or through) the acquisition of the lore of the knowledge of the true nature of the Brahman. [1803]

This explains why gods protect the sacrificer, as understood in

the preceding verse.

अवश्यमृणवत्कृत्यं यावज्जीवादिवाक्यतः ।
यथोक्तं विदितं वेदे तथा स्मृतिवचःसु च ॥१८०४॥

[Verses 1804-1805 explain the sentence *tad vā etad viditam mīmāṃsitam*.]

Certainly it is understood from the sentence *yāvajjīva* ... etc. that there is invariably (ritual) activity (of a human being) who is indebted (to gods and others), as known in the statement of the Veda and also in the statements of the Smṛtis. [1804]

This refers to the statement of what are called the five great sacrifices which a householder is required to perform every day. Refer to SP and NKL for the Śruti and the Smṛti and SP for the sentences from *Gītā*

अवदानविधौ तच्च विशेषेण विचारितम् ।
ऋणं हेत्यर्थवादिषु तस्मात्कुर्याद्यथोदितम् ॥१८०५॥

And that is discussed in relation to the injunction regarding cutting of oblations at a sacrifice (and) in the supplementary repetitive statements like *ṛṇam ha* ...; therefore one should do what is told.¹ [1805]

tad vā etad viditam is explained in verse 1804 and *mīmāṃsitam* in verse 1805. NKL gives a short and yet clear explanation; SP brings out at length the notion of *Mīmāṃsā*.

¹In the context of the injunction, the statement *jāyamāno vai brāhmaṇaḥ* ... is a supplementary statement. Refer to *Taittirīya Saṃhitā* 6.3.10.5.

Now follows up to the end, i.e. verse 1853, the explanation of BU 1.4.17.

प्रवृत्तौ च निवृत्तौ च यथोक्तस्याधिकारिणः ।
स्वातन्त्र्ये सति संसारसृत्तौ कस्मात्प्रवर्तते ॥१८०६॥

In the case of a person who is eligible, as stated (before), there is freedom¹ in respect of both undertaking (an activity) and keeping from (it); then, why is it that he begins to act in this transmigratory world?² [1806]

This explains *ātmaivedam* ... (BU 1.4.17).

¹This refers to the capacity either to perform an activity or to keep from it.

²That is, how does he undertake the performance of ritual activity?

न तु विध्वस्तनिःशेषसंसारानर्थवर्त्तमानि ।
निर्वृत्तिलक्षणे वाच्यं केनायं प्रेर्यते ऽवशः ॥१८०७॥

But, it should not be asked: By whom or what he, the helpless one, is incited to take to the path where the entire mass of undesirable things of the transmigratory world are destroyed, viz. that which is called keeping from activity? [1807]

This is complementary to the preceding verse, in the form of a question. This sets aside the notion of one's natural inclination towards the path of keeping from activity.

¹The AnSS edition has *preryate vaśaḥ*, a wrong reading. NKL reads correctly — supported by SP's paraphrase *paratantravat*. We have adopted it.

रक्षन्ति ननु देवास्तं न विशिष्टाधिकारिणम् ।
ते ऽपि रक्षन्ति यत्नेन न च सामान्यमानुषम् ॥१८०८॥

But, (it may be argued,) gods protect him (viz. the human being) and not the one with some special eligibility¹ and, further, they do so with (special) care; (the answer is:) (But) not any common being. [1808]

This is in answer to the question in verse 1806 above. The first three lines are expressive of a doubt; the fourth, of the answer.

अन्यथा कृतनाशः स्यादकृताभ्यागमस्तथा ।
सामान्यनररक्षायां तस्मादेतदनुत्तरम् ॥१८०९॥

If it were otherwise, that would mean annulment of what is performed and acceptance of what is not performed. Therefore, this¹ is well said, namely, it is for the protection of any common being. [1809]

The idea is: If performance etc. were meant only for a Brahma-cārin, that should mean his performance secured the protection for himself and there was no need of gods' help. These two are *kṛtanāśa* and *akṛtabhyāgama* respectively. That means: They expect even a common man to perform rituals.

¹Namely, gods protect all men alike.

नाप्यविद्येति वक्तव्यं तस्या ध्वान्तैकमात्रतः ।
मिथ्याधीमात्रहेतुत्वात्प्रेरकत्वं न युक्तिमत् ॥१८१०॥

Also it should not be said that it is ignorance (which incites a person to activity), since it is only (of the nature of) darkness (i.e. ignorance). And it is caused by only false knowledge and therefore its capacity to incite (a human being to activity) is not reasonable. [1810]

अनर्थपरिपाकत्वमपि जानन्प्रवर्तते ।
पारतन्त्र्यमृते दृष्टा प्रवृत्तिर्नेदृशी क्वचित् ॥१८११॥

(It might be said:) A person proceeds (to perform ritual activity) knowing (full) well (*api*) that it has the undesirable as its results (and this he does) even without his dependence (on any other); (it has to be observed that) such an activity is nowhere seen. [1811]

तस्माच्छ्रेयोर्थिनः पुंसः प्रेरको ऽनिष्टकर्मणि ।
वक्तव्यस्तन्निरासार्थमित्यर्था स्यात्परा श्रुतिः ॥१८१२॥

Therefore (it is argued), it is to be pointed out as to who incites to undesirable activity a person who desires for bliss.

In order to answer away that, therefore, there follows the subsequent Śruti¹. [1812]

¹Namely, that one which incites a person to act.

प्राप्ताशेषपुमर्थो ऽयं स्वत एवेह मानवः ।
निरस्ताशेषानर्थश्च तन्मोहाद्विपरीतधीः ॥१८१३॥
अनाप्तपुरुषार्थो ऽयं निःशेषानर्थसंकलः ।
इत्यकामयतानाप्तान्पुमर्थान्साधनैर्जडः ॥१८१४॥

Here (i.e. in this world) a man, who has by himself secured the fulfilment of the entire ends of human endeavour, who has completely removed all the undesirables, and who has, therefore, contrary knowledge¹, because of infatuation (i.e. ignorance), [1813]

and who has not obtained any ends of human endeavour, is affected by all the undesirables, and therefore, the fool, desires to secure by those means the ends of (human) endeavour which were not secured. [1814]

These verses explain how a man comes to have desire that leads him towards activity, and also wrong knowledge.

¹Or, wrong knowledge.

जिहासति तथानर्थानविद्वानात्मनि श्रितान् ।
अविद्योद्धूतकामः सन्नथो खल्विति च श्रुतिः ॥१८१५॥

And, consequently (*tathā*), not knowing all those undesirables which have resorted to his inner self, he wishes to throw them away; therefore there is the Śruti statement *atho khalv...*¹[1815]

¹*atho khalv āhuḥ kāmamaya evāyam puruṣaḥ* (BU 4.4.5).

अकामतः क्रिया काचिद्दृश्यते नेह कस्यचित् ।
यद्यद्वि कुरुते किञ्चित्तत्तत्कामस्य चेष्टितम् ॥१८१६॥

Now in the case of anyone is noticed any activity (which has proceeded) from absence of desire; for, whatever little (also)

he does is all of it the result (lit. activity) of desire. [1816]

Cf. *Manusmṛti* 2.4 with some differences; *akāmasya ... karhicit*.

काम एष क्रोध एष इत्यादिवचनं स्मृतेः ।
प्रवर्तको नापरो ऽतः कामादित्यवसीयते ॥१८१७॥

This is desire, this is anger etc. are the statement(s) by (lit. of) the Smṛti(s); therefore, it is understood (lit. concluded) that none else than desire incites (a human being to activity).

[1817]

This is *Gītā* 3.37.

Verses 1818-1839 explain the meaning of 'ātmaivedam agra āsīd eka eva'.

प्राग्दाराद्यभिसंबन्धादेकाकयेव पुमानभूत् ।
ऊर्ध्वं दारादिसंबन्धात्पुत्रपौत्रादिसंयुतेः ॥१८१८॥
विस्तारितकुटुम्बं तं कस्मैचित्कश्चिदन्तिके ।
व्याचष्टे कामसंभूतं पुत्रपौत्रादिविस्तरम् ॥१८१९॥

Man was all alone before he had taken a wife because later he was connected, through his relation to (his) wife and others, with a son, grandson and others. Him, who had (thus) extended his family, someone described to someone else as influenced by desire and having an extension (of his family in) sons, grandsons and others. [1818-1819]

प्राग्दारोद्वहनात्कृत्स्नं कुटुम्बं यत्प्रपश्यसि ।
आत्मैवैकः पुमानासीन्नासौत्पुत्रादि किञ्चन ॥१८२०॥
आत्मप्रत्ययनिर्ग्राह्यं केवलं प्राग्भूदिदम् ।
पुत्रपौत्रादिसंभिन्नं कुटुम्बं यत्प्रपश्यसि ॥१८२१॥

Whatever family you see (of a man) was all, before he took a wife, only one single man; not anyone like a son etc. was there. [1820]

Whatever you now see, viz. a family, made up of by sons,

grandsons etc., was formerly just a single (person) to be taken only in the form of the consciousness (of him). [1821]

कामाद्यशेषबीजात्माप्रज्ञातात्मैकतत्त्वकः ।

सो ऽतिग्रहग्रहाविष्टो विपरीतार्थनिश्चयः ॥१८२२॥

He (was then) one who was of the nature of the seed (i.e. origin) of desires etc., who had not known the true nature of the inner self, who was possessed by goblins with the great goblin of desire (as the preeminent among them), and who had decided (finally) the objects to be otherwise. [1822]

This explains the meaning of *saḥ* in *so 'kāmayata*.

¹That is to say: He did not know them in their true nature.

स्वतः कृत्स्नो ऽप्यसंबोधादकृत्स्नो विपरीतधीः ।

तृष्णया प्रहितो बालः सो ऽकामयत मानवः ॥१८२३॥

कर्माधिकारेहेतुर्मे जाया स्यात्कर्मसाधनम् ।

पूर्वपूर्वस्य हेतुत्वमथशब्दैरिहोच्यते ॥१८२४॥

Complete though he himself was; he was (yet) incomplete because he did not have the knowledge (of the nature of the inner self), and who had a knowledge that was otherwise (than truth), he was impelled by desire (lit. thirst), the ignorant human being, and entertained desires: [1823]

Let me have a wife, the basis (lit. cause) of eligibility to perform (any ritual) activity and (also) a helping hand (lit. means) in the activity. Each preceding (among these) has the nature of the cause (of every subsequent) — that is here mentioned by (the repetition of) ¹ the word *atha*. [1824]

¹This is the force of the plural form *athaśabdaiḥ*.

अथ प्रजात्मना तस्यां जायेय स्थास्नुकर्मणे ।

स पुत्रेणैवेति वचस्तथा च श्रूयते स्फुटम् ॥१८२५॥

(Then he thought,) 'Let me be born from her in the form of an offspring for (the performance of) the ever staying (ritual)

activity.' For (ca), a statement is clearly heard (in the Śruti)
*sa putreṇaiva ...*¹ [1825]

¹*sa putreṇaivāsmiṇ loka pratitiṣṭhati* (BU 1.5.17).

दैवमानुषवित्तेन संपन्नो ऽहमथोत्तरम् ।
 कर्म कुर्यां यथाप्राप्तं दृष्टादृष्टार्थसिद्धये ॥१८२६॥

Now, subsequently, I have become rich with all wealth, divine and human, let me (now) perform (ritual) activity, as comes to me in a matter of course in order that I acquire both the seen and the unseen fruit.' [1826]

एतावानेव कामो ऽस्य नातो ऽन्यो ऽर्थो ऽवशिष्यते ।
 साध्यसाधनरूपे हि द्वे एवात्रैषणे यतः ॥१८२७॥

Only this much¹ is his desire; therefore, there remains for him no other object of desire (to be acquired), since, in this his desire, he has only two (things), viz. what is to be accomplished and what can accomplish that (for him). [1827]

¹This emphasises or points to the sacrificer's having a son etc. as the certain means to the acquisition of the three *lokas*: of men, of gods and of *pitrs*.

एषणे एव चाप्येते साध्यसाधनकल्पिते ।
 पुमर्थस्यानवसितेरैकात्म्याप्रसिद्धितः ॥१८२८॥

And these two desires are thought of only in the form of what is to be accomplished and what accomplishes that; for, there is no complete accomplishing of the ends of human endeavour owing to (his) not having a acquired (or known) the uniqueness of the Ātman. [1828]

This asserts the inutility of having a son etc. in respect of the final goal of life, viz. liberation.

लाकत्रयासंगृहीतेरेतावानिति दुर्घटम् ॥१८२९॥

Since wife and others are of the nature of the means of accomplishing a man's ritual activity, therefore there is no acquisition of the ends of (human) endeavour (through them) and (it might be argued:) Since there is no inclusion of the three worlds (in the expression of the desires by the man), (the word) *etāvan* is (really) difficult to construe. [1829]

न लोकत्रयसाध्यस्य साधनैकव्यपाश्रयात् ।
आक्षिप्तसाध्यं साध्यत्वादितरत्कर्मसाधनम् ॥१८३०॥
लोकत्रयफलं यस्मादुत्पत्त्याद्यात्मकं मतम् ।
कर्मानाक्षिप्य नात्मानं तच्चापि लभते स्वतः ॥१८३१॥

(The answer is:) No. (This is not so), since what is to be accomplished, viz. the three worlds, depends only on the means of accomplishing (the same); since that is to be accomplished, as implied by dependence on the means; (and) that other is a means;¹ [1830]
since it is held that the fruit, viz. the three worlds, is of the nature of what is produced etc.², (and) that (fruit) also will not come into being, on its own, without implying (=depending on) activity. [1831]

¹AnSS edition reads: *itarat karmasāadhanam*, while NKL edition reads *itarat karma sāadhanam*. The idea is: Having a son etc. are the means to the performance of ritual activity and that implies the three *lokas* to be accomplished thereby *necessarily*.

²That is, *utpatti*, *āpti*, *samskṛti* and *vikṛti*.

समाप्तिः कर्मणो नापि लोकत्रयफलादृते ।
अन्तर्णीतफलं तस्मादिह साधनमुच्यते ॥१८३२॥

Completion of (ritual) activity also cannot be said to have been there unless (there has resulted) the fruit in the form of the three worlds; as such, in this connection,¹ the means

Cf. *ākṣiptasādhya* in verse 1830 above.

¹Reference is made to *lokavyavahāra*.

एषणैकैव तेनेयमुत्तरत्राभिधास्यते ॥१८३३॥
अर्थात्साध्याभिधानं स्यात्साधनाभिहितौ यथा ।
भोजने ऽभिहिते पुंसो ह्यर्थात्तृप्तिः प्रतीयते ॥१८३४॥

Therefore, only one desire will be expressed in the subsequent portion. [1833]

Evidently then there would be the mention (i.e. understanding) of what is to be accomplished, even when there is mention made of the means of accomplishing that; this is as when mention is made of a man's taking meals and which implies that there is satisfaction of (the human being) from the object (of desire, viz. food). [1834]

साध्यसाधनरूपे द्वे एषणे काम उच्यते ।
अयथावस्तुरूपत्वादात्माज्ञानैकहेतुके ॥१८३५॥

These two desires, which have the form of what is to be accomplished and what accomplishes that, are called 'desire', since they are of the nature of what is not Reality and are having only ignorance about (the nature of) the Ātman as their cause (i.e. origin). [1835]

This has a reference to *ubhe hyete eṣaṇe eva* (BU 4.4.22).

विश्वासो ऽतो ऽत्र विदुषा न कार्यः स्वप्नलाभवत् ।
व्युत्थायैवैषणाभ्यो ऽतः प्रत्यग्ज्ञानं समाश्रयेत् ॥१८३६॥

Therefore, a learned man should not trust in (i.e. depend on) this¹ as in some profit (or gain) in a dream. Therefore, having risen above all (kinds of) desire, (a person) should take recourse to the knowledge of the inner self. [1836]

¹Namely, *sādhya* and *sādhana*, both called *kāma*.

इच्छन्पि यतो नातो भयो विन्देदतो ऽधिकम् ।

तस्मादविद्याभूमिष्ठः कृत्स्न एतावता भवेत् ॥१८३७॥

Since, even desiring, he would not secure any more fruit than this (viz. the three worlds); therefore, resting on ignorance, he would be complete by this much.¹ [1837]

This explains *necchanś ca na ato bhūyān vindet ... eva tāvan manyate*.

¹The magnitude of the three worlds is smaller than the extense of the Brahman; yet he would consider himself to be complete in all respects. Cf. verse 1839 below.

एकैकमपि जायादेर्यावन्नाप्नोति पुरुषः ।
अकृत्स्नस्तावदस्मीति जडः संभावयत्ययम् ॥१८३८॥

So long as a man does not obtain even one of wife and others (viz. son, grandson, wealth etc.),¹ he, the fool, considers himself as incomplete! [1838]

¹See verse 1840 below.

यावदेते यथोद्दिष्टा आप्ताः स्युः कामपूर्वकाः ।
कृत्स्नो ऽस्मीति तदात्मानं संभावयति मानवः ॥१८३९॥

(But) when these, as enumerated before, are obtained (after they were) desired (by him), this human being considers himself to have been complete. [1839]

Now follows the explanation of 'mana evāsyātmā'.

आत्मजायाप्रजावित्तविद्याभिः पञ्चभिः कृतम् ।
कर्म पाङ्क्तं भवेदेवं पाङ्क्तेन च्छन्दसा मितम् ॥१८४०॥

An activity, done by a person himself, his wife, his offsprings, with his wealth, his knowledge (of the world), i.e. by or with these five, becomes Pāṅkta, since it is (i.e. can be) compared (*mita*) with the metre Pāṅkti. [1840]

Pāṅkti is a Vedic *chandas* 'metre' which contains lines of five letters each. Therefore, mere similarity of the number five leads to this statement. The Upaniṣad calls *karman* also as Pāṅkta like the metre. This is one of the Brāhmaṇical tendencies to establish fanciful equation. (This is known as *bandhutā* philosophy of the Brāhmaṇa texts.)

बाह्यस्य कर्मणस्तावदात्माद्यैः पाङ्क्ततोदिता ।
तेष्वसत्स्वथ पाङ्क्तत्वमुच्यते ऽध्यात्मकर्मणः ॥१८४१॥

To begin with, it was mentioned that the external activity¹ of the person himself and others² is Pāṅkta. Then, in their absence, there is a statement made of the Pāṅkta character of what is done within the body (*adhyātma*).³ [1841]

This explains *mana evāśya*.

¹This singular signifies plural; therefore, there is reference to all external activities. By 'external' is meant the physical movements of the various agents.

²Cf. *ātmajāyāprajāvittavidyābhiḥ pañcabhiḥ* in the preceding verse.

³This refers to the various internal activities — in a word, (called) *dhyāna*.

बाह्याध्यात्मिकभेदेन कर्मैतदुभयात्मकम् ।
पाङ्क्तं यथा तद्वति तथैतदभिधीयते ॥१८४२॥

Activity is of two types, (that is) differentiated as external and what is done within a body; now is explained as to how it (i.e. the twofold *karman*) becomes Pāṅkta. [1842]

अध्यात्मं मन एवात्मा तदायत्तत्वकारणात् ।
वाग्जायादिप्रवृत्तीनां यजमानवदेव तत् ॥१८४३॥

manas which rests in the body is the Ātman, since it depends on that; (and) that is, in the same way, related to the activities of speech, wife and others; (therefore, it is) like a sacrificer.

[1843]

वाक्च जायेति विज्ञेया तदधीनत्वकारणात् ।
यद्ध्यायतीह मनसा वाचा वक्ति तदेव हि ॥१८४४॥

And speech should be known as wife, for it depends on her; and *vāk* speaks indeed that which one thinks of in *manas*.¹

[1844]

This explains *vāk jāyā*.

¹This points out the dependence of speech on *manas*.

संप्रधार्य मनो वाचा मन्त्रलौकिकरूपया ।
अथ प्रस्पन्दते ऽत्यर्थं सा क्रिया प्राण उच्यते ॥१८४५॥

manas, after having decided (the nature of some object), proceeds to activity by speech in the form of Mantras and worldly talk (only) profusely; therefore, that activity (of *manas*) is called *Prāṇa*.

[1845]

Cf. NKL: *prāṇaśabdena kriyocyate* and SP: *ubhayanirvārtiyā ceṣṭā prāṇaḥ* [*ubhaya* = *vāk* and *manas*]. Also, see the next verse.

आगमार्थं विनिश्चित्य मनसाथ प्रवर्तते ।
प्राणः प्रजेति तां चेष्टां प्राहुर्वेदविदो जनाः ॥१८४६॥

Prāṇa becomes active after *manas* has decided the meaning of what is heard;¹ therefore the persons, who know the Veda, describe that activity in words: *prāṇa* is *prajā*.

[1846]

This explains the purport of *prāṇaḥ prajā*.

¹Or, the Vedic text; traditional text.

द्विधैवाध्यात्मिकं वित्तं कार्यभेदात्प्रचक्षते ।
दैवमानुषताप्यस्य साधनत्वोपचारतः ॥१८४७॥

They describe the wealth which is dependent on the body as twofold on account of (two) distinct purposes (served by it);¹ and its nature as divine and human is also metaphorically

(so expressed) because of its being the means (towards them).²

[1847]

¹NKL explains: *cakṣuṣā rūpadhīḥ śrotreṇa śabdadhīḥ— iti kārya-bhedāt.*

²This is explained in the next two verses.

परीक्ष्य चक्षुषा यस्माल्लभते गोधनादिकम् ।
चक्षुः स्यान्मानुषं वित्तं यथायुर्घृतमुच्यते ॥१८४८॥

Since a person gets a cow and (other) wealth (only) after well examining (it) with the eye, therefore, (a human) eye is called human wealth, this is in the same way as ghee is called life.

[1848]

This is the explanation of *cakṣur mānuṣam*.

Ghee brings richness to man's life; therefore, the common man says 'ghee is life.' In the same way, the eye sees the nature of the wealth and later on the man gets it. Therefore, they say that the eye is the human wealth.

दैवभावाप्तितो दैवं ज्ञानं वित्तमिहोच्यते ।
तत्साधनत्वाच्छ्रोत्रस्य श्रोत्रमाध्यात्मिकं धनं ॥१८४९॥

On account of one's acquiring the nature of a divine being, one's knowledge about the divine world is called (in this context) wealth; and because it has the ear as the means (of securing it); therefore, the ear is called divine wealth (which is resting in the body).

[1849]

This explains *śrotram daivam*.

बाह्यवागादिचेष्टा च या चान्तःकरणाश्रया ।
देहे ऽभिव्यज्यते यस्मादात्मा कर्म ततो भवेत् ॥१८५०॥

And since whatever activity of external organ as speech etc., that rests on the internal organ, reveals itself in the body,

and is therefore called Ātman; from that proceeds activity.
[1850]

This is the explanation of *ātmaiva*.

संमितः संख्यया पादैः पाङ्क्तस्य च्छन्दसो यतः ।
पाङ्क्तो यज्ञस्ततः सद्भिः सर्वदा समुदाहृतः ॥१८५१॥

Since (the sacrifice) is comparable in number with the *pādas* 'feet' of the metre, it is ever called by the wise as Pāṅkta.
[1851]

Cf. verse 1840 above.

तत्कार्यत्वात्पशुः पाङ्क्तो यच्च किञ्चिच्चराचरम् ।
तच्चापि पञ्चभूतोत्थं विद्यात्पाङ्क्तमशेषतः ॥१८५२॥

Also the animal (of the sacrifice), being related to that as its object (and) whatever is movable and immovable — all that which has arisen from the five elements — the whole of it is Pāṅkta.
[1852]

पाङ्क्तकर्मात्मको यज्ञो यज्ञकार्यमिदं जगत् ।
एतद्याथात्म्यतो ज्ञात्वा तदेवाप्नोत्यशेषतः ॥१८५३॥

Sacrifice is of the nature of Pāṅkta activity and this world is the product of sacrifice; (therefore) having known this in its true nature, (a man) obtains that in its entirety.
[1853]

In verses 1851-1853 the text speaks of the sacrifice and its relation to bodily and other activities which are *sādhyasāadhanātmaka* and therefore rooted in *avidyā*. Another point to be noted is that the character of the sacrifice as Pāṅkta is related to both ritual and philosophical thought. This explains the name of this section *Puruṣavidha Brāhmaṇa*.

**BRHADĀRANYAKOPANIṢAD-
BHĀṢYA-VĀRTIKA**

1.5

Saptāṇna Brāhmaṇa

अथ योऽन्यामिति ग्रन्थादारभ्योरुप्रयत्नतः ।
अविद्यायाः समाम्नाता आ समाप्तेर्विभूतयः ॥१॥
अध्यायस्यात्र चाविद्वान्वर्णाद्यात्माभिमानवान् ।
धर्मेण नियतात्मा सञ्जुहोत्यादिस्वकर्मभिः ॥२॥
देवादिक्रिमिपर्यन्तं बिभर्ति जगदव्ययम् ।
एवमेव जगद्योनिरेकैकः कर्मकृन्नरः ॥३॥

Beginning with the statement *atha yo 'nyām*, there have been enumerated up to the end of this chapter, with great care,¹ various appearances² of ignorance. [1]

Also in this connection is understood³ one who is ignorant and has a regard for Varṇa etc., (and) being controlled in oneself by Dharma (religious duty) (and) performing one's own duties, viz. offering oblations etc., [2]

sustains, without perishing,⁴ this world, beginning with gods etc. and ending with insects. Just in this way, each sacrificer, a human being, becomes the creator of this world. [3]

In BUBV 1.1-2 the worship of some deity by a sacrificer and then his death are described first. Later, his being a sacrificer is said to be his becoming identical with the deity, viz. Agni=Prāṇa. In BUBV 1.3, the Udgīthagāna which a sacrificer sings in a sacrifice is raised to the highest level, i.e. it is said to be the most potential part of the sacrifice. And, in BUBV 1.4, the Performer is Himself described in terms of a human sacrificer. Thus, a slow change of process is noticed in the foregone chapters and now this chapter of *saptāṇna* 'seven foods' describes the initial sacrificer as a creator of food.

¹SP repeats *uruprayatna*, perhaps to mean 'with great effort'.

²Or alternatively, modifications.

³This has reference to BU 1.4.16.

⁴It is an adverb expressing 'without *vyaya*'.

कृत्स्नेन जगता यद्वत्कर्मकृत्समुपार्जितः ।
यथोक्तकर्मीभिस्तेन जगत्तद्वदुपार्जितम् ॥४॥
स्वदेहवद्यतो भुङ्क्त एकैकोऽनवशेषतः ।
साधारणानि वस्तूनि तथासाधारणान्यपि ॥५॥

As the (initial) performer of (sacrificial) activities (i.e. the Sūtrātman) was obtained¹ by the entire world (of human beings), in the same way was obtained this world by that,² through (the performance of) ritual activities as prescribed (in the Śāstras), [4]
since each (individual) enjoys (i.e. experiences) all common and also uncommon objects in the same way as (he does) his own body.³ [5]

¹That is, brought into existence.

²It means: *karmakṛt* 'the initial sacrificer'.

³The verse justifies the statement in verse 4. The body is obtained and experienced by an individual through his doings (in earlier life); in the same way, the experience of all worldly objects, without exception, is owing to his earlier doing (i.e. *karman*).

स्वकर्मणानुपात्तस्य न च भोगोऽत्र दृश्यते ।
एकैकेनोपकारित्वात्तस्माज्जगदुपार्जितम् ॥६॥

Here (i.e. in this world) is not seen any enjoyment of what is not obtained¹ by one's own performance (of duty); therefore each thing becoming helpful, the world is (described as) what is obtained (by each one through that). [6]

This verse also justifies the statement in verse 4.

For every enjoyment there needs to be an enjoyer. Things of the world are enjoyable and, therefore each human being is described here as an enjoyer or an obtainer.

There is a stress on one's making an effort (or undertaking an activity) in order that one deserves enjoyment. It is noticed that one cannot enjoy what another has obtained through effort. This stress has become necessary in view of what one might point out as an object of enjoyment for all, e.g. the sight of the milky way (*svarnadī*)— suggestion of NKL.

¹This refers to *bhogyā*.

स्वभावतोऽखिलं कर्म धर्माधर्मादिलक्षणम् ।
साधारणविशेषात्मफलमारभते द्विधा ॥७॥

Each (ritual act) is by its nature characterized as either Dharma or Adharma and it begins (lit. produces) twofold fruits of the nature of the general and the particular.¹ [7]

This verse justifies the word *svakarmanā* in the preceding verse.

¹The word 'general' refers to *adṛṣṭa* and the word 'particular' to such performance as leads to *dṛṣṭa*, viz. becoming rich or attaining to heaven. Or perhaps 'general' is what is shared by one in common with others and 'particular' is what one enjoys by oneself.

गुणप्रधानभावेन साधारणविशेषतः ।
सूत्रादेः कर्मणः कार्यं किम्यन्तस्याभिजायते ॥८॥

In the case of (the world of) beings, beginning with the Sūtra and ending with insects, there is produced the result of (each) activity which stands in the relation of the principal and the subordinate, being either general or particular (in nature). [8]

This verse justifies the word *miśra* as understood from *ādi* in the preceding verse. See note above.

द्रव्यादिदर्शनाधीनं फलं सर्वस्य कर्मणः ।
साधारणादिसंभेदभिन्नं तेन क्रियाफलम् ॥९॥

In the case of each activity (it is seen that) the result depends upon the material etc.¹ which is noticed (in the activity); therefore the result of (each) activity is characterized by a variety of the general etc.² [9]

¹This refers to *kriyā* etc.

²That is, the general or the particular or of mixed nature, as suggested by *ādi*— see the next verse.

NKL points out *svakalatradarśana* as an instance of particular nature and *nṛtyekṣaṇa* of general or common nature.

क्वचित्साधारणात्मैव तथासाधारणं क्वचित् ।
क्वचिच्चोभयथा कार्यं द्रव्यादीक्ष्णचित्रतः ॥१०॥

In some case, the result is of general nature; similarly, in some other case, of particular nature and, in yet some others, of both (i.e. of a mixed nature)— (this is so) on account of the various seeing (or view) of the material etc. [10]

समासव्यासतस्तस्माद्यथोक्तज्ञानकर्मभिः ।
एकैकेन जगत्कृत्स्नमुपात्तं भोगसिद्धये ॥११॥

Therefore each one (of the human beings) has obtained the entire world for the acquisition of pleasure by the knowledge and the activity (related to them), as already stated, either jointly by them or severally. [11]

सर्वः सर्वस्य कर्ता च कार्यं चापि यथा तथा ।
मधुविद्याप्रसङ्गेन विस्पष्टमभिधास्यते ॥१२॥

It will be clearly explained in the context of the lore of Madhu as to how (each one of) all (beings) is the agent and so also the effect of every (activity). [12]

This is to justify the *hetu hetumadbhāva* implied in the previous verse.

यदजीजनत्फलं कर्ता स्वकर्मज्ञानसाधनः ।
सप्तान्नप्रविभागेन तद्विभज्य प्रदर्श्यते ॥१३॥

Now is explained the varied result, divided in seven categories of food, namely that (result) which the agent, possessed of the means of his activity and knowing, produced (thereby).

[13]

SP supplies *dhyānārtham iti śeṣaḥ*. This means: for *upāsanā* (NKL). The word *dhyāna* or *upāsanā* becomes significant in relation to a few of the following verses.

Cf. the note by the editor of NKL: *svakarmādinā sṛṣṭasya jagataḥ saptadhā vibhaktasya sūtrātmakasya svātmanā dhyānaṃ sūtrabhāvaphalakaṃ vidhātum idam brāhmaṇam ity arthaḥ*.

त्रीण्यन्नानि फलं कर्तुश्चत्वार्यन्नानि यानि तु ।
प्रयोगसमवायित्वात्तानि स्युः कर्मसाधनम् ॥१४॥

The result (of the activity) of the agent, viz. three foods and those (others) which are four foods, all are together the means of (that individual's) activity, inseparably connected with the performance of ritual.

[14]

The seven foods that are under discussion are divided into two groups: (1) *manas*, *Vāk* and *Prāṇa* together form one group and these three do not become connected with actual performance, viz. ritual activity. (2) The commonly eaten food, *huta* (what is poured into the fire) and *prahuta* (what is offered outside the fire or on the hand of a priest)— these (two foods) are for gods and that food, which is given to animals, viz. milk form the other group. In respect of the first group, we cannot overlook that whatever is created was for the enjoyment of the

sacrificer (*sarvaṃ sarvasya bhogyam*).

So far are mentioned, or rather, enumerated, the seven foods which come from the *sūtragrantha*, viz. the enumerative verses in BU. Later, in BU 1.5.2ff. are explained the meanings of the Mantras in BU.

Verses 15-97 are the discussion of BU 1.5.2.

विज्ञानात्मा पिता तावन्न मनो न प्रजापतिः ।
अविशिष्टाधिकारित्वान्न विज्ञानात्मनोऽपरः ॥१५॥

To begin with (it is stated) that the individual self, (who possesses) knowledge, is the father (of the creation); not *manas*, not also Prajāpati.¹ (This is so) because (anything) else than the individual self, possessing knowledge, is not a specifically eligible performer. [15]

This explains the word *pitā* in *yat saptānnāni ... pitā* of BU.

¹Namely, Hiranyagarbha.

सिद्धितत्त्वान्मनसस्तथा व्यन्नात्मनः प्रभोः ।
साधारणात्मनः स्रष्टा नातः क्षेत्रज्ञतोऽपरः ॥१६॥

Since *manas* is what is contemplated for creation and also (*tathā*) (since Prajāpati is) the master, who is the common self and comprises three foods, there is not¹ a creator other than the individual self (lit. knower of the field). [16]

This is the reason for excluding *manas* and Hiranyagarbha as possible meaning(s) of *pitā*.

Though reference was made to *manas* as *siṣṛkṣita*, it should not be overlooked that Prajāpati also was a product produced by the Ātman; cf. *dvayor api sṛṣṭiniviṣṭatvena kāryakoṭiniviṣṭatā na kāraṇatvam ity arthaḥ* (SP).

¹That, iṣ, cannot be.

ग्रन्थार्थधारणाशक्तिर्मेधा यद्यपि भण्यते ।
तथापि ज्ञानमेवेह साधनत्वाद्विवक्षितम् ॥१७॥

Even if it is said (i.e. understood) that *medhā* (means) capacity to grasp (or, better perhaps, retain) the meaning of a work (studied); yet here, in this context, it is intended to express only knowledge, since it is a means (to ritual activity).¹ [17]

This verse explains the word *medhā* in the statement of BU: *medhayā 'janayat pitā*.

¹This is to exclude the lore of the Brahman which is opposed to common knowledge.

शास्त्रीयलौकिकज्ञानाविशेषग्रहसिद्धये ।
सामान्यज्ञानग्रहणं मेधयेत्यभिधित्सितम् ॥१८॥

By the use of the word *medhayā*, it is intended to express the grasping of common knowledge, (this is) with a view to establishing the non-distinction between knowledge acquired from the Śāstras and from the worldly (dealings). [18]

One may recall here how Śaṅkara has in his *Adhyāsabhāṣya* pointed to the similarity between worldly and Śāstric dealings.

This verse intends to avert the probable notion on the part of the reader of the Upaniṣad that the reference to knowledge has connection with *dhyāna* or *upāsanā* and that which was in the context (from the third Brāhmaṇa); cf. *jñānenājanayad ity ukte dhyānenaiveti prakaraṇānurodhī bhramah syāt tannivṛttyartham medhāgrahaṇam* (SP).

तपःशब्देन कृच्छ्रादि यदि नामाभिधीयते ।
तथापि कर्मग्रहणं सप्तान्नोद्धृतिहेतुतः ॥१९॥

Though indeed by the word *tapas* is expressed (an activity) such as *kṛcchra*,¹ even then (here) is to be understood an activity (in general), for it is the cause of production of the

sevenfold foods.

[19]

¹This refers to bodily mortification which can be for either penance or expiation of some wrong done by one.

धिया धियेति लिङ्गाच्च गृह्यते ज्ञानकर्मणी ।
मेधातपोगिरा नान्ये ग्राह्ये तदफलत्वतः ॥२०॥

Also, from the expression of the cause *dhiyā dhiyā* ... are understood knowledge and activity (viz. performance of the ritual); (therefore) by the (use of) the words *medhā* and *tapas*, are not to be understood two other meanings,¹ for they do not produce any result (lit. fruit).² [20]

This explains the reference to *dhī* in this very *kaṇḍikā*.

¹*medhā* means grasping, and *tapas* means practising penances.

²That is, they do not raise a sacrificer to the status of Prajāpati and are in no way responsible for the creation of the world.

पाङ्क्तं हि प्रकृतं कर्म वेदेति ज्ञानमेव च ।
विहाय नातः प्रकृतं युक्तोऽप्रकृतसंग्रहः ॥२१॥

Indeed what is in the context is the Pāṅkta (i.e. fivefold) activity; and knowledge is expressed by the word *veda* 'he knew'; therefore it is not proper to accept what is not in the context by setting aside what is in the context. [21]

This is the conclusion of the discussion of *medhā* and *tapas*. It emphasises that *dhī* and *karman* are, in this context, the meanings of the two words. SP points out that the usually accepted meanings of the two words would involve the faults of *prakṛtahāni* and *aprakṛtakalpanā*.

Also, this has reference to *eṣa pāṅkto yajñah ... ya evaṃ veda* (BI 1.4.17).

मेधातपोतिरेकेण नान्यत्स्यात्साधनं यतः ।

प्रसिद्धत्वादतो हीति व्याचष्टे श्रुतिरञ्जसा ॥२२॥

Since there is no means to ritual activity in addition to (i.e. beside) *medhā* and *tapas*, therefore the Śruti has clearly stated the words *ato hi*, for the two are known (means of activity).

[22]

This brings out the stress on the word *hi* in *medhayā hi tapasājanayat pitā*. Also, this serves to emphasise that *medhā* and *tapas*, thus understood, can result into one's agency in the act of creation (*sraṣṭṛtva*).

अस्य भोक्तृसमूहस्य साधारणमचीकलृपत् ।
एकमन्नं पिता सृष्ट्वा तच्चेदं यदिहाद्यते ॥२३॥

The father (of the creation or the world) intended one common food for this (entire) mass of enjoyers and, after creating that, (he created) this food which is what is eaten here (by all).

[23]

This refers to BU: *ekam asya ... miśraṃ hy etat*.

यदिदं प्राणिभिर्नित्यमद्यतेऽहरहस्तृषा ।
साधारणमिदं युक्तं सर्वभूतस्थितेस्ततः ॥२४॥

Since this (food) is ever eaten by (all) beings, day after day and with relish (lit. thirst), therefore this is properly (called) common (food for all beings) owing to the sustenance of all beings thereby.

[24]

स य एतदुपास्तेऽन्नमसाधारणरूपतः ।
पाप्मनो नैव स द्रष्टा व्यावर्तत इहातुरः ॥२५॥

He, who worships this (common) food, holding it as uncommon, cannot keep (lit. turn away) from (sin), since thus seeing, he is a weakling¹ in respect of this.²

[25]

This has a reference to BU 1.5.2: *sa ya etad upāste*.

¹The word *ātura* here means: a person who is weak in his understanding of 'the significance of food', since he uses the food only for himself. In other words, he does not hold it as food to be commonly shared.

²This is for *iha* in the sense of *annaviniyoga* (SP).

उपासनं च तात्पर्यमिह श्रुत्याभिधीयते ।
मोघमन्नमिति तथा मन्त्रे ताच्छील्यनिन्दनम् ॥२६॥

In this respect,¹ *upāsana* means 'being devoted (or attached) to that'²— thus it is said in the Śruti, viz. in the Mantra *mogham annam ...*³ and so also is there a censure of being attached to that.² [26]

The third line in this verse is metrically faulty; the sixth letter is short.

¹Cf. SP: *sādhāraṇam annam saptamyarthah* (i.e. *ihārthah*).

²*sādhāraṇam annam*.

³*Taittirīya Brāhmaṇa* 2.8.8: *mogham annam apracetāḥ satyam bravīmi vadha it sa tasya, nāryamāṇam puṣyati no sakhāyam kevalāgho bhavati kevalādī*. This is an Arthavāda in respect of common food enjoyed by only one person who is the sacrificer.

In verses 29 to 38, there is a statement of *Bhārṭṛprapañca*'s explanation of *ekam asya sādhāraṇam* and its refutation as well.

वैश्वदेवं हि नामैतद्यदन्नमुपसाध्यते ।
नालमेतद्धि सर्वेषां पाप्मनां विनिवृत्तये ॥२७॥
इत्येवं केचिदिच्छन्ति तत्तु युक्त्या न युज्यते ।
अनूक्तेर्यदिदमिति सिद्धोऽर्थोऽनूद्यते यतः ॥२८॥
प्रात्यक्ष्यं न च तस्यास्ति शास्त्रमात्रप्रमाणतः ।
यथा सर्वात्तृवक्त्रान्तस्थस्य प्रत्यक्षता तथा ॥२९॥

'It is indeed meant that this (common) food is what is utilized

(*upasādhyate*) for (the performance of) Vaiśvadeva;¹ certainly, this (food) is not capable of removing (or warding off) all the sins', [27]

thus, do some² hold. But that does not get justified by any reason inasmuch as it is given without a basis in (the Śruti-) statement— thus, here is restatement of what is already established. [28]

And that food (used for Vaiśvadeva) is not directly perceptible as such, for it is (understood) only from Śāstra;³ (thus) it does not have that direct perceptibility which the food that enters into the mouths of all eaters has. [29]

This verse also has its third line metrically faulty; the sixth letter is short.

¹Vaiśvadeva is offering of oblations made to all gods by one before one's daily meals (i.e. both in the morning and in the evening). It is a compulsory (*nitya*) rite to be performed by a householder; cf. *Manusmṛti* 3.84-91 (verse 90 in particular).

²This refers to *Bhārṭṛprapañca*.

³Namely, *Manusmṛti*.

प्रतिप्राणि ममेदं स्यादभिलाषश्च दृश्यते ।
सर्वप्राण्यंशमिश्रत्वं ततोऽस्मिन्नवसीयते ॥३०॥

And it is noticed in the case of every being that there is a desire, 'May this (food) be mine'; therefore it is concluded that, in respect of this (food), there is the character of the share for all beings. [30]

This is Sureśvara's justification in respect of the commonly shared food. For this reason, that food also cannot be exception to what is called food and is enjoyed in common.

नात्मार्थं पाचयेदन्नमिति चापि स्मृतेर्वचः ।
तैर्दत्तानप्रदायैभ्यो यो भुङ्क्ते स्तेन एव सः ।
अन्नादे भ्रूणहा माष्टीत्यादीह वचनं स्मृतेः ॥३१॥

Also, there is a statement of a Smṛti, viz. 'One should not get food cooked for only oneself'¹; so also, there are such statements² from a Smṛti as 'He is indeed a robber who enjoys the foods from which he does not give to others...'³ (and) 'He transfers⁴ his sin to the eater of his food—the one who is the killer of a foetus.'⁵ [31]

Reference to various Smṛti sentences is for rejecting Bhartr-prapañca's view that *sādhāraṇa* food is Vaiśvadeva food, that is holding the *asādhāraṇa* food as *sādhāraṇa*.

¹SP supplies after *nātmārtham* ... *annam* three more *pādas*: *na vṛthā ghātayet paśum, na caikaḥ svayam aśnīyāt* and *vidhi-varjaṃ na nirvāpet*. Cp. *Rgveda* 10.117.6.

²*vacanam* stands for *vacanāni* (*jātāv ekavacanam*). *Manusmṛti* 3.105, 107 and 108. Cp. SP. This is understood from *ādi*.

³*Gītā* 3.13ab.

⁴*mārṣti* = *kṣipati* (NKL).

⁵*Manusmṛti* 8.317. SP however reads: *annādeḥ* ... *mārṣti anena abhiśaṃsati, stenah prayukto rājani yāvan nānṛtasamkaraḥ*. Also, it states: *vakṣyati hi variṣṭhabrahmatā ceha bhrūṇahety abhi-dhīyate*.

तस्यापि चान्तःपातित्वात्सर्वाद्यस्यैव युक्तिमान् ।
ग्रहस्तस्य गृहीतौ तु नास्यान्तःपातिता तथा ॥३२॥

Since that¹ also falls (i.e. is included) in (general food), understanding only of that which is eaten by all is proper (i.e. reasonable). As against this, if only that is understood, it is not included in (general food) in the same way.² [32]

This is one more reason in support of the author's view.

¹It means: the food for Vaiśvadeva.

²Read SP: *yathā sarvānnādye 'ntarbhūtaṃ vaiśvadevānnaṃ na tathā tasminn annāntaram ity arthaḥ*.

असृष्टाविनियोगत्वे प्राप्नुतस्तद्ग्रहे सति ।
सर्वप्राणिभिराद्यस्य तच्चानिष्टं प्रसज्यते ॥३३॥

If that¹ is understood (under reference to, or in connection with, that injunction), then there follow two faults: *asṛṣṭatva* 'not being created (by the father, viz. the sacrificer)', and *avinīyogatva* 'not being employed in the (relevant) ritual'. And that would invite the undesired contingency in respect of the food which is to be eaten by all beings. [33]

Yet another fault in the view of Bhartṛprapañca is introduced. This is further clarified in the next verse.

¹Namely, food for Vaiśvadeva.

अव्यावृत्तिश्च पाप्मभ्यो वैश्वदेवान्नसंग्रहे ।
न न्याय्यं वचनं तस्य शास्त्रमात्रव्यपाश्रयात् ॥३४॥

Also, not keeping from sins by accepting the food for Vaiśvadeva is not reasonable,¹ since that² has a basis merely in the Śāstra. [34]

This is yet further fault in the same view. The food for Vaiśvadeva is not eaten in ordinary way like any other *kāmya* 'what is desired' food.

¹It means: not in keeping with the teaching of the scriptures.

²This refers to the food for Vaiśvadeva.

अल्पीयःपापहानिश्च नापि शब्दात्प्रतीयते ।
न स पाप्मन इत्यस्मादश्रुता न च गृह्यते ॥३५॥

Also it is not understood from the word (viz. injunction regarding Vaiśvadeva) that there is the removal of (only) a small sin. And that is not understood from the statement *na sa pāpmanah* ... (for it is) not heard¹ there. [35]

¹SP understands this as the two faults: *śrutahāni* and

aśrutakalpanā.

सर्वाद्यान्नगृहीतौ तु हेतुर्गमक इष्यते ।
असाधारणकारित्वं तस्य साधारणात्मनः ॥३६॥

And (*tu*) there is accepted here an indication (of) the reason¹ for understanding (by *sādhāraṇa*) all eatable food; viz. that it has the capacity to render food of common nature into uncommon food. [36]

This explains the purposeful use in BU of the word *miśra*. The word would be purposeless, if one accepted the view of Bhartṛprapañca. In BU, *sādhāraṇa* food is described as of *miśra* character also; cf. *miśraṃ hy etat*. This description indicates that the food, which is not commonly shared, also brings sin to the eater of it.

¹Actually, the indication, the reason (used in apposition).

सर्वप्राणभृदन्नस्य तस्माद्ग्रहणमिष्यते ।
उक्तौ युक्तिबलादत्र नान्यस्येति विनिश्चितिः ॥३७॥

Therefore it is desired to understand (in this context, only) that food for (i.e. which is eaten by) all living beings. (Thus) on the strength of reasons (stated), here (in the Upaniṣad) the decision is: there cannot (be the acceptance) of any other (food). [37]

This is the author's concluding remark.

पापानिर्मोकहेतूक्तिर्मिश्रमित्यभिधीयते ।
सर्वार्थस्य हि पापाय यतोऽसाधारणीक्रिया ॥३८॥

(In the use of) the word *miśra* is stated the cause for the non-removal of sin; since rendering uncommon that food which is meant for all is (to point to its) resulting into sin. [38]

This is reaffirming how the word *miśra* in BU goes against Bhartṛprapañca's view.

प्रक्षेपोऽग्नौ हुतं विद्यात्तत्पूर्वं बलिकर्म च ।
प्रहुतं चेह विज्ञेयं ते देवेभ्यो ददौ पिता ॥३९॥

[Verses 39-45 explain the meaning of the words *dve devān abhājayat*.]

One should understand that the offering (of food) into the fire as *huta* and that every (offering of) ritual oblation is preceded by that (*huta*). Also *prahuta* is understood here as that which the father (viz. the sacrificer) gave to (i.e. intended for) the gods. [39]

देवेभ्योऽन्ने यतः प्रत्ते हुतप्रहुतलक्षणे ।
तानुद्दिश्य ततोऽद्यापि जुह्वति प्र च जुह्वति ॥४०॥

(And) since the two foods characterized as *huta* and *prahuta* were (in the yore) offered to the gods, therefore even today, they pour the oblation into the fire and also offer (some other outside the fire) intending (it) for them. [40]

This verse explains the word *tasmāt* in the Śruti.

यतः सूत्रपदे द्वित्वमविशेषेण चोदितम् ।
श्रौतस्मार्तविभागेन तत एतद्विकल्पितम् ॥४१॥
स्मार्तान्नानन्तरोक्तत्वात्स्मार्तत्वं स्याद्वयोस्तयोः ।
अग्निहोत्राभिसंबन्धात्स्यातां वा श्रुतिचोदिते ॥४२॥
मन्त्रे द्वित्वाविशिष्टत्वाद्धुतप्रहुतलक्षणे ।
श्रुत्यातस्ते विकल्प्येते श्रौते स्मार्ते हि तुल्यवत् ॥४३॥

[Here is now stated the purport of the Śruti statement *atho āhuḥ*. This is to explain the twofold mention of *juhvati* and *prajuhvati* in the previous verse.]

Since the twofold character (of oblations) is stated (lit. enjoined) in the Sūtra (i.e. in the Śruti-Mantra) without any specification,¹ therefore they are subjected to option viz. in the division: the Śrauta and the Smārta.² [41]

The two (foods *huta* and *prahuta* mentioned earlier) would have the character of the Smārta, since they are mentioned immediately after the Smārta food¹ or rather, (both these) can be regarded as 'those stated (i.e. enjoined) in the Śruti (Śrauta)' since they have a connection with the Agnihotra.³ [42]

Since (the two divine foods), which are characterized as *huta* and *prahuta*, are described by the Śruti as being two, without any specification, they are subjected to option (by the opponent); for, (both) the Śrauta⁴ and the Smārta (are) equal (in status). [43]

In verses 41-43 Sureśvara justifies the option regarding *hutaprahuta* foods and *dārśapūrṇamāsa* foods. The reason for doing this is: In the Mantra portion *dve anne hutaprahute vā dārśapūrṇamāsau vā*, there is no specification of the natures of the two foods and that gives rise to the sense of options. Verse 41 gives the reason for the option. Again, the foods are mentioned as *sādhāraṇa* and are therefore included in *smārtāṇṇa* and, further, they are mentioned immediately after *smārtāṇṇa*. Therefore they are *huta* and *prahuta* foods. But, since they are described as *devāṇne* 'foods for gods' and are thus mentioned in the nearness of the ritual of Agnihotra wherein are mentioned the Darśa and Pūrṇamāsa *grahas* (i.e. foods), therefore the foods can be called *śrautāṇṇa* also. In verse 43, the word *tulyavat* points to the *tulyatva* which is the basis for option (*tulyatvam vikalpahetuḥ*).

¹That is, without any specific mention of the distinction between the two oblations.

²This gives the reason for optionally understanding the word *dve* as the Śrauta and the Smārta oblations, referring to the foods for gods as can belong to *huta* and *prahuta* varieties and

also to oblations in the Darśa and Pūrṇamāsa sacrifices. This option entails the first line of the next verse.

³This is another reason for holding two options. The commonly shared food is included among the Smārta foods.

⁴This refers to the Darśa and Pūrṇamāsa foods.

दर्शश्च पौर्णमासश्च देवान्ने ते यतः श्रुते ।
प्रायस्ताभ्यां न कामाय यष्टव्यमिति गम्यते ॥४४॥

Since (the two foods) Darśa and Pūrṇamāsa are heard (i.e. enjoined) in the Śruti, therefore it is understood that one should not perform the sacrifice with those two foods for obtaining one's desire. [44]

This is based on the authority of the Śruti statement *tasmān neṣṭiyājukaḥ syāt*. The objector's argument is that *dve devān abhājayat* refers only to Darśa and Pūrṇamāsa foods. Therefore the option, mentioned in verse 41 above, cannot be entertained. This is barred by *na kāmāya yaṣṭavyam*.

नेहेष्टयो निषिध्यन्ते देवप्राधान्यसिद्धये ।
ताच्छीलिकोक्ताश्च वणात्तच्छीलत्वं निवार्यते ॥४५॥

Here,¹ *iṣṭis* (small rites performed with desires) are not negated owing (to the desire) to establish the principal significance of the god. By the mention (lit. hearing) of the suffix *ukañ*, which goes with (i.e. refers to) one's being in the habit of performing that (rite), is warded off the character (of the sacrificer) as being given to its performance. [45]

This explains the significance of the suffix *ukañ* in *iṣṭiyājuka* and also explains away the possible doubt that the Darśa and Pūrṇamāsa rites are performed with the desire for heaven.

The author stresses on the significance of the form *iṣṭiyājuka* and points out that Darśa and Pūrṇamāsa rites, though performed with some desire, are not performed by mere habit. Thus only

the habitual performance of rites is warded off.

¹That is, in the statement *neṣṭiyājukaḥ*....

प्रसक्तान्यपि नोच्यन्ते त्रीण्यन्नान्यत्र कारणात् ।
तेषां फलत्वादुक्तेभ्यः साधनेभ्योऽन्यता यतः ॥४६॥
सौकर्यप्रतिपत्तेश्च भूयोविषयतस्तथा ।
साधनैकसजातित्वादानन्तर्यमकारणम् ॥४७॥

Here (i.e. in this Brāhmaṇa), three foods, though contingent¹ for (good) reason, are not discussed (first) because of their character as the fruit (resulting) from those (i.e. the foods) mentioned (earlier) and (thus) there is their difference from those means (to fruits). [46]

Also (this is so done) for easy understanding (of the difference between the means and the end)² and also because they (i.e. the three foods) cover quite a large sphere of things. (The seventh food is mentioned together with the first three) because it has the same character as theirs, viz. that of a means (or cause). The immediately following of the three (*sādhya*) foods does not have any (specific) purpose. [47]

The Vārtika (of course, following the Bhāṣya) has proceeded to explain the seventh food (viz. *paśvanna*) immediately after the first three are explained and it has thus ignored, for the time being, the three foods which are mentioned in the Brāhmaṇa before that (viz. *paśvanna*)— this is, in other words, to explain the purpose of what is called *pāṭhakramātikrama* 'varying the sequence in the original text'.

This explains how the Vārtika and the Bhāṣya refer to the less authoritativeness of the *pāṭhakrama* than that of the *arthakrama* (i.e. the sequence of the purpose). It is an accepted principle that the *arthakrama* is stronger than the *pāṭhakrama*.

The purpose of Darśa and Pūrṇamāsa rites is attainment of heaven; it is not warded off.

¹Cf. SP: *pāṭhakramāt kāraṇāt prāptāni*. Yet further, SP observes: *atha vā paśvannasya sādhanatvād uktasādhanatraye tasya*

*buddhisāmnidhyāc caturthatvena vyākhyānam, tato 'nnatrayavy-
ākhyety ukte saukaryeṇa pratipattir ataś ca pāṭhānādara ity arthaḥ.*

²The three foods, being of the nature of the Sūtra (i.e. Virāj), are of the nature of the end (i.e. result) to be achieved, whereas the others are the means to be employed, i.e. they cannot to be secured— they are infinite in their extent.

पयोऽन्नमेव प्रायेण मनुष्याः पशुभिः सह ।
भुञ्जते पय एवाग्रे तेषामन्नमतोऽस्तु तत् ॥४८॥
भुञ्जते पय एवाग्रे क्रमेणान्यत्तृणादि हि ।
अतोऽनुमीयते पित्रा तेभ्यः प्रतं पयः पुरा ॥४९॥

(The word) *payas* just means food; (for) generally human beings, along with (i.e. as well as) animals, consume (i.e. enjoy) only milk in the beginning; therefore let that (viz. *payah*) be the food. [48]

They (viz. the animals) eat (i.e. enjoy) milk first and then subsequently (i.e. gradually) (begin to) graze (lit. eat) grass etc. For this reason, it is concluded¹ that the father gave them (i.e. men and animals) milk before (anything else). [49]

This explains *paśubhya ekam prāyacchad iti tat payah*.

¹*anumīyate = dr̥ṣṭānusārāt kalpyate*. So it is understood on the basis of what is seen in the life of the humans and the animals (SP and NKL).

पशवः पय एवाग्रे भुञ्जते नापरं ततः ।
कथमेतद्विजानीम इत्येतदभिधीयते ॥५०॥

Animals¹ consume (i.e. enjoy) only milk first (and) not anything else than that. (In order to explain) how we are to know this, there is now stated (in the following verse(s)): [50]

¹This refers to the humans as well as to the animals; because the Śruti considers both the bipeds and the quadrupeds.

यत एवमतो लोके कुमारं जातमग्रतः ।
जातरूपव्यवहितं लेहयन्ति घृतं जनाः ॥५१॥
तस्यानु तदभावे वा पाययन्ति स्तनं शिशुम् ।

[Verses 51 and 52ab explain *tasmāt kumāraṃ jātaṃ ghr̥taṃ vaivāgre pratilehayanti stanam vānudhāpayanti.*]

Since this is so, therefore, in the world, do the people first make a new-born child lick ghee¹ in touch with (i.e. touched by or rubbed on) (a piece of) gold. [51]

Only after that (doing), or (even) in the absence of that, do they put the child on (the mother's) breast. [52ab]

¹Since ghee is a product of milk, it is identified with the latter.

पशुष्वपि तथा जातं वत्सं कश्चित्प्रपृच्छति ॥५२॥
कियांस्ते वयसा वत्स इत्याचष्टे वयो यथा ।
अतृणाद इति तृणं नाद्याप्यति मनागपि ॥५३॥
वर्तते पयसैवासावद्यापीत्यवसीयते ।

So also, in respect of the animals, (they do the same). In relation to a new-born calf, someone asks: [52cd]

'How old is your young one (here, the calf)?'. Thus (asked), one states the age in this manner: 'It is not yet an eater of grass; that is to say, it does not eat even a little of grass.'

[53]

It subsists on only milk yet— so is this understood. [54ab]

प्राण्यप्राणि जगत्सर्वं तस्मिन्नेव प्रतिष्ठितम् ॥५४॥

(Indeed) all the world comprising living beings and non-living things¹ is supported on that (i.e. milk) only. [54cd]

¹The word *prāṇyaprāṇi* literally means: whatever being that

breathes and whatever thing that does not breathe.

पयसीदं जगन्मग्नमित्येतद्गम्यते कृतः ।
प्रसिद्धेर्गम्यते न्यायाद्यतोऽसावभिधीयते ॥५५॥

‘Whence is it understood that this world is supported by (lit. has merged in) only milk?’, (asks someone). (The answer is:) ‘So is it understood for a reason, viz. usage,¹ since that is (so) expressed (i.e. declared). [55]

¹SP: *śrautī prasiddhir eva nyāyaḥ*. Read BU: *tasmin sarvaṃ pratiṣṭhitam yac ca prāṇiti yac ca ncti; payasi hīdaṃ sarvaṃ pratiṣṭhitam yac ca prāṇiti yac ca na*.

आहुतिः पय एव स्यादाज्यं वा पय एव वा ।
पय एवाहुतिः सर्वमित्येतच्च श्रुतेर्मितेः ॥५६॥

An offering into the fire should be of only milk, or of clarified butter or milk. All that is offering is but milk and this is (understood) from the Śruti, the authoritative means (of knowing). [56]

Here the Vārtika refers to the usage among the ritualists which, they hold, has come from some Śruti; viz. *ghṛtāhutiṃ vā payāhutiṃ vobhayam tv etat paya eva* (Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa 2.2.4.4). Here, *miti* is for *māna* (i.e. *pramāṇa*), used in opposition to Śruti.

अथैषाज्याहुतिर्यज्ञे यद्विः सर्वरूपकम् ।
पशुश्चाप्याज्यमेवैतत्करोतीत्यपि चागमः ॥५७॥

Now, this offering of clarified butter in a sacrifice is what is offerings in all forms. So also is the tradition that a sacrificer (while offering) an animal, does offer only this, viz. clarified butter. [57]

This verse paraphrases the Śruti which is cited above in the note on the previous verse. It supports the said known usage.

It states the inference drawn from the Śruti; SP reads: *tatraiva śrutyantaram āha ... ājyāhutes tāvat payastvaṃ tadvikāratvād yac ca yajñe sarvarūpakam puroḍāśātmakam havir yaś ca paśur etat sarvam ājyam evābhighārasaṃskārāt karoti puruṣo na hi carvādy ājyānabhighāritam homyam payaś cājyam iti sarvasya payastvam ity āgamaśāsanam ity arthaḥ.*

आज्याभिघारसंस्कारात्सर्वमेव पयो हविः ।
पयस्येव जगत्कृत्स्नमग्निहोत्रे प्रतिष्ठितम् ॥५८॥

Indeed all offering is but milk on account of its modification (i.e. purification) by the sprinkling of clarified butter on it. (Therefore) the entire world is thus supported in (or established in) only milk, viz. in Agnihotra.¹ [58]

¹The Vārtika justifies this reference to the Agnihotra in the next verse.

ते वा एते इति तथा परिणामोऽखिलं जगत् ।
अग्निहोत्राहुतेः साक्षाच्छ्रुतावेव समीरितम् ॥५९॥

It is (so) stated in the Śruti itself, viz. in *te vā ete ...* that offering of the Agnihotra has as its result all the world.¹ [59]

Reference to the Agnihotra offerings in the preceding verse needed some support. Therefore this Vārtika points to the purport of the Śruti *te vā ete āhūtī hute utkrāmatas te antarikṣam āviśataḥ* (Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa 11.6.2.6). This should not be taken to set aside *apūrva* or *adrṣṭa* effected by the Agnihotra.

¹The word *pariṇāma* here stands for 'effect' (*kārya* or *phala*).

अग्नौ प्रास्ताहुतिः सम्यगादित्यमुपतिष्ठते ।
आदित्याज्जायते वृष्टिर्वृष्टेरन्नं ततः प्रजाः ॥६०॥

He who has poured his offering into the fire well attends on the Sun. From Āditya proceeds rain, from rain food and thence the created beings. [60]

This is from *Manusmṛti* 3.66; for support to what is expressed in the last quarter, refer to *Gītā* 3.14.

पयोद्रव्याहुतेश्चैतत्परिणामोऽखिलं जगत् ।
एतच्च श्रुतितः सिद्धं विश्वमाहुतिकारणम् ॥६१॥

And¹ the entire world is but the result of the offering of the material, viz. milk; and this is established by (the statement in) the Śruti: All the world has offering as its cause. [61]

With reference to the two *cas*, read SP: *apūrvasaṃgrahārtham ādyaś cakāro dvitīyaḥ smṛtisamuccayārthaḥ*.

यथोक्तदर्शनस्तुत्यै दर्शनान्तरकुत्सनम् ।
तस्मिन्सर्वमिति ह्यस्य दर्शनस्य विधित्सया ॥६२॥

(Now follows) the censure of another view in order to praise the already stated view, viz. in that (offering of milk) all (the world is) supported— indeed, this is done (only)¹ with a desire to enjoin (the adoption of the first) view. [62]

¹ 'Indeed' and '(only)' are by the force of *hi*. Cf. SP: *na hi nindā nindyam ninditum api tu vidheyam stotum iti- nyāyadyotako hiśabdaḥ*. Also NKL: *paradarśananindā na niṣ- edhārthā, kim tu atra vidhitsitopāsanastutyarthā ity arthaḥ*.

पयसैवाग्निहोत्रं हि जुह्वत्संवत्सरं द्विजः ।
जयत्येव पुनर्मृत्युं न भूयो मृतिभाग्भवेत् ॥६३॥
संवत्सरे प्रयोगाणामग्निहोत्रे हि संख्यया ।
षष्ट्युत्तराणि त्रीण्येव शतानीति विनिश्चितम् ॥६४॥
क्षपाहान्यपि तावन्ति संख्ययेह भवन्ति हि ।

शतानि सप्त संख्याताः प्रयोगार्धाश्च विंशतिः ॥६५॥
 याजुष्मत्योऽपि तावत्य इष्टकाः स्युः प्रजापतेः ।
 संवत्सराग्नेश्चित्यस्य पुंसो नाड्यस्तथैव च ॥६६॥
 संपदैवाहुतीर्विद्वान्संपाद्याग्नेस्तथेष्टकाः ।
 संवत्सरमवाप्नोति स्वनाडीसंख्यया नरः ॥६७॥
 पुमान्संवत्सरोऽग्निश्च नाड्यहोरात्रयाजुषैः ।
 संपदैते समाः सर्वे तस्मात्संवत्सरश्रुतिः ॥६८॥
 संवत्सरात्मसंपत्त्या कालात्मानं समश्नुते ।
 इत्येवंदृष्टयो धीरा यदाहुरसदेव तत् ॥६९॥

[Now is stated in details the other view; viz. *saṃvatsaram payasā juhvat apa punar mr̥tyum jayati*. And, finally, it is rejected.]

Indeed a twice born, who worships the Agnihotra with milk for a year, overcomes (lit. wins) a second death, i.e. he does not become subject to death again.¹ [63]

It is decided that there are, in a year, three hundred and sixty performances of Agnihotra in number. [64]

Indeed, days and nights also are as many in number (and therefore) the halves of the performances (of the ritual) are counted to be seven hundred and twenty. [65]

Also, as many are the bricks of Prajāpati² related to the Yajus Mantras and similar (i.e. equal in number) are (the bricks) of the fire to be worshipped throughout the year. So also are the veins (in the body) of a man (equal in number). [66]

By means of this very riches,³ that is after making the offering (to Agnihotra fire) and the bricks (of the fire) equal in number with the veins in his own body, a person, who knows (the nature of Vedic ritual) obtains the year.⁴ [67]

A sacrificer (lit. man), a year and the fire— these are all, by this riches, equal with what belongs to the Yajus (viz. Mantras of them, i.e. bricks), the veins and the days and nights. Therefore is there the hearing (i.e. mention) in the Śruti of a Saṃvatsara. [68]

Thus, by producing himself in the nature (or form) of a Saṃvatsara (i.e. Prajāpati) does (a sacrificer) attain the nature of Kāla (i.e. Prajāpati); all this, which the wise ones have thus held in their view, is false (i.e. wrong). [69]

¹The purport is: The sacrificer under reference dies and does not become born or embodied again.

²It is identified with Saṃvatsara.

³This riches consists in the above said large number of them.

⁴Verses 64-67 have thus explained the idea of sacrificer's overcoming death. This view is typically ritualistic in character. The Agnihotra-Upāsana has a basis in the Śruti passages: *tasya ha vā etasyāgnihotrasya sapta ca śatāni viṃśatis ca saṃvatsare sāyamāhutayaḥ sapta caiva śatāni viṃśatis ca saṃvatsare prātar-āhutayaḥ* and *tāvatyo 'gner iṣṭakāḥ*. The performance of the ritual produces, according to this view, the mystically significant similarity among the offerings, the different measures or units of time and the veins in a human body. This effects the attainment of Saṃvatsara (identical with Prajāpati) and deathlessness.

Verse 67 offers quite some difficulty of construe and translation.

पयस्यन्तर्हितं विश्वं पश्यन्नेवं पयो नरः ।
एकयैव स आहुत्या जगदात्मानमश्नुते ॥७०॥

[Now follows the refutation of the view just stated.]

Thus,¹ seeing the entire world as resting (lit. concealed) in milk (and worshipping the Agnihotra) with milk an individual obtains the Ātman of the world by means of just a single offering. [70]

This is to say: One does not have to keep on performing the Agnihotra ritual for one full year. Making only one offering of milk, one can attain one's goal, viz. becoming one with Prajāpati.

¹That is, in accordance with the view earlier stated and

acceptable to Sureśvara.

तत्रैवं सति को मूढो द्राघीयांसं प्रतीक्षते ।
संवत्सरावधिं कालं सकृदाहुतिसाधने ॥७१॥

This being so, which fool would wait for the longer time of a year's duration while there is (available) the means of securing (the Ātman of the world) through only offering one?

[71]

This emphasises why the author discards the other earlier mentioned view.

पयो द्रव्यं यथातत्त्वदर्शी चेच्छद्भयान्वितः ।
यदैवाहर्जुहोतीत्थं हन्ति मृत्युं तदैव सः ॥७२॥
एकयैव स आहुत्या देवेभ्योऽन्नं ह्यशेषतः ।
प्रयच्छति यतो नातः प्रयोगान्तरमीक्ष्यते ॥७३॥
हुतमेवं जगत्कृत्स्नं नातोऽन्यदवशिष्यते ।
यथोक्तदर्शनात्तस्मात्सर्वाप्त्या मृत्युजिद्वेत् ॥७४॥

If one who sees the truth as (discussed just before) offers on some one day the material, viz. milk, overcomes (lit. strikes down) death just then.

[72]

Since he offers all food to the gods in (i.e. by making) a single offering (of milk), there is therefore no need of another performance (i.e. of making any more offering).

[73]

Thus, in accordance with the view which we have stated, what is thus offered (viz. milk) is the entire world and there does not therefore remain anything (to be offered); therefore the sacrificer would become a conquerer (lit. overcomer) of death through his obtaining all.¹

[74]

Verse 72 is the explanation of the sentence *yad ahar eva ...*

Verse 73 explains the sentence *sarvaṃ hi ...* and supplies the reason for the statement in verse 72 above.

Our text and translation of verse 73 follow the reading -*īkṣyate*

in the AnSS and the NKL editions. However, the variant reading *-īkṣate* given in the AnSS edition gives alternative translation, which is better; thus: One does not wait to make for another performance (viz. making an offering every day of the year).

Verse 74 sums up the reason for holding the view stated so far.

¹This may refer to the whole world (*krtsnam jagat*) which is the same as *saṃvatsara* 'Prajāpati'. SP, however, refers 'all' to becoming one with all gods which consequently results into absence of any further (birth and) death.

उक्तवद्भूदि संभाव्य वक्ष्यमाणान्यपि श्रुतिः ।
अन्नानि कस्मादित्याह प्रश्नवाक्यविवक्षया ॥७५॥

Now, having considered the (three) foods, which are (yet) to be stated, as similar to (those already) stated, the Śruti states (the question) *kasmāt tāni...*; (this) through a desire (to make) a statement in answer to the question. [75]

In BU the question *kasmāt tāni* occurs even before there is the statement of the three remaining foods. The author explains the purpose of this: The three foods to be stated are in nature similar to the earlier stated foods, viz. the creation of the sacrificer.

अद्यमानान्यथान्नानि यथोक्तान्यत्तृभिः सदा ।
कस्मात्क्षयं न संयान्ति यवपूर्णकुसूलवत् ॥७६॥

Now (a question arises:) The foods, that are thus stated, ever being enjoyed (lit. eaten) by the eaters, why do they not get exhausted (i.e. do not decrease) just like a granary full of barley (and other corn)? [76]

This explains the purpose of *kasmāt tāni* and is the paraphrase of the Upaniṣadic words *na kṣīyante 'dyamānāni*.

प्रश्नस्य कस्मात्तानीति श्रुत्यैवाचार्यभूतया ।
पुरुषो वा इति गिरा हेतुरुक्तोऽक्षये परः ॥७७॥

To the question *kasmāt tāni* asked by the Śruti, which has (as if) become a preceptor, is stated (in answer) the subsequent reason for the non-decrease (of food) in the word(s) *puruṣo vā* [77]

अद्यते चेत्सदैवान्नं जन्यते न तु तत्ततः ।
यथोक्तः स्यादयं दोषो न तु तन्नैह जन्यते ॥७८॥

There could be this fault which is mentioned (by the questioner), if food were ever eaten and not produced. But, that is not so, (for, in this context, it should be noted that) it is (ever) produced. [78]

अन्नाक्षयत्वहेतुत्वात्पुरुषोऽक्षितिश्च्यते ।
स हि धीहाप्रबन्धेन सर्वदान्नं करोत्यतः ॥७९॥

The sacrificer is called (one having) non-decrease, since he is the cause of the non-decreasing character of food— indeed, by the continuity of knowledge and performance (of the ritual),¹ he ever produces food. [79]

This explains the meaning of the word *akṣiti* according to *hetuhetumadbhāva*.

¹The word *īhā* stands for *karman* as is warranted by the word *kriyābuddhi* in the following verse. Cf. BUBV 1.4.451.

क्रियाबुद्धिप्रबन्धेन यतो भोक्ताप्यहर्निशम् ।
तदन्नं जनयत्येव तस्मादन्नं न हीयते ॥८०॥

Since, by the continuity of knowledge and performance (of the ritual), the enjoyer on his part thus creates the food, therefore the food does not ever get exhausted. [80]

भोगदस्यैव भोगेन सृज्यमानत्वहेतुतः ।
अन्नाक्षयो भवेदेवं तयोरव्यतिरेकतः ॥८१॥

On account of the enjoyment of what yields enjoyment (and) owing to its being (continuously) created, there would be such (i.e. as described) non-decrease of food; this is thanks to the invariable¹ relation of the two (viz. enjoyment and what is enjoyed). [81]

We have followed the reading in the AnSS edition. NKL reads *bhogādasyaiva* in place of *bhogadasyaiva*. It is difficult to decide whether following the latter is correct. SP understands *avyatireka* as *mithoyoga* 'the inseparable relation' of enjoyment which employs the enjoyer.

¹This is *avyatireka* 'inseparability'.

सुखदुःखादिसंवित्तिः फलं पूर्वस्य कर्मणः ।
रागद्वेषक्रिया तत्र स्यात्फलान्तरसिद्धये ॥८२॥

Experience of pleasure, pain etc.¹ is the result of the former performance(s); and the performance through attachment and/or aversion would produce another result. [82]

One performs ritual actions and thereby secures enjoyment and happiness which in turn produce attachment to and/on aversion for some thing(s) and this would produce continuity of action and the consequent production of food— this justifies *annākṣaya* mentioned in verse 81 above.

¹The word etc. refers to various or particular forms of pleasure and pain.

रागादिपूर्वकं कर्म जायते फलवद्यतः ।
रागादिरहितं तत्तु निष्फलं सुप्तवागिव ॥८३॥

Since a performance which has proceeded from attachment etc.¹ produces (further) results (i.e. becomes fruitful); therefore

that which has not proceeded from any attachment etc. does not produce any result(s), like the chatter of a sleeper. [83]

This verse explains further the statement in the preceding verse.

This explanation is a good example of the author's use of the *anvayavyatireka* method. On this method, cf. our book [Vol.1:1982] Introduction.

को हेतुरक्षयत्वे स्यादिति पृष्टमथाधुना ।
तद्विदः फलसिद्ध्यर्थं भूयः प्रश्नोऽयमुच्यते ।
अक्षितित्वं कथं पुंस इत्येतच्चाधुनोच्यते ॥८४॥

Now it is asked: What is the cause of the non-decreasing character (of food)?— This question is asked once again with a view to establishing that there is a (positive) result for (the activity of) the knower of that.¹ And now it is later stated as to how there is the non-decreasing character of the man (viz. the sacrificer)² also. [84]

¹This is rather *kriyābuddhiprabandha* of verse 80 above; cf. the next verse.

²Yet perhaps, as SP points out: *akṣayahetutvagunaḥkasaptānnātmaḥkaprajāpatipuruṣopāsaka* is meant.

स हीदमन्नं कुरुते तत्तत्कालप्रसूतया ।
धिया धिया हि पुरुषः कर्मभिश्चान्नमात्मनः ॥८५॥

Indeed, he produces this food by every (new) thought and activities¹ which have occurred to his mind from time to time; for, the man (viz. the sacrificer) produces food for himself by activities. [85]

¹*dhiyā dhiyā* and *karmabhiḥ* refer to *kriyābuddhiprabandha*.

भुज्यमानान्यपि ततो न क्षीयन्ते प्रबन्धतः ॥८६॥

Therefore foods, though being continuously eaten, never get exhausted through the continuity (of their being eaten and produced). [86]

यथैव पुरुषोऽन्नानां भोक्तात्यन्तं तथैव सः ।
कर्ताप्यत्यन्तमेव स्यादन्योन्याव्यरितेकतः ॥८७॥

As the sacrificer is verily the enjoyer of the foods, so also is he verily the maker (of them), since the two (the sacrificer and the food)¹ have invariable association (with each other). [87]

¹This refers to their nature, viz. *kartṛtva* and *bhokṛtva*, cf. SP.

एवं प्रबन्धरूपेण साध्यसाधनलक्षणम् ।
अविद्यापटसंवीतचेतसां स्थास्निववेक्ष्यते ॥८८॥

Thus, among those whose intellect (*cetas*) is enwrapped by the bondage (or band) of Avidyā, (the food) characterized as both the effect and the cause is understood¹ (lit. seen) to be permanent, as it were, in their continuity.² [88]

¹Our text and translation follow the variant reading *-vekṣyate* and not the printed text of the AnSS edition. This is supported by the NKL edition and is better acceptable.

²NKL explains *prabandha* as *gaṅgāpravāhavat śrotorūpa*.

एतच्च भण्यते श्रुत्या पुंसो वैराग्यसिद्धये ।
संसारादविरक्तस्य मुक्तीच्छा नेह कस्यचित् ॥८९॥

And this is stated by the Śruti for establishing aversion (to worldly existence) on the part of the man who is not averse to transmigratory existence; for, there is not ever noticed here (in the case of such a man) the desire for liberation. [89]

फलहेत्वोर्मिथोऽत्यन्तं सर्वदाव्यतिरेकतः ।
सम्यग्ज्ञानादृते नास्ति तद्वेतुच्छित्तिकारणम् ॥९०॥

Thus, owing to the ever obtaining inseparable association of the cause and the effect (viz. the sacrificer and the food), there is not any means other than right knowledge¹ for the destruction of its cause.² [90]

This is to justify the second line of the preceding verse.

¹This is about the nature of the Ātman; or perhaps about the nature of *kriyābuddhī* as leading to impermanence.

²This refers to *avirakti* 'absence of aversion to worldly existence' caused by Avidyā.

त्यक्त्वान्यत्सकलं तस्मात्सम्यग्ज्ञानस्य लब्धये ।
मनोवाक्तनुचेष्टाभिर्महान्तं यत्नमाचरेत् ॥९१॥

Therefore for securing right knowledge¹ (a man) should first abandon everything else and make very great effort by his *manas*, Vāk and body. [91]

This sets aside the notion that some performance (*karman*) is necessary, in addition to knowledge.

¹See note 1 on the preceding verse.

पुंसोऽक्षितित्वं यो वेद तस्येदं फलमुच्यते ।
सोऽन्नमत्ति प्रतीकेन वृत्त्यान्नं मुख्ययात्ति सः ॥९२॥

Now is stated the result of (the Śruti statement:) 'He, who knows the non-decreasing character of the sacrificer in the statement *so 'nnam atti* ... 'he (i.e. the sacrificer) eats food by the mouth', in its (meaning conveyed by) its (i.e. the word's) primary function. [92]

नैवविद्वुणतामेति ह्यन्नं प्रति कदाचन ।
प्रधानभूतः सन्भुङ्क्ते सर्वदान्नं स कामतः ॥९३॥

(The sacrificer) knowing thus does not ever become subordinate to food; being the principal (i.e. possessing greater importance), he ever enjoys the food, at (his) will. [93]

In this verse, the statement of the preceding verse is presented in the *vyatireka* form.

अपि देवान्स संयाति तथोर्जं चोपजीवति ।
प्रशंसैषा यथोक्तस्य विज्ञानस्येति निश्चितिः ॥९४॥

He unites with the gods and also lives on vital food (or on energy) (*ūrjam upajīva-*). This is the praise of the specific knowledge¹ which is stated (before)— this is the decision. [94]

The first line is the paraphrase of a *praśaṃsāpara arthavāda*.

¹The word *viññāna* is explained as *saviśeṣajñāna*. Cf. our book [Vol.1:1982] Introduction.

अन्नत्रयं यदुत्कृष्टं तस्यायं निर्णयोऽधुना ।
शरीरकार्यसंस्थस्य वर्ण्यतेऽध्यात्मरूपकम् ॥९५॥

There is now the decision regarding that which is the excellent, viz. the triad of food, which abides in the subtle body and the gross one¹— this is of the nature of the body.² [95]

This is to introduce, now after the discussion of four foods, the exposition of the ideas about the three foods *manas*, *Vāk* and *Prāṇa* which remain in connection with gross and subtle bodies and the *Ātman* (as the principal or vital wind in the body).

¹SP translates *śarīra* as *sūkṣma* and *kārya* as *sthūla*.

²The word *ātman*, meaning the principal wind in the body, refers to the body.

प्रयोगसमवायित्वं पूर्वेष्वन्नेषु वर्णितम् ।
 भोक्तारश्चापि ये तेषां तेऽपि श्रुत्योपवर्णिताः ॥९६॥
 प्रयोगसमवायित्वात्पूर्वेषां कर्मणां सताम् ।
 मनआदित्रयं कार्यं तादर्थ्येनोत्तरा श्रुतिः ॥९७॥

In respect of the earlier (stated) foods, there is described their character of being intimately connected with the performance (of ritual) and those also are described who are the enjoyers¹ of them (viz. the foods) in the Śruti. [96]

The earlier (stated foods) being the causes² (lit. actions), inasmuch as they are intimately connected with the performance (of ritual) and the triad beginning with *manas*³ being the effect, (now proceeds) the subsequent (portion of the) Śruti to convey that meaning. [97]

¹SP points out that these include *caṇḍāla* etc., Indra and other gods, and the animals.

²Sureśvara uses the word *karman* in the sense of *kāraṇa*.

³Namely, *manas*, Vāk and Prāṇa.

Verses 98-154 are the discussion of BU 1.5.3.

उत्पाद्य त्रीण्यथान्नानि मेधया तपसा पिता ।
 मनो वाचं तथा प्राणमात्मार्थे तानि चाकरोत् ॥९८॥

The father (i.e. the sacrificer), having first created by his thought and activity¹ the three foods, viz. *manas*, Vāk and Prāṇa, put them to his own² use. [98]

¹This is equivalent to *buddhikriyā* stated earlier in verse 80 and *dhiyā dhiyā* in verse 85.

²We have taken the word *ātmārthe* as equivalent of *svārthe*; that is, the word *ātman* is understood as a reflexive pronoun.

मनसोऽस्तित्वसिद्ध्यर्थं श्रुत्योपन्यस्यतेऽनुमा ।
 सतश्च तस्य कामादिरूपाण्यपि च वक्ष्यति ॥९९॥

The Śruti has put forth an argument (lit. inferential statement) in order to establish the existence of *manas*; and now¹ it will state the properties² of even (*ca*)³ that existing (*manas*),⁴ viz. desire etc. [99]

This is the exposition of *anyatramanāḥ*

¹This is the force of (*sataś*) *ca*.

²The word *rūpāṇi* refers to various *dharma*s; cf. reference to *dharma* in the immediately following verses.

³Cf. SP: *dharmīṇā dharmasamuccayārtham api cety uktam*.

⁴Existing means 'what is inferred' (as the word *anumā* signifies); cf. SP on *sataś ca* = *mitasya ca*.

अविद्याधिकृतावस्यां धर्मधर्म्यादिसंगतिः ।

अविद्याकार्यसंस्थैव न त्वसौ प्रत्यगात्मनः ॥१००॥

(The Śruti means to convey that) the connection of properties and what has properties is (possible only) in the state which is governed by Avidyā, viz. it belongs to the effect of Avidyā and¹ it does not belong to the individual self (in its unaffected form). [100]

¹*tu* is here almost for *ca*, yet alternatively 'however'. Then translate '... of Avidyā. However, it does not ...'

इत्येतत्प्रतिपत्त्यर्थं परो ग्रन्थोऽवतार्यते ।

मा भूत्कामादिधर्मित्वमात्मनीति ऽयत्यते ॥१०१॥

In order to convey (or explain) this,¹ the subsequent² portion (of the Śruti) is introduced. (Also) there is an effort made to the effect that the character of possessing properties such as desire etc. does not cling to (i.e. belong to) the Ātman. [101]

¹That is, the meaning of *anyatramanāḥ*

²This refers to the arguments adduced for proving the existence of *manas*. Cf. NKL with note: *kim atra mānam*— note on this: *pratyagātmani dharmadharmisaṃgatya bhāve mānam kim*.

पृष्ठो जरद्गवं यान्तमद्राक्षीस्त्वमितीतरः ।

ततोऽन्यत्रमना आसं नातोऽद्राक्षं त्वदीरितम् ॥१०२॥

[Verses 102-107 are the exposition of the Śruti *anyatramanāh*]

Asked (by someone): 'Did you see an old bull going by?', the person says, 'My mind (*manas*) was elsewhere, therefore I did not see what you asked about.' [102]

The known worldly example in relation to the absence of *manas* is adduced as an evidence for proving the existence of *manas*! For explanation, read SP: *jaradgavadhīhetau viṣayādaṁ saty api kadācid eva taddhīr jāyamānā hetvantaram ākṣipaty arthādisāṃnidhye kadācid eva jñānotpattir ity arthāpattir manaḥsādhikety arthaḥ*. Also NKL (with note): *jaradgavadhīhetu-* (note: *atra dhīpadena antaḥkaraṇavṛttir ucyate*) *-sākalye sati kadācid eva jāyamānajñānam, viṣayād vyatiriktahetusāpekṣam, tasmin* (note: *-dhīviṣaye*) *sati kadācit jāyamānatvāt, yad evaṁ tad evam, yathā chedyādisamavadhāne kadācid eva jāyamānachidikriyā tadatirikta-kuṭhārasāpekṣā ity anumānam ity arthaḥ*.

विषयान्तरसंबद्धं मनो दृष्टं घटादिवत् ।

आत्मैकसाक्षिकं तच्च ह्युक्तार्थापत्तिसंश्रयात् ॥१०३॥

manas is understood (lit. seen) like a pitcher etc., as connected with another object and it has only the individual self as its seer— this, by resorting to the contingency implied (lit. stated) before.¹ [103]

This refers to the worldly situation stated in the preceding verse.

¹Cf. verse 102cd above.

अस्त्यात्मा चित्स्वभावोऽत्र चक्षुश्चाविकलं तथा ।
सप्रकाशं गवाश्वं च न च पश्यति चेतनः ॥१०४॥
अतोऽनुमीयतेऽस्त्यन्यद्यस्मिन्नसति नेक्षते ।
द्रष्टादि संहतं सर्वं यस्मिंश्च सति वीक्षते ॥१०५॥

(Here¹) there is the Ātman having the nature of sentience and also an eye which is not defective and, further, the bull and the horse have also light on them and yet the sentient (person) does not see it. [104]

Therefore it is concluded that there is something else,² which, not being there,³ a person does not see and only while that exists there (in the ensemble), one can see all the things collected,⁴ viz. the seer etc. [105]

In verse 102, there is no mention of a horse, but this is immaterial.

¹In the case mentioned in verse 102 above.

²That refers to the Ātman, the seer as in verse 103 above.

³That is, not associated with a body.

⁴The word *samhata* stands for a collection of a seeing person, his eyes etc., the object and the light.

यत्तदस्ति मनस्तत्स्यात्प्रसिद्ध्या चास्ति तन्मनः ।
अभून्मम मनोऽन्यत्र यतो नाद्राक्षमित्यतः ॥१०६॥

Whatever it is is *manas* and that *manas* does exist (is understood) by the commonly known (incident, when it was said):¹ 'Since my mind was elsewhere, therefore I did not see (what you asked).' [106]

See verse 102 above.

SP refers *prasiddhi* to the well-known episode of the maker of arrows. The episode refers to a maker of arrows who did not notice the king who had passed by him. Consequently, when

he was asked if he had seen the king, he answered, 'Since my mind ... asked).' Obviously, his mind was completely engrossed in arrow-making and, therefore, did not have any connection whatsoever with other things or his surrounding. The stress here is on the engrossment of one's mind in one's doing. But Sureśvara uses this incident to emphasise that everything exists because *manas* exists there, as connected with it.

सदप्यात्मादिकं सर्वं दर्शनादावकारणम् ।
मनसैव यतो द्रष्टा गवादीह प्रपश्यति ॥१०७॥

All, viz. the self and others¹ being there (in the situation of seeing) though, they are not the cause of the perception (lit. seeing) (of an object), since the seer sees a bull etc.² only through *manas*. [107]

¹Cf. note 4 on verses 104-105 above.

²The word etc. refers to a horse; cf. verse 104 above.

निःशेषप्रत्ययाधारधर्म्यस्तित्वं प्रसाध्य हि ।
कामादिधर्मसिद्ध्यर्थं काम इत्याद्यथोच्यते ॥१०८॥

[Now follows the exposition of *kāmaḥ saṃkalpaḥ*....]

Having (thus) established the existence of what possesses the properties (of seeing etc.) and is the support of entire perception, there is now stated (in the Śruti) *kāmaḥ* ... with a view to establishing the properties, desire and others. [108]

साधनान्येव मनसो बुद्धिकर्मेन्द्रियाण्यपि ।
सहैवायतनैः सर्वैः प्राधान्यं मनसस्ततः ॥१०९॥

Also, Buddhi 'intellect' and (various) organs of activity, together with their abodes- (viz. their bases in the bodies), are only the means; therefore *manas* has the principal status among them. [109]

Buddhi and organs of activity can be the means for an individual only if they abide in a body; cf *cakṣuḥ* (*indriya*) is *kṛṣṇatārāgravartin*.

विषयाभिलाषः कामः स्यान्न विशेषेऽस्ति कारणम् ।
इन्द्रियालोचितार्थस्य स्यात्संकल्पोऽवधारणम् ॥११०॥

kama 'longing for objects' is desire— there is no reason for stating any specific example.¹ *saṃkalpa* is decision (about) the specific nature) of an object perceived by a sense-organ.

[110]

¹This is an instance where Sureśvara comments on what he thinks is an unnecessary or irrelevant explanation in the BU, viz. *kāma* as *strīvyatīkarābhilāṣa*. Thus, this is an example of a Vārtika referring to *durukta* in the Bhāṣya. Read SP: *strīvyatīkarābhilāṣa iti bhāṣye viśeṣoktir ayuktety āha*.

अनिश्चयात्मिका वृत्तिर्विचिकित्सेत्युदाहृता ।
आस्तिक्यबुद्धिः श्रद्धा स्यादश्रद्धा तद्विरोधिनी ॥१११॥

vicikitsā 'doubt' is explained as modification (of Buddhi 'intellect') which is of the nature of indecision (about the nature of the object perceived). *śraddhā* 'faith' is belief in (the existence of) the object perceived and *aśraddhā* 'want of faith' is what is opposed to it.

[111]

धृतिश्रद्धे विना न स्युः कामाद्याः कारणादृते ।
यतोऽकामादयोऽप्यत्र ह्युक्ता एवार्थतो मताः ॥११२॥

There would not be *kāma* etc. without their cause, i.e. without *dhṛti* 'retention' and *śraddhā*, since, here (i.e. in this sentence of the Śruti), absence of *kāma* etc. are also accepted (as resulting) from (some) object.¹

[112]

¹This is a very cryptic statement. The 'object' here stands for that about the existence of which an individual has some notion (lit. faith) or that from which he has to withhold himself (cf. the next verse). NKL states this in brief thus: *śraddhādhṛtyoḥ kāmādihetutvāt tayoḥ abhāvoktyā tatkāryakāmādyabhāvo 'py arthād ukta evety arthaḥ*. The explanation in SP is however clearer, more lengthy though it is.

धारणं च धृतिर्ज्ञेया बुद्ध्योपात्तस्य वस्तुनः ।
विपर्ययोऽधृतिस्तस्या हीर्लज्जेत्यभिधीयते ॥११३॥

And *dhṛti* is to be understood as retention (lit. holding) of an object grasped (or decided) by Buddhi; its opposite is *adṛti*. (And) *hrī* is what is called (or known as) shame. [113]

विज्ञानं निश्चितं धीः स्याद्भयं भीरभिधीयते ।
एतत्सर्वं मनो ज्ञेयमिति तादात्म्यमुच्यते ॥११४॥

viññāna is understanding that is decided (a definite notion about the nature of an object); *bhī* is called that what is fear—all this should be understood as (various forms of) *manas*, (since) here is stated the oneness (of cause and effect¹). [114]

¹The word 'effect' refers to *vr̥ttyantara* 'a modification' (in form) of *manas*.

बुद्धेश्च मनसश्चैक्यं विवक्षित्वोपसंहतिः ।
इन्द्रियाण्यपि सर्वाणि स्वान्तस्यैव तु वृत्तयः ॥११५॥
यतः स्वकार्यनिर्देशः स्वान्तस्य स्पर्शनेन्द्रिये ।
मन एव ततो ज्ञेयं शरीरेन्द्रियसंहतिः ॥११६॥

[Now follows the explanation of *tasmād api*]

There is then made, after the Śruti's having intended to convey the oneness of Buddhi and *manas*, the concluding statement: All the organs are but modifications of one's internal organ

(viz. *manas*), [115]
 since, in respect of the sense of touch, there is the mention
 of the effect of one's internal organ. Therefore the ensemble
 of a body and the organs is to be understood as only *manas*.
 [116]

In these two verses, Sureśvara follows the Sāṃkhya use of
 the word *ṛtti* in the sense of modification of *manas*, viz. the
 effects and the causes.

In the first line of verse 116, Sureśvara has intended the
 Upaniṣadic illustration of a man touched by somebody from
 behind and his knowing about the same. Thus, actually an organ
 comes into contact with an object and it is *manas* that grasps
 it.

पुंसो भोगप्रसिद्ध्यर्थं वैचित्र्यं धीर्निगच्छति ।
 देहेन्द्रियाद्यवस्थाभिरतो धीः सर्वमेव तु ॥११७॥

(Thus) *manas*¹ attains variety (of forms) in order that one
 (viz. the sacrificer or individual) secures enjoyment; therefore
 all is but *manas* appearing in various states of the body and
 organs. [117]

¹In this verse, Sureśvara uses the word *dhī* in the sense of
manas.

जिघ्रन्ती भवति घ्राणं पश्यन्ती चक्षुरुच्यते ।
 शृण्वती भवति श्रोत्रमिति व्यासोऽप्यभाषत ॥११८॥
 शकलं कृष्णमणु स्थलमिति धीः कर्मणो वशात् ।
 द्वैताधिकारमापन्ना वैश्वरूप्यं निगच्छति ॥११९॥

While smelling, (the same *manas*¹) becomes (the organ called)
ghrāṇa; while seeing, it is called *cakṣuh*; (and further) while
 hearing, it becomes *śrotra*— thus has Vyāsa also declared
 (i.e. explained).² [118]
manas, falling within the compass (i.e. province) of duality,

becomes white, black, subtle and gross thanks to (the variety of) *karman* 'object',— (and thus) it attains variety (of forms).

[119]

Vyāsa is the author of the *Mahābhārata*. Sureśvara cites earlier authors for showing how his explanation is correct.

¹Here also, *dhīh*=*manas*. See note under verse 117 above.

²Cp. the first quarter with *Mahābhārata* 12.240.5c (*jighratī* for *jighrantī*), the second quarter with 12.240.5b (with a little difference) and the third quarter with 12.240.4c.

प्रत्यक्चिद्देशभेदेन न हि शुक्लादिवस्तुनः ।

सत्ता संभाव्यतेऽन्यत्र प्रत्यग्वद्ग्राह्यवस्तुनः ॥१२०॥

Certainly it is impossible that there is existence of any object white etc. as apart from sentience in an individual in the same way as the inner self (that can obtain) elsewhere than in an object of our perception.

[120]

Sureśvara affirms here that, really speaking, grasping various objects is owing to the appearance (*vivarta*) of the inner sentience. In other words, worldly knowledge is but Avidyā.

नातः शुक्लादिवस्त्वस्ति बुद्धिरेव क्रियावशात् ।

शुक्लादिरूपतामेति पुरुषार्थप्रसिद्धये ॥१२१॥

Therefore there does not exist (any) object white etc.; it is just *manas* which, owing to (various) activities (of the organs of activity), attains the character of white etc. for securing the end of an individual.

[121]

Here *Buddhi* stands for *manas*; cf. *dhī* above.

धीर्विपर्ययरूपेयं यतः शुक्लादिरूपिणी ।

मन एवेत्यतः प्राज्ञाः सर्वरूपं प्रचक्षते ॥१२२॥

Since this *dhī*,¹ having the (various) forms white etc., is but *manas*, therefore the wise ones declare it as possessed of all forms. [122]

¹*dhī* here appears to be *ṛtṭyantara* 'some modification' of *manas*. Cf. SP: *rūpadheyam sarvaṁ dhīmātram ... dhīr eva sarvaṁ rūpam iti viduṣāṁ paribhāṣā*.

आत्मार्थेनैव सत्यत्वं कृत्स्नात्मीयस्य वस्तुनः ।
तस्य तन्मात्रयाथात्म्यादिति पूर्वमवादिषम् ॥१२३॥

I have already stated¹ that the reality of all the belongings (lit. things) of one² is only by their being useful to³ the individual self, since they have oneness with only that. [123]

This is to affirm again that *manas* is in reality the Ātman.

¹In verse 120 above.

²That is, one's own, *ātmīya* < *ātman*, reflexive pronoun.

³Or, serving the purpose of.

अपि सर्वाणीन्द्रियाणि मन एव यतस्ततः ।
पृष्ठतोऽपि नरः स्पृष्टो मनसैव प्रपद्यते ॥१२४॥

Also, since all organs are only *manas*; therefore a man, when touched even from behind, understands (about it) by *manas* itself. [124]

This is the meaning of the Upaniṣadic statement *tasmād api*, though its purport was explained in earlier verses, cf. verses 117-119. This is clarified further in the following verses.

पराङ्मुख उपस्पृष्टः पाणेः स्पर्शोऽयमीदृशः ।
इति स्पर्शविशेषं ना मनसैव प्रपद्यते ॥१२५॥

A man, who is touched (by someone) from behind,¹ understands, the specific touch only with *manas* thus: "This

kind of touch is that of a hand.'

[125]

¹It literally means: while he is facing away (from one who touches him).

त्वचोपस्पृष्टिमात्रेण स्पर्शमात्रं प्रपद्यते ।
स्पर्शनादिविशेषं तु मनसैव प्रपद्यते ॥१२६॥

He grasps by the sense of touch merely by the touch (lit. touching); but it is only by *manas* that he understands the specific character of touch etc.¹ [126]

¹The word etc. indicates the functions of other organs similar to the sense of touch. *sparsana* = *upaspr̥ṣṭi* (*upa* does not modify the sense of the verb root *spṛś*).

मनसैव यतोऽशेषकरणस्वार्थधीभवः ।
सर्वं हि मन एवेति श्रुतिराह वचस्ततः ॥१२७॥

Since there is the rise of understanding of their own objects by all the organs, thanks only to *manas*, therefore the Śruti has declared 'All is indeed *manas*.' [127]

मनस्तावत्सुनिर्णीतं शरीरं चेन्द्रियाणि च ।
तदनन्तरतो वाचो व्याख्या प्रस्तूयतेऽधुना ॥१२८॥

[Now is introduced the discussion on Vāk (among the three foods).]

In the beginning (*tāvat*) is explained *manas*, so also the body and organs;¹ thereafter is now introduced the explanation of Vāk. [128]

¹That is, the ensemble of them.

यः कश्चेत्यविशेषोक्तिर्नादवर्णपदोक्तिभिः ।

संयोगोत्थो वियोगोत्थो यश्चापि प्रत्ययात्मकः ॥१२९॥
 वागेव स इति ज्ञेयः कुतो यस्मादियं सदा ।
 समानयोने रूपस्य वाक्प्रमाऽतोऽवबोधिका ॥१३०॥

The statement in the Śruti *yaḥ kaś ca* is not a mention of some specific (function). (It means:) Whatever be it, viz. what is of the nature of some experience that has arisen from the combination or from the separation of sounds, syllables and words, it has to be known as Vāk. (One asks:) ‘Why (is this so)?’ (and the answer is:) ‘Since it is ever Vāk that causes the (right) understanding of (any) form which arises from the same source.’¹ [129-130]

¹Cf. verse 119b and verse 122a above.

वागेव प्रत्ययादौ स्यादित्येतद्गम्यते कुतः ।
 स्वाभिधेयावबोधस्य ह्या समाप्तेरियं यतः ॥१३१॥
 यतोऽत्यर्थं प्रवृत्ता वाग्घटबोधे प्रदीपवत् ।
 अर्थावबोधनं कार्यं वाचो नान्यदितोऽपरम् ॥१३२॥

(A question is asked:) Whence is it understood that it is only Vāk that is at the source¹ of perception? (The answer is:) (It is so) since this one (viz. Vāk) continues to be (i.e. to function) till one grasps the meaning² of its own expression. [131]

Since Vāk functions beyond (revealing) the object (which is to be known)³ (*atyartham*), like a lamp in perceiving a pitcher, (therefore) the function of Vāk revealing the (nature of an) object⁴ is not anything beyond this.⁵ [132]

¹Namely, the cause.

²The word *samāpti* refers to both the completion of the function and one’s obtaining or grasping the meaning.

³Namely, the meaning of the word(s).

⁴Or alternatively, the meaning of its expression.

⁵Word and experience (caused by it), viz. *śabda* and *pratyaya*

are together the revealer of the meaning— they are not distinguished (or they do not differentiate themselves). Therefore the utterance of a word and one's grasp of its meaning are but one continued function (i.e. there is no relation of the cause and the effect). Cf. SP: *śabdapratyāṇ arthaprakāśakāṇ ato na tau vācas tattvato bhidyete*. It is in this sense that the simile of the lamp is to be understood; it is not to be understood in its limited sphere.

शब्दोच्चारणशक्तं हि ननु वाग्निन्द्रियं मतम् ।
कथं तद्विषयः शब्दो वागित्यत्राभिधीयते ॥१३३॥

Now, (one might ask:) They understand Vāk as the organ of speech which is capable of uttering a word; how is it then said that the word,¹ which is (but) its effect,² is Vāk? [133]

¹Word is equivalent of *nāda* and/or *varṇa* in verse 129 above and is only one aspect of Vāk.

²This is for *viśaya*, lit. an object; *artha* of a *pada*.

सत्यमन्यत्र तदग्राह्यं तस्य तत्रैव योग्यतः ।
इह त्वन्नत्रयस्यैव सर्वात्मत्वं विवक्षितम् ॥१३४॥

(The answer is:) True,¹ that is to be so understood elsewhere,² for it (viz. the word *vāk*) is used there to convey with propriety³ only that (organ). Here, however, it is intended to convey that the triad of foods alone has the nature of as all.⁴ [134]

¹That is, the question is rightly asked.

²This refers to the organ of speech.

³*yogyataḥ* = *yogyatvataḥ*.

⁴This precludes the other possible meanings of the word *vāk*, in accordance with the maxim *śabdānām anekārthatvāt*. The meaning is thus restricted.

मनोऽन्तःपाति निखिलं रूपं यद्वद्विवक्ष्यते ।
तस्य प्रकाशकस्तद्वत्सर्वः शब्दो विवक्ष्यते ॥१३५॥

As all form, i.e. the entire (world of form), is sought to be expressed as included in (the meaning of) *manas*, so every word is desired (or understood) to be expressive of what illuminates that (viz. Vāk). [135]

प्रकाशस्यैव सर्वस्य शब्दत्वप्रतिपत्तये ।
एषा हि नेत्यतो वक्ति वाग्निन्द्रियनिवृत्तये ॥१३६॥

Therefore in order that one understands¹ every illuminator of all objects² as having the nature of sound and also for setting aside the sense of (mere) organ of speech, the Śruti states *eṣā hi na* [136]

¹Alternatively, ... understands as word all that illuminates the objects, as

²This refers to 'all words (in the language)'.

रूपात्मकं यथा चक्षु रूपस्यैव प्रकाशकम् ।
वाक्च शब्दात्मिका तद्वच्छब्दस्यैवास्तु दीपिका ॥१३७॥

[Verses 137-142 are a short discussion of the view of Bharṭṛ-prapañca on the meaning of the expression in the Śruti *eṣā hi na* This has no basis in the BUB. Therefore this is what one can regard as *anukta* by Śaṅkara.]

(One might hold:) As *cakṣus*, which is of the nature of the form of an object, is the illuminator only of the form,¹ so also should Vāk, which is of the nature of (all spoken) word, be taken as the illuminator of (lit. be a lamp for) the (spoken) word alone.² [137]

¹The word *rūpa* is, in this context, *rūpāṇi (jātāv ekavacanam)*.

²Supply: and not of its sense, or object signified by it.

इति चोद्यं समाशङ्क्य परिहारं प्रचक्षते ।
एषा हि नेति केचित्तु नेयं दीपादिवन्मता ॥१३८॥

Keeping this¹ objection in view, some offer an argument in answer: (The Śruti statement) *eṣā hi na ...* (conveys) that this one (viz. Vāk) is not understood as similar to a lamp etc.²

[138]

¹That is, what is stated in verse 137 above.

²Cf. note 5 (end of it) on verse 132 above.

श्रोत्रादिकरणग्राह्यं सर्वं तद्रूपमुच्यते ।
तस्य प्रकाशिकैवेयं न प्रकाश्या प्रदीपवत् ॥१३९॥

All, that is (to be) perceived by various organs, viz. ears and others, is called form; but this one (viz. Vāk) is the illuminator of that (viz. forms) and is not itself to be illuminated just like a lamp¹ (by anything else).

[139]

¹Cf. BSB 2.1.4 (p.441): *na hi pradīpau parasparasyopakurutaḥ*.

प्रकाश्यमेव चात्यन्तं मनो रूपं यथा तथा ।
प्रकाशिकैव चात्यन्तं वाग्रूपस्येति निश्चितिः ॥१४०॥

And, as *manas* is totally the forms which are to be illuminated (by it), so also does Vāk totally illuminate all forms— this is the decision.

[140]

This is to emphasise that Vāk is 'illuminator'.

प्रकाश्यमेव रूपं स्यात्प्रकाशो वाक्तथैव च ।
विद्यादेतद्समासेन लक्षणं रूपसंज्ञयोः ॥१४१॥

Form is only what is to be illuminated and Vāk is, in the same way, (only) the illuminator (lit. light); this should be

known as the brief explanation of form and name. [141]

This is to distinguish Vāk, i.e. name, from the object, i.e. form, to be illuminated.

नामापि गृह्यमाणं सद्रूपं भवति शैवल्यवत् ।
रूपं च बोधयत्तद्वन्नामपक्षेऽवतिष्ठते ॥१४२॥

Further (*api*), name (i.e. Vāk), being grasped (by the individual self), is, like whiteness, a form and also (*tadvat*)¹ remains in the class (called) name.² [142]

Once again, it is stressed that Vāk is both '(what is) illuminated' and the illuminator.

¹ *tadvat* = *tathā ca*.

² *saṃjñā* in the verse is for *nāma*, i.e. (in reality) Vāk.

एवं वाङ्मनसे सम्यग्व्याख्याय प्रविभागशः ।
तयोर्विधरणः प्राणस्त्वनिरुक्तोऽथ भण्यते ॥१४३॥

[Now is explained the nature of Prāṇa.]

Having thus clearly explained Vāk and *manas* one by one (*pravibhāgaśaḥ*), the Śruti now explains Prāṇa, their supporter,¹ which is not explained (so far). [143]

¹ Cf. BU 4.4.22.

अन इत्यविशिष्टस्य वायोर्ग्रहणमिष्यते ।
स एव प्रादिसंबन्धाद्विशेषार्थो भवेदसुः ॥१४४॥

By the word *ana* is understood (lit. desired to be signified) wind which is unspecified; and the same, viz. Asu, has specified meanings owing to its connection with (*upasargas*) beginning with *pra*.¹ [144]

NKL points out that 'wind' in the body is called by names Prāṇa, Apāna etc., but *in reality* there is only one wind. Read: *prāṇādibheda anupādhikaḥ na svābhāvikaḥ*.

¹The term *prādi* is used by Pāṇini and other grammarians for *upasargas*; here, they are used with *ana* mentioned in verses 145-149 below.

उत्सर्गो मुखनासाभ्यां पिण्डस्य प्रणतिस्तथा ।
 प्राणो नाम मरुद्वृत्तिरपानस्त्वधुनोच्यते ॥१४५॥
 अवाग्वायोरपश्वासो देहस्यावाग्गतिस्तथा ।
 अपान एष कथितो व्यानः सांप्रतमुच्यते ॥१४६॥
 वीर्यवत्कर्महेतुत्वं व्याप्य देहे च वर्तनम् ।
 व्यानवृत्तिरियं प्रोक्ता ह्युदानाख्यापि कीर्त्यते ॥१४७॥
 योद्यमादिक्रियाहेतुस्तथाभ्युदयकर्मकृत् ।
 उत्कर्षहेतुर्देहे तु वृत्तिः सौदानसंज्ञिता ॥१४८॥
 समाहरति वृत्तीयो हृद्देशे कीलवत्स्थितः ।
 स समान इति ज्ञेयः सर्वकार्योपसंहतिः ॥१४९॥

The movement outside by mouth and nostrils and also ¹ the advancing of the body is called Prāṇa. It abides ² in Marut 'the wind'. Now is explained Apāna: [145]

The downward movement of the wind in the body and also the downward movement of the body is called Apāna, Now is explained Vyāna: [146]

Being the cause of action which is full of strength and also the movement in (the whole of) the body is called the function ³ Vyāna. Now is explained (the function) called Udāna. [147]

That function, which is the cause of activities, viz. rising up etc., which brings about worldly prosperity and which is the cause of well-being, is called as the function Udāna. [148]

The one who conducts (the aforesaid) functions, ⁴ residing in the region of the heart, ⁵ like a (firmly driven in) nail, is to be known as Samāna, the one who accomplishes (or leads)

all (human) activities.

[149]

¹This is for *tathā*. But SP understands by *tathā* a reference to other places in the body where *prāṇa* functions, viz. *nābhi*, *stana* and *pādāṅguṣṭha*.

²*ṛtti* here seems to have derived from verb root *ṛt* 'to be', i.e. 'to abide'.

³Sureśvara specifically uses the word *ṛtti* in verses 147, 148 and 149 but not in verses 145 and 146.

⁴There is mention made of *ṛttis* 'functions' which were understood in verses 145-148; this indicates that the words *prāṇa* etc. are functions as well as those that perform them (*ṛtti-ṛttimadabhedena nirdeśaḥ*).

⁵*hrd* is indicative of *nābhi* and other regions of the wind.

यस्यैता वृत्तयः प्रोक्ता वृत्तिमान्सोऽन उच्यते ।
संपूर्यावस्थितो देहं शाकल्यप्रश्ननिष्ठितः ॥१५०॥

That is called Ana, the performer of functions, (that is to say) the one whose functions are thus stated; that one, having occupied the body, remains in the body— (the one) stated in conclusion (of the answer to the question) of Śākalya.¹

[150]

¹This is a reference to BU 4.9.26: *kasminn udānaḥ pratiṣṭhitah, samāna iti*. The mention of Ana as separate from Prāṇa etc. in the BU is thus explained.

प्राणशब्दः पुरा प्रोक्तो वृत्तिमात्राभिधायकः ।
अन्ते वृत्तिमदर्थः स्यात्सर्वं प्राण इतीरणात् ॥१५१॥

The word *prāṇa* which is used herebefore¹ is expressive of all functions,² but that (i.e. the same) occurring in the end refers to the one which performs those functions; (this is so) on the authority of the statement *sarvam prāṇaḥ*.³

[151]

This verse justifies the note after verse 149 above.

¹In the relevant portions of the BU and the BUBV.

²That is, all *ṛttis*.

³Cf. CU 3.15 also.

नाम रूपं तथा कर्म संहतं सत् त्रिदण्डवत् ।
मिथः संकीर्णवृत्तिस्थं देह आत्मेति चोच्यते ॥१५२॥

Name, form and activity— (this triad) holding together like three sticks,¹ (intermixing their) functions, is the body and also the Ātman.² [152]

¹The sticks together are called *kuḍya* etc. 'roof, wall etc. of a thatched hut'. The number three is owing to the force of the triad of foods, though it is merely descriptive and stands for many.

²This stands as a synonym of *deha*.

एतावानेव संघातो देहः प्राणादिरूपकः ।
वाङ्मयोऽथ प्राणमयस्तथैव च मनोमयः ॥१५३॥

Only this much ensemble is called the body and has the form of Prāṇa etc.,¹ (and) that is made up of what is of the nature of Vāk, that of Prāṇa and also that of *manas*. [153]

¹That is, *manas*, Vāk and Prāṇa.

नामात्र वाङ्मयं सर्वं रूपं सर्वं मनोमयम् ।
तद्वत्प्राणमयं कर्म देहस्यास्यैष संग्रहः ॥१५४॥

In this (context), name is all that is made up of Vāk, all (that is called) form is what is made up of *manas* and similarly (all) activity is made up of Prāṇa— this is a brief statement¹ (i.e. description of the nature) of this² body. [154]

¹The term *saṃgraha* technically stands for a statement of some

proposition in brief— a sort of summing up of the argument.

²This is to say: the directly perceptible body.

Now follows the discussion of BU 1.5.4-10. In verses 155-167 there is description of manas, Vāk and Prāṇa with reference to the ādhibhautika world. Sureśvara clarifies the matter of BU under the sphere of manas, Vāk and Prāṇa; it is to be noted that he does not follow the sequence of the readings in the BU.

अन्नत्रयविभागोऽयमध्यात्म उपवर्णितः ।

अथाधिभूतविषये विभागस्तस्य कीर्त्यते ॥१५५॥

(So far) is explained this division of the three foods, which is in relation to the body, and now is being stated (in the following) the division of that in respect of what belongs to matter. [155]

भूर्लोकं जानतर्ग्वेदं देवा माता च वागियम् ।

अधिभूत इह प्रोक्ता विज्ञातं यच्च सा च वाक् ॥१५६॥

[In verses 156-160, Sureśvara explains what is called *pariāya-pāñcaka* 'the five forms' for the worship of Vāk, *manas* and Prāṇa each. They are the five triads, viz. (i) *lokatraya*, (ii) *vedatraya*, (iii) *deva-pitr-manuṣya*, (iv) *pitṛ-mātr-prajā* and (v) *vijñāta-vijijñāsyā-avijñāta*. This is based on the Śruti passage: *trayo lokā eta eva ... prāṇa enaṁ tad bhūtvāvati*.]

Know (this Vāk) as this world and the *Rgveda*. This Vāk which is described as abiding in the elements is the gods and the mother. And, further, what is objective knowledge (or, the knowledge of objects, viz. *vijñāna*) is also Vāk. [156]

अन्तरिक्षं यजर्वेदः पितरश्च पिता तथा ।

इह यच्च विजिज्ञास्यं तन्मनोऽत्राधिभौतिकम् ॥१५७॥

The sky (i.e. the middle world), the *Yajurveda*, the manes and the father and whatever here (i.e. in the worldly dealings) is wished to be known,¹ all that is *manas* in respect of the material (or elemental) world. [157]

¹ *vijijñāsyā* here is in contrast with *vijñāta* in the preceding verse.

द्युलोकः सामवेदश्च मनुष्याः प्रजया सह ।
यच्च किञ्चिदविज्ञातं प्राणोऽसावाधिभौतिकः ॥१५८॥

The heaven, the *Sāmaveda*, men together with offspring and whatever has been unknown are all that *Prāṇa* who is related to the material (or elemental) world. [158]

यत्किञ्चिदिह विज्ञातं तद्वाग्रूपं प्रचक्षते ।
मनोरूपं विजिज्ञास्यं प्राणस्याज्ञातमेव तु ॥१५९॥

Whatever is here (in the world) known is, they say, the manifestation (lit. form) of *Vāk* and whatever is wished to be known is the manifestation (lit. form) of *manas*, but (or and) whatever of *Prāṇa* is unknown. [159]

भूर्लोकदिषु सर्वेषु मनोवाक्प्राणलक्षणम् ।
यथासंभवमायोज्यमेकैकस्मिन्त्रयं त्रयम् ॥१६०॥

All these three, viz. this triad having the nature of *manas*, *Vāk* and *Prāṇa*, is to be connected with each one of all these regions beginning with this world,¹ according to suitability. [160]

¹ Referring to *bhuvah-* and *svah-* also.

अधिभूते यतोऽशक्या वक्तुं वागादिविस्तृतिः ।
यत्किञ्चेत्युपसंहारं लक्षणोक्त्या ततोऽकरोत् ॥१६१॥

As the extent of Vāk etc. in respect of the material (or elemental) world is impossible to state, (the Upaniṣad) stated, by way of conclusion, this general statement¹ *yat kiṃ ca*. [161]

¹Cf. *lakṣaṇoktiḥ sāmānyavacanam* (SP).

लक्षणेनैव संसिद्ध आधिभौतिकसंग्रहे ।
त्रय इत्यादिकोक्तिस्तु नियमार्थेति निश्चयः ॥१६२॥

(Thus) after the brief statement of the material (or elemental) world is established by (i.e. in the form of) a general statement, the (subsequent) statement beginning with (the word) *trayaḥ* is for restricting¹ (its scope)— this is the decision. [162]

¹SP explains thus: This refers to the meditation on these three foods as *manas*, Vāk and Prāṇa and not to any other foods. Cf. *bhūrādyātmanā vāgādi dhyeyam iti niyantum*.

व्याख्याने प्रस्तुते त्वस्मिन्नविद्यायाः समन्ततः ।
कार्यकारणरूपेण तस्या एषोपसंहतिः ॥१६३॥

While there was (thus) introduced an exposition on Avidyā all around, there is (here) this concluding remark (or brief statement) about it as one (appearing) in the form of causes and effects. [163]

Earlier there is stated the variety of the forms of Avidyā in their full extent, but now the same is briefly stated as having cause and effect relation among them.

.. प्राणात्मना तदज्ञातं ब्रह्म कारणमुच्यते ।
नामात्मना तु तन्मानं मनोरूपं च मीयते ॥१६४॥

In the form of Prāṇa is stated that Brahman which has been unknown, as the cause; the knowledge (*māna*) of it¹ however is grasped (*mīyate*)¹ in the form of a name and it is in the

form of *manas*.

[164]

¹*mīyate* means *viśeṣato jñāyate*. As a result, it has not been known as the real cause.

यतोऽविद्यैव सर्वेयं मनोवाक्प्राणलक्षणा ।
अतस्तत्तत्त्वसंबोधात्तां जग्ध्वामृतमश्नुते ॥१६५॥

Since all this, which is in the form of (i.e. is characterized as) *manas*, Vāk, and Prāṇa, is but Avidyā; therefore after having eaten up (i.e. overcome) that and having thus known the true nature of them ² one attains immortality.³ [165]

¹Namely, Avidyā.

²Namely, *manas*, Vāk and Prāṇa— these as the Brahman.

³*amṛta* is for *amṛtatva*.

विज्ञातादन्यदेवैतद्विज्ञातात्तथा पृथक् ।
ब्रह्मैतदुभयं जग्ध्वा पूर्णमेवावशिष्यते ॥१६६॥

This Brahman, which is quite distinct from what is known ¹ and from what is not known,² overcomes both (of them), and (then it) remains only as full.³ [166]

¹This is used in the worldly way (*vyavahārabhūmau*).

²Cp. *Kenopaniṣad* 1.4ab: *anyad eva tad veditād atho aviditād adhi*.

³Cf. *pūrṇam adaḥ pūrṇam idam ... pūrṇasya pūrṇam ādāya pūrṇam evāvaśiṣyate* (BU 5.1.1).

विज्ञातादिविदं भोगैर्वागाद्या देवता नरम् ।
विज्ञातादिस्वरूपेण तमवन्ति पृथक्पृथक् ॥१६७॥

The gods Vāk and others, each one of them severally, product (or favour) ¹ the individual, the knower of them in their forms, which are known etc.² by (yielding to him) enjoyments. [167]

¹This is vedic use of the verb root *av* in a double sense.

²The word etc. stands for *vijijñāsyā* and *avijñāta*.

Now follows the discussion of BU 1.5.11 up to verse 177.

वागादयस्तावदुक्ताः संक्षेपेणाधिभौतिकाः ।
तेषामेवाधिदैवेऽथ व्याख्या प्रस्तूयतेऽधुना ॥१६८॥

So far, Vāk etc. in relation to the material (or elemental) world have been explained in brief and now is introduced an explanation of the same with respect to the sphere of the gods. [168]

This connects what follows, viz. *tasyai vācaḥ* ... with the preceding exposition.

अध्यात्ममधिभूतं च यस्या रूपं पुरोदितम् ।
अधिदैवविवक्षायां तस्या वाच इदं वपुः ॥१६९॥

That Vāk, whose manifestation (or form) with respect to the body and the material (or elemental) world has been explained earlier, has (now, it will be stated,) this form with respect to the sphere the gods. [169]

This is the meaning of *tasyai vācaḥ*

अध्यात्ममधिभूतं च व्याख्याता यात्र वाक्पुरा ।
वाचा सर्वाधिदैविक्या संव्याप्ता साविभागतः ॥१७०॥

Among these (viz. Vāk etc.),¹ Vāk, which has been earlier explained with respect to the body and the material (or elemental) world, is wholly² covered by Vāk in relation to all their gods. [170]

This explains *tad yāvatī*

The twofold nature of Vāk, which is earlier explained, is the effect (*vr̥tṭyantara*) of this Vāk which is to be explained now, i.e. it is really *kāraṇarūpā*.

¹This is for *atra* = *madhye vāgādhīnām* (SP).

²Cf. *dvididhayā ādhidaivikyā kāraṇabhūtayā vācā tādātmyena vyāptā ity arthaḥ* (SP).

Here, Sureśvara introduces Bhartṛprapañca's explanation of *vācaḥ pṛthivī* ... which he appears to find acceptable. Bhartṛprapañca's view runs up to verse 177.

तामसं कठिनं चोर्वी शरीरं वाच उच्यते ।
अग्नेः प्रकाशरूपस्य साधारत्वेन संस्थिता ॥१७१॥

This earth is called the body of Vāk; it is full of darkness and is hard and that (earth) has remained as the support of Agni which is in the form of Light. [171]

SP reports Bhartṛprapañca's comment: *vāco 'dhidaivam pṛthivī śarīram kāṭhinyād ghanatvāt tāmasam*.

The second line explains *jyotīrūpam*

अग्निस्तु सात्त्विकं रूपमाधेयत्वेन स क्षितौ ।
वर्तते तामसे रूपे दैव्येवं द्विविधा हि वाक् ॥१७२॥

And Agni is that form (of Vāk) which is full of Sattva(guṇa) and it obtains in the earth, and remains in the form of darkness as what is supported. Thus, this divine Vāk (exists in a) twofold (form). [172]

This is the purport of Bhartṛprapañca's Bhāṣya: *saiṣā dvividhena rūpeṇa pāṛthivena taijasena cāvasthitā* with reference to *ādhārā-dheyavibhāga*.

अध्यात्ममधिभूतं च वागेकैवाधिदैविकी ।
सामान्यव्यक्तिभेदेन ह्येकानेका च सोच्यते ॥१७३॥

इत्येवं केचिदिच्छन्ति तथान्यादृगपीष्यते ।
तत्रैवं सति वाग्रूपे एवंव्याख्यातरूपके ॥१७४॥

In relation to the body and to the material (or elemental) world, there is Vāk, all alone, as related to it, and that¹ is described as one and also as many with respect to the distinction of (its one) common and particular forms.² [173]
Thus think some³ and, in this way is (that Vāk) understood to be of a different nature. That being so (understood),⁴ these are the two manifestations (or forms) of that Vāk⁵ thus explained (above). [174]

¹The word *sā* refers to Agni (i.e. Vāk in this form)— SP.

²This refers to Bhartṛprapañca's Bhāṣya *adhivaivam ca sarvam agnir ekām devatām upādadaḥ ekaikaḥ kṛtsnām devatām upādatte* on *sāmānya*....

³This is the conclusion in Bhartṛprapañca's view; cf. SP: *adhyātmādhībhūtādhidaiveṣu sāmānyaviśeṣabhāvavad avasthāvad-* (NKL: *avasthāvasthāvad-*) *-bhāvena aṁśāṁśibhāvena ca tair iṣṭā vāgdevatā*.

⁴What follows explains Bhartṛprapañca's word *tatra*.

⁵That is, in its common and particular nature.

यावत्येषा च वागुक्ता तस्या इत्येवमादिना ।
अध्यात्मादिपरिच्छिन्ना या वाक्सा तावती मता ॥१७५॥

And that Vāk of whatever extent (or measure)¹ that is explained there in the words *tasyai* etc. as (what is) delimited (or marked) by its relation to body etc.² is wholly (or, all of it) understood by the word *tāvatī* as related to gods. [175]

This explains Bhartṛprapañca's Bhāṣya: *yāvaty eva vāg adhy-ātmam adhibhūtam vā tāvatī* (SP).

¹This has reference to *ekānekatva*.

²The word etc. refers to *adhibhūta*.

वागध्यात्मेऽधिभते च तावत्येषाधिदैविकी ।
तेन तेन विशेषेण देवतैव यतो भवेत् ॥१७६॥

This (Vāk) in relation to the gods is also of as much extent (or measure) as that which is in relation to the body and to the material (or elemental) world, since it becomes that god with that particular characteristic of the same. [176]

In the previous verse was stated the oneness of *ādhidaivika* Vāk with *adhyātmādhībhūta* (viz. twofold) Vāk.

This explains *kiṃ kāraṇam* in Bhartṛprapañca's comment.

एकैकत्राधिकारेऽग्निः स एव व्यवतिष्ठते ।
पृथिव्यग्निस्वरूपेण क्वचिद्वागात्मना भवेत् ॥१७७॥

In respect of each sphere, there remains (i.e. abides) the same Agni, but, at some place,¹ it remains in the form of fire on earth and, at some other, as having the nature of Vāk. [177]

This explains *tāvan ayam agniḥ* in BUB. Bhartṛprapañca is in agreement, as his remark quoted by SP shows. Thus read: *uktam hi— sa evāyam agniḥ pṛthivyātmanā vāgātmanā vaikai-kasminn adhikārasthale (= -sthāne) kārtsnyena draṣṭavyaḥ*.

¹This refers to the *adhidaivādivibhāga*.

Now follows the discussion of BU 1.5.12 up to verse 192.

यथोदितमिदं योज्यं मनःप्राणात्मनोरपि ।
दैव्यां वाचि यदुद्दिष्टं तुल्यव्याख्यानहेतुतः ॥१७८॥

This (explanation), which is (earlier) offered, in respect of divine Vāk, is to be held (or accepted) in respect of *manas* and *Prāṇa* also, on account of the similar explanations.¹ [178]

This refers to the BU passage *athaitasya manah* ... in whose

explanation Sureśvara holds both Śaṅkara and Bhartṛprapañca to have adopted the same method as in that of Vāk, i.e. while explaining the words *tasyai vācaḥ* ... and *tāvatī* ... in verses 168ff.

¹It refers to the similarity in explaining the earlier and subsequent passages. In other words, Sureśvara sees unity of purport in them. Cf. SP: *pūrvottaravākyānām* to be supplied after *tulyavyākhyānahetutaḥ*.

अध्यात्ममधिभूतं च प्रजा गीर्मनसोर्यथा ।

अधिदैवेऽपि तद्वाच्यमित्यर्थः पर आगमः ॥१७९॥

As (there has been described) the offspring (or effect) of speech (Vāk) and *manas* with respect to the body and to the material (or elemental) world, so also has it to be described with respect to the sphere of the gods— with this purpose proceeds the subsequent Śruti. [179]

This refers to *tau mithunam* ... 'jāyata. SP and NKL here clarify thus: *mana evāsyātmā vāg jāyā prāṇaḥ prajety adhyātme mana eva pitā vān mātā prāṇaḥ prajety adhibhūte ca vān-manasayoḥ prāṇasya prajātvam uktam tathādhidaive 'pi tasya prajātvam vācyam ityevamarthā śrutiḥ*.

मनसश्चन्द्रभावो हि सर्वत्र श्रूयते स्फुटः ।

तस्यादित्येन संबन्धः कस्मादत्राभिधीयते ॥१८०॥

(A question arises:) Indeed, everywhere¹ (in Upaniṣadic passages) *manas* is clearly heard to become the moon; therefore how is here stated its relation² to Āditya? [180]

In verses 180-182, Sureśvara's wording appears to be somewhat puzzling! The words *sambandha*, *saṁdhatte* and *abhisambandha* point to connection and not to origination.

The word *prasava* seems to show affinity with the verb *pracodayāt* in the well-known Gāyatrī (i.e. Savitr) Mantra. Also, cf. the usual ritual formula: *devasya tvā savituḥ prasave* ... However, *candra-*

bhāvaḥ (*sarvatra śrūyate sphuṭaḥ*)— cf. the citation in SP (quoted above)— possibly acceptable to Bhartṛprapañca would justify the word *anugrahavyapekṣā* in the following verse. The correctness of the translation is therefore doubtful.

¹This refers to BU 3.1.6: *brahmaṇārtvijā manasā candreṇa* and *Rgveda* 10.90.13 = *Vājasaneyī Saṃhitā* 31.12: *candramā manaso jātaḥ*. Cf. SP quoting thus: *uktaṃ ca sarvatra hi manasā candro bhavatīti*— possibly Bhartṛprapañca.

²This is identity of the two.

विवक्षितत्वादैक्यस्य मनोबुद्ध्योरतः श्रुतिः ।
 आदित्येनैव संधत्ते मनश्चन्द्रमसा न तु ॥१८१॥
 प्रसवाधिकृतेश्चात्र सावित्रः प्रसवस्ततः ।
 सवित्रैवाभिसंबन्धो मनसस्तेन शस्यते ॥१८२॥

(The answer is:) Since there is intended the oneness of *manas* and Buddhi, therefore does the Śruti relate *manas* only to Āditya and not to Candramas. [181]

Also since there is here the topic of origination,¹ therefore the origin (of *manas*) is from Savitr; thus there is (here) praised the close connection of *manas* only with Savitr (= Āditya).²

[182]

The question in verse 180 is answered in the light of the Bhāṣya of Bhartṛprapañca. Read SP: *manobuddhyor abhedanātmabhūtatvād iti bhartṛprapañcabhāṣyeṇa pariharati*. Read in this context: *manobuddhyor aikyaṃ vivakṣitam, tayoś ca pradhānam buddhir niścayātmavād ato buddhidevatayaiva manaḥ saṃdhatte śrutir na tu candramasā, tadabhedam abhidatte savitā buddhidevateti hi gāyatrīvidāṃ maryādeti bhāvaḥ*. The reason for so doing by the Śruti is given in verse 181. Verse 182 states another reason for the close connection of *manas* with Āditya.

¹The basis of this is the Śruti: *tataḥ prāṇo 'jāyata*.

²Read SP: (*prāṇasya manaso janmocyate*) *tac ca sarvaṃ savitr-hetukaṃ savitrpadasya sarvaprāṇiprasavaḥ tau pravṛtter atas tena-iva manasas tādātmyena saṃgatiḥ*.

अनुग्रहव्यपेक्षायां मनसश्चन्द्रमा भवेत् ।
अधिदैवं तथादित्यश्चक्षुषो देवता मता ॥१८३॥

With a help (lit. favour) in view,¹ Candramas is (lit. becomes)² (the god) of *manas* and (*tathā*) Āditya is accepted as the god of eye, with respect to the sphere of gods.³ [183]

This verse answers a query as to the purport of the Śruti passages which speak about the relation between Candramas and *manas* and also that between eye and Āditya.

The verse keeps in view the objector's question which is stated in verse 180 above. It refers to the relation between *manas* and Candramas. Possibly the questioner has in mind the sentence *brahmaṇartvijā manasā candreṇa* (BU 3.1.6)— this is quoted in the note on verse 180. Sureśvara has in mind the relation between *manas* and Candramas and also that between *cakṣus* and Āditya in BU and BUB 3.1.6 and 3.1.4 respectively. In BUB 3.1.6 has the following (which explains the first line): *tena candramasā manasāvalambanena karmaphalaṃ svargaṃ lokam prāpnoty atimucyate iti bhāvaḥ* and also *adhyātmam yajñasya yajamānasya yad idam prasiddham manaḥ so 'sau candro 'dhi-daivam*.

BU 3.1.4 runs thus (only some part is quoted): *kena yajamāno 'horātrābhyāṃ atimucyata ity adhvaryuṇartvijā cakṣuṣādityena ... tad yad idam cakṣuḥ so 'sāvādityaḥ* This implies *cakṣus* as *adhyātmā* and Āditya as *adhidaiva*.

Yet see SP: *yathāhuḥ— yatra hi manas ca buddhiś ca bhedenā vivakṣyate tatra kāmasaṃkalpādiviṣayasya manasāś candramā devatātha punar yadā kriyāprasavādiṣu vyāpriyate tadā prasava-karma vyāpnuvan manaḥ savitrdaivatam bhavatīti*. (Possibly from Bhartṛprapañca?) Possibly SP has the following to convey: *anugraha* is *upakāra* which has the nature of *prerana*. When Candramas and *manas* are not accepted as identical, such an *anugraha* is expected by *manas* and Candramas is the impelling god for *manas*. So also, Āditya is impelling god for *cakṣus*. But

this is with respect to the sphere of gods as conveyed by *adhidaiva* in the second line. It implies the non-difference between *manas* and *Buddhi*, though the latter is of principal importance. Then *buddhyadhiṣṭhātrdevatā* is identified with *manas* and that further implies: the *ādityātmaka manas* is connected with *agnyātmaka vāk*. Possibly SP has the following to convey: *anugraha* is *upakāra* which has the nature of *prerāṇa*. When Candramas and *manas* are not accepted as identical, such an *anugraha* is expected by *manas* and Candramas is the impelling god for *manas*. So also, Āditya is impelling god for *cakṣus*. But this is with respect to the sphere of gods as conveyed by *adhidaiva* in the second line. It implies the non-difference between *manas* and *Buddhi*, though the latter is of principal importance. Then *buddhyadhiṣṭhātrdevatā* is identified with *manas* and that further implies: the *ādityātmaka manas* is connected with *agnyātmaka vāk*. Our translation and notes thereon show difference from SP.

¹Refer to BU 3.1.6. The note above has a reference to *vyavahārabhūmi*, i.e. ritual and therefore the sacrificer wins the favour of Candramas.

²The word *adhidaiva* in the last part of the quotation above is the basis for this. Also, *bhavet* is for *bhavati*.

³This argument is like that in note 1 above and clarifies the relation between *cakṣus* and Āditya.

From verse 184 onwards will be offered another explanation of tau mithunam ... which was explained in verses 179ff. It will be shown that Prāṇa originates from Agni and Āditya which are Vāk and manas in the sphere of gods.

अग्निरेव यतः सर्वप्रकाशो जगतीष्यते ।

रूपाणां प्रविभागश्च त्वष्टृपाकनिबन्धनः ॥१८४॥

Since only Agni is accepted (lit. desired) in this world as the illuminator¹ of all (creation) (and) the distinction of (various) forms (i.e. manifestations) is also dependent (only) on illumination (lit. heating) by Tvaṣṭṛ² (i.e. Savitr or Āditya),

(therefore all creation originated from Āditya).

[184]

¹Agni, here the terrestrial fire or the Sun, illuminates (i.e. is the light on) the various objects in the world. This means: it is the originator of those objects— this is in relation to the material (or elemental) world. Read *Praśnopaniṣad* 1.5: *athāditya udayan ... yat sarvam prakāśayati*, also *Jaiminiyopaniṣad* 1.34.8: *imām ekām pṛthivīm vasta eka ity agnir ha sah*.

²God Tvaṣṭṛ called as Savitṛ or Āditya is the illuminator (or originator) of all manifest forms— this is in relation to the world of gods. This is understood from *Maitrāyaṇyupaniṣad* 6.15: *dve vāva brahmaṇo rūpe kālāś cākālāś ca ... atha ya ādityādyah sa kālāḥ sakalāḥ ... kālāḥ pacati bhūtāni*.

तयोर्गीर्मनसोरेवं प्रकाशप्रसवात्मनोः ।

प्राग्यथोक्तात्मनोर्योगात्प्राणोऽभूदन्तरिक्षगः ॥१८५॥

[This is the meaning of *tataḥ prāṇo 'jāyata*.]

Thus it is from those two, viz. Vāk and *manas*, who are of the nature of light and origination (and) whose nature has been described before, that there originated Prāṇa who moves about in the sky.¹

[185]

¹This refers to god Āditya— thus distinguished from the earthly fire or the Sun.

प्राणोऽभवद्यथाध्यात्मे प्रजा वाक्स्वान्तयोस्तथा ।

प्राणस्यैवाधिदैवेऽपि प्रसवोऽयमिहोच्यते ॥१८६॥

As Prāṇa became the offspring of Vāk and *manas*, in relation to what is abiding in a body; so also, in the sphere of the gods, this¹ is the birth (or origination) of Prāṇa.

[186]

¹That is, owing to the union of Vāk and *manas*. This is the conclusion of the thought which continued from verse 179 above.

नान्नत्रयं व्यपेक्ष्येह जन्म प्राणस्य कथ्यते ।
किंतु पाङ्क्तक्रियापेक्षं प्राणजन्माभिधीयते ॥१८७॥

Here (i.e. in this sentence that is explained), the origin (lit. birth) of Prāṇa is not stated, in view of the three foods; but this origin of Prāṇa is stated in view the performance of Pāṅktakarman (=ritual activity). [187]

This explains how *tataḥ prāṇo 'jāyata* is not a repetition of *mano vācam prāṇam* in BU 1.5.3 earlier.

स यथाध्यात्मिके देहे प्राणस्तद्वत्प्रजापतेः ।
अन्तरिक्षगतः प्राणः स एष परमेश्वरः ॥१८८॥

As, in relation to the body,¹ Prāṇa (was born) from Prajāpati, so also was it born (from the divine Vāk and *manas*, in the sphere of gods).² That Prāṇa, which abides in the mid-region is this overlord. [188]

¹This stands for *adhibhūta* 'elemental world' also.

²Translation is based on SP.

यतोऽसपत्नस्तेनायमिन्द्र इत्यभिधीयते ।
ननु वाङ्मनसे स्तोऽस्य तत्कुतोऽस्यासपत्नता ॥१८९॥

As this one is without any opponent,¹ therefore it is called Indra.² Here (one might ask:) But there are Vāk and *manas* (beside Prāṇa); how then can it be without any opponent? [189]

¹This refers to Parameśvara in verse 188 above. The intended meaning is: one without a second.

²Vāyu, i.e. Indra, who is thus mentioned, is the overlord of the gods.

नैवं वाङ्मनसे यस्मात्प्राणवृत्त्यैव जीवतः ।
यदनेनान्नमत्तीति तस्मादेत इतीरणात् ॥१९०॥

(The answer is:) This cannot be so, since Vāk and *manas* continue to be (lit. are) alive owing only to the function of Prāṇa— (this is said) on the authority of the statements *yad anenānnam atti* and *tasmād etc.*¹ [190]

¹Read: *yad annenānnam atti tenaitās tṛpyanti* (BU 1.3.18) and *tasmād etc etenākhyāyante prāṇāḥ* (BU 1.5.21).

प्राणस्यैव यतो वृत्ति उक्ते वाङ्मनसे अपि ।
प्राणस्यातोऽद्वितीयत्वं ततश्चेन्द्रत्वमेव च ॥१९१॥

Since it is said that Vāk and *manas* also are the modifications of Prāṇa itself, therefore Prāṇa has singular nature¹ and has, as a consequence, the nature of the moon. [191]

¹It is literally, being one without a second.

न सपत्नो भवत्यस्य योऽसपत्नं विवेद हि ।
असपत्नमुपासीनः ससपत्नः कुतो भवेत् ॥१९२॥

He, who knows (this one) as having no opponent, does not have any opponent. How can one have an opponent (for oneself), who (lit. when he) is devoted to that who has no opponent. [192]

This is an Arthavāda *nāsyā sapatno bhavati*.

Now, follows the discussion of BU 1.5.13 up to verse 202.

उक्ता पाङ्क्तानुरोधेन वाङ्मनःप्राणसंश्रया ।
अन्नत्रयविभागेन प्रक्रिया त्वधुनोच्यते ॥१९३॥

So far has been explained (the result) related to Vāk, *manas*

and Prāṇa, in accordance with the Pāṅkta(karman). Now is explained the result (of their worship)¹ in accordance with the division of the three foods. [193]

What now follows is for explaining away the apparent contradiction involved in first accepting Vāk and *manas* to have originated from Prāṇa and as its subordinates and later in accepting them as its equal— cf. *te ete sarva eva samāḥ*. The earlier explanation referred to *pāṅkta karman* which implied the *guṇapradhāna* relation of Prāṇa and *vāṇmanase*. Now, the same relation is not accepted. There is equal status of them all, in connection with Upāsanā.

¹The word *prakriyā* means *phalam* 'result'; cf. SP: *tatphalasya pāṅktatvaṃ vaktum*. NKL agrees. Also, see verse 203 below.

अध्यात्ममधिभूतं च तथा चैवाधिदैवतम् ।
उक्ता वागादयः सर्वे समा एवेति गृह्यताम् ॥१९४॥

Vāk etc. are explained in relation to the body and the material (or elemental) world and also in relation to the world of the gods (as subordinate to Prāṇa); (but) let it be accepted that all (the three) of them are just equal (in status). [194]

This is the explanation of *ta ete sarva eva samāḥ*.

साम्यं केन प्रकारेणेत्यनन्ता इत्यतोऽवदत् ॥१९५॥

(In answer to the question:) 'In what way is there equality (among them)?', the Śruti has stated *anantāḥ* [195]

नन्वध्यात्मेऽधिभूते च परिच्छिन्नाः पुरोदिताः ।
वागादयस्त्वह कथमनन्ता इत्युदीरणम् ॥१९६॥
नैतदेवं यतोऽनन्ताः सर्वे भावा यथोदिताः ।
वाचा सर्वाधिदैविक्या लोकादेरप्यनन्तता ॥१९७॥

(On this, one would ask a question:) But it was (earlier) stated

that, in relation to the body and to the material (or elemental) world, Vāk etc. are delimited; how then is there the statement that they are *ananta* 'endless'? [196]

(The answer is:) This is not so, since all those things (lit. becomings) that were enumerated are endless; the regions etc.¹ also have endlessness thanks to the Vāk² being related to the entire world of gods. [197]

This objection is based on the contradiction involved between the earlier and later statements. It is explained away in the following verse. The answer is given: The endlessness of Vāk etc. follows from their being related to gods.

This is one reason for saying Vāk etc. are infinite.

¹Cf. SP: *bhurādilokānām tadantasthadevādinām ca* for the explanation of the word etc.

²The word *vācā* implies *manasā prāṇena ca*.

अधिकारपरिच्छेदे सर्वं यस्मात्समाप्यते ।
नासंहतायाः कर्तृत्वं देवतायाः स्वतोऽपरैः ॥१९८॥
स्वाधिकारविनिष्पत्तौ देवता देवतागणम् ।
सर्वमेवात्मसात्कृत्वा तत्तत्कार्यं करोति हि ॥१९९॥

Since all¹ is put together² (by one) in the accomplishing of some function (or activity);³ (and) there is no agency on the part of the divinity which is not contained (or delimited) by itself or by others;⁴ [198]
for,⁵ in accomplishing its own function (or activity),⁶ (every) god gets united with⁷ the entire group of gods and (only) then it can produce every effect.⁸ [199]

¹This stands for *vāgādi*.

²That is, put within limits.

³*adhikārapariccheda* = *vyāpāranirvṛttiḥ* (SP), (*-niṣpattiḥ* NKL); cf. *svādhikāraviniṣpatti* in the next verse.

⁴The divinity is all, viz. Vāk, *manas* and *Prāṇa*, together; this togetherness is not effected by anyone else. As a result, it is

capable of producing effects which are infinite in number. The next verse clarifies this thought.

⁵This is because of *hi*. This is according to SP which cites a line (possibly from the Bhāṣya of Bhartṛprapañca, cf. the note by the editor of NKL). It appears that Bhartṛprapañca has based his explanation of the relevant Upaniṣadic passage on Madhu Brāhmaṇa (NKL). Read: *yathāhuḥ— yat pṛthivyā ānanyam devatāyās tad ekaikasminn ādhyātimika ādhībhautike cādhikāra-paricchede parisamāpyata iti*.

⁶Alternatively, while producing its own effects.

⁷It literally means: containing the entire group of gods within itself.

⁸Or, each of the various effects.

आभतसंप्लवस्थानमानन्त्यं चेह गृह्यते ।
कर्मकार्यस्य हि सतो मुख्यानन्त्यं न युक्तिमत् ॥२००॥

And, in this (sentence), endlessness¹ is understood as the existence of the entire ensemble (of these gods) up to the (absolute) merger of (all) beings.² But (one might observe:) Indeed, endlessness in its principal sense cannot stand to reason,³ when it is an effect of (some) function. [200]

¹Cf. note in the NKL edition: *deśataḥ kālataḥ vastutaś ca paricchedaśūnyatvam* (unlimitedness).

²Cf. *ā saṃsārāt sthitaḥ* in BUBV 1.6.40.

³That is to say: it is not reasonable since it involves opposition to Śruti statements regarding the perishable nature of whatever is born (or produced).

एवं सतीह योऽनन्तानुपास्ते सततोद्यतः ।
सोऽनन्तमेव वागादिलोकमाप्नोति मानवः ॥२०१॥

This being so, (a person) who, ever agile, worships the endless (Vāk etc.) obtains in this (worship)¹ the region of Vāk etc. which is only endless. [201]

This explains *sa yo haitān*

Here is understood the endlessness of the region of Vāk etc.

¹*vāgādyupāsanā* which is *adhikṛtā*. The words 'ever agile ... (worship)' refer to *aparicchinnatva* of *deśa-kāla-vastu*.

उपास्तेऽन्तवतो यस्तु सोऽन्तवन्तमवाप्नुते ।
लोकं यतस्ततोऽनन्तमेत्यनन्तात्मभावनात् ॥२०२॥

But he, who worships (Vāk etc.) which have an end (or a limit), obtains only that region which has an end (or limit). (Therefore the Śruti means:) A man will attain to the infinite world, by being devoted to (or meditating on) (Vāk etc.) as endless. [202]

SP clarifies this thus: *aparicchinne 'nnatraye sūtrātmany ātmatā-dhyānād iti yāvat*.

Now follows the discussion of BU 1.5.14 up to verse 216.

अधिकारो द्वयोरत्र प्रकृतः पाङ्क्तकर्मणः ।
प्रक्रियान्नत्रयस्यापि विभागः प्रकृतस्तथा ॥२०३॥

So far (*atra*) is discussed the sphere of the two.¹ (Now), there is introduced (in this section) the division of the results and of the three foods in relation to the Pāṅktakarman. [203]

¹Namely, Upāsanā and its result.

तत्राधिदैवमुक्तानि त्रीण्यन्नानि विभागशः ।
सोपासनानि पाङ्क्तस्य वक्तव्यमवशिष्यते ॥२०४॥

In that context have been stated the three foods, in relation to the sphere of the gods as in distinct divisions,¹ together with the worship of the same. There now remains to be stated (the result of those three) in relation to Pāṅkta(karman). [204]

¹It means: as *dhyāna* (or *Upāsanā*) and its result (in the case of each).

अधिदैवे त्रयं तूक्तं मनोवाक्प्राणलक्षणम् ।
पाङ्क्तस्य कर्मणः कार्यं नोक्तं वित्तं च कर्म च ॥२०५॥

In relation to the sphere of the god has been already stated the triad (of foods), characterized as *manas*, *Vāk* and *Prāṇa*; but the result of the *Pāṅktakarman*, viz. wealth (*vitta*) and performance (*karman*), has not been stated. [205]

manas, *Vāk* and *Prāṇa* have been stated as *mātā*, *pitā* and *prajā*. But *vitta* and *karman* were not stated, i.e. the character of the *Pāṅktakarman* had not been stated in its fullness.

पाङ्क्तस्य कर्मणः कार्यं न तावदवगम्यते ।
पाङ्क्तत्वसिद्धये यावन्नोच्येते वित्तकर्मणी ॥२०६॥

Indeed, the result of the *Pāṅktakarman* cannot be understood so long as the *vitta* and *karman* of it are not stated for establishing its character as *Pāṅkta*. [206]

The subsequent section describes the *Pāṅkta* character of the result by describing *vitta* etc.

लोककालात्मको देवो विराट्संज्ञः प्रजापतिः ।
तस्याधिलोकमात्मोक्तो योऽयमन्नत्रयात्मकः ॥२०७॥

Prajāpati, (otherwise) called as *Virāj*, is the god having the nature of the region(s) (*loka*) and time (*kāla*). His nature in relation to the regions has been (already) described, i.e. as of the nature of the three foods. [207]

अधिकालं तु योऽस्यात्मा सोऽयं चन्द्रमसोच्यते ।
पक्षमासर्तुवर्षादेः स कर्ता कर्मणोऽनिशम् ॥२०८॥

But (or, And) that which is his nature as related to time is here conveyed by (the word) *candramas*; he is incessantly (lit. day and night) the agent of the *karman* (result), viz. of a fortnight, a month, a season, a year etc. [208]

This explains why Prajāpati is called Kāla. The second line expresses the *karman*, i.e. the result of its activity.

हानिवृद्धिस्वभावेन वित्तं चाप्यत्र लक्ष्यते ।
कलाकाष्ठालवाद्यात्मा विश्वं विपरिणामयन् ।
प्राणपिण्डात्मकः काल आ महाप्रलयात्स्थितः ॥२०९॥

Also, in this context,¹ *vitta* 'wealth' is understood (lit. characterized) by its nature of gradual waning and waxing. This Kāla, having the nature of Prāṇa and body² and having the nature of *kalā*, *kāṣṭhā*, *lava* etc.,³ has remained up to the absolute merger, modifying⁴ all (the world). [209]

¹That is, in relation to Candramas.

²That is, being Sūtrātman and Virāj.

³This means division of time. In this respect, NKL states the following: *lavādilakṣaṇam anyatroktam; nalinīdalasaṃhatyām sūkṣmasūchyabhivedhane, dale dale tu yaḥ kālaḥ sa kālo lavavācakaḥ* (1) *lavaiḥ truṭiḥ syāt trimśadbhiḥ kalām tāvattruṭim viduḥ, kāṣṭhā tāvatkalā jāṇeyā tāvatkāṣṭhā nimeṣakaḥ* (2).

⁴In other words, effecting changes. In BUB it was stated: *jagadvipariṇāmayitṛtvam karma*— this needed to be explained. Therefore this is stated, i.e. continued existence and modifying the world.

यैकावशिष्यतै तस्य कला पक्षक्षये तथा ।
प्रविश्य प्राणभृत्सर्वं पक्षतो जायते पुनः ॥ २१०॥

That small part (or digit) of it (viz. *kalā*), which remains even when a full fortnight¹ has passed— this one, bearing *prāṇa*

'life', enters into all and (gradually) waxes (lit. becomes born again and again) in the second fortnight.² [210]

¹This stands for the dark fortnight of a month.

²This refers to the bright half of the month. The variant reading given in AnSS edition and mentioned by SP is *pakṣatau*; it sounds better as it is in apposition to *pakṣakṣaye* in the first line. Both are terms of Locative. For this, SP's explanation is useful. Read: *strī pakṣatiḥ pakṣamūlam iti hi paṭhanti, jāyate dvitīyakalāyukto bhavatīti yāvat*.

रात्रौ यस्मात्स एतस्यां प्रविश्यास्ते प्रजापतिः ।
प्राणभृन्निखिलं तस्माद्विंशं तस्यां परित्यजेत् ॥२११॥

Since Prajāpati, bearing all life within,¹ (first) enters into this night² and remains (i.e. continues to be there); therefore one (i.e. the sacrificer) should abandon (all) killing in that (night).³

[211]

This explains *tasmād enam*

¹This, under the lead of the preceding verse. Yet, in accordance with SP on verse 213 below, it may be possible to take this phrase as a qualifier of 'one' (i.e. the sacrificer). However, this explanation by SP does not appear to be right.

²Namely, *amāvasyā*.

³The word 'night' stands for both day and night. There is here reference to the ritual performance on the new moon day.

कलाभिरस्तः कृत्ताभिः कृकलास इति स्मृतः ।
हिंसां न कुर्यात्तस्यापि किंन्वनारब्धहिंसनम् ॥२१२॥

(Prajāpati) who is given up (lit. discarded) by the digits which are cut off, (one by one) is known as *kṛkalāsa*¹ 'a chameleon'. One should not (therefore) kill (or, cause injury to) even 'that'. What then to say about such killing as has not been undertaken (lit. is not begun)?

[212]

This is the meaning of *api kṛkalāsasya*; *yaugikārtha* as NKL puts it.

¹This stands for 'a chameleon' which is supposed to be an evil animal. Cf. NKL: *kṛkalāśaśabdasya prāṇiviśeṣe rūḍhim āśrityāha*. Read BUB: *kṛkalāśo hi pāpatmā svabhāvenaiva hiṃsyate prāṇibhir dṛṣṭo 'py amaṅgalaḥ* (on BU 1.5.14, at the end).

सामिप्रमापितस्यापि रात्रौ तस्यां विवर्जयेत् ।
प्राणभृद्धिसनं यत्नात्किन्वनारब्धपीडनम् ॥२१३॥

On that night,¹ one should give up with care even what is half killed.² What to say then about causing harm to any live animal which has yet to be undertaken? [213]

¹It stands for the new moon day.

²Namely, the killing of what still bears life. This in view of *sāmipramāpitasya = ardhahiṃsitasya* (NKL) which justifies the word *yatnāt*; *yatna* is correctly explained by SP as *hiṃsānimitte saty api tannivṛttiḥ*. We have taken *prāṇabhṛddhiṃsanam* as one word and as the object of the verb. However, SP connects *prāṇabhṛt* with the agent of *vivarjayet*. Note by the editor of NKL also points out: *prāṇabhṛd iti bhinnam padam karṭṛvācakam*.

कृकलासे प्रसिद्धा या हिंसा प्राणभृतां स्वतः ।
तामप्यत्र न कुर्वीत किमु वक्तव्यमन्यतः ॥२१४॥

The killing of a chameleon is only naturally known among those who bear life (i.e. men)¹— (but) one should not undertake even that at this time (*atra = amāvasyā*). What to say then about some other (killing)? [214]

¹Here, Sureśvara uses the word *prāṇabhṛt* in a different sense.

एतस्या एव पजायै देवताया निषेधनम् ।
प्राणभृद्धिसनस्यैह नान्यदस्य प्रयोजनम् ॥२१५॥

(This) prohibition points to the worship of this very god (viz. Prajāpati).¹ There is not any other purpose here (in this mention) of the killing of what bears life.² [215]

Killing of beings has been prohibited by the well-known dictum *na himsyāt sarvā bhūtāni* [... *maitrāyaṇagataścaret* (*Mahābhārata* 3.203.45; 12.269.5; 12.316.18), or ... *nāṇṛtaṃ vā vadetkavacit* (*Kūrma Purāṇa* 553.7(2.16); *Padma Purāṇa* 1.55.1; *Saura Purāṇa* 18.1)]. Therefore there can be the question as to why there should be this specific prohibition. This question is answered in this verse.

¹See verse 212 above.

²This justifies our acceptance of *prāṇabhṛddhimśanam* as one word in verse 213 above.

स्मृतावपि निषिद्धेयं हिंसा पर्वसु कर्मिणाम् ।
विशिष्टफलसंगत्या इहोक्तिः सत्यवद्ववेत् ॥२१६॥

In the *Smṛti*¹ also, this (or such) killing during the *parvans* has been prohibited for the ritualists. The statement (of it) here would be like truth on account of connection of the ritual(s) with specific result(s).² [216]

¹Read: *vanaspatigate some yas tu himsyād vanaspatīn, ghorāyām bhrūṇahatyāyām yujyate natra saṁśayaḥ* (1) and *vīrudho ghātayed yas tu vīrutsamsthe niśākare, patraṃ vā pātayed ekam brahmahatyām sa vindate* (2); quoted by both SP and NKL. Quotations not traced. Yet cp. the first line of the second verse with *chinattī vīrudho yas tu ... niśākare* in *Viṣṇu Purāṇa* 2.12.10.

²SP points out in this context the Mīmāṃsā method: *vidhir vā saṃyogāntarāt* and remarks: *satyavacanaviśeṣeṇa vihitam api kratvartham viśeṣeṇa vidhīyate tathāviśeṣeṇa niśiddhāpi himsā-māvāsyāyām viśeṣeṇa niśiddhyate pāpakṣayādiviśiṣṭaphalasiddhyartham iti*.

Now follows the discussion of BU 1.5.15 up to verse 220.

केवलज्ञानमात्रेण मा भूत् त्र्यन्नात्मकं फलम् ।
परात्मज्ञानवत्तस्मात्तस्योपासनमुच्यते ॥२१७॥

Lest it might mean that the fruit in the form of the triad of foods would result from merely knowing (about the food),¹ even as from the knowledge of the highest (Ātman),² therefore the worship³ of that (viz. the three foods) is now stated here.

[217]

This explains the purport of the following Śruti *yo vai samvatsarah*

¹The *kevalajñāna* does not refer to *kevalātmajñāna*. *kevala* means 'only' or 'merely' and *jñāna* means *annatrayasvarūpajñāna* and which precludes any ritual performance.

²This is *vyatirekadṛṣṭānta* 'contrary example'.

³By worship one should not understand meditation on Prajāpati. Here we refer to being 'attached to or in pursuit of' (the three foods). This is by being devoted to the same.

वित्तमेव कला मे स्युः कल्पयित्वा ध्रुवां स्वयम् ।
इत्युपासीत यः सोऽथ कलात्मानं प्रपद्यते ॥२१८॥

He, who, (having the thought)¹ 'May the digits (of Prajāpati) be my wealth',² and considering himself³ to be the (sixteenth) permanent digit, would worship (or be devoted to) Prajāpati, will attain the nature of the (sixteenth) digit.

[218]

This explains the purpose of *tasya vittam eva*.

¹*kalpayitvā* connects itself with *vittam* ... *syuḥ* and with *dhruvām svayam* in keeping with *dehalīdīpanyāya*.

²Cf. SP and NKL: *svavitte pañcadaśakalādrṣṭim kṛtvā*.

³This refers to the individual self of the worshipper.

यथोक्तगुणकं विद्वानुपासीत प्रजापतिम् ।

आरोप्यात्मशरीरेऽस्मिंस्तत्साधर्म्येण संततम् ॥२१९॥

A knower should ever worship Prajāpati, whose qualities have been stated, after superimposing him (=Prajāpati) on this his own¹ body with the notion of similar properties. [219]

The nature of worship in verse 218 is further clarified.

¹ *ātman* in *ātmaśarīra* is a reflexive pronoun, meaning (*sva*-).

वित्तमेव कलास्तस्य तद्वान्युपचयौ क्रिया ।
ध्रुवास्य देह एवायं जीवन्स्यात्षोडशी कला ॥२२०॥

His (i.e. the worshipper's) own wealth itself is the digits of him (viz. Prajāpati), the decrease and increase of the same are (Prajāpati's) activity,¹ and his own living body is this one's (viz. Prajāpati's) sixteenth digit. [220]

The idea of the similarity mentioned in the preceding verse is clarified in this verse.

¹ That is, his modifying the various forms in the world.

Now follows the discussion of BU 1.5.16 up to verse 261.

सोऽकामयत जायेति साधनान्येव नः श्रुतिः ।
अब्रवीन्न तु तत्साध्यं तदुक्त्यर्थं परा श्रुतिः ॥२२१॥

[A view may be held thus: In the earlier part of the Upaniṣad the result has been already declared, viz. a sacrificer's becoming Prajāpati, therefore the Śruti *atha trayo vāva lokāḥ* ... would become meaningless. Therefore in order to refute that view there follow verses 221-224.]

In the words *so 'kāmayata jāyā* ... (BU 1.4.17), the Śruti declared to us only the means, but it did not declare what is to be achieved thereby. (Therefore) the subsequent Śruti (proceeds) to state the same. [221]

This points out the purposefulness of the subsequent Śruti.

साधनोक्त्यैव तत्साध्यं यदि नामावसीयते ।
विशिष्टफलसंबन्धो न तथापि प्रतीयते ॥२२२॥

If (it is held that) indeed what is to be achieved can be understood by a mere statement about the means, even then their connection with any specific result is not understood.¹

[222]

¹There is a statement of mere *sādharmya*, but the result is not stated in the usual words *idam asya phalam* For this reason the subsequent Śruti is to be added.

पुत्रादिसाधनानां स्यादुत्पत्त्यादिसमन्वयात् ।
साध्यं लोकत्रयमतस्त्रयो वावेति च श्रुतिः ॥२२३॥

(One would say:) The three worlds¹ could be (achieved) by the means, viz. a son etc.,² on account of their invariable relation to origination etc.³ Therefore the Śruti proceeds (to state) *trayo vāva*

[223]

¹Sureśvara hints at liberation which also could be achieved by these means.

²The word etc. refers to *jāyā*, *vitta* and *karman*.

³The word etc. refers to *sthiti*, *pralaya*.

त्रय एव यतो लोकाः साध्याः पुत्रादिसाधनैः ।
तन्मुमुक्षुरतो मुक्त्यै त्यजेत्सर्वैषणा यतिः ॥२२४॥

[Here, Sureśvara introduces in the second line the view of an objector to the view of Bhartṛprapañca.]

Only these three worlds would be achieved by the means, namely the son etc.; therefore one who is desirous of liberation,

(i.e. one who is going to be) a mendicant, should give up all hankerings in order to achieve liberation. [224]

अन्यथैवाभिसंबन्धं केचिदत्र प्रचक्षते ।
ज्ञानादेव पुमर्थाप्तिर्निष्फले सुतकर्मणी ॥२२५॥

In this respect,¹ some² explain the connection (of *trayo vāva* ... with the preceding portion) in quite a different way.³ (But the objector's view is:) Since the end of human life⁴ can be achieved by mere worship of the three foods (lit. by knowledge of it);⁵ therefore (having) a son etc. and doing the performance of rituals are futile. [225]

¹That is, with reference to the words *trayo vāva*

²Bhartṛprapañca.

³Bhartṛprapañca has first anticipated an objector's view which Sureśvara states in verses 225cd and 226. Then he states Bhartṛprapañca's own view in verse 227ab. After that, he states the objector's view in full from verse 227cd up to verse 232c.

⁴This is becoming Prajāpati that has the nature of the three foods.

⁵*jñāna* is here (*annatraya*-)*upāsana*.

निःशेषफलसंप्राप्तेर्दर्शनादेव केवलात् ।
सुतादिना न तर्ह्यर्थो नापि स्यात्पाङ्क्तकर्मणा ॥२२६॥

Since by mere understanding (lit. seeing)¹ that there results the acquisition of complete fruit, there would not be any use of (having) a son etc.² and so also by (the performance of) any Pāṅktakarman. [226]

The view of the objector is further clarified in this verse.

¹This is *jñāna* mentioned in verse 225.

²The word etc. refers to wife and others mentioned earlier; cf. BU 1.4.1840: *ātmajāyāprajāvittavidyāḥ*.

तयोरिहार्थवत्त्वाय त्रयो वावेति भण्यते ।
परीक्ष्यैतत्परिग्राह्यं न तु निर्युक्तिकं बुधैः ॥२२७॥

(But the view of Bhartṛprapañca is:) The statement *trayo vāva* is made with a view to (justifying) the meaningfulness of the two.¹ the objector's answer to Bhartṛprapañca is:) This (idea of combination) can be accepted by the wise only after (properly) examining (the utility of the same) and (*tu*) not when it is without any reason. [227]

The first line restates (in brief) the view of Bhartṛprapañca and from the second line begins its refutation which continues up to verse 232c.

¹Namely, having a son and performing the ritual in combination with the knowledge (about rituals) and their results.

स्वफलेऽन्यानपेक्षाणां साधनानां समुच्चयः ।
न युक्तो निरपेक्षत्वाद्गमनेक्षणयोरिव ॥२२८॥

It is not proper to posit a combination of such means as are, in regard to their own results, independent (i.e. not expectant) of any others, in the same way as (the combination of the activities of) going and seeing are independent (of each other). [228]

SP points out that a blind man and a lame man do not combine, if they do not expect help of each other.

अन्यापेक्षाणि चेद्बुधैः कर्मैकत्वं तदा भवेत् ।
समुच्चित्तिर्न चैकस्य रुद्रेणापि समर्थ्यते ॥२२९॥

If (the means), depending on other(s) would produce unity of action, then there could be combination. No (such combination) would be justified by even Rudra.¹ [229]

The idea of verse 228 above is further clarified here.

¹The exact significance of the mention of Rudra cannot be guessed. Is it perhaps to signify the most mighty and capable god, the one who can achieve what is impossible.

तन्तुवीरणमृद्धारुसाधनानां पृथक्त्वतः ।
पटादिकार्यनिष्पत्तौ न तेषां स्यात्समुच्चयः ॥२३०॥

Since threads, straws, clay and (pieces of) wood are such means as have a distinction from one another,¹ there could not be a combination of them for producing such an effect as (one) piece of cloth etc.² [230]

¹That is, they are wholly unrelated to one another.

²The word etc. stands for a pitcher or a hut and others.

तुरीवेमशलाकादेः स्वकार्येऽन्योन्यसंहतेः ।
समुच्चितिरयुक्तेयं तदाप्येकत्वहेतुतः ॥२३१॥

To posit the combination of wem and woof and a wooden pin of the spindle etc. in producing their effect (or product) by combining together¹ would be unreasonable for the reason that they have oneness as the means. . [231]

The last quarter should have been *tadāpyaikatvahetutaḥ*. (?)

¹A combination does not effect oneness; the things mentioned here together form just one means towards producing a piece of cloth.

लोकत्रयस्य संप्राप्तिर्विद्ययैवेति चेन्मतम् ।
तस्याः सर्वाप्तिहेतुत्वान्नैतदेवं पृथक्त्वतः ॥२३२॥

If it is held that there results the aquisition of the three worlds only through the knowledge,¹ since it is the cause of obtaining all results; (Bhartṛprapañca says:) That is not so. They, viz. the means, are distinct from one another.² [232]

¹The word 'knowledge' refers to *annatrayasvarūpajñāna*. NKL reads: *samuccayāyogāc ca*.

²Bhartṛprapañca's refutation of the objector's view begins here. SP adds here: *uktam hi— vidyayaiva sarvabhāvāpattyā lokatrayāptir iti na prthakkāraṇatvād iti*; possibly this is from Bhartṛprapañca's Bhāṣya.

प्रत्येकं भिन्नसाध्यं हि पुत्रकर्मादिसाधनम् ।
एकाकिन्या न तत्साध्यं विद्ययैवेति निश्चयिः ॥२३३॥

Since (*hi*) each means, viz. a son, ritual activity etc. has a different purpose, only through knowledge cannot be achieved (all) that ¹— this is the decision. [233]

¹That is, the purposes of all of the means, or rather *sarvāpti*.

पुत्रेणैवेत्यतो वक्ति साधनान्तरनिहुतिम् ।
ज्योतिषेत्यत्र संचोद्य परिहारं प्रचक्षते ॥२३४॥

(Here, the objector states:) In (the words) *putreṇaiva*,¹ the Śruti affirms the denial (lit. concealment) of any other means (to the winning of the world of men) and (also) raising an objection (to this) in (the words) *jyotiṣemam*, they state the solution (of the same) thus: [234]

Thus, Bhartṛprapañca's objector points out that the emphasis (on *putreṇa*) by *eva* cannot be accepted in view of *jyotiṣemam* which is contrary to what is stated with emphasis on *eva*. The solution to these two apparently contradictory Śrutis is stated by them (who agree with him).

प्राप्त्यतिक्रमसंभित्तेर्विषयप्रविभागतः ॥२३५॥
नैतदेवं यतो नेह पुत्रोत्पत्त्यतिरेकतः ।
साधनान्तरजय्योऽयं लोकोऽतश्चोदितं न सत् ॥२३६॥

This is so, since there is distinction (*sambhitti*) made between

winning and conquering (*prāpti* and *atikrama*); that is, there is division of the results (obtained by the two).¹ [235]

(Bhartṛprapañca replies:) This is not so, for it is not (stated) here² that this world has to be conquered by another means' which is distinct (or apart) from one's begetting a son. Therefore (what is called) objection is not valid. [236]

Verse 236 explains what SP calls *avadhāraṇasādhaka*, viz. *na hi putrotpādanād anyena manuṣyalokajayo 'sti*; (SP and NKL seem to take these words as of Bhartṛprapañca's Bhāṣya). This sets aside the idea of objection in *jyotiṣemam*.

¹*prāptya* ... and *viṣayaprabhāgataḥ* stand in apposition.

²Namely, in this passage *so 'yam manuṣyalokaḥ*

ज्योतिष्टोमेन संप्राप्तिर्भोगायैव तु तत्कुतः ।
सुतेनातिक्रमोऽप्राप्तेः प्राप्तो निर्विषयस्ततः ॥२३७॥

Through (the performance of) a Jyotiṣṭoma, there is the winning of the world only for enjoyment, how then can there be the transcending (of it) by (begetting) a son? Since that (viz. winning etc.) has not followed (having a son) would have no scope.¹ [237]

Thus Bhartṛprapañca clarifies his idea.

¹This would involve the fault 'meaninglessness of the Śruti'. This suggests the wrong in the objector's view.

यद्येवं तर्हि संत्याज्यं ज्योतिषेति वचः श्रुतम् ।
मैवं मनुष्यलोकस्य यतस्तत्राप्तिरिष्यते ॥२३८॥
प्राप्तस्य ज्योतिषा तस्य पुत्रेणातिक्रमो जयः ।

(Yet an objection is raised:) If this is so, then the statement heard in the Śruti viz. *jyotiṣā* ... is to be given up. (Bhartṛprapañca answers:) Do not say so, since there is accepted in the sentence the winning of the world of men.

[238]

(There, in that context) winning means the conquering of what is obtained through a Jyotiṣṭoma sacrifice by means of (begetting) a son. [239ab]

This explains the BUB *kim idānīm tat pratiṣedhyate*. The objector's argument is based on one and the same meaning of the words *jaya* and *atikrama* in the two sentences *putreṇaiva ... jayyaḥ* and *jyotiṣemam ... jayati*. Also, this would mean: Like the word *gau*, the word *jaya* also has more meanings than one. This should, according to him, render the latter statement redundant.

This is explained in the next verse.

Yet read SP: *tatra* (i.e. in *jyotiṣṭomena* ...) *manuṣyalokaprāptir jayo 'bhipreta iha* (i.e. in *putreṇaiva* ...) *tu tato vyāvṛttir iti viśeṣa iti (bhartṛprapañca)bhāṣyenottaram*.

इति निर्युक्तिकं कैश्चिद्व्याख्यानं यत्नतः कृतम् ॥२३९॥

Thus, an explanation is given by some,¹ with (great effort). [239cd]

This is now Sureśvara's reply; here begins his refutation of Bhartṛprapañca's view regarding *putreṇaivāyaṃ loko jayyaḥ*.

¹That is, Bhartṛprapañca.

जय्य एव सुतेनायं लोक इत्यवधार्यते ।
ज्योतिषापि स चेज्जेयो जीयतां न निषिध्यते ॥२४०॥
नरलोकः सुतेनायं जय्य एवेति गण्यते ।
एवेत्ययोगावच्छिन्नौ नान्ययोगव्यपेक्षया ॥२४१॥

[Now follows a detailed treatment of Bhartṛprapañca's view.]

It is emphasised that this world (of men) has to be conquered (only) through (begetting) a son.¹ (And) if that is to be won even through (the performance of) a Jyotiṣṭoma (sacrifice), let it be won; that is not declined (by us).² [240]

It is stated (in the Śruti) that this world of men is indeed to be conquered through (begetting) a son. (In this sentence, the emphasis on ... the particle) *eva* is for excluding connection of (any) other (means) with it. [241]

The purport of the argument is: The supposed opposition between *prāpti* and *atikrama* (cf. verses 234-235 above) is not warranted. If more means can help the winning, there is nothing unwelcome.

¹In *putreṇaiva*, the emphasis is on that no other means can ever conquer the world, i.e. the performance of Jyotiṣṭoma would help in only attaining it and not in conquering it. Read NKL: *avadhāraṇena anyayogavyavacchedārthena virodhāt jyotiṣo na tat-phalatvam*.

²Here Sureśvara uses the word *jeya* beside the word *jayya*. The first indicates the utility of Jyotiṣṭoma in winning the world, whereas the second emphasises one's conquering (lit. transcending) it. The performance of Jyotiṣṭoma can be useful thus in addition to begetting a son. There is no objection to the help derived by its performance.

अतिक्रमो जयार्थश्चेत्सामर्थ्यादेव सिद्धितः ।

पितृलोकाद्यसंप्राप्तेस्तत्रातिक्रमगीर्वृथा ॥२४२॥

(It may be held:) the word *jaya* has the meaning of *atikrama* for the reason that the accomplishment (of the desired result) follows from the *sāmarthyā* 'capacity (of the word) for conveying that ¹ meaning'. (But this is obviated by the answer: No, that cannot be accepted) since, in that case, there would not be acquisition of the world of the manes (as well) and this would render the (Śruti's) use of the word *atikrama* meaningless.² [242]

This is a reply to the argument in *prāptasya jyotiṣā* ... (verse 239) above.

¹One might understand the word to convey the sense of enjoyment of the world and (also the) consequent conquering

of it as well— this, through the (peculiar) capacity of word— and, as such, there follows the acquisition of the end (*jaya*). Therefore *putreṇaiva* is redundant.

²The answer is: The argument of the objector would apply to the acquisition of the world of the manes as well and then the Śruti statements *karmanā pitṛlokaḥ* and *vidyayā devalokaḥ* would demand the use of the word *atikrama* in the proposed sense and that is undesirable, or opposed to the meaningfulness of the Śruti.

नापुत्रस्येति निःशेषलोकास्तौ साधनं सुतः ।
श्रूयते मन्दपालादि तथा चात्र निदर्शनम् ॥२४३॥

In the Śruti statement *nāputrasya ...*¹ is heard that (begetting) a son is the means towards securing all the worlds; (and), in that context, there are illustrations seen (in the stories of) Mandapāla² and others. [243]

¹Cf. *Aitareya Brāhmaṇa* 7.13.12: *nāputrasya loko 'stīti tat sarve paśavo viduḥ, tasmāt te mātṛāpi mithunībhavanti*.

²SP quotes three verses from the *Mahābhārata* and NKL other two verses. Cf. *Mahābhārata* 12.220.7ff.; yet read verse 12 in particular: *tad apākriyate sarvaṃ yajñena tapasā sutaiḥ, tapasvī yajñakṛd vāpi na tu te vidyate prajā*. To explain *ādi* after *mandapāla*, NKL refers to another person called Citraketu and SP to Pāṇḍu.

श्रुतं साध्यं समुल्लङ्घ्य नातोऽन्यत्कामजं फलम् ।
प्रत्यग्विविदिषान्यत्र कर्मणां श्रूयते फलम् ॥२४४॥

Therefore (one should not think of) a result which arises from one's desire, after setting aside what is heard (in the Śruti) as (the one) to be achieved.¹ The desire to know the one within (*pratyak*) is heard to be the result elsewhere and not (in the context of) rituals.² [244]

¹This line seeks to reject an objector's view that 'begetting a son can be considered as useful for attaining to all the worlds as well', the reason for rejection being 'this view is not heard in the Śruti'.

²This sets aside another view of the objector: 'As the Siddhāntin gives up *svargādi* which is described in the scriptures as what is to be achieved and accepts the desire to know sentiency within to be the result, so should he discard the notion of merely attaining the worlds and then accept the winning (*atikrama*) of the same. These situations are similar in respect of the two faults *śrutahāni* and *aśrutakalpanā*.' The Siddhāntin's answer is that the two faults suggested by the objector with respect to *putreṇaiva* etc. refer to one portion of the Śruti, viz. ritualistic. As against this, the Siddhāntin gives up what is said in one section and accepts what is taught in another; there do not therefore occur the two faults.

किञ्च भुक्त्वाथवाभुक्त्वा ज्योतिष्टोमफलं नरः ।
अतिक्रामेदिमं लोकं नोभयत्रापि युज्यते ॥२४५॥

And what is more, a man may or may not have enjoyed the result of (the performance of a) Jyotiṣṭoma sacrifice, but he might yet win this world.¹ But, in the context of both, (the statement:) '(Through begetting a son) one wins this world' does not get (properly) construed.² [245]

This states another reason as to why the word *jayya* cannot have the sense of *atikrama*.

¹This expresses a possible view that the word *jayya* does not mean *atikrama*.

²This is explained in the following two/three verses.

भुक्त्वातिलङ्घनं तावद्विनापि सुतजन्मना ।
निःशेषकर्मकार्याणां भोगेनैव समाप्तिः ॥२४६॥

Even when there is not the birth of a son, there can be

transcending of the world after enjoying (the result of Jyotiṣṭoma), since all the effects (i.e. results) of all the activities are completely consumed after their enjoyment. [246]

This refers to the first alternative suggested, viz. *bhuktvā*.

परब्रह्मात्मविज्ञानजन्मनापि हि कर्मणाम् ।
नाभुक्त्वा फलमाप्नोति निर्वृतिं परमां नरः ॥२४७॥

Even by the rise of the specific knowledge about the highest Brahman, i.e. the Ātman, a man cannot obtain the highest delight, unless he has experienced (lit. enjoyed) the results of the ritual activities (which he has performed earlier). [247]

This refers to the second alternative, viz. *abhuktvā*. The argument is: The knowledge about the highest Brahman does not (or cannot) destroy one's activity that is already performed—and naturally the results of that activity also—since the activity and its result(s) get exhausted only through the enjoyment of the latter. For this, see the statement of the Śruti: *kṣīyante cāśya karmaṇī* (cf. *Muṇḍakopaniṣad* 2.2.9). This holds good in the next Adhyāya of the Upaniṣad, (*cāturthika*, as SP describes it). Note also the oft-quoted line *prārabdhakarmaṇām bhogād eva kṣayah*. And this argument is in conformity with Bhartṛprapañca's theory of the combination of knowledge and ritual activity.

नैरर्थक्यप्रसक्तिश्च ज्योतिष्टोमादिकर्मणः ।
न चेद्भुक्तं फलं तस्य तदभावेऽपि चात्ययः ॥२४८॥

And (therefore) there is the contingency, viz. futility of the ritual activities¹ (such as) the performance of a Jyotiṣṭoma,² if the result of it (viz. the worlds) is not enjoyed. In the absence of that³ also, (there follows the contingency, viz.) transgression (of the Śruti). [248]

¹This is *jātāv ekavacanam*.

²The word 'and' in the beginning shows how this is an additional argument against the first alternative which would appear acceptable. But against this, it can be pointed out: This alternative would invite the fault of considering the Śruti *jyotiṣemam* ... meaningless and therefore unauthoritative.

³The argument in the last part of the verse is very cryptic; it has two parts: (a) *tadabhāve 'pi=jyotiṣtomaphalābhāve 'pi* 'even if it were held that the Jyotiṣtoma does not produce any result'; this entails the view that there need not be any consideration of the result of the *nitya* 'obligatory' performance of the Jyotiṣtoma. (b) It would mean 'transcending of the world is possible, even if a son were not begotten,' and that would be transgression of (i.e. opposition to) the Śruti: *putreṇaiva* ... Transgression consists in yet another way: the result of the performance of the Jyotiṣtoma gets exhausted through the enjoyment of the world and as such the inutility of the Jyotiṣtoma remains in this case also.

चन्द्रलोकादिसंप्राप्तिः श्रूयते कर्मणः फलम् ।

पुण्यलोका भवन्तीति तथा च श्रुतिः स्फुटम् ॥२४९॥

It is heard that the result of ritual (activity)¹ is the attainment of the region of the moon² etc. So also, (it is) clearly (heard in the Śruti) that (the performers of rituals) will be (the dwellers) of the holy worlds.³ [249]

This affirms that even *nitya karmans* must bear results (refer to (b) in note 3 above).

¹Cf. *karmanā pitṛlokaḥ* (BU 1.5.16) which sets aside the possible argument that ritual activity might not produce a result.

²Cf. BU 6.2.16; also *Gītā* 8.25.

³See the clear Śruti *sarva ete puṇyalokā bhavanti* (CU 2.23.1).

सुतजन्मादिभिश्चेत्स्यात्सर्वकर्मफलात्ययः ।

परब्रह्मैकविज्ञानं निष्फलं वः प्रसज्यते ॥२५०॥

If there can be transcending of the results of all the rituals through the birth of a son etc.,¹ then, in your view, a contingency would follow, viz. the specific knowledge (about the nature) of the highest Brahman would be fruitless. [250]

This is yet another argument against Bhartṛprapañca.

¹The word etc. stands for *jyotiṣtomādikarman* and *sarva-karmaphala* for the *atikrama* of the worlds of men, manes and gods.

अनुच्छित्तिश्च भोगेन स्पष्टं श्रुतिवचः श्रुतम् ।
धिया धियेति वाक्येन भोगादेव क्रियोत्थितेः ॥२५१॥

There is a clear statement of the Śruti heard, viz. that there is no cutting off (of the worldly bondage) through enjoyment; for, by the sentence *dhyā dhyā* ... (there is already stated) the beginning (or undertaking) of rituals for (securing) enjoyments.¹ [251]

The argument is: Enjoyment of one result creates a longing for some other object of enjoyment which, in turn, gives rise to yet another ritual activity.

Here ends Sureśvara's refutation of the view of Bhartṛprapañca.

¹This is against the argument: Enjoyment of the results would render the birth of a son inutile.

Now follows the exposition of na karmanā pitṛlokao vidyayā devalokah.

कर्मणा पितृलोकाप्तिर्नाश्रुतेरन्यसाधना ।
कर्मैवोपास्तिरूपं यत्तद्विद्येत्यत्र भण्यते ॥२५२॥
देवलोकाप्तिर्बन्धाद्देवताविषयैव सा ।
विद्या न तु निरस्तान्यप्रत्यङ्मात्रैकगोचरा ॥२५३॥

The attainment of the world of the manes is effected through ritual activity; it is not dependent on any other means, since

there is no hearing of that (in the Śruti). What is here called Vidyā is but ritual activity that has the nature of meditation (*upāsti*). [252]

That Vidyā has for its object only gods, since it is related to attaining the world of the gods; but it is not that which is within a body (*pratyak*) and has completely set aside every other (object). [253]

This means that *vidyā* in this context does not mean *brahmavidyā*.

मनुते यन्न मनसा मनो येन मतं सदा ।
तदेव विद्धि ब्रह्मेति न त्विदं यदुपासते ॥२५४॥

Know only that as the Brahman, namely that which one does not ponder over in one's mind, that through which, the mind is ever known (or understood); and not that which they worship (or meditate on). [254]

This is the paraphrase of *Kenopaniṣad* 1.6. This is given here for setting aside the notion of any *Upāsanā/Dhyāna*; for that would involve opposition to Śruti.

उपासिक्रियया व्याप्तिरब्रह्मत्वस्य लक्षणम् ।
इति श्रुत्यैव निर्दिष्टं नोपास्यं ब्रह्म तेन नः ॥२५५॥

It is declared by the Śruti itself that the attainment (of something) through the activity of meditation is but a characteristic of what is non-Brahman; therefore the Brahman cannot be for us an object of meditation. [255]

This is confirming the *Kāthopaniṣad* passage paraphrased in the preceding verse.

विद्यया देवलोकाप्तिः श्रुतत्वादेव कारणात् ।
नैवकाराभिसंबन्धादेवेत्यत्र न संगतिः ॥२५६॥

[In verses 252-255, Sureśvara seems to explain Bhartṛprapañca's Bhāṣya: *karmaṇā agnihotrādinā kevalena pitṛloko jetavyo na putreṇa nāpi vidyayā tayā devaloko na putreṇa nāpi karmaṇā* with reference to *karmaṇā pitṛlokaḥ* and *vidyayā devalokaḥ*. Here the relevant portion of BUB is: ... *yathā ca putreṇa jetavyas tathottaratra vakṣyāmo nānyena karmaṇā vidyayā veti vākyaśeṣaḥ karmaṇāgnihotrādilakṣaṇena kevalena pitṛloko jetavyo na putreṇa nāpi karmaṇā*. But it seems that Sureśvara does not feel happy with BUB because Śaṅkara appears to insert *eva* after both *vidyayā* and *karmaṇā* and then explain the two sentences. Therefore (perhaps) with dissatisfaction, Sureśvara discusses the *durukta* in BUB; cf. SP and NKL.]

That there is attainment of the world of gods through Vidyā (is accepted) only because it has been so heard; not because of the connection (of the word *vidyā*) with (the word) *eva*. Indeed, in this context, *eva* does not construe well (with the words *vidyayā* etc.¹ [256]

¹Sureśvara has in mind verse 279; cf. SP and NKL.

Now follows the exposition of devaloko vai lokānām

भयःफला यतो विद्या पूर्वाभ्यां तेन सादराः ।
विद्यामेव प्रशंसन्ति न तथा पुत्रकर्मणी ॥२५७॥

Since in comparison with the former two (viz. begetting a son and performing an activity) Vidyā has greater fruit (to yield), therefore they (viz. the seers), full of respect for it, praise only Vidyā, not so (begetting) a son and (performing) an activity. [257]

लोकानां श्रेष्ठ इति च न चेदासिर्विवक्षिता ।
सर्वलोकेष्विदं वाक्यमत्यये दुर्घटं भवेत् ॥२५८॥

If it were not intended in the statement *lokānām śreṣṭhaḥ* that there is attainment (of *loka* etc.), then this statement would be, for all the people, difficult to understand well in (relation to the world) *atyaya*. [258]

The purport is to refute the view that: the words *lokānām śreṣṭhaḥ* are in praise of the world of gods. But that would not be correctly understandable, if the notion of *atyaya* as equivalent of *jaya* is borne in mind.

अत्ययश्चेदभिप्रेतः पुत्रोत्पत्त्यादिभिस्त्रिभिः ।
अपास्तर्णोऽथ स कथं कर्मस्वेष नियुज्यते ॥२५९॥

If 'winning' is understood to result from (lit. to be effected by) the three,¹ viz. those beginning with begetting a son, how then would a man, who has paid off his three debts,² be enjoined to perform rituals?³ [259]

¹If begetting a son etc. were understood to effect the winning of the worlds, that would mean loss of body (both gross and subtle bodies), non-performance of sacrifices, and consequently non-paying of the well-known three debts (which ought to be paid by an individual). Where was the need for him to perform rituals then?

²That is, *pitṛ-ṛṇa*, *ṛṣi-ṛṇa*, *deva-ṛṇa*. This is understood from a quotation Kullūka's commentary on *Manusmṛti* 3.36 (Nirṇayasagar Press, 1946) = *Taittirīya Saṃhitā* 6.3.10.5: *jāyamāno vai brāhmaṇas tribhir ṛṇair ṛṇavā jāyate yajñena devebhyaḥ prajayā pitṛbhyaḥ svādhyāyena ṛṣibhyaḥ*. Also cf. note 2 on BUBV 2.4 (see our book [Vol.1:1982] p.89).

³Cf. *saṃkrāmītmabhāvo 'pi nāgnihotram parityajet* (quotation in SP untraced).

ऋणानि त्रीण्यपाकृत्य मनो मोक्षे निवेशयेत् ।
इति पूर्वाश्रमे वासो ध्वस्तर्णस्य निषिध्यते ॥२६०॥
यथानपाकृतर्णस्य मोक्षेच्छा वार्यते तथा ।

अनधीत्य द्विजो वेदानित्यादिवचनान्मनोः ॥२६१॥

As in the case of one who has paid off the (three) debts, there is denied (or prohibited) the acceptance of the former order of life¹ in (Manu's) words 'Having paid off the three debts, one should fix one's mind on liberation', [260] so also is prohibited one's desire for liberation in the case of one who has not paid off the (three) debts as expressed in the words of Manu *anadhītya dvijaḥ*² [261]

This has a basis in *Manusmṛti* 6.37 and goes against what is said in the preceding verse. The fault in Bhartṛprapañca's argument is its being opposed to the teaching of Manu.

Here ends the refutation of Bhartṛprapañca's view which demanded attention.

¹Namely, the state of a householder.

²*Manusmṛti* 2.168: *yo 'nadhītya dvijo vedān anyatra kurute śramam, sa jīvann eva sūdratvam āśu gacchati sāvayaḥ*. Also see note 2 on verse 259 above.

Now follows the discussion of BU 1.5.17 up to verse 327.

इष्ट्वेति च तथा क्त्वान्तश्रवणात्पूर्वकालता ।
नीत्वा समाप्तिं कर्माणि फलवन्त्यफलानि च ॥२६२॥
शुद्धधीः प्रव्रजेत्पश्चाद्विरक्तः कर्मणां फलात् ।
इत्यनुक्रमसंन्यासे संप्रतिरूपदिश्यते ॥२६३॥

[Here and in the following verses (up to verse 273) there is a discussion on matters (or doubts/queries) related to renunciation (liberation).]

So also, since there is heard the form *iṣṭvā*, which ends in the suffix *ktvā*,¹ there is (understood the time of the ritual which is to be performed) before (seeking liberation)— that is to say, having completed the performance of rituals, be they fruitful or otherwise, [262]

a man with purified intellect should renounce and later become averse to the results of rituals; thus, there is prescribed the rite of Sampratti 'entrusting (the ritual duties) to the son'² at the time of renouncing (worldly life) in the due order of one's religious duties.³ [263]

¹This is based on the word *iṣtvā* in *Manusmṛti* 6.36: *adhitya vidhivad vedān putrān utpādya dharmataḥ, iṣtvā ca śaktito yajñair mano mokṣe niveśayet*.

²Otherwise called as *sampradāna*, in *Kauṣītakyupaniṣad* 2.15.

³For details of this, see SP.

योऽनुक्रमेणेति तथा श्रुतौ स्पष्टमिदं वचः ॥२६४॥

अननुक्रमसंन्यासे न संप्रतिक्रियेष्ट्यते ।

पुत्रे सत्येव सा यस्मान्नास्त्यसौ ब्रह्मचारिणः ॥२६५॥

In this respect (*tathā*), there is a clear statement in the Śruti *yo 'nukramena*¹ [264]

But (or, And) the rite of Sampratti is not desired (i.e. accepted) when there is no renunciation in the due order of one's religious duties, for that (rite of Sampratti) is possible only when a son was born to one. (Therefore) that (rite) is not (possible) in the case of a celibate. [265]

¹SP reports it to be a passage from the *Kāthaka Śruti* (mentioned by some as *Kāthaśrutyupaniṣad*) whereas NKL reports it as from the *Kauṣītaki* and Sureśvara also refers to *Kauṣītaki* in verse 309 below. Yet what is quoted in both SP and NKL does not agree with the passage in the *Kauṣītakyupaniṣad*. However, cf. *Kāthaśrutyupaniṣad* (and also *Samnyāsopaniṣad*) 1.1.

यद्यपुत्र इति वचः संभवे सति युक्तिमत् ।

निरस्तदारसंबन्धे न तु स्याद्ब्रह्मचारिणि ॥२६६॥

The words 'if one does not have a son'¹ would be reasonable, if there is the possibility (of one's renouncing). But, in the

case of a celibate who has (already) kept from (lit. discarded) the relation to a wife, it would not be (reasonable). [266]

This argument proceeds from someone's query about the purpose of the sentence *yady aputraḥ* ... in relation to renunciation. Sureśvara points out that it also refers only to a householder, thus confirming what is said in the preceding verse.

¹SP reports the complete sentence: *yady aputro bhavaty ātmānam eva sarvaṁ dhyātvānapekṣamāṇaḥ prācīm udīcīm vā diśam pravrajat*; NKL reports it as from the *Kauṣītakyupaniṣad*, but it is not there.

ब्रह्मचर्यादेवेत्यादिवाक्यानि शतशः श्रुतौ ।
श्रूयन्ते तु ऋणवचो विरोधात्स्यादपस्मृतिः ॥२६७॥

Sentences such as *brahmacaryād eva* ... are heard in the Śruti many (lit. hundreds of) times and (*tu*) the statement regarding the debts would be a wrong Smṛti,¹ on account of its opposition (to the teaching of the Śruti). [267]

This is an answer to the doubt: 'Renunciation is prescribed only for a householder, may or may not he have a son; as for the celibate, he cannot renounce.' But that cannot be taken as authoritative, for the Śruti has at several places prescribed renunciation even for a celibate. Refer to *Jābālopaniṣad* 4 which prescribes renunciation even from the student's stage. Therefore the Smṛti's import regarding the debt to be repaid by a celibate, which is directly opposed to the Śruti, is unauthoritative. As indicated by SP, read in this context SV 436cd and 437ab: *pratyakṣavedāvacanaprāmāṇyādyāśrayatvataḥ, ādau saṁnyāsasam-siddher ṛnānīti hy apsamṛtiḥ*.

tu ṛnavaco is an instance of absence of Saṁdhi.

¹*apasmṛtiḥ* could be wrong Smṛti, i.e. it is authoritative. Translation holds *apasmṛtiḥ* as a complement of *ṛnavacaḥ*.

वेदाहमितिमन्त्रोक्तेस्तमेवेत्यवधारणात् ।

निषेधान्नान्य इत्युक्तेर्न मुक्तिः सुतजन्मतः ॥२६८॥

There cannot be liberation obtained through the birth of a son (for the following reasons: viz.) because there is a statement in the Mantra *vedāham* ...¹ (in the beginning), because there is an emphatic statement in (the words) *tam eva* ...² (later) and also because there is a (clear) denial of it (understood) from the statement *nānyaḥ*³ [268]

This is for clearing away the notion that renunciation is not necessary for achieving liberation, since it can be obtained by merely begetting a son. But renunciation is a means towards (*brahma-jñāna*).

¹ *vedāham etam puruṣam* (*Taittirīya Āraṇyaka* 3.12.8.)

² *tam evam vidvān amṛta iha bhavati* (*Ibid*). And also, *tam eva viditvātimṛtyum eti* (*Ibid*).

³ *nānyaḥ panthā vidyate 'yanāya* (*Ibid*).

न तत्र दक्षिणा यन्ति विद्ययैव तदाप्यते ।

इति न्याय्यं श्रुतेर्वाक्यं कस्मान्नाद्रियतेऽञ्जसा ॥२६९॥

Why then not accept regardfully the statement from the Śruti which follows reason, viz. *na tatra dakṣiṇā yanti*¹ and *vidyayaiva tad āpyate*?² [269]

Here is stressed the insignificance of rituals and the effectiveness of Jñāna.

¹ Cf. *Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa* 10.5.4.16.

² Citation not traced.

संन्यासमेवोपक्रम्य संप्रतिः श्रूयते श्रुतौ ।

यथान्यत्र तथेहापि कस्मान्नाभ्युपगम्यते ॥२७०॥

(One would ask:) As there is heard elsewhere¹ in the Śruti (the statement regarding the rite of) Sampratti, in the words beginning with *saṃnyāsam eva*, why is it not, in the same

way, accepted here¹ also?²

[270]

This argument is based on what is known as *sarvavedānta-pratyaya* 'unity of thought in the Upaniṣads'.

¹This refers to the *Kauṣītakyupaniṣad*, cf. note 2 on verse 263 above.

²The questioner has in mind one who is about to die and therefore perform the rite of Sampratti. He means: that rite should not be understood as ancillary merely to renunciation.

सर्वकर्मनिवृत्तिर्हि जीवतोऽत्र विधीयते ।
 एकमेव व्रतमिति संन्यासिन्येव युक्तिमत् ॥२७१॥
 लब्धत्र्यन्नात्मकफलो भावनाज्ञानकर्मभिः ।
 संन्यस्ताशेषकर्मा सन्बोध्यतेऽजातशत्रुणा ॥२७२॥

(This is not so) because, here (i.e. in BU 1.5.23), cessation from all performances (of duties) is prescribed in the case of one who is alive (and) statement *ekam eva vratam* is reasonable only in the case of one who has renounced. [271]
 (For example, Gārgya) who had obtained the result which was in the nature of the acquisition of the three foods by means of his devotion, knowledge and performances and had given up all religious performances was enlightened by Ajātaśatru.¹ [272]

This is in answer to the question in verse 270 above.

¹This has reference to BU 2.1 which contains the dialogue between Gārgya Bālāki and Ajātaśatru.

नामरूपक्रियादेहः सर्वोऽस्मीत्यभिमानवान् ।
 अतत्त्वज्ञोऽधिकार्यत्र विद्याया उपवर्ण्यते ॥२७३॥

(For) in this context is described a person who is entitled (to undertake renunciation)— he who is possessed of a notion 'I am all this, viz. what is made up of name, form, activity and body' and is thus one not knowing the reality (in respect

of the true nature of the self).

[273]

अयं लोकश्च पुत्रेण यादृशेन च जीयते ।
तादृक्पुत्रोऽत्र वक्तव्य इत्यारब्धोत्तरा श्रुतिः ॥२७४॥

[In verses 265-273 Sureśvara had given his own idea about the connection of the sentence *athātaḥ samprattiḥ* in BU 1.5.17 to the preceding passage. Now in verses 274-278 he states that connection which is stated in BUB.]

The subsequent Śruti, viz. *athātaḥ samprattiḥ*, has therefore begun with the intention to speak of such a son as through whom this world (relevant here in this situation) (and also others)¹ can be won.

[274]

¹This is the force of *ca*; it refers to Pitrloka and Devaloka.

पुत्रकर्मापरज्ञाननृपित्रमरलोकतः ।
व्याख्यातो नियमोऽन्योन्यं फलसाधनसंगतेः ॥२७५॥

Here is explained the invariable rule regarding the mutual relation of the results and their means, viz. a son, ritual performance(s), worldly knowledge and the worlds of men, manes and gods.¹

[275]

¹The three, viz. the son, (*apara*)*jñāna* and ritual are the means and the other three, viz. the worlds, are the results.

पुत्रकर्मार्थमात्रत्वान्न पृथक्साधनान्तरम् ।
जाया मानुषवित्तं च कर्मैकार्थत्वकारणात् ॥२७६॥

And a wife is not (mentioned as) a distinct means, since she is helpful only for (begetting) a son and for (performing) ritual activity;¹ and a man's wealth also (is not so mentioned) since it is helpful merely for the (performance of) ritual activity.²

[276]

¹A wife is in these two ways indirectly related to *loka-trayaprāpti*.

²Wealth is subservient to the ritual performance(s).

स्वरूपलाभमात्रेण साधनत्वं निगच्छतः ।
कर्मज्ञाने सुतस्तस्य साधनत्वं व्रजेत्कथम् ॥२७७॥

Ritual performance(s) and knowledge about the same come to have their character as the means (to the attainment of the three worlds) only by coming into existence, how then could a son become the means (towards that)? ¹ [277]

¹SP clarifies the thought thus: *putraś tu manuṣyalokajaye na tathā* (i.e. like *Vidyā* and *karman*) *hetuḥ, dravyatvāt; na hi dravyam kriyānāviṣṭam sādhanam drṣṭam*. That is: a son is *dravya* which is useful in the performance; by himself he cannot bring about *manuṣyalokajaya*.

इत्येवमभिसंबन्धो वक्तुर्भाष्यकृतः स्फुटः ।
अस्मदुक्ताविरोधीति तेन नेहातियत्यते ॥२७८॥

This is the clear connection (of Sampratti with *lokajaya*), (as given by) the writer of the Bhāṣya. (And) since it is not opposed to what we have said, there is no special effort made (*atiyatyate*) here (to discuss it further). [278]

Mention was made in verse 256 of BUB's insertion of *eva* in the sentences *karmanā pitṛlokaḥ* and *vidyayā devalokaḥ*. That demands some discussion, since the preceding verse states the non-opposition between Sureśvara and Śaṅkara regarding the explanation of the relevant section. Verses 279-281 serve this purpose.

पुत्रश्चेदनुशिष्टः स्याल्लोकस्तेनैव जीयते ।
नान्येन कर्मणात्रार्थो नृलोकजयसिद्धये ॥२७९॥

पुत्रस्यैवावधृतय एवकारो भवेदयम् ।
पितृदेवलोकसंप्राप्तिः श्रुतेहान्यैश्च साधनैः ॥२८०॥

If a son has been instructed,¹ only then is won through him the world (of men); there is not any purpose (served here² by) any other (means, viz.) ritual performance(s) in achieving the conquest of the world of men; [279]
as such, this specification by the insertion of (the word) *eva* is only in respect of a son— and, (as for) the attainment of the worlds of the manes and the gods, it is heard (to occur) through other means.³ [280]

The idea is: A son can win for his father the *manuṣyaloka* by performing the remainder of his duties and by the enjoyment of the result of the performance (*bhoga*). But this latter is secured by the father through the performance of Jyotiṣṭoma also— not necessarily through his son.

The third quarter of verse 280 is metrically faulty— one letter more in the line and the fifth letter is long.

¹Supply: regarding the duties unperformed (or, which were yet to be performed) by the father.

²This word (*atra*) refers only to *manuṣyaloka*.

³The idea is: The winning of the world of the manes is not dependent only on the obligatory ritual performance; it can be secured through a *saṅkalpa* for it— this involves Śrutivirodha and renders the insertion of *eva* purposeless; cf. *saṅkalpād evāsyā pitarāḥ samuttiṣṭhanti* (CU 8.2.1). This implies similar inutility of *eva* in respect of the world of gods also; cf. *nāpi vidyayaiva devalokajayaḥ* (understood) *saṃnyāsād brahmaṇaḥ sthānam*, quotation not traced.

व्याख्यानमिदमेवात्र विदोषं दोषवत्परम् ।
इदमेव ततो ग्राह्यं न तु यद्दोषवन्मतम् ॥२८१॥

Only this explanation (regarding the insertion of the word *eva* which is given by me) here is faultless; the other is faulty.

Only this much is to be accepted from that (viz. BUB), but not that which is considered (by me) as faulty. [281]

अथानन्तरमेवोक्तात्कर्मोपासनचेष्टितात् ।
अतस्तत्फलनिष्पत्तेः संप्रतिः संविधीयते ॥२८२॥

[Now follows the explanation of the BU sentence *athātaḥ samprattiḥ*, after the connection of that sentence with Sureśvara's own comment and BUB has been thus stated.]

atha means now, i.e. 'immediately after this statement about the performance(s) of the ritual(s) and meditation,' as also for securing the result of that there is prescribed the ritual of Sampratti.¹ [282]

¹ *karmopāsanaceṣṭita* mentioned in the first line. Commentators add that the ritual of Sampratti is an ancillary to Kramasamnyāsa which is related to Upāsana by securing its result.

यतो मनुष्यलोकोऽयं विशिष्टसुतसाधनः ।
तस्मात्संप्रतिकर्मेह वक्तव्यं तत्फलार्थिने ॥२८३॥

Since this world of men has a specifically qualified son as its means there is to be stated the ritual of Sampratti for one who is desirous of its result. [283]

This is considered by Sureśvara as another meaning of the word *ataḥ*. The word 'therefore' conveys the sense of 'desire for a son and (through begetting him)' for the result.

विदुषैव तु कर्तव्या संप्रतिर्नाविपरिचिता ।
यतोऽतः सूत्रिता नेयं सूत्रकृद्भिरनित्यतः ॥२८४॥

Since the ritual of Sampratti has to be undertaken by a knower¹ and not by one who is not a knower; therefore it has not been stated by Sūtrakāras in their (Śrauta) Sūtras,

owing to its non-obligatory character.

[284]

¹That is, one who knows the purpose of Sampratti ritual, as only an ancillary to renunciation.

संप्रतिरिति नामैतदात्मसंस्कारकर्मणः ।
प्रतिपत्तिक्रिया वा स्यादातुरन्यासदर्शनात् ॥२८५॥

Sampratti is the name of a performance of some rite for one's own Samskāra. Or, it is ¹ an action of entrusting ² as noticed from the transferring (of his own duties) by an afflicted person.

[285]

¹*syāt = asti.*

²*pratipatti* is the meaning of *sampratti*.

प्रेष्यन्निति च कालोऽस्य कर्मणोऽत्र विधीयते ।
जातकादिपरिज्ञानाज्ज्ञातुं कालोऽपि शक्यते ॥२८६॥

And in the word *praiṣyan* is prescribed here the time (for the performance) of this rite. And time also, ¹ it is possible to know from one's knowledge of a horoscope etc. ²

[286]

¹The word 'also' implies the time of death (beside the future happenings in a man's life). Cf. SP: *sampadādijñānaṃ drṣṭāntayitum apiśabdah*.

²The word etc. stands for an omen or a dream which is indicative of the ensuing death.

मुमूर्षुश्च पिता पुत्रमथाहूयानुमन्त्रयेत् ।
त्वं ब्रह्मेत्यादिभिर्वाक्यैः सोऽपि प्रत्याह बोधितः ॥२८७॥

Now, ¹ a father, who is about to die, should first call his son (to himself) and then instruct him in the sentences such as *tvam brahma ...* ² and he (viz. the son) also, thus instructed, answers him (in the words *aham brahma ...*).

[287]

¹This is introductory 'Now' for *atha*. Or *ca* has, according to SP, the purpose of excluding any other doing.

²This is BU 1.5.17.

कर्मभ्यः प्रव्रजिष्यन्वा प्रैष्यन्नित्यभिधीयते ।
धातूपसर्गयोर्मुख्यस्तथार्थोऽप्याश्रितो भवेत् ॥२८८॥

Or, perhaps, the word *praiṣyan* is stated (in the Śruti) in the sense of '(when one is) about to renounce ritual performances'. In that way also, the principal meaning of the root and the preposition, understood (together), would be accepted (lit. be resorted to). [288]

अहं ब्रह्मेति पितरं पूर्वमेवोपशिक्षितः ।
प्रतिवक्तुं न शक्तः स्यान्न चेत्प्राविशिक्षितो भवेत् ॥२८९॥

(The son) should answer in the words *aham brahma ...* 'I am Brahman,' being already instructed.¹ (But) he would not be able to answer, if he were not instructed before. [289]

¹Supply: by the father, even long before he is about to renounce or die.

पुत्रानुमन्त्रणस्यार्थं व्याचष्टे स्वयमेव नः ।
श्रुतिस्तिरोहितार्थत्वान्मन्त्राणामित्यतोऽवदत् ॥२९०॥

The Śruti itself explained to us the meaning of what is to be instructed to the son, since the meaning of the Mantras is concealed; so has he (viz. the Bhāṣyakāra) said. [290]

In this, he intends to explain *yad vai kiṃ ca* Here, Sureśvara points out his agreement with Śaṅkara.

अनुक्तं यदधीतं स्याद्यच्चाध्येतव्यमिष्यते ।
यच्चानधीतं तस्योक्तौ ब्रह्मेत्यत्रैकता भवेत् ॥२९१॥

anūkta means what is studied¹ and also what is desired to be studied and is not studied; (therefore) in the mention of that,² there is unification in the Brahman. [291]

¹It literally means: that which is repeated (after the teacher has, in the course of his lessons, uttered).

²This refers to *anūkta*.

त्वं ब्रह्मेतीह वाक्यार्थो ह्ययमत्र विवक्षितः ।
अध्येतव्यार्थनिष्पत्तिस्त्वनिष्पत्त्या मया कृता ॥२९२॥

This¹ one is the intended meaning here,² i.e. of the sentence *tvam brahma* I have explained here what is to be studied, because it was not explained (before). [292]

This is what the father says to the son.

The second line of the verse appears somewhat difficult. Even the variant readings in the AnSS edition do not help.

¹The word 'this' means: what is stated in the preceding verse.

²The word 'here' refers to the explanatory prose sentence in BU *yad vai kiṃ ca tasya sarvasya brahmety ekatā* together with the Mantra *tvam brahma*

यावन्मत्कर्तृकं किञ्चिन्मानेन प्रतिपाद्यते ।
त्वत्कर्तृकं तदस्त्वत्र पितुरेवं विवक्षितम् ॥२९३॥

[Now follows the exposition of *ye vai ke ... yajña ity ekatā*.]

Such is the father's intended (meaning): Whatever is prescribed by the authoritative means (viz. the Śruti) as what is to be undertaken by me should now be what is to be undertaken by you. [293]

This explains the prose in BU: *ye vai ke ca yajñāḥ ... lokāḥ ity ekatā*.

लोकोक्त्यैव हि यज्ञानां तत्फलत्वाद्ग्रहे सति ।
नित्ययज्ञगृहीत्यर्थं के च यज्ञा इतीरणम् ॥२९४॥

And the statement (*ye vai*)¹ *ke ca yajñāḥ* is for understanding obligatory sacrifices, lest by the very mention of the word *loka* there is the acceptance (or understanding) of the sacrifices as having the same² as their result. [294]

¹We have supplied these words in the round brackets, for they occur in the Śruti and which, for the sake of metre, Sureśvara has omitted.

²The word *tat* is expressive of *loka* as the result.

ब्रह्मेत्यादिपदार्थोऽयमुक्तस्तावत्समासतः ।
त्वं ब्रह्मेति तु वाक्यार्थः श्रुत्येदानीं विभाव्यते ॥२९५॥

So far, the meaning of the word *brahma* etc.¹ has been explained in brief. Now² is explained by the Śruti the meaning of the (entire) statement *tvam brahma ... (loka ity ekatā)*. [295]

¹Namely, *tvam brahma*, *tvam yajñāḥ* and *tvam lokāḥ*.

²This is for introducing the exposition on *etāvad vā* as on the 'sentence'.

एतावदेव कर्तव्यं गृहिणेहाधिकारिणा ।
वेदा यज्ञाश्च लोकाश्च नातोऽन्योऽर्थोऽवशिष्यते ॥२९६॥

Only this much¹ has to be undertaken here² by a householder who is eligible for it; (this is to say:) the Vedas (are to be studied), sacrifices (are to be performed) and the worlds (are to be attained);³ there remains nothing else (to undertake).

[296]

This is the meaning of *etāvad vā idam sarvam*.

¹Namely, all this which has been enumerated.

²Namely, in respect of ritual activity.

³Supply *adhyetavyāḥ*, *yaṣṭavyāḥ* and *jetavyāḥ* after *vedāḥ* etc. respectively.

यथोक्तार्थचिकीर्षुः संस्तन्मयस्तत्क्रतुः स्वतः ।
 इतोऽधिकारबन्धान्माऽभुनजत्पालयेदिति ॥२९७॥
 चेतस्याधाय वाक्यार्थमिममाह पिता सुतम् ।
 त्वं ब्रह्मेत्यादिवाक्यानां नातोऽन्योऽर्थो विवक्षितः ॥२९८॥

Himself being desirous of performing the ritual activities as are stated (in the scriptures), being devoted to them and having the intention to perform the same and having kept in mind the thought: 'May (this son) release me, i.e. protect me, from this, the bondage of responsibility (lit. the state of being enjoined to do all that is mentioned above)', the father has conveyed to the son this meaning of the sentences, viz. *tvam brahma*¹ No other meaning is intended. [297-298]

¹Hereby is denied any other meaning of the sentences.

यत उक्तं चिकीर्षुः सन्ननुशिष्टश्च तादृशः ।
 अतो लोकहितार्थं तं पुत्रमाहुर्मनीषिणः ॥२९९॥
 अनुशिष्टो यतः पुत्रः पित्रैवैति समर्थताम् ।
 अनुशिष्टमतो लोक्यं पुत्रमाहुर्विपश्चितः ॥३००॥

The wise ones have called him a son, who is desirous of doing what is told (him by his father),¹ who is instructed in that way,² and who has therefore become helpful (to the father), (securing) for the benefit (of the acquisition) of *loka* 'the world of men'. [299]

Since the son is instructed by the father himself for his entitlement (to do what is required of him), the learned call this thus instructed son as useful for (effecting the attainment of) the world (of men). [300]

This is the meaning of the Śruti: *tasmāt putram anuśiṣṭam*

lokyam āhuḥ, tasmād enam anuśāsati.

¹This refers to his asking him to continue to undertake what he did earlier.

²That is, what he was told in the rite of Sampratti, viz. *tvam brahma tvam yajñas tvam lokas tvam sarvam*

पितरश्चात एवैनमनुशासति सत्सुतम् ।

अनुशिष्टेन पुत्रेण लौक्यः स्यामिति यत्नतः ॥३०१॥

Just for this, do the fathers¹ instruct their good sons² with the thought (lit. carefully) 'Let me be fit for (the attainment of) the world (of men) through this son who is instructed by me.' [301]

¹Namely, those who undertook their religious duties (mentioned earlier).

²*sutam* is for *sutān* (*jātāv ekavacanam*).

संक्रामितात्मभारोऽपि नाग्निहोत्रं परित्यजेत् ।

इत्येतत्कर्मरागोक्तं निष्प्रमाणं न गृह्यते ॥३०२॥

[Verses 301-312 refute the view of Bhartṛprapañca regarding continuous performance of Agnihotra till the end of one's life, even though the rite of Sampratti has been performed.]

The statement which pertains to attachment to ritual activity, viz. 'A person should not give up (the observance of) Agnihotra, even if he has transferred (or entrusted) his own responsibility (to the son)', is not accepted as one devoid of any authority. [302]

This verse states in brief the view of Bhartṛprapañca and marks the beginning of its refutation also. The words in inverted commas are the view of Bhartṛprapañca. SP cites his words: *sa eṣa samprattiṃ kṛtvā yāvaj jīvati na tāvad agnihotram utsrjet*. The word *iti* after *saṃkrāmitātma- ... parityajet* seems to show the

passage is a quotation— this is untraced.

संप्रतिलिङ्गात्संन्यासविधिरत्र विवक्षितः ।
निःशेषोपनिषन्मानमेकं ज्ञानमितीष्यते ॥३०३॥

Here is intended (to prescribe) the injunction regarding renunciation (as is clear) from its indication, viz. the ritual of Sampratti.¹ (Indeed) it is desired that knowledge has (only) one authoritative means (for it), viz. all the Upaniṣads.² [303]

¹The *Kāthaka Śruti* (cf. note 1 on verse 265 above) has prescribed it as an ancillary to renunciation.

²This refers to *sarvavedāntapratyayanyāya*. It is intended to bring out that the Upaniṣads teach the pursuit of the Brahman, the knowledge about the nature of it, and also the attainment of the same, but not the performances of rituals as understood by Bhartṛprapañca. Therefore it is to be accepted here that they prescribe only renunciation.

अयन्नात्मभावसंप्राप्तेर्जीवतैव कृतत्वतः ।
साधनानां फलान्तत्वात्संन्यासः किं निवार्यते ॥३०४॥

Why then reject (the prescription of) renunciation,¹ if one can have achieved, in one's life-time,² oneness with (lit. the nature of) the three foods³ in accordance with the rule that the means⁴ culminate in (acquiring) the results? [304]

¹Supply: immediately after the performance of the Sampratti ritual. Here there is reference to Bhartṛprapañca's view; see note under verse 302 above.

²Or, while one is continuing to live.

³This is the same as becoming (one with) Prajāpati (or Sūtra).

⁴Namely, Upāsanā.

यावज्जीवश्रुतिप्राप्तेर्न चेत्तत्याग इष्यते ।
प्रयोगावसितैर्नैवं जरिणोऽधिकृतिर्न च ॥३०५॥

प्रातर्देशावसानत्वादग्निहोत्रादिकर्मणः ।

नित्यानामपि संन्यासः कर्मणां स्यात्तदैव तु ॥३०६॥

If it is understood (lit. desired) that, since there is a Śruti regarding (the performance of rituals by one) till the end of one's life, renunciation is not to be resorted to; it is not to be so accepted, for there is (possible) the cessation of the ritual¹ and there is no eligibility of one who has grown old.²

[305]

(And) since the rituals of Agnihotra etc. conclude at the end of the duration of the morning and in specific regions, non-performance of obligatory rites³ (has to resorted to) at that very time.⁴

[306]

One more objection is understood, viz. *kurvann eveha karmāṇi* ... (Īsopaniṣad 2) is a Śruti that is opposed to renunciation. That is answered.

¹This is in the case of one who is unable to perform ritual activity in its entirety on account of weakness.

²Cf. *jīrṇo vā viramet* (quotation in NKL, not traced).

³Agnihotra etc. are obligatory rites to be performed.

⁴This suggests one's giving up of rituals when one wishes to renounce.

संक्रामितात्मभारस्य त्वं ब्रह्मेति वचोऽर्थवत् ।

तदा स्यात्सर्वकर्माणि यदि संन्यस्य तिष्ठति ॥३०७॥

If a person continues to live after having renounced all ritual activities, only then would the statement (of the Śruti) *tvam brahma* ... be meaningful in the case of him who has transferred his own responsibility to the son.

[307]

This is one more argument in favour of renunciation immediately after the performance of the Sampratti ritual.

सर्वात्मकार्यनिचयपुत्रसंक्रामितत्वतः ।

न चेत्तित्यक्षितं सर्वं प्रतिप्रसवगीर्भवेत् ॥३०८॥

If it were not intended that all (ritual performance) should be renounced after the entire mass of one's ritual activity was transferred to the son, then there would have been (in the Śruti) the prohibitive injunction (to activity). [308]

कौषीतकिश्रुतौ तद्वद्बृहस्थस्यैव जीवतः ।
संन्यासः श्रूयते स्पष्टः पुत्रैश्वर्ये सुखं वसेत् ॥३०९॥

In the same way¹ there is in the *Kauṣītaki Śruti* a clear (injunction regarding such) renunciation even while a householder is alive, (viz.) 'May he stay happily while the son is in prosperity.' [309]

In the discussion of renunciation and the ritual of Sampratti, BUBV refers to the *Kauṣītaki Śruti* by name, whereas SP has mentioned (in the same context) the *Kāthaka Śruti*, cf. SP on verses 264-265 and 303 above! Here also, SP points out the agreement between the *Kāthaka* and the Vārtika. We were unable to trace the quotation *putraiśvarye vā vaset* (though Jacob quoted in his Concordance) only *vṛddhāśraṃ vā gacchet* which is cited by SP. This seems to be *Kāthaśrutyupaniṣad* (not verified by us). But see *Manusmṛti* 6.95 for *putraiśvarye*

¹That is, to the same effect, viz. supporting what is said in the preceding verse.

संन्यस्य सर्वकर्माणि सर्वदोषानपानुदन् ।
इत्यादि मनुनाप्युक्तं तद्विरुद्धं च भण्यते ॥३१०॥

And also a statement made by Manu, viz. *saṃnyasya sarva-karmāṇi sarvadoṣān apānudan* ...¹ where there is said what is in opposition to that.² [310]

¹The NKL edition reads *apānudet* (not so in *Manusmṛti* 6.95). SP points out that Manu also accepted *kramasaṃnyāsa* as seen

from his long quotation of Manu's verses, viz. 6.92-96.

²This refers to the objection which is understood in verses 305ff.

उपास्तितफलमेवास्य पितुर्यद्वदिहोच्यते ।
प्रतिप्रसूयते कस्मान्नाग्निहोत्रादिकं तथा ॥३११॥

(We wish to ask:) As here ¹ is stated only the result of that worship ² in favour of the father, ³ why is not the ritual activity of Agnihotra etc. prohibited (in an injunction) in the same way? [311]

This reaffirms what is stated in verse 306cd above. The objector's argument is: In the sentence regarding the ritual of Sampratti, renunciation of all (ritual) activity is not intended. The answer is: As there is no prohibitive injunction in regard to Agnihotra, so it is not here also.

¹That is, in *pr̥thivyaī cainam* ... (BU 1.5.18).

²This implies that no other ritual is prescribed.

³He who has transferred his own duties to the son.

एकमेवेत्यवधृतेर्युक्तं प्राणव्रतं पितुः ।
संस्कारकत्वात्तस्यैव न तदन्यदिहेष्यते ॥३१२॥

(Also) from the specification (in the Śruti statement) by (the words) *ekam eva*, it is proper to understand (the observance of) the *prāṇavṛata* in the case of the father, ¹ since that is for effecting a Saṃskāra on him. There is nothing other than that ² to be accepted (or desired). [312]

This sets aside a possible counter-argument that *ekam eva* ... is prohibitive of *prāṇanādivyāpāra* 'the function of breathing'. The argument against that is: that function is understood to be necessary in the observance of *prāṇavṛata*.

¹Supply: who has performed the Sampratti ritual and is renouncing.

²That is, *prāṇavrata*.

म्रियते स यदैवंवित्पुत्रसंक्रामितक्रतुः ।
क्रत्वञ्जितैस्तदा प्राणैः सह पुत्रं विशत्ययम् ॥३१३॥

When such a person, who, knowing this, has transferred his thoughts¹ (about the performance of sacrifices)² to the son, dies, and then enters into his son with his *prāṇas*, which are marked (lit. annointed) by his thoughts (as said above). [313]

This explains *sa yadaivamvid*

¹That is, his resolve.

²Supply: and other duties.

प्रागात्मक्रतुसंक्रान्तेरभूद्यादृक्क्रतुः पिता ।
स तादृक्क्रतुबिम्बोऽस्य संक्रान्तः स्वसुते पितुः ॥३१४॥

Possessed of whichever thought (regarding ritual activity) be the father before the transfer of his own thought (to the son), that (thought), with a reflection similar to it, will be transferred into the son. [314]

The objector could question about the nature of the father's entry into his son, which is mentioned in the preceding verse—'Could it be similar to the entry of a serpent into a hole?' The answer is: The body of a person cannot enter into another's; there is only a metaphorical entry! It is the transfer of the thought about ritual performances. This is clarified further in the next verse.

जलार्कस्येव संक्रान्तिः स्वाभासभ्रमकारणात् ।
परोपाधिनिमित्तैव कौटस्थ्यात्प्रत्यगात्मनः ॥३१५॥

This reflection (lit. entry) is like (that of) the Sun in water on account of the error about its own appearance;¹ (that reflection) is caused by the limiting adjunct of another, owing

to the immutability of the inner self.

[315]

This clearly shows that the rite of Sampratti etc., all of them, fall in the sphere of Avidyā. The truth is that there is only the appearance of the inner self in the body of the son and so on.

In this context, SP makes some worth-noting observations: (we give them somewhat briefly though— perhaps at the cost of clarity!) At first, an objector raises the question: Does the *saṃkrānti* mean that of the *upādhi* 'delimiting adjunct', viz. the body, or alternatively that of the inner self? The first alternative is discarded, for the body of the father cannot get into that of the son. So also, the entry of the father's inner self into the son is not possible. What appears to be the case is that the father's thought regarding rituals only appears (i.e. is taken) to enter into the son much in the same way as the Sun seems to enter water. And finally, the consequence is that the inner self appears to have entered into the son! Real entry is impossible, for the reason that the inner self is immutable.

¹This is an incidental reference to the Ābhāsa theory of Sureśvara.

ऋत्वज्जितंधियो यद्वत्स्वात्मदेहस्य साक्षिता ।
तद्वत्पुत्रादिदेहेषु मोहान्नानात्मविभ्रमः ॥३१६॥

As one's own body has the ability to perceive (i.e. experience) the thoughts marked by some sacrifice, so also there (is that ability to perceive) in the bodies¹ of the son etc. The various appearances of the Ātman, (i.e. the father's inner self) are caused by ignorance.

[316]

¹This is a reference to the variously acting body of the son.

स्वाधिकारसुतावेशात्पितृवाविशतीत्यतः ।
स्वयं निरधिकारस्तु दैवप्राणोऽवतिष्ठते ॥३१७॥

Since it is that by transferring unto his son his own eligibility the father himself enters into (the son) and (*tu*),¹ as such, being (now) bereft of his own eligibility,² he himself stays in the form of the divine Prāṇa.³ [317]

This reaffirms the thought in the preceding verse.

¹Or alternatively, but.

²Supply: for performing ritual activity.

³This refers to the result of his Upāsana, viz. oneness with Prāṇa.

आध्यात्मिकेन देहेन न्यनकार्यसमाप्तये ।
पिता पुत्रेण कुर्वाण आस्तै तत्फलभुक्स्वयम् ॥३१८॥

(Thus), for accomplishing lesser activity the father stays on with a body which is (wholly) resting in (or, fixed on) the Ātman and keeps on doing the same (activity) through his son, (but) himself enjoying the result of the same. [318]

The father who has transferred to his son the eligibility for the performance of rituals continues to live, doing small activities through the son and enjoying the fruit of the same.

दैवसाधनसंपन्नः पुत्र एवावतिष्ठते ।
पिता तु तत्फलात्मैव न तु साधनरूपभृत् ॥३१९॥

Being possessed of the divine means, the father stays in the son; the father is, however, in the form of the result (of Sampratti and renunciation), but not bearing a form that is a means.¹ [319]

This is to explain away any supposed duality of bodies, viz. the body of the son and the divine body (i.e. *daiva-prāṇa-yukta* body) of the father.

¹SP offers two alternative explanations of this verse; our translation is based on the second alternative (this seems to

be adopted by NKL also). The first alternative of SP is: The father has entered into the son by having the state of one who causes the performance of the ritual activity (*kāraṇakotīniviṣṭa*) but does not stay there as the agent of the ritual activity (*sādhana-rūpa*); he has at the same time continued to be of the nature of the (known) result, viz. *Sūtra-rūpa*. This is to say: *hetuphalabhedād dvirūpaḥ*.

नाकारि कार्यं यत्पित्रा स्वाधीत्यादि प्रमादतः ।
तत्पूरणात्पितृस्त्राणात्पुत्र इत्यधिधीयते ॥३२०॥

By completing whatever of the father's study of the Veda etc.,¹ that was not done by him through some fault, and thus protecting him thereby is the son signified (by the noun) *putra*.²

[320]

¹The word etc. stands for performance of rituals.

²This is a typical Brāhmaṇic derivation in BU— viz. derivation of one noun from two verb roots *pṛ* and *tra*.

संपूर्णस्वात्मकार्योऽयं पिता दैवात्मना स्थितः ।
पितुः सामिकृतं कार्यं पूरयन्वर्तते सुतः ॥३२१॥

[Now there is the exposition of the Śruti passage *sa yady anena*]

This father,¹ who has accomplished all of his duties, now remains in the divine body² (and the son) keeps on completing the incomplete (lit. half-done) activity of the father.³ [321]

¹Namely, one who has performed the Sampratti ritual.

²Cp. *daivaprāṇaḥ* in verse 317 above.

³This is in support of the derivation of the word *putra* offered in the preceding verse.

मृतेरच्छिद्यते लोकः साधनोच्छित्तिहेतुतः ।

पितुरित्यपि नाशङ्का कार्या यस्मात्स एव तु ।
पुत्रेणैव शरीरेण कुर्वन्नास्ते नवं नवम् ॥३२२॥

Further, an objection should not be raised that, in the case of the father, the world (of men) gets lost (lit. destroyed) by his death, viz. by the cause of the destruction of the means,¹ since he himself keeps on doing the rituals, one after another,² through his body, verily the son. [322]

This explains *sa putreṇaivāsmil loke*

¹This indicates the body, *jāyā*, *putra*, *dravya* etc. which belonged to him in his life-time.

²This is a free rendering for 'whatever remained to be done' (lit. every new activity).

पुत्रेणैवेत्यतो वक्ति नित्याधिकृतिसिद्धये ।
जयतीमं पिता लोकमेवंभूतेन सूनुना ॥३२३॥

Therefore, the Śruti states (the words) *putreṇaiva*, in order that the obligatory entitlement to duty is established. (Indeed) a father wins this world through a son who has become thus (i.e. as instructed). [323]

न त्वात्मलाभमात्रेण जयः स्याज्ज्ञानकर्मवत् ।
पुत्राधिकारानुत्त्यर्थमथशब्दः प्रयुज्यते ॥३२४॥

But, the winning (of the world of men) would not result merely from the son's being born, in the same way as from knowledge and activity.¹ The word *atha*² is (now) used for setting aside the topic of the son. [324]

In verses 322-323 was explained the purport of the Śruti *sa putreṇa* The first line of this verse (i.e. 324) states the difference between a son (i.e. begetting him etc.) and *vidyā-karmanī* (i.e. *jñānakarmanī*). Now a new sentence begins with the word *atha* and starts a new topic, viz. the discussion of

the meaning of *evam* which does not refer to a son.

¹As these two, only on being produced, become instrumental in the attaining of the worlds of the manes and of the gods.

²In *athainam ete devāḥ prāṇā amṛtā āviśanti*.

कृतसंप्रत्तिकं दैवाः प्राण वागादयः समम् ।

पितरं संविशन्त्युक्ताः सदा तद्भावभावितम् ॥३२५॥

The divine Prāṇa, Vāk etc., which have been mentioned,¹ all of them, enter together into (a father) who has performed the Sampratti ritual and who has ever considered himself to become the same.² [325]

¹Supply: as *amṛtāḥ*.

²Namely, Śrauta Prāṇa.

पृथिव्यै चैनमित्यादि तद्व्याचष्टे यथा तथा ।

हेत्वर्थो वाथशब्दोऽयं यस्मात्संक्रामितक्रतुः ॥३२६॥

As the Śruti has explained that (viz. father's entering into the son) in the sentence *pr̥thivyai cainam* ..., so (is there stated) the word *atha* to convey the sense of the reason, viz. Prāṇas, since the father has transferred his own thoughts (of rituals unto the son). [326]

The preceding verse referred to the entering of Prāṇa, Vāk etc. into a father who has performed the Sampratti ritual; now in this verse is explained the nature of that entering, i.e. transference of thoughts etc.

तद्वियोगादतो दैवा आविशन्ति यथोदिताः ॥३२७॥

Therefore, at the separation from that,¹ the divine Prāṇa etc., which are already described,² enter (into the son). [327]

¹The word 'that' stands for the father's intention to perform

the ritual duties. Separation stands for transference.

²Supply: as *amṛtāḥ*.

Now follows the discussion of BU 1.5.18 up to verse 346.

श्रुतिस्था या हि वाक्स्याः पञ्चमीयं परा भवेत् ।
ततो लब्धात्मलाभायाः प्रथमा जन्महेतुतः ॥३२८॥

That Vāk¹ which has been (relevant in this discussion) in the Śruti is (now mentioned) subsequently (by the word *vāk*) in the Ablative case and (later, the same word is put) in the Nominative case signifying (that Vāk)² which has come to exist from that (earlier mentioned Vāk) since that is the source of its origin. [328]

Here is an answer to some ticklish question: The word *vāk* occurs in the sentence *pr̥thivyaī cainam agneś ca daivī vāg āviśati*— first as *pr̥thivyaī* in the Ablative (the Dative standing for the Ablative, owing to case attraction in *agneḥ*— a Vedic peculiarity) and later in the Nominative. How is one to account for the two cases?

The verse is explained by SP thus: *yā śrutidṛṣṭā prakṛtā grāhyā vāk pūrvasiddhopāśyasūtrarūpā tasyāḥ parastāt pr̥thivyā agner iti cāpādānapañcamī; ādhārādheyabhūtopāśyasūtravāgrūpād apādānāt prāptaprakṛtopāśakaphalabhūtavācaḥ parastād daivī vāg iti prathamety arthaḥ*.

The exactness of the translation is doubtful!

¹This is Sūtrarūpa Vāk which one has to worship (or meditate on).

²This is divine Vāk which is the result obtained by the worshipper.

वाचं संश्रुत्य वाक्यस्थां चिनुते भावनामयीम् ।
उपादानमतः श्रौती स्याद्वाणी भावनात्मनः ॥३२९॥

Having heard (i.e. known) the Vāk (of the nature of the

Sūtrātman) which is conveyed by the sentence (of the Śruti),¹ he adopts (that speech) which is full of devotion² (to the Sūtrātman) as the means.³ Then there will follow the (divine Vāk), mentioned in the Śruti (in the father) who has been (intensely) thinking (about Sūtrātman). [329]

This explains why it is said in the preceding verse that Vāk has come into existence.

¹This is the Vāk that is in the nature of the Sūtrātman.

²*bhāvanāmayī* refers to the devotee's (i.e. Upāsaka's) speech which is full of devotion to the Sūtrātman— it is consequently capable of bringing about a change in his nature, i.e. he becomes the Sūtrātman.

³It is that *vāṇī* which is explained in the preceding note—as a means it is naturally beneficial to the devotee, since thereby he attains the nature of the Sūtrātman. The adoption of this Vāk by the devotee means its coming into existence.

न हि वस्तु स्वतःसिद्धमन्यत्स्यास्तपरमात्मनः ।
सदेवेत्यादिकं शास्त्रं बाधितं स्यात्तथा सति ॥३३०॥

Verily, the thing, which is self-established, cannot be other than the highest Ātman. If it were there,¹ the scriptural text beginning with the words *sat eva ...* would be opposed.² [330]

This answers an objection by Bhartṛprapañca.

It is time and again mentioned in previous verses that the Sūtrātman is *svataḥsiddha* 'self-established'; therefore there is an objector's argument here. The devotee's speech, becoming one with the Sūtra-vāk, would then be *svataḥsiddha*, i.e. it has to be considered as 'unborn'!

¹This is to suggest the acceptance of the Sūtrātman as *svataḥsiddha*.

²This is then the consequence of the preceding.

धिया धियेति कार्यत्वं कृत्स्नस्य जगतः स्वयम् ।

श्रुत्यैव स्पष्टमाख्यातं नातोऽभिव्यक्तीरिष्यते ॥३३१॥

In the words *dhiyā dhiyā* it is clearly stated by the Śruti itself that the entire world is but an effect;¹ therefore the manifestation of the same² is not acceptable (lit. desired). [331]

The verse rejects a statement possibly in the Bhāṣya of Bhartṛprapañca: *bhinnaghaṭapradīpaprakāśavad abhivyaktimātram vācaḥ* as reported by NKL(note) in the comment on verse 330.

¹This means it is not *svataḥsiddha*, since, like every effect, it is produced.

²*abhivyakti* means the appearance of what has been already existing.

आर्तश्रुतेश्च प्राणादि वाचारम्भणशास्त्रतः ।

नात्मवत्स्यात्स्वतःसिद्धमुत्पत्त्यादिश्रुतेस्तथा ॥३३२॥

Prāṇa etc. cannot be self-established like the Ātman (as it is evident) from the statement regarding an *ārta* 'what is an effect/perishable', from the text about the (world as mere) activity of Vāk and also from the scriptural statement regarding their origin etc. [332]

This answers the preceding argument: Vāk etc. cannot be *svataḥsiddha*.

¹Cf. *ato 'nyad ārtam* (BU 3.4.2; 3.5.1; 3.7.23); *vācārambhaṇam vikāro nāmadheyam* (CU 6.1.4) and *etasmāj jāyate prāṇaḥ* (*Muṇḍakopaniṣad* 2.1.3).

कर्तृभिः क्रियते तस्माद्वावनाज्ञानकर्मभिः ।

अयन्नात्मकमिदं विश्वं नातोऽभिव्यक्तिरिष्यते ॥३३३॥

Therefore this world, which is of the nature of the three foods is produced by the performers (of rituals) through their devotion, knowledge and activity. Consequently, manifestation of the same is not acceptable. [333]

This gives some more reasons as to why *prāṇa* etc. are not said to be self-established.

ब्रह्मैवेदं तथात्मैव पुरुषश्चेति चागमः ।
एवं सत्यर्थवान्नः स्यादन्यथा स्यादनर्थकः ॥३३४॥

And the Vedāntic tradition (i.e. Vedāntic instruction): '(all) this is only Brahman,¹ also the Ātman² and Puruṣa³ as well' would be for us meaningful, only if this is accepted;⁴ otherwise, it would be meaningless. [334]

¹Cf. *Muṇḍakopaniṣad* 2.2.12.

²Cf. CU 7.25.2.

³Cf. *Muṇḍakopaniṣad* 2.1.4; *Śvetāśvataropaniṣad* 3.15.

⁴This refers to the non-acceptance of the manifestation, mentioned in verses 331-332.

पुत्रकर्मापरज्ञानसाधनान्यपरे जगः ।
मनुष्यलोकपित्रमरलोकेभ्यः स्युर्निवृत्तये ॥३३५॥
एवं मोक्षार्थतां तेषां पुत्रादीनां प्रचक्षते ।
लोकव्यावृत्तिमार्गेण श्रुतिस्तेषां निषेधकृत् ॥३३६॥
काम्यमेवाखिलं पाङ्क्तं कर्मेत्येवं प्रकृत्य तु ।
पुत्रादीनां स्वसाध्यार्थविनियोगोपसंहृतेः ॥३३७॥

Others have held (lit. sung): The means, viz. the son, the ritual activity and lower (lit. other)¹ knowledge, (lead to liberation);² (these are) for the attainment of the worlds of men, the manes and the gods.³ [335]

Thus they hold (lit. speak) that the son and others serve the purpose of (attaining) liberation, in such a way that the (three) worlds come to cease.⁴ (But) the Śruti decries (or censures) them, [336]

for, beginning with the remark that the entire Pāṅktakarman is but caused by desire, it has concluded with the injunction regarding the son etc. (to be used) towards the (effecting)

of the (desired result).

[337]

¹Supply: than the knowledge of the Brahman. Or, *vijñāna* 'subject-object oriented knowledge'.

²This is on the authority of the Śruti and the Smṛti regarding the removal of death— this is the view of Mīmāṃsakas.

³This is the view of Bhartṛprapañca who holds that this attainment of the worlds, when combined with the knowledge of the Ātman, would lead to liberation.

⁴This means: They are transcendent. (According to both the Mīmāṃsakas and Bhartṛprapañca.)

संसारफलतैवातः पुत्रादेर्गम्यते श्रुतेः ।
अविद्वद्विषयैवात ऋणश्रुतिरपीष्यते ॥३३८॥

Therefore it is understood from the Śruti that the son etc. have the nature of producing (only) transmigratory existence as the result. Therefore the statement regarding the debts¹ is also understood as referring to a non-knowing person.² [338]

¹Cf. verses 259 and 260 above.

²That is, the non-knower of the Ātman.

प्रजया किं करिष्याम इत्येवं च प्रवक्ष्यति ।
नातो विदितवेद्यस्य कथंचित्स्यादृणश्रुतिः ॥३३९॥

Further, (the Śruti) will state (lit. say) *prajayā kim kariṣyāmaḥ*;¹ therefore there would not ever be a statement regarding the debts in the case of one who has known what is to be known.²

[339]

¹BU 4.4.22.

²This refers to the Brahman.

व्यावृत्त्यर्थानि नैतानि पुत्रादीनि यथा तथा ।
पृथिव्यै चैनमित्याद्या स्वयं निर्वृत्ति नः श्रुतिः ॥३४०॥

The Śruti beginning with *prthivyaī cainam* itself explains to us as to how these, viz. a son etc., are not for the cessation (of the world). [340]

In verses 337-339, Sureśvara refuted the view of Mīmāṃsakas and thereby some part of Bhartṛprapañca's argument also. Now, in verses 340-346, he refutes the view of Bhartṛprapañca in other respects.

न च त्र्यन्नात्मसंप्राप्तिः कैवल्यमिति युज्यते ।
तस्या मेधातपोजत्वात्पौनःपुन्येन तच्छ्रुतेः ॥३४१॥

Also, it is not reasonable (to hold) that the acquisition of the three foods means (attaining) *kaivalya* 'uniqueness',¹ because that² is repeatedly³ heard to be (resulting) from *medhā* and *tapas*.⁴ [341]

¹That is, Brahmanhood (*brahmatva*).

²Namely, acquisition of the three foods.

³Cf. the repetition in *dhiyā dhiyā*.

⁴The reason is: what is produced cannot be permanent (and here Brahman).

तथा क्षयश्रुतेस्तस्य यद्वैतदितिवाक्यतः ।
पृथिवी शरीरमित्युक्तेः शरीरित्वं प्रजापतेः ॥३४२॥
नामरूपक्रियात्वेन मोहकार्योपसंहृतेः ॥३४३॥

In the same way, by hearing about its decrease from the Śruti sentence *yad dhaitat*¹ (and) from the statement *prthivī śarīram*,² (it follows that) Prajāpati is possessed of a body, [342]

(and also) from the concluding remark³ about the effects of ignorance which have the nature of name, form and activity. [343]

This means: the three foods which are but this world are perishable. That is becoming the three foods (Sūtrātman) is not liberation.

¹Cf. BU 1.5.2.

²Cf. BU 1.5.11.

³Cf. BU 1.6.1.

करयचिन्मुक्तयेऽलं स्यात्कस्यचित् व्यन्नवित्तये ।
सकृच्छ्रुतं वचोऽशक्तं विधातुं द्वयमञ्जसा ॥३४४॥

If a statement is understood (once) to be for effecting liberation of someone¹ (and at another time) to be for his attainment of the form of the three foods,² it is then to be pointed out that the statement heard only once cannot smoothly yield two meanings.³ [344]

This is in answer to one who might hold one and the same Śruti statement to serve (more than one, i.e.) two purposes in the same way the Sun or water serve many purposes.

¹Some hold that in the case of one who has become averse to ritual performances can, by being possessed of the nature of the three foods (the same as *sūtrātmatva*), attain liberation.

²This is in the case of one who is not averse to ritual performances. This one becomes the Sūtrātman but is not liberated.

³This is considered as the fault called Vākyabheda. In Śruti, a sentence can yield only one sense, not two. See SP's citation: *ekasya vākyasya sakṛcchṛtasya nānekārthatvam, bhidyate hi tathā vākyam*.

भूर्यथता प्रकाशादेः प्रत्यक्षादेव कारणात् ।
न त्वागमैकगम्येषु तथात्वमवसीयते ॥३४५॥

It is on account of the direct perception of light that it has (the capacity to reveal) many objects; but that sort of capacity¹ cannot be accepted (viz. understood) in respect of matters

to be known only from the Śruti.

[345]

¹Namely, *bhūryarthaprakāśatā*.

श्वेतोऽसौ धावतीत्यादेरनेकोक्तित्वकारणात् ।
अनेकार्थावसायः स्यान्न त्वेवमिह युज्यते ॥३४६॥

In the statements like *śveto 'sau dhāvati* and others, there can be understanding of more meanings than one (lit. not (only) one meaning), since (in that statement) there can be the state of expressing more meanings than one; but such a happening is not reasonably accepted here.¹ [346]

Here ends Sureśvara's refutation of Bhartṛprapañca's view.

¹This means: in the case of the Śruti.

Now follows the exposition of the sentence sa evaṃvit ... in BU 1.5.20. (Sureśvara has left out commenting on BU 1.5.19, since that kaṇḍikā does not appear to make any specifically new/additional argument.)

निःशेषभूतात्मैकः सन्नधिदैवात्मना स्थितः ।
भूतपापैरसंकीर्णो दैवं सुखमुपाश्नुते ॥३४७॥

Having become the Ātman of all beings, this one alone¹ stays in the form of the superior divine being (viz. Prajāpati) and, being unaffected² by the sorrows (lit. sins) of beings,³ he enjoys happiness. [347]

This is the purport of the sentence *sa evaṃvit sarveṣāṃ bhūtānām ātmā bhavati yathaiṣā devatāivam*.

¹Becoming one with Prajāpati means not expecting anything else, for there exists none other.

²How he is unaffected will be clarified later in verses 353-361 below. Here, *pāpa* is used in opposition to *sukha*.

³*bhūtapāpaiḥ asaṃkīrṇaḥ* explains away a doubt arising from

becoming *sarvabhūtātmā* which would bring to him the sins of all beings.

सर्वभूतात्मभूतोऽसौ सर्वानन्यत्वदर्शनः ।
जगदुत्पत्तिसंहारैः क्रीडन्निव विचेष्टते ॥३४८॥

The one, who has become the Ātman of all beings and the seer of the non-distinction of all,¹ keeps on doing (various) activities, viz. creation and destruction of the world, enjoying sport as it were. [348]

This explains the meaning of the sentence taken up for discussion.

¹Non-distinction of all from himself (who is now Prajāpati), therefore not seeing himself as different from all things in the world.

वाक्च सा सर्वभूतानां श्रोत्रं त्वग्रसनं मनः ।
घ्राणपादादयः सर्वे सर्वोपादानकारणात् ॥३४९॥

And that Vāk is the ear of all beings, the sense of touch (lit. skin), the tongue, and the *manas* (of all). All of these, viz. the sense of smell, the feet etc., (it becomes) on account of taking all of them (i.e. these of the beings) as the means (of its activity). [349]

ज्ञानं सप्रतिघं यद्वत्कार्यं वास्मासु दृश्यते ।
नैवमीशस्य सर्वत्र पूर्वोक्तादेव कारणात् ॥३५०॥

As it is noticed amongst us that knowledge or activity is with limitations, so is it never¹ (seen in the case) of the Lord (Prajāpati), for the reason already stated.² [350]

This verse points out that the worshipper of the three foods (*annatrayopāsaka*) is not only the Prāṇa of all, but is also their Vāk.

¹ *na sarvatra* 'never', or 'nowhere'.

² Because of *sarvātmatva*; cf. verse 347 above.

किंच सर्वाणि भूतानि तमवन्ति यथाबलम् ।
इममर्थं श्रुतिर्वक्ति दृष्टान्तेन प्रयत्नतः ॥३५१॥

Moreover, all beings protect¹ him (i.e. the worshipper of the three foods) according to their own strength. (And) this thought does the Śruti state with an illustration, with great care.² [351]

This is the purport of *sa yathaitaṁ devatām ... gacchati* which explains the nature of the worship.

¹ Already (under verse 167) we have noticed the use of verb root *av* in the sense of 'to protect, or to favour'; cf next verse also.

² Or, very carefully.

पूर्वजन्माभिनिर्वृतां यथैवावन्ति देवताम् ।
तथैवैवंविदं भोगैः सर्वभूतानि सर्वदा ॥३५२॥

As they (viz. the worshippers of Prāṇa etc.) protect (i.e. keep secure or, favour=serve) the divinity (viz. Vāk), which the sacrificer has secured¹ in his earlier life, so do all beings ever (protect) the knower of all this by (yielding) various enjoyments. [352]

This is the paraphrase (or explanation) of *sa yathaitāṁ*

¹ That is, (Vāk) with which he has become one; cf. SP: *pūrvasiddhadevatā* and therefore the worshipper as *tadbhāva-sākṣātkāravat*.

सर्वभूतात्मतापत्तिर्यद्येवंविद इष्यते ।
संगतिर्भौतिकैर्न स्यात्तस्य दुःखादिभिः कथम् ॥३५३॥

(An objection is raised:) If it is desired (by you) that there is for such a knower (i.e. the worshipper of Prāṇa etc.) the

attainment of the nature of all beings, then how is it that there is no connection of him with the miseries etc. experienced by (or belonging to) those beings? [353]

This verse raises a question about what is said in verse 347 above, viz. *bhūtapāpair asaṃkīrṇaḥ*.

नापरिच्छिन्नबुद्धित्वात्तस्य दुःखाद्युपप्लुतिः ।
कुक्षिस्थकिमिदुःखैर्नो न मनागपि संगतिः ॥३५४॥

[This and the following verses (up to 361) are the answer to the preceding verse.]

(The answer is:) There is no affliction by grief etc.¹ in the case of him, because he has unlimited knowledge. Also, there is not even a little connection with the miseries caused by small worms which reside in the belly.² [354]

¹The word etc. implies *sukha*.

²This is to say that the worshipper who has attained oneness with Prajāpati (or Sūtrātman), might still have worms in the belly. But they cannot affect him as in his earlier life. Cp. the oft-quoted line *prārabdhakarmanām* ... cited under verse 257 above.

अस्मदाद्यभिमानित्वे तस्यास्मद्दुःखसंगतिः ।
तस्य कृत्स्नाभिमानित्वान्नास्मन्मात्राभिमानता ॥३५५॥

There is his connection with our (common-felt) sorrows, only while he entertains ego.¹ (But) now when he comes to have the awareness of oneness of being (identical with) all (in the world), he does not entertain his identity with 'I' etc. [355]

¹The words 'entertains ego' are a brief expression for 'having the notions such as 'I', 'mine' etc.

ईश्वरत्वाच्च तस्यास्मद्दुःखैर्न स्यात्समागमः ।
अस्माकं दुःखसंप्राप्तिरनैश्वर्यकृतैव तु ॥३५६॥

On account of his being the overlord (of all), he does not have any connection with our sorrows. As against this, our experiencing sorrow is caused by not having attained the overlordship. [356]

This is to say: Despite entertaining identity with all, this one does not experience our sorrows— we feel them because we are not one with 'Íśvara' (i.e. Prajāpati or Sūtrātman).

इत्यादि हृदये कृत्वा न्यायं श्रुतिरुदाहरत् ।
यद्दुःखं किंचेति विस्पष्टं प्रजादुःखनिषेधकृत् ॥३५७॥

Keeping all this¹ in mind, the Śruti has introduced the rule in clear words *yad u kiṃ ca*, which denies (in the case of this one who has become one with Prajāpati) the miseries of the beings. [357]

¹*ityādi* means this: *iti* is for what is stated in the preceding verses. *ādi* refers to the worshipper's achieving *sarvakṛttva* and *sarvātmatva*.

यच्छोचन्ति प्रजाः सर्वा दुःखैराध्यात्मिकादिभिः ।
आसामेवात्मभिः साकं तद्दुःखमुपयुज्यते ॥३५८॥

Whatever all the beings grieve over, viz. the miseries pertaining to the body etc.,¹ is to be connected (only) with their bodies.² [358]

This is the meaning of *yad u kiṃ cemāḥ prajāḥ śocanti amaivāsāṃ tad bhavati*.

¹The word etc. stands for *ādhibhautika* 'caused by elements' and *ādhidaivika* 'caused by gods'.

²This is about the common or ordinary people who have to

experience (verb root *bhuj*) the miseries (implying happiness as well) as *bhoga*. These are caused by their identifying themselves with various limitations of their intellect.

यथोक्तन्यायतो दुःखं न सार्धं देवतात्मना ।

कृतनाशस्तथा च स्यादकृताभ्यागमस्तथा ॥३५९॥

On account of the reason(s) stated above, there is no misery (accompanying) him, who has become divine in nature. (But, if it were that)¹ there would follow (these two faults, viz.) nullifying what is done and also the acceptance of what is not done.² [359]

The emphasis on *eva* in the preceding verse is explained. Further, the objector again says: 'This Upāsaka, who has obtained oneness with Prajāpati and is also possessed of the nature of all beings (cf. *sarvātmata*), must experience the *bhogas* of all.' To this, there is an answer.

¹That is, if he (the *sarvātman*) was understood to suffer misery.

²This is the reason why the worshipper, (now) identical with the divine, does not suffer. Here, *kṛtanāśa* literally means destruction of (i.e. nullifying) what is earlier done (Upāsana) and *akṛtābhyāgama* means acceptance of result(s) produced by some activity which is not done by the worshipper (Upāsaka).

पुण्यमेव कृतं यस्मात्पुण्यमेवामुमेत्यतः ।

पापस्याकरणादेव नैति पापं कदाचन ॥३६०॥

Since only merit was collected (by the worshipper in his earlier life), therefore only merit comes to him (and) only by not doing any sin, (now in this later state of oneness with Prajāpati), he never comes to have any sin. [360]

The first line explains *punyaṃ evāmuṃ gacchati* and the sentence *na ha vai devān pāpaṃ gacchati* clarifies the second line of the previous verse.

अग्निं न त्प्रेक्षते शैत्यमग्निवस्तुस्वभावतः ।
पाप्मानो देवतां तद्वद्देवतात्मस्वभावतः ॥३६१॥

Cold does not affect (lit. come to) fire because of the nature of fire as it is; in the same way sins (do not affect) the god (viz. Prajāpati) because of his nature, viz. godhood. [361]

This illustrates the thought in the preceding verse.

Now follows the discussion of BU 1.5.21-22 up to verse 375.

सर्व एव समाः प्राणा इत्युक्तेः साम्यनिश्चितौ ।
उपासने विकल्पेन प्राप्ते मीमांस्यते व्रतम् ॥३६२॥
दैववागादिसंपत्तिर्मृतस्य त्र्यन्नदर्शिनः ।
जीवता किं व्रतं धार्यमिति मीमांस्यतेऽधुना ॥३६३॥

Since it was (earlier) stated that all Prāṇas (i.e. Prāṇa, *manas* and Vāk)¹ are all equal and there was (thus) the decision of their equality, there now follows a doubt as regards their worship² and therefore is the vow (or meditation) being considered (in what follows). [362]

(It is learnt that) when a person, who knows (himself as) the three foods, dies, he becomes the divine Vāk etc. Therefore is now considered what vow should be followed by that while he is alive. [363]

What now follows has the purport of answering one who would have said that the discussion of 'seven foods' is completed at the end of BU 1.5.20 and then questioned about the purpose of *athāto vratamīmāṃsā*. Verses 362 and 363 state the purport of the whole argument.

SP and NKL point out the substance in the argument thus: under the doubt if 'any one of the three (i.e. *manas*, Vāk and Prāṇa) is to be worshipped (i.e. meditated upon) or all the three are to be worshipped together' and the decision is that

Prāṇa is to be worshipped principally.

¹Refer to verse 194 above; also cf. BU: *te ete sarve eva samāḥ sarve anantāḥ* ... mentioned under that verse.

²Regarding the superiority of the *upāsya* 'object to be worshipped'.

सर्वात्मकर्मसंन्यासात्प्राप्ते नैष्कर्म्यरूपके ।
प्राणव्रतविधानार्थं परो ग्रन्थोऽवतार्यते ॥३६४॥

(Now) is introduced the subsequent portion (of the Śruti) for presenting the vow of (i.e. the meditation on) Prāṇa, (for a person) after he has attained the state of not having to perform (any ritual activity) by having given up his own ritual activities in their entirety.¹ [364]

¹This refers to the time of his performing the Sampratti ritual.

बहूक्त्यैव तु सर्वेषां सिद्धं पूर्वमुपासनम् ।
स यो हैतानिति ततो नेदं पूर्वमपेक्षते ॥३६५॥

By the very reference to many (objects of Upāsana) in the statement *sa yo haitān* ... there is already established the worship of all. Therefore it is not that this vow is related only to Prāṇa. This (vow, viz. the one under consideration) expects (that sentence: *sa yo haitān* to precede it). [365]

This verse anticipates the opponent's view: 'There is reference to the vow of only Prāṇa' and answers it: The earlier sentence (cf. 1.5.13) precedes the statement *athāto vratamīmāṃsā*.

वाक्स्वान्तयोः स्वरूपोक्तिर्वृथैव स्यात्पुरोदिता ।
तयोरुपासनं नो चेत्प्राणवत्स्याद्विवक्षितम् ॥३६६॥

(The argument above goes further:) The description of the nature of Vāk and *manas* which is given earlier would be meaningless if their worship (also) were not intended to be

in the same way as of Prāṇa.

[366]

मृत्युना श्रमरूपेण ग्रस्ता वागादयो यतः ।

म्लोचन्त्यपि च श्राम्यन्ति तेन भग्नव्रताः स्मृताः ॥३६७॥

Since Vāk etc.¹ are overpowered by death in the form of fatigue, they (i.e. the gods) feel fatigue and (Vāk etc.) become tired; therefore they are stated to have abandoned (or, have been lost to) their vows (i.e. activities).

[367]

This explains the meaning of *tasmād ete etenākhyāyante prāṇa iti*.

¹The word etc. refers to *manas* and the gods connected with Vāk and *manas*.

तद्रूपो मध्यमो वायुः श्रमास्तमयवर्जितः ।

यतौऽभग्नव्रतस्तस्मात्तस्यैव व्रतमाश्रयेत् ॥३६८॥

[Here follows the story of the quarrel amongst various organs.]

The middle wind and Vāyu,¹ having its² form, was not affected by (lit. was without) fatigue and (final) loss. (Thus) since it had not abandoned its vow (i.e. activity); therefore one should take to (i.e. observe) the vow of it alone.

[368]

This refers to *athemam eva nāpnod yo 'yam madhyamaḥ prāṇaḥ*.

¹The words *madhyama* and *vāyu* refer to the *adhyātma* and *adhidaiva* forms of Wind (=Prāṇa).

²The word 'it' refers to Prāṇa, i.e. Mṛtyu.

प्राणे म्लोचन्ति वायौ च वागाद्यग्न्यादयो यतः ।

प्राणस्यैव व्रतं धार्यमतो नान्यस्य कस्यचित् ॥३६९॥

Since the Vāk etc. and Agni etc.¹ merge (lit. become lost) into Prāṇa, therefore the vow only of Prāṇa is to be undertaken

and not of any other.²

[369]

¹The first etc. refers to *manas* and the second to the gods of Vāk and *manas*.

²It means: because Upāsanā of Prāṇa includes that of Vāk and *manas* also. This is clarified in the next verse.

प्राणैकालिङ्गनात्प्राणा यथा तन्नामरूपिणः ।
आसन्प्राणविदप्येवं प्राणात्मोपासनाद्वेत् ॥३७०॥

Since, on account of their (viz. of Vāk and others) having clung to Prāṇa, they came to have its name and form, therefore a knower of (the nature of) Prāṇa also comes to have, through his meditation on that, the name and form of Prāṇa likewise.

[370]

This is the purport of *tasmād ete*

सर्वेन्द्रियेषु यावान् स्यात्परिस्पन्दः क्रियात्मसु ।
प्राणस्यैव स विज्ञेयस्तेषां त्वर्थप्रकाशनम् ॥३७१॥

Whatever movement¹ is noticed in all organs² which have the nature of doing activity, let that be known as of Prāṇa and, as for them, there is only (the function of) revealing³ their own objects.

[371]

¹The word 'movement' stands for every activity, even illuminating or revealing; i.e. causing perception of objects.

²These are eleven in all; five *jñānendriyas*, five *karmendriyas* and the eleventh is *manas*.

³The word 'revealing' signifies all movement (clarified in the note 1 above).

यथा वागादयस्तद्वदधिदैवेऽपि योजयेत् ।
अग्न्यादिषु परिस्पन्दो वायोरेवेति निश्चयः ॥३७२॥

As Vāk etc. (have become known by the name and form of Prāṇa), so also, in the case of the sphere of gods, should one (i.e. the worshipper) understand. The decision is: whatever be the movement (noticeable) in Agni and others, it is only that of Vāyu.¹ [372]

¹NKL points out *calanasya prāṇadharmatva* (SP: *calanasva-bhāva*).

वागाद्यनुग्रहः सिद्धस्त्वग्न्यादेः कर्म केवलम् ।
सर्वेन्द्रियाणामात्मैव प्राणो सर्गो लयस्तथा ॥३७३॥

The favour of Agni and others¹ done to Vāk and others² is (thus) established (in the Śruti) as the singular (or matchless) doing (of Prāṇa). (Therefore) Prāṇa is the (real) nature of all organs³ and also their origin and merger (i.e. the end/the meeting point).⁴ [373]

The first line refers to the Śruti statements *agnir vāg bhūtvā* (*Aitareyopaniṣad* 1.2.4) and others. That means the favour done to Vāk etc. which are explained in note 2 on verse 371 above.

¹These are various gods who superintend over the activities of the organs. Their entry into these latter is their favour.

²Others mean the remaining organs.

³This is, in reality, not merely of organs, but also of their gods.

⁴This means: where they finally merge in.

प्राणरूपाभिधानाभ्यां ख्याता वागादयो यथा ।
प्राणवित्संज्ञया ख्यातिं याति विद्वत्कुलं तथा ॥३७४॥

As Vāk and others have been known by the form and name of Prāṇa, so also, does the family of a knower (i.e. the worshipper) of Prāṇa become known as (lit. by the name) the knower of Prāṇa. [374]

यश्चापि प्राणवित्स्पर्धी स्पर्धामनु स मृत्युवत् ।
शोषमित्रा मृतिं याति द्विष्यान्नातोऽनवेदिनम् ॥३७५॥

And whosoever is a rival with the knower of Prāṇa becomes, after (entering into) rivalry with him, withered as after death, and then (or finally) dies. Therefore one should not be inimical to the knower of Prāṇa. [375]

This explains the meaning of *ya u haivaṃvidā spardhate anuśuṣyaty anuśuṣya haivantato mriyate*.

Now follows the discussion of Bu 1.5.23 up to the end.

ब्राह्मणोक्तार्थदाढ्याय श्लोको मन्त्रोऽनुकीर्त्यते ।
यतश्चोदेति सूर्योऽसौ यत्र चास्तं निगच्छति ॥३७६॥
प्रश्नरूपमिदं वाक्यं यतः प्रत्युक्तिरुच्यते ।
प्राणादित्यादिना भानोरुदयास्तमयौ कथम् ॥३७७॥

With a view to supporting the matter stated in the Brāhmaṇa¹ there is now stated a verse, a Mantra,² viz. *yataś codeti sūryo 'sau, yatra cāstaṃ nigacchati*.³ [376]

This Śruti statement has the form of a question, since there is an answer stated in the words *prāṇāt*⁴ (And, on this, the question is:) How are there the rise and the setting understood in the case of the Sun?⁵ [377]

¹That is, the explanation (in prose) of the original Mantras in the Upaniṣad; cf. the usual remark in Vedic literature: *tasyoktam brāhmaṇam*.

²*śloka* and Mantra are in apposition. In usual practice, *śloka* is used for a metrical verse in non-Śāstric literature, while Mantra is for a verse in sacred literature or Śruti. Yet, Sureśvara is here using the words in only one sense. The *kaṇḍikā* states: *athaiṣa śloko bhavati*. SP points out that the purpose of the preposition in *anukīrtyate* is to point out that the second line of this Vārtika is not a Mantra— it is *śloka* (already known

as Kārikā, it being in Śāstric literature).

³BU 1.5.1-2.

⁴In the Vedic *yataś chodeti* ... there is not used the interrogative particle *kim* or (or its form). Yet, since what follows as an answer indicates the character of a question.

⁵It means: On what authority it is so said? This is because the Śruti states that these are used on account of Prāṇa.

यदा वै पुरुषः शेते प्राणमप्येति वाक्त्तदा ।
चक्षुः श्रोत्रं मनस्तद्वज्जायते तत एव च ॥३७८॥

When a man sleeps, then does Vāk enter into the Prāṇa, (so also do) eyes, ears and *manas*. Also (each¹ one of them) originates only from that.² [378]

In the preceding verse the question is asked about the rise and the setting— this is for merger— of the Sun. The answer, given in the Śruti (cf. note 5 on that verse), is: 'On account of Prāṇa.' Now, in order to explain that answer, Sureśvara first states the rise and merger of Vāk etc. as caused by Prāṇa and then (in verse 379) those of Fire etc., Fire being taken as the Sun (also).

¹The word 'each' is used in view of every singular form *caḥṣus* and *śrotra*.

²This implies also their merger into Prāṇa.

अधिदैवतमप्येवं वायोरग्न्यादिसंभवः ।
अप्ययश्च यथाध्यात्मं श्रेयान्प्राणस्ततोऽन्यतः ॥३७९॥

In the world of gods also, the origination of Agni and others is from Vāyu (i.e. Prāṇa) likewise; so also is their merger (into it). Therefore, in relation to the body, Prāṇa is superior to others (viz. *prāṇas* 'organs'). [379]

आत्मैव प्राणशब्दः स्यात्प्राणबन्धनवाक्यतः ।
असदेवेदमित्युक्तेरात्मनो भानुसंभवः ॥३८०॥

The Ātman is signified by the word *prāṇa*; (this is understood) from the Śruti statement *prāṇabandhana*¹ (Also) from the statement *asad evedam*² (it follows that) the rise³ (lit. birth) of the Sun is from the Ātman. [380]

For explanation see SP on this verse; it is too elaborate to reproduce.

¹Cf. CU 6.8.2.

²CU 3.19.1.

³This implies the setting also.

यत् एव समुत्पत्तिस्तत्रैव प्रलयोऽपि च ।
मृदो जातस्य कुम्भस्य न लयो वीरणादिषु ॥३८१॥

From what there is rise (or, origination of the Sun etc.), in that itself is there (the) merger of them as well. (Verily) a pitcher, which is produced from clay, does not have its merger into a wooden pin of the spindle etc.¹ [381]

¹The second line is a *vyatikadṛṣṭānta* 'contrary example'. The word *ādi* stands for various means (i.e. material causes) of other kinds of production.

वागादिगणधारित्वाद्धर्मं वायुव्रतं विदुः ।
चक्रिरे दधिरे धर्मं धारणं प्रकृतं यतः ॥३८२॥

They have known the vow of Prāṇa as Dharma, since it (i.e. Prāṇa) sustains the entire group (of organs) that is headed by Vāk, since they have made, i.e. held, that as Dharma from which all sustenance is obtained (or understood). [382]

This refers to the Śruti: *taṁ devāś cakrire dharmam*

अद्यापि क्रियते तैस्तत्कर्तारश्चापि तत्सुराः ।
अधियन्त यममुर्हि तस्मिन्काले पराजिताः ।

धर्मव्रतं तदेवाद्य बिभ्रत्यग्न्यादयः शुभम् ॥३८३॥

Even now (that vow) is observed by them; also (their gods) will observe that which they observed¹ then, at that time, when they were defeated. The same auspicious vow of Dharma do Agni and others observe (even) today. [383]

¹This refers to *yad vā ete amum adhriyanta*

अभग्नं मृत्युना यस्मात्प्राणस्यैव व्रतं ततः ।
एकमेव व्रतं प्राणं चरेदा मरणात्सदा ॥३८४॥

Since the vow of (i.e. observed by) Prāṇa was not overcome (i.e. was not set to nought) by death (and fatigue), therefore one should ever observe only one vow, viz. Prāṇa,¹ till death. [384]

¹*vrataṁ prāṇam* are really *prāṇavratam*. Translation takes the words in apposition. In that case, Prāṇa is to be understood as 'called Prāṇa'.

प्राण्यादपान्यात्प्राणात्मा ह्युक्त्यादिष्वपि कर्मसु ।
अन्तर्भावो यतोऽमीषां श्रोत्रादीन्द्रियकर्मणाम् ॥३८५॥
प्राणकर्मणि तेनैतदेकमेव व्रतं चरेत् ॥३८६॥

May (an individual) breathe in (and/or) breathe out, he is of the nature of Prāṇa in all (his) doings, viz. speaking etc., for the functions of the organs, ears etc., are included in the doing of Prāṇa. Therefore one should observe this vow, the only one (vow). [385-386]

प्राणापानात्मकं यस्माद्व्रतं प्राणैककर्तृकम् ।
प्राण्यादपान्याच्च ततो नित्यमा मरणाद्बुधः ॥३८७॥

Since the vow, which is of the nature of breathing in and breathing out, has Prāṇa alone as its agent, therefore a wise

man should ever, till his death, breathe in and breathe out,
[considering the same as the observance of the vow of Prāṇa.]¹

[387]

¹The words in the square brackets need to be supplied. Cf. SP: *budhaḥ sarveṣu vāgādivyāpāreṣu prāṇavyāpāradr̥ṣṭis tad upā-sīta.*

प्राणात्मनैव वागादिव्रतान्यपि चरेत्सदा ।
वागाद्यासङ्गवत्तन्मां पाप्मा मा प्रापदासुरः ॥३८८॥
इत्येवमभिसंधिः सन्निवृत्तान्प्राणव्रतं चरेत् ।
प्राणव्रतं चेदारब्धम् चिकीर्षेत्तत्समापनम् ॥३८९॥

One should ever perform the vows of Vāk and others also as only those, which have the nature of Prāṇa, bearing in mind this intention: Let not the demoniac sin come to me like my attachment to Vāk and others.

If the vow of Prāṇa is (once) commenced (by a person), let him desire to complete the same. [388-389]

अभ्यस्तेनामृतेर्यस्मात्सायुज्यादि समश्नुते ।
ऋयन्नात्मदेवतायास्तु तस्मादेवं विधीयते ॥३९०॥

Since, by continuous (lit. repeated) observance (of this vow), one attains union etc.¹ (with Prāṇa), therefore is prescribed thus this vow to the god who has the nature of the three foods. [390]

¹The word etc. refers to *sālokya* and *sārūpya*.

इति श्रीबृहदारण्यकोपनिषद्भाष्यवार्तिके प्रथमाध्यायस्य

पञ्चमं ब्राह्मणम् ॥५॥

**BRHADĀRANYAKOPANIṢAD-
BHĀṢYA-VĀRTIKA**

1.6

[The Brāhmaṇa is not known by any specific name.]

This is about introducing BU 1.6.

तद्वेदमित्यविद्याया उक्तं कार्यमशेषतः ।
उक्तार्थस्यैव संक्षेपस्त्रयं वा इत्यथोच्यते ॥१॥

In the words *tad dhedam*¹ has been stated the entire (world of the) effects of Avidyā and, now, in the words *trayaṃ vā* ... is stated a summary of what has been said.² [1]

This justifies the introduction of the Brāhmaṇa (viz. BU 1.6) beginning with the words *trayaṃ vā*.

¹That is, from BU 1.4.7 to the end of BU 1.5—this is an extensive discussion on Avidyā.

²This shows the purpose of summing up the contents of BU 1.4.7ff.— cf. SP *saṃkṣepavistarau ca sukhapratipattiyartham iṣṭau*.

अज्ञातैकात्म्यकार्यं तद्यदेतदभिर्शब्दितम् ।
न तु विध्वस्तसंमोहप्रत्यङ्मात्रसतत्त्वगम् ॥२॥
एवमुक्ते विरक्तोऽस्मान्मुमुक्षुः श्रद्धयान्वितः ।
ब्रह्मज्ञानेऽधिकारी स्यात्कथं नामेति भण्यते ॥३॥

That is the effect of the absence of the knowledge of the uniqueness of the Ātman which is thus (*etat*) mentioned and (*tu*) not that which pertains only to the inner self, together with its nature, the ignorance about which can be destroyed.

[2]

That being said, a person, (who has become) averse (to the world) would be desirous of liberation, would be possessed of faith and would be entitled to the knowledge of the

Brahman. How this is to be is stated (in the following Brāhmaṇa). [3]

These two verses point out the purposefulness of these concluding remarks on the portion between BU 1.4.7 and the end of BU 1.5; that is to consider how a person, who has become averse to this world (which is caused by Avidyā), would become entitled to acquiring the knowledge of the Brahman.

अविद्योत्थपुमर्थेभ्यो विमुखीभूतमानसः ।
आत्मतत्त्वविजिज्ञासुस्तद्व्यावृत्तो भवेन्नरः ॥४॥

(It is to this purpose:) A man, whose mind has turned away from the aims of human life (the notions about which) had arisen from Avidyā, and has become desirous of knowing about the true nature of the Ātman, becomes¹ averse to them.²

[4]

This is to stress the need of aversion to worldly existence.

¹Sureśvara uses *bhavet* for *bhavati* (in the manner of Vedic injunctions).

²The word 'them' refers to *avidyotthapumarthas*, viz. those which have been described in BU 1.4.7.

बाह्यार्थबद्धधिषणः प्रत्यग्याथात्म्यवित्तये ।
नालं विरोधात्पुरुषः पराञ्चीत्यागमोक्तितः ॥५॥

A person, who has fixed his intellect on the external objects, is not able to get to know the true nature of the inner self, since that (viz. his attempt towards knowing that) involves opposition (as seen) from the Śruti statement *parāñci khāni*¹

[5]

This states why a person, non-averse to the world, is unable to ascertain the nature of Reality.

¹*parāñci khāni vyatṛṇāt svayambhūh.. (Kāthopaniṣad 4.1).*

अविद्यामात्रहेतुत्वं न त्वैकात्म्यानुसारिता ।
यथोक्तवस्तुनः कस्मादित्येतत्प्रतिपाद्यते ॥६॥

It is discussed¹ as to why the thing which is stated² has only Avidyā as its cause and does not have the capacity to follow the uniqueness of the Ātman. [6]

¹That is, ... will be discussed in BU 1.6.

²This refers to the world consisting in the seven foods which are discussed in BU 1.5.

अज्ञातादात्मनः साक्षादभिव्यक्तिः पुरोदिता ।
अहेतुफलरूपस्य नामरूपक्रियात्मभिः ॥७॥

There has been earlier stated the direct manifestation from the unknown Ātman which is by nature not a cause and/or an effect and (has become known by) name, form and action.

[7]

There is, to begin with, a discussion on prapañca which consists in name, form and action. Now follows the discussion of BU 1.6.1.

नामाद्यात्मकतैवास्य ब्रह्मादेः स्थावरावधेः ।
न तु वस्त्वन्तरं तत्स्याद्यथा तदिह वर्ण्यते ॥८॥

This world,¹ beginning with the Brahman up to what does not move has merely the nature of name etc.² It is (really) nothing other (than the real) thing. How that is is explained here.³ [8]

¹Supply: which has the nature of the three foods.

²The word etc. refers to form and action.

³That is, in this Brāhmaṇa, viz. 1.6.

कारणत्वसमानत्वस्वात्मलाभत्वहेतुभिः ।
नामाद्यात्मकतैतस्य प्रपञ्चस्य प्रसाध्यते ॥९॥

It is by (giving) reason, (i.e. by stating that) this world has a cause,¹ equality (among its three constituents²) and origination,³ that it is established to have the nature of name etc. [9]

¹ *kāraṇatva = kāraṇavattva.*

² The three foods (*annatraya*) are meant.

³ In NKL, there is a note: name etc. are *uktha*, *sāman* and *brahan* and have, therefore, the nature of the cause etc. Cf. verses 13-15 below based on the Śruti passage *teṣāṃ vāg ity eteṣāṃ*

अनेकभेदसंभिन्नं यदेतद्व्याकृतं जगत् ।
नामरूपक्रियातत्त्वमेतत्सर्वं प्रतीयताम् ॥१०॥

Let it be understood that this world, which has become manifest, is entirely made up of (or, characterized by) numerous variety (in it) and has the nature of name, form and action. [10]

त्रयं वा इदमित्येवं प्रतिज्ञार्थमिदं वचः ।
हेतूक्तिरुत्तरो ग्रन्थस्तेषामित्यादिनोच्यते ॥११॥

Or rather, this, viz. (the words) *trayaṃ vā idam ...*, is thus a statement for (merely) enunciating (what has been already discussed) and the subsequent portion (of this Brāhmaṇa), which begins with the word *teṣāṃ* is the statement of the reason. [11]

According to NKL, *trayaṃ vā* does not repeat what is conveyed by *teṣāṃ nāmnām* (this is in the note on this verse).

वागित्यनेन शब्देन नादमात्रं विवक्ष्यते ।

अपजुहुषितत्वात् नादोत्थस्य विकारतः ॥१२॥

By the word *vāk* is intended all that is sound, since it is intended to conceal¹ what has arisen from sound as its effect.²

[12]

¹NKL (text and commentary) read *apajuhūṣitatvāt* for *apajuhnuṣitatvāt* in the AnSS edition (text and commentary). It is difficult to decide what NKL seeks to convey.

²*vikārataḥ* is for *vikāratvataḥ*.

एषां नामविकाराणामुक्थं नादस्तदुत्थितेः ।
सर्वनाम्नामतो नाद उक्थमित्यभिधीयते ॥१३॥

Sound is the *uktha* (or origin) of all these modifications, viz. names, because they arise from that. Therefore the sound is described as the *uktha*, i.e. origin of all names. [13]

SP points out: all names (i.e. words in language) are, in essence, not different from their cause (*uktha*) like a pitcher from clay.

¹This explains *etad eṣām uktham* in BU. In this entire context (i.e. in what follows) *uktha* is understood as 'origin' or 'cause'.

तथा सामान्यतो वाचो विशेषाणां तदात्मता ।
न हि निष्कृष्य सामान्याद्विशेषः कश्चिदीक्ष्यते ॥१४॥

So also, sound is the *sāman* (generality) of all the modifications, viz. particular (expressions) of speech, since they arise from the other (i.e. from *sāman*). No particular (object) is experienced as taken away from (i.e. without) generality. [14]

This explains *etad eṣām sāma*. SP remarks that all particular names are understood (or, derived) from their generality and each has that in it like the *idam* portion continuing in the apprehension of a serpent etc. in a rope (in false knowledge).

आत्मत्वाच्च तथा वाचो नात्मीयोऽन्योऽवशिष्यते ।
कात्स्न्येनैवाभिसंबन्धादात्मीयस्येह वस्तुनः ॥१५॥

So also, owing to the nature of Vāk as the Ātman¹ (of all modifications of speech), there is not left out any other (as an effect) of the Ātman; this is because all the things here have, in their entirety, a close connection with the Ātman.

[15]

This explains *etad eṣām brahma*. SP adds: Since Vāk is the Ātman of all sounds, they are not different from it, as a pitcher is not different from on account of (i.e. since it is made from) clay.

¹That is, the essence.

कार्यकारणगो भेदः प्राप्तो लोके य ईक्ष्यते ।
अविचारितसंसिद्धः सोऽयं श्रुत्या निषिध्यते ॥१६॥

Whatever distinction between cause(s) and effect(s) obtains in this world is (but) established in the absence of (proper) thought and that is (here) rejected by the Śruti.

[16]

The verse intends to state: The three preceding verses have rejected all 'distinction' in speech, since all of them are but one (viz. Vāk) in their essence. That distinction has proceeded from want of proper reasoning.

एवं सति प्रमाणत्वमपूर्वार्थावबोधनात् ।
अन्यथातोऽनुवादः स्याच्छ्रुतेर्ज्ञातार्थबोधनात् ॥१७॥

If this is so, there is authoritativeness¹ (in the Brāhmaṇa), for it would be capable of informing (us) of a thing not known before. If it were otherwise, (this Śruti) would have been only an Arthavāda by its informing us about what has been already known.

[17]

The purport of this verse, together with its preceding, is: to establish *abheda* among all sounds and *bheda* among them is, in reality, only falsely conceived.

¹Or, meaningfulness/purposefulness.

Now follows the discussion of BU 1.6.2.

चक्षुषो विषयश्चक्षुःशब्देनेहाभिधीयते ।
रूपाणामिति संबन्धाद्रूपात्मत्वात्तथैव च ॥१८॥

Here (in this section), the objects¹ of the eye are stated by the word *cakṣus*, because they have connection with *rūpāṇām...*² and also because they are of the nature of the form.³ [18]

¹Singular stands for the plural according to *jātāv ekavacanam*.

²In *rūpāṇām* ... there is reference to particular *rūpas* 'forms'.

³That is to say: *cakṣus* 'eye' is but an effect of *rūpa* which is the generality in all forms. Therefore the objects of the eye are but form. This is explained in the next verse.

यद्यद्वि रूप्यते किञ्चिच्छब्दस्पर्शादिकं धिया ।
तत्तद्रूपमिति ज्ञेयं तैजसत्वाविशेषतः ॥१९॥

Whatever, be it word and touch etc., is grasped (lit. seen) by a person's intellect, is to be known as *rūpa* 'form' since (each one of them) is uniformly of the nature of *tejas*.¹ [19]

This explains why one does not have to understand only whiteness etc. as *rūpa*.

¹*cakṣus* is described as *tejas*, therefore its objects are *taijasa* and, as such, *rūpa*.

त्वाष्ट्रमेव हि सर्वत्र तेजो रूपादिलक्षणम् ।
तस्माद्विषयसामान्यं चक्षुःशब्देन भण्यते ॥२०॥

Everywhere only the *tejas* of the Tvaṣṭṛ¹ is the cause of form

etc.;² therefore generality in all the forms is referred to by the word *cakṣus*. [20]

¹This stands for Savitr. Cf. 1.5.184.

²'Cause of form etc.' is really the illuminator of form etc. The word etc. has a reference to *yat ... śabdasparśādikaṃ rūpyate dhiyā* in the preceding verse.

हेतुतज्जाविभागेन कार्यकारणहेतुतः ।
वाचारम्भणशास्त्राच्च विकारानृततोच्यते ॥२१॥

This is assertion of the falsity (or unreality) of the modification, because, as the cause and its effects, there is (always) identity between a cause and its effect, and also on the basis of the scriptural statement about the function of speech.¹ [21]

This general remark is introduced here for justifying what is said above, viz. without the generality called *rūpa*, there cannot be (or exist) the particular or individual *rūpas* 'forms'.

It seems from SP on the next verse that this is an explanation of the statement about *uktha*.

¹Cf. *vācārambhaṇam vikāro nāmedheyam* (CU 6.1.4-6).

अन्तर्भावश्च सामान्ये विशेषणामथोच्यते ।
सामान्यमेतत्सर्वेषां विशेषाणां समं हि तैः ॥२२॥

And then there is stated the inclusion of (all) the particulars in generality, for indeed generality of all particulars is equal to all of them. [22]

This explains the statement about *sāman* above.

न विशेषो न सामान्यं भेदतोऽभेदतोऽस्ति नः ।
तथा रूपविशेषाणां रूपमात्रात्मकत्वतः ।
स्रग्वत्सर्पादिकान्यद्वद्रूपं सर्वं बिभर्ति हि ॥२३॥

According to us, there does not (really) exist either particularity or generality, be it owing to the distinction or non-distinction among forms because all the particular forms are thus only (the general) form in nature and which bears all (other forms) just as a garland bears the form of a snake etc. [23]

From the word *tathā*, there is the explanation of *etad eṣāṃ brahma*.

Now follows the discussion of BU 1.6.3.

उक्तं समासतस्तावदेकत्वं नामरूपयोः ।
कर्मणोऽपि तथैकत्वमधुना प्रतिपाद्यते ॥२४॥

Thus far is stated in brief oneness of name and form. Similarly the oneness of action also is explained. [24]

SP clarifies: As all particular names are explained as only 'name' and all particular forms are only 'form', so are all actions but 'action'.

वाक्चक्षुशब्दतो यद्वद्गृह्यते विषयस्तयोः ।
आत्मनो विषयस्तद्वदात्मशब्देन गृह्यते ॥२५॥

As from the words *vāk* and *cakṣus* are understood the objects of the two; so also from the word *ātman*¹ is grasped the effect(s)² of it. [25]

¹Here the word *ātman* is the body.

²The effect (singular for plural) stands for the organ(s).

सर्वेन्द्रियपरिस्पन्दो व्यज्यते नः शरीरके ।
शरीरविषयस्तस्मादात्मेत्यत्राभिधीयते ॥२६॥

The activities¹ of all organs is revealed in our body; therefore

by the word *ātman* is expressed here the activities² of the body.³ [26]

¹This is *jātāv ekavacanam*.

²Here, *viśaya* stands for activity. Singular indicates plural, as in the preceding line.

³In *śarīra*, the suffix *-ka* indicates the little importance of the body; cf. SP on this word in verse 33 below.

आत्मैव त्वस्य कर्मेति तथैवाभिहितं पुरा ।
अतोऽत्र कर्मसामान्यं गृह्यते देहसंश्रितम् ॥२७॥

So it was stated earlier¹ in *ātmaiva tasya karma*; therefore, in this context, action in general is understood as supported by the body. [27]

¹BUBV 1.4.1845 and 1850.

नाम रूपं तथा कर्म यदेतत्त्रयमीरितम् ।
एकमेव भवत्येतत्त्रयं सद्देहमात्रकम् ॥२८॥

This triad, viz. name, form and action, which has been (thus) described before, is but one and this triad, which is but the body, is *sat* 'the existent (or reality)'. [28]

This explains the meaning of *tad etat trayam*.

विकर्तृत्वेन कर्मात्र नामरूपात्मनोर्भवेत् ।
कर्मणः साधनत्वेन नामरूपे व्यवस्थिते ॥२९॥

In this (body) is¹ here action the modifier² of what have the nature of name and form; (indeed) name and form have remained as the means to action. [29]

¹*bhavet*=*bhavati* in Vedic manner; cf. note 1 on verse 4.

²*vikartr* 'acting (mutually as the cause and the result)'— SP.

रूपमेव प्रतिष्ठा स्यात्सर्वदा नामकर्मणोः ।
न हि रूपमनाश्रित्य विद्येते नामकर्मणी ॥३०॥

Ever¹ would form be the support of name and action, for name and form cannot exist without having resorted to form.

[30]

This explains the significance of the word *itaretarāśraya* in BUB with a view to stating how *rūpa* is the support of *nāma* and *karman*.

¹The word 'ever' refers to the time so long as these two are limited in a body.

प्राण एव प्रतिष्ठैवं सदा स्यान्नामरूपयोः ।
प्राणैकात्म्याश्रयाद्यस्मादात्मलाभः सदा तयोः ॥३१॥

In the same way, Prāṇa alone would ever¹ be the support of name and form, since the two ever have their origin in their oneness with Prāṇa.

[31]

¹See note on the preceding verse.

तद्वद्वागाश्रयत्वं च तयोः स्याद्रूपकर्मणोः ।
वाचा प्रकाशयमाने ते प्रयुज्येते यतः सदा ॥३२॥

In the same way,¹ the two, viz. form and action, would be having their support in Vāk, since the two are used (in worldly doings) (only) when they are illuminated by Vāk.

[32]

¹This means: these two also become perceived through their oneness with Vāk.

आश्रयाश्रयिभावेन नामरूपक्रियात्मनाम् ।
एकार्थानां सतां तेषां संहतिः स्याच्छरीरके ॥३३॥

In a body, there remains (or exists) the ensemble of those which are of the nature of name, form and action and (which function) for one another as the support and the supported, serving the purpose of only one (viz. the Ātman). [33]

This explains the word *saṃhatam* in BUB.

एकः सन्नेष आत्मापि त्रयमेतत्प्रपद्यते ।
नामद्रूपक्रियाभिन्नो देहोऽयं गृह्यते यतः ॥३४॥

This Ātman also, remaining only one, becomes these three,¹ since this body is understood as characterized by name, form and action. [34]

¹Namely, name, form and action.

एतन्मयोऽयमात्मेति तथा पूर्वं प्रपञ्चितम् ।
एतावद्व्याकृतं सर्वं यदेतत्संहतं त्रिभिः ॥३५॥

It has been earlier explained that this Ātman is made up of this (i.e. triad, name, form and action);¹ only this much is all that is manifest, viz. the one which formed (lit. collected) into one (whole) by these three. [35]

¹Cf. BU 1.5.3.

तदेतत्खलु वैराजं नामरूपक्रियात्मकम् ।
नामरूपात्मसत्त्येन च्छन्नं प्राणामृतं तु तत् ॥३६॥

Thus is this indeed the form of Virāj which is made up of (the nature of) name, form and action; (indeed) that is immortal Prāṇa which is called (lit. covered) by the truth, viz. the body¹ consisting in name and form. [36]

¹The word *ātman* here refers to body; cf. verse 25 above. This refers to the body of Virāj.

प्राणशब्देन लिङ्गात्मा भण्यते करणात्मकः ।
पिण्डस्य मरणे नैतन्म्रियतेऽतोऽमृतं मतम् ॥३७॥

By the word *prāṇa* is expressed the subtle body which is of the nature of (i.e. made up of) organs, (but) when the body dies, it does not die; therefore it is considered to be immortal.

[37]

This explains *prāṇo vā amṛtam*.

पृथिव्यग्निभूतानि सत्संज्ञान्यत्र लक्षयेत् ।
त्यत्संज्ञके तु विज्ञेये वाय्वाकाशे महात्मभिः ॥३८॥

Here (among the five known (elements) one should note *pr̥thivī*, *ap* and *agni* as having the designation *sat* (and) the wise ones¹ (lit. the great ones) should know *vāyu* and *ākāśa* to have the designation *tyat*.

[38]

There is now the derivation of the word *satya* from two words *sat* and *tyat*. (This is an example of the well-known typical Brāhmaṇic tendency to offer such etymology!) It explains the word *sattya* in *nāmarūpe sattyaṁ*.

¹SP clarifies *mahātmabhiḥ* thus: *mahaty ātmany avacchinne ceto dhārayutum icchadbhiḥ*.

सच्च त्यच्चेति तत्सत्यं पञ्चभूतात्मकं विदुः ।
करणायतनं स्थूलं वैराजं यत्प्रचक्षते ॥३९॥

Therefore what are *sat* and *tyat* are, they have known, (the reality) made up of five elements and this gross abode of organs is what they call as the gross form of Virāj. [39]

It is gross, since it can be called by a name; i.e. it is an object which can be perceived (or rather, it is knowable).

pr̥thivī, *ap* and *agni* are directly perceptible, whereas *vāyu*

and *ākāśa* are imperceptible. These latter are known as *mahat*, the possible Ātman. *vāyu* indicates *mukhya prāṇa*. (?)

अस्याप्यन्तर्गतः प्राणो विज्ञानात्मेति यं विदुः ।
आ संसारात्स्थितः स्थास्नुः परिणामात्मकः सदा ॥४०॥

And the one, whom they (=the wise ones) have known as the knowing self (*viññānātman*), the Prāṇa is within this (form of Virāj). That has remained permanent up to the end of transmigratory existence,¹ (but) ever in the form of the modifications.² [40]

¹Cp. *ābhūtasamplavasthāna* in BUBV 1.5.200.

²That is, the manifest world. This is the nature of the abode of organs, the form of Virāj, mentioned in the preceding verse.

यथाकर्म यथाज्ञानमुपादत्ते शरीरकम् ।
प्लुष्यादिना समोऽतौऽयं श्रुतावप्यभिधीयते ॥४१॥

This one (viz. Virāj) takes up a body according to action or according to knowledge (of an individual).¹ Therefore this one is sung (or described) in the Śruti also as similar (in size) to a gnat.² [41]

This explains why the subtle body of Virāj undergoes transmigratory existence (as said in the preceding verse; this subtle body is in reality somewhat gross, for it is similar to a gnat (in size)— this on the authority of the Śruti— and can then be subject to modification, i.e. various manifestations.

¹Supply: while he lead his life.

²Cf. BU 1.3.22 and BUBV 1.3.305: *samaḥ pluṣiṇā*.

उपात्ताशेषभूतोऽयं यथोक्तोपात्तदेवतः ।
कृत्स्नाविद्यौत्थमानी च प्रत्यगज्ञानकारणात् ॥४२॥

This one,¹ which has taken up² all the elements, who has

(also) taken up the gods³ that are (already) mentioned and which, therefore, feels itself to be (identical with) all that has arisen out of Avidyā, (is so⁴) on account of ignorance about (the true nature of) the inner self.⁵ [42]

¹That is, the body of Virāj which is so far described as both gross and subtle— naturally the various organs (eleven in number, as pointed out earlier in a note on verse 1.5.371.

²That is, assumed the forms of.

³Supply: who are associated with the organs.

⁴That is, subject to transmigration.

⁵The Sūtrātman (i.e. the self of Virāj) is really the inner self of the individual, but it is overpowered by ignorance.

हैरण्यगर्भे तत्त्वज्ञो वैराजे च शरीरके ।
आबद्धात्माभिमानोऽयं गार्ग्योऽविद्यासमन्वितः ॥४३॥
कृत्स्नसंसारमान्येष सर्वोऽस्मीति व्यवस्थितः ।
ब्रह्मोपदेशविषयः श्रुत्यैवोत्थाप्यते जडः ॥४४॥

This Gārgya, who is a knower (in respect) of the body of Hiranyagarbha and (that of) Virāj¹ and feels himself to be one with the same, is (thus) overpowered (lit. accompanied) by Avidyā and, considering all this world (i.e. transmigratory existence) as his own, has remained (or, is happy) in the state of feeling 'I am all (this).' (This one), the ignorant one, is (now)² introduced by the Śruti as the recipient³ of the knowledge of the Brahman. [43-44]

This forms the purport of the concluding sentence in BU 1.6.

¹The two bodies are subtle and gross.

²This refers to BU 2.1.1 which is to follow immediately.

³The word *viṣaya* stands for *adhikārī* 'eligible to receive'.

नामरूपाभिमानाभ्यां मर्त्याभ्याममृतः स्वयम् ।
प्राणः करणसंघातश्छन्नः संवेष्टितः सदा ॥४५॥

Prāṇa itself being immortal, is ever concealed, it is thus covered by the group of organs by (the subtle and the gross bodies which are) mortal (i.e. perishable) and have association (lit. oneness) with name, form and ego. [45]

This explains the meaning of *tābhyām* etc.

There is now in verses 46-51 the explanation in respect of the passage, tad etat trayam, as given by Bhartṛprapañca and then follows Sureśvara's refutation of it up to the end.

संप्रदायविदस्त्वत्र नानात्वैकत्ववादिनः ।
भिन्नाभिन्नात्मकं ब्रह्म नामरूपादिवज्जगुः ॥४६॥

But, in this respect,¹ the knowers of Vedānta tradition,² who hold (lit. advocate) difference and non-difference³ (among name etc.), have stated (lit. sung) the Brahman (to be) consisting in difference and non-difference just like name, form etc.⁴ [46]

¹That is, in respect of the sentence *trayam ca tad ekam* which refers to name, form and action.

²SP holds this as reference to Bhartṛprapañca (in the plural) for deriding him.

³The word etc. indicates *karman*.

त्रयं सदेकमेव स्यादेकं सत्तद्यथा त्रयम् ।
अनेनैवानुमानेन विद्याद्ब्रह्मापि तादृशम् ॥४७॥

Being a triad (i.e. three), it is¹ one; so also, being one, it is a triad. With (the help of) this illustration,² one should know that the Brahman also is likewise³ (viz. like the triad). [47]

This refers to *trayam sat ekam ayam ātmā* which states the oneness of the three and *ātmā ekaḥ sann etat trayam* stating

‘one is three’. This explanation of Bhartṛprapañca is opposed to Sureśvara’s position: ‘the Brahman is not like the three (or triad)’.

¹That is, they are.

²This is for *anumāna*, viz. *drṣṭānta*.

³That is, *bhinnābhinna*.

दृगादिशक्त्यनेकत्वेऽप्येकमेव परं विदुः ।
शक्तिशक्तिमतोरैक्यादद्वैतमिति भण्यते ॥४८॥

They¹ have known the highest one to be only one² even though there is oneness the manyness/plurality of powers (or capacities) of seeing etc.³ (And) the non-duality (of the Brahman) is posited (i.e. stated in the Śruti) for the reason that capacity and what is capable are, in reality, (but) one.⁴

[48]

¹Namely, seers of the Vedānta.

²This suggests that, being *bhinnābhinna*, it can have so many powers.

³The word etc. refers to hearing, touching and other functions of organs.

⁴This shows that there is not involved any contradiction with the Śruti.

सास्नादिषु यथा गोत्वमभेदेन व्यवस्थितम् ।
मिथः सास्नादयो भिन्ना गोत्वाभिन्नास्तथापि ते ॥४९॥

(This non-difference in difference is noticed thus:) As *gotva* (cowness) obtains as common in (lit. non-different) among many (animals) having a dewlap etc. the animals having a dewlap etc. are (at the same time) differentiated (from one another) and yet are not differentiated from *gotva*.² [49]

This illustration here paves way to Bhartṛprapañca’s argument about the Brahman.

¹That means: oneness of the Brahman exists among many objects which are but the single Brahman.

²The implication is: the various objects in the world can be considered as *bhinnābhinna*.

भिन्नाभिन्नात्मता यद्वत्स्थूलेष्वर्थेषु दृश्यते ।
सूक्ष्मेष्वपि तथा विद्यादनुमानबलाद्बुधः ॥५०॥

(Therefore) as being different and yet non-different is noticed among gross objects, so (it is noticed) among even subtle objects ¹ — thus should an intelligent man know on the strength of the illustration. [50]

¹This refers to the power of seeing and similar others— and consequently to the Brahman.

परपक्षे न दृष्टान्तः कश्चिदप्युपलभ्यते ।
भिन्नाभिन्नात्मकं तस्मात्सर्वं वस्त्विति निश्चयः ॥५१॥

In the view of the other (i.e. the opponent), ¹ there is not a single illustration available; ² therefore the decision is that all objects are both different and non-different. ³ [51]

¹That is: in confirmation of the theory of the other Advaitin.

²Supply: for proving his view.

³This includes even the Brahman (as a *vastu*).

Now follows the refutation of Bhartṛprapañca's view.

अनुमानैकसिद्धत्वाद्विन्नाभिन्नात्मवस्तुनः ।
आगमेनात्र किं कार्यं लिङ्गसिद्धानुवादिना ॥५२॥

If (thus) the thing which is in nature both differentiated and non-differentiated becomes known (or established) through (the help of) an illustration, what (then) is the use, in regard to this, of the Śruti which (merely) repeats what is known through

an illustration? ¹

[52]

The argument about the meaninglessness of the Śruti, in the form of a question, is for asserting the inutility of *anumāna* and for silencing Bhartṛprapañca who also does not hold the Śruti as meaningless.

¹*liṅga* 'lit. a characteristic' is here used as an equivalent of *anumāna* (used in the first line) in the sense of 'illustration'; cf. verse 47 above.

न चागमस्य तात्पर्यमेवंभूतेऽस्ति वस्तुनि ।
अस्थूलं नेति नेतीति ज्ञाताज्ञातह्युतेस्तथा ॥५३॥

Also, the Śruti does not purport (to convey) a thing which has been thus,¹ for there is in it the negation of what is either known or unknown in the words *asthūlam*² and *neti neti*.³

[53]

This rejects the idea that the Śruti is the authority for holding the Brahman as both differentiated and non-differentiated.

¹That is *bhinnābhinna*.

²Cf. BU 2.8.8.

³Cf. BU 3.9.26; 4.4.22; 4.5.15.

विशेषात्मनिषेधाय तथा सामान्यरूपिणः ।
क्षुरविश्वंभरौ श्रुत्या दृष्टान्तौ प्रतिपादितौ ॥५४॥

(Further) the Śruti¹ has adduced the illustrations of a knife and Viśvambhara 'the supporter of all the world' for rejecting (the view that the Brahman is of) the nature of a particular object and also of what has the form of generality. [54]

¹This refers to BU 1.4.7; cf. BUBV 1.4.636-645 and also 648-658.

अन्त्या विशेषा दृष्टान्तः परपक्षेऽपि विद्यते ।

त्वत्पक्ष एव दृष्टान्तो यथा नास्ति तथोच्यते ॥५५॥

(As regards the statement that) particular objects have an end (i.e. limit), there is in (your) opponent's view an illustration; but there is not (i.e. cannot be) any illustration in your view itself. How it is not (there) is now (i.e. hereafter) explained.

[55]

This is in answer to the argument in verse 51 above, meaning: what Bhartṛprapañca has said to be the fault in the others' view is really in his own view.

In the third quarter, the reading in the NKL edition (text and commentary) is *tavaiva pakṣe* for *tvatpakṣa eva*.

निःसामान्या विशेषाः स्युर्गोता तेभ्यो न चेद्विरुक् ।
अथ व्यावर्तते तेभ्यो गोत्वं ते खण्डवद्भवेत् ॥५६॥

The particular objects (viz. the cows) would be without generality in them, if *gotā* (= *gotva*) were not differentiated (i.e. existing apart) from them.¹ But if (*atha*) it differs (i.e. exists apart) from them, (only) then *gotva* would be, in your view, like any single (i.e. particular) object.² [56]

¹The first line presupposes that cowness is not different (*abhinna*) from the individual objects; this means non-acceptance of 'generality'!

²This line contends the argument that generality is distinct (*bhinna*) from the individual objects; that means: what is called generality is also a particular.

व्यावृत्तं यदि भिन्नेभ्यस्त्वयाभिन्नगिरोच्यते ।
व्यावृत्तं न विशेषश्चेत्यहो विद्याविचेष्टितम् ॥५७॥

If what does not exist in the distinct (individual) objects, as described (by you) in the words '(It is) non-different from them, and what exists apart from (others) is not a particular

(object)', then (we have to say:) 'Oh! What achievement of learning!' [57]

The verse is in derision of the view that 'cowness' is both different and non-different (*bhinnābhinna*) from the particular cows. It presupposes generality as different from the nature of the particulars.

अव्यावृत्तं विशेषेभ्यस्त्वथ सामान्यमुच्यते ।
सामान्यस्य विशेषत्वाद्विशेषा एव केवलाः ॥५८॥

And again, what does not exist in the particular (objects) is described by you as generality, then generality, being (another) particular, (there would remain) only particulars! [58]

This presupposes generality as non-different from the nature of the particulars— cf. also verse 56 above.

न ह्यभिन्नधिया गोत्वं विशेषेषु प्रतीयते ।
विशेषमात्रनिष्ठत्वाद्विन्नाभिन्नं किमुच्यते ॥५९॥

Indeed, *gotva* is not noticed among particular (cows) with the notion that it is non-different (from them); (thus) because it does exist only among particulars, why is it said that it is 'different and non-different'? [59]

This verse refers to the common experience of generality among cows and sets aside the possibility— suggested by the preceding verse— that there would remain only particulars.

अभेदः किं तयोर्योगः किं वैकात्म्यमभिन्नता ।
नाभेदो मेषयोर्योगे यथा भिन्नौ तथा युतौ ॥६०॥

(A question can be asked thus:) Is non-difference the conjunction of the two?¹ or is it oneness in nature or non-difference? (But it has to be observed that) there is not

non-distinction as in the case of two lambs' conjunction, (for the simple reason that) they are conjoint,² since they are different. [60]

It is now proposed to discuss the nature of *abheda* or *abhinnatā*.

¹This refers to the two notions of generality and of particularity.

²The notion of the conjunction of two objects presupposes the distinction (i.e. separate existence) of the two.

व्यामिश्रं यदि वा शुद्धं गोत्वं भेदेषु गम्यते ।
नोभयत्राप्यभिन्नत्वमसाधारण्यसंस्थितेः ॥६१॥

(Possibly) cowness is grasped (or understood) among (cows) different (from one another) in its mixed form¹ or pure.² But (the situation is:) in both the cases, there is no non-difference (of cowness from them) on account of its existence in such of its nature as is uncommon.³ [61]

This argument pertains to the nature of the experience (or grasping) of cowness among cows, disproving their *bhinnābhinnatva*.

¹Namely, that cowness and the individuality of the cow as one single object of experience.

²That is, *gotva* 'cowness' as distinct from a *go* 'cow'.

³That is to say: *gotva* is noticed in each of the individual cows and is, at the same time, distinguished from each.

भेदेषु चोपयुक्तं तद्गोत्वं तद्वा पृथक्स्थितम् ।
सामान्यं वा विशेषो वा कोऽनयोरभिधीयताम् ॥६२॥

And that cowness, be it existing¹ in the different (cows)² or existing apart from them, which of the two³ is it, as generality or particularity⁴ (of cows)? [62]

This argument assumes the non-difference (*abheda*) of cowness

and cows and discusses whether cowness is distinct or non-distinct [as NKL puts it: *iṣad-abhinna* or *atyantābhinna*] from cows. It suggests the difficulty felt in either case while deciding cowness at the *sāmānya* or *viśeṣa* in any cow.

¹This is for *upayuktam*, 'conveying the sense of *a-prthak-sthitam*, i.e. non-different, which is in contrast with *prthak-sthitam*, i.e. different.

²Different (cows) is for *bhedas*.

³Namely, *a-prthak-sthita gotva* and *prthak-sthita gotva*.

⁴The meaning is: Is cowness, whether non-different or different from the cows, their generality or particularity. Let this be remembered here that *sāmānya* or *viśeṣa* is a *guṇa* in some *vyakti*.

उपयुक्तं विशेषत्वादितरस्याप्यनन्वयात् ।

भिन्नाभिन्नात्मतां नैति द्वैरूप्यासंभवात्तयोः ॥६३॥

If it is held to be non-different (i.e. existing among the individual cows), it has the nature of what is particular¹ and the other² also cannot persist (in each individual³)— thus, it cannot have twofold⁴ nature. [63]

This argues against the non-different existence of cowness among individual cows.

¹Namely, it is particularity, i.e. it ceases to be generality. Since it is included in an individual, it cannot be said to be in another individual. This is to be understood thus: *gotva*, being included in an individual cow (i.e. a particular body), has to be different from every other cow.

²Namely, distinct existence. This is an example of Sureśvara's typically cryptic style. *itara* (in the second quarter) is used here in contrast with *upayukta* (in the first quarter) and stands for 'what is different', i.e. 'what exists as distinct'. Then the argument follows: If it is different, that cannot be said to exist in every other individual. It is like some particular called *Khaṇḍa* which cannot exist in another individual called *Muṇḍa*.

³It is not connected with them as generality.

⁴Namely, of generality and of particularity.

वस्तुवृत्तं न सामान्यं न विशेषस्तथैव च ।
अपेक्षामात्रतः सिद्धेर्व्योम्नि काष्ण्यादिवृत्तवत् ॥६४॥

The nature ¹ of anything is neither generality nor particularity, (since the two, viz. generality and particularity) come to exist only through the expectancy (of (or, dependence on) each other) ² as darkness etc. ³ come to exist in the sky ³ (etc. owing to one's imagination). ⁴ [64]

The argument is: What we call generality and particularity are in reality the products of our imagination; i.e. we form the notions of them. This is exactly like our forming a notion of the darkness of the sky; it really does not exist, it is but imaginary.

¹Sureśvara uses *vastuvṛtta* in the sense of *vastusva- bhāva* (= *vastusvarūpa*).

²The two expressions generality and particularity represent our notion about the relation among things. Neither can be understood without the other.

³Darkness is really 'the blue of the sky'; it is only a product of imagination. *ādi* is possibly for serpent or silver seen through the notion about it.

⁴This is to emphasise the non-duality of what is merely conceived, i.e. taken as existing. Cf. *Gauḍapāḍakārikā* 4.57.

प्रत्यभिज्ञानतोऽभेदः खण्डमुण्डस्थगोत्वयोः ।
एकाधिकरणज्ञानात्खण्डाद्यैस्तद्विभिन्नता ॥६५॥

(There is a likely argument of Bhartṛprapañca:) There is non-difference of the two *gotvas*, viz. that *gotva* which exists in Khaṇḍa and that which exists in Muṇḍa ¹ on account of the recognition of it ² and owing to (its) having (only) one (individual) for its support. It (viz. *gotva*) appears to be different (on account of its association) with Khaṇḍa and

others.³

[65]

Bhartṛprapañca would argue about *bhinnābhinnatā* thus: *gotva* seen in Khaṇḍa is recognised as that seen in Muṇḍa; this explains *abhinnatā*. Yet when it is seen only in Khaṇḍa it has to be considered as existing in one particular substratum and that seen in Muṇḍa exists only there. This explains their difference (*bhinnatā*). *bhinnābhinnatā* of *gotva* is thus justified.

¹These could be the names of particular bulls. (If they were names of cows, then there could be the words Khaṇḍā and Muṇḍā).

²One recognises that *gotva* in Khaṇḍa is the same as that seen in Muṇḍa. Therefore 'it' stands for the two *gotvas*.

³This presupposes the *abheda* of *gotva* and *go(vyakti)*. That being so, the *gotva* in Khaṇḍa cannot be the *gotva* in Muṇḍa. And, consequently, these two are different (*bhinna*).

भिन्नाधिकरणज्ञानान्नैवमप्यभिदा तयोः ।

सामान्येऽभिन्नधीर्यस्माद्विन्नेष्वेव तु भिन्नधीः ॥६६॥

(This is the answer to the above:) Even in this way, there cannot be (posited) non-difference between the two¹ on account of the knowledge of (two) different (individuals as their) supports, since there is knowledge of non-difference only in respect of generality, but knowledge of difference (occurs) in respect of what are different (viz. individuals).² [66]

This is to say that though *sāmānya* (viz. *gotva*) and *viśeṣa* (viz. *govyaktitva*) are thus noticed in one individual as their support, they cannot be *bhinnābhinna*. The reason for this is: *gotva* is *anuvṛtta* 'occurring again' in other cows while *govyaktitva* is *vyāvṛtta* 'non-occurring (or absent) in others'. Thus this *sāmānādhikarāṇya* (cf. *ekādhikarāṇa* in the preceding verse) is like in the instance of the 'blue' in 'a lotus'.

¹That is, *gotva* in Khaṇḍa and that in Muṇḍa.

²This argument is summed up by NKL: (*gotvayoḥ*) *abheda-*

buddheḥ sāmānyaviṣayatvān naikādhikaranyam ity arthaḥ.

प्रत्यक्षेणानुपात्तत्वान्न स्मृतिस्तद्वितीक्षणम् ।
न हि प्रत्यक्षतोऽप्राप्तं स्मर्यते वस्तु किञ्चन ॥६७॥

Again the memory (of *gotva*) does not mean the seeing of it, since that is not grasped by direct perception. Indeed, a thing which is not grasped by direct perception is (said to be) remembered. [67]

The argument pertains to *pratyabhijñāna*. It answers what is said in verse 65 above. It is argued that *gotva* in Muṇḍa is directly perceived and it reminds one of the *gotva* in Khaṇḍa which was earlier perceived; it is not directly perceived. That goes to disprove the difference in non-difference of *gotva*.

सामानाधिकरण्यस्य विभिन्नार्थव्यपाश्रयात् ।
अभेदधीः कथं तत्र विशेषणविशेष्ययोः ॥६८॥

Since existence in the same substratum is here supported in different objects (of cognition),¹ how could there be the perception of non-difference between what are (really) a qualifier and the qualified?² [68]

The argument in this verse proceeds to answer away the objector's notion— based on recognition— that the two (viz. generality and particularity) have one and the same substratum and therefore they are *abhinna*; cf. verse 65 above. Existence of *gotva* and *khaṇḍatva* cannot be a valid basis for the argument about *bhinnābhinnatā*.

¹This means *gotva* (i.e. *jāti*) and *khaṇḍatva* (i.e. *vyakti*) in one individual cow.

²Thus: *jāti*, while it belongs to a *vyakti*, distinguishes it from other *vyaktis* and a *vyakti* is therefore *jātivīṣiṣṭa*. Here SP and NKL point out: In a blue lotus, blue is blue, and a lotus is a lotus; and there is a lotus qualified (i.e. distinguished from

lotuses of other colours) by the adjective blue. The two, namely blue and lotus cannot therefore be identical.

अभिन्नवचसा भिन्नप्रतिषेधोऽभिधीयते ।
प्राप्तस्य भिन्नरूपस्य शून्यतातः प्रसज्यते ॥६९॥

By (the use of) the word non-different is expressed the rejection of (the nature of) what is different. (Therefore) from this (rejection)¹ there follows meaninglessness² of what obtains as having the nature of a different (object). [69]

It is refuted that *bhedābhāva* is the meaning of the word *abheda*. The word *abhinna* can be understood to reject the notion of *bheda*.

¹This is the rejection of the identity of what is conjoined as a qualifier and what is qualified.

²*śūnyatā* is *asiddhi* of *abhinnatā*.

वचो भेदनिषेधं चेन्न कुर्याद्वेदवाक्यवत् ।
भिन्नाभिन्नात्मतापक्षहानिरेवं प्रसज्यते ॥७०॥

In case a statement would not reject (lit. prohibit) *bheda* in the same way as a statement which conveys *bheda* does, then also there certainly follows rejection (lit. loss) of the view which advocates the nature of non-difference in difference.

[70]

This verse considers the possibility that someone would understand the word *abhinna* as not conveying the rejection of *bheda*. In this case, such a person would take *abhinna* to mean *anyabheda*. (This is like the word *aśveta aśva* 'a horse, of any colour other than white'.) Therefore *bhinnābhinna* would mean *bhinna* and *bhinnāntara* (another *bhinna*).

तत्रकौण्डिन्यवन्न्यायो न चेहाप्यवसीयते ।
उत्सर्गानवकाशत्वाच्छून्यतैवात आपतेत् ॥७१॥

Also, there does not apply here the reasoning¹ as (in the maxim of) 'butter-milk to Kaundinya',² since there is no occasion for any general rule (to be set aside);³ and, as such, there follows only meaninglessness.⁴ [71]

There is yet more argument regarding *abheda* in the sense of what is other than *bheda*. The objector can, in reply to the two preceding verses, raise some difficulty thus: *abheda* may, in any one of the two senses, tend to reject the view of difference in non-difference, but that should not show the meaninglessness of the view. It is possible to understand the meaningfulness of some action prohibited in the case of an individual when an action is recommended in respect of all. It can be put thus: *sarvatra prāptasya kāryasya viśeṣavidhinā niṣiddhasya na śūnyatā* (= *asiddhiḥ*). See note 2 below.

¹ *nyāya* here stands for *anumāna* which is really reasoning with some illustration (cf. verse 50 above— that is also called *drṣṭānta* in verse 51 above).

² 'Butter-milk to Kaundinya' is a well-known maxim. It is connected with two instructions: (1) *āryebhyo dadhi dīyatām* 'Curds may be give to the respectable persons (*āryas*)' and (2) *takram kaundinyāya* 'Butter-milk to Kaundinya'. Here, according to (1), which is a general instruction, Kaundinya is already included among the respectable persons and should have been therefore served with curds, but (2) points out an exception to (1). This is thus an example of a general rule together with the mention of an exception to it. This means rejection of *dadhi* for Kaundinya which is otherwise to be given to all (*sarvatra prāpta*), but this rejection/prohibition is not meaningless. Similar procedure can apply to *bhinnābhinna* view, as Bhartṛprapañca might argue.

³ The meaning of *abheda* and that of what is other than *bheda* do not stand in the relation of a general rule and its exception. It is not a case similar to Kaundinya's (in the note 3 above).

⁴ Cf. note 2 on verse 69 above.

भिन्नौ जातिगुणौ द्रव्यात्स्वानुभूत्यनुरोधतः ।
तद्विरोधादभिन्नत्वं कथं मानात्प्रतीयते ॥७२॥

(Again) *jāti* 'genus' and *guṇa* 'property' are distinct from a *dravya* 'substratum'¹ — this is in accordance with general experience. Hence, while there is opposition to it,² how could (their) non-difference be understood from the illustration?³

[72]

This verse rejects yet another alternative meaning of *abheda*, viz. what expresses (or, conveys the sense of) the opposite of *bheda*.

¹For example, *gotva* 'cowness' and *sāsnādimattva* 'having a dewlap etc.' are different from an individual cow.

²The word 'it', here, stands for one's own experience of the distinction between *jāti* or *guṇa* and *dravya*, viz. a cow.

³The illustration of butter-milk to Kaundinya. Here, *māna* stands for *anumāna* which is 'illustration' as noticed above. This points out how the non-difference of the property (or properties) of a substance from itself cannot be proved on the basis of *utsargāpavādanyāya* 'the rule regarding a general rule and a particular'.

अभिन्नं सद्विभिन्नत्वं न कथंचित्प्रपद्यते ।
स्वाश्रयत्वादभिन्नस्य कुतोऽस्य स्यात्पराश्रयः ॥७३॥

Being non-different (from another), a thing cannot in any way have the nature of being different from it. Also, how then can what is non-different from its another substratum? [73]

The argument here is for the final rejection of the three above-mentioned views regarding the meaning of *abheda* and for the consequent acceptance of *abheda*. Sureśvara, accepting non-difference alone as the meaning of *abheda*, points out that the non-difference of all so-called things, being their real nature,

सामान्यं च विशेषश्च द्रव्यतन्त्रौ मतौ यदि ।
असामान्यविशेषात्मद्रव्यवत्प्राप्नुतश्च तौ ॥७८॥

If (again) genus and a particularity are held to be non-different from¹ substance(s), they would obtain² as what are neither genus nor particularity but (only) as substance(s).³ [78]

¹*dravyatantra* is understood here as *dravyābhinna*, i.e. non-different from (or one with) substance(s). This is Sureśvara's peculiar use of the word *tantra*.

²That is, become perceived or known.

³This means— they would be just *dravya*. In other words, one could not postulate the notions of *sāmānya* and *viśeṣa* and, as a consequence, any consideration about their *bhinnābhinnatā* would not arise.

गुणतन्त्रं यदा द्रव्यं प्रसिद्धेर्बाधनं तदा ।
एकस्यानेकतापत्तिर्द्रव्यस्यापि प्रसज्यते ॥७९॥

If a substance is taken to be non-different¹ from a property (of it), then that is opposed to what is common knowledge. Also, there would result in the case of a substance the contingency of having manyness even if it is one single substance. [79]

This sets aside that *dravya* can be considered by one as included in (i.e. identical with) *sāmānya*.

¹*gunatantra* is *gunābhinna*. Cp. note 1 on the preceding verse.

द्रव्येणैवाभिसंबन्धाद्गुणानां न परस्परम् ।
अन्योन्यानभिसंबन्धान्न विशेषस्तथेतरत् ॥८०॥

Owing to the close connection¹ of the properties² with only a substance, there cannot be mutual (connection) among them; (and) since there is no mutual relation among themselves, there cannot be any particularity, nor can there be the other.³ [80]

This sets aside the possible notion of the inclusion of genus and/or particularity with *dravya*.

¹This stands for non-difference; *abhisambandha* = *abheda*.

²These are genus and particularity.

³That is, any genus.

सामान्येतरतो भिन्नं द्रव्यं चेद्वदतो मतम् ।
तन्निषेधेन तत्सिद्धेः कथं स्यात्तदभिन्नता ॥८१॥

(Now) if it is your opinion that substance is different from genus and the other,¹ then, since by the denial of the same (viz. the two)² that (viz. substance) gets established, how could there be then non-difference between them? [81]

The notion of difference between *dravya* and *sāmānya-viśeṣa* (discussed in the two ways above) leads to the rejection of their *bhinnābhinnatā*.

¹That is, particularities.

²That is, *sāmānya* and *viśeṣa*.

अथाभिन्नं मतं ताभ्यां द्रव्यस्यापहवस्ततः ।
न विशेषो न सामान्यमन्योन्यासंगतेर्भवेत् ॥८२॥

If again it is understood as non-different from the two, there would result the denial (of the existence) of a substance; (for) there could not exist (i.e. be conceivable) either particularity or genus owing to the non-association¹ of them. [82]

¹That is, absence of *āśrayāśrayibhāva*.

भिन्नाभेदादभिन्नस्य भेदः स्यात्पिण्डवद्ध्रुवम् ।
पिण्डश्च सर्वगस्तद्वज्ज्ञेत्वाभेदात्प्रसज्यते ॥८३॥

On account of the non-different being identical with what is different, there will certainly be a difference of what is

non-different (from the other), as (there is a difference) of a body (from another). And it would contingently follow that a body, being non-different from *gotva*, will obtain among all (cows). [83]

While discussing (what he considers as) the wrong (or unacceptable) in Bhartṛprapañca's view, Sureśvara uses such expressions (i.e. words and phrases) as would cause some confusion for a reader. Thus, here he uses the words *bhinnābheda*, and *abhinna* for *sāmānya* and *viśeṣa*. (In some subsequent verses also, he uses *jāti* and *vyakti*; *samasta* and *vyasta* for the same.)

With this in view, the following should clarify the argument in this verse which pertains to the relation of non-difference between *jāti* or *sāmānya* and *vyakti* or *viśeṣa*. Thus, according to the advocate of the theory of *bhedābheda*, *sāmānya* (= *gotva*) being non-different from *viśeṣa* (= *govyakti*) will have difference from *viśeṣa* (*govyakti*) which (also) is not different from the non-different (= *sāmānya*).

अन्योन्याव्यतिरेकित्वादैकात्म्यं प्राप्नुयात्तयोः ।
ततः प्रत्यक्षबाधः स्यात्तद्वेदो हि तदाश्रयः ॥८४॥

(Further) there would be oneness of nature of the two on account of their being inseparable from each other and there would result from that opposition to direct perception,¹ since the difference between the two rests on the two (themselves as different). [84]

It would be useful to write the relevant part of the verse by using the words *sāmānya* and *viśeṣa* in suitable places (and with a little modification) thus: *sāmānyaviśeṣayor abhinnatvāt* (= *avyatirekitvāt*) *tayoḥ aikātmyam* (= *ekasvarūpavattvam*) ... *sāmānyaviśeṣabhedo hi (bhinna-)sāmānyaviśeṣāśrayaḥ*.

¹This pertains to *anubhūtivirodha*.

व्यस्ताभेदात्समस्तोऽर्थो व्यस्तवन्न मनागपि ।
समस्ताकारवज्ज्ञानं कुर्यात्प्रत्यक्षबाधतः ॥८५॥

Owing to (its) non-difference with a particular object, generality would not, like (some) particular object, yield even a little knowledge of what has the nature of generality— since (that would involve) stultification of what is directly perceived by its having the nature of a particular. [85]

This verse also needs replacement of its original words by other relevant words; then the verse would read: *viśeṣābhedāt sāmānyarūpo 'rthaḥ viśeṣavan na manāg api sāmānyākāravaj-jñānam kuryāt, (tena) pratyakṣabādhah (bhaved ity) atah.*

The argument is: generality, being non-different from particularity, would not, like any particular object, yield even a little knowledge of what has the nature (lit. shape) of generality. If it yielded that, there would be disagreement with (our) daily experience in direct perception.

व्यस्ताभेदेऽपि चेत्कुर्यात्समस्तधिषणां बलात् ।
व्यस्तात्मनासमस्तोऽपि कुर्यात्प्लुषिधियं गिरिः ॥८६॥

In case there is accepted non-difference (of genus) from a particular and yet it¹ would cause the knowledge² of (what is) genus, then (it has to be accepted) that a mountain, which is not genus, would give rise to the knowledge of an ant, by its nature of a particular. [86]

¹That is, a particular.

²*dhiṣaṇā = buddhi, jñāna.*

असाधारणरूपेण भेदो जगति निश्चितः ।
साधारण्यं तयोर्मानात्समस्तव्यस्तयोः कुतः ॥८७॥

The difference (between genus and particularity) has been (already) decided in this world¹ on account of their non-

common nature. (Therefore) by what authoritative means of knowing (could there be) non-difference between genus and particularity? [87]

¹This is reference to *vyavahārabhūmi*. Once again, *anubhūti* (of conventional *pramāṇaprameyavyavahāra*) is the basis of Sureśvara's argument.

सर्वाभेदाच्च सर्वस्य रज्ज्वां सर्पादिबुद्धयः ।
रज्जुबुद्धिवदेव स्युस्तद्धीरचाप्यहिबुद्धिवत् ॥८८॥

And, further, everything (lit. all that is thing) being non-different from every (other) thing, there would arise the knowledge of a serpent etc.¹ in a rope just like the knowledge of (it as a) rope and the knowledge of that (viz. rope, would also be) like that of a serpent.² [88]

The argument is: In the theory of non-difference in difference there cannot be postulated any *pramāṇa* as right or false.

¹Sureśvara's use of *ādi* refers to other mistaken objects involved in an error— yet this use of mere *rajivām* in connection with *sarpādi* is a bit of non-careful expression (which he has adopted, possibly for metre's sake).

²This knowledge of a serpent is what is accepted as correct knowledge— not an error (*bhrama*). The earlier reference to it meant error.

निषेधविधिहेतूनां सर्वेषां सर्ववस्तुषु ।
समाप्तेरधिकारानामप्रवृत्तिः प्रसज्यते ॥८९॥

(Also) there follows the contingency that all (the Śruti statements which) pertain to prohibition and/or injunction¹ would decide² the eligibility of all³ (persons) in respect of all activities⁴ and (thus) there would result non-activity. [89]

The argument here pertains to the absence of any distinction

as *pramāṇa* and *apramāṇa* which would result from the view of non-difference in difference. There would be no means for deciding what statement in the Śruti is *niṣcdha* or *vidhi* and, consequently, anybody would enter upon any ritual activity. This is undesirable! Cf. a quotation in SP: *apravittinivṛttīdam prāptam sarvatra hi jagat*— possibly from the Bhāṣya of Bhartṛprapañca.

¹It literally means: are (i.e. act as) the causes indicating prohibition or injunction.

²That is, would be understood as laying down

³Cf. SP: *adhikārāṇam pravṛttyādihetumatām adhikāriṇām ity arthaḥ* and NKL: *adhikārāṇām pravṛttinivṛttinimittabrāhmaṇa-tvādīnām*. NKL appears preferable.

⁴Cf. NKL: *sarvavastuṣu caṇḍālādiṣv api bhāvād ity arthaḥ*. SP does not specifically explain this, yet seems to accept what we have given in translation; cf. its remark— we quote only relevant words— *sarveṣām brahmakṣatrādīnam adhikṛtānām sarveṣu brhas-patisavarājasūyādiṣu*

अभावमानक्लृप्त्यर्थो यश्चायासः कृतो महान् ।
निष्फलः सोऽभिसंवृतो भिन्नाभिन्नाव्यवस्थितौ ॥९०॥

This (thus, i.e. above discussed) disorderliness¹ (in the theory of) difference in non-difference obtaining, the great effort, which is made (by its advocate) for postulating the (authoritative) means of deciding (the nature of) *abhāva*,² has become (or proved to be) without utility (lit. fruitless). [90]

The thought in this verse presupposed that all things are different and non-different from all others (*sarvam sarvasmād bhinnābhinnam*). It is then argued that the theory of non-difference in difference [*bhinnābhinna* would literally mean different and yet not different; this order is maintained in the verse and its translation] is advocated without a quite carefully formulated view on *pramāṇas*. Accepting that theory would only yield improper results, particularly in respect of Vedic texts. Cf. NKL's remark: *ghaṭādeḥ bhūtalādyātmanā grhyamāṇasya*

yogyānupalambhāsiddheḥ. SP gives more details regarding *yogyānupalabdher akimcitkaratva*.

¹This means: the theory of *bhedābheda* is not coherently postulated. That is to say, it is unsystematic.

²*abhāva* suggests *bhedābhāva*.

स्वविशेषानुरोधित्वं सामान्यानां मतं यदि ।

समस्तव्यस्ततापक्षस्तदा कुप्यति कल्पितः ॥९१॥

(Again) if it is held that all that is genus¹ resembles (in nature) the particulars related to itself,² then there would be defiance of³ what is conceived as the theory of genus and particularity. [91]

This verse argues about another aspect of the theory of *bhedābheda*; it would mean that some genus is different and non-different from some particulars (connected with it). According to Sureśvara, this involves the fault of *ardhajaratiya* 'regarding a half of someone as old' (as SP calls it); or as NKL puts it thus: *kimcit kutaścid (bhinnābhinnam)*.

¹SP points out that the mention of the relation between genus and particulars is indicative of the relation between (i) a whole and its parts, (ii) properties and what possesses them, and (iii) effects and causes.

²Again, SP explains: *kvacid bhinnābhinnatātyāge sarvatra tattyāgaḥ*. Possibly it means: cowness is associated with only some cows and not with some others. NKL remarks: *gotvaṁ svavyaktibhiḥ bhinnabhinnaṁ, āsvatvādy api tathā*.

³It literally means: the theory would be angry (this means 'violated').

न चापि सर्वसामान्यविशेषार्थावबुद्धये ।

कश्चिदप्यधिकार्यस्ति कृत्स्नेऽपि जगतीदृशः ॥९२॥

And there is not in the whole world a single such person¹ who is capable of (lit. eligible for) understanding all the things

having the natures of genus and particular.

[92]

The thought is here of knowing or worshipping (perhaps, meditating on) what are genus and particular. The view of *bhedābheda* would not lead any person to any certainty in respect of them (as shown above). This culminates into meaninglessness of his knowledge or worship.

न वेदार्थो न चापीदृक्कर्केणाप्युपपद्यते ।
भिन्नाभिन्नेक्षणं सर्वं यथोक्तन्यायवर्त्मना ॥९३॥

According to the explanation which we have thus far given, neither the entire view of *bhedābheda* of this kind nor the meaning of the Veda (according to it) can by any reason be taken as acceptable.

[93]

इति श्रीबृहदारण्यकोपनिषद्भाष्यवार्तिके प्रथमाध्यायस्य
षष्ठं ब्राह्मणम् ॥६॥

इति श्रीमत्परमहंसपरिव्राजकाचार्यश्रीसुरेश्वराचार्यविरचिते
बृहदारण्यकोपनिषद्भाष्यवार्तिके प्रथमाध्यायः ॥१॥

BRHADĀRANYAKOPANIṢAD-
BHĀṢYA-VĀRTIKA

2.1

Ajātaśatru Brāhmaṇa

तद्धेदमित्यविज्ञातप्रत्यक्तत्त्वादिदं जगत् ।
रज्ज्वां सर्पादिवज्जातं नामरूपक्रियात्मकम् ॥१॥

(In the words) *tad dhedam* ...¹ (is described) this world as having the nature of name, form and activity, since the truth (or, true nature) of the inner self has not been known—this (origin) is as (that of a) serpent etc.² (which seems to) become born from (lit. in, i.e. in the place of) a rope.³ [1]

This is a statement in an extremely brief form, of what was discussed in BU 1.4.

¹This has a reference to BU 1.4.7.

²The word etc. stands for other objects like a piece of silver, a double moon and such other objects which are seen (or perceived) in a misapprehension (or, superimposition, i.e. falsely conceived objects).

³It appears that, for the sake of metre, Sureśvara has used *rajyvām* in the place of *rajyvādaḥ* which was necessary (or required) in view of *sarpādi*.

अनिश्चिता यथा रज्जुरन्धकारे विकल्पिता ।
सर्पधारादिभिर्भावैस्तद्वदात्मा विकल्पितः ॥२॥

“As a rope, which is not determined (as such), is, in darkness, mistaken for (various) becomings, viz. a serpent or a stream (of water)—in the same way is the Ātman (variously) conceived.” [2]

This is *Gauḍapāḍakārikā* 2.17. It is adduced as an authoritative support for what is said in the preceding verse.

अनर्थहेतुरज्ञानं तदुत्थं चाखिलं जगत् ।
प्रतीचोऽनर्थ इत्यस्माद्वीतोऽत्यर्थं मुमुक्षति ॥३॥

The cause of the undesirable is ignorance¹ and the entire world is the product of that.² An individual³ intensely seeks to release himself (from it,⁴) since that is the undesirable for the inner self.⁵

[3]

¹Translation follows AnSS edition. NKL edition reads *anarthahetur ajñātaḥ* 'The cause of the undesirable is not known, (i.e. identified).' The use of the word 'undesirable' is to indicate the final opinion of the Vedānta on Avidyā.

²Literally, has arisen from that ignorance.

³Individual means a human being of the transmigratory world—in reality 'the product of Avidyā'.

⁴It can refer *either* to the undesirable effects of ignorance *or* to ignorance itself.

⁵The inner self refers to the sentience within an individual's body.

पुरुषार्थोऽखिलानर्थप्रध्वस्तिः प्रत्यगात्मनः ।
सम्यक्तत्त्वपरिज्ञानं पुरुषार्थस्य कारणम् ॥४॥

For the inner self,¹ the end of life² is the removal³ of all the undesirable; (indeed) the effective means⁴ to the end of one's life is the complete⁵ (*pari*) correct⁶ knowledge of the truth⁷ about it.

[4]

This states how every individual self is beset with the undesirable.

¹Here, it stands for an individual in the transmigratory world.

²Literally, the end of human life; the desired achievement of a human being.

³Literally, destruction. Yet, 'removal' means securing release from all evils of worldly life.

⁴*kāraṇam* could mean 'efficient cause'. Yet the words 'the effective means' are used for effectively removing every evil and thereby serving to effect the overall achievement of final release.

⁵The preposition *pari* is significant; it refers to the knowledge of the nature of the bondage for the inner self and its effects as well.

⁶*samyak* precludes the views of other non-Vedāntic thinkers.

⁷Truth stands for the true knowledge of everything which has appeared to have been associated with the inner self.

निरस्ताशेषानर्थाप्तकृत्स्नाह्लादसतत्त्वकः ।

स्वतो यतोऽयं संसारी तेनाज्ञो विपरीतदृक् ॥५॥

Since this transmigratory being is by its nature¹ of the nature of one that has obtained the entire delight after having dispelled away every undesirable (effect), therefore, the one who has not known (the true nature of it)² sees (all this)³ otherwise.⁴

[5]

This states why *tattvaparijñāna* in verse 4 secures the end of human life.

¹Or literally, by itself. That is to say: not made so by any other agency.

²This refers to the transmigratory being, though it finally signifies the inner self.

³'All this' means 'whatever is known as worldly thing or being'.

⁴This refers to the effect of Avidyā, i.e. the inner self which is taken to be an individual being, possessing various belongings and passing under different vicissitudes (i.e. phases) of life.

मोहमात्रान्तरायत्वात्पुरुषार्थस्य नापरम् ।

अविद्याध्वंसिनो बोधात्किञ्चित्साधनमिष्यते ॥६॥

Since, (securing) the end of human life has only ignorance¹

as its hindrance, therefore, there is not accepted (in Vedānta) any means other than knowledge² as the destroyer of ignorance. [6]

This verse sets aside the idea of any other means to *mokṣa*.

¹This verse uses both *moha* and *avidyā* as synonyms.

²This is *samyaktattvaparijñāna* of verse 4 above. The other means could be, according to SP, either *prasaṅkhyāna* (NKL: *dhīsamuccita karman*) or *karman* (NKL: *kevala karman*).

आत्मेत्येवेति विद्यायाः सूत्रमित्युदितं पुरा ।
उपोद्धातस्तथा तस्य प्रागुक्तः सप्रयोजनः ॥७॥

Earlier, there has been stated the principal thought¹ of the lore (of the Ātman)² in the words *ātmety eva ...*; so also (*tathā*) the introductory to it has been already (*prāk*) stated, together with its purpose.³ [7]

This brings out clearly the meaningfulness of BU 1.4.

¹*sūtram* is here the principal thought which is enunciated at BU 1.4.7.

²Here only 'lore' is referred to; it means Ātmavidyā or Brahavidyā—cf. verse 9 below.

³This appears to be understood from *tad etat padanīyam asya sarvasya yad ayam ātmā* in BU 1.4.7 up to *ātmā hy eṣāṃ sa bhavati* in BU 1.4.10. This long passage is described as the *prayojana* in SP thus: *ākṣepapūrvakaṃ prayojanaṃ tad āhur ityādāv uktam ity āha*. The reference seems to be to BUB 1.4.9.

प्रतीचि साक्षाद्विज्ञाते ज्ञेयं सर्वं समाप्यते ।
निःशेषतस्तमोऽवस्तेः पुमर्थश्च समाप्यते ॥८॥

When the inner self is directly¹ known, all that is to be known is obtained² (and thus), as the entire darkness³ is destroyed, the end of (a human being's) life is obtained. [8]

This stresses upon the purposefulness of *pratyaktattvavijñāna*.

¹This refers to one's experience or realisation (*anubhavāvagati*); cf. BSB *brahmāvagatir hi puruṣārthaḥ* (i.e. *mokṣaḥ*) (1.1.1, pp. 77-78).

²Here 'obtained' has the meaning of 'known'—(also elsewhere) the latter one means 'secured or got'.

³It stands metaphorically for ignorance which is referred to as *moha* and also as *Avidyā* in verse 6 above.

यत एवमतः पश्येदात्मन्यात्मानमद्वयम् ।
आत्मैको ब्रह्मविद्याया विषयः श्रुतितो मतः ॥९॥

Since this is so, therefore, one should see within one's self¹ the Ātman, which has no duality.² (Indeed), only the Ātman has been known from the Śruti as the object (i.e. the subject matter) of the lore of the Brahman.³ [9]

¹This refers to the inner self of one who is desirous of liberation. The Ātman here is, at least at the verbal level, different from the Ātman which is subsequently identified as the Brahman.

²To complete, add: (associated with it).

³This line accepts the worldly dealing (*vyavahāra*) of language, i.e. the knower-knowable relation understood from the use of words. This suggests the greatness of the Ātman (cf. SP: *svamahimapratiṣṭhatvārthaṁ viśinaṣṭi*).

अथ योऽन्यामिति तथाविद्यां चानूद्य नश्वरीम् ।
आध्यायावसितेः कार्यं तस्या व्याख्यातमञ्जसा ॥१०॥

Then, in the words *atha yo 'nyām ...*,¹ (the Upaniṣad or Śruti) first makes a statement² about the perishable³ ignorance and has, in the natural course,⁴ explained fully its⁵ effect up to the end of the Adhyāya.⁶ [10]

This explains *anarthahetu* understood in verse 3 above.

¹This refers to BU 1.4.10: *atha yo 'nyām devatām upāste ...*

na sa veda.

²*anūdyā* literally means 'having restated'. But here the reference is to the clear statement of/about Avidyā.

³It signifies the destructible nature of Avidyā.

⁴Literally, smoothly, or in a straight manner.

⁵This refers to Avidyā.

⁶That is, up to the end of BU 1.6 (i.e. first Adhyāya).

अध्यात्ममधिभूतं च तथा चैवाधिदैवतम् ।
 भूतं भवद्विष्यं च साध्यं साधनमेव च ।
 जनिमत्सर्वमेवेदमविद्यायाः समुत्थितम् ॥११॥
 संक्षिप्य चाप्युपन्यस्तमध्यायान्ते च तत्पुनः ॥१२॥
 त्रयं वा इदमित्येवं रूपं नाम च कर्म च ।
 त्रयस्यापि च संक्षेपो लिङ्गदेहात्मसंहतिः ॥१३॥
 त्रैलोक्यात्मशरीर्येष विश्वरूपः प्रजापतिः ।
 अन्तर्णीताखिलानन्तदेवतः प्राणविग्रहः ॥१४॥

What pertains to a body, what to the sphere of the elements, what again to the sphere of deities; what (belonged) to the past, what is of the present and what is going to be;¹ what is the means and also what the end(s); whatever has an origin²—all this, which has arisen from ignorance, [11] is indeed³ presented again at the end of that Adhyāya after giving it in brief. [12]

(And) thus in *trayam vā idam ...*⁴ the triad of form, name and action is stated in brief,⁵ a conglomeration of the subtle body and the Ātman. [13]

(That is to say: This is) Prajāpati, (later) assuming various (lit. all) forms, possessed of a body in the form of the triad of worlds⁶ and having a manifestation (lit. body) in Prāṇa⁷ with all the deities⁸ concealed within. [14]

This is a brief statement of the contents of the Saptāṇṇa Brāhmaṇa, i.e. BU 1.5 and 1.6. Verse 14 explains the contents of verse 12.

¹Or literally, what is becoming. *bhaviṣya* is for *bhaviṣyat*.

²Literally, what has a birth.

³*ca*, used twice in verse 12, stands for emphasis, conveyed only once by 'indeed'.

⁴Read BU 1.6.1: *trayaṃ vā idam ...*

⁵Read BU 1.6.3: *tad etat trayam ...* and this refers to the *kāryakāraṇasaṃghāta* (SP).

⁶This refers to the *kārya* as a whole, the embodied (subtle form, viz. the Sūtrātman).

⁷This refers to the sentience in a body.

⁸Reference is thus made to the organs and the deities superintending over them.

अविज्ञातात्मतत्त्वः संस्तदध्यस्ताभिमानवान् ।

पराक्प्रवृत्तेर्विरतो विद्याया विषयस्त्वयम् ॥१५॥

साक्षात्कृतात्मभावोऽयमेवंलक्षणवस्तुनि ।

श्रुत्योपस्थाप्यते गार्ग्यो ब्रह्मविद्याभिधित्सया ॥१६॥

This one (viz. Gārgya), being one who has not known the true nature of the Ātman, who has had the consciousness (or, ego) of being what is superimposed¹ on it (viz. the Ātman) and who has become averse to action (prescribed by religion), is the person eligible (*viṣaya*)² for the instruction (about the Ātman, i.e. the Brahman). [15]

He has directly understood the Ātman in the thing, which has such nature³ (and therefore) he, Gārgya, is presented by the Śruti (as the *viṣaya*) with the desire to state⁴ the instruction about the Brahman. [16]

This refers to the purpose of the narrative in BU 2.1.

¹This refers to the *lingadehātmasaṃhati* of verse 13 above (which is clarified further) and the consequent misapprehension about the nature of the Ātman.

²*viṣaya* is for *adhikārin*, one of the four Anubandhas of the discussion.

³This refers to verse 14 above.

⁴That is, to expound.

अकृत्स्नब्रह्मवेदित्वाद्दृप्तोऽसावल्पकस्ततः ।
न हि पूर्णपरिज्ञानः कश्चिद्दृष्यति निर्द्वयः ॥१७॥

Since he had not known about the Brahman in its fullness, he was therefore very proud and of less importance.¹ Indeed, one, who possesses complete knowledge (of the Brahman),² is never proud—the one who does not have (any consciousness or awareness of) duality.³ [17]

This explains how Gārgya Ajātaśatru is considered as eligible for receiving instruction regarding the Brahman.

¹This refers to the eligibility of Gārgya as a pupil, i.e. his inferior status as compared to that of Kāśya.

²Refer to verse 4 above.

³Literally, one who has got over (viz. discarded) the notion of duality.

समाप्ताशेषविज्ञेयपुरुषार्थस्तथा परः ।
अजातशत्रुरैकात्म्याद्गार्ग्याचार्यः प्रकल्पते ॥१८॥

So also, the other one, who has obtained¹ (the knowledge of) the entire knowable, which is the (ultimate) end of life, viz. Ajātaśatru can be the preceptor of Gārgya, owing to his (having realised) the singleness of the Ātman. [18]

This answers away the doubt about the non-eligibility of Gārgya for being the preceptor.

¹Namely, known or acquired (the full knowledge of the Ātman).

व्याख्यातायामविद्यायां तदुच्छिन्नावथाधुना ।
आत्मेत्येवेति सूत्रस्य व्याख्या प्रस्तूयते स्फुटा ॥१९॥
श्रुत्या गार्ग्याद्युपन्यासशिष्याचार्यस्वरूपया ।
सुखावबोधसिद्धयर्थमियमाख्यायिकोदिता ॥२०॥

(Thus) when ignorance has been (fully) explained (in the earlier Adhyāya), there is now introduced a clear exposition of the enunciation *ātmety evopāsīta* in order that it (i.e. ignorance) is removed (lit. destroyed). [19]

The Śruti has stated the narrative which has in the introductory (part) a pupil in the form of Gārgya and the preceptor (in the form of Ajātaśatru), for the purpose that an easy understanding (of the lore of the Brahman) is secured. [20]

According to SP, these two verses have the purpose of showing how the narrative in BU 2.1 is fruitful; read SP: *asaṁdigdhā-bādhita-phalavajjñānodayāya*.

Now follows in verses 21-28 the statement of *Bhartṛprapañca* regarding the connection between BU first Adhyāya and BU 2.1 and also the refutation thereof.

अन्ये त्वत्राभिसंबन्धमेवं व्याचक्षते बुधाः ।
 स एष इत्यपन्यस्तो विज्ञानात्मा हि यः पुरा ॥२१॥
 गार्ग्यकार्येतिहासेन वक्ष्यते तस्य निर्णयः ।
 कर्त्र्यो भोक्त्र्यश्च देहेऽस्मिन्देवता एव नापरः ।
 श्रुतिर्गार्ग्यात्मना सेयं पूर्वपक्षमभाषत ॥२२॥
 आत्मनोऽस्ति त्वकर्तृत्वभोक्तृत्वप्रतिपत्तये ॥२३॥

The other learned (scholars),¹ however, expound the connection here (i.e. of BU 2.1 to the earlier portion of BU) thus: The knowing inner self (*viññānātman*) which was introduced (in the discussion) earlier, in the words *sa eṣa...*² [21]

has its decision³ stated in the narrative of Gārgya and Kāśya; that is: In this body, the agents (of actions etc.) and the enjoyers are the deities (and it is stated later:⁴) 'not any other'⁵ — thus has the Śruti stated the *prima facie* view in the form (of the words) of Gārgya. [22]

(This, the Śruti has done) for establishing the existence of the Ātman (and) its capacity to do activities and to enjoy

(the fruits thereof).

[23]

¹This use of the plural is possibly in mock respect for Bhartṛprapañca.

²Read *sa eṣa iha praviṣṭaḥ* in BU 1.4.7.

³This is literal translation; it stands for 'fuller and clear explanation'.

⁴Read SP: *aparaśabdād ūrdhvam iti padam adhyāhṛtya pūrvapakṣapadena yojanīyam*. SP adds further (possibly a statement in the commentary of Bhartṛprapañca): *yathāhulī bhoktryaś ca devatāḥ karaṇādhiṣṭhātryaś ca kim anyad vijñānātmanā kāryam asty etasmin darśane sthito gārgyaḥ pūrvapakṣaparigrahāyotthāpyata iti*.

⁵Namely, the Ātman. This is stated with the purpose of averting a doubt about the uselessness of the decision, for already the thought of the *vijñānātman* is clear (NKL).

श्रुत्या सिद्धान्तसिद्धयर्थं काश्यरूपं प्रकल्पितम् ।

निष्फलत्वात्स चायुक्तः प्रकृतानभिसंगतेः ॥२४॥

Then, for proving the Siddhānta, the Śruti has thought of (or, presented) the part of Kāśya. And¹ that (connection) is opposed to reason,² for it does not serve any purpose³ and is not (properly) connected with what has been undertaken (or, begun).⁴ [24]

¹In verse 24cd begins the refutation of Bhartṛprapañca's view.

²The particle *nañ* has the sense of opposition—not the sense of negation.

³That is to say: The Ātman does not have any need to perform any action for an enjoyment or towards an end.

⁴The main purpose of the Śruti is to establish only the singleness of the Ātman—cf. BU 1.4.10: *tad ātmānam evāvet*—and its not having any purpose to achieve. As such, the idea of *karṭṛtva* and *bhokṭṛtva* of the Ātman which Bhartṛprapañca posits, is purposeless (read SP: *na hi jīvasya vāstave karṭṛtvādau*

tatsiddhiḥ— where *tat* refers to *ātmakarṭṛtvādi*). This is clarified in the next verse.

देवतास्तित्वपक्षेऽपि किमस्तित्वादि नेष्यते ।
देहाद्विन्नस्य विज्ञातुरिष्टं चेन्निष्फलः श्रमः ॥२५॥

(One might ask:) “Why not accept the existence etc.¹ (of the Ātman, apart from the gross body) even after accepting the existence (etc.)¹ of the deities (as proposed)?²” (In answer, it is said:) If you thus desire to accept (the existence etc. of) the knower (i.e. *viññātr*) apart from the body, then that effort (to seek to prove that desired end) is purposeless (lit. fruitless).³

[25]

¹The word etc. stands for *karṭṛtva* and *bhokṭṛtva*.

²Cf. verse 22cd above.

³There is thus stated by Sureśvara his view (as opposed to that of Bhartṛprapañca) is free from any blemish. This is clarified in the following two and a half verses.

अज्ञातैकात्म्ययाथात्म्यो यदा त्विह विवक्ष्यते ।
अविद्याकार्यनिष्ठः सञ्श्रुत्या गार्ग्यशरीरया ॥२६॥
पूर्वपक्षितयाशेषदुःखहेतूपशान्तये ।
पूर्वपक्षनिदानच्छिन्नाशयः सिद्धान्तवाद्यपि ॥२७॥
श्रुत्येहोत्थाप्यतेऽशेषवेदान्तार्थावबुद्धये ।
सर्वोऽप्येष तदा यत्नः फलवान्स्यान्न चान्यथा ॥२८॥
श्रद्धाचारादिविध्यर्था यदि वाख्यायिका त्वियम् ।

When (i.e. as against Bhartṛprapañca's view) it is taken that the intention of the Śruti referring to Gārgya,¹ a person given to activities proceeding from ignorance, [26]
as the holder of the *prima facie* view; and, so also, Kāśya as the exponent of the Siddhānta, as the remover (lit. destroyer) of the decision² of the holder of the *prima facie* view, [27]
is mentioned the Śruti so that one knows the entire (or,

complete) meaning of the Vedānta (i.e. Upaniṣad), only then,³ all this effort (of the Śruti) would become meaningful (lit. fruitful), not otherwise. [28]

Or perhaps,⁴ this narrative is introduced for the purpose of laying down an injunction regarding faith and (proper) conduct (of a person) etc.⁵ [29ab]

¹*gārgyaśarīrā śruti* literally means: the Śruti text in the form of (the statement about) Gārgya.

²*nidāna* is taken here for resorting to ignorance which leads to Upāsanās as the *upāya* for *tattvajñāna*.

³That is, in the opinion of the Siddhāntin, viz. Sureśvara's explanation.

⁴Earlier, Sureśvara has clarified the purpose of the narrative in BU 2.1.1ff. and here he states yet another purpose of the same.

⁵'Faith' refers to the proper attitude towards the lore of the Brahman and 'conduct' refers to one's proper method of attaining the same; and *ādi* 'etc.' refers to not resorting to mere reasoning about the Brahman—this last stressing the need of realising the same, cf. *naiṣā tarkeṇa matir āpaneyā* (*Kāthopaniṣad* 1.2.9).

Now follows the exposition of BU 2.1.1 in verses 29-43.

यथोक्तदर्शनाप्तार्थो नान्यदस्तीति भावितः ।

अतोऽतिदृष्टोऽविज्ञातदर्पकारणघस्मरः ॥२९॥

(Gārgya), who (thought, he had) obtained the (true) knowledge (of the Brahman in the three foods) as stated before,¹ came to hold that there (the Brahman) was not other (than himself) and therefore he was very proud and was the destroyer of the cause of the pride which was not known to him. [29c-f]

¹This is in accordance with SP. The meaning is: Prāṇa is known by the names Virāj, Vaiśvānara, Prajāpati, Hiraṇyagarbha and Vijñānātman. This one deity obtains in the other deities

which superintend over the various other organs of the gross body. Therefore, it is the Brahman which is in reality the agent of all actions and the enjoyer of the fruits of the same.

श्रद्धालुं वित्तसंपन्नं श्रेयोऽर्थिनमुपेत्य तु ।
ब्रह्म तेऽहं ब्रवाणीति गार्ग्यः काश्यमभाषत ॥३०॥

Approaching Kāśya,¹ who already² had a faith (in the lore of the Brahman), had obtained the knowledge (of it),³ and was desirous of bliss, Gārgya, said to him, 'Let me tell you (about) the Brahman.' [30]

¹The adjectives of Kāśya are really of one who deserves to impart the instruction about the Brahman.

²This is for *tu*. But SP states: *yogyam adhikāriṇam prati praśnam antareṇāpi prativacanam ucitam iti vaksyamāṇārthasūcanārthas tuśabdah*.

³*vitta* is derived (in this context) from the verb root *vid* 'to know'.

न जातो न भविष्योऽस्ति शत्रुरैकात्म्यदर्शनात् ।
अजातशत्रुः काश्योऽतो गार्ग्यबुद्धिविरुद्धधीः ॥३१॥

Since there was not born, nor would there be (born)¹ and nor is there any enemy (for him), Kāśya, on account of his knowing (lit. seeing) the singleness of the Ātman, was (known as) Ajātaśatru;² therefore, he had an attitude (or faith) which was opposed to (that of) Gārgya. [31]

¹*bhaviṣyaḥ* is for *bhaviṣyan*.

²This is an illustration of the Brāhmaṇical etymology which serves a meaningful purpose.

ब्रह्म यस्मात्परं नास्ति न च वस्त्वन्तरं यतः ।
ब्रवाण्युपास्यं तत्तेऽहं सर्वापध्वस्तिकारणम् ॥३२॥

Since the Brahman is that beyond (or besides) which there is (nothing)¹ and there is no other thing (than that in existence), therefore, let me tell you that which is to be worshipped and that which is the cause of the destruction of all (notions about other things).² [32]

¹This has a basis in the Śruti statement: *yasmāt param nāparam asti kiñcit* (Śvetāśvataropaniṣad 3.9).

²This refers to the result of Brahmajñāna.

नापृष्ट इति नन्वेतद्विरुद्धमकरोदृषिः ।
यद्ब्रह्म ते ब्रवाणीति ह्यपृष्टः काश्यमब्रवीत् ॥३३॥

(One would object:) 'Indeed, the sage did what is opposed to (the instruction of the Smṛti) *nāpṛṣṭaḥ* ...,¹ since he said to Kāśya "Let me tell you about the Brahman," though indeed not asked by him.' [33]

This emphasises the sage's conduct in opposition to the acknowledged religious precept.

¹This has a reference to *Manusmṛti* 2.110:

*nāpṛṣṭaḥ kasyacid brūyān na cānyāyena pṛcchataḥ /
jānann api hi medhāvī jaḍaval loka ācaret //*

दर्पादिदर्शनान्नूनं वेत्त्यकृत्स्नात्मदर्शनम् ।
कृत्स्नत्वार्थमतोऽप्राक्षीत्काश्यं प्रज्ञासमन्वितम् ॥३४॥

(The objection is answered away thus:) 'Indeed, (the sage now) knew himself as having imperfect knowledge of the Ātman (within himself),¹ as has evidence in his pride etc.² Therefore, for securing fullness (of that knowledge), he asked³ Kāśya who was possessed of intellect.'⁴ [34]

¹'Of the Ātman' means 'about the nature of the Ātman'.

²Translation follows SP which states *akṛtsnātmadarśanam svātmānam* (gārgyo vettīti śeṣaḥ)— thus the word *akṛtsnātma-*

darśanam is taken as an adjective of Gārgya. NKL however states *akṛtsnātmadarśanam svam* and that means 'his own incomplete knowledge about the Ātman'—here, *svam* is a qualifier of the noun *akṛtsnātmadarśanam*, a substantive. (This is more likely despite our following SP.)

The word etc. refers to Gārgya's desire to secure full knowledge from Kāśya (i.e. he has *arthitva*) etc. (so SP—does it refer to his affliction on account of his ignorance?); or, better refer to the next verse.

³*aprākṣīt* is a paraphrase of *brāvāṇi* from the verb root *bru* in the sense of 'to ask'—this, in accordance with the well-known acceptance of *dhātūnām anekārthatva*. Read NKL yet: *bravāṇi ity asya prcchāmi ity arthe prayogād (=lakṣaṇayā ?) avirodhaḥ*.

⁴This does not refer to *buddhīndriya*, it refers to his right knowledge.

श्रद्धालरधिकारी यो जिज्ञासविनयान्वितः ।

अपृष्टैनापि वक्तव्या तस्मै विद्या विपरिचिता ॥३५॥

'(A person), who has faith (in some preceptor) and is possessed of modesty, is eligible (to receive instruction).¹ To such a person instruction is to be imparted (lit. told) by a wise person,² even if he is not requested (lit. asked) by another.'³

[35]

This is to justify Gārgya's doing which can be considered as conforming to the teaching of the Smṛti.

¹These adjectives are significant for pointing out how Gārgya is a proper recipient of the lore of the Brahman. Also, they justify the word *ādi* (in *dārpādi* in the preceding verse). Also read in this context SP's quotations from *Manusmṛti* 2.111 and 114 which prove, by the method of *Vyatireka*, the propriety of these adjectives:

adharmena tu yaḥ prāha yaś cādharmena prcchati /

tayor anyataṛaḥ praiti vidveṣaṃ ca nigacchati //

(The text of *Manusmṛti* however reads ... *vidveṣaṃ vādhi-*

gacchati) and

*vidyā brāhmaṇam ety āha śevadhis te 'smi rakṣa mām /
asūyakāya mām mā dās tathā syāṃ vīryavattamā //*

धर्मार्थौ यत्र न स्यातां शुश्रूषा वापि तद्विधा ।
तत्र विद्या न वक्तव्या शुभं बीजमिवोषरे ॥३६॥
धर्मार्थौ यत्र च स्यातां शुश्रूषा वापि तद्विधा ।
वक्तव्या तत्र विद्येति निषेधादेव लिङ्ग्यते ॥३७॥

That kind¹ of instruction should not be imparted² to him in whom there is no (inclination to the pursuit of) Dharma and Artha, or even a desire to receive (lit. to hear) it; even as a good (lit. auspicious)³ seed (should not be sown) in a barren land. [36]

From the prohibition (by the use of the particle *na*) it is indicated that this kind of instruction should be imparted to him in whom there is (inclination to the pursuit of) Dharma and Artha or even a desire to receive (lit. to hear) it. [37]

These two verses justify the contents of verses 34-35 by the statements involving Anvaya and Vyatireka.

¹*tadvidhā* is paraphrased by SP as *deśakālasāmarthyānurodhinī*.

²This is in conformity with the AnSS and NKL editions. However, *Manusmṛti* uses *vaptavyā* in place of *vaktavyā*— and that is warranted by the simile.

³The word 'auspicious' has the power to convey 'bliss' which attends upon a knower of the lore of the Brahman.

नष्टाश्वदग्धरथवनन्यायं चाश्रित्य भूमिपम् ।
प्राह मानुषवित्ताढ्यं दैववित्तसमन्वितम् ॥३८॥

(Gārgya) replied to the king, in the way (of the maxim) of two persons one of whom has lost the horses and the other (having) burnt a chariot,¹ asking him who was possessed of the human wealth together with the divine wealth.² [38]

This is to justify why Gārgya approached the king, a Kṣatriya. This is one more reason for Gārgya's doing.

¹Read the quotation in SP (possibly from the commentary of Bharṭṛprapañca): *yathāhuḥ— yuktaḥ saṃyogo 'dhikārārthena hetunā naṣṭāśvadagdharathavad iti.*

²Refer to BU 1.4.17.

वित्तद्वयेन संपन्नो यतोऽधिक्रियते नरः ।

सर्वकर्मस्वतोऽवादीद्वालाकिः काश्यमन्तिकात् ॥३९॥

Since a person, possessed of the two kinds of wealth (mentioned above), is stated to be eligible (for the performance) of all (kinds of religious) activities, therefore did the scion of Balāka speak in the presence (lit. nearness) of Kāśya.¹ [39]

¹This is justified by a quotation in SP (again from Bharṭṛprapañca, in all probability): *yathāhuḥ— ubhayavittavato 'sya hy adhikāras tasmād adhikārārthena hetunā yuktam upetya vacanam iti.*

This is the meaning of sahasram etasyām ... in BU 2.1.1.

ब्रह्म तुभ्यं ब्रवाणीतिवाङ्मात्रव्यापृतावहम् ।

गोसहस्रं ददाम्यद्य विनाप्यैकात्म्यनिर्णयात् ॥४०॥

Only on (Gārgya's) uttering the words, 'Let me tell you about the Brahman', (Kāśya said,) 'I shall grant you a thousand cows',—this, even without (his, i.e. the former's) decision regarding the singleness of the Ātman. [40]

This is the purport of janako janakah:

गोसहस्रप्रदानस्य निमित्तं श्रुतिरभ्यधात् ।

जनको जनक इति नामाभ्यासोक्तितः स्फुटम् ॥४१॥

शुश्रूषुं जनकं सर्वे जना दित्सन्तमेव च ।
विवक्षवोऽभिधावन्ति तमुद्दिश्य जिघृक्षवः ॥४२॥

The Śruti has stated the reason for the grant of a thousand cows; (this is) clear from the repeated mention of the name (in the words) *janako janakaḥ*. [41]

All the people, who wish to tell (what they have known), rush unto Janaka, who is desirous of hearing them and also wishing to grant them (gifts of cows etc.), with a desire to accept (lit. receive) the same (from him). [42]

मौढीं प्रसिद्धिमुल्लङ्घ्य गार्ग्योऽयं मामुपागतः ।
नूनं दित्सुं च शुश्रूषुं संभावयति मामपि ॥४३॥

This Gārgya has overlooked the (custom) well-known (even) among the non-learned (or, foolish)¹ and approached me who am indeed, he thinks, desirous of giving (gifts) and of receiving (lit. hearing from him what he wishes to instruct).² [43]

¹This alternative follows the reading *maudhīm* in NKL edition. AnSS reads *maugdhīm* which leads to the translation: the (belief) known among the ignorant, of course, with little difference.

²SP brings out the purport of this thus: *tadīyaṃ vānimātram eva nimittīkr̥tya gosahasradānam ucitam iti bhāvaḥ*.

Now follows the exposition of BU 2.1.2.

आदित्यचक्षुर्बुद्धिस्थश्चेतनः सर्वगो ध्रुवः ।
एतमेव सदोपासे ब्रह्मेति रविमध्यगम् ॥४४॥

The sun, residing in the eye (and) intellect, the sentient one, the one invariably (*dhruvaḥ*)¹ existing in all—this one do I ever worship as the Brahman abiding in the sun.² [44]

This verse explains the meaning(s) of *ya evāsau ...* and (SP adds:) *tvam api yathoktam brahmopāsveti śeṣaḥ*.

Sureśvara's mention of *cakṣus* and *buddhi* is prompted by BUB *ya evāsāv āditye cakṣuṣi caiko 'bhimānī cakṣurdvāreṇha hr̥di praviṣṭo 'ham bhoktā kartā cety avasthitaḥ*. Reference to *cakṣus* and *buddhi* is to the sense-organ (*indriya*) which is the bodily (*adhyātma*) support for Āditya.

¹It should be translated literally as 'the ever abiding, or the unchanged (among all)'.

²*ravimadhyaga* is *prādhānyān nirdeśaḥ*, i.e. as the chief among the objects of worship.

तथा ब्रुवाणं तं गार्ग्यं काश्यो मा मेत्यथोचिवान् ।
केवलो मतिसंवादो भवदुक्तेर्ममाभवत् ॥४५॥
न त्वपर्वार्थविज्ञानं प्रतिज्ञातं यथा त्वया ।
मा वोचोऽतो यतो वेद्मि विनापि वचनात्तव ॥४६॥

To Gārgya, who was thus telling,¹ Kāśya said, 'Do not, (indeed) do not (tell me this);² (for), from your speech, there has been for me only a confirmation of my thought [45] and (*tu*) not any not-before-known³ knowledge as you had promised (to bring to me). Therefore, do not tell (that which) I have (already) known even without your telling.'⁴ [46]

¹'Telling' is for 'speaking about'.

²Alternatively, 'Do not tell me', where one *mā* can be taken for *mām*. But it is better to understand the *vīpsā* 'repetition' of the prohibitive particle *mā*; cf. verse 47 below.

³What Gārgya should have told (i.e. declared or imparted as instruction) should have been *ajñātārthajñāpana*.

⁴But it is already known to Kāśya (*jñātapiūrva*). See the next verse.

निषेधाभ्यासो मा मेति ज्ञातब्रह्मप्रवादिनः ।
आबाधितधि(?) भि)याभ्यस्तो गार्ग्यस्यानुवितकारणात् ॥४७॥

The repetition of the prohibition by the particle, viz. *mā mā* (lit. prohibition) by the instructor (of the lore) of the Brahman,

who had already known (it), is owing to his fear that it would become stultified¹ on account of the non-statement (about the Brahman) by Gārgya. [47]

¹Here *ābādhitabhī* is accepted for *ābādhitadhī*; yet *ā* in the sense of *īṣat* which is proposed by SP need not be taken seriously.

सुप्रसिद्धं यदस्माकं त्वच्छासनमृतेऽपि तत् ।
नापेक्षते भवद्वाक्यं सिद्धयर्थं प्राक्प्रसिद्धितः ॥४८॥

'That, which has been well known to me even in the absence of (i.e. without) any instruction by you, does not expect (i.e. depend upon) your statement (i.e. saying about it), for establishing (or, imparting) it, since it is already established (for me, i.e. known to me).' [48]

तदुपासां न वेद्मीति मा च शङ्कां कृथा यतः ।
उपासनं च वेद्म्यस्य गुणं तत्फलमेव च ॥४९॥

'Do not also entertain any doubt that I do not know about the worship of that (viz. the Brahman), since I have (already) known about its worship, its¹ excellence and also the result thereof.'² [49]

¹That is, of that worship.

²SP adds here *atiṣṭhāḥ sarveṣāṃ ityādir avatārayati* as introductory to this verse. Actually, that should properly be the introduction of the following two verses.

अतीत्य सर्वभूतानि प्राधान्येन स्थितो यतः ॥५०॥
अतिष्ठा इति नामास्य तेनादित्यात्मनोऽभवत् ।
चक्षुरुद्दीप्तिमत्वाच्च राजेत्येषोऽभिधीयते ॥५१॥

Since this (Brahman Ātman) has remained principally (i.e. as the principal) among them, having surpassed (or, been superior to) all the elements, [50]

therefore, the name of this one, viz. the Ātman of the nature of Āditya 'sun', has been Atiṣṭhā; and also this one is called Rājan 'the king' owing to the eye's possessing extraordinary (ud-) lustre.¹ [51]

These two verses explain the significance of the name Atiṣṭhā—i.e. (i) excelling the elements and (ii) possessing the highest lustre.

¹Translation follows the reading in AnSS edition. NKL edition reads in the text *cakṣurmuddīptimattvāt* (v.l. in AnSS edition) while NKL properly reads *cakṣurmudī[di]ti*, i.e. it is *cakṣurmut* 'dazzling the eye, (i.e. stealing the power of the eye), *dīptimattvāt* 'on account of its possessing lustre'. (Or, causing delight to the eye, if *-mud* is accepted.)

स य एतं यथोद्दिष्टमुपास्तेऽहर्निशं नरः ।
यथोपासनमेवास्य फलं भवति नान्यथा ॥५२॥

He, who day and night worships this one, as described here, has for himself only that fruit (as described) to be in consonance with (*yathā*) the worship (which he has offered), not otherwise. [52]

This explains the words in the BU sentence *sa ya etam*

Now follows the exposition of BU 2.1.3.

मतिसंवाददोषेण काश्येनोत्सारिते रवौ ।
गाग्यो ब्रह्मान्तरं राज्ञे प्रवक्तुमुपचक्रमे ॥५३॥

After (the notion of the Brahman) in respect of the sun¹ was rejected by Kāśya through (the fault of) its (merely) conforming to his (already known) thought, Gārgya proceeded to tell the king (about) another (form of the) Brahman. [53]

This is the purport of *sa hovāca ... candre puruṣaḥ*

चन्द्रे मनसि बुद्धौ च ब्रह्मोपासेऽहमद्वयम् ।
 भानुमण्डलतो यस्माद्विगुणं चन्द्रमण्डलम् ।
 बृहन्निति ततश्चन्द्रः प्रमाणेनाभिधीयते ॥५४॥

(He said,) 'I worship the Brahman, which does not have duality (in it), in the moon, the *manas*¹ and the intellect; (and) since the orb of the moon is (of a size) double (that) of the orb of the sun; therefore is the moon called Br̥hat,² in accordance with the magnitude³ (of its size). [54]

Sureśvara's mention of *manasi buddhau ca* is prompted by BUB: *ya evāsau candre manasi caikaḥ bhoktā kartā ceti pūrvavad viśeṣaṇam* (cf. under verse 44 above). Here, *manas* and *buddhi* are the insentient support for Candra.

¹The word *manas* is retained in the translation, though usually they translate it as 'mind'. The two words have different imports, the first does not show any trace of sentience associated with it whereas the latter is (certainly) associated with it.

²This is to point out the significance of the address Br̥hat (nominative form *br̥han*) an adjective of the moon-Brahman.

³The reference to this magnitude is known from *Brahmāṇḍa Purāṇa* 1.24.99cd-100 (SP states the text:)

navayojanasāhasro viṣkambhaḥ savituh smṛtaḥ //
dvigūṇas tasya vistāro maṇḍalasya pramāṇataḥ //
dvigūṇaḥ sūryavistārād vistāraḥ śaśinaḥ smṛtaḥ //

अम्भोऽतिपाण्डरं वासो यस्माच्चन्द्राभिमानिनः ।
 तस्मात्पाण्डरवासाः स्यात्सोमः सौम्यत्वकारणात् ॥५५॥
 ज्योत्स्नया राजतेऽत्यर्थं सोमो ब्राह्मणराजतः ।
 सोमो राजेत्यतो वक्ति तदुपासाविधित्सया ॥५६॥

Since the garment of the one who identifies¹ himself with the moon is extremely pellucid (lit. clear-white) water, therefore that one is² described as one clad in white; (also that one is) called Soma for the reason of being (very) mild (gentle).

[55]

Thanks to *jyotsnā* , Soma shines exceedingly and, therefore, on account of silver(-like brightness of a) Brāhmaṇa, (the Śruti) describes it thus: (viz.) Soma (is) the king³—this, with a desire to prescribe the worship of that.⁴

[56]

This explains the words in the BU: *pāṇḍaravāsāḥ somo rājā* which describe the moon-Brahman.

¹This word gives the meaning of the literal expression 'having the awareness of being (the moon)'.

²*syāt* is taken for *asti*, according to the Vedic usage.

³Refer to *somo rājā* ... thus twice in this Brāhmaṇa and cf. BU 6.2.14; CU 5.4.2, 5.10.4; *Kauṣītakyupaniṣad* 4.3; *Jaiminīyopaniṣad* 3.21.2.

⁴The last clause states the result (lit. fruit) of the worship of the moon having the four significant names (i.e. adjectives): *br̥hat*, *pāṇḍaravāsas*, *soma* and *rājan*.

तुल्याभिधानधर्मत्वाल्लता सोमोऽपि गृह्यते ।
उभयोर्देवतैकत्वादुपास्यं तेन तद्द्वयम् ॥५७॥

A creeper (called Soma, i.e. Soma plant) also is taken as Soma (i.e. moon),¹ on account of their having properties² (which are) of the same description and, therefore, since both have (but) one deity (to superintend over them), the two of them are to be worshipped,³ (only as one deity). [57]

This states another meaning of the word Soma, viz. a plant of that name; this is beside the 'moon'.

¹NKL reads thus: *latāsome 'pi hr̥savṛddhyākhyo dharmo 'pi vidyate dvitripatrādirūpeṇa vṛddhēr ity arthaḥ*.

²SP clarifies these as *vṛddhi* 'waxing in size or fattening' and *hr̥sa* 'waning in size or withering away'. NKL points out that, in the case of the creeper-(moon) the appearance of one leaf, a second leaf and a third and so on go to show the *vṛddhi*.

³SP adds: *prāṇātmanaikīkṛtya* 'having identified (each) with

Prāṇa (i.e. the vital force) in the body'.

एषैका देवता विभ्वी प्रत्येकार्थावसायिनी ।
भोक्त्री कर्त्री च सर्वत्र तस्य भोज्यमतोऽपरम् ॥५८॥

This (viz. the moon) is the only one deity, which is (all-)pervading and accomplishes¹ the purpose of each (of the two); so also, it is the enjoyer and the agent everywhere² and everything else is therefore the object of (its) enjoyment. [58]

This verse explains the nature of the deity of Soma in each of its senses.

¹That is, the deity, i.e. the moon, secures the purpose of each (of the orb of the moon and the plant).

²That is, in all the cases relevant upon each sense of Soma.

ब्रह्मैषा सर्वसंव्याप्तेरात्मेत्येतामुपास्महे ।

This (deity)¹ is the Brahman, since it encompasses (or, pervades) all—we worship this one as the Ātman. [59ab]

This points out that Prāṇa (i.e. the vital force) has to be taken as the Ātman—the Brahman which cannot be *bhojya*, viz. that which consists in food.

¹*devatā* is implied by *eṣā*.

Verses 59cd and 60 point to the general meaning of the various alternative notions of Gārgya about the Brahman (in *paryāya* 3 onwards).

व्याख्या तुल्यैव विज्ञेया सर्ववाक्येषु पूर्ववत् ॥५९॥
गुणो यत्र हि यः पुंसो नाम्ना संभाव्यतेऽत्र तु ।
फलं तदेव तस्य स्यात्सर्ववाक्येषु निर्णयः ॥६०॥

In all the (remaining) sentences (i.e. *paryāyas* of Gārgya about

the Brahman), one should know that the explanation (of each) is similar to what is given before (i.e. in respect of the first two *paryāyas*). [59cd]

And (tu) here (i.e. in respect of each) what(ever) property be understood (or, considered as possible) in whichever (of the *paryāyas*) is itself the result (lit. fruit) of that¹—this is² the decision in respect of all the sentences. [60]

¹This refers to the worship meant in respect of the so-called Brahman, possessed of that property.

²*syāt* is to be taken as *asti*.

BU 2.1.4 is now under reference.

This verse explains the significance of the third paryāya, viz. vidyut.

भानुचन्द्रमसोस्तेजो जलदैरभिभयते ।
विद्युत्तत्राप्यतितरां तेजस्वी तेन विद्युति ॥६१॥

The lustre of (each of) the sun and the moon is overpowered (i.e. covered or concealed) by the clouds;¹ but there (i.e. in the clouds) lightning (shines) exceedingly;² therefore, the lustrous (*puruṣa*) in lightning (is to be worshipped).³ [61]

¹This brings out the lustre in the sun and/or the moon (and, for that matter, in fire, viz. Agni, as the editor of NKL points out in his note; also read SP: *agner api kadācid udbhūtam abhibhūtam ca tejo lakṣyate tatrāpi jaladeṣu satsv apīti yāvat*) is less bright than that of lightning.

²Supply *tejasvinī* (about *vidyut*) after *atitarām*.

³*tejasvī* entails the words *dhyeyaḥ puruṣaḥ*.

BU 2.1.5 is under reference.

This verse refers to the fourth paryāya, viz. ākāśa.

खण्डशो न यथा मूर्तं खं पूर्णं चाप्रवर्तनात् ।

अप्रवर्त्यक्रियावत्स्युर्व्योम्नि सर्वाः प्रवृत्तयः ॥६२॥

The sky is, in its parts,¹ *mūrta* 'having a form', whereas it (is) complete (or whole),² for it is non-moving;³ for it cannot be moved (by any one) and therefore there cannot be any activity produced in or by it. Yet all activities are (said to be) of the sky.⁴ [62]

This verse explains how the sky is called *pūrṇa* and *apravarti*.

¹*khaṇḍaśaḥ* implies the various parts imagined of the sky as in *ghaṭākāśa*, *karakākāśa* etc.

²This refers to the real partlessness of the sky.

³Translation takes *apravarti* as *acala*. Yet, it can be taken alternatively as *apravartaka* 'not setting anyone/anything to any activity'.

⁴This is Sureśvara's alternative explanation of the word *apravarti*. No activity can be produced in the sky, nor can it be the support (viz. *adhikaraṇa*) of any activity. Any activity, which is said to be 'in the sky' is only imaginary. (Cf. SP: *vyomni hi sarvāḥ pravṛttayaḥ santi na svayaṁ kriyā tadvad vā tasmād apravartīty arthaḥ*. Yet NKL: *svayaṁ na kriyā[vat] kriyāvatām adhikaraṇam ity apravartīty arthaḥ*.)

Verses 63-65 speak of the fifth paryāya, viz. *Vāyu*.
BU 2.1.6 is under reference.

जिष्णुः स्याज्जयशीलत्वाज्जीयते न परैर्यतः ।
अपराजिष्णुरित्येवं तस्मादेवाभिधीयते ॥६३॥
अन्यतो मातृतो जाता अन्यतस्त्या उदाहृताः ।
अप्यन्यतस्त्यजायी स्यात्सापत्नभ्रातृमर्दनः ॥६४॥

(*Vāyu*) is¹ (described) as the conquerer, since it has the character (or, capacity) of (ever) conquering and since it is not conquered by others (or any enemies/opponents); therefore, it is invincible (lit. not-to-be-conquered)—so is it thus said.

anyatastyas are said to be those who are born of another, i.e. of another mother. And (*api*) one who is born of another would be the killer (or, tormentor) of them who are his brothers, viz. those born of the same (mother). [64]

These verses explain the significance of the three adjectives of Vāyu, viz. *jiṣṇu*, *aparājiṣṇu* and *anyatastyajāyin*. There is then a threefold result for its worshipper which is implied. The editor of NKL subjoins a note: *kramena ekaikaguṇopāśanasya ekaikaṃ phalam bodhyam*.

¹*syāt* is for *asti*.

जिष्णुरिन्द्रगुणोपास्तेवैकुण्ठगुणतः परः ।
सेनापराजितैत्यस्मात्सपत्नानां पराजयः ॥६५॥

(The worshipper becomes) a conquerer by concentrating on (or, worshipping) the qualities of Indra¹ (which he comes to possess); (he becomes) beyond (i.e. invincible to) the enemies owing to the qualities of Vaikuṇṭha (Viṣṇu ?) (which he comes to possess) and the army (of the Maruts)³ since it is (ever) unconquered; therefore, (the worshipper secures) the conquest of enemies.⁴ [65]

¹The name of Indra signifies Parameśvara, i.e. the lord of all.

²*vaikuṇṭha* literally means one who cannot be withstood (*aprasahya*)— whether it refers to Viṣṇu is (though implied, and, therefore, a little) doubtful!

³*senā* stands for the Vedic *marudgaṇa*. In Veda, the Maruts are a development of Vāyu, who is a close associate of Indra or Agni. Yet usually *senā* is associated with Indra (as here in this verse).

⁴This verse justifies the threefold result of the worship of Vāyu.

Verse 66 refers to the sixth paryāya, viz. Agni/Vāc.

BU 2.1.7 is under reference.

अभ्याहितमपि जगत्सहतेऽग्निर्यतस्ततः ।
भस्मसात्करणादुक्तो विषासहिरितीश्वरैः ॥६६॥

Since Agni overpowers the (outside)¹ world which it oversteps,² therefore, (i.e. thereby) rendering (the same, i.e. the world) into ashes, it is called by the learned (lit. the lords)³ *viśāsahi* 'one that can stand the oncoming (world).'⁴ [66]

¹This refers to all *apparent* creation beside the Ātman.

²*sahate* literally means withstands.

³These are the lords of words, the learners and (as such) the knowers of (the meaning of) the Vedas.

⁴This is based on the etymology offered by SP: (*yad dhaviḥ svasmin*) *viśyate kṣipyate tat sodhum śīlam astīti vyutapattiḥ*.

Verses 67 and 68 explain the meaning of the seventh paryāya: *ya evāpsu*

BU 2.1.8 is under reference.

अप्सु रेतसि बुद्धौ च पुरुषं ब्रह्म चेतनम् ।
उपास एतमित्युक्तः काश्यः प्रत्याह पूर्ववत् ॥६७॥

"In waters, in semen and in intellect (do I see) *puruṣa*, the sentient Brahman—I worship this one," (thus) told (by Gārgya), Kāśya said in return as before. [67]

Sureśvara adds *retasi*, following BUB. Also, he adds *buddhau* as he has done under 2.1.2-3 (but this is not in BUB).

प्रतिबिम्बोदयः कार्यं प्रतिरूपं यतस्ततः ।
प्रतिरूप उपास्योऽप्सु फलमप्यस्य तादृशम् ॥६८॥

Since *pratirūpa* 'image' is an effect, viz. the rise (or, appearance) of a reflection; therefore, the reflection (of a

puruṣa 'a man' in the waters etc.) is to be worshipped. The result for this one (viz. the worshipper) in (relation to) waters is also of that kind.¹ [68]

¹ Namely, *bahurūpa* 'multifold in form' as in the case of the preceding *paryāya*— but the stress is on the plentiness of waters conveyed by the plural form *apsu*.

Verse 69 explains the meaning of the eighth paryāya.

अन्वर्थे प्रतिशब्दोऽयं फलस्य पुरुषार्थतः ।
प्रातिलोम्येन तु ज्ञेयो ह्यनर्थः स्यात्तथा सति ॥६९॥

The preposition (lit. word), viz. *prati*, is (used) here in the sense of the preposition *anu* 'following', since the result is (securing or obtainment) of the end of (a human being's) life.¹ (As against this) it can be known in the sense of 'being opposed', but (*tu*), that being so, there would indeed² be an undesirable end.³ [69]

¹ Read SP: *pratiśabdasya nipātatvenānekārthatvasambhavāt prakṛtopāstyanusāreṇānvarthatvam ucitam*. Also *puruṣārthataḥ* is for *puruṣārthavattvataḥ*.

² This is the force of *hi*.

³ Read SP: *tathā sati prātikūlyārthatvābhyupagame satīti yāvat*.

श्रुतिस्मृतिसदाचारान्प्रति यः सततोद्यतः ।
प्रतिश्रुत्यादिरूपत्वात्प्रतिरूपस्ततोऽस्तु सः ॥७०॥

He, who is ever inclined towards (lit. bent on), (the teachings of) the Śruti and the Smṛti and (follows) the conduct of the good,¹ is² then, owing to his following each of the śruti etc.,³ has thence (a son born to him, that is) in accordance with (or, following) the Śruti etc. [70]

This is the meaning of *atho pratirūpo 'smāj jāyate*.

¹Or alternatively, the good conduct in keeping with the teaching of the Śruti etc. This is according to SP.

²*astu* is taken for *asti*.

³The word etc. refers to *smṛti* and *sadācāra*. Also, this refers to his adopting the worships (viz. *Upāsanās*) taught in the *śruti* etc. The son also is likewise a worshipper of the same.

Verses 71-73 explain the meaning of the ninth paryāya.
BU 2.1.9 is under reference.

रोचिष्णुपनिषत्कान्तमादर्शाक्षादिबुद्धिषु ।
उपास इत्यभिहिते काश्यः प्रत्याह पूर्ववत् ॥७१॥

When it was told (him) 'I worship (that Brahman)¹ in the intellect and organs etc. (which are reflected) in the mirror, viz. that which is brilliantly shining (and) delightful (as said) in the Upaniṣads.',² said Kāśya in return (once again) as before.

[71]

This explains *ya evāyam*

¹This is implied by *rociṣṇu* which is paraphrased as *upaniṣatkāntam* (neuter). Or, it is possible to understand the word *puruṣam* (accusative singular, masculine) which is qualified by the Karmadhāraya compound *rociṣṇūpaniṣatkāntam*. Also cf. NKL: *dīpyamānarahasyakāntisahitam ity arthaḥ*; read the note of the editor of NKL: *upaniṣatpadam rahasyārthakam iti bhāvaḥ*.

²Or, following SP, 'delightful though its refulgent lustre remains concealed (*dedīpyamānagopyakāntisahitam*)'.

यत्रोपास्यबहुत्वं स्यात्फलं तत्र प्रजास्वपि ।
शतहृदादर्शाद्यर्था बहवस्ते प्रसिद्धितः ॥७२॥

Wher(ever) there is plurality of the objects of worship, there is abundance (or lit. plurality) of the result in respect of the (forthcoming) offspring also.¹ Indeed many things like (the flashes of) lightning and the mirror etc. are known (to be

of this nature).²

[72]

¹Cf. SP: *svāmīno 'nyatrāpi vācanikam aviruddham iti bhāvaḥ*.

²SP explains this as *kvācītkam upāsyabahutvam eva sphorayati*.

फलं यद्गुणकं यत्र तद्गुणं स्यादुपासनम् ।
फलानुमानतस्तत्र न फलं ह्यनुपासितम् ॥७३॥

Wherever there is a result of whatever quality,¹ there is a worship of that (viz. similar) quality;¹ so is it inferred from the result²—indeed (*hi*) the result is not what is not worshipped for.³ [73]

This is to justify how in some modes of worship (*paryāyas*) the result is manifold.

Also, it explains *ya evāyaṃ yantaṃ*

¹This stands for quantity also.

²SP states the inference thus: *yasmin paryāye yadguṇakam phalaṃ dṛṣṭaṃ tatra tadguṇakam upāsanam phalena tatsāadhanasya ... tadvaicitrye saty upāsanavaicitryasyāvaśyakatvāt*.

³This is to state the inference in the form of Vyatireka.

In verses 74-76, BU 2.1.10 is under reference.

गच्छन्तमन यः शब्दो बहिर्वच्छ्रूयतेऽध्वनि ।
अध्यात्मं दैहिके शब्दे बुद्धौ चेति विनिर्दिशेत् ॥७४॥

In what sound is heard outside as following a walker on some path, and also in that in the intellect with respect to the (walker's) body should one point out (there is the Brahman).

[74]

पुंसोऽभिधावतस्तूर्णं देहदेशैः समाहतः ।
प्राणो वृत्तिविशेषेण बहिर्वत्कुरुते ध्वनिम् ॥७५॥

(For) it is (the wind called) Prāṇa which, struck by various

limbs of the (walker's) body, while (he is) running fast, that produces by its particular function¹ (or, makes) a sound as (belonging to) outside (the body). [75]

In verses 74 and 75 is expressed the view of Gārgya.

¹This is the walker's particular movement. Or, possibly, this refers to some function of the Prāṇa which is other than the usual inhaling.

वृत्तिक्षेपादसुरयमायुषश्च तदाश्रितेः ।
शतायुरेव भवति म्रियते नापमृत्युना ॥७६॥

This is (the deity called) Asu,¹ because there is snapping (or stopping) of the function (of Prāṇa). And because² the life (-span) is dependent on that, a man attains to the age of a hundred (years) and does not come to have (untimely) death (in that). [76]

This is Ajātaśatru's view.

¹This is to say that the sound (mentioned in the two preceding verses) is produced by *śabda-puruṣa*.

²This explains the Upaniṣadic sentence *sa ya etam*

In verses 77 and 78, BU 2.1.11 is under reference.

दिक्षु द्वितीयोऽनपगः सद्वितीयः सदैव सः ।
दुःसंभाव्या हि पूर्वा दिङ्मुक्त्वाशां परिचमां जनैः ॥७७॥

He (that Puruṣa) is the second in the quarters—he is inseparable and is ever the second¹—the eastern quarter (alone) is indeed difficult to be considered (alone),² the western quarter being left aside by men. [77]

This explains the significance of *sadvidyā* and *anapaga* connected with *dikpuruṣa*.

¹There is reference to the ears, corresponding to the quarters,

and the region of the heart. Also, the ears are connected with the Aśvins who are inseparable twins; the heart, covered in the body, refers to the cover of ignorance (about the real nature of the Brahman) on the part of Gārgya.

²This is the significance of *duḥsambhāvyā*; SP comments on this word: *diśāṃ sadvitīyatvaṃ lokaprasiddham iti hisābdah*.

साधुभृत्यपरीवारः सर्वदोषासको भवेत् ।
पुत्रादिगणसंतानस्थैर्यमेव सदा भवेत् ॥७८॥

A worshipper (of this deity) becomes ever accompanied by his retinue (*parivāra*), viz. his good attendants; (also) there will ever result (for him) continuity in respect of sons and other offspring. [78]

This explains the Upaniṣadic sentence *sa ya etām ...* and also the worship of the deity having two qualities mentioned in the preceding verse.

This verse explains BU 2.1.12: sa evāyaṃ chāyāmayah

छायामये तथाज्ञाने बुद्धौ चैकैव देवता ।
मृत्युकालात्पुनः नास्य व्याधिरप्युपसर्पति ॥७९॥

There is only one deity in the shadow-*puruṣa*,¹ viz. that in darkness (or, ignorance) outside and in the intellect (inside of the worshipper) and, before the time of his death, there does not come to him any ailment also.² [79]

¹The shadow-*puruṣa* is described (or, qualified) as Death.

²This is the result of the worship of Death, viz. long life and absence of any disease—this is conveyed by *nainam purā kālāt* 'Even' has the force of conveying the delayed time for death.

Verses 80-84 discuss the import of BU 2.1.13: ya evāyaṃ ātmani

....

विराडात्मनि देहे च बुद्धावित्यादि पूर्ववत् ।
आत्मन्वीति च वश्यात्मा प्रजा चापि शमान्विता ॥८०॥

(In this *paryāya*) Puruṣa refers to Virāj, the Ātman 'individual self,'¹ and the intellect in the body (even) as before (i.e. in the preceding *paryāyas*). The adjective *ātmanvī* points to his being strong in himself (or, mind). Also, the offspring² (of the worshipper) is possessed of tranquillity. [80]

¹This refers to Hiranyagarbha (in making) as understood from the qualifying attribute *ātmanvī*.

²*prajā* is singular form, indicative of the plural sense.

व्यस्तानां पूर्वमद्देशः समस्तानां त्विहोदितः ।
विवक्षावसितिर्गाँगी तथा सत्युपपद्यते ॥८१॥

Earlier,¹ there was enumeration of (each of the) individual deities (to be worshipped), whereas there is here a general (or single) enumeration of them all. That being so, there is a reasonable conclusion of Gārgya's intended thought (lit. speech).² [81]

This is to explain how this *paryāya* is different from the earlier ones and a fitting conclusion of the thought.

¹This refers to the earlier *paryāyas* mentioned in the preceding verses. The intention there was to refer to the worship of each individual deity.

²This is warranted by the earlier modes of worship.

प्रत्याख्यातोपदेशः सन्संवादेन पुनः पुनः ।
ब्रह्मान्यदन्यदवददात्मन्वीत्यन्तमादरात् ॥८२॥
विशेषाणामनन्तत्वात्समस्तं ब्रह्म सोऽवदत् ।
तस्मिन्नपि निषिद्धेऽथ तूष्णीं गार्ग्यो बभूव ह ॥८३॥

By his repeated talk (with Ajātaśatru, Gārgya had) his instruction (regarding the Brahman) repudiated; for, (the former) instructed (lit. mentioned) the Brahman to be different (from that in each of Gārgya's *paryāyas*) with profound respect (for the Brahman having as its qualifying attribute) *ātmanvī*.

[82]

Thus, he (finally) mentioned the Brahman as a whole (*samasta*) on account of the numberlessness of its particular attributes. Then,¹ as that (Brahman, taken severally and jointly by him) was rejected (by Ajātaśatru as the Brahman), Gārgya indeed² came to maintain silence.

[83]

¹*atha* indicates Gārgya's ignorance of the ultimate reality.

²This is for *ha*. An expression of Gārgya's lowering of the head in the assembly of Ajātaśatru.

यत्कृत्स्नं ब्रह्म पूर्वोक्तं तदेवेदमविद्यया ।
एकधानेकधा मूर्धैः कल्प्यते रज्जुसर्पवत् ॥८४॥

All that Brahman, viz. which(ever) was earlier mentioned, is but so stated by ignorant persons in one way or in several ways, owing to their non-knowing (lit. ignorance, about it); it is so imagined in the same way as one imagines a rope to be a serpent.

[84]

The verse seeks to establish that the Brahman is variously, i.e. singly or jointly, understood by persons under the sway of ignorance—this is so indicated by the rejection of all the *paryāyas* by Ajātaśatru. The *paryāyas* had originated in only a partial view of the Brahman as variously delimited; that is to say: it was taken to be what was other than the *mukhya* Brahman, viz. the ultimate reality.

In verses 85-91 follows the explanation of BU 2.1.14 (and allied matter).

अवाकशिरस्कमालोक्य नृपो गार्ग्यमनुत्तरम् ।
एतावदिति तं प्राह शेषाशङ्कानिवृत्तये ॥८५॥

On seeing Gārgya having lowered his head and having no more to say in reply, the king said to him *etāvad* ... '(is it only) this much?'—this was with a view to clearing away whatever remained as doubt (in his mind).¹ [85]

¹This refers to Gārgya's wish to know the ultimate reality.

निगृह्यमाणयोगे च प्लुतिमत्र विनिर्दिशेत् ।
ब्रह्म ब्रवाणीत्यात्थ त्वमेतावद्ब्रह्म तच्च ते ॥८६॥

One should point out the *pluti* 'prolation' here (i.e. in the text) as associated with an individual's being checked (or, held, i.e. stopped):¹ (this is thus expressed in Ajātaśatru's intention, viz.) 'You said to me "Let me tell you about the Brahman", and your (statement of) the Brahman is (just) this much!' [86]

This has a reference to BU using *pluti* in *sa hovācājātaśatruḥ, etāvan nū3 iti*.

¹This is Suresvara's reference to Pāṇinian procedure regarding the use of *pluti* in Pāṇini Sūtra 8.2.94: *nigrhyānuyoge ca*.

अज्ञाते जगदज्ञातं ज्ञाते ज्ञातं च यत्र तत् ।
तदेव ब्रह्म पूर्णत्वान्न त्वदुक्तमकृत्स्नतः ॥८७॥

²That alone is the Brahman, which remaining unknown the entire world (remains) unknown¹ and which being known that (becomes) known—this is owing to its being the all-encompassing (or, whole)—that which you have told (or, declared) is not the Brahman owing to its not being the whole. [87]

The verse does not mean to convey that Gārgya had completely

gone wrong, since each of his *paryāyas* about the Brahman was included in the Brahman which is *mukhya* 'ultimate'. The only shortcoming was that, in each of the *paryāyas*, there was so-called partial expression of the Brahman (*akṛtsnatva*). This is further clarified in the following verse.

अव्यावृत्ताननुगतस्वतःसिद्धात्मवस्तुनि ।
मुख्यार्थो ब्रह्मशब्दः स्यान्न त्वदुक्तेऽतथात्वतः ॥८८॥

(Ajātaśatru meant to say:) 'The word Brahman, in its principal (or, real) sense, can be (i.e. is to be) used in respect of the thing (called) Ātman, which is not (i.e. cannot be) distinguished (from any other thing), which has no resemblance with (lit. has not been followed by any other thing) and which is self-established; not in respect of what you have mentioned, since that is not similar to it.'¹ [88]

¹Namely, it is not *avyāvṛtta* ... *svataḥsiddha*.

यस्मादेवमतो गार्ग्यमेतावद्धीतिवादिनम् ।
नृपो नैतावतेत्याह ब्रह्मत्वासंभवं स्फुटम् ॥८९॥

Since this was so, the king said to Gārgya, who declared the Brahman to be this much¹ 'It is not this much'—thus (declaring) clearly the impossibility of that being the Brahman. [89]

¹It referred only to the so-called expression of the Brahman.

अज्ञातब्रह्मतत्त्वस्य दुःसंभाव्यमिदं वचः ।
नैतावतेति ब्रह्मातः काश्यो वेत्तीति लिङ्ग्यते ॥९०॥

That such an expression (lit. this expression) cannot ever come from one who has not known the real nature of the Brahman is indicated by the expression 'not by this much is (declared/explained the Brahman)' and that therefore, Kāśya

knew (the real nature of) the Brahman.

[90]

This explains the significance of Gārgya's words *upa ivāyāni* 'let me approach you (for instruction)'. This is clarified in the following verse.

गार्ग्योऽनुमाय राज्ञोऽथ प्रावीण्यं ब्रह्मवेदने ।
उपायानीत्युवाचेमं परब्रह्मावबुद्धये ॥९१॥

Having then understood (lit. inferred) the king's ability for instructing about (the nature of) the Brahman, Gārgya said to him, 'Let me approach you (for instruction).' [91]

In verses 92-99 follows the explanation of BU 2.1.15 (and allied matter).

परं ब्रह्म विजिज्ञासुरपेतोऽस्म्यहमादरात् ।
अनुशाधि यथातत्त्वमित्येवंवादिनं नृपः ॥९२॥
क्षत्रियं ब्राह्मणो जात्या यदुपेयादनापदि ।
प्रतिलोममिदं वृत्तं धर्मशास्त्रैर्निषिद्धतः ॥९३॥

(While Gārgya) said, 'Desirous of knowing the highest Brahman,¹ I have approached you respectfully; please teach me what (or, as) it is in reality', the king [92] (said), 'That (you) a Brāhmaṇa by birth should approach (me) a Kṣatriya, (while you are) not in difficulty, this (your) doing (lit. behaviour) is against (or, not in accordance with Dharma), for there is prohibition (or, censure against it) of (lit. by) the Dharma texts.² [93]

¹NKL edition reads *para brahma*; but that makes no difference.

²SP and NKL adduce support for the king's words thus:

*abrāhmaṇād adhyayanam āpatkāle vidhīyate /
anuvrajyā ca śuśrūṣā yāvad adhyayanam guroḥ //
nābrāhmaṇe gurau śiṣyo vāsam ātyantikam vaset /
brāhmaṇe cānamūcāne kāṅkṣan gatim anuttamām //*

(*Manusmṛti* 2.241-242). SP further supports this by a citation from *Gautamadharmasūtra*: *āpatkāle brāhmaṇasyābrāhmaṇād vidyopayogo 'nugamanam śūśrūṣāsamāpteh*.

योगक्षेमफलार्थाय गमनं न निषिध्यते ।
ब्रह्म मे वक्ष्यतीत्यर्थं निषिद्धं नृपसर्पणम् ॥९४॥

“(but) his (i.e. a Brāhmaṇa's) approaching (him, a Kṣatriya) is not prohibited (or, censured), (in case it is) for effecting (or, securing) (*arthāya*) the meaning of life;¹ (thus, your) approaching (me), a king, with the desire (*ity artham*) 'he would tell (declare to) me (the nature of) the Brahman' is (indeed) censured. [94]

¹I have translated *yogakṣema* thus, though against SP which states: *aprāptaprāpanam yogah prāptarakṣanam kṣemah* and supports the explanation by citing a Smṛti:

*vedārthān adhigacchec ca śāstrāṇi vividhāni ca /
upeyād īśvaram caiva yogakṣemārthasiddhaye //*
(*Yājñavalkyasmṛti* 1.99)

This is supported by NKL: *yogakṣemārtham īśvaram adhigacchet* (*Gautamadharmasūtra* 1.9.63).

अतोऽनुपेतमेव त्वां करविन्यस्तबिल्ववत् ।
ब्रह्म विज्ञापयिष्यामि यज्ज्ञाने सर्वविद्भवेत् ॥९५॥

“Therefore, I shall inform you¹—who have, in reality, not formally approached me—about (the nature of) the Brahman even like a *bilva* fruit placed on the palm of a hand, by securing whose knowledge, one would become the knower of all.” [95]

¹SP explains in this context: *varṇato gārgyasyādhikyād upasattyabhāve 'pi vidyāto rājño vaiśiṣṭyāt tatas tadgraho yuktaḥ* and supports 'his by a passage from the *Manusmṛti* 2.154:

*na hāyanair na palitair na vittair na ca bandhubhīḥ /
ṛṣayaś cakrire dharmam yo 'nūcānaḥ sa no mahan //*

इत्युक्त्वा तमथो पाणौ गृहीत्वोत्थितवानृपः ।
आजग्मतुश्च तौ सुप्तं नरं कार्यविवक्षया ॥९६॥

Having thus said to him and taking (lit. holding) him by his hand, the king rose up (i.e. began to walk). (Then) the two came to a man, who was sleeping, with the desire to make (that man) speak what was to be achieved. [96]

गार्ग्योक्तब्रह्माभोक्तृत्वं तथामीषामनात्मताम् ।
बालाकेर्बोधयिष्यामीत्यतः सुप्तमगानृपः ॥९७॥

With the intention to bring home to Bālāki the nature of a non-enjoyer of what was declared by him, i.e. Gārgya, as the Brahman and also the character of non-Ātmans (i.e. non-Brahman) of these,¹ the king went up to the sleeping (man). [97]

This explains *kāryavivakṣā* 'the desire of stating what was to be achieved, viz. to make (that sleeping man) speak'.

¹This should have been 'them', but owing to the force of *amīṣām* 'these' refers to the Sun etc. which Gārgya had earlier mentioned as the Brahman.

देवतानामभिः काश्यो गत्वा सुप्तं यथोदितैः ।
आमन्त्रयां तदा चक्रे बृहन्नित्येवमादिभिः ॥९८॥

Then, having gone up to the sleeping (man), Kāśya called¹ him by (various) names of the deity, as said (in the Upaniṣad), viz. Bṛhat and others.² [98]

This explains the BU sentence *tam etaiḥ*

¹The verb is *āmantrayāṃcakre*, it is separated into its two components *āmantrayāṃ* and *cakre*, for metre's sake. Such tendency of separating the verbs is occasionally noticed in classical Sanskrit writers.

²These names are: Br̥hat, Pāṇḍaravāśas, Soma and Rājan.

संबोध्यमानोऽपि तथा सुप्तो नैवोदबुध्यत ।
यतोऽतो गार्ग्याभिमतो न भोक्तेत्यवगम्यते ॥९९॥

Since that sleeping (man) did not at all become awake, even when so addressed, therefore, it is understood that he was not the enjoyer as understood by Gārgya. [99]

This explains *sa nottasthau* in BU. It brings out the thought that the Prāṇa 'vital Prāṇa in the human body', which was functioning (i.e. active therein), was not *really* the enjoyer, i.e. experiencer (of the various names or words addressed to him).

Verses 100-108 bring out the significance of Ajātaśatru's approaching the sleeping man.

जाग्रत्कालं परित्यज्य सुप्तं किमिति जग्मतुः ।
स्पष्टता सर्वभावानां जाग्रत्काले हि लक्ष्यते ॥१००॥

(A question is asked:) 'Why did the two approach the sleeping (man), avoiding his state (lit. time) of waking (or, wakefulness)?' (The reason for the question is given thus:) Indeed it is only in the state (i.e. time) of waking that clear visibility¹ of all becomings (*bhāvas*) is noticed.² [100]

The implication of the question is: It is not proper (or, useful) to approach a sleeping man—it was proper to go to one who was awake, for it could only be in the case of the latter that the king was in a better position to explain the nature of the Ātman. Yet, see verse 103 below.

¹NKL reads *spaṣṭatvāt* for *spaṣṭatā*! difficult to decide the correct reading.

²SP clarifies the idea thus: *tatra sarvasyāpy ādiṣṭo 'rtho vivicya vaktuṃ śakyate na svāpe sarvavyavahāralopād atas tadgatir anarthikety arthaḥ*. This is clarified in the following verse.

प्राणानां देवतानां च पुरुषस्य च संकरात् ।
बोधे न शक्यते कर्तुं विवेको भोक्तृभोज्ययोः ॥१०१॥

(What is said in the preceding verse is so) because there is in the waking state an intermingling¹ of the *prāṇas*, (various) deities (of the organs) and Puruṣa (viz. the vital Prāṇa); it is not possible to make distinction (or, to distinguish) between the enjoyer (i.e. experiencer) and the objects enjoyed (or experienced). [101]

¹SP and NKL vividly clarify the idea of intermingling by citing the mixture of milk and water.

भोक्तृत्वमेव पुंसोऽस्ति भोज्यत्वं न मनागपि ।
काश्याभिप्रायतोऽनस्य भोज्यतैव न भोक्तृता ॥१०२॥

In the case of a man, there is the character only of an enjoyer (i.e. experiencer) and not at all the nature of what is enjoyed (i.e. experienced). And, in the opinion of Kāśya, the Prāṇa¹ has the nature of being enjoyed (i.e. experienced) alone and not the character of an enjoyer (i.e. experiencer).² [102]

¹*ana* is used for *prāṇa*.

²SP clarifies *bhoktr̥tva* as *sākṣitva* and *bhojyatva* as *sākṣya*.

संकीर्णत्वादशक्यः स्यात्प्रबोधे भोक्तृभोज्ययोः ।
कर्तुं विवेकोऽतो यातः सुप्तं पुरुषमादरात् ॥१०३॥

Owing to the intermingling of the two, viz. the enjoyer and the enjoyed, in the waking state (of an individual),¹ it is not possible to make any distinction between them (and), therefore, (Kāśya) approached the sleeping man respectfully.² [103]

¹This, i.e. *saṁkīrṇatva*, is used for emphasising the *sākṣitā-mātratva* of Prāṇa.

²That is, with proper care for achieving the desired end.

तस्माद्यद्यपि सांनिध्यं प्राणादीनां प्रजागरे ।
संकीर्णत्वान्मिथस्तेषां दुःशकं तद्विवेचनम् ॥१०४॥

Therefore, even though there is presence (lit. nearness, under view) of the *prāṇas* and others¹ in the state of waking, it is quite difficult to distinguish them (from *Prāṇa*) owing to their intermingling. [104]

This verse clarifies the idea of *spaṣṭatā* in verse 100 above and thus justifies Kāśya's approaching the sleeping man.

¹The deities of the various organs are meant.

आत्मनः प्रोषितत्वात्तु भोगोऽस्मै न प्रयुज्यते ।
उदासतेऽखिलाः सुप्ते देवताः करणैः सह ॥१०५॥
जाग्रद्भोगप्रयुक्तस्य कर्मणः प्रक्षयात्तदा ।
शेरते करणान्यस्य सह भोक्त्रात्मनात्मनि ॥१०६॥

And (*tu*) enjoyment (of objects) is not brought to it, since *Prāṇa* is in a state of separation (from the organs etc.); (for), in the state of sleep, all the deities together with their (respective) organs remain (wholly) inactive, [105]
(for), at that time, owing to the cessation (lit. loss) of any activity which is caused (or, employed) for enjoyment in the waking state, all the organs remain inactive;¹ though (they are) together with the enjoyer *Ātman* in (the so-far-unknown) *Ātman*.² [106]

This is said with a view to pointing out how in sleep state it is possible to distinguish between the *Ātman* and the deities, together with their respective organs, even though there is intermingling of them all (105). This is further reasoned out in verse 106.

¹That is, they have withdrawn from all activity.

²That is to say: they have not ceased to exist.

प्राण एकस्तु जागर्ति भोक्ता यो गार्ग्यसंमतः ।
प्राणेन रक्षन्निति च तथोदके प्रवक्ष्यते ॥१०७॥

The one alone (who is) awake is Prāṇa, the one accepted by Gārgya (also); so will this be said even later (in the words) *prāṇena rakṣan*.¹ [107]

¹Cf. *prāṇena rakṣann avaram kulāyam* in BU 4.3.12 which indicates how only Prāṇa remains active even in sleep. This is supported in the next verse by citing two Śrutis.

प्राणाग्नय इति स्पष्टं तथानस्तमितश्रुतेः ।
अश्रान्तः प्राण एवातो जागर्त्यत्र दिवानिशम् ॥१०८॥

(It is) clear in (the Śruti text) *prāṇāgnayaḥ*¹ ... and also from the (other) Śruti *anastamita* 'its not becoming inactive' (regarding Prāṇa) – thus only Prāṇa, who is not (at all) tired, remains here (in this body) awake, day and night. [108]

¹*prāṇāgnaya evaitasmin pure jāgrati* (Praśnopaniṣad 4.3).

²*na vyathate na riṣyati śaiṣānastamitā devatā yad vāyuh* (BU 1.5.22).

Verses 109-132 discuss how the vital force, i.e. Prāṇa, Hiranya-garbha, is non-Ātman.

यथा जाग्रदवस्थायां भोक्ता प्राणः पुराभवत् ।
स्वप्नेऽप्येष तथैवास्ते बोद्धा चेद्बुध्यतामयम् ॥१०९॥

As the enjoyer, Prāṇa has been there in the state of waking earlier, so is it, in the same way, there even in sleep state; (yes), if (as) the knower, then let it be knowing. [109]

This explains what is meant by 'Prāṇa is ever awake'.

प्राणस्येन्दोस्तथा चापां त्र्यन्तात्माविष्कृतौ यतः ।
ऐक्यमुक्तमतः प्राणो बोध्यते चन्द्रनामभिः ॥११०॥

Since, while revealing the nature of the triad of foods,¹ it has been pointed out that Prāṇa, the moon and the waters are (but) one in nature; therefore, is (here) Prāṇa addressed by the attributes (lit. names) of the moon. [110]

This explains why Prāṇa, though sentient, in sleep state is called by the names of another.

¹Here the reference is to BU 1.5.13: *athaitasya prāṇasyāpaḥ śarīraṃ jyotīrūpam asau candraḥ*.

बृहन्नित्येवमादीनि सन्तु चेहोपलक्षणम् ।
अनुक्तदेवतानाम्नां सामर्थ्यात्तद्ग्रहोऽथवा ॥१११॥

Or, let the attributes (lit. names) Br̥hat and others be considered here (i.e. in Kāśya's address) as indicative (of the other attributes/names also)—(that is to say:) Or, let there be the acceptance of the names of even (other) deities whose attributes (lit. names) are not stated; this, on account of the force (of oneness, i.e. *sāmarthya*).¹ [111]

An alternative understanding of the words is also acceptable here.

¹The reason for this is that Prāṇa is one with Sūtra, i.e. Hiranyagarbha.

यदि भोक्ता भवेत्प्राणो जाग्रद्वच्छब्दमागतम् ।
अश्रोष्यत्स न चेद्भोक्ता नाश्रोष्यदुपलादिवत् ॥११२॥

If Prāṇa were the enjoyer (i.e. experiencer), then it would have heard (even in sleep state) the word (i.e. various words of address) spoken unto it as in the state of waking; (as against this), if it were not the enjoyer (i.e. experiencer), it would not have as a stone etc.¹ heard (would not have heard). [112]

¹The word etc. implies a log of wood, a piece of some metal.

ननु सुप्तेऽपि पुंस्यस्मिन्बोधितः सन्स्वनामभिः ।
भोक्तैव भोत्स्यते शब्दं न त्वभोक्ता परो जडः ॥११३॥
नैवातोऽपि विवेकः स्यादुत्थितः कोऽनयोर्द्वयोः ॥११४॥

(A doubt is raised:) But, even if this sleeping man is addressed by his own attributes (lit. names), it is only the enjoyer (i.e. experiencer) who would hear (lit. enjoy or experience) the word and (*tu*) not the non-enjoyer (i.e. non-experiencer), (who is) other than that, i.e. the insentient. [113]

Indeed, for this (reason) also, there could be distinction made (between the Ātman and the non-Ātman); (for the question could be:) 'Which of these two is awakened?' [114]

This is to point out that making distinction between the enjoyer and the enjoyed is impossible even in sleep state, since only the enjoyer (Ātman) can experience the address. NKL puts it succinctly thus: *ātmā śabdopalabdhyā nānātmā ity etāvataṁ vivekāśiddhiḥ*.

This is pointed out in the next verse.

नैवं गार्गीयपक्षस्य विशेषावधृतेः सदा ।
अजातशत्रुवभिप्रेतब्रह्मणः प्राक्प्रमाणतः ॥११५॥

This is not so,¹ because there is ever held (or, determined) a (specific) distinction between what is held in Gārgya's opinion (lit. view, as the Brahman) and what is understood (or, accepted) as the Brahman² by Ajātaśatru, (as established) by the authoritative means (viz. the Śruti passages) already adduced.³ [115]

This is to answer away the doubt raised in verses 113 and 114 above.

¹That is, the doubt cannot be entertained.

²The Brahman in the view of Gārgya can be active only in the state of waking and inactive (or dormant) in sleep state, whereas the Brahman, as understood by Ajātaśatru, is ever active.

³This refers to passages meant in verse 108 above. Yet read SP: *gārgyeṣṭapraṇasya kāśyeṣṭātmanah sakāśād yo viśeṣaḥ sadā vyāpṛtatvaṁ tasya prabodhāt prāg api pramitatvāt prāṇotthāne śabdāśravaṇāyogāt pāṇipeṣānupapatteḥ sa na bhoktety arthaḥ.*

योऽनस्तमित एकोऽत्र वागाद्यस्तमयेऽमृतः ।
इन्द्रोऽसपत्नोऽब्देहश्च नामरूपसमावृतः ॥११६॥

That (Brahman in Ajātaśatru's view) is only that one who has not become inactive and who is active even when *vāc* and others have stopped to be active,¹ active (lit. alive, i.e. not dead), the one who is called Indra, having no enemy² and having a body in the (form of) waters³ and who is wrapped up by name and form.⁴ [116]

This justifies my translation of the preceding verse.

¹The language here is figurative: one who has not set down as against those who have set down.

²Cf. *sa indraḥ sa eṣo 'sapatnaḥ* (BU 1.5.12).

³Cf. *athaitasya prāṇasyāpaḥ śarīram* (BU 1.5.13).

⁴Cf. *nāmarūpābhyāṁ satyābhyāṁ prāṇas channo naivam ātmā satyasya satyam* as cited by SP. However, cf. BU 1.6.3: *nāmarūpe satyam, tābhyāṁ ayam prāṇas channaḥ*. (Also cp. BU 2.3.6) [so cited in the note of the editor of NKL].

अध्यात्माद्यखिलं विश्वं संव्याप्य समवस्थितः ।
ओतं प्रोतं जगद्यस्मिन्नरनाभिनिदर्शनात् ॥११७॥

(That Prāṇa) has remained after having pervaded the entire universe beginning with what rests in the (human) body (and) in this one is the world woven warp and woof (or, is the world pervaded) (as shown) by the illustration of the hub and the spokes (of a wheel).¹ [117]

This has a basis in BU 1.5.21-22 in particular. Also cf. BU 3.8.

¹The illustration is from BU 2.5.15. Cf. verse 137 note 1 below.

कुर्वाणस्तुमुलं शब्दं स्वव्यापारमशेषतः ।
कुर्वाण एव स्वप्नेऽपि प्राण आस्ते प्रबोधवत् ॥११८॥

Prāṇa keeps on producing (lit. making) a loud¹ sound) and also does the whole of its activity,² even in sleep, as in the waking state. [118]

¹SP points out that the word *tumula* 'loud' indicates that it is louder than that in the waking state.

²This is to bring out the peculiar character of Prāṇa, viz. its doing all of its activities; whereas the others (viz. organs and their deities) are inactive.

न च भोक्त्रन्तरं प्राणाद्गार्ग्येणेहाभ्युपेयते ।
तत्काले भिन्नकाले वा प्राणादन्यस्य भोज्यतः ॥११९॥

Again, here (i.e. in the sleep state) Gārgya does not accept any other enjoyer (than Prāṇa), since, at that time or at any other time, there is (i.e. can be) any enjoyable (i.e. worth experiencing) other than Prāṇa. [119]

तस्मादवश्यं बोद्धव्यं बोध्यं साक्षादुपस्थितम् ।
प्राणेन बोद्धरूपत्वाद्वाह्यं दग्धा यथा दहेत् ॥१२०॥

Therefore, it should be necessarily understood (or, known) by one that here (i.e. in sleep state) there is directly perceived in Prāṇa, the form of the perceiver, just like what burns (viz. fire) would burn (or, consume) what is to be burnt.¹ [120]

¹SP adds: *prāpte viṣaye śaktasya kāryakaratve drṣṭāntaḥ*.

न चासौ बोध्यमानोऽपि प्रत्यबुध्यत नाम तत् ।
प्राणोऽभोक्ता ततः सिद्धः स्वनामाप्रतिबोधनात् ॥१२१॥

And that the (sleeping man), even when addressed (by various names), did not become awake, therefore (lit. therefrom) is established the non-enjoyer Prāṇa,¹ on account of its not being awakened by its own attributes (i.e. names). [121]

¹SP carefully points out *abhokteti cchedaḥ* and invites attention to the reading *prāṇo 'bhoktā*.

स्वाख्याविशेषसंबन्धाग्रहणाच्चेन्न बुद्धवान् ।
अग्रहासंभवान्नैवं सर्वज्ञा देवता यतः ॥१२२॥

If it is held that he did not become awake because he did not grasp (its) connection with his own names, that is not so on account of the impossibility; since there the reason is that the deity is all-knowing. [122]

त्वत्पक्षेऽप्यग्रहो दोषस्तुल्यश्चेदिति चोद्यते ।
नैवं कृत्स्नाभिमानित्वादकदेशानहंकृतेः ॥१२३॥

(Also) if it is argued 'In your (i.e. the Siddhāntin's) view also, there is the same fault, viz. non-grasping (of Prāṇa's connection with the names)', that also is not tenable, because he has identified¹ himself with the whole body, viz. there is not (on his part) ego about (only) some one part of the body (which he is said to have assumed).² [123]

¹That is, he has entertained ego for the whole body.

²SP adds: *na tv abhoktrtvāt*.

अङ्गुल्याद्यभिधानोक्तौ न हि तद्वान्प्रबुध्यते ।
कृत्स्नदेहाभिमान्येवं नैकदेहाभिमानभुक् ॥१२४॥

As indeed, by the mention of the (different) name(s) of the

finger(s), a person who is possessed of the same is not awakened, so (also) a person who has identified oneself with the whole body¹ (does not wake up); (for) he does not identify (himself only) with some one part (of the body).² [124]

This is an illustration for supporting the argument in the preceding verse.

¹See note 1 under the preceding verse.

²SP and NKL add: *na tv anātmavāt*.

प्राणस्य तु समाप्तत्वात्समस्तव्यस्तवस्तुषु ।
नात्मवत्स्यादसंबोधस्तस्य सर्वाभिमानतः ॥१२५॥

As for Prāṇa, since it has pervaded the things in the universe jointly and singly, there cannot be on its part, non-waking; for, it has identified itself with all (the things in the universe).¹

[125]

¹SP and NKL point out the similarity of Prāṇa's pervading everything in the universe with 'cowness' pervading all cows.

बोधाबोधौ चित्तेर्न स्तः कटस्थज्ञप्तिमात्रतः ।
परायत्तप्रबोधो नाह्यप्पात्रौत्थाद्रवेरिव ॥१२६॥

Waking up and its absence cannot be (understood or accepted in the case) of sentience, owing merely to its nature of being immutable knowledge (or knowing). (But) a man¹ is indeed dependent on some other (person or thing) for his knowledge² in the same way as the reflection in the water-pot of the orb of the sun.

[126]

¹*nā* is in the sense of *amukhyātman*, i.e. *cidābhāsa* or *anātman*.

²Or, getting to know something which comes through the help of eye and other organs.

स्वसंज्ञयाप्यसंबोधो यथा दृष्टस्तदात्मनः ।

भोक्तृत्वे सत्यपि तथा प्राणेऽप्यप्रतिबोधनम् ॥१२७॥

As there is noticed non-waking of the Ātman, at the time of being called by its own name; so also in the case of Prāṇa, there is no waking (or, knowing) even though it has the nature of an enjoyer (or, experiencer). [127]

This is a reference to the individual self (Jīva) in relation to the organs.

सप्तासुप्तत्वसंभेदविशेषन्यायसंभवात् ।
नैव सुप्तग्रहो युक्तो न त्वसुप्तस्य युज्यते ॥१२८॥

Since there is possibly some reason¹ for distinguishing between the sleeping² and the non-sleeping³ who exist in union (*sambheda*),⁴ therefore the sleeping one does not grasp (the address) and (*tu*) that non-grasping is not reasonable in the case of the non-sleeping. [128]

¹This is for *nyāya*.

²This refers to Prāṇa.

³Reference here is to *prāṇas* and their deities.

⁴Both Prāṇa and the Puruṣa (possessed of a body) co-exist in a human body.

श्रोत्रादेर्गुणभूतत्वात्प्रधानं प्रति सर्वदा ।
तस्मिञ्जाग्रति जागर्ति सुप्ते स्वपिति तद्वशात् ॥१२९॥

Since the ear and others have¹ ever been subordinate to (i.e. dependent on) the principal (one),² they are awake (i.e. active) while that one is awake (active) and they sleep while that is asleep, owing to their dependence on it. [129]

This sets aside the idea that Prāṇa does not hear its own names owing to the inactivity of the organs and not because it is non-enjoyer.

¹Though the word *śrotrādi* is in the singular, I have used the plural to refer to various organs implied by the use of *ādi*.

²The word *pradhāna* here does not refer to the Pradhāna of the Sāṃkhyas, but it refers to the *mukhya* Ātman, only in an embodied state.

नेन्द्रियाणां भवेत्स्वापो यदि प्राणप्रधानता ।
नामात्याः शेरते यस्माद्वाज्ञि स्वामिनि जाग्रति ॥१३०॥

There would not be sleep possible in the case of the organs if they are having Prāṇa as their principal (i.e. governor or controller); this is because the subordinates (or, servants *amātyas*) do not sleep while their master is awake (i.e. is functioning). [130]

The thought here is: Since (or when) Prāṇa (i.e. Jīva) is the enjoyer, the organs cannot have withdrawn their functions while it is not asleep.

अप्रसिद्धार्थसंज्ञाभिरुक्तेष्वेदप्रबोधनम् ।
देवतात्मनिषेधार्थपरत्वात्तद्ग्रहोऽर्थवान् ॥१३१॥

(The opponent argues:) Since there has been the use of not well-known (i.e. unusual) names in that address, there is no wakening (of the sleeping one¹); (only) then the understanding of that (call) would be meaningful by the rejection of the nature of the deities. [131]

The intention of the opponent is to point out that the sleeping one cannot accept the call owing to the names which are unfamiliar/unusual; not because it is non-Ātman.

¹This refers to the non-Ātman, viz. the individual.

Now is explained *kevalasambodhana* ... in BUB 2.1.15 (p.254).

प्राणस्याभोक्तृतासिद्धिः स्वनामाग्रहणादपि ।

देवताप्रतिषेधार्थं बोध्यते चन्द्रनामभिः ॥१३२॥

That Prāṇa is non-enjoyer (or, non-experiencer) is established even by the non-utterance of what are not its attributes (lit. names), (for) it is addressed by the attributes (lit. names) of the moon, prohibiting (or, rejecting) thereby that it is a deity. [132]

NKL comments: *devatānāmabhiḥ iti siddhāntabhāgaṃ vibhajate.*

Verses 133-137 clarify the nature of the organs as non-Ātman.

स्मृतिज्ञानेषणादीनां संधानानुपपत्तिः ।
करणानामभोक्तृत्वं देहांशानामिवेष्यते ॥१३३॥

Since it is not reasonable to posit any relation (or, connection)¹ of memory, grasping and desire etc., it is accepted that the organs are, like (various) parts of a body, non-enjoyers (or, non-experiencers).² [133]

This is to set aside a possible notion that each of the organs could be the Ātman.

¹Namely, continuity of varied experience on their part.

²SP clarifies thus: *smṛtyādīnāṃ yo rūpam adrākṣaṃ sa śabdaṃ śṛṇomītyādipratisaṃdhānasya anupapatteḥ.*

अचैतन्यात्तथोक्तस्य कुतो भोक्तृत्वसंभवः ।
चिदन्यस्य च भोज्यत्वान्नान्यस्यातोऽस्ति भोक्तृता ॥१३४॥

How could there be the nature of the enjoyer (or, experiencer) of them, so described,¹ on account of their being insentient? And since (only) whatever is other than sentience is what is (or, can) be enjoyed, there is not the nature of the enjoyer in what is other (than sentience). [134]

¹This refers to the description of the organs taken singly or

jointly. The argument is well brought out by SP thus: *yathā samudāyaḥ samudāyibhyo bhedaḥbhedaḥbhyām (ayuktas tathā caitanyābhinnaṭvenoktasyācetanasya karaṇavargasya na bhoktrtā jadatvād ghaṭavad ity arthaḥ)*.

दण्डापिकनीत्यैव करणानामभोक्तृता ।
न च प्राणातिरेकेण देवतान्योपपद्यते ॥१३५॥

The nature of (all) the organs as non-enjoyers (i.e. non-experiencers) is (understood) in the manner of (understanding the nature of) the cakes tied on a pole.¹ And one cannot understand (or, accept) any deity other than Prāṇa,² beside it. [135]

¹SP gives this in brief, but clearly, thus: *daṇḍe 'pūpalagne grhyamāṇe balād apūpo 'pi grhyate tayā nityā*

²This refers to the individual self which is of the nature of Sūtra.

ननु तद्व्यतिरेकेण प्रागादित्यादिरीरितः ।
देवताविषयो भेदः स कथं विनिवार्यते ॥१३६॥

But, (it is said), the different deities,¹ viz. Āditya and others, are first (or, earlier) mentioned beside (lit. in addition to) that;² how can that be explained (away)? [136]

This stresses the opposition to Prāṇa (=Sūtra) as marked by the beginning of the story (*ākhyāyikā*).

¹Literally, variety or maniness in respect of deities.

²This refers to the individual self.

नैवं तस्य समस्तस्य प्राण एकत्वहेतुतः ।
अरनाभ्यादिदृष्टान्ताद्वायुप्राधान्यतस्तथा ॥१३७॥

(The answer to the question is:) This cannot be so (said or asked), since Prāṇa is the cause of bringing about the unity

of the many, (as is clear from the illustration of the spokes and the hub) etc.¹ and also from the vital breath's having principal importance.² [137]

¹The word etc. implies *eṣa u hy eva sarve devāḥ* and *katama eko devaḥ* The illustration occurs in BU 2.5.15.

²Cf. CU 4.3.1: *vāyur vāva saṁvargaḥ*.

Now, there is in verses 138-157 argument about the gross body as non-Ātman.

संघात एव भोक्तास्तु तस्य प्रत्यक्षसंगतेः ।
न तु तद्व्यतिरिक्तस्य भोक्तृता मित्यसंभवात् ॥१३८॥

(There is an argument of the opponent:) Let the conglomeration (of the elements)¹ be the enjoyer (i.e. experiencer), for it is in accordance with direct perception.² And, thus, there cannot be the nature of any one/thing beside that as the enjoyer (i.e. experiencer), since there is no means of proving it. [138]

¹SP and NKL point to *bhūtacatuṣṭayasamāhāra* as the gross body (i.e. *saṁghāta* 'conglomeration').

²See, for example, the direct awareness, i.e. experience, of a person as 'I am fair' (SP) or 'I am a human being' (NKL).

नाचेतनस्य भोक्तृत्वं कथंचिदवकल्पते ।
चिदन्यस्य च भोग्यत्वात्कम्बलौदनतोयवत् ॥१३९॥

(The answer to the argument is:) This is not so, because the nature of an enjoyer (i.e. experiencer) cannot somehow¹ be attributed to (lit. posited of) a non-sentient (thing) somehow,¹ since whatever is other than sentience is (merely) of the nature of what is to be enjoyed (i.e. experienced) in the same way as a blanket, cooked rice and water etc. [139]

¹It means: without reason, purely out of imagination. NKL brings out the import of this thus: *cidviśiṣṭaḥ kāyo bhokteti tad-abhyupagamaḥ* (clarified by the editor as *dehātmavādinō 'bhyupagamaḥ*), *tatra mānaṃ ca pratyakṣam eveṣṭam* (clarified by the editor thus: *pratyakṣātiriktapramāṇānānigīkārāt iti bodh-yam*).

न चापि चिद्विशिष्टत्वं प्रत्यक्षेणोपलभ्यते ।

चित्संबन्धोपलब्ध्यर्थं तज्ज्ञाता कः प्रकल्प्यते ॥१४०॥

And, further, the nature (of that conglomeration) as (what is) characterized (lit. qualified) by sentience cannot be grasped (i.e. perceived) directly; as such, who could be (imagined/postulated) as the knower of grasping its relation to sentience?

[140]

The argument is: The opponent holds the gross body characterized by sentience as the experiencer; but it is already pointed out that direct perception of a non-sentient conglomeration is impossible and no other means of perceiving that is available! SP is clearer (than NKL) on this point. Thus it states: *cidviśiṣṭasya meyatve 'pi jñātā deho 'nyo vā nādyā ekasya jñātrjñeyatvāyogān netaro jñātrantarasya te (= ākṣepakasya) ani-ṣṭeḥ*.

नेह चिद्व्यतिरेकेण स्वार्थं किञ्चिदपीष्यते ।

नापि स्वार्थातिरेकेण प्रमाणफलभागभवेत् ॥१४१॥

Here¹ is not accepted anything else than sentience as its (desired) object;¹ nor also does (sentience) come to enjoy the result of any means of knowing which is other than (lit. beside) itself.³

[141]

¹That is 'in this world and in the scriptures' as SP clarifies.

²Or, its own end, i.e. aimed thing.

³This is another meaning of *svārtha*.

न ह्यचित्कं प्रमेयं सच्चिन्मिदं चिदपीक्ष्यते ।
न चानुभूतिः प्रात्यक्ष्यमन्यतोऽपेक्षते जडात् ॥१४२॥

It is not accepted that a non-sentient, being itself an object of knowing, is knower of sentience (or, the sentient).¹ Nor again does any experience (i.e. knowledge)² expect direct perception by some other (who is) non-sentient.³ [142]

¹This argument proceeds from the non-existence of another sentient knower.

²Experience is *jñāna* which is here accepted in the sense of the experiencer (*jñātr*).

³Or alternatively, by someone other than a non-sentient. Cf. SP: *jadād ajadād iti vā chedaḥ*; thus it reads alternatively ... *pekṣate 'jadāt*.

देहात्प्रात्यक्षनिष्पत्तौ न च प्रात्यक्षमिष्यते ।
लिङ्गस्य चाप्रमाणत्वात्कुतः प्रात्यक्षमानिता ॥१४३॥

Also, direct perception¹ is not accepted (lit. desired) in securing the direct perception of it² by³ the body and (*ca*), since *liṅga* 'characteristic (mark)' is not (in this respect) a means of knowing;⁴ how can the body be the direct perceiver? [143]

The argument is based on the opponent's holding *deha-viśiṣṭātman* as Reality.

¹This *pratyakṣa* refers to the means.

²This is *pratyakṣa jñāna*, of sentient, viz. the result, for the opponent holds the body as identical with the Ātman (*dehātmavāda*).

³*dehāt* is *hetau pañcamī*, i.e. *dehadvārā*.

⁴This, i.e. *liṅgasya apramāṇatva*, is owing to the impossibility of any characteristic mark by which the *dehātmavādin* can find any *liṅga* as the means of knowing the *dehātman*.

तथार्थान्तरसंबन्धे प्रत्यक्षे देहनिष्ठिते ।
अनुसंधानसंसिद्धौ न किञ्चिन्मानमिष्यते ॥१४४॥

And, further,¹ in relation to the direct perception of the body, there is not (i.e. cannot be) accepted any means of knowing for ascertaining its connection with (any other object necessary) towards a recollection (*anusandhāna*) of it. [144]

¹In place of *tathārthāntara* ... NKL reads *yathārthāntara* ... the purport of that reading cannot be pointed out significantly.

वागभिव्याहृतिश्चेयं लिङ्गाप्रामाण्यवादिनः ।
अप्रत्यक्षात्परज्ञप्तिसंगतेः स्यादनर्थिका ॥१४५॥

Furthermore, for the advocate of the non-authoritativeness of the characteristic mark, this statement would be meaningless on account of the impossibility of (its) association with any other (thing) owing to the absence of direct perception (of it).¹ [145]

¹Translation accepts NKL reading *apratyakṣāt* instead of AnSS edition *āpratyakṣyāt*.

स्वात्मदृष्ट्यनुरोधेऽपि मौढ्यमेव प्रसज्यते ।
व्युत्पत्तेः साधुलोकस्य न कश्चिदपि दित्सति ॥१४६॥

Even if one's¹ own theory is followed, there would follow foolishness only as contingent. None among the good people would give (to this view any credit) of wisdom (as of any specific information). [146]

¹NKL specifically mentions the name of Cārvāka.

अधर्मादिभयाभावाद्धन्युरेनमशङ्किताः ।
आदद्युश्च बलाद्वित्तमेतद्व्युत्पत्तितः फलम् ॥१४७॥

And this would be the result of (such) knowledge, viz. they¹ (the followers of this view), would kill this one (viz. the wise one)² being free from any fear and since there is no danger of any irreligious behaviour etc., they would perforce snatch away (this one's) wealth. [147]

¹SP points out the over-bearing nature of the follower of Cārvāka: *unmattapakṣe nikṣiptaḥ san* and then remarks that they are worth ignoring (*upeksyaḥ*).

²That is, the one mentioned in the preceding verse.

आपेक्षणे विशेषस्य दृष्टत्वाद्देहसंहतिः ।
न भोक्त्री सुखदुःखादिफलानां स्यात्कदाचन ॥१४८॥

(And) since there is seen a particular person¹ (as related to) the action of shaking (by hand), the conglomeration (of the four elements) in the form of a body would never be the enjoyer (i.e. experiencer) of the results, viz. happiness, sorrow and others.² [148]

This is one more reason for holding the body as non-Ātman.

¹The touch of only one particular body is meant.

²SP explains: *ādipadam tadavāntarabhedasamgrahārtham*, signifying other experiences.

यदि संघातमात्रस्य भोक्तृत्वमिह कल्प्यते ।
संघातस्याविशिष्टत्वान्नातिशीतिर्भवेत्सदा ॥१४९॥

If it is accepted here (i.e. in respect of the object to be enjoyed/experienced) that the nature of an enjoyer/experiencer is only a conglomeration (of four elements); then, that conglomeration being unspecified, there would not ever be a special mention (of any particular body). [149]

These statements are made by way of the Vyatireka form of argument.

ईषत्संपृष्टमात्रस्य बलाच्चापेषणात्तथा ।
 देहादिभिन्नजातीयो भोक्ता यस्य च वादिनः ॥१५०॥
 धर्मादिहेतुसंबन्धबहुत्वात्स्यात्समञ्जसम् ।
 पेषणापेषणकृतवेदनायां भवेद्विदा ॥१५१॥

So also, (there would not be a special mention of any particular body), caused by just a gentle (lit. little of a) touch or vigorous shaking by a hand. But (or, as against this (*ca*)), in the case of one who holds (lit. speaks) that the enjoyer (or, experiencer) is of a nature different from (that of) a body etc.,¹ [150] (the specification arising from different ways of touch) would be understandable (i.e. reasonable) owing to the variety (lit. maniness) of the cause(s) such as merit (*dharma*) etc.,² (for) there would be difference(s) in respect of the feelings³ caused by his being shaken by a hand or non-shaking (thereby). [151]

¹What this 'etc.' means is not clear; but 'SP' states there is *avāntarabheda-saṃgraha*.

²The word etc. here refers to *adharma* and *vāsanā*.

³This is clarified in the following verse.

सुखदुःखादिहेतूनामुत्तमाधममध्यतः ।
 तत्प्रबोधविशेषोऽयं युक्त एव भवेत्तदा ॥१५२॥

Only then would it be reasonable that this particular (type)¹ of the (resulting) waking of that (person)² owing to the (causes of) pleasure, sorrow (i.e. feeling of some trouble) etc.³ which may be of the highest, the lowest and the ordinary⁴ types. [152]

¹This explains *bhidā* in the preceding verse.

²Reference is to the *Jīvātman*, in the view expressed from verse 150b onwards.

³This is related to *dharmādharmādi* in the preceding verse. The word etc. refers to the different articulations or the loud

or gentle calls in the address which accompany the shaking by a hand.

⁴*madhya* is for *madhyama*.

अस्ति चायं विशेषोऽत्र यत्संस्पर्शनमात्रतः ।
अबुध्यमानः संसुप्त आपिष्यापिष्य बोधितः ॥१५३॥

Furthermore, this is the (specific) difference here (i.e. in this view): the sleeping one, who did not become awake by mere (or gentle) touch, was awakened after (Ajātaśatru) had shaken him again and again (by his hand). [153]

अत आपेषणाद्योऽसावुत्थितः करणैः सह ।
राजेव सचिवैः सार्धं स भोक्तेहेति गम्यताम् ॥१५४॥

Therefore that one, who, together with the organs, became awake is to be understood, like a king by his servants, as the enjoyer (or, experiencer) here.¹ [154]

¹That is, in this body (SP).

मृतकल्पमिमं देहं स्वचित्तावेशयन्निव ।
ज्वलन्निव समुत्तस्थौ यः स भोक्तेति गम्यताम् ॥१५५॥

That one, who rose up, like a burning fire flashing forth,¹ putting his own sentience² into the almost dead body,³ as it were, should be understood as the enjoyer (or, experiencer). [155]

This explains *jvallann iva sphurann iva kutaś cid āgata iva* in BUB.

¹*svacittāveśayan* is to be split as *svacittā* (i.e. *cit-tā*)-*aveśayan* Yet read *Vārtikasāra* 2.1.37: ... *svacitaavezayann iva* which is better. translation is in agreement with it.

²Or, the dead-looking body.

³Cf. *na hi jvalanam agner iva cid ātmano 'sti kiṃ tu tathā*

sphuraṇaṃ grhītvā jvalann ivety uktam (SP).

क्रोधहर्षभयोद्वेगज्ञानधर्मैर्विशेषयन् ।

शरीरं यः समुत्तस्थौ स भोक्तेत्यवसीयताम् ॥१५६॥

That one is to be understood as the enjoyer (or, experiencer) who rose up modifying the (dead-looking)¹ body with the properties, viz. anger, joy, fear, dejection and *jñāna*. [156]

This explains *piṇḍaṃ ca pūrvaviparītaṃ bodhaceṣṭākāraviśeṣā-dimattvenāpādayan* in BUB (p.256).

¹Cf. the word *mṛtakalpanam* in the preceding verse.

Now follows in verses 157-62 another explanation as to why *Prāṇa* (viz. the vital force) is non-*Ātman*.

अपि प्राणस्य पारार्थ्यं संहतत्वाद्गृहादिवत् ।

ततश्च भोग्यरूपस्य भोक्तृत्वं नोपपद्यते ॥१५७॥

Also, since, in the case of *Prāṇa* (viz. *Sūtra/Hiraṇyagarbha*), there is subservience to someone else, as is in the case of a house etc., on account of its being a conglomeration (*saṃgraha*) and, being as a result (*tataś ca*), of the nature of what is to be enjoyed (or, experienced), it is not reasonable to hold its being the enjoyer (or, experiencer). [157]

देहस्यान्तर्गतः प्राणः स्थूणावद्देहभृत्सदा ।

संहन्यते शरीरेण यथा वायुस्तथैव सः ॥१५८॥

Prāṇa 'the vital force', being fixed inside a body, just like some pillar (in a house), is ever possessed of a body; it is fixed just like the wind¹ that is bound to a body. [158]

¹SP points out that this wind is the breath or *mukhya Prāṇa*.

यत एवमतः प्राणो गृहादिवदिहेष्यते ।

देहाच्च देहधर्मेभ्यो विधर्मात्मावभुक्ततः ॥१५९॥

Since this is so, therefore, Prāṇa 'the vital force' is understood here (i.e. in the body) like a house (viz. a conglomeration subservient to someone else); therefore, it is, in respect of properties, different from a body and the properties of that body and therefore a non-enjoyer (or, non-experiencer).¹ [159]

¹See SP: *saṁhatatvahalaparāmarśī*.

स्वात्मांशान्सिसजातीयविविक्तफलसद्भवत् ।
 संहतत्वात्तथा प्राणोऽसंहतात्मोपभोगकृत् ॥१६०॥
 स्वजन्मोपचयग्लानिनाशाख्याकृतिजन्मदिग्- ।
 धर्मानपेक्षसंलब्धसत्त्वादस्वार्थरूपकः ॥१६१॥
 तद्गोचरैकसंद्रष्टृविज्ञात्रर्थं समीक्ष्य हि ।
 प्राणस्य तद्गुणानां च तथार्थत्वं प्रतीयताम् ॥१६२॥

So also, being bound (in a body), Prāṇa 'the vital force' is of help to (or, of use for) the (ever) bound Ātman,¹ just like a house which is a result (lit. fruit) distinct from those that are its likes (or similar ones) which are its own parts² or any (other) house(s) having similar parts.³ [160]
 Indeed, on seeing that it⁴ is (useful) only for the seer and the knower (of its objects), the one who comes to manifest itself and to have its own form without depending on the birth, growth, decay, death, name and the form, together with the space (lit. direction) of its rise,⁵ [161-162ab]
 let it be understood that Prāṇa 'the vital force' and its properties have a similar purpose.⁶ [162cd]

We have ignored the NKL edition which reads *svajanma ... nāśākhyākṛti dṛgjanma dharmāna ... rūpaka ... tadgocaraika ... trartham* as one word, since it is metrically faulty. Yet, *janma* which is repeated in the first line of verse 161 offers some difficulty, and which I have somehow solved! Therefore, it appears that the text given does not stop as ... *rūpakah* in 161d.

¹The Ātman is not combined with the body; it is taken as bound to it through ignorance.

²This refers to the pillars and such other parts of that house which, being combined together with it, are subservient/useful to it (*svātmāmśa*).

³Some similar (*sajātīya*) houses made of these (i.e. similar) parts (*aṁśas*).

⁴The idea of the house (*aṁśin*) persists here also.

⁵Literally, the birth and the space of the Ātman. Or does it refer to the properties of the house (*aṁśin*)?

⁶*tathārthatva* is *parārthatva*.

It is to be noted how, by this single word, Sureśvara conveys the similarity of a house etc. with Prāṇa and its accompanying properties (*dharma*s) which is brought out in BUB, in its fullness.

Read NKL: *prāṇataddharmāṇāṁ ca tathātvam anumeyam ity arthaḥ*.

In verses 163-174, there is now a discussion on the nature of the Ātman in respect of which some division (into parts) is (only) imagined.

ननु वेदान्तसिद्धान्ते न वस्त्वन्तरमिष्यते ।

सांख्यराद्धान्तवर्तिकचित्प्रत्यगात्मैकवस्तुनः ॥१६३॥

(An objection is raised:) But, in the Vedānta doctrine, they do not accept (i.e. hold as existing) anything other than only the single inner self, as in the Sāṃkhya doctrine.¹ [163]

The objection proceeds from the basic impossibility of Anvaya and Vyatireka method of inference. For this method, see our book [Vol.1:1982] Introduction.

¹The Sāṃkhyas accept many Puruṣas, i.e. as many inner selves are there as there are bodies and, therefore, Anvaya and Vyatireka method of argument is possible for them.

Incidentally, a fastidious person might point to the word *rāddhānta* as indicative of the rejected view! See Belvalkar's

Note on BSB 2.2.17 (*The Brahma-Sūtras of Bādarāyaṇa with the Comment of Śaṅkarāchārya Chapter II, Quarters I & II* third edition, p.114, Poona: Bilvakuṇja Publishing House, 1938). But this is hardly meant.

ऐकात्म्याविद्यया सर्वं प्रतीचि परिकल्पितम् ।
प्राणाद्यनात्मजातं यद्रूपं नाम च कर्म च ॥१६४॥

(The objector says further:) It is owing to the ignorance about the singleness of the Ātman that all is imagined (to be existing) in the case of the inner self—all, viz. *prāṇas* etc. which is the entire collection of the non-Ātman, viz. what are called a form, a name and (any) activity. [164]

This averts the notion of *prāṇa* and other things as existing beside the Ātman.

कल्पिताकल्पितं सर्वं यदात्मैवाभ्युपेयते ।
अन्वयव्यतिरेकोक्तिस्तदैक्यान्नेह युज्यते ॥१६५॥

Since all, viz. whatever is imagined and whatever, not imagined, is accepted to be just the Ātman; therefore, owing to this singleness of the Ātman, there cannot be (made) any reasonable statement (on the basis) of Anvaya and Vyatireka. [165]

This re-assertion by the objector aims at pointing to the imaginary nature of non-Ātman conceived as existing in the inner self. The thrust of this argument is noticed in the following verse. Also, see verses 171ff. for discussion on this point again.

नान्वयो व्यतिरेको वा कल्पितस्यानृतत्वतः ।
अकल्पितस्य चैकत्वान्नितरां न प्रसिध्यति ॥१६६॥

Since the (thing) imagined is false (or, unreal), therefore, there cannot be (any statement made about it, basing it on) Anvaya and Vyatireka. And,¹ the non-imagined (viz. the real, i.e. the

sthānam.

ऐकात्म्यसिद्धौ दोषः स्यात्तत्सिद्धिश्च न वास्तवी ।
 प्रामाणिकी हि तत्सिद्धिरतो नासौ विरुध्यते ॥१७१॥
 न चापि मानव्यापारव्यपेक्षैकात्म्यनिश्चितौ ।
 तत्फलस्य समाप्तत्वादपेक्षा निष्फला यतः ॥१७२॥

(If it is argued:) 'The singleness of the Ātman being taken as established,¹ there will follow the fault (viz. impossibility of the method of Anvaya and Vyatireka),'² (the answer is:) 'No, (that is not so), its establishing (thereby) is not real; (for) that establishing (of it) is depending on the means of knowing³ and, therefore, it is not opposed. [171]

Furthermore, there is no need whatever of the function of any means of knowing⁴ with respect to deciding the singleness of the Ātman, since any expectancy about it⁵ is useless (lit. unproductive), for its result is already obtained.⁶ [172]

The argument in verse 165 is the basis of the argument here. In these two verses, it is taken that the singleness of the Ātman is known.

¹This refers to *svaprakāśatva* of the Ātman, i.e. its singleness.

²If singleness is already established, there is no usefulness of the method of Anvaya and Vyatireka.

³This refers to understanding the sentences of the Śruti, i.e. their verbal level can be taken as *pramāṇagocara* and, therefore, Avidyā.

⁴The *pramāṇavyavahāra* is understood as *mithyā* 'false'.

⁵This refers to any *pramāṇa*.

⁶That is, self-established.

यावत्त्वागमतः साक्षात् वेत्त्यात्मानमद्वयम् ।
 अन्वयाद्यात्मबोधार्थं तावत्तत्केन वार्यते ॥१७३॥

But, so long as one does not directly know (i.e. learn) from the Śruti (the nature of) the Ātman as without any duality,

who would set aside for that while Anvaya etc. (is available) for getting to know (the nature of) the Ātman? [173]

This verse grants the use of the method of Anvaya and Vyatireka, if, i.e. while, the singleness of the Ātman is not known.

अज्ञानं च तदुत्थं च ह्यात्मैवाज्ञाततत्त्वकः ।
तत्तत्त्वबोधात्तद्बाधः सर्परज्ज्वादिबाधवत् ॥१७४॥

Ignorance and what arises from it are but (i.e. nothing else than) the Ātman alone, its nature remaining (for that while) unknown; therefore, by the knowing the nature of it (viz. the Ātman), there follows the stultification (i.e. removal) of that,¹ just like the stultification of a serpent (etc.) by (knowing the nature of) a rope etc.² [174]

¹This refers to 'Ignorance and what arises from it'.

²The word etc. refers to the other things that are taken wrongly through superimposition on them of the nature of others.

Here also, Sureśvara uses *ādi* only after *rajju*, implying it also after *sarpa*.

क्लृप्तानामपि रज्ज्वादौ कल्पितान्तरसंश्रयात् ।
क्लृप्तान्तरापनुत्तिः स्याद्यथा तद्वदिहात्मनि ॥१७५॥

Further, as there is (lit. would be) removal of the other things which are imagined in the place of a rope etc. among (objects that are) imagined, in the same way, (there is removal of what is imagined) in the Ātman. [175]

The verse proceeds from the argument that all *pramāṇa-vyavahāra* being false, the result, viz. knowing thereby the nature of the Ātman from the Śāstras, is also false.

प्रत्यङ्मानैकमेयोऽतो भोक्ता भोग्यं ततोऽपरम् ।
भोग्यानां व्यभिचारेऽपि भोक्तैकोऽव्यभिचारवान् ॥१७६॥

Therefore, the enjoyer (or, experiencer) alone is the one inferred from the experiencer of the inner self and the enjoyed (or, experienced) is different from (lit. other than) that. (And) even in variation (*vyabhicāra*) of the objects that are enjoyed (or, experienced) is (the Ātman) alone invariably (to be understood). [176]

This concludes the discussion of 'individual self' and others, being perceived (*drśyamāna*), are only false (or imagined).

Now follows in verses 177-182 the explanation of the BU sentence: *tam pāṇināpeṣam bodhayamcakāra*.

बृहन्नित्यादिभिः प्राणो बोध्यमानोऽपि यत्नतः ।
 नैवान्वबुध्यत यदा चक्रे यत्नान्तरं तदा ॥१७७॥
 पाणिनापिष्य बहुशः सुप्तं काश्योऽप्यबोधयत् ।
 आपेषोद्धृतसंक्षोभस्ततोऽसौ प्रत्यबुध्यत ॥१७८॥

When Prāṇa (the vital force in the body of the sleeping man), though addressed again and again (*yatnataḥ*) by (the names/attributes) Brhat and others, did not become awake, then (Kāśya) made another effort. [177]

Having many times shaken the sleeping (man) by his hand, Kāśya (finally) awakened him and then, being disturbed by the shaking, he (also) became awake. [178]

कारणानामिदं वृत्तं यन्निमित्तान्तराश्रयात् ।
 स्वात्मकार्यसमुद्भूतिरम्बरादभ्रभूतिवत् ॥१७९॥

This is the happening in the case of causes that there followed (lit. arose) the effect of their own operation in the same way as there is the rise (or, movement) of clouds in the sky. [179]

The argument is: The sky does not function in any way, yet there is rise or movement of the clouds in the sky, thanks to

the winds blowing in various directions. So also, the shaking of the limbs caused the waking of Prāṇa 'the vital force' in the body—but not the Ātman that is ever awake (and is thus free from any effect of the shaking). This is clarified in the following verse.

आपेषाल्लीनबुद्ध्यादिसमुत्पत्तौ परात्मनः ।
घटाकाशवदुत्पत्तिर्नाञ्जसैव सदा दृशेः ॥१८०॥

The waking of the highest Ātman consequent upon the rise of (i.e. being active/operative of) intellect and others, which had merged (in sleep), by the shaking (by Kāśya's hand), is not acceptable (or, reasonable), even like the origin of sky in a pitcher, because (that highest Ātman) is ever the seer (i.e. always awake). [180]

The argument is: In the creation of a pitcher, there is consequently a supposed (i.e. false) creation of 'sky in a pitcher'. So also, the waking up of intellect and other organs is assumed to be the waking of sentience in the sleeping man.

तस्मादप्रतिबोधेन प्राणोऽभोक्तेति गम्यताम् ।
पुंसस्तु प्रतिबोधेन भोक्तृतैवावसीयते ॥१८१॥

Therefore, from this non-waking, let it be understood that the vital force (within) is the non-enjoyer (or, non-experiencer). Its being the enjoyer (or, experiencer) is concluded by the man's waking. [181]

This explains the BU sentence: *tau ha puruṣaṁ suptam*

The conclusion that the vital force within the earlier sleeping man is the enjoyer (or, experiencer) is reached through the force of only verbal argument. This becomes clear from the following verse.

अदाहवगनां दग्धृत्वं यथा दाहकसंगतेः ।

भोक्तृसंयोगतस्तद्वद्वोक्तृत्वं देवतात्मनः ॥१८२॥

As the nature of a burner (or, what burns) is attributed to a non-burner (also), on account of its association (i.e. being together with) what (really) burns; so also, the nature of an enjoyer (or, experiencer) is attributed to the vital force, which is of the nature of a deity, on account of its association (lit. conjunction) with a (real) enjoyer (or, experiencer). [182]

Now follows in verses 183-207 the explanation of BU 2.1.16 (and allied matter).

देहेन्द्रियमनोधीभ्यो विविच्यात्मानमेकलम् ।
भोक्तारं दर्शयित्वाथ राजा गार्ग्यमपृच्छत ॥१८३॥
आपेषणेन ब्रुबुधे यः प्राणादिविलक्षणः ।
क्वामूदयं पुरा बोधात्कुतश्चागतवान्पुमान् ॥१८४॥

Having thus understood the Ātman, who is single, as different from the body, its organs, *manas* and intellect, and shown it to be the enjoyer (or, experiencer), the king then asked Gārgya: [183]

Where was this one before waking up, (the one) who has a nature different from that of Prāṇa 'individual self' and others and was awakened by (Kāśya's) shaking him by his hand and where has this Puruṣa come from? [184]

अन्तःकरणसंबन्धे विज्ञानमिति कर्तरि ।
प्रत्ययः करणार्थः स्यात्क्रियायां भावसाधनः ॥१८५॥
प्रमेयार्थविवक्षायां शब्दः स्यात्कर्मसाधनः ।
यथोक्तानामसद्भावात्प्रायार्थः प्रत्यगात्मनि ॥१८६॥

In relation to the internal organ, the word *vijñāna* is expressive of the agent;¹ the (same) suffix is expressive of the means (or, instrument)² if it would be expressive of the action (proper), being a conveyer of process,³ [185]
(and) that (same) word is a conveyer of the object (of action),

when the intention would be to convey (the meaning of) the object to be known.⁴ Of these many meanings which are thus stated, the meaning is, according to our intent (or, interpretation), that which is '(mostly) consisting in'⁵ the inner self.

[186]

In these two verses, Sureśvara resorts to grammatical erudition and explains the meaning of *vijñāna*, as he accepts it. He has done this, keeping in view the opinion of Bhartṛprapañca (conveyed in BSB in the word *kecit*, and as annotated by the editor of NKL: *bhartṛprapañcamatanirāsārtham*) that by the word *vijñāna* is meant the inner self as the product of the Brahman—read NKL: *vijñānamayaḥ ity atra vijñānapadena brahmābhīdhānāt tadvikāratvaṃ jīvasyocyate*. Sureśvara's opinion is clarified by both SP and NKL (which almost fully concurs with SP) and, therefore, read SP: *pratīci kūṭasthe yathokta-karṭṛtvādyabhāvād atrāsyā karṭṛvyutpattyāntaḥkaraṇaviṣayatvāt pratīcas tadavikāratvāt prāyārtho mayat ity āha*.

¹ Cf. Pāṇini Sūtra 3.3.113: *kṛtyalyuṭo bahulam*.

² Cf. Pāṇini Sūtra 3.3.117: *karāṇe lyuṭ*.

³ Cf. Pāṇini Sūtra 3.3.115: *bhāve lyuṭ*.

⁴ Cf. Pāṇini Sūtra 3.3.116: *karmaṇi lyuṭ*.

⁵ Cf. Pāṇini Sūtra 5.4.21: *prāyārthe mayat* (according to *Kāśikā*).

स्वाभासवदविद्योत्थबुद्ध्यादिव्याप्तिविभ्रमात् ।

तदात्मत्वाभिमानित्वाद्विज्ञानमयतात्मनः ॥१८७॥

The Ātman is taken to be *vijñānamaya* 'mostly consisting in' the internal organ (viz. intellect) owing to the error of its (supposed) pervasion by intellect which has arisen from ignorance that is (merely) its (viz. the Ātman's) semblance and also because it identifies itself with it.

[187]

This verse explains why the Ātman, the *kṣetrājña*, is *antaḥkaraṇaprāya*.

साक्षित्वेनोपलभ्यत्वात्साक्ष्यबद्ध्यादिसंश्रयात् ।
अकारकफलत्वेन तेन प्रायार्थतेष्यते ॥१८८॥

(Or alternatively/in addition) because it is noticed as of the nature of the witness¹ and has a resort in intellect and others,² which are to be witnessed, and because it is not of the nature of a result of any agent;³ therefore, it is understood as a thing mostly consisting in (intellect). [188]

¹This is because it is not a modification (*vikāra*).

²*manas*, *ahamkāra* and other organs are meant.

³Because it is not a *kriyā* etc. (Is it *prāpti* 'reaching (something)' or *saṃskāra* 'polishing'?)

यतो विज्ञानमानी सन्सर्वं वस्त्ववगच्छति ।
विज्ञानमयता तस्मात्प्रतीचोऽबोधकारणात् ॥१८९॥

Since, identifying itself with intellect, it grasps all things (as existing outside); therefore, the inner self is taken as mostly consisting in intellect, there being absence of the knowledge (of its own true nature) on the part of it. [189]

This is to answer a possible doubt: 'How could the all-knowing be a witness depending upon intellect and others?

विज्ञानेन विशिष्टं वा यस्मान्मेयं प्रपद्यते ।
प्रायार्थत्वं प्रतीचोऽतस्तदभिन्नग्रहाद्वेत् ॥१९०॥

Or, since it comes to know the object of knowing which is specified by *vijñāna* 'intellect', therefore, the inner self becomes a thing 'mostly consisting in' (it), viz. that is taken as non-distinct from (it). [190]

विज्ञानमय इत्युक्त्वा पृथिव्यादिमयोक्ततः ।
षड्विकारनिषेधाच्च प्रायार्थत्वं समञ्जसम् ॥१९१॥

The nature of the inner self as 'mostly consisting in' (intellect) is reasonable (by the Śruti's) having said (that the inner self) is 'mostly consisting in' *vijñāna* 'intellect', and by (first) calling (the same) as 'mostly consisting in' earth etc. and thereafter by rejecting the six (known) modifications (of the same).¹

[191]

¹This is on the basis of SP.

अनात्मनो यतोऽशेषान्कल्पितत्वादकल्पितः ।
पूरयन्पुरुषः प्रत्यक्सर्पादीन्नशना यथा ॥१९२॥

The inner self is (called) *Puruṣa*, since, itself unimagined it (is ever) creating (lit. filling this world with) all the non-Ātmans (which are so called) on account of their being imaginary (even) as a girdle (that is real, creates) a serpent etc.¹ [192]

This is Sureśvara's etymology of the word *Puruṣa* for the inner self, viz. it is from verb root *pṛ* 'to fill'—it is offered in the Brāhmaṇical style.

¹The use of 'etc.' is really unintended; yet see verse 174 above for similar mode of writing.

व्युत्पत्तिरियमेवात्र तात्पर्यस्य समीक्षणात् ।
स वा इति ह्युपक्रम्य नैनेनेत्यादिनिर्णयात् ॥१९३॥

It is reasonable to accept only this derivation in view of the purport (of the BU passage), for it has first begun with (the words) *sa vā* and then finally concluded in (the words) *nainena*¹

[193]

Sureśvara states the reason for offering his own etymology of the word *puruṣa* in preference to BUB's *puri śayanāt* SP states the following in this regard: *pūrṇatvāt puruṣa ity eṣaiva vyutpattir atra grāhyā pratyakpūrṇatve vākyatātparyadrṣṭer ity arthah.*

¹This refers to BU 2.5.18: *sa vā ayam puruṣaḥ sarvāsu pūrṣu puriśayo nainena kiñcanānāvṛtaṃ nainena kiñcanāsamvṛtaṃ*.

It appears that Sureśvara is ignoring here the word *puriśaya* which BSB maintains! (Also cf. BUBV 2.5.120 on BU 2.5.18.)

इयं तावत्पदार्थोक्तिः संबन्धोक्तिरथाधुना ।
प्रश्नस्य क्वैष इत्यादेः किमर्थोऽयमुपक्रमः ॥१९४॥

This then (*tāvat*) is the statement of the meanings of the (different) words;¹ now is a statement (made) about the relation (of them to what follows); as such, there is a question: 'What is the purpose of this introductory, viz. of the question, "where (was) this ...?"'. [194]

¹These are *vijñāna* and *puruṣa*.

In verses 195-201, there follows a statement of Bhartṛprapañca's view on the question and its answer.

चोद्यैकमूलां प्रश्नोक्तिं केचिद्व्याचक्षतेऽपरे ।
याथात्म्यप्रतिपत्त्यर्थमुत्थितस्य प्रचक्षते ॥१९५॥

Some others¹ explain that the question is rooted in some objection: They state that (the question) which has arisen is for understanding (clearly) the true nature (of the Ātman)² — [195]

¹This is a reference to Bhartṛprapañca (NKL).

²The second half of the verse seems to be parenthetical.

पुंसोऽस्य ज्ञस्वभावत्वे करणेष्वपि सत्सु च ।
कादाचित्कोऽवबोधोऽस्य कुत इत्युच्यतां यथा ॥१९६॥

viz. "How is it then that this Puruṣa, being of the nature of a knower, and the (various) organs also are (present), this one can have knowledge belonging to (or, arising at) only

some (particular) time?"; let (this) be told.

[196]

The argument is: The inner self is an ever knowing (agent) and has the help of all the organs. As such, it should ever be knowing, i.e. not ever asleep. See how SP refers to the Bhāṣya of Bhartṛprapañca: *bhoktur jñānasvabhāvatve karaṇeṣu vidyā-māneṣu katham kadācit prabodha iti tadīyabhāṣyārtham āha.*

विहायैतच्छरीरं वा गतो देशान्तरं पुमान् ।
विनष्टो वा कुतो भूयो देहमागादितिर्यताम् ॥१९७॥

'Either this Puruṣa left the body and went to (some) other region (or, place), or being lost (somewhere), whence has he come back to the body (again)?' Let this be told (or, explained).

[197]

SP appears to quote Bhartṛprapañca thus: *uktaṃ hi atha punar vihāyaitad asaṃnihito 'bhūd vinaṣṭo vā kutaḥ pratyāgamanam iti.*

प्रष्टव्यमेतद्गार्गेण शिष्यत्वान्न त्वचूचुदत् ।
नैवोदास्ते तथापीनो बोधाभ्युपगमात्स्वयम् ॥१९८॥

Being a pupil (now), Gārgya should have asked this; and (*tu*) he did not raise any doubt! Even then (*tathāpi*) the king (*ina*) did not remain silent because he himself had accepted to enlighten (him).

[198]

Under this verse also, SP quotes Bhartṛprapañca thus: *yathāhuh— tad etad gārgyeṇa praṣṭavyam āsīt sa hi śiṣyaś codayiteti.* Then again: *uktaṃ ca yadā codayituh śiṣyasya pratipattir na bhavaty ācāryaś ca tam artham vyācikyāsur bhavati tadā svayam eva codyam utthāpya vyācaṣṭa iti.*

अर्थिनेऽर्थं प्रतिज्ञाय नासंपाद्य निवर्तते ।
यथार्थितं सत्पुरुष इति सत्पुरुषव्रतम् ॥१९९॥

A good man, having promised to a suppliant (to give) some particular thing, does not hold himself back if (i.e. till) he has not granted it in accordance with the supplication; this is the vow (i.e. unfailing behaviour) of a good man. [199]

This general statement implies that, being a good man, Kāśya does not withhold himself from imparting to Gārgya the instruction regarding the Brahman, even if he was silent and yet wishing to have it.

कूटस्थोऽस्यावबोधश्चेत्कादाचित्कं कुतो भवेत् ।
मतोऽवबोधोऽनित्यश्चेत्कादाचित्कं तदार्थवत् ॥२००॥

If the waking (i.e. knowledge) of this one is immutable, how could (this waking) be belonging to (or, arising at) only some (particular) time? If again it is held that the waking (i.e. knowledge) is not-always-obtaining; in that case alone, its belonging to (or, arising at) only some (particular) time would have been meaningful (i.e. reasonable). [200]

This is said in view of verse 196 above.

Translation follows SP's second alternative explanation, NKL agreeing with it. SP's first alternative is: If the knowledge on the part of the Ātman is immutable and not belonging to (or, arising at) only some time, it should follow that the Ātman is neither asleep nor gone elsewhere. On this, the objector might say: But this is against the usual experience (expressed in) 'I did not know (or feel) anything.' If alternatively, the Ātman's waking is taken as not-always-obtaining, then one cannot explain away the knowledge that belongs to (or, arises at) only some particular time. This explanation, though not altogether impossible, appears laboured or not naturally occurring.

देहादिष्वभिमानोऽस्य कादाचित्कः सहेतुकः ।
आगमापायिसाक्षित्वं नित्यमेवानिमित्ततः ॥२०१॥

(In answer to the above question, which is clarified further, Bhartṛprapañca answers it away thus:) The identification of itself by this one with the body etc. is occurring only at some particular time and is having some cause(s)¹ for it; (but) its being the witness of what comes into existence and goes out (or dies)² is (certainly) perennial owing to its having no cause(s). [201]

¹These are *dharma*, *adharma* etc. The identification by the Ātman with the body and the organs of itself is the basis of its experiences of the results of *dharma*, *adharma* etc.

²Cf. *Gītā* 2.14:

*mātrāsparśās tu kaunteya śītoṣṇasukhaduḥkhadāḥ /
āgamāpāyino 'nityās tāṃs titikṣasva bhārata //*

इदमेव यतो वृत्तं कारणापेक्षिणां सताम् ।
अभूत्वा भवनं तस्मात्कादाचित्कं न दोषभाक् ॥२०२॥

Since, in the case of the existent objects, which expect some cause(s), this (i.e. such)¹ is the behaviour, viz. coming into existence after it has not been there; therefore, the belonging to (or, arising at) some (particular) time (of them)² does not involve any fault. [202]

It follows from the argument in this verse that the *kādācitka* of *dehādyabhimāna* (mentioned earlier) is only natural.

¹Their character as *āgamāpāyin*.

²*dharma* and *adharma*, together with their results, are meant. Cf. SP: *dharmādeś ca pravāhāvicchede 'pi vyaktivicchedān na sadā sattvaṃ na ca sati hetau kāryaniyamaḥ sāmāgryāṃ tanniyamād ato na susūptyasiddhir iti bhāvaḥ (kādācitkaṃ dehādyabhimānasyeti śeṣaḥ).*

In verses 203-204, there is repudiation of Bhartṛprapañca's view.

प्रतीच्येव यतश्चाभूदागाच्च प्रत्यगात्मनः ।
प्रश्नार्थप्रतिकूलत्वात्प्रत्युक्तेर्नेदृगर्थता ॥२०३॥

Such is not the situation,¹ since 'The individual self was (i.e. had merged) in the inner self and also came (i.e. arose) from (that) inner self.' is an answer opposed to the content of the question (viz. the *codya*), (which you have posited).² [203]

This argument is based on verse 200 above.

¹That is, *paroktārthatā* 'the nature of what another person has said' which is for *īdṛgarthatā*.

²In verse 195 above.

गत्यादिसाधनानां च देह एव स्थितेः कुतः ।
देशान्तरगतिः पुंसो नापि नाशोऽस्य युक्तिमान् ॥२०४॥

"Also, since the means of going (elsewhere)¹ exist only in the body; how can there be the Puruṣa's going to some other region? So also, the being lost (somewhere, of this one) is not reasonable." [204]

This verse keeps in view verse 197 above.

¹These are feet, wish, decision.

²Or, it does not stand to reason, because there would not be waking up (or, coming back) again possible. Read SP: *punarutthānāyogād akṛtābhyāgamādiprasaṅgāc ca*.

Now follows Sureśvara's own explanation of the question and its answer.

साक्षाद्ब्रह्मावबोधस्य प्रतिज्ञातत्वकारणात् ।
भोक्तृभोक्तव्ययोस्तत्त्वं वक्तुं युक्तमतोऽञ्जसा ॥२०५॥

Owing to (the situation that) there is a promise¹ of directly informing (Gārgya) about (the nature of) the Brahman, it is (only) proper to declare (i.e. explain) clearly the (true) nature

of the enjoyer (i.e. experiencer) and the enjoyed (i.e. experienced). [205]

This verse fulfils the suggestions in verses 195-196 and 201.

¹Cf. the sentence *vy eva tvā jñāpayiṣyāmi* in BU 2.1.15.

कर्मादिहेतुजं रूपमतत्त्वं तदनन्वयात् ।
अनिमित्तं स्वतस्तस्य सर्वदाव्यभिचारतः ॥२०६॥
अकारकक्रियाकार्यं रूपं प्राक्प्रतिबोधतः ।
बुबोधयिषितं भोक्तुरस्मद्भोचरवर्तिनः ॥२०७॥

The form,¹ (of the *bhoktavya*) which is produced by action etc.,² is false (lit. not its true nature), since it does not follow (i.e. continue to be, in sleep state) and the nature of it (viz. the *bhoktr*) itself does not invariably have any cause (for its existence), [206]

(and) its form is devoid of any agent(s) of activity, action and what is to be done (i.e. to be effected or achieved by an action); (this) nature of the enjoyer (or, experiencer) was sought to be explained (by Kāśya to Gārgya), that which (existed even) before waking (up of the man) and which is within the experience of (all of) us.³ [207]

¹This stands for name, action.

²It refers to *dharma*, *adharma* etc., i.e. *avidyā* and its effects.

³Read SP in this context: *asmatpratyaayaśabdayor gocaro 'haṁkāras tatra sākṣitvena vartamānasyātmano nirvikāraṁ rūpaṁ svāpe*

यतोऽस्य न पुरा बोधात्कर्मादेः कार्यमण्वपि ।
प्रतीचो गृह्यते मानादतोऽयं तत्स्वभावकः ॥२०८॥

(This is so explained by Kāśya) since, before waking (up of a person from sleep), not even any effect of (some) action etc., is grasped by any means whatever, as done by the inner self; therefore, this one (viz. the inner self) does not have

that as its nature.¹

[208]

¹This is to say *akāraḥakriyākārya*. Cp. *paśyan vai tan na paśyati* (BU 4.3.23).

क्वाभूदेष पुरा बोधात्कृतरचायमुपागतः ।
आचक्ष्वैतद्वयं गार्ग्य स्थितावागमनेऽवधिम् ॥२०९॥

(Therefore,) where was this one before becoming awake? Whence has this one come? Tell (me) these two (things), O Gārgya. What again was the duration of that condition (of sleep, *sthiti*) and the coming (i.e. waking)? [209]

This is the meaning of the question in BU according to BUB.

अभूत्प्रतीचोऽन्यत्रायमन्यस्माच्चचायमागतः ।
यदि चेत्कारकत्वं स्यान्नो चेद्भ्रान्तिरियं भवेत् ॥२१०॥

(Possibly) this one (while sleeping) was elsewhere than in the inner self and this one has come back from another (i.e. not from within the inner self); then (in that case) there would be agency (on the part of the inner self)!¹ If that is not so,² then this is mere error.³ [210]

¹That would mean not accepting *akriyākārya rūpa* of the inner self. One wonders why SP adds: *sthitāṁ āgatau ca svayam evāvadhīr nānyaś cet*, though actually it is not mentioned in this verse. (It is mentioned in the preceding verse.)

²Understand after 'so', 'and that is not so' as parenthesis.

³That is false attribution of the non-existing.

यत्र वा अन्यदित्येवं यत्र त्वस्येति चापरम् ।
अविद्याविद्ययोः कार्यं तथा च श्रुतिरब्रवीत् ॥२११॥

And so has the Śruti declared (about) the result(s) of ignorance and knowledge, viz. in *yatra vā anyat*¹ and also elsewhere

in *yatra tv asya*.²

[211]

¹Cf. BU 4.3.31: *yatra vā anyad iva syāt*

²Cf. BU 2.4.14: *yatra vā asya sarvam ātmaivābhūt*.

वक्तुं प्रष्टुं च बालाकिर्न यतो जज्ञिवांस्ततः ।
प्रश्नयोः स्वयमेवार्थं काश्यो वक्तुं प्रचक्रमे ॥२१२॥

Since Bālāki did not know (what) to speak and/or to ask, therefore, Kāśya himself began to explain the meaning of the two questions. [212]

This explains *tad u ha na mene gārgyaḥ* in BU.

पृष्टेनापि न विज्ञातं भवता तदिदं मया ।
उच्यमानं यथा तत्त्वं सम्यक्त्वं श्रोतुमर्हसि ॥२१३॥

You have not known that, even if you are asked (about it); therefore, this one—the truth (or, essence)—as it is, is being explained by me. Therefore, you should hear (it) alternatively. [213]

Verses 214-262 discuss the meaning of BU 2.1.17 (and allied matter).

यत्रैष एतत्सुप्तोऽभूत्स्वनामामन्त्रणध्वनिम् ।
नाश्रौषीद्यन्निमित्तं ज्ञस्तन्निमित्तमिदं शृणु ॥२१४॥

Why, while this one was asleep here, he did not hear the sound of the call of his own names; (and) why he came to know (lit. became a knower of) that—this, (now) listen. [214]

This explains *yatraiṣa etat supto 'bhūt ...* in BU. It refers to the *upādhi* and *upādhyupasaṃhāra* in relation to the Brahman.

त्रैविध्यं लक्ष्यते यस्माद्बुद्ध्यादिप्राणभूमिषु ।
तदेषामिति षष्ठीयं श्रुत्या तस्मात्प्रयुज्यते ॥२१५॥

Since there is noticed threefold (functioning) of intellect up to *prāṇas*, therefore, there is use of the genitive case in the word *eṣām*¹ in the Śruti. [215]

¹This is *nirdhāraṇe ṣaṣṭhī*, i.e. for specifying 'among them'. It means: *teṣām madhye ye prāṇāḥ*.

The three are mentioned in the next verse thus: The inner self, its semblance and *prāṇas*, i.e. organs in the body.

प्रत्यक्चिदवभासश्च कारणानुगमोऽपरः ।
तथा च करणात्मानो बाह्यगोचररञ्जिताः ॥२१६॥

The inner self and the other, viz. the semblance of sentience, which is understood (or, inferred) from its cause(s)¹ and so also those which are of the nature of the organs that are affected (lit. coloured or tinted) by external objects² (are the three meant in *eṣām*). [216]

¹Or alternatively, which comes to exist, as it were, owing to the cause, viz. ignorance.

²See SP on this: *karaṇātmanāṃ karaṇāmatvaṃ vinā svarūpenābhivyaktyarthāṃ viśinaṣṭi*.

बुद्ध्यादेः कृत्स्नकार्यस्य पुंस्कर्मोद्भूतिहेतुतः ।
बुद्ध्याद्युत्क्षेपसंहारौ तस्मात्कर्मनिबन्धनौ ॥२१७॥

Since the effects in their entirety,¹ viz. intellect etc.¹ are owing to the person's (own) *karman*² operative, the rise as well as the inactivity (lit. withdrawing) of intellect etc. are therefore dependent on *karman*. [217]

¹The word etc. stands for organs.

²This is not any activity on the part of the person, i.e. done

by any of his organs. It is his merit and/or demerit. Cf. SP: *tasyotkṣepasamhārāv utthānābhibhavau karma haiva*.

स्वात्मावभासतो भोक्ता कर्ता त्वज्ञानहेतुतः ।
द्वयाविविक्तो हि परो भोक्ता कर्तेति चोच्यते ॥२१८॥

It (i.e. the Ātman or the inner self) of a person is the enjoyer (i.e. experiencer) owing to its being the semblance of it and is the agent (of activities) because of (its) ignorance (about its own true nature). Indeed, the highest self which is not distinct (or distinguished) from duality (in the state of ignorance) is called both the enjoyer (i.e. experiencer) and the agent (of activities).¹ [218]

¹SP brings out the force in the last part of the verse thus: *bhoktaiva kevalam na karteti nirasitum cakārah*.

जाग्रत्फलप्रयोगस्य यदा कर्म प्रहीयते ।
व्युत्थानहेत्वसद्भावात्तदाकर्ता सुषुप्सति ॥२१९॥

When activity, which is related to the rise of results in the waking state, is missing (lit. lost), then the (real) non-agent¹ (of activities) goes to sleep (lit. wishes to sleep), as there do not exist here any causes of the rise (of the organs to act). [219]

This is to explain the sleep state of an individual. This explanation is occasioned by the continuous existence of the *bhoktr*.

¹SP points out *akarteti cchedaḥ* (in *tadākartā*) and remarks *akartṛtvam abhokṛtvasyāpy upalakṣaṇam*.

भोक्तृप्रयुक्तं कर्तृत्वं कर्त्रा कर्म प्रयुज्यते ।
कर्मप्रयुक्तो भोगश्च ततः संस्कारसंभवः ॥२२०॥

(In sleep state), agency (of activities) is caused by the enjoyer

(i.e. experiencer), the activity is caused by the agent and the enjoyment (i.e. experience) is caused by activity and from that there follows the possibility of impression(s). [220]

This is for explaining that the sleep state is not the state of liberation. NKL points out more clearly: *bhoktrtvāder anyo-nyahetutvād avicchedaḥ* (= *saṃsārāvicchedaḥ*, note by the editor of NKL).

सुखदुःखादिसंस्कारसंस्कृतोऽयं जडः पुमान् ।
रागद्वेषादिनाक्षिप्तस्ततो भूयः प्रवर्तते ॥२२१॥

This ignorant Puruṣa,¹ affected by the impressions such as happiness, misery etc.² (and) therefore overcome by attachment, hatred etc.,³ proceeds to act again. [221]

This explains why there is no liberation in this state.

¹This refers to the transmigratory being, *jada* cannot be insentient, it should mean 'ignorant'.

²The word etc. appears to indicate ignorance.

³The word etc. here indicates hankerings and wish for more of happiness.

अन्योऽन्यं कार्यता चैषां कारणत्वं तथैव च ।
तेनानुच्छिन्नसंस्कार आत्मायं प्राक्प्रबोधतः ॥२२२॥

Furthermore, these (viz. *bhoktrtva*, *kartrtva* and *saṃsāritva*) have (among them) mutual relation of being cause and effect; therefore, the Ātman (i.e. the individual self) is, before its waking (up to its real nature), not devoid of impressions(s).¹

[222]

¹That is, with the impressions on it not removed.

अविद्यानाभिसंबन्धो मिथ्याधीचक्रसंस्थितः ।
आब्रह्मास्थाण्वयं योनीर्बभ्रमीत्यनिशं परः ॥२२३॥

This highest (Ātman), having a relation to the hub (in the form) of ignorance and resting on (*saṁsthita*) the wheel of wrong (or, false) knowledge, continuously (*anīṣam*) keeps on revolving among (numerous) species of life, beginning (*ā*) with the Brahman up to (*ā*) a pillar. [223]

This is a stress on the continuous flow of impressions responsible for transmigration of the life for a person.

जाग्रत्कर्मक्षये सोऽयमादायाशेषभावंनाः ।
 असंबुद्धात्मकोद्भूतमनोबुद्ध्यादिरूपिणा ॥२२४॥
 आधिस्वभावजेनेति कर्तादानस्य भण्यते ।
 प्रत्यक्चिदवभासान्तः कर्ता क्षेत्रज्ञ उच्यते ॥२२५॥

This one is called the agent, after it has taken up (i.e. received) all the impressions (of the waking state) as the activity of the waking state ceases (lit. comes to be lost) and is called the agent of taking up (various objects), being possessed of the form of *manas*, intellect and others¹ which have the nature of what is unawakened and which have the nature of what have been born from the limiting adjuncts² (of the Ātman)—yes, this (real) agent and knower of the field (revealing itself) as the end of the semblance of the sentience which is the inner self. [224-225]

After the explanation of the threefoldness connected with *eṣām* (in verse 216 above) and of *buddhi* etc. (in verse 217 above) are given, there now follows the explanation of their working as expressed in *viññānena viññānam ādāya* in the BU sentence.

The editor of NKL writes a note on *kartāraṁ vivicyāha* (in NKL) thus: *ādānakriyāyāṁ cidavabhāsāntaḥ cidābhāsāśrayaḥ jīvaḥ kartā; buddhyādigataḥ cidābhāsaḥ karaṇam (viññāneneti karaṇe tṛtīyā); vāgādiprāṇānām arthadhīśaktirūpaṁ viññānam karma iti viveko bodhyaḥ.*

¹The word 'others' refers to various organs of activity.

²ādhi is for upādhi.

आदीयमानं विज्ञानं सामर्थ्यं विषयोन्मुखम् ।
वागादीनामिह ग्राह्यं प्राणानां विषयाञ्जनम् ॥२२६॥

viññāna is what is being taken up (i.e. received), the capacity which is ready (or, about) to take up the objects (of desire etc.). In this regard, one has to understand that there is colouring (i.e. tinting) of *prāṇas*, viz. *vāc* and others, by the objects. [226]

This is the explanation of *prāṇānām* ... in BU.
SP points out that *ādānakarmaviññāna* is called *pūrvabhāvanās*.

शक्तयः करणान्यत्र गृह्यन्ते कारणात्मना ।
परमात्मा ग्रहीतात्र स्वाभासाभिन्नविग्रहः ॥२२७॥

Here,¹ the organs, viz. *śaktis* 'capacities'² are taken up (i.e. assumed or used) by that (Jīva) whose nature is the cause;³ (for), here,¹ the one who takes up (i.e. uses, the same) is the highest Ātman⁴ which has a body that is non-distinct from its own semblance. [227]

This is another way of understanding the BU sentence: *prāṇānām viññānena viññāya eṣo 'ntar hṛdaya ākāśaḥ tasmin śete* (in relation to sleep).

¹That is, in the happenings or actions mentioned in verses 224-225 are meant.

²This is another meaning of *viññāna* in the accusative case.

³It stands for the agent of activities (*viññāna*).

⁴Add: who is under the influence of ignorance (*avidyā*).

तथा संवर्गविद्यायां प्राणवाय्वात्मना श्रुतिः ।
वागग्न्याद्युपसंहारं वक्ति नान्येन कारणात् ॥२२८॥

To this effect (*tathā*),¹ the Śruti states in the lore of Saṃvarga²

the merging (*upasaṁhāra*)³ of *vāc*, Agni and others in the form (*ātmanā*) of Prāṇa-Vāyu; and not by any other cause (of their merger).⁴ [228]

¹Or, in this (very) sense.

²Cf. CU 4.3.2.

³Cf. CU 4.3.3.

⁴Cf. SP: *na ca kāryasya kāraṇād anyātmanopasaṁhārah*.

नामाद्याशावसानं च प्राणे सर्वं प्रतिष्ठितम् ।
प्राणबन्धनवाक्याच्च सूक्तमेतद्यथोदितम् ॥२२९॥

The merger of name etc., all (of them) in *āśā* 'hope' is fixed on (or, has rested in) Prāṇa (i.e. the Ātman); (and) this is well said in the statement (of the Śruti) about the fixture in Prāṇa.¹ [229]

This is yet another support for verse 227 from another Śruti.

¹The word *prāṇabandhana* occurs in CU 6.8.2. NKL points to CU 7.15.1: *prāṇo vā āśāyā bhuīyān, yathā vā arā nābhau samarpitāḥ evam asmin prāṇe sarvaṁ samarpitam*. SP merely points to the discussion of *bhūmavidyā*.

आविर्भूतस्वकार्यस्य संसर्गः कारणात्मना ।
वागाद्यादानमत्र स्याद्बुद्बुदानां यथाम्भसा ॥२३०॥

The contact (i.e. identity) of its effect(s) which are manifest, viz. assuming (or, taking up) of *vāc* and others with the Ātman, which is the cause,¹ is like (the oneness) of the bubbles with water. [230]

¹Here the origin is meant. That explains *ādāna*.

सहार्थे वा तृतीयेयं विज्ञानेनेति या श्रुता ।
सह प्रमातृज्ञानेन वागादेरुपसंहतिः ॥२३१॥

Or rather (*vā*), this (use of the) instrumental case which is heard in the word *vijñānena* is in the sense of 'being joint (or, together) with';¹ therefore the cessation (or withdrawing) of *vāc* and others is together with (the arising of) the knowledge of the knower (viz. the Ātman, the inner self).²

[231]

Already, the instrumental form *vijñānena* is explained in the sense of *karaṇa* 'an instrument or a means'; now another explanation is offered.

¹Cf. Pāṇini Sūtra 2.3.19: *sahayukte 'pradhāne*. SP brings out the meaning thus: *mātrā tanniṣṭhajñānena ca saha karaṇānām saṃhṛtiḥ*.

²The idea that the Ātman is the agent of activities also ceases to be.

यदि वास्तु तृतीयेयमित्थंभूतार्थवाचिनी ।
प्रत्यग्ज्ञानस्वभावेन कार्यकारणसंहतिः ॥२३२॥

Or perhaps (*vā*), let this (use of the) instrumental case be expressive of the indicative mark;¹ (accordingly, the meaning would be:) there is cessation (or, withdrawing) of the cause and the effect(s) by the inner self's (assuming) its own nature, viz. knowledge.²

[232]

This is yet another explanation in the light of *itthambhūtārtham*.

¹Cf. Pāṇini Sūtra 2.3.21: *itthambhūtalakṣaṇe* (*trītyā* is taken over from Pāṇini Sūtra 2.3.18).

²Cf. NKL: *sahetoḥ kāryasya caitanyātmanopasaṃhṛtir ity arthaḥ*— this is clear from SP thus: *sve mahimni tiṣṭhaty ātmety arthaḥ*.

अनन्यबोधप्रत्यक्षो य एष इति भण्यते ।
तस्य संप्रतिपत्त्यर्थमन्तर्हृदयकीर्तनम् ॥२३३॥

In the words *ya eṣaḥ* ...¹ is mentioned the one who is directly

known by itself (lit. by none other),² (and) the mention of (its being) inside the heart is for well conveying (only) that.³

[233]

¹This is BU sentence: *ya eṣo 'ntar hr̥daya ākāśaḥ*

²This refers to the self-illuminating Ātman (*svapprakāśa*).

³Namely, the Ātman, which is self-illuminating. The idea is: The inner self rests in the heart and so also does the highest self. This brings out well the identity of the inner self and the highest self.

पराक्प्रमेयभूमिभ्यो व्युत्थाप्य मन आदरात् ।

प्रत्यक्प्रवणया दृष्ट्या पश्यात्मानं त्वमञ्जसा ॥२३४॥

Having therefore respectfully taken away (your) *manas* from the objects which are known as (existing) outside,¹ do you well see the Ātman with the notion (lit. view) inclined towards the (acceptance of) the inner self.²

[234]

¹Or literally, from the (bases of) the objects of knowing that are outside the body.

²Or, adopting the view that the inner self is nothing else than the Ātman, i.e. Brahman.

आत्मबुद्धिरियं पुंसां लक्ष्यतेऽव्यभिचारिणी ।

व्यभिचारिणीष्वनात्मोत्थबुद्धिषु प्रत्यगात्मनि ॥२३५॥

It is noticed that among men the awareness (i.e. knowledge), viz. (I am) Ātman,¹ is never varying (or absent) even while the awarenesses of the non-Ātmans are varying (i.e. are not always present), in relation to the inner self.

[235]

This clarifies the distinction between the Ātman and the non-Ātmans.

¹*ātmabuddhi* is to be understood as *ātmā iti buddhiḥ*.

बुद्धात्मनोऽपि सा बाह्यपदार्थज्ञानविभ्रमात् ।
संकीर्यमाणेवाभाति तमसोपहतात्मनाम् ॥२३६॥

(And) in respect of the Ātman that is awakened¹ also, that appears like varied³ (in nature) to those whose inner selves are affected (i.e. overpowered) by darkness⁴ on account of the error that there is knowledge of outside objects. [2]

¹This refers to the inner self which has come to realise its true nature, viz. its being the Ātman.

²This is *ātmabuddhi* mentioned in the previous verse.

³Literally, mixed, as it were. That is to say: having the distinct things as the knower and the knowable(s).

⁴That is, ignorance or Avidyā.

जग्धे कार्ये च निःशेषे कारणे चात्मविद्यया ।
अपूर्वाद्यात्मनात्मायमात्मन्येवावसीयताम् ॥२३७॥

When the entire (mass of) effect(s) and also the cause¹ are destroyed (lit. eaten up) by the lore of Ātman,² let it be concluded that this Ātman is in one's self (i.e. in the inner self) in the nature of *apūrva* etc.³ [2]

¹This refers to Avidyā (cause) and *tajja*.

²Actually this should mean: by knowing the true nature of the Ātman.

³Cf. BU 2.5.19: *tad etad brahmāpūrvam anaparam anantaram abāhyam ...*; and BU (Mādhyandina) 3.8.8: *apūrvam anaparam ... abāhyam*.

आदायाकाशशब्दाभ्यामैकात्म्यं प्रतिपाद्यते ।
क्षेत्रज्ञेश्वरयोः साक्षाच्छ्रुत्येहाज्ञानहानतः ॥२३८॥

By the words *ādāya* and *ākāśa* is directly established here the singleness of the Ātman,¹ viz. of the knower of the field and the Lord (i.e. the highest self), as (resulting) from the

destruction (lit. loss) of ignorance.

[238]

NKL clarifies: *tvamarthaḥ ādāya ity ucyate, tadarthaḥ ākāśe iti, śete iti tadekatvam* (i.e. *tayor ekatvam*).

¹That is, in *aikyajñāna*.

तात्स्थ्याद्बुद्धयशब्देन बुद्धिरत्राभिधीयते ।

ऐकात्म्यप्रतिपत्त्यर्थं क्षेत्रज्ञपरमात्मनोः ॥२३९॥

By the word *hṛdaya* 'heart' here is expressed *buddhi* 'intellect', because of its staying in that.¹ (This is so done) for conveying the oneness of the knower of the field and the highest Ātman.

[239]

This explains the meaning of *hṛdaya* in *antar hṛdaye*.

¹That is, since the individual self and the Ātman stay together in the *hṛdaya*, their oneness is proved. Also the meaning of *hṛdaya* as (only) a lump of flesh in the body is thus precluded.

घटाकाशो महाकाश इत्युक्तौ खैकधीर्यथा ।

तथेहापि कथं नाम प्रत्यग्धीः स्यादिति र्यते ॥२४०॥

This is said in order to answer the question (*iti*) 'how is the inner self called intellect?'; viz. thus: "As in the statements 'sky in a pot' and 'great sky (that is all pervading)', there arises (the knowledge of) the oneness of sky"; so is it understood here also.

[240]

It is interesting to note how there is to be understood oneness of the knower of the field and the highest Ātman, despite two (apparently) distinct words. The purpose of the illustration is thus clarified by SP thus: *tayor aikyātmyam tādātmyam aikyam vādye bhedo 'pi syād dvitīye padāntaravaiyarthyam ity āśaṅkya tadaikye 'pi vyāvartyabhedaṁ na padāntarānarthakyam iti man-vānaḥ sann āha ghaṭeti*.

बुद्धेरन्तः प्रतीचोऽन्यो नार्थः संभाव्यते यतः ।
तस्मादाकाशशब्देन प्रत्यगात्माभिधीयते ॥२४१॥

Since there cannot possibly exist in the intellect anything else than the inner self, therefore, (it is only) the inner self (that) is expressed by the word *ākāśa*. [241]

This is to answer away an objection that might arise from the linguistic usage of *ākāśa* in the sense of the elemental sky (*bhūtākāśa*).

प्राणादीनां यतो जन्म वक्ष्यते प्रत्यगात्मनः ।
तस्माच्चाकाशशब्देन ब्रह्मैवात्राभिधीयते ॥२४२॥

Since it will be stated that the *prāṇas* and others have their origin in the inner self,¹ therefore also² it is just the Brahman that is expressed by the word *ākāśa*. [242]

This is to clear away a doubt that the *ākāśa* which is said to exist in the *hṛdaya* can be the elemental sky also, for it is all-pervasive.

¹This refers to *evam evāsmād ātmanah sarve prāṇāḥ sarve lokāḥ sarve devāḥ sarvāṇi bhūtāṇi vyuccartanti* (BU 2.1.20).

²*ca* invites reference to *sarvāṇi ha vā imāni bhūtāny ākāśād eva samutpadyante* (CU 1.7.1).

अथाकाशो ह वै नाम सता सोम्येति च श्रुतिः ।
ब्रह्माकाशात्परो नान्य आकाश इह गृह्यते ॥२४३॥

Also, there is a Śruti passage (which says the same thing): *athākāśo ha vai nāma, satā somya*;¹ (thus) here (in this context)² *ākāśa* is not taken as other than *Brahmākāśa*, viz. the Brahman that is *ākāśa*. [243]

Here is cited one more support from the Śruti.

¹This is a reference to two passages, CU 8.141 (without *ha*)

and CU 6.8.1.

²This refers to *ākāśe śete*.

स्वतोऽवगमरूपेऽस्मिन्कूटस्थे कारणात्मना ।
कात्स्न्येनावसितिर्भोक्तुः शेत इत्यभिधीयते ॥२४४॥

Thus is expressed in the word *śete* the merger in this immutable (Ātman) which is of the self-knowing nature of the enjoyer (i.e. experiencer) in its fullness, in the form of the cause(s).¹

[244]

¹This aims to justify repeated/varied experiences due to ignorance.

दृष्टान्तश्च कुमारादि तथा च घटतेऽञ्जसा ।
प्रत्यक्चैतन्यमात्रत्वान्न तु निद्रेह युज्यते ॥२४५॥

And (this is to be understood thus, because) the illustrations of Kumāra and others¹ would also be smooth to understand;² (as against this, the usual) sleep will not be properly understood³ owing to the inner self being only sentience. [245]

This explains why the familiar sense of *śayana*, viz. *nidrā*, is not accepted.

¹Cf. BU 2.1.19.

²That is, be smoothly construed.

³That is, will not be supported by reason.

देहाद्यध्यक्षतां हित्वा यदायं वर्तते तदा ।
स्वात्मन्येवास्त इत्येतत्कुतश्चेत्स्वपितीत्यतः ॥२४६॥

Whence is it understood, 'While this one gives up superintendence over the body etc.¹, it remains in its own form'? (In answer to this, it is said) 'Because (then) it sleeps'. [246]

¹The word etc. refers to the organs, the objects of desires

and so on.

इतश्च प्रत्यगात्मस्थो नान्यत्रागादयं पुमान् ।
सुषुप्ते स्वपितीत्युक्तेस्तदेतदभिधीयते ॥२४७॥

From the statement ¹ 'This one (viz. the individual self) sleeps when that (Ātman) goes to sleep' is understood that this man resting in the inner Ātman has not gone elsewhere. (Also) ² it is said (in other Śruti statements as well). [24

¹SP points out, *itaḥ* is connected with *svapiti*. But NKL refers *itaḥ* to *ca*.

²Also *ca* conveys, according to SP, that CU 6.8.1: *satā somya* is to be understood together with the statement in BU. But NKL refers to CU 8.3.2: *aharahaḥ brahmalokaṃ gacchantyaḥ*.

Now follows in verses 248-254ab Bhartṛprapañca's interpretation of the sentences *tad eṣām ...* and others.

अन्ये व्याचक्षते बुद्धिविज्ञानेनेति विस्मिताः ।
वागादिज्ञानमादाय हृत्खे शेते य उत्थितः ॥२४८॥

Others, ¹ who are stunned by the *buddhivijñāna* (in the case of the inner self) ² explain (*tad eṣām ...*) thus: That, who has (now) become awake, is the one that sleeps in the sky (covered) in the heart, ³ having taken with it the knowledge (that arises from) *vāc* and others. ⁴ [248

¹This is the reference to Bhartṛprapañca.

²Both NKL and SP appear to be here putting the cart before the horse. NKL just remarks: *asmadvyākhyāne vismitāḥ doṣaṃ manvānāḥ*. But SP is more to blame while stating: *asmadvyākhyānaṃ duṣṭaṃ svavyākhyānaṃ cāduṣṭaṃ paśyanto vismayāviṣṭadhiyaḥ*. Are we to hold from statement of thme this that Bhartṛprapañca knew the explanations offered by Sureśvara? Or, for that matter, Śaṅkara? Does it mean that he was not an

earlier commentator of BU? But, since both Śaṅkara in BUB and Sureśvara in BUBV refer to his views in a number of places, would it be reasonable to hold *anye* in the sense of Bhartṛprapañca? It may not be unwarranted, therefore, to hold *anye* in the sense of the followers of Bhartṛprapañca, while Sureśvara used the words *buddhi- vijñānena vismitāḥ* with a double sense, the second being the one proposed by SP and NKL.

³This refers to *bhūtākāśa* in the heart.

⁴These are various organs and their objects.

सुषुप्सुर्मनसैवात्मा मनस्येव समूहति ।
प्राणान्स्वशक्तिभिः साकं मनोऽप्यात्मनि लीयते ॥२४९॥

When wishing to sleep, the Ātman (viz. the inner self) absorbs (lit. collects together) the *prāṇas* 'organs' and with them their powers¹ in the *manas*² also by means of *manas*³ and (at that time) *manas* also merges into the Ātman.⁴ [249]

¹These refer to their various capacities to grasp the different objects outside.

²I have not translated *manas* as mind, since this latter has the element of *cit* 'sentience' associated with it. Here, *manas* is just *antahkaraṇa* 'internal organ'. (The Sāṃkhyas' notion of *trividha antahkaraṇa* has to be remembered; this will explain the occurrence of *buddhibhāvanā* in the following verse.) And it may be noted in passing that the *Yogasūtra* state *yogaś cittavṛttinirodhaḥ* and not *manovṛttinirodhaḥ*, just for this very reason.

³This explains *manas* in the sense of *karaṇa* 'instrument or means' (i.e. *karaṇe tṛtīyā*). It is possible to understand *manasā* alternatively as *manorūpeṇa* (SP and NKL) to mean 'in the form of *manas*'; this can be justified thus: In the dream state (which can occur in sleep state), *manas* performs the various functions of the different organs. This explains the dream state that is mentioned in the following verse.

⁴That is, *manas* also, in its own turn, gets absorbed into the Ātman. That explains the dreamless sleep state.

विशीर्णकरणग्रामो बुद्धिभावनया युतः ।
हृद्याकाशात्प्रसृत्यात्मा नाडीभिः स्वप्नमश्नुते ॥२५०॥
मनोवागादिविज्ञानविग्रहः करणाख्यया ।
विजानातीति कर्तृस्थे परस्मिन्भावसाधनः ॥२५१॥

The Ātman (i.e. the inner self or, the knower of the field) which has the collection (*grāma*) of the organs absorbed (lit. rendered in a power) within ¹ and is bearing (lit. accompanied by) the impressions on the intellect (received in the waking state), ² proceeds from the sky in the heart through (various) veins (*nādīs*) and experiences dream(s); [250]
(and) since it, being possessed of a form made up of various organs (*viññāna*), ³ viz. *manas*, *vāc* and others, experiences (lit. knows), ⁴ by (means of intellect) called *karana* 'organs'; ⁵ therefore, in relation to the highest (Brahman), that is (really) the agent, it (viz. the knower of the field) brings about the various experiences (lit. becomings). ⁶ [251]

This is Bhartṛprapañca's explanation of *tad eṣām prāṇāṇāṃ viññānena viññānam ādāya* in BU.

¹Cf. the preceding verse.

²*buddhi* is to be understood, with the Sāṃkhyas, as one of the three aspects of the *trividha antaḥkaraṇa*.

³Here, *viññāna* specifically refers to the organs.

⁴This points to *viññāna* in the sense of the inner self. It is worthwhile to note what SP quotes, viz. *yathāhuḥ: ubhayatrāpi karaṇasādhana eva viññānaśabda iti* (Probably, Bhartṛprapañca's Bhāṣya itself). Also, read in this context NKL: *parasmin viññānaśabdapravṛttau viññānam iti paraḥ syāt, na cehobhayaṃ yuktam ādāyeti prṥthak karṇnirdeśat*.

⁵It refers to intellect as an organ that helps in dream towards knowing various objects.

⁶This is for distinguishing the real knower (viz. Ātman) from

what has appeared as the knower (viz. *kṣetrajña*).

प्रकाशवृत्तिर्या ज्ञस्य सा हृद्धर्मानुगा सती ।
उद्गच्छति यतस्तस्माद्द्विशेषे लयं विदुः ॥२५२॥

Since (that) which is the (very) being¹ viz. the (self-) illuminating nature, flashes forth (lit. comes up), becoming in accordance with the properties of the heart;² therefore, they have known (its) lying down³ in the particular part of the heart.⁴ [252]

This brings out the purport of *ya eṣa ...* in BU.

¹This is *vṛtti* from verb root *vṛt* 'to be', not in the sense of function (or even, modification).

²These are desires, attraction etc. which belong to a human heart.

³This refers to the sleep state; therefore, the alternative translation could be 'becoming dormant'.

⁴This refers to the elemental sky that is in the heart. Read in this context SP (quoting probably from Bhartṛprapañca's Bhāṣya): *yathoktam tasya hi jñānātmano yā ca svaprakāśavṛttiliṅgā sā hṛdayadvāreṇa vyuccaratīti hṛdayaṃ viśeṣāyatanaṃ iti*.

स्वगोचरोन्मुखं ज्ञानं वागादीनामशेषतः ।
आदाय भावनाबुद्ध्या शेते जो हृदयाम्बरे ॥२५३॥

The knower (i.e. the Ātman) remains (lit. sleeps) in the sky of¹ the heart, with the intellect having on it the impressions (of the waking state), receiving the knowledge of *vāc* and others,² in its entirety,³ that has come to become their own objects (to be known). [253]

This is yet another interpretation of *vijñāna*; cp. verse 248 above. And also the completion of the sentence-sense.

¹Again, this is a reference to the elemental sky existing in the heart.

²That is, organs.

³This refers to the various objects of all the organs.

भावनारूपविज्ञानमभिव्यक्तं यदा हृदि ।
क्षेत्रज्ञस्यार्थवद्भाति शेते हृदीत्यतो वचः ॥२५४॥

When this knowledge in the form of impressions¹ (*viññāna* on the part of the knower of the field) is revealed to the heart,² then the statement 'It sleeps in the heart' appears meaningful in the case of the knower of the field.³ [254]

¹These are gathered in the waking state.

²Because they are really not existent outside; they are only appearances.

³Read SP (quoting probably Bhartṛprapañca himself): *yathāhuh tatra hi bhāvanāvijñānaṃ viśeṣeṇābhividyaktam āste yata evaṃ kṛtvā tasmiṇ śeta ity ucyata iti.*

एवं श्रुतिरियं कैश्चिद्व्याख्यातातिप्रयत्नतः ।

Thus is this Śruti explained by some with a great effort.¹ [255ab]

¹*atiprayatnataḥ* is explained by SP thus: *śrutitātparyam atikramya svakīyotprekṣaya vyākhyānasya pravṛttir iti prayatnaḥ*; This is SP's introductory to verses 255cd-256.

Thus Sureśvara concludes the interpretation by Bhartṛprapañca.

In verses 255cd-256, Sureśvara has made a brief remark on the interpretation by Bhartṛprapañca.

परीक्षयैतद्द्वयं ग्राह्यं स्वयमेव परीक्षकैः ॥२५५॥

Having well examined these two interpretations,¹ let the examiners give their acceptance (to what appears to them faultless). [255cd]

सह भावनया बुद्धेः श्रुतत्वादुपसंहतेः ।
न स्यात्तथोपसंहारस्तेनैयं कल्पना मुधा ॥२५६॥

Since there is heard (in the Śruti) the absorption of (even) intellect, together with the impressions,¹ there would not be absorption (of *vāc* and others) in that way² and, therefore (*tena*), this notion (of Bhartṛprapañca) is purposeless. [256]

Not feeling satisfaction by making a simple remark in 255cd, Sureśvara states why the view of Bhartṛprapañca deserves rejection.

¹These (despite the singular form) are gathered in the waking state. Here, *manas* and *buddhi* are not taken as distinct—this is in the Sāṃkhya manner of treating them as one *antaḥkaraṇa* ‘internal organ’.

²That is, ‘in the way Bhartṛprapañca has stated’. But, NKL edition reads *na syāt tayopasaṃhārah*.

Verses 257-261 are the explanation of the BU sentence *tāni yadā*

स्वगोचरेषूत्सृष्टानि यदा गृह्णात्ययं स्वयम् ।
वागादीनि तदैवैनं स्वपितीति प्रचक्षते ॥२५७॥

When this one (viz. the inner self), of itself, absorbs (within itself)¹ *vāc* and others, among their own objects,² then do they describe (or, call) it by the name (*iti*) Svapiti.³ [257]

This is a brief restatement of Sureśvara’s own interpretation of *tāni*

¹Literally, takes (back):

²Which are unreal, i.e. the products of the same.

³Read SP introducing the next verse thus: *svapitināmanir-deśasya phalam āha*.

समाख्यासंश्रयात्तस्मादभूत्प्राक्प्रत्यगात्मनि ।
व्यभिचारोऽपि चेन्नामिन् ततो युक्तिरपीर्यते ॥२५८॥

If one would say, 'As there has already been given a derivation (of the word *svapiti*),¹ therefore, there has been variance² also as regards the name', then (i.e. in that case) also there is a reason given (lit. stated).³ [258]

¹Cf. CU 6.8.1: *svam apīto bhavati, tasmād evaṃ svapitīty ācakṣate*

²The sentence in the preceding note gives untruth to the remark in the preceding verse. This is to say that a name and the named would show variance (*vyabhicāra*), as, for example, an individual may be named Aśvakarṇa while that person is not a horse's ear (so pointed out by SP).

³This is stated in the following verse.

वागादिप्रकृतौ प्राणशब्दो घ्राणेऽवगम्यते ।
मुख्यस्यानुपसंहारात् तद्वाचक इष्यते ॥२५९॥

(See, for example, in the Śruti itself)¹ when the relevant (topic) is of *vāc* and others, the word *prāṇa* is understood as (i.e. having the meaning of) the sense of smell and there is no (reference to) principal Prāṇa in the absorption (by the inner self); therefore, it (viz. that word *prāṇa*) is not taken as expressive of it (viz. principal Prāṇa). [259]

¹This is: *tadgrhīta eva prāṇo bhavati* in BU 2.1.17 itself. It is pointed out with a view to giving unreasonableness in the objection understood in the preceding verse. Thus the argument regarding *nānni vyabhicāra* does not hold.

वासनामात्रहेतुश्च स्वप्ने कर्मेन्द्रियाश्रयः ।
सर्वेन्द्रियाणां लीनत्वाद्वापारो न प्रबोधवत् ॥२६०॥

Again, in the sleep state, the functions, which are dependent

on the organs of activity, as also of knowing,¹ are caused only by impressions and, further, the activity (in the sleep state) is not like that in the waking state, owing to (the fact that) all the organs have merged (in the inner self). [260]

¹This is by the force of *ca* (SP); *cakāro jñānendriyāśraya-vyāpārasamuccayārthaḥ*.

वागाद्युपाधिसंबन्धे संसारित्वमिवेक्ष्यते ।
ते तूपसंहताः सर्वेऽसंसारित्वमतो दृशेः ॥२६१॥

It is noticed that being transmigratory occurs (in the case of a self) when there is (its) relation to the limiting adjuncts such as *vāc*;¹ but since they have merged (in the inner self in the sleep state) and, therefore, the seer (viz. the Ātman) does not have transmigratory nature. [261]

¹Here are meant, two states, viz. that of waking and of sleep. In the second half of the verse, only the sleep state is meant. *dr̥ṣi* is to be understood, in relation to the first half, as 'appearing to be transmigratory'.

In verses 262-306, there is discussion on the contents of the BU 2.1.18 (and allied matter).

ननु स्वप्नेऽपि जाग्रद्वत्प्रत्यक्षमुपलभ्यते ।
सर्वेन्द्रियवियोगेऽपि सुखिदुःखित्वमात्मनः ॥२६२॥

But (it may be argued now), in dream state¹ also, there is the direct experience, as in the state of waking; for, even in the absence (lit. separation) of all organs, there is (noticed) the condition of the self as happy or miserable. [262]

It is related to the BU sentence *sa yatra*

¹This is in view of verse 264 below.

मैवं मृषात्वात्स्वप्नोत्थसुखदुःखादिलक्षण- ।
संसारस्येत्यतो वक्ति श्रुतिस्तस्य मृषार्थताम् ॥२६३॥

(In answer, it is said: This is) not so, because the transmigratory existence is characterized by happiness and misery which arise in dream state and are unreal (i.e. false) in nature. For this reason, the Śruti states the falseness of that (viz. transmigratory existence then). [263]

नास्य स्वापः प्रबोधो वा कुतः स्वप्नस्य संभवः ।
प्रत्यक्स्वभाव एवास्य जाग्रत्स्वप्नसुषुप्तयः ॥२६४॥

For this one (i.e. the highest Ātman) there is neither sleep nor waking up as well, how could there be the possibility of a dream? It is (in) the nature of the inner self that it has (all the three states of) waking, dream and sleep.¹ [264]

This is clarified in the following verse.

¹SP supports this by a quotation from a Smṛti: *svabhāvas tu pravartate* (Gītā 5.14d).

सुप्तः प्रबुद्ध इत्येवं स्वप्नं पश्यति चेति यः ।
विकल्प एष भूतानामविद्यात्रिशायिनाम् ॥२६५॥

That this one is asleep or awake and also that one sees a dream is an option (i.e. an optionally made statement) about the beings (one has to say: human beings) who sleep (during) the night of ignorance. [265]

मायामात्रमिदं सर्वं जगत्स्थावरजङ्गमम् ।
सर्पादेरिव रज्ज्वादितत्त्वमस्ति परं पदम् ॥२६६॥

All this world, steady and moving, is merely *māyā* (i.e. what is conceived). As in the case of a serpent etc. (there is truth) viz. a rope etc.;¹ so, the truth is the highest (Ātman).² [266]

¹In this verse, Sureśvara is careful in citing an illustration. The word etc. refers to other well-known instances of Adhyāsa.

²The translation of this last sentence follows the reading in NKL edition, viz. *sarpādeḥ ... tattvam asti param padam*. I have adopted that reading for the text in the AnSS edition.

चित्तसंमोहमात्रेऽसिंमल्लोकोऽयं परिखिद्यते ।
दिङ्मोहाकुलविज्ञानो नष्टमार्ग इवाध्वगः ॥२६७॥

In this (happening), which is merely delusion of the mind (*citta*), this people¹ feels troubled (i.e. is sorry), like a traveller (lit. way-farer) who has his knowledge (of the ways) affected by confusion about the directions and lost his way. [267]

¹That is, the people in this world. They cannot see only one thing (viz. the Ātman) as truth; they entertain various notions owing to Avidyā.

अस्मिन्नर्थे जगादेमौ श्लोकौ यदुकुलोद्धहः ।
पुराणः शाश्वतो विष्णुः प्रपन्नाय किरीटिने ॥२६८॥

In this sense, the scion of Yadu family, viz. the ancient and eternal Viṣṇu, has recited two verses to Arjuna,¹ who respectfully resorted to him. [268]

¹This is a reference to Śrī Kṛṣṇa, who is considered to be an incarnation of Viṣṇu. He recited to Arjuna (lit. the wearer of a crown—which has become his proper name) two verses, viz. *Gītā* 7.15 and 7.14—these are quoted below.

न मां दुष्कृतिनो मूढाः प्रपद्यन्ते नराधमाः ।
माययापहतज्ञाना आसुरं भावमाश्रिताः ॥२६९॥

The wrong doers, the foolish ones, viz. the wretched men do not resort to (i.e. take shelter with) me, since they have their correct knowledge destroyed (lit. carried away) by *māyā*

'delusion' and have resorted to the demoniac feeling (or, way of behaviour). [269]

This is *Gītā* 7.15.

दैवी ह्येषा गुणमयी मम माया दुरत्यया ।
मामेव ये प्रपद्यन्ते मायामेतां तरन्ति ते ॥२७०॥

This my *māyā* (i.e. delusion caused by me) is divine, made up of (three) Guṇas, and difficult to get over. (And) those who resort only to me, (do) get over this *māyā*. [270]

This is *Gītā* 7.14.

आत्मैवेदं जगत्सर्वं सत्यापर्वदिलक्षणम् ।
वेत्ति यस्तत्त्वतो वाक्यात्तस्यैवेह कृतार्थता ॥२७१॥

This entire world is (in reality) only the Ātman which has the nature of Truth, unpreceded (i.e. not caused) by anything etc.¹ He who knows (it) in the real nature of it (*tattvataḥ*) from the sentence(s) (of the Śruti) has for himself here the fulfilment of the end (of life).² [271]

¹Cf. BU 5.5.1: *satyam brahma* and BU 2.5.19; see verse 237 note 3.

प्रत्यक्तमोवसाय्येव पराज्ञानमशेषतः ।
प्रत्यगात्मन्यविद्येति त्वविद्यापरिकल्पना ॥२७२॥

The entire knowledge about the outside (objects) is invariably (*eva*) ending in ignorance about (the real nature of) the inner self. And (*tu*) the concept of Avidyā 'ignorance' is (i.e. is rooted in) the non-knowing (*avidyā*) of the inner self.¹ [272]

¹This is to mean: non-knowing in respect of the real nature of it. SP has already pointed out *vastuvṛtṭyā na tatrāvidyeti*

tuśabdah. SP refers also to SV 106ff.

स्वार्थं प्रत्येव विज्ञेयाः सदसत्त्वादिकल्पनाः ।
जाग्रत्स्वप्नावतः सिद्धौ स्वार्थं प्रत्येव न स्वतः ॥२७३॥

The notions of *sat* 'existent' and *asat* 'non-existent' have to be taken as related to the objects for an individual's own self (i.e. known by one as obtaining outside). Therefore, the (two) states of waking and dream are established (i.e. understandable), not in their own right but only in relation to the (outside) objects for an individual. [273]

This is an echo of Gauḍapāda's statement about these objects being unreal on account of the well-known cause, viz. *drśyatva*.

वागादिसाध्यसंदृष्टेः स्वप्नो बोधसमो यदि ।
अवस्थान्त्रितयस्यास्य कुतः सिद्धिरितीर्यताम् ॥२७४॥

(A question is here asked:) If the dream state is (to be taken as) similar to the waking state on account of perceiving (lit. seeing outside)¹ what is grasped (lit. obtained) by *vāc* etc., how can there be established² this triad of the states?;³ let this be explained. [274]

¹See *drśyatva* in the note on the preceding verse.

²Literally, the establishing of the triad.

³This refers to *jāgrat*, *svapna* and *susupti*; SP refers to *trayaḥ svapnāḥ* (*Aitareyopaniṣad* 1.3.12).

आदायेति च क्त्वान्तोक्तेः पूर्वकालैककर्मणः ।
स्वप्न एव तु संसिद्धिरादावन्ते ह्यसंभवात् ॥२७५॥

On account of the use of the verbal form *ādāya*, which has an ending *ktvā* and has therefore an object belonging to some previous (moment(s)) of time, the (existence of the object(s)) is proven to be belonging only to a dream; (this is) for the

reason that their existence before and after is impossible (to accept).¹ [275]

¹Cf. *Gauḍapāḍakārikā* 2.4ab: *ādāv ante ca yan nāsti vartamāne 'pi tat tathā*.

इति भूतार्थसंबोधज्ञानोन्मीलितचक्षुषाम् ।
नास्ति व्याधिर्जरा नास्ति नास्ति देशपरिभ्रमः ॥२७६॥

Thus,¹ in the case of persons, who have their eyes opened by the proper (*sam*) knowledge of the thing, that has been an existential entity, there is no disease, (there is) no old age and (there is) no movement around many regions.² [276]

This verse expresses the result of one's knowing the true nature, viz. falsehood, abiding in the three states discussed above and naturally the consequent, viz. the knowledge of Reality, i.e. the Ātman, in its true nature.

This thought is continued in the following two verses.

¹That is 'by knowing the nature of the three states as caused by ignorance about the Ātman'.

²In other words: transmigration, or movement from place to place; one *yoni* to another and so on.

नास्ति रोगो न संतापो नास्ति कामादिसंप्लुतिः ।
न स्युर्हर्षभयोद्वेगहानोपचयमृत्यवः ॥२७७॥
न शोको नारतिः काचिन्न कर्तृत्वं न कार्यता ।
न ज्ञेयं नापि च ज्ञाता तदभावोऽपि नेष्यते ॥२७८॥

(In that case) there is no disease, no mental affliction, no overpowering by (lit. plunging or drowning in) desire etc.;¹ (also) there would not be joy, fear, dejection, loss, profit and death; [277]

there is no grief, no uneasiness (or rather, restiveness) of any kind, no (real) agency (in any activities), no nature of being an effect/product (of something or some activity or some

person); there would not be any object to know; there would not be any knower (of them) and there would not (ever) be accepted any absence of them. [278]

Translation ignores the extreme brevity of Sanskrit language and expresses itself somewhat freely. Also, the much erudite explanations of SP are not considered.

¹The word etc. should refer to the six well-known enemies of man. SP, however, explains it as the beginning of desire, viz. Avidyā. Hardly probable!

इति क्षरार्थसंबन्धज्ञानेऽस्मिन्नल्लोकचक्षुषा ।
विकल्पहेत्वविद्यायाः प्रत्यग्याथात्म्यनिष्ठितः ।
सम्यग्बोधाग्निना द्रवस्तौ विकल्पो नावशिष्यते ॥२७९॥

Thus, the variety of notions (about objects etc.), which arises from this relation of the perishing objects before the eye¹ of the people, which (has arisen) from ignorance (Avidyā) that is the cause of that variety, which (really) rests in the true nature of the inner self² and does not remain (even a little), when there occurs its destruction by the fire of proper (*saṁ*) knowledge (about the inner self, the Ātman). [279]

Here is the concluding remark about the falsehood of worldly experiences.

¹*cakṣus* indicates other organs.

²Namely, 'in somehow being overpowered by Avidyā'.

विजिज्ञापयिषुर्गार्ग्यमिममर्थमतो नृपः ।
स यत्रेत्यादिकामाह परामुक्तिपरंपराम् ॥२८०॥

Therefore, the king who wished to inform/instruct Gārgya about this matter made unto him the subsequent statements, one after another, viz. *sa yatra* [280]

Now follows in verses 281-285 the explanation of *sa yatra* itat

svapnyayā carati.

स्वप्ने भवत्वात्स्वप्न्येति जाग्रत्स्वापाद्विवेचनम् ।
मिथ्यात्वप्रतिपत्त्यर्थं स्वप्नस्य क्रियते स्फुटम् ॥२८१॥

(The world) *svapnyā*¹ is used, because it occurs in dream state. The distinction of dream from waking and sleep states is made clear for establishing the unreality (of it). [281]

¹This is based on the reading in the Mādhyandina recension of BU: *svapnyayā carati*. *svapnyā* as reported and paraphrased in SP and NKL as *darśanākhyā vṛtti* 'the function called seeing'. However, the printed edition of that recension does not show any difference from the Kāṇva recension.

निशायां संप्रवृत्तायां संहताक्षस्य निद्रया ।
जाग्रत्कर्मण्युपक्षीणे स्वप्नभोग उपस्थिते ॥२८२॥
बोधावस्थां तिरोनीय देहाद्याश्रयलक्षणाम् ।
कर्मोद्भावितसंस्कारस्तत्र स्वप्नरिरंसया ॥२८३॥
अवस्थां प्रययावन्त्यां मायावीवात्ममायया ।
उच्चावचान्बहूनर्थान्सोऽसृजत्सृजतेऽनृतान् ॥२८४॥
अविद्याकामकर्मादिसाधनैः समुपार्जितान् ।
बोधे साधारणा येऽस्य स्वप्ने तेऽनन्यद्रष्टृकाः ॥२८५॥

When, at the advance of night, a person's eyes are overcome by sleep, the activity of the waking state has come to a halt (lit. to be lost) and the experience of a dream is imminent, [282]

(the person, having) the impression, which has been raised (or, produced) by (his) *karman*, after it has suppressed (or, concealed) the waking state, that which is characterized by its resorting to the body etc., has a desire (as it were) to enjoy a dream [283]

(and therefore) has gone to another state and created false (objects), in the way a magician who, by his magic, creates

(lit. lets forth) many things, high and low,¹ [284]
 (the objects) of the dream which are brought forth by means
 of desire and activity² (being produced by) ignorance (Avidyā)
 and which are the same as in the waking state, have really
 no seer other (than the inner self). [285]

¹High and low are meant to qualify the objects of the waking
 and the dream state.

²Singulars in desire and activity imply the plural sense.

In verses 286 to 300, there is clarification of the meaning of
 te hāsyā lokāḥ

लोकाः कर्मफलानीति तेषां मिथ्यात्वमुच्यते ।
 उतेवेत्यादिना स्पष्टमैकात्म्यप्रतिपत्तये ॥२८६॥

The word *lokāḥ* stands for the results of *karman*. Their false
 nature is now described in (the statement) beginning with *uteva*,
 in order that there is a clear understanding of the singleness
 of the Ātman. [286]

ननु बोधे यथा लोकास्तत्कालाव्यभिचारिणः ।
 स्वप्नेऽपि स्वप्नकालस्थास्तद्वत्सन्तिवति भण्यते ॥२८७॥
 ननु जाग्रत्स्थलोकानां मिथ्यात्वं प्राक्प्रपञ्चितम् ।
 अविद्यामात्रहेतुत्वं पाणिपेषप्रबोधनात् ॥२८८॥
 तथा च सति दृष्टान्तो भवतो नोपपद्यते ।
 मिथ्यात्मकत्वात्सर्वस्य नैतदेवं कुतो यतः ॥२८९॥
 विवेकमात्रसिद्धयर्थो भोक्तृभोग्यपदार्थयोः ।
 पाणिपेषादिको ग्रन्थः शुद्धिस्तत्र विवक्ष्यते ॥२९०॥

But, (it is stated by an objector:¹) 'As in the waking state
 the *lokas* do not differ in point of time (of that state), so
 also let them belong to the same time as of the dream.' [287]
 (In answer, the Siddhāntin states:) 'Indeed, the false nature
 of the *lokas* in the waking state is already fully explained,

viz. that they have only ignorance (Avidyā) as their cause, (as this is noticed) from awakening (the sleeping man) by the shaking of the hand, [288]

and, that being so, your illustration² does not become reasonable, (for you will have to tell) why this (viz. what is given in the illustration) is not (false) since all (things, as you have already stated) are false (i.e. unreal). [289]

(And further) the text relating to (lit. beginning with) the shaking him by hand is only for differentiating between the things (known as) the enjoyer and the enjoyed (i.e. the experiencer and the experienced). (Therefore) an explanation in that regard (*tatra*) has to be given.³ [290]

¹This is raised by one who holds that the objects seen or experienced in a dream are real.

²The argument is regarding the illustration of the sleeping man, being awakened by shaking him by his hand. This illustration is faulty in that it is included in false experiences.

³Or, one could alternatively translate: that being the case (*tatra*) (an explanation of) the unaffected nature of the inner self (*śuddhi*) is desired.

तस्मात्कृतकदृष्टान्तमुपादायात्मनोऽञ्जसा ।
आध्यात्मिकादिलेपानां विशुद्धिरिह भण्यते ॥२९१॥

From that, viz. an artificial illustration,¹ here (i.e. in respect of a dream) is clearly stated an explanation of the effects² on the Ātman which appear to have come from the body etc.³ [291]

¹Namely, the use of what is made to appear as illustration.

²Literally, smearing, tints etc. (caused by Avidyā).

³*ātman* in *adhyātman* → *ādhyātmika* refers to body, its organs, their activities and their relation to objects.

किञ्चित्सामान्यमाश्रित्य जामित्वं प्रतिपद्यते ।

न्यायः सर्वोऽपि येनातो नैतत्साधु प्रचोदितम् ॥२९२॥

Relationship (viz. being closely related)¹ is accepted (or, understood) by one after resorting to some kind of common property (or, purport);² this is the general rule everywhere (*sarvo nyāyah*).³ Therefore, this objection is not rightly raised.

[292]

¹It means: the sameness, which amounts to mean repetition (so SP and NKL).

²This refers to volitionally accepted or attributed property; not an actual common property.

³In the case of *dr̥ṣṭāntas*, this is a universally accepted way of understanding; viz. not an actually existing commonness is taken as existing. This is so well-known in *Alaṃkāra Śāstra*. Therefore, SP states it to be only *vācanika* 'at the word level'; cf. *śrauta* in this very sense (NKL). NKL clarifies this specifically thus: *pūrvavākye* (referring to *pāṇipeṣaṇavākya*) ... *ātmanah samvidekarasatvād ārthikam* (i.e. real) *mithyātvam, iha tu lokaśabdena karmaphalamātratvasvīkārāt śrautaṃ tad iti bhedād ity arthaḥ*.

महाराजादयो नास्य स्वप्नानुभवगोचराः ।

आत्मभूता इति ज्ञेयास्तद्वेदेनोपलम्भनात् ॥२९३॥

For this one (who is dreaming), the great king (or, emperor) and others are not the (actual) objects of his experience in the dream state, since they are to be taken only as products (lit. properties) of the *Ātman* (viz. inner self); there is the knowledge (*upalambhana*) about them as distinct (from what are taken as real objects).

[293]

पर्यङ्कशयिताद्राज्ञः प्रत्यक्षादिप्रमाणकात् ।

बहिः समीक्ष्यते राजा स्वप्नदृग्भिर्वनं गतः ॥२९४॥

A king is seen by the dreaming persons to have gone to a

forest outside (his palace, viz. as one different) from that (very) king who is (in reality) sleeping on (his) couch (as noticed by others) by the means of knowing such as direct perception. [294]

स्वानुभूत्यनुरोधेन राज्ञो राजामृषा गृहे ।
स्वप्ने प्रबुद्धस्य सतो मृषा स्याद्वनमाश्रितः ॥२९५॥

For the king (himself), he is truly a king¹ in his (own) home (and) for the person who is (now) awakened (from the dream, that (same king) who had gone to a forest is unreal. [295]

In the preceding verse, there was difference shown between the experiences of the persons who were awake and those who were dreaming. Now, in this verse, the experiences of both of them are shown as not different, the dreaming persons realising the error. The significance of these two verses (viz. 294 and 295) is well brought out in the following verse.

¹SP rightly (and usefully) points to the resolution the Saṃdhi in *rājāmṛṣā* as *rājā amṛṣā*.

जाग्रदृष्टं मृषा स्वप्ने स्वप्ने सज्जागरे मृषा ।
अन्योऽन्यव्यभिचारित्वात्स्वप्नजाग्रत्पदार्थयोः ॥२९६॥

(Thus) on (one's) knowing the king seen in the waking state as false (while one is) in the state of dream and (what was seen as) real in the dream is known as false in the waking state—(this is) on account of mutually differing things seen in a dream and in the waking state. [296]

अहः क्षपायां च कुतः संहताक्षस्य चेक्षणम् ।
मृतानां जीवनं तद्वद्वद्वानां यौवनं कुतः ॥२९७॥

Whence¹ can there be seeing of what is seen by day (as the same) by night?² How¹ can there be seeing by one who has closed his eyes?³ So also, whence can there be living

state of those who are (already) dead and youth (in the case) of those who are (already) old? ⁴ [297]

¹Whence and also how for *kutaḥ* which is connected with both parts of the line.

²This implies that night is not proper time for seeing what are the real objects. It is the time for seeing objects in the dream—naturally not real.

³This refers to the absence of proper means of seeing.

⁴The fourth line refers to things opposed to actual experiences.

न चक्षुरादिदृष्टीनामन्तर्देहसमीक्षणम् ।
हिमवत्प्रभृतीनां च कुतोऽन्तः संभवो हृदि ॥२९८॥

There is no perceiving (lit. seeing) by organs,¹ viz. the eye and others, within the body; how can there be the existence of Mt. Himālaya and others² in the heart? [298]

Verses 298-300 point to the unreality of the objects seen in dreams; this is done with the help of the experiences of the waking state.

¹The word *dr̥ṣṭi* is used in distinction from the eye and, therefore, must be taken to signify the function of the organs, not only that of the eye.

²The organs cannot perceive Mt. Himālaya as existing within a body; whereas they are taken to be there by a dreamer. As such, the false nature of them when seen as objects in a dream.

The word 'others' refers to Mt. Vindhya, Mt. Malaya and so on.

नापि देहाद्विनिष्क्रम्य पर्वतादीन्समीक्षते ।
देहं विना कथमगाङ्गतिसाधनवर्जितः ॥२९९॥

Not also does (a dreamer actually) go out of his body and see mountain(s) and others; for, how could he go (to see them)¹ without having a body and not possessing² any means?

[299]

¹This is because they are actually outside the body.

²Literally, devoid of any means; these are vehicles etc. beside the body.

अन्तरेणापि देहादींस्तत्कार्यं चेत्करोत्ययम् ।
व्यर्थं देहाद्युपादानमस्य प्राप्नोत्यसंशयम् ॥३००॥

If this one (viz. the dreamer), not possessing (or, devoid of) a body etc.¹ does perform the functions² of them; then it certainly follows that his actually having a body etc. is futile.

[300]

Here, Sureśvara points to the contingent futility of the dreamer's body.

¹The word etc. refers to the organs of the body and their functions.

²*kāryam* is singular, yet signifying plurality.

ननु पर्यङ्क आसीनो गच्छन्निबिकया वनम् ।
वेश्मतो बहिरात्मानं द्रक्ष्यतीति न तद्यतः ॥३०१॥
अमात्यादीन्यथादाय स्वात्मभोगप्रसिद्धये ।
नृपः स्वदेशमध्यस्थो यथेष्टं परिवर्तते ॥३०२॥

(And) it is not that ¹ (viz. what one might say:) 'But, indeed (*nanu*) he (viz. the king) is resting on his bed sees himself outside his house, going to the forest in a palanquin. [301]

For, taking (with himself) his attendants,¹ for securing his own pleasures, the king would move at will, within his own territory. [302]

These two verses explain *sa yathā mahārājah*.

¹Namely, the statement that the experience in the dream is real.

²This does not necessarily mean 'ministers'.

स्वदेहराष्ट्रसंस्थोऽयं जाग्रद्भावनिरूपिणः ।
प्राणानात्मा तथादाय स्वप्नान्पश्यति कामतः ॥३०३॥

(In the same way) this Ātman (i.e. the inner self) staying in the territory in the form of its own body and taking with it the *prāṇas* 'organs', sees, at its will, the dreams, viz. those that display (or, assume) the forms (and objects) of the waking state. [303]

This is the explanation of *evam evaiṣaḥ* ... clarifying the illustration in the two preceding verses.

असत्योपाधिभिः सोऽयं कूटस्थासङ्गविग्रहः ।
अविद्यारोपितमलो विद्ययात्मा विशोध्यते ॥३०४॥

(Thus) this Ātman (i.e. the inner self), the immutable and (the one) who does not have any connection with a body, has impurities (or, dirt) superimposed on it by the unreal limiting adjuncts, is purified by knowledge (of its true nature). [304]

The argument in this verse pertains to the unreal nature of all the experiences in the waking and dream state, their being the products of ignorance (Avidyā).

निःसङ्गस्य ससङ्गेन कटस्थस्य विनाशिना ।
आत्मनोऽनात्मना योगौ वास्तवो नोपपद्यते ॥३०५॥

There cannot (ever) be a real union of (i.e. connection between) the Ātman (inner self), which is devoid of any attachment and is immutable, with the non-Ātman that is full of (or, affected by/with) attachment and perishable. [305]

This statement about the never possible union is to clarify more the mention of *avidyāropitamala* on the Ātman, mentioned

in the preceding verse.

कूटस्थादत्तानुज्ञं सत्प्रत्याख्यातं सहान्वयम् ।
कारकाद्यन्यतो मोहान्नात्मानं प्रति द्वैकते ॥३०६॥

The (notions of) *kāraka* etc.,¹ together with what follows them,² being never allowed³ by the immutable, do not drive themselves⁴ unto the Ātman, (even) through infatuation caused by another.⁵ [306]

¹That is, *kārya* 'effect(s)'.

²Namely, desires, hatred, attachment etc. which are caused by them.

³Literally, disallowed, that means 'not tolerated'.

⁴That is, they cannot affect the Ātman. The Ātmepada from *dhaukate* is significantly used. The plural is forced by *sahānvayam*.

⁵Such a thing does not really exist. Yet the statement is made with a proviso 'if at all it did exist'.

Verses 307-390 are a discussion of the BU 2.1.19 (and allied matter).

ननु कामवशादस्य त्वयोक्तं परिवर्तनम् ।
द्रष्टृदृश्यादिभावश्च कथं शुद्धस्तथा सति ॥३०७॥

(A question is raised:) 'But, whatever changes you have mentioned have come to this one (viz. the dreaming inner self) on account of its desire(s), as also the relations such as¹ the seer and what is seen;² that being so, how could there be purity (of the inner self as said by you)?' [307]

¹'Such as' is for 'etc.'; they refer to the listener and what is listened to and other organs and what are perceived (or grasped) by them.

²Literally, what is to be seen.

मैवं स्वतोऽवबुद्धत्वात्कुतोऽज्ञानेन संगतिः ।
अज्ञानसंगतिं मुक्त्वा न स्यात्तज्जेन संगतिः ॥३०८॥

(An answer is given:) 'Do not say so. Since that one is (already) awakened by itself, how could there be its association with ignorance? (Indeed) leaving (aside any) association with ignorance, there could not be its association with what is its outcome (or, product). [308]

एवं यस्मात्स्वतः शुद्धो द्वितीयासंगतेरयम् ।
आत्मा तस्मात्स्वतो मुक्तः कूटस्थज्ञप्तिमात्रतः ॥३०९॥

Since it is thus pure in itself (or, in its own right) on account of (all) non-association with another, therefore, the Ātman (i.e. the inner self), is of itself free (or, liberated), on account of its being merely immutable knowledge.¹ [309]

¹*kūṭastha ... mātrataḥ* is for *kūṭastha ... mātratvataḥ*. Or perhaps, as SP suggests: *kūṭastha ... mātrataḥ* is for *kūṭastha ... mātraḥ* 'for it is merely immutable knowledge'.

न यथा श्रोत्रविज्ञानं रूपेणैति समागमम् ।
संसारेण तथैवात्मा कौटस्थ्यान्नैति संगतिम् ॥३१०॥

As the perception (*viññāna*) by ear(s) does not come to be related to (or, to have any connection/conjunction with) a form, in the same way, the Ātman (i.e. the inner self) does not, owing to its being immutable, come to have (any) relation to transmigratory existence. [310]

इत्यर्थस्यावबोधार्थं परो ग्रन्थोऽवतार्यते ॥३११॥
विशुद्धिं व्यतिरेकं च स्वप्नजाग्रदवस्थयोः ।
उक्त्वात्मनोऽद्वयत्वं च सुषुप्ते चाधुनोच्यते ॥३१२॥

For the explanation of this (very) matter is (now) introduced the subsequent text. [311]

Having (thus) stated the purity and also the absence of the Ātman (i.e. the inner self) in the two states of dream and waking, the Śruti has now stated the non-duality of (or, the absence of duality in) the Ātman in the sleep state also. [312]

This is regarding the introductory to BU sentence *atha yadā suṣupto bhavati*.

Verses 313-318 explain the meaning of the BU clause *yadā na kasya cana veda*.

न वेदेत्यात्मनः श्रुत्या कर्तृत्वं प्रतिषिध्यते ।
पश्यन्नपि यतः प्राज्ञः कौटस्थ्यान् प्रपश्यति ॥३१३॥

In (the words) *na veda* is rejected by the Śruti the agency (of any activity) on the part of the Ātman (i.e. the inner self),¹ since this Prājña² (viz. the inner self), even while it is (i.e. appears to be) seeing, does not really (*pra-*) see, on account of its immutability. [313]

¹It is worthwhile to note how the Śruti is equating the meanings of the verb roots *vid* and *kr*; see for a similar use *brahma veda brahmaiva bhavati* where the verb roots *vid* and *bhū* do not convey two sequential actions, they represent just one action (or what one would call simultaneous actions!).

²This is the (proper) name of the inner self in the sleep state—cf. *Maṇḍūkyaopaniṣad* 5 and *Gauḍapāḍakārikā* 1.11 related to it. Cf. verse 330 below.

अथ यो वेदेति तथा ज्ञातृसाक्षित्वमात्मनः ।
प्रतीचोऽकारकत्वं नः सर्वत्र प्रतिपाद्यते ॥३१४॥

So (also) in the sentence *atha yo veda ...*,¹ the nature of the Ātman (i.e. the inner self) as the knower and the witness and also is the non-agency of the inner self is explained to us everywhere.² [314]

¹This is reference to CU 8.12.4: hereby is explained how the Ātman is *really* the witness and so on.

²Cf. for instance, Śvetāśvataropaniṣad 1.9; 6.11 (SP quotes this); Maitrāyaṇyupaniṣad 2.7; 6.7.

क्वचित्प्रमातृवित्साक्षी क्वचित्प्रत्ययवित्परः ।
क्वचिद्वाह्यार्थविच्चात्मा तत्कर्तृत्वं निषिध्यते ॥३१५॥

At times (or at places or in some situations), the highest self is the knower and the witness of the knower (viz. the experiencer self), the knower of experience (viz. the experiencer's doing) or the knower of external objects (which, in reality, only appear to exist); but ¹ (its) agency is (totally) ¹ denied (or, rejected). [315]

¹This is by implication.

परप्रयुक्तं वेत्तृत्वं यदस्य प्रत्यगात्मनः ।
संबन्धजत्वात्तस्यातः कस्येत्यत्राभिधीयते ॥३१६॥

Since the nature of the knower in the case of this inner self is caused (or, produced/brought to it) by the highest self and also by its relation (to ignorance), therefore, for this reason (*ataḥ*) is used (lit. expressed) here the word *kasya*.¹ [316]

¹In the sentence *na kasya cana veda*, the word *kasya* implies *sambandha* to mean *hetu*; this then means: *na kasyāpi sambandhasya* (viz. *kim api*) *veda*, or, in other words, 'it did not know of any relation (to objects)'. Thus *kasya* is a genitive form expressive of relation (*sambandhe śaṣṭhī*). This is clarified in the following verse.

कर्मोत्थत्वात्प्रमात्रादेस्तत्क्षये क्षयवत्त्वतः ।
षष्ठीयं कर्मणि न्याय्या द्वयाभावविवक्षया ॥३१७॥

Since the knower etc.¹ have arisen from (i.e. produced by) *karman* and have an end (lit. exhaust) when that (viz. *karman*) comes to an end (lit. has exhausted); the genitive expressive of the object (viz. grammatical *karman*) is (to be accepted as being) in conformity with the grammatical practice (*nyāya*).

[317]

Read the introductory of SP on this: *tām (śaṣṭhīm) viśeṣe yojayati*.

¹The word etc. refers to *prameya* and *pramāṇa*.

अप्यर्थे चनशब्दोऽयमभावस्यापि वारकः ।
शेषशेषितरोभावे सुषुप्तिरिह भण्यते ॥३१८॥

The word *cana* in the sense of *api* is (useful in) warding off even *abhāva* 'absence' (of being an object of knowing itself) (and to convey the concealment of the sense of) the relation of *śeṣa* and *śeṣin* (between *abhāva* and *bhāva*) (and) therefore, in (the word) *iha* is conveyed the sleep state in the case of the individual self.¹

[318]

¹Cf. SP: *iheti saptamī puruṣam adhikaroti*.

In verses 319-342, there follows the explanation of *hitā nāma nāḍyaḥ* ...; i.e. to begin with, there is the description of various *nāḍīs* 'veins' and then follows the explanation of the process of sleep coming over a *Puruṣa*.

अथ केन क्रमेणायं सुषुप्तं प्रतिपद्यते ।
इति क्रमविधानार्थं हिता नामेति भण्यते ॥३१९॥

Now, in order to convey the order (of the process) of the sleep state to which this one (i.e. the inner self) comes, the words *hitā nāma* ... are used (i.e. stated).

[319]

आ नाभितस्तथा कण्ठाद्धृदयं मध्यतः स्थितम् ।

सनालं पद्मकोशाभं पञ्चच्छिद्रमधोमुखम् ॥३२०॥

The heart (*hr̥daya* of this *puruṣa*) is situated (in the region) from the navel and (*tathā*) to the throat; it is having a stem, has the colour of the interior of a lotus, has five holes and has an opening (lit. a face) downwards.¹ [320]

¹SP quotes a Śruti: *padmakośapratīkāśaṃ hr̥dyaṃ cāpy adho-mukham* (*Tittirīya Āraṇyaka* 10.11.6).

Also it refers to CU as the source for the word *pañcacchidra*.

स्वप्नाश्रयाणि हृन्मध्ये नीलाद्याभानि देहिनः ।
स्थानानि सुरमर्त्यादिजुष्टान्यस्य भवन्त्युत ॥३२१॥
बिलानि सुषयश्चैता जाग्रद्वत्प्रत्ययोद्भवाः ।
एकोत्तरं नाडिशतं विष्वक्ताभ्यो विनिर्गतम् ॥३२२॥
प्रतीन्द्रियं दश दश निर्गता विषयोन्मुखाः ।
नाड्यः कर्मादिहेतूत्थाः स्वप्नादिफलभुक्तये ॥३२३॥

In the heart of this *Puruṣa* (lit. the embodied one) there are in the dream state the bases, having blue and others as their colours, and they are accepted by gods, mortals and others (for their abodes or supports); [321]

the openings and these holes which have arisen from the experience(s) of the waking state—viz. these are a hundred and one of the veins that have come out (or proceeded forth) from the same,¹ on all sides, [322]
to each organ in groups of ten (of them) they eager (to meet or receive) the objects—these veins, which have arisen (i.e. have been produced) from the causes *karman* and others,² are for the enjoyment of the results, viz. the heaven etc.³ [323]

¹This refers to the experiences.

²The impressions, desires etc. are meant.

³For a full enumeration of the veins etc., refer to SP and NKL—as known from the Śruti—could these be only mythical? Cf. *Kaṭhopaniṣad* 6.16, CU 8.6.6 and *Praśnopaniṣad* 3.6.

वहन्त्यम्भो यथा नद्यो नाड्यः कर्मफलं तथा ।
अनन्तैकोद्वर्गा नाडी तथा गच्छन्विमुच्यते ॥३२४॥

As the rivers carry (or, take) waters in them, so do the veins, the result of *karman* (etc.)¹ (Only) one of the veins has no end, it goes upwards and (the Puruṣa, i.e. Jīva), going by (or, in) that, is liberated.¹ [324]

¹SP quotes the Śruti: *tayordhvam āyann amṛtatvam eti*; *Kaṭhopaniṣad* 6.16 and CU 8.6.6 are referred to in note 3 on the preceding verse.

एकैकस्याः पुनर्नाड्याः सूक्ष्मभेदाः प्रकीर्तिताः ।
द्वासप्ततिसहस्रैस्ते संख्याता योगचिन्तकैः ॥३२५॥

Again, there have been described more subtle varieties of (or, differences among) them in relation to (or, connected with) each vein—they are described as seventy two thousand in number by those who meditate in *yoga*.¹ [325]

¹SP refers to some Śruti (only cryptically) and cites, in support of this. But see *Yājñavalkya Smṛti* 3.108-109ab and 3.101. Also cp. *Skanda Purāṇa* 5.3.159.45.

कदम्बकुसुमोद्भूतकेसरा इव सर्वतः ।
प्रसृता हृदयान्नाड्यो याभिव्याप्तं शरीरकम् ॥३२६॥

The veins have proceeded (lit. spread out) from the heart, on all sides, like pollen produced (or, given out) by a Kadamba flower, and whereby (i.e. thereby) is occupied the whole of this body.¹ [326]

¹In *śarīraka*, the suffix *-ka* is *svārthe*.

हितं फलं प्रयच्छन्ति यस्मात्तस्माद्विताः स्मृताः ।
हृदयात्ता विनिष्क्रान्ता यथार्काद्रश्मयस्तथा ॥३२७॥

Since they yield a fixed¹ result, therefore, they are known (by the name) *Hitā*. They have gone forth from the heart as the rays from the Sun. [327]

¹'Fixed' means determined (by the *karman*, impressions, desires etc.). The meaning 'agreeable' 'pleasure' also cannot be ruled out.

पुरीतदभिधानेन हृद्वेष्टनमिहोच्यते ।
तत्तूपलक्षणं विद्यादेहव्याप्तिविवक्षया ॥३२८॥

In this (happening),¹ the name *Purītat* conveys the sense of what wraps the heart; and (*tu*) one should know it as indicative (of the desire (or, wish)) to convey the pervading (by it) of the whole of the body. [328]

¹This refers to the experience of the three states.

स्वप्नकर्मसमुद्भूता वासना या हृदि स्थिताः ।
नाडीभिस्ता वितत्यात्मा स्वप्नान्पश्यति कामतः ॥३२९॥

The impressions, which have come out from (or, which are produced by) the activity in the dream state (and) which have remained in the heart—they does the *Ātman* (i.e. the inner self) first extend to (*manas*, i.e. scatter over it) and then see dreams (i.e. them in his dreams) according to its desire(s). [329]

स्वाप्नान्भोगानशेषेण भुक्त्वा स्वप्नक्रियाक्षये ।
ताभिरेवोपसंहृत्य प्राज्ञो याति सुषुप्तताम् ॥३३०॥

Having enjoyed all the enjoyables of the dreams (in their entirety), (the inner self) first withdraws them by those very (veins), and, at the end of the activities¹ in the dream, this Prājña² goes to sleep. [330]

¹This plural is implied by 'dreams'.

²Refer to verse 313 above.

जाग्रत्स्वप्नक्रियोद्धूतान्भुक्त्वा भोगानशेषतः ।
इन्द्रियाण्युपसंहृत्य शेते नाडीभिरात्मनि ॥३३१॥

Having (thus) enjoyed the enjoyables in their entirety, viz. those which have arisen from the activities in the waking and the dream states, it (i.e. the inner self) first withdraws by means of the veins (all) the organs within itself (*ātmani*)¹ and enjoys sleep.² [331]

¹This is reflexive pronoun.

²Or alternatively, goes to sleep.

सामान्यप्रज्ञया देहं संव्याप्यान्तर्बहिः श्रमात् ।
श्येनवत्परमं स्थानमात्माभ्येति सुषुप्तताम् ॥३३२॥

As a falcon¹ approaches (i.e. returns to) its nest (lit. resting place) out of fatigue, so does the Ātman (i.e. the inner self), owing to fatigue (caused) both inside and outside² finally³ return to the body, and, pervading it by its common character of knowing (*prajñā*),⁴ it goes to sleep. [332]

¹The example of a falcon (*śyena*) is taken because of its immense power of hovering high and long in space and also because of its large size and great strength.

²This refers to the inner self's activities in and out of the body, i.e. in the dream and the waking states.

³*paramam* is taken alternatively.

⁴It is present in all the states, even in sleep; yet, in this

(last), it does not become related to any object of and for knowing.

धियोऽन्तःकरणस्येह स्थानं हृदयमिष्यते ।
तत्रेन्द्रियाणि सर्वाणि बुद्धितन्त्राणि सर्वदा ॥३३३॥

In this (state), the heart is accepted as the (resting) place for the inner organ, viz. intellect.¹ There (rest in it), all the organs, depend as they do ever on the intellect. [333]

¹Though, by definition, the inner organ comprises the three, viz. *manas*, *ahaṅkāra* and *buddhi*, only the last one is meant; this is clear by the use of the word *dhiyaḥ* in apposition to *antahkaranasya*.

यत एवमतस्तानि नाडीभिः कर्मणो वशात् ॥३३४॥
प्रसारयति धीर्वृत्तीर्मत्स्यजालकवद्वहिः ।
प्रसार्यायतनस्थानि तानि धीरधितिष्ठति ॥३३५॥

Since this is so;¹ therefore, under the influence of *karman*, does intellect spread them and their activities by means of (or, through) the veins outside,² [334]
as (a fisherman spreads) his net, and, (thus) having spread those abodes of them (all),³ intellect superintends over them. [335]

¹That is, as said in the second half of the preceding verse.

²*bahis* refers to the area or locus of the functions or activities of the organs other than intellect; in other words, the world of the external objects of knowing.

³Here, there is reference to the organs as the source of activities.

जाग्रत्काले ततो ज्ञोऽयमभिव्यक्तविशेषधीः ।
व्याप्नोति निष्क्रियः सर्वान्भानुर्दश दिशो यथा ॥३३६॥

Then, this knower (i.e. the inner self), which has, during the time of the waking state, intellect with some special (or, particular) powers revealed in it,¹ though not (at all) active, pervades all (the objects of knowing), just like the sun (which pervades) the ten quarters. [336]

¹This refers to the influence of Avidyā.

ता एवेन्द्रियवृत्तिः स्वाश्चैतन्यखचिता यदा ।
संयच्छति प्रतीच्यात्मा स्वपितीति तदोच्यते ॥३३७॥

When the Ātman (i.e. the inner self) withdraws (or, restricts) within itself those very modifications¹ of (various) organs of itself, which are marked by (lit. studded with) sentience, then it is said that it is a sleep. [337]

¹This is for *vṛttis* identified as *vṛttimats*, viz. the active organs.

बुद्ध्युपाध्यनुरोधेन प्रतीचः प्रभवाप्ययौ ।
विक्षेपलयहीनस्तु स्वतः कुम्भखवत्परः ॥३३८॥

The rise and merger¹ of the inner self are through (i.e. owing to) the limiting adjuncts, viz. intellect (etc.)². However, this one, being (really) the highest self, is devoid of (i.e. not marked by) flashing forth and merger—it is like the sky in a pitcher.³ [338]

¹These are the waking and the sleep states.

²The word etc. in round brackets stands for the other organs which are also active and thus, like intellect, modify the inner self.

³Sureśvara has expressed the simile in very brief: The all-pervading sky which, by its nature, remains outside the pitcher and gets inside it also; in a similar way, the inner self appears active both outside and inside the body, though it is naturally all-pervading.

ताभिः प्रत्यवसृप्यात्मा वृत्तीर्नाडीभिरानयन् ।
तप्तायोवच्छरीरं स्वं व्याप्य शेते स्व आत्मनि ॥३३९॥

(Thus) having crept all around by means of the veins and (finally) withdrawing (them all within) and pervading its own body, the inner self sleeps within itself,¹ like a heated piece of iron.² [339]

This completes the meaning of *tābhiḥ pratyavasṛpya purīṭati śete*.

¹The word itself is for *ātmani* which is a reflexive pronominal form; cf. verse 331 above.

²The simile is somewhat unclear! There is doubt (i) if it is compared with the inner self or its body and also (ii) about the common property, viz. *vyāpti-kriyā* or *śayana*.

स्वहेतुमात्रया स्थानमिन्द्रियाणां न कार्यतः ।
यतोऽतश्चिन्निभेनैव व्याप्तिः स्यात्कारणात्मना ॥३४०॥

The resting (within the body) by (the various) organs is by assuming the nature of their own cause (and) not by (doing their various) activities; for, there is the pervasion (of the body) by the inner self (which is of) the nature of (their) cause; the one that is like (the all-pervading) sentience. [340]

The meaning of the resting of organs within the body is thus explained.

सुषुप्तौ न शरीरेण संगतिः प्रत्यगात्मनः ।
नापि बुद्ध्यादिभिः साक्षात्तत्स्थानासंगतेर्भवेत् ॥३४१॥

In sleep state, there is no (actual) connection (i.e. contact) of the inner self with the body,¹ not also with intellect etc.,² owing to the absence of its association with their resting places (in the body) in a direct way.³ [341]

¹This refers to the contact with the external organs. The sentience within has nevertheless a contact with them, i.e. its presence in them is admitted.

²These are the three internal organs; they have a place inside the body.

³Though the internal organs, especially intellect, would be resting inside the body, there is not any special contact with the same, since the heart, which is described as their resting place (cf. verse 333 above) is wrapped up by the vein called Purītat (in verse 328 above).

तीर्णो हीति तथा चैतदुत्तरत्राभिधास्यते ।
सुषुप्तेऽत्र पिता चेति सर्वसंबन्धवारणम् ॥३४२॥

Also, it will be later said (about the inner self) *tīrṇo hi...*, and in the sleep state, there is a rejection of all relations in the words *atra pitā*¹ [342]

¹Cf. BU 4.3.26: *atra pitāpitā bhavati ... tīrṇo hi kadā sarvān śokān hr̥dayasya bhavati.*

There is now, in verses 343-362, an explanation of the BU passage *sa yathā kumāro vā*

सर्वसंसारदुःखौघव्यतीतेयं परात्मनः ।
अवस्थेत्यत्र दृष्टान्तः स यथेत्यभिधीयते ॥३४३॥

This state¹ of the Ātman (viz. the inner self) is beyond all the influx of misery (caused by) transmigratory existence; in this regard, an illustration is stated in (the words) *sa yathā* [343]

¹This refers to the sleep state.

स्तनंधयो यथा बालो रागद्वेषविवर्जितः ।

तदभावाद्विकुर्वन्ति चेतो न विषयाः सदा ॥३४४॥

As a suckling is free from any attachment and/or hatred, (so) ¹ are the objects of desire (infested by the same) and, owing to their absence (in them, never affect the *manas* (of this one, i.e. the individual). [344]

¹This is for *evam* in the BU passage; the usual correlative *tathā* of *yathā* is not used by Sureśvara. Also, the simile is somewhat unhappily (or, clumsily) expressed!

अप्ररूढेन्द्रियत्वाच्च रागद्वेषाद्यसंप्लुतिः ।
मृदुकण्टकवत्तद्धीर्नालं वेद्धुं स्वगोचरान् ॥३४५॥

In the case of young baby, there is no possibility of being overpowered by attachment, hatred etc., owing to the organs not being (fully) developed, its intellect is not capable of grasping its objects, as the soft thorns ¹ (are not strong enough to pierce them that come its way). [345]

This is yet one more reason for the absence of *rāgādi* on the part of the inner self. There is a deliberate or intentional use of the word *aprarūḍhendriyatvāt* in a double sense; it is related to both a baby and the inner self. It may be said that the simile has become somewhat over-worked!

¹This is to mean that the thorns are not fully developed and, therefore, not sharp.

सर्वत्राव्याहताज्ञश्च विधेयप्रकृतित्वतः ।
राजा वातिसुखी लोके प्ररूढेन्द्रियवानपि ॥३४६॥

And even if the king has his organs fully developed, he is one whose orders are everywhere unchallenged owing to his subjects being under his control and he is therefore very (lit. extremely) happy. (Even so is the inner self very happy). ¹ [346]

This is in contrast with *apradūḍhendriyatva* etc. in the case of the baby in the preceding verse.

¹In this simile, the common property is 'extreme happiness'. One need not seek further point(s) of similitude. Also may be marked the use of *vā* in the sense of *iva* (as sanctioned by *Alaṃkāraśāstra*). See the next verse also for this.

विज्ञाताशेषतत्त्वो वा ब्राह्मणः कृतकृत्यतः ।
आनन्दस्य परां काष्ठामतिघ्नीमेत्य निर्वृतः ॥३४७॥

Or (the inner self is like) a Brāhmaṇa,¹ who has known the entire truth (of transmigratory nature of life), has achieved (the proper end of all) his duties (lit. doings), and having reached the farthest end of happiness,² the highest happiness (or, bliss), has become³ utterly happy (*nirvrta*). [347]

¹The use of *mahābrāhmaṇa* in BU does not relate to the later accepted derogatory sense.

²This is the meaning of *atighnī*; it is later explained in verse 350 below.

³SP refers to the Brāhmaṇa's happy sleep!

बालादित्रयमप्येतदेको दृष्टान्त इष्यते ।
बालमौढ्यमदान्धत्वनिवृत्त्यर्थं तथोच्यते ॥३४८॥

The triad, beginning with a baby is accepted (lit. desired) to be but (*api*)¹ one illustration; (but) it is so² expressed (only) to avert (the notions of) the baby's ignorance (lit. folly) and (the king's) blindness by passion. [348]

¹Read SP: *yad etad bālāditrayaṃ dr̥ṣṭāntatvenoktaṃ tan na tathā kiṃ tv eko mahābrāhmaṇo dr̥ṣṭānta ity arthaḥ apis taddhīr nālam ity ato nañam anukarṣati*. The second line explains the significance of the first line.

²That is, in the form of three illustrations.

बालस्य निर्विवेकत्वात्सविवेकः क्षितीश्वरः ।
तन्मदान्ध्यनिषेधार्थं महाब्राह्मण उच्यते ॥३४९॥

Because a baby has no capacity for differentiating (between things and things) and (in contrast with it) the king (lit. lord of the earth) has a capacity of differentiating (between them); therefore, rejecting his blindness caused by pride, there is mention¹ made of a great Brāhmaṇa. [349]

This explains how the illustration is not 'expressed' in fullness.

¹This is in the sense of 'the use of the illustration'.

अतीत्य दुःखहेतून्या हन्ति दुःखान्यशेषतः ।
आनन्दस्य परा निष्ठा तेनातिघनीति भण्यते ॥३५०॥

That state of happiness which transcends all unhappinesses (or, sorrows) and destroys all the miseries in their entirety is therefore expressed in the word *atighnī* 'the highest happiness (or bliss)'. [350]

This explains the word *atighnī* in verse 347 above.

निर्विकारात्मनां यस्माद्बालादीनां स्व आत्मनि ।
अतीव जायते ह्लादो दृष्टान्तः स विवक्षितः ॥३५१॥

Since, in the case of a baby and others, who are devoid of (i.e. unaffected by) what have the nature of modifications of the original state of mind, there arises (lit. is produced) in one's own self¹ a great joy; therefore that² is intended as an illustration. [351]

¹*ātmani* is used as a reflexive pronoun, and yet the sense of the inner self cannot be neglected.

²The word that refers to all the three sentences which convey different examples to form a *mahāvākya*; i.e. *vākyasamuccaya*,

as the writers on Poetics call it; cf. *Sāhitya Darpaṇa* chapter 1.

परसंबन्धमेत्यात्मा कार्यकारणरूपिभिः ।
ऐकात्म्यलक्षणं साक्षाच्छेत इत्यभिधीयते ॥३५२॥

What is said in the above is: Having come into direct connection with (or, relation to) the highest self, which is characterized by singleness, through (organs) which had assumed the forms of causes and effects, the Ātman (i.e. the inner self) goes to sleep. [352]

This is the proper meaning of *śete* in BU.

अत्यन्तसंनिकृष्टानामपि भिन्नात्मनां मितेः ।
लोचनस्थाञ्जनादीनां न दृष्टिपथतेष्यते ॥३५३॥
किमु प्रध्वस्तनिःशेषभेदहेताविहात्मनि ।
ग्राह्यग्राहकसंबन्धः सर्वभेदापनोदिनि ॥३५४॥

It is accepted that the collirium etc. in the eye, though they are extremely near (to the eye), being (known) as having different natures though, cannot become visible; [353]
what then to say in respect of the relation between what is to be grasped and the one who grasps (it), viz. the Ātman here (i.e. in the stage of sleep, or, in the inner self)¹ who is the cause of the complete (*pra*) destruction of all the differences in their entirety and who removes far away all distinct (objects)?² [354]

This argument is adduced for bringing out that the highest Ātman and the inner self in the sleep state, though very near to each other, are not known as one, owing to the difference in their natures. This is done by *kaimutikanyāya* in verse 354.

¹ Better, however, is to understand the sleep state.

² The word *bheda* seems to have, in this verse, two senses: (i) difference, and (ii) distinct objects.

स्वस्थावस्थैव यैतेषां प्रसिद्धा जगतीक्ष्यते ।
दृष्टान्तत्वेन स्वापस्य सैव साक्षाद्विवक्ष्यते ॥३५५॥

By the use of the illustration of the sleep state, here is intended to speak about that very state by which is known (or, accepted) in (our) worldly life (*jagati*) the most (*pra*) familiar condition of them.¹ [355]

¹This refers to *bāla*, *mahārāja* and *mahābrāhmaṇa* in the 'so-called' one illustration.

दाष्टान्तिकत्वेन यतः सुषुप्तोऽत्र विवक्षितः ।
नापि बालादिस्वापस्य विशेषः कश्चिदीक्ष्यते ॥३५६॥

Since as the *dārṣṭāntika* 'that for explaining which an illustration is given' is accepted here a person in sleep, therefore, there is not any particular nature of the sleep of a baby and others kept in view. [356]

अव्याहतमतिर्बालः सर्वातिशयवर्जिताम् ।
आनन्दस्य परां निष्ठामतिघ्नीं प्रतिपद्यते ॥३५७॥

A baby whose intelligence (or, sense of knowing) is not obstructed (by any outside influence) reaches the farthest end of happiness, the highest happiness (i.e. bliss) which is devoid of all excellences of other (states). [357]

यावद्यावत्प्ररूढत्वं रागादेर्जायते शिशोः ।
तावत्तावत्प्ररूढत्वं दुःखस्याप्यभिजायते ॥३५८॥

In the case of the baby, the more is the development (of its) attachment (to things) etc., the more is the intensity (of its) sorrow also. [358]

यथैव तत्तनुत्वं च यावद्यावदिहात्मनः ।

दुःखस्यापि तनुत्वं स्यात्तावत्तावत्सुखात्मनः ॥३५९॥

(And) as there would be smallness¹ of its sorrow (in proportion to its wants or needs), so also there would be in the case of the Ātman (i.e. the inner self) here (i.e. in worldly life or at the level of worldly existence) smallness in the sorrow, viz. of the one in the state of happiness. [359]

¹What is expressed in the preceding verse is stated in this verse in *vaidharmya* form.

उत्तरोत्तरवृद्ध्यातो दुःखहेतुक्षयाच्छ्रुतौ ।
सहस्रदशभागेन निष्ठानन्दस्य भण्यते ॥३६०॥

Therefore, there is stated in the Śruti a gradual subsequent increase in the limit of the happiness (of the inner self) on account of (the gradual) loss (or, decrease) of sorrow, in relation to the ten thousand measures of them.¹ [360]

¹This is on the basis of *Taittirīyopaniṣad* 2.8 beginning with *sa eko mānuṣa ānandaḥ* up to *sa eko brahmaṇa ānandaḥ*. Read SP for a little more explanation of the increase of the limit of happiness as *sukhabāhulayasiddhi* under reference.

अव्यावृत्ताननुगतप्रत्यङ्मात्रसमाप्तिः ।
भूमन्येव तु परा निष्ठानन्दस्येति श्रुतेर्वचः ॥३६१॥

(Also) there is a Śruti statement¹ that conveys the farthest limit of joy (or happiness) in only *bhūman* 'plenty' arising from obtaining only (the pure, i.e. unaffected, state of) the inner self which is not (i.e. cannot be) distinguished from or similar to (any other object).² [361]

¹This refers to CU 7.23.1.

²This is said, because that does not exist.

आनन्दः स्वयमेवात्मा भेदसंसर्गवर्जितः ।
दुःखहेतुविनिर्मुक्तावतिघ्नीमेत्यतः स्वतः ॥३६२॥

The Ātman (here, the inner self), (then) becoming devoid of any contact with distinct objects, is itself happiness and when there is release from the causes of sorrow (or, miseries), attains, of itself,¹ to the farthest limit (of happiness.) [362]

¹The significance of this word, viz. *svataḥ* 'of itself', is to point to the absence of the final release from transmigration (SP).

Verses 363-366 are for pointing out the relation of the preceding to the subsequent *Kaṇḍikā*: *sa yathorṇanābhīḥ*

गार्ग्यं काश्यो यदप्राक्षीत्क्वाभूदेष तदेति तत् ।
सप्रपञ्चं यथावच्च सर्वमुक्तमशेषतः ॥३६३॥
अनेन च यथोक्तेन पाणिपैषोत्थितस्य हि ।
मोहोत्थाशेषकार्येभ्यो विशुद्धिं श्रुतिरब्रवीत् ॥३६४॥

That Kāśya asked Gārgya, 'Where was this one then?' is explained in its fullness, as was necessary (*yathāvat*). [363]
And by this,¹ viz. this explanation, the Śruti has declared the purification (i.e. distinction) of just² that one, who was awakened by shaking (by Kāśya) with his hand, from all of the effects that had arisen from ignorance. [364]

¹Both SP and NKL point to it as *tvampadārthaśodhana*.

²This is for *hi*; SP remarks: *tathāvidhā śuddhir anyatrāpi prasiddheti hiśabdārthaḥ*.

कुत आगदिति त्वस्य प्रश्नार्थविश्चकीर्षया ।
सुषुप्ताज्जाग्रदापत्तिर्यथा तदधुनोच्यते ॥३६५॥

And (*tu*) now is stated as to how there is awakening (i.e. bringing him to the waking state) from the state of sleep,

with a desire to clarify the thought (lit. thing, raised by) the question, 'Whence has he come?'. [365]

This refers, in substance, to Jīva 'the inner self' that was asleep.

Verses 366-390 discuss a doubt raised about the repetition of the questions (i.e. statements) of Kāśya and the rejection of the same.

नन्वस्थाद्यो हि यत्रेह स तस्मादन्यतो व्रजन् ।
वेश्मतो ग्रामतो वासौ तत एव व्रजेद्ध्रुवम् ॥३६६॥

'But, indeed,' (it may be argued) 'he, who stood at some place (*yatra*), would, going elsewhere,¹ whether from a house or a village, certainly go only from that place itself.' [366]

¹This is the object to which the person goes; cf. SP: *anyata iti gatikarmoktiḥ*.

तस्मात्सामर्थ्यतः सिद्ध उत्तरप्रश्ननिर्णयः ।
तन्निर्णयार्थमारम्भो न कार्यो जामिदोषतः ॥३६७॥

Therefore, the decision regarding (i.e. answer to) the subsequent question is (already) given (lit. determined) through the force (of that); therefore, there should not (now) be made an effort (lit. a beginning) to decide the same, lest there would result the fault of repetition (*jāmi*). [367]

न निमित्ताद्यर्थतापि पञ्चम्या उपपद्यते ।
ऊर्णनाभ्यग्निदृष्टान्ते न निमित्तादि गम्यते ॥३६८॥

Also, it does not stand to reason to hold that the meaning conveyed by the ablative case is expressive of reason (or, cause); (for) in the illustration of the spider and (also that of) Agni¹ there is not understood any reason etc. [368]

¹This is a reference to the illustration *sa yathorṇanābhiḥ* ... to follow.

प्रत्युक्तौ न निमित्तादि यदि साक्षात्समीक्ष्यते ।
अपादानार्थतैवास्तु दोषस्यान्यत्र दर्शनात् ॥३६९॥

Since, in the answer, there is not any reason etc. directly noticed, therefore, let there be the sense of ablation (or, going away from a thing), as there is noticed the fault (of repetition) (in the case) of the other (sense). [369]

नन्वत्रापि समो दोषो वाक्यस्य पुनरुक्तता ।
नैवं यतोऽखिलध्वान्तकार्यध्वंसो विवक्षितः ॥३७०॥

(An objection is raised thus:) 'But, here (i.e. in this case) also, there is the same (*sama*) fault, viz. the repetition of the sentence(-sense).' (There is now an answer to this objection:) 'This is not so; for what is intended to mention is the destruction of the entire effect(-world) of darkness, i.e. ignorance (Avidyā).' [370]

अव्यावृत्ताननुगतं पूर्णं ब्रह्म विवक्षितम् ।
प्रत्यङ्मात्रैकयाथात्म्यं न दोषो जामिता ततः ॥३७१॥

Since it is (here) wished to speak about the Brahman, which is not distinguished from (anything else), nor is it similar to (anything else); full/complete (in itself), and only the true nature of the inner self; therefore there is no fault of repetition. [371]

This is the intended statement latent in the second question of Kāśya.

विषयौ द्वावपन्यस्तौ विद्याविद्यात्मनोरिह ।
आत्मेत्येवेति विद्याया विषयः प्रागुदाहृतः ॥३७२॥

अविद्याविषयस्तावत्संसारानर्थ ईरितः ।

क्रियाकारकभेदेन नामरूपक्रियात्मकः ॥३७३॥

Here are put forth two topics of the dialogue, i.e. the subject matter regarding knowledge and ignorance about (the true nature of) the two Ātmans,¹ (and) already (*prāk*) the subject matter of knowledge is presented just in the words *ātman* [372]

(and), as for the subject matter of ignorance, there is stated the undesirable transmigratory existence which comprises action (or activity) and various factors related to it and which has the nature of name(s), form(s) and action(s).² [373]

¹The highest Ātman and the inner self.

²This refers to the subject matter of first Adhyāya.

तत्राविद्योद्भवं कार्यं यावत्किंचिद्विवक्षितम् ।

तत्प्रत्यपादि निखिलं पूर्वं श्रुत्यैव यत्नतः ॥३७४॥

Of these two,¹ whatever was intended as effect arising from ignorance has been already² explained by the Śruti, in its fullness and with particular care. [374]

¹That is, knowledge (*vidyā*) and ignorance (*avidyā*).

²That is from 1.4.10 onwards up to the end of first Adhyāya.

अविद्याप्रतिपक्षाया विद्याया विषयोऽधुना ।

प्रवक्तव्योऽतस्तद्योग्यौ प्रश्नौ द्वौ समुदाहृतौ ॥३७५॥

(And) now is to be discussed (or explained) the subject matter of knowledge, which is opposed to (lit. is an opponent to) ignorance; therefore, there are introduced two questions which are suitable for the same.¹ [375]

¹SP states *vidyāsūtram na prapañcitam iti*.

हेतुस्वरूपकार्याणि विरोधीनि परस्परम् ।
अविद्याविद्ययोर्यस्मात्तद्योग्यप्रश्नगीरतः ॥३७६॥

Since the causes, natures and effects¹ of ignorance and those of knowledge are mutually opposite, therefore, the statement of the (two) questions is proper.² [376]

This clarifies the mutual opposition of ignorance and knowledge.

¹SP clarifies them thus:

	ignorance	knowledge
cause	informative of non-discrimination, attachment etc.	productive and informative of (proper) discrimination, aversion to pleasures etc.
nature	manifest	unmanifest
effect	bondage	freedom from bondage

²That is, suitable for giving an exposition of knowledge which removes ignorance.

कारकव्यवहारोऽयमविद्याविषयः सदा ।
आधाराधेययोर्भित्तौ तयोः कारकतेष्यते ॥३७७॥

The function of various factors which are instrumental in bringing about an activity is ever the subject matter of ignorance. (And) on the basis of the support and the supported are the two¹ accepted as related to action (expressed by the verb in the sentence (*kārkatā*).¹) [377]

¹Namely, ignorance and the instrument of its activity.

²SP states that this statement pertains to the first question of Kāśya.

तद्वद्गच्छति यो यस्माद्भेदे सत्येव याति सः ।
इत्यविद्याव्यवस्थेयं विद्यायास्तद्विपर्ययः ॥३७८॥

Similarly, he who goes from some (place) does so (i.e. goes) only when there is a difference (between the other place and the goer's earlier place); thus is the order of things (*vyavasthā*) related to ignorance and, in relation to knowledge,¹ the opposite of it (viz. non-difference and the consequent order of things) is (to be understood). [378]

¹SP observes that this is related to the second question of Kāśya. The editor of NKL adds a note to the NKL thus: *apādānakartṛbhāvasya* (as *apādānatvakartṛtvayoḥ*), *tathāṭve* (as *avidyākāryatve*) and *yuktim* (as *bhedasāpekṣatvarūpāṃ yuktim*) *āha*.

क्रियाकारकभेदाद्या लोकतः शेमुषी त्वभूत् ।
यथास्थितात्मयाथात्म्यसम्यग्ज्ञानेन बाध्यते ॥३७९॥

And (*tu*) what notion there was about the difference between an activity and its instruments—as is held by the people (*lokataḥ*)— is stultified by the right knowledge of the real nature of the Ātman that has been existent. [379]

This expresses the effect of knowing clearly the difference between ignorance and knowledge.

नान्योऽयमात्मान्यत्राभन्नान्योऽन्यस्मात्तथैति च ।
इति निःशेषतन्मोहकार्यैध्वंसो विवक्षितः ॥३८०॥

This Ātman (i.e. the inner self) did not become another in another place, nor is it another and does it go elsewhere; thus it is intended to express the complete (or, utter) destruction of the wrong apprehension about it and also (the consequent) effects thereof. [380]

NKL briefly points out the intention thus: *ādhārādheya-bhāvāpādānakartṛtvādinirāso vivakṣita ity arthaḥ*.

अभेदव्यतिरेकाभ्यां वस्त्वन्तरमिहात्मनः ।
श्रुत्या निषिध्यते साक्षाद्वेदहेतोर्निषेधतः ॥३८१॥

Here (in this statement of questions) anything else than the Ātman (i.e. the inner self) is rejected by the Śruti, with the Anvaya and Vyatireka (method of argument) and, directly, by (the consequent) rejection of the cause of (their) being distinct.¹ [381]

¹This refers to ignorance.

ननु प्राणादिभिः सद्भिः कथं निर्भेदतात्मनः ।
नात्मन्येव तदध्यासाच्छ्रुतकारजतादिवत् ॥३८२॥

‘But’ (it is objected): ‘How can there be the non-distinction of the Ātman (i.e. the inner self) (from the *prāṇas* ...) while there are *prāṇas* and others¹?’ (The answer is:) ‘That cannot be so, owing to the superimposition of them on the Ātman (i.e. the inner self) like that of silver etc.² on a shell.’ [382]

¹The word etc. refers to intellect, *manas*, *ahaṁkāra*, *mamātva* and others.

²This ‘etc.’ is yet again Sureśvara’s loose diction, i.e. for *ādi* in *rajatādi* there are not mentioned any counterparts other than a shell. Or, are we to understand the compound *śūktikārajatādivat* as *śūktikādi-rajatādi-vat*, (for such is Sureśvara’s way of expression)?

कथं तदिति दृष्टान्त ऊर्णनाभ्यादिरुच्यते ।
वास्तवं वृत्तमापेक्ष्य न त्वियं सृष्टिरात्मनः ॥३८३॥

(A question is asked:) ‘How is that¹ (to be understood)?’ (In answer) it is pointed out ‘(the illustration of) a spider etc. is given.’ (Again, another question:) ‘(Is not) this with actual happening in view?’³ (An answer to it is given thus:)

'Indeed, this is not the creation of the Ātman (i.e. inner self).'
[383]

¹The questioner asks about the superimposition affirmed in the preceding verse.

²The word etc. refers to the sparks of fire. It has a basis in the clauses *yathorṇanābhiḥ tantunocaret, yathāgneḥ kṣudrā visphulingā vyuccaranti*.

³The *lyabanta* form *āpekṣya* is from a verb root *īkṣ* with *ā-apa* as a compound prefix.

नासतो जन्मना योगः सतः सत्त्वान्न चेष्ट्यते ।
कूटस्थे विक्रिया नास्ति तस्मादज्ञानतो जनिः ॥३८४॥

That which is non-existent is not connected with (any) origination, nor is it accepted as originating from what is existent; because it has (already) the nature of being an existent. In the immutable again, there does not occur any modification. Therefore, (it is settled that the *prāṇas* etc. have) an origin in ignorance.
[384]

This explains the unreality of *prāṇas*.

पुंसप्रबोधप्रसिद्धयर्थं सृष्टिव्याजोऽयमुच्यते ।
कौटस्थ्यात्त्वात्मनः सृष्टिर्न कथं च न युज्यते ॥३८५॥

In order to explain (lit. establish) the waking up of the man,¹ this pretext of (the statement of) the creation is adopted; nevertheless, (any) creation from the Ātman (i.e. the inner self) does not, owing to its immutability, become in any way possible.
[385]

¹NKL reads: *svaprabodhasiddhyartham* in place of *pumspra...*; but that does not seem to be probable.

निःशेषवेदसिद्धान्तविद्वद्विरपि भाषितम् ।

गौडाचार्यैरिदं वस्तु यथास्माभिः प्रपञ्चितम् ॥३८६॥
 मृल्लोहविस्फुल्लिङ्गाद्यैः सृष्टिर्या चोदितान्यथा ।
 उपायः सोऽवताराय नास्ति भेदः कथं चन ॥३८७॥

The revered teacher (*ācārya*) Gauḍapāda, who knew the entire Vedānta doctrine (only too well), also has described at length the thing (viz. the existent thing is really the Ātman alone), in the same way as I have done: [386]

“Whatever creation (was earlier) pointed out (by me), viz. by (citing examples of) clay, iron, sparks of fire and others, was only otherwise (i.e. false or not real); that was only by way of introducing (the real matter, in hand); indeed, there do not exist any discrete objects.”¹ [387]

¹This is a quotation, viz. *Gauḍapādakārikā* 3.15.

सृष्टावन्यपरायां तु न चोद्यस्यास्ति संभवः ।
 कूटस्थात्कथमुत्पत्तिरचित्कं चेतनात्कथम् ॥३८८॥

When creation¹ is pointing towards something else,² there is no possibility of (or, no scope for) any objection;³ (for we ask:) ‘How can there be any origination (of something) from the immutable and how could there be any non-sentient (produced) from the sentient?’ [388]

The argument refers to what are known as *sṛṣṭivākyas* ‘statements about the origination of what forms the mundane world’. Reference was made to these by Gauḍapāda and other Vedāntins; yet with the intention of showing the origination as unreal.

¹That is, the statements about creation or origination of some thing(s).

²This is based on the singleness of the Ātman.

³Namely, the Ātman or the immutable originates other things.

निःसाधनं च कार्याणि कथं कुर्यादनेकधा ।

विश्वरूपसमुत्पत्तिरेकरूपात्कथं भवेत् ॥३८९॥

How can what does not have any means (of activity) produce manifold (i.e. varied) effects? How (again) can there be creation of all forms (*viśva-rūpa*) from what is (only) uniform?

[389]

This argument is based on the prerequisites of creation, viz. (i) there should be the means for creation and that (ii) the cause and the effect must be similar (in form).

इत्येवमादि चोद्यानां पुंस्वभावानुरोधतः ।
परिहारवचः श्रौतं न च वस्त्वनुरोधतः ॥३९०॥

Thus the statements of refutation in the Śruti¹ pertain to the objection (that arises) from men's nature and not from (the real state of) the thing.²

[390]

Here is given finally the purport of the whole of the argument.

This is to explain the need of the Śruti sentences which resemble those in common parlance; cf. BSB 1.1.1 (p.40): *tam etam adhyāsam avidyākhyam ātmānātmanor itaretarādhyāsam puraskṛtya sarve pramāṇaprameyavyavahārā laukikā vaidikāś ca pravṛttāḥ*.

¹The reference in the singular implies the plurality of the sentences. This refers to the illustrative statements in the Śruti which explain the natures of ignorance and knowledge.

²That is, the nature of the Ātman or, the inner self (as the case may be).

Now follows the explanation of the BU 2.1.20 and discussion of allied matters.

ऊर्णनाभिः स्वयं कर्ता प्रयुङ्क्ते कर्म चात्मना ।
तन्तन्स्वतः प्रसिद्धेन करणेन च तन्तना ।
गमिक्रियां साधयति तथैकत्रापि चात्मनः ॥३९१॥

A spider, being itself an agent, employs, on its own, the object, viz. the threads (produced) from itself¹ by means of its (well-)known organ, viz. the thread, and accomplishes the action of going (along/about) it); so is it (to be understood) also (*ca*) in the case of the Ātman (i.e. the inner self), even though it is only single (by itself).² [391]

The word *anekadhā* in the preceding verse is in view.

¹See on this NKL: *svayam eva kartrā karanam ca tyaktvā anekadhā sṛṣṭatvam āha*.

²'So is it ... (by itself)' is in conformity with the explanation of SP and NKL. I believe it to be necessary owing to the incompleteness of the meaning, if *ekatrāpi cātmani* is related to the spider itself. So also, the force of *ca* 'also' would be otherwise lost.

अचेतनो यथा जाल ऊर्णनाभेः सचेतनात् ।
आकाशादिजगत्कार्यमात्मनश्चेतनात्तथा ॥३९२॥

As an insentient cob-web¹ (comes from, i.e. is produced from) a sentient spider, so does the (entire world of) effect(s), beginning with the sky,² (come from) the sentient Ātman (i.e. the inner self). [392]

This answers *acitkam cetanāt katham* in verse 388 above.

¹Sureśvara uses the word *jāla* in the masculine! Perhaps, a fastidious reader, following the dictum of Poetics, would suggest: *acetanam yathā jālam* so that it corresponded to *kāryam* (in neuter) and that could not be objectionable. But this can be in (Sureśvara's) occasional Vedic fashion.

²Cf. *Taittirīyopaniṣad* 2.1.

विस्फुलिङ्गा यथा चाग्नेर्जायन्तेऽग्निस्वभावकाः ।
सुषुप्तादात्मनस्तद्वत्प्राणादीनां समुद्भवः ॥३९३॥

Also as small sparks proceed (i.e. arise) from fire and (further) have the nature of fire (itself), so do the *prāṇas* etc. come (i.e. arise) from the Ātman (i.e. the inner self) which is asleep. [393]

This is to answer (also) *kūṭasthāt katham* in verse 388 above.

सुषुप्तोदाहृतिर्येयं तया समुपलक्ष्यते ।
विश्वाभिव्यक्तितः पूर्वं ब्रह्मैवानामरूपकम् ॥३९४॥

What (again) is the example of the one (viz. the inner self) that is asleep points to (or, indicates) the very Brahman which existed before the world became manifest (and) which did not have any name and form. [394]

This sets aside any notion of *kāryakāraṇa* relation between the (sleeping) inner self and the highest Ātman.

सर्वासूपनिषत्स्वेवं कारणं नान्यदात्मनः ।
श्रूयतेऽतः परात्मैव जगतः कारणं परम् ॥३९५॥

Thus in all of the Upaniṣads is thus heard that there is nothing else¹ as the cause of the inner self; therefore, the highest Ātman alone is the ultimate (*para*) cause. [395]

¹SP points out that this sets aside the theory of the Pradhāna as the cause. This, on the basis of the Upaniṣads.

There is now, in verses 396-413, Sureśvara's discussion about the divergent views of the followers of his some allied schools, viz. possibly of those who accept the authoritativeness of the Śruti. And there is also the refutation of the same in brief.

ब्रह्मण्यस्तमितेऽत्यर्थं जगद्यस्मिन्नशेषतः ।
जगत्प्रसूतौ को हेतुस्तदन्याव्यतिरेकतः ॥३९६॥

(One might say:) 'When (i.e. in the case that) this entire world has finally merged into the Brahman, what can (or, could) be the cause of/for its origination, since there is altogether an absence of anything else than that?' [396]

The argument is based on two aspects of the Brahman: (i) it is immutable and (ii) it is without a second. Therefore, once the world merges into the Brahman, there can never be any creation!

अस्तीशो व्यतिरिक्तश्चेत्सोऽपि केन प्रवर्तितः ।
जगन्निर्मिनुयादेतत्स्वतश्चेत्सर्वदा न किम् ॥३९७॥

If (it is held that) there is a Lord, apart (from the Brahman), (then the question would be,) 'How would he be able to create the world?'¹ (and) impelled by whom? And if he would do so, on his own (*svataḥ*), then why (does or can he) not (create the world) always?² [397]

This argument comes from Tārīkikas 'Logicians' who hold that there is an indifferent (*atastha*) Lord, beside the Brahman.

¹Having doubted the existence of such a Lord (cf. *so 'pi*), Sureśvara puts a question: 'Who would impel that Lord?'

²This is a counterquestion to the Tārīkikas. Here, another alternative, viz. *svataḥ* 'on his own' is refuted.

ऐश्वर्यं पारतन्त्र्यं च नापि संभाव्यते मितेः ।
नापि कार्यं विलीनत्वात्स्वात्मोत्पत्तौ प्रवर्तते ॥३९८॥

And Lordship and dependence both cannot possibly exist (in just one Lord), (for that can be understood) from the modes of arguing.¹ So also, the effect, owing to its having merged (in the Brahman), cannot proceed to produce itself.² [398]

There are two aspects of this verse. One is in continuation of the Tārīkikas' argument and, the other of the Svabhāvavādins

who believe in the nature of things to come into existence on their own. Cf. *Śvetāśvataropaniṣad* 1.2 and 6.1.

¹This has reference to yet another aspect of the Tārīkikas' thought, viz. it is *karman* that impels the Lord to create. But this would mean his dependence and, being a Lord, he should be independent! That would involve self-contradiction.

²It can be argued by the Svabhāvavādins that the world, which is a *kārya*, can come into existence by its own nature. Yet, having had merged into the Brahman, how could it proceed to any activity?

भिन्नं चेत्कारणात्कार्यं कार्यकारणता तयोः ।
पृथक्प्रसिद्धयोः केयं हिमवद्विन्ध्ययोरिव ॥३९९॥

If (again) the effect is different from the cause, what kind of cause and effect relation can there be between them, viz. the cause and the effect, which are quite well-known to be distinct even as Mt. Himālaya and Mt. Vindhya? [399]

The question pertains to the Tārīkikas' position that cause and effect must be similar. Here the Brahman and the world are totally different from each other and, therefore, one could not consider them as the cause and the effect.

अथाभिन्नं तदैकत्वात्कार्यकारणता कुतः ।

Further, if thus the effect is not distinct¹ from the cause; then the two being just one, how could there be (posited) the cause and effect relation of the two? [400ab]

¹By 'distinct' one should be required to understand two different entities; but this is denied by the use of the word *ekatvāt*. Non-distinction in nature is not under discussion here; for, the Tārīkikas have already mentioned that as what is a characteristic of the cause and the effect—this is mentioned in the note on the preceding verse.

नापि निष्क्रियरूपं सत्कारणत्वं समश्नुते ॥४००॥
 तथा चाक्रियमाणं सत्कथं कार्यमिहोच्यते ।
 क्रियाशून्यं च यद्वस्तु तच्चाकारकमिष्यते ॥४०१॥

Also, nothing, being inactive in nature, can be a cause (or, be called a cause).¹ [400cd]

So also, what is not being subjected to some action is described here as the effect!² And, that thing which is devoid of any activity is regarded (lit. accepted) here as what is instrumental (in some activity).³ [401]

¹Actually, this line is read in the printed edition together with verse 400ab and is not separated as is done here. But it begins a discussion of the natures of what are related as the cause and the effect. Here, it is pointed out that what is non-operative/non-active in nature—such is the Brahman—is considered as the cause; this is not logically possible.

²To be an effect something is required to have been subjected to an activity of some cause(s) to produce it. But the argumentator seems to hold that there is some effect, and yet that has no cause(s) for it!

³The word 'instrumental' suggests the nature of what is held as cause—most likely, the agent—and has no relation to any activity whatever.

लयेनैव समाप्तत्वात्कालकर्मादिकारणम् ।
 स्वात्मोत्पत्तावशक्तं तद् व्यक्तं सामर्थ्यभाष्यतः ॥४०२॥

Since what is considered as the cause of creation, viz. the *karman* (or activity of) Kāla,¹ is already included in Merger,² that (viz. Kāla) is not capable of coming into existence itself and it is held to have the capacity to create (only when) it is manifest!³ [402]

Here is controverted a view of those who hold Kāla as the

cause of the creation of the world; cf. reference to this view in *Gauḍapāḍakārikā* 2.24.

¹The basis of this may be BU 1.2.4 (and *Maitrāyanyūpaniṣad* 6.14).

²The Brahman itself is (in every likelihood) called *laya* 'Merger', since all objects in the world merge in it.

³The argument is: To be able to create anything, Kāla must come into existence first.

नित्यशक्तित्वपक्षेऽपि युगपत्प्रभवादिकम् ।
प्राप्नोति सर्वकार्यस्य न च तद्वर्तते तथा ॥४०३॥

If a view is held¹ that the cause of the world² has ever (or, for all time) the power to create, then the origin etc.³ of all effects would be (only) simultaneous; but that does not so happen.⁴ [403]

¹For 'If a ... held', alternatively translate: 'In the view that ...'. But the first alternative appears better.

²That is Kāla, continued from the preceding verse.

³The word etc. refers to *apyaya* 'merger'. Or, one can understand in the place of these two: the usual triad, *utpatti*, *sthiti* and *laya*.

⁴This is how the view under reference cannot be accepted.

शक्त्युत्पत्त्यभ्युपेतौ च कारणं स्यादशक्तितमम् ।
अथ शक्त्यन्तराच्छक्तिरनवस्था प्रसज्यते ॥४०४॥

Or, if it is held that this power to create the world comes to exist in the cause, it would then mean that the cause does not have the power (to create the world);¹ thence it would follow that that power (to create the world) has come from (or, originated in) another power² and thus there would be the contingent *infinite regress*. [404]

This is an alternative view to that in the preceding verse and

is consequently refuted.

¹This would mean a cause is powerless to create the world and is itself created by some cause.

²This power, in its turn, must originate in yet another and so on.

किमपेक्ष्य व्यपेतत्वं कालोऽयं वार्तमानिकः ।
यायादनागतत्वं च तस्यैक्याभागवत्त्वतः ॥४०५॥
नित्यमेकं विभु द्रव्यं यदि कालोऽभ्युपेयते ।
अतीतानागतत्वादिभेदः स्यात्किंनिबन्धनः ॥४०६॥

On what does (Kāla) depend (i) to be (of the nature of being) past and (ii) that this Kāla of the present would be (of the) future—if it has just the nature of being one whole and having no parts? [405]

If Kāla is accepted as eternal, one (i.e. single) and all-pervading substance; then in what is rooted its differentiation into what is past and what is to come? [406]

The argument is: Acceptance of the past, the present and the future as three parts of Kāla would render it unfit to be the origin or cause of this world.

The Vaiśeṣikas (i.e. Tārīkikas) hold Kāla as *nityā-*, *eka-* and *vibhu-* *dravya* 'substance'. This means, being *vibhu* 'all-pervading' like the sky, it cannot have such parts as are mentioned in the above.

आदित्यादिगतिश्चेत्स्यात्कालोऽव्यक्तसमुत्थितौ ।
आदित्यादेर्विलीनत्वान्न तदा तत्क्रियेयते ॥४०७॥

If (it is said that) Kāla is the (varying) movement of Āditya and others,¹ then (it has to be admitted that that movement can occur only) after there has been the rise (or manifestation) of the unmanifest;² but, because Āditya and others¹ have already had merged (in the unmanifest), there would not be any action thought of (or, contemplated, lit. accepted of the

Āditya and others).

[407]

¹It is difficult to explain what is meant by *-ādi* 'others' in *ādityādi* (this is twice used in this verse). One can perhaps say that *-ādi* refers to the limiting adjuncts of the sun, viz. *gati*, capacity to heat, and light—this can be so on the clue suggested by NKL's explanation of *kālah* as *kālopādhir iti yāvat*. NKL's comment on this verse offers some difficulty: It states: *yad vā ādityādikriyaiva kālah ity āśanikya anena vārtikena nirasyate*; but how can this be an alternative? The tenor of the arguments precludes the same.

Or possibly, and better perhaps, to hold that this is based on *Maitrāyanyupaniṣad* 6.15.

²The unmanifest is the Brahman, the so-called source of the world; *nāmarūpābhyām avyākṛta*.

न चावयविनो वृत्तिर्निरंशैकत्वहेतुतः ।

भागेषु निष्कलत्वैक्यनिःसामान्यत्वकारणात् ॥४०८॥

So also what is (said to be) made of parts¹ cannot exist in (its different/discrete) parts (simultaneously) owing to the reason that it is without parts (i.e. a whole) and (just) one thing; and also because it is (really) not made up of parts and (therefore) is not (what can be called as) general property.

[408]

SP clearly brings out the argument thus (this is only briefly indicated here): A piece of cloth, as a whole, cannot rest on all threads which are related to it as its parts—it can be argued that, while 'clothness' can obtain in some threads, it does not obtain on others. Thus the so-called *samavāya* relation cannot obtain in the case of the Ātman and the various individuals. (This is clarified in the following verse. SP points out thus: *vipakṣam anūdya doṣam āha*.)

¹That is, 'it is a whole'.

आधारेषु निरंशेषु यद्याधेयस्तथाविधः ।
भिन्नदेशेषु तेष्वेकस्तथा चावयवी कथम् ॥४०९॥

If (then) that kind of 'what is to be supported' exists in 'what are supports' that are (in reality) not parts, how then the single one, existing in various places (or beings) can be said to be 'having parts'? [409]

This is to say that the single Ātman, though appearing to exist in many bodies, cannot be said to have those bodies as its parts. It cannot be compared with 'being a form' (*rūpatva*) that is common to many forms (*rūpas*).

तस्मान्न देशकालादिभेदो वस्त्वाश्रयो मितेः ।
दिग्भेदकलृप्तिवद्वयोमिन् भेदोऽयं तद्वदात्मनि ॥४१०॥

Therefore, the distinctions¹ such as a region (or part), Kāla 'time' do not have a support in the thing (viz. the origin of the world, i.e. the Brahman), since (we can show) by (or from) inference (*mitēḥ*) that this (world of) distinctions in (alleged to be obtaining) in the Ātman (in this context, the inner self) is like the (differentiation) in (the case of) the sky in (its) divisions (called) quarters. [410]

Actually, there is not any specific argument in respect of region (unless, of course, *ādhāra-ādheya*, *avayava-avayavin* or *bhāgas* (and, therefore, *bhāgin*) are understood in the sense of *deśa*— and this is clear from the illustration of the sky which is (said to be) divided into quarters.

¹This plural is implied by the singular.

जगदुत्पत्तिसंहारास्तद्वदात्मनि कल्पिताः ।
वस्तुवृत्तं समालोक्य कुतः सृष्ट्यादिसंभवः ॥४११॥

In the same way, (then), the origin and the merger of the world in the (highest) Ātman are (only) imagined; (therefore),

after having seen (i.e. carefully examined) the nature of things,¹ how (or, on what ground, or, whence) can (one posit that) there is a possibility of the creation etc.² of the world? [411]

There is here a stress on the imaginary nature (*kalpitatva*) of the world. This is entailed by the earlier statement about the imaginary nature of the world.

¹Things here refer to the discrete objects in the world, their origination and merger as also the ultimate reality.

²The word etc. refers to the mutual relations among the things in the world and their modifications (*vikāras*).

कारकादिर्यथा भ्रान्तिस्तथा पूर्वमवादिषम् ।
सर्वमात्मेति नेतीति तथा सत्युपपद्यते ॥४१२॥

I have already spoken as to how the (distinctions such as) instrument of activity¹ are only imaginary (i.e. products of imagination). Only that being so,² (the Śruti statements) *sarvam ātmā ...*³ and *neti ...*⁴ become⁵ reasonable. [412]

¹This is indicative of the agent, his action and so on.

²This means: since this is so.

³Cf. BU 4.5.7.

⁴Cf. BU 4.4.22; 4.5.15.

⁵That is, they prove to be in conformity with reason (in our arguments above).

उद्भूतिस्थितिनाशाः स्युर्जगतोऽतः प्रतिक्षणम् ।
अविद्यामात्रहेतुत्वान्नामौषां विद्यते क्रमः ॥४१३॥

As a result, therefore, there occur at every moment the origin, the sustenance and the destruction of (the discrete things in) the world. (And) since these have only ignorance (*Avidyā*) as the cause (of their existence), there is no specific order (among them).¹ [413]

¹This is to point to various orders in creation in different Śruti texts; e.g. *Taittirīyopaniṣad* 2.1: *tasmād vā etasmād ātmana ākāśaḥ sambhūtaḥ*; CU 6.2.4: *tat tejo 'srjata*.

Verses 414-425 explain the meaning of sarve prāṇāḥ

प्राणाः श्रोत्रादयोऽत्र स्यर्दश सप्त च ये मता ।
लोकावच्छेदतोऽमीषां भेदोऽध्यात्मादिलक्षणः ॥४१४॥
जरायुजादिसंभेदभिन्ना लोकाः पृथग्विधा ।

They are the *prāṇas*, viz. the ears and others, which are known as ten and seven,¹ because they are the limiting adjuncts of the *loka* 'a body'; these have a further division into what have the nature of *adhyātma* 'pertaining (or related) to the body' and so on. [414]

The *lokas* 'bodies'² are of various types, viz. distinguished into discrete bodies such as *jarāyuja* 'born from a womb'.³ [415ab]

¹These are: five organs of knowing, five organs of activity, five winds, *manas* and intellect. NKL quotes from *Samkṣepa Śārīraka* 3.20: *iha tāvad akṣadaśakam manasā saha buddhitattvam atha vāyugaṇaḥ*.

²This is to explain how *loka* has a special sense here, viz. 'a body'.

³The others are *udbhijja*, *aṇḍaja* and *svedaaja*.

तथाधिदेवतात्मानो देवाः स्युर्बहुभेदकाः ॥४१५॥

So also there are gods, viz. those who have the nature of (superintending)¹ deities and have many distinctions (among them). [415cd]

¹That is, superintending over the *prāṇas*.

तेऽपि साधारणाः प्राणा देहेऽसाधारणास्तु ते ।

भूतानां परिणामोऽयं यथाकर्म यस्माश्रुतम् ॥४१६॥

And those *prāṇas*¹ are so jointly (i.e. generally)² (residing) in the body, yet they are particular ones (also);³ this is (thus) the modification of the (five) elements,⁴ in accordance with the *karman*⁵ and as it is heard. [416]

¹Here the word *prāṇa* is understood in the sense of gods.

²This is while they are mentioned as having godhead, or, the nature of gods in a general way, viz. Āditya and others, as superintending deities (*ādhidaivika*).

³Those very gods are each one of them identified with the eye and other organs severally (*ādhyātmika*).

⁴They are the products of the five elements and therefore capable of effecting various functions of the organs.

⁵This explains why at times they bring happiness and at others sorrow.

प्राणादिजन्मना जज्ञे विस्फुलिङ्गैर्यथा शिखी ।

परमात्मापि जज्ञे खं यथा कुम्भादिजन्मभिः ॥४१७॥

प्राणाद्यद्भूतितो नान्या क्षेत्रज्ञोद्भूतिरिष्यते ।

श्रुतेरेतेभ्य इति हि तथा स्पष्टं वचः श्रुतम् ॥४१८॥

(The inner self) was born by becoming *prāṇas* 'organs' etc., in the same way as fire was produced (i.e. born) in (lit. by or from) small sparks; (and) also the highest self (i.e. Ātman) was born in the same way as the sky came into being (manifold) through becoming a pitcher etc. [417]

The birth of the knower of the field is not accepted as other than the springing up (i.e. coming into existence) from the *prāṇas* 'organs' etc.; for there is (very) clearly heard a statement from the Śruti, viz. *etebhyaḥ* [418]

Verse 417 clarifies the thought in *sarva eta ātmano vyuccaranti* read in the Mādhyandina recension of BU after *sarvāṇi bhūtāni* in the Kāṇva recension as explained by Śaṅkara also. The stress

is on the *viśiṣṭa-cidābhāsa-rūpa-janma-vyavahāra*. NKL adds: The illustration of *kha-janman* (as *ghaṭākāśa*, *karakākāśa* etc.) is for precluding the idea of the *ātmajanman* owing to the acceptance of *aṁśāṁśi* relationship.

The argument in verse 418 is based on (or, related to) a doubt that the Ātman is born of itself and not from anything else), like a pitcher. It is related to the Śruti (this is explained later:) *etebhyo bhūtebhyah samutthāya* (BU 2.4.12). Also, basically, the notion of the birth of the inner self is rooted in ignorance/superimposition on *cit* of the limiting adjuncts.

यस्मादविद्ययैवात्मा प्राणक्षेत्रज्ञरूपभाक् ।
स्वतोऽतः स परं ब्रह्म तस्योपनिषदुच्यते ॥४१९॥
उपासनार्थं यद्गुह्यं नामोपनिषदुच्यते ।
तदस्य परं गुह्यं तेनोपासीत तत्त्वतः ॥४२०॥

Since, it is owing to ignorance (Avidyā) alone that the (highest) Ātman, of itself, comes to have the forms of the *prāṇas* 'organs' and the knower of the field; therefore, it is the highest Brahman. Now is stated the secret doctrine, viz. *upaniṣad*, of that; [419]
whatever is the secret name for purposes of a worship is called *upaniṣad*.¹ This² is the highest secret of this one;³ with that (in mind) should one worship that truly. [420]

These verses preclude the idea of a triad, viz. *prāṇas*, *jīva* (i.e. *kṣetrājña*) and the highest Ātman. The triad could be posited on the basis of verses 417-418 above.

¹I have taken 420ab as parenthetical.

²The word this refers to the Śruti statement: *satyasya satyam*, understood from *tasyopaniṣad* and *upāsanārthaṁ guhyaṁ nāma*.

³The highest Ātman is meant.

ब्रह्मविद्याधिकारेऽस्मिन्यावत्किञ्चिदुपासनम् ।
ब्रह्मविद्योत्थितिफलं तत्सर्वमिति निर्दिशेत् ॥४२१॥

Whatever be the mode of worship in the topic of the lore of the Brahman, viz. the rise of the knowledge of (the true nature of) the Brahman,¹ is, one should affirm, in this (context) also. [421]

¹The word *brahmavidyā* is understood in a double sense: (i) the lore of *brahman* and (ii) the knowledge of the true nature of the Brahman; *vidyā* in (i) has thus a reference to some mode of studying or worshipping and in (ii) the result of it. Here, in the later case, it is *vastutattvapratipatti*.

गोदोहनादिवद्विद्यादेवं सर्वमुपासनम् ।
विद्याधिकारजीवित्वात्र स्वतन्त्रफलं भवेत् ॥४२२॥

Thus all modes of worship are to be considered, like the ritual with Godohana¹ etc.² (as yielding the result of the various modes of worship in the later Brāhmaṇas); since they have dependence on the topic of *vidyā* (i.e. *Brahmavidyā*), it does not have a result of its own. [422]

¹This is an example which Sureśvara takes over from the Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā. The use of the Godohana pot forms a part of the *apām praṇayana* rite, which, in its own turn, forms an ancillary to the Darśapūrṇamāsa rite. Therefore, since the performance of the Darśapūrṇamāsa rite secures for the sacrificer the result, viz. *svargaprāpti* 'attainment of abode in heaven,' the use of the Godohana pot also (depending on *apām praṇayana*) has the same result for the performer. Yet it has its own result also—that is in addition, viz. it brings about the securing of cattle. Sureśvara extends this ritualistic procedure to the mode of worship of the Brahman, mentioned in verse 420. For further details on Godohana, read SP. Read NKL's brief statement: *jñānārthatvena sṛṣṭaprapaṇicopajīvitvāt prapaṇicadvāreṇa jñānam prasādhyaiḥ (upasanā-)phalāntarahetutvāt upāsanam śuddhidvārā (brahma-) dhīsāadhanam ity arthaḥ*. See also BUBV 3.3.51 and note thereon.

²The word etc. refers to similar relation of *strīṇātikriyā* with *vedikarāṇa*.

सत्यस्य सत्यमिति या ब्रह्मोपनिषदुच्यते ।
प्राणा वै सत्यमित्यस्या व्याख्योपनिषदः कृता ॥४२३॥

What is called the Brahmopaniṣad, viz. *satyasya satyam*, itself presents (or, forms) the explanation of this Upaniṣad, viz. *prāṇā vai satyam*. [423]

This is the meaning of *prāṇā vai satyam*.

नामरूपात्मकाः प्राणाः परसत्याभिसंगतेः ।
सत्यमित्यभिधीयन्ते तेषां सत्यं परं पदम् ॥४२४॥

The *prāṇas*, which are of the nature of name and form, are, on account of their close association (*abhi-saṅgati*), with the highest Truth (i.e. Reality) called *satya* 'Truth'; their basis is the highest Truth. [424]

This points to the meaningfulness of the preceding verse.

उक्तोपनिषदर्थस्य सम्यगाविष्कृतुत्तरम् ।
यो ह वै शिशुमित्यादि भविता ब्राह्मणद्वयम् ॥४२५॥

Of this *upaniṣad* 'secret doctrine,' the two subsequent Brāhmaṇas (viz. BU 2.2-3) which begin with *yo ha vai śīśum* ..., will give a clear exposition. [425]

This points to the significance of the two subsequent Brāhmaṇas as bringing to fullness the contents of this one.

Verses 426-432 form an introductory to a question whether the secret doctrine (*satyasya satyam*) relates to the transmigratory being or the Brahman.

कामं ह्युपनिषद्व्याख्या भवत ब्राह्मणद्वयम् ।
संसारिब्रह्मणोः कस्य नामैतदिति भण्यताम् ॥४२६॥

Granted that the two (subsequent) Brāhmaṇas are an exposition of the *upaniṣad* (mentioned above); let this be declared (or lit. said), however, as to whom, between a transmigratory being and the Brahman, it relates. [426]

पाणिपेषप्रबुद्धस्य नाम संसारिणो यदि ।
तदा स एव विज्ञेयस्तज्ज्ञानादेव मुक्तता ॥४२७॥

If it relates to the transmigratory being who is awakened (from sleep) by shaking (him) by the hand, then it is he who should be known (in fullness), for liberation can realise (i.e. be effected) through the knowledge about him. [427]

SP rightly points out a well-known dictum in the field of enquiry, viz. *saṁdigdham saphalam ca vicāryam*. Also, it justifies *tajjñānād eva muktatā* as an answer to the possible doubt: *yajjñānān muktis tasyaiva jñeyatā na jīvasyety āśaṅkyāha*.

ब्रह्मशब्दाभिधेयश्च संसार्येव तदा भवेत् ।
तद्विद्या ब्रह्मविद्येति प्रतिपद्यामहे तदा ॥४२८॥

Then (i.e. in that case), the transmigratory being himself would be what is to be expressed (or, signified) by the word *brahman*. And, as a result of that, we propose that the knowledge about him will be the knowledge of the Brahman. [428]

In this verse also, the doubter has continued his argument.

अथासंसारिणो नाम न्यायतोऽध्यवसीयते ।
संसारिणि यदुक्तं तत्तदा तत्र भविष्यति ॥४२९॥

If, on the other hand (*atha*), it is concluded (lit. determined), on the basis of proper reasoning (*nyāya*),¹ that it (viz. the

upaniṣad) relates to the non-transmigratory (Brahman), then what is said in relation to a transmigratory being could apply (or, be extended) to that (viz. the non-transmigratory Brahman).

[429]

The doubter still persists and points out the result of his own view.

¹Read SP: *yathoktanāmārthasya tasminn eva mukhyatārtham bādhāyogyatvādinyāyaḥ*; or, in brief though, NKL: *sarvakalpanā-dhiṣṭhānatvaṃ nyāyaḥ*.

भिन्नात्मनोस्तयोर्दोषो ब्रह्मत्वप्रतिपादिकाः ।

कुप्येरञ्श्रुतयः सर्वा नान्यदन्यद्ववेद्यतः ॥४३०॥

If the two are held as having different natures, then the Śrutis which propound their oneness would be set aside (lit. would be angry); since one thing cannot be another. [430]

This argument proceeds from holding utter distinction between the transmigratory being and the Brahman.

ब्रह्मणोऽव्यतिरेके च तद्वच्चासति दुःखिनि ।

ब्रह्मविद्योपदेशस्य कैमर्थक्यं प्रसज्यते ॥४३१॥

And also (or similarly (*tadvac ca*)) in case there is (held) non-distinction between them, then there will not be any sorrowful being (i.e. anyone misery-stricken) and the contingent question would be: What is the purpose of the knowledge about (the real nature of) the Brahman? [431]

This is an argument in contrast with that in the preceding verse. The Brahman, by its nature, is free from all misery and therefore even a transmigratory being would be free from it. That would render any effort to acquire the knowledge about the Brahman useless!

इति संदेहे हेतुश्च विचारस्य प्रयोजकः ।
तस्माद्विचारः कर्तव्य उक्तसंदेहहानिकृत् ॥४३२॥

Such is the cause for the doubt and it compels a discussion (on the matter under doubt); therefore is to be undertaken an enquiry (or, to begin a discussion) that would remove (lit. destroy) the doubt. [432]

In verses 433-444ab, there is a statement of the prima facie view (pūrvapakṣa), viz. this upaniṣad is related to a transmigratory being.

नासंसारी परोऽन्योऽस्ति पाणिपेषप्रबोधितात् ।
प्राज्ञावस्थात्मकाद्यस्मादुत्पत्तिः श्रूयते श्रुतौ ॥४३३॥

It is not a non-transmigratory (thing related to the *upaniṣad*), that is other (i.e. different from the highest Brahman which is other) than that who is awakened (from sleep) by shaking him by the hand; the one who is of the nature of one in the state of Prājña¹ from whom there is the rise (or, origin of *prāṇas*) heard in the Śruti. [433]

Cf. Verse 330 above.

ब्रह्म तेऽहं ब्रवाणीति प्रतिज्ञाय ततो नृपः ।
सुप्तं पुरुषमभ्येत्य पाणिना बोधयन्स्वयम् ॥४३४॥

(But,) after making a promise 'Let me declare to you what is the Brahman', the king approached a man who was asleep and himself awakened him, shaking him by the hand. [434]

The thought underlying this verse is identifying the Brahman as a transmigratory being.

तमवस्थान्तरं नीत्वा स्वप्नदर्शनवर्त्मना ।
सुषुप्ताख्यं ततस्तस्मात्प्राणाद्युत्पत्तिमब्रवीत् ॥४३५॥

Having brought him to another state (viz. the waking state), he first offered the explanation of the experience(s) in the dream state¹ and later described him as one in the state called sleep and as having an origination of his *prāṇas*. [435]

¹This refers to *sa yatraitat svapnyayā carati* (BU 2.1.18); also cf. verses 281-285 above.

संसारी प्रक्रमाच्चेह नान्यः संभाव्यते ततः ।
अनूद्य च प्रियात्मानं स द्रष्टव्य इतीर्यते ॥४३६॥

It is clearly the transmigratory being (that is intended) from the introductory (part of Kāśya's talk/doing) here¹ and none other is possible to think of; and (later) having made a reference to that again as a dear one to himself,² he has said—it is argued—'that he should be seen'. [436]

¹This refers to the introductory *tau ha ...* in the beginning of this narrative (*iha*).

²This refers to Yājñavalkya's dialogue with Maitreyī in BU 2.4 where occurs the oft-repeated phrase *ātmanas tu kāmāya sarvam priyam bhavati* and the concluding remark *ātmā vā are draṣṭavyaḥ ...* (this referring to the dear *ātman* 'self' of his own, the enjoyer (that is a transmigratory being)! [Let it be remembered that this is said for argument's sake.]

वेदान्तेषु च सर्वेषु प्रत्यगात्मैव चोद्यते ।
वेद्यत्वेन न तद्विन्नं पश्येदित्यभिधीयते ॥४३७॥

And, in all the Vedānta texts, only the inner self is put forth (or, pointed out) as what is to be known; also it is said that one should not see any other knowable different from that (i.e. the inner self). [437]

Possibly, the argument: *janmādy asya yataḥ* has a reference

to *jīva/kṣetrajñā* from whom are born the *prāṇas*, as said earlier in verse 435 above. Therefore, that one should be known.

अवस्थान्तरसंबन्धादसंसारो भविष्यति ।
संसार्यपि स्वतोऽयं चेन्नेदृग्दृष्टेरसंभवात् ॥४३८॥

If one might argue (here against this, thus:) 'Owing to its having relation to the different states, even a transmigratory being will be non-transmigratory';¹ then (the reply will be: 'That is) not so, since such a sight/seeing is impossible to happen.'² [438]

SP reports this argument as one coming from the *Seśvaravādins'* school which believes in the work of an all-powerful God.

¹Here, there is a reference to the sleep state wherein the *Jīva* has no connection whatsoever with the world of objects.

²The argument is: A change in the state of a being does not bring about any essential change in that being. The argument is thus opposed to common experience.

नान्यजातिविशिष्टोऽर्थः स्वतो जात्यन्तरं ततः ।
कश्चिदेति जगत्यस्मिन्नन्यत्रेश्वरहेतुतः ॥४३९॥

In this world, not a thing, which is characterized by some one genus, can come to belong to another genus, unless where (or, when) it is on account of the Lord's wish (that it does so). [439]

This is the position of the *Seśvaravādins* mentioned in the note on the preceding verse.

स्वभावमपि जह्याच्चेदग्निः शीतो भवेद्ध्रुवम् ।
सर्वप्रमाणकोपश्च सर्वं स्यादधरोत्तरम् ॥४४०॥

If indeed fire would give up its own nature and, for certain, become cool, then it would mean that all the means of right

knowledge¹ have gone totally wrong² and everything would be topsy-turvy.³ [440]

Evidently, the Seśvaravādins persist to hold that the power of the Lord defies all laws of logic. Thereby, they seek to point out that the one related to Brahman is none other than a transmigratory being. Any idea of some Lord which one would be required to posit (as shown in verses 439 and 440 above) would be only to be scoffed at. The reference to the Sāṃkhyas and others in the following verse is for strengthening the argument.

¹This refers to various sets of rules regarding the behaviour of things that form logic.

²That is to say: these rules are not in conformity with what is happening. Literally, the rules would be angry, i.e. they would refuse to be logical.

³*adharottaram* literally means 'the low and the high' and it indicates the reversal in the order of things. The true would become false and the false, true. SP seems to hint at this thus: *yo bhāvo yaddharmako mito nāsau taddharman vyabhicarati (ity atiprasaṅgaḥ)*. One remembers here Śāṅkarava's remark *Abhijñānaśakuntaram: śrutam bhavadbhir adharottaram* pointing to the reversed of truth and falsehood on the part of Śakuntalā and Duṣyanta.

सांख्यादयस्तथेशस्य ह्यभावं बहुयुक्तिभिः ।

आपादयन्ति यत्नेन तेभ्योऽन्यः कोऽधिको धिया ॥४४१॥

The Sāṃkhyas and others¹ propound the character of a negative entity in that (kind of) Lord by means of various reasons² and with great care;³ who else than them is superior in intellect? [441]

¹This is a reference to other Tārīkas 'Logicians'.

²SP points to these: *tasya (īśasya) dehitve 'smadāditulyatvāt; tadabhāve muktavajjagatkartṛtvāyogāj jīvānām evādrṣṭadvārā tat-*

karṣṭvasambhava and, as a result, *tasya (īśasya) akiñcitkaratva*. And NKL thus: *īśvarecchāprayatnādeḥ nityatve sadotpattyāpattiḥ anityatve asmadādisāmya* and so on. A close study of these thinkers' writings would reveal more of their arguments for not accepting such a Lord.

³The word *yatna* is explained by SP as *yuktiṣu doṣa-rāhityopanyāsa* 'careful presentation of reasons which are free from faults'. Therefore, we have translated 'carefully'.

संसारिणोऽप्यसामर्थ्याज्जगज्जन्मादिकर्मसु ।
जगद्धेतुत्वमन्याय्यमिति चेन्न श्रुतेर्बलात् ॥४४२॥
अक्षाद्यगोचरो यद्वच्छास्त्रादध्यवसीयते ।
तद्वत्संसारिकारित्वं जगतो गम्यतां श्रुतेः ॥४४३॥

(One might argue:) 'Yet, since a transmigratory being does not have the (necessary) power for (accomplishing) such acts as the production of the world etc., it is contrary for reason to accept (that transmigratory being as) the cause of the world.' (The answer:) '(This argument is) not (correct), for there is the Śruti's strength (opposing it).' [442]

'As a thing, which does not occur as the object of the eye and/or other (organs), is determined (or, grasped to be such and such) through (or by or from) the Śāstras (i.e. scriptures);¹ so also, should the world be known from the Śruti as what creates a transmigratory being. [443]

The arguer of the preceding verse points to how scriptures can inform one about Dharma etc. Thus, the scriptures would oppose the non-acceptance of a transmigratory being as the cause of the world.

¹Reference is here to matter related to Dharma, Adharma, Adrṣṭa and so on.

एवं तावदयं पक्षो न्यायतः प्रतिपादितः ।

Thus, this view is, so far, presented (or, explained), on the

basis of reasoning.

[444ab]

This marks the end of the arguments of those who follow the authority of the Śruti but reject the idea of the Lord who governs the world.

In verses 444cd-445, the view of the Seśvaravādins is presented.

शास्त्रन्यायादितोऽन्योऽपि पक्षोऽथ प्रतिपाद्यते ॥४४४॥

Now is presented (or, explained), on (the basis of) scriptures and reasoning (i.e. logic), the view, which is other than this.¹

[444cd]

¹The word this refers to the just preceding section.

यः सर्वज्ञः सर्वविद्योऽशनायादिविवर्जितः ।

यः पृथिव्यामिति तथा नेति नेतीति चागमः ॥४४५॥

अस्थूलाद्यक्षरोक्तेश्च तथापूर्वादिवाक्यतः ।

असंसारी परोऽस्तीशो यस्य सर्वमिदं वशे ॥४४६॥

The sentences in the Śruti (describe him thus:) *yaḥ sarvajñah*,¹ *sarvavid yaḥ*,² *aśanāyādivivarjitah*,³ *yaḥ pṛthivyām*⁴ and also *neti neti*⁵ [445]

and also from the statements (about him as) *asthūla*,⁶ *akṣara*⁷ etc.; and again from sentences (about his being) such as *apūrva* etc.;⁸ (it can be concluded that) there is a Lord, non-transmigratory, the highest (or, beyond/above all), in whose control is (or, on whom rests) this world. [446]

¹Cf. *Muṇḍakopaniṣad* 1.1.9; 2.2.7.

²Is it *sarvavidyaḥ*?; cf. *Śvetāśvataropaniṣad* 6.2.22.

³Cp. BU 3.5.1.

⁴BU 3.7.3.

⁵Cf. BU 3.9.26; 4.2.4; 4.4.22; 4.5.15.

⁶Cf. BU 3.8.8.

⁷Cf. BU 3.8.9; Śaunakopaniṣad 1.

⁸Cf. BU 2.5.19; see verse 237 note 3.

स एव च जगत्कारी सत्यज्ञानादिलक्षणः ।
तस्मादित्यात्मनश्चेति सामानाधिकरण्यतः ॥४४७॥

And he alone is the creator of the world, having the nature of *satya*, *jñāna* etc.¹ Therefore, the words *tasmāt* and *ātmanah*² have to be understood as standing in the relation called *sāmānādhikaranyā*. [447]

¹Refer to *Taittirīyopaniṣad* 2.1.

²This also is from *Taittirīyopaniṣad* 2.1 where the words *tasmāt* and *ātmanah* are taken to be *sāmānādhikaranyā*, i.e. not only as occurring in the same grammatical case (*sāmānavibhaktika*) but also as related to the same *substratum*. Therefore, the argument is that the word *ātman* in the *Taittirīyopaniṣad* refers to the inner self also; as a result, it then follows that the inner self is related to the *upaniṣad* 'satyasya satyam' which is in question.

संसारिणो ननुत्पत्तिरेवमेवेति कीर्तिता ।
नैवं महेश्वरस्यैव तत्राकाशत्वसंश्रयात् ॥४४८॥

But (one argues:) 'In the sentence *evam eva* ...,¹ there is stated the origin of the world from a transmigratory being',² (the answer is:) 'No, not so; for, there is in *evam* ... reference to the great Lord since there is (mention made of) him as the sky (in the heart).'³ [448]

¹The reference is here to the phrase *evam evāsmād ātmanah* in the BU passage under discussion.

²The argument is: Thus this BU passage is contradictory to the *Taittirīyopaniṣad* passage.

³The BU sentence *ya eṣo 'ntar hṛdaya ākāśah*, it is argued, has the word *ākāśa* as referring to the highest self as *prakṛta*

‘the subject matter (of the discussion)’. Cf. BS 1.1.22: *ākāśas tallingāt*.

ब्रह्म तेऽहं ब्रवाणीति प्रकृत्य ब्रह्मबोधनम् ।
अब्रह्माप्रकृतं ब्रूयात्कथं राजातिपण्डितः ॥४४९॥

The topic in the passage has begun with (the words) ‘Let me declare to you (the nature of) the Brahman’; (that is to say with the intention of) declaring (the nature of) the Brahman. Therefore, how would the king, himself a great learned man, would declare what is not relevant (here), viz. what is not the Brahman? [449]

The argument is based on a doubt that the word *ākāśa* in the passage under reference does not signify the Brahman. Cf. BSB 1.1.22 (p.198): *tatra saṁśayaḥ— kiṁākāśaśabdena paraṁ brahmābhīdhīyata uta bhūtākāśamiti, kutaḥ saṁśayaḥ; ubhayatra prayogadarśanāt*. Therefore, since *ākāśa* does not it signify the Brahman, and signifies the elemental sky, the Śeṣvaravādin is adopting *prakṛtahāni* and *aprakṛtaprakriyā* on the part of the intelligent king (SP).

श्रुत्यन्तरविरोधश्च संसारी चेदिहोच्यते ।
सता सोम्येति सन्नाम्ना ब्रह्म तत्र विवक्षितम् ॥४५०॥

Again, there would result opposition to another Śruti (passage), if here (i.e. as in your opinion regarding the king’s reply, it is) a transmigratory being that is (talked about, or, relevant). (For), in the sentence *satā somya ...*,¹ it is the Brahman that is intended to be expressed by the name (i.e. word) *brahman*.²

[450]

¹This is CU 6.8.1.

²The same *sat* is used in CU 6.1.1 for the Brahman and the Brahman continues to be discussed in the succeeding sections of CU. As a result, *satā somya* has a meaning *brahmanā somya*

.... Therefore, in view of *sarvavedāntapratyanyāya*, the reference in the passage under discussion to a transmigratory being is unwarranted. Cf. NKL's remark *durbalaparakaraṇena balavacchruticālanam* which means, in deciding the meaning of doubtful Śruti passages, Śruti (even if another) is the stronger decider than *prakaraṇa* 'topic under discussion'.

आकाशो ह वै नामेति ब्रह्मैवानामरूपकम् ।
श्रुत्यन्तरे श्रुतं साक्षादाकाशाह्वानवत्परम् ॥४५१॥

In a passage *ākāśo ha vai nāma* in another Śruti¹ is heard only the Brahman which has not a name and a form; (and) that² is directly³ expressive of the highest Brahman. [451]

This is to point out that another Śruti also intends to use *ākāśa* as a synonym of the word *brahman*.

¹Cp. CU 8.14.1.

²The word or name *ākāśa*.

³The word *sākṣāt* is used expressly to rule out another sense of *ākāśa*.

तथा चाहरहः शास्त्रं पर आत्मनि चेति यत् ।
सुषुप्ते ब्रह्मणोऽन्यस्य नावकाशोऽस्ति दुःखिनः ॥४५२॥

So also, since the Śāstra 'scripture' *aharahaḥ ...*¹ is in respect of the highest Ātman; therefore, in the sleep state, there is no place/scope for anyone who is other than the Brahman and who is affected by misery. [452]

¹This is a reference to CU 8.3.2: *aharahaḥ brahma gacchantya etam brahmalokam na vindanti*. NKL adds to this *Praśnopaniṣad* 6.7: *sa yathā somya vayāṃsi vāsovrkṣaṃ sampratiṣṭhante evaṃ naitat sarvaṃ pare ātmani sampratiṣṭhate* to support the argument that, in reality, the inner self is, in the state of sleep, of the nature of the Brahman.

अतद्विकारतो जन्म प्रलयश्च तथात्मनः ।
भौतिकाकाशविषयो न कथं चन युज्यते ॥४५३॥

It is in no way reasonable to hold that the Ātman (here, the inner self) has its origin and merger as well in (*ākāśa*, viz.) what is not a modification of that (Brahman), and that the word (*ākāśa*) has for it the elemental sky the object of reference. [453]

SP clarifies the argument thus: *ya eṣa ityādau bhūtākāśasya prakṛtatve tasyaivāyam parāmarśaḥ syāt, na ca tasmāt prāṇādi-janmalayau tasya bhūtākāśavikāratvāprasiddheḥ, asmād ity asyātmaśabdasāmānādhikaranyāc ca tasmān nāyam ākāśaśabdo bhūtā- kāśaviṣaya ity arthaḥ.*

जगज्जन्मादिसामर्थ्यं सामग्र्यादि च दुःखिनः ।
संसारिणो न संभाव्यमस्मदादेर्यथा तथा ॥४५४॥

The capacity for (causing) the origin etc.¹ of the world, the means (for creating it etc.) and other things² cannot possibly be thought of (as belonging to) a miserable transmigratory being³ in the same way as (belonging) to us! [454]

¹The word etc. refers to the sustenance and the merger.

²These other things are the knowledge for creating etc. (or, the technical know-how for it).

³Here, the reference can be to *ākāśa*.

न शक्त्याधानकृच्छ्रास्त्रं तस्याभिव्यञ्जकत्वतः ।
मानान्तरविरोधेन न हि मानं प्रवर्तते ॥४५५॥

Śāstra does not place in any one the capacity/ability (for doing some particular thing),¹ since it is merely informative about the same. (Also) a means of knowing would not be (usefully) operative when there is opposition to it of another means

of knowing.²

[455]

The argument in the first half of the verse is to thrash away the view that a transmigratory being can be the creator etc. of the world since scripture has said it. And the second half points to the opposition among the means of knowing being the cause of the futility of one of them.

¹In other words, scriptural text would be only *jñāpaka* 'informative about something' and not its *kāraka* (or *utpādaka*) 'producing (the necessary) capacity or ability for some doing/activity'.

²Here, one would hold Śāstra as an informative means about the activity of originating the world etc. obtaining in a transmigratory being and there can be opposition to it by another means, viz. direct perception showing a human being's capacity for doing so.

Verses 456-460 state a view that there is no non-distinction between the inner self and the Brahman.

परस्परानपेक्षौ चेत्संसारीशौ स्वतः स्थितौ ।
ऐकात्म्यं न तयोर्युक्तं प्रकाशतमसोरिव ॥४५६॥

If, thus,¹ a transmigratory being and the Lord are not mutually dependent, and they have been in existence in their own right (*svataḥ sthitau*); then it is reasonable to hold that they are but one (or, that they have oneness/identity) in the same way as (identity could be posited) of light and darkness. [456]

¹This refers to the arguments in the preceding section.

अहं ब्रह्मेत्यतोऽयुक्तं ब्रह्म प्रत्यक्तयाञ्जसा ।
ग्रहीतुं दुःखिनोऽन्यत्वाद्दोषभावस्यादतोऽन्यथा ॥४५७॥

Therefore, it is unreasonable¹ to accept smoothly that the Brahman is the inner self, (while one is saying) 'I am Brahman';

for, that² misery-stricken being is different (from it).³ From this (or, by this notion) the thing which has (so many) faults/shortcomings (in itself) would consider itself (lit. be) otherwise.⁴ [457]

This verse expresses the outcome of the preceding argument.

¹Both SP and NKL have not pointed out that there is Saṁdhi of ... *tyato* and *ayuktam*.

²This refers to the inner self.

³This refers to the Brahman.

⁴Free from all faults.

सत्कर्मभिस्तु तं देवं जगतः कारणं परम् ।
आराध्य परमोत्कर्षं तत्प्रसादात्समश्नुते ॥४५८॥

As against that (*tu*), (a transmigratory being/inner self) would attain the highest well-being through the favour of that (Lord), after it has pleased by good deeds¹ that Lord, the highest and the cause/origin of the world. [458]

This is the way to attainment of liberation.

¹SP supports this by quoting possibly from Bhartṛprapañca(?): *uktaṁ hi— matkarmakṛṇ matparama ityādi*. Also it cites the view of the Pañcarātrins in:

*parabrahmatvam āyāti matkarmaparamaḥ pumān iti ca and
ye saṁśrayanti taṁ bhaktyā sūkṣmam adhyātmacintakāḥ /
te yānti vai padam viṣṇor jarāmarañavarjitam //*
(Jayākhyā Saṁhitā 1.24) [a Pañcarātra text]

ब्रह्मात्मैकत्वशंसीनि वाक्यान्यपि तथा सति ।
अर्थवादीभविष्यन्ति विरोधः स्यादितोऽन्यथा ॥४५९॥
तर्कशास्त्रैस्तथा लोकन्यायैरप्यविरुद्धता ।
तथा सतीति संप्राप्तावत्र प्रतिविधीयते ॥४६०॥

That being so, the sentences (of the Śruti),¹ which speak about (or express) the oneness (or, identity) of (the inner self with)

the Brahman,² the Ātman would be (fully) meaningful. If (taken) otherwise than this,³ there would be an opposition to them. [459]

(Only) that being so, there would be non-opposition to logical reasonings⁴ and popular acceptances.⁵ When this position⁶ is reached, (now) there follows an argument which sets it aside. [460]

Verse 460 up to 'is reached' concludes the views of the Seśvaravādins.

¹I think, here the round brackets (viz. of the Śruti) should be necessary.

²This indicates the sentences like *tat tvam asi*.

³Namely, if the common man's opinion/view (*lokavāda*) is held.

⁴This is a reference to the Sāmkhyas and others; cf. verses 441-443.

⁵The commonly held beliefs or faiths.

⁶This is reiteration of the view that it is the Lord who, at his will, creates the world etc.

Now there is (a brief) exposition of the Siddhānta view, in verses 461-465, viz. that the upaniṣad, i.e. satyasya satyam, is related to the Brahman which is non-distinct from the inner self.

नैतदेवं यतोऽस्यैव मन्त्रब्राह्मणमानतः ।
प्रवेशः श्रूयते साक्षात्परमेशस्य सर्वतः ॥४६१॥

This is not so, since it is learnt (lit. heard) from this very (authoritative) means of knowing, viz. the Mantra and Brāhmaṇa (texts),¹ that there is the entry of the all-controlling (Brahman) everywhere. [461]

¹This refers to the Saṃhitās and the Brāhmaṇas (which include the Upaniṣads).

पुरश्चक्रे द्विपदः पुरः पुरुष आविशत् ।

रूपं रूपं च सर्वाणि त्वं स्त्री त्वं च पुमानसि ॥४६२॥
 इति मन्त्रसमाम्नायस्तथा च ब्राह्मणान्यपि ।
 इह प्रविष्ट इत्युक्तिः पुरस्ताद्ब्राह्मणोदिता ॥४६३॥
 तत्सृष्ट्वेति तथा वाक्यं तैत्तिरीयश्रुतौ श्रुतम् ।
 सेयमित्यादिकं वाक्यं छान्दोग्योपनिषद्वापि ॥४६४॥

‘He made cities, i.e. bodies, the bipeds ... the highest (i.e. supreme) Puruṣa entered the bodies’,¹ ‘In every form he assumed a similar form’,² ‘You are all, you (are) a woman and you (are) a man.’³ — [462]

this is a collection of Mantras. So also are there the Brāhmaṇa (texts): (Thus) there is a statement ‘In this he entered’, as already recorded in (this) Brāhmaṇa;⁴ [463]

also there is heard in the Śruti of the Taittirīyas a sentence *tat sṛṣṭvā ...*;⁵ so also in CU a sentence which begins with the words *seyam*.⁶ [464]

¹Cf. BU 2.5.18; Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa 14.5.5.18.

²Cf. Rgveda 6.47.17.

³Cf. Atharvaveda 10.8.27.

⁴BU 1.4.7.

⁵Taittirīyopaniṣad 2.6.

⁶CU 6.3.2 and 3.

ब्रह्मात्मशब्दयोस्तद्वदेकाधिकरणश्रुतेः ।
 अहं ब्रह्मेत्यवसितुं युक्तमेव भवेदतः ॥४६५॥

In the same way, on the basis/strength of the Śruti regarding the two words *brahman* and *ātman* referring (only) to one substratum,¹ it will only be proper (i.e. reasonable), therefore, to conclude *aham brahma*,² i.e. the inner self is the Brahman.

[465]

¹Refer to BU 4.5.19.

²This has a reference to the opponent’s view expressed in verse 457 above. The falsity of that view follows from the Śruti,

viz. BU 4.5.19.

Verses 466-467 refer to a view that the oneness (or, identity) of the inner self and the Brahman is faulty.

यदा चैवं स्थितः पक्षस्तदा दोषोऽयमागमत् ।
संसारित्वं परस्येति तदनन्यत्वकारणात् ॥४६६॥

(An objector says:) 'If this is thus established (*sthitah*) as (your) view, then there follows (lit. comes) this difficulty in (lit. blame to) it, viz. the highest (Brahman) would come to have transmigratory character on account of its being non-distinct from that (viz. the inner self).' [466]

अथासंसारितैतस्य कथंचिदुपपद्यते ।
तदोपदेशानर्थक्यं तमृतेऽप्यस्य मुक्ततः ॥४६७॥

'(Also,) if the non-transmigratory character of this one (viz. the highest Brahman) is somehow (shown to be) reasonable, then, in that case, there would be meaninglessness (*ānarthakya*) of the instruction (about it); since, without that also, there is the state of liberation for this one.'¹ [467]

¹*muktataḥ* is for *muktatvataḥ*.

Verses 468-472 present Bhartṛprapañca's answer to the objection above.

एवं प्रचोदिते केचित्परिहारं प्रचक्षते ।
सृष्टेषु न परः साक्षात्प्राविशत्परमेश्वरः ॥४६८॥

When this has been put forth (as an objection), some (scholars)¹ state (the following as) an answer (to clear that away): 'In the (objects) created, the Lord himself, viz. the highest (Ātman) itself (*sākṣāt*), did not enter.' [468]

This is a respectful reference to Bhartṛprapañca.

विकाररूपापन्नः सन्विज्ञानात्मत्वलक्षणः ।
ब्रह्मादिस्थावरान्तेषु भूतेषु प्राविशत्परः ॥४६९॥

‘Coming to have the forms of modifications and being characterized by the nature of *vijñāna* ‘specified knower/knowledge’, the highest (Ātman) entered into the beings/becomings, from the Brahman¹ up to those which are immovable.’ [469]

This explains the second line of the preceding verse.

¹Does this stand for Viriñca?

विज्ञानात्मापि महतः परमात्मस्वभावकात् ।
अन्योऽनन्यश्च विज्ञेयः स्वाभाव्यात्सर्ववस्तुनः ॥४७०॥

‘The one having the nature of an individual self also is different from the great one, viz. the one having the nature of the highest Ātman and further it should be known as non-distinct also on account of the nature of all things (in the world).’

[470]

This is Bhartṛprapañca’s affirmation of his Bhedābheda, viz. the theory of difference in non-difference.

येनान्यस्तेन संसारी कर्माधिकृत इष्यते ।
अनन्यपक्षेऽहं ब्रह्मेत्युक्तेर्ब्रह्म प्रपत्स्यते ॥४७१॥

‘Since it is different (from the highest Ātman), therefore it is accepted/desired that a transmigratory being is enjoined to (ritual) activity and, in the case (*pakṣa*) that it is not different (from it), it comes to be (i.e. attains the status of) the Brahman from the (Śruti) statement, ‘I am Brahman’.’ [471]

This, according to NKL, is the advantage of the Bhedābheda

theory; this will be evident from the following verse.

यथोक्तदोषसंबन्धो नैवं सति भविष्यति ।
इतोऽन्यथा कल्पनायां यतो दोषेण संगतिः ॥४७२॥

'This being so, there will not be any connection with the blame that is pointed out earlier;¹ for, in case a theory other than this is accepted, there is connection with that fault.' [472]

SP summarises the argument thus: *atyantam bhinnatve 'bhinnatve vā kalpyamāne nopadeśārthavattā nāpi brahmaṇo 'saṃsāritā tadbhinnābhinnatā pārīṣeṣyād ity arthaḥ*.

¹Cf. verses 466-467 above.

Verses 473-505 discuss the faults in the view of *Bhartrprapañca* who understands (only) a part of theory correctly (*ekadeśin*).

देहाद्युपाधिसंबन्धं सिद्धं मान्तरसंश्रयात् ।
अनूद्य ब्रह्मता वाक्यान् प्रविष्टाद्यतः श्रुतेः ॥४७३॥

(The refutation of the above is thus:) After the connection (of the individual self) with the limiting adjuncts, viz. a body etc.,¹ which is already known among people by resorting to the other ways of knowing,² there follows (for the *ekadeśin*) its nature as the Brahman from (only) the (Śruti's) statement,³ and not from a Śruti statement regarding (the modifications beginning with) 'he entered.'⁴ [473]

¹SP refers to *upādhidvaya viśiṣṭa jīva*.

²This refers to direct perception (*pratyakṣa*) in particular.

³This refers to the famous *Mahāvākya tat tvam asi* in CU. Both SP and NKL refer to the subsequent result which can be traced to *Taittirīyopaniṣad* 2.7; CU 8.3.4.

⁴These are probably the sentences quoted in verses 462-464 above. The correctness of the translation of *na praviṣṭād yataḥ śrutiḥ* can be subject to question!

विज्ञानात्मन एताः स्युर्गतयो विक्रियां प्रति ।
 नानाद्रव्यसमाहारः पृथिवीवत्परो भवेत् ॥४७४॥
 तस्य सावयवस्य स्यादेकदेशस्य विक्रिया ।
 विज्ञानात्मेति यं प्राहुः परिणामः स आत्मनः ॥४७५॥
 घटादिवत्क्षतेरस्य ह्येकदेशस्य विक्रिया ।
 संस्थानानुपमर्देन यद्वा केशोषरादिवत् ॥४७६॥
 कात्स्न्येन वा परिणमेत्क्षीरद्रव्यादिवत्परः ।
 इयन्त एव पक्षाः स्युर्विकारे परमात्मनः ॥४७७॥

Now, as regards the modification of the individual self, these would be the ways (or, alternative ways): (i) The highest self would be, like the earth, an aggregate of many substances¹

[474]

and the modification of a part (*ekadeśa*) of that which comprise many parts they call the individual self; (thus) that is an effect (or, a modification) of the Ātman,

[475]

like a pitcher etc. (is a modification) of the earth; or (ii) The form of the Ātman remaining unmodified, it (viz. the individual self) would be a modification, like, for instance, hair (on a body) or a piece of barren land (of the earth);

[476]

or (iii) The highest self would fully undergo a modification (and become the individual self) like the substance (called) milk wholly (becoming curds); only these² could be the possibilities of the modifications of the highest self.

[477]

¹Both SP and NKL refer to this aggregate as similar to a heap of sesame (i.e. a homogeneous aggregate) or one made up of dissimilar things (no example is provided!). Yet, in actual argument this fastidious division is unwarranted! (cf. BUB).

²SP's remark: *sambhavati kalpāntare kalpatrayaṃ kurvato bhāṣyakṛto nyunatvam āśaṅkyāha ityanta iti*, is for precluding any other possibility.

भिन्नद्रव्यसमूहस्य मुख्यैकत्वं न युज्यते ।
 एकजात्यभिसंबन्धादेकत्वं गुणतो यतः ॥४७८॥
 तथा च सति सिद्धान्तहानिर्वः संप्रसज्यते ।

In the case that the Ātman is held to be an aggregate of different substances, then it would not be logical to say that there is a certain principal singleness (among many), for singleness consists only in one property in the relation to many of a single. [478]

For, if that be so, there would arise the contingent defeat (lit. loss) of your (i.e. Bhartṛprapañca's) theory. [479ab]

Verse 478 sets aside the first alternative as incorrect. The idea is: One can posit *gotva* as the principal single property in respect of the Brahmatva among the many modifications together, according to the first alternative. Sureśvara's composition is here very terse. BSB in this respect is more lucid. Read: *tatra samānajātīyānekadravyasamūhasya kaścīd dravyaviśeṣo vijñānātmavm pratipadyate yadā tadā samānajātīyatvād ekatvam upacaritam eva na tu paramārthataḥ tathā ca sati siddhāntavirodhaḥ*. And verse 479ab points to the consequence of the above.

नित्यं चायुतसिद्धांशानुगतोऽवयवी यदि ॥४७९॥
 तदवस्थस्य तस्यैकदेशः संसारितामगात् ।
 प्रत्यंशावसितेस्तस्य तदापि परमात्मनः ॥४८०॥
 स्वभागानुगतो दोषो गुणो वास्य प्रसज्यते ।
 संसारिता परस्यैवं दोषः स्याद्दुर्निवारणः ॥४८१॥

If (in the second alternative) the (Ātman is a whole) ever having parts which are inseparably connected with it [479cd] and while (it remains) in that state, a part of it becomes transmigratory (viz. an individual self); then, owing to the highest Ātman (ever) consisting in each of its parts, [480] there would then come contingently to it either a blemish or an excellence that is connected with its part and thus the blemish of being transmigratory in the case of the highest

(Ātman) would be difficult to avoid/avert.

[481]

Obviously, these verses refute the second alternative.

निःशेषपरिणामेऽपि पयोवत्परमात्मनः ।

श्रुतिस्मृत्युक्तिकोपः स्यात्स चानिष्टः प्रसज्यते ॥४८२॥

Also, if (there be accepted) the modification of the highest Ātman as a whole, in the same way as (that) in the case of milk,¹ there would be opposition of Śruti(s) and Smṛti(s);² and that is an undesired contingency. [482]

This is the refutation of the third alternative.

¹*payovat* is either *yathā payasi* or *yathā payasaḥ* according to Pāṇini Sūtra 5.1.116: *tatra tasyeva*.

²These are quoted in the following two verses.

न जायते म्रियते वा इति षड्भावविक्रिया- ।

निषेधकृद्वेदवाक्यं प्रत्यग्विकृतिवारणम् ॥४८३॥

In the verse *na jāyate mriyate vā ...*¹ there is a clear (Śruti) statement which rejects the six modifications of beings/becomings—that is warding away (of the alternative regarding) modification of the inner self. [483]

¹Cf. *Kenopaniṣad* 2.1.8. SP reports this Mantra with a variant *kadācit* in place of *vipaścīt*— NKL reports correctly (with a misprint 1.2.18!). Also, SP cites *avyakto 'yam acintyo 'yam ...* from *Gītā* 2.25.

दिव्यो ह्यमर्तः पुरुषः सबाह्याभ्यन्तरो ह्यजः ।

निष्कलं निष्क्रियं शान्तं विमलं व्योमवत्स्थितम् ॥४८४॥

‘Heavenly, formless is the Puruṣa, being without and within (of things), unborn ...,’¹ ‘without parts, without activity, tranquil,’² ‘free from blemish has it remained like the sky’.³

[484]

This verse cites the Śruti texts to point to their opposition to all the three alternatives discussed before. SP's erudite remarks may be read with profit. NKL cites *Gītā* 2.20 and 25 and a verse:

*avikārāya śuddhāya nityāya paramātmāne /
sadaikarūparūpāya viṣṇave prabhaviṣṇave //*

(This is not traced in *Viṣṇusahasranāma*, however, cf. *Mahābhārata* xiii.713^{*}.1.)

¹*Mundakopaniṣad* 2.1.2.

²*Śvetāśvataropaniṣad* 6.19.

³Not traced.

इत्यादिशतशो वाक्यैः श्रुतिस्मृत्युदितैरमी ।

सर्वे पक्षा विरुध्यन्ते त्याज्यास्तैऽतः प्रयत्नतः ॥४८५॥

By these and other¹ hundreds of sentences, expressed in the Śrutis and Smṛtis, all these alternatives (or, views) are opposed and, therefore, they are to be discarded with insistence (lit. effort). [485]

¹SP refers to *ākāśavat sarvagataś ca nityaḥ*; cf. *śaṅkara's* reference to *kaThopaniṣad* (not traced in that tradition, though *śaṅkara's Bhāṣya* on CU 6.3.3 so mentions it); BU 4.4.24: *sa vā eṣa mahān aja ātmā*; *Gītā* 12.3: *kūṭastham acalam dhruvam*; *Gītā* 2.25: *avikāryo 'yam ucyate* as sentences from Śrutis and Smṛtis.

संसारानुपपत्तिश्च कूटस्थात्मैकदेशतः ।

स्वकर्मफलदेशेषु क्षेत्रज्ञस्य प्रसज्यते ॥४८६॥

On account of being a part of the immutable Ātman, there would contingently follow, in the case of the knower of the field, unreasonableness in respect of its transmigratory existence, in the regions that are earned by its own (ritual) activity.

The individual self would attain to heaven etc. by means of its ritual activities; but this would not happen in case (i.e. when) it is a part of the immutable. NKL rightly remarks: *aṁśino niścalatve aṁśānām calanāyogāt*.

वियुक्तस्यात्मनश्चेत्स्याद्विस्फुलिङ्गादिवद्गतिः ।
तथापि क्षतसंप्राप्तिरव्रणस्य प्रसज्यते ॥४८७॥

If it is said that, in the case of the individual self which has (or, is) separated from the Ātman, there can be movement (i.e. transmigration), like that in small sparks (of fire, from which they have separated), then also, there would be the contingency that the one (viz. the highest Ātman), which is not having (even) a scar, has come to have a wound. [487]

Sureśvara's cryptic verse needs some explanation. It presupposes the individual self to be a part (*aṁśa*) of the highest Ātman (*aṁśin*) like the small sparks are of fire. Therefore, as the sparks can get separated from fire and move in various ways, every individual self also gets separated from the highest Ātman and then transmigrates. Consequently, Sureśvara adduces the argument: the highest Ātman first comes to have a scar by the separation of an individual self and then a wound inasmuch as a part of it, viz. that individual self, is wounded, i.e. it transmigrates. This is undesirable an incident, for the highest Ātman is declared by the Śruti (*Īśopaniṣad* 8) as free from any scar.

वारिणो मत्स्यसंचारे छिद्रसंग्रथने यथा ।
भ्रमत्सु तद्वज्जीवेषु प्राप्नुतः परमात्मनः ॥४८८॥
तथा चाव्रणवाक्येन विरोधोऽपि प्रसज्यते ।
स्वकारणातिरेकेण वृत्तिः कार्यस्य नान्यतः ॥४८९॥

As in the case of water, one thinks (only foolishly) that there

is a hole when the fish have moved in it and a consequent repair in it (viz. water); so also, in the case of the highest Ātman, there (appear to) occur the two (viz. the scar and the wound) when the individual selves are transmigrating. [488] And, in this way, there will also¹ be the contingency of opposition to the Śruti statement (about the highest Ātman's being) without any scar. (Indeed, one should note that) an effect does not have existence/modification beside its own cause, i.e. elsewhere than in it.² [489]

Verse 488 states one more reason for proving the blemish (or, foolishness) in the ideas of Bhartṛprapañca.

¹The word *api* has the force to remind one of the opposition of the Śrutis and Smṛtis cited above in verses 483 and 484.

²This is a general rule regarding the relation between the cause and its effect. Any special modification cannot come to the effect, in case it does not come to the cause. In the present context, since the individual selves are the effects of the highest Ātman, there cannot come to them transmigration unless it comes to the highest Ātman. But such is never the case, for the highest Ātman is immutable.

परमात्मैकवृत्तित्वात्कुतो जीवस्य संसृतिः ।
स्वप्नसंचारवत्तस्माज्जीवसंसार इष्यते ॥४९०॥

(Further) whence can there be transmigratory existence in the case of the individual self, since it exists/abides only in the highest Ātman? As such, the transmigration of an individual self is accepted (or, can be conceded) only to be like one's movement in a dream.¹ [490]

This verse clarifies the general statement in the second line of verse 489 above.

¹That is to say: It is an effect of ignorance (*bhrānti*).

स्थास्नुष्वपि महद्दुःखं कण्टकादिषु देहिनाम् ।

परात्मनो महद्दुःखं जीवसंचरणेऽप्यतः ॥४९१॥

Even though (the individual persons) continue to remain (alive),¹ there is yet, on the part of men, great pain when there are thorns etc.² (pricking them); therefore, in the case of the higher Ātman also, there is great pain when there is transmigration of the inner self.³ [491]

¹*sthāsnūṣu* expects *jīveṣu* to be supplied, though, at the very sight of it (*āpātataḥ*), it appears to qualify *kaṇṭakādiṣu*. However, by pun, one may take it as a qualifier of the same! Yet, there is not any charm or purpose in doing so.

²*kaṇṭakādiṣu* can be taken for the cause of piercing the body and thereby causing pain to an individual. The word etc. refers to other painful things in life.

³*jīvasaṁcarane* is a variant reading noted in AnSS edition, it is preferable to what appears in both AnSS and NKL editions. It is meaningless to argue: 'When the individual selves do not migrate, the highest Ātman also is in pain.' Again, *jīvasaṁcarane* would not well balance with *kaṇṭakādiṣu*.

अदोषो विस्फुलिङ्गादिदृष्टान्तादिति चेन्मतम् ।

नैवं यथास्थितार्थानां शास्त्रस्य ज्ञापकत्वतः ॥४९२॥

If it be held, on (the basis of) the illustrations of small sparks (of fire) etc. that there is no fault (in accepting the highest Ātman and also the individual selves as transmigratory); that cannot be so, the Śāstra (i.e. scripture) is (merely) informative of objects as they are. [492]

The verse aims at rejecting the opponent's view of *aṁśā-ṁśibhāva* between the individual selves and the highest Ātman and also, as a consequence, their transmigratory natures—on the basis of the Śāstra. The reason adduced is that the Śāstra does not go beyond describing the things as they are.

अज्ञातज्ञापकं शास्त्रमेवंस्वाभाव्यतो मितेः ।
पदार्थान्नान्यथा कर्तुं प्रवृत्तं माननिश्चितान् ॥४९३॥

The Śāstra is informative (or, makes one know) about what is not known, for it is known that knowledge (gained from it) has such nature;¹ it has not (ever) proceeded to render things otherwise than what they are determined to be by various means of knowng.² [493]

¹Namely, it is *ajñātajñāpaka*.

²Cp. verse 455 above.

मूर्तामूर्तादयो यद्वत्पदार्था माननिश्चिताः ।
यथादृष्टानुरोधयेव दृष्टान्तैर्वस्तु बोध्यते ॥४९४॥

As the perceptible and imperceptible things are determined by the (various) means of knowng to be such and such; therefore, the (nature of a) thing is made known by an illustration, only in a way conformative of how it is known (lit. seen). [494]

This is to state that Śāstra, or rather the illustrations in it, merely confirm the nature of a thing which it already has.

एवं प्रवृत्तं सर्वत्र शास्त्रं दृष्टान्तपूर्वकम् ।
न प्रमान्तरसंसिद्धविपरीतात्मबोधनम् ॥४९५॥

Thus has proceeded everywhere (any) Śāstra, adducing illustrations; it is never to inform (one) of the nature of a thing which is the opposite of (or, contrary to) that established by other knowledge.¹ [495]

¹Namely, other means of knowledge.

अतिशीतोऽग्निरित्यत्र दृष्टान्तानां शतैरपि ।
प्रमान्तरविरुद्धत्वान्नेन्द्रेणाप्यधिगम्यते ॥४९६॥

(For example, in some information like) 'Fire is very cold,' that would not be accepted (i.e. so understood) by Indra also, even if hundreds of illustrations (go to say so), on account of that being opposed to other knowledge(s).¹ [496]

¹Namely, those acquired through other means of knowing.

मानान्तरविरुद्धं च न च मानं सदिष्यते ।
मानान्तरेणासंव्याप्ते मेये स्यान्मानता यतः ॥४९७॥

Also a means of knowing is not accepted as useful if it is opposed to the other means of knowing, since it has the nature as a means of knowing (only) if the matter to be known by it is not covered (i.e. made known) by any other means of knowing. [497]

तथा पदतदर्थैश्च लिङ्गप्रत्यक्षगोचरान् ।
नानादृत्यगमेनार्थमज्ञातं वेत्ति कश्चन ॥४९८॥

In the same way, one does not (come to) know an unknown object by means of Āgama (i.e. Śruti), having disregarded the words and the objects signified by them and also those that are known from their characteristics and direct perception. [498]

The point which this verse emphasises is: In actual worldly dealings, the Śāstra is not opposed to the accepted means of knowing.

लोकप्रसिद्धन्यायार्थैरंशशित्वादिकल्पना ।
परात्मनः कल्पयितुं नातो युक्ता कथं चन ॥४९९॥

Therefore, it is in no way reasonable to entertain a notion about the highest Ātman that its relation to the individual selves is that of a whole and (its) parts, on the basis (or, strength) of popularly known illustrations (lit. ways of knowing).

[499]

The point is: Since the Śāstra is not opposed to the popularly accepted ways of knowing, it should not be necessarily in conformity with them, in matters that are not worldly. In fact, that alone is the authoritative means.

विस्फुलिङ्गाद्युपन्यासः क्षेत्रज्ञपरमात्मनोः ।
ऐकात्म्यप्रतिपत्त्यर्थस्तस्मादत्र विवक्षितः ॥५००॥

Therefore, here, (in the context of the relation) between the knower of the field and the highest Ātman, it is intended to introduce (the illustration of) small sparks (of fire) as the conveyer of the oneness (or, identity) of them. [500]

उपक्रमोपसंहाराद्यथोक्तोऽर्थो विवक्षितः ।
ब्रह्मादि सर्वमात्मेति प्रतिज्ञाय श्रुतिर्यथा ॥५०१॥
दुन्दुभ्याद्यैश्च दृष्टान्तैर्हेतुभिश्च समर्थ्यते ।
अपूर्वाद्यादिभिर्वाक्यैः प्रतिज्ञार्थोपसंहृतिः ॥५०२॥

(Therefore), from the introduction and the conclusion, the thing that was sought to be expressed is first enunciated as the Śruti text 'All this which begins with the Brahman is the Ātman', [501]

it is then justified by the illustrations of a trumpet etc. and by various reasons;¹ and thereafter is the recapitulation of the matter enunciated by such sentences as begin with the words *apūrvā* etc.² [502]

¹These refer to explanations of various superimpositions caused by ignorance (Avidyā).

²Refer to BU 2.5.19; see verse 237 note 3.

सर्ववेदान्तवाक्येषु ब्रह्मैकत्वं विधीयते ।
इत्यविप्रतिपत्तिर्हि व्याख्यातृणामशेषतः ॥५०३॥

'In all the sentences of the Vedānta, there is declared (lit. stated) the singleness of the Brahman'—there is thus no disagreement (viz. agreement) of all the exponents of them, without exception (*aśeṣataḥ*). [503]

तद्विद्येकोक्तियोगस्य ह्यक्लेशात्संभवे सति ।
सृष्ट्यादिवचसां नैव युक्तार्थान्तरकल्पना ॥५०४॥

(Therefore,) when it is possible to connect with ease the sentences about creation etc. with the sentences which converge on stating the earlier unknown oneness of that (viz. the highest Ātman), it is not reasonable to entertain any other meaning (of those sentences). [504]

SP shows the connection between this and its preceding verse by pointing to an accepted mode of reasoning (*nyāya*) among the discussants. The *nyāya* is: *sambhavaty ekavākyatve vākyabhedo hi neṣyate*.

न च प्रमाणं तत्रास्ति कल्प्यं च स्यात्फलान्तरम् ।
ऐकात्म्यपरतैवातः सृष्ट्यादिवचसां भवेत् ॥५०५॥

There should not be imagined any authoritative means of knowing in respect of that;¹ nor also should one entertain the thought of any other result;² as such, it is only oneness or identity (of the individual selves and the highest Brahman) that is (finally) conveyed by sentences regarding creation etc. [505]

¹ Namely, in respect of the Śruti statements about the creation of the world.

² That is, the reality of the world full of variety of objects. Read in this context SP: *na ca tat kalpayitum śakyam phalavatsaṃnidhāv aphalaṃ tadanigam iti nyāyavirodhāt*; cf. *śaṅkara on &iiizopaniSad 9 and cp. &zaastradiipikaa 4.4.1*.

Now there is in verses 506-523 a discussion on a certain narrative told by Dravidācārya.

आचक्षते तथा चात्र केचिदाख्यायिकां शुभाम् ।
यथाभिलषितार्थोऽयं यया संभाव्यते स्फुटः ॥५०६॥

In connection with this matter, they¹ narrate an auspicious² tale by which³ is clearly honoured (i.e. exposed as possible) the matter (or, view) that is desired (or, accepted by the knowers of the Vedānta). [506]

¹This is a reference to Dravidācārya as reported by Ānandagiri (and, of course, by NKL). Śaṅkara describes him in BUB as *saṃpradāyavid* 'knower of the tradition' in Vedānta. very little is known about him.

²Read SP in this connection: *phalaparyantatayā dr̥ṣṭānta-dār̥ṣṭāntikarūpāyās tasyāḥ śubhatvam* (this consists in the second line of the verse).

³'by which' is for *yayā* —I suggest this emendation in the place of the second *yathā*. The two *yathās* in the verse are meaningless! Further, read the last sentence in SP: *sa yayā niḥsaṃdigdho 'bādhito sambhavati*.

यथा हि कश्चित्प्रागासीच्चक्रवर्तिसुतो युवा ।
व्याधियोगोपघातादेरुन्मत्तः सम्पद्यत ॥५०७॥

It is like this (*yathā hi*):¹ There was in olden days a certain young (prince), the son of a sovereign monarch. Struck as he was by an attack of some disease, he became disordered in mind. [507]

Sureśvara has made quite a few changes in the narrative reported by Śaṅkara. Here, in this verse, SP points to the prince's separation from his parents and also the subjects of the kingdom. Sureśvara omits this detail here.

¹Ordinarily, one finds *tathā hi* for this.

ध्वस्तराजाभिमानः सन्मुग्धो वनमुपेयिवान् ।
व्याधैः परिगृहीतश्च व्याधोऽस्मीत्यभिमन्यते ॥५०८॥

Losing his awareness that he was a king¹ (this is for a king's son), he went to forest. (There) he was received (lit. surrounded) by fowlers and (consequently) he began to feel 'I am a fowler'. [508]

¹This refers to the disorderliness in his mind.

तत्कर्मा तदहंकारः कालेन महताभवत् ।
ध्वस्तराजत्वसंस्कारो वसञ्शबरसद्मनि ॥५०९॥

And, in the course of long time, he, who had lost all (his previous) impressions of royalty and was staying in the dwelling of a forester, did their doings and entertained an awareness of that (viz. belonging to the fowlers' clan). [509]

शुभौषध्युपयोगाच्च स्वस्थधीः समजायत ।
स्वस्वभावानुरोधाच्च व्याधेभ्यो व्युत्थितात्मधीः ॥५१०॥
तच्छीलरूपकर्मभ्यो व्यावृत्तधिषणः स्वतः ।
केवलस्मृत्यभावाच्च न व्याधत्वं जहात्यसौ ॥५११॥

And (as time went on) he became orderly (or well) in his mind by the use of good medicines. Further, owing to his natural instincts, he became aware of himself (as different) from the fowlers. [510]

By himself, he had his mind turned away from their mode of behaviour, of attire and of activity; but (ca), only because there was no memory (of the past), he did not give up his belonging to the fowlers' clan. [511]

कुतश्चिदागमाज्ज्ञात्वा तमुपेत्याप्रतारकः ।
तज्जातिकर्मसंबन्धतत्त्ववित्तिपतः सखा ॥५१२॥
प्रवृत्त्या कर्मणा जात्या चक्रवर्त्युचितैस्तथा ।

लक्षणै राजपुत्रत्वं यथा कश्चित्प्रबोधयेत् ॥५१३॥

(Then later, some) friend of his father (to become),¹ having known (about him) from (somebody's) telling,² (becoming) conversant (lit. a knower) about the truth of his birth, doings (i.e. duties) and other relations,³ (himself) an honest person (lit. non-deceiver), approaching him (i.e. the prince), [512] (acquainted him) with his being a prince on account of (or rather, by the revealing things/factors,) such as his natural inclinations, doings (or, actions),⁴ (the truth of his) birth, and also the characteristic marks (on his person) befitting a sovereign monarch, as someone (who is a knower of some fact) would inform (another person about the same).⁵ [513]

¹This is to say: (*tatpituh sakhā*) *bhaviṣyan*; this last word is to be supplied predicatively.

²This is *āgama* 'talk by one person to another'—not usual sense of traditional knowledge of scriptures.

³This refers to the real situation about the young prince. However, it is possible to understand this also as 'the truth about his belonging to the fowlers' clan, duties and his real relations to them (i.e. the fowlers).

⁴*karman* in verse 512 meant 'duties, as determined by the stay among the fowlers' and in verse 513, doings or actions (for, they were not as yet his royal duties, owing to his utter ignorance about his royal connections).

⁵A simple statement of the simple behaviour of a person who knows some truth about the real state of things is here used, not as a simile; only the resemblance between such a person and the one, who was going to be a friend of the prince's father is meant.

लब्धमात्रस्मृतिः सोऽथ राजास्मीत्यवबोधतः ।

बाधित्वा स्वमसंबोधं हित्वा व्याधत्वमात्मनः ॥५१४॥

राज्याभिषेकमाप्नोति प्राप्य सिंहासनं पितुः ।

अवाप्तराजसूनुत्वात्तत्प्राप्तौ नापि चेष्टते ॥५१५॥

Immediately as he (i.e. the prince) got back his memory, he gave up his own ignorance (that obtained up to now) about himself by the awareness (awakened in him thus) 'I am a king' and also the relation to the fowlers (as one of them),

[514]

he secured (i.e. could secure) coronation of himself, obtaining the father's throne—(this is to say that he could do so) because he was (i.e. got back the memory and also the status of) the king's son; he did not act (or have to make efforts) to get it (viz. the coronation).

[515]

मोहाद्यस्तात्मव्याधत्वान्मोहध्वंसातिरेकतः ।
राजपुत्रत्वसंप्राप्तौ नान्यत्किञ्चिदपेक्षते ॥५१६॥

Since the nature of a fowler was superimposed upon him owing to his ignorance and (later) by the complete (*atireka*) removal (lit. destruction) of that ignorance, there was no need of (his doing) anything else for securing the status of a prince. [516]

In this verse, Dravidācārya (in the words of Sureśvara) mentioned *mohakārya*, *mohadhvaṃsa* and the consequent achievement in the case of the prince. This serves as a suitable illustration for proving the philosophical point of view under reference. This is clear in the following verse.

यथा तथायं ब्रह्मैव ब्रह्मासंबोधमात्रतः ।
बुद्धीन्द्रियशरीरादावात्मत्वं प्रतिपेदिवान् ॥५१७॥

As (the prince obtained his natural status), so does this one (viz. the individual self) obtain (i.e. came to know)¹ the nature of the Ātman, viz. the Brahman, in the place of intellect, organs and the body etc. (which existed for it earlier) owing merely to not knowing (i.e. ignorance about the true nature of) the Brahman.

[517]

¹*pratipedivān* is for *pratipadyate*.

सोऽयं सांसारिकैरर्थैः प्रत्यक्तत्त्वाप्रबोधतः ।
विशिनष्टि स्वमात्मानं प्रतीचीनमनात्मभिः ॥५१८॥

This one (viz. the individual self) characterizes itself, that has turned back (from reality), by means of the properties or objects belonging to the transmigratory world, the non-Ātmans, on account of (its) not knowing the true nature (of the sentience/self) within. [518]

This verse explains how a person gains the knowledge of the Ātman/Brahman.

संसारभूमावासीनं संसार्यस्मीत्यवस्थितम् ।
मुमुक्षुं तत्त्ववित्साक्षात्संसारव्युत्थितैषणम् ॥५१९॥
य आत्मेत्यादिभिर्वाक्यैरन्वयव्यतिरेकतः ।
तत्त्वमस्यादिवाक्येन गुरुः संबोधयेन्नरम् ॥५२०॥

Him (i.e. the man), who has belonged to (lit. occupied) the level of transmigratory world, who has considered himself thus, viz. 'I belong to this world', who is (now or afterwards) seeking to be liberated (from transmigration), who has all his desires for the transmigratory world removed directly by a knower of truth, [519]

(such a man) should the preceptor (first) awaken by (using) sentences such as *ya ātmā*,¹ i.e. by the method of Anvaya and Vyatireka, (and then) by the sentence *tat tvam asi*² etc. [520]

These verses explain the preceptor's role in a person's effort to obtain liberation.

¹Cf. CU 8.8.1.

²Cf. CU 6.8.7ff.

सम्यग्ज्ञानाग्निसंप्लुष्टप्रत्यक्तत्त्वमहातमाः ।
हित्वा मोहोत्थमखिलं ब्रह्मैव ब्रह्म यात्यथ ॥५२१॥

प्रत्यक्तत्त्वतमोऽध्वंसव्यतिरेकेण मुक्तये ।
अपेक्षते यतो नान्यत्किञ्चित्साधनमण्वपि ॥५२२॥

This (individual), who has then his thick (lit. great) ignorance (lit. darkness) about the true nature of the inner self burnt (i.e. destroyed, or removed) by the fire of right knowledge, first gives up (or, abandons) what has arisen from ignorance and thus (knowing) only the Brahman, attains to (the status of) the Brahman immediately,¹ [521]
since, (for obtaining) liberation, he does not need (lit. depends on, or, waits for) any—even a (very) small—means whatever beside (lit. in addition to) the destruction of darkness (i.e. ignorance) about the true nature of the Brahman. [522]

¹Cf. SP states: *kāryāntaravāraṇam athaśabdārthaḥ*. See next verse.

जन्माद्यसंभवात्तस्माद्ब्रह्मबोधातिरेकतः ।
कार्यान्तरं न संभाव्यं व्यर्थं चापि भवेद्वचः ॥५२३॥

Then, on account of the impossibility of birth etc., consequent to it (*tasmāt*), there is not any possibility (or need) of (his doing) any other activity in addition to (his) knowledge of the Brahman (which he has already obtained); (otherwise) the utterance (of the Upaniṣad) would become futile.¹ [523]

¹Cf. *brahma veda brahmaiva bhavati* (Munḍakopaniṣad 3.2.9). NKL, however, points to *Gītā* 3.20: *karmanaiva hi saṃsiddhim āsthitā janakādayaḥ*.

Verses 524-530 state that the passage regarding creation etc. does not intend to point out the relation of a part and a whole between the individual selves and the Brahman.

अंशांशित्वादि चेत्साक्षाद्ब्रह्मज्ञाने विवक्षितम् ।
समुद्रादेरिव तदा नावक्ष्यच्छ्रुतिरादरात् ॥५२४॥

यदनभ्युदितं वाचा मनते मनसा न यत् ।
अपूर्वादि तथा वाक्यमपि सैन्धवखिल्यवत् ॥५२५॥

If it was intended to speak about the relation such as that of a part and a whole, as in the case of the ocean etc.;¹ then, in that case, the Śruti would not have respectfully stated:

[524]

'That which is not expressed by speech',¹ 'that which it does not think with *manas*';² in the same way, the sentence which begins with (the word) *apūrva*,³ and also (the simile) 'like a lump of salt'.⁴

[525]

¹*Kenopaniṣad* 1.5.

²*Ibid.* 1.6.

³BU 2.5.19; see verse 237 note 3.

⁴BU 4.5.13.

नानात्वदृष्टिनिन्दां च मृत्योरिति तथा वचः ।
अंशांशित्वविवक्षायां न प्रायोक्ष्यत्तदेदृशम् ॥५२६॥

So also, it would not have employed such statements as purport to censure the seeing of multiplicity (of objects),¹ or the sentence 'from death ...'² and others,³ having the intention to express the notion of a part and a whole.

[526]

¹BU 4.4.19; *Kenopaniṣad* 4.10 and 11.

²*Ibid.*

³BU 4.4.20; *Kenopaniṣad* 4. 11.

एकैकरूपैकात्म्यार्थधियो दाढर्यप्रसिद्धये ।
सृष्ट्यादिश्रुतयस्तस्मान्न तु तत्प्रत्ययाय ताः ॥५२७॥

The Śruti sentences regarding creation etc. are stated with a view to securing/establishing the strength (of arguments) about the knowledge of the single Ātman as one homogeneous unity; and (*tu*) not for (causing) belief in the same.

[527]

न चात्मनो निरंशस्य तथासंसारिणः स्वतः ।
 अंशिसंसारिभावत्वं न्यायेनाप्युपपद्यते ॥५२८॥
 कल्पितोपाधिहेतुश्चेदंशिसंसारिकल्पना ।
 काममस्तु न तादृक्षु धीराणां सत्यधीर्भवेत् ॥५२९॥

Not also does it stand to reason that the (highest) Ātman, which, by nature, is without any parts and also, in itself, non-transmigratory, can become possessed of parts and be transmigratory, on the basis of any illustrations. [528]

And this notion of being possessed of parts and transmigratory (in the case of the highest Ātman) has a cause in the imaginary limiting adjuncts (of it). Let that be there; the wise ones do not have a belief in these kinds of notions as true. [529]

These two verses point out that the relation of parts and a whole and having transmigratory existence also are purely imaginary, opposed to reason and the Śruti.

विवक्षितं चेदैकात्म्यं सर्वोपनिषदां भवेत् ।
 विज्ञानात्मादिसंभेदस्तद्विरुद्धः किमुच्यते ॥५३०॥

If all the Upaniṣad texts intended to declare the singleness of the Ātman, why then talk about the conglomeration of the individual selves etc.¹ which is opposed to it? [530]

¹The word etc. refers to the body, the organs and the several objects of them.

Verses 531-537 discuss if the discrete knowers of the field etc. are real in order that the Karmakāṇḍa portion of the Veda is to be considered as authoritative.

कर्मकाण्डप्रमाणत्वविरोधवस्तये किल ।
 विज्ञानात्मादिसंभेद इति केचित्प्रचक्षते ॥५३१॥

Some scholars¹ state that the conglomeration of the individual selves etc. is associated with the highest self and is accepted indeed for averting (lit. destroying) the opposition to the author-itativeness of the Karmakāṇḍa. [531]

This is an answer, as it were, to what is stated in the preceding verse as a question.

¹This refers to the dualists.

ऐकात्म्यमात्रे जगति समाप्तपुरुषार्थके ।
चोदनाप्रतिषेधौ वः स्यातां निर्विषयौ तदा ॥५३२॥

(This is a dualist's observation:) If this world were merely of the nature of just a single Ātman and also would have had achieved all the ends of man's life, then, in that case, the injunction(s) and prohibition(s) (in the portions of the Veda) would become for you without any purpose/scope. [532]

This is how the multiplicity of individual selves and the rituals involving worldly objects is justified. This is a direct address to the opponent(s).

स्वत एव विमुक्तत्वाद्धन्धाभावात्स्वतस्तथा ।
वेदान्तानां तथारम्भो निष्फलः संप्रसज्यते ॥५३३॥

Also, because the Ātman is by itself in the state of a liberated being and because there does not exist any bondage for it, in its own right, the activity or the beginning of all the Vedānta texts would become futile! [533]

This argument of the dualist goes to point to the futility of the Vedānta teaching as well.

इत्येवमादिचोद्यानि परिहाराश्च वर्णिताः ।
संबन्ध एव बहुशो विचारेषु च कीर्तिताः ॥५३४॥

This and such other objections and the answers to (lit. refutations of them) have been presented (lit. described) in the *Sambandha(vārtika)* itself and also mentioned (time and again) in different discussions. [534]

SP clarifies the meanings of the different words, viz. *iti*, *evam* and *ādi* but that was really not necessary. The relevant comment is: *prakārāntareṇa parihartum codyotthāpanam ity arthaḥ*. This is to indicate that repetition is avoided by adopting a different mode of refutation.

परस्परविरोधाच्च प्रकाशतमसोरिव ।
कर्मकाण्डोपनिषदोर्निष्प्रामाण्यं द्वयोरपि ॥५३५॥

And there is (in fact) unauthoritativeness of both the Karmakāṇḍa and the Upaniṣads (i.e. Jñānakāṇḍa) owing to their mutual opposition as (that of) light and darkness. [535]

In the first instance, Sureśvara here rejects the authoritativeness of both the Kāṇḍas, for each opposes the other.

सति यस्य प्रमाणत्वे प्रामाण्यं स्याद्द्वयोरपि ।
तस्यैव कर्मकाण्डस्य प्रामाण्यमवसीयताम् ॥५३६॥

Or, let it be decided that there is authoritativeness in the Karmakāṇḍa itself, which being authoritative, there will (automatically) follow the authoritativeness of both Kāṇḍas. [536]

The argument is: For the Karmakāṇḍa, there is need of the relationship of individuals as teachers and the taught. Such a relationship will be necessary in respect of Jñānakāṇḍa also and then it will also be authoritative likewise. Sureśvara takes up here another alternative. This verse takes for granted the authoritativeness of the Karmakāṇḍa and that would compulsorily invite the authoritativeness of Jñānakāṇḍa as well. Therefore,

the idea of only one being authoritative cannot be accepted.

SP, while introducing the following verse, states very succinctly the argument involved thus: *tarhi* (this is in view of verse 536) *karmakāṇḍavaj jñānakāṇḍasyāpi svārthe mānatvaṃ vācyaṃ na ca tadartho dvaitaṃ kāṇḍabhedābhāvaprasaṅgād upakramopasaṃhārādivirodhāc cāto jñānakāṇḍamānatvabalāt kāṇḍāntaraviśaya-dvaitabādhakam advaitaṃ eva punar āgatam iti.*

The purport of this verse is put by NKL very clearly thus: *jñānakāṇḍaprāmāṇyaṃ tvayaivānirākṛtam syāt.*

कर्मकाण्डप्रमाणत्वे प्रामाण्यं चेद्द्वयोरपि ।
सर्वग्रासि तदैकात्म्यमागादिह पुनर्बलात् ॥५३७॥

If there is thus, in accepting the authoritativeness of the Karmakāṇḍa, the (compulsory acceptance of) the authoritativeness of both, then there has followed here (i.e. in our discussion), with (full) force, the all-devouring singleness of the Ātman. [537]

Verses 538 and 539 state, in this context, a prima facie view: the Upaniṣads are then unauthoritative.

यद्येवमप्रमाणत्वमस्तुपनिषदां तदा ।
मानान्तरविरोधाच्च नैतासां मानतेष्यते ॥५३८॥

If this is so,¹ then let there be unauthoritativeness of the Upaniṣad texts; (for,) owing to the opposition of the other means of knowing² as well (*ca*), their authoritativeness is not accepted. [538]

This verse states what BUB states in *evaṃ tarhi* It can be taken to be the opinion of him who accepts that there are many individuals in reality.

¹SP clarifies this thus: *na caivam adhyayanavidhivirodho japārtham tadadhyayanasiddher iti matvā tāsām (=upaniṣadām) amānatvam.*

²These are direct perception (*pratyakṣa*) and inference (*anumāna*) (*upamāna* is included in the latter). Also the Karmakāṇḍa is (implied by *ca*).

अपि स्वार्थविधातं च करोत्युपनिषद्यतः ।

अप्रामाण्यमतस्तस्याः कर्मकाण्डस्य मानता ॥५३९॥

Also, because the Upaniṣad¹ disproves its own meaning as well; therefore, its unauthoritativeness follows and (further there follows only) authoritativeness of the Karmakāṇḍa (also). [539]

The purport of the argument is: The Upaniṣadic acceptance of such distinction as the teacher and the taught is against their own teaching of oneness (*advaita*).

Verses 540-587 establish the Siddhānta: the Upaniṣads are authoritative.

नोक्तोत्तरत्वात्साध्वेतद्भवता परिचोद्यते ।

व्यर्थतान्यार्थते नेह यथा तत्प्राक्प्रपञ्चितम् ॥५४०॥

(The Siddhāntin answers:) It is not that you have raised this objection well, since already it has been answered. Here (in respect of the Upaniṣads) there is neither futility nor subservience (to any system). How this is, is earlier discussed at length. [540]

ब्रह्मास्मीति धियो जन्मसमकाला विमुक्तता ।

यतोऽनुभूयते साक्षान्नानर्थक्यं भवेत्ततः ॥५४१॥

Since the state of liberation is directly experienced as occurring at the same time with the rise of the knowledge (*dhi*)¹ 'I am Brahman'; therefore, there is no meaninglessness (in the Upaniṣads). [541]

¹*dhiyo janmasamakālā* is an instance of Sureśvara's use of

sāpekṣā samāsa.

वस्तुमात्रावसायित्वं संबन्धे प्राक्प्रपञ्चितम् ।
यतोऽतो नोपनिषदामन्यार्थत्वं कथं चन ॥५४२॥

Since it is already discussed fully in the *Sambandha*(*vārtika*) that the final conclusion (of the Upaniṣads is that) there is (in reality) only the thing (viz. the Brahman), therefore, there is not at all any subservience of the Upaniṣads (to any system).

[542]

स्वप्रमेयप्रमोत्पत्त्यनुत्पत्त्येकहेतुके ।
प्रमाणत्वाप्रमाणत्वे नान्यथा ते प्रसिध्यतः ॥५४३॥

Giving rise to the correct knowledge of the object to be known by itself and not giving rise to the same are (really) the bases (of the means of knowing which have) the character of being authoritative and unauthoritative—if they are otherwise,¹ they are not accepted (lit. established as means).

[543]

¹That is, if they do not conform to what is already stated (in the earlier part of the verse).

किं चातो यदि नामैवं प्रकृतार्थोपयोगि यत् ।
शृण्वेकाग्रमनाः सर्वं यदेवं सति वस्तु तत् ॥५४४॥

(A question is asked:) 'If this is thus,¹ what (comes) from this, viz. which is useful in the matter in hand (or, for our purpose)?' (The answer is:) 'Listen, being attentive in mind, to all that which is the thing while this is so.

[544]

¹This refers to the purposeful means of knowing as explained in the preceding verse.

स्वप्रमेये प्रमां साक्षात्करोत्युपनिषद्यदि ।
अप्रामाण्यं कथं तस्याः कुतोऽतो मानतान्यथा ॥५४५॥

If, in respect of what is its object to be known, the Upaniṣad directly produces that (right) knowledge, then how could there be unauthoritativeness of it? where else than this could there be authoritativeness (as a means)? [545]

न चेत्करोत्युपनिषत्प्रमामित्यभिधीयते ।
प्रत्यक्षेण विरुद्धार्थं त्वदीयं वचनं भवेत् ॥५४६॥

If you were to say that the Upaniṣad does not produce right knowledge, then your (such) statement will have a meaning that is opposed to what is directly noticed. [546]

This verse presupposes the objector's view that the Upaniṣad does not produce knowledge.

नाग्निर्दहति काष्ठानि न तापयति भास्करः ।
इति यद्वत्तथोक्तस्ते प्रत्यक्षेण विरुद्ध्यते ॥५४७॥

Your statement is opposed by direct perception in the same way as (are the statements) 'Fire does not burn wood.' and 'The sun does not cause heat.' [547]

अग्निदाहादिवत्साक्षाद्वेदान्तज्ञानजं फलम् ।
संसारानर्थहानारूपं प्रत्यक्षमनुभूयते ॥५४८॥

The result of the knowledge produced by the Vedānta (i.e. Upaniṣad) is directly perceived like burning by fire; (the result) called as the losing of all the undesirable matters of transmigratory existence. [548]

विघ्नन्ति स्वार्थमित्युक्तं यच्च तच्चापि पेलवम् ।
यथा तदुच्यमानं त्वं यथावच्छ्रोतुमर्हसि ॥५४९॥

And what is said, viz. they (i.e. the Upaniṣads) destroy their own subject matter,¹ is also a weak (argument); how (that

is) is (now/hereafter) being told, you should hear that properly (yathāvat). [549]

¹This relates to the acceptance of the relations such as the teacher and the taught; the illustrations, narratives and so on.

स्वप्रमेयावबोधो हि मानानां स्वार्थ उच्यते ।
तं चेत्कुर्वन्ति वेदान्ताः कुतस्तेषाममानता ॥५५०॥

They call that indeed as the *svārtha* 'purpose' of the means of knowing, viz. what is making (one) know about what they present as the matter for knowing. (And) if the Vedāntas do that,¹ how can they be rejected as authoritative means? [550]

¹Namely, fulfil their purpose.

न च वेदान्तवाक्योत्थज्ञानस्येहास्ति बाधकम् ।
बाधकानामपि सतां प्रत्यग्याथात्म्यरूपतः ॥५५१॥

Not also is there here any stultifier of the knowledge arising from the Vedānta sentences; for, even in case there existed any stultifiers,¹ they would have been (in reality) the nature of the inner self. [551]

¹The stultifiers could only be the means of knowing such nature of the Vedānta sentences. But these also would have been nothing but the products of ignorance about the nature of the Ātman, i.e. they would have been falsely produced by the Ātman.

प्रमाणमप्रमाणं च प्रमाभासस्तथैव च ।
कुर्वन्त्येव प्रमां यत्र तदसंभावना कुतः ॥५५२॥

How could there be impossibility (of the existence) of those which cause right knowledge, viz. the authoritative means, the

non-authoritative means and also false knowledge?

[552]

This verse is identical with 1.4.874 and TUBV 2.619.

किमेकविषयत्वेन किंवा विषयभेदतः ।

विरोधः स्यात्प्रमाणानामित्येतदभिधीयताम् ॥५५३॥

Let this be told whether the opposition of the means of knowing (to the Upaniṣads) is on account of (just) the same object (as theirs) or their having different objects. [553]

मानान्तरेण संवादो यदि चेदनुवादिता ।

विरोधो न तु मानानां सदैकार्थसमागमे ॥५५४॥

If there is agreement of the Upaniṣads with the other means of knowing, call it their nature of being repetitive; and (*tu*) that would not be opposition to the other means of knowing, if they come together to convey one and the same object (to be known). [554]

This refers to the notion of mutual opposition between two means of knowing which have the same object to be known!

भिन्नप्रमेयतायां च श्रोत्रादीनां यथा तथा ।

परस्परानपेक्षत्वान्नितरामविरुद्धता ॥५५५॥

In the case that they have different objects to be known, they do not have any opposition (to the other means) in the same as the ears and others (which have different objects to be known) since they are mutually independent. [555]

This points to the acceptance of different means of knowing in relation to different objects to be known.

न चैकमेव सद्वाक्यं करोति न करोति च ।

प्रमां तत्प्रतिषेधं च कुर्वत्क्वचिदिहेष्यते ॥५५६॥

It is nowhere¹ accepted that just one sentence² causes and also does not cause (understanding of a meaning); and also causing right knowledge and its opposite as well. [556]

The argument relates to two opposite functions done by a single means of knowing, i.e. in respect of their operations and of the results as well.

¹This refers to 'no time' or 'no place'.

²Be it a Vedic or a popularly spoken sentence.

अग्निः शीतस्तथोष्णश्चेत्येवमाद्युक्तितो ननु ।
विरुद्धार्थावभासोऽयं जायमानः समीक्ष्यते ॥५५७॥

But (one might say:) 'From such expression as "fire is cool" and so also "it is hot", there is noticeable the conveying¹ of (two) opposite meanings!' [557]

This objection is based on popular experience of such meanings as are conveyed by sentences.

¹This is for *avabhāsa* not in the sense of *avamata* or *avasanna bhāsa*; it is for only *bhāsa*, i.e. *bodha*.

नैकस्मान्नापि च द्वाभ्यां विरुद्धार्थोऽवसीयते ।
अनूद्योक्त्येकदेशेन शीतोऽग्निरिति बोध्यते ॥५५८॥

Mutually contradicting meanings are not understood from (just) one sentence and also from two (different) sentences, for if there are two sentences, (then) by one part (of sentences which has parts of apparently two contradictory meanings) (of the composite utterance) there is repeated (what is conveyed by yet another sentence earlier) and there is conveyed (in another part) the sense 'fire is cool'. [558]

Note SP: *na cānuvādakabodhakabhāgayor virodho 'tulyabalatvād*

ity arthaḥ.

संभवत्येव शीतोऽग्निः प्रमाणान्तरगोचरः ।
मानान्तरविरोधोऽपि तथा च सति नेष्यते ॥५५९॥

Indeed, there does possibly exist cool fire,¹ (but) that is the object of another means of knowing;² and in case that is so, there is not understood thereby any opposition to (or, by) another means of knowing, at the same time.³ [559]

¹This refers to fire in the moon (this is poetically so!), fire in a cloud etc., cf. SP on verse 561 below.

²Here, there is reference to actually experienced hot fire.

³This is for *api*. SP states: *vidyamānārthatāvad ity aper arthaḥ*.

शीतवद्भा भवेच्छीतः शैत्यस्यानपहारतः ।
एवमप्यविरोधः स्यादस्य मानान्तरैरपि ॥५६०॥

Or 'cool fire' can be¹ 'like cool', owing to the non-removal of cool. (But), in thus saying also, there is (really) no opposition to this (sentence) by any other means of knowing. [560]

This verse keeps in view two parts of one sentence: 'fire is cool' and 'fire is hot' and also of the situation that both the meanings conveyed by the two parts are a matter of one direct experience; there is thus a difficulty. The answer relates to such a situation that fire is cool in winter (i.e. not as hot as at other time). Or, perhaps, it can be a simile 'some fire may be *like* cool fire'—in this case, a part of 'cool fire' is not opposed to one's direct experience. For, in similes, they accept *āhārya* 'imaginary' non-opposition.

¹Or, can be understood or purposely stated as.

शैशिरोऽग्निर्भवेच्छीतस्तथोष्णः पार्थिवो भवेत् ।
भिन्नार्थत्वावबोधित्वाद्वाक्ययोर्न विरुद्धता ॥५६१॥

Fire related to cool objects¹ is cool and (the usual) fire on earth is hot. Thus there cannot be opposition between the two sentences, since they convey two different meanings (i.e. states of, or for, a thing, here 'fire'). [561]

This is to clarify further verse 559 above.

¹These are, for example, the moon, the cloud (having lightning in it). Cf. NKL: *vidyuccandrādīdivyāgniḥ śaiśira ucyate*.

ऐकार्थ्ये न विरोधोऽस्ति द्वयर्थत्वेऽपि न माश्रयात् ।
मानान्तराच्च नैवास्ति मान्तराविषयत्वतः ॥५६२॥

If thus a sentence has only one meaning to convey or two meanings also, there is no opposition (to that being so), inasmuch as they resort to (right) knowledge; and, because there is another means of knowing, there is no (question of there being) any other object of right knowledge. [562]

अभ्युपेत्यैतदुदितं न तु वाक्यविदां नयः ।
यदनेकार्थबोधित्वमेकस्य वचसः सतः ॥५६३॥

This¹ is said (only) after granting (the objector's view),² but such is not the way³ of those who know (the science of) sentences),⁴ viz. that there is one sentence and that it has more senses than one. [563]

¹The word *etad* refers to the second part of the first line in the preceding verse.

²Namely, one sentence can have two meanings—this is an acceptance for argument's sake.

³That is, guiding principle.

⁴The Mīmāṃsakas are meant.

अर्थैकत्वादिति तथा वाक्यलक्षणमुच्यते ।
अनेकार्थावबोधित्वे न स्याल्लक्षणवद्वचः ॥५६४॥

That is to say:¹ The definition of a sentence given (by the Mīmāṃsakas) is that it has only one meaning.² In case a sentence conveys more meanings than one, the utterance (of it) does not conform to the definition (of a sentence).³ [564]

¹This is for *tathā*.

²Cf. *Pūrvamīmāṃsāsūtra* 2.1.46: *arthaikatvād ekaṃ vākyaṃ (sākāṅkṣaṃ ced vibhāge syāt)*.

³That is, it would not be one sentence, according to the definition.

एकमेव यदा वाक्यं कृत्स्नो वेदोऽभ्युपेयते ।
वाक्यान्तरासंभवतस्तदा केन विरुद्धता ॥५६५॥

When it is accepted that the entire Veda (is just one sentence), then, there being no possibility of the occurrence of any other sentence, to what (other sentence) the sentence under question would be contradictory? [565]

This verse presupposes the objector's question, 'if the entire Veda is accepted as one sentence—cf. the concept of Mahāvākya (not the Vedāntic; but that in Poetics)—or, it is made of many sentences' and answers the first alternative.

वाक्यद्वयं चेदथवा सिद्धसाध्यार्थभेदतः ।
तदापि न विरोधोऽत्र विभिन्नार्थावबोधिनाः ॥५६६॥

Or, it (i.e. the Veda) can be considered as two sentences owing to the difference (in respect of their meanings, viz.) what is already existent and what is yet to be effected.¹ Even in that case, there is no (mutual) contradiction, since they inform one about two different things (each different from the other).² [566]

¹The existent is *siddha*— it is the Brahman which has been existent even before the other thing, viz. Dharma, which is to

be effected or accomplished (*sādhya*).

²In both these cases, each sentence is *ajñātārthajñāpaka* 'informative of a thing which has not been known before'.

नापि स्वार्थं परार्थं वा विहन्त्युपनिषत्त्वचित् ।
कथं चेदुच्यमानं तच्छृण्वेकाग्रमना यथा ॥५६७॥

Also it is (a fact) that nowhere does an Upaniṣad contradict its own meaning¹ or the meaning of any other (means of knowing). (If you ask) 'How is it so?', listen to what is being told, with an attentive mind. [567]

¹This is either the subject matter or the result accruing from it.

सर्वमात्मेति चेत्कुर्यात्प्रमेयविषयां प्रमाम् ।
विहन्त्युपनिषत्स्वार्थमिति निर्लज्जगीरियम् ॥५६८॥

Since (lit. if) the Upaniṣad causes the right knowledge about the object to be known by it, viz. all is the Ātman, then it is only a shameless talk to say that the Upaniṣad contradicts its own meaning. [568]

निःशेषपुरुषार्थमिति सर्वानर्थात्ययः सदा ।
वेदान्तज्ञानतश्चेत्स्यात्स्वार्थोऽतोऽन्यः क इष्यते ॥५६९॥

If there would ever result from the knowledge conveyed by the Upaniṣad that the securing all the ends of life (or, *puruṣa*) in their entirety and also the awareness of all undesirables (in the transmigratory world); then what other thing than all this is expected to be its meaning? [569]

निषेधति विधत्ते वा न चाप्युपनिषत्क्रियाम् ।
प्रत्यक्तत्त्वैकसंबोधे तद्वाक्योपक्षयत्वतः ॥५७०॥

The Upaniṣad does not either prescribe or prohibit any activity,

since its sentences come to an end¹ only in giving the (rise to the knowledge of the nature of the inner self. [570]

¹Or literally, come to be exhausted.

न चापि कर्मकाण्डोक्तिः स्वार्थे न कुरुते प्रमाम् ।
स्वार्थे च सा प्रमां कुर्वत्यमानं कथमुच्यते ॥५७१॥

It is not also that the sentence in the Karmakāṇḍa does not produce right knowledge about the object of its knowing; how could it be said that it is not an authoritative means of knowing, produce as it does right knowledge about the object of its knowing? [571]

The argument is that the Karmakāṇḍa sentences are also meaningful so far as their own subject matter is concerned. That the Upaniṣadic sentences convey the knowledge of the Brahman should not be taken to mean that the Karmakāṇḍa sentences do not convey their meaning.

प्रात्यक्ष्याच्च प्रमोत्पत्तेर्ज्योतिष्टोमादिवाक्यतः ।
प्रमैवोत्पद्यते नेति वक्तुमेतन्न शक्यते ॥५७२॥

And it is a matter of direct knowledge that there arises from the sentences such as those about the Jyotiṣṭoma sacrifice right knowledge (about them). It is (therefore) not possible to say this, viz. there does not arise (from them any) right knowledge at all. [572]

विषयापहृतेर्नो चेद्वेदान्तोक्त्या प्रमोत्तिथिः ।
न प्रत्यक्षबलीयस्त्वादनुमानप्रबोधतः ॥५७३॥

(If it is said that), since the Vedānta sentences disprove the meaning (of the Karmakāṇḍa sentences), there is no rise of right knowledge (from them, i.e. these latter); it is not so (to be understood) because the direct perceptibility (of the

knowledge from them) is stronger than what is understood (by you) from inference. [573]

यथासिद्धान्युपादाय कामद्वेषवशानुगः ।
 इष्टमेव सदा मे स्यान्मा भूच्चानिष्टमण्वपि ॥५७४॥
 साधनानीष्टलाभार्थमनिष्टार्थापनुत्तये ।
 आचक्षाणा श्रुतिः पुंसो नान्यार्थं वक्ति कंचन ॥५७५॥

“Having taken up (the things that are) already made, (a person) who acts under the sway of desire and hatred (or, dislike), (who thinks to himself) ‘let there always be for me only (what) I have desired and let not there be even a little undesired (or, undesirable thing)’ [574]

(should acquire) the means for securing what is desired and for warding away (every) undesirable”—thus saying, the Śruti¹ does not state for a man any other thing. [575]

¹This is the Karmakāṇḍa portion of the Veda.

यथा काम्याग्निहोत्रादौ साध्यसाधनसंगतिम् ।
 विदधन्नानृतत्वादि कामानां वक्ति कुत्रचित् ॥५७६॥

As, while the Karmakāṇḍa prescribes the connection between what is to be accomplished and what accomplishes (the same) in regard to the *kāmya* ‘desired’ (rituals) and Agnihotra etc., it does not anywhere speak of the truth (i.e. being true) of the desires. [576]

The argument seems to be this. The Karmakāṇḍa merely mentions the *sādhya-sādhana-sambandha* in the case of both the compulsory Agnihotra ritual and the *kāmya* rituals; yet it does not mention them as true (in the same sense as the Brahman is true).

न चापि न प्रवर्तन्ते पुरुषाः काम्यकर्मसु ।
 यतोऽतत्त्वविदां कामो न कदाचिन्निवर्तते ॥५७७॥

It is not that men do not enter upon (the performance of) *kāmya* rituals also,¹ since, in the case of those who are not conversant with (or, aware of) the Truth, desire never satiates.

[577]

¹The word 'also' indicates the performance of compulsory Agnihotra etc.; men do perform these, but they enter on the *kāmya* rituals as well.

अकामतः क्रिया काचिद्दृश्यते नेह कस्यचित् ।
यद्यद्वि कुरुते किञ्चित्तत्तत्कामस्य चेष्टितम् ॥५७८॥

In this world (*iha*) there is nowhere noticed any activity which is (done) without any desire. For, whatever a man does, is all of it the effect (lit. doing) of desire.

[578]

This is identical with BUBV 1.4.1816. We have changed *kasyacit* which is already shown by AnSS edition as a variant reading. Also, cp. BUBV 4.4.223. Cf. *Manusmṛti* 2.4 where the first line ends in *neha karhicit*.

स यथाकाम इत्यादिरेषोऽर्थश्च सविस्तरः ।
वक्ष्यतेऽकामयमानश्च तथाकुर्वन्विमुच्यते ॥५७९॥

This matter will be stated in its (full) length in *sa yathākāmaḥ* ...;¹ and a person, who does not entertain (any) desire,² does not perform³ (any ritual activity) and gets liberated.

[579]

¹Cf. BU 4.4.5.

²Cf. BU 4.4.6: *athākāmayamānaḥ yō 'kāmo niṣkāma āptakāmo na tasya prāṇā utkrāmanti brahmaiva san brahmāpyeti*.

³SP and NKL point to the dissolution of the Saṃdhi *tathā akurvan*.

सर्वाधिकारप्रध्वंसात् कृत्स्नात्मावबोधिनः ।

प्रवृत्तौ वा निवृत्तौ वा गुणभावः सदेष्ट्यते ॥५८०॥

Since in the case of one, who has the knowledge that all is the Ātman, there are all (kinds of) eligibility¹ (for ritual performance) destroyed, there is ever accepted, in regard to inclination and disinclination, the eligibility to act.² [580]

¹*adhikāra* is explained by SP and NKL as *vidhipuruṣa-sambandhādih*.

²This is for *guṇabhāvaḥ* paraphrased in SP and NKL as *karṭṛtva*.

अतो निर्विषयत्वादि ब्रह्मैकत्वाद्यदीरितम् ।
तत्सर्वं परिहृतं ज्ञेयं यथोक्तेनैव वर्त्मना ॥५८१॥

Therefore, (all that was said about the Upaniṣad as) having no object (to state about ritual activity) etc. and (as merely declaring) the singleness etc. of the Brahman is to be known as refuted, in the very way stated. [581]

Read in this context the note of the editor of NKL: *ajñasyāviraktasya karmaṇi pravṛttiḥ. sādhyasādhana-sambandha-bodhakatvena karmakāṇḍaprāmāṇyam. ... na virodhaḥ upaniṣadām ityuktamārgenetyarthah*.

न निवर्तयितुं शक्तं रागाद्याकृष्टचेतसः ।
शास्त्रं विरक्तचित्तान्वा न प्रवर्तयितुं क्षमम् ॥५८२॥

The Śāstra (viz. Karmakāṇḍa) is not useful (lit. not able) to ward away those minds which are attracted by longing etc., nor is it capable of inducing those whose minds are averse (to worldly life). [582]

Read, in this context, the note of the editor of NKL: *ajñasyāviraktasya karmaṇi pravṛttiḥ/ sādhyasādhana-sambandha-bodhakatvena karmakāṇḍaprāmāṇyam/*

karmatatphalādīnāṃ satyatve udāgīnaṃ karmakāṇḍam/ tena na virodhaḥ upaniṣadām ityuktamārgenety arthaḥ/

इष्टानिष्टफलानीति साधनानि प्रकाशयेत् ।
न निवृत्तिं प्रवृत्तिं वा पुंसः शास्त्रं करोति तत् ॥५८३॥

(Therefore) the Śāstra¹ should reveal² the nature of those activities which yield either desired or undesired results. That the Śāstra does not promote man's activity or ward him from activity. [583]

¹This again refers to the Karmakāṇḍa.

²The words 'should reveal' is *really* for 'reveals', cf. verse 585 below.

अपि शास्त्रं समुल्लङ्घ्य रागादिबलवत्तया ।
प्रवर्तमानाः पुरुषा दृश्यन्तेऽद्यापि कामिनः ॥५८४॥

Also, even now are noticed men, having desires, to overlook (lit. go beyond the limits of) the Śāstra, owing to the strong longing etc. [584]

साध्यसाधनसंबन्धानिष्टानिष्टफलोदयान् ।
शास्त्रं त्वादित्यवत्साक्षात्प्रकाशयति तान्सदा ॥५८५॥

(Actually), the Śāstra ever reveals to them about the connections between various objects to be achieved and the means to achieve them and also about the rise of the desired and the undesired results, so directly as the sun (reveals different objects). [585]

तेषु शास्त्रैकदीपेषु साध्यसाधनवर्त्मसु ।
यथार्चि प्रवर्तन्ते पुरुषा न तु शास्त्रतः ॥५८६॥

But men turn to these paths of *sādhyā-sādhana*s which are for them the only lamp in the form of the Śāstra, only at

their liking and not in accord with the Śāstra.

[586]

विधिशास्त्रस्य नैवातो वेदान्ता बाधकाः सदा ।
न च निर्विषयं तत्स्यान्मेयभेदात्त्वगादिवत् ॥५८७॥

As such, the Vedānta (texts) are never the stultifiers of the Śāstra of injunctions. And that¹ should not be considered as having no objects (for them to talk about) only owing to the difference in respect of the objects to be known (from them), like the skin etc. (of a living being).² [587]

¹This should mean: the two Kāṇḍas together.

²The simile is not explained by both SP and NKL. It is somewhat unclear. I suggest: the skin etc. have various kinds of objects—even mutually opposed in nature—to touch etc. They remain the same and yet function in their particular ways. So do the two Kāṇḍas of the Veda.

Verses 588-591 state the view of the Tārkikas 'logicians' who are opposed to the Vedānta.

केचित्तु पण्डितमन्या विरोधीनि परस्परम् ।
संभावयन्ति मानानि सर्वाण्यैकात्म्यवस्तुनि ॥५८८॥

But there are some, who regard themselves as learned men, and look upon all the mutually opposed¹ means of knowing 'as opposed'¹ in respect of (the view that there is) (only) singleness of the Ātman. [588]

¹In this verse, the word *virodhīni* is to be read twice: First as *parasparam viruddhāni* with reference to the means acceptable to the Tārkikas, this is expressed (*vācya*); then as *viruddhāni aikātmavastuni* (locative singular indicating the *adhikaraṇa* 'object' of *viruddhāni*).

श्रोत्रादिभिर्यतो भिन्ना मिथः शब्दादयस्त्वमी ।

मीयन्ते सर्वमात्मेति प्रत्यक्षेण विरुध्यते ॥५८९॥

Since these mutually differing words etc. are known by the ears etc., in a similar way, (the proposition:) 'All is the Ātman.' is opposed by direct perception. [589]

The verse states the mutual opposition among the various means of knowing as an example for showing the opposition of direct perception to the statement regarding *brahmaikya*.

शब्दाद्यर्थोपलब्धारः कर्तारश्च पृथक्पृथक् ।
यस्मादिहानुमीयन्ते तस्माल्लिङ्गविरोधिता ॥५९०॥

Since the agents who know the objects such as a word are inferred here¹ to be different from one another; therefore, there is opposition (in respect of) inferences² (about singleness of the Brahman). [590]

¹The word *iha* refers to the body.

²*linga* means *anumāna*. This opposition of inference to the Vedāntic proposition is stated in BUB thus: *śrotrādibhiḥ śabdādyupalabdhāraḥ kartāraś ca dharmādharmayoḥ pratiśarīraṃ bhinnā anumūyante saṃsāriṇaḥ, tatra brahmaikatvam bruvatām anumānavirodhaḥ*. Also see SP: *svadehasamavetaceṣṭātulyaceṣṭā dehāntareṣu drṣṭā sā yatnavatpūrvā viśiṣṭaceṣṭātvāt sammatavad ity anumānaviruddham aikyaśāstram iti bhāvaḥ*.

तथागमविरोधं च ग्रामकामादिभेदतः ।
उद्भासयन्ति संहृष्टा ब्रह्मैकत्वप्रदूषकाः ॥५९१॥

In the same way, those, who find fault with (the theory of) the singleness of the Brahman, (and feel) very delighted (at heart),¹ highlight (the argument of) the opposition of the Śruti texts on account of their having differences as regards desire for a village etc. [591]

The Śrutis which are adduced by the Tārkikas in support of their opposition to the Vedānta theory are: *grāmakāmo yajeta*, *paśukāmo yajeta*, *svargakāmo yajeta* etc. These presuppose many individuals who are possessed of many desires and are later sacrificers. But the Vedānta theory would not allow such multiplicity of them, recognised by the Śruti texts. This should point to the opposition they mention.

¹The delight is caused by their being able to point out contradictory Śrutis and, in general, every other kind of contradiction.

Verses 592 onwards to the end, i.e. verse 611, present the Vedāntin's refutation of the argument of the Tārkikas.

ब्रह्मैकत्वविरोधो वः कथं भिन्नार्थबुद्धिभिः ।
इति ब्रह्मविदोपेत्य प्रष्टव्या भेदवादिनः ॥५९२॥

The knower of the Brahman(-theory) should approach the dualists and ask them, 'How is (this) your opposition to the singleness of the Brahman (held/explained by you) who hold duality (in the world)?' ¹ [592]

¹This, I think, can be clarified by BUB thus: *śarīrendriyamana-ātmasu pratyekaṃ anumānakauśalapratyākhyāne śarīrendriya-manahsādhana ātmāna vayam ...* (of course, Śaṅkara has used this for scoffing at them!).

किं भोः शब्दादिभेदेन खस्यैकत्वं विरुध्यते ।
न चेद्विरुध्यतेऽथोच्चैर्विरोधः किमितीर्यते ॥५९३॥

Please tell us, O men, if the oneness of the sky is contradicted by difference(s) in words (which are used to signify the same). If it is not (contradicted), then why is it loudly said that there is contradiction (to the Vedānta proposition)? [593]

The argument of the Vedāntin is thus explained by SP: *yathā*

sarvabhūtastham ekam ākāśam ity ukter na śabdādibhēdagrāhi-pratyakṣādivirodho 'bhinnaviṣayatvāt tathā sarvabhūtastham ekam brahma ity ukter api na tatpratyakṣeṇa virodhaḥ.

सत्परिच्छेदकैर्नापि प्रत्यक्षाद्यैर्ग्रहो भवेत् ।
व्यावृत्तेरन्यतोभावमात्रायाः केनचित्क्वचित् ॥५९४॥

The means of knowing, viz. direct perception and others, which have only the existent (objects) as their (objects of knowing), cannot, any one of them and/or anywhere, grasp *vyāvṛtti* 'exclusion' which consists merely in the absence of any other (object). [594]

This argument is based on the Tārkikas' opposition to non-duality of the Brahman. Since non-duality is not an existent object, the Vedāntin contends, the Tārkikas' means of knowing cannot grasp and oppose the same.

द्वैतग्राहि यथा मानं न किञ्चिदपि विद्यते ।
तथोदर्के प्रवक्ष्यामि नातो मानविरोधिता ॥५९५॥

Since there does not (or, cannot) exist a means of knowing which can grasp duality¹—I shall discuss this later² (again)—for this reason also, there is no opposition by every means of knowing (to the Vedāntin's theory of the singleness of the Brahman). [595]

¹This is to state that the notion of duality, entertained by the Tārkikas, is already refuted in SV.

²This refers to BU 5.1 beginning with the Mantra *pūrṇam adah.*

यच्चोक्तमनुमीयन्ते प्रतिदेहं पृथग्विधाः ।
शब्दाद्यर्थोपलब्धारः कर्तारश्चापि कर्मणाम् ॥५९६॥

Now regarding the statement: 'There are inferred to be

different knowers, one in each body, of the objects such as words and also the agents of (various) activities.' [596]

भिन्नाः कैरनुमीयन्त इति पृष्टो वदेद्यदि ।
अस्माभिलिङ्गकुशलैरित्येतच्च न युक्तिमत् ॥५९७॥

If (the Tārkikas is) thus questioned: 'By whom are these different (agents of varied activities) inferred?', and then he replies, 'By us, who are adepts in the act of inferring'; then (we have to say) 'This (answer) is not (supported) with reason.' [597]

This last observation of the Vedāntin, i.e. 'The (answer) ... reason', is explained in the following verse.

अनन्यमानमेयेऽर्थे न भेदः प्रत्यगात्मनि ।
पराङ्मानप्रमेयाश्च नात्मानः स्तम्भकुम्भवत् ॥५९८॥

In the case of the inner self, which is a thing not to be known by any other knower or means of knowing, there is no discrete object (other than that can be pointed out).¹ And the Ātmans (i.e. inner selves) are not, like pillars or pitchers, to be known by the means of knowing that are outside (them).² [598]

¹This argument is put forth with a view to rejecting the inner self's being known as an object, since it is *svaprakāśa* 'self-illuminating'.

²In this part of the verse it is pointed out that the inner self, if taken as what can be perceived like a pillar etc. (i.e. *dr̥śya*), would cease to be the Ātman—it will be only non-Ātman—and thus non-existent (*asiddha*).

अनुमाकुशला ययं क इत्येतद्विभाष्यताम् ॥५९९॥
देहेन्द्रियमनोबुद्धिक्षेत्रज्ञेषु पृथक्पृथक् ।
नानुमाकौशलं तावत्प्रत्येकं तेषु विद्यते ॥६००॥
देहादिसाधनास्तस्माद्वयमात्मान एव हि ।

भूरिसाधनसाध्यत्वात्क्रियाणां नो विभिन्नता ॥६०१॥

Now, let it be explained as to who you are—you, who are adepts in the act of inferring.¹ [599]

To begin with, there does not obtain adeptness in the act of inferring in each of the body, the organ,² *manas*, intellect and the knower of the field, taken severally. [600]

(Then the Tārkikas would say:) 'Therefore, we are the very Ātmans (i.e. the individual selves), possessed of the body and others as the means (of the act of inferring) and there will be difference in our actions (of inferring) on account of their being accompanied by many (*bhūri*) means (of activity).' [601]

¹This is reference to verse 597 above. In verb root *vi-bhāṣ*, the preposition does not modify the meaning of root in any way.

²This is *jātāv ekavacanam*; it means the organs.

भूरिसाधनसाध्यत्वात्क्रियाणामिति चेद्वेत् ।
हेतुस्तवाप्यनेकत्वमेकस्यापि प्रसज्यते ॥६०२॥

If (you state as) the cause of the difference in actions as their being accomplished by many means of activity, then there will be the contingency that even a single inner self in (each one of) you (Tārkikas) will be many (inner selves). [602]

आत्मादीनां क्रियास्तित्वात्प्रत्येकं कारकत्वतः ।
अग्न्यादीनामिव तत आत्मानेकत्वमापतेत् ॥६०३॥

In the case of the Ātman (i.e. the inner self) and others, there will be action (performed by each), since each one of them is a *kāraka* 'instrumentally connected with the verb root, i.e. an agent (here)' (in the activity implied by it); therefore, as in the case of fire and others (there is maniness), there will (inevitably) follow maniness in the case of the Ātman (as well). [603]

This has reference to *avāntaravyāpāras*, i.e. some other functions, which also are conveyed by each of the *kāraṅkas*. This results into multiplicity of effects, viz. the main effect, together with some side-effects.

अनुमापि क्रिया साक्षाद्भवतैवाभ्युपेयते ।
शरीरेन्द्रियबुद्ध्यादेः प्रत्येकं स्यादनेकता ॥६०४॥

Inferring also is an action—so you yourself (*sākṣād bhavatā*) have accepted—therefore, in the case of each of the body, the organ, intellect etc.,¹ there will be maniness. [604]

¹The word etc. refers to *manas* and the *Ātman* (i.e. the inner self).

बहुसाधनसाध्यत्वात्क्रियाणामितिहेतुतः ।
एवंलक्षणहेतूक्तिमौख्यलिङ्गं भवेदतः ॥६०५॥

Therefore, adducing a cause of this kind, viz. owing to the difference in actions on account of their being accompanied by many means (of activity), will (only) be an indication of your foolishness. [605]

गुणक्रियाणां सर्वासां कर्तृमात्रव्यपाश्रयात् ।
अनैकान्तिकता हेतोस्तथा वः संप्रसज्यते ॥६०६॥

Since all of the subordinate actions have only the agent as the support; therefore, the cause (which you have cited) will have a contingency, viz. it will (have a fault called) *anaikāntika* 'leading to more than one conclusion'. [606]

अपक्षधर्मता हेतोर्नामरूपाश्रयत्वतः ।
धर्माभावात्प्रतीचश्च तद्भेदे हेतुता कुतः ॥६०७॥

Also the cause (*hetu* which you have cited) can be a property of the *pakṣa* 'subject under doubt', since it can have a support

(only) in name and form. But (*ca*) the inner self does not have any property and, therefore, how can there be any cause of distinguishing it (from others)? [607]

ऐकात्म्यवन्तो देहाः स्युर्विवादो येषु वर्तते ।
शरीरत्वाविशेषत्वात्प्रतिवादिशरीरवत् ॥६०८॥

(And, therefore,) there will be bodies having only one Ātman (within them)—and you have a difference of opinion about them!—and they will be, like the body of (any of their) opponents, having bodies which cannot be distinguished. [608]

तथेन्द्रियमनोबुद्धिविषयेष्वपि योजयेत् ।
ऐकात्म्यं सर्वभूतेषु प्रात्यक्ष्याच्चात्मनस्तथा ॥६०९॥

One should apply this (reasoning) in respect of the organs, *manas* and intellect as well; then (you would realise) oneness of the Ātman in all beings on account of its being directly experienced (by you). [609]

आत्मप्रत्यय एकात्मा सर्वदेहेषु सर्वदा ।
नानात्मवदनेकत्वं कश्चिदात्मनि वीक्षते ॥६१०॥

In all the bodies (then), there is ever (only) one Ātman; (indeed) no one experiences (lit. sees), in the Ātman, plurality (or maniness) as in the case of non-Ātmans. [610]

अनुमानादनेकत्वमात्मनो ये प्रचक्षते ।
तेषां प्रत्यक्षमानेन बाधो लिङ्गधियो भवेत् ॥६११॥

(Therefore,) for those who postulate, on the basis of inference, plurality (or, maniness) in the case of the Ātman, there would be opposition of the direct means of knowing (viz. experience) to the (or, their) knowledge derived by inference. [611]

BRHADĀRANYAKOPANIṢAD- BHĀṢYA-VĀRTIKA

2.2

Śiśu Brāhmaṇa

Sureśvara begins his discussion in BU 2.2 (basis of BUBV 2.2) with a brief statement regarding its relation to BU 2.1 (basis of BUBV 2.1). Yet that statement is too brief to convey fully (or properly) the import of Śaṅkara's comment on the relevant portion in BUB. Therefore we reproduce here BUB and add to it its English rendering. We hope that it should be useful in understanding Sureśvara's discussion better.

BUB reads (pp.295-297):

ब्रह्म ज्ञपयिष्यामीति प्रस्तुतम् । तत्र यतो जगज्जातं यन्मयं यस्मिंश्च
लीयते तदेकं ब्रह्मेति ज्ञापितम् । किमात्मकं पुनस्तज्जगज्जायते
लीयते च । पञ्चभूतात्मकम् । भूतानि च नामरूपात्मकानि । नामरूपे
सत्यमिति ह्युक्तम् । तस्य सत्यस्य पञ्चभूतात्मकस्य सत्यं ब्रह्म ।
कथं पुनर्भूतानि सत्यमिति मूर्तामूर्तब्राह्मणम् । मूर्तामूर्तभूतात्म-
कत्वात्कार्यकरणात्मकानि भूतानि प्राणा अपि सत्यम् । तेषां कार्य-
करणात्मकानां भूतानां सतत्त्वं निर्दिधारयिष्या ब्राह्मणद्वयमारभ्यते
सैवोपनिषद्व्याख्या । कार्यकरणसतत्त्वावधारणद्वारेण हि सत्यस्य
सत्यं ब्रह्मावधार्यते । अत्रोक्तं प्राणा वै सत्यं तेषामेष सत्यम् इति ।
तत्र के प्राणाः कियत्यो वा प्राणविषया उपनिषदः का इति च ब्रह्मोपनि-
षत्प्रसङ्गेन करणानां प्राणानां स्वरूपमवधारयति । पृथिगतकूपारामा-
द्यवधारणवत् ।

यो ह शिशुं साधानं सप्रत्याधानं सस्थूणं सदामं वेद तस्येदं
फलम् । किं तत् । सप्त सप्तसंख्याकान्ह द्विषतो द्वेषकर्तृन्-
भ्रातृव्यान्भ्रातृव्या हि द्विविधा भवन्ति द्विषन्तोऽद्विषन्तश्च । तत्र

द्विषन्तो ये भ्रातृव्यास्तान्द्विषतो भ्रातृव्यानवरुणद्वि । सप्त ये
ये शीर्षण्याः प्राणा विषयोपलब्धिद्वाराणि तत्प्रभवा विषयरगाः
सहजत्वाद्भ्रातृव्याः । ते ह्यस्य स्वात्मस्थां दृष्टिं विषयविषयां
कुर्वन्ति तेन ते द्वेष्टारो भ्रातृव्याः । प्रत्यगात्मैक्षणप्रतिषेध-
करत्वात् । काठके चोक्तम् अपराञ्चि खानि व्यतृणत्स्वयंभू-
तस्मात्पराङ्पश्यति नान्तरात्मन् इत्यादि । तत्र यः शिश्वादीन्वेद
तेषां याथात्म्यमवधारयति स एतान् भ्रातृव्यानवरुणद्वयपावृणोति
विनाशयति ।

तस्मै फलश्रवणेनाभिमुखीभूतायाह । अयं वाव शिशुः । कोऽसौ ।
योऽयं मध्यमः प्राणः शरीरमध्ये यः प्राणो लिङ्गात्मा यः पञ्चधा
शरीरमाविष्टो बृहन्पाण्डरवासः सोम राजन्नित्युक्तः । यस्मिन्वाङ्-
मनःप्रभृतीनि करणानि विषक्तानि । पङ्क्तीशशङ्कुनिदर्शनात् ।

(In the beginning, i.e. BU 2.1.15) it has been said, "I shall instruct you (as regards) the Brahman." And it has been instructed that "It is that single Brahman from which the world has originated, of what it is made and in what it (finally) merges." What then is the nature of that world (which) originates (from) and (finally) merges (in)? (The answer is:) It has the nature of the five (great) elements. And the elements have names and forms. (Again) it is (already) said (in the Śruti that) name(s) and form(s) are truth. The Brahman is the truth of the truth in the form of the five elements. (A question is asked:) How are the (five) elements truth? (In answer to this question is stated) the Mūrtāmūrta Brāhmaṇa. Owing to having the nature of the *mūrta* and *amūrta*, the (five) elements and the *prāṇas* (organs in a/the body) also (come to) have the nature of causes and their means (and are therefore) truth (*satya*). Now begin the two Brāhmaṇas with a desire to determine the nature of those (five) elements which have the nature of causes and their means—that is the explanation of the Upaniṣad (viz. secret doctrinal teaching). Indeed, by determining the nature of causes and their means is

determined the Brahman which is the truth of truth. In this regard, it is said, '*prāṇas* are truth, this one (i.e. *Prāṇa* 'vital force') is their truth.

There, in that context (arise questions:) What are the *prāṇas*? how many? and which are the Upaniṣads there that have (those) *prāṇas* as the subject matter? (And this Upaniṣad, viz. BU) determines, while discussing the secret doctrine of the Brahman, the nature of (various) organs, the *prāṇas*—this is like fixing the resting places on the path (of one's journey).

This (then) is the result (or gain) of (the statement) *yo ha vai śīśuṃ sādhanam sapratyādhānam sasthūnam sadāmanam veda*. What is that (exactly)? Seven, i.e. seven in number, inimical, i.e. haters, viz. the offspring of brothers—the offspring of brothers are of two types: (actual) haters and non-haters. Among them, those offspring of brothers who hate them (viz.) the haters does [the *śīśu* 'young one (of a cow)' kill (lit. check, or, restrain)]. Those which are the seven *prāṇas* resting in the head, viz. the means (lit. openings) of securing (various) objects—from them are born attachments to (various) objects; these are for them the offspring of brothers (i.e. enemies), owing to their coming into existence together with them. Since they make (the Vital Breath's) eyes (lit. sight) prone towards the objects, therefore they are haters, the offspring of brothers (for them). (This is so) because they have the tendency (or, capacity) to hinder (or, prohibit) the inner self from realising (lit. seeing) the Ātman. In the *Kāthaka (Upaniṣad)*, it is already said, "The self-born has cut away the different (lit. away from itself) organs; therefore, it sees outside [lit. away (from itself)] and not within its (own) self" and so on. In that case (that is to say,) when the existence of the offspring of brothers has been established, the one, who knows (about) the *śīśu* and others, and also determines (i.e. understands clearly) the true nature of them, restrains these offspring of brothers, i.e. overpowers them (and) destroys them.

To that one, who has become eager for (or, inclined to) hearing the result (of the *vidyā* 'knowledge about the Brahman'), the Upaniṣad says this (i.e. the following): "This is indeed the young (calf)." (The question is): 'Who is that?' That one is described as he, who is inside a/the body, the *madhyama* 'innermost' vital breath, that Vital Breath who is the subtle Ātman, the one who has occupied the body in five ways, the one who is great and clad in white robes, Soma, the king, the one in whom cling (various) organs, viz. speech (and) *manas* as the principal ones among them. This is clear from the example of pegs (serving as) fetters (on the feet) of a horse.

Here is stated the connection of 2.2 with the earlier portion of BU.

जगज्जनिस्थितिध्वंसा यस्मात्सिद्ध्यन्ति तत्परम् ।
ब्रह्मेति प्राक्प्रतिज्ञाय यथावदुपदर्शितम् ॥१॥

Having first enunciated 'that it is the highest Brahman from which proceed the origin, sustenance and merger (lit. destruction) of the world', (that) was shown accordingly. [1]

This has, according to SP, reference to BU 2.1.20: *brahma te bravāṇi*. BUB states *brahma jñāpayiṣyāmūti prastutam*. This refers to purport (=essence) of that sentence. The editor of NKL refers to 2.1.425 as indicative of this Brāhmaṇa.

तस्योपनिषदित्युक्तं तद्व्याख्यात्राधुनोच्यते ।
आ मैत्रेय्याः परब्रह्मसत्यस्य प्रतिपत्तये ॥२॥

(Also) it was stated 'This is the secret doctrine of the Upaniṣad'. And now is stated here full explanation of that¹ up to the (end of) Maitreyī (Brāhmaṇa), so that one should understand the truth, viz. the highest Brahman. [2]

This refers to BU 2.1.20; *tasyopaniṣat satyasya satyam iti*

¹*tad* = *pratyagbrahma* (SP). But SP's remark does not appear consistent.

सृष्टिप्रस्ताव एतस्मिन्प्राणादेर्जन्म सूत्रितम् ।
यतोऽतः प्राणसंबन्धात्पूर्वं व्याख्या प्रपञ्च्यते ॥३॥

Since in this introductory statement regarding creation there has been enumerated the origin of *Prāṇa* etc., (therefore) from this ¹ connection of *Prāṇa* (with the origin etc.) is now given in detail (its) explanation. [3]

SP points out that *Śīśu Brāhmaṇa* has the precedence over *Mūrtāmūrta Brāhmaṇa* (viz. 2.3).

¹*ataḥ* = *etasmāt*; it is not an adverb in the sense of 'therefore'.

ततः परेण लोकादेरपि याथात्म्यमुच्यते ।
अध्यात्ममधिदैवं च देवताकरणाश्रयम् ॥४॥

Subsequent to that, there is stated the true nature of the world etc. ¹ in relation to (both) the body and the gods in relation to ² the deities and the organs. [4]

Here is given the reason as to why the *Mūrtāmūrta Brāhmaṇa* follows immediately after the *Śīśu Brāhmaṇa*.

¹This refers to superintending god of the world.

²Or, depending upon.

प्राणादि सर्वमेवेदं पञ्चभूतसतत्त्वकम् ।
न हि भूतातिरेकेण प्रतीचः किञ्चिदिष्यते ॥५॥

Prāṇa etc., that is, all this is of the nature ¹ of the five elements. Indeed nothing else than the elements is accepted to be existent beside the inner self. ² [5]

The second line of the verse emphasises the idea that duality is conceived of only owing to ignorance about the true nature of the inner self.

¹*satattva = svarūpa.*

²The inner self refers to the sentiency within (whereas the individual self is understood as a human being's self).

प्राणा वै सत्यमित्युक्तं के प्राणा इति यत्नतः ।
व्याख्यायन्तेऽथ तै प्राणास्तथोपनिषदश्च याः ॥६॥

It is (earlier) stated: 'Prāṇas are the truth.' Then those Prāṇas are explained with care (lit. purposefully) as an answer to the question 'which are those Prāṇas?' and also the secret doctrines of the same. [6]

प्राणेन मध्यमेनान्नं जग्धं वागादितर्पणम् ।
यथा करोति तद्वाच्यं प्राणोपनिषदश्च याः ॥७॥

Now is to be stated as to how the food eaten by the middle Prāṇa¹ effects pleasures of Vāk etc.; and also there are to be explained the secret doctrines of Prāṇa. [7]

¹Supply: which moves in the mouth and nostrils. This refers to vital breath. SP explains this as *mukhanāsikāsañcārī prāṇaḥ*.

Now follows the discussion of BU 2.1.1.

यो ह वा इति प्रश्नोक्तिस्तस्यायमिति निर्णयः ।
शरीरेऽभ्याहितः प्राणो मूर्ध्नि प्रत्याहितस्तथा ॥८॥

The words *yo ha vai ...*¹ is the statement of the question about the Prāṇa and in the words *tasyāyam ...*² there is the decision (about it); Prāṇa resides³ in the body and also resides specially in the head. [8]

¹This introduces *yo ha vai śiśum ... sasthūṇaṇ* in the beginning of BU 2.2.1.

²It begins with *ayam vā ... sthūṇānnaṇ dāma*.

³It literally means: is placed in

विषयेष्वनभिष्वङ्गाच्छिशुः प्राणोऽभिधीयते ।
वागादेरिव नासङ्गो यतः प्राणस्य विद्यते ॥९॥

Prāṇa is mentioned as young one of the animal because of its non-attachment to (various objects) of pleasure since Prāṇa does not have any attachment to them as Vāk etc. [9]

This verse states with reasons which justify the Śruti 'Prāṇa is Śiśu'. This indirectly reveals the nature of the section of Śiśu Brāhmaṇa.

शीर्षण्यप्राणसंस्था ये शब्दाद्या सङ्गलक्षणाः ।
भ्रातृव्यास्ते सहोत्पत्तेः प्रत्यग्दृष्ट्यपहारतः ॥१०॥

Those which are characterized as attachment to words etc. and are residing in Prāṇa in the head etc. are enemies,¹ since they are born together with Prāṇa—this is on account of the obscuring of knowledge about the individual self. [10]

¹It literally means: born from (or, offspring of) a brother.

शरीरमस्याधानं स्याच्छरीरेऽवस्थितो यतः ।
सामान्यवृत्त्या प्राणोऽयं तस्मादाधानमुच्यते ॥११॥

The body is¹ the abode of this (Prāṇa), since (this one) has stayed in the body, performing² its common function; therefore (the body) is called the abode. [11]

In the *Sāṃkhyakārikā* there is mention of five different functions of the Wind with reference to different places in the body; and Prāṇa is called *sāmānyakaraṇavṛtti*. Cf. BUBV 1.5.

¹syāt for asti.

²Literally, 'owing to the performance of'.

शरीराश्रयिणं प्राणं यतो वागादयः श्रिताः ।

अलं स्वकार्यनिष्पत्तौ न तु प्राणैकसंश्रिताः ॥१२॥

Since tongue¹ etc. has resorted to Prāṇa residing in the body, they are capable of accomplishing their own functions; but not so, if they have resorted to Prāṇa alone.² [12]

This is the statement of another reason for mentioning body as the abode of Prāṇa.

¹Vāk here stands for the functioning organ, viz. tongue.

²This means that Prāṇa has no connection with the body: SP clarifies that in the case of stupor Prāṇa does not have any connection with the body and there is no functioning of organs. NKL refers to the sleep state and not stupor. Only in the waking state, Prāṇa is connected with the various organs which can function—in the v.l. of AnSS edition, the organs are described as *kāryakāraṇāni*. Read NKL: *dehaniṣṭhaprāṇāśritānām tatsāmarthyāt* (i.e. *tattatkāryajananasāmarthyāt*— gloss in NKL edition) *prāṇasyādhānaṃ śarīram ity arthaḥ*.

प्रति प्रत्याहितत्वाच्च प्रत्याधानं शिरो विदुः ।
शिरोदेशविशेषेषु प्रति प्रति स आहितः ॥१३॥

They have known the head as the 'special abode', since (the prefix) *prati* is to indicate *pratyāhitatva* 'special placing (in every part of the body)'. (Indeed) that (*prāṇa*) is placed in each particular part of the head.¹ [13]

¹The particular parts of the head are eyes, ears, nostrils and mouth. Deussen translates 'roof of the abode' for *deśa*.

अन्नपानसमुत्था हि शक्तिः प्राणो बलं तथा ।
बलावष्टम्भ एतस्मिन्प्राणो देहेऽवतिष्ठते ॥१४॥
अबल्यं नीत्वेति तथा प्राणोत्क्रान्तिः प्रवक्ष्यते ।

Indeed, power originates from food and drink; and (therefore) it is Prāṇa and also strength. Prāṇa stays in this body, viz. in this which has strength as its support. [14]

So also, the exit of Prāṇa (from the body) will be stated in the words *abalyaṇi nītvā* ... 'Having rendered it powerless'¹

[15ab]

The words *avaṣṭambha* and *avatiṣṭhate* refer to the word *sthūṇā* in BU. NKL connects this as *prāṇapadārtha* (= *prāṇāḥ sthūṇā ity āha prāṇapadasyārthaḥ*).

¹Sureśvara, following Śaṅkara, is justifying the second line of verse 14 by the support of the Śruti statement *sa yatrāyamātmābalyaṇi nyetya saṁmoham iva nyeti* (BU 4.4.1).

उच्छ्वासादिक्रियं केचिद्वायुं स्थूणां प्रचक्षते ॥१५॥

Some scholars¹ explain *sthūṇā* (the post) as the Wind which performs the activity of going out (of the body). [15cd]

Here Sureśvara, following Śaṅkara, refers to the view of Bhartṛprapañca regarding the strength of the body as the cause of Prāṇa. This shows how Sureśvara and Śaṅkara regardfully derive support from Bhartṛprapañca (possibly because of their agreement with him in respect of their use). SP appears to quote from Bhartṛprapañca thus *uktaṁ hi prāṇa ucchvāsaniḥśvāsakarmā vāyuh śarīrah śarīrapakṣapātī grhyate. etasyāṁ sthūṇāyāṁ śīśuḥ prāṇaḥ karaṇadevatālingapakṣapātī grhyate. sa devaḥ prāṇa etasmin bāhye prāṇe sambaddha iti*.

¹The plural is expressive of Sureśvara's respect for Bhartṛprapañca.

जाठराग्न्यभिसंबन्धाज्जग्धमन्त्रं त्रिधा क्रमात् ।

परिणामं व्रजत्येतत्स्थूलमध्यमसूक्ष्मतः ॥१६॥

स्थूलांशः पृथिवीमेति पुरीषं मूत्रमेव च ।

स्थूलदेहोपचित्यर्थो मध्यमोऽंशः प्रकीर्तितः ॥१७॥

यस्तु सूक्ष्मो रसोऽन्नस्य भागोऽमृतमितीर्यते ।

स हृद्देशं समागम्य नाडीमध्यसमाश्रयः ॥१८॥

हृदयाद्विप्रकीर्णाभिर्नाडीभिर्लिङ्गदेवताः ।

प्रीणयन्नुपचिन्वंश्च दामात्रमिति भण्यते ॥१९॥

On account of its connection with the fire in the stomach, this food which is eaten (by an individual) is transformed in three ways, respectively as of gross and middle size and as subtle in form. [16]

The gross portion becomes (*eti*) earth, faeces and urine; the portion of middle size is said to be effective in the increase of the gross body. [17]

And that which is the subtle (portion) of that food is that sap, called (also) *amṛta*. That (sap) reaches the region of the heart and, finding a place in the veins, [18]

(flowing) through various veins and from the heart, causes pleasure to the deities in subtle (form) and is therefore called the cord, the food (*dāmānna*).¹ [19]

These verses explain BUB *annam dāma hi*, i.e. why food is called *dāman*.

देहं रसादिना बद्ध्वा सूक्ष्मांशेन शिशुं तथा ।
पाशद्वयाभिसंबन्धादन्नं दामेति शब्दयते ॥२०॥

anna is called *dāman* on account of its close connection with two bonds;¹ viz. it has bound the body by the sap and also the young one (viz. *Prāṇa*) by the subtle portion (of the sap) etc.² [20]

This explains how food becomes *dāman* of various sizes.

¹The *pāśadvaya* is for *deha* and *śīśu* (= *Prāṇa*).

²SP explains this as skin, flesh

दाम प्रतनुतां याति यदा कर्मक्षयात्तदा ।
यथास्वं यान्त्यथ प्राणा देहादुच्छिन्नबन्धनाः ॥२१॥

When the cord becomes very thin owing to the decrease (lit. destruction) in (effects of) *karman*, then the *prāṇas*, (organs) which have their bonds cut off, depart from the body in

accordance with the nature of the deities associated with them.

[21]

This verse states the relation between *dāman* and *Prāṇa* by the method of *anvayavyatireka*; the first line by *anvaya* and the second line by *vyatireka* method.

Now follows the discussion on BU 2.2.2.

प्रत्याधानसमूहस्य शिशोस्तस्यैव काश्चन ।
अक्षय्युपनिषदो वाच्यास्तमेता इत्यतः श्रुतिः ॥२२॥

Since some Upaniṣadic statements in relation to the eye (etc.) are to be stated with reference to that young one born as a consequence of its being supported, therefore there is the Śruti statement *tam etāḥ*

[22]

उपासतेऽक्षणि प्राणं रुद्राद्याः सप्त देवताः ।
अक्षीणा इति ता ज्ञात्वा नान्नक्षयमुपाश्नुते ॥२३॥
मूर्ध्नि प्रत्याहितं प्राणमृषयः प्राणसंज्ञकाः ।
रुद्राद्या मध्यमं यस्मात्सततं पर्युपासते ॥२४॥

The seven gods¹ Rudra and others wait on² *Prāṇa* (residing) in the eye (etc.). Having known them as non-decreasing,³ a worshipper does not experience decrease in (lit. destruction of) food,

[23]

(since)⁴ those seers, called *Prāṇa*, the seven gods Rudra and others ever particularly⁵ wait upon that *Prāṇa*⁶ which is supported in the head.

[24]

Those seven gods related to the Śīśu under reference also become known as *prāṇas* and seers. In the case of Rudra and others, we must remember that these are gods connected with seven particular parts of the head—not usual deities. We must also remember here how there is influence of ritualistic idea of differentiating a deity when it is related to one or another

deity or thing. For example, Agni is different from Agni in *agnāviṣṇu*.

¹Those are Rudra, Parjanya, Āditya, Agni, Indra, Pṛthivī and Dyau.

²*upāsate* literally meaning 'offer worship to'.

³Or, imperishable.

⁴NKL edition reads *yasmāt* which is better.

⁵Or, with great care/effort.

⁶This is *madhyama prāṇa*; cf. verse 7 above.

Now follows the discussion of BU 2.2.3.

अक्षणेव यतः पूर्वं व्याख्यातो देवतागणः ।
श्रोत्रादिकरणार्थोऽयं श्लोकस्तस्मादुदाहृतः ॥२५॥

Because the group of gods in the eye (etc.) is enumerated already (i.e. in the second section), therefore this verse is now cited as conveying the meaning of the various (sense-) organs, ears etc.¹ [25]

This has a reference to the verse *arvāgbilah* ... cited in BU with the words *tad eṣa śloko bhavati* (cf. *Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa* 14.5.2.4); cp *Atharvaveda* 10.8.9 (with variants). The verse is called *śloka* 'a non-Vedic metrical verse' though it is actually a Mantra 'Vedic verse'.

¹Referring to the senses of seeing, hearing, smell, taste and touch.

विश्वरूपं यशो ज्ञेयं शब्दाद्यर्थावभासकम् ।
तेजस्तच्चाप्यनेकात्म विभिन्नार्थावभासनात् ॥२६॥

Fame of various kinds¹ is to be known as *tejas* 'light' which illuminates the objects, viz. wind etc. and that also is of various kinds since it reveals various objects. [26]

This explains the word *viśvarūpayāśas* in the Atharvavedic

Mantra. This refers to the deities other than Rudra etc. who are connected with other (sense-)organs. The objects illuminated by *tejas* are different and therefore *tejas* is said to have different kinds.

¹It literally means: having various forms/nature.

तीरे तस्यासते सप्त वायवः करणाश्रयाः ।
ऋषयश्च यशश्चेति प्राणा उक्तेन हेतुना ॥२७॥

On the brink of it (or, in the vicinity of it; this refers to *bila*) (in *arvāg*) sit seven Winds¹ residing in the organs;² (therefore) *prāṇas* are both the seers and the fame,³ for the reason stated.⁴ [27]

This explains the meaning of *tejas* in the Mantra cited.

¹Sureśvara refers to the Wind. Possibly Sureśvara refers to the five sense-organs and *ucchvāsādi* in verse 15 above (read SP's citation: *uktam hi prāṇa ucchvāsaniḥśvāsakarmā vāyuh śārīrah*; cited under verse 15 above).

²Cf. *devatākaraṇāśraya* in verse 4 above.

³SP states the gods are the seers because they act in relation to their objects (*spandātmakatva*) and they are fame because they reveal the nature of word etc. (*śabdādivyākhyānahetutva*).

⁴The explanation given by Śaṅkara of the reason is: because they are of the nature of activity (*spanda*).

वक्तृत्वात्तृत्वभेदेन वाग्विधैकैव भिद्यते ।
सप्तमी चाष्टमी चेति सैवैका प्रोच्यते ततः ॥२८॥

Vāk, which is only one, is described as twofold on account of the difference in its character as the speaker and as the eater and therefore that single one is called the seventh and the eighth (deity). [28]

This explains the Śruti's reference to Vāk in *vāgaṣṭamī brahmaṇā saṁvidānā*.

वर्णनिष्पादनं वाचा तथाद्यरसवेदनम् ।
भवेद्द्विकर्मसंयोगात्सप्तमी चाष्टमी च वाक् ॥२९॥

Revealing the utterance of a sound is accomplished (i.e. done) by Vāk and enjoyment of the sap is also (performed¹ by Vāk); and thus, owing to its connection with two activities, Vāk is the seventh and the eighth.² [29]

This verse further clarifies the thought of verse 28 above.

¹Cf. SP: *rasavedanaṃ carvaṇakriyā*.

²Read NKL: *atṛtvena saptamī vakṛtvena cāṣṭamīty arthaḥ*.

Now follows the discussion of BU 2.2.4.

विशिष्टाह्वानसिद्ध्यर्थमृषीणामुत्तरा श्रुतिः ।
इमावेवेति च तथा फलवत्स्यादुपासनम् ॥३०॥

Now, the subsequent Śruti statement *imāv eva* is for establishing the different, specific names of those seers and (with the intention that) the worship of those deities would be fruitful.¹ [30]

This discusses the passages *imāv eva*

¹That is, for knowing the cause of their names.

सर्वस्येति फलोक्तिः स्यादुक्तोपासनकर्मणः ।
अत्रातृत्वनिषेधार्थं सर्वमस्येति भण्यते ॥३१॥

The word *sarvasya*¹ is for stating the result of the activity (or, activities) of the worship already mentioned and the words *sarvam asya*¹ are stated for the purpose of excluding the idea of the food as the enjoyer.² [31]

Here Sureśvara has in mind the notion in Saptāṇna Brāhmaṇa where *bhoktr* and *bhogyā* interchange their positions.

¹In the BU *sarvasyāttā bhavati sarvam asyānnaṁ bhavati ya evaṁ veda*.

²Read SP: *upāsitur yad bhojyaṁ (or bhogyam) tasya taṁ prati na bhoktrivaṁ kiṁ tu bhogyatvam evety arthaḥ*; NKL has expressed the same idea in other words. This serves to exclude the idea of *sarvam eva* as a repetition of what is stated in *sarvasya*.

इति श्रीबृहदारण्यकोपनिषद्भाष्यवार्तिके द्वितीयाध्यायस्य
द्वितीयं ब्राह्मणम् ॥२॥

BRHADĀRANYAKOPANIṢAD-
BHĀṢYA-VĀRTIKA

2.3

Mūrtāmūrta Brāhmaṇa

प्राणोपनिषदश्चोक्ताः प्राणाश्चापि समासतः ।
यत्तु तेषां परं सत्यं तदिदानीं निरूप्यते ॥१॥

(Earlier) the worships of (lit. secret doctrines about) Prāṇa are described and also (are described) Prāṇas, (both) in brief.¹ And (tu) what their ultimate truth is is now explained.² [1]

The word *upaniṣad(s)* refers to Upāsanā(s) of Rudra (and others) and the word *prāṇa* to (i) organs, and (ii) deities superintending over them.

¹This is so because a full description would be too long owing to the largeness/infiniteness of the number of *prāṇas* (SP).

²This is the purport of the present Brāhmaṇa.

प्राणाः किमात्मकास्तेषां कथं सत्यत्वमिष्यते ।
इत्येवमादि वक्तव्यमित्यर्थः पर आगमः ॥२॥

There is yet desired to be stated (i.e. needs) as to what the nature of (those) Prāṇas is and as to how the truth of them is understood (lit. accepted)—for stating this and other (related) matter (*ādi*) there follows the subsequent Śruti text.

[2]

SP brings out the purpose of the beginning of this Brāhmaṇa even though it began as *dve vāva*, and not as *athāta ādeśaḥ* (*prāṇānām* ...). also, the purpose of *ity evam* is pointed out to refer to averting the doubt about the sentiency (or insentiency) of *prāṇas*.

पञ्चभूतसत्त्वानां शरीरकरणात्मनाम् ।
स्वरूपनिश्चयार्थाय प्रारब्धं ब्राह्मणं परम् ॥३॥

The subsequent Brāhmaṇa¹ is begun with the intention of the deciding nature of the body and the organs which are of the nature of five elements.² [3]

This verse further clarifies the idea of previous verse.

¹That is, subsequent to Śiśu Brāhmaṇa. Yet SP refers only to the word *dve vāva*; read: *brāhmaṇaśabdas tadekādeśaviṣayaḥ*.

²-*bhūtasatattva* = -*bhūtātman* (SP).

यदुपाधिनिषेधोक्त्या नेतीति ब्रह्मणः स्फुटम् ।
आविश्चकीर्षितं तत्त्वं तदेतदधुनोच्यते ॥४॥

Now is stated (in the following) that true nature of the Brahman which is desired to be clearly revealed in the words *neti* (and) the (various) adjuncts of which are rejected in the words (*neti ...*). [4]

Read NKL: *prakṛtabrahmanirūpaṇe prāṇanirūpaṇasya katham upayogaḥ*, as the reason for stating this verse.

स्वतोऽरूपं परं ब्रह्म तदविद्यादिहेतुतः ।
द्विरूपमिति निर्दिष्टं वियद्वत्कुम्भसंश्रयात् ॥५॥

The highest Brahman is by nature formless and yet, owing to ignorance etc.¹ (about the same), it is mentioned as having two forms—(this is) like (the sky) appearing twofold by its resorting to a pitcher.² [5]

This verse explains why the single Brahman is described to be twofold: *mūrta* and *amūrta* 'having a body and bodiless'.

¹The word etc. refers to 'product of ignorance'.

²Though the sky is just one, it appears as one outside the pitcher and another contained in the pitcher (*ghaṭākāśa* and *bāhyākāśa*).

रूपे वा ब्रह्मणो विद्यान्मूर्तामूर्ते सवासने ।
ब्रह्मैव रूप्यते ताभ्यां ब्रह्मत्वं न हि रूपवत् ॥६॥

One should know that there are two forms of the Brahman: one with a body and one without it, together with their impressions¹—by these two forms, the Brahman¹ is (fully) explained—for in reality the Brahman² does not possess any form. [6]

¹The word *savāsane* qualifies the word *mūrtāmūrte* and excludes the idea of a third form of the Brahman.

²Sureśvara uses the word *brahmatva* as non-different from *brahman*; the suffix *tva* does not modify the sense of the word *brahman*.

अविद्यामात्रोपाध्येतद्ब्रह्म कारणमुच्यते ।
तदेव ज्ञातृतामेति बुद्ध्युपाधिसमाश्रयात् ॥७॥

The Brahman is said to be the cause, when it has the adjuncts,¹ viz. those (resulting from) ignorance alone; and that Brahman becomes the knower by resorting to the adjunct (of ignorance) called Buddhi.² [7]

This explains that the Brahman remains only one, even if it is named in two ways as the cause and the effect. Read NKL: *adhyastam ekaṁ rūpaṁ svarūpaṁ caikam (=cānyat) ityuktam*.

¹These are various organs which have forms (i.e. are *mūrta*). They do not determine another *real* form of the Brahman, originate as they do in ignorance (*avidyā* regarding the Brahman).

²This also is an adjunct resulting from ignorance and having no form (*amūrta*).

तद्वृत्त्युपाधिसंस्थं सत्तज्ज्ञानमिति भण्यते ।
देवतेन्द्रियसंबन्धं तत्तत्तदभिधीयते ॥८॥

And that Brahman, appearing in its¹ functions, (viz. those

resulting from) its limiting adjuncts, is called knowledge. And that is called by the name of (the organ), having relation to that organ and its god. [8]

Construe the second line thus *tad devatendriyasambandham tad(=devatā) abhidhīyate*. Read SP: *tad eva cādhiṣṭheyopādhi tacchabdanirdeśyam ity arthaḥ*.

¹This refers to Buddhi in the preceding verse and implies other organs as well.

तथा देहादिसंबन्धं दुःखजात्यादिमद्वेत् ।
गोधनाद्यभिमान्येवं धनी गोमानितीर्यते ॥९॥

So also, that which has a connection with the body etc.,¹ comes to have misery, some genus etc.² (And) it is also said that one is possessed of the wealth, viz. cows, if (or when) one has the awareness of having the wealth of cows etc.¹

[9]

¹The word etc. refers to different organ, gross and subtle.

²This refers to various shapes, names and so on.

अन्तर्यामी तथा साक्षी सर्वज्ञश्चेत्यविद्यया ।
मिथ्याध्यासैश्च तत्कार्यैरप्रमेयं प्रमीयते ॥१०॥

And that incomprehensible (Brahman) is comprehended as the one within and the witness and the omniscient—this owing to ignorance, false attributions and their¹ various effects. [10]

antaryāmin has reference to existence of the Brahman in a body, *sākṣin* to its being an agent in the action of knowing some objects and *sarvajña* to its knowing all that exists outside—all this is based on duality.

¹SP refers *tat* to ignorance. But it is better to have ignorance and *mithyādhyaśa* as the meaning of that word.

एकं तावदिदं रूपं ब्रह्मणो मोहहेतुजम् ।

प्रत्यङ्मात्रैकधीगम्यं रूपं वास्तवमात्मनः ॥११॥

To begin with, one form of the Brahman is the product of delusion (and) the other form is understood from the knowledge of it, viz. as only that which exists within, (and) that is the true nature of the Ātman. [11]

In the first line, Sureśvara speaks of every object of our knowledge as a form the Brahman caused by false impression or ignorance. In the second line he refers to sentiency within a human body and therefore, it seems, he has used two different words *brahman* and *ātman* in the two different lines. He refers to the *adhyasta* and *vāstava* forms of the Brahman.

अव्यावृत्ताननुगतं द्वितीयासंभवादजम् ।
न वाक्यपदयोरर्थो भेदसामान्यवर्जनात् ॥१२॥

That Brahman is not distinguished from (any other objects) and it is not similar to any of them. It is unborn since there is no possibility of (existence of) a second (object). It is not some meaning to be conveyed by a sentence and/or a word since it precludes (both) difference and similarity. [12]

Hereby Sureśvara emphasises the indescribability of the Brahman.

न प्रमाणान्तरैर्गम्यं पराघेत्वसमन्वयात् ।
अनपेक्षितमात्रादि तदविद्यासमन्वयात् ॥१३॥

It is not to be understood by any of the means of knowing since it is not inseparably associated with the causes (of understanding) which are away from it;¹ it does not depend on² any means of knowing, because they are inseparably associated with ignorance. [13]

Sureśvara emphasises that the usual *pramāṇa-prameya-vyavahāra* is a product of ignorance, i.e. the absence of the knowledge

of reality. SP refers to the SV which has discussed the impossibility of any relation of the Brahman with the various means of knowing; cf. SV 148ff.

¹This refers to *pramāṇa* causing *pramā*.

²It literally means: 'it has no expectancy of'.

आत्मप्रत्ययमैकात्म्यं द्वितीयस्त्वात्मनो भवेत् ।
अनात्मप्रत्ययोऽतोऽहं स्वत एकोऽस्मि केवलः ॥१४॥

The uniqueness of the Ātman is from (i.e. results from) the realisation of one's own self, and any one who is really non-Ātman is other than the Ātman. Therefore, 'I am alone,' by myself (is the real knowledge). [14]

This implies the existence of the world as imaginary (i.e. false) like the serpent seen in a rope. The last part points to the nature of the Ātman as having no extension (*prapañca*) and no dependence on any other thing for its own existence.

Now begins the discussion of BU 2.3.1 up to verse 34.

यन्निषेधमुखेनेदं नेति नेतीति भण्यते ।
अविद्यामवधिं कृत्वा द्वे रूपे ब्रह्मणस्त्वमे ॥१५॥

These are the two forms of the Brahman which are denied in these words, viz. *neti neti*, which purport to negate (all duality), which keep in view ignorance in its full extent. [15]

It purports to say that one can mention the two forms only so long as ignorance persists and, on removal of ignorance, one cannot talk of any form of the Brahman.

अवधारणाय वावेति द्वे एवेति विनिश्चितौ ।
समुच्चिते सजातीयैरुत्तरैस्ते विशेषणैः ॥१६॥

The word *vāva* (in BU) is for emphasis and thus, when (the forms of the Brahman) are restricted as only two, they are

connected¹ with the subsequent qualifiers (i.e. properties) born with them.² [16]

This is to explain the particles *vāva* and *ca*. The two particles *vāva* and (*dve*) *eva* together specify (or, define) the non-existence of any qualifier or attribute of the two, viz. *mūrta* and *amūrta*, forms of the Brahman. This is further clarified in the following verse.

¹NKL paraphrases *samuccite* as *viśiṣṭe*.

²The moment we look upon the single Brahman as twofold, viz. *mūrta* and *amūrta*, the various qualifiers which follow can be postulated. The various adjectives are determined by the notion of duality arising out of the notion that this universe originates from the Ātman.

वावशब्दं चशब्देन प्रत्याहृत्याभिधीयते ।
मूर्तमेव च तद्रूपं ब्रह्मणोऽमूर्तमेव च ॥१७॥

The statement (in BU)¹ is made by putting together² the particle (lit. word) *vāva* with the particle *ca*. (Therefore, it means that the form of the Brahman is 'one having a body' and also 'one not having a body'. [17]

¹Namely, *mūrtam caivāmūrtam ca*.

²This refers to BUB which paraphrases it as *mūrtam caiva tathāmūrtam cāmūrtam eva ca*. This means that Sureśvara explains away a doubt, 'nanv amūrtam eva ceti katham bhāṣyakārasyāmūrtam cety atrāśruteḥ?'

अविद्यावत्परं ब्रह्म मूर्तामूर्तादिलक्षणैः ।
विशिष्यते न धर्माणां मिथः संगतिरिष्यते ॥१८॥

The highest Brahman, (only when) associated with¹ ignorance is specified by the characteristics *mūrta*, *amūrta* etc.² but there is not accepted any connection of properties with one another. [18]

Sureśvara emphasises in this verse the real non-connection of the adjectives with the Brahman; in other words, he points to the *mithyādhyāsa* 'false association' of them with (i.e. superimposition on) the Brahman. Refer to BSB 3.2.6 which refers to the *mūrtāmūrtatva* of the Brahman.

¹That is, overpowered by.

²The word etc. stands for *martya*, *amṛta*, *sthita*, *sat* and *tyat*.

विशेष्यार्थैकतन्त्रत्वाद्धर्माणां न परस्परम् ।

तथानपेक्षतस्तेषां संगतिः स्यात्कदाचन ॥१९॥

Since (any) properties are dependent only on the thing qualified (by them) there can never be their mutual connection; so also (there) cannot be connection among them, since they do not expect one another.¹

[19]

The adjectives *mūrta*, *martya*, *sthita* and *sat* refer to various *dharma*s (= *guṇa*s) of the Brahman (of course, due to *avidyā*) and they do not get connected with one another. SP points out that, as in the *aruṇādhirakaṇa* of *Mīmāṃsāsūtra* 3.1.6.12 which refers to *aruṇa* (= *guṇa*) of 'cow' (a *dravya* that is *guṇin*), these *dharma*s do not necessarily stand in connection (*sangati*). This is implied in the second line of this verse.

¹This is for *anapekṣataḥ* which is *anapekṣatvataḥ*. Cf. verse 13cd above and note thereon.

विज्ञानपुरुषान्तस्य ब्रह्मणः परमात्मनः ।

तमस्विनोऽथ द्वे रूपे तदन्याव्यतिरेकतः ॥२०॥

Thus then there are two forms of the highest Ātman, i.e. the Brahman, which ends in the knowing self¹ (and) which is overpowered by darkness,² there is no separate existence of any one other than that.

[20]

¹This refers to the most minute, yet perceptible, form of the

Brahman, maybe, Hiranyagarbha which appears to create the world—cf. NKL: *śṛṣṭyanantaram praviṣṭasya*.

²This is literal translation of *tamasvin* which means 'possessed of'.

क्लृप्तसर्पादिभिर्यद्वदज्ञातायाः स्रजः सदा ।
वास्तवोऽवास्तवो वा न व्यतिरेको न चान्वयः ॥२१॥
तद्वन्न व्यतिरेकेण ब्रह्मणो द्वे स्वतः सदा ।
नापि चाव्यतिरेकेण ते तु ब्रह्मैव निर्द्वयम् ॥२२॥

As, on account of a serpent etc.¹ which are imagined (in the place) of wreath (etc.),² there is no real or unreal (thing which exists) beside it, or there is no connection (of the same with another), [21]

in the same way, the two (forms) of the Brahman (do) not (exist) as apart from itself or as (connected) with it; the two are just the Brahman which is free from (i.e. devoid of) duality.³ [22]

¹The word etc. implies other examples of misapprehension (*adhyastakalpanā*) such as *śūktikārajata*, (*ekaś*) *candraḥ sadvitīyaḥ*.

²Though only *śrak* is mentioned, the other objects, viz. *śūktikā* and (*eka*) *candra* are implied.

³Read SP: *bhāsamānāyor* [*mūrtānuṛtāyor*] *dvayoḥ kā gatiḥ ity āśaṅkyāha te tv iti*.

अण्वाद्यवयवं मूर्तं पीनं संस्थानवद्दृढम् ।
तद्विरुद्धममूर्तं स्यान्निरंशं देशवन्न च ॥२३॥

'That which has a form' if made up of parts, viz. *aṇu* etc., solid and firm like a composition and (that which is) 'not having a form' is opposed to it (in nature),¹ i.e. partless and undivided into regions. [23]

This refers to the twofold objects, viz. (i) the earth, waters and fire as having parts and regions and (ii) the Wind and

Sky as not having them.

¹Here *tadviruddham* means *apīna* and *adr̥ḍha*.

मर्त्यं मरणधर्मि स्याद्यद्विनश्वरलक्षणम् ।
अमृतं तद्विरुद्धं च ध्रुवं यत्र विपद्यते ॥२४॥

Mortal is what is liable to perishing;¹ it is characterized as not abiding (for ever). Immortal is what is opposed to it;² it is permanent and does not come to destruction. [24]

This explains the meaning of the word *martya*.

¹It literally means: what has the property of decay or death.

²Namely, the mortal.

आश्रितं स्थितमत्र स्याद्गत्वाव्याप्य च तिष्ठति ।
तद्विरुद्धं तथा यत्स्यादेत्येव न तु तिष्ठति ॥२५॥

The word *sthita* here¹ means that which is supported (in some place); and that goes (to some place) and stays on it without having pervaded it and that, which is opposed to that, goes (to some place) but does not stay there. [25]

This explains *sthitam ca*

¹That is, in this BU sentence.

सदिति व्यक्तरूपं यद्गृह्यमाणविशेषणम् ।
प्रत्यक्षं तद्विरुद्धं त्यदप्रत्यक्षं तथोच्यते ॥२६॥

The word *sat* means (having) a manifest form whose qualifiers can be grasped and it is directly perceptible and what is opposed to that is then called *tyat*, it is described as what is not directly perceptible. [26]

This brings out the purport of *sat*.

क्षितिर्जलं तथा वह्निरित्येतन्मूर्तमुच्यते ।
भूतद्वयममूर्तं च वायुश्चाकाशमेव च ॥२७॥

The earth, waters and also fire are this (Brahman) which is said to have a form and the two elements, the Wind and Sky are (the Brahman) which does not have a form. [27]

This refers to the five great elements divided into two groups, *mūrta* and *amūrta*.

मूर्तं मर्त्यं स्थितं सच्च क्षित्यबग्नित्रयं विदुः ।
 अमूर्तामृतयत्यत्तु वाय्वाकाशद्वयं स्मृतम् ॥२८॥
 मूर्तत्वादेव मर्त्यं तन्मर्त्यत्वादेव तत्स्थितम् ।
 स्थितत्वादिन्द्रियग्राह्यं निर्धार्येदंतया पृथक् ॥२९॥
 सोपाख्यत्वान्न तद्व्यापि क्वचिदेकांशवत्स्थितेः ।
 स्थितत्वाच्चापि तन्मर्त्यं मर्त्यत्वान्मूर्तमेव च ॥३०॥
 अमूर्तत्वादमर्त्यं तद्यद्व्यापि त्यदतीन्द्रियम् ।
 अतीन्द्रियत्वात्तद्व्यापि व्यापित्वाच्चामृतं ततः ॥३१॥
 अस्थितत्वादमूर्तं तदाकारव्यक्तिवर्जितं ।
 हेतुतत्फलरूपेण मूर्तादेः संगतिर्मिथः ॥३२॥

They have known the triad of the earth, waters and fire as having a form, mortal, limited and existing (i.e. directly perceptible) as not having a form, and the two, viz. Wind and Sky are known immortal, moving and that (beyond direct perception).¹ [28]

Only since it has a form, it is mortal,² and only since it is mortal, it is said to be steady (i.e. limited for some time). And because it is steady, it can be grasped by the sense-organs after determining it as 'this is distinct from others'. [29]

(And) since that has a name, it is not pervasive; because it stays at some place like a part (of it) and because it has (so) stayed, it is mortal. And because it is mortal, it is possessed of a form. [30]

Since it does not have a form³ it is immortal and that which is pervasive, it is 'that,' i.e. beyond sense-organs. Because it is beyond sense-organs, it is pervasive; and because it is

pervasive it is immortal. [31]

Because it is not steady (i.e. limited for some time), it is without a form and any manifestation of shape—thus the properties *mūrta* etc.⁴ having relations in the form of the cause and the effect stand (i.e. are) mutually connected. [32]

¹Cf. *tyad apratyakṣam* in verse 26 above.

²In these two verses, viz. 29 and 30, Sureśvara explains how the adjectives *mūrta*, *martya* etc. give rise to every subsequent adjective and *vice-versa*.

³This and the next verse state the same adjectives (as described in the two preceding verses) and help to bring out clearly the cause and relation among them.

⁴The word etc. refers to *martya*, *sthita* and *sat*.

अक्षसूत्रवदन्योन्यं सामर्थ्यस्याप्रहाणतः ।

हेतुतद्वत्तया ज्ञेयामूर्तादेरपि संगतिः ॥३३॥

Because there is no loss of the capacity (among those, viz. that having a form etc. to modify one another) as in the case of the beads and the thread (in a rosary); in the same way, it should be known that what has not a form etc.¹ is (to be understood as) connected in the form of the cause and its effect.² [33]

¹The word etc. stands for *amṛta*, *asthita* and *asat*.

²It literally means: that which has that, viz. that cause.

संभवेऽन्यतमस्यापि सर्वेषां संभवो यतः ।

अतोऽवधारणार्थाय तत्रैवग्रहणं कृतम् ॥३४॥

Since all of these come into existence immediately as any one of them comes into existence, therefore, for the sake of emphasis, there is the insertion of the word *eva*.¹ [34]

¹Cf. *eva* in verse 29 above, viz. *mūrtatvād eva* and *amūrtatvād eva*.

Now follows the discussion on BU 2.3.2 up to verse 44.

तयोर्द्विष्टयोर्मर्तं प्रथमं तावदुच्यते ।
अन्यद्वाय्वन्तरिक्षाभ्यां भूतत्रयमिहोच्यते ॥३५॥

To begin with there is first explained, that one of the two thus enumerated which has a form and thus here¹ is explained that triad of elements which is other than the Wind and Sky. [35]

This explains *etan mūrtam*

¹That is, in verses 36-38 which follow.

मर्तं संस्थानवद्वयेतत्तथा मर्त्यं विनाशवत् ।
एतत्स्थितं परिच्छिन्नमेतत्सत्सविशेषणम् ॥३६॥

This one, which has a form, is in the form of construct and also that is mortal, viz. it is perishable; this has stayed (for some time), i.e. is limited (or measured by another object) and this is existent, i.e. it is having attributes. [36]

This explains *etan martyam*

चतुर्विशेषणस्यास्य क्षित्यबग्न्यात्मकस्य हि ।
चतुष्टयरसत्वार्थं पुनरुच्चारणं कृतं ॥३७॥

Indeed of this one, which has these four attributes, viz. of what is of the nature of the earth, waters and fire, is stated once again with a view to conveying that 'the group of the four'¹ are the essence (of them). [37]

This explains *tasyaitasya* This means that the four adjectives qualify (are the effects of—Naiyāyikas terminology) all the three elements. It is not intended to qualify (only) one of them (at one time). Further, the statement of the four, *mūrta* etc., once again—immediately after verse 36—is not to be considered as

repetition—so it is intended. Cf. NKL: *adhikavacanam anyārthaṃ dyotayatīty arthaḥ*.

¹*mūrta, martya, sthita and sat.*

सर्वव्यापी रसो ह्येष शश्वत्तपति यो रविः ।
चतुष्टयान्वयादेष भूतत्रयरसः स्मृतः ॥३८॥

Indeed this sun who ever shines (lit. heats) is the all-pervasive essence; since it is connected with 'the group of the four'.¹ This is known as the essence of the three elements. [38]

This explains the meaning of *sa eṣa tapati*.

¹This is because the sun makes this division visible.

य एष तपतीत्यत्र मण्डलं परिगृह्यते ।
चतुष्टयं हि मूर्तीदि मण्डले गृह्यते यतः ॥३९॥

Here, in the BU sentence *sa eṣa tapati* is understood the orb (of the sun), because 'the group of the four', viz. *mūrta* etc., is grasped while there is the orb shining. [39]

This explains the meaning of *eṣa* as standing for the orb of the sun, not any live being.

चतुर्णामन्वयो हीति हेतुनात्रविभाव्यते ।
सतश्च ग्रहणं विद्याच्चतुर्णामुपलक्षणम् ॥४०॥

By the word *hi* which is (expressive of) the reason in this (statement) is understood the association of 'the group of the four' and (therefore) one should understand (here) the inclusion of *sat* as indicative of² 'the group of the four'. [40]

¹This explains the significance of the word *hi* in *sato hi*.

²Read NKL: (*sato hi iti*) *etat caturṇām madhye anukṭānām mūrtādīnam upalakṣaṇam ity arthaḥ*.

कृष्णसारं यथा स्थानं चक्षुषः करणात्मनः ।

तथा हिरण्यगर्भस्य मण्डलं करणात्मनः ॥४१॥

As in the case of the eye, which has the nature of a sense-organ, the dark pupil is its abode,¹ so is orb the abode of Hiraṇyagarbha that has the nature of sense-organs. [41]

¹The words *sthāna* and *maṇḍalam* are synonymous.

उत्सर्गाद्रूपनिर्माणे प्राधान्यं तेजसो यतः ।
तस्माद्रसत्वनिर्देशः क्रियते मण्डलात्मनि ॥४२॥

Since, in the act of the creation of various forms (in the universe), prominence belongs to *tejas*,¹ there is reference made here to the character of the orb as the essence. [42]

This explains why there is mentioned the orb of the sun instead of *tejas*.

¹Cf. BU 1.2.2: *tejo raso nirvartata*. Also, cf. verse 44 below.

अप्क्विलन्नः पार्थिवो धातुस्तेजसा परिपच्यते ।
अङ्कुराद्यभिनिष्पत्तौ मुख्यतैवं हि तेजसः ॥४३॥

Indeed prominence is given to *tejas* which is thus understood since at the time of (the appearance) of the sprout there appears heating (lit. waking) of the earthly element¹ which is wetted by water. [43]

¹It refers to the softness created in earth or seed by water; cf. SP: *adbhir vikledaṃ mṛdutvam āpāditaḥ śālyādiḥ pṛthivī-svabhāvaḥ....* This justifies the *prādhānya* of *tejas* (in *rūpasarga*).

सारस्त्रयाणां भूतानां रसो मण्डलमुच्यते ।
एतत्साराणि हि त्रीणि भूतान्याहुर्विपश्चितः ॥४४॥

The essence of the three elements (viz. earth, waters and fire) is called the orb; indeed the wise ones have declared that these three elements have this as their essence. [44]

This explains BUB *trayāṇāṃ hi ...* which gives yet one more reason (viz. *vidvatprasiddhi*) as to why the *maṇḍala* is held to be *bhūtatrayasāra*.

Now follows the discussion of BU 2.3.3 up to verse 68c.

मण्डलायतने यत्तु कारणं संश्रितं विभोः ।
विराजो देवदेवस्य तदिदानीमिहोच्यते ॥४५॥

What in the abode of this orb has been accepted (i.e. stated)¹ as the cause pertains to the all-pervasive Virāj,² the lord of the gods—(how) that (is) is 'now explained here (i.e. in what follows). [45]

¹The v.l. in AnSS edition *saṁsthitam* 'has remained' does not appear convincing.

²Virāj is for Hiranyagarbha, Sūtra, *kalīṅga* (in verse 47 below).

आदित्यान्तर्गतः साक्षात्करणात्माभिधीयते ।
वाय्वाकाशरसत्वेन तत्रामूर्तान्वयो यतः ॥४६॥

The one who is inside the sun is called the Ātman of the different organs of perception since therein is the presence of the one which does 'not have a form'¹ as the essence of the Wind and Sky. [46]

¹Read SP: *amūrta-graṇam amṛtāditrayopalakṣaṇam*.

कलिङ्गारम्भसिद्धयर्थं वाय्वाकाशसमुद्भवः ।
ईश्वरात्कारणाद्यस्माल्लिङ्गं तेन रसस्तयोः ॥४७॥

Since the origin of the Wind and Sky is from the cause, viz. the Lord, for effecting the activity of the various organs, viz. *ka*,¹ he is the *liṅga* and essence of the two.² [47]

Here Sureśvara seems to be borrowing the idea of Sāṃkhyas about *liṅga*, inferred sentience in a body.

¹This stands for Sūtrātman or Hiranyagarbha. Here Sureśvara uses an unusual word *ka-liṅga*.

²The Wind and Sky are thus subordinate to *liṅga*, viz. Virāj.

वाय्वाकाशरसो ह्येष इति हेतुः प्रदर्श्यते ।
त्यस्य ह्येष रस इति यथोक्तौ मण्डलात्मनि ॥४८॥

Now is stated the reason as to why this one is (described as) the essence of the Wind and Sky. This is so said in the statement *tyasya hy eṣa rasaḥ* with reference to the Ātman in the orb. [48]

This explains *asya hi*. In verses 45ff. Sureśvara holds Hiranyagarbha (*liṅga*), and the knower of the field (as well) as synonymous with sentient being in the orb of the sun; cf. *ādityāntargataḥ* in verse 46 above.

हिरण्यगर्भक्षेत्रज्ञं रसं केचित्प्रचक्षते ।
कारणं रसशब्देन यस्मादत्राभिधीयते ॥४९॥

Some scholars hold (lit. say) that Hiranyagarbha, the knower of the field, is the essence, since in the cause¹ is expressed by the word *rasa*. [49]

This explanation is offered by Bhartṛprapañca; it is stated in verses 49 to 57ab. Read SP with advantage: *tyasya hūtyādau rasaśabdena bhūtadvayakāraṇam uktam na ca tac cetanād anyan na ca jīvas tathāsāmarthyān nāpi paraḥ kauṭasthyāt tasmāc cetanaḥ sūtrakṣetrājñō 'tra rasa ity arthaḥ*. Both Śaṅkara and Sureśvara mention this with some explanations.

¹This means: the origin.

यस्माद्विरण्यगर्भस्य कर्म वाय्वन्तरिक्षयोः ।
प्रयोक्त्रव्यक्तयोस्तस्माद्रसः क्षेत्रज्ञ उच्यते ॥५०॥

Since the activity of Hiranyagarbha is the impeller in the case of the two 'not directly perceptible'¹ Wind and Sky, the knower

of the field is said to be their essence.

[50]

This clarifies why Hiranyagarbha is the *kāraṇa*.

¹AnSS edition has a v.l. in the second line, viz. *prayoktr-vyaktayoh*, but that being a Dvandva compound, does not properly qualify *vāyvantarikṣayoh*— indeed, an inferior reading.

भूतद्वयरसो ज्ञेयो मण्डले चेतनः पुमान् ।
त्यस्य ह्येष रस इति तत्सिद्धौ कारणाभिधा ॥५१॥

The sentient man in the orb (of the sun) is to be understood as the essence of the two elements¹ and the statement of the reason for effecting this is in the words *tyasya hy eṣa rasah*.

[51]

This is a brief statement of the sentence *tasyaitasyāmūrtasya*; it justifies the argument in the preceding verse.

¹This is a reference to the Wind and Sky.

न्यायोक्तेरेव संसिद्धेः प्रतिज्ञातस्य वस्तुनः ।
क्षेत्रज्ञः कारणं कस्मादित्यत्र न्याय उच्यते ॥५२॥

Since what is enunciated becomes established by the statement of the reason, here¹ is stated the (logical) reason as to why the knower of the field is the cause.

[52]

The statement of the reason (*nyāya*) is for averting a doubt about the uselessness of it which is implied in the Śruti statement (*nyāya*).

¹In the sentence *tyasya hy eṣa rasah*.

एतस्मिन्मण्डले योऽन्तर्विज्ञानात्मत्वमागतः ।
अविद्याभावनाकर्महेतुतो नान्यकारणात् ॥५३॥

He who has become the inner self in this orb of the sun has become so only because of (his) activity which proceeded from ignorance; and not from any other motive.

[53]

SP points out that Sureśvara states the reason for establishing the statement of the Śruti in the common or popular way of *nyāya* 'reasoning'. Further, it seems to quote Bhartṛprapañca's statement: *nyāyam eva darśayan yo hy etasmin maṇḍale vijñātmēti*. Translation of *avidyābhāvanākarma* ... is not certain/correct!

तस्य यत्कर्मरूपं तद्वियद्वायुप्रयोजकम् ।
 खस्थस्य कर्मणस्तस्य मरुत्प्रस्पन्दरूपिणः ॥५४॥
 वायवाकाशप्रनाड्यैवं तेजसः संभवस्ततः ।
 जज्ञाते तेजसो भूते जलं च पृथिवी तथा ॥५५॥

And that which has the nature (lit. form) of his activity is the cause (of the origin) of the Wind and Sky—that is the activity of him who stays in the sky and has the form of the flutter of the wind. [54]

Thus there is then the origin of *tejas* through the channels of the Wind and Sky and from that *tejas* were born the two elements water and earth. [55]

We read the second line of verse 54 as *khashtasya karmaṇas tasya*, following the NKL edition.

On verse 55 refer to verse 42 above. Also read SP: *tat* (=standing for *karmarūpam* in verse 54) *ākāśam utpādya tadrūpeṇa sthitam tasya marut kāryam tena spandātmanā sthitasya dvayadvārā teja evam karmaṇas tayos tejasaś ca janmety arthaḥ*. The meaning of *taijase itare bhūte* is given in *jajñāte*

कर्मणा पौरुषेणैवं रसभूतेन संभवः ।
 वायवन्तरिक्षयोर्यस्माद्रसस्तेन पुमांस्तयोः ॥५६॥

Since thus there is the origin of the Wind and Sky from the activity belonging to the man,¹ which has become the essence, the man (in the orb of the sun) is the essence. [56]

This is the concluding remark in the view of Bhartṛprapañca.

¹This man is Hiraṇyagarbha.

मेधया तपसेत्यादि तथा च प्रागुदाहृतम् ।
न्यायेनानेन पुरुषो रसशब्देन भण्यते ॥५७॥

So has it been stated earlier in the words *medhayā tapasā* ('janayat')¹ and for this reason is that man mentioned by the word *rasa*. [57]

There is cited here an authority from Śruti to support the statement in the preceding verse.

¹BU 1.5.1.

त्यस्य ह्येष इति ह्युक्त्या न्यायः श्रुत्यायमुच्यते ।

In the words *tyasya hy eṣa rasaḥ* is stated by the Śruti the reason.¹ [58ab]

¹Cf. verse 51cd and 52 above.

Now follows, in verses 58cd-68, arguments against the view of *Bhārtrprapañca*.

नैतदेवं भवेन्मूर्तरसेनास्यासमत्वतः ॥५८॥
भूतत्रयस्य मूर्तस्य रसो मण्डलमभ्यधाः ।
धर्मैश्चतुर्भिर्मूर्ताद्यैर्भूतत्रयवदन्वितम् ॥५९॥
अमूर्तयोरपि रसो लिङ्गात्मा गृह्यतां तथा ॥६०॥

This cannot be so, since this will result in the inequality of this essence (of what does not have a form) with the essence of what has a form. [58cd]

You have called the essence of the triad of elements, which has a form, by the name *maṇḍala* and which is connected with (i.e. possessed of) the four properties, *mūrta* etc. in the same way as the three elements. [59]

Therefore, the essence of even the two (elements), which do not have a form, is to be understood as the nature of *liṅga*¹

‘subtle form’.

[60]

In verse 58cd above, argument is made about the inequality which is clarified here: In the view of Bhartṛprapañca, the essence of the three elements which have a form is the orb of the sun (which is gross) and the essence of the Wind and of the Sky is not a subtle body; but it is the knower of the field, a sentient being. Here, Sureśvara addresses the first line of verse 59 directly to Bhartṛprapañca—this is clear from the reading *abhyadhāḥ* in verse 49b, against the v.l. noted in AnSS edition *abhyadhāt*.

¹*linga* is the subtle form (of a living being).

वाक्यप्रवृत्तेस्तुल्यत्वात् युक्तोऽत्रान्यथाग्रहः ।
वैरूप्यलक्षणो दोषः सत्येवं वः प्रसज्यते ॥६१॥

Since the procedure of the Vedic sentence in either case is similar, it is not proper to adopt a different procedure (in the sentence referring to *amūrtarasa*). (For) if this is so, there would necessarily result a fault of accepting dissimilarity (of procedures) in the two sentences. [61]

This verse gives reason for blaming Bhartṛprapañca for his aforesaid view.

In these verses Sureśvara is putting forth the argument of Śaṅkara cryptically. Śaṅkara’s argument is: The three elements which have a form have an essence (or, cause) that has a form, so also the two elements which do not have a form have an essence (or, cause)—cf. verse 63 below—which has a form. So far, this is agreeable, but Bhartṛprapañca holds that, in the first case, the essence (or, cause)—cf. verse 63 below—is non-sentient and, in the other, sentient. This results into dissimilarity. This is objectionable.

अथ मूर्तरसोक्त्यापि चेतनस्यैव चेद्ग्रहः ।
अत्यल्पं भवताभाणि सर्वमात्मैव नो यतः ॥६२॥

If (Bhartṛprapañca might argue) it is held that in the statement

about the essence (or, cause)—cf. verse 63 below—of what has a form is only a sentient being, (then Śaṅkara's answer is:) Oh. You have said just a small (i.e. insignificant, or unnecessary) thing, since we have accepted that all this is but the Ātman. [62]

Śaṅkara thinks all that effort of Bhartṛprapañca is not necessary in view of the accepted doctrine of Vedānta (according to Śaṅkara) that, in the final analysis, every effect is but caused by the Ātman (just through ignorance).

न ह्यात्मव्यतिरेकेण किञ्चित्कारणमिष्यते ।
तेन तेन स्वरूपेण प्रत्यगात्मैव कारणम् ॥६३॥

Indeed there is not accepted any thing other than the Ātman as the cause (for the effects)¹ since it is only the inner self in one form or another which is the cause.² [63]

Read SP (which brings out the purport of this verse):
parasyaivājñātasya kāraṇatāyā vaidikatvād ity arthaḥ.

¹Here, there is reference to the elements and their modifications.

²This sets aside the notion of Kṣetrajña (i.e. a particular Jīva).

मण्डलात्मनि चाधारे लिङ्गात्मैवावसीयताम् ।
करणस्यैव तत्स्थत्वाद्विज्ञानात्मा हि लिङ्गगः ॥६४॥

And let it be understood that there is the subtle Ātman at the basis of what has the nature of an orb, because it is the inner self¹ which exists in the subtle body for the organs rest (i.e. are supported) in the same.² [64]

¹This is for Vijñānātman already referred to in verse 53 above. It is the same as Jīva.

²That is, Kṣetrajña.

अज्ञातः पुरुषो यस्मात्कार्यकारणशब्दभाक् ।

अज्ञातमिथ्याविज्ञानरूपत्वात् तु तत्त्वतः ॥६५॥

(This is so) because Puruṣa is not known as designated by the words cause and effect; it is so (i.e. *kāryakāraṇabhāk*), because of its nature which is not known and has some false notion about it; it is not (indeed) that in reality. [65]

In the argument, there is stress laid on the cause and effect relation. The two must be similar, while Bhartṛprapañca seems to accept this cause and effect relation, whereas Śaṅkara does not accept it.

अचेतनेषु लोकेऽस्मिन् दृष्टा पुरुषाभिधा ।
इति चेन्नैतदेवं स्यादचित्केष्वपि दर्शनात् ॥६६॥
त एतान्सप्त पुरुषानित्यादिश्रुतिवाक्यतः ।
असंवित्केऽपि पक्षादौ दृश्यते पुरुषाभिधा ॥६७॥

(Indeed) there is nowhere noticed in the world the use of the word *puruṣa* in the case of the non-sentient (things). (Yet an objection can be raised:) No, this is not so, since it is noticed in the case of those which are of the nature of the non-sentient. [66]

[Thus it is learnt (i.e. known)] from the Śruti statement *ta etān sapta puruṣān ...*,¹ and also in the case of the parts (of the beings' bodies)² etc.; which do not have any sentience, there is the designation (for them) *Puruṣa*. [67]

Verse 67 explains the thought in verse 66.

¹Read SP and NKL: *te prāṇā na śaktā vibhaktā* (not in NKL) *vyavahāraṃ janayitum* (NKL: *dārśayitum*) *iti kṛtālocanās tvak-cakṣuḥśrotrajihvāghrāṇavānimanorūpān etān puruṣān ekaṃ līṅgātmakaṃ* (NKL: *līṅgaṃ*) *puruṣam akurvan* (untraceable!) and also *sa vā eṣa puruṣo 'nnarasamayah* (*Taittirīyopaniṣad* 2.1).

²Cf. SP: *pakṣādaḥ tadavayavabhākṣu koṣeṣu iti yāvat* and NKL: *pakṣapucchādeḥ samūhe koṣe ity arthaḥ*.

अध्यात्मोक्त्यवधिज्ञप्त्या अधिदैवतकीर्तनम् ।
मूर्तामूर्तविभागोऽयमध्यात्ममधुनोच्यते ॥६८॥

(Now) by informing about the beginning of the discussion on what pertains (or, belongs) to the body,¹ there is (completion of) the statement² of what pertains to the deities (in the body). Now (then) follows the division of *mūrta* and *amūrta* (in the statement of) what pertains to the body.³ [68]

¹This refers to BU statement: *athādhyātman*

²This is translation of *kīrtana*.

³This purports to be the beginning of the discussion of BU 2.3.4ff.

Now follows the discussion of BU 2.3.4-5 (from verse 68d) up to verse 82.

भूतत्रयं पृथिव्यादि देहेऽपि परिगृह्यते ।
मूर्तशब्देन यत्प्राणद्वयोऽन्मनश्चापरं च यत् ॥६९॥

The triad of elements, beginning with earth is grasped even in a body, which is signified by the word *mūrta*, viz. that which is other than *Prāṇa* and the Sky (i.e. space)¹ in the heart. [69]

¹We have ignored the reading of NKL edition *yat* in the place of *hr̥d*.

चक्षुरसस्त्रयाणां स्याद्विशेषेणात्र निष्ठितम् ।
तेजः सर्वशरीरस्य निर्मातृ स्यादसंशयः ॥७०॥

Here,¹ the eye is the essence (or, cause) of the three (elements) wherein abides, without any doubt, fire which is the creator of whole body. [70]

This explains *etasya satah*, (for already *etan martyam* etc. is explained).

SP and NKL cite the passage *ādityaś cakṣur bhūtvākṣiṇī prāviśat* (*Aitareyopaniṣad* 1.2.4) as the basis for this; cf. BU 1.3.3. There is thus *cakṣus* used as a synonym for *tejas*.

प्रथमा संस्कृतिरिति मन्त्रवर्णोऽपि दृश्यते ।
शश्वद्वै रेतस इति तथा च श्रुतिशासनम् ॥७१॥

Also there is noticed the Mantra *prathamā saṃskṛtiḥ*¹ So also there is instruction in the Śruti *śaśvad vai retasaḥ*² [71]

The verse cites a Śruti and a Brāhmaṇa in support of the statement in the preceding verse.

¹Cf. *sā prathamā saṃskṛtir viśvavāra, sa prathamō varuṇo mitro 'gniḥ—Vājasaneyi Saṃhitā* (of Yajurveda) 7.14. In this, there is reference to *prathamasarṣṭā drṣṭi*.

²Cf. *śaśvad vai retasaḥ siktasya cakṣuṣī prathame sambhavataḥ* (untraceable).

There now follows the view of *Bhartṛprapañca* which is to be accepted in this context.

मूर्तामूर्तविभागोऽयं यदि नामेह भण्यते ।
अधिदैवं तथाध्यात्मं तथापीयान्न गृह्यते ॥७२॥

If, indeed, here (in the Śruti and Brāhmaṇa stated) this is stated as the division of what has a form and what does not have a form with reference to sphere of the deities and also to the sphere of the body, even then this is not to be taken to be this much.¹ [72]

SP points out how Sureśvara states in this verse that the view of *Bhartṛprapañca* regarding the division of *mūrta-amūrta* is not against the Śruti statements mentioned above.

¹This division of *mūrta-amūrta* should not be taken as exhausted because it implies many more divisions within. This

invites the argument in the next verse.

कृत्स्नस्य ब्रह्मणो रूपे मूर्तामूर्ते विवक्षिते ।
यतोऽतो नेयता कात्स्न्यं देवताध्यात्मयोर्भवेत् ॥७३॥

Since it is intended to express the two forms of the entire Brahman,¹ viz. what has a form and what does not have a form; therefore, only by this much (description) there is not fullness of the description of the sphere of gods and that of body. [73]

¹This refers to the entire creation caused (as it is supposed) by the Brahman.

आरब्धकार्यभूतानां गृहीतौ न च संभवः ।
यथोक्तलक्षणस्यैह मुख्यवृत्त्योक्तभूमिषु ॥७४॥

There is no possibility of the given description to include, by (the) primary function (of its words) all the elements that have begun to produce their effects, among the various levels (of creation). [74]

This is one more reason that points out the insufficiency of the description.

व्याप्येव लक्षणं युक्तमन्यथा तदलक्षणम् ।
निर्देशस्तुपरिच्छिन्नविषयोऽत्राभिधीयते ॥७५॥

The definition should be all-pervasive;¹ if it is not so, it is not a definition and here the mention is made of what has only a limited sphere. [75]

The argument in this verse is: The division (i.e. definition) of the Brahman as *mūrta* and *amūrta* cannot—in its primary sense—be really applicable to all the five elements (which comprise the Brahman) and yet it should be applied to (all) the five elements. It is answered away in the second line; that

is to say: *mūrta* and *amūrta* are used for only limited number of elements, viz. three and two.

¹That is, it is applicable to all relevant items.

तत्रैवं सति यत्र स्यान्मूर्ताद्युक्तं चतुष्टयम् ।
लक्षणं तत्र संपूर्णमन्त्यकारणकार्ययोः ॥७६॥

This being so, that should be considered as full definition wherein there is stated the group of the four, viz. what has a form etc.¹ which is stated and all that falls between the two finals, viz. effects and their causes.² [76]

¹Namely, *mūrta*, *martya* etc.

²Read SP: *apyayakramaṇāntye kārāṇe catuṣṭayāmūrtāmṛtādi tatrobhayatra lakṣaṇaṁ pūrṇamiti yathāyogaṁ lakṣyavyavahāra-siddhir ity arthaḥ.*

आकाशशब्दवाच्यो यः सर्वकारणकारणः ।
मुख्यवृत्त्या समर्थं स्यात्तत्रैवामूर्तलक्षणम् ॥७७॥

Only with reference to that the one, who is the cause of all causes, is to be expressed by the word *ākāśa*, the definition of what does not have a form will be suitable in its primary sense, only with reference to that. [77]

Verses 77-79 clarify the thought of verse 76 above. For profit, read NKL: *amūrtalakṣaṇaṁ avyākṛtamātraviśayaṁ mūrtalakṣaṇaṁ prthivīmātraviśayaṁ ityarthaḥ.*

पृथिव्यां चापि तन्मुख्यं यदुक्तं मूर्तलक्षणम् ।
उभयोरन्तरालस्था मिथः संकीर्णलक्षणाः ॥७८॥

And what is given as the definition of what has a form is principally signifying the earth and then there are other definitions intermixing with one another, which pertain to the different levels between the two (Sky and Earth). [78]

लक्षणं गौणमेव स्यादन्त्ययोर्मध्यभूमिषु ।
मूर्तामूर्तव्यवहृतिस्तथा तत्रापि दृश्यते ॥७९॥

Definition would be secondary in the case of the levels between the two finals; so also, there is noticed among them the use of the word signifying 'what has a form' and 'what does not have a form'. [79]

मुख्यवृत्तिग्रहायातो व्यापिलक्षणसिद्धये ।
क्षित्यादिवियदन्तं स्यान्मूर्तामूर्तस्य लक्षणम् ॥८०॥

Therefore, for accepting the primary function (of the words) and for achieving an all-pervasive definition, the definition of what has a form and what does not have a form should be what begins with the Earth and ends in the Sky. [80]

This is the end of Bhartṛprapañca's view.

योऽयं दक्षिणेऽक्षत्रिति शास्त्रदृष्टत्वकारणात् ।
दक्षिणेऽक्षणि लिङ्गस्य विशेषः कश्चिदिष्यते ॥८१॥

[Now follows the purport of the specific statement *yo 'yaṃ dakṣiṇe akṣan*]

The Śruti statement 'This one who is noticed in the right eye' is made because it is seen by the scripture. Here is understood (lit. desired) some special aspect of the subtle (form of the Brahman). [81]

वीर्यवद्दक्षिणं लोकेऽप्यङ्गं दृष्टं यतस्ततः ।
दक्षिणेऽक्षत्रिति वचः श्रुतेर्यत्नादिहेष्यते ॥८२॥

Since it is noticed in the world that the right part (of a body) is powerful, therefore, in this (context), the statement of the Śruti *dakṣiṇe 'kṣan ...* is accepted with purpose. [82]

Now follows the discussion of BU 2.3.6.

पिण्डप्राणविभागेन ह्यध्यात्मे चाधिदैवते ।
मूर्तामूर्तात्मनोरुक्तो विभागो ब्रह्मरूपयोः ॥८३॥

(Thus) by the division of the body and Prāṇa in relation to physical sphere and sphere of gods there is given division of the two forms of the Brahman which are having a form and not having a form. [83]

अथाधुना यथोक्तस्य तस्यैव करणात्मनः ।
लिङ्गस्य रूपं वक्ष्यामो वासनामयमात्मनः ॥८४॥

Now we shall state the form of the subtle form of the Ātman within, which is already mentioned and which is of the nature of impressions. [84]

मूर्तामूर्तादिसंबन्धाद्वासना लिङ्गमाश्रिताः ।
स्वाभासभ्रमदोषेण तन्मयः पुरुषो मतः ॥८५॥

Impressions have clung to the subtle form of the Brahman owing to their connection with what has a form and what does not have a form and owing to the fault consisting in the error of (seeing) the sentient being in its own appearance, it is taken to be full of them, i.e. the impression. [85]

अनेकवासनाचित्रं तल्लिङ्गं पटभित्तिवत् ।
मायेन्द्रजालसदृशं व्यामोहास्पदमात्मनः ॥८६॥
एतावन्मात्रमेवेति यत्र भ्रान्ता निरागमाः ।
विज्ञानवादिनो बौद्धास्तथा नैयायिकादयः ॥८७॥
आत्मनो द्रव्यभूतस्य यदेतद्वासनात्मकम् ।
रूपं गुणोऽस्य संसार इति वैशेषिकादयः ॥८८॥

That subtle form of the Ātman is variegated by numerous impressions like a picture-scroll on the wall; it is similar to a magic show and is subjected to delusion, [86]
and with reference to which the Bauddhas of the school of

Vijñānavāda who do not follow Vedas and also the Naiyāyikas, who (i.e. both of whom) are mistaken, hold this one¹ to be only this much² [87]

(and have understood) this Ātman, which is (already) a *dravya* 'matter' as having a form and properties, viz. its transmigratory existence, constituted by what is impression.³ The Vaiśeṣikas (also are similarly mistaken). [88]

¹Namely, the *linga* in verse 84 above.

²That is, *buddhimātram*, *ahanvṛttiviśiṣṭa*, *svarasabhaigura* and *rāgādikaluṣa* and not another that is *sthāyin*. In the case of the Bauddhas, they hold it to be momentary.

³SP: *tadīyabhrāntiṃ prakāṣayati* which NKL clarifies as *tārkikabhrānti*. This connects *vaiśeṣikādayaḥ* with *bhrāntāḥ*.

त्रिगुणं सत्प्रधानस्थं पुरुषार्थेन हेतुना ।
प्रवर्तते स्वतन्त्रं सदिदमित्यपि कापिलाः ॥८९॥

And Sāṃkhyas also¹ have said that this is but the independent existent (being) which proceeds to activity for the achieving of its end, resting on the Pradhāna made up of three *guṇas*. [89]

¹Construe: *kāpilāḥ api*.

Sureśvara cites the view of *Bhartrprapañca* whom he blames as 'not a true knower of Vedānta' in verses 96-104ab.

अप्यौपनिषदमन्याः केचिदत्यन्तनैपुणात् ।
प्रक्रियां रचयित्वाहुर्वेदान्तार्थाविपश्चितः ॥९०॥

And also some thinkers,¹ who have really not known the nature of Vedānta and who have considered themselves as followers of the Upaniṣads,² have developed some kind of system with great skill! [90]

¹This is a mockingly regardful description of, or with reference

to Bhartṛprapañca.

²That is, the words which constitute the so-called theory of Vedānta.

यावान्बाह्यो विकारः स्यात्क्षेत्रज्ञपरिवेष्टनः ।
अध्यात्मं चाधिदैवं वा नामरूपविभागतः ॥९१॥
अव्याकृताद्व्याकृतः स्यादेतावानेव सोऽत्र तु ।
मूर्तो वा यदि वामूर्तः सच्च त्यच्चेति भण्यते ॥९२॥

Whatever be the external modification is ¹ all here, whether having a form or not having a form, is called *sat* and also *tyat* and that one which is wrapped by the self within (lit. the knower of the field) whether in relation to the body or to the sphere of deities, and divided into name and form and which has become as the modified from the unmodified, is here ² only this much. [91-92]

This explains the *prakriyā* mentioned in the preceding verse.

¹*syāt* = *asti*.

²That is, *etāvān* referring to the Ātman described earlier as *mūrta*, *amūrta*, *sat* and *tyat*.

प्राणानामपि सत्यत्वं भूतसत्याभिसंगतेः ।
कथं यतस्त्वमी सर्वे प्राणाः क्षेत्रज्ञलक्षणाः ॥९३॥
अनामरूपकाः सन्तः सत्यसंयोगहेतुतः ।
देहिनः प्राणवत्साक्षात्संवृत्ता नामरूपिणः ॥९४॥
निदेशाय च कल्पन्ते प्राणा वा इति नान्यथा ।
तदत्र निखिलं सत्यं श्रुत्या संशोधितं स्फुटम् ॥९५॥

prāṇas are also described as being the *satya* 'truth', because they are associated with the elements that are the *satya*. (Someone asks:) How? (The answer is:) Since the *prāṇas* are modifications (or adjuncts) of the knower of the field and, having no name and form, they exist on account of their connection with the truth (viz. the organs) as the organs of

the embodied and they become perceptible (and come to) have name and form and become fit for the description that they are now *prāṇas* (and are) not otherwise and all this is the whole truth, clearly presented to us by the Śruti. [93-94-95]

This is Bhartṛprapañca's explanation of *prāṇa vai satyam ... satyāya satyam*. The first *satya* refers to the elements which later on become the second *satya*, viz. *prāṇas* 'organs'. Thus, this is the explanation of what appears as creation and which is different organs of a human body. This is a kind of system that Bhartṛprapañca suggested.

व्याविद्धसत्यराशेः स्याद्विज्ञानात्मन एव तु ।
स्वरूपं यत्तदधुना वक्तव्यमवशिष्यते ॥९६॥

But that nature of the inner self which has thus appeared¹ from the entire mass of truth is now left to be explained now. [96]

Verses 93-95 have described the modifications of Vijñānātman and in what follows in verses 97-99 is the description of Vijñānātman.

¹*vyāviddha* = *vyākṛta* of verse 92 above.

तत्रैतस्यामवस्थायां विभागो विनिवर्तते ।
अयं भोक्ता विज्ञानात्मा तथा दैवतिकास्त्वमी ॥९७॥
विज्ञानात्मान इत्येष भेदहेतुनिवर्तनात् ।
यत आधारगो ह्येष नामरूपादिलक्षणः ॥९८॥
विशेषो न स्वतस्तच्च नामरूपादि शोधितम् ।
संशोध्य तदिदं सर्वं विज्ञानात्मा प्रदर्श्यते ॥९९॥

There, i.e. in this state of Vijñānātman, any division¹ ceases to exist; namely, this one is the enjoyer and this one is the inner self and these are (different) deities. [97]

Since the cause of (any) difference is set aside by the word *vijñānātmanah*, since this specification depends on some basis

which has a form and name and form, it does not exist on its own account, therefore that name; and the form (of any modification) was explained (by the Śruti)—therefore, thus having described all that (only) as Vijñānātman is shown.[98-99]

In verses 93-95 the division meant the enjoyer of the means to enjoyment and also different deities related to them; thus the division does not differ there.

Sureśvara uses *daivatikāḥ* for *devatāḥ*.

¹Namely, different organs, *vibhāga*.

सर्वेषामपि तेनेदं समानं लक्षणं भवेत् ।
क्षेत्रज्ञानां विशेषोऽत्र यतो नैवोपपद्यते ॥१००॥

Therefore, this is the description of all the knowers of the field, for the reason that there does not appear to be any (reasonable) distinction between one and another of them.

[100]

Here, Bhartṛprapañca appears to consider, like the Sāṃkhyas, that there are many Puruṣas that are similar to one another.

एतस्य पुरुषस्येति रूपं निर्दिश्यतेऽधुना ।
पुंसो रूपमुपक्षीणं मूर्तामूर्तसमाश्रयम् ॥१०१॥

And now is described in the words *etasya puruṣasya* the form of the Puruṣa, since all that, which pertains to (lit. depends on) what has a form and what does not have a form is so far fully explained (lit. exhaustively stated).

[101]

This is the explanation of *taṣya haitasya puruṣasya vijñānātmano rūpaṃ nirdiśyate*.

येन त्वस्य विशेषेण विज्ञानात्मत्वमिष्यते ।
विभज्यमानस्य सतः परस्मादात्मनोऽद्वयात् ॥१०२॥
अपाञ्चभौतिकं रूपमिह तन्निर्दिदिक्ष्यते ।
यथेति माहारजनं वासनोपचयात्मकम् ॥१०३॥

तस्य हैतस्य संबन्धमेवं केचित्प्रचक्षते ।

Here is now sought to point out that the form of the Ātman, which is not comprising five elements (and) whereby, i.e. by what specification is understood the nature of it as the inner self, i.e. being distinguished from the highest self which is without (any) duality. In the words *yathā māhārajanam* ... that is (described as) comprised of mass of impressions.¹ [102-103]
Thus do some explain the relation of the statement *tasya haitasya* (with *yathā māhārajanam* ...) [104ab]

¹The earlier parts of these verses (viz. 101ff.) clarify *samānam lakṣaṇam kṣetrajñānām* in the preceding verse (i.e. verse 100). The last quarter of verse 103 refers to the passage in BU which Bhartṛprapañca holds as the proper introduction of the description of Vijñānātman.

In verses 104-111, Sureśvara discusses the wrong in Bhartṛprapañca's view on the connection of tasya ha ... which is mentioned in verse 103.

तदयुक्तं यथान्यायस्तथायमभिधीयते ॥१०४॥

(But) that is not proper, since it is an improper explanation.
(How this is) we shall now say (in the following). [104cd]

This is Sureśvara's remark of the non-acceptance of the view which is stated so far.

पुष्पादिवासनानां हि वस्त्रादिष्वेव संगतिः ।
सजातीयेषु नियता दृश्यते नान्यजातिषु ॥१०५॥

In the case of fragrances (lit. impressions) of flowers etc. they necessarily continue to be resting only in the garment etc. which are similar in kind and they are not seen in those which belong to other (kinds). [105]

This is to state *ātmā na vāsanāśrayaḥ*. In the first line, Sureśvara refers to flowers and similar things (*dravyas*), which means some specific things. These are in contrast with individual selves (not *dravyas*) that are not of the kind of flowers (*sajātīya*) and therefore the argument about the impressions, which is adduced, cannot apply to the subtle inner self. Cf. verses 117-118 below.

द्रव्येऽपि न खलु व्योम्नि वासना काचिदीक्ष्यते ।
अद्रव्ये चासजातीये चैतन्ये वासना कुतः ॥१०६॥

Though sky is a *dravya*,¹ there is not noticed any impression on it; therefore, how can there be impressions on sentience which is not *dravya*, and which is not of the same kind (of a flower etc.)? [106]

The argument in verse 105 is clarified here further even in the case of the sky which is not of the same kind (*vijātīya*) as the flower there is not any impression noticed therefore the second line follows by *kaumutikanyāya*.

¹So in Nyāya terminology.

वासनाकारतां गच्छेच्चैतन्यं चेत्कपालवत् ।
वासनानिष्फलत्वं स्याच्चैतन्यादपृथक्स्थितेः ॥१०७॥

If it is held that sentience (*jīva*) assume the form of impression(s), it would be like a potsherd;¹ therefore, since sentience remains apart from them (viz. various parts of a body), there would not be any result produced by impressions. [107]

This sets aside the notion that impressions (*vāsanās*) are non-distinct from the Ātman.

¹That is, perishable, or, liable to destruction.

न हि श्रोत्रोत्थविज्ञानं रूपवासनयाञ्ज्यते ।
विषयत्वाविशेषेऽपि कुतोऽसङ्गत्वतश्चित्तेः ॥१०८॥

Indeed, knowledge that arises from ears (etc.) cannot be marked¹ by impressions of the form, even if the two² are not distinct, objects of perception that they are; how then can sentience (be by marked impressions) since it has no contact with any organs? [108]

This is for setting aside an alternative notion that impressions are distinct from the Ātman.

¹NKL reads *añcyate* for *añjyate*.

²Namely, knowledge mentioned and impressions.

षड्भावविक्रियाणां च निषेधश्चेतनात्मनः ।
असङ्ग इति चाप्युक्तिरसकृच्छ्रयते श्रुतौ ॥१०९॥

Also, there is denial, in the case of the sentient Ātman, of the six modifications of becomings (objects);¹ for the statement (about the Ātman that) it is not having a contact (with any other thing) is several times heard. [109]

Thus blame is given to Bhartṛprapañca that his theorization is opposed to the Śruti. It states that sentience is immutable (*kūṭastha*) and it cannot be in contact with impressions.

¹These refer to the six modifications stated in *Nirukta* 1.2.

भूतसंयोगतः प्राप्तं न च तत्पाञ्चभौतिकम् ।
इति ब्रुवाणो लोकेऽस्मिन्हस्यते बालकैरपि ॥११०॥

In this world, one who postulates that (a thing) is obtained from conjunction of elements and it is still not made up of those five elements, is scoffed at even by children. [110]

मूर्तामूर्तीविभागेऽस्य विभागो विनिवर्तते ।
इति स्वोक्तमविस्मृत्य वासनाभेदगीः कथम् ॥१११॥

How can there be the statement about the variety of impressions by one who has forgotten his own statement,¹

viz. that there does not remain any division in the case of this one, even if division of it into what has a form and what does not have a form (has been already made by the Śruti)? [111]

This is to blame Bhartṛprapañca for the fault of self-contradiction. This is noticeable from verse 87 above which accepts the *bhokṛ-bhogyā* division. The argument thus pertains to the *bhokṛ-bhogyā* relation consequent upon *mūrta-amūrta* division of the Brahman—here, Jīva is meant.

In verses 112-124, Sureśvara gives an exposition of Bhartṛprapañca's view on the prakriyā mentioned in verse 90 above.

रचयन्ति तथासाध्वीं प्रक्रियां न्यायवर्जिताम् ।
मूर्तामूर्तात्मको राशिरेको बाह्यः किलेष्ट्यते ॥११२॥
उत्तमः परमात्माख्यो राशिरत्राभिधीयते ।
मध्यमोऽयं तृतीयस्तु ताभ्यां राशिः प्रयोजकः ॥११३॥

Thus, (the scholars)¹ develop into a proper system which is devoid of reasoning: They¹ accept that there is one mass consisting in what has a form and what does not have a form; (this is) accepted (as lying) outside (the teaching of Śruti) [112]

and there is then stated (in their theory) a second² mass called the highest Ātman; and this third one apart from them, called Madhyama is proposed by them as causing³ the two (masses). [113]

¹This refers to Bhartṛprapañca in plural, which is out of mock respect.

²This is for *uttama*.

³Cf. NKL: *prayojakah utpādakah mūrtāmūrtarāśeḥ*.

पाणिपेषोत्थितेनायं कर्त्रा भोक्त्रा सहात्मना ।

भावनाज्ञानकर्मादिसमुदायः प्रयोजकः ॥११४॥

मूर्तामूर्तादिराशिस्तु प्रयोज्यः साधनं तथा ।

तार्किकैः सह संधिं च चिकीर्षन्ति यथाबलम् ॥११५॥

This one (viz. the Madhyama) is the cause (lit. producer), together with the agent, the enjoyer, viz. the Ātman who has risen (from sleep) due to the shaking by hand, a mass of impressions, knowledge, activity etc.¹ [114]

The (entire) mass of what has a form and what does not have a form etc.² is to be set to activity (*prayojya*) and also the means of activity; and they³ make an agreement with the logicians according to their capacity (strength of mind). [115]

Cf. SP citing (possibly Bhartṛprapañca's statement): *sa eṣa vidyākarma pūrvaprajñārūpo 'sya karmaṇo bāhyaṃ mūrtāmūrtaṃ sādhanam yad upādāya kāryakaraṇavato bhogasiddhir iti rāśi-trayaṃ kalpayitvā kalpanāntaram api kurvantīti*. For clarification of Sureśvara's cryptic explanation, refer to BUB: *kartrā bhoktrā vijñānamayenājātaśātrupratibodhitena saha vidyākarmapūrvaprajñā-samudāyaḥ prayoktā karmarāśiḥ prayojyaḥ pūrvokto mūrtāmūrta-bhūtarāśiḥ sādhanam ceti*.

¹The word etc. refers to attachment (and other feelings (?)).

²The word etc. refers to *martya*, *amṛta*, *sthita*, *sat* and *tyat*.

³Referring to Bhartṛprapañca.

अयं प्रयोजको राशिलिङ्गमेव किलाश्रितः ।

इत्युक्त्वा सांख्यत्वभयात्कल्पयन्ति ततोऽन्यथा ॥११६॥

This mass, which causes the (i.e. sets to) activity (the other mass, viz.) the *linga* has resorted to the subtle form (of Hiranyagarbha) and thus then they are a little apprehensive of being called as Sāṃkhyas and therefore explain (the idea) in yet another way. [116]

The argument is: The statement *karmarāśir lingāśritaḥ* would

mean acceptance of the Sāṃkhya view. Therefore, the exponent of the view explains his opinion in the following verses, in the way the logicians do.

गन्धः पुष्पाश्रयो यद्वत्पुटमाश्रित्य तिष्ठति ।
कुसुमापागमेऽप्येवं लिङ्गस्था वासनात्मनि ॥११७॥

As fragrance residing in a flower remains after resorting to its wrapper¹ even after the flower has disappeared, in the same way, impression which resides in the subtle form (viz. *liṅga*) stays in the Ātman. [117]

Cf. verse 105 above. Read a note by the editor of the NKL edition: *liṅgāśritā vāsanā ātmānam āśrayate puṣpāśrito gandhaḥ puṣpaviyoge 'pi putatāilam iva. liṅgād āgatena saḡuṇo bhavati paramātmāikadeśaḥ svato nirguṇo 'pi. sa vijñānātmā badhyate mucyate ca iti kalpanayā tārīkasaṃvādam api kurvanti iti samudāyabhāvaḥ. This explains anyathā kalpayanti.*

¹Cf. note 1 on verse 159 below.

वासनाकामकर्माणि लिङ्गस्थान्येव नात्मनि ।
लिङ्गादात्मानमायान्ति गन्धो गन्धपुटं यथा ॥११८॥

Impression, desire and activity are all residing in the subtle form (of the Vijñānātmā) and not in sentience proper; they come to the Ātman from the subtle form in the same way as the fragrance (of the flowers) to what has wrapped the fragrance, i.e. the flower. [118]

This is amplification of verse 117.

निर्गुणोऽपि परैकांशो बहिरभ्यागतेन सः ।
कर्मणा सगुणः साक्षाद्भवतीति प्रचक्षते ॥११९॥
ततश्च कर्ता भोक्ता च बध्यते मुच्यते तथा ।
विज्ञानात्मेति कणभुवि च तमेवं समाश्रिताः ॥१२०॥

Then this portion of the highest self, though it does not have

any properties, seems to be possessed of properties by the external adventitious activity—thus do they explain. [119]

And from that it (viz. the Vijñānātman) becomes the agent (of the activity) and the enjoyer (of the result), it gets bound and becomes released. Thus have they taken recourse to the thought of Kaṇāḍa. [120]

भूतराशेरगाल्लिङ्गं कर्मराशिः सकाशतः ।
 लिङ्गादात्मानमागात्स लिङ्गसंबन्धकारणात् ॥१२१॥
 कृष्णशक्तिरविद्यापि परस्मादेव सोत्थिता ।
 विकृत्य परमात्मांशं विज्ञानात्मनि तिष्ठति ॥१२२॥

The entire mass of activity has come from the mass of elements and then owing to its association¹ with the subtle (of the Vijñānātman) it has proceeded from the subtle form to the Ātman (i.e. sentience). [121]

The power of (Lord) Kṛṣṇa which is but ignorance (i.e. which has in reality) arisen from highest (Ātman) and, modifying the portion of the highest Ātman, it remains there in the individual self. [122]

It appears that Sureśvara is feeling the thought of Vaiṣṇava and seeks to explain it in the same way as the logicians.

¹It literally means nearness, a kind of *tadātmya* as it were.

यथोषरात्मको दोषः पृथिव्या एव जज्ञिवान् ।
 क्षमैकदेशं विकृत्यास्तेऽविद्या तद्वत्परात्मनः ॥१२३॥

As one has known that the barren land which is but a defect of the (entire) earth, has affected only a part of the earth; so also ignorance (affects only a portion) of the highest self.

[123]

This explains how *avidyā* affects only a Jīva which is but a part of the highest Ātman, even if it (viz. *avidyā*) rises from it (i.e. Ātman). The view of the Sāṃkhyas is understood from Bhartṛprapañca's holding *karmarāśi* as *antaḥkaraṇadharmā* and

avidyā as *anātmadharma*.

अनात्मधर्मोऽविद्येति वदन्तश्चोषरादिवत् ।
इत्येवं सांख्यसिद्धान्तमनुवर्तन्ति संभ्रमात् ॥१२४॥

Thus, saying that ignorance is a property of the non-Ātman, like a barren land etc. (of the entire earth), they are really following¹ the doctrine of the Sāṃkhyas, owing to some confusion.² [124]

Sureśvara points out that Bhartṛprapañca, though he follows the way of Naiyāyikas' argument, follows in reality the Sāṃkhyas.

¹*anuvartanti* is in Vedic style for *anuvartante*.

²That he follows the doctrine of the Sāṃkhyas results only from confusion, for it is already stated that Bhartṛprapañca has chosen to follow the logicians.

In verses 125-137, Sureśvara controverts Bhartṛprapañca's notion of the prakriyā running through verses 112-124.

नैवं कल्पयितुं युक्तं वेदसिद्धान्तबाधनात् ।
पुरापि चैतदुदितं यथा वेदान्तबाधनम् ॥१२५॥

It is not proper to think like this, because it involves contradiction with the established doctrine of the Veda; and as to contradiction to the Vedānta, we have said earlier.¹

[125]

¹NKL calls it *vṛddhavicāra* and SP, *bṛhadvicāra*, which is the same as the thought expressed in the SV 181ab-184.

सकलत्वे परस्योक्ताः संसारित्वादिलक्षणाः ।
दोषाः सर्वेऽपि चायान्ति प्रत्यगात्मानमेकलम् ॥१२६॥

By the acceptance of the highest self as comprising the whole (world), there come to be attached to the inner self which is just alone, all the faults characterized as being transmigratory

etc.

[126]

This clarifies the idea in verse 125cd above.

क्षेत्रज्ञस्य च संभितौ परस्मादात्मनः स्वतः ।
एकत्वसंभवोऽत्यन्तं क्षेत्रज्ञपरमात्मनोः ॥१२७॥

If the knower of the field is taken to be different from highest Ātman, then there follows of itself the utter impossibility of the uniqueness of the highest self and of the knower of the field.

[127]

This thus leads to opposition to Śruti; refer to the well-known Mahāvākya *tat tvam asi*.

अथोपचारतो देशो लिङ्गमेवात्मनो मतः ।
न तदा लिङ्गविध्वस्तौ वासनात्मनि युज्यते ॥१२८॥

If (however) one understands by metaphor that the subtle form (of the Vijñānātman) is the part of the Ātman, then there would not remain (any) impression in the Ātman, when the subtle form (of the Vijñānātman) is destroyed.

[128]

This argument proceeds from a possible supposition that the *linga* is a part of the Ātman itself. The supposition can be answered away in the following statement: *lingābhāve 'pi lingasthā vāsanā jīve tiṣṭhati iti svaśāstrāsiddhiḥ*.

न्यायः पुरोदितो योऽत्र वासनासंश्रयं प्रति ।
स सर्वोऽत्रानुसंधेयः पूर्वपक्षापनुत्तये ॥१२९॥

And the reason¹ stated before as regards the (Ātman) being related to impression has to be remembered fully (here) for the refutation of the *prima facie* view.

[129]

This sets aside the notion that *vāsanā* rests in the Ātman.

¹Refer to verses 106 and 117 above.

उत्थानं चाप्यविद्यायाः परस्मादात्मनः स्वतः ।
ऊषरादिवदित्यादिकल्पना नोपपद्यते ॥१३०॥

So also the notion about the rise of ignorance from the highest Ātman itself like the notion of (the earth being affected by) a barren land cannot stand to reason. [130]

अनिर्मोक्षप्रसक्तिः स्याद्यद्यविद्या परात्मनः ।
निरात्मवादसक्तिश्च मोहोच्छेदे भवेदिह ॥१३१॥

Further, there would result absence of liberation, if (it is posited that) ignorance belongs to the highest Ātman and, when infatuation is removed, there would only result the theory that there is no Ātman. [131]

This points to undesirable results which arise from accepting *avidyā* to rest in the highest Ātman.

वास्यदेशातिरेकेण वासनाया न चेष्यते ।
देशान्तरोपगमनं गुणवद्द्रव्यवर्जनात् ॥१३२॥

It is not accepted that an impression shifts from one region to another which is different from where that (impression) existed (earlier) even like a property (moving to another substance) after leaving one substance. [132]

A property of a thing is innate in it; it does not leave that thing and go to another. Similarly an impression does not leave one abode and move to another. This argument was evoked by the illustration of fragrance of a flower stated earlier.¹

¹Cf. verse 118 above.

सामञ्जस्येन गच्छन्ति न च श्रुत्यक्षराण्यपि ।
यथोक्तकल्पनायां हि न युक्ता तेन कल्पना ॥१३३॥

Since (*hi*) by accepting the theory (of Bhartṛprapañca) stated

earlier, the statements¹ in the Śruti also do not get properly understood;² therefore, that theory is not reasonable. [133]

This is one more reason for holding that *vāsanā* cannot have a support in the Ātman. In this and the next two verses, a reference is made to Śaṅkara that was opposed.

¹It literally means: letters.

²That is, 'they do not go well with reason'.

कामः संकल्प इत्याद्या मनसो धर्मिणः श्रिताः ।
धर्मा न त्वात्मनः शास्त्रे ह्यसङ्गो हीति वारणात् ॥१३४॥

Desire, resolution etc. are properties heard in the scriptures as belonging to *manas* which has (those) properties and not of the Ātman, because in the scriptural text *asaṅgo hi ...*¹ there is clear denial (of any property). [134]

Cf. BU 1.5.2 for *kāmasaṅkalpa*.

The words *manas*, *hṛdaya* in the following verse are used for the Ātman. NKL: *uktaśrutigatamanohṛdayādisabdānām ātmavacanatvāt* (note on NKL:) *ātmā ucyate anena iti vyutpattyā ātmabodhanatvād ity arthah*.

¹Cf. BU 4.3.15: *asaṅgo hy ayaṁ puruṣa iti*.

हृदये ह्येव रूपाणि ध्यायतीवेति चापरम् ।
कामा येऽस्य हृदीत्यादि तीर्णो हीति तथा वचः ॥१३५॥

'Only in the heart does he ponder over, as it were, the forms' is another (statement), so also is there the sentence 'He has indeed crossed over those desires which are in his heart'. [135]

श्रुतादर्थान्न चान्योऽर्थो यथोक्तवचसां यतः ।
सम्यक्कल्पयितुं शक्यः कल्पनातो न युज्यते ॥१३६॥

Since it is not possible to consider the meaning of the sentences quoted above as other than what can be the meaning heard from Śruti; therefore, the theory (of Bhartṛprapañca) is not

reasonable.

[136]

प्रत्यग्ब्रह्मत्वसिद्धयर्थं सर्वैवोपनिषत्त्वियम् ।
तावन्मात्रपरत्वेन वेदान्तानामुपक्षयात् ॥१३७॥

And in fact this entire Upaniṣad is for establishing that the inner self is but the Brahman; therefore, all the Vedas do culminate in only that much as the instrument. [137]

In other words, the Vedas do not say any more than the *pratyagbrahmatva*.

There follows now the refutation of three different masses proposed by Bhartṛprapañca.

राशित्रितयपक्षे च नाप्यर्थोऽत्र समञ्जसः ।
क्रियते कल्पना येन सर्वन्यायविरोधिनी ॥१३८॥

And also the meaning (of the Śruti) is not reasonably understood (*samañjasa*), if the theory of three groups (*rāśis*) is accepted, (for) thereby¹ is accepted a notion which is opposed to all reason. [138]

¹That is, in that theory, viz. the word *vāva*.

द्वे एव तु यदा रूपे मूर्तामूर्ते सवासने ।
ब्रह्म रूपि तृतीयं च तदा वावेति युज्यते ॥१३९॥
ब्रह्मैकदेशभूतस्य विज्ञानात्मन एव ते ।
रूपे इति तदा युक्तं कल्पनानुगुणं वचः ॥१४०॥

If it were that there were only two forms, having a form, and not having a form together with the impressions and, therefore, the Brahman were the third, viz. as having the two forms, only then the word *vāva* (in BU) would be reasonable.

[139]

And when it held that the two forms¹ belong to the *Vijñānātman* which has been only included in the Brahman,

only then the statement 'the Brahman has only two forms' would be in conformity with the theory. [140]

¹Cf. verse 126 above.

विज्ञानात्ममुखेनाथ यदि वा परमात्मनः ।
रूपे इति तदावक्ष्यच्छ्रौती चेत्कल्पना भवेत् ॥१४१॥

Or, if the two forms¹ were to be of the highest Ātman through (their being the forms of) Vijñānātman, then one could have said that the theory is enunciated by the Śruti. [141]

Hereby Sureśvara suggests that this is not so stated by Śruti.

¹Namely, *mūrta* and *amūrta*.

द्विवचश्च तथायुक्तं त्रैरूप्यस्येह संभवात् ।
मूर्तामूर्ते च द्वे रूपे तृतीयं वासना यतः ॥१४२॥

And thus statement of the two (forms) would have become unreasonable, since here (in the Śruti) there could be (contingent) the existence of three forms: thus, the two forms, viz. what has a form and what does not have a form, and the third (i.e.) impression. [142]

The argument is: The word *vāva* for specification (*avadhāraṇa*) would then be improper or unreasonable.

मतं मूर्तेतरे रूपे ब्रह्मणोऽभिमते सदा ।
क्षेत्रज्ञस्य तु नैवैते वासनामात्ररूपितः ॥१४३॥
तदापि जीवद्वारेण विक्रियां व्रजतो विभोः ।
वासनाद्यभिसंबन्ध इतीयं गीरनर्थिका ॥१४४॥

It may be held that the two forms *mūrta* and the other (i.e. *amūrta*) are of the Brahman and not of that knower of the field, since it is only of the nature of impression(s).¹ [143]
(But) in that case also, the all-pervasive would be undergoing

modification through the individual self and, therefore, the statement that it is connected with impression would be meaningless. [144]

The argument in verse 143 proceeds from the acceptance of *vāsanā* as the form/nature of Jīva (i.e. *jīvarūpa*). And that in verse 144 proceeds from the contingency of *vāsanās* being related to the Brahman through a Jīva thus disproving *mūrta* and *amūrta* as being two forms of what undergoes modification, viz. Jīva.

¹The word *vāsanāmātrārūpitaḥ* is for *-rūpitvataḥ*.

वासनानामपि यतो न विशेषो मनागपि ।
क्षेत्रज्ञद्वारतायाः स्यादसत्तस्माद्विकल्पितम् ॥१४५॥

This is so because even impressions do not even slightly differ (from *mūrta* and *amūrta*); therefore this notion (about) impressions through their relation to the knower of the field is wrongly conceived. [145]

This adduces the reason for the argument in the preceding verse.

वस्तु वस्त्वन्तरत्वेन न च विक्रियतेऽञ्जसा ।
वृत्त्येह मुख्ययेत्येवं शक्यो वक्तुं जगत्पि ॥१४६॥

And it does not smoothly follow that in this world one thing gets modified through (the modification of) another; it is not possible to state so in the primary meaning of the words. [146]

This argument is against the notion that Jīva is distinct from the highest Brahman.

वस्त्वन्तरं न च मतः क्षेत्रज्ञः परमात्मनः ।
सिद्धान्तहानिरेवं च कल्पनायां ध्रुवं भवेत् ॥१४७॥

And the knower of the field is not accepted as a thing different

from the highest Ātman. Therefore, there is thus in this theory (of Bhartṛprapañca) the discarding of the doctrine of Vedānta.

[147]

This argument is based on the acceptance of Jīva as not different from the Brahman.

आविश्चकीर्षुभिस्तस्माद्वेदान्तार्थं महात्मभिः ।
ईदृशी कल्पनायुक्ता कृतं परहितार्थिभिः ॥१४८॥

Therefore it is unreasonable to hold the theory on the part of those who desire to clarify the meaning of Vedas and thereby achieve the well-being of others.

[148]

This is concluding that Jīva serves as the substratum for *karma* etc. and that there can be postulated three masses.

Now follows the explanation of the word *tat* in *tasya haitasya* which is accepted by Sureśvara.

दक्षिणेऽक्षन्पुमानिति लिङ्गात्मा परिगृह्यते ।
अध्यात्मेऽथाधिदैवे च तस्यैव प्रकृतत्वतः ॥१४९॥

In the words (of the Śruti) *dakṣiṇe akṣan* ... it is the subtle form (of the Ātman), viz. the man, that is understood with reference to the body and also to the sphere of deities, because that itself is under reference.¹

[149]

¹Cf. *ya eṣa* ... in this context.

जीवग्रहोऽत्र नन्वस्तु प्रकृतत्वाविशेषतः ।
तस्यैवैतानि रूपाणि कस्मान्नेत्यभिधीयताम् ॥१५०॥

(One might argue:) Let there be here accepted (a reference to) the individual self, since in the matter of being relevant it is not different;¹ then why could it not be said that these² are but its³ forms?

[150]

¹That is, it is also under reference.

²This refers to impressions.

³That is, of the individual self.

नैवंरूपितया यस्मादिह श्रुत्या विवक्षितः ।
क्षेत्रज्ञः करणात्मैव तस्मादिह विवक्षितः ॥१५१॥

(The answer is:) This is not so, since the knower of the field is not here intended by the Śruti as having this nature;¹ therefore, here is intended only (that knower of the field) who has the nature of the deities. [151]

In verse 150 Jīva refers to the Vijñānātman possessing impressions and in verse 151 Kṣetrajña is understood as not tainted by any impressions, that is to say, it is not different from the Brahman.

¹That is, having *vāsanās* as its nature.

वासनानुगतं लिङ्गं मृद्वन्मृद्विक्रियात्मसु ।
चेत्यते साक्षिणा यस्मान्नातः क्षेत्रज्ञरूपिता ॥१५२॥

Since the subtle form (=Jīva), associated with impressions is revealed by the seer (=Kṣetrajña) just as clay is revealed in what are various modifications of clay, therefore (Jīva) does not have the character of Kṣetrajña. [152]

This explains why the Jīva (which is really not different from the Ātman) does not have the nature of being affected/characterized by *vāsanās*. And it is argued that they belong to what is *citta*, a false 'modification' of the Brahman.

माहारजनमित्यादि रूपं चेत्साक्षिणो भवेत् ।
नेति नेतीत्यथादेशं नाकरिष्यत्तदात्मनः ॥१५३॥

If in the words *māhārajanam* ... there was intended the expression of the form of the seer,¹ Śruti would not have

given the instruction (about the Brahman) in the words *neti neti*. [153]

Here is suggested that opposition of the Śruti to the objector's argument.

¹That is, the Ātman.

अन्यस्यासौ न चादेशः शक्यो वक्तुं प्रमाणतः ।
नेति नेतीति तस्यैव षष्ठान्त उपसंहृते ॥१५४॥

And that instruction *neti neti* could not have been expressed with reference to another¹ in an authoritative way further, in the end of the sixth chapter² since the conclusion there is only in reference to that itself (viz. the seer).³ [154]

¹That is, other than the seer.

²The sixth, the traditional counting of chapters, means the fourth chapter. Refer to BU 4.4.22.

³The word in fourth chapter is the Ātman.

व्येव त्वेति प्रतिज्ञाया अर्थवत्त्वं तथा भवेत् ।
पाणिपेषोत्थितस्यैव यद्यादेशो भवेदयम् ॥१५५॥
पाणिपेषोत्थितोऽन्यश्चेन्नेतीति च ततोऽपरः ।
अन्योऽसाविति मिथ्या धीस्तदा स्यान्मोहकारणात् ॥१५६॥

Only in that way there will be meaningfulness of the enunciation *vy eva tvā*¹ If this instruction were of the one who is awakened by shaking by the hand, [155]
and, as a result, if that one, viz. awakened by shaking by the hand, were not different from that other than that then there would arise false knowledge owing to delusion. [156]

This is to assert that *neti neti* ... is the instruction about the inner self only (verse 155) and the same is asserted again (in verse 156) by way of *vyatireka*.

¹Refer to BU 2.1.15.

न स्यादात्मानमेवावेदहं ब्रह्मेतिमानजा ।
सम्यग्धीर्निखिलध्वान्तघातिनी मुक्तिदायिनी ॥१५७॥

Further (i.e. in that case), there would not arise the right knowledge from an authoritative means (i.e. the Śruti statement *neti neti*), (the awareness:) I have known the Ātman, (and) I am Brahman, which destroys the entire darkness (i.e. ignorance) and effects liberation. [157]

This is to point out yet another fault in Bhartṛprapañca's theory.

करणात्मन एवातस्तस्य हेति ग्रहो भवेत् ।
न तु तत्साक्षिणो युक्तस्तस्य रूपनिषेधतः ॥१५८॥

Therefore, there can be in the words *tasya ha* the mention only of that *kāraṇātman*.¹ And it is not proper to be that of the seer, since there is denial of (any) form² of that. [158]

Cf. verse 151 above.

¹This refers to *citta*, as noted under verse 152 above.

²That is, a body and its organs which come to have some knowledge.

वासना भूरिरूपास्ता लिङ्गस्था लिङ्गसाक्षिणः ।
कुर्वन्ति बहुरूपत्वं मणेरस्तरणं यथा ॥१५९॥

Impressions have many forms and, residing in the subtle form, they effect the multi-formed character of the seer in the subtle form, in the same way as a wrapper¹ (causes the appearance of varied forms) of a jewel. [159]

Here is stated how the appearance (*ābhāsa*) in the Jīva is caused through misapprehension (or, wrong understanding).

¹Cf. NKL: *āstarāṇaṃ raktavastrādikam*.

माहारजनमित्यत्र हारिद्रं रूपमुच्यते ।
इन्द्रगोपोपमानेन कौसुमस्य गतत्वतः ॥१६०॥

In the word *māhārajana*, there is expressed the form of what is painted with turmeric, since, by the (use of) the standard of comparison, viz. Indragopa, the red colour is already conveyed. [160]

Verses 160-170 is Sureśvara's explanation, following Śaṅkara, of the meaning of BU 2.3.6.

SP seems to quote from *Bhartṛprapañca*: *uktam hi syāt kusumbhaṃ vahniśikhaṃ māhārajanam ity api iti*. But NKL cites the same quotation with the concluding remark *iti nāmaśāsanāt*.

पीतं वस्त्रं यथा तद्वल्लिङ्गमाभाति साक्षिणः ।
आस्त्र्यादिविषयोद्धूतवासनावसितं दृशेः ॥१६१॥

As there is yellow garment, so does there appear the subtle form of the seer, tainted (in the colour); it (viz. the seer) is affected by impressions rising from (various) objects (of enjoyment), viz. beginning with a woman etc. [161]

ईषत्पाण्डु यथोर्णादि तद्वल्लिङ्गं प्रकाशते ।
इन्द्रगोपोऽतिरक्तश्च भृशं रक्तं मनस्तथा ॥१६२॥

As a piece of wool etc.¹ appears slightly white, so does the subtle form appear (slightly white); and (as) an Indragopa appears extremely red; so is *manas* very much tainted by impressions. [162]

This explains *yathā pāṇḍvāvīkam*.

¹The word etc. refers to some blanket (*kambala*).

रजसः क्वचिदुद्रेकस्तमसः क्वचिदिष्यते ।
सत्त्वस्यापि तथोत्कर्षः कुतश्चिदुपजायते ॥१६३॥

In some cases, there is accepted (i.e. noticed) excellence of *rajas* and in some (others) of *tamas*; so also, there is excellence of *sattva* for some reason or other. [163]

That is to say (using the Sāṃkhya terminology): Owing to the variety in the known three *guṇas*, there are different tainted characters of impressions.

क्वचिदेकप्रधानत्वं कस्मिंश्चिद्विषये द्वयोः ।
त्रयाणामपि चान्यत्र ज्ञानकर्मादिचित्रतः ॥१६४॥

In some (case), there is prominence of (any) one (of the *guṇas*); in some, of two and elsewhere of all the three—this owing to the variety (of an individual's) knowledge and/or activity etc.¹ [164]

This is for justifying the statement in the preceding verse.
¹The word etc. refers to feeling like attachment.

अग्नेरर्चिर्यथा भाष्वत्सत्त्वोत्कर्षात्तथा मनः ।
पुण्डरीकं यथा शुक्लं सौम्यमाह्लादकृत्तथा ॥१६५॥

As the flame of fire is bright, so is *manas* (bright) owing to the excellence of *sattva* and it is like a lotus, white, gentle and a cause of delight. [165]

This explains *yathāgnyarciḥ*.

सकृद्विद्युद्यथात्यन्तं घनध्वान्तापनोदकृत् ।
अतीव भास्वरास्माकं चक्षुर्मुट्सकृदुद्गता ॥१६६॥

Just as a single flash of lightning is destroyer of pitch darkness in its fullness, so is (knowledge) extremely bright and has arisen (just) once for blinding the eye. [166]

This explains *yathā sakṛd vidyut*

हिरण्यगर्भतत्त्वस्य जायमानस्य केशवात् ।
विद्युद्वत्प्रथते रूपं किल तस्य महात्मनः ॥१६७॥

Then there appears, like lightning, that form of the truth about

Hiraṇyagarbha which is being produced (lit. born) from the great soul Keśava. [167]

Here Sureśvara seems to be under influence of the Vaiṣṇava sect of his times. Cf. verse 122 above. This is stated with a view to praising the Sūtrātman who comes into being after one's death and is characterized by one's last *vāsanā* (desire, or impression).

अतोऽनेनैव रूपेण य उपास्ते दिवानिशम् ।
सर्वान्धकारहन्त्रीव विद्युत्तं श्रीः सदाश्रयेत् ॥१६८॥

Therefore, in him, who meditates day and night on that (Keśava giving rise to Hiraṇyagarbha) in that form, there comes like lightning which destroys all darkness that knowledge, viz. the excellence for him. [168]

नादिर्न मध्यं नैवान्तो नेयत्ता विद्यते यतः ।
अनन्तकल्पोपचयाद्वासनानामुदाहृतिः ॥१६९॥
माहारजनमित्यादिर्न त्वियत्ता विवक्षिता ।
प्रकारदर्शनायैव तेनोदाहृतिरिष्यते ॥१७०॥

Since (in the case of impressions) there is no beginning, no middle, no end and no measure, therefore they are stated (as) example (of the infinite) on account of their increase in mass through numberless *kalpas*. [169]

And in the words *māhārajana* ..., there is not intended any measure (lit. this much of size), therefore, there is stated the example which is indicative of the kind (of numerousness). [170]

A reference to measure is evoked by the six illustrations in BU 2.1.6. Sureśvara intends that one should infer the extent of *vāsanās* (only) from those six impressions.

Now follows the explanation of the instruction *neti neti*.

निःशेषमेवं सत्यस्य रूपं व्याख्याय सांप्रतम् ।
परमार्थसत्ययाथात्म्यनिर्देशाय प्रयत्यते ॥१७१॥

Having thus explained completely the form of the truth,¹ now attempt is made to point out the true nature of the highest truth. [171]

¹That is, from the beginning of Śiśu Brāhmaṇa, viz. *yo ha vai śiśum*, up to *satyasya* which is explained up to verse 170 (on 2.3.6).

यतो व्याख्यातमखिलं मूर्तामूर्तीदिवस्त्वतः ।
आदेशोऽनन्तरं तस्य क्रियतेऽनन्यमानिनः ॥१७२॥

Since all the things that begin with *mūrtāmūrta* have been explained, therefore now instruction is given about that person who does not consider himself other than that, viz. Brahman.¹ [172]

This is to explain the purport of *athātaḥ* ...; which is to explain *yo ha vai* ... ending in nominative case. That refers to all the *mūrtāmūrta* things.

¹The editor of NKL edition paraphrases *ananyamāninaḥ* as *ādeśānyamānarahitasya*.

मूर्तामूर्तस्वभावस्य सत्यस्याविष्कृतेरथ ।
ब्रह्मार्तिरेकतो नान्यद्यतो वस्त्ववशिष्यते ॥१७३॥
आदेशो ब्रह्मणोऽतोऽयं निरादेशस्य भण्यते ।
अतिमानाभिधानस्य प्रत्यङ्मात्राद्व्यात्मनः ॥१७४॥

Now then after¹ the explanation of the truth, which is of the nature of what has a form and what does not have a form, there is nothing else than the Brahman that remains (to be referred to). [173]

Therefore, this is an instruction regarding the Brahman which cannot (really) be instructed about, about which any mention

is beyond the means of knowing and which is merely what exists within a human body and (also) the non-dual Ātman.

[174]

NKL points out why there is no other *vastu* explained after *mūrta* etc. are explained. SP brings out the purpose of the discussion of the Brahman after that on *satyasya satya*.

¹This is the purpose of the ablative form *āviṣkṛteḥ*.

कर्मण्यादेशशब्दोऽयं यदि वा करणे भवेत् ।
आदिष्टिरथवादेशो नेति नेत्यद्वयात्मनः ॥१७५॥

This word *ādeśa* signifies an action or the means of action or the very instruction; therefore, (this) instruction *neti neti* has reference to the non-dual Ātman.

[175]

This explains the meaning of the word *ādeśa*. Cf. SP (NKL follows it): *ādiśyate iti vyutpattyā brahma; ādiśyate 'neneti vyutpattyā śabdo (vā) and ādiṣṭir iti vyutpattyā jñānam (vā ādeśaḥ)*.

नेति नेतीतिशब्दाभ्यां सत्यस्य ब्रह्मणः कथम् ।
प्रमाणगोचरातीतं तत्त्वं स्यान्निर्दिदिक्षितम् ॥१७६॥

(A question is asked:) How can there be a reference to the truth, (viz.) the Brahman by the word *neti neti*, if the truth which is beyond what are objects of knowledge? How is it intended to be instructed about?

[176]

शृणु सर्वं तदज्ञानसमुत्थस्य निषेधतः ।
प्रत्यङ्मात्रैकरूपेण तदबोधनिराकृतेः ॥१७७॥

Listen. (That is intended to be instructed about), viz. all that which, owing to the denial (or rejection) of what has arisen from ignorance, exists in the form only of the inner self by (its) dispelling ignorance about it(self).

[177]

This is in brief the answer to the question above.

अमर्तस्य परा निष्ठा कारणात्मा पुरोदितः ।
मूर्तस्य च तथा पृथ्वी मध्ये संकीर्णता तयोः ॥१७८॥

The last limit of all that has not a form is earlier said to be the Ātman, as the cause¹ and, in a similar way, the earth (is mentioned) as last limit of what has a form; and between the two there is all variety. [178]

¹It is the first *vyākṛta* form of the Brahman.

मानाभिधानयोर्यावान्कश्चिद्विषय इष्यते ।
उक्तयोर्मध्यवर्त्येव कार्यकारणयोरसौ ॥१७९॥

Whatever object is accepted as the objects of the means of knowledge and of (having) name is midway between the two, viz. the cause and the effect. [179]

नामरूपे तथा कर्म प्राणा लोकादयस्तथा ।
कारकं वा क्रियान्यद्वा कारणं कार्यमेव च ॥१८०॥
जातिर्गुणः क्रिया द्रव्यं संबन्धो भाव एव च ।
सदसत्सदसच्चेति समस्तव्यस्तमेव च ॥१८१॥
प्रमाता च प्रमाणं च प्रमेयोऽथ क्रियाफले ।
इत्यादेः प्रतिषेधेन प्रत्यङ्मात्रावलम्बिना ॥१८२॥

Name and form, so also action and similarity, *prāṇas* and regions etc., the means of activity or anything else which is cause and/or effect, [180]

(what is) genus, (what) property, (what) substance and (what) relation and (what) becoming (and) whatever is called existent, non-existent and existent and non-existent, (all that is) collection of things and severality (of things), [181]
the knower and the means of knowing, also the object(s) of knowing, the activity and the result—(all these) by the negation (or denial) of them, depending on merely the inner self (are

but the Brahman).

[182]

These verses point to non-existence of anything other than the three mentioned above, viz. the prime cause (i.e. the *avyākṛta* Brahman), the last effect (viz. *prthivī*) and whatever is midway between them (viz. water etc.)—this is according to the theory of *Bhārtrprapañca*.

उपप्रदर्शकोऽशेषनामादेरितिरिष्यते ।

तस्योपदर्शितस्याथ निषेधः क्रियते नञ् ॥१८३॥

iti is accepted as indicative of all that has begun with name and now there is indicated the denial of what is shown (above) by the particle *na* (i.e. *nañ*). [183]

This is to signify the purpose served by *na* (in *neti neti*).

आकृष्टं रूपिणो रूपं न पृथग्व्यवतिष्ठते ।

जगत्त्यकल्पितमपि किमु मोहादिकल्पितम् ॥१८४॥

That form of what has a form, which can be included among the above, does not stand apart in this world, even if it is not conceived; what to say then if it is imagined owing to delusion etc.? [184]

This sets aside a possible view that *kāma* etc. could belong to something else than Brahman, for it is asserted that it does not belong to the Brahman.

घटे पटो निषिद्धोऽपि घटादन्यत्र तिष्ठति ।

तदन्यत्रापि सद्भावादनषिद्धस्य धर्मिणः ॥१८५॥

(An argument could be made:) A piece of garment, though denied as existent in a pitcher, exists elsewhere than in a pitcher; therefore, whatever has properties can have existence elsewhere than in the existent (viz. Brahman), even if it is

denied.

[185]

This serves as an illustration for the view that is rejected above.

परमार्थान्निषिद्धस्य तन्मोहोत्थस्य वस्तुनः ।
हिक्विस्थितिः कथं तस्य परमार्थात्मनाथवा ॥१८६॥

(The answer to this is:) How can there be the existence of a thing elsewhere than in the highest reality, if it has arisen from ignorance about that and is denied, or it is held to be having the nature of the highest Ātman?

[186]

Read SP: *ātmano niṣiddhasyānātmano 'nyatra bhedenābhedenā vā na sthitī rajatādivat kalpitatvād ity arthaḥ*

निषेधयानामशेषाणामन्योन्यव्यभिचारतः ।
प्रतीचोऽव्यभिचारोऽतस्तत्राद्यस्तं निषिध्यते ॥१८७॥

Since all the objects that are denied are invariably related mutually and there is non-failing existence of the inner self; therefore, whatever is superimposed on it is denied.

[187]

This establishes the *kalpitatva* as leading to unreality.

इतिशब्दोपदिष्टानां निषेधोऽनुभवात्मनि ।
अनन्तेऽन्तवतां यत्र तद्ब्रह्मेत्यवसीयताम् ॥१८८॥

The negation of those, which are indicated by the word *iti*, is in relation to numberless objects that (in reality) exist in the endless Ātman which is the experiencer. Let that be known as the Brahman.

[188]

The argument, viz. one could understand the denial of all the objects mentioned before; but thereby is not established the Brahman, is thus answered here.

सद्भावश्चोपलब्धिश्च स्वार्थप्रत्यक्चिदाश्रयात् ।

मूर्तादीनामनिर्देश्यादितिर्मत्तो निवर्तते ॥१८९॥

The existence of the existent, the experience also (of the same) is owing to the sentience, which is within; and that is thanks to the absence of what could be pointed out as having a form etc.; (this is) thus away from 'myself'.¹ [189]

¹Note in NKL on the word *mattah* 'from me' refers the word to Sureśvara himself but it should be taken to refer to one's *pratyaya* 'awareness' 'I am'.

निषेधति निषेधयार्थं यद्वलान्नञ्चिदात्मनः ।
विज्ञानेनैव हत्वान्यत्पूर्णत्वेनैति चित्स्वतः ॥१९०॥

That sentient Ātman through whose power the negative particle *na* (technically *nañ*) denies all that is to be denied, after having destroyed all other things by the knowledge through intellect¹ attains its fullness, on its own. [190]

¹*viññāna* is here understood as the commonly acquired knowledge.

प्रत्यङ्गात्रदृशि ह्यस्मिञ्जाग्रत्स्वप्नसुषुप्तिषु ।
तदन्यद्यत्तदाभासं तत्रा प्रतिषिध्यते ॥१९१॥

It is only in this seer, which is but the inner self, that, in the states of waking, dream and sleep, everything else just appears to exist; (all) that is denied by the negative particle *na* (technically *nañ*). [191]

Here is the concluding remark about the denial of all duality.

अविचारितसंसिद्धिप्रत्यङ्मोहहतौ सदा ।
विस्फारिताक्षः प्रत्यङ्धीर्मानान्निर्वात्यथात्मनि ॥१९२॥

Ever, when there is destruction of ignorance about the inner self which comes about¹ (even) without thought, there merges

in the Ātman,² the inner self, possessed of knowledge, with the eyes with (or, fully) open. [192]

¹That is, gets established.

²That is, in its own glory.

अपेक्षाज्ञानहेतूत्थं कार्यकारणवस्त्वतः ।
विचार्यमाणं तत्रास्ति व्योम्नि काष्ण्यमिवात्मानि ॥१९३॥

Therefore, the thing that is related as cause and effect and has arisen from the knowledge of what is expected (as objects),¹ does not, it becomes clear on thought, exist in the Ātman, like darkness in the sky.² [193]

¹That is, depending on outside objects.

²It means: as darkness is seen to belong to the sky, even if it really does not.

शब्दप्रवृत्तिहेतूनां प्रत्यगात्मन्यसंभवात् ।
प्रमाणगोचराणां च स्वतः सिद्धेर्न निवृत्तिः ॥१९४॥

Words, activities and causes cannot properly exist in the inner self and are (we notice) as objects of the means of knowledge; they do not get established by themselves. (Therefore,) there is the negation¹ of them. [194]

This explains the *raison d'être* of the negative particle in the instruction *neti neti*.

¹It literally means: concealment.

मानाभिधानविषयो यावन्नात्मानमात्मनि ।
लभते प्रत्यगात्मानं न नञ्तावन्निवर्तते ॥१९५॥

So long as the object of knowledge (by means of knowing) and the name does not find itself as existing in the Ātman and (does not become) the inner self, the *na* (*nañ*) (i.e. the particle of denial) does not discontinue. [195]

There is a difference of reading of this verse in NKL and AnSS editions. We follow the latter, though the v.l. in the latter agrees with NKL; cf. *ātmani* in the next verse.

निरस्ताज्ञानतत्कार्ये लब्ध आत्मन्यथात्मना ।
निषेध्यहेतौ प्रध्वस्ते निषेधोऽपि निवर्तते ॥१९६॥

And that negation also ceases to exist when the cause of what is to be denied is destroyed in the inner self by itself when the entire ignorance and its effects are destroyed. [196]

प्रमातृत्वादिना यावत्किञ्चिदत्र विवक्षितम् ।
तदभावश्च तत्सर्वं नेतीति प्रतिषिध्यते ॥१९७॥

Whatever is here intended to be expressed by the words expressive of the character of an agent etc.¹ and (also is intended) the absence of the same—all that is negated (denied) by the word *neti*. [197]

¹Cf. specifically verse 182 above but reference to verses 180-181 above is useful.

निषेध्यं सर्वमेवैतदनिषेध्यात्मवस्तुगम् ।
अतो नाभावाविष्टः स्यादभावस्यापि निह्वात् ॥१९८॥

All this which is to be negated (finally) culminates into the thing called the Ātman which cannot be negated; therefore, (the negation in *neti neti*) does not end into the absence of anything, because there is the negation of even the absence (of every object negated). [198]

This explains the purport of the repetition of *neti* and how there is not *anavasthā* resulting from the negation of the negator.

नेति नेतीत्यतो वीप्सा जिघृक्षितनिषेधतः ।
बुभुत्सितस्य कृत्स्नस्य वीप्सैवातो निषेधनी ॥१९९॥

Therefore, this repetition in *neti neti* proceeds to negate whatever is sought to be taken up (or, postulated by any objector) and, therefore, this repetition is the negator of all that is *sought* to be known.¹ [199]

¹This means: an object conceived as what is to be known.

ज्ञानक्रियाभ्यां व्याप्योऽयमित्याकाङ्क्षा निवर्तते ।
अप्रमित्सित एकस्मिन्निष्ठां यात्यचिकीर्षिते ॥२००॥

The expectancy of (some thing as) what is to be pervaded (i.e. grasped) by knowledge and activity (then) ceases to be. And the final end (of the intellect)¹ is achieved with respect to that alone which is not sought to be known and/or which is not sought to be effected. [200]

¹Namely, the knowledge of the uniqueness or singleness (*aikya*) of the Ātman.

रज्जुयाथात्म्यविज्ञानात्सर्पवत्कारणात्मनः ।
निषेधो नान्यतः शक्यः कर्तुं वर्षशतैरपि ॥२०१॥

It is not possible, even for hundred years, to effect the negation of anything other than the Ātman which is (held as) the cause (of all existence) in the same way as there cannot be negation (of a serpent on knowing) the true nature of a rope [which is the cause (of the false apprehension)]. [201]

यद्यत्प्राप्तं जगत्सिंस्तत्तत्सर्वं निषिध्यते ।
एवं च सत्यनिर्दिष्टाशङ्कापि विनिवर्तते ॥२०२॥

Whatever is obtained here in this world is all of it negated; (and) thus even a doubt (that can be) expressed regarding the truth ceases to exist (i.e. disappears). [202]

This expresses the effect of the instruction *neti neti*.

न चेद्वीप्सा तदा वाक्यद्वयमेतद्विवक्षितम् ।
 उक्तद्वयनिषेधेन तस्य चोपक्षयाद्वेत् ॥२०३॥
 अनुक्तविषयाशङ्का सर्वस्याप्रतिषेधतः ।
 यदि वाभावविषया न ह्यभावो निषिध्यते ॥२०४॥

If there were no repetition (of the word *neti*), then there could be those two sentences intended by an objector: (i) by the negation of the pair that is already stated (*mūrtāmūrta*) and there could arise after the cessation of that (pair) [203] a doubt about some object that has not been stated there would not be the negation of all; (ii) or, perhaps, this would refer to only the absence of some object(s); and, indeed, an absence is not negated. [204]

साक्षान्मानप्रसिद्धेषु प्रतिषिद्धेतरग्रहः ।
 अप्रसिद्धे प्रसिद्धानां निषेधाच्छून्यताग्रहः ॥२०५॥

(In the objects), that are established by the direct means of knowing, there can be acceptance of things other than those negated and there could be understanding of nothingness from the negation of the known things, with respect to unknown objects (if any). [205]

Sureśvara implies that the negation *neti neti* does not refer to avoid the result of negation* (viz. the knowledge of the Brahman), because the Brahman is already known in the form of 'I am'.

आदेश इत्युपक्रम्य प्रतिषेधोऽयमुच्यते ।
 साक्षादादिश्यते येन तादृगादेश उच्यते ॥२०६॥

Beginning with the word '(this is) instruction' there is stated the negation and thus there is a direct instruction (about the Brahman), since such is the instruction of the Brahman. [206]

Read SP (NKL agreeing with it in substance): *brahmaṇa ādeśa ity uktvā niṣedhokter ayam ādeśo niṣedhākhyā brahmaprati-*

pādanapara evety arthaḥ.

निषेधवर्त्मना तस्मादनिषेध्यात्मसाक्षिणा ।
ज्ञाताज्ञातं निषिध्याथ सदा दृष्टौ प्रतिष्ठति ॥२०७॥

Therefore, having negated by this way of negation, (all that) which has the Ātman as its seer, that cannot be negated, viz. all known and unknown (things), one settles down in the state of a knower (lit. a seer).¹ [207]

¹It literally means: in the state of knowing.

यथा श्रोत्रधिया रूपं रूपहेत्वसमन्वयात् ।
नाग्रहीन्न च गृह्णाति न ग्रहीष्यति शब्दवत् ॥२०८॥
प्रत्यक्तत्त्वे विनिर्ज्ञाते नेति नेतीतिवाक्यतः ।
तद्वत्सकारणोऽनात्मा नाभूदस्ति भविष्यति ॥२०९॥

As, by the knowledge through the sense of hearing, one has (never) grasped, nor does one grasp and will grasp, like a form, (even as one grasps) a wind since (one's action is not related to the cause of form); [208]

in the same way, when truth of the inner self becomes known from the sentence *neti neti*, there has not been, is not and will not be any non-Ātman together with its cause (viz. the ignorance about the nature of the Ātman). [209]

नान्यदज्ञानतोऽस्तित्वं द्वितीयस्यात्मनो यथा ।
निवृत्तिस्तद्वदेवास्य नावगत्यात्मनोऽपरा ॥२१०॥

As there is no existence of what is other than the Ātman except from the ignorance. (about the nature of it), similarly there will be cessation of this (ignorance) which cannot consist in anything else than in the knowledge of the Ātman. [210]

अनन्यायत्तमैकात्म्यं यदा साक्षाद्व्यवस्थितम् ।
व्येव त्वेति प्रतिज्ञेयं तदा स्यात्सफलोदिता ॥२११॥

- When this uniqueness (or singleness) of the Ātman, which has been thus directly obtained, as it does not depend on another, then, therefore, this enunciation, viz. *vy eva tvā*, would be described (i.e. considered) as fruitful. [211]

नेति नेतीत्यतो वीप्सासंभवादुक्तवस्तुनः ।
कृतार्थता तथा च स्यादन्यथा नोपपद्यते ॥२१२॥

Therefore, from the repetition in the statement *neti neti*, there results meaningfulness of the thing¹ that is stated and of that anything otherwise does not reasonably exist. [212]

¹Of *aikātmajñāna*, or better perhaps, of the enunciation *vy eva tvā*.

परागर्थेषु सक्ता धीः प्रत्यगर्थानुरञ्जनात् ।
निषिद्धातः परागर्थात्प्रतीचि लभते स्थितिम् ॥२१३॥

(Therefore) one's intellect, which is fixed on objects outside, is warded off from the objects outside and then, being tainted by the thing within (viz. the inner self), becomes steady in that thing within. [213]

So far, Sureśvara explains the meaning of the sentence neti neti ... ādeśaḥ in agreement with BUB. Now, he explains it as an informative injunction regarding the inner self.

व्यतिरेकस्य सिद्धत्वादादेशोक्तेः पुरैव हि ।
साक्षाद्ब्रह्मत्वसिद्धयर्थमादेशोऽयमथोच्यते ॥२१४॥

Now, this instruction (viz. *neti neti*) is stated here for establishing that the Brahman is patent to oneself, since the meaning of instruction which has been already established through (conveying) the distinction of the Brahman from (the *mūrtāmūrta* things) is already known. [214]

This is the explanation of the instruction *neti neti* given by

Sureśvara.

This argument presupposes the distinction between the Brahman and the *mūrtā* things by the very use of the genitive in the expression *brahmaṇaḥ* (*dve rūpe*). The words *neti neti* only confirm the distinction.

न निषेधो निषेधार्थो लक्षणार्थपरत्वतः ।
ब्रह्मणो मान्तरासिद्धेः शून्यतैव प्रसज्यते ॥२१५॥

The negation (in *neti neti*) does not pertain to what is to be negated, since it is the purport of indicating (the Brahman). Since the Brahman is not established by any other means,¹ therefore there could have followed only void.² [215]

This is to explain why the negation in the instruction *neti neti* does not purport only to negate the *mūrta* etc.

¹This refers to anything else than the statement in the Upaniṣad about the Brahman (*brahmaparavākya*).

²This reaffirms that the negation does not pertain only to what is to be negated, which implies that nothing else than that existed.

षष्ठ्युक्तेरेव संसिद्धा मर्तादेर्ब्रह्मणोऽन्यता ।
ततश्च जामितासक्तिर्नातः स्यात्पारिशेष्यगीः ॥२१६॥

By (lit. from the statement with the use of genitive in *brahmaṇaḥ dve* ...) it gets established that the *mūrta* etc. are different from the Brahman and from that there necessarily (or contingently) follows the relation (of what is negated to the Brahman); therefore from this (sentence *neti neti*) (one is) not (to understand) a statement of the remainder.¹ [216]

¹Namely, of what remains after the *mūrta* and *amūrta* are stated.

शक्यते न निषेद्धं च प्रत्यक्षाद्याश्रितत्वतः ।
निषेधान्न पुमर्थोऽपि कश्चित्सिद्धयेत्समीहितः ॥२१७॥

It is not possible to negate (the mass of *mūrtāmūrta*), since it is dependent on direct perception etc.¹ and also the end of human beings (viz. *mokṣa* or *brahmajñāna*) which is desired (by men) will not result from mere negation. [217]

This is to affirm that the sentence *neti neti* does not purport merely to negate *mūrtāmūrta*; but it conveys the knowledge of the Brahman.

¹This refers to other means of knowing.

निषेधमात्रनिष्ठत्वे न चादेशो भवेत्प्रभोः ।
ब्रह्म मूर्तादि नेत्युक्तौ मूर्तादेर्न निषेधगीः ॥२१८॥

Being merely for negation (of *mūrta* etc.), there would not be the instruction about the lord¹ and by a statement, viz. 'Brahman is not *mūrta*' etc., there cannot be negation of *mūrta* etc. [218]

This is to say: The instruction *neti neti* cannot be merely for rejection of others; nor can the denial of the Brahman to be *mūrta* etc. give rise to the knowledge of it.

¹That is, the all-pervading Brahman.

ततश्च ब्रह्मतासिद्धिर्द्वितीये सति वस्तुनि ।
व्येव त्वेति प्रतिज्ञार्थो नापि चाविष्कृतो भवेत् ॥२१९॥
पारिशेष्यादतोऽसिद्धिः स्याद्विवक्षितवस्तुनः ।
यथा सिद्धिस्तथा व्याख्या कार्येहोक्तेरतोऽब्जसा ॥२२०॥

And from that there would not be the establishing of the Brahman if it were taken as a thing other (than the negated) and also the purport of the enunciation by *eva tvā* would not become revealed. [219]

Therefore, there is no establishing of the thing which is intended to be expressed by the rule of the remainder.¹ Therefore, the explanation of the statement (*neti neti*) should be offered in such a way that there would be established (that

thing only) smoothly.

[220]

In verses 219-220ab there is a refutation of two views regarding the meaning of *neti*: (a) negation of all knowables, (b) establishing Brahman as what remains. And verse 220cd states the purport of *neti neti* as a suitable expression of the existence of the Brahman.

¹That is, the Brahman is what remains after the *mūrta* etc. are already described.

सिद्धो निषेधः प्रागेव सर्वस्यानात्मवस्तुनः ।
प्रत्यग्याथात्म्यविज्ञानादन्योन्यव्यभिचारतः ॥२२१॥

Negation of all non-Ātman things has been already¹ established by the knowledge of the true nature of the inner self and on account of the mutual exclusion of the non-Ātman things.
[221]

¹Refer to verse 216 above.

अन्योन्यव्यभिचारोऽस्य वीक्ष्यतेऽनात्मवस्तुनः ।
स्वरूपव्यभिचारोऽपि सुषुप्तादौ स्वसाक्षिगः ॥२२२॥
यथा मात्रादिसत्तेयं प्रत्यक्संवित्सिद्धिका ।
प्रमात्रादेरभावोऽपि प्रत्यग्बोधाश्रयात्तथा ॥२२३॥
अविचारितसंसिद्धिरात्माविद्यैकरूपतः ।
सिद्धायतेऽखिलोऽनात्मा स्वतःसिद्धात्मसंश्रयात् ॥२२४॥
अतिरोहितसंवित्को व्यपास्ताशेषविक्रियः ।
अनन्यमातृमानादिर्दृष्टिमात्रात्मकत्वतः ॥२२५॥

This mutual exclusion of the non-Ātmans is (already) seen and also the exclusion of their own forms is noticed in the state of sleep etc.; and which is perceived by the inner self.
[222]

As this existence of the means of knowing etc.¹ is established by the knowledge of the self within, so also the absence of

the knower etc.² is similarly established by resorting to the knowledge of the inner self. [223]

The entire (mass of) non-Ātman appears to get established owing to its being of the nature only of ignorance about (the nature of) the Ātman and is thus established without (even a) thought and on account of its dependence on the self-established Ātman, [224]

(Who is thus self-established) because sentience in it does not remain concealed, because it has discarded the entire mass of modifications and because it is of the nature of only the seer (lit. seeing) and has no other knower or means of knowing. [225]

¹The word etc. refers to *meya* and *māna* [beside *mātr* (possibly) the means of knowing].

²The word etc. refers to *prameya* and *pramāṇa* (i.e. the act of knowing and/or the means of knowing).

भावाभावात्मिका सिद्धिर्येयं सर्वाप्यनात्मनः ।
तद्विरुद्धात्मकान्मतो मय्येवासौ प्रसिध्यति ॥२२६॥

Whatever be (pointed out) as the establishing of the presence and the absence of the entire non-Ātman, it is established owing to the awareness of only 'from me' and 'in me'.¹ [226]

¹From the Ātman which is known as I (*aham*) and from me (*mattah*). Cf. verse 189 above and note thereon regarding *mattah*.

Sureśvara often uses pronominal forms like *aham*, *mayi* and *tava* and lends to his writing the form of some direct conversation. There is nevertheless the purport of conveying an individual self.

अनन्यानुभवेनैव भावाभावात्मभूमिषु ।
प्रत्यक्कूटस्थ आत्मानं पश्यन्नास्ते फलात्मना ॥२२७॥

Through the experience of none else does the inner self, the immutable one, see itself in the various levels of the presence

and the absence (of things), and thus sees itself as of the nature of the fruit (viz. right knowledge). [227]

This sets aside the notion of an inner self needing the help of another and so on in infinite regress.

AnSS suggests *-sthan* as a v.l. reading, but both commentaries do not show and support this.

अतो मात्रादिसंभेदो यत्र यत्र निवर्तते ।
तत्र तत्रैकलः प्रत्यक्स्वमहित्रैव सिध्यति ॥२२८॥

Therefore, whatever these distinctions of organs (or means) etc. cease to exist, there does the single inner self remain owing to its own glory¹ (or power) alone. [228]

Refer to verse 223 above.

¹Cf. verse 192 above. Also refer to *yadbalāt* in verse 190 above.

प्रमात्रादेरभावोऽतो यः सिद्धः स्वात्मबोधतः ।
नञ्वृत्तिस्तं सदाबुद्धं लक्षयत्यपृथक्प्रमम् ॥२२९॥

Therefore, the absence of the agent (of knowing) etc. is established as (or, is caused by) the knowledge of the Ātman. The function of the negation-particle (*nañ*) indicates¹ the ever awake Ātman which does not have any distinction from knowledge.² [229]

Refer to note 2 on verse 223 above.

¹This means that *nañ* conveys the meaning of the inner self, i.e. it does not express the same; it only indicates it. The reason for this is stated in the next verse.

²NKL reads in the end *apṛthakprabham*.

वैविकत्यात्र च मानादेरनन्यानुभवात्मनि ।
सहेतुकस्य वृत्तिः स्यान्नित्यबोधावबोधिनि ॥२३०॥

Owing to the distinction of the means of knowing etc. which have some cause (for their existence) there cannot be any functioning of them in the case of (the Ātman) which is of the nature of experience of nothing else than itself and which ever enlightens itself. [230]

This explains why the Ātman is indicated (i.e. not expressed) by the particle of negation, viz. *nañ*.

अविद्याद्यतिरेकेण कारणादिविधर्मकं ।
लब्धमात्मात्मकं वस्तु प्रतीचोऽन्नन्यमानतः ॥२३१॥

This thing which is of the nature of the Ātman is obtained (i.e. known) from the inner self which does not have any other means for (revealing) itself—this thing which is in nature opposed to causes etc. and which is other than ignorance etc.¹ [231]

This is for justifying the word *vaiviktyāt* in the preceding verse.
¹The word etc. refers to *avidyāphala* its effects.

एतद्वस्तु स्वतःसिद्धं प्रमात्राद्यनपेक्षतः ।
सर्वस्यैव ततः सिद्धेः कथं सिध्येत्तदन्यतः ॥२३२॥

This thing (i.e. Ātman) is self-established, being independent of any knower etc.¹ and, since all (the knowables in the world) get established on its account, how can it (i.e. the Ātman) get established by something else? [232]

¹Refer to note 2 on verse 223 above.

उक्ता प्रमेयसंसिद्धिः स्वमहिम्नैव नञ्श्रुतेः ।
तस्य ब्रह्मत्वबोधाय नेति ब्रह्मेतिनोच्यते ॥२३३॥

From this hearing of *nañ* is thus the establishing of what is to be known (viz. the Ātman) owing to its own power (or, glory); for the knowledge of that as the Brahman (the word)

iti in *neti* expresses that.

[233]

This is to point out that *nañ* primarily refers to the object (i.e. *tvam padārtha*), because the Brahman is self-established; *iti* refers to the *mūrta* etc.

आत्मप्रत्ययमामेयो लक्षितो यो नत्राञ्जसा ।
अविद्यादेस्तदात्मत्वादिति ब्रह्मेति बोध्यते ॥२३४॥

It is conveyed (lit. made known) that the Brahman is that (one) which is smoothly indicated by (the negative particle) *nañ* and which is the knowable (i.e. to be known)¹ by the awareness of (one's own) self owing to ignorance etc.² which is its nature.

[234]

The argument is Jīva 'the inner conscience' is subjected to worldly dealings and yet it is the Brahman. So it is indicated by *nañ*.

¹*māmeya* means *meya* 'knowable (or what is to be known)' from *mā* 'knowledge' in the worldly dealings (*pramāṇaprameya-vyavahāra*).

²The word etc. refers to the effect(s) of *avidyā*.

प्रत्यङ्मोहतदुत्थस्य प्रत्यग्याथात्म्यबोधतः ।
बाधितत्वादतौऽवोचदिति ब्रह्मेति मोहनुत् ॥२३५॥

Owing to the rise of the knowledge of the true nature of the inner self from the delusion (about the nature of) the inner self and the product (i.e. ignorance) of it, (the Śruti) states *iti* in order to convey that (the Ātman is) the Brahman, (and it is thus) the remover of delusion.

[235]

Now follows the discussion of the meaning of the sentence *na hy etasmād iti netyantat param asti*.

आदेशं प्रत्यतिमहानथात इति संभ्रमः ।
तेनासदृश आदेशो नन्वयुक्तोऽयमीर्यते ॥२३६॥

(An objection may be raised:) Indeed, this instruction is improperly given, since it is not a proper instruction; for there is very great confusion about (or, misgiving as to the purpose of) the instruction. [236]

युक्त एवायमादेशो न यतो विद्यते परः ।
आदेशोऽतोऽयमेवात्र ब्रह्मण्यादेश इष्यते ॥२३७॥

(The answer is:) Indeed, this instruction is but proper, since there is no other (instruction elsewhere in the Śruti). Therefore, this itself is desired as instruction about the Brahman. [237]

आदिदिक्षितमेतस्य तत्त्वं यद्ब्रह्मणः परम् ।
यावन्तस्तत्र निर्देश्यास्तेऽर्थाः सर्वे निवर्तिताः ॥२३८॥

Since the highest truth about this Brahman is intended to be under instruction, whatever are there the objects to be pointed out (by words etc.) they are all of them set aside (by the words *neti neti*). [238]

This justifies the statement *na yato vidyate paraḥ* in the preceding verse.

निवृत्तिश्च यथोक्तैव तेषामैकात्म्यलक्षणा ।
भिन्नदेशस्थितिस्त्वत्र वास्तवी नोपपद्यते ॥२३९॥

And the cessation (of the duality, viz. *mūrta* etc.) is (effected) just as stated (before), viz. it is of the nature of a single Ātman (in the case) of them.¹ And their actual existence in different places here (i.e. in this world) cannot stand to reason.² [239]

¹This refers to the objects, viz. *mūrta* etc.

²Alternatively, cannot be reasonably accepted (as real).

अव्यावृत्ताननुगतो ब्रह्मशब्दार्थ इष्यते ।
मुख्योऽन्यस्मिन्सति यतो ब्रह्मार्थो नावसीयते ॥२४०॥

शब्दप्रवृत्तिहेतूनामैकात्म्येन समाप्तिः ।

तथा तदभिधेयानामादेशोऽयं मतः परः ॥२४१॥

It is accepted that the object signified by the word Brahman is not distinguished from other (objects) and is not similar to any other(s) because this object, viz. the Brahman, is not understood as the principal meaning of the word (*śabda*) (in *brahmaśabda*) (if there existed any other object). [240]

Since it is (thus) understood (lit. obtained) those which have caused the functions of words, viz. those which are signified by them, are only the Ātman, therefore, this instruction is understood as the highest.¹ [241]

¹That is, the highest conveyer of the truth.

अभिधाभिधेयसंबन्धमङ्गीकृत्य यतोऽक्षरे ।

न कश्चिदपि शब्दोऽत्र साक्षाद्ब्रह्मणि वर्तते ॥२४२॥

(This is so) because not a single word refers to the Brahman itself after accepting the relationship between expression¹ and what is signified by it. [242]

¹It can stand for word or for the primary function of words.

आदेशो नेति नेत्येव तेनेह घटतेऽञ्जसा ।

तदबोधप्रसूतानामाकाङ्क्षाणां निषेधतः ॥२४३॥

Therefore, the instruction in the words *neti neti* gets, smoothly construed (in respect of the truth to be conveyed by the Śruti), owing to its rejection of all the expectancies which arise from ignorance about it (viz. Brahman). [243]

Now follows the exposition of the meaning of *atha nāmadheyam satyasya satyam iti prāṇā vai satyam teṣām eva satyam*.

मूर्तामूर्तं हि सत्याहं प्राणाः सत्यास्तदात्मतः ।

क्षेत्रज्ञस्तदुपाधित्वात्सत्य इत्यभिधीयते ॥२४४॥

Since (the mass of) *mūrtāmūrta* is called *satya*, *prāṇas* (organs etc.) are also (called or described as) *satya*, on account of their having that (viz. *satya*) as their nature, and, therefore, the knower of the field is also called *satya*, for it has them as its limiting adjuncts. [244]

अनिर्देश्यस्य निर्देश्या ये भेदाः कार्यलक्षणाः ।
तेषु लब्धास्पदं नाम परस्मिन्नुपचर्यते ॥२४५॥

The noun which has found scope in those distinct objects, having the nature of effects, and which can be signified (by words), of what cannot be signified (by words) is transferred to the highest (reality, i.e. Brahman). [245]

This is to explain why the Brahman also is signified by the word *satya* even after *satyasya* (in genitive) expresses what can be signified in words.

मूर्तामूर्तात्मकं सत्यं प्राणादेः कार्यरूपिणः ।
तस्याप्येतत्परं सत्यं यन्नेतीत्यवधारितम् ॥२४६॥

What is specified in the word *neti* is this highest truth of the *prāṇas* (viz. the organs) etc. which is of the nature of effects and is (commonly known) as truth and (is known) in the form of *mūrtāmūrta*. [246]

In *satyasya satyam*, the two words occur respectively in genitive and nominative forms. In the earlier verse, the word *satya* (in genitive) has been explained and, now, the word *satya* (in nominative) is explained.

उक्तवस्त्वतिरेकेण नामीषां सत्यता यतः ।
न चाप्यसत्यता तस्मात्तेषां सत्यं परं पदम् ॥२४७॥

Since all these do not have any true nature other than (that of) the said thing (viz. the Ātman), therefore, they do not have (any) untrue nature and their truth is the highest truth

(viz. the Brahman).

[247]

This is to state that the word *satya* can be applicable (in final reality) to the world also.

आत्मवन्तो यथा रज्ज्वा रज्जुसर्पादयस्तथा ।
आत्मवन्तो निरात्मानः प्राणाद्याः प्रत्यगात्मना ॥२४८॥

As a serpent in a rope etc. come to have existence (*ātmavantaḥ*) through only a rope, similarly, *prāṇas* etc. which are non-Ātman come to have existence only through the inner self. [248]

The statement in the preceding verse is clarified by citing an example.

यत एवमतोऽन्वीक्ष्य मूर्तामूर्तादिवर्त्मना ।
सत्यशब्दाभिधेयार्थं तथा द्वारा परं पदम् ॥२४९॥
व्यपदिश्यमानमैकात्म्यं सत्यस्यात्मानमद्वयम् ।
द्रष्टव्यमात्मनैवैनं सत्यं पश्येद्यथोदितम् ॥२५०॥

Since this is so, (therefore) having understood the meaning of what is signified by the word *satya* by way of understanding the *mūrtāmūrta* etc. and in that way (should one see) the highest truth; [249]

the nature of their being but the unique or single Ātman which is thus conveyed by the word (*satya*),¹ viz. the non-dual Ātman, (that is) to be seen—thus should one see this truth which is thus described. [250]

¹NKL edition reads *ucyamānam aikātmīyam*.

अतोऽव्याकृतयाथात्म्यं व्याकृतेनोपदिश्यते ।
सत्यस्य सत्यमिति तन्नान्यथा व्यपदेशभाक् ॥२५१॥

Therefore in the words *satyasya satyam* is conveyed the nature of the unmodified by means of (the statement about) the modified; that cannot be conveyed by any other words. [251]

This sets aside the possible argument that the word *satya* cannot signify the Brahman, since that use of the word cannot be proved useful in the way of continued *anvaya* of it with the same.

व्यपदेशाय नामैतन्न स्वं नामास्य विद्यते ।
ननु ब्रह्माक्षरमिति व्यपदेशोऽत्र नामभिः ॥२५२॥

All this is for conveying (that) it has no name (i.e. noun) of its own. But ¹ indeed this reference, viz. *brahma akṣaram* ..., is but use of names.² [252]

¹This is an objection.

²That is, for signifying it.

कार्यकारणगे तत्त्वे नाम लब्धास्पदं यतः ।
रूपाभिधेयसंबन्धमरूपाशब्दमक्षरम् ॥२५३॥
लक्षयेन्नाञ्जसा वक्ति परं ब्रह्म कथंचन ।
शब्दप्रवृत्तिहेतूनां साक्षाद्ब्रह्मण्यसंभवात् ॥२५४॥

Since the name (i.e. noun) has found relevance on the truth which exists in the causes and effects and it has relation to form and names though it (itself) has no form, no word for its description and it is imperishable— [253]

that name indicates it, since it can never express smoothly the highest Brahman in any way. (This is so) because, in the case of the Brahman, there is no direct relationship with the causes of functions of the words. [254]

In these verses Sureśvara answers the objection and gives his idea of *lakṣaṇā* to be understood in such Upaniṣadic sentences as convey the nature of the Brahman.

TRANSLATION AND ANNOTATION

BUBY 2.4

आत्मेत्येवेति सूत्रस्य व्याख्येयं प्रस्तुता स्फुटा ।

ब्रह्म तेऽहं ब्रवाणीति प्रारभ्याऽऽपूर्णवाक्यतः ॥ १ ॥*

1. Now begins a clear exposition of the aphoristic remark, "Let him meditate (on that Brahman) as the Ātman" (BU 1.4.7) etc., which began with, "I shall tell you the Brahman" (BU 2.1.1) and continued up to the end of last sentence of the previous section (viz. BU 2.3).

NOTES

The aphoristic remark, "Let him meditate (on that Brahman) as the Ātman," etc. which is the so-called *vidyāsūtra*, is enunciated in BU 1.4.7 which is the third chapter of the Madhukāṇḍa. The second chapter of BU (=the fourth chapter of the Madhukāṇḍa) which begins with *brahma te aham bravāṇi* is devoted to an elucidation of the purpose of the *vidyāsūtra*. In this connection BUB (pp. 318-319) remarks: "But in the second chapter, after introducing the individual consciousness which is the object of the knowledge of the Brahman in the passages 'I shall tell you the Brahman,' 'I shall let you know the Brahman,' the Śruti has taught the Brahman, the one reality where there is no duality, without all characteristics, all material qualities, directly indicated by the word *satya* ('truth'), having action, its functionaries and its results as its essential nature, by the negation 'not this, not this.'"

नित्यकर्माद्यनुष्ठानसंशुद्धिषणः पुमान् ।

निःशेषकर्महेतुत्वफलसावद्यधीस्ततः ॥ २ ॥

*The Devanāgarī text is taken from the Ānanda Āshrama edition (ĀnSS 16, 3 vols).

2. A man has his intellect purified by (i.e. through) the performance of the daily action etc.; later he comes to have (i.e. develop) the notion that the result arising from the cause in the form of the entire action is to be blamed.

NOTES

Sureśvara seems to accept the notion of *kramamukti*. I have discussed this point in the Introduction; cf. section 2.

विरक्त आप्रजात्सोऽयं तत्सावद्यसमीक्षणात् ।

संसारदुःखसंस्कारस्मृतिभिः प्रेर्यमाणधीः ॥ ३ ॥

उद्भूततज्जिहासः संस्तद्वाने साधनस्पृहः ।

त्यक्ताशेषेषणः सोऽथ प्रत्यग्याथात्म्यनिश्चयः ॥ ४ ॥

3-4. Having well (*saṁ*) seen that it (viz. the fruit of action) is full of blame, a person turns averse to the result of previously performed actions.¹ His intellect being stirred by impressions and memories of the misery of the transmigratory existence, he has a desire to abandon it (viz. the transmigratory existence) and (also) the wish for acquiring the means for abandoning the same; he gives up all the desires, and has then determined the true nature of the individual consciousness.

NOTES

(1) *āgraja* < *agraja*, i.e. produced by the earlier (performed action)—maybe, it is mostly prosperity like riches in cattle etc. acquired by rituals. Cf. TUBV 2.6 where BOETZELAER translates *āgraja* as “previously gained (possession)”. At some other places, Sureśvara uses this word in the sense, ‘belonging to (or, characteristic of Hiraṇyagarbha, the first born’. (cf. TUBV 2.537). But this meaning is not suitable in the context here.

वस्तुवृत्तात्मसंबोधवस्तुसंसारकारणः ।

व्याविदाशेषसंसारो विमुक्तो ना विमुच्यते ॥ ५ ॥

5. The man, who has destroyed the cause of the transmigratory existence by means of his knowledge of the nature of

reality (viz. the Brahman) and his own self (viz. the individual consciousness), and (thereby) destroyed the entire transmigratory existence, becomes liberated.

यावत्किञ्चिदविद्यायाः कार्यं वैराग्यकारणम् ।

तत्संन्यासो विरक्तत्वात्स्वत एव न शास्त्रतः ॥ ६ ॥

ब्रह्मयाथात्म्यविज्ञानसाधनत्वं विनाऽऽगमात् ।

संन्यासस्य न विज्ञातं तच्छास्त्रेणेह बोध्यते ॥ ७ ॥

6-7. Whatever is the product of ignorance (becomes) the cause of aversion (to the transmigratory existence). The abandoning of the product of ignorance effects of itself, owing to one's being averse to it; (it is) not (effected) by Vedic injunction. That renunciation is the means to ascertaining the true nature of the Brahman is not known (except from the Śruti¹). And this (lit. that) is preached here (i.e. in the Śruti).

NOTES

Śaṅkara remarks: *asyā brahma-vidyāyā aṅgatvena saṁnyāso vidhītsitaḥ*, "The Śruti wishes to enjoin renunciation as subsidiary (i.e. helpful) to (the acquisition of) the knowledge of the Brahman." (BUB, p. 319). But Sureśvara does not admit of any injunction either for urging renunciation or for prescribing renunciation as a means to the knowledge of the Brahman. The scriptural text is therefore merely informative of renunciation.

(1) The word *āgama* here refers to any Śruti which is traditionally handed down.

ब्रह्मविद्यासमुत्थानात्कार्यकारणलक्षणात् ।

व्युत्थाप्य नेति नेतीति परं ब्रह्म प्रदर्शितम् ॥ ८ ॥

8. The Brahman, the highest, has been explained in the words, "(The Brahman is) not this, not this..." (BU 2.3.6), after showing it (to be) apart from what is characterized as the cause and the effect, viz. that which has arisen from ignorance of the Brahman.

NOTES

Commenting on BUB (pp. 318-319): *caturthe tu brahma-vidyā-
viṣayaṁ pratyagātmānaṁ brahma te bravāṇīti brahma jñāpayiṣyāṁ
ca prastutya tad-brahmaikam advayaṁ sarva-viśeṣa-śūnyaṁ kriyākāraka-
phala-svabhāva - satya-śabda - vācyāśeṣa - bhūta-dharma - pratiṣedha-
dvāreṇa neti netiti jñāpitam |*

[Up to the eighth verse, the intention of BU 2.3 is summarized in accordance with BUB (stated in the note on verse 8). Now, while proceeding to 2.4, an objection is raised which runs up to the 17th verse.]

तद्वैतच्छङ्क्यते चोद्यं ब्रह्मत्वासिद्धिदोषकृत् ।

निषिद्धं नेति नेतीति मूर्तामूर्तादि वस्तु यत् ॥ ६ ॥

9. In this regard, an objection is raised, pointing to the fault (which consists in) non-establishing of (viz. not proving) the nature of the Brahman. Whatever thing, concrete or abstract and so on,¹ is denied (to be the Brahman) in the sentence, “(The Brahman is) not this, not this. . . ”.²

NOTES

1. The word *mūrtāmūrtādivastu* means concrete or abstract things, *satya* or *asatya nāmarūpa* etc. which are discussed in the end of BUB 2.3. In short it refers to all that is the non-Ātman.

2. Cf. BU 2.3.6 : *athāta ādeśo neti neti*, also BU 3.9.26, 4.2.4, 4.4.22, 4.5.15: *sa eṣa neti netyātmā*.

किं तद्ब्रह्मानुगं सर्वं किं वा तस्माद्विच्यते ।

यदि ब्रह्मानुगं ब्रह्म स्यादनर्थात्मकं तदा ॥ १० ॥

10. Is all that identical with the Brahman, or distinct from it? (And) if it is identical with the Brahman, then the Brahman would be of the nature of evil.

NOTES

Regarding the relation between things and the Brahman three alternatives are possible :

- (a) All that may be existent and identical with the Brahman,
 (b) all that may be non-existent and identical with the Brahman, and
 (c) all that may be different from the Brahman.
- The discussion of this relation continues up to verse 14. In this verse, the alternative (a) is refuted *anartha* 'evil' consists in the body that originates from ignorance. Hence if (a), the Brahman would be produced from ignorance. On *anartha*, see TUBV 2.125: *avidyāhetavaḥ kāmāḥ kāmamūlāḥ pravṛttayaḥ | dharmādharmau ca tanmūlau deho 'narthāśrayas tataḥ ||*

अभावनिष्ठं तच्चेत्स्यान्मुख्यं ब्रह्म न सिध्यति ।

अभावस्य ततोऽन्यत्वादन्वयव्यतिरेकतः ॥ ११ ॥

11. If that (thing) is non-existent, then the highest¹ Brahman does not become established, for non-existence is different from that (Brahman) as (is clear) from the method of *anvayavyatireka*.²

NOTES

The alternative (b), as pointed out above, is refuted here. While refuting the case (b), the method of *anvayavyatireka* becomes useful. Thus one cannot specifically state what the *abhāva* 'is' and what it 'is not'. Again in the case (b), one would be required to say : 'Since all that (*mūrtāmūrtādi* of verse 8 above) does not exist, the Brahman does not exist.' This would disturb the Advaita doctrine which holds that it is the Brahman alone that exists. And all the efforts of Vedas in search of the Brahman would be useless.

1. The word *mukhya* is literally 'the principal'.

2. The word *anvayavyatireka* means 'the method of *anvayavyatireka*'; on this see the Introduction section 7.

नेतीत्यपि निषेधोक्तिस्तथा सति विरुध्यते ।

वैदिकश्च प्रयासोऽयं सर्वः स्यात्तुषकण्डनम् ॥ १२ ॥

12. In that case (viz. in case it is held that all that is distinct from the Brahman), the statement of rejection in the

Vedic passage: “(The Brahman is) not this, not this . . .”, would also be opposed, and all the (lit. this) effort of the Vedas would be useless like the (effort of) pounding the husk.

NOTES

The alternative (c) is refuted. In case argument (c) is accepted, the negative assertion of the Śruti *neti neti* . . . would be contradicted.

विविच्यते ब्रह्मणश्चेन्मैवं दोषस्तथाऽपि हि ।

ब्रह्मत्वं ब्रह्मणो न स्याद् द्वितीये सति वस्तुनि ॥ १३ ॥

13. If again (you would say that) that thing is definitely taken as different from the Brahman, do not (say so, for) in that case also there would be wrong reasoning: (That is to say), the Brahman would not remain the Brahman (any more), if there existed a second thing (i.e. a thing apart from the Brahman).

अव्यावृत्ताननुगतं वस्तु ब्रह्मत्वमश्नुते ।

एतच्च दुर्लभं तस्य द्वितीये सति लक्षणम् ॥ १४ ॥

14. (Also), the entity which is not differentiated from (all that) and not followed (by all that) is called the Brahman (lit. obtains the nature of the Brahman); and this definition (of the Brahman) would be difficult to assert, if there existed a second entity.

NOTES

The alternative (c) is refuted further: The Śruti defines the Brahman as *ekam evādvitīyam* ‘The Brahman is one where there is no second entity.’ This definition would prove false, if one accepted the existence of thing(s) other than the Brahman.

अथाब्रह्मात्मकं वस्तु जग्ध्वा चेद्ब्रह्म तद्भवेत् ।

प्रतीचो ब्रह्मणाऽत्तत्वान्न मोक्षो नापि संसृतिः ॥ १५ ॥

15. If (one were to say that) all the non-Brahman would become the Brahman after the Brahman contained (lit. ate) it

within itself,¹ there would be neither liberation nor the transmigratory existence for the individual consciousness because it would be contained in (lit. eaten up by) the Brahman.

NOTES

The first line proposes further possibility, viz. the Brahman would include the second entity and then the following alternatives would be assumed: (A) The individual consciousness is included in the Brahman, (B) the individual consciousness is not included in the Brahman. The second line refutes (A).

1. The words *jagdhvā* (<√*jakṣ* 'to swallow') and *atta* (<√*ad* 'to eat up') are used in figurative sense, they show the merger of the entity into the primordial entity. Cf. TU 3.1: *yato vā imāni bhūtāni jāyante | . . .|tad brahmeti |*

संसारिणो न चेदत्ति संसार्येव प्रसज्यते ।

नाऽऽप्नोति ब्रह्मतां साक्षात्सत्सु संसारिवस्तुषु ॥ १६ ॥

16. If (the Brahman does) not eat up (i.e. withdraw within itself) numerous individual consciousnesses, then it would result that the Brahman itself is transmigratory. (If it is held that) there actually exist transmigratory entities, it would not attain the status of the Brahman.

NOTES

(B) is refuted: If (B), again two other alternatives could be assumed, viz. (i) the Brahman is identical (in nature) with the numerous individual consciousnesses, (ii) the Brahman is different (in nature) from them (i.e. numerous individual consciousnesses). If (i), the question of withdrawing the others within itself (by the Brahman) does not arise. If (ii), there is nothing which has the status of the Brahman, as required by the definition.

संसारे चापि जग्धेऽस्मिन्ब्रह्मणा निखिले सति ।

ऋतेऽपि ब्रह्मविज्ञानात्सर्वे स्युर्मुक्तबन्धनाः ॥ १७ ॥

17. And further if the whole of the transmigratory existence was withdrawn (lit. eaten up) by the Brahman, all beings would be released even without having obtained the knowledge of the Brahman.

NOTES

A doubt could be this: 'Even if the transmigratory things and the Brahman are identical in nature, the Brahman cannot be said to be transmigratory, because the Brahman is said to withdraw the transmigratory things within itself and it does not get withdrawn in any other thing.' The answer is stated in the following verses.

अन्वयादिनिषेधाय सर्वमात्मेति वाक्यतः ।

मैत्रेयीत्यादिको ग्रन्थस्तस्मादारभ्यते परः ॥ १८ ॥

18. Therefore, in order to reject (the argument regarding) the method of *anvayavyatireka* by means of (i.e. through the help of) the sentence, "All (this) is the Ātman,"¹ (now) begins the subsequent work starting with the words, "O Maitreyī".

NOTES

Now begins the answer to the objection stated in verses 10-17. That the world is nothing but the individual consciousness is proved by the Śruti "All (this) is the Ātman" which negates the method of *anvayavyatireka*. In connection with this begins the present section.

1. Perhaps the statement, "All (this) is the Ātman" is a brief paraphrase of (*idaṁ*) *sarvaṁ* (*yad ayam*) *ātmā* in BU 2.4.6.

सर्वब्रह्मनिषेधेन तदर्थो वेह निश्चितः ।

तस्य संसिद्धिविषयमैकात्म्यमधुनोच्यते ॥ १९ ॥

19. Or,¹ (since) the entity which is expressed by the word *tat* (viz. the Brahman) is ascertained by rejecting all the non-Brahman entities (in the preceding sections to this, i.e. in BU 2.3.6) now is being declared (lit. stated) the oneness of that

(Brahman with the non-Brahman)² pertaining to the realization³ in its real form.

NOTES

In verse 18 reference is made to the introduction of the section “O Maitreyī . . .” as an answer to the question in verses 10-17, but now is stated another answer. By rejecting the non-Ātman such as a concrete thing etc., the entity expressed by the word *tat*, viz. the Brahman, has been ascertained. Now is to be ascertained the oneness of the Brahman with the entity expressed by the word *tvam*, viz. the individual consciousness.

1. The word *vā* marks first alternative way of introducing comment on “O Maitreyī . . .”. Note the word *vā* in the following verse.
2. Cf. SP: *tasya* (= *tadarthasya*) *tvamarthenaikyam*.
3. The word *samsiddhi* literally means ‘establishing (in real form)’, but here it is the synonym of *mukti* = *avagati*.

नेतीति ब्रह्मणोऽन्यत्र मूर्तामूर्तव्यवस्थितौ ।

प्रसक्ते सांख्यसिद्धान्ते सर्वमात्मेति वोच्यते ॥ २० ॥

20. Or if on the basis of the statement, “(The Brahman is) not this. . .,” (one accepted) the existence of concrete and abstract things (apart from the Brahman), (and) would (thus) be led to the acceptance of the Sāṃkhya doctrine,¹ then, (in order to obviate that difficulty) is stated “All this is the Ātman.”

NOTES

1. According to the Sāṃkhya, both *prakṛti* and *puruṣa* are existent. Hence, the Sāṃkhya is called a realist and dualist. He holds that all the worldly phenomena are real, since they originate from real *prakṛti*. As suggested by ‘if...(one accepted) ...’ in the verse, the Vedāntin would not remain in any way different from the Sāṃkhya. That is, the Advaita Vedāntin would be forced to hold the duality, giving up *kevalādvaita*, ‘absolute-monism’.

सत्यपि ब्रह्मवेदित्वे नासंत्यक्तैषणो यतिः ।

मुक्तिभागिति चेहोक्तः संन्यासेन समुच्चयः ॥ २१ ॥

21. An ascetic, who has not given up the desire, may not attain liberation even if he is a knower of the Brahman.¹ Therefore, the combination (of the knowledge of the Brahman) with renunciation is mentioned here (as a means to attaining liberation).

NOTES

In verses 19-20, the purpose of this section (viz. BUBV 2.4) was introduced, i.e. the oneness of the Brahman and the Ātman, all this is the Ātman. Here another purpose is described: Though it was stated before that renunciation is subsidiary to the knowledge of the Brahman, now is declared the combination of renunciation with the knowledge of liberation.

1. Here we find the suggestion of *vidvat-samnyāsa*. Thus the necessity of renunciation for liberation is introduced as one of the purposes of this section.

निरस्तातिशयज्ञानो याज्ञवल्क्यो यतो गृही ।

कैवल्याश्रममास्थाय प्राप तद्वैष्णवं पदम् ॥ २२ ॥

22. Because Yājñavalkya, a householder, who possessed the knowledge of that which surpassed all excellence, obtained the highest place of Viṣṇu,¹ after attaining the state of renunciation² (hence the combination of knowledge with renunciation is essential for liberation).

NOTES

By taking up the example of Yājñavalkya, the Vārtika confirms what was stated in the preceding verse, i.e. even if one has the knowledge of the Brahman, one cannot attain liberation without renunciation; the combination of knowledge with renunciation is essential for liberation.

1. Sureśvara uses the words *vaiṣṇavam padam* in PKV 62 also in order to convey the sense of the Brahman. And a similar expression *viṣṇoḥ paramam padam* found in SV 219 is first used in KathU 3.9 conveying the same idea. One

could notice the influence of Vaiṣṇavism on Sureśvara's expression for the Brahman. In TUBV also the word *viṣṇu* appears twice, i.e. at 2.374 and 380, conveying the sense of the Brahman. Also cf. Nais 1.1 which uses the word *hari* in a similar context.

2. The word *kaivalya* means *pārivrājya* 'separation from wives etc.' This stresses *saṁtyaktaiṣaṇo yatiḥ* in the preceding verse.

त्याग एव हि सर्वेषां मोक्षसाधनमुत्तमम् ।

त्यजतैव हि तज्ज्ञेयं त्यक्तुः प्रत्यक्परं पदम् ॥ २३ ॥

23. Indeed, renunciation is, for all, the best means to liberation,¹ for it is only by one who has renounced (lit. is renouncing) that the highest state of the individual consciousness can be attained.²

NOTES

This verse is the same as SV 215.

It is proved by inference as well as by the Smṛti that the knowledge combined with renunciation is the cause of liberation.

1. This is based on passages which mention that renunciation is the best means. These are: *tyāgenaike amṛtatvam ānaśuḥ* (KaivU 2, *MahānārāyaṇaU* 10.5); *naiṣkarmya-siddhiṁ paramāṁ saṁnyāsenādhigacchati* (BG 18.49).

2. This is the reply to the possible objection: 'Renunciation is the cause of liberation and not knowledge combined with renunciation (SP).'

मुक्तेश्च बिभ्यतो देवा मोहेनापि दधुर्नरान् ।

ततस्ते कर्मसूद्युक्ताः प्रावर्तन्ताविपश्चितः ॥ २४ ॥

24. The gods, being afraid of (men who would get) liberation, covered them with infatuation¹ (i.e. ignorance). Then they (i.e. men), the ignorant ones, began conducting themselves in action.

NOTES

This verse is almost the same as SV 218. SV 218 uses the word *avicakṣaṇāḥ* instead of *avipaścitaḥ*. The idea of the fear of

the gods is derived from BU 1.4.10. On this see MAHADEVAN's note on SV 218 (*op. cit.*, pp. 111-112).

1. The word *moha* is the synonym of *avidyā* or *ajñāna* 'ignorance'.

मोहमात्रैकहेतूनि तस्मात्कर्माण्यशेषतः ।

संन्यस्तैकात्म्यसंबोधाद्भित्त्वा मोहं विशुद्धधीः ।

ज्ञानमेवाऽऽत्मनाऽऽत्मानमुपासीनोऽमृतो भवेत् ॥ २५ ॥

25. Therefore, having completely abandoned actions which proceed only from infatuation (i.e. ignorance), the one of clear intellect¹ overcomes (lit. breaks or destroys) ignorance by knowing the oneness (of the individual consciousness with the Brahman); he of himself meditates on his own self (i.e. consciousness) as the Ātman which itself is knowledge (itself) and becomes immortal (i.e. liberated).

NOTES

1. Regarding *kramasamnyāsa* and *viśuddhadhiḥ*, see verse 2 and note on the same.

इति प्रमाणमत्रार्थे वचनं भाल्लविश्रुतौ ।

सर्वः संन्यस्तकर्मैव ज्ञानात्कैवल्यमश्नुते ॥ २६ ॥

26. In this respect, there is an authoritative statement in the Bhāllavi-Śruti, viz. Śruti attributed to Bhāllavin¹: "Only he who has given up action attains liberation² through knowledge."

NOTES

1. Bhāllavi-Śruti is the scriptural passage belonging to the school of the Bhāllavins, but a text thereof is not available; cf. SV 220 where Bhāllavin is referred to: *iti bhāllavi-śākhāyām adhiyate/ śarva-karma-nirāśena tasmād ātma-dhiyo janiḥ*||

2. The word *kaivalya* means 'liberation'. Cf. verse 22 note (2) where the word *kaivalya* is used in the sense of *pārivrajya*.

ब्रह्मचर्याद्गृहाच्चैव वनाच्चापि विधीयते ।

निःशेषकर्मसंन्यासो यतोऽतो नर्णबद्धता ॥ २७ ॥

श्रुत्या जाबालशाखायां तथा चानधिकारिणाम् ।

संन्यासस्य विधानान्च कार्योऽतोऽसौ मुमुक्षुभिः ॥ २८ ॥

27-28. Since renunciation of the entire action is prescribed even at (lit. from) the stage of a student, or of a house (holder) and of an anchorite, there remains (for one) no bondage of debt.¹ In the same way, there in the Śruti of Jābāla school renunciation is prescribed for those who are not entitled to perform the prescribed action (i.e. they are not eligible for the same), therefore, renunciation has to be accepted (undertaken) by those who are desirous of liberation.²

NOTES

This is the reply to the possible objection: 'There is impropriety of renunciation owing to the contradiction with the Śruti and the Smṛti which prescribe paying off the three debts.' SP points out to Sureśvara's intention thus: 'It is established in SV that the authoritativeness of the *arthavāda* in the Śruti and the Smṛti is not accepted if it is contradictory to an injunction.' (Cf. SV 540b-541a, 564b-567a) This is why the verse refers to *saṁnyāsaavidhāna*.

1. There is a mention in the Śruti and the Smṛti that a man has to pay back: (i) the debt to the sages, as a student; (ii) the debt to manes, as a householder; and (iii) the debt to gods, as a sacrificer; see the *Manusmṛti* 6.35: *ṛṇāni trīṇy apākṛtya mano mokṣe niveśayet | anapākṛtya mokṣaṁ tu sevamāno vrajaty adhaḥ ||*; the *Taittirīyasaṁhitā* 6.3.10.5: *jāyamāno vai brāhmaṇaḥ tribhir ṛṇāvā jāyate | brahmacaryeṇa ṛṣibhyo yajñena devebhyaḥ prajayā pitr̥bhyaḥ | eṣa vā anṛṇo yaḥ putri yajvā brahmacārīvāsi |* Cf. SV 436b-437a and SP thereon.

2. JābālaU 4: *yadi vetarathā brahmacaryād eva pravrajat gṛhād vā vanād vā | atha punar avrati vā vrati vā snātako vā asnātako votsannāgniko vā yad ahar eva virajet tad ahar eva pravrajat |* Cf. note (1) on verse 23 regarding the Śruti mentioning renunciation.

नरलोकादिकामानां सुतोत्पत्त्यादि साधनम् ।

तेभ्यो व्युत्थितचित्तानां संन्यासस्त्वात्मकामिनाम् ॥ २९ ॥

29. For those who have a desire for the world of men etc.,¹ begetting a son etc. is a means (to fulfilling the same,) but, in the case of those who are desirous of (the knowledge of) the Ātman (and) whose mind has risen above them (i.e. the objects of desire), renunciation is the means.

NOTES

This verse is the reply to the possible objection: 'Even if renunciation does not go against the authoritative Śruti in respect of *ṛṇa*, renunciation cannot be accepted as subsidiary to knowledge leading to liberation. It may be possible that by getting a son (etc.) or by acquiring the knowledge of the Brahman together with that (viz. getting a son etc.), one may get liberation. That is to say, renunciation is not all necessary.' Sureśvara replies that renunciation has to be accepted as subsidiary.

1. See BU 1.5.16 which mentions that *manuṣyaloka*, *pitṛloka* and *devaloka* are attained through a son, rites such as *agnihotra* and knowledge respectively: *atha trayo vāva lokā manuṣyalokaḥ pitṛloko devaloka iti so'yaṁ manuṣyalokaḥ putreṇaiva jayyo nānyena karmanā pitṛloko vidyayā devaloko . . .* |

इममर्थं श्रुतिर्वक्ति सर्वकर्मनिपेक्षिणी ।

प्रजादिना करिष्यामः किं तत्फलवितृष्णतः ॥ ३० ॥

30. The Śruti, indifferent to all action, states this¹ very thought: What should we do with a son etc., or with hankering for the fruit of having that, viz. a son etc.²

NOTES

1. BU 1.5.16: *atha trayo vāva lokā manuṣyalokaḥ pitṛloko devaloka iti so'yaṁ manuṣyalokaḥ putreṇaiva jayyo nānyena karmanā pitṛloko vidyayā devaloko devaloko vai lokānāṁ śreṣṭhaḥ tasmād vidyāṁ praśaṁsanti* |

2. The reading of the printed edition is *phalavitrṣṇataḥ*, but the other reading in the footnote *phalavitrṣṇavaḥ* (*phala-vi-trṣṇu*) 'not longing for fruit' is more suitable to the context. The manuscript of SP also shows this reading. But Sureśvara's

fondness for using ablative cannot be altogether overlooked.
Cf. verses 170, 275 etc.

उत्पत्त्यादिविरुद्धोऽयं लोको येषामकर्मजः ।

मोहमात्रान्तरायत्वाज्ज्ञानमात्रमपेक्षते ॥ ३१ ॥

31. (We hold that in the case of those) for whom this world is not subject to (lit. opposed to) origination etc. and not produced by any action, (it exists) on account of the obstacle only of infatuation (i.e. ignorance) (and therefore their liberation) expects¹ only of knowledge (of the oneness of the Ātman).

NOTES

31a states the reason why there is no hankering for a son etc. This explains *phalavitṛṣṇavaḥ*.

1. The word *apekṣate* requires words *teṣām mokṣaḥ* as its agent. Also *apekṣate* is equal to the word *avalambate* 'depends (on. .)'. Cf. SP: *mokṣaḥ sutādy-anapekṣaḥ cet kim apekṣya bhavati tatrā ha* /

प्रवृत्तिलक्षणो योगो ज्ञानं संन्यासलक्षणम् ।

तस्माज्ज्ञानं पुरस्कृत्य संन्यसेदिह बुद्धिमान् ॥ ३२ ॥

32. Yoga is characterized by activity and knowledge by renunciation. Therefore, having preferred knowledge (to Yoga) the intelligent one should renounce this world.

NOTES

This verse is a quotation from MBh 14.43.24b-25a and is the same as SV 217 as well as BUBV 3.5.4. It is shown on the basis of some Smṛtis that renunciation leads to knowledge.

भावितैः करणेश्चायं बहुसंसारयोनिषु ।

आसादयति शुद्धात्मा मोक्षं वै प्रथमाश्रमे ॥ ३३ ॥

33. Indeed this pure Ātman¹ attains liberation in the (very) first stage (of life) by means of the sense-organs properly brought under control in many transmigratory existences.²

NOTES

This verse is a quotation from MBh 12.313.26.

In verse 32 there is the prescription of renunciation. One would doubt if renunciation comes in following the order of the stages of life (*āśramas*). Sureśvara answers that one could renounce in any stage of life. In verse 34, he states that renunciation which is preceded by knowledge could not be overcome by any desire whatsoever.

1. This refers to one whose mind is purified. On this cf. the Introduction section 2. The word *ātman* refers to the *Jīvātman*. The case is the same with the *Ātman* in verses 37 and 38.

2. Cf. BG 4.5, 7.19 which speak of many births: *bahūni me vyatitāni janmāni tava cārjuna | tāny ahaṁ veda sarvāṇi na tvaṁ vettha paramtapa ||* (4.5), *bahūnām janmanām ante jñānavān mām prapadyate | vāsudevaḥ sarvaṁ iti sa mahātmā sudurlabhaḥ ||* (7.19). In tradition, chapter 18 of BG is called *mokṣasamnyāsayoga*; also cf. 18.2, 5-6, 12, 51-53; 2.47-48 and Ch. 5 which is called *samnyāsayoga*—this latter emphasizes *karmayoga*, 'action with detachment.'

तमासाद्य तु मुक्तस्य दृष्टार्थस्य विपरिचयः ।

त्रिष्वश्रमेषु कोऽन्वर्थो भवेत्परमभीप्सतः ॥ ३४ ॥

34. And in the case of one who has obtained that (liberation) (in the first stage¹), i.e. in the case of the intelligent one who has seen (i.e. experienced) the desirable,² what purpose would be there in the (subsequent) three stages of life?—he is one who is wishing for the highest.

NOTES

This verse is a quotation from MBh 12.313.27.

This is a discussion about one who would feel the necessity of the stage of a householder etc. when he has renounced at the stage of a student (SP). Sureśvara asserts, 'one who has renounced after feeling aversion to momentary fruits would get liberated and later would not feel the necessity of any stage of life.'

1. The statement that three stages of life are redundant implies *tam* (= *saṁnyāsam*) (*brahmacārye eva*) *āsādyā*. SP also supports this view.

2. *artha* = *parārtha* = *mokṣa* 'liberation' as *param abhīpsataḥ* shows. There is a play on the word *artha*. 'purpose'. In *drṣṭārtha* 'one who has acquired (lit. seen) the purpose' the author refers to *mokṣa* as the (highest) desirable object. Naturally, for such a *drṣṭārtha*, there is no *artha* in *gārhasthya* etc.

श्रुतयः स्मृतयश्चैव मस्मिन्नर्थे सहस्रशः ।

प्रत्यक्षा एव विद्यन्ते संन्यासप्रतिपादिकाः ॥ ३५ ॥

35. (Already) there exist thousands of Śrutis and Smṛtis¹ pointing to this thing, i.e. they preach renunciation.

NOTES

1. JābālaU 6: *saṁnyāsend dehatyāgaṁ karoti*; BU 3.5.1: *etaṁ vai tam ātmānaṁ viditvā brāhmaṇāḥ putraiṣaṇyāś ca vittaiṣaṇyāś ca lokaiṣaṇyāś ca vyutthāyātha bhikṣācāryaṁ caranti*; MuU 1.2.12; *parikṣya lokān karmacitān brāhmaṇo nirvedamāyān nāsty akṛtaḥ kṛtena / tadviññānārthaṁ sa gurum evābhigacchet samitpāṇiḥ śrotriyaṁ brahmaṇiṣṭhaṁ //* and the Manusmṛti 6.31: *aparājitaṁ vāsthāya vrajat diśam ajihmagah / ā nipātāc charirasya yukto vāryanilāśanaḥ //* Cf. note (1) on verse 23.

मुख्यार्थता वा प्रागुक्ता ब्रह्मेत्यस्य सदादृशि ।

प्रतीच्यथाऽऽत्मशब्दस्य मुख्यार्थो ब्रह्मणीयते ॥ ३६ ॥

36. Or rather it has been first stated that (the word) *brahman* has indeed as its primary meaning 'ever-seeing individual consciousness' and then is the primary meaning of the word *ātman* stated to be the Brahman.

NOTES

The first line of the verse states in brief the purport of the previous section, i.e. BUBV 2.3. And the second line states in brief the purport of the new section that has begun.

ततस्तदेतदिति च ब्रह्मात्मपदवाच्ययोः ।

मधुकाण्डार्थसर्वस्वं वाक्येन प्रतिपाद्यते ॥ ३७ ॥

37. And, therefore, by the statement, "This is that. . .," (which is to follow¹) is expressed the essential meaning of the Madhukāṇḍa,² (viz. the oneness of meanings expressed) in the two words *brahman* and *ātman*.

NOTES

The aim of BU 1-2 is reconfirmed as showing the oneness of the Ātman and the Brahman.

1. *tad etad brahmāpūrvam anaparam anantaram abāhyam* /
2. The Madhukāṇḍa refers to BU 1-2.

प्रत्यग्याथात्म्यविज्ञानजन्मनेऽतः श्रुतिः स्वयम् ।

विधित्सन्तीह संन्यासं मैत्रेयीति प्रवर्तते ॥ ३८ ॥

38. Therefore, seeking to prescribe renunciation (as a means to liberation), for the emergence of the knowledge¹ of the true nature of the Ātman, the Śruti itself begins with the word, "O Maitreyī".

NOTES

Renunciation is prescribed as subsidiary to the knowledge of the oneness, viz. liberation. This is the reassertion of BUB (p. 320): *pārivrājyaṁ sarvasādhanasamnyāsalakṣaṇam aṅgatvena vidhītsyate* /

1. The term *viññāna* means *brahmajñāna*.

भार्याद्यनुज्ञापूर्वो हि संन्यासो विहितः श्रुतौ ॥

अतोऽनुज्ञार्थमेवाऽऽह मैत्रेयीमृषिरात्मनः ॥ ३९ ॥

39. Indeed, in the Śruti¹, renunciation is prescribed only when it is allowed by a wife etc., therefore, the sage addressed (his wife) Maitreyī for (securing) her consent.

NOTES

1. This refers to the normal *kramasamnyāsa* 'renunciation at the fourth stage of life.' In the case of Yājñavalkya, the Śruti refers to *kramasamnyāsa*. This remark of Sureśvara is an answer to the possible question as to why Yājñavalkya who wanted to renounce sought the consent of his wife. Sureśvara does

not insist on *kramasamnyāsa* nor does he censure it. SP clarifies the idea of the verse thus: *mātaram pitaram bhāryām putrān suhr̥do bandhūn etān anumodayitoā ye ca anyartvijas tām sarvān pūrvavad vṛṇitvā vaiśvānarim iṣṭim kṛtvā sarvasvam dadyād* /—this brings out the purpose of *ādi* in *bhāryādin*.

उद्यास्यन्वा अरे स्थानादस्माद्गार्हस्थ्यलक्षणात् ।
चिकीर्षवे मे संन्यासमनुज्ञां दातुमर्हसि ॥ ४० ॥

40. “I am about to renounce this stage of life which is characterized as of a householder. You should give consent to me who am desirous of renouncing,” (says the sage Yājñavalkya).

NOTES

Commenting on BU 2.4.1, *udyāsyān vā are sthānād asmād . . .*, ‘I am about to give up this stage of life. . . .’

The difference of word-order between BU and BUBV (i.e. *asmāt sthānād* and *sthānād asmād*) is owing to exigencies of metre.

युक्तमाह भवानस्माननुरूपं चिकीर्षति ।
यदेवं सति कर्तव्यं तत्क्षिप्रमनुशाधि माम् ॥ ४१ ॥

41. (The wife said,) “You have told me (lit. us) the proper thing. (Indeed,) you desire to do what is (only) proper; therefore, please tell me quickly what is to be done (by me), when this is the case (i.e. you propose to renounce).”

NOTES

From this verse up to the 45th verse, Sureśvara comments on BU 2.4.1: *hanta te ’nayā kātyāyanyāntam karavāṇiti*, ‘Let me now divide property between you and Kātyāyanī’.

[Verses 42-44 are Yājñavalkya’s talk.]

अनुज्ञातोऽथ तामाह हन्तेत्यादि परं वचः ।
कात्यायन्या सपत्न्या ते विभागं करवाण्यहम् ॥ ४२ ॥

42. Thus allowed by her, he said to her, “Let me now divide my property between you and Kātyāyanī who is your co-wife.

1. The word *vitta* can mean both 'knowledge' and 'wealth' (which one is possessed of). It appears that Maitreyī is playing on the word; cf. the contrast of *dhana* and *jñāna*.

In verses 46-48, Sureśvara is adding some of the possible thoughts that would pass in Maitreyī's mind.

महानुभावसंपर्कः कस्य नोन्नतिकारणम् ।

अशुच्यपि पयः प्राप्य गङ्गां याति पवित्रताम् ॥ ४७ ॥

47. "(Tell me), for whom is not the association with persons of great eminence the cause of prosperity? See, (for instance,) even unholy water, when united with¹ Gaṅgā, becomes holy.

NOTES

SP quotes BG 9.32: . . . *ye 'pi syuḥ pāpayonayah | striyo vaiśyās tathā śūdrās te pi yānti parām gatim ||* and says that since women are sinful by nature (*pāpayoni*), they do not have any right to *·hitasādhana dhana = hitakara dhana* (i.e. *vitta*).

1. The word *prāpya* should be paraphrased as *saṅgamyā* 'having united (with. . .)'.

भगवत्संगतेनन्यः पुरुषार्थोऽमृतत्वतः ।

पृच्छाम्यतोऽमृतत्वस्य साधनं स्यात्कथं धनम् ॥ ४८ ॥

48. "There is no end of human life other (i.e. higher) than immortality which results from the association with you. Therefore do I ask you: How can wealth be the means to immortality (viz. liberation)?

NOTES

This is an explanation of *yan nu me iyaṁ bhagoḥ . . .*, "If now, sir, . . ."

सारेण यदि नामेयं पूर्णं स्याद्वसुना मही ।

तावताऽप्यमृताऽहं स्यां किंवा नेत्युच्यतां यथा ॥ ४९ ॥

49. "If, indeed, this whole earth (*mahi*) were filled with excellent wealth,¹ will it be that I could be immortal with all of that? Or shall I not be that? (Please) tell me.

NOTES

The question of Maitreyī was stated in the previous verse cryptically; it is now elaborated.

1. The words *vasu*, *vitta* (BU 2.4.2) and *dhana*, all mean 'wealth'.

सत्तामात्रोपकारीणि धनानि धनिनां न हि ।

क्रियाद्वारोपकारीणि यतोऽतः पृच्छ्यते क्रिया ॥ ५० ॥

50. "Indeed riches of the wealthy are not useful (beneficial to others) by their mere existence; (rather), they are beneficial (only) through the actions (which become possible therewith). Therefore, I ask you the purpose (served by your wealth)."

NOTES

This is an explanation of BUB (p. 322, line 4): *pr̥thivī pūr̥ṇa-vitta-sādhyena karmaṇā* ('*gnihotrādinā*'), "through the actions which can be performed with (the support of) wealth which is abounding in the earth", which paraphrases *tena* in BU 2.4.2. (p. 322, line 4).

On the question 'whether or not wealth can be a means to liberation,' Śaṅkara says, 'There is remote connection between the ritual which can be performed with the support of wealth and immortality implied in the question, 'Would I be immortal by means of that (wealth)?' Śaṅkara in KeU 1.2 also states: *amṛtā amaraṇa-dharmāṇo bhavanti* / "*na karmaṇā na prajayā dhanena tyāgenaike amṛtatvam ānaśuḥ*" (KaivU 1.2). . . *ityādi-srutibhyaḥ* /

प्रत्याह पृष्टः स्वां जायां नामृतत्वं धनादिति ॥ ५१ ॥

वित्तं चेन्नामृतत्वाय कस्माद् दित्सति तद्भवान् ।

इति पृष्टोऽब्रवीद्वित्तसाधनस्य प्रयोजनम् ॥ ५२ ॥

51-52. Thus asked, he answered his wife, "There is (indeed) no immortality through wealth". (As he was again) asked, "Why do you wish to give (us) wealth, if it does not lead to immortality?", he told her the purpose served by wealth as a means.

NOTES

Verse 51 is an explanation of *neti hovāca yājñavalkyaḥ*, “No, answered Yājñavalkya”. Verse 52 is based on *yathavopakarāṇa-vatāṃ jīvitam tathāiva te jīvitam syād....*, “Your life would be like that which is in the case of those who are with means. . . .”

[Verses 53-54 are Yājñavalkya's talk.]

क्षयिष्णुसाधनाधीनं जीवितं स्याद्यथा नृणाम् ।

तथैव तव वित्तेन जीवितं नामृतात्मता ॥ ५३ ॥

53. “Just as the life of men is dependent on perishable means, in the same way, indeed, is your life (also dependent) on wealth (as perishable means). (There is) no immortality (for you, through that).

अविद्यामात्रविध्वंसाज्ज्ञानादेवामृतं यतः ।

अमृतत्वस्य नाऽशाऽऽपि वित्तसाध्येन कर्मणा ॥ ५४ ॥

54. “Since immortality¹ (results) only from knowledge which is destruction (i.e. removal) of total ignorance alone, there is no hope whatsoever of immortality through action (which) can be performed with (the support of) wealth.”

NOTES

This is an explanation of BU 2.4.2: *amṛtatvasya tu nāśāsti vitteneti*, “However, there is no hope of immortality through wealth.” On this passage of BU, BUB says *amṛtatvasya tu nāśā manasāpy asti vittena vittasādhyena karmaṇeti* / In the second line of the verse, *vittasādhyena karmaṇā* is taken from BUB as it is and *api* means *manasāpi* in BUB. What is meant is this: Even if there is no hope of acquiring immortality through action which can be performed with the support of wealth, hope can be entertained in thought or dream etc. But by the words *manasāpi* (or, *api*) total negation of hope is intended.

1. The word *amṛta* is substituted by *amṛtatva* owing to the exigencies of metre.

कुतोऽमृतत्वसंप्राप्तिज्ञानमात्रं हेतुना ।
न कर्म कारणं मुक्तेर्नाग्निस्तापस्य भेषजम् ॥
कर्मभ्यो जन्म नियतं जन्म चेन्निवृत्तिः कुतः ॥५५॥

55. (One would ask:) Whence (can one say that) one would attain immortality solely by means of knowledge? Why, again, is not the action the means to liberation? (The answer is:) Indeed, fire² is not a remedy against heat. It³ is certain that birth follows from (various) action, and if there is birth, how could there be liberation?⁴

NOTES

1. The first two lines of the verse contain two questions with a view to elaborating the idea that immortality can be obtained through knowledge alone.

2. Fire stands metaphorically for *karman*; it is not a remedy (*bheṣaja*) against heat which stands for the transmigratory existence.

3. The third line of the verse shows that action is a hindrance to obtaining liberation.

4. The word *nirvṛtiḥ* shows the condition of the being (individual consciousness) whose covering is taken away. Cf. *saṁvṛti* which is the opposite of *nirvṛti* in GK : *saṁvṛtyā jāyate* (4.57); *saṁvṛtyā jāyate tu saḥ* (4.74)

स्वभावादेव साधूनां प्रवृत्तिरूपकारिणी ।

अपकारिण्यपि जने किमु भक्तजनं प्रति ॥५६॥

56. The activity of the good is, by its very nature, beneficial even to (i.e. in the case of) harmful people. What to say, then, (about its being so) in the case of the devoted people?

NOTES

Sureśvara's next verse is Maitreyī's question to Yājñavalkya and it implies some unaccounted for unkindness on the part of Yājñavalkya. Therefore, he wants to avert that possible implication and so this general maxim is prescribed.

[Verses 57-63 are Maitreyī's talk.]

62. “(Please) give (me) that wealth which has neither a beginning nor an end nor a middle and which does not perish even when enjoyed.

अनन्तवित्तो हि भवानन्तवद्दीयते कुतः ।

असतः कीदृशं दानं सदेवातः प्रदीयताम् ॥६३॥

63. “Indeed, you possess endless wealth (viz. knowledge¹), why then do you give me that (wealth) which has the end? What kind of a gift is that which is unreal (i.e. perishable)? Give me, therefore, that which is real² (i.e. perennial).”

NOTES

Here concludes the Vārtika on BU 2.4.3.

1. As in verse 60, here also, do we find a pun on the word *vitta* ‘knowledge’ or ‘wealth’.

2. There is an indirect mention of *sat* = *ananta* and *asat* = *antavat*. SP paraphrases *sat* as *jñāna* and *asat* as *ajñāna*.

संसारपुरुषार्थेभ्यो यतो नाव्युत्थितात्मने ।

मुक्त्येकसाधनं ज्ञानं दातुं शक्यमिदं मया ॥६४॥

अमुनुक्षुत्वमाशङ्क्य भवत्ये तत्प्रदित्सितम् ।

संसाराच्चेद्विरक्ताऽसि गृहाणानुत्तमामृतम् ॥६५॥

64-65. (He said to her,) “Since it is not possible to impart knowledge, which is the sole means to liberation, to one who has not risen above¹ (i.e. raised himself above) the ends of human life² in this transmigratory existence and since I doubted whether you have a desire for liberation, I wished to give you that, viz. wealth. Now, if you have turned averse to the transmigratory existence, accept then excellent immortality (viz. knowledge which leads to immortality).

NOTES

This is an explanation of *sa hovāca yājñavalkyaḥ...* (BU 2.4.4), “Then Yājñavalkya answered. . .”.

1. *saṁsārapuruṣārthebhyo. . .avyutthitātmane* constitutes *sāpekṣa-samāsa* ‘a compound whose dissolution expects the help of another word by the side of itself’.

2. The word *puruṣārtha* in this context means *dharma*, *artha* and *kāma*. Here Sureśvara develops his idea of four prerequisites (*sāadhanacatuṣṭaya*), i.e. *nityānitya-vastuviveka* is prescribed for *dharma*, *ihāmutraphala-bhogavirāga* for *artha* and *śamadamādisā-dhanasampat* for *kāma*. And he says that wealth is to be given to those who have not gone beyond these ends of human life, viz. who are *amumukṣu*. To a *mumukṣu*, is to be given the knowledge of the Brahman which is the last of the four prerequisites. Cf. the Introduction section 2 in connection with *sāadhanacatuṣṭaya*.

स्त्रीणां यदुचितं वाक्यं प्रतिलोमं न भाषसे ।

पूर्ववत्त्वनुकूलं त्वमिदानीमपि भाषसे ॥६६॥

66. “You have always spoken to me that which is (quite) natural for ladies to speak and is not disagreeable (to me); and even now you are speaking (to me) only (that which is) agreeable (even) as before.

NOTES

This is an explanation of *priyā batāre naḥ satī priyam bhāṣase*, “Already dear to me as you are, you speak to me that which is agreeable.”

SP points out how the women should speak to their husbands by quoting the *Manusmṛti* 5.152, 154: *viśīlaḥ kāma-vṛtto vā guṇair vā parivarjitaḥ / upacaryaḥ striyā sādhyā satatam devavat patiḥ // pāṇigrāhasya sādhyi stri jivato vā mṛtasya vā / patilokam abhipṣanti nācaret kvacid apriyam //* (but SP quotes *kuśīlaḥ* instead of *viśīlaḥ* and *pūjaniyaḥ* instead of *upacaryaḥ*.)

मोक्षं यान्तं नरं सर्वे मुञ्चन्ति सहजा अपि ।

अतिभक्तितया मां त्वं मोक्षेऽपि न जिहाससि ॥६७॥

67. “All persons, by their own nature, give up (the company of) a person who is seeking for liberation. You, however, do not wish to abandon me even while I am seeking for liberation because of your intense devotion to me.

NOTES

SP states the purpose of this verse thus: Śruti (the *Taittiri-yasamhitā* 6.1.8.5) has a statement, 'A wife is only half of oneself' (*ardho vā eṣa ātmano yat patnī*). Therefore Maitreyī shows agreeable intention towards him in both worldly and non-worldly ways. Yājñavalkya is pleased at the fulfilment of his wish (*svābhiprāyasampattaḥ tuṣṭaḥ*, BUB, p. 323) and intends to share his knowledge of immortality with her.

विभागमसहन्तीव मदतिस्नेहकारणात् ।

मुक्तावनुयियासि त्वं मदंकात्म्यपरीप्सया ॥६८॥

68. "Not tolerating (i.e. unable to endure) separation from me, as it were, owing to your great love for me, you wish to follow¹ me even in liberation with the full desire of being one with me.

NOTES

1. The verb *anuyiyāsi* contains the omission of the letter *sa* from *anu-yi-yā-sa-si*, since the desiderative should have been *-yi-yā-sa-si*. On such an un-Pāṇinian irregular formation, see HIRIYANNA's introduction to Nais (pp. xxxi-xxxii).

अतिस्नेहाऽपकृष्टोमा देहार्धं शूलिनः श्रिता ।

त्वं तु सर्वात्मनाऽऽत्मानं कृत्स्नं मामापनुमिच्छसि ॥६९॥

69. "Carried away by great love, Umā occupied half of Śiva's body. But you, on your part, wish to secure the whole of me, the Ātman, by your whole self.

NOTES

We find in this reference to Śiva whose half body is Umā, the mythological bias of Sureśvara. Cf. the *Raghuvaṃśa* 1.1: *vāgarthāḥ iva sampṛktau vāgarthapratipattaye / jagataḥ pitarau vande pārvatīparamēśvarau ||*

यत एवमतस्तुभ्यं वक्ष्याम्यमृतसाधनम् ॥

निदिध्यासस्व चेतोऽतो व्याचक्षाणस्य तन्मम ॥७०॥

70. “Since this is so, I shall, therefore, explain to you the means to immortality. And,¹ therefore, pay (complete) attention, while I am revealing (i.e. explaining) it to you now.

NOTES

This is an explanation of *ehy āssva vyākhyāsyāmi te vyācakṣāṇasya tu me nididhyāsasveti* (BU 2.4.4).

1. There are two ways of reading *cetaḥ*:

(i) *cetas* ‘mind’ and (ii) *ca itas* ‘and . . . now’. SP accepts (i) and explains the second line thus: ‘And, therefore, desire to profoundly meditate on the meaning of the words having concentrated the mind on my exposition of that (knowledge for liberation)’. But this is not satisfactory. The alternative (ii) seems to be better. The word order of the second line would then be *ataś ca nididhyāsasva itaḥ vyācakṣāṇasya . . .*

आ ब्रह्मणोऽस्मात्संसाराच्छुद्धधीर्न विरज्यते ।

यावत्तावन्न विद्याया अधिकारी भवेन्नरः ॥७१॥

71. “As long as a person of pure intellect¹ does not become averse to this transmigratory existence beginning with the Brahman (i.e. Hiraṇyagarbha, up to the blade of grass²), he is not eligible for the knowledge (of the Brahman).

NOTES

Already in verse 2 above, there is a reference to *vairāgya* which is one of the prerequisites for knowing the Brahman. Sureśvara takes up that point again with a view to explaining the passage in BU 2.4.5: *na vā are patyuh kāmāya patiḥ priyo bhavaty ātmanas tu kāmāya patiḥ priyo bhavati. . . ātmanas tu kāmāya sarvaṁ priyaṁ bhavati*, “Indeed, not for love of the husband is a husband dear, but for love of the Ātman is a husband dear. . . (Indeed, not for love of all is all dear,) but for love of the Ātman is all dear.” This verse shows that he who has not become averse (to this transmigratory existence) is not eligible for acquiring the knowledge of immortality.

1. On the word *śuddhadhiḥ* see verses 2 and 25 above and the Introduction. sections 2 and 10.

2. The phrase *ābrahmaṇaḥ* suggests *ābrahmastambaparyanta*. On this see the Introduction section 10.

[The discussion on aversion (*vairāgya*) continues up to verse 77 and see note on verse 2 above referring to *vairāgya*. The eligibility for knowledge of the Brahman of one who has been averse to this transmigratory existence will be again discussed at verse 93 onwards.]

वैराग्यहेतावप्यस्मिन्नक्तो धर्मादिहेतुतः ।

यतोऽतः कर्मशुद्धात्मा भवादस्माद्विरज्यते ॥७२॥

72. "Since on account of merit etc.¹, a person attaches (himself to this world) even though this (transmigratory existence) is the cause of aversion, therefore, one is purified by (the performance of) action and then turns averse to this world². (viz. transmigratory existence).

NOTES

This is in reply to the possible objection: viz. 'Since a bondage is of very momentary nature, there is the absence of any cause of attachment to that. Therefrom the aversion is established, of itself. Consequently, there is no need of the Śruti speaking about that bondage.' (SP)

1. The link of causation is shown in Nais 1.1, TUBV 2. 125-126 and BSB 1.1.4. Cf. BOETZELAER, *op. cit.*, p. 7.

avidyā-hetavaḥ kāmāḥ kāma-mūlāḥ pravṛttayaḥ |
dharmādharmau ca tan-mūlau deho 'narthāśrayas tataḥ ||
ato vidyā-nirodhe syān nirodho viduṣaḥ sadā |
niḥśeṣa-karma-hetūnām vikārāṇām tadaiva tu ||

(TUBV 2.125-126).

2. *bhava* = *saṁsāra*, from $\sqrt{bhū}$ 'to become'; it refers to *utpattyādi*.

वैराग्यहेतुसंसारे तस्माद्यत्नादियं श्रुतिः ।

न वा अर इति ह्युक्त्या वक्तुं समुपचक्रमे ॥७३॥

73. "Therefore, indeed, it is that this Śruti text (which commences) with the words *na vā* are began specifically to state the cause of aversion to this world.

NOTES

BU asserts here the causes of one's aversion to worldly belongings etc., such as their perishable nature and so on and then proceeds to state the words *na vā are . . .* for one whose mind is purified through the performance of action, since even in that state one may yet desire for some enjoyment. Cf. SP. on the same.

यस्मिन्नेव परा सक्तिस्तस्मिन्नेव निरादरम् ।

कर्म कृत्वा परं यत्नादन्यस्यार्थयते फलम् ॥७४॥

74. "On performing action without any regard whatever to that (viz. the transmigratory existence) towards which one (naturally) has the greatest attachment, one desires the enjoyment (lit. fruit) of another (i.e. knowledge¹).

NOTES

This is in reply to the possible objection: 'If the worthlessness of the transmigratory existence is stated for bringing about one's aversion to the results of action, how does action performed generate purity?' A worldly person has an extreme attachment in respect of heaven etc. On account of performing *kāmyakarman* (or *pratiṣiddhakarman*) he loses the respect for purity. But by means of performing *nityakarman* (or *naimittika-karman*) with no personal interest, he can get his intellect purified, become averse to the results of action, and might expect some unexcelled fruit of knowledge.

Cf. BG 3.19: *tasmād asaktaḥ satataṁ kāryaṁ karma samācara / asakto hy ācāraṁ karma param āpnoti pūruṣaḥ ||*

"Therefore, do always perform action to be done without attachment. For, one who performs action without attachment attains the highest, viz. liberation (through the purification of mind)." The bracket is supplied with the help of BGB.

1. Cf. NKL, p. 830 footnote.

किमिक्षो रसमाप्नोति यत्नान्निष्पीडयन्न ना ॥७५॥

75. "Why ! Does not a man get the juice of sugarcane when he presses it with effort ?

NOTES

This is in reply to the possible objection: 'There is no desire to know the Brahman through purification of mind even by performing *nityakarman* etc. since such a desire is not noticed in the case of persons like us. Just as one obtains the juice of a sugarcane by pressing it in a machine, so does one obtain the fruit of action, viz. the desire to know the Brahman by performing *nityakarman* etc. with the intention to offer its fruit to God, on the basis of the Śruti; (quoted in SP) *yena kenacana* (not traceable yet).

तीव्रदुःखोद्भवो बुद्धौ संस्कारो यावदेव तु ।

तद्विपक्षः सुखं तावदल्पं तत्संक्षये क्षयः ॥७६॥

76. So long as there is an impression in the mind of that great grief (which is entailed in the ritualistic performances which lead to pleasures), there arises slight pleasure which is its opposite. When (however), there is destruction of that (viz. little pleasure), there occurs the destruction (of all misery).

NOTES

This is in reply to the possible objection: 'There is no desire to know (the Brahman) through purification (of the intellect) by means of performing *nityakarman* etc. because there is the experience of pleasure and therefore there is no aversion (also)'. Aversion depends not on purification of the intellect but on the need for that. Acute misery consists in the effort of performing what leads to pleasure. And so long as hankering (or pleasure) which has arisen from that (misery) is there, there is to follow the pleasure of senses and sense-objects which are opposed to that pleasure. And that pleasure is very short-lived and it ceases to be there when misery also ceases because of its invariable association with it. And therefore that pleasure also is not important and therefore one should not have any attachment to pleasure.

शीतमल्पं सुखं ग्रीष्मे तापोऽल्पः शिशिरे सुखम् ।

तदेव दुःखकृद्भूरि तद्धेतवोरनवस्थिते ॥७७॥

77. “In summer, cold (though only) little, is pleasant, (and) in winter, is heat (though only) little, pleasant; but the same would cause great misery when its causes (viz. summer and winter) have remained no more.

NOTES

The verse states the reason for the recognition of pleasure and its cause, in the light of an example in our daily life. It implies that pleasure, be it small or great, is essentially misery. As such, when the causes of pleasure, viz. *dharma* and *adharma*, are overcome, there remains no misery whatever.

शब्दोऽस्ति न प्रियः कश्चिदप्रियो वा स्वतस्तथा ।

रक्तद्विष्टमनो हेतुः शब्दाद्यर्थे प्रियाप्रिये ॥७८॥

78 “Word is not agreeable or disagreeable (to one), by its own nature. In case of a thing such as a word etc. (which is considered as) agreeable or disagreeable, the cause is one’s mind which is attracted (towards it) or abhorrent (of it).

स्वतोऽखिलोऽप्रियोऽनात्मा प्रत्यङ्मोहैकहेतुतः ।

प्रत्यगाह् लादकारित्वादप्रियोऽपि प्रियो मतः ॥७९॥

79. “All the non-Ātman¹ is disagreeable by (its own nature), since it has the ignorance of the individual consciousness² as its sole cause. But (the same), though by nature disagreeable, is taken as agreeable when it causes delight to the individual consciousness.³

NOTES

Verses 78-79 state the agreeableness and disagreeableness of the non-Ātman. The first line points out that agreeableness and disagreeableness of the non-Ātman is not by its own nature. That which makes a thing agreeable is *manas* tinged with *rāga* etc., and preceded by the superimposition of *śobhanāśobhana*. Verse 79 elaborates the second line of verse 78: The superimposition of *śobhanāśobhana* on *manas* as a cause of agreeable or disagreeable feeling is pointed out to be the effect of ignorance of the individual consciousness. A second

cause is added in the second line of verse 79: The non-Ātman, disagreeable as it is by nature, is the object of the function of *dhi* (= *buddhi*) which reveals the joy (*ānanda*), the nature of the individual consciousness. (SP)

1. The word *anātman* refers to *śabdādi* 'a word etc.' explained in the previous verse.

2. Here we can find full support for the fact that the *pratyag* in BUBV always means *pratyagātman*.

3. The second line gives the essence of *ātmanas tu kāmāya sarvaṃ priyaṃ bhavati* where *ātman* is a reflexive pronoun, expressive of the individual consciousness. Cf. E. ROER, *The Twelve Principal Upanishads*, Madras: Theosophical Publishing House, 1931, vol. II, p. 238.

जायादिरप्रियः सर्वः स्वत आद्यन्तदुःखकृत् ।

तद्वेतोरात्मनः प्रीतेर्जायादिः प्रिय उच्यते ॥८०॥

80. "All objects such as a wife etc. are disagreeable by their own nature, because they are the causes of misery both in the beginning and in the end. On that account (only), it is said that a wife etc. are agreeable, when they bring delight to the individual consciousness.

NOTES

Though every object is disagreeable from the philosophical point of view, viz. because it is *ādy-antaṃ-duḥkhaḥkṛt*, it is taken as agreeable on the worldly level because it is *pratyagāhlāda-kāri*, viz. it causes delight in the individual consciousness. Also cf. verses 82, 84 and 85 below.

न कस्यांचिदवस्थायामात्मा लोकेऽप्रियो मतः ।

प्रियोऽप्रियश्च जायादिर्यथाऽनात्मा मूहुर्मूहुः ॥८१॥

81. "In no condition is the Ātman considered to be disagreeable (to anyone) in this world. A wife etc. like any non-Ātman is time and again considered agreeable and disagreeable as well.

NOTES

This is in reply to the possible objection: 'One's own self is unsteady, since a desire to cut oneself, viz. to commit suicide,

can be sometimes seen. Although there is the desire to cut the body, no discrepancy would be concluded as to the love for its own nature. The Ātman is of the nature of pleasure alone.' (SP)

स्वत एवाप्रियोऽनात्मा ह्यात्मप्रीत्यर्थसाधनात् ।

जायादिः स्यात्प्रियो भक्त्या बन्धक्याः कामुको यथा ॥८२॥

82. "Although the non-Ātman such as a wife etc. is not agreeable by its own nature,¹ it is said to be an object of pleasure for the individual consciousness,² (only) secondarily, just as³ a paramour (is considered to be agreeable) to a libertine.

NOTES

This is in reply to the possible objection: 'If the non-Ātman is by nature disagreeable, it cannot be agreeable even though it is meant for the Ātman since it is impossible for one to have the nature of the other. Supposing for instance, a man is not fire by his own nature, he can still be called fire in a secondary sense (*bhaktyā, lakṣaṇayā, upacāreṇa*), because he is of the nature of fire (i.e. cause of fear) and therefore the characteristic of fire is transferred to him. Likewise, the non-Ātman is disagreeable by nature, still it is secondarily agreeable since the Ātman (the individual consciousness) seeks it for pleasure and the nature of pleasure is then transferred to the non-Ātman.

1. This is already stated in the first line of verse 80.

2. *ātma-prīty-artha-sādhana* = *pratyagātmānandārtha-kāraṇāt*.

3. According to SP, *bandhaki* stems from *bandha* and is the synonym of *pumścali, asati, kulaṭā itvari*. (Cf. the *Amara-kośa* 2.6.10). A reading *vardhaki* in place of *bandhaki* is noted by SP, though it is not supported by any manuscript used by the editor. A paramour is not really agreeable to a libertine but he becomes agreeable (i.e. acceptable) only because he gives her the pleasure of money.

निर्हंतुकी स्वतः प्रीतिरात्मन्येव यतस्ततः ।

भाक्तं प्रियं परित्यज्य मुह्यं प्रियमुपाश्रयेत् ॥८३॥

83. "Since the delight of the individual consciousness does not proceed from any cause, therefore one should give up the thing which is agreeable (only) metaphorically and take to the thing which is agreeable (only) primarily.

NOTES

This verse concludes the discussion that the Ātman is by nature agreeable and the non-Ātman is by nature disagreeable.

क्षयान्ता निचयाः सर्वे पतनान्ताः समुच्छ्रयाः ।

संयोगा विप्रयोगान्ता मरणान्तं च जीवितम् ॥८४॥

84. "All collections end in destruction, all rises (or riches) end in decline, all unions end in separation, (so also) all (worldly) life ends in death.

NOTES

This verse is quoted from MBh 13. appendix 15.3967-8 and the *Rāmāyaṇa* 2.105.16. Sureśvara uses this quotation with the intention of seeking the support of Vyāsa, the author of MBh, for pointing out the transitoriness of worldly pleasure and its cause.

Cf. the maxim: *itihāsapurāṇābhyām vedam samupabṛmhayet*; also one cannot overlook the traditional belief that Vyāsa was the compiler of the *Brahmasūtra*.

न तदस्ति सुखं लोके यन्न दुःखकरं भवेत् ।

तदसम्प्राप्तिविच्छेदक्षयेष्वसुखकृद्यतः ॥८५॥

85. "There is no pleasure in this world which does not cause misery, since that (pleasure) causes misery (if and when it is) unobtained, or separated, or (has) a destruction.

NOTES

Cf. verse 77 above.

एवं चेत्साधनोद्भूतं यावत्किञ्चित्सुखं मतम् ।

तन्निःशेषं परित्यज्य सुखमात्यन्तिकं श्रयेत् ॥८६॥

86. "If, for this reason one considers as pleasure whatever is produced by some means, then giving it up entirely, one should be after (lit. take to, i.e. seek) the pleasure which is absolute.

NOTES

It is shown that as long as pleasure is caused by anything it causes misery.

सांसारिकसुखस्यास्य दुःखत्वादुक्तहेतुतः ।

निष्कृष्यातस्ततः प्रीतिं प्रतीच्येव निवेशयेत् ॥८७॥

87. "Since for the reason (thus) stated¹ all this worldly pleasure is misery², therefore,³ one should first turn away (lit. draw out) (the idea of) pleasure from it (i.e. any object in the world) and then find (lit. place) it (viz. pleasure) in the individual consciousness.

NOTES

This is in reply to a possible objection: 'The love for pleasure derived from the sense-objects is considered by people as imperishable—this has been so stated in the Smṛti (as SP states); "Pleasure of those who cannot discriminate one object from another is imperishable". (Quotation untraced) Therefore, one might say one should not give up the enjoyment of the object.'

1. See the verses 80-81 above.

2. Whatever is called pleasure (*sukha*) is nothing but misery (*duḥkha*). Cf. SK 2: *dr̥ṣṭavad ānuśravikaḥ sa hy aviśuddhi-kṣayātisaṃyuktaḥ* which points to the fact that the pleasure promised by *śrutivihitakarman* is also with an end and therefore a cause of sorrow.

3. The word *atas* refers to the earlier ablative, i.e. *duḥkhatvāt*.

स्रजि दण्डादयो यद्वत्स्रगज्ञानैकहेतुकाः ।

पतिजायामुताद्येवं प्रत्यगज्ञानहेतुजम् ॥८८॥

88. "As a stick etc. are (perceived) in the place of a garland solely on account of the non-perception (lit. absence of

proper knowledge) of a garland, so (also the notion that) a husband, a wife, a son, etc. (are a source of pleasure) is caused by ignorance about the individual consciousness.

NOTES

The illustration is given in order to show that the worldly notion of pleasure from a wife or a son etc. results from non-knowing of one's self.

सर्वानर्थनिवृत्तिश्च सर्वाह्लादाप्तिरेव च ।

प्रतीचि ज्ञानमात्राच्चेत्तदन्यत्प्रार्थ्यते कथम् ॥८६॥

89. "If there is, for an individual (consciousness), the removal of all undesirable results and the acquisition of all pleasures merely on account of knowledge, how is it then that a thing other than that (pleasure in the Ātman) is solicited (by one)?"

NOTES

SP explains this verse thus: One should give up the non-Ātman and love the Ātman because no pleasure is possible in the non-Ātman which has arisen from ignorance and because two-fold human aims, viz. *dharma* and *mokṣa* are attained merely by the knowledge of the Ātman.

Sureśvara has in mind the Śruti: *yathā hy évaiṣa etasminn adṛśye 'nātmnye' 'nirukte 'nilayane 'bhayaṁ pratiṣṭhāṁ vindate/ atha so 'bhayaṁ gato bhavati* / "For truly, when one finds fearlessness as support in Him who is invisible, bodiless, undefined, without support, then has he reached fearlessness." (TU 2.7. 1. Trans. S. RADHAKRISHNAN, *The Principal Upaniṣads*, London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1953, p. 549).

यस्य सम्बन्धमाश्रित्य ह्यप्रियोऽपि प्रियायते ।

प्रियोऽप्यप्रियतां याति यस्य सङ्गतिकारणात् ॥८७॥

दृष्ट्वाऽनुभवतस्तत्त्वमात्मानात्मपदार्थयोः ।

उपादित्सा जिहासा च तत्कृतवानुपालयताम् ॥८८॥

90-91. "(Pleasure should be sought in that, viz. the Ātman) depending on contact (with which) even a disagreeable thing

becomes agreeable, (and) on account of whose close association whatever is agreeable becomes disagreeable. Having known the reality of objects denoted by the word *ātman* and *anātman* through experience¹, one should entertain a desire to accept or to abandon what is related to them² (i.e. *ātman* and *anātman*).

NOTES

1. The word *ātmapadārtha* means *asmatpratyayagocara* and the word *anātmāpadārtha*, *yuṣmatpratyayagocara* respectively as shown in BSB 1.1.1.

2. The desire to accept (*upāditsā*) that the Ātman is the highest reality, i.e. *pūmartha* 'the end of human life' and the desire to abandon (*jihāsā*) that the non-Ātman is not the highest reality, i.e. it is 'not the end of human life'.

नानाप्रकार आसङ्गो विषक्तो योऽस्य बाह्यतः ।

यथोक्तकारणात्सर्वं प्रतीच्येव निवेशयेत् ॥६२॥

92. "Whatever attachment of various kinds has clung to it, (viz. the Ātman) from (any) exterior (object) is owing to the reason (already) stated.¹ (Therefore) one should place (viz. find) (attachment) in the individual consciousness.

NOTES

The end of human life can be found only in the Ātman and nowhere else because of the reason stated in verse 90.

1. See verses 90 and 91.

नरकादिव निविण्णो यावन्नाऽऽब्रह्मणो नरः ।

न तावदधिकारोऽस्ति कैवल्यज्ञानवर्त्मनि ॥६३॥

93. "So long as a man is not averse to this whole universe beginning with the Brahman¹ (i.e. Hiraṇyagarbha), as if (averse) to the hell², he has no eligibility (to tread) on the path of knowledge of liberation³.

NOTES

Up to the previous verse the aversion to the non-Ātman has been stated. Here is stated that no eligibility for knowledge

is possible in the case of one who is not so averse to the non-Ātman.

1. See note (2) on verse 71.

2. He seems to express the idea that there exists such unpleasant abode for beings as *naraka* etc. whose descriptions we come across in later Purāṇas but do not have any description of *naraka* etc. in Upaniṣads or Śaṅkara's Bhāṣyas.

3. This term is used in the Sāṅkhya to denote final emancipation resulting from discrimination of *puruṣa* from *prakṛti*. See note (2) on verse 26.

सर्वासङ्गचिन्मिर्मुक्तो मोक्षमात्रप्रयोजनः ।

अतोऽधिक्रियते प्रत्यग्ज्ञानोत्पत्तौ न रागवान् ॥६४॥

94. "Therefore¹, a person is eligible in respect of rise of knowledge of the individual consciousness if he is fully free from all attachment and he has liberation alone as his purpose and not the one who has any attachment."

NOTES

1. The word *atas* means that aversion is conducive to the rise of knowledge and attachment is obstructive to it.

आत्मा प्रत्यक्प्रसिद्धेः स्यात्तत्रैवाऽऽत्मानुभूतितः ।

इति प्रमेयनिर्देशो द्रष्टव्य इति तत्प्रमा ॥६५॥

95. The Ātman¹ is (talked about) on account of (the commonly accepted) knowledge of the individual consciousness, because one experiences it (viz. the Ātman) in that (viz. one's own consciousness). Thus (in the sentence "The Ātman is to be seen, . . ." which will follow) there is the mention of the object of knowing (and the word) *draṣṭavyaḥ* refers to the right knowing of it (viz. the object of knowing).

NOTES

Whatever has preceded explained the portion of the BU beginning with *na vā are patyuh* . . . up to what immediately precedes the sentence *ātmā vā are draṣṭavyaḥ*. Now is to be explained the meaning of the word *ātman*, used in the

sentence *ātmā vā are draṣṭavyaḥ*. (SP) In the first line Sureśvara proves the commonly accepted meaning of the word *pratyag*. In the sentence *ātmā vā are draṣṭavyaḥ* the Ātman is stated as the object of knowing. When the Ātman (viz. the individual consciousness) is the object of knowing, the Vedic sentence is the means of knowing it. The Vedic sentence can give the correct way of knowing the nature of the Ātman. In this sense, the seeing (or knowing, *darśana*) of the Ātman (the individual consciousness) is the object of knowing, there possibly arises the objection as in BSB 1.1.1 (p. 2): *katham punaḥ pratyagātmani aviṣaye 'dhyāso viṣaya-tad-dharmāṇām? sarvo hi puro 'vasthite viṣaye viṣayāntaram adhyasyati | yuṣmat-pratyayāpetasya ca pratyagātmano 'viṣayatvaṁ braviṣi* / For such an objection there is a reply of Śaṅkara: *aparokṣatvāc ca pratyagātma-prasiddheḥ* / 'And because the individual consciousness is established on account of its immediate presentation.'

1. The word *ātman* means the Jīvātman as stated earlier. In the following verses, this meaning is kept in view.

आत्मबुद्धिरियं तावत्सर्वेषां जायते स्वतः ।

अप्राप्ता सर्वमात्मेति सेवातो धीर्बिधीयते ॥६६॥

96. As for the awareness of one's own individual consciousness, it is patent to oneself (i.e. it is cognized through itself, i.e. by its mere being there in one). (But the knowledge) "All this is the Ātman" is not obtained (in the same way.) Therefore, the knowing of that¹ (knowledge) is prescribed (in the injunction, "The Ātman is to be seen,").

NOTES

This verse refers to the view of a *vidhivādin* who holds *ātmā vā are draṣṭavyaḥ* as an injunction: The suffix *tavya* is known to be prescriptive (of some action) and then it prescribes (a) the seeing (viz. knowing) of the Ātman which has been already known to all, or (b) the securing of the knowledge, i.e. the oneness of the Brahman and the Ātman. The *vidhivādin* refutes the alternative (a) in the first line and accepts the alternative (b) in the second line.

1. The words *buddhi* and *dhi* have usually the same meaning 'knowledge', but here the word *dhi* is used to express the sense, 'act of knowing'.

द्रष्टृद्रष्टव्ययोर्भेदे सत्येवं धीविधीयते ।

नियोज्यविषयाभेदे घटते न विधिर्यतः ॥६७॥

97. Such (act of) knowing is prescribed only when there is (grasped, i.e. accepted, by one) the distinction between the knower and the object of knowing; for, (indeed), in case there exists no distinction between the one who is enjoined and the object towards which his action is directed, (the prescription of) an injunction does not stand to reason.

NOTES

To such a *vidhivādin's* view about an injunction in verse 96, Sureśvara says: Such an injunction is possible when (i) the oneness of the Brahman and the Ātman is not known, or (ii) the oneness is known. Not (i); because the object of knowing is absent (the first line). Nor (ii); because of no distinction between one who is enjoined and the object (*niyojya-viṣaya*) which is indispensable to an injunction. Hence the injunction is impossible as to the sentence *ātmā vā are draṣṭavyaḥ*

उत्तरोत्तरभूयांसि नामादीनि यथाक्रमम् ।

उपन्यस्याऽऽत्मयाथात्म्यं तत्तत्त्वं प्राब्रवीच्छ्रुतिः ॥६८॥

98. Having introduced in (order one after another), name etc.¹, each latter of higher importance, the Śruti text declared the real nature of the Ātman (and) that to be the 'Truth'.²

NOTES

After proving that there exists no distinction between *niyojya* and *viṣaya* (for the oneness of the Brahman and the Ātman is known), Sureśvara keeps in mind an objection on the basis of *bhūmā tv eva* . . . (CU 7.23.1) which concludes a series of injunctions as regards various objects of knowing as the Brahman and then answers it: Prescribing the 'Truths' beginning

with *nāma* and ending with *prāṇa* in order, and showing that each latter 'Truth' is greater, he only goes to prove that the real nature of them all is *bhūman* 'infinite', viz. the Ātman, alone through taking support from the Śruti, *bhūmā tv eva vijijñāsitavyaḥ* . . . 'But the infinite is to be known. . .' (CU 7.23.1).

1. CU 7.1.4-7.15.4 declares *nāma*, *vāc*, *manas*, *saṁkalpa*, *citta*, *dhyāna*, *viññāna*, *bala*, *anna*, *ap*, *tejas*, *ākāśa*, *smara*, *āśā* and *prāṇa* in ascending order (of the 'Truths'.) These 'Truths' are enumerated in CU 7.26.1 also. The word 'Truth' (*tattva*) does not really refer to the Brahman, but name etc. which are tentatively taken to be the Brahman in the course of discussion for the sake of understanding.

2. The reading should be *tat tattvaṁ* instead of *tat tatvaṁ*.

भूम्नश्च लक्षणं चक्रे यत्र नान्यदिति स्वयम् ।

अथ यत्रेति चाल्पस्य प्राणान्तस्य च लक्षणम् ॥६६॥

99. Further¹ (the Śruti text²) itself defined the 'infinite' *bhūman*, (i.e. the Brahman) in the words, "Where there is nothing else (that is called *bhūman*)," and defined also 'the finite' (*alpa*, i.e. small one) (whose enumeration begins with that of *nāma* and) ends with (the mention of) *prāṇa* in the words, *atha yatra*. . . .

NOTES

This verse points out how *bhūman* alone is the Brahman and therefore to be known. It points to the definition of *bhūman* in CU 7.24.1: *yatra nānyat paśyati nānyac chṛṇoti nānyad vijānāti sa bhūmā* / *atha yatrānyat paśyaty anyac chṛṇoti anyad vijānāti tad alpam* / Also cf. Nais 2.57 and Cand on the same.

1. There are three *cakāras* in this verse. The first *cakāra* in the first quarter expresses that verse 98 and 99 retain the same idea. The second *cakāra* in the third quarter combines with the first line. The third *cakāra* in the fourth quarter makes an additional argument that *nāma* to *prāṇa* are not the Brahman.

2. This Śruti, viz. CU 7.24.1, comes immediately after CU 7.23.1 which has been dealt with in the note of the previous verse.

the nature of it (viz. the Ātman), (and then) declares to us that all this is the Ātman.

NOTES

Here is an assertion of the correspondence of BU with CU and other Upaniṣads.

1. *sa eṣa neti nety ātmā* (BU 3.9.26, 4.2.4, 4.4.22, 4.5.15); also cf. *adeśo neti neti* (BU 2.3.6).

भावाभावात्मना स्थानं न निषेध्यस्य वस्तुनः ।

यतोऽतः सर्वमात्मैव प्राब्रवीच्छ्रुतिरञ्जसा ॥१०५॥

105. Since a thing which is to be denied¹ cannot have existence as an entity or a non-entity, therefore the Śruti text declares in clear terms that all this is the Ātman.

NOTES

1. The word *niṣedhya-vastu* means any object of our awareness, which is denied by BU 3.9.26 to be the Brahman; cf. note on the preceding verse.

नाव्युत्थितमनाः कश्चित्प्रतीचोऽन्यत्प्रपश्यति ।

व्युत्थितात्माऽपि चाऽऽत्मानं पश्यन्नेवान्यदीक्षते ॥१०६॥

106. A person whose *manas* has not become operative¹ does not perceive anything other than the inner consciousness. Also a person whose Ātman has² become operative perceives things other than the inner consciousness, while it is perceiving the inner consciousness as well.

NOTES

Sureśvara has already pointed out why injunction is not required when the Brahman is both known and unknown. Now he points out another reason for it.

1. The word *avyutthitamānas* is explained thus: *avyutthitamānas* means *manas* which is not operative. In this state, no subject-object relation (viz. duality) is perceived. This state of *manas* is possible in deep sleep and is like *amanibhāva* in GK 3.31: *manodrśyam idaṁ dvaitaṁ yat kiñcit sacarācaram/ manaso hy-*

amanibhāve dvaitam naivopalabhyate/, Mai U 6.34. (*amanastā* in GK 3.32).

2. For *vyutthitātman* cf. verse 104 above.

स्वातन्त्र्यं यत्र कर्तुः स्यात्तत्र कर्ता नियुज्यते ।

अन्वयव्यतिरेकाभ्यामात्मानात्मविवेचने ॥१०७॥

107. An agent is enjoined to do that (thing) in (respect of) which he has a freedom (to choose the course of action). (Therefore, there is the Vedic injunction¹) as regards discrimination between the Ātman and the non-Ātman by the method of *anvayavyatireka*.²

NOTES

'If in respect of the knowledge of the Ātman, whether known or unknown, there cannot be any injunction, what then is enjoined by the word *draṣṭavyaḥ*?' In reply to this objection a statement is made as to when an injunction is laid down.

1. This is supplied on the basis of SP: *viddhir iti śeṣaḥ*.

2. See the Introduction section 7.

वचोर्थप्रतिबोधस्य पदार्थाज्ञानमेव तु ।

यतोऽन्तरायस्तद्वानौ तेन तत्र नियुज्यते ॥१०८॥

108. Since ignorance of that which is signified by the word(s) alone is a hindrance to becoming aware of the sentence-sense; therefore a person is enjoined to determine¹ that which is signified by different words, i.e. to remove ignorance of that which is signified by word(s).

NOTES

One might object: The *vākyārtha* can be understood merely from the sentence; what is then the need of an injunction that one should find out the *padārtha* by the method of *anvayavyatireka*. This verse is in reply to that.

1. The words *taddhānau* and *tatra* mean *padārthājñānadhv-astau padārthasodhane* respectively, according to SP.

एवं ज्ञातपदार्थः सन्यथा पूर्वमवादिषम् ।

ब्रह्म वा इदमित्यत्र न्यायेनैकात्म्ययायिना ॥१०६॥

निस्तन्तरायो वाक्यार्थं वाक्यादेवावगच्छति ।

अव्यावृत्तानुगतप्रत्यक्तत्त्वसमीक्षणात् ॥११०॥

109-110. Thus having known that which is signified by the word(s) (in a sentence), as I have said in consonance with the rule that is related to the oneness (of the Brahman and the Ātman) a person gets to know the sentence-sense in the sentence, "The Brahman is indeed all this", from the sentence itself without any hindrance, on the proper pondering over the true nature of the individual consciousness which is not differentiated from and followed by anything else.

NOTES

Here Sureśvara refers to his comment on BU 1.4.10 and 11 which is to this purport: On hearing the Vedic sentence, one immediately understands (i.e. realizes) its meaning; the method of *anvayavyatireka* helps one to assert the meanings of the words in a sentence. This makes one aware of the real nature of the inner consciousness. This awareness is not produced (i.e. conveyed) by any means like a sentence in common parlance.

नित्यमुक्तत्वविज्ञानं वाक्यादेवाञ्जसा भवेत् ।

वाक्यार्थस्य च विज्ञानं पदार्थस्मृतिपूर्वकम् ॥१११॥

अन्वयव्यतिरेकाभ्यां पदार्थः स्मर्यते ध्रुवम् ।

एवं निर्दुःखमात्मानमक्रियं प्रतिपद्यते ॥११२॥

111-112 The awareness¹ (that the Ātman is) eternally liberated can result straight from the Śruti statement.² And the awareness of the sentence-sense is preceded by the remembrance of that which is signified by the word(s). One firmly recollects (or, recognizes) by the method of *anvayavyatireka*³ that which is signified by the word(s). Thus does one know the Ātman as free from misery and inactive.⁴

NOTES

Verse 111 is almost same as SV 206 whose second quarter is *vākyaḥ bhavati nānyataḥ* and verse 112 is the same as SV 207.

1. The word *viññāna* is loosely used as equivalent to *jñāna*.
2. Sureśvara expresses his agreement with Śaṅkara in that the knowledge of the Brahman is acquired only from Vedānta sentence. Cf. BSB 1.1.4 (p.11) : *tad brahma sarvajñam sarvaśakti jagadutpattisthitikāraṇam vedāntaśāstrād eva avagamyate* |
3. Sureśvara replies to an objection: 'What is the purpose in explaining *padārtha* by the method of *anvayavyatireka* ?'
4. Through the knowledge of Vedic sentence such as *tat tvam asi* there remains (only) the immovable (i.e. consciousness).

प्रत्यङ्मोहोद्भवानात्मप्राधान्येन तमोन्वयात् ।

आत्माऽऽत्मानं पुराज्ञासीद्वाक्यार्थज्ञानजन्मतः ॥११३॥

अनात्मनोऽत आत्मानमन्वयव्यतिरेकतः ।

निष्कृष्याऽऽत्मन्यथाऽऽत्मानं सर्वमात्मेति पश्यति ॥११४॥

113-114. Before the rise of the knowledge of the sentence-sense the Ātman (i.e. the individual consciousness) is in association with ignorance and therefore it knows itself as principally being the non-Ātman (which has but) arisen from ignorance on the part of the individual consciousness. Therefore, one first distinguishes (lit. separates) the Ātman from the non-Ātman by the method of *anvayavyatireka*¹ and then² one knows (lit. sees) the Ātman (viz. the Brahman to be) in the Ātman (viz. individual consciousness) and also that all this is the Ātman.

NOTES

Once again Sureśvara asserts here that the limitation of knowing only the sentence-sense by the method of *anvayavyatireka* is in respect of the words in it.

1. See the Introduction section 7.

2. The word 'then' refers to 'removal of ignorance together with its effects.' Here 'effect' means 'grasping reality otherwise (*anyathāgrahaṇa*)', caused by ignorance, and also, joy etc. derived from *anyathāgrahaṇa*.

अज्ञातज्ञापनं चातो विधिरत्राभिधीयते ।

अप्रवृत्तप्रवृत्तिश्च न्यायाभावात्त युज्यते ॥११५॥

115. And, therefore, the Vedānta sentence is to be considered as an injunction informing one of what is not known (before). But¹ (lit. and) it does not stand to reason to say that the injunction makes one inclined towards an action (which was never undertaken before), for there is no reason² (of such a doing).

NOTES

It is shown that an injunction has been laid down in respect of explaining the **padārtha** which is understood by the method of *anvayavyatireka*. Now it will be shown that it would not be wrong to accept that there is an injunction which makes known what is not already known (*ajñātajñāpana*), viz. the knowledge of the sentence-sense.

There are two implications in respect of an injunction, (i) *ajñātajñāpana* regarding the matter of knowing and (ii) *appravṛttappravṛtti*, 'instigation towards some act which one normally does not take to.' In the context of the knowledge of the Brahman, the injunction is intended to be *ajñātajñāpaka* but not *appravṛttappravṛtti* (*kāraṇa*). Sureśvara clarifies that no action is possible in respect of knowledge—see BSB 1.1.4: *nanu jñānaṁ nāma mānasi kriyā . . .* where Śaṅkara has elaborately discussed that knowledge is not action.

1. The reading in the footnote is *tu* instead of *ca*. The word *tu* seems better because the two lines of the verse state two implications in contrast.

2. Here the word *nyāya* means 'reason'. Verse 168 uses the word in the same sense; cf. GK 2.3: *abhāvaś ca rathādināṁ śrūyate nyāyapūrvakam* for *nyāya* in this very sense; Śaṅkara's comment on it is *yuktitaḥ*.

नित्यं न भवनं यस्य यस्य वा नित्यभूतता ।

न तस्य क्रियमाणत्वं खपुष्पाकाशयोरिव ॥११६॥

116. As in the case of sky-flower or sky, so in the case of that whose being produced is never (possible) or that which is ever being (i.e. whose existence is eternal), there cannot be (an injunction as to its) being produced.

NOTES

This verse (which is identical with TUBV 2.15 and BUBV 4.3. 1596) clarifies why the previous verse uses the word *nyāyābhāva*:

The example of sky-flower or sky points to the general rule as regards the impossibility of producing the knowledge (or awareness of the Ātman which is ever existent). A sky-flower, eternally non-existent, or sky, eternally existent, cannot be ever produced and therefore there cannot be any injunction as to the production of the same. This would point to the futility of any injunction in respect of *ātmajñāna*.

उत्पत्त्यादि स्वतो यस्य चात्यन्तमेव न ।

क्रियानपेक्षसिद्धत्वात्स्वतः सिद्धं तदुच्यते ॥११७॥

117. That is called self-established which exists in its own right, and whose origin etc. (from anything else) cannot (or, is not) asserted; for it is (already) existing independent of (anybody's) activity.

NOTES

There are three kinds of existents: (i) those whose existence depends on origin etc., e.g. a pot, (ii) those whose existence is independent of origin etc., e.g. sky, and (iii) non-existence, e.g. a sky-flower. Though the case (i) needs action for its existence, the cases (ii) and (iii) do not. The Ātman is the case (ii); it already exists and does not come into existence on account of any other thing. This is called *svataḥsiddha* 'self-established'.

उत्पत्त्यादौ तु यच्छक्तं हेतुमात्रमपेक्षते ।

साफल्यं कर्मणस्तत्र तदभिव्यक्तकृद्धि तत् ॥११८॥

118. Whatever is capable of origin etc. expects only a cause. In such a case (somebody's) action becomes fruitful. For, that (i.e. action) causes the manifestation of it (i.e. effect).

NOTES

The first line of this verse is identical with TUBV 2.14 (first line) and BUBV 1.4.814 (first line).

Wherever there is *kārya-kāraṇa* relation there is usefulness of action. For, action makes *kāraṇa* manifest in the form of *kārya*. Only in such a case, i.e. when action is possible, an injunction

can be assumed. To the contrary, there is no *kārya-kāraṇa* relation, i.e. no origin etc. is possible in case of the Ātman; therefore, neither action nor an injunction is possible. Here the idea of *kāryakāraṇa* relation is introduced. Cf. SK 9: *asad-akaraṇād upādāna-grahaṇāt sarva-sambhavābhāvād | śaktasya śakya-karaṇāt kāraṇa-bhāvāc ca satkāryam ||*

कार्यं कारणतन्त्रं स्यात्तत्तत्स्याऽऽत्मलाभतः ।

अन्यकार्यमकार्यं च नान्यत्कारणमीक्ष्यते ॥११६॥

119. An effect depends on a cause, because it (the effect) comes into existence owing to that (the cause). We do not see there any cause of that which is not the effect of another or which is not (of the nature of) an effect.

NOTES

The impossibility of an injunction regarding the Ātman and its knowledge is being mentioned on the basis of the *kārya-kāraṇa* relation.

सर्वमात्मेति या बुद्धिः स प्रमेयबलाद्भवेत् ।

प्रमातृतन्त्रा सा चेत्स्यात्प्राप्ता लोकाग्निबुद्धिवत् ॥१२०॥

120. The knowledge that all (this) is the Ātman arises from the strength of a thing (which is) to be known (i.e. the Ātman itself). If that knowledge depended on a knower (viz. the individual who possesses a body, sense-organs etc., it could be) obtained like (the knowledge of) the worldly fire.

NOTES

A question may be asked: 'What do you want to prove by showing that there is no injunction possible in respect of the Ātman and its knowledge?' In reply Sureśvara says: Since the Ātman is not something to be achieved through action, there is no expectation of an injunction; its knowledge also, though possible on the strength of a means of knowing etc., is not *puruṣatantra*, i.e. it is not to be accompanied by desire or exertion on the part of a person dependent on an injunction in that respect. The second line is in reply

to the objection: 'It is not established that the knowledge of the Ātman does not depend on a person's desire or effort'. On this cf. BSB 1.1.4. (P. 18): *nanu jñānam nāma mānasi kriyā/na/vailakṣaṇyāt/ kriyā hi nāma 'sā yatra vastusvarūpanirapekṣaiva codyate puruṣacittavyāpārādhinā ca / yathā "yasyai devatāyai havir gr̥hitam syāt tām manasā dhyāyed vaṣaṭ kariṣyan" iti "saṁdhyām manasā dhyāyet" iti caivamādiṣu / dhyānam cintanam yady api māna-sam tathāpi pūruṣeṇa kartum akartum anyathā vā kartum śakyam puruṣatantratvāt / jñānam tu pramāṇajanyam / pramāṇam ca yathā-bhūta-vastuviśayam / ato jñānam kartum akartum anyathā vā kartum na śakyam kevalam vastutantram eva tat na codanātantram nāpi puruṣatantram / tasmān mānasatve 'pi jñānasya mahadvailakṣaṇyam / yathā ca "puruṣo vāva gautamāgniḥ" "yoṣā vāva gautamāgniḥ" ity atra yoṣitpuruṣayor agnibuddhir mānasi bhavati / kevalacodanājanyatvāt tu kriyaiva sā puruṣatantrā ca / yā tu prasiddhe 'gnāv agnibuddhiḥ na sā codanātantrā nāpi puruṣatantrā / kiṁ tarhi pratyakṣaviśayavastutantraineti jñānam evaitat na kriyā / evam sarvapramāṇaviśayavastuṣu veditavyam /*

अतोऽपुरुषतन्त्रत्वान्नात्मज्ञाने विधिर्भवेत् ।

अन्वयादिक्रिया त्वस्य तत्तन्त्रत्वाद्विधीयते ॥१२१॥

121. Therefore there is no injunction possible in respect of the knowing of the Ātman,¹ since it (i.e. knowing the Ātman) does not depend on a person (i.e. his desire or effort). However, the process of *anvaya* etc. is prescribed here because it depends on that (viz. a person).

NOTES

The statements in the Śruti such as *dyauḥ agniḥ*, *lokaḥ agniḥ*, *yoṣid agniḥ* etc. lead to one's cognition of fire at least for some while. But the knowledge of the Ātman would not arise from the statement: *idaṁ sarvaṁ yad ayam ātmā*, for if the statement were taken as an injunction, it would point to the limitation on the Ātman like in the case of *loka* etc. With such an objection in view, the author writes the present verse.

1. *ātmajñāne vidhiḥ* = *ātmaviśaye ātmajñānaviśaye ca vidhiḥ*; cf. SP: *ātmani tajjñāne cety arthaḥ*

श्रवणं मननं तद्वत्तथा शमदमादि यत् ।

पुमाञ्शक्नोति तत्कर्तुं तस्मादेतद्विधीयते ॥१२२॥

122. In the same way (are prescribed) hearing about (and) pondering over (the nature of the Ātman). Also whatever (be it, whether) mental control, control of the external senses etc., a person can do it; therefore (all) this is enjoined.

NOTES

The first line explains the idea of *anvayādikriyā* 'the action of *anvayavyatireka*' done by a person and the second clarifies it further. [Verses 123-125 state two reasons why the Ātman is not the object of an injunction.]

विशिष्टेहानुभूतिश्च सर्वमानफलं यतः ।

फलं च न विधेयं स्यादतो नेदं विधीयते ॥१२३॥

123. And since here a peculiar kind of experience is the result of all means of knowing, and because the result is not the object of any injunction,¹ therefore this (viz. the knowing of the Ātman) is not enjoined.

NOTES

Another reason is given why there is impossibility of the Ātman being the object of an injunction. The experience which is the result of all means of knowing and is characterized by *satya*, *ānanda* etc. is the very nature of the Ātman; it cannot be enjoined, like other fruits of action such as attainment of heaven.

1. An injunction is always in respect of some activity which produces some result. The knowledge of the Ātman is not in any way produced by any human activity.

प्रमाणमप्रमाणं च प्रमाभासं च यद्भवेत् ।

चैतन्याकारमेवैतत्प्रथते सर्वमेव तत् ॥१२४॥

124. Whatever be it—a means of knowing, no means of knowing and appearance of right knowledge—all that is (i.e. these things are) nothing but a form of sentiency.

NOTES

Regarding that the knowing of the Ātman is not enjoined, yet another reason is given in this verse: The means of knowing etc., all appear to be imagined in sentiency. Therefore, since the sentient being is the substratum everywhere, it is not to be an object towards which one is enjoined to act.

नानकारानुपादत्ते चेतन्याकारमेव सत् ।

प्रतीच्यव्यभिचार्येकं तदन्ये व्यभिचारिणः ॥१२५॥

125. The existent, which has the form of sentiency, itself assumes manifold forms; it is but one invariable present in the individual consciousness. All other things, viz. the non-Ātman, are variable.

NOTES

The Brahman is partless and of the nature of sentiency; it becomes the support of many particulars having attributes. Therefore, the Brahman, which has no attributes of its own, cannot be enjoined as an object of some action. The second line states a further reason: The nature of the Ātman, sentiency, is homogeneous (*ekarasa*), and it is invariable, while the non-Ātman is always variable.

मात्रादिव्यभिचारेऽपि संविदव्यभिचारिणी ।

मिथः कृत्स्नेऽपि जगति तदन्यद्व्यभिचारि तु ॥१२६॥

126. Although objects of sense or sense-organs etc.¹ are variable, the cognizing principle² is ever invariable. But in the entire world, all things other than that (viz. cognizing principle) are variable in relation to one another.

NOTES

This is a reply to a possible objection: 'Sentiency of the Ātman is also variable in deep sleep.'

1. The word *mātrā* may mean 'object of cognition' or 'means of cognition, sense-organs.' However, in his Bhāṣya on BG 2. 14: *mātrā-sparśās tu...*, Śaṅkara clearly states that the word *mātrā* means 'sense-organs such as the ear'. However,

one might be inclined to interpret *mātrādi* to stand for *mātr*, *māna* and *meva* which give rise to experience in the state of sleep. But the contrast between *saṁvid* and *mātrādi* does not allow one to do so. The word *mātr*, thus understood, is really not different from the word *saṁvid* which stands for 'knower' as well as 'knowing'.

2. The word *saṁvid* means cognizer, i.e. individual consciousness (cf. SP which says *saṁvid* means *cit*) or knowledge itself.

उत्पन्नमपि सज्ज्ञानं प्रमातृत्वाद्युपग्रहात् ।

तदनुत्पन्नवद्भाति तद्ध्युत्पत्तेः पुरा नृणाम् ॥१२७॥

127. The knowledge (about the Ātman) does not appear to have come into existence even though it has already arisen and is in existence (as we say in our common dealings) because it has been grasped as a knower etc., before one has really understood¹ (the nature of the knowing which is not other than the object of knowing).

NOTES

In reply to the objection: 'if the Ātman is of the nature of sentiency, its knowledge is always established, therefore, an injunction such as hearing etc. about the Ātman would be useless.', Sureśvara states: Even though the knowledge is always present in the individual consciousness, it is overpowered by notions about it as a knower etc. and therefore appears as not obtained. For this reason, hearing etc. are prescribed, in the worldly way. Cf. BSB 1.1.1 (p.2): *tam etam avidyākhyam ātmānātmanor itaretarādhyāsam puraskṛtya sarve pramāṇa-prameya-vyavahārā laukikā vaidikāś ca pravṛttāḥ. . . .*

1. This is possible with the help of what looks like an injunction, viz. *śrotavyaḥ* etc.

व्युत्पाद्यते यदा साक्षाद्यथोक्तन्यायवर्त्मना ।

उत्पन्नमेव विज्ञानं तदा प्रागपि मन्यते ॥१२८॥

128. When this awareness is directly brought to one, following the argument¹ (already) stated, the person considers that knowledge² was already in existence even before.

NOTES

The result of one's following the injunction discussed above, is given: Through hearing etc. one gives up the misconception about the Ātman as a knower etc. and knows the meaning (significance) of the word *tvam* as the Ātman without a second. We say: 'This knowledge is attained' though it was there, only covered with illusion.

1. The word *nyāya* means reasoning. Cf. note on verse 115.
2. The word *vijñāna* is nothing but *jñāna*. Cf. note on verse 112.

स्वसाक्षिकं सर्वस्य न वेद्योत्यपि या मतिः ।

किमु वेद्यीति बुद्धिः स्याच्चिदतोऽप्यभिचारिणी ॥१२६॥

129. Whatever be the thought of an individual, be it the thought 'I do not know', also be it the thought 'I do know', it has only the individual consciousness as the cognizer;¹ the cognizing principle (viz. sentiency) is not different (lit. variable) in every cognition.

NOTES

One might object that knowledge is variable because of non-observation of particular kind of knowledge before enlightenment and because one feels that one has obtained enlightenment. In reply Sureśvara states that the Ātman is invariable. *cit* 'sentiency' is *sākṣin* of *jñāna* and *ajñāna*, which has the form of cognition: 'I do know' and 'I do not know'. That is, both *jñāna* and *ajñāna* rest on sentiency.

1. The word *cit* means *saṁvid*. See note on verse 126.

आत्मेति मेयनिर्देशो वेशब्दस्तत्स्मृताविह ।

प्रमातृक्रियया व्याप्तिर्द्रष्टव्य इति भण्यते ॥१३०॥

शब्दानुरोधतस्तावदीदृगत्रोपजायते ।

भूतेरनुभवः साक्षाद्यथावस्तु न वेति वा ॥१३१॥

विचार्यमाणोऽनुभवो रूप्यशक्त्यनुभूतिवत् ।

प्रमाणमप्रमाणं वा मेयसंगत्यसंगतेः ॥१३२॥

130-132. Here (i.e. in the Vedic sentence, *ātmā vā are draṣṭavyaḥ*) (the word) *ātman* refers to (or, denotes) the object of knowing and the word *vai* states the remembrance of it as the ascertained (decided) object.¹ By (the word) *draṣṭavyaḥ* is stated the acquisition (i.e. attaining proper understanding of the object of knowing) by the activity (viz. effort) of a knower. In this respect (i.e. in respect of the knowing the Ātman) such (knowledge) arises when one follows (the meaning of) the word. (As compared to the knowledge obtained) from the Śruti, experience may or may not be in conformity with the object (to be known).² The experience which is subject to reasoning³ is like the experience of (a piece of) silver or conch-shell; it is valid or invalid knowledge because of its agreement or disagreement (with the nature) of the object of knowing.⁴

NOTES

In earlier portion, it has been refuted that the sentence, *ātmā vā are draṣṭavyaḥ* was intended to be an injunction. Now follows the refutation of the meanings obtained from the words severally.

1. The word *vai* means *niścitam* as noticed in Brāhmaṇa literature several times.

2. I.e. it is not as certain (right).

3. The words *vicāryamāṇo 'nubhavaḥ* are explained by SP as *brahmātmani mātrādibhedadhiḥ*. The words *mātr+ādi* used by SP can be understood in three ways: (i) *mātrādi* 'a knower etc.', (ii) *mātrā+ādi* where *mātrā* is 'cognitive mechanism such as senses' or alternative (iii) *mātrā+ādi* 'object of knowing'. Even though the use of (ii) is seen in verse 126, it does not hold good in this case. In the case of (i) *mātrādibhedadhiḥ* means 'cognition of distinction such as a knower in respect of the Ātman, but this leaves some vagueness. But, on second thought (when we take into consideration the next verse, *pramāṭrmeyabhedo. . . .*) this appears intended by Sureśvara. In the case of (iii): *mātrādibhedadhiḥ* means *vividhaviśayabhedagrahaṇa*, 'cognition of various objects', for that is subjected to reasoning, compared as it is with *rūpyaśuktyanubhava* 'experience of (a piece of) silver or conch-shell'.

4. The word *rūpyaśukti* can be better taken as *vaikalpika dvandva*, i.e. *rūpyam vā śuktir vā*. This seems to be justified by *meyasaṁgatyaṁgateḥ*. The experiences of silver in silver and of conch-shell in conch-shell are cases of *meyasaṁgati*, but the experiences of silver in conch-shell and of conch-shell in silver are cases of *meyāsaṁgati*. Thus is explained the word *meyasaṁgatyaṁgati*.

प्रमातृमेयभेदोऽत्र न तावद्गम्यते मितेः ।

प्रत्यग्धीमात्रगम्योऽर्थो यस्मादात्मेति निश्चितः ॥१३३॥

133. To begin with, there do not arise from (what is taken as) accurate knowledge in this respect (i.e. in respect of the Ātman), discrete notions such as (this is) a knower (and this is) an object of knowing etc. since the object to be understood only from the (correct) knowledge of the individual consciousness is determined to be (none other than) the Ātman itself.

NOTES

Here Sureśvara states the reason for explaining the ideas of the preceding verses. The general rule which has been given in the second line of the preceding verse does not hold in the case of the knowledge of the Brahman, because there are no discrete notions of a knower and an object of knowing and he supports this by stating the Vedāntic conclusion that the Ātman is self-luminous.

प्रत्यग्धीगोचरो नो चेदनात्माऽसौ घटादिवत् ।

ब्रह्मादिमध्यपातित्वं ततश्चास्य प्रसज्यते ॥१३४॥

134. If the Ātman were not grasped as identical with (lit. within the sphere of) the individual consciousness, it would be the non-Ātman like a pot etc. and thence would (necessarily) follow that the Ātman is included among the (range of) objects beginning with the Brahman¹ (i.e. Hiraṇyagarbha) (up to the blade of grass).

NOTES

This verse is for refuting the doubt: 'It is not established that the Ātman is self-luminous', which arises on hearing the

argument of the preceding verse. The word *pratyagdhigocara* is to be understood as *pratyagdhimātragamyā* in the previous verse. The argument is: As a pot which is the object of knowing for an individual is distinct from the consciousness within him (i.e. the pot is the non-Ātman), so, would the Ātman (mentioned in the preceding verse as the object of knowing) be the non-Ātman.

1. Cf. the phrase *ā brahmastambaparyanta*; see note (2) on verse 71.

विभिन्नद्रष्टृदृष्ट्याप्तिर्घटादेरिव नाऽऽत्मनः ।

न चाभेदेऽस्ति संख्याप्तिरेकात्म्यादेव कारणात् ॥१३५॥

135. In the case of the Ātman, the acquisition of a certain understanding by a knower (who is distinct from the object) is not possible as it is in the case of a pot etc. And (when a knower and an object of his knowing are) not distinct, there is no (possibility of) acquisition (of any kind) just for the reason of the oneness (i.e. uniqueness) of the Ātman.

NOTES

In verse 134 is stated that the Ātman cannot be an object. Now in the first line of this verse Suresvara states that the Ātman does not enter on 'the activity of knowing'. The first half of the second line states that there is absence of *saṃvṛtyāpti* (= *saṃāpti* as SP states) of the Ātman. The second half refers to *aikātmayajñāna* as the cause for its being so.

न च द्रष्टाऽऽत्मनोऽन्योऽस्ति द्रष्टृन्तरनिषेधनात् ।

न च द्रष्ट्रोद्वयोलोके द्रष्टृदृश्यत्वसंगतिः ॥१३६॥

136. There is no seer (of the Ātman) other than the Ātman itself, for there is a denial (in the Śruti) of another seer¹ and it is nowhere seen in the world that the character of a seer and an object of seeing can be spoken of two seers.

NOTES

The possible argument 'somebody else than the Ātman is its knower', is refuted: The first line takes support from the

Śruti: *nānyo'to 'sti draṣṭānānyo 'to 'sti śrotā*. . . (BU 3.7.23). The refutation in the second line is clarified by SP thus: When we accept two seers, we should consider (a) two seers are equal, or (b) they are not equal. If (a), it is impossible to suppose a subject and an object like in the case of a lamp which needs no other lamp for its illumination. If (b), there is no means to prove inferior and superior nature between two sentient (beings). Thus, it is impossible to establish the knower of the Ātman. SP points out the outcome of this discussion: The Ātman is not understood by the discrete knowledge.

1. Cf. BU 2.4.14: *viññātāram are kena vijāniyāt*; BU 3.8.11: *nānyad ato 'sti draṣṭr*.

क्रियाविरोधः प्राप्नोति द्रष्टुः स्वात्मसमीक्षणे ।

तद्दृष्टेर्नित्यसंप्राप्तेर्विध्यानर्थक्यसंगतिः ॥१३७॥

137. If (we accept the notion that) a seer can see himself, (there would follow) impossibility of that activity.¹ And since (in that case) he² (the seer) would always possess the knowledge (of himself), it would be only reasonable to understand the injunction as useless.

NOTES

The view of a possible opponent is given—it pertains to another defect in the view that the Ātman is the seer of itself.

1. SP explains *kriyāvirodha* thus: There is one act of seeing, i.e. knowing. And if it is held that the Ātman is both the seer (i.e. the agent) and the seen (i.e. the object), then it would mean that only one entity, the Ātman, has prime importance as the subject (i.e. agent) and secondly as the object—herein lies the difficulty: One and the same word is related to the verb twice.

2. Since the Ātman can see with its own will there is no need of an injunction. Or, the Ātman's action does not depend upon an impulse from a Śruti passage.

[The previous verse has dispensed with the need of an injunction for an individual whose act of seeing the Ātman (i.e.

the individual's own consciousness) depends on his own will. Yet an objector would persist in stressing the need of such an injunction. His objection is as regards the nature (qualification—*adhikāra*) of the Ātman who may be (i) transmigratory, or (ii) non-transmigratory; this objection is refuted in the following verses, i.e. 138-142.]

संसार्यात्मनि दृष्टेऽपि न च किञ्चित्प्रयोजनम् ।

अयमेव च नोऽनर्थो यत्संसार्यात्मदर्शनम् ॥१३८॥

138. It serves no purpose to get to know (lit. see) that the Ātman is subject to the transmigratory existence, for it is indeed undesirable for us to get to know that the Ātman is transmigratory.

तदन्यस्याप्रसिद्धेश्च कथं स्यात्तत्समीक्षणम् ।

अथ प्रसिद्धोऽसावात्मा तद्दृष्टिः किं विधीयते ॥१३९॥

139. If the other (i.e. the non-transmigratory, is supposed to become known), (we say) it is not established (i.e. known as such). 'How then will it be possible to see it?' If, on the contrary, (it is held) that the Ātman is established,¹ (we ask) 'where is the need to enjoin that one should see the Ātman?'

NOTES

1. The argument on *prasiddhatva* or *aprasiddhatva* of the Brahman is found in BSB 1.1.1: *tat punar brahma prasiddham aprasiddham vā syāt. . .*, where Śaṅkara says that the Brahman is generally known, still not known in detail, for the detailed knowledge sake, *jijñāsā* is necessary.

द्रष्टृदर्शनदृश्यानां प्रात्यक्ष्यान्नाऽगमेक्षणम् ।

द्रष्टुरात्मा पृथक्चेत्स्यात्पृथगात्मेति दुर्वचः ॥१४०॥

140. (If it is thus held that) a seer, (his) act of seeing and the (object he has) seen are within the purview of direct perception, there is no need of the injunction of the Śruti¹ for seeing (the Ātman). Also, if the Ātman is (held to be) different from the seer, (we reply) it is wrong to say that the Ātman is different (from the seer).²

NOTES

Verse 140 states yet another reason for that the seeing of the transmigratory Ātman cannot be the purpose of any injunction.

1. Because a thing which is directly perceived in the world does not expect any Vedic injunction for seeing it. The very idea of a Vedic injunction involves the laying down of what is not known otherwise, i.e. from any means other than the Vedic injunction.

2. The reason for this has already been accounted for in verse 134 above.

न चाऽऽत्मन्यप्रसिद्धे स्यात्संसारस्य प्रसिद्धता ।

न ह्यप्रसिद्धसम्बन्धी सम्बन्धः क्वचिदिष्यते ॥१४१॥

141. And if the Ātman is not established, the transmigratory existence (of it also) could not be established, because nowhere is such a relation¹ observed (lit. desired, or accepted) as existent of which the constituents are not established.

NOTES

Verse 141 continues the discussion of the second line of verse 140: Suppose we accept that the Ātman exists apart from the seer, i.e. as the object of his action of seeing. Even then a Vedic injunction regarding the seeing of it by one is necessary, for the Ātman is not like other objects of experience; its properties such as being above hunger etc. are not known except from the Vedic text. Next the verse raises some important and pertinent questions: How can one assert that the Ātman, which is accepted as the object of seeing, is subject to the transmigratory existence, for such an assertion is based on grasping the relation of the Ātman and other objects of the transmigratory existence? To say that the Ātman is not known as other existential entities and also that it is related to other known things is only unwise.

1. SP paraphrases the word *sambandha* as *samsāra*.

न चेदात्माभिसम्बन्धः संसारोऽयं समीक्ष्यते ।

तन्मुमुक्षत्वमायातं कुतो हेतोरितोर्यताम् ॥१४२॥

142. If (it is held that) this transmigratory existence is not related to the Ātman, then it should be pointed out as to how the desire of liberation has arisen (on the part of the Ātman).

NOTES

One might take a stand on what the Sāṃkhya says, viz. that transmigratory existence is related to the *antaḥkaraṇa* but not the Ātman. To this Sureśvara answers: Since now the Ātman is not related to the transmigratory existence *mumukṣutva* cannot be asserted on it, because *mumukṣutva* is possible only on the transmigratory.

अनृतन्त्रे विधिर्नेष्टो बन्ध्यापुत्रोद्भवे यथा ।

मातृतन्त्रे तथैवायं न विधिः प्रत्यगीक्षणे ॥१४३॥

143. An injunction¹ is impossible if it (i.e. the activity involved in it) does not depend on (the activity or desire of) a person as the birth of a son of a barren woman (which does not depend on any person). So also an injunction regarding seeing (viz. thinking of the individual consciousness) is not (possible) since (that seeing) depends on the cognizing principle² itself (viz. the individual consciousness).

NOTES

1. It has been established that the seeing of the Ātman, whether transmigratory or non-transmigratory, cannot be the object of an injunction. This is proved through an illustration. It is stated that the Ātman cannot be the object of one's seeing because it does not depend for its existence on anyone else.

2. On the word *mātr*, see note (3) on verse 130. It means here only 'cognizer'.

नानाद्रव्यसमायोगे वियोगे च घटात्मनः ।

वियत्संपूर्णता नित्या वियत्सक्तेरवर्जनात् ॥१४४॥

शब्दादिबाह्यसम्बन्धे विभागे च तथा धियः ।

प्रत्यक्चतन्यसम्बन्धो नित्यो नित्यात्मसाक्षिकः ॥१४५॥

यतोऽतः पाक्षिकी प्राप्तिर्नेहास्त्यंलात्म्यदर्शने ।

नियमः परिसंख्या वा न तेनेहोपपद्यते ॥१४६॥

144-146. A thing which is called (i.e. possesses the nature of) a pot is eternally possessed of ether, while it is and it is not in contact with other diverse objects, because its close association with ether is never given up (in any case). In the same way, knowledge is eternally in contact with the individual consciousness within while it stands in relation to the external things such as sound, etc. and it is in separation from the same because it (viz. that contact) has the eternal Ātman as the witness. Since (it is clear) from this that there is no optional acquisition of the knowledge of the oneness of the Ātman, therefore *niyamavidhi* or *parisaṁkhyāvidhi* is impossible in this respect.

NOTES

An injunction is normally *apūrvavidhi*, that is to say, it makes known what is not known (*ajñātajñāpaka*). It is already shown in this work that such an injunction is not possible (i.e. cannot be thought of) in the case of 'seeing of the Ātman' (*ātmadarśana*) etc. One might then point out: 'If that is so, why not think that there is *niyamavidhi* or *parisaṁkhyāvidhi*?' To this Sureśvara answers: The knowledge of the Ātman is for one ever-attained (*nityaprāpta*), therefore, neither *niyamavidhi* nor *parisaṁkhyāvidhi* is possible, *niyamavidhi* is an injunction which enjoins a thing which is established in alternatives (*pakṣe aprāpta*). But the knowledge of the Ātman is ever-attained (*nityaprāpta*), i.e. ever-known (*jñāta*), and not alternatively non-attained (*pakṣe aprāpta*), i.e. a sort of *ajñāta* 'non-known'. Therefore, no *niyamavidhi* is applicable in respect of the knowledge of the Ātman. *parisaṁkhyāvidhi* is an injunction which excludes one of the two alternatives which become simultaneously available (*tatra cānyatra ca prāptā sā*), where choice or restriction is undertaken for what has been attained (*prāpta*). But no such restriction etc. is possible in respect of the Ātman.

कर्मकाण्डे यथा मानं तथैवोपनिषत्स्वपि ।

विधिरेवानपेक्षत्वात्सापेक्ष्यान्नाभिधाश्रुतिः ॥१४७॥

147. (Objection:) Just as in respect of the ritual-section, so in the Upaniṣads also, is the injunction the means of knowing, because it expects no other means of knowing. (Here the means of knowing) is not a simple affirmation,¹ because it expects (i.e. depends on) other means of knowing.

NOTES

One might object: In the ritual-section (*karma-kāṇḍa*) an injunction is independently authoritative and non-injunctive statements are useful as its subsidiaries. In the same way, in the knowledge-section (*jñāna-kāṇḍa*) also, an injunction must be an authoritative means of knowing. But a simple affirmation (*abhidhāśruti*), which informs about (the nature of) the Ātman but does not enjoin one to act, cannot be a means of knowing, because the Ātman which is conveyed by the simple affirmation is already known by (i.e. it depends on) another means of knowing.

1. The simple affirmation (*abhidhāśruti*) is the Śruti passage which contains a mere utterance in contradistinction to an injunction which enjoins one to act. The four *mahāvākyas*, i.e. *ītat tvam asi* (CU 6.8.7), *aham brahmāsmi* (BU 1.4.10), *ayam ātmā brahma* (BU 2.5.19), *sarvaṁ khalu idaṁ brahma* (CU 3.14.1), are simple affirmations. Here, in the course of discussion of the Vedic sentence *ātmā vā are draṣṭavyaḥ*, Suresvara asserts that this sentence is not an injunction but a simple affirmation.

मेवं मानान्तराप्राप्तसम्यगैकात्म्यबोधतः ।

अभिधाश्रुतेः प्रमाणत्वं सुप्तोत्थापकवाक्यवत् ॥१४८॥

148. (Reply:) It is not so. As an address which wakes up a sleeping man, so is the simple affirmation the means of knowing because of the perfect (lit. right) cognition of the oneness of the Ātman which does not arise from any means of knowing (other than the Śruti).

NOTES

A reply is given to the objection stated in verse 147: 'The sentence *ātmā vā are draṣṭavyaḥ* is an injunction and, therefore,

an authoritative means of knowing.' The sentence *ātmā vā are draṣṭavyaḥ* is not an injunction but a simple affirmation. And this simple affirmation can be authoritative (and therefore useful) in respect of the knowledge of the oneness of the Ātman and the Brahman like an address which wakes up a sleeping man.

अकारकं कात्म्यमात्रं मेयं वस्तिवर्ष्यते यतः ।

तदन्यस्य यतो मानाद्व्यतिरेको न लभ्यते ॥१४६॥

149. Since it is understood (lit. desired) that a thing to be known is only of the nature of the oneness and not productive, therefore,¹ one cannot obtain the distinction from it of anything other than itself.

NOTES

Again a doubt is raised about a simple affirmation being considered as the means of knowing: 'The oneness of the Ātman and the Brahman cannot be the object of knowing by a simple affirmation, because the object of knowing is known by a knower; the distinction of a knower and an object of knowing is presupposed. Then there would be the contradiction between oneness and distinction'. To this doubt Sureśvara replies: As long as the distinction between a knower and an object of knowing persists in the worldly dealing, the doubt would be right. But in the stage of the knowledge there is no distinction of a knower or an object of knowing.

1. The word *yataḥ* means *ataḥ* 'therefore', as SP points out.

मुक्त्वेकात्म्यस्य चाज्ञानं नान्तरायान्तरं यतः ।

विधितन्त्रस्य कार्यत्वान्नाज्ञाने प्रभविष्णुता ॥१५०॥

150. Since apart from ignorance about the oneness there is no other hindrance (to the knowledge of the Brahman), (no procedure is therefore laid down by an injunction,) (for) being of the nature of an action to be performed, it (i.e. injunction) is not authoritative in respect of (the removal of) ignorance.

NOTES

Yet another possibility is pursued about the usefulness of an injunction in Vedānta: 'Even if no injunction is possible regarding the means of knowing in Vedānta, the injunction is required since knowledge which is laid down in the Śruti (*vihitajñāna*) is expected for the purpose of removing the hindrance between the Brahman and the Ātman.' In reply to this Sureśvara assumes the alternative regarding what the hindrance is: The hindrance is (i) something other than ignorance, or (ii) ignorance. If (i), the injunction would be prescribed for the sake of removing it and not for acquiring knowledge (which removes ignorance). If (ii), knowledge dependent on an injunction would not be a right means of knowing, and, therefore, it would not have the capacity to remove ignorance.

यथास्थितात्मवस्तुतज्ज्ञानं मुक्त्वा तमोहनुतौ ।

नान्यो हेतुर्यतस्तस्मान्न त्रय्यन्ते विधिः प्रमा ॥१५१॥

151. Since for the removal of darkness (i.e. ignorance) there is no means other than knowledge that arises out of the existential entity (viz. the Ātman) as it is, one, therefore, cannot envisage that there is an injunction in the Vedānta texts,¹ conducive to the right knowledge.

NOTES

1. The word *trayyanta* 'end of three (Vedas)' means Vedānta; cf. verse 418, SV 12 and the word *vedāvasāna* in Nais 1.8 meaning the same.

नियोज्यस्य च नैश्वर्यं धीसम्यक्त्वं प्रतीष्यते ।

तस्य मेयंकहेतुत्वान्नैव स्यान्मातृतन्त्रता ॥१५२॥

152. It is not accepted that one on whom the injunction is enjoined has no freedom (liberty, capacity, power) insofar as rightness of knowledge is concerned. Since it (right knowledge) originates only from the (so-called) object of knowledge, therefore it does not depend on the knower (i.e. his activity, effort to acquire it).

NOTES

An objection is raised to the previous verse : 'It is not reasonable to hold that whatever depends on an injunction does not lead to the right knowledge, because it does not remove ignorance and because regarding knowledge, which is laid down in the Śruti, the authoritative means of knowing is effected by a person with intellect.' To this Sureśvara answers in the first line. And in the second line he confirms that the knowledge of the oneness of the Brahman and the Ātman is not *puruṣatantra* but *vastutantra*, so then an injunction which involves a *puruṣatantra* has no scope in acquiring knowledge of the oneness of the Brahman and the Ātman.

विद्येरिवानपेक्षत्वं वेदान्तेष्वभिधाश्रुतेः ।

अनृतन्त्रत्वसामान्यात्तथाऽतीन्द्रियबोधतः ॥१५३॥

153. In the knowledge-section the simple affirmation does not depend on any other means of knowing (as the injunction in the ritual-section), on account of similarity in respect of not being dependent on (the activity or desire of) a person¹ and because it leads to cognition which is beyond sense-perception.²

NOTES

The first line is a reply to a possible objection: 'The simple affirmation refers to the thing already known, is dependent (i.e. expects another means of knowing) and, therefore, is not an authoritative means of knowing.'

1. Both a simple affirmation and an injunction are *anṛ-* (= *apuruṣa-*) *tantra*.

2. Both a simple affirmation and an injunction are *atindriyabodha*, i.e. they lead to the knowledge of what is beyond the capacity of sense-organs.

अक्षाद्यविषयं प्रत्यक्स्वतः सिद्धेरसाधनम् ।

अभिधा बोधयन्तीयं नान्यत्किञ्चिदपेक्षते ॥१५४॥

154. A simple affirmation regarding the individual consciousness¹ which is not the object of direct perception etc.² and

does not need any means of knowing, since it is self-established does not need any other (support).

NOTES

The reply is given to an objection: 'Because like earth etc. the Ātman can be known by other means of knowing, how do you say that it is beyond sense-perception?' The Ātman is a well-known entity and still it is not like the earth etc. because the Ātman is devoid of a form etc. (*rūpādiḥina*); it is self-luminous (*svaprakāśa*, like a lamp); it needs no means of knowing (*sādhanaṇapekṣa*); and it is not known by direct perception etc. (*pratyakṣādyayogya*). (Cf. direct perception is *indriyārthasam-nikarṣajñāna*). Therefore, the simple affirmation referring to the Ātman does not need the help of an injunction. Cf. BSB 2.1.6. which declares that the Brahman is not established by direct perception or inference: *rūpādyabhāvād dhi nāyam arthaḥ pratyakṣa-gocaraḥ / liṅgābhāvāc ca nānumānādinām /*

1. Meaning the Brahman as SP points out.

2. The word *akṣādi* means *pratyakṣa*, *anumāna* and *upamāna*.

तस्माद्विधेः प्रमाणत्वं साध्यसाधनबोधने ।

अतीन्द्रिये तदन्येन ज्ञातुं शक्यं न तद्यतः ॥१५५॥

155. Therefore, (it follows that) an injunction is an (authoritative) means of knowing the end and the means in respect of things beyond sense-perception, because it is impossible to know the same (lit. it) by any other (means than the injunction).

NOTES

In respect of the well-known entity one does not expect an injunction. An injunction is relevant in respect of a command (*niyoga*), therefore in respect of the Brahman it is naturally set aside. My translation above differs from SP which appears to divide this verse into two different sentences.

साध्यसाधनसम्बन्धो न शक्योऽभिधया यथा ।

प्रतिपत्तुं स्वतः सिद्धोऽशक्यो विधिगिरा तथा ॥१५६॥

156. Just as the relation between the means and the end is impossible to understand by simple affirmation (about it), so it

is impossible (to understand) by the words of an injunction that (relation) which is self-established.

NOTES

According to SP, the intention of the verse is: A simple affirmation leads to the inferential knowledge which is opposed to knowledge about the Brahman that is unstultified, unobtained and undoubted.

ऐकात्म्यस्य स्वतः सिद्धेन क्रियास्पेक्ष्यते यतः ।

ततश्च भावनाभावो भावनायाः क्रियाश्रयात् ॥१५७॥

विरहे भावनायाश्च न विधेस्तत्र मानता ।

स्वतःसिद्धार्थबोधित्वादभिधायास्तु मानता ॥१५८॥

157-158. Because the oneness (of the Brahman and the Ātman) is self-established on account of the fact that it does not expect any act, therefore there is the absence of the injunctive force,¹ for the injunctive force (ever) rests on an act. And in case there is no injunctive force (operating), an injunction cannot be the means of knowing. But the simple affirmation is an authoritative means of knowing, since it only informs one of a certain thing which is self-established.

NOTES

This is another reason why an injunction is not a means of knowing in respect of the well-known entity, viz. the Ātman.

1. The word *bhāvanā* is a technical term of the Mīmāṃsakas; it means 'productive force, imperative power etc.' *bhāvanā* is of two kinds, (i) *ārthi bhāvanā* and (ii) *śābdi bhāvanā*, and is closely related to an injunction; it is both *ajñātajñāpaka* and *apraṇṇāpaka*. An *ajñātajñāpaka* informs one of the unknown three-fold *ārthi bhāvanā* in this way—one's action has *sādhya*, *sādhana* and *itikartavyatā* while an *apraṇṇāpaka* informs one of threefold performances which one has not performed. Thus, *bhāvanā* operates in order to enjoin one to some act, so then it constitutes the necessary function in an injunction.

सापेक्षत्वादमानं चेदभिधा लोकवर्त्मना ।

अभिधा तत्त्वमस्यादि सरित्तीरफलोक्तिवत् ॥१५६॥

159. Since a simple affirmation is not (accepted as) a means of knowing because it has an expectation (of some other proof); then following the worldly way, (one can say that) the simple affirmation 'Thou art that' etc. (would also not be authoritative) (just) like the statement, 'There are fruits on the bank of a river.'¹

NOTES

An objection is raised on the strength of an illustration of *sarittiraphala* which is nothing but an affirmative statement.

1. This illustration is found in the *Śābarabhāṣya* 1.1.2 (p. 13): *nanv atathābhūtam apy artham brūyāc codanā yathā yat kimcana laukikam vacanam nadyās tire phalāni santiti* / This is used as a worldly illustration of a simple affirmation. But it is not so. On this Sureśvara's discussion follows in verses 162 ff. Cf. BOETZELAER's note on TUBV 2.611 (p. 155), Nais 3.47 etc.

संहत्यनुपपत्तिरच पदानामभिधाश्रुतो ।

आख्यातपदहेतुत्वात्सर्वत्र पदसंहतेः ॥१६०॥

160. (Objection:) In a simple affirmation, the proper construe is wholly impossible, since everywhere a word gets properly construed (with other(s) in the statement) only because of a verbal form.

NOTES

An objection is raised: An injunction is required not only for the sake of authoritativeness in Vedāntas but also for the sake of effecting proper construe of words. This objection is noted in Sureśvara's concept of an injunction which is essentially ever-connected with some action as against a simple affirmation of the Vedānta which is not connected with any action. A question, therefore, arises: What is the purpose of the verb in the simple affirmation? Cf. in this context: *kṛtiḥ ākhyātārthaḥ yathā caitras taṇḍulam pacatityādau tinārthaḥ sarvatra ākhyātārtho bhāvaneti mimāṃsakāḥ* / (the *Nyāyakośa*, p. 103)

The word *ca* in the first line combines the objection in verse 159 with the objection in this verse. The objection stated in this verse is refuted in the next verse, and the objection in verse 159 later, in verses 162-164 below.

नाऽऽख्यातपदसद्भावात्स्यादेव पदसंहतिः ।

अस्यस्म्याद्याख्यातपदमस्त्येवेहामिधाश्रुतौ ॥१६१॥

161. (Reply:) No. Construing of the words would be possible on account of the existence of the verb; here in the simple affirmation (of the Vedāntas) are indeed used the verbs such as *asi*, *asmi* etc.¹

NOTES

The objection in the preceding verse, viz. an injunction is required for establishing a proper construe of words, is refuted.

1. The word *ādi* refers to the verbs *veda*, *bhavati* etc. The verb *asmi* is in the sentence *aham brahma asmi*, the verb *asi* is in *tat tvam asi*. In *ayam ātmā brahma*, *sarvam khalu idam brahma*, the word *bhavati* is intended, also see the sentence *brahma veda brahmaiva bhavati*.

The second line is an answer to the other objection: 'It was stated that the verbal form exists in the simple affirmation. This would result in the necessity of an injunction because the verbal form is nothing but a word expressive of action.' If the Vedāntin also takes this position, he is in full agreement with the Mimāṃsaka who holds: *āmnāyasya kriyārthatvāt*... Sureśvara wishes to set aside this possible argument.

सरित्तीरे फलानीति युक्ताऽपेक्षाऽभिधाश्रुतेः ।

प्रत्यक्षमानप्राप्तत्वात्फलतीरार्थसंगतेः ॥१६२॥

162. In the case of the simple affirmation, 'There are fruits on the bank of a river,' it is reasonable to say that there is some expectation of help from elsewhere because the connection between things, viz. fruits and the bank, is grasped by means of knowing, viz. direct perception (of them).

NOTES

As regards the illustration of *sarittiraphala* stated in the verse 159, there is a condition (*upādhi*) that it is the object of

another means of knowing. Yet the simple affirmation like 'This is the Ātman' does not depend on any such outside help.

प्रत्यक्षग्राह्य एषोऽर्थो न तदन्यप्रमाणकः ।

यतोऽतो नाऽऽगमादेव तादृशेऽर्थे विनिश्चितिः ॥१६३॥

163. This thing is grasped by direct perception and not by any other means of knowing. Since (the oneness of the Brahman and the Ātman) is not grasped by this (viz. direct perception) therefore any definite idea about it (lit. a thing of that nature) is formed only from (i.e. with the help of) the Śruti statement.¹

NOTES

Impossibility of direct perception of the oneness of the Brahman and the Ātman is denied clearly. A thing called the connection between fruits and the bank of a river is directly known by a speaker who states 'There are fruits on the bank of a river' only after he went to the bank of a river and saw fruits. So, the sentence is merely a repetition of what he has seen. Thus in respect of *sarittiraphala*, there is no authoritativeness in simple affirmation about it since it needs another means of knowing, viz. direct perception.

1. See note on verses 6-7.

अपूर्वादिवचोऽर्थे तु न प्रत्यक्षाद्यपेक्षते ।

प्रत्यक्षाद्यप्रमेयत्वादेकात्म्याख्यस्य वस्तुनः ॥१६४॥

164. In respect of the thing about which there is a statement '(It is) without preceding¹ . . .' there is no expectation (i.e. necessity) of direct perception etc., for the reason that the thing called the oneness of the Ātman is not the object of knowing by direct perception etc.

NOTES

SP begins with *sādhnavyāptim pratyāha*: 'The author answers (the objection in respect of) the dependent character of the means (which is here simple affirmation).' This needs some clarification. The objector's view of *sādhnavyāpti* appears to be this: As regards the illustration of *sarittiraphala* for the

simple affirmation, *sādhānavyāpti* is possible thus, *yatra yatra abhidhā tatra tatra sāpekṣatvaṁ yatra yatra sāpekṣatvaṁ tatra tatra amānatvam*. Though *sarittiraphala* has been introduced as the illustration for the simple affirmation, it is *sāpekṣa*, i.e. it can be apprehended by direct perception. As such, one might say, it is not the simple affirmation but direct perception that is authoritative in apprehending *sarittiraphala*. This leads to the conclusion that simple affirmation cannot be authoritative. Sureśvara's verse is against this view of *sādhānavyāpti* in respect of simple affirmation. He means: In the case of a sentence like 'That Brahman is without preceding. . .', there is no dependence on any other means (cf. *nāyam pratyakṣagocaro 'rthaḥ*) though there is simple affirmation about the Brahman because the *sādhānavyāpti* in respect of simple affirmation about the Brahman cannot be established.

1. *tad etad brahmāpūrvam anapāram anantaram abāhyam* (BU 2.5.19), "That Brahman is without preceding or succeeding, without internal or external."

अपौरुषेयवाक्यत्वं समानमभिधाश्रुतेः ।

अतीन्द्रियार्थबोधित्वं समानं चोदनोक्तिभिः ॥१६५॥

165. Simple affirmation (in Vedānta texts) shares (with an injunction) a common (characteristic), viz. it does not have a human agency (or authorship). (And) with an imperative injunction it shares (another) common (characteristic), viz. it has the capacity to inform one of a thing which is beyond sense-perception.

NOTES

In this verse, Sureśvara shows the similarity of simple affirmation in Vedāntas with both *anuvāda* and *codanokti*. Simple affirmation is the same as *anuvāda* in the Śruti in one respect, viz. it is an *apauruṣeyavākya*, but it is different from it, since *anuvāda* is supported by direct perception while simple affirmation is not. For instance, *agniḥ himasya bheṣajam* (the *Vājasaneyisaṁhitā* 13.10) is a simple affirmation, supported by direct perception. Simple affirmation (in Vedānta) is the same as an injunction in two respects; (i) it is an *apauruṣe-*

yavākya, and (ii) *nirapekṣā*, but it is different from the latter since it does not lead us to undertake some activity.

सिद्धसाध्यप्रमेयत्वभेदो यदि परं तयोः ।

प्रामाण्ये त्वतिशीतिस्तु न काचिदपि दृश्यते ॥१६६॥

166. If at all there is a difference between simple affirmation and injunction¹ in having the object to be known², what is established and what is to be accomplished, no difference³ is noticed insofar as an authoritativeness is concerned.

NOTES

The defect *sāpekṣatva* in inference consists in 'dependence on another means of knowing.' The object of knowing by simple affirmation is *siddha*, viz. the Brahman and that by injunction is *sādhya* 'that which is to be accomplished, like heaven etc.' Thus, both are different in respect of the object of knowing (*prameya*), but identical in that both are authoritative. Cf. BSB 1.1.1 (P. 4) on *prameyabheda*: . . . *phalajijñāsyabhedāc ca / abhyudayaphalam dharmajñānam tac cānuṣṭhānāpekṣam / niḥśreyasaphalam tu brahmajñānam na cānuṣṭhānāntarāpekṣam* |

1. The word *tayoḥ* means *abhidhāsruti* and *codanokti* stated in the previous verse. SP says that *tayoḥ* means *karmajñānakāṇḍayoḥ*. The intended meaning is the same, still SP has loose expression and is not exact.

2. The reading *prameyatva* should be *prameyatvāt* as the footnote points out.

3. The word *atīṣiti* means *atīṣaya* or *bheda*; this is an instance of Sureśvara's deriving help from Śaṅkara.

प्रमोपजायते तावदहं ब्रह्मेत्यलौकिकी ।

तत्त्वमस्यादिवाक्येभ्यः श्रवणात्समनन्तरम् ॥१६७॥

167. An uncommon (lit. non-worldly) right knowledge, viz. 'I am Brahman' arises immediately after hearing passages like 'Thou art that' etc.

NOTES

A possible objection may be: 'It has not been established that Śruti sentences give rise to the right knowledge. Then,

how can you say that the Śruti is a means of knowing? To this objection is the reply: In the case of a proper (eligible) person the right knowledge resulting from (hearing/understanding) the Śruti cannot be repudiated (that is to say, we have to accept that the Śruti enlightens an eligible person). Cf. *brahma veda brahmaiva bhavati* or other passages whose hearing is immediately followed by the knowledge of the Brahman.

एवं चेदप्रमाणत्वं किमिवेहाभिधाश्रुतेः ।

विधेरपीह मानत्वं नोक्तन्यायातिरेकतः ॥१६८॥

168. If one were to declare the unauthoritativeness of this type, what indeed is achieved by simple affirmation? An¹ injunction is also not held authoritative in supercession of any reason.²

NOTES

1. On the contrary, an injunction is also to be taken as unauthoritative if an opposite is proved. This is given in the second line.

2. It must be possible to point out the opposite of an injunction as otherwise proved. Cf. note (2) on verse 115 above.

स्वशक्तिः सर्वमानानां यथा वस्त्ववबोधने ।

अभिधायाश्च सास्त्येव किमिति स्यादमानता ॥१६९॥

169. Just as all the means of knowing have each one of them a capacity in informing about something, simple affirmation also has that power. How then do you consider that simple affirmation is not a means of knowing?

NOTES

The Śrutis are also the means of knowing what is meant by them, just like the other means of knowing like direct perception etc.

नाप्यर्थेऽतीन्द्रिये सिद्धे मानं लिङ्गाद्यपेक्षते ।

योगिप्रत्यक्षमानं वा तयोरविषयत्वतः ॥१७०॥

170. Moreover, in respect of an entity which is (already) established as one beyond sense-perception one cannot expect

any characteristic mark etc. as the means of knowing it;¹ nor² also direct perception of the ascetics.³ (This is so) because the two are devoid of any object⁴.

NOTES

1. It may be objected: 'True. The Brahman is not known by direct perception, but it would be possible to know the same by means of inference etc. and, therefore, the Vedānta are not a means of knowing the Brahman.' The first line answers the objection thus: Inference holds good in respect of a thing with characteristics (*liṅgavat*) but not, in respect of a thing which is without any characteristics, i.e. the Brahman. One could yet further argue: 'Though the Brahman is not the object of our direct perception etc. it could be grasped by direct perception (at least) of the ascetics who are distinguished from us, ordinary folks.' To this, the second line gives an answer.

2. The word *vā* indicates the continued use of the word *na* together with the verb *apekṣate*.

3. There is the description of *yogipratyakṣa* in the *Tattvakaumudī* on SK 5: *viṣayāḥ pṛthivyādayaḥ sukhādayaś ca asmadādinām aviṣayāḥ tanmātralakṣaṇāḥ, yoginām ūrdhvasrotasām ca viṣayāḥ* | Direct perception by the ascetic(s) can be authoritative in respect of the subtle object (*sūkṣma*) but not, an object beyond sense-perception.

4. Like Śaṅkara, Sureśvara also holds that the Brahman is *pratyakṣādyagocarārtha*, i.e. it does not have any characteristics. Naturally, therefore, it cannot be the object in any inference from some characteristics. Direct perception, even *yogipratyakṣa*, is already ruled out automatically.

Sureśvara thus rules out the possibility of the Brahman being the object of *yogipratyakṣa* and *laukikānumāna*. This is elaborated in the following two verses.

नेतीत्यस्थूलमित्यादिवाक्याद्योऽर्थोऽवगम्यते ।

योगिप्रत्यक्षगम्योऽयं न तत्प्रत्यक्त्वहेतुतः ॥१७१॥

171. A thing which is understood from words like '(The Brahman) is not this¹', '(The Brahman) is non-gross. . .²' etc. is not obtained by direct perception of the ascetics,³ because it (viz. that thing) is already within themselves.⁴

NOTES

The reason is stated for the argument in the last quarter of the preceding verse.

1. BU 2.3.6 etc., see note on verse 104.
2. BU 3.8.8.
3. But this argument: 'Since the ascetics also cannot observe any characteristic, how can ordinary people notice any?' —to be inferred.
4. The characteristics of what is within one cannot be 'directly perceived' by one, even by Yogins.

प्रत्यक्षानवताराच्च नानुमानेन मीयते ।

धर्मधर्म्यभिसम्बन्धे नागृहीतेऽनुमा यतः ॥१७२॥

172. And¹ therefore the knowledge of the Ātman cannot be comprehended through inference, since direct perception also cannot acquire it, viz. its characteristic, because knowledge² by inference is not possible when the close³ relationship between *dharma* and *dharmin* is not apprehended.

NOTES

1. Another reason why the Brahman cannot be known by inference is given in the first line.

2. A question arises: 'Even if the Brahman is not known by two kinds of direct perception (i.e. common and ascetic's), how is it not possible to assume that the Brahman is not known by inference?' To this question Sureśvara gives an answer in the second line.

3. The word *abhisambandha* is the loose expression for *vyāpti*. In the sentence *parvato vahnimān dhūmāt*, *dhūma* is *dharma* and *vahni* is *dharmin*, because the *vyāpti* '*yatra yatra dhūmaḥ tatra tatra vahniḥ*' is possible. Cf. BSB 2.1.6 as a support for this which has been referred to in verse 154.

[Verse 173 introduces the rule regarding the excellence of an object and verses 174-75 discuss the excellence of a means of knowing. Both these verses occur in Kumārila's *Śloka-vārtika: codanāsūtra* 113-114.]

यज्जातीयैः प्रमाणैस्तु यज्जातीयार्थदर्शनम् ।

भवेदिदानीं लोकस्य तथा कालान्तरेऽप्यभूत् ॥१७३॥

173. (Indeed) whatever kind of objects are now known to people and by whatever means of knowing, they had become known to people of some other (i.e. earlier) time also by the same (means of knowing) and as of the same kind.

NOTES

An objection could be: 'Even if the Brahman is not known by direct perception in this time, it could have been in another time by some excellence in it (direct perception).' The answer is that direct perception of today also depends on the sense-organs as in earlier times. Means of knowing have not changed in the course of time. Cf. *adyatvavad eva kālāntare' pi pramāṇasvabhāvo nānyādṛśa iti* (the *Nyāyaratnākara* on the *Śloka-vārtika* 113, p. 60).

यत्राप्यतिशयो दृष्टः स स्वार्थनितिलङ्घनात् ।

दूरसूक्ष्मादिदृष्टौ स्यान्न रूपे श्रोत्रवृत्तिता ॥१७४॥

174. Where¹ again one sees a certain excellence, that results from seeing it from after and/or with closer attention, but (certainly) not going beyond the object of its own. Never indeed can any form be the object of the sense of hearing.

NOTES

One might say that since there is no excellence in our sense-organs now, the Brahman would not be their object. On this Sureśvara argues on the basis of the idea that whatever is devoid of excellence is not known by sense-organs. (SP) If sense-organs would at some time proceed towards objects beyond perception such as *dharma*, the Brahman etc., then it would be possible that ears would proceed also towards a form which is grasped only by the eyes.

1. There are two possibilities in the word *yatra*; (i) *yatra viṣaye* (ii) *yatra pramāṇe*. In this verse (i) is applicable and (ii) in the next verse—this verse refers to the excellence of the object and the next to the excellence of the means of knowing.

योगिप्रत्यक्षमानादेन चेदंकात्म्यमेयता ।

तत्प्राप्तमपि किं कुर्यात्स्वात्मायोग्यासु भूमिषु ॥१७५॥

175. If the oneness (of the Brahman and the Ātman) cannot become the object of the means of knowing, viz. direct perception of the ascetics etc.¹ of what use will they be, even if one possessed them, in matters which cannot properly be their own objects ?

NOTES

Where direct perception of the ascetics does not operate, inference might be useful, but it must be remembered that it could be so only in the case of objects other than the Brahman.

1. Cf. *māna* = *pramāṇa* in verse 170 above. Here 'etc.' refers to *anumāna* 'inference'. SP points out the purpose of the mention of *yogipratyakṣa* as it is more prominent than any other means, as seen from the preceding two verses.

अक्षादिमेयासारूप्यादेकात्म्यं स्यान्न तत्प्रमम् ।

यथा विधेयासारूप्यान्नैकात्म्यं स्याद्विधेस्तथा ॥१७६॥

176. The oneness is not correctly learnt from that (viz. any injunction) owing to the fact that it does not possess the form as an object to be enjoined; (this is) in the same way as that (oneness) is not known by direct perception etc.¹, for it does not possess the form as an object of knowing it (i.e. direct perception etc.).

NOTES

This verse is a reply to the possible objection: 'Even if the oneness of the Brahman and the Ātman is not made known by direct perception etc. because of the rule stated above, how can the Śruti be a means of knowing without depending on any other means of knowing when the oneness is understood by the injunction?'

1. Cf. note (2) on verse 154 above.

संभाव्यते चेदक्षादि ह्यैकात्म्यार्थे फलादिवत् ।

न तद्वारयितुं शक्यं लोके विधिशतैरपि ॥१७७॥

नासमीक्ष्य स्वसामर्थ्यं पुमान्विधिशतैरपि ।

प्रवर्ततेऽनपेक्षत्वं कुतो विधिवचः स्वतः ॥१७८॥

177-178. If direct perception etc. could prove effective, (i.e. it could grasp, or it could be the means of knowing the object) in the case of the object, viz. the oneness, as (it would be) in the case of a fruit etc.¹, then it would be impossible to ward it off (i.e. to deny it to be so) even by hundreds of injunctions,² (i.e. by any Śruti). Without having well-considered one's own capacity, one does not enter on any act even (though impelled) by hundreds of injunctions; how then is it possible to say that injunctive statements of the Śruti are themselves independent of (anything else) ?

NOTES

After stating that the Vedāntas are authoritative means of knowing the oneness, without expecting help from any other means of knowing, Sureśvara further goes to say that even an injunction stands expectant of some other means of accomplishing an act to be accomplished.

1. Cf. note on verse 159 above.

2. Verse 177 echoes Śaṅkara's idea regarding a hypothetical contradiction between direct perception and the Śruti; cf. BGB 18.67 (p. 535): *na hi śrutiśatam api śīto 'gnir aprakāśo veti bruvaṭ prāmāṇyam upaiti* |

अपाक्येषु नियुक्तोऽपि कृष्णलाञ्छपयेदिति ।

न तच्छक्तिं विना कश्चित्पुमांस्तत्र चिकीर्षति ॥१७६॥

179. No one desires to do anything without having the capacity for (doing) it, even if he is enjoined (to cook) the uncookable (as in the statement), 'Let him cook black berries.'¹

NOTES

Here is an illustration which supports that an injunction depends on one's capacity to perform the act enjoined; it consists in the eligibility or capacity of a person (*adhikārigata-pravṛttiśaktisāpekṣa*, *puruṣaśaktyapekṣa*).

1. Sureśvara has stated this illustration in TUBV 2.626 also. "The maxim refers to a thief (who engaged himself) as a cook. His inability to perform the duties, however, lead to

his discovery and arrest. This is intended to teach the folly of undertaking to do some thing quite beyond one's power." (BOETZELAER's note, p. 159).

एवं चेदनपेक्षत्वं विधेः किमिति भण्यते ।

न भावनानपेक्षोऽसौ विधिर्यस्मात्प्रवर्तते ॥१८०॥

180. If this is so, why is it said that injunction (in the Śruti) depends on nothing else, (indeed) because an injunction does not operate when independent of any injunctive force ?¹

NOTES

This is a reply to the possible objection: 'Injunction expects only the capacity of one who is enjoined to act.' Sureśvara again stresses that injunction is not authoritative independently, because it certainly depends on the injunctive force of the words.

1. On the word *bhāvanā* see note (1) on verses 157-158 above.

न भावनान्तरमियं न च मानान्तरं तथा ।

अपेक्ष्याभिधयंकात्म्यमवबोधयति श्रुतिः ॥१८१॥

181. This Śruti text, by (mere) simple affirmation, informs one of the oneness of the Ātman, without expectancy of any other injunctive force,¹ or of any other means of knowing.

NOTES

An objection could be raised thus: 'In the case of a simple affirmation such as *tat tvam asi* also, there is similarly an expectancy as regards the said capacity on account of the acceptance that Veda gives rise to the right knowledge only if there is an eligible person.' To this, the answer is given in the first quarter.

SP is elaborate and useful: In both Vedānta and Veda, there is equal expectancy for the capacity of a person. As regards the capacity of one for activity and the *bhāvanā*, the discrepancy of expectancy arises only in the case of injunctions. Yet one might object: 'Since injunctions are authoritative independently, they do not therefore expect any other

means of knowing for their support.' To such an objection Sureśvara replies: A command (*niyoga*) is insentient, so there is the necessity of another means of knowing, for otherwise the capacity in an injunction would not be grasped at all. But in the case of the Ātman the position is different; the Ātman is not the object of any means of knowing because it is self-luminous. The understanding of the meaning (*śaktigraha*) stands to reason. Therefore the Śruti, enlightening the oneness of the Ātman by mere affirmation which is devoid of an injunction does not expect any other means of knowing or the capacity for activity, except one's concentration (*niṣṭhā*) on the Brahman. The Śruti only by its own greatness enlightens the eligible person as regards the oneness of the Ātman.

1. This refers to simple affirmation in Vedānta texts.

अतोऽनपेक्षता युक्ता सर्वदेवाभिधाश्रुतेः ।

अभिधानाभिधेयार्थज्ञानमेव व्यपेक्षते ॥१८२॥

182. Therefore, it is reasonable to accept that simple affirmation in the Śruti is at all times expectant of nothing. It depends only on understanding the thing which is to be conveyed by means of direct expression.

NOTES

This verse concludes that simple affirmations in Vedāntas are different from injunctions.

One may now say: 'If one always holds non-expectancy of simple affirmations in the Vedāntas, there would follow the absence of expectancy as regards the understanding of the meaning of such affirmations also. And in that case even one who knows nothing would desire the cognition of the oneness only on hearing the sentences *tat tvam asi* etc.' The second line of the verse answers this.

The word *anapekṣatva* of simple affirmation in Vedāntas means the *anapekṣatva* of the direct expression (*abhidhāna*) whichever consists in the use of words that are rooted in the accepted convention (*saṁketa*) in respect of their meanings.

ज्ञानक्रिया प्रमातृस्था न यथावस्तुबोधकृत् ।
प्रमेयकर्तृकं वासौ यथावस्तुबोधिनी ॥१८३॥

183. The act of knowing, which enlightens one about a thing as it is, does not belong to the knower; that (viz. act of knowing), which enlightens one about a thing as it is, is caused by the object of knowing.¹

NOTES

It has been established through logical reasoning that Vedāntas are independently authoritative even without that injunction. Now it is proved that knowledge enjoined serves no purpose. See verse 120 above. Also cf. BSB 1.1.4 (P. 18) which questions if knowledge is a *kriyā* : *nanu jñānam nāma mānasī kriyā / na/vailakṣanyāt / . . .*, see note on verse 120.

1. Although SP says that the word *prameyakartṛkā* means *mānameyādhina*, no justification is possible.

न चान्यदीयव्यापारे ह्यन्योऽशक्तेनियुज्यते ।
न ह्यग्निसाध्ये शोषादौ नियोगो घटतेऽम्भसः ॥१८४॥

184. And¹ no one can be employed to do any activity that can be accomplished by anyone else on account of one's incapacity for it.² Indeed, it does not stand to reason that a pitcher of water is employed for the act of drying up (something) etc. which is accomplished by fire.³

NOTES

One may ask: 'Even if such a knowledge, viz. *vastutantra-jñāna* may result from mere hearing a sentence like *tat tvam asi*, why not enjoin a person to get to know it?' Here is a reply to the question.

1. The printed edition reads: *na cānyadiya . . .*, but the edition of NKL reads: *na hy anyadiya . . .*

2. SP states: Although it is possible to enjoin the son in respect of an activity of his father, the injunction is of no use when the son has no independence. This is stressed by the word *hi* used here.

3. The illustration in the second line points out that because of the incapability of one, there is no command given to one.

[One may argue thus: 'In order that the knowledge related to an injunction has a fruit, an injunction is required for getting to know (*pratipattividhi*). This may imply four possibilities: (i) Its fruit is the destruction of difference, (ii) it is the cessation of ignorance, (iii) it is the attainment of the Brahman by the Jīvātman, (iv) something else. The answer is made in verses 185-189.]

ब्रह्मणोऽविद्यया योऽपि स्यादवच्छेद आत्मनः ।

तदवच्छेदविध्वस्तौ न साधनमपेक्षते ॥१८५॥

185. Whatever differentiation is (grasped) between the Brahman and the Ātman owing to ignorance, no injunction¹ is expected for the removal of that (differentiation).

NOTES

Regarding (i) there can be two alternatives: (a) The differentiation in question results from ignorance, or (b) it is natural. If (a), there is no need of an injunction, for knowledge of the oneness gives rise to the destruction of any differentiation.

1. *sādhana* = *vidhi*. (SP)

अनवच्छिन्नयाथात्म्यब्रह्मकात्म्यादविद्यया ।

अवच्छिन्नवदाभाति क्षेत्रज्ञो रज्जुसर्पवत् ॥१८६॥

186. On account of the oneness of the Brahman whose real nature is not differentiated (from the individual consciousness), the consciousness within an individual¹ only appears to be differentiated by ignorance, like a serpent (appears) in a rope.

NOTES

The alternative (b) under (i) is refuted in this verse.

1. *kṣetrājña* 'one who knows the body', i.e. 'consciousness within an individual'.

न चाविद्यानिरास्यत्र प्रत्यग्याथात्म्यबोधतः ।

साधनं किञ्चिदापेक्ष्यं स्वर्गे यागादिवत्क्वचित् ॥१८७॥

187. (Apart from) knowing the real nature of the Ātman, nothing else is expected in this matter (as the means) for the removal of ignorance on the part of this (Ātman¹) just as a sacrifice and the like (are sometimes² expected) for attaining the heaven.

NOTES

This is an answer to alternative (ii) which is like this: 'Even if one holds that the destruction of the body is produced by the removal of ignorance there is need of knowledge for purposes of removing ignorance. Therefore, in this respect at least an injunction is required.' For refuting this second alternative this reply is given.

1. Cf. *atra pratici yāvat* in SP.

2. SP holds : *kvacid deśe kāle vā*; but *kāle* alone would convey better sense after understanding *atra* as *pratici*. . , for *pratyak* implies some *deśa* invariably.

न चापि मुख्यया वृत्त्या साध्येऽसति जगत्त्यपि ।

किञ्चित्साधनमित्येवं भण्यते लोकवेदयोः ॥१८८॥

188. 'And indeed even in (this) world there is no means which (can accomplish) by its primary operation an object which does not exist (as the end of it)'.———so it is said among the people and in the Veda.

NOTES

Now an answer to the alternative (iii): 'It is proved that the attainment of the Brahman by the Jīvātman can be achieved by the knowledge enjoined. So an injunction is required in order that one acquires knowledge.' For refuting this alternative is given this verse. Even if the Brahmanhood is attained by knowledge, it does not mean that it is attained by the primary sense of a word. The Brahman is ever-attained in a primary sense, so the Brahman is never attained by any means such as an injunction. It is generally accepted that when *sādhya* in a primary sense does not exist, *sādhana* too does not exist in any worldly dealing. And, therefore, no injunction is possible. (SP) SP clarifies how the general

principle in this verse is applicable even in the knowledge of the Brahman.

साध्यं च लोकेतः सिद्धमुत्पत्त्यादिचतुष्टयम् ।

प्रमाणस्य न तन्न्याय्यं सिद्धार्थव्यञ्जकत्वतः ॥१८६॥

189. And an object which is to be accomplished in any worldly dealing and is accepted to be four-fold,¹ i.e. it has origin etc., has been already established; but it is not proper to say that an object can be accomplished by a means of knowing since it (the latter) is merely capable of revealing an already existential entity.

NOTES

This is the refutation of alternative (iv) : Any fruit other than that stated in (i)-(iii) would be possible. Origin (*utpatti*), attainment (*āpti*), change (*vikṛti*) and purification (*saṃskṛti*) are attained by an injunction. And a means of knowing can prove a thing which has already come into existence. Therefore no injunction is possible.

1. The four fruits of act are origin, attainment, change and purification. Cf. BUBV 3.3.26, TUBV 2.13, Nais 1.53, BSB 1.1.4 etc.

नाऽत्मलाभातिरेकेण व्यञ्जकस्य मनागपि ।

सम्भाव्यतेऽपरं रूपमज्ञातत्वापनोदकृत् ॥१८७॥

190. It is again impossible to think of even a slightly different form of any means of knowledge that exists apart from its being merely a manifestor (or an already existent thing) so that it can be said to remove the condition of being not known.

NOTES

One might postulate: 'After the validity of an injunction in respect of the knowledge resulting from the Śruti (*śābdajñāna*) is refuted, one might urge that the injunction is required for the constant meditation on that knowledge since that would destroy ignorance.' The answer is: Such an injunction is not necessary, since when knowledge arises ignorance gets immediately destroyed.

आत्मासामान्यरूपोत्थं न चाभूत्वोपजायते ।

घटादिज्ञानवज्ज्ञानं भिन्नहेत्वनपेक्षतः ॥१६१॥

191. Without coming into existence, the knowledge which was (already) existing owing to (lit. born of) the peculiar nature of the Ātman, does not arise like the knowledge of a pot etc., because it does not expect any cause (for its coming into existence).

NOTES

It has been stated that an injunction is not required for the sake of knowing, or for constant meditation on it. Yet one may require it for the purpose of knowing the nature of the Brahman. One is then given the following reply.

Knowledge of the Brahman arises from the Ātman itself, it does not depend on anything else. That is to say, knowledge of the Brahman is not an effect; it is not the object of any injunction. Cf. verse 187.

स्थास्वनुभवमात्रत्वात्कार्यकारणवस्तुनः ।

अभूतभूतिर्नैवातो युज्यतेऽनुभवात्मनि ॥१६२॥

192. Since the thing which is both the cause and the effect¹ (viz. the Brahman) is merely of the nature of permanent experience, it is not proper to hold in the case of what is of the nature of the experience that there comes into existence one that did not exist.

NOTES

The knowledge is *sthāṇvanubhavātmaka*, the injunction is *abhūtabhūtyātmaka* (*sādhya*). It is stated that an injunction is useful for a thing to be attained but useless for an ever-attained thing (viz. *jñāna*). Knowledge does not expect any cause apart from itself.

1. Here the Brahman is described as *kāryakāraṇavastu* only in the empirical sense, not in absolute sense. Cf. verse 422 below where the Brahman, i.e. the Ātman, is described as *ākāryakāraṇa*.

प्रत्यगज्ञानहेतुत्वा भावनेयं न तु स्वतः ।

प्रत्यग्याथात्म्यजिज्ञासोः कथं सा विषयो भवेत् ॥१९३॥

193. The injunctive force¹ arises from the cause, viz. ignorance about the Ātman and not of its own. How then can it be an object (to be achieved) for a person who is desirous of knowing the real nature of the individual consciousness.

NOTES

An injunction may be meant either (i) for one who is desirous of knowing the Brahman, or (ii) for one who knows it. In the case of (i), the injunction is prescribed either (a) regarding the means of knowing the Ātman, or (b) for any other purpose. This verse refutes (b); (a) being acceptable.

1. See note (1) on verse 157 above.

क्रियाकारकभेदोऽयमज्ञातैकात्म्यवस्तुनः ।

तज्ज्ञानेऽसावसम्भाव्यस्तद्वेतुच्छित्तिकारणात् ॥१९४॥

194. This distinction between action and that which helps action¹ (arises) out of a thing which has only the oneness (i.e. the Ātman²) and has not been known (as such). When it (viz. the Ātman) is known that (viz. distinction) is not possible (to think of) because of the eradication of its cause.³

NOTES

The alternative (ii) stated in the note on the previous verse is refuted: Injunction is possible when ignorance persists and causes distinction and the enjoining force. But on the part of one who knows the Brahman, ignorance is already removed, therefore, no injunction is possible.

1. It means *kartr* 'agent (of an action)' or *karana* 'a means (of achieving the action)'.

2. The Ātman here refers to the Jīvātman, i.e. the individual consciousness (*pratyagātman*) which is really not different from the Brahman.

3. See next verse referring to ignorance as the cause of distinction.

न चाविद्यासमुच्छित्तिर्शनोत्पत्त्यतिरेकतः ।

संसारनाशोऽविद्याया नाशान्न व्यतिरिच्यते ॥१६५॥

195. And eradication of ignorance is not possible by anything else than the rise of knowledge (of the oneness of the Brahman and the Ātman). The disappearance of the transmigratory existence is not different from that of ignorance.

NOTES

This is a reply to a possible objection: 'There is no eradication of ignorance, i.e. cause of differentiation. Because if ignorance has not been created, how can the remover thereof be possible in the absence thereof? If ignorance has been created, it would be not opposed to the transmigratory existence. As the removal of darkness consists in the light of a lamp, there is no sequence between the rise of knowledge and eradication of ignorance.'

One could argue: 'Although destruction of ignorance invariably follows the rise of knowledge, the injunction is yet required for the constant meditation on the oneness of the Brahman and the Ātman for the sake of destruction of products of that ignorance.' This is answered in the second line.

न चाप्यविद्यानाशोऽत्र संसर्गः कारणात्मनि ।

तद्धवस्तेवंस्तुवृत्तत्वान्मृदि लोष्टादिनाशवत् ॥१६६॥

196. Destruction of ignorance is not its merger into the (material) cause (viz. the Ātman), since that merger (of ignorance) consists in the *vastuvṛtta*. '(mere) existence of reality'; it is like merger (lit. destruction) of a lump of clay etc. into clay (which is its material cause).

NOTES

There are two kinds of merger, i.e. *sānvayanāśa* and *niranvayanāśa*. In the case of the former, a product merges into its material cause as a lump of clay merges into clay, its material cause. Hence, merger (destruction) of a lump of clay precedes the appearance of clay, i.e. the remainder. In the case of the latter (viz. *niranvayanāśa*), there remains nothing behind

after merger (destruction). This is the case with the merger of ignorance. Because ignorance is not the effect (product) of the Brahman which could be stated as the material cause.

आदाय वास्तव्यं वृत्तं ज्ञानमज्ञाननाशकृत् ।

वस्तुयाथात्म्यवृत्तेन तमोऽपह्नूयते सदा ॥१६७॥

197. Only on understanding (lit. taking into consideration) the real nature of the thing (viz. the Ātman), (one may hold that) knowledge is the destroyer of ignorance, since then darkness (viz. ignorance) is for ever removed by the (very) nature of the thing as it is.

NOTES

Here is explained how the destruction of ignorance is nothing else than the rise of knowledge of the Ātman.

अज्ञातज्ञापनं तस्माद्विधिरत्रोपपद्यते ।

अकृतस्य क्रिया त्वत्र विधिनैवोपपद्यते ॥१६८॥

198. Therefore, it stands to reason that here (in this Śruti statement) there is an injunction that informs one of what is not known; but it cannot be held reasonable (to say that here there is) an injunction regarding doing what is not (previously) done.

NOTES

Cf. verse 115 above.

द्वैविध्यं चाप्यविद्याया न च युक्त्याऽवसीयते ।

ऐकात्म्यमात्रवस्तुत्वादविद्यैकैव युज्यते ॥१६९॥

199. Now as regards the two-fold nature of ignorance, it cannot be concluded (i.e. determined) even by reasoning. Ignorance can reasonably be accepted as unifold, since it pertains (only) to the oneness of the Brahman and the Ātman.

NOTES

'Ignorance can be understood as two-fold; (i) non-grasping of reality (*agraha*) and (ii) grasping the thing (i.e. reality)

as otherwise (*anyathāgraha*). The *agraha-ajñāna* is destroyed by the very rise of knowledge and the *anyathāgraha-ajñāna* is destroyed by the knowledge laid down in the Śruti.' This view of some is refuted by the first line. One could determine the nature of ignorance if it really existed apart from the Brahman. If one could discern two distinct objects as a man and a tree then alone one could say that objects are two-fold. Hence it is impossible to speak of two-fold character of ignorance.

The second line refutes the objection: 'Unifold ignorance is impossible because of the absence of reasoning etc.' Because there is complete absence of any other substratum for ignorance, there cannot be any other kind of ignorance. This is supported by the following verse.

प्रमेयभेदभिन्नत्वं ज्ञानानामिव भेदकम् ।

नाविद्याया यतोऽस्तीह द्वैविध्यं तेन दुर्घटम् ॥२००॥

200. Since in the case of ignorance there is no variety of objects to be known as in the case of other 'knowledges (form and knowledge) which would here be the cause of differentiation, therefore it is difficult to accept the diverse nature of ignorance (in respect of the individual consciousness).

प्रत्यगज्ञानमेवेह तदन्यद्वस्तुकारणम् ।

तदन्यकारणासत्त्वाद्वैविध्यं तमसः कुतः ॥२०१॥

201. Here (i.e. in our worldly dealing) ignorance about (the nature of) the individual consciousness is the cause of (awareness of) a thing other than itself. Since there is no cause other than ignorance (about the nature of the individual consciousness), how could there be the two-fold nature of darkness (i.e. ignorance)?

NOTES

The first line repeats the idea of Śaṅkara, i.e. *tam imam adhyāsam avidyākhyam puraskṛtya sarve pramāṇaprameyavyavahārā laukikāvaidikāś ca pravṛttāḥ* (BSB 1.1.1, p. 2). That is to say, we hold other things as existent only because we do not know the real nature of the Ātman.

With the help of the Śruti, *indro māyābhiḥ pururūpa iyate* (the *Rgveda* 6.47.18), 'Indra moves in various forms due to his miraculous powers', it is held that ignorance of the individual consciousness is the cause of the non-Ātman world. And the argument against bringing two things at one time by just one thing, i.e. ignorance (primarily), conceals the Ātman and secondly causes the world also; this is justified by the *kulyāpraṇayananyāya* according to which a thing made for some one purpose subserves another purpose also. Cf. *yathā śālyartham kulyāḥ praṇiyante tābhya eva pāniyam ca piyate tadvat* 'Canals are dug for purposes of bringing water to the paddy field (for the growth of paddy), but their waters are used for drinking purposes also.', quoted from G. A. Jacob, *A Third Handful of Popular Maxims*, Bombay: 1910, p.36).

न चाभ्यासाद्यपेक्षाऽपि स्वतोमुक्तत्वकारणात् ।

न घटादेर्घटत्वादि घटाद्यभ्याससंशयम् ॥२०२॥

202. There is again no expectation of constant meditation etc.¹ (on the part of an individual, i.e. individual consciousness) because of its (already) being liberated by itself. (Take, for instance,) ² the potness of a pot etc. that does not depend on the constant meditation on a pot etc.

NOTES

One may yet argue: 'An injunction is required for constant meditation on knowledge because the liberated nature of the Ātman results from the constant meditation of knowledge.' This possible objection is answered in this verse.

1. The word *ādi* means *yoga* 'physical practices such as *prāṇāyāma*' 'controlling breath'.

2. This illustration is given in order to stress that an ever-liberated being does not expect constant meditation.

न चाविषयविज्ञानमनाकारं च भाव्यते ।

भावकप्रत्यगात्मत्वादाकृतेश्च निषेधतः ॥२०३॥

203. And that which is not an object of (common) knowledge¹ and does not have any form (indeed) cannot be known,

because one who meditates² is the individual consciousness itself and because³ there is a (clear-cut) denial of its having a form.

NOTES

The knowledge with its object and a form such as an eagle is constantly meditated, but knowledge of the Ātman is otherwise; the Ātman knows itself, there is no subject-object relation in this respect. Therefore, no constant meditation for the knowledge of the Ātman is necessary. No injunction is, therefore, required regarding the same.

1. The word *viññāna* here means *savikalpakajñāna*, 'knowledge of object outside the subject' which is to be distinct from the knowledge of the oneness. On *viññāna* and *jñāna*, see note on verse 112 and the Introduction section 6.

2. The word *bhāvaka* refers to one who repeatedly meditates on the nature of the Ātman.

3. The Śruti to that effect is *aśabdam asparśam arūpam*—(KāthU 3.15).

नेन्द्रियेण ग्रहोऽस्यास्ति शब्दाद्यर्थानुपातिना ।

दुःखादिवच्च नैवाऽऽत्मा चित्तेः स्वार्थैकरूपतः ॥२०४॥

204. The Ātman is not grasped by the (external) sense-organs, which follow (lit. run after) the objects, sound etc. The Ātman is not grasped, like misery etc. also since knowledge¹ is of the same nature as that of its object.

NOTES

Here is denied any possibility that the knowledge of the Ātman is grasped (i) by the external sense-organs, or (ii) by *manas*.

1. *citi* = *cit*. Knowledge consists in the one who knows; here there is no distinction between object and subject.

भावनोपचितं चेतो न च कैवल्यकारणम् ।

तस्यैव समुच्छेदात्तद्वैतज्ञानहानतः ॥२०५॥

205. And indeed *manas*¹ which is nourished by constant meditation² is not accepted as the cause of (bringing about) the

state of the absolute (Ātman), since there is complete negation of itself in the state³ of the absolute (Ātman) (which proceeds) from abandoning ignorance which causes it (viz. *manas* etc.).

NOTES

But some say that *manas* with repeated meditation laid down in the Śruti is the cause of liberation and so they want an injunction as regards constant meditation on the nature of the Ātman. To them, Sureśvara replies in the first line.

That cause of liberation may be either (i) *upādānakāraṇa* or (ii) *nimittakāraṇa*. The alternative (i) is refuted in the second line of the verse.

1. The word *cetas* is used for *manas*.

2. The word *bhāvanā* has to be understood as *abhyāsa*, i.e. constant thinking about it; cf. the use of the causative of $\sqrt{bhū}$ in verse 203 above; also in Śaṅkara's *Mohamudgaraḥ*: *artham anartham bhāvaya nityam nāsti tataḥ sukhaleśaḥ satyam* /

3. The word *iha* is used for *jñānasattvāvasthā*.

स्वकार्यार्थानुगामित्वं भावनाज्ञानकर्मणाम् ।

अकार्यकारणात्मत्वात्कैवल्येऽनुगतिः कुतः ॥२०६॥

206. Constant meditation, knowledge (and) activity follow (i.e. are) in consonance with their own objects (to be known and) to be accomplished. (But) because (the Ātman) is not of the nature of a cause or an effect, how can there be such following on the part of its state of the absolute (Ātman)?

NOTES

Here is refuted the alternative (ii) mentioned in the note on the previous verse.

साक्षादात्मप्रसिद्धौ च नाभ्यासस्तत्फलस्थितेः ।

ज्ञानाभावादसिद्धौ च क्व न्वभ्यासव्यपेक्षणम् ॥२०७॥

207. Since the Ātman is already known directly, there is no need of constant meditation; there (already) exists its fruit; and while (the Ātman is) not known, where could there be any support for constant meditation.

NOTES

An injunction for constant meditation could be reasonable (i) when the Ātman is already directly known (*prasiddha*) or (ii) when the Ātman is not known (*aprasiddha*). Both these alternatives are refuted by the first and the second lines respectively.

आत्मासामान्यरूपोत्थं ज्ञानमज्ञानमात्मनि ।

सकृज्जातं न चेद्ब्रून्ति ज्ञानमेव न तद्भवेत् ॥२०८॥

208. If knowledge which arises from the unique nature of the Ātman is once obtained and it does not remove ignorance on its own part, it would not at all be knowledge.

NOTES

‘The knowledge which has been once obtained does not remove ignorance. Therefore an injunction is required for constant meditation.’ To such a doubt is given this answer. Because the mutual contradiction between knowledge and ignorance has been established, both cannot co-exist.

सम्यग्ज्ञानं यदाश्रित्य तन्मोहोऽपि तदाश्रयः ।

अबाधितं तमोऽत्रास्त इत्युक्तिर्जडवक्तृका ॥२०९॥

209. Ignorance of that resorting to which there arises right knowledge also resorts to that. The statement that darkness (i.e. ignorance) remains unsublated here (i.e. in the Ātman) is made (only) by a stupid person.

NOTES

An objector may say : ‘Ignorance may not necessarily be removed merely by the rise of knowledge but it would be definitely removed by the constant meditation on the knowledge.’ To this Sureśvara replies with an illustration. It is never found that darkness (i.e. ignorance) also remains where there is illumination (knowledge).

इत्येवमादि यच्चोक्तं पूर्वमेवातिविस्तरात् ।

तत्कृत्स्नमनुसन्धेयं सर्वविकारहानिकृत् ॥ २१० ॥

210. Thus, whatever has been said before in great detail is all to be borne in mind as that which removes all objections (in respect of an injunction).

NOTES

SP refers *pūrvam uktam* to the earlier refutation of the idea that the Vedāntas have prescribed any injunction in respect of the knowledge of the Brahman at several places in SV.

सर्वमात्मेत्यतः पश्येदात्मानात्मविभागवित् ।

आत्मा द्रष्टव्य इत्युक्त्या ह्येषोऽर्थोऽत्राभिधीयते ॥२११॥

211. Therefore, knowing the distinction between the Ātman and the non-Ātman, one should see that all (this) is the Ātman; this is the only¹ thing conveyed by the statement, 'The Ātman is to be seen.'

NOTES

This asserts the final position that the sentence *ātmā vā are draṣṭavyaḥ* does not prescribe any action for one but expresses the proposition: 'All this is the Ātman'. The long discussion beginning with verse 95 is concluded here.

1. Cf. SP : *prāg uktam arthāntarāsambhavam hetum kartum hi śabdaḥ*.

सर्वमानप्रसक्तौ च सर्वमानफलाश्रयात् ।

श्रोतव्य इत्यतः प्राह वेदान्तावरुत्सया ॥२१२॥

212. (Now) since it becomes necessary to hold the Ātman as the cause of all means of knowing on account of its being the very basis of the results of all means of knowing, (the seer of the Upaniṣad) declared, '(The Ātman has) to be heard about with a desire to declare the Vedānta texts (as the only means of knowing it).

NOTES

The suffix *avya* in the sentence *ātmā vā are draṣṭavyaḥ* does not intend to 'enjoin' but to 'express' the Ātman as 'worthy of seeing'. Therefore, the meaning of the sentence is that the

Ātman deserves to be seen. This has been already proved. Now the sentence (*ātmā vā are*) *draṣṭavyaḥ* is being explained.

दर्शनस्याविधेयत्वात्तदुपायो विधीयते ।

वेदान्तश्रवणं यत्नादुपायस्तर्क एव च ॥२१३॥

213. Since seeing¹ is not what can be enjoined, hearing of Vedānta texts is specifically prescribed as a means of knowledge. And the means is only reasoning².

NOTES

Sureśvara introduces here the sense of *śrotavyaḥ* in the sentence *ātmā vā are draṣṭavyaḥ śrotavyaḥ . . .*

1. The word *darśana* means 'seeing' as 'knowledge'. Cf. BOETZELAER (*op. cit.*, p. 51) on *adarśana*.

2. "According to Sureśvara and Madhusūdana Sarasvatī, hearing of the *mahāvākya* is the principal means of Brahman-realization, but such 'hearing' has to be aided (*sahita*) by *manana* and *nididhyāsana*. Madhusūdana says that 'pondering over the Upaniṣad *vākyas*' (*vedānta-vicāra*) is nothing but *śravaṇa* aided by *manana* and *nididhyāsana*; and such a *śravaṇa* is of the nature of *anvaya-vyatireka-tarka*" (K. SATCHIDANANDA MURTY, *Revelation and Reason in Advaita Vedānta*, Motilal Banarsidass, 1974, p. 152). For our purpose, reference could be made only to Sureśvara. Here then the second *upāya* means 'ancillary help'. Perhaps then *śravaṇa* and *manana* are *avinābhūta*.

श्रुतिलिङ्गादिको न्यायः शब्दशक्तिविवेककृत् ।

आगमार्थविनिश्चित्यं मन्तव्य इति भण्यते ॥२१४॥

214. The rules, viz. *śruti*, *liṅga* etc.¹, which differentiate various powers of words for the sake of determining the meaning of the tradition², are mentioned (here) by the word *mantavyaḥ*.

NOTES

The purposes of hearing (*śravaṇa*) and meditation (*manana*) are stated in the first and the second lines respectively. The

word *śravaṇa* means the clarification of the ultimate exposition of the meaning of Vedāntas in respect of the oneness of the Brahman and the Ātman with the help of the rules which determine the meaning of words and the meaning of a sentence; these are *śruti*, *liṅga* etc. The word *manana* conveys the sense of reasoning which establishes the falsity of duality, thereby determining of the Truth known by *śruti* etc. which help the removal of defects in one's wrong understanding of the Śruti texts.

1. *śruti*, *liṅga*, *vākya*, *prakaraṇa*, *sthāna* and *samākhyā*, which are powers of words determining the meaning of the Śruti. Cf. the *Jaimini Sūtra* 3.3.14.

2. The words *śruti* and Śruti are to be distinguished; the former is specific statement in the scripture which is a means of determining the meaning and the latter is the sacred or revealed texts.

वस्तुतत्त्वविवक्षेह मन्तव्य इति शासनात् ।

योषिदग्न्यादिदृष्टौ हि नैव मन्तव्यताविधिः ॥२१५॥

215. From the instruction in (the word) '(is) to be pondered over' we learn the desire on the part of (Yājñavalkya who is) explaining the nature of reality. Indeed there is never an injunction (such as) '(is) to be pondered over'¹ in the case of tentatively looking on a woman as fire² etc.

NOTES

The first line once again asserts that Vedāntas aim at expressing or explaining the reality, viz. the Brahman, but not at prescribing any *upāsana* while the second line points out that the meaning of the reality is ascertained through *manana*.

1. *manana* is the speculation by *tarka* (= *tarkānusaṁdhāna*) and *tarka* is based on direct perception. Hence *manana* is impossible in respect of such a subjective reality.

2. Where only *upāsana* is desired and not the knowledge of reality, there is no injunction in the Śruti such as 'to be meditated on' etc. In the illustration, 'a woman is fire', the identification of a woman with fire is imaginary, i.e. it is

subjective reality and not the objective reality. Cf. *yoṣā vā agnir gautama* (BU 6.2.13), *yoṣā vāva gautamāgniḥ* (CU 5.8.1).

वेदशब्दानुरोध्यत्र तर्कोऽपि विनियुज्यते ।

वाच्यवाचकसम्बन्धनियमे तस्य हेतुता ॥२१६॥

216. Here (viz. in determining the meaning of the Śruti), is employed reasoning which is in keeping with the words of the Śruti. (Indeed) it is a cause of determining (lit. limiting down) the relation between a word and its expressed sense.

NOTES

One may argue that the use of *tarka*, mentioned here as *manana* also, would contradict the Śruti statement *naiṣā tarkaṇa matir āpaneyā* '(O dearest one,) that (knowledge) is not to be obtained through reasoning.' Therefore, Sureśvara answers that objection in the first line: The *tarka* in the statement *naiṣā* . . . refers to that *tarka* which is not in keeping with Veda (*avaidikatarka*); whereas the *tarka* intended here in this statement is not contradictory to Veda (*vedānusāritarka*, *vedā-virodhitarka*). Cf. Śaṅkara's argument on the use of *tarka*: *śrutyanugrhita eva hy atra tarko'nubhavāṅgatvenāśriyate* / (BSB 2.1.6, pp. 188-189).

'If the Vedic statement is sufficient to give the decisive meaning, what is the use of *tarka*?' To this question the second line is the answer: *tarka* fixes the relation of *vācya* and *vācaka* in respect of things expressed by the words *tvam* and *tat*. Although the Śruti is the unfailing means of knowing reality, *tarka* known as *manana* is also used as a mode to be adopted (*itikartavyatvena*) for it removes the impossibility (*asambhāvanā*) etc. (this etc. may refer *viparyaya*, *saṁśaya*).

अपरायत्तबोधोऽत्र निदिध्यासनमुच्यते ।

पूर्वयोरवधित्वेन तदुपन्यास इष्यते ॥२१७॥

217. Here (in this text, the word) *nididhyāsana* is used for understanding which depends on other(s) and its statement is expected by Śruti as the limit of the previous two.

NOTES

The nature and the effect of *nididhyāsana* are stated in the first and the second lines respectively. The word *nididhyāsana* means 'the understanding of the meaning of the Śruti on the basis of *vācyavācakasambandha* without any difficulties in the case of a person who has overcome the hindrance to the knowledge of the meaning of the sentence, having resorted to *śravaṇa* and *manana* and associated (himself) with *śama* etc.' Another meaning may also be assumed: In the passage *ātmā vā are draṣṭavyaḥ* has been declared the knowledge which is accidental and causes thought. This repetition is for purposes of laying down the pursuit of the same knowledge as the means.

श्रवणादिक्रिया तावत्कर्तव्येह प्रयत्नतः ।

यावद्यथोक्तं विज्ञानमाविर्भवति भास्वरम् ॥२१८॥

218. The activity of hearing about etc. is to be carried on zealously¹ here (i.e. towards the Ātman²) till the blazing knowledge³ as (already) stated manifests (itself).

NOTES

nididhyāsana as being the support for the culmination of *śravaṇa* etc. associated with *śama* etc. is clarified.

1. *prayatna* = *śamādisāhityam tatrāvṛttiṃ sūcayati*. (SP)
2. *iha* = *ātmani*. (SP)
3. *bhāsvaratva* = *phalaśiraskatva* = *svaprakāśatva*. The use of the word *viññāna* here is in the sense of *ātmajñāna* owing to its adjective *bhāsvara*. On *jñāna* and *viññāna* see note on verse 112.

आगमाद्दर्शनं पूर्वमागमाच्चायतो मतिः ।

त्रयाणामपि सङ्गानाच्छास्त्राचार्यात्मनां स्थिरम् ॥२१९॥

219. First, knowledge (i.e. information, is secured) from the Śruti. From the Śruti and the preceptor comes thought (i.e. understanding). (And) the permanent (knowledge, i.e. the knowledge of the Ātman, is secured) from the mention (i.e.

following) of the three, viz. the Śruti, preceptor and oneself together.

NOTES

Sureśvara refers to *darśana* etc. in keeping with the order in the text, viz. *draṣṭavyaḥ*, *śrotavyaḥ* and *mantavyaḥ*. The study of the Śruti together with its ancillary texts gives rise to the knowledge which instigates thought. After that there is *śravaṇa* from the Śruti and from preceptor. Then, by means of the praise and the practice of *manana* which is nothing but *manana* and instigated by *śravaṇa* in keeping with the Śruti etc. as the cause of knowledge of the Ātman, there arises knowledge of the Brahman called *nididhyāsana* which is stable and void of *asambhāvanā*, *viparyaya*, *saṁśaya*. Cf. note (1) on verse 213.

1. BUB (p. 325) states this in a reverse way thus: *śrotavyaḥ pūrvam ācāryata āgamāc ca* / 'To be heard firstly from preceptor and then from the Śruti.'

2. *mati* = *manana*.

प्रतिपत्तिः पुरा शाब्दी यावन्न मनुते श्रुतम् ।

श्रुत्वा मत्वाऽथ तं साक्षादात्मानं प्रतिपद्यते ॥२२०॥

220. One's understanding is merely verbal so long as one does not meditate on what is heard. One directly understands (what is the Ātman only) after¹ one meditates on what one has already heard.

NOTES

This order of *śravaṇa* etc. is not merely one in the Śruti but in logical process also.

1. *atha* is *ānantaryavacana* 'expressive of later occurrence'. Therefore *śravaṇa* has to be first qualified by *manana* and *nididhyāsana*, then alone it leads to liberation. (SP)

अनन्यायत्तबिज्ञाने श्रवणादेरुपायतः ।

जाते नापेक्षते किञ्चित्प्रतीचोऽनुभवात्परम् ॥२२१॥

221. When by such means as hearing etc. there arises

knowledge¹ which does not depend on anything else (the knower²) does not expect anything else than the awareness of the individual consciousness.

NOTES

This verse reasserts that 'the moment one has 'understood' the meaning of *tat tvam asi*, one does not have to expect anything else———one is immediately liberated———'understanding' follows grasping of the verbal meaning as stated in the preceding verse.

1. On *viññāna* see note on verse 218.

2. The word *vidvān* (= *brahmavid*) is supplied in view of (na) *apekṣate*.

[When knowledge arises, (i) liberation is dependent, or (ii) knowledge is dependent. Both the alternatives are refuted in the following two verses.]

साध्यसाधनसम्बन्धे शास्त्रापेक्षैव नापरा ।

लिङ्गापेक्षाऽनुमेयेऽर्थे नरापेक्षा नरोचिते ॥२२२॥

222. In respect of determining¹ the end and the means, there is expectation only of the Śruti and of nothing else. (So also), in respect of a thing which is to be inferred, there is expected (the knowledge of a) characteristic and a person is expected (in respect of a thing²) fit (to be achieved by) a person.³

NOTES

The alternative (i) is refuted. SP says on this thus : The rule is : Whichever is the proper means to the desired object is alone to be expected; so, knowledge which is the only means to liberation is alone to be expected. But this goes one step further from the original verse.

1. *sādhyaśādhanasambandha*(*jñāna*) implies *jñātrjñeyaikātmyāvagama* 'understanding of the oneness of a knower (*sādhana*) and an object of knowing (*sādhya*).'

2. The word *arthe* is to be supplied.

3. *narocita* = *narayogya* = *narapratyakṣagamya*.

भिन्नमात्रादिविज्ञाने सापेक्षं विनिश्चितिः ।

एकमात्रादिके त्वस्मिन्कः किं कस्मादपेक्षते ॥२२३॥

223. In respect of the knowledge of various (things, viz.) knower etc.¹, ascertainment (of their nature) is dependent (on them all).² On the contrary³, in respect of this (Ātman) which alone is the knower etc. who can (be said to) expect what (and) from whom ?

NOTES

The alternative (ii) is refuted. Cf. BU 2.4.14 : *yatra hi dvaitam iva bhavati . . . tad itara itaram paśyati . . . yatra vā asya sarvam ātmaivābhūt . . . tat kena kaṁ paśyet . . .*, and also BSB 1.1.1. (p. 2) : *tam etam avidyākhyam ātmānātmanor itaretarādhyāsam puraskṛtya sarve pramāṇaprameyavyavahārā laukikā vaidikāś ca pravṛttāḥ* /

1. Knower, object of knowing, means of knowing——all these are *anātman*.

2. I. e. 'the ascertainment . . .' corresponds to all these three.

3. The word *tu* is *pūrvapakṣāvachchedaka*.

प्रमाणरूपावष्टम्भात्प्रमा पूर्वं प्रजायते ।

पश्चात्प्रमेयनिष्ठं प्रमेयार्थानुरोधेन ॥२२४॥

आत्माऽऽत्मानं विजानाति यत्र वाक्यादिमानतः ।

तत्र मात्रादिसम्भेदो न मनागपि लभ्यते ॥२२५॥

224-225. By resorting to the means of knowing and the form is produced right knowledge; (and) afterwards there remains one's awareness of the object to be known, which follows the object to be known. When¹ the Ātman knows itself after² knowing the authoritative sentence (i.e. the Śruti) etc. there then remains no distinction, viz. a knower etc., even slightly.

NOTES

There are two modes of rise of knowledge : (i) It arises from awareness of a knower etc., i.e. the object of knowing

is the non-Ātman, (on this; cf. verse 223), or there is *bhedabuddhi*; and (ii) it arises when there is no awareness of a knower etc., i.e. the object of knowing is the Ātman, or there is *abhedabuddhi*. Case (i) is mentioned in verse 224 and (ii) in verse 225 respectively.

1. By the word *yatra* in the first line, the condition of purity of the intellect is stated and by the word *tatra* the condition of its fruit is stated. (SP)

2. 'After' or 'through' for *-mānataḥ* where *-tasi* is expressive of the cause of knowledge.

पदार्थविषयस्तर्कस्तथैवानुमितिर्भवेत् ।

वाक्यार्थप्रतिपत्तिस्तु वाक्यादेवाभिजायते ॥२२६॥

226. Logical reasoning refers to the object (or what is signified by word(s), inference¹ will also be likewise in accordance with that (viz. the signified)². Understanding of the sentence-sense however arises only from (hearing) the Śruti (statement).

NOTES

In this verse Sureśvara wants to avert such a wrong notion as 'the word *vākyādimānataḥ* might lead one to believe that knowledge of the Ātman could arise from anybody's speech (lit. sentence / words)'

1. The word *tarka* 'logical reasoning' may not be based on the Śruti, or may sometimes be *vedāntavirodhi* 'opposed to the Śruti', *anumiti* 'inference' also may be similar, i.e. *vedāntavirodhi*.

(2) *tathaiveti padārthaviṣayatvoktiḥ* (SP)

(3) *tarka* has for its *viṣaya* (only/even) *tanmātras* (i.e. the non-Ātman) for the knowledge of the Ātman however only Vedāntas is useful.

आत्मानात्मत्वमात्रं हि लिङ्गाद्वस्तुषु गम्यते ।

सर्वमानातिवर्त्यात्मा वाक्यादेवावगम्यते ॥२२७॥

227. From the characteristics one comes to know only the nature of objects, viz. this is Ātman and/or this non-Ātman. As against this, (one comes to know that) the Ātman is (ever)

beyond the (useful) means of knowing only from the Śruti (statements).

NOTES

Sureśvara states here the reason why logical reasoning (*tarka*) etc. can be said to refer to the meaning of the words but not to the sentence-sense (*vākyārtha*) in respect of a *mahāvākya* like *tat tvam asi*; there the *vākyārtha* is really *avākyārtha*. Cf. the Introduction: discussion on the method of *anvayavyatireka*. Among objects whose characteristics are not specifically known, some may be the non-Ātman; these are the worldly things. *tarka* conveys only relative knowledge, not the nature of the Ātman; the Śruti alone can give it, independent of any other means.

नन्वकृत्स्नं भवेज्ज्ञानं यद्यात्मैव समीक्ष्यते ।

केवलोऽनात्मनोऽदृष्टेः प्रतीचोऽन्यस्य वस्तुनः ॥२२८॥

228. (Objection:) Indeed knowledge (that thus arises) would not be complete, if the Ātman alone is understood (from the Śruti). (Reply:) (This is not so) because the non-Ātman which is a thing other than the Ātman is not seen.¹

NOTES

Agreeing that the Śruti alone is the source of the knowledge of the Ātman, one may yet say that the Śruti may bring both the Ātman and the non-Ātman within the range of knowledge. Thus when the Ātman and the non-Ātman are both known by the Śruti, the Ātman should be taken as distinguished from the non-Ātman by some characteristics. This would lead to the acceptance that the Ātman is possessed of characteristics (*saviśeṣa*). It is this argument which is refuted here.

1. 'Seen' indicates 'proved to exist'.

नायमन्योऽथवाऽनन्यः प्रत्यगज्ञानजत्वतः ।

दण्डसर्पादिवद्रज्ज्वां स्वतोऽपूर्वादिमान्यतः ॥२२९॥

229. One cannot say that this individual consciousness is different from or the same as the other (thing (s)), (because such a knowledge) is produced from ignorance of the individual

consciousness¹; (this is) as in the case of (the indefinite apprehension of) a stick, a snake in (the place of) a rope. (This is so, i.e. cause / origin²).

NOTES

Sureśvara declares *anirvacaniyakhyāti* in respect of the individual consciousness.

Ignorance of the Ātman alone leads to the awareness of the non-Ātman as existent, because the Ātman is not produced by anything, nor has it any subsequent product; the knowledge of duality is caused by ignorance.

1. Cf. BU 2.4.14: *yatra' hi dvaitam iva bhavati . . . tad itara itaram paśyati . . .*

2. Cf. BU 2.5.19 : *tad etad brahmāpūrvam anaparam anantaram abāhyam.*

यतोऽतो दृष्ट एतस्मिन्प्रत्यगात्मनि केवले ।

नास्ति ज्ञानमनुत्पन्नं नाप्यध्वस्तं तथा तमः ॥२३०॥

प्रत्यङ्मात्रेकयाथात्म्यात्कार्यकारणवस्तुनः ।

तज्ज्ञानात्किं तमोऽध्वस्तं त्किंवाज्ञानं वदाऽऽत्मनः ॥२३१॥

230-231. Since when this individual Ātman is thus¹ known as alone², it is not that knowledge has not (already) arisen and not also³ that darkness (i.e. ignorance) has not been removed. Since the thing which is itself the cause and the effect is really of the nature of the individual consciousness, tell me⁴, therefore, what darkness (i.e. ignorance) would remain undestroyed, because of knowledge of it? or what ignorance (would remain) on the part of the Ātman?

NOTES

The reason expressed by the word *yataḥ* in verse 230 is clarified in the first line of verse 231 and that by *ataḥ*, in the second line.

1. I.e. as told in previous verse, or *śrutivākyāt*. This is the meaning of *ataḥ*. The Śruti which Sureśvara has in mind is *ekam evādvitīyam* (CU 6.2.1).

2. I.e. one without a second.

3. *tathā* = *api ca*.

4. For *vadātmanah* in the text, the footnote thereon shows the other reading, i.e. *tadātmanah* which indicates two possible readings, i.e. *tad ātmanah* and *tadā ātmanah*. My translation follows the text, i.e. *vada ātmanah*.

अनुवादे यथोक्तानां प्रक्रान्ते दर्शनादिषु ।

विज्ञानेनेत्यथ कथं निदिध्यासनमुच्यते ॥२३२॥

ध्यानाशङ्कानिवृत्त्यर्थं विज्ञानेनेति भण्यते ।

निदिध्यासनशब्देन ध्यानमाशङ्क्यते यतः ॥२३३॥

232-233. (Objection :) Although there is restatement of what was (already) stated in (the words) *darśana* etc., how is it that *nididhyāsana* is expressed by (the word) *viññāna*? (Reply:) (The word) *viññāna* is used (lit. uttered) in order to avert the doubt if meditation is referred to, for they would understand (lit. suspect) by the word *nididhyāsana* 'meditation'.

NOTES

Cf. the last sentence of BU 2.4.5: *ātmā vā are draṣṭavyaḥ śrotavyaḥ mantavyo nididhyāsitaḥ maitreyy ātmano vā are darśanena śravaṇena matyā viññānenedam sarvaṁ viditam* / In this, the word *viññāna* paraphrases the word *nididhyāsana*—this is unlike other words, viz. *darśana* for *draṣṭavyaḥ*, *śravaṇa* for *śrotavyaḥ* and *mati* for *mantavyaḥ*. In normal linguistic usage, the word *nididhyāsana* means 'meditation'. Therefore, one might doubt that the word *nididhyāsana* means *dhyāna*. This is understood from the second line of verse 233. The Śruti, therefore, replaces the word *nididhyāsana* by the word *viññāna* and sets aside the possible doubt. SP points to the known dictum of Mīmāṃsā : *sandig-dhasya vākyaśeṣān nirṇayaḥ*; e. g. the sentence *aktāḥ śarkarā upadadhāti* implies *ghṛtenāktāḥ* in view of the *vākyaśeṣa* 'tejo vai ghṛtam'; cf. the *Jaiminiyanyāyamālāvistaraḥ*, Benares : Kashi Sanskrit Series 126, 1937, p. 13.

विज्ञानोत्पत्तिहेतुत्वं ध्यानादेः प्रागवादिषम् ।

स्वार्थमेव तु विज्ञानं मुक्तिमात्रफलं स्मृतम् ॥२३४॥

234. I have already mentioned¹ that meditation etc. is the origin of knowledge. But it is held that knowledge is for its own sake; it results only in liberation as its fruit.

NOTES

Since it is now pointed out that *nididhyāsana* means *viññāna*, one may hold that *nididhyāsana* thus refers only to grasping fast the meaning of the Śruti statement and would say that the Śruti does not refer to the means to liberation. This doubt is answered in the first line. Yet further doubt may be: When an injunction is absent, *dhyāna* cannot be a means, because the Śruti : *tasmād evaṁvic chānto dānta uparatas titikṣuḥ samāhito bhūtvātmany ātmānam paśyati* (BU 4.4.23) says that discipline is necessary for the knowledge and because the word *nididhyāsanaḥ* conveys the knowledge of the meaning of the sentence resulting from *śravaṇa* etc., associated with *dhyāna* (see notes on verses 217 and 218). Then, if *dhyāna* is accepted as a means, a question could be asked; 'Why does not the Śruti mention it directly?' The answer is : 'The subsequent part of the Śruti is opposed to it.' It is stated in the second line: 'Knowledge which has liberation for its fruit and expects nothing is nothing but *nididhyāsana*.'

1. From SV onwards at various places in BUBV.(SP) Refer to SV for that *dhyāna* leads us to *viññāna*.

एकात्म्याज्ञानविष्टवंसर्व्यतिरेकेण नेष्यते ।

एकात्म्यविज्ञानफलं प्राप्तमेव हि तत्स्वतः ॥२३५॥

235. They do not accept that the fruit of knowledge of the oneness¹ (of the Ātman) is different from the destruction of ignorance regarding the oneness (of the Ātman), since² that (fruit) is (already) by its very nature existent (lit. attained.)

NOTES

If it is said that knowledge has liberation as the fruit then liberation is non-eternal, being dependent on a means. This is to say : *sādhanaena sādhyam ataḥ anityam*. The first three quarters answer this doubt.

1. Sureśvara holds *aikātmya*, *kaivalya* and *nityaprāpta* as *paryāyas* 'synonyms.'

2. Liberation is the fruit of knowledge. That is to say : Knowledge is a means to uncovering of itself by the removal of ignorance — such is its *sāadhanatva* and *sādhya**tva*. This is merely a figurative expression; liberation is always existent and not at all created. Therefore, knowledge, i.e. liberation is eternal or *nityaprāpta*.

यतोऽनवयदेनैव रज्जुसर्पादिवत्तथा ।

आत्माऽयं सङ्गतिं याति तन्मोहाध्यस्तरूपिणा ॥२३६॥

236. The Ātman goes together¹ with the non-Ātman which has a form superimposed on itself through infatuation (i.e. ignorance) (of it) and (which is) not its part, exactly in the same way as the serpent goes together with the rope.

NOTES

If cessation of ignorance together with its effect is accepted as different from the Ātman, there would result duality. And in that condition before liberation, it is to be taken as identical with the Ātman and thus the Ātman has to be taken as dependent on a means. To this objection, is given a reply in this verse. In the example of *rajjusarpa*, the true rope and the false serpent are noticed in just one and the same thing. So also then the Ātman and the non-Ātman (which is the effect of the ignorance about the nature of the Ātman) are noticeable in just one and the same Ātman. Thus the Ātman is to be taken as co-existent with the means of its liberation. In both, the example and the object of comparison, viz. the Ātman, the serpent and the non-Ātman are not parts of the rope and the Ātman respectively; these are, however, superimposed on them through ignorance and cannot really be taken apart from them. Such is the *anirvacanīyakhyāti* above referred to.

1. *saṅgatiṁ √yā* is a metaphorical expression.

आत्मा तत्त्वं विभक्तस्य प्रमात्रादेरनात्मनः ।

स्वतः सिद्धस्तदज्ञानसमुत्थस्य मृषात्मनः ॥२३७॥

237. Self-established is the Ātman, which is the essence of the non-Ātman consisting of a knower etc. (that is taken as) different (from the Ātman), which is of the nature¹ of falsity arising from the ignorance about it (i.e. the Ātman).

NOTES

It was said in the previous verse that the Ātman goes together with the non-Ātman. This verse explains how. And also how the Ātman is said to be the essence of the non-Ātman that is imagined. The notion of the non-Ātman is produced from ignorance about the Ātman and is therefore the nature of falsity, consisting in a knower etc. Therefore the Ātman is figuratively said to take the form of the non-Ātman; really speaking, the Ātman is merely the substratum of all 'imagination'.

1. *mṛṣātman* = *mṛṣāsvarūpa*.

आत्मज्ञानप्रमेयाच्च नान्यस्तज्ज्ञानकृद्यतः ।

अनन्यमातृमानोऽतः प्रत्यगात्मा तमोपनुत् ॥२३८॥

238. Since that which causes the knowledge of what is not different from the object of knowledge of the Ātman, therefore, one whose knower and means of knowing are not different (from oneself) is the individual consciousness which is the remover of darkness (i.e. ignorance).

NOTES

Even in the absence of duality, caused by the destruction of ignorance along with its effects, (i) the knower may be different from the Ātman, or (ii) identical with it. If (i), the Ātman would not be non-dual. If (ii), there would arise a different condition for immutability of the Ātman. For, it would then be concluded that a knower is neither different from nor identical with the Ātman. Therefore the first line of this verse gives an answer : There is neither abandoning of non-duality nor would arise there the difficult condition of immutability, because the nature of the Ātman as 'a knower' exists only in the condition of ignorance.

Then, yet another objection may be raised : 'The knowledge, however, can be (i) different from the Ātman, or (ii) identical with the Ātman.' Not (i), because there would be the abandoning of non-duality. Nor (ii), because of existence of ignorance, there would always be the destruction of ignorance. This is given in the second line. The individual consciousness, non-dual and obtaining the position of being the fruit of knowledge produced from the sentence, burns away the ignorance about itself along with its effects. Therefore, the defect as stated would not result.

अज्ञानोत्थमनूद्यातो मिथ्याक्लृप्तमशेषतः ।

इदं ब्रह्मेति वचसा सर्वमात्मेति नोऽवदत् ॥२३६॥

239. Having repeated whatever arises from ignorance, i.e. whatever false is imagined in the statement 'This is the Brahman', the Śruti text declared to us that all this is the Ātman.

[The preceding verse pointed out the purpose of the paraphrase under reference from verse 232. Now Sureśvara commences the discussion on *brahma tam parādād yo'nyatrātmano brahma veda kṣātram tam. . . sarvaṁ veda* (BU 2.4.6), up to verse 260.]

आत्मधीमात्रगम्यार्थास्तदन्योऽवभासते ।

तद्दर्शननिषेधार्थं ब्रह्मेत्याह परा श्रुतिः ॥२४०॥

240. In order to prohibit the vision of whatever appears to be different from an object to be understood only from the knowledge of the Ātman, the subsequent Śruti passages declared; 'The Brahman . . .'.

NOTES

To begin with, the aim of this statement is stated thus : It seeks to prohibit the vision of whatever object appears to be different from the self-luminous Ātman.

समस्तव्यस्तता तस्मान्नवेह श्रुतिमानतः ।

अनात्मबुद्धिविषयं यतो यत्नान्निषेधति ॥२४१॥

241. Since the Śruti specifically rejects any object of cognition that is the non-Ātman, therefore, here in this particular matter¹, there is no separation of different parts of what is whole², on the authority of the Śruti.

NOTES

1. The word *yatna* refers to 'repeated negation'. Cf. verses 73 and 213.

2. As to the word *samastavyastatā*, Cf. verse 464 below and Nais 1.73. And TUBV uses the word *samaṣṭivyaṣṭitā* in 2.162 and 174.

कार्यत्मा कारणात्मा च द्वावात्मानौ परात्मनः ।

प्रत्यग्याथात्म्यमोहोत्थौ तन्नाशे नश्यतस्ततः ॥२४२॥

242. The highest Ātman is said to have two parts : One is the Ātman which has the nature of an effect and the other is the Ātman having the nature of a cause———this notion arises from infatuation (i.e. ignorance) of the true nature of the individual consciousness, (and therefore) these two parts (the awareness of them) cease to exist (lit. perish) when that (ignorance) gets destroyed (lit. perishes).

NOTES

This verse answers an argument that could be made thus : 'The highest Ātman consists in the two Ātmans, viz. *kāryarūpa* and *kāraṇarūpa*. Therefore, if one is negated, the other is automatically negated. Where is then the need for repeated negation?'

अपूर्वानपरोक्षेहि कार्यकारणताऽऽत्मनः ।

कुतः प्रमाणात्सम्भाव्या कार्यकारणघस्मरे ॥२४३॥

243. Indeed, on account of the statement in respect of the Ātman (which is) devourer of the cause and effect (relation) that it does not have anything preceding and subsequent to it,¹ on what authority could there be the nature of a cause and of an effect ascribed to the Ātman.

NOTES

One could argue : 'It is not proved that the notion about the Ātman that it is a cause and also an effect has originated from ignorance.' To this argument, is this verse a reply. The means of knowing does not put forth an object which is contradictory to the means of knowing, because the nature of being the means of knowing (*pramāpakatva*, *jñāpakatva*) expects non-contradiction——this is stressed in the second line by the word *hi*.

1. Cf. BU 2.5.19 already cited under verse 229 above.

नैतस्माज्जायते किञ्चिन्नायं जातः कुतश्चन ।

आत्मेत्येवं श्रुतिर्वक्ति कारणादिनिषेधकृत् ॥२४४॥

244. Nothing (else) is born from this (Ātman), nor is this born from anything (else). Thus (lit. this) does the Śruti declare, (thereby) rejecting the cause etc.¹

NOTES

The Śruti, 'The Ātman has nothing preceding . . .' (BU 2.5.19), does not establish the uniqueness of the Brahman, at the most it may point to its being unrelated to anything else. Therefore there is reference to *na jāyate mriyate vā kadācin nāyam bhūtvā bhavitā vā na bhūyaḥ* ((Kath U 2.18), which is the authoritative Śruti (Also cf. BG 2.20).

1. Meaning *kāraṇa*, *kārya* and *kartr*.

ज्ञेयं यत्तत्प्रवक्ष्यामि यज्ज्ञात्वाऽमृतमश्नुते ।

अनादिमत्परं ब्रह्म न सत्तन्नासदुच्यते ॥२४५॥

यस्मात्क्षरमतीतोऽहमक्षरादपि चोत्तमः ।

अतोऽस्मि लोके वेदे च प्रथितः पुरुषोत्तमः ॥२४६॥

यो मामेवमसम्भूदो जानाति पुरुषोत्तमम् ।

स सर्वविद्भूजति मां सर्वभावेन भारत ॥२४७॥

245-247. I am going to declare that which is the object of the knowledge (and) by knowing which one attains (lit. enjoys)

immortality. It is said (i.e. declared in the Śruti) that the highest Brahman is beginningless, and neither existent nor non-existent. Because I am beyond the destructible and beyond also the indestructible, therefore I am widely (*pra*)¹ known as the best of men, both in the world and in the Śruti² as well. He who, unperplexed, knows me as the best of men, is a knower of everything and resorts to me in all objects (viz. with all sincerity), O son of Bharata !

NOTES

In this regard, SP points out that Sureśvara takes the support of the Smṛti. It is citations from BG 13. 12, 15. 18-19.

1. Or 'ever'.
2. CU 8. 12. 13 : *sa uttamah . . . puruṣaḥ* and cf. BG 8. 1. 10. 15, 11. 3 referring to *puruṣottama*.

इति वेदात्मनः साक्षाद्वचनं श्रुतिसम्मतम् ।

सर्वान्तर्यामिणः शौरेर्नोपेक्ष्यं तद्भुवादृशः ॥२४८॥

248. Thus is the direct speech of Śauri¹ who himself is Veda and resides² within all, it is supported by the Śrutis; therefore, it should not be ignored by those³ who are like you.

NOTES

The Smṛti passages cited are stated by the lord who is *sarvajña* and *yathārthavaktā* (viz. *āptavacana*); therefore, they are authoritative.

1. The descendent of Śūra clan; this is Śri Kṛṣṇa of MBh, the lord of the song, called BG.

2. Cf. BG 18.61 : *iśvaraḥ sarvabhūtānāṃ hṛddeṣe 'rjuna tiṣṭhati*; and also the *Māhānārāyaṇa U* 17.5.

3. The followers (i.e. knowers) of the Veda—, Maitreyī was conversant with Vedic lore.

तत्रैवं सति यो मूढः कार्यकारणदर्शनः ।

पराङ्मुखं निदध्यात्तमात्माकृत्स्नत्वदर्शनम् ॥२४९॥

249. This being the case, the Ātman would turn him away

whosoever ignorant sees (the Ātman as consisting in) the cause and the effect, and (therefore) does not see the wholeness¹ (of the Ātman).

NOTES

After stating the general meaning (purport) of *brahma tam parādādyo'nyatrātmano brahma veda kṣatram tam sarvam veda*. (BU 2.4.6) the literal meaning is briefly stated. Though the Ātman is free from duality, a non-discriminative person sees it as the cause and himself as an effect. The notions of a brahmin, a kṣatriya etc. are falsely seen; they take the person who sees such differences away from the human goal.

1. It refers to 'partlessness'. That is to say: The Ātman cannot be divided into *kārya* and *kāraṇa*. Cf. the Śruti passages to the same effect: *virajam brahma niṣkalam* (Mu U 2.2.9), *tad etat pūrṇam apravartī* (CU 3.12.9).

ब्रह्मेति जातिनिर्देशः क्षत्रसन्निधिकारणात् ।

ब्रह्मजातिः परादध्यादसम्यग्दर्शिनं नरम् ॥२५०॥

250. (In the word) *brahman*, there is the mention of the (brāhmin) caste owing to its usage in the vicinity of (the word) *kṣatra*. The (notion of the) brahmin caste would put him away from reality, the one who does not see correctly !

NOTES

This verse reiterates the purport of the previous verse; here Sureśvara supplies the reason to Śāṅkara's commentary, *brahma brāhmaṇajātīḥ*.

यदस्ति तन्न जानाति यन्नेहास्ति तदीक्षते ।

इत्येवमपराधोत्थकोपाविष्टेव बालिशम् ॥२५१॥

कैवल्यात्तं पराकुर्याद्विप्रजातिः पराङ्मुखम् ।

अजातिब्रह्मतत्त्वं मां योज्यं जात्यात्मनेक्षते ॥२५२॥

251-252. The¹ (notion of the) brahmin caste would turn him away from reality², who is ignorant³ that he does not know what⁴ exists and sees what does not exist as if full of anger

which has arisen out of this fault (of his), (with this thought:) this one is indeed looking upon me as of the nature of caste (etc., even if) I am the truth, viz. the Brahman, and one not having a caste.⁵

NOTES

The word *asamyagdṛṣṭi* 'seeing incorrectly' is further explained.

1. The word *viprajāti* means *brahmajāti*. Cf.

*janmanā brāhmaṇo jñeyaḥ saṃskārair dvija ucyate/
vidyayā yāti vipratvaṃ tribhiḥ śrotriya-lakṣaṇam||*

(the *Padmapurāṇa*, *śṛṣṭikhaṇḍa* 43. 134, *Ānss* 131, vol. 3, 1894).

2. The counter-entity of *parākarāṇa* 'taking away', viz. *kaivalya*, is stated.

3. The word *bālīṣa* means 'childish person' or 'one who is not good at discrimination.' (SP) Cf. GK 4.83.

4. 'What exists' refers to *ātman* and 'what does not exist', *anātman*.

5. Context wants the idea of caste; though, by pun, one could understand 'not-born (at all)'.

किं तेन न कृतं पापं चोरेणाऽऽत्मापहरिणा ।

योऽन्यथा सन्तमात्मानमन्यथा प्रतिपद्यते ॥२५३॥

253. What sin is not committed by the thief, who is concealing (the real nature of) the Ātman and looks upon the Ātman as different from what it is?

NOTES

Verse 253 is a quotation from MBh 1.68.26, with the difference that the lines of the original verse have been reproduced here in the reverse order. The second line of the verse explains the concept of the 'theft' involved with respect to the Ātman.

यो न वेदाऽऽत्मयाथात्म्यं वेद जात्यादिमत्तया ।

स यद्यतोऽतो जातिस्तं परादध्याज्जडं नरम् ॥२५४॥

254. If he, who does not know the real nature of the Ātman (in the expression *brahman*), knows the Ātman as having the sense of a caste etc. (and takes it) apart from this *brahman*), then the (notion of) caste would keep him, the foolish, away (from reality).

सर्वदाऽव्यभिचार्येकं व्यभिचार्यर्थबुद्धिषु ।

यत्तत्त्वं गम्यते प्रत्यक्तदेवानात्मवस्तुनः ॥२५५॥

255. That is the individual consciousness which is understood¹ as essence (i.e. basic reality), the ever invariable, the one in all cognition of variable objects of consciousness, (apart) from the non-Ātman.

NOTES

An objection may be: 'If the brahmin caste etc. is understood as different from the Ātman, there would result non-acceptance of monism. If it is taken as identical with the Ātman, it would be what, in your opinion, is the non-Ātman.' Sureśvara gives a reply to this.

1. The word *gamyate* is the same as *pratiyate* or *anubhūyate*.

अन्तर्मेयबलाज्ज्ञानं प्रत्यङ्मोहजसंश्रयम् ।

बाधतेऽव्यभिचारिस्त्वाद् व्यभिचारि तमोन्वयम् ॥२५६॥

प्रत्यक्तमोजयाथात्म्यमात्राभिजनहेतुतः ।

कालादौ तदभावोऽतो न ज्ञानस्यापवादकृत् ॥२५७॥

256-257. The knowledge wards away (i.e. sets away or destroys) (ever-) variable cognition associated with (i.e. marked by) darkness (i.e. ignorance) arising from (i.e. related to) infatuation (i.e. ignorance) regarding the (nature of the) individual consciousness, owing to the strength of the object of knowing within oneself (viz. the Ātman), (and) because it is (ever-) invariable. (Now,) in time etc.¹ there is absence of it² on account of the origin of their nature (as such and such) only in ignorance about the individual consciousness; therefore, (time etc.) is not the remover (i.e. destroyer) of knowledge³

NOTES

If the Ātman (*tat*) is the essence of all, how then is this every other thing (*itara*) set aside as false by knowledge (about the Ātman) arising from the Śruti? Why is the essence (*tat*) itself not set aside by the well-known time etc., since there is no difference between *tat* and *itara*? To such a doubt a reply is given in 257 (after the doubt above.) The discussion from the previous verse is on *bādhaka-bādhya* relation between knowledge, and time etc. Knowledge, which is invariable, is *bādhaka* owing to *antarmeyabala*. On the other hand, time etc., which is variable, cannot be *bādhaka*. It is *bādhya*, although it is knowledge, since it has arisen from ignorance about the Ātman, the unique real.

1. According to some thinkers, time etc. is 'eternal'. These are notions different from the Ātman—they are false since they originate from ignorance about the Ātman. As to time etc., cf. GK 1.6-9 where nine thinkers regarding the origin of creation are enumerated; they regard the origin as *praṇava*, *puruṣa*, *vibhūti*, *svapnamāyā*, *icchā*, *kāla*, *bhoga*, *kriḍa* and *svabhāva*.

2. I.e. *antarmeyabala* mentioned in verse 256; thus it refers to the absence of the Ātman in these others postulated by other thinkers apart from it.

3. This is the same as the Ātman.

न बाह्यजव्यपेक्षं हि ज्ञानं बाधकमिष्यते ।

तयोमिथो विरोधित्वात्सम्यग्ज्ञानं तमोपनुत् ॥२५८॥

258. They do not consider that cognition as the remover of ignorance which is itself dependent on (some other cognition) produced from an object (whose reality is) disproved. Right knowledge is (accepted as) remover of darkness (i.e. ignorance), as the two¹ are mutually opposed.

NOTES

When knowledge (common knowledge) and time etc. are similar in that both have arisen from ignorance, this difference, viz. one is *bādhaka* and the other *bādhya*, is not proper. However, right knowledge is *bādhaka* because it has not arisen from

ignorance and also because it is *antarmeyabala*. For instance, knowledge about silver as silver is *antarmeyabala*, therefore this is right knowledge. But knowledge about conch-shell as silver is not *antarmeyabala* but produced from ignorance, therefore this knowledge is removed (*bādhya*) by right knowledge, viz. *bādhaka*.

1. (a) Right knowledge, viz. that the Ātman is one and only real, and (b) knowledge produced from (i.e. based on) ignorance about the real nature of the Ātman.

[A doubt has arisen accidentally regarding the Ātman as the essence of all.]

आत्मानं यो यथा वेत्ति सम्यग्वा यदि वाऽन्यथा ।

यथादर्शनमेवासौ फलमाप्नोति मानवः ॥२५६॥

इति ब्रह्म तमित्यादेः संक्षेपार्थः समीरितः ।

संसरत्यन्यथाज्ञानात्सम्यग्ज्ञानाद्विमुच्यते ॥२६०॥

259-260. The man who knows the Ātman in a manner which is either right or wrong (lit. otherwise), obtains a fruit according to his perception (of the Ātman). Thus is declared in brief the meaning of the passage *brahma tam*. . . Due to false knowledge, men undergo the transmigratory existence; but due to the right knowledge is one freed.

NOTES

Here concludes Sureśvara's commentary on *brahma tam parādād yo...*

[In the following two verses, Sureśvara comments on the Śruti passage *idam brahmedaṁ kṣetram ime lokā... idam sarvaṁ yad ayam ātmā*.]

अपोदितत्वाद्ब्रह्मादिदर्शनस्येति किं पुनः ।

द्रष्टव्यमित्यतो वक्ति त्वदं ब्रह्मेति नः श्रुतिः ॥२६१॥

261. (One may ask:) "Now that the vision of the brahmin caste etc.¹ is (already) blamed², what again is recommended to be perceived?" Therefore (in order to answer the question) the Śruti text declares to us, '(All) this is the Brahman.'

NOTES

Beginning with a question in the first line, the verse affirms the purport of the Vedānta.

There are three *itis* in this verse (which are marked by (a), (b) and (c) in my translation.) The first *iti* indicates that 'if the vision . . . is thus blamed.' The second *iti* indicates that 'this is the purpose'. And the third *iti* indicates a quotation in my translation.

1. The word 'etc.' indicates *kṣātra*, *lokas*, *devas*, *bhūtas* which are described in BU 2.4.6.

2. Cf. verses 250-254 above.

प्रत्यक्त्वेन य आभाति प्रत्यग्बुद्धिप्रमाणकः ।

तावन्मात्रैकयाथात्म्यं ब्रह्मेत्युक्तं प्रतीयताम् ॥२६२॥

262. "The Brahman is the true nature of only that one who appears (in a body) as the individual consciousness and is the perceiver of the individual's awareness¹ 'I am this'."

NOTES

This is reiteration of the affirmation in the Śruti sentence, in a clearer form.

1. The word *buddhi* is translated here as awareness so as to indicate that there may not be reference to any object outside.

एवं श्रोतव्य आत्माऽयं समाप्तः श्रवणे विधिः ।

अथ मन्तव्य इत्यस्य प्रपञ्चः पर उच्यते ॥२६३॥

263. In this way is this Ātman to be heard. Thus is complete (our discussion of) the injunction in respect of hearing (about the Ātman.) Now hereafter is stated an elaborate explanation¹ of the injunction, viz. '(The Ātman) is to be meditated on'.

NOTES

Verses 263-266 are the introductory part of the discussion on BU 2.4.7. In earlier portion, there was merely a statement or report about the purport of the Śruti passage. Hereafter,

there is reasoning about the same in a manner following the Śruti (*śrutyanusāri tarka*).

1. By elaborate explanation Sureśvara means a detailed examination of the illustration in the passages to follow.

नामरूपादिसम्भिन्नं जगदेतत्कथं पुनः ।

आत्मैव सर्वमित्येवं द्रष्टुं शक्यमिहाञ्जसा ॥२६४॥

264. (Objection :) How could it be logical¹ thus² to look upon (i.e. accept) this entire world, marked by (i.e. made up of) name, form etc., as the Ātman ?

NOTES

The objector means : “The Śruti ‘All this is the Ātman’ is contradictory to the direct perception etc.”

1. Cf. verse 266 below for the word *añjasā* ‘logically’ or ‘clearly’.

2. In the manner shown in the preceding portion which has brought out the purport of the Śruti; cf. *iheti nāmayavahārabhūmir uktā*. (SP)

अव्यावृत्तिसंवादिप्रत्यग्धीव्याप्तिकारणात् ।

एतद्विरुद्धबुद्धीनामेवमेव हि शक्यते ॥२६५॥

265. (Reply :) (This is so possible) because the individual intelligence, (in reality, the individual consciousness itself) which is not variable and not contradictory pervades (all that is namable etc.) Only this¹ (awareness) is possible in the case of those whose intellect is opposed to (the cognition of) this (world mentioned in the previous verse).

NOTES

The first line is a reply to the objection raised in the previous verse. The second line justifies how the first line is a suitable reply. SP holds that this is the reply to the possible objection that the cognition, namely “all this world is only sentiency” does not arise in the case of persons like us. Thus, the verse brings out the contrast between those who are ignorant of reality and those who are the perceivers of it.

1. SP regards that the word *etat* refers to *nāmarūpasambhinna jagaddvaita* and constitutes compound with *viruddha*, meaning 'opposed to this world which is divided into name, form etc.' But it appears that *etat* indicates that which has preceded, viz. *avyāvṛttavisamvādi pratyak*, and so here it refers to *vyāvṛttavisamvādi pratyagdhiḥ*.

व्यभिचारिषु बोधेषु बोधोऽव्यभिचारवान् ।

तत्प्रमाणापितो मेयो ग्रहीतुं शक्यतेऽञ्जसा ॥२६६॥

266. It is possible to understand (lit. grasp) the object of knowing clearly (i.e. logically) when it is grasped on the authority of that cognition which (though) among many that are variable, does not vary.

NOTES

The verse aims to point out that it is possible for persons like us also to understand the uniqueness of the Ātman and sentiency of the world, not only for the wise.

[There is now a discussion on generality and particularity and it will continue up to verse 274.]

यथा दुन्दुभिशब्दत्वसामान्यादुत्थितान्पृथक् ।

नाऽऽवातुं शक्नुयात्कश्चिद्विशेषानसिकोशवत् ॥२६७॥

तद्वद्वात्मातिरेकेण नाऽऽत्मीयार्थो मनागपि ।

यतः समीक्षितुं शक्यस्तेनासौ रज्जुसर्पवत् ॥२६८॥

267-268. Just as nobody would be able to grasp (lit. take up) particular notes which have arisen (from a drum) separately (only) from sound in general, like a sword (which is covered) in a sheath; in the same way, (it is not possible)¹ for the Ātman to grasp even a single object (*manāk*)² apart from the Ātman itself; since (this is so) it is possible to see it (viz. the Ātman) just as (one sees), the rope-serpent.³

NOTES

The words 'when a drum is being beaten' indicate the nature of sound (*śabdatva*) and particular external sounds

which have arisen from the drum are different from it (viz. sound).

1. This is the repetition of *nādātum śakyah*
2. The word *manāk* literally means 'even a little'.
3. The well-known example of *anirvacaniyakhyāti*; cf. verses 236 and 245 above.

विशेषैरन्वयो नापि सामान्यान्वयवत्कचिद् ।

सामान्यस्याविशेषत्वान्नातः सामान्यधीग्रहः ॥२६६॥

विशेषैरन्वयो नो चेदिभाष्यव्यक्तिवन्मिथः ।

खण्डवत्स्याद्विशेषादौ यत्सामान्यमितीरितम् ॥२७०॥

269-270. Nor also (is it possible for the Ātman) to be associated with a number of particularities, like generality, for generality has no particularities. Therefore, there is no understanding (the Ātman) as generality. If there is distinction between generality and particularity as between an elephant and a rat, then what is called generality will be like parts of different particularities.

NOTES

One could argue : 'The generality-particularity relation is found in the illustration, so the same relation should be found in the illustrated; because the illustration is based on equality of both.' In order to refute this, one may assume that (i) generality is identical with particularity, or (ii) generality is different from particularity. But here, (i) is not possible. Like the identity of particularities with generality, identity of particularity with generality cannot be found anywhere in respect of the Ātman, as the Ātman who is the basis of all imaginations is not associated with all particularities which are imagined.

द्विष्टत्वादन्वयस्यापि व्याप्यव्यापकयोर्मिथः ।

व्यतिरेकमतो मुक्त्वा मिथो व्याप्तिर्न सिध्यति ॥२७१॥

271. Since (what we call) association is related to (two) different particulars, the relationship of concomitance between

two particulars cannot be obtained if we leave out the notion of mutual difference (between the pervaded and the pervasive).

NOTES

After refuting in verses 269-270, the assumption that generality and particularity are identical or different, Sureśvara anticipates another possible argument which pertains to *vyāpti* 'concomitance' between the two and proceeds to refute the same. The particular is *vyāpya* (*vyāpta*) 'less pervasive'. But unless there is difference between them, there can be no *vyāpti*. The relation in the form of *vyāpti* has the nature of staying on the two, and it expects the difference. Therefore, there is no *vyāpti* in the absence of any difference between the two, which has been already shown. Nor is there any other relation between the two, the generality-particularity relation is purely imaginary.

प्रत्यग्बोधानिरस्तोऽर्थः प्रत्यग्वन्न हि सिध्यति ।

न चाभावमुखोऽनात्मा नान्वयेनाप्यतो दृशि ॥२७२॥

272. A thing which is not denied by the knowledge of the individual consciousness cannot indeed (be proved to) exist like the individual consciousness. Therefore, there does not exist the non-Ātman whether of the nature of non-existence or as related to the Ātman by *anvaya*.

प्रत्यङ्मात्रैकरूपत्वादात्मा नानात्मतां स्वतः ।

सहते नापि चानात्मा स्वार्थादन्यत्र सिध्यति ॥२७३॥

273. Since the Ātman is merely of the nature of individual consciousness, it does not allow any notion of the non-Ātman of itself. And the non-Ātman also does not get established except in itself.

NOTES

One may raise a doubt that even if the method of *anvayavyatireka* cannot properly be conceived in respect of the Ātman and the non-Ātman, *anvayavyatireka* of the Ātman

with the non-Ātman is possible because of the vicinity of the latter. Sureśvara answers this possible objection in this verse.

अनात्मवस्तुनः प्रत्यक्प्रत्यक्त्वान्नातिरिच्यते ।

पराङ् नान्वेति चाऽऽत्मानं व्यतिरेकात्मकत्वतः ॥२७४॥

274. The individual consciousness cannot exist outside the non-Ātman, because it is always its (i.e. of then non-Ātman) individuality. The non-Ātman (also) cannot co-exist with the Ātman owing to its nature consisting in its difference from the Ātman.

NOTES

This verse shows how the Ātman and the non-Ātman appear to be different and yet co-exist. In reality, one cannot make the Ātman from the non-Ātman. And yet the non-Ātman cannot be shown to be related to the Ātman by the method of *anvayavyatireka*.

दुन्दुभ्यन्वितशब्दस्य सर्वत्राव्यभिचारतः ।

पुंस्प्रयत्नादिलब्धात्मव्यभिचारिरिवात्मसु ॥२७५॥

275. Owing to the invariable occurrence of the sound connected with a drum, (one grasps the common character¹ of the sound) in the notes of varying nature that have come into being thanks to the effort of some man etc.

NOTES

Sureśvara introduces the reason for grasping the common nature of the sound (*śabdatva*); cf. verse 267 above.

1. Cf. *prakṛte vākye sāmānyopādānam iti śeṣaḥ* (SP)

उच्चनीचादिभेदेषु मिथः स व्यभिचारिषु ।

दुन्दुभिध्वनिरेवैकः सर्वत्राव्यभिचारवान् ॥२७६॥

276. The sound of a drum alone is unvarying among all the mutually varying differences such as high, low etc.

NOTES

Sureśvara aims to stress that generality resides among variable different particulars.

दुन्दुभिध्वनिसामान्यव्यतिरेकेण तेन ते ।

निरात्मका न शक्यन्ते तद्विशेषाः समीक्षितुम् ॥२७७॥

277. Therefore, particularities of the notes of a drum are not possible to think of (lit. see) as having their own character (which is) different from the common character, viz. (they are) the sound produced from the drum.

NOTES

Here concludes the comment on *sa yathā dundubher hanyamānasya na bāhyāñ śabdāñ śaknuyād grahaṇāya*.

दुन्दुभिध्वनिरित्येतत्कुतो लब्धं विशेषणम् ।

दुन्दुभेर्ग्रहणेनेति लब्धमेतद्विशेषणम् ॥२७८॥

278. (Objection:) Whence is the distinguishing attribute¹, viz. the sound of a drum, obtained? (Reply:) This distinguishing attribute is obtained from the use of (the word) 'of the drum.'

NOTES

An objector might say : 'In the words, 'when a drum is being beaten . . .', there is mention only of a drum, the distinguishing attribute of the drum, viz. the sound, is not mentioned. What leads you to use it then?' To this Sureśvara replies : It is possible to understand the distinguishing attribute from the remainder of the sentence (*vākyaśeṣa*). Indeed there is no understanding of any particular sound possible when only the stick is mentioned, i.e. the *dundubhi* is uttered; and a sound in general is indicated (*lakṣita*) by the word *dundubhi*, and the distinguishing attribute, i.e. the sound (in general) is to be obtained from the (other) word *hanyamānasya* 'being beaten.'

1. On language level, the word *viśeṣaṇa* means 'adjective' but here it means 'distinguishing attribute'.

दुन्दुभेस्तु रवा एत इत्येवं ग्रहणे सति ।

गृहीतास्तद्विशेषाः स्युस्तेषां तादात्म्यकारणात् ॥२७६॥

279. When there is the grasping (of the sense) that 'these are the notes of the drum', then their particularities are also understood on account of the fact (lit. reason) that they are of the same nature.

भेर्याघातग्रहाद्वाऽपि तद्विशेषग्रहो भवेत् ।

वीरादिरससंयुक्तो दुन्दुभ्याघात उच्यते ॥२८०॥

280. Or,¹ by grasping (or, stopping) the beating of a drum, one can grasp (or, stop) the particularities. The² beating of a drum is always said to be associated with *rasas*³ beginning with *vira*, (viz. the heroic).

NOTES

This is the comment on the sentence, *dundubhyāghātasya vā śabdo grhitah*.

1. Or, by grasping intermediate generality in the form of the common nature of the sound, there is grasping of its particularities. This is an alternative to what is stated in the preceding verse.

2. This is the explanation of 'the beating of a drum'. This sound of a war-drum etc. which is a symbol of one of nine *rasas* 'emotional contents' and is heard in the battle etc. is known as the beating of a drum. When the sound is heard, its particularity, viz. the *rasa*, is also understood because both are of the same nature.

3. The nine *rasas* are *śṛṅgāra*, *hāsyā*, *karuṇā*, *raudra*, *vira*, *bhayānaka*, *bibhatsā*, *adbhuta* and *śānta*; cf. the *Nāṭyaśāstra* 6.15: *śṛṅgārahāsyakaruṇaraudravirabhayānakāḥ | bibhatsādbhutasamjñau cety aṣṭau nāṭye rasāḥ smṛtāḥ ||*

And later the ninth *rasa*, i.e. *śānta*, is added in the *Kāvyaśāstra* 4.4 : *bibhatsādbhutaśāntāś ca nava nāṭye rasāḥ smṛtāḥ ||*

उपलब्धोऽस्ति सन्कुम्भो लम्बोष्ठो देशकालवान् ।

पूर्वपूर्वातिरेकेण नोत्तरोऽर्थोऽनुभूयते ॥२८१॥

एवं चिदन्वयात्सर्वस्तदध्यस्तः समीक्ष्यते ।

सामान्यं वा विशेषो वा चिदसम्बोधहेतुतः ॥२८२॥

281-282. The existing jug (pitcher) with its protruding brim (lit. lip) is always grasped as related to time and place, but a thing of each later (moment and place) is not experienced as apart from it of each previous moment. In the same way, all that on which is superimposed sentiency, whether common character or particular, may be seen on account of its co-existence with sentiency and (also) due to the non-knowing of sentiency.

NOTES

After introducing the illustration, viz. *dundubhes tu grahaṇena dundubhyāghātasya vā śabdo grhītaḥ* (verses 279 and 280), Sureśvara clarifies the illustrated (*dārṣṭāntika*) as he has already done so in verses 267 and 268 above.

The objection may be : 'If that which has to be enlivened (*cetya*) does not exist, apart from sentiency (*cit*), how can one think of *vyatireka* relation between them?' To such an objection does Sureśvara reply in verse 282: In reality there is no difference between *cetya* and *cit*; however, generality etc. are superimposed on *cit* owing to ignorance; and there appears *cetya*.

प्रत्यग्रूपस्य संसिद्धौ प्रतीचोऽन्यत्र कारणम् ।

अनात्मवत्तदप्यात्मविशेषणतया भवेत् ॥२८३॥

283. There¹ is no reason other than the individual consciousness for proving the existence of the individual consciousness and, like² all the non-Ātman, that³ (viz. the cause, the individual consciousness) also would be (established) as the distinguishing attribute of the Ātman.

NOTES

1. A doubt may arise : 'If the non-Ātman appears as the sentient Ātman, that Ātman also would appear as something else like a lamp. Then there would result infinite regress.' To this doubt is there an answer in the first line of this verse.

2. In proving the non-Ātman, there is a certain proof for its existence in the form of a knower.

3. A possible objection is : 'Since you accept something else (viz. a knower etc.) to prove the existence of the non-Ātman, it means that you give up the theory that the Ātman proves all, viz. a knower etc. exist apart from the Ātman.' The reply is that, what proves the non-Ātman, in the form of a knower, can be said to prove the Ātman only as subsidiary, for the Ātman alone has assumed the nature of it. Therefore, there is no abandoning of the theory.

कर्तृत्वकञ्चुको यद्वदात्माऽनात्मानमीक्षते ।

कूटस्थदृष्टिमात्रत्वान्न तथाऽऽत्मानमीक्षते ॥२८४॥

284. As the Ātman which has put on (viz. assumed) a robe¹ of the character of an agent sees any non-Ātman in the same way, it does not see itself, since the Ātman is of the nature of immutable seeing power alone.

NOTES

Sureśvara has the following passage in mind : *yatra hi dvaitam iva bhavati tad itara itaram jighrati . . .* (BU 2.4: 14)

1. On the word *kañcuka*, cf. TUBV 2.314; Nais 3.60; this is a technical term in the Kashmir Śaivism.

संहतो गम्यतेऽनात्मा प्रत्यक्षेण यथा सदा ।

गम्यतेऽसंहतस्तद्वदात्मा प्रत्यग्धियाऽऽत्मना ॥२८५॥

285. As one knows by direct perception that the non-Ātman is ever made up of parts¹, so does one know by the knowing principle within² that the Ātman is not made up of parts.

NOTES

An objection may arise: 'Since it is possible to assume that the Ātman is a knower etc., it may be said that the Ātman cannot be accepted as ever immutable seeing power.' To this is a reply given : As the non-Ātman, which is gross and accompanied by other objects, is known by direct perception, so

is the Ātman, which is subtle and free from action, known by sentiency itself but not by anything outside itself, for that thing does not exist.

1. The word *saṁhata* means 'that which is of the nature of a collection' and is a synonym of the word *saṁghāta*. On this see SK 17: *saṁghātaparārthatvāt triguṇādiviparyayād adhiṣṭhānāt / puruṣo'sti bhokṛbhāvāt kaivalyārtham pravṛtteś ca //* Here Sureśvara refers to the Sāṁkhya notions of *saṁghāta*, *sthūla* and *sūkṣma* which are the basis of the notion of *saṁghāta*. He rejects these notions perhaps on the support of GK 3.10: *saṁghātaḥ svapnavat sarva ātmamāyāvisarjitaḥ /*

2. *pratyagdhi* is the same as *pratyagātman*.

[Verses 286-289 correspond to BUB 2.4.9 : *anekaḍṛṣṭāntopādānam iha sāmānyabahutvakhyāpanārtham / aneke hi vilakṣaṇās cetanācetanarūpāḥ sāmānyaviśeṣāḥ / teṣāṁ pāramparyagatyā yathaikasmin mahāsāmānye' ntarbhāvaḥ prajñānāghane katham nāma pradarśayitavya iti / dundubhiśaṅkhaviṇāśabdasāmānyaviśeṣāṇāṁ yathāśabdatve 'ntarbhāvaḥ / evaṁ sthitikāle tāvat sāmānyaviśeṣavyatirekād brahmaikatvaṁ śakyam avagantum /* Śaṅkara restricts his statement to the reason why many illustrations are given. But Sureśvara goes further, viz. he mentions why it is necessary to state the reason.]

दाष्टान्तिकार्थसम्भित्तेरेकेनैव कृतार्थतः ।

दृष्टान्तेन बहूनां तु किमर्थोक्तिरित्युच्यते ॥२८६॥

286. One might object : 'Since there is no variety in the illustrated, one illustration is sufficient to prove the point; why is it then that the point is stated by means of many illustrations?' —therefore, it is (now) said (in reply) :

NOTES

An objection is raised : 'Though there are many illustrations mentioned such as *dundubhi*, *śaṅkha* and *viṇā* (BU 2.4.7, 8 and 9), the illustrated is one, viz. the Ātman alone exists everywhere. Therefore, merely by one illustration can be proved the illustrated; it is useless to state many illustrations !'

महासामान्य एकस्मिन्विशेषाणामशेषतः ।

विलयः स्यात्कथं नाम व्यावृत्तान्वयरूपिणाम् ॥२८७॥

287. How can there be a merger in one great generality of all the distinguishing attributes which are of the forms mutually distinguished and related ?

NOTES

The reply to the question in verse 286 continues up to verse 289. The seer of the Upaniṣads has employed three different illustrations in order to state the merger, in order, of many distinguishing attributes, generality and both of them into the unique Brahman, which occupies the place of the great generality.

महासामान्यदृष्टान्तो दौन्दुभो रव उच्यते ।

सामान्येतररूपस्य दुन्दुभ्याघात इष्यते ॥२८८॥

288. The sound of a drum is called the illustration for the great generality (and) the beating of a drum is called (lit. desired to be, the illustration) of the form other than generality.

NOTES

Now Sureśvara further clarifies the significance of the three illustrations. By the mention of the drum, the seer points to generality which consists in 'sound' and persists in every particular note that arises from the beating of a drum. It can therefore be the illustration for 'great generality', viz. the Brahman which persists in every particular thing of which it is also the origin. And when the seer refers to the beating of a drum, i.e. to some particular note produced from it, he has in mind some particular note that corresponds to any particular (so-called) product of the Brahman. The *kārya-kāraṇa* relation, 'the relation between the origin and its product(s)' is in both the illustration and the illustrated only the product of imagination, i.e. unreal.

बाह्यानिति तथाचोक्तिविशेषाणां तु केवलम् ।

इत्युक्तार्थप्रसिद्ध्यर्थमित्युदाहरणत्रयम् ॥२८९॥

289. And the expression, '(to) the external (notes) (in the objective case)' refers only to the particular notes. The three

illustrations (are related), therefore, only for establishing the matter (already) stated.

NOTES

In keeping with three illustrations there are three, i.e. particular (*viśeṣa*), species (*sāmānya*, *sāmānyetara*, *avāntarasāmānya*) and genus (*mahāsāmānya*). Particular is some particular note of a drum, species is the sound of a drum (*duṇḍubhiśabdatva*) and genus is sound (*śabdatva*). Hence, as all particular notes of a drum are first understood as 'the sound of a drum' and then (later) as 'sound', so all things are related first to individual consciousness and then to the Brahman.

अन्वयव्यतिरेकाभ्यामभाववपुषाऽथवा ।

सद्ब्रह्म्याद्विरुद्धस्तु न मानेनावसीयते ॥२६०॥

290. Neither by the method of *anvayavyatireka*, nor by (a means in) the form of non-existence is the existent within ascertained. Indeed, (it is understood) only by experience that it exists.

षष्ठ्यर्थसम्भ्रमोऽतः स्याद्द्वितीयासम्भवात्सतः ।

यथा सति तथा विद्यात्प्रतीक्ष्यनन्यमानके ॥२६१॥

291. In the case of the individual consciousness, for (understanding) which there is no means other (than itself), one should get to know in the same way as in the case of an existent thing. (One understands that) there is the impossibility of the meaning conveyed by the genitive¹ owing to the absence of the second existential entity.

NOTES

This is an answer to the following argument which is possible. If particularity and generality are identical, what follows? When there do not exist many individuals, particularity and generality cannot be related. So, the nature of generality and particularity cannot be proved in the case of the Brahman.

1. It is impossible to think of any relation between the Brahman and any other thing, since in grammar the genitive case becomes helpful to express two things existent. In the case of the Brahman the use of genitive case or suffix is very naturally precluded.

सामान्यभेदरूपाणां विशेषाणामशेषतः ।

महासामान्य एकत्र भूयसां स्याद्यथा तथा ॥२६२॥

मिथोभिन्नपदार्थानां नामरूपक्रियात्मभिः ।

स्थूलाद्यनभिसम्बन्धे कार्यकारणरूपिणाम् ॥२६३॥

292-293. As each and every of many particularities which are of the nature of the various generality finally exists together in one great generality, so the different things which are distinct in the nature of name, form and function (and) which are also of the nature of the cause and the effect, (exist finally in the Brahman) which has no connection with the gross etc.

NOTES

The discussion on the illustration is concluded.

सूक्ष्मताभ्यापिते ज्ञेये भूम्यादेरुत्तरोत्तरम् ।

प्रत्यगात्मावसानेषु पूर्वपूर्वप्रहाणतः ॥२६४॥

नामादीनि च तत्त्वानि प्राणान्तानि तथाऽऽत्मनि ।

पूर्वपूर्वप्रहाणेन यान्त्यस्तं केवलावृये ॥२६५॥

294-295. Of (the elements,) earth etc., each preceding one gives up its own nature and is merged into each succeeding one and finally ends in the individual consciousness (which is) the object of knowing and (which is) marked by subtlety. The Truths beginning with name and ending with *prāṇa* get merged into the absolute non-duality, each preceding one giving up (its own nature and merging into the more and more subtle).

NOTES

Sureśvara takes the support of Śaṅkara's view, viz. all modifications merge into the individual consciousness in order

among *prthivi*, *ap*, *tejas*, *vāyu*, *ākāśa*, *ātman*—each succeeding one is more subtle than its preceding one. Sureśvara takes the support of CU. 7.25.1ff., cf. verse 98 above.

दृष्टान्तत्रितयं तावत्स्थितिकाल उदाहृतम् ।

महासामान्यवत्प्रत्यक्सर्वानात्माप्ययः स्वतः ॥२६६॥

[Now follows an explanation of the illustrations in BU 2.4. 10 : *sa yathārdraidhāgner abhyāhitāt prthag dhūmā viniścaranti*, it continues up to verse 303.]

296. As for the three aspects of illustration¹, they are mentioned with reference to the time of sustenance (of other existent objects), since the individual consciousness is itself, like the great generality, the (place of) merger of all the non-Ātman.²

NOTES

1. *dr̥ṣṭāntatritaya* should not be three illustrations but possibly the three aspects of the illustration (viz. *mahāsāmānya*, *sāmānya* (*itara=avāntara*) and *viśeṣa*). On this see note on verse 289.

2. This is a statement of the purport of the three aspects of the illustrations : As the existential particularities, viz. the non-Ātman, culminate into but one existence, the individual consciousness, nothing else remains after the merger into it.

स्थितिकाले यथैकात्म्यं शक्यते ज्ञातुमञ्जसा ।

यथोक्तन्यायतस्तद्वबुत्पन्नावपि शक्यते ॥२६७॥

297. As it is possible to know the real nature of the Ātman (only) clearly at the time of sustenance (of other existent objects), so is it possible to know it at the time of its origin, with the help of the manner (already) stated.

NOTES

Now, Sureśvara states in brief the purport of BU 2.4.10.

धूमार्चिर्विस्फुलिङ्गादि यथापूर्वं विभागतः ।

अग्निरेव न धूमादिभेदः कश्चन लक्ष्यते ॥२६८॥

प्राणलोकाविरप्येवमनात्मा प्राग्विभागतः ।

अपूर्वनिपरानन्तप्रत्यगात्मैव केवलः ॥२९६॥

298-299. Smoke,¹ flame, sparks etc. are, before separation², nothing but fire (and) no distinction like smoke etc. can be observed, in the same way,³ the non-Ātman, like *prāṇa*, world etc. is (before separation) nothing but the individual consciousness which is only one and does not have any preceding, any succeeding and an end.

NOTES

1. This is the literal meaning of the illustration stated in BU 2.4.10.

2. This refers to the origin (*janma*).

3. The illustrated is stated.

एकजातौ हि भिन्नानां शब्दानां शब्द एव तु ।

दृष्टमैक्यं न भिन्नानां भिन्नजातौ तथेति चेत् ॥३००॥

धूमादिभेदभिन्नानां यथैकत्वं विभावसौ ।

नामरूपादिभिन्नानामैकात्म्यं तद्वदात्मनि ॥३०१॥

300-301. If one were to object, 'one notices (i.e. grasps) the identity of different words with word when all of them belong to the same category; whereas, if they belong to the different categories, the case is not the same'; (we reply), 'as particulars like smoke etc. which are distinct from one another on account of distinction (among them) have (but) oneness in (i.e. with) fire, so is there identity of different things like name, form etc. with the Ātman.'

NOTES

In order to prove the other purport of BU 2.4.10 than that stated in verse 297 the objection is raised : "The identity of its distinguishing attributes with the sound can be seen not like the case of things belonging to different categories such as a pot etc. in the fragrant herb etc. Therefore the identity of the world made up of different things such as name etc.

with the Ātman, for they belong to different categories.' The reply refers to both the illustration and the illustrated.

बोधाविशेषादथवा भेद एव न विद्यते ।

कार्यकारणयोस्तत्त्वमुभयोरविलक्षणम् ॥३०२॥

302. Or, perhaps, on account of the non-distinction in realization, the difference (between objects) does not exist. The nature of the two, i.e. the cause and the effect, is not varied in characteristics¹.

NOTES

The mention of 'different things' in the preceding verse implies acceptance of various reality. This is explained away here in the verse. Sureśvara asserts that the different things are nothing but sentiency and, as such, there is no mutual exclusion among them. Indeed, we mention them as causes and their effects; however, they are but one, viz. the individual consciousness.

1. Meaning 'does not have different characteristics'.

स्वार्थसाधनयत्नादीननपेक्ष्योत्सृजेद्यथा ।

धूमादीन्हुतभुक्तद्वत्प्राणादीन्प्रत्यगीश्वरः ॥३०३॥

303. As the fire would give out smoke etc. without any regard for the effort for the means of its own existence, so does the lord¹, the individual consciousness, would give rise to *prāṇa* etc.

NOTES

This verse is in answer to a possible objection which can be stated thus : 'If the individual consciousness is assumed to be a cause, there must be an effect, because one, who acts after having thought about the action, does not undertake any activity that does not bear any effect. Also one cannot do without any means, or the procedure, for attaining the effect. It should therefore follow that the individual consciousness abandons its nature of being one whose desire is fulfilled (*āptakāma*). Indeed, thinking about some effect to follow and

āptakāmatva are mutually contradictory.' Cf. GK 1.9 : *devasyaiṣa svabhāvo 'yam āptakāmasya kā sprhā*.

1. *pratyagiśvara* = *pratyagātman*, since the individual consciousness completely controls the creation around itself.

श्रोतव्यः श्रुतिवाक्येभ्य इत्यत्राऽऽशङ्क्यते यतः ।

प्रयत्नानन्तरः शब्दोऽनित्यः कुम्भादिवद्भवेत् ॥३०४॥

इत्यस्य परिहारार्थं निःश्वासोदाहृतिस्त्वयम् ।

अप्रयत्नोत्थितो वेदो नित्यः स्याद्व्योमवत्स्वतः ॥३०५॥

304-305. Since a doubt may be entertained as regards the Śruti sentences, '(The Ātman) is to be known (lit. heard) from the Śruti passages,' viz. that a word follows the effort (of a speaker) and therefore it would be non-eternal, like any pitcher etc.¹; therefore, in order to answer it away, there is this statement in the Śruti of the *niḥśvāsa* ('breath' of the great being)². Indeed, the Veda has arisen without any effort (of anyone) and is therefore by its own nature (*svataḥ*) eternal, like the sky.

NOTES

The argument proceeds from the notion that the Veda was made by the lord and must, therefore, be non-eternal like the statement of persons (like the Buddha—SP) as it would be dependent on some one's efforts.

1. The axiom is : Whatever is produced is perishable (non-eternal).

2. The refutation is clarified further : The Veda is not non-eternal because the Veda is manifested from the highest without any effort, just as the sky which only seems to be produced as the sky in a pot. In reality, it has ever been existent; there is nothing produced. The Veda is, by nature, eternal.

[The discussion on *niḥśvasita* continues up to verse 312.]

अबुद्धिपूर्वकत्वाच्च यथावत्स्वनुरोध्यापि ।

बुद्धिवन्नाप्रमाणत्वं वेदस्येहोपपद्यते ॥३०६॥

306. Since the Veda is not preceded by any deliberate thinking it cannot be considered as unauthoritative, like human intellect in our world (*iha*), even though it follows (the nature of) the thing as it is¹.

NOTES

This is an answer to the objection regarding *kṛtakatva* of the Veda that leads to its *anityatva*. The adjective of the Veda *yathāvastvanurodhi* would invite further difficulty. It is held that any worldly knowledge is true if and only if it conforms to its object as it is : The truth of this knowledge depends upon the proper grasping (*niścaya*) of the nature of the objects by the intellect (*buddhi*). As such, the information about the Brahman which the Veda gives, must be grasped only by intellect—this constitutes some efforts of someone before the Veda was created. That is to say : We must accept the Veda as non-eternal. Sureśvara firmly asserts that this objection cannot arise, simply because the Veda is the breathing out of the great being—it is not preceded by any thought. Nor is it like any human being's speech. As such, the Veda must be accepted as eternal.

1. I.e. the existent Brahman.

सर्वथा यदनेनोक्तं तच्छ्रद्धेयं बुभूषता ।

भानुप्रकाशवच्छब्दो नित्योऽयं न तु कृत्रिमः ॥३०७॥

307. Certainly whatever is stated by the Veda must be believed by one who wants to know¹; like the light of the sun,² this word (viz. Veda) is eternal and not at all a product.

NOTES

1. SP clarifies *bubhūṣatā* as *bhavitum icchatā*, i.e. by one who seeks for liberation.

2. The second line answers an implied doubt, viz. 'that even though the Veda proceeds like breath, it is still not eternal because it is artificial (*kṛtaka*).' The Veda is just the very nature of the lord, like the rays of the sun. (SP mentions that the Veda is the *vivarta* of the lord.)

पर एवाऽऽत्मनाऽऽत्मानं प्रतिपाद्य नरं श्रुतिः ।
कार्यकारणवत्पीत्वा स्वात्मनेवावतिष्ठते ॥३०८॥

308. (Since) it has been established that the consciousness¹ in a human being is the Ātman², the Śruti is the highest (Ātman itself). (Then having) negated (lit. swallowed/drunken off) this (mundane existence) made up of *kāraṇa* 'cause(s)' and *kārya* 'effect(s)' it stands (firmly established as eternal) on its own (support).

NOTES

One could say : 'If the eternity of the Veda is derived from the manifestation as shown in the previous verse, other things are also eternal because they are the manifestations of the lord, too. A distinct note of the Veda is useless.' Therefore, it is stated as to why the Veda alone can be said to be eternal. Purifying the objective things misconceived by a man by stating that they are identical with the non-dual Brahman and thereby sublating the world by means of knowledge, the Śruti remains as the Brahman. The excellence of the Śruti lies in that it removes the ignorance.

1. Just 'consciousness' (sentiency in a human being).
2. The consciousness (= *paramātmān*).

वेदामात्वप्रसक्तौ वा सर्वमात्मेतिवाक्यतः ।
वेदामात्वापनुत्त्यर्थं स यथेत्यागमः परः ॥३०९॥

309. Indeed if one were forced to consider the Veda as non-authoritative means to knowledge, then after making the statement, 'All (this) is the Ātman' with a view to removing the idea of the Veda as non-authoritative means to knowledge, the latter (part of the) Śruti¹ proceeds in words *sa yathā*.

NOTES

Three different explanations of the purport about the sentence *sa yathārdraidhāgner* have been given in verses 297-308. Now, yet another purport thereof follows.

One might argue that from the sentence, 'All this is the Ātman', it may be concluded that the Veda is not authorita-

tive. Without accepting falsity of all this world, one does not understand it as the Ātman. And when all is false, the Veda also, being included in all, is false and therefore not a means of knowing, like the appearance of smoke certainly leading to knowing of fire. In order to refute this argument, Sureśvara points to the Śruti, *sa yathā* . . .

1. On the word *āgama*, cf. note on the verses 6-7.

तदयुक्तं पुमर्थस्य तदुक्त्येव समाप्ततः ।

सर्वोपायोऽनुपायः स्यादुपेयावसितौ यतः ॥३१०॥

स्वोपेयार्थप्रसिद्धौ च नोपायानामुपायता ।

न चोत्सर्गापवादोऽपि साक्षाद्वेदग्रहभवात् ॥३११॥

310-311. It is not proper (to say that the Veda is not the authoritative means to knowledge), because it has been declared by the Veda itself that the end of human life is obtained (only) by the (knowledge of the) Vedic statement. When the purpose of a means (viz. Veda) is served, it does not (any more) remain a means. And the means do not have the nature of the means when the thing to be obtained by them is well-known. And there is not an exception to the general rule, (in the case of the Veda also), on account of the direct hearing (i.e. understanding) of the Veda.

NOTES

A means (*upāya*) is possible when one still has something to accomplish (*upeya*). Then once *upeya* is accomplished, a means (*upāya*) cannot remain a means any more. On verbal level, Veda is a means (*upāya*) and liberation is *upeya*. Once one is aware of the oneness of the Brahman and the Ātman, Veda cannot remain a means any more. One might object : 'If all is the Ātman, Veda which is included in all is also the Ātman. How can the Veda be a means ?' A reply is : All is the Ātman is the thought which occurs later. As long as one does not become aware of the oneness, all is not the Ātman and Veda is a means.

बालोन्मत्तोक्तिवच्चाहं वक्तुं दूषणमादरात् ।

जिह्मेमि बहुशोऽत्रोक्तौ तस्मादेवोपरम्यते ॥३१२॥

312. On account of my great regard (for the Vedānta) I feel reluctant in stating the faults (that are) in many ways (or, at many times) attached to the word of the Veda (by others), in the manner of the speech of a child (ignorant one) or of a mad man. Therefore, I stop talking further.

NOTES

On account of my having made statement several times in this regard I stop talking.

[Sūreśvara now proceeds to comment on BU 2.4.10 : *yad ṛgvedo yajurvedaḥ sāmavedo 'tharvāṅgīrasa itihāsaḥ purāṇam vidyā upaniṣadaḥ ślokaḥ sūtrāṇy anuvyākhyānāni vyākhyānāny asyaivaitāni niḥśvasitāni*. The comment runs up to verse 326.]

ऋग्वेदादिगिरोच्यन्ते ऋग्यजुःसामलक्षणाः ।

अथर्वाङ्गिरसस्तद्वन्मन्त्राः स्युर्ब्राह्मणोद्धृताः ॥३१३॥

313. By the words *ṛgveda* etc. should be understood *mantras* which are characterized (by names) R̥g, Yajur, Sāma and Atharvāṅgīras¹ as well (and) which are quoted in the Brāhmaṇa texts.

NOTES

1. *atharvāṅgīras* denotes 'the two elements which make up the Atharvaveda'; see A. A. MACDONELL and A. B. KEITH, *Vedic Index*, Delhi : Motilal Banarsidass, 1958, vol. 1, p. 18, also BLOOMFIELD, *Hymns of the Atharvaveda*, pp. xviii ff.

इतिहासादिसम्भेदभिन्नं ब्राह्मणमेव तु ।

ग्राह्यमत्र प्रसिद्धस्तु नेतिहासादिरिष्यते ॥३१४॥

314. But, in this respect¹, by the words (i.e. prose compositions) marked as variety of Itihāsa (narratives) etc.² only Brāhmaṇa is to be understood. Indeed, it is not intended to refer to the well-known *itihāsas*³.

NOTES

1. The word *atra* refers to the sentence under discussion, viz. BU 2.4.10

2. Itihāsa etc. refers to narratives in the Brāhmaṇa texts such as *ākhyāna*, *nārāśaṃsi* etc. that are related to the *mantras* of Ṛg etc. Refer to the eight-fold Brāhmaṇa as understood in BUB (pp. 330-331), i.e. *itihāsa*, *purāṇa*, *vidyā*, *upaniṣad*, *śloka*, *sūtra*, *anuvyākhyāna* and *vyākhyāna*.

3. MBh, which is called *itihāsottama*, and the *Rāmāyaṇa* are meant here.

अभिधेयार्थजन्मापि ह्यभिधासम्भवोक्तिः ।

द्रष्टव्यं नाभिधानं स्यादभिधेयमृते क्वचित् ॥३१५॥

315. One should understand (lit. see) that the thing to be signified originates indeed from a statement which originates from (the function called) expression. Never could there be any expression without (there being) what is to be expressed.

NOTES

The idea is perhaps to explain *yasya niḥśvasitam*. ...That is to say : If there did not exist the Great Being, there could be no (power of) expression, no expression and there could not be any such things as Ṛg etc. The Brahman is *sarvaśaktimat* and *cit*, so it is capable of utterance. Therefore, there is the rise of words and the signification, i.e. the signified.

मन्त्रब्राह्मणयोर्वेदनामधेयत्वकारणात् ।

ऋग्वेदादिगिरा तस्मान्मन्त्रब्राह्मणयोर्ग्रहः ॥३१६॥

यथासिद्धमितिहासपुराणाद्यपि गृह्यते ।

लोकप्रसिद्धिमुल्लङ्घ्य यतोऽन्यायोऽन्यथाग्रहः ॥३१७॥

316-317. Since the *mantra* and the Brāhmaṇa have the name *veda*, therefore, one grasps (i.e. understands) by the word *ṛgveda* etc. the *mantras* and the Brāhmaṇa (texts). Also Itihāsa, Purāṇa etc., as they exist¹, are also understood here, even going beyond the popular usage (of the word); understanding them in some other way is improper².

NOTES

1. That is already declared by the Śruti as the breathing out of the Great Being, i.e. they are already existent.

2. *anyāyyo'nyathāgrahaḥ* is Sureśvara's objection to Śaṅkara's explanation of the words *itihāsa* etc., i.e. he considers it as *durukta*.

इतिहासपुराणाभ्यां वेदं समुपबृंहयेत् ।

इत्यादिमनुनाऽप्युक्तं कथं तत्त्यागमर्हति ॥३१८॥

318. Even¹ Manu says, "One should amplify (i.e. support/explain) the Veda by means of Itihāsa and Purāṇa."² How does it deserve to be given up ?

NOTES

1. The word *api* is used to indicate that Atri has said the same thing. (SP)

2. *itihāsapurāṇābhāyāṁ vedam samupabṛṁhayet/
bibhety alpaśrutād vedo mām ayaṁ prahariṣyati* //

This verse cannot be found in the *Manusmṛti*, but one finds it in MBh, i.e. 1.1.204. However, Sureśvara ascribes it to Manu. This means tradition held this as an opinion of Manu, the time-honoured authority on Vedic learning. Cf. *yan manur avadat tad bheṣajam bheṣajatāyāḥ*.

इतिहासपुराणादेर्वेदमूलत्वकारणात् ।

प्रामाण्यं नान्यथा तस्य प्रामाण्यमुपपद्यते ॥३१९॥

319. Since Itihāsa and Purāṇa etc. have their source (lit. roots) in the Veda they are authoritative; otherwise their authoritativeness would not stand to reason.

NOTES

If the meaning of the Veda is clarified by Itihāsa etc., it would bring about an undesirable result, viz. that the Veda is not independently authoritative. Such an argument cannot be entertained. The verse gives reason for the same. The Veda is the basis or cause of Itihāsa etc. That is to say; if one ascertains the meaning of the Veda from words of some

expounder, it would not mean that the Veda gives up its independent authoritativeness.

From significance, meaning is ascertained. Itihāsa etc. are taken by the learned to be based on the Vedic tradition (*vedamūlatva*) and therefore, if one entertains a doubt about a Vedic passage it should not mean that the Vedic passage is unauthoritative. One should interpret Vedic passages in the light of interpretation supplied by Itihāsa etc. SP refers to *na hi vyākhyānato viśeṣapratipattiḥ*; on this see the *Paribhāṣendu-śekhara of Nāgojibhaṭṭa*, Poona: BORI, 1962, p. 1.

प्रत्यक्षवेदवचनविरुद्धं तेषु यद्वचः ।

बुद्धवाक्यादिवत्तादृक्त्याज्यं श्रुतिविरोधतः ॥३२०॥

320. Whatever statement in them would be noticed as directly opposed to the Vedic statement, like the statements of (Gautama) Buddha, it is to be given up on account of its contradiction to the Śruti statement.

NOTES

Here is a reason given for accepting the Itihāsa etc. as authoritative even like the Veda; these are not opposed to the Śruti statements. Sureśvara affirms his opinion that anything opposed to the Veda cannot be authoritative and whatever follows the Śruti is, on the other hand, authoritative.

न चेश्वरातिरेकेण कश्चित्त्रष्टाऽभ्युपेयते ।

इतिहासपुराणादेस्तदन्यस्येह कार्यतः ॥३२१॥

321. Further, (in the case) of Itihāsa and Purāṇa no creator other than the Īśvara¹ is accepted in our view on the ground that they are some effect.

NOTES

1. Īśvara = the Lord.

कारणत्वं प्रमाणेन यस्य साक्षाद्विनिश्चितम् ।

अपि तत्कार्यकर्तृत्वे तदेवाभ्युपगम्यते ॥३२२॥

322. That whose nature as the cause is ascertained directly by some means of knowing is itself accepted as the creator of the effect (i.e. its own effect) also.

NOTES

The idea is that Vyāsa is the author of MBh, Purāṇa etc. but the Brahman is the creator of Vyāsa. Therefore finally, the Brahman is the creator of MBh.

As to SP's quotation from MBh (appendix 2.2 pr. appendix 3. 2 pr.), in the critical edition of MBh this verse is given in an appendix which records passages that are left out by the editor, on the ground that they are later additions. At least in Ānandagiri's age, these passages were there in MBh.

बीजमेवाङ्कुरादीनां यथा कारणमिष्यते ।

अङ्कुराद्यात्मना तद्वद्बीजमेव तु कारणम् ॥३२३॥

323. As a seed is held to be the cause of a sprout etc., so is that seed itself understood as the cause of the nature of the sprout etc.

NOTES

This is not a strictly logical argument; that which seed produces, viz. sprout (1), in its turn produces seed (2).

आद्यन्तयोर्यतो बीजं प्रत्यक्षेणावसीयते ।

तस्मात्तन्मध्यकार्येषु बीजमेवास्तु कारणम् ॥३२४॥

324. As a seed is noticed by direct perception, both in the beginning and in the end, therefore, in the middle stage of the effects also let the seed be (understood as) the cause.

NOTES

The illustration of the seed-sprout relation depending on the deciding factor is elaborated; cf. GK. 2.6 : *ādāv ante ca yan nāsti vartamāne 'pi tat tathā* /

न च वेदोक्तितो वेदः श्रद्धेयार्थ इहेष्यते ।

कित्वमानं त्वहेतूनां वेदवाक्येष्वसम्भवात् ॥३२५॥

325. It is not intended here to state that the Veda has to be believed in, (only) on (the basis of) the statement in the Veda, but (it is intended to state) that there is no possibility of (stating) any reasons to determine the unauthoritativeness of the sentences of the Veda.

NOTES

The purport of this verse is to point out that the Śruti is authoritative owing to the fact that it is not and cannot be opposed by any other means of knowing.

प्रामाण्यं वेदवाक्यानां न च मानान्तराश्रयात् ।

अक्षादेरपि मानत्वं यथोक्तादेव कारणात् ॥३२६॥

326. That the sentences of the Veda are authoritative does not follow from one's resorting to other means of knowing. Direct perception etc.¹ are also accepted as authoritative means of knowing just for the reason mentioned before.

NOTES

yathoktakāraṇa may refer to *amānatvāhetūnām asaṁbhavāt*. Then, ordinarily, means of knowing are considered authoritative, since there is no opposition to them by any other means. Therefore, let one not suppose that the words of Veda are unauthoritative because they use the same word as in common parlance. In reality, the Veda signifies that which cannot be understood by any other means though the words of Veda may be the same as those of the daily speech.

1. For the word *akṣādi*, cf. note (2) on verse 154 above.

प्रज्ञानव्यतिरेकेण यथैव स्थितिसर्गयोः ।

वस्त्वन्तरं न संभाव्यं प्रलयेऽपि तथोच्यते ॥३२७॥

327. As it is impossible to conceive of (i.e. accept) any other thing over and above (i.e. beside) knowledge (i.e. Brahman), which is supposed to be existing at the time) of the creation and sustenance (of the world), so it is said to be there at the time of the merger also.

NOTES

This is a comment on *kiṁ cānyan na kevalam sthityutpattikālayor eva prajñāna-vyatirekeṇābhāvāj jagato brahmatvaṁ pralaya-kāle ca* (BUB, p. 332), which explains the introductory part of BU 2.4.11 : *sa yathā sarvāsām apām. . .*

[Now follows a comment on *sa yathā sarvāsām apām samudra ekāyanam evaṁ sarveṣām gandhānām nāsike ekāyanam evaṁ sarveṣām rasānām jihvaikāyanam evaṁ sarveṣām rūpānām cakṣur ekāyanam evaṁ sarveṣām śabdānām śrotram ekāyanam evaṁ sarveṣām saṁkalpānām mana ekāyanam evaṁ sarveṣām vidyānām hṛdayam ekāyanam* (BU 2.4.11) ; it continues up to verse 377 below.]

विभिन्ननामरूपाणां सरितां सागरो यथा ।

अभिन्ननामरूपैकः प्रलयोऽयनमेकता ॥३२८॥

स्पर्शादिज्ञानभेदानां त्वगाद्येकायनं यथा ।

स्वान्ते त्वगादयस्तद्वद्बुद्धौ च मनसस्तथा ॥३२९॥

कर्मक्षयात्तथा बुद्धिः कारणत्वेन तिष्ठति ।

एष साधारणस्तावत्प्रलयोऽबुद्धिपूर्वकः ॥३३०॥

328-330. As the ocean having but one (and the same) name and form is the merger¹ (i.e. the meeting-point) of rivers which have different names and forms———(and) merger means oneness———so is the skin etc. the one meeting point of different knowledge such as touch etc. And the skin etc. also (get merged) into their own end² (viz. *manas*) and so also is (the merger of) *manas* into the intellect. In the same way, intellect (also) remains in the form of cause,³ when action gets destroyed. This is the common⁴ (nature of) merger (everywhere) and it is not preceded by any deliberate thinking.

NOTES

1. The word *pralaya* has two senses, (i) 'the act of merger' and (ii) 'the point of merger' (the place where the merger takes place). In order to set aside the sense (i) the word *ayana* meaning (ii) is used. And the word *ekatā* 'oneness' is used in order to obviate the idea of void—oneness means becoming 'one'.

2. The word *svānte* means 'in their own . . .', viz. *manas*.
3. *kāraṇatvena=kāraṇātmanā* (SP), it takes the form of *prakṛti*.
4. Referring to two types of *pralaya* : *sādhāraṇa* and *asādhāraṇa*. This verse refers to the first variety of *pralaya*.

प्रत्यग्याथात्म्यविज्ञानाद्वस्तुवृत्तानुरोधतः ।

प्रलयोऽज्ञानविध्वंसाद्यस्त्वसौ बुद्धिपूर्वकः ॥३३१॥

331. But that merger, which (results from) the destruction of ignorance, the knowledge of the real nature of the individual consciousness and is owing to following (i.e. accepting) the real nature of the thing (viz. the Brahman), is preceded by some deliberate thinking.

NOTES

This verse refers to the second type of merger, viz. the uncommon merger (*asādhāraṇa* and *buddhipūrvaka*).

Cf. *evam eva khalu soṃyemāḥ sarvāḥ prajāḥ sati saṃpadya na viduḥ sati saṃpadyāmaha iti / ta iha vyāghro vā simho vā vṛko vā varāho vā kiṭo vā pataṅgo vā daṃśo vā maśako vā yad yad bhavanti tad ābhavanti* / (CU 6.9.2-3), which intends that all beings get merged into the highest and again come into existence at the time of creation. Also cf. CUB on the same and BSB 2.1.9.

अग्निरेकायनं यद्वत्सर्वासां सरितां तथा ।

त्वग्गोचराणां स्पर्शानां त्वगेवैकायनं परम् ॥३३२॥

332. As the ocean is the one meeting-place of all the rivers, so is the skin the one meeting-place of all the touches which are the objects of the skin.

स्पर्शशब्देन विषयस्त्वग्ग्राह्योऽत्राभिधीयते ।

तथा गन्धादिशब्देन घ्राणादिविषयो मतः ॥३३३॥

333. The word *sparśa* (here) expresses (only) the object grasped by the skin. Similarly, by the words *gandha* etc. are to be understood the objects of the nostrils etc.

गन्धादिसंहतिः पृथ्वी रसान्तानां तथा जलम् ।

तेजस्त्रयाणां वायुस्तु द्वयोरेकात्मकं नमः ॥३३४॥

334. Earth is the collection of (five objects such as) the smell etc., water (is likewise the collection of four objects) ending with the taste. Fire is (the collection) of three. As for wind, it is of two and ether (is) of the nature of one.

NOTES

Here is introduced the merger of the elements.

Element (<i>bhūta</i>) : Property (<i>guṇa</i>)	
<i>prthivī</i>	: <i>śabda, sparśa, rūpa, rasa, gandha</i>
<i>ap</i>	: <i>śabda, sparśa, rūpa, rasa</i>
<i>agni</i>	: <i>śabda, sparśa, rūpa</i>
<i>vāyu</i>	: <i>śabda, sparśa</i>
<i>ākāśa</i>	: <i>śabda</i>

एवं लक्षणतः पञ्च भूतान्येतानि निर्दिशेत् ।

मूर्तामूर्ताविष्करणं गुणाविष्कृतिरिष्यते ॥३३५॥

335. From this explanation, one should understand (the nature of) these (five) elements. (And) their manifestation of concrete and abstract¹ are understood as the manifestation of their *guṇas* 'properties'.

NOTES

The five elements are collection of five *guṇas* 'properties' beginning with the smell and ending with the sound which

increase and decrease as shown in the previous verse. The rise of the five elements from their own causes is nothing but the manifestation of the smell etc. from the primordial cause, in ascending order. And the merger of the element into a subtler element is not else than the merger of *guṇas*.

1. Among the five elements, ether is *amūrta* and the rest are *mūrta*.

संहतोक्तविशेषाणां भूतानां कारणात्मता ।

तत्र स्पर्शग्रहेणैव वायोरंशोऽत्र गृह्यते ॥३३६॥

तेजसस्तु तृतीयांशश्चतुर्थोऽपि तथा भुवः ।

पञ्चमस्तद्गुणैर्भेदस्तथा स्पर्शं समीक्ष्यताम् ॥३३७॥

गन्धादिषु तथा योज्यो भेदोऽयं गुणभेदतः ।

पृथिव्यंशस्य बाहुल्यात्कर्कशः स्पर्श उच्यते ॥३३८॥

शीतश्च पिच्छिलश्चापि बाहुल्यात्स्पर्श इष्यते ।

भूयस्त्वात्तेजसश्चोष्णः सुकुमारस्तथा मरुत् ॥३३९॥

बाहुल्यादिति विज्ञेयो यथोक्तगणसंश्रयात् ।

ध्वस्ताशेषविकारस्य ब्रह्मणोऽविद्ययाऽऽत्मनः ॥३४०॥

स एष परिणामः स्यात्तेजोवन्नाद्युपक्रमः ।

स्पर्शनाद्यात्मनाऽप्यन्तं परं काठिन्यमागतः ॥३४१॥

336-341. The¹ objects (lit. elements), which possess these (already) mentioned distinct properties collected together, have the nature² of the cause. Among these (elements) is understood the element of wind by the mere mention of touch. And the third is that of the fire; the fourth, of water and the fifth, of earth. Again distinction (of five elements) in touch may be noticed by means of (the distinction of) their *guṇas* : So also, this distinction (of the five elements) as regards the smell etc. has to be associated with the difference of *guṇas*, thus³ : The touch is stated to be rough owing to the abundance of the earth (element in an object). (Again), touch is taken to be cool and

slippery when there is abundance of the water (element in an object). The wind (also) is taken to be hot or pleasant when there is abundance of fire (element in an object). Thus this mention of the transformation having its beginning in (the mention of) fire, water, food etc. should be (treated as) of the Brahman⁴, whose entire modification is denied (lit. destroyed), (as possibly existing), owing to its basis on the *guṇas* already stated (and) the ignorance (about the real nature) of the Ātman (Jīvātman) — (this modification) has attained to (lit. has come to) extreme grossness (etc.)⁵, owing to its (having) *guṇas* touch etc.

NOTES

1. Here in SP the reference is to *guṇa* which occurs in the previous verse. It is that which would give rise to the doubt. The doubt expresses a possible interpretation of verse 335 (last line) according to the Vaiśeṣika theory. The first line of the verse 336 is the answer to it.

2. The theory of causation which Sureśvara accepts (for the sake of argument, not in reality) resembles that of the Sāṅkhya. Therefore all these *guṇas*, together in a substance assume the forms of the cause and the effect. Thus, Sureśvara rejects the *asatkāryavāda* of the Vaiśeṣika. In other words, the elements can exist in both the forms, the cause and the effect — this explains their *jani* and *laya*.

3. One could entertain a doubt: 'Since there is a mention in the Śruti (only) of *guṇas*, viz. touch etc., it intends to refer to the merger of the elements which have not been mentioned.' This doubt is answered in the next two sentences. The mention of *guṇa* is indicative of *guṇin*. This is done only after accepting the difference of *guṇa* and *guṇin* in normally spoken language of every day life. It is not real.

4. This sentence is an answer to the doubt: 'There is the transformation of the highest in the form of the earth etc. which is of the nature of the touch etc.' Sureśvara thinks that without ignorance about the nature of the Brahman and / or of the Ātman (= Jīvātman) which is inner and immutable, such a talk of transformation is impossible — the world is 'caused' by ignorance of the Brahman.

5. Cf. SP's mention of the two types of hardness (etc.) — One is *sthūla* (gross) and the other *sūkṣma* (subtle). (Etc.) is necessary in view of *sparsādi*, 'touch etc.' *kāṭhinya* is literally 'hardness'; however, it is translated as grossness in view of Sureśvara's use of the adjectives *kāṭhina* and *svaccha* as pair in verse 344 below.

उद्भूतस्पर्शविज्ञानस्त्वचा तस्य समागमात् ।

स्पर्शभेदपरिज्ञानं ततोऽभिव्यज्यते दृशेः ॥३४२॥

342. (This transformation wherein) that knowledge of the touch has arisen is owing to its (i.e. of the Ātman)¹ association with the skin, (for) the complete knowledge of distinct touches² is said to be of the seer (= the Ātman³) from (i.e. by means of) that (i.e. the skin).

NOTES

How is the transformation of the touch etc. proved? When one has got a knowledge in the form 'This is a touch' etc., that cognition results from the association of the Ātman with the skin etc. SP's explanation of the compound *udbhūtasparśa-vijñānaḥ* is not satisfactory. One can take the compound as an adjective of the *pariṇāma* (mentioned in earlier verse) and *tasya* as *ātmanaḥ*.

1. The Ātman in verse 340—this association is rooted in ignorance. See for that verse 344 below.

2. Cf. *sparsādibhedavijñānam* in the next verse as further support.

3. Alternatively translated as; 'the complete knowledge of distinct touches is manifested to the seer.'

स्पर्शादिभेदविज्ञानं स्यादचेतनमेव तु ।

स्पर्शादिवत्परार्थत्वात्स्वार्थं तन्न तु साक्षिवत् ॥३४३॥

343. Indeed¹, the knowledge of distinct (objects), touch etc., is insentient², because it is for the sake of another³, as (is) the touch etc. (for another), it is not for its own sake, accompanied (as it is) by the witness (Ātman)⁴.

NOTES

This is the refutation of some opponent's view that even if this is not inferred, it is known by a witness, because it is self-luminous.

1. The word *tu* is used for emphasis.
2. Sureśvara follows the Sāṃkhya theory of cognition.
3. Cf. SK 17 which has been already quoted in the note on verse 285 above.
4. The construction is thus: *sākṣivat (sat) tat (= sparśā-dibhedavijñānam) na svārtham*.

अतीव कठिनं ज्ञानं त्वचातोऽस्य समागमात् ।

मनसा तस्य संयोगे ततः स्वच्छैव धीर्भवेत् ॥३४४॥

344. The very gross¹ (of the Ātman), (arises) on account of its association with the skin (etc.). (And) when it comes into contact with *manas*, there arises only subtle knowledge.

NOTES

The idea of *laya*, as mentioned in notes on 336-341, is explained here further. One takes *jani* and *laya* according as one's knowledge is gross or subtle.

1. the word *kāṭhina* means *sthūla* or 'gross' and the word *svaccha*, *sūkṣma* or 'subtle'; (as noted earlier in the note on verse 341 above.)

ततोऽपि सूक्ष्मं विज्ञानं बुद्धिसंयोगजं भवेत् ।

यावद्बुधिरसंव्याप्तिः शरीरे तावदेव तु ॥३४५॥

बुद्धेः सामान्यवृत्त्येह व्याप्तिरादेहसंक्षयात् ।

चैतन्याभासवत्प्राणस्तां वृत्तिं व्याप्य तिष्ठति ॥३४६॥

345-346. Yet¹ subtler knowledge would occur (to the Ātman) owing to its association (only) with the intellect. The intellect wholly pervades a body by its common function so long as there is pervasion by blood all through the body until the fall of it. (And) the *prāṇa*,² which has the appearance of sentiency, exists (in the body), pervading the (common) function (of the intellect).

NOTES

1. The same knowledge would be subtler because the intellect is subtler than *manas*.

2. *prāṇa* is one of the winds in the body. It resembles sentiency in the body because of their *avinābhāva*. One should remember here the common function of the three-fold inner-organs, *prāṇādīdhāraṇa*. Cf. SK 29 referring to the common function of the three inner-organs: *sāmānyakaraṇavṛttiḥ prāṇādyā vāyavaḥ pañca*.

अकार्यकारणस्त्वात्मा तमपह्नुत्य तिष्ठति ।

कण्टकादिसमायोगे शरीरे विक्रिया यदा ॥३४७॥

तदाऽधर्मादितो दुःखं विक्रियातोऽभिजायते ।

देहैकदेशगं दुःखं विशिनष्टि स्वदेशगाम् ॥३४८॥

धियं तद्देशदुःखित्वाद्दुःखित्वं जायते धियः ।

तस्यावच्छिन्नये वृत्तिर्दुःखभूत्यैव जायते ॥३४९॥

347-349. As for the Ātman, which is neither a cause nor an effect, it remains after covering that *prāṇa* which is mentioned just in the previous verse. If there is a change in a body when there is a contact of it with a thorn etc., then there is pain (on the part of the Ātman) due to the (so-called) demerit etc.¹ consequent to the change (in the body). The pain² in one part of the body qualifies the intellect belonging to that part, (for) the condition of the misery of the intellect arises from the pain of that part (of the body). (And) for the eradication of (the condition of) that (misery), the function (activity of the intellect) results only from the abundance (i.e. intensity) of the misery.

NOTES

1. A pun on the word *adharma*. It means (i) demerit (as commonly understood) and (ii) (in reality) not its property—this latter points to unreal pain.

2. This sentence is an answer to the possible doubt : 'When misery has arisen in one part of the body, how can one say that misery rests on the intellect?' The reply is: Since the intellect

pervades the entire body, therefore, misery in any part of the body stays on the intellect also.

भोक्तृभोग्याभिसंबन्धस्तन्निमित्तोऽयमात्मनः ।

बुद्धेः सेयमहंवृत्तिर्दुःखावच्छेदिनी सती ॥३५०॥

परिच्छिनत्ति बोद्धारं बोद्धाऽप्याभासमात्मनः ।

न बहिविक्रियां मुक्त्वा देहेऽहंवृत्तिसंभवः ॥३५१॥

350-351. This (commonly known) relation of the enjoyer and the enjoyable (for) the Ātman is caused by that intellect.¹ This (commonly known) function of Ego which belongs to the intellect, being the encompasser of misery, encompasses the knower and the object of knowing also (encompasses) its own semblance.² There³ does not arise the function of Ego in a body without there being any external change.

NOTES

Again, Sureśvara talks in terms of the Sāṃkhya theory of cognition, nevertheless, showing that there is an important difference.

1. Sureśvara does not accept that the Ātman is the natural enjoyer.

2. It is *ahamkāra* 'Ego' (inseparable from *buddhi*) that is responsible for experience — it is (by mistake) understood for the Ātman and *vice-versa* and therefore these are statements like 'I know' etc.

3. This sentence points out how the function of Ego and a change in the body (*not in the Ātman* in anyway) are simultaneous and also how there is an error of identifying the Ego and the Ātman as one. This is amplified in the following verses.

स्वस्थेन्द्रियमनोबुद्धेर्नैवाहमिति वीक्ष्यते ।

पुत्राभिमानजे त्वस्मिन्न देहांशविशिष्टता ॥३५२॥

352. When (a person's) sense-organs, *manas* (and) the intellect are (in fact) in their own form,¹ there is not seen the Ego (functioning). However, when this (i.e. the Ego) is noticed

(to function) by attachment to a son (etc.), it (i.e. Ego) is then qualified as being the part of some particular body².

NOTES

1. That is, they are not affected by any external object of misery or joy — e.g. by a prick of a thorn or some soft touch.

2. This is in contrast with the first line. The Ego can persist even without an external object, since it may retain some attachment to a son etc.

तत्तद्वस्तु समुद्दिश्य दुःखित्वं तत्र मानिनः ।

अज्ञानादभिमानोऽयं बुद्ध्यादौ विषयावधौ ॥३५३॥

353. Referring¹ to different objects a person is stricken by misery when he regards them as his. (And)² the notion, (this is) mine (i.e. Ego³) is due to ignorance in respect of the intellect and insofar as the (external) objects (exist).

NOTES

1. One who possesses *abhimāna*, viz. the notion 'this is my son etc.' with reference to a wide range of objects, has misery. Further, it is then indirectly superimposed on the witnessing consciousness within.

2. This explains that misery arises from the misconception such as 'this is mine', which really the witnessing consciousness does not entertain.

3. *abhimāna* = *ahamkāra*. Cf. SK 24: *abhimāno 'hamkāraḥ*

न तु निःसङ्गकूटस्थप्रतीचः स्यादहंमतिः ।

न कार्यप्रलयो दृष्टो यस्मादन्यत्र कारणात् ॥३५४॥

त्वगारम्भकसामान्यं त्वगिराऽतोऽत्र गृह्यते ।

कार्यत्वान्नेन्द्रियेष्वेव विषयप्रलयो भवेत् ॥३५५॥

354-355. The thought 'I am (this or that)' could not be on the part of the individual consciousness which is free from all attachment and immutable,¹ since merger of an effect is not seen elsewhere than in the cause.² Therefore, the word skin³

(etc.) is understood here, in the sense of the common origin of the skin (etc.), for⁴ the merger of the objects would not be in the sense-organs inasmuch as they (themselves) are of the nature of an effect.

NOTES

1. This is a reply to the doubt that the misconception of Ego and that of 'mine' are on par, then how can you say the misconception of 'mine' really exists ?

2. According to SP, Sureśvara refers to this as the refutation of the view of Bhartṛprapañca (*bhedābhedavādin*) —though SP did not say so on verses 328-330. Sureśvara obviously follows his master Śaṅkara who cites this view of Bhartṛprapañca in BUB 5.1.1 (see the Introduction section 9).

3. Cf. next verse which mentions *tvagādi*.

4. SP states : The sense-organs are the effects of the objects and, therefore, not their origin.

न मृदोऽन्यत्र कुम्भादेः शरावे प्रलयो यतः ।

तस्मात्त्वगादयः शब्दास्त्वगाद्यारम्भकामिधाः ॥३५६॥

सर्वत्र प्रतिपत्तव्या नान्यत्र प्रलयो यतः ।

गन्धशब्देन कृत्स्नाऽपि पृथिवी परिगृह्यते ॥३५७॥

356-357. Since the merger of a pitcher etc. is not elsewhere than in clay, i.e. in a plate¹, therefore the words *tvac* etc. (here in this discussion) are (properly) to be understood everywhere as expressive of that which originates skin etc. Since their merger is not found anywhere else, therefore, by the word *gandha* is to be understood the whole earth².

NOTES

1. A possible objection is : 'Would it be wrong to hold that the objects merge into the sense-organs ?' This is answered here : If the effect gets merged into something else than a cause, then a pitcher etc. would also get merged into a plate. Therefore, the merger of objects into the sense-organs cannot be established.

2. Here concludes the explanation of the Śruti 'of all touches . . .' Now follows the explanation of the word *gandha* in the Śruti, 'Of all smells The word *gandha* indicates the gross earth in the form of collection of five *guṇas* such as the sound etc.

यदि वा परिभागोऽस्या गन्धस्यानेकभेदतः ।

गन्धो गुरुः क्षितिप्रायो ह्लादो शीतोऽप्रधानतः ॥३५८॥

तेजोभूयस्तया तीक्ष्णो लघुर्वायुप्रधानतः ।

शान्तोऽथ विशदो व्यापी स्याद्द्युयोम्नोऽथ प्रधानतः ॥३५९॥

358-359. Or, perhaps, (by the word *gandha* is understood) the minute part of this (earth), on account of the variety of smell : (Thus) the smell¹ is intense (strongly fragrant) when it is abounding in (the element of) earth. It² is pleasant (and) cool when it is abounding in the (element of) water. It is sharp when it is abounding in the (element of) fire (lit. lustre). It is gentle when it is abounding in the (element of) wind. And it is mild, pleasant and (all-) pervading owing to the abundance of the element of ether.

NOTES

1. The meaning of the word *gandha* is the most minute part of the earth, because smell appears (is felt) in manifold forms.

2. This explains the different kinds of smell.

पार्थिवाप्यांशयोस्तेजः परिक्लेदात्तथाऽधमः ।

दुर्गन्धो जायते गन्धः पापकर्मप्रबोधतः ॥३६०॥

360. On account of the overpowering of the element of the earth and the water by (the element of) fire, there arises the worst (lit. lowest) smell. On account of the rise of (some) evil act,¹ the smell becomes bad smell.

NOTES

Sureśvara makes a reply to the doubt : 'How can there be the knowledge of difference of good or bad smell, even if

there is difference of the smell in accordance with the element?' First, he speaks of the seen cause and then the unseen (*adr̥ṣṭa*) cause.

1. See Nais 1. 1 on *adharma* as the cause of misery (*duḥkha*).

समांशपरिणामे तु सुरभिर्जायते शुभः ।

पुण्यकर्मप्रयुक्तः सञ्जन्तो रासङ्गकृत्या ॥३६१॥

361. But there arises an auspicious (i.e. fragrant¹) smell when there (exists) combination (lit. effect) in equal proportion (of the elements²). So also, being effected by holy activity (the combination of merit and demerit in equal proportion) creates attachment to (various external objects) in (an individual that is) born.³

NOTES

1. *śubhatva* = *sukhakaratva*. (SP)
2. 'When the equal proportion of the earth etc. are heated by fire'. (SP)
3. This explanation is forced by the words *pāpakarma-bodhataḥ* (in the preceding verses) and *śubha* with *double entendre*.

रसरूपरवेण्वेवं यथोक्तं प्रतिपादयेत् ।

प्रधानगुणभावेन गुणानां भूरिरूपता ॥३६२॥

362. In respect of the taste, the form and the sound (of five objects, the touch and the smell) also should one state (or, explain) as (stated) before. Variety (of objects and individual) arises from the relation of the principal and the subordinate among the various properties.

NOTES

The manifoldness of the touch and the smell stated above is extended to the taste etc. in the passage 'Of all tastes . . .' The *guṇas* are manifold due to the increase and the decrease of the elements. The case is the same with individuals—this is implied by two preceding verses.

असाधारणगन्धादिग्राहकत्वानुमानतः ।

ग्राह्यभूतप्रधानत्वं घ्राणादिष्वपि निर्दिशेत् ॥३६३॥

363. On the basis of inference¹ of a capacity to grasp the uncommon (*guṇas* like) smell etc. one should attribute to the sense of smell etc.² what are grasped as the principal elements among those entities.

NOTES

This verse answers the possible objection : 'When the said difference in respect of the smell etc. is established in the Śruti, how is it said in the passage 'that common origin of the touch . . .' (verse 355) that the smell etc. are the origin of the smell etc.?'

1. SP refers *anumāna* to *liṅga*.

2. SP understands *api* 'etc.' in the sense of *yathā* or *iva* as implying a simile.

स्वग्राह्यार्थसजातीयमिन्द्रियं स्यात्प्रदीपवत् ।

रूपस्यैवावभासित्वान्न चेत्स्याच्छ्रोत्ररूपवत् ॥३६४॥

364. As the light (is not different from the object which is illuminated by it, so) does a sense-organ belong to the same category as the object which is grasped by it, because (it)¹ illuminates that which is a form. If (this was) not (so)², then it would be (related to the form) in the same way as the ear and the form.

NOTES

1. This 'it' means *pradipa*.

2. If the lamp is not of the same nature of the form which is to be understood, the form is not grasped even by the lamp as it is not grasped by the ear. This evidence proves the point by an instance of contradiction. The eye is very easily understood from the instance of the lamp, for the lamp and the eye share the same *guṇa*, viz. they are both *taijasa* and, therefore, illuminators.

न चेदर्थसजातीयं सर्वार्थग्रहणं भवेत् ।

एकैकस्येन्द्रियस्येह मनोबुद्ध्योर्यथा तथा ॥३६५॥

सर्वभूतात्मकत्वात् सर्वार्थग्रहणं तयोः ।

मनोबुद्धयोरिति ज्ञेयमन्यथा तदसम्भवात् ॥३६६॥

365-366. If a sense-organ would not belong to the same category (as its object), then there would be the grasping of all the objects; as each of the sense-organs would here (in our worldly dealings) grasp all objects so do *manas* and the intellect (grasp all of them). It should be remembered (i.e. known) that as for *manas* and the intellect, they grasp all objects since they are of the nature of all the elements (together), for, otherwise, it would be impossible (for them to grasp them all).

त्वगादिज्ञानशक्तीनां बुद्धिः सामान्यमुच्यते ।

प्राण एव क्रियाशक्तिसामान्यं तद्वदुच्यते ॥३६७॥

367. The intellect is said to be the generality¹ of the powers of knowing, viz. the skin etc., likewise is the vital force said to be the generality of the powers of action.

NOTES

1. The word *sāmānya* means the common quality of them all.

शब्दादिभोगसिद्ध्यर्थं श्रोत्राद्या ज्ञानशक्तयः ।

तद्वत्कर्मोपभोगार्थं वागाद्याः कर्मशक्तयः ॥३६८॥

368. (As) there are the powers of knowing, viz. the ear etc., in order to achieve (lit. to secure) the enjoyment of the sound etc., likewise there are the powers of action, viz. speaking etc.¹ for (the securing of) the enjoyment of action.

NOTES

The reasons why the organs of knowing and those of action are stated in this context are indicated in the first and the second lines respectively.

1. SP quotes SK 21 where the functions of powers

of action are described, i.e. *vacana* 'speaking' by *vāc*, *ādāna* 'taking' by *hastau*, *viharāṇa* 'moving' by *pādau*, *utsarga* 'excretion' by *pāyu* and *ānanda* 'joy' by *upastha*.

यथोक्तशक्तिविक्षेपो मनोबुद्धिपुरःसरः ।

संकल्पाध्यवसायाभ्यां तयोर्भेदोऽपि च द्विधा ॥३६६॥

369. The application (i.e. the appearance) of the powers (already) stated proceeds (only) from (the inner-organs, i.e.) *manas* and the intellect.¹ The distinction between them is (also) divided into two categories, viz. imagination and ascertainment.

NOTES

This verse states how the different sense-organs act.

1. According to PKV 33, 34, the inner-organs are four-fold, i.e. *manas*, *buddhi*, *ahamkāra* and *citta*. And their functions are *saṁkalpa* 'imagination', *niścaya* or *adhyavasāya* 'ascertainment', *abhimāna* 'misconception' and *anusaṁdhāna* 'investigation' respectively. But here Sureśvara seems to follow the Sāṁkhya view of three-fold inner-organs. This could lead one to hold that PKV is not the work of Sureśvara Cf. SK 23, 24 and 27, where three-fold inner-organs (*manas*, *buddhi* and *ahamkāra*) and their functions are described.

योग्येन्द्रियस्य या यस्य ततोऽन्यत्रापि लक्षिता ।

वृत्तिस्तस्यैव सा ज्ञेया न स्वभावविपर्ययः ॥३७०॥

370. Whatever modification (i.e. function) of some sense-organ is noticed on the part of another sense-organ it should be taken to belong, in reality, to that particular sense-organ alone; there (has) not (been) change (as regards the modification).

एवं ज्ञानक्रियाशक्तिविक्षेपाज्जगदात्मनः ।

करणायतनत्वाय बेहाविर्भूतिरात्मनः ॥३७१॥

371. In this way, on account of the application (i.e. appearance) of the powers of knowing and action (on the part) of the soul of the world, there is the manifestation in a body of the Ātman (Jīvātman merely) for serving (as) the support of the sense-organs.

NOTES

SP clarifies Sureśvara's idea thus: The old authorities say that the Ātman becomes, i.e. appears as transmigratory due to the two-fold functions of the sense-organs as stated before. The creation of a body is the necessary basis for the functions of sense-organs which are impossible without its support. Moreover, the body also is made up of the five elements, because the five-fold objects, viz. sound etc., are found in the body (of a being).

एवं च सति यद्यस्मात्कार्यमाविरभूत्पुरा ।

तत्तु तत्रैव विलयं कार्यमेति स्वकारणे ॥३७२॥

372. Such being the case, whatever effect has first manifested from whichever cause properly gets merged into its own cause.

NOTES

Sureśvara thus reiterates how the various sense-organs get merged into the five elements which are their 'cause'.

मूलकारण एवेषां सर्वेषां विलयो भवेत् ।

तत्कारणत्वात्कार्याणां न तु कार्यान्तरे लयः ॥३७३॥

373. All these (entities) would get merged into their root-cause, (being) the products of that cause.¹ Indeed, they do not get merged into other effects.²

NOTES

1. This is to remove the doubt that the sense-organs would then merge into the five elements, something else than the Brahman. Sureśvara asserts that the idea of a merger (*laya*) is associated with the effects merging into the 'root-cause'.

2. The sense-organs as well as the elements being effects, it is improper to say that the sense-organs which are some of the effects (of the root-cause) get merged into the five elements which are some other effects.

पिण्डादिष्वेव प्रात्यक्ष्याद्ब्रह्मादीनां लयादियम् ।

भ्रान्तिः पूर्वेषु कार्येषु लयोऽयमिति मोहतः ॥३७४॥

374. It (lit. this) is misapprehension (to say): "On account of directly perceiving the merger of a pot etc. into a lump (of clay)¹ etc., it is possible to hold that every effect merges into every another preceding effect"; (and this is) owing to infatuation (i.e. ignorance).

NOTES

SP points out a possible doubt which is the basis for this verse—; the argument could be: 'All effects do not merge into the Brahman, because (i) we notice that the pitchers etc. merge into clay etc.; and (ii) all the sense-organs, which are effects, merge into the five elements; according to the Vedāntin himself.' The answer is: This argument originates in ignorance. On *sāmānya* and *mahāsāmānya* see note on verse 289.

1. The foot-note on *piṇḍādiṣv eva* reads a variant *mṛdādiṣv eva*: It seems a better reading. The translation follows the text of the edition.

एवं त्वगादिवाच्यासु स्पर्शादीनां यथायथम् ।
स्पर्शादिमात्रासु लयस्तासामपि लयस्तथा ॥३७५॥

मनोविषयसामान्ये तस्यापि प्रलयो धियः ।
स्वगोचरैकसामान्ये सरितां सागरे यथा ॥३७६॥

बुद्धेर्विषयविज्ञानसामान्यमपि चाऽऽत्मनि ।
परस्मिन्नल्लयविक्षेपरहितेऽपरिणामिनि ॥३७७॥

375-377. Thus, there is (the merger of the effects such as) the touch etc. into the sense-organs expressed by the words *tvac* etc¹.; similarly, there is (the merger) of them also into their generality, viz. the objective *manas*; further, that also has its merger in the one (greater) generality, viz. the intellect— (this is) just the same way as there is the merger of rivers into the ocean. Also, the (great) generality of objective knowledge merges into the Ātman (which is) above (itself and is) without any (further) merger and which does not undergo any modification.

NOTES

Having thus explained the merger of the elements and their products into the root-cause (the Brahman), the author points to the meaning of the statements in BUB on 'thus of all touches...'

1. The word *yathāyatham* informs us that the merger of particular objects such as touch into the particular sense-organ, viz. the sense of touch, is denoted by the word *tvac*, and so on.

वदनादिस्वसामान्यविषयेषु तथा लयः ।

कर्मन्द्रियाणां सर्वेषां तत्सामान्येषु पञ्चसु ॥३७८॥

378. In the same way, there is the merger of all actions, viz. speaking etc., into their own generality and further that of all the organs of action into their own generality.

NOTES

Now is shown the purport of the passage: *evam sarveṣāṃ karmaṇāṃ hastāv ekāyanam evam sarveṣāṃ ānandānāṃ upastha ekāyanam . . . sarveṣāṃ vedānāṃ vāg ekāyanam* (BU 2.4.11).

परिस्पन्दः प्रकाशश्च ज्ञानशक्तिषु विद्यते ।

केवलस्तु परिस्पन्दः कर्मशक्तिषु निष्प्रभः ॥३७९॥

379. Movement and lustre are found in the powers of knowing; however, movement alone, i. e. devoid of lustre, is found in the powers of action.

NOTES

This verse states the purport of the passage in BUB: *prāṇas ca prajñānamātram eva* (p. 334, line 8)

सर्वोऽप्येष परिस्पन्दो बुद्धीन्द्रियसमाश्रयः ।

प्राणात्मक इति ज्ञेयो हन्तास्येवेति च श्रुतेः ॥३८०॥

380. It is to be known that all movement which rests on the organs of knowing, is of the nature of the vital force, for there is the Śruti statement, *hantāsyaiiva*.¹

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स्पर्शादिमात्रासु लयस्तासामपि लयस्तथा ॥३७५॥

मनोविषयसामान्ये तस्यापि प्रलयो धियः ।

स्वगोचरैकसामान्ये सरितां सागरे यथा ॥३७६॥

बुद्धेर्विषयविज्ञानसामान्यमपि चाऽऽत्मनि ।

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प्राणात्मक इति ज्ञेयो हन्तास्येवेति च श्रुतेः ॥३८०॥

380. It is to be known that all movement which rests on the organs of knowing, is of the nature of the vital force, for there is the Śruti statement, *hantāsyaiiva*.¹

NOTES

This is the purport of BUB (p. 334, line 8). Because the movement is of the nature of the vital force and because manifold sense-organs are of the nature of movement, therefore, organs of action are vital force. This is based on the Śruti *yo vai prāṇaḥ sā prajñā* (KausU 3.3), which is quoted in BUB (p. 334, line 8). And because the vital force and the knowledge (*buddhi, prajñā*) are considered as identical, organs of knowing are, therefore, the vital force. Thus, the two-fold sense-organs are proved to be the vital force (*kāryakāraṇayor abhedah, ādhārādheyayor abhedah*).

1. The source of this quotation is not traceable.

पङ्क्तीशशङ्कुदृष्टान्तात्प्राणस्यैव तु शक्तयः ।

कर्मेन्द्रियाणि सर्वाणि तथा बुद्धीन्द्रियाण्यपि ॥३८१॥

381. The power of all the organs of action as well as those of knowing belong only to the vital force as seen from the illustration¹ of the nails which are driven into the foot (of a horse).

NOTES

In addition to the Śruti, *hantāsyaiiva*, the author quotes yet another Śruti to prove that two-fold organs (i.e. sense-organs and the organs of action) are of the nature of the Ātman, i.e. the vital force.

Just as an excellent (i.e. strong) horse uproots simultaneously all the four spikes which are on its hoofs, in the same way the vital force overcomes (i.e. pervades) speech etc. Therefore, the sense-organs stated in the Śruti are dependent on the vital force.

1. Cf. CU 5.1.12 : *yathā suhayaḥ paḍviśa-śaṅkūn sam-khidet* ; also BU 6.1.13 : *yathā mahāsuhayaḥ saindhavaḥ paḍviśa-śaṅkūn samvṛhet* /

आर्पातकरणग्रामे पुंसि स्वात्मन्यवस्थिते ।

तथा प्राणाग्नयः शुद्धा जाग्रतीति श्रुतेर्वचः ॥३८२॥

382. There is a statement in the Śruti : “(When the Man i.e. the Ātman, has concentrated on himself and all of his

sense-organs have been merged (lit. drunk) within himself, then the fires of *prāṇa* remain (alone) in the waking state.”

NOTES

This seems to be a paraphrase of the ideas in PU 4.1.2-3 :
*tasmai sa hovāca | yathā gārgya maricayo'rkasyāstaṁ gacchataḥ sarvā
 etasmimś tejomaṇḍala ekibhavanti | tāḥ punaḥ punar udayataḥ
 pracaranti | evaṁ ha vai tat sarvaṁ pare deve manasyekibhavati |
 tena tarhyeṣa puruṣo na śṛṇoti | na paśyati | na jighrati | na rasayate |
 na spṛśate | nābhivadate | nādatte | nānandayate | na visṛjate |
 neyāyate | svapitity ācakṣate || prāṇāgnaya evaitasmin pure jāgrati |
 gārhapatyō ha va eṣo' pānaḥ | vyāno'nvāhāryapacanaḥ | yad gārhapat-
 yāt praṇiyate praṇayanād | āhavanīyaḥ prāṇaḥ ||* Thus the words
iti śruter vacaḥ should not be taken to conclude a quotation of
 the Śruti.

सहैव कर्मशक्त्यास्तौ ज्ञानशक्तिर्विलीयते ।

प्राणात्मनि श्रुतिश्चाऽऽह कस्मिन्निति च सादरा ॥३८३॥

383. Therefore, along with the powers of action do the powers of knowing get merged into the Ātman, the vital force, and¹ the respectful Śruti says in this connection, *kasmin . . .*²

NOTES

The result of the merger of the two-fold sense-organs in the vital force is mentioned ; and consequently, it points out that the vital force is the highest and the cause.

1. The first *ca* refers to the experience of the vital force, as stated in the Śruti; the other *ca* indicates another Śruti, *sa prāṇam asṛjata* (PU 6.4)

2. PU 6.3 : *kasminnvaham utkrānto bhaviṣyāmi*, ‘As a result of whose (departure) shall I rise up?’

साधारणोऽयं विलयः समानान्तोऽभिधीयते ।

स्वहेतुमात्रसंसर्गाश्रयात्म्यान्तिको लयः ॥३८४॥

384. It is stated that this merger which has one common end is the common (merger), and (the effect) being united with its own cause alone, there does not follow the absolute merger.¹

NOTES

The natural (i.e. commonly known / perceived) merger which is common to all beings is spoken of at the end of BU 2.5, i.e. 2.5.18, also — all beings (i.e. their bodies) end in the cause known by one common word.

The second line of this verse gives the reason why this merger at 2.4 and that at 2.5 are similar.

1. Meaning 'destruction'.

ज्ञानशक्तिक्रियाशक्तिविभृत्वात्परमक्षरम् ।

व्युह्याऽऽत्मानं जगत्स्वेन स्वात्मन्येव समूहति ॥३८५॥

385. The highest indestructible having first expanded itself in the form of the world through its powers of knowing and action and pervasive nature, withdraws (lit. collects) it all into itself again.

NOTES

This verse explains why the common merger is mentioned once again at BU 2.5.18. The Brahman is nothing but the Ātman because of its omnipotence; it spreads itself as the world gathers it back in itself but it remains in its own.

निरुह्येति तथा श्रुत्या कारणात्माऽभिधीयते ।

अत्यक्रामदिति त्वस्य निर्बोजावस्थतोच्यते ॥३८६॥

386. The Śruti¹ mentions the Ātman as the cause (of all this) in the words, 'Having completed....,' but the words 'it went beyond....' is the statement of its condition, viz. not being the cause (of all this).

NOTES

Here Sureśvara explains how that Śruti statement includes the word referring to the cause also, for the effects, viz. *prāṇa* etc. are specifically mentioned. The first line refers to the cause, viz. the Ātman, which spreads out the world as well as enters into itself and finally remains (alone). One should not understand that the Ātman together with these its

effects (viz. the world) is the ultimate reality—this is understood from the second line.

1. Cf. BU 3.9.26 *sa yas tām puruṣān niruhya pratyuhya atyākramat tam tvā aupaniṣadam puruṣam prcchāmi* / “I ask you of that being who is to be known only from the Upaniṣads, who definitely projects those beings and withdraws them into itself.”

यत् एवमतोऽशेषज्ञानशक्तिलयात्परम् ।

सर्वकार्योपसंहारी प्राण एकोऽवतिष्ठते ॥३८७॥

387. Since this is so, there remains only the vital force after the merger of the entire (group of) powers of knowing etc., it is the withdrawer (i.e. the collector) of all effects.

NOTES

Since the Śruti, *niruhya...*, mentions the root-cause of this world, therefore the Śruti : *kasmin nu tvam cātmā ca pratiṣṭhitau stha iti prāṇa iti...* / “On what do the body and the heart (you and yourself) rest? On vital force.” (BU 2.9.26) mentions the merger-sequence. And, as such, one may ask ‘why is not there (i.e. in the latter passage) the statement of the absolute merger?’ This verse is an answer to this doubt : ‘Vital force alone remains.’

प्राणोऽपाने तथाऽपानो व्यानात्मनि विलीयते ।

व्यानोऽप्युदानमप्येति ह्युदानोऽपि समानगः ॥३८८॥

388. The *prāṇa*¹ merges² into the *apāna*, likewise the *apāna* into the *vyāna*, the *vyāna* into the *udāna* and the *udāna* into the *samāna*

NOTES

The word *prāṇa* indicates the specific function, viz. ‘breathing’, because it is impossible to accept the merger of *prāṇa* in the principal sense ‘vital force’; cf. the Śruti, ... *prāṇa iti* / *kasmin nu prāṇāḥ pratiṣṭhita iti apāna iti* / “On *prāṇa* On what does *prāṇa* rest? On *apāna*” (BU 2.9.26).

1. The five kinds of *prāṇa* are described in BU 1.5.3, 3.9.26; TU 1.7.1; Mai U 2.6 etc. cf. verse 299 above.

2. The word *apy-eti* is used in the sense ‘to get merged’; cf. Nais 1.52.

कारणात्मैव जगतः समानोक्त्याऽभिधीयते ।

सर्वसाधारणः सोऽयं प्राकृतः प्रलयो मतः ॥३८६॥

389. The Ātman which is the cause of the world is mentioned in the word *samāna*. This merger which is common to all is accepted as the natural (i.e. common) merger.

NOTES

The word *samāna* is used not in the sense of the specific function, 'downward movement of the wind' but like the word *prāṇa* in the sense of *kāraṇātman* 'the prime-cause Ātman'. This is explained in brief as the natural merger.

प्रज्ञानघनताऽप्यस्य न बुद्धिप्रज्ञयोच्यते ।

प्रत्यक्प्रज्ञोत्थिताभाससंबन्धात्प्राज्ञ उच्यते ॥३८७॥

390. (Take for instance:) This (vital force) is said to be a mass of knowledge not because of the knowledge through the intellect; it is called *Prājña* because of its connection with the apparent rise of the knowledge on the part of the individual consciousness.

NOTES

Since Upaniṣadic time, the *Prājña*, which stands for the individual consciousness in sleep, is very clearly declared to be the *ābhāsa* of the Brahman. It means that terms *prājña*, *aijasa* and *vaiśvānara* known from GK are also related to some sort of ignorance about the true nature of the Ātman. The true condition of the Ātman is knowledge par excellence. SP refers to GK 1.7 and 11 on the word *prājña*. For the word *prajñāna-ghana*, cf. MāU 5 and 7; BU 4.5.13.

यन्निमित्तं प्रमाणानि प्रामाण्यमिह बिभ्रति ।

तदविज्ञातयाथात्म्यमेतत्कारणमुच्यते ॥३८९॥

391. That on account of which these means of knowing have an authoritativeness and whose real nature is not known is the origin of this (world).

NOTES

An objection could be raised thus : 'When the root-cause of the world is knowledge because of its connection with the appearance of the knowledge on the part of the Ātman, the view that the root-cause *prajñānaghana* would not stand to reason. Since there is accepted in that view a difference between what is cause and what the Ātman.' To this is given the reply : The direct perception etc. are authoritative on the plane of the worldly existence by making the then unknown Ātman as its object. And this Ātman is shown in the Smṛti and the Śruti as the cause of the world. There is thus no duality at all.

यस्मिञ्ज्ञाते भवेज्ज्ञातं जगदेतच्चराचरम् ।

अज्ञाते च तथाऽज्ञातमेतदेव तदुच्यते ॥३६२॥

392. Here is a statement about that which being known, this entire world, movable, becomes known, and which not being known, this world is not known.'

NOTES

That the Ātman is the cause so long as ignorance persists is supported by the Śruti informing that all worldly knowledge is derived from the knowledge of that alone. Cf. CU 6.1.3 :

... *yena avijñātaṁ vijñātaṁ (bhavati)* 'By which being known (all becomes) known.' Further it is declared to be the cause of all this (world). This is to say that the *upādeyā* 'worldly knowledge' does not exist without its *upādāna*, the prime-cause Ātman, i.e. knowledge itself.

नन्विह प्रलयः श्रुत्या विषयस्यैव भण्यते ।

करणस्य तु नैवोक्तस्तत्कस्मादिति भण्यते ॥३६३॥

स्वगोचरसजातीयं करणं मन्यते श्रुतिः ।

विषयस्य लयोक्त्याऽन्तःकरणप्रलयोक्तता ॥३६४॥

393-394. (Objection:) It is pointed out that the Śruti mentions the merger of the objects alone, and not that of the cause;

why then do you say this ? (Reply:) The Śruti holds that the cause belongs to the same category as its own object. (Therefore) by the statement of the merger of the object is to be considered the statement of the merger of the inner-organs (also).

NOTES

The objection is based on the acceptance of the Śruti as the authoritative means of knowing these matters : “Even if the merger of the intellect etc. is proved to be the natural merger, it is not declared by the Śruti anywhere—therefore, that argument of the author is unauthoritative.” On verse 394, cf. verse 395 which states that the sense-organs belong to the same category as their respective objects. As such the objection that there is no authoritative Śruti does not hold.

[Verses 395-398 constitute the commentary on the introductory part of BUB 2.4.12.]

एवं मन्तव्य आत्माऽयं तर्कतः प्राग्यथोदितः ।

दुन्वुभ्याद्युक्तदृष्टान्तन्यायमार्गेण यत्नतः ॥३९५॥

आत्मसामान्यसंभूतिलयहेतुसमाश्रयात् ।

आत्मैव सर्वमित्येष प्रतिज्ञार्थः समर्थितः ॥३९६॥

395-396. Thus, the Ātman is to be considered (i.e. understood) as already mentioned, through reasoning with effort, in the light (lit. in the way) of the illustrations that are cited, viz. the drum etc. That all this (world) is the Ātman is justified by taking recourse to the reasoning, viz. the rise and the merger coming commonly from the same source which is similar to the Ātman (the source of the world).

NOTES

Here SP remarks : ‘The elaborate discussion on *mananavidhi* is now concluded.’ But I believe that the word *mantavyaḥ* in verse 395 does not refer to *mananavidhi* as SP would have it, the word *mantavyaḥ* should be paraphrased as *jñeyaḥ*. There is no *mananavidhi* at all.

स्वाभाविकोऽयं प्रलय इति पौराणिका जगुः ।

बुद्धिपूर्वस्तु विलयः सम्यग्ज्ञानैकपूर्वकः ॥३९७॥

397. The Paurāṇikas have declared that this merger is the natural (merger). As against that, the merger preceded by the proper reasoning (about the nature of the worldly existence) is preceded by the right knowledge (of the world etc.)

NOTES

This is a comment on BUB 2.4.12 (p. 335, line 6): *svābhāviko 'yam pralaya iti paurāṇikā vadanti*. There is agreement of the Paurāṇikas with the Upaniṣadic thinkers in respect of this said merger which forms the remaining part of the text. Cf. the *Vāyupurāṇa*, 4.100.135ff.; the *Agniṣpurāṇa*, 368.2 ff; the *Padmapurāṇa*, 13.1.19. Cf. BG 9.7 : *sarvabhūtāni kaunteya prakṛtiṃ yānti māmikāṃ | kalpakṣaye...||*

शक्तिमात्रात्मना स्थानं कार्याणां यत्स्दकारणे ।

इत्यनात्यन्तिकलयो भूयोजन्मकृतक्षणः ॥३६८॥

398. The non-absolute merger consists in that the effects reside in their own cause in the form¹ of efficiency alone and with the fixed condition that they would be produced again.

NOTES

It is stated that the natural merger is different from the merger preceded by knowledge. In the case of the natural merger, the effects get merged into and stay in the cause in the form of its efficiency to produce those effects; but it never steps further, it is non-absolute.

1. Cf. SK 9 : '*śaktasya śakyakaraṇāt...sat kāryam*/'

अतीतानागतेहत्यजन्मनाशादिहेतुनुत् ।

यस्तु धीपूर्वको ध्वंसस्तदर्थेयं परा श्रुतिः ॥३६९॥

399. This (subsequent) part of the Śruti intends to speak the destruction (of the transmigratory existence), which removes the causes of the origin, the destruction etc. of the worldly existence in the past and in the future and which is preceded by proper reasoning (about the real nature of the Ātman).

NOTES

This is a comment on *avidyānirodhadvāreṇa yo bhavati tayārtho 'yam viśeṣārambhaḥ* (BUB 2.4.12, p. 335, line 8).

The destruction of ignorance, which is the cause of the births in three times, is preceded by knowledge.

The Śruti BU 2.4.12 clarifies that knowledge is the means of the destruction.

यथोक्तवस्तुसिद्ध्यर्थं दृष्टान्तोऽयमिहोच्यते ।

यथा सैन्धवखिल्योऽस्तः स्वयोनावुदधाविह ॥४००॥

कठिनोदकविलयमनु खिल्यो विलीयते ।

विलीनस्याद्भ्य उद्धृत्य ग्रहणाय न कश्चन ॥४०१॥

निपुणोऽपि नरः शक्तः खिल्यरूपेण पूर्ववत् ।

सामुद्ररूपान्नान्येन ग्रहीतुं कश्चन क्षमः ॥४०२॥

400-402. In order to prove the matter (already) mentioned is here (i.e. now) stated an illustration¹: As when a lump of salt is thrown into its own cause (viz. the ocean), the lump melts after² gross (i.e. solidified) water has merged (into liquid water). When it (the lump of salt) has melted (in water), even a skilful person is not capable of picking it out of water in the earlier form of a lump. No one is capable of picking it up in a form other than that of sea (i.e. sea-salt).

NOTES

This is an explanation of *sa yathā saindhava-khilya udake prāsta udakam evānuviliyeta na hāsyodgrahṇāyeva syāt . . .* (BU 2.4.12).

1. It was earlier stated in general terms that the world merges into its cause, the Brahman, when there arises knowledge of reality. Now, in order to prove this, the Śruti adduces an illustration.

2. Cf. SP : *kaṭhinodakavilayānantaram liyata iti yojanā*.

[Now follows a paraphrase of *yato yatas tv ādadito lavaṇam eva . . .*, up to verse 409.]

आददीत समुद्राम्भस्तं जिघृक्षुर्यतो यतः ।

ततस्तवस्तल्लवणं वेत्ति खिल्यं न कुत्रचित् ॥४०३॥

403. He may take water from whatever part of the ocean, as he is desirous of taking that lump. But he notices that it is everywhere the salty water, but not anywhere the lump (of salt).

सामुद्रमम्भः खिल्यत्वं याति भानुविपाकतः ।

सिन्धोरायातः स यतस्तस्मात्सैन्धव उच्यते ॥४०४॥

404. Owing to the heating by the sun, the water of the ocean gets the nature of a lump. (And) since it has come from the ocean (*sindhu*), it is called *saindhava* 'originating from *sindhu*'.

NOTES

The second line follows BUB (p.335, lines 9-10) : *sindhor vikārah saindhavaḥ sindhuśabdenodakam abhidhiyate syandanāt sindhuḥ udakam tadvikāras tatra bhavo vā saindhavaḥ*.

असंभिन्नस्वावयवः खिल्यः सोऽथ निगद्यते ।

सोऽयं सैन्धवखिल्योऽस्तौ यथैवेह महोदधौ ॥४०५॥

405. Then it is called a lump, in that no part of it is distinguished (or, separated) from any other; it is this lump of salt that is (said to be) thrown (here) into the big ocean.

NOTES

In the first line is given the meaning of the word *khilya*; cf. BUB (p. 335, line 11) mentions *khila eva khilyaḥ svārthe yat-pratyaya . . .*, "*khila* itself is called *khilya* —in this word the suffix *yat* is used (with the intention of restraining) the original sense". The meaning of the word 'that whose part is not separated' is the grossness due to the parts being mutually combined. The word *atha* means 'in the condition before it was thrown into water, its cause'. After the meaning of the words *saindhava* and *khilya* has been stated, there follows in the second line the meaning of the sentence. The lump of

salt gives up the heat through which it obtained the nature of the lump contradictory to that of water. See the next verse for this. This explanation of Ānandagiri is based on the contents of the following verse.

तेजो विरोधिनीं प्राप्य प्रकृतिं विजहात्यथ ।

तेजोवियोगात्काठिन्यं ध्वस्ती भवति तद्घनम् ॥४०६॥

406. Having entered into its original form (viz. water) which is of the opposite nature, it (the lump) gives up the heat stored within it¹. (Then) owing to the loss of the heat, that (earlier acquired) grossness gets destroyed.

NOTES

This verse states that after the loss of the heat, one should not hold that there would have remained the condition of a lump; it gets destroyed.

1. See the note on the preceding verse.

काठिन्यकारणध्वस्तौ खिल्यस्येह महोदधौ ।

कठिनोदकविध्वंसमनु खिल्यो विलीयते ॥४०७॥

यदेवाकृत्रिमं रूपं तदेवास्यावशिष्यते ।

तेजोवयवसंबन्धसमुत्थं विनिवर्तते ॥४०८॥

407-408. When, in respect of a lump, there is the destruction of the cause of its grossness in the big ocean, the lump (also) melts just in the manner the gross water gets destroyed. There (thus) remains the unacquired form (viz. water of the lump); but that form which had arisen due to its contract with the part of (i.e. some heat) disappears (i.e. gets destroyed).

NOTES

These two verses amplify the briefly stated thought of the preceding verse.

तेजआद्यभिसंबन्धः कारणं खिल्यरूपिणः ।

तद्भावभावतस्तस्य तद्ध्वस्ती ध्वंसतस्तथा ॥४०९॥

409. The connection (of that) with heat etc. is of the cause of (the existence of) the one in the form of a lump. Its existence is owing to the existence of the heat (which is the cause), and likewise its destruction follows the destruction of that (cause).

NOTES

One should not doubt that mere contact with heat is the cause of the existence of the lump of salt, for the earth etc. would also help its formation. This is stated in the first line. But the second line states why the earth etc. are also specifically mentioned as the cause, just like heat. The cause is understood from the method of *anvayavayatireka*.

[Now begins the explanation of *evam vā ara idam mahadbhūtam anantam apāram vijñānaghana eva* (BU 2.4.12); it continues up to verse 416.]

एवं वा अर इत्यस्य कार्यकारणरूपतः ।

प्रतीचो वास्तवं वृत्तं विरुद्धमभिधीयते ॥४१०॥

410. In the statement, *evam vā ara* is stated the real nature of that individual consciousness which is contradictory to its being in the form of the cause and the effect.

NOTES

The verse brings out in full the purport of the illustration (which has been earlier stated in brief). The word *idam* in the passage quoted refers to the natural condition of the individual consciousness which contradicts the cause etc.

अव्यावृत्ताननुगतब्रह्मत्वप्रतिपत्तये ।

महदित्यभिधानं स्यात्कौटस्थ्यार्थं च भूतगीः ॥४११॥

411. For the purpose of understanding the nature of the Brahman which is not differentiated from and followed by anything else, there is the expression (viz. the word) *mahat* and the expression *bhūta* (occurs) for indicating its immutability.

NOTES

The significance of the words *mahat* and *bhūta* is thus clarified.

वास्तवं वृत्तमाश्रित्य प्रतीचः प्राक्प्रबोधतः ।

स्वतःसिद्धस्य विज्ञप्त्यै महदित्यादि भण्यते ॥४१२॥

412. Having kept in view (lit. depending on) the actual state of things, has the Śruti stated (the word) *mahat* etc., for the purpose of making known the individual consciousness which is self-established, (but) before it is realized.

NOTES

This is to avert the doubt that the nature of *mahat* etc. is possible only in the state of liberation.

कारणस्य निषेधोक्तिरनन्तमिति यद्वचः ।

अपारमिति कार्यस्य पारः कार्यस्य कारणम् ॥४१३॥

413. (The use of) the word *anantam* is expressive of the denial of the cause, (and the word) *apāram* is (the denial) of the effect, (since)¹ (the word) *pāra* means the cause of the effect.

NOTES

Now are stated the meanings of the words *ananta* and *apāra*.

1. This answers the objection : 'How is it negated by the word *apāra* that the highest is an effect ?' Sureśvara means to say that as by the word *apūrvā* one negates that the highest has some cause, so does one negate by the word *apāra* that the highest is the effect. Cf. *anaparam* which is also used along with *apūrvam* in BU 2.5.19 : *apūrvam anaparam anantaram abāhyam* . . ., or GK 1.26 : *apūrvō 'nantaro' bāhyō'naparah*.

कारणस्य तथा कार्यमन्तोऽनादेः प्रसिद्धितः ।

जात्यन्तरनिषेधाय विज्ञानघनगीरपि ॥४१४॥

414. In the same way, (we¹ know that) every effect is the end of some cause, (this) from the well-known information about the beginninglessness of the (ultimate) cause (viz. the Brahman). So also,² the word *vijñānaghana* (is used) for 'warding off any other effect being produced.

NOTES

1. One seeks to know how it is possible to negate that the highest (Brahman) is the cause (of this world) by the use of the word *ananta*. And the reply is : A cause should have no beginning, for otherwise it would involve absence of *anvaya* and infinite regress, and have the nature of an effect. And an effect is the end of a cause, because there is an endness in an effect. Clay etc. having got the nature of a pot cannot give rise to a plate, that is to say : The potness is the end of clay and plateness cannot result from it. Then, the word *anapara* is capable of negating that the highest is a cause because of the denial of any effect proceeding from it.

2. This is the meaning of the word *vijñānaghana*. It is clear that an effect being produced is different from knowing (the nature of reality).

क्षेत्रज्ञाकाशयोरेवं कार्यकारणसंगतिः ।

अग्निस्थानीयमैकात्म्यं प्राप्योक्तेर्विनिवर्तते ॥४१५॥

415. Thus is the relationship as the cause and the effect between the individual consciousness and the Ākāśa (viz. Brahman). Obtaining (i.e. understanding) the oneness (of the Ātman and the Brahman) which is comparable to the ocean the awareness of the world outside the Jivātman goes away.

NOTES

The meaning of the word *eva* is stated in this verse.

The oneness of the Jivātman and Īśvara is known from the sentence, 'Thou art that'. Thereby is removed the world which is made up of cause and its effects. Such being the case, the homogeneousness of the Jivātman and the Brahman is ascertained.

कार्यकारणविध्वस्तौ ब्राह्मणैकात्म्यप्रबोधतः ।

न विशेषात्मलाभोऽस्ति खिल्यस्येव महोदधौ ॥४१६॥

416. When (the notion of the individual consciousness and the Brahman as) the cause and the effect is (completely) lost

owing to the realization of the oneness of the Brahman, it (viz. the Ātman) never comes into existence as any particular individual (i.e. Jīvātman) as the lump (of salt thrown) into the big ocean (does not regain any of its property).

NOTES

One might argue that even if the nature of the Jīvātman is lost through knowledge leading to the destruction of the cause and effect relationship, it, i.e. the Jīvātman, may be born again. That would mean there is no final liberation as such. To this is given the following reply : No. The Jīvātman is not reborn because of the absence of the cause. Like the lump thrown into the big ocean Jīvātman which has been once and for all destroyed does not again arise.

[This is an explanation of *etebhyaḥ bhūtebhyah*; it continues up to verse 422.]

तेजःसंबन्धमासाद्य यथाऽम्भः खिल्यतामगात् ।

तथैवाज्ञानभूतेभ्यः परः क्षेत्रज्ञतां ययौ ॥४१७॥

417. As the water has attained the state of a lump after having come into contact with the heat, so also has the highest one come to the state of an individual consciousness though above (i.e. different from) the elements and ignorance.

NOTES

Sureśvara points out that the destruction of the nature of the Jīvātman has come about on the occasion of the destruction of ignorance because the entire non-Ātman is produced from ignorance — this he does in answer to the possible objection that there is the destruction of ignorance owing to knowledge, but not that of the nature of the Jīvātman and of the relation between the Brahman and the Jīvātman being a cause and an effect.

कार्यात्माऽपचयं गच्छन्त्यत्र निष्ठां निगच्छति ।

तानि भूतान्यविद्येति प्राहुस्त्रय्यन्तनिष्ठिताः ॥४१८॥

418. The persons who take their stand on the texts of the Vedāntas have declared as ignorance (*avidyā*). The elements

(*bhūtam*) where the origin (lit. nature) of effects, reducing itself (in qualities), goes down to some other things.

NOTES

An objection could be thus stated: 'Since the word *bhūta* is associated with the elements, how is it said that the highest, the individual consciousness arises from the elements which are of the nature of ignorance?' Sureśvara says in reply to this: That which all effects get merged is the root cause. That is expressed by the word *avidyā* and also by *bhūta*. Cf. Vācaspati's remark : *nāmarūpabijaśaktibhūtamavyākṛtaṁ bhūtasūkṣmam*, as stated by SP; it does not stand to reason that the elements can give rise to the individual consciousness.

परः कारणकार्येभ्य आत्मा पूर्णत्वकारणात् ।

एतेभ्योऽविद्याभूतेभ्यः कार्यकारणतामगात् ॥४१६॥

419. The Ātman is beyond causes and effects on account of its fullness. It becomes the cause of all effects on account of these elements which are (products of) ignorance.

NOTES

One may say that those which give rise to the individual consciousness are causes and effects as well are the elements. To this, this verse is an answer. The Ātman, which is different from the limited (*paricchinna*) cause because of its fullness, is taken as the cause producing all effects owing to the element of ignorance. Cf. the preceding verse which explains *avidyā* as *bhūta*. SP points out that the Ātman is said to have produced effects on account of *mūlāvidyā* 'basic, or natural, ignorance' about the Brahman and also that the word *bhūta* in *avidyābhūtebhyaḥ* means *kārya* in *avidyākārya*.

यतोऽविद्यैव तद्धेतुस्तदुच्छित्तावतो न सन् ।

कार्यकारणभेवोऽयं ब्रह्मास्मीतिप्रबोधतः ॥४२०॥

420. Since it is ignorance that is the cause of it,¹ therefore, when this ignorance is eradicated, the distinction such as the

cause and the effects does not remain (any more) — (this proceeds) from the knowledge 'I am Brahman'

NOTES

1. This is all worldly existence.

तस्मिन्वस्तेऽथ संबोधात्केवलंकात्म्यशेषतः ।

विशेषसंज्ञा नास्त्यस्य पूर्णप्रज्ञप्तिमात्रतः ॥४२१॥

421. When that¹ is destroyed by the knowledge² (arising) from the remainder, viz. the oneness of the Ātman alone, there is no particular awareness for it,³ only on account of the knowledge⁴ that it (viz. the Ātman) is full.

NOTES

Some might say : 'The result of the cessation of difference is voidness.' This verse seeks to refute this.

1. 'Distinction such as the cause and the effect.'

2. Cf. *brahmāsmiṭiprabodhataḥ* in the previous verse

3. See the last remark in SP on verse 420. The word *saṃjñā* means 'awareness'; see verses 437, 444, 448 and 449 below.

4. *prajñāpti* = *prajñāna* = *jñāna*

[Now begins the explanation of the word *samutthāya* (BU 2.4.13), it continues up to verse 429.]

प्रविचारितसिद्धीनि यान्यविद्येत्यवादिषम् ।

एतेभ्यो हेतुभूतेभ्यो भूतेभ्योऽकार्यकारणः ॥४२२॥

कार्यकारणवद्रूपं समुत्थायेति शब्द्यते ।

अविद्यासंगतेरस्य जायतेऽनेकरूपवान् ॥४२३॥

422-423. (That Ātman which is) neither a cause nor an effect, (arising) from these very elements which have become the causes (of the transmigratory existence) and which I have (earlier) mentioned as ignorance and the existence of which cannot be subjected to any examination — becomes described (in the words); having arisen from (the *bhūtas*) in the form of

causes and effects and, owing to its (so-called) association, with ignorance, it becomes possessed of many forms.

चेतनाचेतनाभास आत्मानस्मित्वलक्षणः ।

कार्यकारणरूपेण मिथोपेक्षाश्रयं तमः ॥४२४॥

424. The appearance of sentiency and insentiency has the nature of the Ātman and the non-Ātman, (standing) in the form of causes and effects, (and) thus mutually dependent — this is darkness (i.e. ignorance).

NOTES

Desiring to explain the appearance of the Ātman in manifold forms, Sureśvara points out to the characteristic appearance of sentiency.

कार्यकारणतां यात आत्माऽप्येवं तमोवशात् ।

स्वाभासैर्बहुतामेति मनोबुद्ध्याद्युपाधिभिः ॥४२५॥

425. Having thus reached the nature of causes and effects, due to darkness (i.e. ignorance), even that Ātman attains manifoldness by its limiting adjuncts, viz. *manas* and the intellect etc., (which are) its own appearances.

NOTES

Here, Sureśvara states what follows from the individual consciousness assuming manifold forms due to ignorance. Not only does the Ātman get the nature of causes and effects due to ignorance, but also it comes to possess the nature of a knower etc.

तमोहेतु समुत्थानं न वेद्यीत्यग्रहात्मकम् ।

मिथ्याज्ञानं तमः कुर्वन्दीदृगेव करोति तत् ॥४२६॥

426. Any¹ activity (of the Ātman) originates from darkness (i.e. ignorance). Ignorance produces false knowledge of the nature of non-grasping (of reality, which is expressed in the words) 'I do not know' and that (false knowledge) produces such (further ignorance).

NOTES

All activity of the Ātman is born of ignorance which first causes false knowledge of the form of non-grasping (*agrah-ātmaka*) expressed in words 'I am ignorant, I do not know' and at the same time it causes yet further false knowledge which is similar to it, viz. grasping reality otherwise (*anyathāgraha*).

1. Activity of the Ātman = rise of the Jīvātman.

अविद्याकार्यबुद्धिस्थप्रत्यगाभासरूपवत् ।

बोद्धेत्यादिसमुत्थानं भण्यते परमात्मनः ॥४२७॥

427. What is described as the activity of the highest Ātman, viz. the knower etc.,¹ has the appearance of the individual consciousness residing in the intellect which is the effect of ignorance.

NOTES

1. The word *ādi* refers to the condition of the Jīvātman as the *bhoktr* 'enjoyer', the *kartr* 'agent'. This will be clear from the following verses.

श्रोता स्प्रष्टेतिरूपः स्यात्तथैवेन्द्रियवृत्तिभिः ।

दुःखी गौरो द्विजश्चेति शरीरोत्थानतः परः ॥४२८॥

428. Likewise, he (the highest Ātman) would be having the form of one who listens, one who touches etc., thanks to the (different) organs and their functions. Also, he¹ who is above (i.e. aloof from) the activity of the body, (appears as) miserable, fair and twice-born.

NOTES

1. Cf. BSB 1.1.1 (p. 3):.... *tathā dehadharmān sthūlo'ham kṛśo'ham gauro'ham tiṣṭhāmi gacchāmi laṅghayāmi ceti | tathendriyadharmānmūkaḥ kāṇaḥ klībaḥ badhiraḥ andho'ham iti |*

धनी गोमान्दरिद्रो वा धनाद्यर्थस्मिसंगतेः ।

अतद्वानपि संमोहाद्यथोक्तात्मकतामगात् ॥४२९॥

429. (The highest Ātman) is (described as) wealthy, or possessed of cows or poor owing to his¹ association with objects such as wealth etc. Even, though he does not have that (character) (he has) become known as such due to infatuation.

NOTES

1. 'His' stands for 'that of his body; cf *ātmaśabdo deha-viṣayaḥ* . (SP)

प्रत्यग्यायात्म्यमोहोत्था विरिञ्चोपक्रमा मृषा ।

क्षेत्रक्षेत्रज्ञभेदेन ह्या स्थाणोरुत्थितिर्दृशेः ॥४३०॥

430. The activity of the 'seer' consisting in the distinction as the body and the individual consciousness beginning with the (appearance as a) creator and up to (that of) a pillar is false, as¹ it arises from ignorance about the real nature of the individual consciousness.

NOTES

[This is the explanation of *tāny evānuvinaśyati*; it continues up to verse 436, in 8/9th lines.]

1. The word *hi* emphasises that the cause of falsity is 'ignorance'.

यथावस्तु यदा बोधो वेदान्तोक्तिश्रुतेर्भवेत् ।

तदा नश्यन्ति भूतानि येभ्यः क्षेत्रज्ञतां गतः ॥४३१॥

431. When there results knowledge of the thing (viz. the Brahman) as it is, on hearing the statements of the Vedāntas, then get destroyed the elements¹ (as distinct from the individual consciousness) on account of which the Ātman has got the status of the individual consciousness.

NOTES

1. I.e. the awareness of them as distinct from the Ātman.

स्वरूपलाभमात्रेण सम्यग्बोधोऽखिलं तमः ।

यतो हन्ति ततो नासावभ्यासं प्रति वीक्षते ॥४३२॥

432. Because right knowledge (about the nature of the Ātman) removes total darkness (i.e. ignorance), merely by its rise (lit. acquiring its natural form), it does not look to (i.e. expect) any more repetition (of knowledge-acquiring practice).

NOTES

The verse seeks to set aside the view that the right knowledge depends on repeated practice (of meditation) in order that it destroys ignorance and its effects. Cf. the *Brahmasūtra* 4.1.1 : *āvṛttir asakṛt upadeśāt*.

व्यङ्ग्येत्वर्थेषु नाऽऽवृत्त्या व्यञ्जको हन्ति तत्तमः ।

व्यञ्जकस्य स्वभावोऽयं न प्रयोगमपेक्षते ॥४३३॥

433. The manifestor (viz. the individual consciousness) does not destroy darkness (i.e. ignorance) in respect of things which are to be manifested¹ by repetition (of meditation etc.) Such (indeed) is the nature of the manifestor that it does not have to apply itself to (lit. expect) repeated practice of meditation.

NOTES

There is a suggested illustration of the lamp that illuminates objects once for all, it does not have to repeat the act of illuminating. The Ātman is like the lamp.

1. What are these *vyāṅgyārthas*? Perhaps, there is Śleṣa and *vyāṅgyārthas* refer to (i) the objects in the world (as false) and (ii) the objects of the world to be brought to light by the lamp.

2. For the word *prayoga* see NKL (p. 902) : *prayogam abhyāsakriyām iti yāvat*.

मोहतत्कार्यनीडो यस्तस्याज्ञानसमन्वयात् ।

प्रत्यगात्माऽपि तद्ब्रह्म परोक्षमभवन्मुखा ॥४३४॥

तद्ब्रह्मयतस्त्वोऽपि तदसम्बोधहेतुतः ।

आत्मा संसारितां यातो यथा काष्ण्यं वियत्तथा ॥४३५॥

434-435. Even for the individual consciousness, who is the abode of infatuation (i.e. ignorance) and its outcome owing to the inherent relation to ignorance, the Brahman becomes falsely beyond perception. In the same way, that Ātman becomes possessed of the transmigratory existence on account of not knowing its nature, although there is no other Truth beside itself (this happens) as the sky (becomes) dark¹.

NOTES

The verse 434 anticipates the objection : If ignorance is abandoned due to the rise of knowledge of the oneness of the Ātman, then because of the ever non-existence of this oneness : (i) How can one say that the Brahman is beyond perception, since the Brahman is held as identical with the individual consciousness which is directly perceptible. (ii) Also, how can one say that the Ātman is transmigratory, though the Ātman is identical with the Brahman which is non-transmigratory. And this is the reply : (i) is not fault, for it is ignorance that makes one feel the Brahman as not directly perceptible. Cf. the Śruti : *yat sākṣād aparokṣād brahma* (BU 3.4.1, 3.5.1); "The Brahman that is immediate and direct." Verse 435 refutes (ii) as stated in the note on the previous verse. The illustration of the sky becoming dark, i.e. getting to possess the quality of darkness is owing to the onlooker's misconception. Cf. BSB 1.1.1 (p. 2): *apratyakṣe 'py ākāṣe bālās talamalinatāyāmadhyasyanti*.

आत्मनो ब्रह्मता यस्माद्ब्रह्मणोऽप्यात्मता स्वतः ।

तमोमात्रान्तरायत्वात्तद्व्यस्तावेव साऽऽप्यते ॥४३६॥

436. Since the Ātman has the nature of the Brahman and the Brahman, of the Ātman in its own right, therefore, on account of eradication of the obstruction, viz. merely darkness (i.e. ignorance) (of the true nature of the Ātman), is attained that (oneness of the two).

NOTES

The purport of the passage *tāny evānuvinaśyati* is concluded in this verse. When knowledge of the true nature of the

Ātman arises, ignorance is eradicated. And the Brahman shines in its own form.

[This is the meaning of *na pretya samjñāstity are bravimīti hovāca yājñavalkyaḥ* (BU 2.4.13); it continues up to verse 444.]

सर्वमात्मेतिसम्यग्धीजन्मनंवाखिलं तमः ।

ध्वंसमेति ततः संज्ञा नाविद्योत्थाज्ज्वलिष्यते ॥४३७॥

437. The total darkness (i.e. ignorance) is destroyed merely by the rise of the right knowledge (in the form), 'all (this) is the Ātman'. And then, there does not remain any awareness (etc.¹ for the Ātman) arising from ignorance.

NOTES

1. This is most probably in the form, 'I am this; I have this name,' etc.

सदोत्पन्नाऽऽत्मनि मितिरुत्पाद्याऽकारणादिधीः ।

कारणादिधियः पूर्वं प्रतीचि ब्रह्मधीस्ततः ॥४३८॥

438. The knowledge¹ is ever-existent in the Ātman. The knowledge that (the Ātman) is not the cause etc. is to be effected (lit. produced). The (various) knowledge of the cause etc. on the part of the individual consciousness (occurs) first (lit. before, i.e. in the beginning) and the knowledge that it is only the Brahman (occurs) later.

NOTES

The objector might ask: 'When the knowledge of the Ātman arises, how is it that there remains no awareness (of name etc.) The reply is: The awareness such as 'I am the agent of this action' etc. on the part of the Ātman is accepted by everyone as a general rule, but the knowledge that 'the Ātman is non-agent' is created by the statement of the Śruti. Moreover, by the knowledge of the oneness of the Ātman, from the statement of the Śruti, the awareness of the agentship is destroyed at first and then the awareness in the individual consciousness, viz. it is the Brahman, is destroyed—just as the fire burns out when it is without any fuel.

l. *mati* = *jñāna*.

अपास्ताशेषभेदस्य यद्रूपं भेदवद्गतम् ।

तज्ज्ञानेनैव तज्ज्ञातं तदन्यानवशेषतः ॥४३६॥

439. Only by the (proper) knowledge of that which is known as the form consisting in variety of that (consciousness) whose all variety has been set aside (i.e. thrown away as unreal) becomes known that (viz. consciousness, since there does not remain anything else than itself.

NOTES

A question arises: 'How does one grasp that there does not remain anything else than the Ātman that is wholly devoid of variety? For, it is heard that *ākāśa* etc. exist apart from the Ātman.' The reply is: True, that nature of the homogeneous individual consciousness possessing difference like ether (*ākāśa*) etc. is known only by the knowledge of the individual consciousness and that is the effect of ignorance alone. So, when the notions about the Ātman regarding his agentship etc. are removed, all so-called difference such as ether etc. is also destroyed. And there remains consciousness alone.

अहेतुफलरूपेण प्रतीचा तद्विलक्षणम् ।

कार्यकारणवज्जगध्वा द्रष्टवैकोऽवशिष्यते ॥४४०॥

440. Having become one with (lit. eaten) is which consists in causes and effects and which is in characters different from the individual consciousness that has the nature neither of cause nor of effect, the seer (i.e. the Ātman) remains alone.

प्रत्यङ्मात्रेक्षणादात्ममोहतज्जनिराकृतेः ।

असंभवाद्वितीयस्य स्यामपूर्वादिमानहम् ॥४४१॥

441. Since, on thinking of (lit. seeing) the individual consciousness alone, there is removal of infatuation (i.e. ignorance) about the Ātman and its (i.e. of the ignorance) products and therefore there is no possibility of a second

existence, (there remains the thought;) may I be one without any beginning etc.

NOTES

One might think that since the individual consciousness is declared to be one thing, it can have the nature of cause as well as effect; this is totally averted.

व्यपेततमसस्तत्त्वमागमापायसाक्षिणः ।

ज्ञानेन गम्यते साक्षात्तावन्मात्रानुरोधिना ॥४४२॥

442. The Truth of the Ātman from whom has (all) darkness (i.e. ignorance) withdrawn and who is the witness of the appearance and the disappearance (of the worldly objects) is known by the knowledge which is in keeping with that (Ātman) alone.

NOTES

This verse conveys that it is not possible to remove ignorance of the Jīvātman by means of knowing of a pot etc. that cannot be the witness (*sākṣin*).

दृष्टिमात्रात्मयाथात्म्यात्कार्यकारणवस्तुनः ।

नाज्ञातं किञ्चिदप्यस्ति नानपास्तं तमोऽप्यतः ॥४४३॥

443. There is nothing unknown (that is other) than the real nature of the Ātman which consists only in seeing itself, and which (in reality) is (the thing at the basis of) causes and effects. And darkness (i.e. ignorance) also does not remain unremoved by this (i.e. the knowledge of the individual consciousness).¹

NOTES

Here is shown the difference between the knowledge of the individual consciousness and that of a pot etc.

1. Cf. *ataḥśabdena pratyagjñānoktiḥ*. (SP)

क्षेत्रज्ञेश्वरभेदेन संज्ञा नैवेह विद्यते ।

तद्वेतौ तमसि ध्वस्ते कुतः संज्ञाऽनिमित्ततः ॥४४४॥

444. There does not exist here (i.e. in the state of knowledge)¹ any awareness of the distinction as the individual consciousness² and Īśvara (the Brahman). (For) when the cause of that, i.e. darkness (i.e. the ignorance), is destroyed where could there be (such) awareness which has no cause (to effect it)?

NOTES

1. Cf. *iheti vidyāvasthoktiḥ*. (SP)
2. *kṣetra = pratyag, Īśvarā = brahman*.

संज्ञा प्रेत्याऽऽत्मनो नास्तीत्येतच्छ्रुत्वा त्वचूचुदत् ।

शङ्कुमानाऽऽत्मनो नाशं मंत्रेयी पतिमादरात् ॥४४५॥

445. On listening, “After departure, there is no awareness of one (‘I am such and such etc.’),” Maitreyī feared the destruction of her own self and through reverence (or, with a little fear) implored (lit. goaded) him (with a question).

विज्ञानैकघनोक्त्या च निःसंज्ञवचसा तथा ।

उक्त्योर्मिथोविरुद्धत्वादात्मा मोमुह्यते मम ॥४४६॥

446. By the statement that the Ātman is a mass only of consciousness and also by the statement that there is no (more) consciousness (after death) which are mutually opposed, my mind (lit. Ātman) is in (great) infatuation (i.e. feels great apprehension).

NOTES

This explains *mā bhagavān amūmuhan na pretya samjñāstīti* (BUB 2.4.13).

[Now follows up to verse 452 the explanation of *sa hovāca vā are 'ham moham bravimi* (BUB 2.4.13).]

अविरुद्धं सुविस्पष्टं मया तुभ्यं प्रभाषितम् ।

स्वापराधात्तु मद्वाक्यं विरुद्धार्थं त्वमीक्षसे ॥४४७॥

447. (Yājñavalkya answered) “I have told you (what is) non-contradictory and clear. But you understand (lit. see) my say as involving contradictions on account of your own fault.

विज्ञानंकघनोक्त्याऽहं कृत्स्नैकात्म्यं तवावदम् ।

संज्ञानाशेन चाविद्याहेतुत्थापह्नुति तथा ॥४४८॥

448. "In the statement 'the Ātman is a mass only of consciousness,' I have declared to you the complete oneness (of the Jīvātman) with the Ātman and by (the statement of) the absence of awareness (of name, form etc., I have declared) likewise the overpowering (lit. covering), (of reality) arising from ignorance."

विशेषसंज्ञा याऽस्याभूद्विज्ञानात्मादिलक्षणा ।

सम्यग्धीध्वस्तमोहस्य सा कृत्स्ना विनिवर्तते ॥४४९॥

449. Whatever special awareness there was spoken of the Ātman as characterized by some definite knowledge etc.¹, all that (awareness) disappears (from it) whose infatuation (i.e. ignorance) is destroyed by the right knowledge.

NOTES

This is reiteration of the idea in the latter half of the previous verse.

1. *jñātrtva* of the Ātman in relation to *jñeya* 'knowable (object) beside it; cf. verses 427 and 435 above—this refers to the Ātman's discrimination between one object and another.

यत्त्वपारमनन्तं च वास्तवं ज्ञानमात्मनः ।

कूटस्थं तत्स्वतःसिद्धेस्तत्कस्माद्विनिवर्तते ॥४५०॥

450. The knowledge on the part of the Ātman which does not produce any (later) existent effect¹ endless and immutable, since it is self-established, how can it (ever) disappear ?²

NOTES

1. Cf. verse 413 and note thereon.
2. I.e. get removed by any cause.

इतीममर्थं भार्यायै याज्ञवल्क्योऽभ्यभाषत ॥४५१॥

कार्यकारणनाशोऽपि स्वतःसिद्धमनन्यगम् ।

यद्वस्तु तद्वत् स्वात्मसंवित्त्यै निरपेक्षतः ॥४५२॥

451-452. Such a thing did Yājñavalkya speak unto his wife. That thing which is self-established and which is without anything else¹ is, even when there occurs the destruction of (the notion regarding) the cause and effect (relation), capable of making itself understood independently (of anything else).

NOTES

This is an explanation of *alam vā ara idam vijñāya* (BU 2.4.13).

1. The text reads *ananyamam*, qualifying *tad vastu*. It is difficult to make out its sense. Possibly the correct word could be *ananyagam* 'which does not follow any other', that is to say 'which is one without a second' . . . cf. the *Bṛhadāraṇyakavārti-kaśāra* 2.4.163 (p. 1523).

[This is the significance of *yatra hi dvaitam iva bhavati* (BU 2.4.14); it runs up to verse 464.]

यत्राज्ञातात्मतत्त्वात्माऽविद्यासंवीतशेषुषिः ।

तत्र मिथ्याग्रहग्रस्तो द्रष्टृदृश्यादिभेदधीः ॥४५३॥

453. Whoever is one that has not known the Truth of the Ātman and has the intellect overpowered (lit. wrapped) by ignorance; is overwhelmed by wrong knowledge and has the notions of distinction such as the seer, the object of the seeing etc.

यत्राज्ञातात्मयाथात्म्यस्तत्तमोपिहितेक्षणः ।

तत्राविद्योत्थबुद्ध्यादिगुणभूतात्मविघ्नरः ॥४५४॥

454. The person, who has not known the real nature of the Ātman, has eyes covered by darkness (i.e. ignorance) about that, understands the Ātman as being possessed of properties such as the intellect etc. which have arisen from ignorance.

अविद्यामात्रशेषत्वं जगतः प्रागवादिषम्

नर्तेऽविद्यां कार्यमिदं हीति हेतावतः पदम् ॥४५५॥

455. I have already declared that the world is the product of ignorance alone; there would not be this effect, (viz. the world) without ignorance. The word *hi* is used for indicating the reason.

NOTES

The purport of the passage from the BU is already stated; now, the meaning of the word *hi* is explained. Cf. BUB (p. 340, line 9) : *hi yasmāt*.

सतोऽभिव्यञ्जकं मानं स्वभावोऽयं मितेर्भवेत् ।

अविद्यायाः स्वभावोऽयं यदसत्करणं मृषा ॥४५६॥

456. The means is that which manifests the existent——— such is the nature of the (right) knowledge. But the nature of ignorance is such that it falsely creates that which is non-existent.

NOTES

The world is (i) existent, or (ii) non-existent. If (i), there would be no use of ignorance. If (ii), how is it possible to see the non-existent through ignorance—this doubt is removed by means of illustration.

The nature of knowledge and that of ignorance are clarified in contrast. Knowledge is that which manifests what is existent. Ignorance gives rise to what is non-existent.

उक्तहेत्वर्थदीप्येतद्वीति तस्य निपाततः ।

द्वीतं द्विधेतमेकं सत्तद्भावो द्वैतमुच्यते ॥४५७॥

उपमार्थं इवेत्येतद्भवतीति क्रियापदम् ।

तत्रैव विद्यावस्थायां संज्ञेयं युज्यते मृषा ॥४५८॥

457-458. This¹ word *hi* is to clarify the thing which has been already stated on account of its being an adverb. (The² word) *dvitam* is explained as *dvidhā itam* 'that which, being one has proceeded in two ways'—the nature of that is *dvaita*. The word *iva* is for conveying the sense of comparison. (The word) *bhavati* is a verbal form. In that, viz. in the condition of ignorance, is this name falsely used.

NOTES

1. The question, 'How can one say that the word *hi* clarifies its reason ?' is answered thus : Since the world is caused by the nature of being the seen etc., it is nothing but the product of ignorance like a serpent in a rope.

2. The second line of verse 457 and verse 458 explain *yatra hi dvaitam iva bhavati* (BU 2.4.14).

ननु द्वैतमिवेत्येतदुपमानं कथं भवेत् ।

द्वैतं वस्तु न चेदस्ति सर्वस्यैकात्म्यमात्रतः ॥४५६॥

459. One might object : How can (the words) *dvaitam iva* serve as the standard of comparison, for all this is but one Ātman and therefore there is no duality (or, lit. nothing else beside one reality) ?

NOTES

The *upamāna-upameya* relation is impossible in case there exists but one thing.

नैष दोषो यतो दृष्ट एकस्मिन्नपि वस्तुनि ।

उपमेयोपमाभावो दिग्धीरिव विहायसि ॥४६०॥

रामरावणयोर्युद्धं रामरावणयोरिव ।

यथा प्रसिद्धो जगति तथैवेहापि गम्यताम् ॥४६१॥

460-461. (The answer is :) This is not a fault, because the relation of the standard of comparison and the object of comparison is noticed even in the case of only one thing—thus, for example, it is there in the case of the sky where there is the notion of different quarters. As there is the example known in the world, viz. the fight between Rāma and Rāvaṇa was like that between Rāma and Rāvaṇa, so also may be understood (the relation of comparison and the object of comparison) in this case as well.

NOTES

Even in the absence of a thing different from the Ātman, the word *iva* can be used for the sake of comparison. The

notion of different quarters which is known about just one and unique sky is an example. It should be borne in mind that *sādharmya* can be spoken of only two different things—cf. *sādharmyam upamābhede* (the *Kāvyaprakāśa* 10.1). Likewise, even if there is no duality in respect of the Ātman, it is possible to say that the Ātman appears to be manifold. Cf. *ekam sat viprā bahudhā vadanti* (the *Rgveda* 1.164.46).

Another illustration is given to prove the same in verse 461. One should remember that there is the idea of similarity volitionally conceived of—the purport is to point out the incomparableness of the thing (*ananvaya*). Cf the *Kāvyaprakāśa* 10.5 *vr̥tti* : *upamānāntarasambandhābhavo'nanvayaḥ*. The basic idea in *ananvaya* is *anyasadr̥śavyavaccheda*.

अद्वैतात्परमार्थाद्वा मायाद्वैतमपीष्यते ।
तेनोपमार्थसंसिद्धेर्यथा स्वप्नेन्द्रजालयोः ॥४६२॥

462. Or, from the non-duality which is the highest reality is understood the false duality also, for thereby is established the idea of comparison as in the case of sleep and the show by a magician.

NOTES

Sureśvara points out that the duality spoken of is not really existent, it is imagined to be so. Thereby, he wants to establish the propriety of the comparison used by the Śruti as in BU 4.3.10; MaiU 4.2, 7.10; GK 3.29 ff. etc. The use of similes based on experiences in the dream and in the magic show only help to point out the unreality of the non-Ātman. Read SP : *kalpitadvaitenopamāsiddhiṃ sphuṭayati*.

मिथ्येव भाति सत्योऽपीत्यापि लोकेऽभिधीयते ।
मिथ्याभावो न नास्तीति वक्तुं कश्चिदपि क्षमः ॥४६३॥

463. It¹ is said in the world that even² a real thing appears to be false; (and³) no one can ever say that there is no unreality.

NOTES

1. This verse is an answer to the doubt : 'How can the

false duality of sleep etc. be the illustration of the real Ātman ?'

2. The word *api* implies that the false thing also appears to be real. According to SP, the second *api* is used for giving the two arguments in the Śruti.

3. This part of the verse seeks to obviate the possible question : 'Because of invariable concomitance in the form that whatever is visible is unreal, how can one say that a false (unreal) thing does not exist ?' The answer is : They often establish the contradiction and sublation of falsity by Truth.

समस्तव्यस्ततारूपं यो वक्षतीहाऽऽत्मनः श्रुतेः ।

तत्पक्षस्य निषेधोऽयं यत्र हीत्यादिनोच्यते ॥४६४॥

464. This statement, *yatra hi* ... (BU 2.4.14), is the refutation of the view of one who propounds, on the basis of the Śruti¹, that the Ātman has a condition (consisting) in whole and its parts.

NOTES

This is the purport of *yatra hi* ... , that is to say : Seeing duality is possible only in the condition of ignorance, not otherwise. It is only through ignorance that one would talk of creation of the universe from the Brahman (= Ātman). Or, in other words, one would consider the Brahman (= Ātman) as a whole and the various objects its parts.

1. Cf. PU 4.9 : *eṣa hi draṣṭā spraṣṭā śrotā* ... "And this one is the seer, the feeler, the hearer ...", also BU 2.4.6 : *idaṁ sarvaṁ yad ayam ātmā* "All this is what is this Ātman."

[This is the meaning of *tad itara itaraṁ jighrati* ... *tad itara itaraṁ vijānāti*; it continues up to verse 468.]

तस्यामविद्यावस्थायां स्वप्नावस्थां गतो यथा ।

घ्रातेतरः सन्नितरं गन्धं घ्राणेन जिघ्रति ॥४६५॥

465. In that condition of ignorance, a person like the one who is in the dream-state, smells a thing by the sense of smell, being different from that which is smelt.

घ्रातृघ्रेयाभिसंबन्धाद्घ्राणाद्याहृतिरिष्यते ।

जिघ्र तीत्यपि निर्देशः क्रियातत्फलयोर्भवेत् ॥४६६॥

466. It is on account of the connection of one who smells and that which is smelt one that one understands the statement about the act of smell etc.¹ Also, the expression *jighrati* can become the mention of both the action and its result.

NOTES

One might doubt that the expression *ghrāṇena* is not proper, because we hear words which have the meaning of the agent, the object of action and the action. The first line of the verse states the purport of BUB (p. 341, line 6): *itara itaram iti kārakapradarśanārtham . . .*, "The words *itara itaram* are used to show the functionaries." Yet, one might ask 'what is the fruit?', for it is not intended here there is no word denoting that.

1. The word *ādi* conveys to us the idea of all that causes contact with objects in respect of *ghrāṇa*.

उत्तरेष्वपि वाक्येषु योजनेयं यथोदिता ।

प्रत्यगज्ञानमात्रोत्थं ग्राहकाद्यत्र भण्यते ॥४६७॥

467. In the subsequent sentence also is applicable what is here, thus stated. (Indeed) the statement about cognizer etc. is made as it does arise merely from ignorance about the individual consciousness.

NOTES

The first line states that the subsequent passages *tad itara itaram paśyati . . .* should also be explained in the same manner as the statement *tad itara itaram jighrati* is explained. In the second line concludes the meaning of the passage *yatra hi dvaitam iva bhavati tad itara itaram jighrati . . .*

क्रियाकारकसंज्ञाया विषयोऽयं समीरितः ।

अतोऽविद्यासमुच्छित्तावियं संज्ञा निवर्तते ॥४६८॥

468. (All) this matter is discussed in respect of the name,

viz. action and that which helps action. Therefore, this name vanishes when there is the eradication of ignorance.

[Now begins the explanation of *yatra vā asya sarvam ātmaivābhūt tat kena kaṁ jighrati—tat kena kaṁ vijāniyāt* (BU 3.4.14); it continues up to verse 478.]

विज्ञानघन इत्युक्तेविषयोऽयमथोच्यते ।

यत्र वा इति वाक्येन ध्वस्ताविद्ये विपश्चिति ॥४६६॥

469. Then is discussed the matter mentioned in the words *vijñānaghana*, in the sentence *yatra vā*, in respect of the wise (knower) whose ignorance has been destroyed.

यत्र त्वस्याऽऽत्मनोऽज्ञस्य शास्त्राचार्यप्रसादतः ॥४७०॥

प्रत्यग्याथात्म्यविज्ञानभास्वद्भास्करदीधिति-

संप्लुष्टनिखिलाविद्ये तत्र कः केन किं वद ।

जिघ्रैदेकात्म्यमात्रेण सर्वस्यास्याऽऽत्ममात्रतः ॥४७१॥

470-471. But where, that is to say, in the case of one who is ignorant about the Ātman and whose entire ignorance is destroyed by the rays of the bright sun in the form of the knowledge of the true nature of the individual consciousness through the favour of the exponent (lit. preceptor) of the Śruti, tell me, who could smell what and with what? (I ask this,) because to him all this is the Ātman alone on account of (i.e. through the fact that there is) oneness (of reality).

NOTES

Sureśvara refers to the other reading *yatra tv asya* in place of *yatra vā asya* (*sarvam ātmaivābhūt*) of BU 2.4.14. This *yatra tv asya* is noted in BUB (p. 342, footnote no. 1).

षष्ठगोचरवत्सर्वं कार्यकारणवज्जगत् ।

ध्वस्तात्मान्ध्यस्य विदुषः सम्यग्ज्ञानोदये भवेत् ॥४७२॥

472. All (this) world (which is) made up of causes and effects, would become like the world which falls within the range of the sixth sense-organ, viz. *manas*,¹ when there arises the right knowledge on the part of one whose blindness as regards the true nature of the individual consciousness is destroyed.

NOTES

Doubting that, when all the agents are the Ātman and nothing else, the nature of the existent is only like that, he concludes the purport of *sarvam ātmaivābhūt*.

1. The word *ṣaṣthagocara* is used in Nais 1.30, 2.114 and Cand explains it as the *pramāṇa* called *abhāva* in 1.30, otherwise as *asat* in 2.114, cf. further HIRIYANNA's note on Nais (p. 220), HACKER, *op. cit.*, p. 39 footnote. It is nevertheless uncertain if this could be correct, inasmuch as, in Śaṅkara's time, *abhāva* (*anupalabdhi*) was not considered as a *pramāṇa*—Śaṅkara accepted only three *pramāṇas*, i.e. *śabda*, *anumāna* and *pratyakṣa*. In fact, BSB 2.1.2 (p. 436) reads *ṣaṣṭhasyaivendriyārthasya na smṛtir avakalpate* which shows *ṣaṣṭha* to refer to *manas*. And, as such *ṣaṣthagocara* may better be paraphrased as *manogocara*. It is, therefore, doubtful that Sureśvara, a direct disciple of Śaṅkara, accepted *abhāva* as a *pramāṇa*.

अव्यावृत्ताननुगतमतिहेतु सदैकलम् ।

विज्ञानधनमानन्दमैकात्म्यं व्यवतिष्ठते ॥४७३॥

473. There remains only the oneness which is not differentiated and followed by anything else, beyond cause, ever alone, a mass of consciousness, and bliss.

NOTES

One might say that, like duality, non-duality could also be insignificant. Therefore, Sureśvara asserts that there remains just the oneness which has neither particularity nor generality and which is self-luminous. In other words, duality ends into what is not void.

ग्राहकादिविभागोऽत्र नास्ति तद्वैतसम्भवात् ।

चिन्मात्रस्य स्वतः सिद्धेर्विज्ञानधनगीरतः ॥४७४॥

474. Distinction (lit. division) (of reality) such as a knower etc. does not exist here¹ owing to the impossibility of there being any cause of that (ignorance). Since consciousness, one (without a second), is self-established, there is the word (of the Śruti) *viññānaghana* (about it).

NOTES

Sureśvara asserts here that the Ātman is self-luminous and therefore does not fall within the purview of the usual knowing mechanism such as the knower, the means of knowing etc.

1. This refers to the state of pure knowledge on the part of the individual consciousness; *atreti vidyāvasthoktā* . (SP)

आत्माविद्यामनाश्रित्य कारकत्वं न लभ्यते ।

कारकं चानपाश्रित्य न क्रियेह प्रसिध्यति ॥४७५॥

475. Here (i.e. in the worldly dealings) the character of an agent (on the part of the individual consciousness) is not noticed (lit. found) by one who has not resorted to ignorance about the Ātman. And there is no activity established without resorting to (the character of) agent.

NOTES

It is possible to translate the first line of this verse in two alternative ways which depend upon two translations of the word *kāraakatva*: (i) the character of an agent and (ii) the character of a means. The translation above is in keeping with the alternative (i); the other translation of the first line in keeping with the alternative (ii) is thus: In the worldly dealings the character of a means of knowing is not noticed by one in what has not depended on ignorance about the Ātman. Cf. SP: *kriyākāraakavyavahārah saptamyarthaḥ*, where *saptami* means *adhikaraṇārthaḥ*.

अन्तरेण क्रियां तद्वत्फलं नैव प्रसिध्यति ।

कारकाद्यात्मना सेयमविद्यैव प्रकाशते ॥४७६॥

476. Similarly, no result is ever secured without some activity. Thus, in the form of the different *kāraakas* this ignorance itself manifests (to one).

NOTES

One might argue that a result could be obtained only through activity which involves the thought of *kāraakas*, i.e. of duality. But Sureśvara argues that the notion of different *kāraakas*

proceeds only from ignorance about the true nature of the Ātman.

यत एवमतोऽविद्यासमुच्छित्ताविदं जगत् ।

व्याकृताव्याकृतं कृत्स्नमात्मतामेति बोधतः ॥४७७॥

477. Because this is so, there being complete eradication of ignorance, the entire world, manifest and/or unmanifest, becomes one with the Ātman, through knowledge (of the real nature of it).

NOTES

Once again, Sureśvara asserts the absence of any division of this world into the agent, activity etc.

भूयोऽपि लभते संज्ञां लीनं सत्कारणात्मनि ।

जगदेतद्यथा तद्वन्नाविद्याविलये भवेत् ॥४७८॥

478. As this world which has (earlier) merged into its existential cause once again gets the awareness (that it exists etc.), so does it not get that awareness in case there is the disappearance of ignorance.

NOTES

One might argue that, as at the end of the dream state, a person may become aware of duality. Sureśvara does not tolerate this idea of similarity between dream state and the experience of reality. Once ignorance is destroyed, there is no return of worldly existents.

[This is the clarification of *yenedam sarvam vijānāti tam kena vijāniyāt*; it continues up to verse 482.]

ज्ञानोत्पत्तौ न संज्ञाऽस्तीत्यास्तां तावदिहाऽऽत्मनः ।

अपि सत्यामविद्यायां न संज्ञाऽस्त्यात्मनीदृशी ॥४७९॥

479. If one says, there cannot be any awareness on the part of the Ātman (viz. I am this etc.) when there arises the knowledge; our answer is: Let that be so, for even when there is ignorance, on the part of the Ātman, there¹ does not exist any

awareness on its part which is like this (viz. dependent on division such as the agent, the activity etc.).

NOTES

The word *idr̥ṣi* means 'that which cognizes the difference such as a cognizer etc.'

ग्राहकादि जगत्सर्वं येन कूटस्थसाक्षिणा ।

लोकः सर्वो विजानाति जानीयात्केन तं वद ॥४८०॥

480. Tell me by what means one should know that one, the immutable witness through whose help people know this whole world, the perceiver¹ etc.

NOTES

Sureśvara puts a rhetorical question only with the intention of asserting that the witness of all is in every condition but the Ātman. Cf. Ānandagiri on BUB (p. 343) : . . . *taṁ sākṣiṇaṁ kena karaṇena ko . . . jāniyād . . .* /

1. *grāhaka-* = *indriyeṇa grāhaka-*

अचेतने जगत्त्यस्मिन्साक्ष्येवैकोऽत्र चेतनः ।

ग्राहकादिर्न तत्रापि साक्षिसिद्धावपेक्ष्यते ॥४८१॥

481. In this insentient world, the sentient one alone is the witness. But even that being so, the division such as the knower etc. is not expected for proving (the existence of) the witness.

NOTES

The first line affirms that even in this world of ignorance, a witness is only a sentient being that is unchanging. And the second line points out that, though there is sentient being alone that grasps the oneness of the Ātman, it is independent of any means etc. unlike the sentient being in the world of ignorance.

संज्ञेयं किमु विध्वस्तसंसारानर्थकारणे ।

उदितैकात्म्ययाथात्म्यसम्यग्ज्ञानदिवाकरे ॥४८२॥

482. How could be there this awareness when the Sun (lit. the maker of day) of the right knowledge of the true nature of the Ātman, viz. of its oneness, has arisen and which is the cause of destruction of evil, viz. the transmigratory existence?

NOTES

This clarifies the sentence *yenedam sarvaṃ*—which was earlier indicated by the word *api* in *tatra api* of the previous verse. Since there does not exist any other witness than the Ātman, there is no notion of difference such as the perceiver etc.

बोद्धारमपि चापेक्ष्य न संज्ञा प्रत्यगात्मनि ।

बोद्धृतज्ज्ञानविषयैर्न बोद्धा गृह्यते यतः ॥४८३॥

483. Referring to the knower also, there is not an awareness (viz. I am this etc.) in respect of the individual consciousness, because the knower is not (i.e. cannot be) understood by the usual relation of the knower, the object of knowing.

[This explains *vijñātāram are kena vijāniyāt* in 11th line.]

अविचारितसंक्षिप्तिः प्रमात्रादिस्वलक्षणा ।

संज्ञेयं प्रथते मोहान्तत्वसौ वस्तुनिश्चितौ ॥४८४॥

484. This awareness, which has its own characteristics consisting in the knower etc. and (whose proof is) established (even) without any thought, (is) well-known on account of infatuation (i.e. ignorance). But (certainly) it does not get established when there is an ascertainment of reality (i.e. Ātman).

यत एवमतः सिद्धं दर्शनं प्रत्यगात्मनः ।

श्रुत्यादिसाधनं साक्षात्सर्वमात्मेत्युदीरितम् ॥४८५॥

485. Since this is so, therefore, the understanding (lit. seeing) of (the true nature of) the individual consciousness is established. And there (in the Śruti) is there a proof mentioned (in the words), 'All this is the Ātman'.

NOTES

Thus is concluded the purport of the section. It has been ascertained that the dealings proceed from difference which can be found only in the condition of ignorance. Also, it is established that what has been stated to be the direct perception of the individual consciousness dependent on hearing etc. is the means to liberation along with renunciation.

BRHADĀRANYAKOPANIṢAD- BHĀṢYA-VĀRTIKA

(BUBV 2.5)

मधुब्राह्मणम्

BUBV 2.5 is the concluding *brāhmaṇa* 'section' of the Madhukāṇḍa (BU chh. 1-2). Here Sureśvara confirms and assures that the Madhukāṇḍa constitutes the essence of ŚatBr. The Kāṇva-recension of ŚatBr consists of 17 *kāṇḍas* 'books'. The first two *adhyāyas* of the 17th book of it are called BĀ and then following six *adhyāyas* thereof, viz. BĀ chh. 3-8, are called BU. The first two chapters of BU, viz. BĀ 3-4, are called the Madhukāṇḍa. [To be precise, tradition calls BU chh. 3-4 (BĀ chh. 5-6) the Yājñavalkyakāṇḍa (or Munikāṇḍa) and BU chh. 5-6 (BĀ chh. 7-8) the Khilakāṇḍa.¹]

नमोऽसाधारणज्ञातृज्ञानज्ञेयात्मबोधने ।

जग्धाशेषमहाविद्यातज्ज्ञानार्थाय विष्णवे ॥१॥

[Sureśvara begins this last section of the Madhukāṇḍa (viz. BU 2.5), with a *maṅgalaśloka*.² SP points out the alternative purposes of this *maṅgala*: (i) In keeping with the tradition which Patāñjali has noted in his *Mahābhāṣya* regarding the *maṅgalācaraṇa*, viz. *maṅgala* should be observed even in the middle of a Śāstric text, as in the beginning and at the end of it; or (ii) the earlier two sections have clarified the meanings of the different words in the Śruti and now begins an exposition of the purport of the 'sentence' in the same. This necessitates the *maṅgalācaraṇa*; or (iii) *maṅgala* marks the conclusion of the Madhukāṇḍa.]

1. BUB p. 369, lines 1-2; p. 697, line 7; ABUB p. 369, lines 1-3; p. 697, lines 8-9; BUBV 3.1.1-2 and 4-5; 5.1.1-2.

2. Actually BU 2.6 which follows this section is described as the ending section of the Madhukāṇḍa, but it consists of only six verses and states nothing significant; see Appendix.

Salutation to Viṣṇu¹ who is possessed of the uncommon nature of (the triad, viz.) knower, knowing and object of knowing,² who knows his own nature, (and) who destroyed (lit. devoured) the extensive Ignorance³ and the evil resulting therefrom in their entirety. [1]

¹Though this is the name of a god, it can be understood in the sense of the individual consciousness, this sense being derived from root *viṣ* 'to pervade' (the entire body).

²Cf. BG 18.18: *jñānam jñeyam parijñātā trividhā karma-codanā/ karaṇam karma karteti trividhaḥ karma-saṁgrahaḥ*||

³There are two types of *avidyās*, viz. *mūlāvidyā* and *tūlāvidyā*. The former is the force overpowering the Brahman, viz. *māyā*, which has been ever there, i.e. beginningless. It is termed simply as *avidyā* also. The latter is the effect of the former; it is an error on the part of an individual. The two *avidyās* are sometimes identified with *tattvāgrahaṇa* and *tattvānyathāgrahaṇa* respectively. Also cf. the *Vedāntakalpataru* p. 3, lines 16-17.

प्रत्यग्वान्तसमुच्छेदि ज्ञानमैकात्म्यनिष्ठितम् ।
संन्याससाधनं प्रोक्तममृतत्वंकसाधनम् ॥२॥

[Thus Sureśvara summarises the contents of BU 2.4 in order to point out the connection between BU 2.4 and BU 2.5.]

It is declared (in the preceding section) that Knowledge is the destroyer of darkness (viz. Ignorance) in its fullness (*saṁ*) in respect of the (nature of) individual consciousness, (firmly) based on the uniqueness of the Ātman, and the (potent) means to renunciation (of all attachment to body) which is the sole means to immortality.¹ [2]

¹BUBV 2.4.23: *tyāga eva hi sarveṣāṁ mokṣa-sādhanaṁ uttamam/ tyajataiva hi taj jñeyam tyaktuḥ pratyak param padam*|| On this see Hino (1982), p. 87.

हेतवोऽपि च तत्सिद्धौ श्रवणादिपुरःसराः ।
उक्ता यथावत्तत्रैव श्रोतव्यः श्रुतिवाक्यतः ॥३॥

मन्तव्यो हेतुभिः सूक्ष्मैरुक्तदृष्टान्तबोधितैः ।

चित्सामान्यचिदुत्पत्तिचिदेकप्रलयात्मभिः ॥४॥

[These verses show that not only is renunciation necessary for acquiring the Knowledge (i.e. causing the rise of Knowledge) (as stated above) but *śravaṇa* etc. also are the means to the same.]

And in order to acquire that (knowledge), the means, viz. those beginning with 'hearing',¹ are also declared there: from the Śruti passages,² ' (the Ātman is) to be heard' [3]

' (the Ātman is) to be thought of' with the help of subtle reasons which are conveyed by the already stated examples,³ which have the purport that this has Sentiency (alone) as its generality, originates from Sentiency (alone) and which merges (also) into Sentiency alone.⁴ [4]

¹Cf. BU 2.4.5: *ātmā vā are draṣṭavyaḥ śrotavyo mantavyo nididhyāsitavyaḥ*.

²The word *śruti-vākyaṭaḥ* may mean either 'from the passages from the Śruti texts' or 'from the Śrutis and the instruction of teachers'. The latter interpretation is supported by *śrotavyaḥ pūrvam āgamataś ca* (BUBV 2.4.5), *āgama-darśanam pūrvam āgamācāryato matiḥ* (BUBV 2.4.218) and *tatra śrotavyaḥ ācāryāgamābhyām* (BUB 2.5.1).

³These are stated in BU 2.4.7-12: 'A drum, a conch and a Vīṇā and their sounds' (7-9); 'smoke and fire as its origin' (10); 'waters and ocean as their merging place' (11); 'water and salt which is poured into it and remains there invisibly and pervading all of it' (12).

⁴Here only *śravaṇa* and *manana* are a little clarified, *nididhyāsana* is not spoken of.

आशङ्क्य हेत्वसिद्धत्वं मधुब्राह्मणमुच्यते ।

कुतोऽसिद्धत्वमिति चेच्छृणु तद्गदतो मम ॥५॥

[Here begins the discussion of BU 2.5.]

Keeping in view (the possibility) that the (earlier sta-

ted) reasons can be (taken by some¹) as not justified, exposition is now given on the section on Madhu. If (one would ask), 'Owing to what (is this) unjustified character of the reasons?', (I have to say,) 'Hear while I explain the same.'

[5]

¹This refers to the Sāṃkhyas and others, also possibly the Naiyāyikās who hold similar (views); see the next verse.

निःसामान्यविशेषत्वाच्चित्सामान्यं कथं भवेत् ।
चिदुत्पत्तिलयासिद्धिः सांख्यादीन्प्रति वादिनः ॥६॥

How can Sentiency be the generic characteristic, because it is devoid of generality or particularity?¹ (The view of the Vedāntin, viz.) the origination (of this world) is from Sentiency and its merger (also) is into Sentiency, is not justified (with reason only) for the contenders, the Sāṃkhya and others.²

[6]

¹Notions of *viśeṣa* and *sāmānya* cannot be associated with the Ātman, for the Ātman is *nitya*, *eka* and *anekānugata*. On this, cf. BUBV 1.4.656-657. The Ātman (or Sentiency) is ever described in the Śrutis as *avyāvṛtta*, *ananugata*; cf. BUBV 1.4.529; 4.4.569; Hino (1982), p. 299.

²Śaṅkara has pointed out the views of all these thus: *na yathokta-viśeṣaṇasya jagato yathokta-viśeṣaṇam īśvaram muktvānyataḥ pradhānād acetanād aṇubhyo 'bhāvāt saṃsāriṇo vā utpattyādi sambhāvayitum śakyam* (BSB 1.1.2, p, 88, lines 2-3).

ऐकात्म्यवस्तुतात्पर्यं हेत्वादिच्छद्मनोच्यते ।
वेदे यतो न हेत्वादि लोकवत्स्याद्विवक्षितम् ॥७॥

(This is so) because, in the Veda, is stated its purport, viz. the uniqueness of the Reality, under the garb of (its being) the origin etc.¹ (of this world),² (there) it is not intended to state the origin etc. (of this world) in the worldly way.³

[7]

¹This is *janman* 'origin', *sthiti* 'sustenance' and *pralaya* 'merger'.

²This is a reference to the *sr̥ṣṭi-vākyas* in particular.

³This may refer to the use of logic in all worldly discussion, though SP and NKL make a reference to the Vaiśeṣika view of the *ārambhavāda* and the Sāṃkhya view.

चित्तत्वं सदविद्यावत्कारणत्वं निगच्छति ।

चित्सामान्याद्यतः सिद्धं प्रागप्येतत्प्रसाधितम् ॥८॥

(The Śruti-) conclusion establishes that Sentiency, the (only) existent principle, is the cause of what is made of ignorance, for the reason that it has Sentiency as its generic characteristic. I have already shown this earlier.¹ [8]

¹BUBV 2.4.282: *evam cid-anvayāt sarvas tad-adhyastah samīkṣyate/ sāmānyam vā viśeṣo vā cidasambodha-hetutah*|| On this, see Hino (1982), p. 208. Also compare BU 1.4.7: *tad dheham...etc.*

अभ्युपेत्याप्यसिद्धत्वं तत्सिद्धत्वाभिधित्सया ।

मधुब्राह्मणमारब्धमियमित्याद्यथोत्तरम् ॥९॥

[This verse speaks of the purpose of the Madhubrāhmaṇa (MB) 'section on Madhu' which begins with the words, *iyam (pr̥thivi)*..., for one would consider it purposeless if the Siddhāntin argued that there was already a proof given of Sentiency being the generic characteristic of the world.]

Yet, even granting that (the earlier statement about Sentiency) is not justified with reason, this later section on Madhu is now begun (by the seer) with the desire to re-affirm the same with the words, *iyam (pr̥thivi)*... [9]

प्रतिदेहं लयोत्पत्तिश्रुतेर्ह्यात्मनि शङ्क्यते ।

भेदोऽतस्तन्निवृत्त्यर्थं मधुत्वेनैकतोच्यते ॥१०॥

Since there is a (statement of the) Śruti that each and every body merges in and originates from (the Ātman),¹ it may be suspected that there is numerousness of the Ātman

(=Jīvātman associated with every different body). Hence, in order to obviate that doubt, the uniqueness of the Ātman is declared (by stating it) to be Madhu. [10]

¹Cf. for example BU 4.3.8: *sa vā ayam puruṣo jāyamānaḥ śariram abhisampadyamānaḥ pāpmabhiḥ saṁsrjyate* which would forcefully lead to the idea of differentiation of the numerous Ātmans.

उपकार्योपकारित्वभिन्नं यज्जगदीक्ष्यते ।

उपकार्योपकारित्वात्तत्स्यादेकात्मतत्त्वकम् ॥११॥

Since it is noticed that the world is characterised as the benefitted and the benefactor (which are its components)¹, therefore, on account of its being comprised of the components, (viz.) the benefitted and the benefactor, it should be held as (the product of one cause) of one uniform nature (viz. the individual consciousness).² [11]

¹The relation of *upakārya-upakārin* is possible only if the notion of duality is held. Śaṅkara discusses this relation in BUB 2.5.1 (p. 344, line 9 to p. 345, line 1) and BSB 2.3.43.

²That which is the product is similar to its cause. Therefore the world of duality must have a cause, viz. it is marked by duality. Such is the individual consciousness, wrapped as it is by *avidyā*. SP points out *svapna-dvaita* for clarifying this cause and effect relation. On this, cf. GK 2.4; 3.29^a; 4.62^a.

प्रतिज्ञायाथवैकात्म्यं हेतूनुक्तवोक्तसिद्धय ।

निगमायोत्तरो ग्रन्थः प्रतिज्ञाया विवक्षितः ॥१२॥

प्रतिज्ञातार्थसिद्धयर्थं हेतूनुक्त्वा पृथग्विधान् ।

हेतोर्निगमनं पश्चात्क्रियतेऽथोत्तरोक्तिभिः ॥१३॥

[These verses present another way of explaining the relationship between BU 2.4 and BU 2.5: BU 2.5 is intended to serve as the restatement of the *pratijñā* 'enunciation' in respect of the uniqueness of the Ātman after the *hetu* 'reason' was proved.]

Or rather (we may say), it is intended (by the seer) to begin the subsequent part (of the work) after having first enunciated the uniqueness of the Ātman (or, that all this is but the Ātman) and then stated the reasons for proving what was stated (therein), in order that it should serve as the conclusion.¹ [12]

(Such is the practice that) after having stated various reasons for proving what is enunciated, one states the conclusion (in the form of a restatement) in subsequent statement.¹ [13]

¹This refers to the practice of the commonly used *pañcāvayava-vākya* 'five-membered syllogism'. Read BUB 2.5.1: *tathā hi naiyāyikair uktam hetvapadeśāt pratijñāyāḥ punar-vacanam nigamanam iti*

निदिध्यासनसिद्धयर्थं केचिद्व्याचक्षते परम् ।
मधुब्राह्मणमेतत्तु न युक्तं प्रतिभाति नः ॥१४॥
श्रुत आगमतो योऽर्थस्तर्केणापि समर्थितः ।
स एवार्थस्तु निष्णातो निदिध्यासनमुच्यते ॥१५॥
शास्त्राचार्यानुभवनैर्हेतुभिश्च समर्थितः ।
ईदृगैकात्म्यसंबोधो निदिध्यासनमुच्यते ॥१६॥
निदिध्यासनसिद्धयर्थो यत्नोऽतोऽयमनर्थकः ।
प्रत्यग्याथात्म्यसंबोधमात्रत्वादेव हेतुतः ॥१७॥

[Ānandagiri reports here as also in ABUB that there now follows a discussion on the view of Bhartr̥.]

Some say¹ that this subsequent section, viz. the section on Madhu, is begun for clarifying the notion of *nididhyāsana*. But this does not appear to us reasonable. [14]

Nididhyāsana is so called when a matter, which is (first) learned from tradition, (later) supported by logic, and then subjected to a deep study.² [15]

Nididhyāsana is so called when, instruction about the uniqueness of the Ātman is justified by (proper) reasons, viz. the Śruti, (instruction of) teachers and (one's own) experience (of the same.)³ [16]

Therefore, this effort (of this section of the Upaniṣad) for showing that (it is intended) to establish *nididhyāsana* (declared by Bharṭṛ) as unnecessary, since the cause of one's (acquisition of) the knowledge of the true nature of the individual consciousness consists only in informing (one about it).⁴ [17]

¹The use of the plural shows the author's respect for Bharṭṛ who holds that verses BU 2.4.1-6 are meant to clarify *śravaṇa*, BU 2.4.7-14, *manana* and BU 2.5, *nididhyāsana*.

²NKL reads *evārthaḥ suniṣṇātaḥ* for *evārthas tu niṣṇātaḥ*. *tu* is understood here in the sense of *ca*. According to NKL, *nididhyāsana* consists in knowing the meaning of the Śruti sentence which results from hearing it and thinking over it and not in meditating on it.

³SP points out that BU 2.4 has explained how *nididhyāsana* consists in the acquisition of *vāk्यārthajñāna*. NKL states that verse 16 explains the purport of *sunīṣṇāta*.

⁴Cf. NKL which informs that *nididhyāsana* is *vāk्यārtha-jñāna* coming from *śravaṇa-manana-phala*.

क्रियाफलोपभोगार्थं सर्वैरेव स्वकर्मभिः ।

जन्तुभिः पृथिवी सृष्टा मधु तेषां ततो मही ॥१८॥

पृथिव्याप्यात्मभोगार्थं सृष्टाः सर्वेऽपि जन्तवः ।

पृथिव्या अपि कार्यत्वान्मधु तेऽपि भवन्त्यतः ॥१९॥

पार्थिवानि शरीराणि सर्वेषां देहिनां यतः ।

पृथिव्या तानि सृष्टानि पृथिव्यन्वयदर्शनात् ॥२०॥

भूतानां च पृथिव्याश्च मिथः कार्यत्वहेतुतः ।

भोग्यभोक्तृत्वसंबन्धस्तस्मात्सिद्धः परस्परम् ॥२१॥

भोग्यता प्रथमान्तेन पृथिव्यादेरिहोच्यते ।

कर्तृता भोक्तृता चैषां षष्ठ्यन्तेनाभिधीयते ॥२२॥

अचेतनांशप्राधान्यात्कार्यकारणतोच्यते ।

भोक्तृभोग्याभिसंबन्धश्चेतनाचेतनात्मनोः ॥२३॥

सर्वेषामपि भूतानां कार्यकारणसंगतेः ।

सर्वभूतात्मकत्वं स्याद्यथा सर्वात्मनस्तथा ॥२४॥

[These verses explain the nature of Madhu as *paraspara-upakārya-upakāraka-bhāva*.]

All beings have created the earth by their own doings¹ for the enjoyment of the fruits of their various activity. Hence the earth is for them Madhu. [18]

The earth also² has created all of the beings for its own enjoyment. Thus, being the product of the earth, they also are Madhu. [19]

Since, the bodies of embodied beings are made of (the stuff of) the earth, therefore, they are (to be taken as) created by the earth;³ we see in them the continued existence of the earth.⁴ [20]

Thus, owing to the reason that the earth and the beings⁵ have a mutual relationship of (cause and) effect, therefore, there is established a mutual relationship of the enjoyer and the enjoyable.⁶ [21]

Here (in the statement, *iyam pṛthivi...*) the character of the enjoyable (and also of the effect)⁷ of *pṛthivi* etc. is expressed with the use (of the noun) with the nominative ending and the character of the cause (or agent) and of the enjoyer of these is expressed (by the noun) with the genitive ending.⁸ [22]

(It is) owing to the predominance of the insentient part that there is the statement of the cause and effect relation and (it is intended to convey that there exists) the relation of the enjoyer and the enjoyable between those that are (of the nature of) the sentient and the insentient.⁹ [23]

(As we can) thus (affirm) on account of the relation of cause and effect which obtains among all beings, they are of the nature of all (beings), in the same way, (we can affirm that) the Ātman (which exists) in all (beings) is (of the nature of them all).¹⁰ [24]

¹*svakarman* refers to the *upakārya-upakāraka* relation which is mentioned earlier.

²SP explains the purpose served by the word *api* which occurs in the verse four times. The first (= the third and the fourth)

api is *upamāvacaka* 'expressive of a simile'. The second *api* stresses that each and every being is included.

³This is parallel to what is stated before; viz. the earth is produced by the beings.

⁴One may remember here: *kāraṇa-dravyam kārye 'vatiṣṭhate*.

⁵*bhūtāni* refers to the existent beings, not the elements.

⁶Sureśvara uses here *bhoktr-bhogyā* in the place of *upakārya-upakāraka*.

⁷*karṭṛtā* in the second line implies *kāryatā* beside *bhogyatā*.

⁸The verse clarifies the mutual relation implied in *bhoktr-bhogyatā* and *karṭṛ-kāryatā*. Such relationships are to be understood in the following verses also.

⁹This verse explains the significance of the two pairs of words that explain the mutual relation between the earth and the beings. This cause and effect relation can obtain between two non-sentients, whereas the enjoyer-enjoyable relation implies the necessity of sentience. Read SP: *pṛthivyāder acetanāmśa-prādhānyāt kāryatvādi-trayam cetanāmśa-prādhānyāc ca bhokṭṛtā*.

¹⁰This is *nigamana* 'conclusion'. The nature of the primordial cause is the nature of all that are effects. The Ātman is the cause of all. Hence, the Ātman is all, i.e. all is nothing else than the Ātman.

संहृत्य स्थूलमाधारं भूतानां च क्षितेस्तथा ।

तदाधेयोपसंहृत्यै यश्चायमिति शब्दयते ॥२५॥

अस्यां पृथिव्यां यश्चासौ भास्वद्विज्ञानविग्रहः ।

अमृतो नित्य एवातो न नाशी स्थूलदेहवत् ॥२६॥

स चापि मधु सर्वेषां भूतानां तानि तस्य च ।

मधु सर्वाणि भूतानि यथा पूर्वमवादिषम् ॥२७॥

सहाध्यात्माधिदैवं हि साधिभूतमिदं जगत् ।

एकैकस्यात्मनः कृत्स्नं भोग्यत्वेनावतिष्ठते ॥२८॥

सर्वः सर्वस्य कार्यं स्यात्सर्वः सर्वस्य भोजकः ।

एवं सति भवेत्सिद्धं यथा पूर्वं प्रपञ्चितम् ॥२९॥

After having thus stated (about) the gross support of beings and also of the earth, (now) is stated (the sen-

tence), *yaś cāyam...* for bringing in (the information about) what is supported in them. [25]

(The one) who is in this earth, possessed of the body (in the form) of lustrous knowledge,¹ is indeed immortal (and) eternal;² therefore, that one is not (at all) perishable like a gross body. [26]

He also is Madhu³ of all beings and all those beings are likewise his Madhu, in the same way as I have already stated.⁴ [27]

Indeed, this whole world, together with the *adhyātma* 'embodied', the *adhidaiva* 'divine' and also the *adhibhūta* 'elemental',⁵ exists for every Ātman (Jīvātman) as its enjoyable.⁶ [28]

All would be the effect of all; all, the enjoyer of all.⁷ This being the case, what is stated herebefore would become justified. [29]

¹*vijñāna* is 'knowledge' associated with the notion of duality. This is so because the individual consciousness (which is, in final analysis, not distinct from the Ātman) is associated with the body and external objects and there thus exists knower-knowable relationship.

²This is to contrast the individual consciousness with the gross body.

³NKL refers this to the notions of *karṭṛ*, *kārya*, *bhokṭṛ* and *bhogyā*.

⁴Stated earlier in verse 22 above.

⁵*adhyātma* is what is associated with the individual consciousness, that is each of the various beings; *adhidaiva*, with each of the divine beings; *adhibhūta*, what is related to each of the elements, i.e. the things.

⁶The idea of the beginningless transmigration of beings in relation to the divine and the elemental world around is the basis of this verse. Consequently, there is reference to many Ātmans, i.e. Jīvātmans. This is similar to the *puruṣabahutva* 'plurality of *puruṣas*' of the Sāṃkhya theory. The concept of the threefold world is held by the Sāṃkhyas: cf. SK 1 and the *Sāṃkhyatattva-kaumudī* and the *Gauḍapādabhāṣya* on the same.

⁷All refers to the transmigratory existence which is in reality the product of ignorance. This has been explained in the earlier

section of this Upaniṣad: cf. *idaṁ sarvaṁ yād ayam ātmā* (BU 2.4.6) as NKL points out.

अध्यात्मं यश्च शारीरः पार्थिवांशसमाश्रयः ।
स चापि मधु सर्वेषां सर्वभूतानि तस्य च ॥३०॥

The embodied one, who is described with reference to (any) embodied (being), and has resorted to the earthly portion, is (likewise) Madhu of all things around him. All (those) things also (are Madhu) of him.¹ [30]

¹This speaks of the Jīvātman and the things around as *upakārya* and *upakārin*, i.e. mutually dependent.

कार्यकारणरूपेण भोज्यभोक्तृतयोदितम् ।
चतुष्टयं पृथिव्यादि तस्य तत्त्वमथोच्यते ॥३१॥
चतुष्टयविभागेन स्वार्थोऽप्यात्मा विभज्यते ।
अविभागोऽपि तादर्थ्याद्भोक्तातः सोऽत्र गृह्यते ॥३२॥

Now is being explained the true nature of the group of the four,¹ beginning with the earth which has been already described (as that which stands) related as mutual cause(s) and the effect(s) and also as being the enjoyer(s) and the enjoyable(s). [31]

In the way of the division of the group of the four, the Ātman also, is being divided, even though it exists for itself. Undivided though he is (as comprising the group of the four),² he is the enjoyer since (the group of the four) exists (solely) for his sake. For this reason, he is understood here (as divided).³ [32]

¹The group of the four comprises of *prthivī*, *ap*, *tejas* and *vāyu*.

²*avibhakto 'pi* implies *vibhaktaḥ*; supply *prthivyādicatuṣṭayarūpeṇa*.

³That is to say: as the *bhoktr* among the four, viz. *karṭr*, *kārya*, *bhoktr* and *bhogya*.

प्रत्यक्तया यः प्रथते चतुष्टयविलक्षणः ।
प्रात्यक्ष्यात्सोऽयमित्येवं प्रत्यक्साक्ष्यभिधीयते ॥३३॥

अयमेव स इत्युक्त्वा सामानाधिकरण्यतः ।

प्रत्यङ्मात्रैकयाथात्म्यं चतुर्थोक्तस्य बोध्यते ॥३४॥

पृथिव्यादिषु यः पूर्वं व्याख्यातोऽन्तरबाह्यतः ।

आत्मैव स इति ज्ञेयः तदबोधप्रसूतितः ॥३५॥

अयमित्यस्य शेषः स्याद्योऽयमित्यादिकः परः ।

एवेत्यवधृतावेतत्संसर्गप्रतिषेधकृत् ॥३६॥

तत्त्वं चतुष्टयस्यास्य प्रत्यगात्मैव केवलः ।

अव्यावृत्ताननुगतध्वस्ताविद्यातदुद्भवः ॥३७॥

[Verses 33-37 are *udbhāṣya vyākhyāna*; i.e. they state what is *anukta* in the *bhāṣya* of Śaṅkara, viz. the meaning of *ayam eva saḥ* in BUB; this has a reference to the group of the four *bhoktr* etc.]

He, who is distinct from the group of the four, stands pre-
eminent on account of his being inside (all); (and) on
account of his being directly perceptible, he is described
as the 'inner witness' in the sentence, '*ayam...*' [33]

The Śruti has first made the statement *ayam eva saḥ*; and
now it declares the true nature, viz. the uniqueness of the
individual consciousness even if it is stated as divided into
four¹ by using (the two words *saḥ* and *ayam*) in the same
case. [34]

He who was earlier declared to be the being within and
outside of the (four) beginning with the earth² is (to be
known) as identical with the Ātman; (but he is so descri-
bed there) because of the rise (of the notions) out of ig-
norance about the same (viz. the Ātman).³ [35]

The subsequent (statement) beginning with *yo 'yam*
should be (taken as) a complement of this statement '*ayam*
... (i.e. the statement, *ayam eva saḥ*)'; this word *eva* is for
emphatically asserting and it negates the idea of a contact
(of these, viz. the Ātman⁴ and the group of four.) [36]

The true nature of this group of the four is but (his being)
the unique individual consciousness, which is neither
differentiated (from anything else), nor (lit.) followed by
(i.e. similar to) (anything else) and which has destroyed
ignorance and what has originated from it.⁵ [37]

¹See note 3 on verse 32 above. Alternatively, the individual consciousness can be understood with reference to the embodied beings and divinities and then each of these two kinds of beings can be understood to present the relation of the support and the supported—that makes the division of the individual consciousness into four.

²This description entails the acceptance of duality in that the Ātman is said either to need some support in the body or to be related to it from outside.

³This explains away the contingency of accepting duality.

⁴This explanation is necessitated by a possible doubt that the Ātman and the group of the four are connected like a lotus and its blue (in the statement 'the blue lotus') where 'blue' and 'lotus' are used in the same case (i.e. they have *sāmānādhikaraṇya*).

⁵The four elements, which form a group, are unlike the Ātman, *vyāvṛtta* and *anugata*. Further, they themselves originate from ignorance (about the nature of the individual consciousness); cf. note 3 above.

प्रकृतात्माभिधानं वा स इत्येतत्पदं भवेत् ।
 अयमित्युच्यते साक्षात्संनिकर्षाच्चतुष्टयम् ॥३८॥
 स एवायमिति ज्ञेयो यो द्रष्टव्यतयोदितः ।
 यच्चामृतं स्वभार्यायै याज्ञवल्क्येन भाषितम् ॥३९॥
 ब्रह्मेति ध्वस्तसंभेदं यन्नेतीति पुरोदितम् ।
 सर्वं समभवत्कृत्स्नं यद्याथात्म्यावबोधतः ॥४०॥
 पृथिवीं पार्थिवं चांशं शरीरं साधिदैवतम् ।
 जानीयात्सर्वमात्मेति नेति नेत्युपलक्षणम् ॥४१॥

[This introduces the *ukta* portion of BUB]

Or, the word *saḥ* could be the word that expresses the Ātman (which is) taken up (for discussion).¹ So also the word *ayam* is used for expressing the group of the four on account of its direct contact (with the sense-organs). [38]
 (In the statement) beginning with *sa evāyam* is mentioned the one who is described as one that should be seen and

also whatever is declared by Yājñavalkya to his wife as the immortal.²

[39]

(This group of the four is described) as the Brahman,³ in which (all) difference is destroyed; the one which has been earlier stated (in the sentence) as 'not this, (not this also)'.⁴ All (i.e. this group of the four) has become one whole is a (correct) decision arising from the knowledge of the true nature of the Ātman.⁵

[40]

One should know all⁶ (of) the earth, the earthly portion (in the body) and also the body (of a being) together with their presiding deities, as the Ātman. The words *neti neti* are (but) an indication (of this).⁷

[41]

¹The Ātman has been the subject of discussion from BU 2.4, i.e. the Maitreyī-brāhmaṇa (MaiB); cf. the next verse.

²See *idam amṛtam* (BU 2.5.1); cf. Yājñavalkya's instruction on the doctrine of immortality (of the Ātman) to Maitreyī in BU 2.4.5 ff. And also cf. *etāvad are khalv amṛtatvam* (BU 4.5.15) as NKL points out. The sentences *sa evāyam* here and *ātmā vā are draṣṭavyaḥ* in BU 2.4.5 differ only in words, but they are identical in sense. That is to say: The Ātman is immortal is the *vākyārtha* 'sentence-sense'. Also, 'the group of the four is immortal' can be understood because the four arise from *citsāmānya*.

³Refer to *idam brahma*.

⁴Cf. BU 2.3.6.

⁵Refer to *idam sarvam*; but *tasmāt tat sarvam abhavat* (BU 1.4.10) as NKL points out.

⁶SP points out that all refers to the *adhyātma* and the *adhi-daiva* each of which is twofold, viz. *sthūladvaya* and *sūkṣmadvaya*.

⁷This concludes the explanation of the statements, viz. *idam amṛtam*, *idam brahma* and *idam sarvam*.

उत्तरेष्वपि वाक्येषु योक्तेनैव वर्त्मना ।

इममेव तु वाक्यार्थं व्याचक्षीताविचारयन् ॥४२॥

In respect of the subsequent sentences also should one explain, without entertaining (even a bit of) hesitation (and) in this very manner, that only this is their meaning.¹

[42]

¹BU 2.5.2-10 will describe *ap*, *agni*, *vāyu*, *āditya*, all *diś*, *candra*, *vidyut*, *stanayitnu*, *ākāśa*; these are like the *prthivi* in BU 2.5.1 and therefore, the explanation of 2.5.1 is to be *atidiṣṭa* 'extended' to them.

पृथिव्यादीनि भूतानि तदंशाश्च समीरिताः ।
 हिरण्यगर्भलिङ्गांशास्तथा पूर्वोक्तमूर्तयः ॥४३॥
 यथोक्ता येन सर्वेऽपि प्रयुक्ताः स्वात्मकर्मभिः ।
 उपकुर्वन्ति नः सर्वान्स धर्म इति संज्ञितः ॥४४॥
 तस्य कार्यं द्विधेहोक्तं सामान्यात्मविशेषतः ।
 पृथिव्यादीह सामान्यं विशेषः पिण्डमात्रकम् ॥४५॥
 तत्कार्यस्येह प्रात्यक्ष्यात्तदभेदोपचारतः ।
 प्रत्यक्षवदयं धर्मस्तस्मादेवाभिधीयते ॥४६॥
 साधारणः पृथिव्यादिकारी धर्मोऽभिधीयते ।
 यश्चायमिति वाक्येन तथासाधारणाभिधा ॥४७॥
 यश्चायमध्यात्ममिति योऽयं मद्देहकृन्मतः ।
 साधारणविशेषात्मा यदपूर्वं तदुच्यते ॥४८॥
 प्राजापत्यमपूर्वं यत् सर्वभूतप्रयोजकम् ।
 अध्यात्मं पिण्डकृद्यच्च सोऽयं धर्माभिधोदितः ॥४९॥

(In the same way)¹ the elements earth etc. and their portions, and also the portions of Hiranyagarbha² are declared as the various forms of (the Brahman) already stated. [43]

That has the name *dharma* on account of which (all those fragments of Hiranyagarbha) that are stated before (become) employed (in their respective activities) and become useful to us all on account of their actions.³ [44]

⁴The effect of that (*viz. dharma*) (in the case of each individual being) is, on account of their common characteristic (effect) and the peculiar characteristic (effect) of each,⁵ stated here⁶ to be twofold; thus, here (in respect of *dharma*)⁷ the common (effect) is the earth etc., whereas the peculiar (effect) is just a form (of the earth etc.) [45]

Since the effect of that (*dharma*) is here (i.e. in all dealings) directly perceptible, therefore, just for that (reason), (the phrase) *ayam dharmaḥ* 'this (directly perceptible) *dharma*' is uttered by considering that (*dharma*) in a secondary sense.⁸ [46]

In the statement *yaś cāyam...*, is stated the common property (*dharma*), (viz. that) which produces (the effect, viz.) the earth etc. So also is there a statement of the particular property⁹ [47]

in the words *yaś cāyam adhyātmam....* Thus, the Ātman which is considered as the common and the uncommon property, is the maker of (the notion of) 'my body'. What is *apūrva* is (now) explained. [48]

The activity of Prajāpati (the sacrificer) has no cause (for it) which is the inciter of all beings, and which is, with reference to a (being's) body, the producer of a form. It is this property which is mentioned by the word *dharma*. [49]

¹This understands 'as in verse 42 above'.

²These are the bases or support for the elements; *bhūta-śarīrādhāraḥ* (SP).

³Each portion of Hiraṇyagarbha has its own *karman* 'duty to perform'; *svātmakarman* is *svarūpasadṛśakarman* 'action (prescribed) as particular to one's own nature'. From this verse onwards, the word *dharma* is used in more than one sense. Here, it means duty prescribed for one by the scriptures, and also indicative of its result (something like *punya* or *adṛṣṭa*); cf. BU 1.4.14.

⁴Verse 45 answers a possible objection, viz. *dharma* is imperceptible and known only from the Śāstra, that is to say: It is not directly perceptible; as such, the reference to it as *ayam* 'this one' is unreasonable.

⁵The common characteristic activity is their act of offering support to the 'being' within and the peculiar characteristic activity is that which distinguishes itself from that of any other among them. See verses 47-49 below.

⁶I.e. in the Śāstra.

⁷The second *iha* refers to *vyavahāra* 'actual activities' associated with the elements.

⁸*dharma* and *kārya* are described metaphorically as identical and therefore *dharma* is perceptible.

⁹*asādhāraṇa* is the same as *viśeṣa* above; *dharma* here refers to *kriyā* 'activity'.

तथैवाचाररूपेण प्रत्यक्षेण यदीक्ष्यते ।

स एव धर्मः सत्यं स्याद्यद्व्यवस्थाप्रयोजकम् ॥५०॥

साधारणविशेषाभ्यां धर्मवत्तदपि द्विधा ।

साधारणविशेषार्थव्यवस्थाकारणत्वतः ॥५१॥

In the same way, only that, which is directly perceived in the form of some conduct, is *dharma*,¹ the eternal existent, which would cause the regulated order² (of the universe or of beings).

[50]

That (viz. regulator conduct) also is, like *dharma*, twofold, viz. the common and the particular, because of its being the cause of the arrangement of various objects, both common and particular.³

[51]

¹*dharma* is the cosmic Truth which causes/regulates the course of the worldly things.

²*vyavasthā* is *varṇāśramavyavasthā* (SP).

³Cf. *yaś cāyam asmin satye* with reference to the common object and *yaś cāyam adhyātman satyaḥ* the particular.

धर्मसत्यप्रयुक्तोऽयं लिङ्गपिण्डस्वलक्षणः ।

विराड्द्विरण्यगर्भश्च सर्वजातिसमन्वितः ॥५२॥

मनुष्यजातेर्ग्रहणं सर्वजात्युपलक्षणम् ।

इदं मानुषमित्येवं व्याख्या तस्यास्तु पूर्ववत् ॥५३॥

This Immanent Hiranyagarbha,¹ comprising of all (human) species, is (but) effected by *dharma*, the eternal existent, and has its subtle form as its own characteristic.

[52]

In the statement *idam mānuṣam* there is the mention of 'the entire human race' (and it is indicative of all species (in the same)). And² the explanation of that (viz. all species) is like the one given before.³

[53]

¹Cf. note 2 under verses 55-57 below.

²The word *tu* here means *ca*.

³Viz. (in the explanation of) *dharma*. On the previous verse the word *dharmavat* is related to the common characteristic of a certain group of (and also of the particular characteristic of) an individual who is a member of that group and in these verses the word is expressive of the entire group known after its common quality —this last thus refers to *dharmīn* instead of *dharma*.

पृथिवी शरीर इत्येवं खण्डशो यः पुरोदितः ।
विराड्द्विरण्यगर्भश्चेत्ययमात्मेति तद्वचः ॥५४॥

[In verse 54, Sureśvara states the general purport of 'BU 2.5.1-13 and its relation to BU 2.5.14.]

That statement *ayam ātmā* is the description of the One who is already described in one section after another, viz. as the earth, the embodied one etc. (and) the Immanent Hiranyagarbha.¹ [54]

¹This is the explanation of the statement *ayam ātmā*. Of course, in earlier text, the sentences *iyam pṛthivī...* referred to various parts of this whole, i.e. Hiranyagarbha (*avayavin*); cf note under verse 42.

हिरण्यगर्भभेदानां भूतानां च पृथक्पृथक् ।
उक्तं मधुत्वं येनातस्तत्सामस्त्यमथोच्यते ॥५५॥
अयमात्मेति निर्देशो विराजः प्रथमो मतः ।
सप्तम्यन्तेन तत्प्रत्यङ्गलिङ्गात्मास्तोऽभिधीयते ॥५६॥
कार्यात्मा कारणात्मा च यदर्थो भवतः सदा ।
यश्चायमात्मेत्यत्रोक्तो विज्ञानात्मेति यं विदुः ॥५७॥
यस्मिन्नात्मनि विध्वस्तव्याकृताव्याकृतात्मके ।
खिल्यदृष्टान्तवचसा विज्ञानात्मा प्रवेशितः ॥५८॥

Since up to now is stated the character of Madhu in various fragments of Hiranyagarbha and also of elements (in different sub-sections),¹ now is being stated the wholeness of all of them.² [55]

It is held that the first mention³ of the Immanent (Ātman) occurs in the words *āyam ātmā* and, therefore, in the word *ātmani*, which ends with the locative (suffix), is then mentioned the subtle Ātman (residing) in each individual,⁴ [56] and whose meanings are ever the Ātman in the form of the cause and that in the form of the effect, who is mentioned in the words *yaś cāyam ātmā* and (yet) whom they know as an individual knowing Ātman. [57]

⁵In the words conveying the illustration of a lump (of salt), is introduced the individual knowing Ātman (viz. Jīvātman)⁶ as that Ātman (lit. it is made to enter the same), who has the nature of one that is beyond (lit. has destroyed) the manifest and the unmanifest. [58]

¹This refers to *prthivī*, *ap*, *tejas* etc. as the fragments of the Virāj and *śarira*, *caitanya*, *vāṇmaya* etc. of the elements.

²This verse thus introduces the description of the Hiranyagarbha as a whole. He is the first and the subtlest manifestation of the Brahman, when it is somehow and inexplicably affected by Māyā. He is considered to be the first sacrificer, so to say.

³It is doubtful if the word *prathamah* does not stand for *prathamāntah* = *prathamāntam padam* in view of *saptamyantena* which follows.

⁴SP clarifies that this is so because it is later described as *tejomaya* 'full of lustre' etc.

⁵Verse 58 reaffirms that the Immanent Ātman is the Jīvātman.

⁶*Vijñānātman* is Jīva whose knowledge can be described as arising out of subject-object relationship. The word *praveśita* should be understood in the sense of 'made known as identical with'; cf. BU 2.4.12: *sa yathā saindhavakhilya udake prāsta udakam evānuvilīyeta, na hāsyodgrahaṇāyeva syāt...*

ब्रह्मविद्याहतध्वान्ते तस्मिन्ब्रह्मणि निष्ठिते ।

तमस्तदुत्थकार्याणामत्यन्तासंभवादतः ॥५६॥

योऽसावविद्यया देही संसारीवाप्यभूत्पुरा ।

सोऽयं साक्षात्परं ब्रह्म विद्यया वर्ततेऽधुना ॥६०॥

ध्वस्ताज्ञानतदुत्थोऽयं संविन्मात्रसतत्त्वकः ।

अनन्तापार आत्मैव स्वमहिम्नि व्यवस्थितः ॥६१॥

अपूर्वानपरामध्यप्रत्यग्याथात्म्यवित्तये ।

स वा इत्यादिको ग्रन्थः सदृष्टान्तोऽभिधीयते ॥६२॥

ब्रह्मास्मीति परिज्ञानध्वस्तध्वान्तत्वकारणात् ।

राजेति राजनात् भास्वदविप्लुतात्मदर्शनात् ॥६३॥

तथाऽधिपतिशब्देन स्वातन्त्र्यमभिधीयते ।

स्वार्थः प्रत्यक्तदर्थत्वात्सहेतोर्जगदात्मनः ॥६४॥

[Verses 59-64 describe the nature of the Jīvātman and its relation to the Brahman.]

Since there would be utter impossibility (of the existence) of ignorance and its effects, when that (Jīvātman) which has destroyed the darkness (of ignorance) by the knowledge of the Brahman (and has thus) settled in the Brahman. [59]

Now (i.e. when the love of Madhu is obtained), owing to Knowledge, this one, who had formerly become, owing to ignorance, an embodied transmigratory being, as it were, himself is (but) the highest Brahman. [60]

This one whose ignorance and what has arisen from it are destroyed is of the nature of mere sentience (or knowledge),¹ the endless and boundless Ātman existing in his own greatness.² [61]

³The (part of the) work, beginning with *sa vā* is explained together with an illustration in order that one comes to know the true nature of the individual consciousness which does not have any preceding (i.e. origin), any succeeding (i.e. end), and a middle.⁴ [62]

The word *rājā* (is used in the passage) owing to his (newly acquired) shining (i.e. glow), his knowledge (about the Ātman) which is never lost and on account of his complete awareness 'I am Brahman', i.e. because of its having destroyed the darkness (of ignorance). [63]

So also, the word *adhipati* expresses independence (of the Ātman). The individual consciousness (exists) for its own purpose, for the Ātman of the universe (the creator of it), and of its cause (viz. ignorance), exists for it.⁵ [64]

¹The word *satattvaka* literally means 'accompanied by the truth (viz. its nature)' where *satattva* means *svarūpa* ' (its) own nature'.

²Thus is stated that the Jīvātman is but the Ātman, viz. the Brahman, owing to the acquisition of the knowledge of the true nature of the same.

³SP points out that verse 62 refers to the support from a statement in the Śruti for what was described in verse 62, viz. the *vidyāphalabhūta* Ātman, as the sum and substance of verses 58-60.

⁴*apūrvānaparāmadhya* shows the ever-abiding uniform nature of the Ātman. See *tad etad brahmāpūrvam anaparam anantaram abāhyam ayam ātmā brahma* (BU 2.5.19).

⁵Hereby is explained away the possible idea of the fault of *punarukti* 'repetition'. In common parlance, the words *rājan* and *adhipati* are understood as synonyms, but the Upaniṣad uses them with a specific purpose as Śaṅkara points out in BUB 2.5.15 *rājatvaviśeṣaṇam adhipatir iti bhavati kaścīd rājocita-vṛttim āśritya rājā, na tv adhipatiḥ, ato viśinaṣṭy adhipatir iti* (p. 354, lines 4-5). This means that the word *rājan* can be associated with the nature of a human being for offering protection to others, being good to them etc., whereas the word *adhipati* expresses his independence. An *adhipati* is a master of himself and does not depend on others while he enters upon any activity. Thus verses 62-63 bring to the fore two aspects of the Ātman, viz. the supreme lustre and absolute independence.

प्रत्यग्विज्ञप्तिमात्रेण समाप्तिं जगदात्मनः ।

आविश्चिकीर्षुः साक्षान्नस्तद्यथेति परा श्रुतिः ॥६५॥

चक्रनाभौ यथा प्रोताश्चक्रनेमौ च बाह्यतः ।

अराः प्राणादयस्तद्वदोताः प्रोताः परात्मनि ॥६६॥

[This is Sureśvara's introductory remark on the illustration.]

The subsequent passage of the Śruti beginning with *tad yathā*, seeks to reveal to us directly the accomplishing of (i.e. becoming one with) the Ātman of the universe by merely giving information about the individual consciousness.¹ [65]

Just as the spokes (of a wheel) are fixed in the hub and also on the (outside) rim, so also are *prāṇa* etc. woven lengthwise and crosswise in the highest Ātman.² [66]

¹This is the purport of the words *tad yathā*...in the Śruti passage.

²This is the paraphrase of the Śruti statement *tad yathā rathanābhu*...

व्याचक्षतेऽन्यथैवेमं दृष्टान्तं केचिदात्मनः ।
 समस्तादिप्रतिज्ञार्थसिद्धये ब्रह्मवादिनः ॥६७॥
 एकीकृत्य स्वमात्मानमक्षरे परमात्मनि ।
 चक्रनाभिवदात्मानं कल्पयित्वा विचक्षणः ॥६८॥
 शरीरं नेमिवच्चैतद्देवताद्यरवज्जगत् ।
 कल्पयित्वा निदिध्यासेत्तद्भूवाविष्टधीः सदा ॥६९॥
 अनेन ध्यानमार्गेण ध्यायमानस्य सर्वदा ।
 तप्तलोहवदेकत्वं भवत्यावृत्तिदुर्लभम् ॥७०॥
 एतामवस्थामापन्नो ध्यातृत्वाद्विनिवर्तते ।
 अविद्यातिमिरान्धानां ध्येयत्वमधिगच्छति ॥७१॥
 निश्चित्याचिन्त्यमेतद्यो योगिनां निलयं परम् ।
 यं प्राप्य न निवर्तन्ते निर्वाणं परमं गताः ॥७२॥
 प्रत्येकं प्राणिनां ह्येतद्ब्रह्मचक्रमवस्थितम् ।
 असंबोधात्तु तैः सर्वैः प्राणिभिर्नानुभूयते ॥७३॥

[Suresvara's discussion of Bhartr's view (introduced in verses 65-66) with the illustration occurs in verses 67-89. Verses 67-73 represent Bhartr's interpretation of the illustration in the preceding verse.]

But some knowers¹ of the Brahman explain this illustration (in respect) of the Ātman² in quite another way, viz. for establishing the meaning of the enunciation beginning with *samasta*.³

[67]

Having fixed one's own self on the imperishable highest Ātman, and having considered the self (in relation to the universe) as the hub of a wheel,

[68]

the body as the rim of the wheel and this universe beginning with the deity as its spokes, the wise one should ever meditate (on the nature of the self) with his intellect fixed on the thought about (its) mode.

[69]

For one who is ever meditating (on the nature of the self) in this way of meditation,⁴ there results oneness (with the highest Ātman) which is similar to one (whole) ball of hot iron and which is difficult (to occur) in transmigration.⁵ [70]

(The wise) one who has attained this state ceases to have the status of a meditator (and), (being one with the Brahman) becomes the object of meditation for those who are blinded by the darkness of ignorance. [71]

He who has (thus) ascertained (for himself the nature of) this unthinkable (Ātman reaches the highest abode of the Yogins), having attained which they do not return (to the transmigratory existence,⁶ (for they) have attained final liberation (lit. extinction of duality).⁷ [72]

Indeed in each of the beings rests (i.e. is present) this wheel of the Brahman (*brahmacakra*), but it (viz. that this is so) is not experienced by all those beings, owing to (their) not knowing of the same.⁸ [73]

¹The reference to Bharṭṛ in the plural shows Sureśvara's (as also Śaṅkara's) respect for him. This interpretation by Bharṭṛ is not found in BUB. Hence it may be said that it is the *anukta* portion in Śaṅkara's comment.

²SP: *dr̥ṣṭānta-grahaṇam dār̥ṣṭāntkopalakṣaṇam* 'The illustrated should be (taken as) implied by the illustration.'

³Upaniṣadic enunciations meant by Bharṭṛ are *idaṁ sarvaṁ yad ayam ātmā* 'All this is what is (called) Ātman', *saprapaṇco 'yam ātmā* 'This Ātman is accompanied by the whole of the universe.'

⁴The use of 'meditation' (*nididhyāsana*, *dhyāna* according to Bharṭṛ) is introduced: Meditation effects oneness of the individual consciousness with the highest Brahman, i.e. it effects the destruction of one's bondage after knowing the true nature of the self.

⁵*āvṛtti-durlabha* is *āvṛttau durlabha*. This means that oneness of the Jīvātman and the Ātman is not experienced by one so long as one is subjected to transmigration.

⁶It appears that there are echos of the thought expressed in BG. See BG 15.6^b: *yad gatvā na na nivartante tad dhāma paramam mama*||

⁷The meditator (*dhyātr*, *yogin*) does meditation (*dhyāna*, *nidī-dhyāṣana*) on *dhyeya* the highest Ātman and having determined the true nature of his own self as identical with the *dhyeya*, attains the highest abode, viz. *para nilaya*, i.e. *parama nirvāṇa*. Thereafter, he no more remains in the condition of a *dhyātr*. He never returns to the status of a *dhyātr*.

⁸This verse offers Bhartr̥'s alternative explanation of the illustration. Further cf. BG 18.61^a: *īśvaraḥ sarva-bhūtānām hṛd-deśe 'rjuna tiṣṭhati*

वैश्वानरवरात्केचिदेवं व्याचक्षते स्फुटम् ।

अक्षरानन्वयात्त्याज्या व्याख्येयं साध्वपीदृशी ॥७४॥

Thus have some very clearly explained (illustration) thanks to the boon of Vaiśvānara.¹ Yet, this (explanation), quite good though it is, has to be rejected,² for want of its proper construe (with the Śruti). [74]

¹We notice that time and again Sureśvara refers to the favour of Agni on Bhartr̥: cf. BUBV 1.4.490; 1.4.1779; 3.2.41; 4.3.1187. Sureśvara seems to suggest that Bhartr̥ derived his knowledge from Agni's favour—it was thus dependent on a deity.

²Sureśvara clearly states his rejection of Bhartr̥'s view.

[Hereafter follows Sureśvara's refutation of Bhartr̥'s view up to verse 89 and in the 90th verse is reaffirmed the view of the Śruti acceptable to him]

सामर्थ्यादपि संप्राप्तो न चेदक्षरपूर्वकः ।

तादृङ्नोपास्य एवेति प्राहुरागमवेदिनः ॥७५॥

प्रमाणवन्त्यदृष्टानि कल्प्यानि सुबहून्यपि ।

अदृष्टशतभागोऽपि न कल्प्यो निष्प्रमाणकः ॥७६॥

यथोक्तचक्रविन्यासो न श्रुतोऽक्षरपूर्वकः ।

न चाप्युपासनपदं कृत्स्नेऽपि ब्राह्मणे श्रुतम् ॥७७॥

नाभिनेमिद्वयस्थाने दृष्टान्तत्वेन संमते ।

दाष्टान्तिकोक्तावात्मैव यतः साक्षादिह श्रुतः ॥७८॥

समर्पितत्वं प्राणादेः श्रूयते प्रत्यगात्मनि ।

भूतेषु देवतादेस्तदश्रुतं गृह्यते कथम् ॥७९॥

बहिरन्तर्विभागोऽस्य कार्यकारणता तथा ।
 तदेतदिति वाक्येन प्रतीचोऽत्रैव वार्यते ॥८०॥
 अथ योऽन्यामिति तथा भेददृष्टिनिराकृतेः ।
 उपास्योपासनविधिर्न सम्यगिति मे मतिः ॥८१॥
 अज्ञानमात्रव्यवधेर्ब्रह्मैकात्म्यफलस्य च ।
 ब्रह्मविद्यातिरेकेण तत्प्राप्तौ नापरा क्रिया ॥८२॥
 यद्वाचानभ्युदितं मनुते मनसा न यत् ।
 तदेव ब्रह्म विद्धि त्वं न त्विदं यदुपासते ॥८३॥
 उपासिक्रियया व्याप्तिरब्रह्मत्वस्य लक्षणम् ।
 श्रुत्याकारि यतस्तादृक्कथं ब्रह्मेत्युपास्यते ॥८४॥
 दृश्यते त्वग्र्यया बुद्ध्या मनसैवेति यद्वचः ।
 तदात्मविद्याविध्यर्थं नोपासनविधायकम् ॥८५॥

Those who have known the (Vedāntic) tradition have declared that (a doctrinal thought)¹, though entertained (lit. obtained) on the basis of the force of the sense (in the illustration² in a passage from the Śruti), should not at all be accepted, if it is not expressed by the Śruti. [75]

One can imagine (that there exist) quite good many things which, though not known (lit. perceptible), have authoritative proof for establishing their existence. However, not even a hundredth part or fraction of some unknown (lit. unseen thing) should be entertained (lit. imagined), if it has no (such) authoritative proof.³ [76]

The (introduction of the) idea of the cycle (of the Brahman by Bharṭṛ) is not heard as enunciated first by the Śruti.⁴ So also not (a word) is heard about meditation⁵ in the whole of this section (of the Upaniṣad, i.e. BU 2.5). [77]

The two distinct places, viz. the hub and the rim, are accepted (by the Śruti merely) as an illustration; however, in the place of the illustrated is here heard only the (unique) Ātman.⁶ [78]

The merger of *prāṇa* etc.⁷ in the individual consciousness is (directly) heard (in the Śruti). How can one accept

the merger of the deity etc. in the elements, (which is) not heard in the Śruti?⁸ [79]

Such division as the exterior and the interior, and also the nature of being (related as) the cause and the effect is just here set aside (viz. rejected) with reference to this individual consciousness in the sentence *tade tat*.⁹ [80]

And also on account of the rejection of the notion of the existence of discrete objects, in the Śruti sentence *atha yo 'nyām*,¹⁰ I think that (accepting) an injunction regarding meditation¹¹ on an object of meditation is not proper.¹² [81]

Further, beside (acquiring) the knowledge of the Brahman,¹³ there is no other activity (to be undertaken) for attaining the Brahman, since there is only one obstacle, viz. that of ignorance, to the acquisition of the fruit, viz. the unity (or uniqueness) of the Brahman.¹⁴ [82]

Know (you) this: That, which is not expressed by speech and which one does not ponder over with *manas*, is the Brahman, but not this which they meditate on.¹⁵ [83]

The definition of what is not the Brahman is (that) it is obtained (lit. limited or covered) by an act of meditation. Hence how can that which (one thinks as) similar to that¹⁶ (viz. *abrahman* 'the non-Brahman') be meditated on as the Brahman? [84]

The statement (in the Śruti) *drśyate tv agryayā buddhyā manasaiva*¹⁷ is for laying down the knowing of the Ātman, but not injunctive of any meditation. [85]

¹*artha* is explained in SP as *drṣṭānta-sāmarthyāt tvadiṣṭo 'rthaḥ*; so also in NKL.

²*sāmarthya*: The determinant of the meaning is the force of the illustration in the passage, as can be interpreted by someone. That is to say: The interpretation of an illustration should be in keeping with what is expressly stated in the Śruti; it should not arise from one's imagination.

³Sureśvara suggests that it is only the play of imagination that works while Bharṭṛ posited his views on the *drṣṭānta* under discussion and no authoritative proof of the Śruti has led him to do so. For Sureśvara (and also for others), the Śruti is the

ultimate decisive proof. Also cf. NKL: *evenividhasyārthasya śrutatvāt na kalpakāpekṣā*.

⁴That is to say: It is not supported by the Śruti.

⁵There is not a single word expressive of *nididhyāsana* as understood by Bharṭṛ.

⁶See Introduction pp. xvii-xx on the illustration of *rathanābhi*, *rathanemi* and *rathacakra*.

⁷These are *prāṇādayaḥ* mentioned in BU 1.4; or the sense-organs as mentioned in the Upaniṣad pertaining to what happened at the time of death. See CU 6.8.6 and 6.15.2.

⁸Sureśvara has already explained Bharṭṛ's idea of the *brahmacakra* in verses 68-69. Now he raises here objection to the idea contained in verse 69. True, Bharṭṛ has explained the illustration logically, but he does not have any Śruti for support! He imagines those things which are not mentioned in the Śruti.

⁹The Śruti *tad etat* is *tad etad brahmāpūrvam anaparam anantaram abāhyam ayam ātmā brahma sarvānubhūḥ*; cf. NKL-footnote. The reference in Bharṭṛ's explanation to the exterior and the interior is not supported by the Śruti.

¹⁰BU 1.4.10: *atha yo 'nyām devatām upāste...*

¹¹According to Bharṭṛ, the root *upās-* in BU 1.4.10 has the sense of the root *dhyai* (from which come *dhyāna* and *nididhyāsana*) and, therefore, there is an injunction regarding meditation.

¹²Refer to SP: *na hi bhedaṁ vinopāsyādi-prakārasambhavaḥ prakṛte ca bheda-drṣṭir apodyate tan nātropāsti-vidhir ity arthaḥ*. Any meditation presupposes duality, viz. the subject and the object of meditation. Since the Upaniṣad under discussion clearly sets aside the notion of duality, any meditation is altogether impossible.

¹³This is in reality no activity, for it means only the removal of ignorance.

¹⁴Knowledge of the Brahman is, though the result, not the fruit of any activity. NKL reads *brahmātmaikya* for *brahmaikātmya* and that would mean 'oneness of the Brahman and Jīva'.

¹⁵Time and again Sureśvara refers to different Śrutis in order to lend support for his view. Here, the first *pāda* 'quarter' of the verse is identical with KenaU 1.5 (its first *pāda*), the second *pāda* compares with KenaU 1.6 (the first *pāda*), viz. *yan manasā na manute*, and the third and the fourth *pādas* (i.e. the second

line) are similar to KenaU 1.5-9 (the second line of each), viz. *tad eva brahma tvam viddhi nedam yad idam upāsate*. This precludes the idea of any *upāsana* (or *nididhyāsana*—cf. note 5 above).

¹⁶'That' in 'similar to that' means what is obtained (lit. limited or covered) by an act of meditation.

¹⁷This is similar to KaṭhU 3.12 (the second line): *drśyate tv agryayā buddhyā sūkṣmayā sūkṣma-darsibhiḥ*.

रजस्तमोनुविद्धेन यतो न ब्रह्म गम्यते ।

शुद्धचेतस्तया तस्माद्विद्याद्ब्रह्मान्तरात्मनि ॥८६॥

यद्वानात्माभिसंबन्धात्पूर्वमैकात्म्यनिष्ठता ।

सर्वप्राणभृतां बुद्धिरित्यर्थो वचसो भवेत् ॥८७॥

[This as well as the following verse are meant for the interpretation of the Śruti quoted in the preceding verse]

Since the Brahman is not understood by one who is overcome by *rajas* and *tamas*; therefore, one should know the Brahman within one's (*own*) consciousness, being possessed of purified intellect.¹ [86]

Or rather, the meaning of the Śruti (passage) could be that before there occurred their association with the non-Ātman, the intellect of all human beings² rested in the uniqueness (of the Ātman).³ [87]

¹The word *śuddha-cetas* means *śuddha-citta*. This *citta* does not belong to *buddhi* part but it belongs to the individual consciousness which is held to be participating in any knowledge situation. And this *citta*, individual consciousness, is identical with the body itself and brings about a favourable situation for the knowing mechanism.

²The word *prāṇa-bhṛt* signifies literally one who bears, i.e. possessed of, *prāṇa*, i.e. a living being. Yet because of the reference to *buddhi* 'intellect', it is proper to translate it as a human being.

³cf. *brahmaikātmya* in verse 82 above; NKL explains *aikātmya* as *cidākāratā*.

एषोऽर्थो वचसस्तस्य न तूपासाविधिर्भवेत् ।
प्रध्वस्तभेद ऐकात्म्ये नोपासनविधिर्यतः ॥८८॥

This is the meaning of that statement; it could not indeed be any injunction for meditation,¹ since there would not be any injunction for meditation in the case of the uniqueness of the Ātman, wherein the existence of discrete objects is completely destroyed. [88]

¹This refers to *yadvānātmābhisambandhāt* (*upāsāvidhiḥ*) in the preceding verse. The purpose of this verse is to preclude the possibility of assuming that there is scope for an injunction with regard to meditation.

चक्रवृत्तिरतोऽसाध्वी श्रुत्यादिमितिबाह्यतः ।
तदेतदिति वाक्यार्थो ग्राह्योऽतः संभवान्मितेः ॥८९॥

[Here is concluded Sureśvara's refutation of Bhartr's interpretation of the illustration.]

Hence the notion of the cycle (of the Brahman) is not reasonable for the reason that it is outside (the ways of right) knowing, viz. *śruti* etc.¹ The meaning of the sentence *tad etat...*² should therefore be acceptable owing to the possibility of right knowing. [89]

¹Read BUBV 2.4.214: *śruti-liṅgādiko nyāyaḥ śabdaśakti-vivekakṛt/ āgamārtha-viniścityai mantavya iti bhanyate*|| On this, see Hino (1982), pp. 177-178. Also cf. *Arthasaṁgraha* (p. 12): *etasya vidheḥ sahakāri-bhūtāni ṣaṭ pramāṇāni śrutiliṅga-vākya-prakarāṇa-sthāna-samākhyā-rūpāṇi*.

²BU 2.5.19: *tad etad brahma apūrvam anāparam anantaram abhāhyam...*

तदाहुरिति वाक्येन ब्रह्मविद्याप्रयोजनम् ।
साक्षेपं प्रागुपन्यस्तं तस्यायं निर्णयः कृतः ॥९०॥

In the passage beginning with *tad āhur*, 'Now, they

declare',¹ there is first stated the purpose of the knowledge of the Brahman, together with the objection to it, and this is the decision given in respect of that (viz. the sentence of the Śruti). [90]

¹BU 1.4.9: *tad āhur yad brahma-vidyayā sarvaṃ bhaviṣyanto manyasyā manyante kim u tad brahmāved yasmāt tat sarvaṃ abhavad iti*

आत्मेत्येवेति सूत्रस्य व्याख्येयं सम्यगात्मनः ।

पञ्चभिर्ब्राह्मणैः श्रुत्याकारि कृत्स्नात्मबुद्धये ॥६१॥

समाप्ता ब्रह्मविद्येयं कैवल्यावाप्तयेऽखिला ।

यामवोचत्स्वभार्यायै याज्ञवल्क्योऽतिविस्तरात् ॥६२॥

Thus has the Śruti offered, in its five sections,¹ the explanation² of (or exposition on) the fundamental proposition 'only as the Ātman'³ for the complete knowledge of the Ātman. [91]

Thus is completed (the instruction on) the lore of the Brahman,⁴ for attaining the state of the Absolute, (the one) which Yājñavalkya imparted to his wife, at (sufficient) length. [92]

¹I.e. BU 2.1-5.

²Here the word *vyākhyā* does not mean 'definition'; it means 'exposition'.

³The so called (*vidyā*)*sūtra* 'fundamental proposition' is *ātmety evopāsita* (BU 1.4.7).

⁴The purpose of this verse is to state that the complete exposition of the fundamental proposition given so far is also the exposition of the lore of the Brahman. The two are in no way different.

यथोक्तब्रह्मविद्याया इत आरभ्य भण्यते ।

आख्यायिकेयं स्तुत्यर्था प्रवृत्त्यङ्गतया परा ॥६३॥

आख्यायिकार्थं मन्त्राभ्यां व्याचष्टे श्रुतिरादरात् ।

श्रुतिमन्त्रस्तुतो ह्यर्थ आदेयत्वं निगच्छति ॥६४॥

[These verses are the link between the discussion so far on the knowledge of the Brahman and BU 2.5.16 and 17: They say that two *mantras* quoted in BU 2.5.16 and 17 have the same purpose, viz. imparting instruction about the knowledge of the Brahman.]

(Now) from this (ensuing) passage begins the narrative in praise of the lore of the Brahman (which is) thus discussed (above), as subservient to (securing one's) inclination (to proceed to the study of the lore).¹ [93]

The Śruti has with great care (lit. respectfully) explained the meaning of the narrative in two *mantras*,² because a meaning (i.e. doctrine) which is presented (lit. praised) by the *mantras* of the Śruti possesses (lit. comes to have) acceptability. [94]

¹That is to say: The narrative in BU 2.5.16-17 is purposeful like an Arthavāda.

²The word *mantra* means 'verse from a Vedic Saṁhitā, (such as the *R̥gvedasaṁhitā*, the *Yajurvedasaṁhitā* etc.) The *mantras*, the prose of the Brāhmaṇa and the Upaniṣadic passages are all called Śruti. Yet, *mantra* is supposed to be the greatest authority.

[Now follows a discussion on Madhuvidyā in the light of the narrative of the Aśvins' securing the knowledge of Madhuvidyā and also of two other Vedic verses.]

अवाप्तपुरुषार्थोऽपि यामरक्षच्छचीपतिः ।
 प्रत्यग्विद्यैव तेन स्यादुदारफलसाधनम् ॥६५॥
 महता च यतोऽश्विभ्यामायासेनार्जिता पुरा ।
 ब्रह्मविद्या ततो नास्या मुक्तौ स्यात्साधनं परम् ॥६६॥
 निःशेषपुरुषार्थानां कैवल्योत्तमता यथा ।
 साधनानामपि तथा तद्विद्योत्तमसाधनम् ॥६७॥
 अश्व्याथर्वणयोर्वृत्तं ब्रह्मविद्याप्तिकारणात् ।
 यत्प्रागाविष्कृतिस्तस्य मन्त्राभ्यां क्रियतेऽञ्जसा ॥६८॥

[These verses give the meaning of the two *mantras* quoted in BU 2.5.16 and 17.]

The knowledge of (the nature of) the individual consciousness, which the lord of Śacī (viz. Indra) guarded (i.e. kept from others), even though he had obtained his end of life (viz. god-head in heaven)¹; hence, it would be a means to the acquisition of (the most) profuse fruit (viz. liberation). [95]

And since that knowledge of the Brahman was formerly (i.e. in the ancient times) obtained by the two Aśvins with great efforts,² therefore, there could not be any greater means to liberation (than that knowledge). [96]

As the greatest excellence abides in liberation amongst all the ends of human life, among all the means (to liberation), the best means is the (acquisition of the) knowledge of the Brahman. [97]

Whatever transpired between the Aśvins and Ātharvaṇa in respect of (the Aśvins') obtaining the knowledge of the Brahman is first made known by two *mantras* (of Rv) in a clear way. [98]

¹Sureśvara bases his verse on the Purāṇic notion that attaining the status of Indra was the highest fruit of sacrificial activity and the highest goal of human life. Even then, he did not part with Madhuvidyā. This shows how much (more) precious is the knowledge of the Brahman.

²This has a reference to ŚatBr 14.1.1-2 where the ritual of Pravargya is discussed. The Aśvins are said to have obtained knowledge of that ritual which made the imperfect sacrifice perfect. Thereby they attained a share of Soma at that ritual. This refers to the *tvāṣṭra madhu* mentioned in verse 114 below.

अश्विभ्यां प्रार्थितोऽथर्वा मधुविद्यामिमां किल ।
तावथर्वाब्रवीदिन्द्रश्छिन्द्यान्मे ब्रुवतः शिरः ॥६६॥
अतो भयादिमां विद्यां युवाभ्यां न ब्रवीम्यहम् ।
तमूचतुः पुरैवावामिन्द्रच्छेदनतः शिरः ॥१००॥

छित्त्वा तवाश्व्यं सन्धाय शिरः श्रोष्यावहे ततः ।
 ब्रूह्यतोऽश्व्येन शिरसा मधुविद्यां विमुक्तये ॥१०१॥
 एवमस्त्वित्यनुज्ञाते छित्त्वा तस्याथ तच्छिरः ।
 समधत्तां शिरोऽश्वस्य तेन विद्यामुवाच सः ॥१०२॥
 पुनश्छिन्नेऽथ शिरसि तेनेन्द्रेणाश्विनावपि ।
 समधत्तां शिरस्तस्य विद्यां स्वशिरसाथ सः ॥१०३॥
 शेषामवोचदश्विभ्यामृतायन्नात्मनो वचः ।
 यत एवमतस्तस्मात्सत्यं रक्ष्यं प्रयत्नतः ॥१०४॥

[The narrative of the Aśvins and Ātharvaṇa is given here in brief.]

It is said that Atharvan (i.e. Ātharvaṇa) was requested by the Aśvins (to impart to them) this knowledge of Madhu. To them he said, "Indra would cut off my head if (lit. while) I talked. [99]

"Hence, out of fear (for him), I do not disclose (lit. declare) this lore to you two." The two (Aśvins then) said to him, "Even before your head is cut off by Indra, [100]

we shall have cut your head and fixed (on your shoulders) a horse-head; then shall we hear (the knowledge of Madhu) from that (head). Disclose (lit. declare) the lore of Madhu with that horse-head, so that (we can attain) liberation." [101]

When he consented (in the words), "Be it so", they cut off his head and fixed a horse-head (on his body). By that (horse-head) he then declared (to them) the lore (of Madhu). [102]

Then, after that (horse)-head was cut off by Indra, the two Aśvins also restored his own head (to his body). Then, with his own head, he — [103]

declared to the Aśvins the remaining part (of the lore of Madhu), (thus) wishing to follow *rta* (i.e. fulfilling his agreement).¹ Since this is so, therefore should one maintain (lit. protect) Truth with all (of one's) efforts. [104]

¹*ṛtāyat* (Vedic adj.) wishing to acquire, i.e. follow, *rta*

‘the eternal order (of things)’ which comprises the ever obtaining Truth. This justifies the words *satyaṃ rakṣyam prayatnataḥ. ṛta* of Vedic times paved away to the concept of *satya* ‘verifiable truth’.

इदं वै तन्मधु प्रोक्तं यत्तत्प्रकरणान्तरे ।
 दध्यङ् ह वा आभ्यामिति श्रूयते ब्राह्मणोक्तिः ॥१०५॥
 मधुब्राह्मणमेतत्तद्यत्प्रागुक्तमभूत्स्फुटम् ।
 दध्यङ्ङाथर्वणोऽश्विभ्यां यदुवाचात्मबोधनम् ॥१०६॥
 अश्व्याथर्वणयोरेतत्कर्म पश्यन्नृचाब्रवीत् ।
 ऋषिरार्षेयदृष्टचैव तदेतदभिधीयते ॥१०७॥

This is indeed that Madhu, which was declared in another context (i.e. the book of this text),¹ for it is heard from the Brāhmaṇa (i.e. in a statement in it),² “Indeed, to these two Dadhyañc Ātharvaṇa...” [105]

This is that (known) section on Madhu which was earlier fully (or clearly) explained, (the one) which Dadhyañc the son of Atharvaṇa, declared to the Aśvins, revealing (as it does, the nature of) the Ātman. [106]

Seeing with a seer’s eye this doing of the Aśvins and Ātharvaṇa, the seer spoke (about it) in a *ṛk*. It is declared (thus) here. [107]

¹In the context of the Pravargya rite, in the earlier section of ŚatBr. *prokta* is paraphrased by NKL as *sūcita*. This indicates the unity of thought in ŚatBr 14.1.1-2 and BU 2.5.16.

²The quotation *dadhyañ ha vā ābhyām* is from ŚatBr 14.1.1; it is earlier referred to in Rv 1.116.12.

आविष्करोमि तत्कर्म युवयोरद्य हे नरौ ।
 लाभाय सनये क्रूरं चक्रथुर्यद्रहस्यगौ ॥१०८॥
 वृष्टेरागमनं यद्वत्स्तनयित्नुः प्रबोधयेत् ।
 रहस्यं युवयोः कर्म तद्वदाविष्करोम्यहम् ॥१०९॥
 अश्वस्य शिरसा वां यदवोचन्मध्वसावृषिः ।
 दधीचोऽश्व्यं शिरश्छित्त्वा निकृत्यास्य शिरोऽश्विनौ ॥११०॥

संधत्तां सोऽश्वशिरसा युवाभ्यां मध्वथाब्रवीत् ।

ऋतायन्सत्यमात्मानं कर्तुमिच्छन्नसावृषिः ॥१११॥

प्राणसंशयमापन्नस्तस्माच्चैवावसीयते ।

आत्मनो मरणेनापि सत्यं रक्ष्यं प्रयत्नतः ॥११२॥

[In the preceding verses, Sureśvara gave a summary of the contents of the *mantras* in Rv 1.116.12 (accents are not shown here): *tad vām narā sanaye daṁsa ugram āviṣkṛṇomi tanyatur na vṛṣṭim| dadhyañ ha yan madhv ātharvaṇo vām aśvasya śirṣṇā pra yad im uvāca|| atharvaṇāyāśvinā dadhice 'śvyamṁ praty airayatam*. Now he gives a philosophical exposition of the same]

That mighty deed of you two, which you did for a gain, do I proclaim (lit. reveal) today, O heroes, O knowers of (the) secret. [108]

As the cloud would make known (i.e. proclaim) the coming of showers, so do I reveal (that) secret¹ deed of yours, [109]

viz. that the seer declared to you, the (lore of) Madhu; that you had cut the horse-head of Dadhyañc after you had (earlier) cut off his own head, and O Aśvins, [110]

you had fixed a horse-head on him, and then, that seer revealed (lit. declared) to you that (lore of) Madhu, seeking the *ṛta*² i.e. wishing to prove himself truthful; [111]

and thus he had fallen in danger of life.³ And from that itself is it decided (lit. concluded) that truth should be maintained (lit. protected) by one with all efforts, even at the cost of one's life. [112]

¹Meaning 'not to be known to common people'.

²*ṛta* (in Veda) means the established truth and *satya*, the verifiable truth. See Velankār, "Ṛta and satya in the Ṛgveda" pp. 3-6.

³Sureśvara's exposition well compares with a narrative composition.

⁴The use of the word *ātman* in the sense of 'life' is to be noted.

आदित्यविषयं त्वाष्ट्रं मध्वोचदथर्वणः ।

हे दस्रावपि कक्ष्यं यत्प्रत्यग्याथात्म्यदर्शनम् ॥११३॥

उपक्षयकरौ व्याधेर्दस्रौ स्यातामतोऽश्विनौ ।

न केवलं त्वाष्ट्रमेव कक्ष्यमप्यब्रवीन्मधु ॥११४॥

[Here is given an explanation of the words *tvāṣṭra* and *dasra* in the R̥gvedic verses.]

¹Atharvaṇa (i.e. Ātharvaṇa) declared the Madhu of Tvaṣṭṛ, having the Sun (viz. Āditya) as its object, “O wondrous,² (it revealed) even the secret (lore),³ the knowledge of the true nature of the individual consciousness.⁴

[113]

Hence are the Aśvins declared *dasrau*, viz. those who cause destruction (of malady). (As such, it is no wonder that) not only did (Ātharvaṇa) declare (the) Madhu of Tvaṣṭṛ but also that which was to be kept hidden under the armpit.⁵

[114]

¹This is the explanation of Rv 1.117.22: ...*tvāṣṭram yad dasrau apikakṣyam vām*.

²*dasrā* = *dasrau* (Vedic dual) is the most usual epithet of the Aśvins who are known for their performance of wonderful deeds.

³The word *kakṣya* means ‘secret’; literally ‘kept hidden under one’s armpit’—this follows the reading in Rv. It is apparent that Sureśvara reads *api* as a separate word. This is against the Vedic tradition! He takes *kakṣya* as secret and *api* as *ca*. See next verse also.

⁴*pratyagātman* is light itself.

⁵The first line explains the significance of the epithet *dasrau* and the second line, of the word *api*. Thus, BU has made a change in the R̥gvedic idea wherein *madhu* is understood to be twofold: That which is related to Tvaṣṭṛ and that which is to be kept as secret—one in ritual contexts, the other in philosophical.

प्रवर्ग्याध्याययोरेवं त्वाष्ट्रज्ञानोपसंहृतम् ।

मन्त्रद्वयेन कृत्वाथ कक्ष्यज्ञानोपसंहृतिः ॥११५॥

क्रियतेऽध्याययोरेवं मधुकाण्डं समाप्यते ।

श्रुतिमन्त्रोपदिष्टोऽर्थो यस्मादाद्रियते ततः ॥११६॥

[Concluding remark on the Aśvin-legend]

Thus, having put in two *mantras* the knowledge about (the secret of) Tvaṣṭṛ (which was earlier) imparted in the two chapters on Pravargya¹ is now concluded (i.e. brought out) the secret knowledge (lit. that which is to be kept hidden under the armpit) in these two chapters. [115]

And thus² is concluded the Madhukāṇḍa, because the thought which was given by the *mantras* in the Śruti is to be respected. [116]

¹Cf. ŚatBr 14.1.1-2

²*tvāṣṭra-jñāna* leads to *kakṣya-jñāna*; there is now a shift from ritual to philosophy.

पुरश्चक्रे शरीराणि द्विपदः पक्षिमानुषान् ।

चतुष्पदोऽथ पशवः पुरश्चक्रे स्वमायया ॥११७॥

पुरो भुक्तशरीरात्स पक्षी लिङ्गमिहोच्यते ।

पुरो नवशरीराणि प्राविशज्जलचन्द्रवत् ॥११८॥

[These verses explain BU 2.5.18: *puraś cakre dvipadaḥ puraś cakre catuṣpadaḥ/ puraḥ sa pakṣi bhūtvā paraḥ puruṣa āviśat/*]

First he made cities, i.e. bodies, the bipeds, viz. the birds and the human beings, then he made the four-footed animals, by his own powers. [117]

From the city, i.e. the body which was enjoyed (by him earlier); the bird is (the one which is) an indication;¹ (thus is it stated here.) He entered into new bodies, like the moon, into watery places.² [118]

¹The bird flies from one perch to another, likewise the Ātman moves from one body to another; this is transmigration of the Ātman during the continuance of ignorance. And entering into

the body requires 'subtleness' which is also indicated by the 'bird'.

²While introducing this verse, BU has stated that it has the same significance as the Aśvin-legend. That is to say: Madhu is the all-pervasive character of the Ātman.

कस्मात्पुरुष इति चेत्पुरुषार्थं श्रुतिः स्वयम् ।
स वा इत्यादिनाचष्टे सर्वैकात्म्यावबुद्धये ॥११६॥
पुरुषोऽयं भवेदात्मा यतः शेते स पुरुषु ।
सर्वासु तेन लोकेऽस्मिन्पुरुषोऽयमितीर्यते ॥१२०॥

[Here is an incidental explanation of the word *puruṣa* in BU 2.5.18.]

If one were to ask 'why is that one called Puruṣa?', the Śruti itself declared the meaning of the Puruṣa in the passage beginning with *sa vā* so that there arises the understanding that all is but the uniqueness of the Ātman. [119]
The Ātman is Puruṣa because he resides in all (the bodies).
Hence, he is described in this world, (as) 'This is Puruṣa.'¹ [120]

¹This is an etymological meaning of the word *puruṣa*. It is a characteristic method of Brāhmaṇas for explaining various names of the rites. See BU 2.5.18: *sa vā ayam puruṣaḥ sarvāsu pūrṣu puriṣayaḥ.*

परिच्छेदप्रसङ्गश्चेन्मैवं यस्मादिदं जगत् ।
नैनैनानावृतं किञ्चिन्नाव्याप्तं ह्योततन्तुवत् ॥१२१॥
नासंवृतं तथा किञ्चित्प्रोततन्तुवदात्मना ।
पूर्णत्वात्पुरुषः सोऽयं ब्रह्मैकं पुरुषस्ततः ॥१२२॥

If (one were to say) that this (definition of Puruṣa) involves the contingency of (accepting) limitation (on the Puruṣa in respect of uniqueness)¹ (then our reply is): do not say so, since it is not that, not even a little of this universe is not covered by this one and also not pervaded (by this one) like a lengthwise woven thread.² [121]

So also there is not anything that is not wrapped by this Ātman like a breadthwise woven thread. He is the Puruṣa because of his fullness and, therefore, this Puruṣa is the unique Brahman.³

[122]

¹Because of *puri śete* one can postulate the idea of duality.

²Read BU 2.5.18: *nainena kimcanānāvṛtam nainena kimcanāsamvṛtam*.

³See verse 66 above; two similes in these two verses refer to the *otaprotatva* of the universe effected by the Brahman in BU.

यस्मात्परं नापरमस्ति किञ्चि-

द्यस्मान्नाणीयो न ज्यायोऽस्ति कश्चित् ।

वृक्ष इव स्तब्धो दिवि तिष्ठत्येक-

स्तेनेदं पूर्णं पुरुषेण सर्वम् ॥१२३॥

आवृतं ज्ञप्तिमात्रेण सर्वमात्मीकृतं जगत् ।

संवृतं प्रतिषिद्धं तद्यदनात्मेव लक्ष्यते ॥१२४॥

तन्नास्ति कारणं कार्यं यन्नानेनात्मसात्कृतम् ।

तन्नास्ति कारणं कार्यं यन्नानेनात्मना ह्नुतम् ॥१२५॥

[These verses re-affirm that the Puruṣa is the same as the Ātman.]

All this is pervaded (lit. filled) by that Puruṣa in comparison with whom there is nothing higher or lower, than whom not any other¹ is smaller or greater, and who stands alone like a huge tree steady in the sky.²

[123]

(This) whole universe which is ascertained as the Ātman is pervaded by Knowledge alone. All that is wrapped (i.e. limited or covered by ignorance) is rejected (i.e. not understood as the Ātman); (it is) what is characterized like some non-Ātman.³

[124]

There is not a cause or an effect which is not included in itself by the Ātman. (And also) there is no such cause or effect as is not covered by the Ātman.⁴

[125]

¹This description of the Puruṣa is thus that of the Brahman. This leaves no scope for any notion of duality.

²Sureśvara cites this verse from the *Śvetāśvataropaniṣad* viz. 3.9.

³The first line explains what is meant in verse 121 and the second, verse 122. The words *āvṛta* 'covered' and *saṁvṛta* 'limited' frequently occur in GK.

⁴The verse expresses the thought of the preceding verse, but by the *vyatireka* method; cf. Hino (1982), p. 47 ff. on *anvayavyatireka* method.

रूपं रूपं प्रति ह्येष प्रतिरूपो बभूव ह ।
 देहं देहं प्रविष्टः संस्तद्देहाकारतामगात् ॥१२६॥
 मायाभिः प्रत्यगज्ञानैर्यदि वानृतबुद्धिभिः ।
 गम्यते पुरुरूपोऽज्ञैरेकोऽपि जलसूर्यवत् ॥१२७॥
 प्रत्यग्याथात्म्यबोधार्थं रूपं मायामयं विभोः ।
 शास्त्राचार्यादिना नर्ते ज्ञातुं वस्त्वह शक्यते ॥१२८॥
 कुतोऽस्य बहुरूपत्वमिति हेतुरिहोच्यते ।
 युक्ता ह्यस्येति वचसा मिथ्याज्ञानैकहेतुतः ॥१२९॥
 स्रजस्तत्त्वापरिज्ञानाद्युक्ता दण्डादयो यथा ।
 प्रत्यक्तत्त्वापरिज्ञानादात्मनो हरयस्तथा ॥१३०॥
 इन्द्रियाण्येव हरयो हरणाद्विषयान्प्रति ।
 दश तानि सहस्राणि शतानि प्राणिभेदतः ॥१३१॥

[These verses explain BU 2.5.19 which is originally an exposition on Rv 6.47.18: *rūpaṁ rūpaṁ pratirūpo babhūva tad asya rūpaṁ praticakṣaṇāya/ indro māyābhiḥ pururūpa iryate yuktā hy asya harayaḥ śatā daśa*]]

Indeed¹ did he become a counter-form for each and every form. Having entered into each body, he is reported to have¹ attained the shape of that body.² [126]

On account of his powers, i.e. various types of ignorance about the true nature of the individual consciousness (or owing to false knowledge), is this one, though unique (i.e. one without a second) is understood as being possessed of many forms like the sun (which seems to be many) in watery places.³ [127]

It is not possible in this universe⁴ to know Reality, viz. the form of the all-pervading (Ātman) which is possessed of many powers,⁵ without (the help of) the Śruti and teachers etc., in order that one can understand the true nature of the individual consciousness.⁶ [128]

If one asked the question, 'How can this one have many forms?', the reason (for saying so) is stated here⁷ by the statement, *yuktā hy asya...*, to say (that 'this is so) on account of its originating from false knowledge alone.' [129]

As (the apprehension of) a stick etc. is, on account of non-grasping the truth about the wreath (etc.),⁸ considered as right knowledge, so also are the sense-organs⁹ supposed to be related to the Ātman because of the non-knowing about the true nature of the individual consciousness. [130]

On account of their carrying away (the Ātman) to the objects (of worldly experience) the sense-organs are called horses;¹⁰ they are ten, a thousand, a hundred, according as they are grasped¹¹ as discrete beings.¹² [131]

¹This is owing to the use of *ha* in the verse. The two particles *hi* and *ha* emphasise the popular experience of duality.

²This is the meaning of *rūpaṁ rūpaṁ pratirūpo babhūva tad asya rūpaṁ praticakṣaṇāya*.

³This sets aside the possible notion that the manifold forms of the Ātman have a material or an efficient cause.

⁴*iha* refers to transmigratory existence.

⁵It should be observed that this verse also is taken by BU to convey the idea of Madhu as the all-pervading character of the Ātman that is noticed in the Aśvin-legend.

⁶These two verses interpret the second line: *indro māyābhiḥ pururūpa iyate*. Sureśvara interprets the word Indra in the Śruti to mean the Brahman and Indra's powers (*māyās*) as *upādhis*: cf. Śaṅkara on this at BU 2.5.19.

⁷This verse explains the significance of the line *yuktā hy asya*.

⁸This is an elaboration of verse 129, in the form of an illustration with its explanation.

⁹*harayaḥ* are horses, here standing for the sense-organs; cf. KaṭhU 1.3.4: *indriyāṇi hayān āhur.....*

¹⁰According to Sureśvara, *daśa* in the Śruti has to be understood as the sense-organs apart from *manas*. On this, see BU 3.9.4: *daśeme puruṣe prāṇā ātmaikādaśaḥ*; and also BSB 2.4.6 (p. 635) wherein BU 3.9.4 is referred to and explained.

¹¹This is owing to ignorance.

¹²This is the explanation of *prāṇibheda* 'notion of discreteness of beings' in the last quarter *harayaḥ śatā daśa*.

नान्यो हेतुरविज्ञानादिन्द्रियादेरिहात्मनि ।
यतोऽयमेव हरयो यावत्संख्या तदाश्रया ॥१३२॥
अयमेवेन्द्रियत्वेन देहत्वेन च कल्पितः ।
तथा शतसहस्रादिसंख्याभेदेन चाप्ययम् ॥१३३॥
नामरूपक्रियाभेदैर्यथा पूर्वमवादिषम् ।
अयमेव तथारूपः कल्पितोऽविद्ययाद्वयः ॥१३४॥
तदेतत्कल्पितं सर्वं सहेतु फलवज्जगत् ।
प्रत्यगात्मात्मकं भास्वत्प्रज्ञानघनतत्त्वकम् ॥१३५॥

[These verses explain BU 2.5.19: *ayam vai harayaḥ ayam vai daśa ca sahasrāṇi bahūni cānantāni ca* in relation to *yuktā hy asya...*]

There is no other cause than ignorance about the sense-organs etc. (that makes one feel their being supported) in the Ātman, since this one itself is the horses (i.e. sense-organs), (therefore) whatever (be) the number (of them), they are dependent on it. [132]

The same Ātman is conceived as being the organs and the body, so also (is) this one (known) by the various numbers, a hundred, a thousand etc. [133]

The same Ātman, (who is) formless (and) one without a second, is conceived by discrete names, forms and actions on account of ignorance, as I have discussed (lit. stated) earlier. [134]

All this universe is then conceived as having a cause and (also) as having an effect; (nevertheless) being of the nature of the individual consciousness and a shining mass of consciousness in its (true) nature.¹ [135]

¹The world, a product of ignorance, is conceived to be consisting of causes and effects, though it is in reality of the nature of the Ātman.

निःशेषोपनिषत्सारस्तदेतदिति सांप्रतम् ।

उक्त्याविष्क्रियते साक्षात्करविन्यस्तबिल्ववत् ॥१३६॥

[Sureśvara states how the previous discussion on the *ṛks* to the Aśvins have lead one to understand the general purport of the Upaniṣads. It is specifically re-affirmed in the statement *tad etat...*]

The statement *tad etat* is now the essence of all Upaniṣads without exception. The Śruti reveals it directly (just) like a Bilva fruit put on a hand. [136]

अज्ञातं संशयज्ञातं मिथ्याज्ञातमिदं जगत् ।

तदेतदित्यनूद्यैतत्तत्त्वमवबोध्यते ॥१३७॥

Having reiterated in the statement *tad etat* that this universe is (really) not known, known with doubt (about its true nature) and known falsely, (the Śruti) informs (us) of its true nature. [137]

ब्रह्मेति वास्तवं वृत्तं तावदस्यावबोध्यते ।

ज्ञानात्पुरापि ब्रह्मैव नातो ज्ञानफलं भवेत् ॥१३८॥

To begin with, the real nature of this (world) is stated in the word *brahman*, viz. this (world) is the Brahman itself,¹ even before the knowledge of the true (is acquired by one). Hence, this cannot be the result of knowledge.² [138]

¹This explains the meaning of the word *brahman*.

²This sets aside the popular notion that knowledge occurs to one as the result of some activity. Cf. Śaṅkara's refutation of this notion in BSB 1.1.4 (pp. 125-128)

अपूर्वमिति कार्यत्वनिषेधायाभिधीयते ।

कारणत्वनिषेधाय तथानपरगीरियम् ॥१३६॥

The word *apūrva* is uttered for declining the notion that it is of the nature of an effect; so also the word *anapara* is (uttered) for rejecting the notion that it is of the nature of a cause.¹

[139]

¹This brings out the significance of the words *apūrva* and *anaparam*.

अनन्तरमिति तयो रन्ध्रस्य प्रतिषेधनम् ।

कार्यकारणयोर्बाह्यमबाह्यमिति वार्यते ॥१४०॥

The word *anantara* is for setting aside the notion of any distinction of (the Brahman) from the two. So also, by the word *abāhya* is warded off the notion that the Brahman is kept outside i.e. away from any cause and its effect.

[140]

सत्ता वानन्तरगिरा ब्रह्मणः प्रतिषिध्यते ।

विशेषोऽबाह्यशब्देन ततो वाक्यार्थरूपकम् ॥१४१॥

Or, by the word *anantara* is denied the existence of the Brahman (as a discrete object); so also, by the word *abāhya* (is denied that it is) the distinctive feature (of the discrete objects)—from that (comes to the fore) the explanation of the sentence-sense (viz. the uniqueness of the Ātman).

[141]

नात्मनोऽन्यत्र संभाव्यमपूर्वादि यदीरितम् ।

ब्रह्मात्मैवेत्यतो वक्ति श्रुतिरैकात्म्यसिद्धये ॥१४२॥

पारोक्ष्यप्रतिषेधार्थं ब्रह्मात्मैवेति भण्यते ।

ब्रह्मैवात्मेति च तथा संसारित्वनिवृत्तये ॥१४३॥

भिन्नं ब्रह्मापरिज्ञानात्संसारित्वं तथात्मनः ।

तत्त्वज्ञानात्तमोऽध्वस्तौ नेतीत्यात्मावशिष्यते ॥१४४॥

[These verses explain *ayam ātmā brahma*]

Whatever was stated with the word *apūrva* in the beginning cannot be possible in respect of anything else than the Ātman. Hence, the Śruti asserts that the Brahman is but the Ātman so that the uniqueness of the Ātman is established.¹ [142]

The statement, 'The Brahman is but the Ātman' is made, for rejecting the non-immediateness (of the Brahman). So also, the statement, 'The Brahman alone is the Ātman' is made in order to reject the idea of transmigratoriness (of the Brahman). [143]

Owing to the non-knowing (of it), the Brahman is taken as distinct (from other objects); in the same way, transmigratoriness (is stated) of the Ātman. When there occurs the destruction of darkness (viz. ignorance) at (the rise of) the knowledge of the true nature of the Ātman, there remains (only the awareness that) the Ātman is (to be described as) 'Not this, not this'. [144]

¹This sums up the explanation of the words, viz *apūrva*, *anapara*, *anantara* and *abāhya* and conveys that the Brahman is *avyāvṛtta*, *ananugata*, *niḥsāmānyaviśeṣa* as said earlier in verse 6.

सर्वोऽनुभव एवायमतः सर्वानुभूः परः ।

कात्स्न्यत्सर्वो भवेदेष चिन्मात्रत्वात्तथाऽनुभूः ॥१४५॥

All this (universe) is but the (object of) experience, beyond this is the experiencer of all, because of its fullness, it is all. So also, because of its nature of (being) Sentiency alone, it is the experiencer.¹ [145]

¹This is an explanation of the word *sarvānubhūḥ* in the end of BU 2.5.19.

इतीत्युक्तपरामर्शो वेदाज्ञा चानुशासनम् ।

कर्तव्यमेतद्विज्ञानमिति वेदानुशासनम् ॥१४६॥

The word *iti* is the reference to what is (already) stated;

the Vedic teaching is the instruction. The words *kartavyam etad vijñānam* are the instruction.¹ [146]

¹This is the explanation of *ity anusāsanam*.

अस्यातिलङ्घने दोषः संसारानर्थसंगतिः ।

कुर्वतश्च महाँलाभ आत्मनः कृतकृत्यता ॥१४७॥

In transgressing this (instruction regarding acquiring Knowledge), there occurs the fault, viz. the association with, (the) undesirable object, viz. transmigratory existence. There will be great benefit accruing to one who is doing it (viz. the instruction of the Śruti).¹ The Ātman will have done what has to be done (viz. one will be liberated). [147]

¹Following the instruction mentioned in the preceding verse.

इति द्वितीयाध्यायस्य पञ्चमं मधुब्राह्मणं समाप्तम्

APPENDIX

BUBV 2.6

वंशब्राह्मणम्

स्तुत्यर्थं ब्रह्मविद्याया ब्रह्मविद्वंश उच्यते ।
जपोऽयं ब्रह्मविज्ञानजन्मने चोद्यते श्रुतौ ॥

Now is stated the line of the knowers of the Brahman so that the lore of the Brahman is praised; for, this recitation¹ (viz. that of the line) is enjoined in the Śruti as conducive to the knowledge of the Brahman.² [1]

¹Śaṅkara writes *mantraś cāyam svādhyāyārtho japārthaś ca*; Sureśvara holds *svādhyāya* and *japa* as Duty enjoined on one by the Śruti: *svādhyāyo 'dhyetavyaḥ* (*Taittirīyāranyaka* 2.15).

²Note the contrast between *brahmavidyā* and *brahmapijñāna*.

पुंमत्यूहोत्थिताशङ्कानिवृत्त्यर्थं यथोदितम् ॥
ब्रह्मज्ञानस्य वा वंशो यत्नाच्चक्षुत्यायमुच्यते ॥

(This sixth Brāhmaṇa follows the Madhubrāhmaṇa) as stated (in Vedic tradition) so as to effect the removal of a doubt that (the teaching of the Madhukāṇḍa) has arisen from human intellect and ratiocination. Or rather, this line (of teachers) of the knowledge of the Brahman is stated by the Śruti time and again.¹ [2]

¹This is the meaning of the word *yatnāt*; cf. SP: *yatno bahuśo vacanam*; it does not have a technical meaning of ritual texts.

यस्यानुशासनं तस्य स्वयंभोः प्रतिपत्तये ॥
पौतिमाष्यादिको ग्रन्थः श्रुत्याथ प्रतिपाद्यते ॥

Now is stated the work beginning with the word *pautimāṣya* so that there arises (in one) the knowledge of that Self-born whose instruction (it is).¹ [3]

BRHADĀRANYAKOPANIṢAD-
BHĀṢYA-VĀRTIKA

3.1

Aśvala Brāhmaṇam

समाप्तो मधुकाण्डार्थो याज्ञवल्कीयकाण्डगः ।

अतः परं प्रयत्नेन श्रुत्या व्याख्यायते स्फुटम् ॥१॥

(The discussion of) the matter in the Madhukāṇḍa¹ is completed. Now hereafter will be clearly explained carefully the matter in the Yājñavalkyakāṇḍa. [1]

¹This is the traditional name for the first and second chapters of the BU. Yājñavalkyakāṇḍa or Munikāṇḍa, which follows, is the name for the third and fourth chapters.

याज्ञवल्कीयमेतस्मान्मधुकाण्डादनन्तरम् ।

काण्डं विचारभूयिष्ठमधुनारभ्यते परम् ॥२॥

The Yājñavalkyakāṇḍa (which comes) after this¹ Madhukāṇḍa (and which is) mostly discursive² is now begun thereafter.

[2]

¹That is, which is discussed just herebefore.

²This is to invite attention to its contrast with the Madhukāṇḍa which is *āgamapradhāna*, i.e. it enunciates the instruction handed down in tradition. (See note 2 under verse 5.) Read NKL: *āgamapradhānam madhukāṇḍam, pramāṇānugrāhakatarkapradhānam munikāṇḍam iti tadānantaryam.*

ननु पूर्वं य उक्तोऽर्थः स एवेहापि भण्यते ।

पुनरुक्तं न च न्याय्यमेकप्रवचनस्थयोः ॥३॥

(One might ask:) 'But there is being discussed here the same matter (as was) discussed earlier! And repetition (of matter) is not reasonable in (two sections) occurring in one (text of) exposition'.¹ [3]

¹SP points out that repetition cannot be tolerated on the ground that it would oppose the Vedāntic manner of discussion which is adopted in the topic of *sarvavedāntapratyaya* (BS 3.3.1). Also it observes that repetition does not produce any new argument. Yet read NKL: *evam punaruktiparihāre 'pi tadajñānāt* (read the editor's note: 'suggested by *vicārabhūyiṣṭham* in verse 2 above').

एकार्थत्वेऽपि च सति नैवास्य पुनरुक्तता ।
याज्ञवल्कीयकाण्डस्य ह्युपपत्तिप्रधानतः ॥४॥

(The Siddhāntin answers:) '(But) there is not repetition of (matter in) this, even though there is the sameness of (its) meaning (with that of the earlier portion) for the reason that the Yājñavalkyakāṇḍa is based on the prominence of reasoning'.¹ [4]

¹SP points out: they do not consider such writing as repetition as is in support of what has been the principal matter of discussion.

आगमोक्तिप्रधानत्वं मधुकाण्डस्य वर्णितम् ।
आगमार्थविशुद्ध्यर्थं युक्तीरत्र प्रवक्ष्यति ॥५॥

It is (already) pointed out¹ that (the matter in) the Madhukāṇḍa attaches prominence to what has come from tradition.² (Now, this Kāṇḍa) here will state (various) reasons for clarifying the matter (which has come) from tradition.³ [5]

¹Literally, described; cf verse 7 below.

²We shall use hereafter in this section, only 'tradition' for instruction handed down in tradition.

³The word 'tradition' here refers to traditionally handed down doctrines or thoughts of the Śruti.

न चागमस्य स्वातन्त्र्यं युक्त्युक्तेरपनुद्यते ।
अर्थान्तरत्वाद्युक्तीनां प्रमाणेभ्यो यतस्ततः ॥६॥

Further (ca), the independence¹ of tradition is not denied (or set aside) by stating reasons (for proving its authoritativeness) since the reasons convey other matters² which cannot be considered as (properly supported by) the means of knowing. [6]

¹Its character as self-established or as its not having the need of any proof.

²That is to say; they are not wholly similar to what is conveyed by proper reason. Cf. NKL: *apramāṇatvād iti* (or, *pramāṇabhinnatvāt* as noted by the editor of NKL).

सर्वप्रमाणशेषत्वं युक्तीनामुपवर्णितम् ।
शास्त्रान्तरेष्वपि तथा नातः स्वातन्त्र्यखण्डनम् ॥७॥

(Again) it is pointed out that, in respect of other Śāstras also, all reasoning is (but) ancillary to that of all (other) means of knowing. As such, there is no denial¹ of the independence (of tradition) from this (adducing of reasoning).² [7]

¹Literally, destruction, i.e. setting aside.

²SP points out the definition of reasoning (*tarka*) as given in *Nyāyasūtra* 1.1.40: *pramāṇāni tarkaviviktam arthaṃ yathābhūtam adhigamayanti* and others follow it. It quotes, further, the views of the commentators and sub-commentators of *Nyāyasūtra* also.

पदार्थविषया चेयं युक्तिस्तर्कोऽभिधीयते ।

वाक्यार्थस्त्वागमादेव निरपेक्षमतो वचः ॥८॥

And this reasoning, pertaining to matters conveyed by the (various) words (used in the discussion), is called reasoning (*tarka*). As against this (*tu*), the meaning conveyed by the (Śruti) statement¹ is understood only from tradition. Therefore, the statement (of the matter in this Kāṇḍa) is (in reality) independent (of any reasoning etc.). [8]

¹That is, the matter stated in the Śruti. Cf. NKL: *viṣayabhedāc ca na sāpekṣatā* and the editor's note: *tvampadārthaśodhanam yuktisāpekṣam aikyārūpavākyārthajñānam vākyamānādhīnam ity arthaḥ*.

पौरुषेयवचःस्वेव युक्तेः प्राधान्यमिष्यते ।
अनरोक्तौ तु तात्पर्यं युक्तेरर्थो न युक्तिततः ॥९॥

Prominence of reasoning is desired (i.e. accepted) only in respect of the speech of human beings. As against this (*tu*), reasoning has to be having for its purport¹ (what occurs in) the statements which are not of human beings,² the meaning (of them, i.e. of these latter) does not (occur to the listeners) on (the basis of) reasoning. [9]

¹Cf. Śaṅkara in BSB: *tasmād brahmajñānāsopanyāsamukhena vedāntavākyamāmanṣā tadavirodhitarkopakaraṇā niḥśreyasaprayojanā prastūyate* (p.83) and *śrutir api śrotavyo mantavyaḥ' iti śravaṇavyatirekeṇa mananam vidadhatī tarkam apy atrā-dartavyam darśayati* (p.411). Also NKL: *anāptasambandhasandehanirāsāya puṁspranīte tarkāpekṣā, vedasya punar apauruṣasya tātparyanirṇaye tarkāpekṣā (yā) na svārthapramitāḥ ity arthaḥ*.

²Literally, utterances of non-human (beings)—i.e. *apauruṣeya* Śruti.

प्रत्यक्षाद्यतिवर्तित्वाद्युक्त्यपेक्षा न विद्यते ।

आगमार्थे यथैवं स्याद्युक्त्यर्थे नागमेक्षणम् ॥१०॥

As, in respect of the meaning conveyed by tradition, there is not any need of¹ reasoning, owing to its being beyond (the means of knowing, viz.) *pratyakṣa* 'direct perception' etc.,² in the same way, there is no need of seeing (or observation in) tradition³ in respect of the meaning of a (worldly) statement. [10]

¹That is, dependence on.

²The word 'etc.' refers to inference and analogy.

³This refers to the independence of experience in worldly life. Cf. Śaṅkara in *Gītābhāṣya* 18.80: *na hy agnir anuṣṇa iti vadantī śrutih*

पुंस्वभावानुरोधेन युक्तिर्वेदेऽभिधीयते ।
आगमस्य प्रवृत्तिस्तु मेयवृत्तव्यपेक्षया ॥११॥

In respect of the Veda,¹ reasoning is adopted (lit. stated) in a way natural to human mind; but the (Vedic) tradition² follows (a thing) in accordance with the characteristic of what is to be known.³ [11]

¹This refers to the discussion in the Vedic texts including Vedānta (i.e. the Upaniṣads).

²That is, makes its statement about things as they are.

³This refers to the Brahman, ritual etc. to be known only from the Vedic texts.

ननूक्ता मधुकाण्डेऽपि दुन्दुभ्याद्युपपत्तयः ।
आगमैकप्रधानत्वं कथं तस्येति भण्यते ॥१२॥

But, (one might ask:) 'In the Madhukāṇḍa also, there are stated illustrations¹ of a drum etc.; how could it be said then that they are dependent only on tradition?' [12]

¹Cf BUBV 2.4.275-282, 395. The word 'illustrations' stands for reasoning on the basis of analogies.

नैष दोषो यतस्तत्र युक्तीनामप्रधानता ।
 प्राधान्यं याज्ञवल्कीये युक्तीनामभिधीयते ॥१३॥
 युक्त्यागमौ हि संभूय करस्थामलकादिवत् ।
 सुसूक्ष्ममपि सद्वस्तु शक्तौ ज्ञापयितुं यतः ॥१४॥

(The Siddhāntin answers:) 'This is not a fault, since all reasoning (based on illustrations) is (there) merely subordinate/ancillary (to the matter to be enunciated). In the Yājñavalkyakāṇḍa, (however,) it is held (lit. stated) that all (such) reasoning is principally accepted [13] because reasoning and tradition, coming together,¹ become capable of informing (one) about (even) an extremely subtle existent matter (as clearly) as a berry (placed) on the palm of a hand'. [14]

¹That is, functioning together.

युक्तयोऽतोऽभिधीयन्ते पूर्वपक्षादिसंश्रयाः ।
 याज्ञवल्कीय एतस्मिन्काण्डे जल्पोक्तिवर्त्मना ॥१५॥

As such, here, in this Kāṇḍa of Yājñavalkya, are stated reasons, pertaining to the *prima facie* view and others, in the manner/way of talk in common.¹ [15]

¹The word *jalpa* may not be taken as a technical term in Nyāya. This is well brought out by the editor of NKL thus: *vijigīṣukathā jalpaḥ, tattvabubhutsukathā vādaḥ*.

उद्गीथप्रमुखा येऽर्था मधुकाण्डे पुरोदिताः ।
 तेषामेव विशुद्ध्यर्थं विचारः क्रियतेऽधुना ॥१६॥

An enquiry is now undertaken for the clarification of (i.e. for deciding or ascertaining) such matters as the Udgītha etc.

which were discussed in the Madhukāṇḍa before. [16]

This clarifies the relation between the Aśvala Brāhmaṇa and the Madhukāṇḍa.

दर्शनस्यास्य तेनात एकवाक्यत्वमिष्यते ।
तथैवान्यपदार्थेषु तद्द्वयोरपि काण्डयोः ॥१७॥

Therefore, here is accepted (lit. desired) the unity of purport in respect of this philosophical treatise; so also is it accepted in respect of the meanings/matters conveyed by the two Kāṇḍas. [17]

Read NKL: *ādyabrāhmaṇoktopāsanāśeṣatvam atra lingam ... dvitīyabrāhmaṇaprabhṛtyabhihitayuktinām madhukāṇḍoktatattvam-ādīpadārthanirṇāyakatvād ity arthaḥ.* and, for clarification, read further the editor's note 3 thereon.

Now follows the discussion of BU 3.1.3.

यदिदं कर्मणोऽशेषसाधनं मृत्युनाप्लुतम् ।
स्वामिमन्त्रर्विगग्न्यादि त्वभिपन्नं वशीकृतम् ॥१८॥

All this, i.e. whatever the means of ritual activity (viz.) the owner (of these means), the Mantras, the priests, the fires etc., is overpowered, swayed (i.e. mastered) and possessed by death. [18]

Here follows the explanation of the words in the BU sentence: *yad idaṃ sarvaṃ mṛtyunāptaṃ sarvaṃ ... atimucyate.*

परिच्छेदकृदज्ञानं सासङ्गं मृत्युसंज्ञितम् ।
केनायं यजमानोऽतो मृत्योराप्तेर्विमुच्यते ॥१९॥

Ignorance is the cause (i.e. bringer) of limitations on them; it is associated with attachment (to momentary pleasures and

pain) and (is consequently) called death.¹ Then what is that by which is the sacrificer freed from meeting (lit. attaining) death?² [19]

¹This refers to ritual activities.

²Cf. NKL: *rāgayuktam ajñānam brahmakṣatrādibhedabhrānti-janakam mṛtyuḥ*.

यन्मर्त्यसाधनं साध्यं मर्त्यं तदपि जायते ।
साधनानुमितं साध्यं मुक्तिः केनात उच्यते ॥२०॥

(Also) whatever that can be the means for a mortal¹ is also mortal² and is born (i.e. produced). The goal is inferred from the means of reaching it—also there is stated in the words *kena* ... 'by which (liberation from it) is possible?' is then obtained. [20]

¹It refers to activities connected with ritual.

²This refers to what is perishable.

होत्रर्तिवजाग्निना वाचा मृत्योराप्तेर्विमुच्यते ।
इति प्रश्नप्रतिवचो याज्ञवल्क्योऽप्युवाच तम् ॥२१॥

'By the Hotṛ priest, viz. fire, i.e. by speech, is one released (i.e. kept from) meeting death'—this answer to the question did Yājñavalkya make (lit. utter) to him.¹ [21]

¹The word 'him' refers to the sage Aśvala; see the next verse.

प्रवक्ता याज्ञवल्क्योऽत्र तं पृच्छन्त्यश्वलादयः ।
सराजके समाजेऽयं विचारः क्रियते महान् ॥२२॥

Here,¹ Yājñavalkya is the exponent and him do Aśvala and others ask (their questions). (Thus), in the assembly with the king in it, there is carried on (lit.made) a profound discussion.²

[22]

¹It means: In this talk; cf verse 15 above.

²SP refers to *jalpakathā* as explained in *Nyāyasūtra* 4.2.50 and its commentaries. Cf. the definition of *jalpa* quoted under verse 15 above.

यजमानस्य येयं वाग्घोता चैतद्द्वयं यदा ।
अधिदैवात्मना वेत्ति स होतैर्वविधो भवेत् ॥२३॥

That Hotṛ would become like this¹ if he knows these two, viz. the *vāc* of the sacrificer and the Hotṛ priest,² to be possessed of the nature of what rests on the divine (fire).³

[23]

This explains *vāg vai yajñasya* ... (BU 3.1.3).

¹Literally, of this sort, i.e. of one who has overcome death.

²SP points out that *vāc* is *adhyātma* 'in a body', i.e. 'in the body of the sacrificer' and that, the Hotṛ priest, i.e. in the body of the Hotṛ who invokes the gods in a sacrifice, is *adhiyajña*. Cf. *yajño vai yajamānaḥ* (not traced).

³*adhidaiva*: what rests on the divine, i.e. Agni. This indicates that the sacrificial activity is in reality the worship of Agni. Cf. *sa cāgnir hotāgnir vai hotā* (not traced).

अनन्तविग्रहः सोऽग्निर्होता मृत्योर्यथोदितात् ।
यजमानस्य मुक्तिः स्यादतिमुक्तिस्तथैव च ॥२४॥

That Agni who is possessed of innumerable forms/bodies is the Hotṛ (beyond)¹ death, as said (earlier); he is the (cause of) liberation² for a sacrificer and so also the liberation³ *par excellence*.

[24]

This describes seeing of the real nature of Agni and the achieving of liberation. It explains *sa muktiḥ* ... in BU.

¹That is, beyond the clutches of death.

²Śaṅkara describes it as 'seeing the (real) nature of Agni'.

³This is described also as renunciation or a means to liberation.

आसुरात्साधनाद्वैवप्राप्तिर्मुक्तिरिहोच्यते ।
साध्यादप्यासुराद्वैवसाध्याप्तिरितिमुक्तिता ॥२५॥

Here liberation is described as the attainment of the divine (nature)¹ by such means as are demoniac (viz. performances rooted in ignorance about the nature of the inner self)² and liberation *par excellence* means obtaining what is to be achieved by the divine (result), (which in itself is) what is to be finally achieved.³ [25]

This states the intended meanings of the words *mukti* and *atimukti*. Read in this context NKL: *jñānahīnam (atra upāsanam jñānam abhipretam) puṇyakarmāsurasādhanam, daivam hiraṇyagarbhādyupāsanam ... daivasādhanaphalāptiḥ (sūtrāder āptiḥ) atimuktiḥ*.

¹This refers to becoming Agni which is the deity of *vāc*.

²This is sacrificial performance which is considered to be impure, i.e. demoniac sin (*āśura pāpman*) mentioned in BU 1.3, be it accompanied by knowledge or otherwise. Cf. *dr̥ṣṭavad ānuśravikaḥ* in *Sāṃkhyakārikā* 2.

³Becoming one with the deity of *vāc* is only a step towards further achievement, viz oneness with Prāṇa. Thus, this is a movement/progress from one *sādhyā* to yet another.

यथोक्तोपासनादेव कैवल्यं चेद्विवक्ष्यते ।
ब्रह्मविद्या किमर्थेयं नान्यन्मुक्तेः फलं ततः ॥२६॥

(One would ask:) 'If it is intended to speak of mere differentiating¹ (of the sentience/self from the body) by means of the worship (that is) thus prescribed, what is the purpose of the lore of the Brahman, since there is no other result (thereof) than (mere) separation?'² [26]

¹This refers to *kaivalya* of the Sāṃkhyas by means of

vyaktāvyaktajñāvivēka 'discrimination between the gross body and the subtle knower, i.e. sentience or *Puruṣa*'.

²This separation (or, differentiation as said earlier) being the final end, what other thing is there to be achieved? or considered as liberation? Hence, the lore of the Brahman is unnecessary.

Now follows the discussion of BU 3.1.4.

आसुरात्कर्मणो मृत्योरतिमुक्तिरिहोदिता ।
कालात्कर्मातिरेकेण मृत्योर्मुक्तिरिहोच्यते ॥२७॥

Here (i.e. in this context), liberation *par excellence* is stated to be that (viz. freedom) from the demoniac¹ (ritual) activity and liberation is stated to be freedom/escape from (i.e. overcoming of) death, by transcending Time (or Death) by means of giving up (lit. going beyond) activity (in ritual). [27]

This is to emphasise the idea that mere overcoming of the demoniac inclination does not mean liberation; for, there is the need of overcoming death also.

¹It signifies 'which really (or, in the final analysis) involves sin'.

प्रयोगसमवाय्येव द्रव्यकर्त्रादिसाधनम् ।
तत्प्रयोगावसाने च सर्वं तदपवृज्यते ॥२८॥

The means (of a sacrificial performance, viz.) the material, the agent etc.¹ are only intimately/inseparably associated with² the performance (of a ritual) and (consequently)³ all that is separated (from it)⁴ on the completion of the performance of that. [28]

¹The word 'etc.' refers to the deity.

²That is, inherent in.

³This is the force of the word *ca*.

⁴This refers to the basic notion of (or the accepted

differentiation of) what really cannot be differentiated.

प्रयोगावसितेस्तुर्ध्वं कालः प्राक्च प्रयोगतः ।
क्षपयन्वर्ततेऽजस्रं सर्वं तत्कर्मसाधनम् ॥२९॥

(The above is stated) because time¹ keeps on continuously affecting² all that is accessory of the performance (even) after the completion of the (ritual) performance and (also) before that performance. [29]

¹Or, by pun, Death.

²Literally, reducing it continuously, bit by bit.

तस्मात्कर्मातिरेकेण कालो मृत्युः प्रतीयताम् ।
ततोऽपि मुक्तिर्वक्तव्येत्यत आरभ्यते परः ॥३०॥

Therefore may Death be understood as Time by its extension beyond (the period of) the (ritual) performance. (And) since it is to be stated that liberation *par excellence* is achieved (in reality) after that; therefore, the subsequent (portion of the Śruti) is (now) begun. [30]

कालश्च द्विविधः प्रोक्त एकोऽहोरात्रलक्षणः ।
तिथ्यादिलक्षणश्चान्यस्ताभ्यां मुक्तिरिहोच्यते ॥३१॥

Time is described in two ways: one characterized by day and night and the other by *tithi*¹ etc. Here (in what follows) is stated (about) freedom/liberation² from the two. [31]

This is stated for the purpose of making the subject-matter of BU 3.1.4-5 distinct from the earlier section. Read NKL (note): *kanḍikādvayātmakasamudāyasya kālāt muktinirūpaṇe tātparyam*.

¹In relation to the phases of the sun and the moon—the latter in particular.

²That is, overcoming such differences as constitute liberation.

उपस्थापयतः कर्म तथा क्षपयतो यतः ।
अहोरात्रे ततो मृत्युस्ताभ्यां मुक्तिः कुतो भवेत् ॥३२॥

‘But’, (one would ask), ‘since day and night (are for one), who begins/undertakes (some ritual) performance as also for one who completes (the same), therefore, there is (certainly) death (for that one); how could there be liberation (then)?’.

[32]

Read NKL (note): *kālamuktiviṣayapraśnayoḥ prathamah yad idam sarvam ... atimucyate iti praśnah tasya.*

अध्यात्मं चक्षुरध्वर्युरधियज्ञं द्वयं रविः ।
साक्षादनन्तदेहोऽयमिति ध्यायन्विमुच्यते ॥३३॥

(The Siddhāntin answers:) ‘The eye¹ in the body and the Adhvaryu priest at the sacrifice are both the sun of innumerable forms—considering/thinking (to himself) thus (i.e. this truth), the performer (of ritual) is liberated’.

[33]

Yājñavalkya’s reply *adhvaryuṇartvijā ... sātīmuktiḥ* is under reference.

¹This is for two eyes.

आत्मावयव एवायं सूर्यश्चक्षुर्ममांशुमान् ।
अध्वर्युरहमेवेति साक्षात्कृत्वा विमुच्यते ॥३४॥

‘He is released, thinking (to himself thus:) ‘This sun is but an aspect (lit. a limb) of the Ātman (and) my eye is the sun and I am the Adhvaryu priest (at this sacrifice)’.’

[34]

This explains *cakṣur vai yajñasya ... ātmaśabdena yajamānaḥ* (BU 3.1.4).

Now follows the discussion of BU 3.1.5.

कलावृद्धिक्षयाभ्यां तु पक्षयोरुभयोस्तथा ।
चन्द्रः कर्तेह तत्प्राप्त्या पक्षाभ्यां विप्रमुच्यते ॥३५॥

'Similarly (*tathā*) is released he (who thinks to himself thus:) "I am the moon having in both these halves (of the months) the waxing and the waning of the digits, I am the agent, i.e. performer (of the ritual)", attaining thereby (the nature of) the two halves.' [35]

This is the answer to the question in *yad idaṃ sarvaṃ pūrvapakṣāparapakṣābhyām* ... (BU 3.1.5), according to the reading in the Mādhyandina recension of the text.

हासवृद्धयोर्यतः कर्ता वायुश्चन्द्रमसस्ततः ।
वायुनैवोपसंहारः प्राणोद्गात्रोरयं कृतः ॥३६॥

Since the wind and the moon are (each) the agent respectively of waxing and waning; therefore, the conculsion (of the discussion) is stated as (the meditation on the nature) of the wind and the Udgātr.¹ [36]

¹SP points out that this verse follows the text of the Kāṇva recension of the BU.

मनोऽध्यात्मं यदस्याभद्ब्रह्मा चैवाधियज्ञगः ।
तस्याधिदेवता चन्द्र इति माध्यंदिनश्रुतिः ॥३७॥

The Śruti statement of the Mādhyandina recension is: 'Since *manas* in the body of this performer became the Brahman priest in the sacrifice; therefore, the moon is its superintending deity ...'. [37]

Read NKL: *uditānuditavat śākhābhedenā vyavasthitatvāt katham viruddham dhyānam ucyate iti na śaṅkanīyam*.

Now follows the discussion of 3.1.6.

कर्मतः कालतो मृत्योर्मुक्तोऽयं स्वर्गमेष्यति ।
तं प्रयास्यति केनायमाक्रमेणेति पृच्छयते ॥३८॥

This (i.e. the performer) is liberated from (the clutches of) Time (and) of Death (and therefore) attains to heaven. 'By what support (i.e. step) will he go there?'—this is the question asked (now). [38]

This explains *yad idam antarikṣam ...* (BU 3.1.6).

स्वर्गलोकगतावत्र साधनं पृच्छयते यतः ।
अन्तरिक्षमनाधारं गतौ हेतुनिषेधनम् ॥३९॥

(The answer is:) The question here is asked regarding the means to attaining to (i.e. reaching) heaven, since the sky is supportless and therefore prohibiting any means of going. [39]

This justifies how the question in the preceding verse has a propriety (referring to *gatisādhana* view). This can be the view of Bhartṛprapañca as is noticed from the introductory remark in SP on the next verse. Also read NKL: *anārambaṇam iti hetuḥ niṣedhanam yataḥ ity arthaḥ*.

न तु देहग्रहे प्रश्नः सति गन्तरि पृच्छयते ।
अग्न्यादिदृष्टिभिश्चास्य देहः प्राक्प्रतिपादितः ॥४०॥

And there cannot be asked (such) a question about a goer when there is (reference to) having a body. Already it is asserted that this (performer) has a body on account of his considering (himself and his own limbs, viz. *vāc* etc.) as Agni and others.¹ [40]

This refutes Bhartṛprapañca's justification of the question, as noted in the preceding verse.

¹This has a reference to *so 'gnir abhavat ...* (BU 1.3.12-13).

मनोऽधियज्ञं ब्रह्मैव ब्रह्मा चन्द्रोऽधिदैवतम् ।
चन्द्रेण मनसा लोकमवष्टम्भेन यास्यति ॥४१॥

manas (of the sacrificer) is, in the context of sacrificial performance, the Brahman and the Brāhmaṇa¹ priest is the moon among the deities; (therefore) by *manas*, by the moon, (which is) the support (for the sacrificer), he reaches (lit. will reach) the world (of the Brahman).² [41]

This is a part of the answer to Bhartṛprapañca. Read NKL: *brahmaṇā ityādiparihārārtham āha*.

¹The form *brahmā* in the masculine as opposed to *brahma* in the neuter.

²Possibly this refers to the god Brahmadeva.

अध्यात्मं प्राण एव स्यादुद्गाता योऽधियज्ञगः ।
स वायुरिति पाठे स्याद्व्याख्या माध्यन्दिने त्वयम् ॥४२॥

Prāṇa¹ in the body (of the sacrificer) is the Udgātr priest in (the performance of) the sacrifice. And (*tu*) this should be the explanation when the reading in the Mādhyandina recension is (accepted, viz.) *sa vāyuh*² [42]

Now follows the explanation of the passage which occurs in the Mādhyandina recension of BU.

¹This is sentience in the body, Jīva.

²Cf. BU 3.1.5.

यजमानश्रुतेरत्र पूर्वोद्गीथैकवाक्यतः ।
यजमानो जपस्तत्र ज्ञानं नेत्यवसीयताम् ॥४३॥

Owing to the unity of purport of this (Aśvala) Brāhmaṇa and the Udgītha (Brāhmaṇa), the recitation (of Abhyāroha) is caused by, or for the purport of, the sacrificer;¹ the knowledge

(does) not (belong to him)²—let this be concluded thus. [43]

¹The word *yajamāno japah* should be understood as *yājāmāno japah*; cf. SP: *yajamānasvāmikah*; and *yajamānagam* in the next verse.

²It is knowledge about Prāṇa as the deity of the *sāmagāna*.

संभाव्यते न यत्तत्र यजमानस्य मानतः ।
अस्तु कामं तदुद्गातुर्न तु तद्यजमानगम् ॥४४॥

In the various worships (in the Udgāna), it¹ cannot be thought of as belonging to the sacrificer—this (is so) on account of the (proper) means of knowing. Well may it belong to the Udgātr but not to the sacrificer. [44]

¹This is knowledge mentioned in the preceding verse. This refers to the *viññānas* which are *ṛtviksvāmikāni*, i.e. *tatkarṭṛkāni*.

इतीत्युक्तपरामर्शो ह्यतिदेशार्थ उच्यते ।
इतोऽन्यत्रातिमोक्षा ये तेऽप्येवमिति वीक्ष्यताम् ॥४५॥

(The word) *iti*¹ refers to what is (already) stated—it is (used in the) expression for extending (the idea of *atimokṣa* 'liberation *par excellence*'); whatever be (the references to) *atimokṣa* (made) elsewhere should also be (understood) in this very way²—let this be noted. [45]

¹This is *ity atimokṣah* in BU 3.1.6; it is the same as *atimukti*.

²They are also *atideśārtha*. That is to say: the procedure in respect of *vāc* is to be extended to the sense of touch etc.

अधिदैवात्मना तेषां दृष्टयः साधनात्मनाम् ।
अतिमोक्षाः स्युः सर्वत्र यथोक्तादेव लक्षणात् ॥४६॥

Seeing them¹ with the notions of being possessed of the nature of those among deities,² (though they are) of the nature of

the means (of sacrifice), they would everywhere³ be (i.e. result into) liberation *par excellence*, on the ground (viz. by the indications)⁴ stated (earlier). [46]

¹This refers to the *prāṇas*.

²These are the superintending deities or gods, viz. Agni and others.

³That is, in all sacrificial performances.

⁴This refers to *devatātmadarśana*. Read NKL (note): *lakṣaṇāt kāraṇād iti yāvat*.

फलवत्कर्मणां क्वापि किञ्चित्सामान्यसंश्रयात् ।
संपत्तिमर्हतां संपदल्पीयःकर्मसूच्यते ॥४७॥

Now is discussed meditation based on resemblance¹ in (even) smaller (i.e. less significant) ritual(s);² this, at places, consists in that the rituals which bear fruit, become similar to the great (i.e. more significant) ritual(s),³ on the strength (lit. support) of (even) little similarity. [47]

After completing the discussion on *udgīthopāsana* in its entirety, there is now discussion on *atha sampad* Also read: *agni-hotrādikarmaṇā aśvamedhādi mayā kriyate iti dhyānam ity arthaḥ* (NKL).

¹For example, the performer of a small rite like Agnihotra considers that he is performing the Aśvamedha ritual (SP).

²These refer to the minor rites which are subordinate to the Udgātr's performance.

³They refer to the Udgāna, Aśvamedha etc. which deserve richer results (*sampad*, *sampatti*).

यदि वा तत्फलस्यैव किञ्चित्सामान्यवर्त्मना ।
संपादनं भवेत्संपदग्निहोत्रादिकर्मणि ॥४८॥

Or, (it could be understood thus:) Obtaining the result of that (smaller ritual) itself becomes in the ritual of Agnihotra

etc. the acquiring of (greater) result, on the strength of some similarity. [48]

This explains *phalasyaiva vā* in BUB 3.1.6 (p.379).

संपदा चेत्फलप्राप्तिरश्वमेधादिकर्मणाम् ।
त्रयाणामपि वर्णानां तत्पाठः फलवान्भवेत् ॥४९॥

If by such meditation¹ in respect of the rituals such as Aśvamedha and others there is obtained the result, then the persons of all the three Varnas would have their recitation of (the texts pertaining to) them as yielding some result! [49]

NKL comments: *sampadām aphalatvāt tallakṣaṇam (na) kartavyam ity atrāhaḥ*

¹This stands for 'meditation based on resemblance'; cf. verse 47 above. This extends to other cases in this section where *sampad* is referred to.

नातिभारोऽस्ति नो बुद्धेः शास्त्रं चेत्तत्परं भवेत् ।
विदुषां श्रेयसेऽतोऽध्वा न क्वचित्प्रतिहन्यते ॥५०॥

If (the study of) the scriptures would be having that (viz. such result as the) purport, then that (viz. the study of them) is not for our intellect any great burden. And (*vā*) the path for the knowers to well-being is nowhere obstructed. [50]

Now is discussed BU 3.1.7, viz. on the nature of *sampad*.

तिसृभिरिति संख्यार्थप्रश्ननिर्णयमब्रवीत् ।
पुरोनुवाक्याद्युक्त्या तु संख्येयार्थविनिर्णयम् ॥५१॥

By the word *tisṛbhiḥ*¹ the Śruti has declared the decision in respect of matters signified by the number (of the *ṛcs* to be recited); and (*tu*) by the statement about *puronuvākyas* 'verses for the fore-offerings'² (is declared) the matter (viz.

the *ṛcs*) to be known (i.e. as to be recited).

[51]

This verse seeks to avert the idea of repetition in respect of the words *tisṛbhiḥ* and *tisraḥ*.

¹For the explanation of the three read the editor's note in NKL edition: *puronuvākyaṁ yājyaṁ ca śasyaiva tṛtīyā*.

²*puronuvākyas* are introductory or invitational verses (*ṛcs*) in the Prayāja offerings.

त्रैलोक्यसंख्यासामान्यात्स्यात्सर्वप्राणभृज्जयः ।

सर्वप्राणभृतां यस्मात् त्रिष्वेवैतेषु संभवः ॥५२॥

Because of the similarity (of the number of these *puronuvākyas*) with the number of the worlds, there would result (for the reciter) the conquest of all living beings;¹ (this is possible) because the birth of all those living beings would be in these very three worlds.

[52]

This has reference to the Prayāja offerings offered with the recitation of prayers.

¹Read the note on *prāṇabhṛt* by the editor of NKL: *sarvam prāṇijātam ity arthaḥ*.

Now follows the discussion of BU 3.1.8-10.

उज्ज्वलत्वादिसामान्याद्देवलोकदिसंपदः ।

फलसंपद एवैता नात्र कर्म विवक्ष्यते ॥५३॥

Because of their similarity (with the divine world) in respect of resplendence, there can be meditations on the result; in respect of this (matter), it is not intended to state any ritual.

[53]

This refers to the *karmaphalasampads* of the *devaloka*, referred to in BU 3.1.8, i.e. *devalokam* ..., for clarification read the note of the editor of NKL.

दीप्तिर्नादोऽधःशयनमाज्यमांसपयोऽम्भसाम् ।
देवलोकदिसंपत्स्याद्दीप्तिमत्त्वादिसंभवात् ॥५४॥

Brightness, (loud) sound and lying down (i.e. sleeping on the ground)¹ of clarified butter, flesh and streaming waters (respectively) would have the meditations of (becoming/being) the divine world etc. because of their being possessed of brightness etc. [54]

This refers to the offerings which have the potency of producing those results that are bright like the *devaloka*.

¹It means: flowing down along on the sacrificial altar.

वृत्त्यानन्त्यान्मनोऽनन्तं शब्दादीनामनन्ततः ।
विश्वेदेवान्मनोवृत्तीः संपाद्यानन्त्यसाम्यतः ॥५५॥
अनन्तमेव तेनासौ सम्यग्ज्ञानेन विन्दति ।
लोकं यथोक्तदृष्टिः सन्यजमानः फलं स्वयम् ॥५६॥

manas is infinite because of the innumerable functions it performs,¹ thanks to the vast numerousness of words etc. Having rendered these functions of *manas* into all gods² on account of the similarity in respect of vast numerousness, [55] he, the meditator thereby, i.e. with the (herebefore) stated meditations, secures (for himself) endless world, yea, by right knowledge, himself being the sacrificer. [56]

Now there is reference to *anantaṃ vai manaḥ* ... in BU 3.1.9.

¹Or alternatively, modifications which it undergoes.

²Or alternatively, *Viśve-devas*.

तिस्रः पुरोनुवाक्याद्या ऋचः पूर्वमुदीरिताः ।
यास्ता एवात्र विज्ञेयाः स्तोत्रिया अपि नापराः ॥५७॥

Those three *puronuvākya* *ṛcs* etc., which are mentioned before, are themselves to be understood here as *śtotriyas*,¹ not any

others.

[57]

The word *tisraḥ* refers to *stotriyāḥ stoṣyanti*.

¹It means: verses in praise of gods.

गीतयस्त्वधियज्ञं ता अध्यात्मं कास्तु ता इति ।
प्राणापानव्यानरूपा अध्यात्मं ताः प्रचक्षते ॥५८॥

‘What are the songs in the sacrifice? and (tu) what (again) are those having reference to the body (of a sacrificer)?’—(on this) they declare them to be in the body (and) having the nature of (the three winds) Prāṇa, Apāna and Vyāna.¹ [58]

¹The second line explains *prāṇa eva*.

जयो भूरादिलोकानां संख्यादित्वादिसाम्यतः ।
अश्वलौऽप्युपरेमेऽथ स्वोक्तप्रश्नविनिर्णयात् ॥५९॥

Conquest of the (three) worlds, beginning with (this) earth, is (spoken of) on account of the similarity in respect of number. Thereafter Aśvala stopped (asking questions), because of the decision (given to him by Yājñavalkya in respect of his question). [59]

This explains *pr̥thivī lokam eva purovākyayā jayati*.

इति श्रीबृहदारण्यकोपनिषद्भाष्यवार्तिके तृतीयाध्यायस्य
प्रथमं ब्राह्मणम् ॥१॥

**BRHADĀRANYAKOPANIṢAD-
BHĀṢYA-VĀRTIKA**

3.2

Ārtabhāga Brāhmaṇam

Verses 1-8 bring out the connection between BU 3.1 and 3.2.

मृत्योर्मुक्त्यतिमुक्ती द्वे पूर्वस्मिन्ब्राह्मणे गते ।
मृत्युरूपावधृतये परं ब्राह्मणमुच्यते ॥१॥

In the preceding Brāhmaṇa are discussed the two, viz. *mukti* and *atimukti* from *Mṛtyu* (and now) the subsequent Brāhmaṇa is introduced for ascertaining the nature of *Mṛtyu*. [1]

Yet read SP: *mṛtyor iti brahmakṣatrāḍiparicchedaheṭoḥ rāgādisahitāt mithyājñānāt karma tasmāt ... kālāt ... mṛtyor muktiṁ vyākurvātā tvamarthaśuddhir vihitety arthaḥ*.

किंलक्षणेन ग्रस्तोऽयं मृत्युनेति प्रचोदिते ।
ग्रहातिग्रहरूपेण ग्रस्तोऽयमिति कथ्यते ॥२॥

As (the thinker of Upaniṣad) is incited by the question, "By what nature of *Mṛtyu* is this one¹ grasped, i.e. overpowered?",² it is told that this one is overpowered by (*Mṛtyu*) of the nature of *Graha* and *Atigraha* 'the organs and the objects acquired by them'.³ [2]

See the next verse. Also NKL states *mṛtyurūpaṁ* as *indriyaviṣayātmaka*. See note of the editor of NKL: *grahāḥ indriyāṇi, atigrahāḥ indriyaviṣayāḥ*.

¹This refers to *Hiraṇyagarbha* which a worldly sacrificer became by the worships earlier explained.

²Cf. verse 10 below.

³These are explained in verse 10 below.

अधिभूताधियज्ञादिपरिच्छेदफलात्मकः ।
मोहासङ्गास्पदो मृत्युर्ग्रहातिग्रहलक्षणः ॥३॥

Mrtyu is of the nature of Graha(s) and Atigraha(s), i.e. of the nature of the result(s) accruing from limitations (on the inner self) which pertain to the elements and the sacrifices etc.¹ and which is the abode of delusion and attachment. [3]

¹This refers to *kriyā* 'activity', *kāraka* 'instrument' and *phala* 'result' etc.

इतो मुक्तस्य रूपाणि त्वग्न्यादीनि पुराब्रवम् ।
उद्गीथब्राह्मणे पूर्वमश्वलब्राह्मणे तथा ॥४॥

I have already stated in the Udgītha Brāhmaṇa and also in the Aśvala Brāhmaṇa that Agni and others are the forms of one (who is) liberated from this (i.e. worldly life). [4]

Agni is identified with Āditya and the other deities, viz. those which superintend over different parts of the human body.

फलं च ज्ञानयुक्तानां कर्मणामेतदिष्यते ।
उत्पत्त्याद्यन्वयात्तस्मादनित्यं स्याद्घटादिवत् ॥५॥

And also this is desired as the result of the activities of those who are possessed of the knowledge (of the actions and what is associated with actions) (and) therefore, owing to their connection with origination etc.¹ the (result) would be perishable like a pot of clay etc. [5]

This indicates that *becoming* Sūtra is not liberation.

¹The word 'etc.' refers to five other *bhāvavikāras*.

अतो यथोक्तादेतस्मात्साध्यसाधनलक्षणात् ।
संसाराद्धन्धनान्मोक्षः कर्तव्यो ज्ञानहेतुतः ॥६॥

Therefore by (causing the rise of) knowledge (*jñānahetutaḥ*) one should effect liberation from the worldly existence which comprises the ends and means¹ that are already stated, viz. the bondage. [6]

¹This refers to the ritual activity which is a means to bring about the result, viz. heaven etc., cf. *kriyā*, *kāraka* and *phala* noted above under verse 3 above.

ज्ञानकर्मफलं दिव्यं यदि नाम पुरोदितम् ।
ग्रहातिग्रहबन्धेन तथापि सितमेव तत् ॥७॥

Yes, even though the result of knowledge and action (combined together)¹ was earlier pointed out as divine, that is still bound² by the ties of Graha and Atigraha. [7]

¹This is becoming Sūtra.

²This is from the root *so* 'to bind' (not 'to cut').

वाङ्मनःप्राणरूपाणां त्र्यन्नात्मन्यपि संभवात् ।
ग्रहातिग्रहरूपाणां नातो मुक्तः प्रजापतिः ॥८॥

The forms of Graha and Atigraha do exist even in the one of the nature of three foods (viz. Hiraṇyagarbha or Sūtra) as the forms of Vāc, *manas* and Prāṇa and therefore Prajāpati is not (entirely) free (from them, i.e. liberated).¹ [8]

¹Read SP: *saviṣayāṇām teṣām prajāpatau sattvam evātaḥ-śabdārthaḥ*.

BU 3.2.1 is under reference.

वागादयो ग्रहा ज्ञाताश्चतुष्ट्वं चाविवक्षितम् ।
अतिमोक्षातिदेशोक्तेस्तद्विशेषोऽथ भण्यते ॥९॥

The Grahas, viz. Vāc and others are already known and (yet) their being four (in number) is not (specifically) intended.¹ Now then is stated here the specific (points of) distinction among them in view of (or, on account of) the extension of (the notion of) *atimokṣa*. [9]

This has reference to earlier discussion of the four, *vāk*, *cakṣuṣ*, *ghrāṇa*, and *manas*

¹Read SP: ... *atimokṣā iti vāgādāv uktanyāyasya tvagādāv atideśād grahaikavad avivakṣitaṁ catuṣṭvam* ... (and further elaborate comment which is not imperatively necessary!)

BU 3.2.2-9 is under reference.

ग्रहा घ्राणादयो ज्ञेया गन्धाद्यास्तदतिग्रहाः ।
ग्रहैर्गन्धादयो ग्रस्ता ग्रहाश्चात्मा च गोचरैः ॥१०॥

By Grahas are to be understood *ghrāṇa* and others¹ (and) Atigrahas are smell and others (viz. their objects). Smell etc. are grasped by Grahas. Thus Grahas 'organs' and also the Ātman 'inner self' are grasped by the different objects. [10]

¹This refers to the different organs. *ghrāṇa* is for *prāṇa* in BU, this by context.

अपानेनाहतो गन्धो घ्राणस्यैति वशं यथा ।
चक्षुरादिग्रहास्तद्वत्प्राणादिसचिवैरिह ॥११॥

As the smell which is brought by exhaling (*apāna*) becomes grasped by the nose, so (also) the organs, viz. the eye etc. are similarly (become grasped) by those (objects) that are subordinate to nose etc. (*prāṇa*). [11]

The word *prāṇādisacivaiḥ* conveys that the Atigrahas, viz. *rūpa* etc. must be connected with the inner self who grasps them. Thus, there is the relation of being bound mutually.

गन्धादिविषया धीस्थाः कर्मसंबोधिता यतः ।
प्रयुञ्जते हि घ्राणादींस्ततस्ते स्युरतिग्रहाः ॥१२॥

Since objects, viz. smell and others, which are abiding in intellect are revealed (*sambodhita*) by actions (of the organs) and then indeed (*hi*) do they put the nose etc. to action, therefore the objects are called Atigraha(s). [12]

This verse implies the idea of the inner self. SP adds: *viṣayāṇām indriyaprarakatvam anubhavasiddham iti hisabdārthaḥ*.

BU 3.2.10 is under reference.

योऽयं मृत्युरिह प्रोक्तो मृत्युस्तस्यापि चापरः ।
अस्ति नास्तीति वा ब्रूहि याज्ञवल्क्य यथातथम् ॥१३॥

(A question is asked to Yājñavalkya:) Tell me clearly, O Yājñavalkya, if there really is or is not another Mr̥tyu for that Mr̥tyu which you have described here (i.e. in BU 3.1). [13]

अस्ति चेदनवस्था स्यादनिर्मोक्षो न चेद्वेत् ।
इति प्रतिवचः कष्टं मत्वेनं पर्यपृच्छत ॥१४॥

If there is one, there would be *infinite regress*; if there is none, there would be the absence of liberation. This, (Ārtabhāga) asked, having thought to himself that an answer to his question was difficult. [14]

न कश्चिन्नियतो भावो मृत्युरित्युपदिश्यते ।
विनाशको यतो मृत्युर्विनाशयान्प्रति भण्यते ॥१५॥

There is not any definite *bhāva* 'positive entity' which is described as Mr̥tyu; since Mr̥tyu is called the destroyer of them which can be destroyed by it. [15]

This verse aims to set aside the popularly accepted notion of Mr̥tyu as Vaivasvata (Yama).

मृत्योरपि सतो मृत्युरस्त्येवेति मयोच्यते ।
न चानवस्थेहाप्नोति सर्वमृत्युत्वकारणात् ॥१६॥

(Indeed) I have said that there is certainly Mr̥tyu even while Mr̥tyu continues to exist and this does not involve any *infinite regress* for the reason that all (objects etc.) are subject to Mr̥tyu. [16]

This explains *asti tāvan mr̥tyor mr̥tyuh* in BU.

सर्वात्रभक्षणादग्निर्मृत्युस्तावदसावपि ।
अपामन्नं भवन्दृष्टो बह्वीनां तनुविग्रहः ॥१७॥

Since he eats all the foods, therefore is Agni Mr̥tyu of them. And even he is known to become the food for waters that are in plenty, himself being smaller in form. [17]

अग्निर्हिरण्यगर्भो वा ह्यापस्तत्कारणं मताः ।
कार्याणां मारणान्मृत्युः कारणं प्रथितं भुवि ॥१८॥

Agni or (even) Hiranyagarbha has waters as the origin¹ and it is well known in the world that the cause is the Mr̥tyu of its effects as it destroys them. [18]

¹Cf. *apa eva sasarjādau tāsu bījam avāsrjat ...* (Manusmṛti)

प्रत्यग्याथात्म्यविज्ञानं मृत्युरज्ञानरूपिणः ।
संसारहेतोर्मृत्योः स्यान्नापीहास्त्यनवस्थितिः ॥१९॥

The knowledge of the real nature of the inner self is Mr̥tyu for what has the form of ignorance, viz. what is the cause of transmigratory existence, and thus there is not (at all) any

infinite regress involved here (i.e. in respect of what is under discussion). [19]

This has the basic acceptance of the inner self as not having any cause for its existence. (It is *really avyākṛta*.)

निरुणद्धि यथा जन्म तत्राशमपि तत्तथा ।
प्रत्यग्याथात्म्यविज्ञानं नानवस्थाप्यतो भवेत् ॥२०॥

As the knowledge of the real nature of the inner self does not hinder the origin (of things etc.) and similarly (it does not cause) the destruction of them as well, so, there is no *infinite regress* in this way also. [20]

अन्येऽतो मृत्यवो गौणास्तैर्मृतौ स्यात्पुनर्जनिः ।
प्राक्तनान्यपि जन्मानि सम्यग्ज्ञानं तु हन्ति नः ॥२१॥

Mṛtyus other than this one are (really) secondary and (in that case) there is a birth for an individual after he is dead. As against this (*tu*), right knowledge¹ destroys all our births of the past as well.² [21]

¹That is, *ekātmajñāna*.

²This is used only for conveying the idea about the births of all the three periods of time.

यथोक्त एव व्याख्याने युक्तेयं स्यात्फलश्रुतिः ।
न तु निःशेषसंसारविध्वंसिन्यात्मबोधने ॥२२॥

And this statement about (the accruing of) the result¹ will be reasonable only if the explanation which is stated (is accepted),² but this is not so accepted in case one is informed about the proper nature of the Ātman which destroys the entire transmigratory existence. [22]

¹This refers to *apa punar mṛtyam jayati* in BU 3.2.10.

²This refers to the explanation of Mr̥tyu and its cause.

Now BU 3.2.11 is under reference. In the case of the knower of the true nature of the Ātman, there is no movement upwards etc., after that person's (commonly known) death.

समस्तमृत्योस्तमसः सम्यगात्मावबोधनम् ।
मृत्युस्तत्फलविज्ञप्त्यै परो ग्रन्थोऽवतार्यते ॥२३॥

Informing an individual about the proper (nature of) the Ātman is Mr̥tyu, for the darkness is (in fact) the Mr̥tyu of all (the transmigratory beings). Now the subsequent portion (of this Upaniṣad) is introduced for informing an individual of the result of that.¹ [23]

This explains *yatrāyam puruṣo mriyate ...* in BU 3.2.11.

¹Namely, *ātmāvabodha*.

सम्यग्ज्ञातात्मयाथात्म्यो यदायं म्रियते पुमान् ।
किमुत्क्रामन्त्यतः प्राणा उताहो नेति भण्यताम् ॥२४॥

(One asks:) 'When this person, who has properly known the true nature of the Ātman, dies,¹ do his *prāṇas* move upwards or not?'—may this be told. [24]

utkrānti gati 'upward movement' at the final end of the journey for a man of transmigratory world is already discussed earlier. Therefore, this Brāhmaṇa, it is pointed out, pertains to the life-breath of a person who has known the nature of that.

¹SP states that the time referred to is marked by the exhaustion of the *karman* which has already begun to produce its result.

उत्क्रान्तौ स्यादनिर्मोक्षो जन्मार्थं मरणं यतः ।
अमृतिश्चाप्यनुत्क्रान्तौ सत्सु प्राणेषु का मृतिः ॥२५॥

'If it is accepted that there is an upward movement of (*prāṇas*),

then there does follow the absence of liberation, (just) because Mṛtyu is always to precede the ensuing birth.¹ If again there is absence of any upward movements (of the *prāṇas*), there is then the absence of death; for while *prāṇas* do exist (in a body) how could there be death?' [25]

This explains the purpose of the questioner in the previous verse.

¹This refers to *Gītā* 2.27ab: *jātasya hi dhruvo mṛtyur dhruvaṃ janma mṛtasya ca*.

दुःशकोत्तरमित्येवं प्रश्नं मत्वान्वपृच्छत् ।
आर्तभागो मुनिर्विद्वान्स च नेति तमब्रवीत् ॥२६॥

Having thought that such a question as he has put is very difficult to answer, Ārtabhāga asked that, and the knower (of the knowledge of the Ātman), the sage on his part, answered him in the words 'No' [26]

अकर्त्रात्मपरिज्ञानाद्धवस्ताविद्यस्य सर्वतः ।
देहान्तरग्रहाभावात्प्राणोत्क्रान्तेरसंभवः ॥२७॥

'There is impossibility of any upward movement of *prāṇas* because there cannot be resorting to another body by an individual who has his ignorance destroyed in every way (*sarvataḥ*) by means of the full (*pari*) knowledge of the Ātman as the non-agent (of any actions). [27]

यदैव सम्यग्विज्ञानं जातमस्यागमोक्तितः ।
प्राणाः सहेतवः सर्वे तदैवास्ता निरन्वयाः ॥२८॥

Just at the very time when the proper knowledge about the Ātman has occurred to this person by (hearing of) the statement of the Veda, all of his *prāṇas*, together with their causes,¹ have been abandoned, leaving no trace of themselves behind.² [28]

This seems to state that *prāṇas* of the knower of the Ātman do not function with any purpose as in the case of ordinary persons.

¹These are desires and activities etc. (i.e. *vāsanās*).

²This refers to ignorance (*mūlakāraṇam avidyā*) which is the material (*upādāna*) cause of transmigration.

नान्वयं सहते प्रत्यङ्गं चापि व्यतिरेकताम् ।
कौटस्थैकत्वहेतुभ्यां प्रत्यग्याथात्म्यवस्तुनः ॥२९॥

(Now) the inner self does not tolerate any continued connection (of itself with something else); nor does it tolerate the possibility of a relation to the absence of any others.¹ (This is so) because the thing, viz. the true nature of the inner self has for its cause immutability and singleness. [29]

This argument sets aside the notions of the Ātman being non-distinct from the discrete worldly objects etc. and also not having a character distinct from that of any other object(s).

¹Sureśvara uses *vyatirekatā*, while *vyatireka* is expected in contrast with *anvaya*.

ध्वस्तध्वान्तस्य विज्ञानादतो हेतुफलात्मनाम् ।
दृशौ स्यात्समवनयः सर्पादीनां यथा स्रजि ॥३०॥

Therefore, in the case of a person who has destroyed his ignorance by this knowledge (of the Ātman) there would be the merger (*samavanaya*) of what have the nature of causes and effects in the seer, as in the case of a serpent and others while there (really) exists a wreath (etc.).¹ [30]

This explains *atraiva samavanīyante* in BU 3.2.11.

¹This is one more instance of Sureśvara's loose phraseology—*sarpādi* would expect its counterpart *sragādi*.

न स्वकारणसंसर्गस्तस्य ज्ञानादपहनुतेः ।
निष्फलं च भवेज्ज्ञानं यदि कारणसंगतिः ॥३१॥

There is no contact (of the inner self of a person) with its own cause (i.e. ignorance), owing to (this person's) having acquired that knowledge (which is) the very concealment (i.e. removal, of ignorance); (and) if there remains any association (of it) with the cause, then his knowledge would become useless (lit. fruitless).¹ [31]

¹Read SP: *sati jñāne kāryāṇāṃ kāraṇasaṃsargaśe cet tadvināpi tatsambhavāḥ jñānavaiyarthyam.*

उत्क्रामन्ति न चेत्प्राणा नायं तर्हि मृतो भवेत् ।
देहस्यैव मृतेनैवं जीवो न म्रियते सदा ॥३२॥

(One would ask:) 'If the *prāṇas* (of this person) do not move upwards, this one would not be considered as dead.' (The answer is:) 'This is so, only where there is the death of the body (and) never does the inner self die.' [32]

Sureśvara takes *prāṇas* 'sense-organs' as belonging to the body and therefore the upward movement does not belong to the inner self. The upward movement of *prāṇas* implied their merger into their causes, viz. elements etc. This is his primary position and he confirms it in the following verses. In other words, it is only the body that dies, i.e. becomes subject to decay.

जीवापेतमिति ह्युक्तेर्जन्मादेश्च निषेधतः ।
यत्संबन्धादचित्कोऽपि जीवतीत्यभिधीयते ॥३३॥
देहस्तस्य कथं मृत्युर्जीवस्येहोपपद्यते ।
यतोऽतो देहमरणं प्रात्यक्ष्यादुपपद्यते ॥३४॥

[That it is the body which dies, i.e. decays, is supported by *anubhava*, i.e. *pratyakṣa-darśana*.]

'(This is so) indeed¹ on the basis of (lit. because of the Śruti)

statement *jīvāpetam* ... 'what is devoid of Jīva ...'² and also there is rejection of the origination etc. (of Jīva)³ on account of the connection with which even a non-sentient thing is said to be living [33]

the body of that (moves) upwards etc. How can the death of the inner self be reasonable: For the death (viz. destruction) of the body alone stands to reason, it being directly perceived. [34]

¹Cf. BS 2.3.17 which explains the use of *hi* 'indeed'.

²CU 6.11.3 which refers to the self; here is meant the inner self which is identical with the self.

³*Kāthopaiṣad* 2.1.18; cp *Gītā* 2.20.

BU 3.2.12 is under reference. There follows in verses 35-40 an exposition of *kim enaṃ na jahātīti nāmeti*— i.e. the name, viz. description 'he is liberated' remains after a person leaves the worldly body.

प्राणा एव विलीयन्ते किं वान्यदपि कृत्स्नतः ।
प्रयोजकादि निःशेषं म्रियमाणाद्विपरिचतः ॥३५॥

(One asks:) 'In the case of a dying person, who knows (about the nature of the Ātman), is it only the *prāṇas* that merge (into their causes)? or, is there anything else (that so merges) in its entirety? or that which affects (the activities of the sense-organs) etc.,¹ without (leaving) any remainder?' [35]

¹*prayojaka* refers to desires which cause activity and *ādi* to the world of the objects of desires.

प्राणमात्रविनाशे स्याद्भूयो जन्म प्रयोजकात् ।
सप्रयोजकतन्नाशे मुक्तिरस्योपपद्यते ॥३६॥

(The answer is given:) '(If it is held) that there is death (i.e. merger) of only *prāṇas*, then there would certainly be a birth

(for the dying knower) again, since there has remained that which causes activity.¹ And if you accept that there is a destruction (of those *prāṇas*) together with those which cause activity in them, then there does reasonably follow liberation (of the dying knower).’ [36]

For the dying knower of the Brahman there is not any more any connection with the sense-organs and also their objects; this duality does not exist in him. It is this thought which underlies this verse.

¹This implies what we have mentioned in the note on the preceding verse.

किमेनं न जहातीति पृष्ठो नामेत्यथाब्रवीत् ।
न किञ्चिन्न जहातीति प्रसिद्धेरिदमुच्यते ॥३७॥

(Then the Siddhāntin when) asked: ‘What does not leave him (i.e. this dying knower)?’ answers, ‘(It is only) name.’ This is in the same way as it is a commonly accepted notion that a (dying) person does not leave anything—nothing is left (behind) him. [37]

This explains the commonly accepted notion which forms the basis of the preceding verse.

नाममात्रावशेषं तदित्युक्तौ गम्यते यतः ।
न किञ्चिदवशिष्टं स्यादिति यद्वत्तथेह तत् ॥३८॥

As it becomes known from (lit. in) the (popular) speech, viz. ‘That has remained only in name’, that there is nothing left (of a thing); so that is here (in the answer). [38]

This explains the commonly accepted notion (*prasiddhi*) mentioned in the preceding verse.

शब्दार्थश्चाकृतिर्यस्मान्नातो नाम विनश्यति ।

आनन्त्यं नित्यतैवास्य नाम्नो न व्यक्तभूरिता ॥३९॥

Since the meaning of a word is but a form (i.e. some manifest form)¹, therefore, name does not (ever) perish and this name has infiniteness and perenniality, though it does not assume many manifestations. [3

This verse explains *anantaṃ vai nāma*.

What remains is the name but not the differently named individuals; for instance, in the statements like 'Śuka obtained liberation', 'Vāmadeva obtained liberation' and such other statements about different individuals, those individuals have died, but their names which are used in worldly dealings ever continued to remain.

Read SP: *vyaktibhedasya prasiddhatvān na tadvaktavyam brahmadevāḥ svadr̥ṣṭyā nāmāpi na śīsyate pra(=loka)dr̥ṣṭyā tadavaśeṣoktiḥ ... ato nāmanityatvaṃ vyāvahārikam*.

¹Cf. the discussion in BU 1.4 on *nāmarūpābhyām vyākṛta*, as SP has pointed out: *ākṛteḥ śabdārthatvaṃ tṛtīye* (i.e. BU chapter 1) *vyutpāditam*.

There is now in brief the statement of the purport of BU 3.1.3.

मृत्योः प्रयोजकं यत्स्याद्ग्रहातिग्रहस्पिणः ।
तत्स्वरूपावधृतये प्रारब्धैषोत्तरा श्रुतिः ॥४०॥

Now in order to ascertain the notion of what causes Mr̥tyu which is of the forms of Graha and Atigraha, the subsequent Śruti has begun. [40

This refers to *yatrāsyā puruṣasya mṛtasya*

Verses 41-44 state the view of Bhartṛprapañca about the meaning of kim enaṃ na jahāti (which is already explained in BU 3.2.12).

वैश्वानरवरादत्र केचिदाहुर्महाधियः ।

देहद्वयविमोकेऽपि नैव मुक्तः पुमानिति ॥४१॥

Some (persons) of great intellect¹ have, owing to the favour of Vaiśvānara (viz. Agni), said in this connection 'Even if there is separation from both the bodies,² the person³ is still not at all liberated'. [41]

The second line refers to Bhartṛprapañca's theory of two *samuccayas* in relation to liberation. This is mentioned in the next verse.

¹Sureśvara thus expresses his mock regard for Bhartṛprapañca.

²This refers to both the *sthūla* and the *sūkṣma* bodies.

³That is, the person with the inner self.

नाममात्रावशेषोऽसावन्तरालेऽवतिष्ठते ।

परात्मनः परिच्छिन्नोऽविद्ययोषरूपया ॥४२॥

That (person) remains just midway between (the state of liberation and the existence on the earth), having only the name as his remainder, kept apart (lit. cut away) from the highest Ātman (as he is) by ignorance¹ which has the nature (similar to that) of a barren land. [42]

¹Read NKL: *brahmāprāpya saṃsārāc ca muktaḥ antarāle avidyāmātravyavadhānas tiṣṭhati*.

उच्छिन्नकामकर्मासौ कृत्स्नतत्फलभोगतः ।

उच्छिन्नाशेषबुद्ध्यादिस्तत्कारणपरिक्षयात् ॥४३॥

That person has his desires and (ritual) activity cut away by the enjoyments of all the fruits (i.e. results) of the same. And also he has his entire notion of them destroyed by the destruction (lit. decrease) of their cause. [43]

The second line points to how the *antarāle* 'vasthāna' (mentioned in the preceding verse) finally comes to an end.

अद्वैतदर्शनेनास्य द्वैतदृष्ट्यपनुत्तये ।
पर आरभ्यते ग्रन्थो ब्रह्मविद्यावबुद्धये ॥४४॥

Now, the subsequent portion of this Adhyāya is begun in order that the seeing of duality on the part (of that person) is removed by the sight of non-duality and that there is the acquisition of the lore of the Brahman by him. [44]

Verses 45-121 give blame to the view of Bhartṛprapañca in its various aspects (these are shown as subsections below).

अत्र यत्प्रतिवक्तव्यं तदुक्तमसकृत्पुरा ।
जिहेम्यत्र पुनर्वक्तुं पुनरुक्तगिरा भृशम् ॥४५॥

Whatever is to be stated as the refutation in this respect has been already stated by me time and again (lit. not once); therefore, I feel embarrassed to repeat what is said as the restatement of the same at length (*bhr̥śam*). [45]

This refers to BUBV 1.4.1692ff. in relation to BU 1.4.15.

भाष्योपात्तमतो ब्रमो नानुपात्तं कथं चन ।
पिष्टपेषणवत्सर्वं पूर्वपक्षौक्तिदूषणम् ॥४६॥

Therefore, I shall state (only) that which is gathered from the comments in the Bhāṣya and not at all (*katham cana*) what is not stated by him, since pointing out the entire (mass of) faults in his view (lit. *prima facie* view) is like grinding what is already ground. [46]

The word *bhāṣyopātta* has to be understood in relation to the writing of Bhartṛprapañca and not to Śaṅkara's writing. Again the word *anupātta* stresses how various shades of thought which arise from Bhartṛprapañca's comment (without his own knowing!) are in this place avoided—Sureśvara has not done so earlier.

Read SP (followed by NKL): *bhāṣyoktaṃ dūṣaṇaṃ katham
api na brūmaḥ, kiṃ tu tenānuktaṃ bhartṛprapañcabhāṣyoktaṃ
taiḥ svadoṣatvenājñātaṃ taddūṣaṇaṃ apūrvam varṇayāmaḥ.*

द्वैतदृष्टयैव निःशेषद्वैतकार्यपरिक्षयात् ।
न भूतमात्रोपादाने बीजमस्ति मनागपि ॥४७॥

Owing to (the dead person's) seeing of duality (in its proper perspective), there is the destruction of the entire (world of) effects of duality, therefore, there is not even a little of a seed of taking up the elements (for the body by the Ātman of the departed). [47]

This verse originates in Bhartṛprapañca's own statement: *dvaitadarśanena kṛtsnadvaitakāryam ucchinnaṃ na bhūtamātro-
pādāne bījam.*

पुमर्थावसितेः शास्त्रं कृतार्थं विनिवर्तते ।
अद्वैतदर्शनेनातो नास्ति किञ्चित्प्रयोजनम् ॥४८॥

Since there has already occurred the accomplishment of the end of human life, scriptures become (only) redundant (lit. return); for their purpose is (already) achieved. And, consequently, on the acquisition (lit. vision) of non-duality, the scriptures have no purpose to achieve. [48]

This means Bhartṛprapañca's theory of the first *samuccaya* of *dvaitabuddhi* and *karmajñāna* effects the removal of the transmigratory existence. And, therefore, there cannot be any purpose for the scriptures to achieve. This is to say that the man is already *apavṛkta* '(rendered) devoid of (any purpose)' and therefore *kṛtārtha*.

अद्वैतदर्शनार्थाय शास्त्रारम्भोऽत एव च ।
नैवोपपद्यते कृत्स्नपुरुषार्थावसानतः ॥४९॥

For this very reason, the effort (*ārambha*) of the scriptures for leading a person to the sight of non-duality does not become reasonable, for all the ends of human life have been achieved.¹ [49]

¹In the view of Bhartṛprapañca, add here *dvaitadarśanenaiva*.

उपपन्नस्तदारम्भो मिथःकार्यपृथक्त्वतः ।
द्वैताद्वैतात्मसंदृष्टयोर्दन्तोलूखलयोरिव ॥५०॥

Therefore, there rationally follows that (viz. the effort of scriptures) is useful in that the seeing of duality and also of non-duality could together have their effectiveness, each being useful for (its distinct) different purposes; (this) would be like (the effects produced by) the (upper and lower) teeth of a person and a mortar and a pestle. [50]

The use of the teeth of a man is for chewing the food and that of a mortar and a pestle is to pound the grains so that their powder becomes eatable. Different parts of the Śāstra give rise to the awareness of duality (related to ritual) and non-duality (of the Ātman); thus, these two are different in their purposes.

आसङ्गकार्यमुच्छिन्नं द्वैतदृष्ट्यात्मनो यतः ।
आसङ्ग एव भूतानामुपादानमिहेष्यते ॥५१॥

As¹ it is held by the view of duality (between the Ātman and the varied worldly objects) that the effects² of attachment become destroyed, so here (i.e. in our view also) it is accepted that attachment itself (*eva*) is the material cause of the elements.³ [51]

¹This is for *tataḥ* which literally means 'because'. However, the intention is to point out the similarity between the *dvaitādvaita* view of Bhartṛprapañca and the Advaita view.

²The singular form *kāryam* is indicative of the plural *kāryāṇi*,

i.e. *jātāv ekavacanam*.

³In the Advaita view also, attachment to worldly objects is considered to be the material cause of *bhūtādisṛṣṭi* 'the world of objects which originate from elements'. But, of course, it should not be forgotten that *āsaṅga* 'attachment' is earlier stated to be *pāpman* 'evil, or root of evil, i.e. transmigratory world'. Cf. BUB 1.3.1 (p.44): *ko 'sau svābhāvikaḥ pāpmāsaṅgo mṛtyuḥ* and, in particular, BU 1.3.10 and 11.

स एष द्वैतदृष्ट्यात्र कर्मपक्षो निराकृतः ।
कामश्च वासनाः सर्वा माहारजनपूर्विकाः ॥५२॥

This is thus the refutation (or discarding) of the view regarding (ritual) activity in the light of the view of duality; and (it is shown that) desire is (but) impressions which have (been expressed) as preceded by (the word) *māhārajana* 'turmeric'. [52]

This explains the thought of verse 51 in its fullness.

सर्वं चेद्विनिवृत्तं स्यात्किमन्यदवशिष्यते ।
तत्परिच्छेदि विज्ञानमविद्यैवावशिष्यते ॥५३॥

(Further, a question is asked by the Advaitin:) 'If (in your theory) all (the world of objects) has become destroyed (lit. turned back), what else does there remain then?' (The answer to the question can be:) 'There (yet) remains ignorance which is otherwise called *vijñāna*, 'the knowledge on the part of the inner self' which delimits it (lit. cuts it away from its natural status).' ¹ [53]

This verse is supported by SP with a quotation: *yathāhuḥ vijñānātmanah kim avaśiṣyata iti, vijñānātmanah avaśiṣyata iti bhāṣyeṇottaram āha*. This is further explained in verse 54 below.

¹NKL states: *tatparicchedakāraṇam ajñānam ity arthaḥ*.

कर्मारम्भे विकर्त्रेव स्वाश्रयस्य सदेष्ट्यते ।
इयत्ता कारकावस्था परिच्छिज्ज्ञानमेव तु ॥५४॥

It is ever accepted that, at the beginning, an activity is the specific modifier of its own substratum (and), being possessed of a certain magnitude, the characteristic of the state (of the inner self) as an agent of the activity it is only the specific knowledge¹ of the inner self which cuts it away (from the Ātman). [54]

Bhartrprapañca hereby reaffirms the effect of ritual activity only insofar as the state of duality is accepted and ignorance still continues to be there until the real state of non-duality is established.

¹We have specific knowledge in the light of what Bhartrprapañca has in mind, as explained in the next verse.

सैषाविद्या परिच्छेत्री ययायं परमात्मनः ।
संसारित्वं परिच्छिन्नो विज्ञानात्मत्वमश्नुते ॥५५॥

This¹ is that ignorance which cuts (the inner self) away from the highest Ātman, and by which there results transmigratory existence for the highest Ātman; (this highest Ātman, thus) delimited (lit. cut off) from its natural state, comes to have the nature of Vijñānātman. [55]

This explains the nature of Vijñānātman mentioned in the preceding verse.

¹This refers to knowledge mentioned in verse 54 above.

निवृत्तो द्वैतविषयाद्यप्येष तथापि तु ।
संसारावस्थ एवायं द्वैतत्वाद्ब्रह्मभेदतः ॥५६॥

Even if this one has turned away (from the status of) duality,¹ it still is in the state of a transmigratory being, on account of its difference from the Brahman and also its being subject

to duality.

[56]

Both AnSS and NKL misread *-viṣayādyadyapyeṣa*.

¹NKL points out *prathamopāstisāmarthyāt* which is paraphrased by the editor as *dvaitopāśanabalāt*.

यतोऽनवसितं वाक्यं पुमर्थानवसानतः ।
प्रवर्तते पुरेवातो ब्रह्मण्यप्ययसिद्धये ॥५७॥

Since the intended sense (lit. the sentence of Bhartṛprapañca) is not complete (in the light of above explanation),¹ the final end of the human beings (*mokṣa*) has not been accomplished; therefore, that inner self proceeds (to perform activities), as before, in order that the merger into the Brahman is (finally) accomplished.

[57]

¹That is, is not meaningful (*anavasitārtha*).

एकवाक्यत्वमेतस्माद्द्वैताद्वैतार्थवाक्ययोः ।
मोहादवस्तेर्न चाशेषः पुरुषार्थः समाप्यते ॥५८॥

Thus, these two statements, which relate to duality and non-duality, form one unified sentence(-meaning) (and) there does not occur destruction of delusion and thus the complete achievement of (the final) human end is not accomplished.

[58]

परिच्छेदं हि यत्कार्यं तदेव विनिवर्तते ।
ध्वान्तोच्छ्रितौ विकर्तृत्वं कर्मणस्त्वनुवर्तते ॥५९॥
आसङ्गश्च तथैवास्ते ते एते सङ्गकर्मणी ।
अनिवृत्ते सती भूयोऽविद्यां जनयितुं क्षमे ॥६०॥
अविनिर्भागवृत्तित्वात्सर्वदैव परस्परम् ।
न चाविशुद्धे द्वैतार्थे शक्यमद्वैतमीक्षितुम् ॥६१॥

It is only that which ceases to exist (lit. turns back) whose effect is delimiting (the inner self); but, when darkness¹ is

destroyed, there still continues to be the character of activity, viz. that it modifies (or affects the nature of the inner self).

[59]

And, attachment to the objects still continues to be there just the same. Thus, these two (viz. attachment and activity) being continuous (lit. not having turned away) are capable of generating ignorance.

[60]

Thus, since (attachment and activity) have at all times not existed mutually apart, and, the state of duality is not purified, it is impossible to experience (lit. see) non-duality.

[61]

¹This relates to 'whose effect' as already stated.

इत्यादि पूर्वपक्षोक्तिदूषणेष्वभिधास्यते ।
ग्रन्थभूयस्त्वसंत्रासात्रैह कृत्स्नोऽभिधीयते ॥६२॥

This and such other (argument) will be pointed out among the faults in the statements of the *prima facie* view; yet, for fear of prolixity of the work, I do not state the whole of it.

[62]

We should remember here that the *prima facie* view holds singleness of the Ātman consisting in *samasta* and *vyasta* forms (viz. in 'collectivity and individuality'). Sureśvara makes only the faulty statement of Bhartṛprapañca as the objects of refutation, as said in verse 46 above and as will be clear from the verses that follow.

In verses 63-83, there is refutation of the view: The first combination of knowledge and activity results in removal of duality.

भूरि दूषणमत्रोक्तं श्रुत्या च स्वयमेव च ।
पुरुषो वा इति ह्युक्त्या तथास्मादिति वाक्यतः ॥६३॥

In this respect, many faults have been pointed out by the

Śruti and he himself (has said faultily).¹ (This is clear) indeed by the statement (of the Śruti) *puruṣo vā* ...² and similarly from the statement *asmāt* ...³ (by Bhartṛprapañca himself).

[63]

¹This means that these faults in his own comments are to be gathered from his own interpretations of the Śruti.

²This refers to BU 1.5.2 and on this Bhartṛprapañca in BUBV 1.5.27-58.

³This refers to BU 1.4.15 and on this Bhartṛprapañca in BUBV 1.4.1644-1658.

कारणादक्षरादन्नं पुरुषेणेह कर्मणा ।
अव्याकृतादिभावेन व्रीह्यादित्वाय जन्यते ॥६४॥

In this view,¹ the Puruṣa who has not become manifest etc.² creates from the imperishable cause (i.e. the Brahman) the grains of rice etc.³

[64]

¹This is mentioned by SP in the sense of 'in this world which is the substratum of various enjoyments'. This could not be set aside altogether.

²The word 'etc.' refers to things like Vāc, body and intellect; see verse 66 below.

³This refers to other kinds of grains like barley.

तत्रैवं सति यद्येतदद्येतैव हि केवलम् ।
न जन्यतेऽतः क्षीयेत न त्वेतन्नेह जन्यते ॥६५॥

This being so, if this (*vṛīhi* etc.) is not created by only the eater, then, therefore, it could not either decrease or be reproduced.

[65]

This verse answers the question that the food being continuously eaten could not be eternal. The answer means: as the food is being eaten continuously, therefore it is imperishable.

Read SP: *bhogasya sargāvinābhāvadyotīti hiśabdaḥ*. This is further explained in the next verse.

नित्यं भुङ्क्ते यथैवान्नमात्मा वाग्देहबुद्धिभिः ।
अक्षीणैः कर्मसंतानैस्तथैव जनयत्यपि ॥६६॥

As this Ātman ever keeps on eating (the food etc.) by means of his Vāc, body and intellect,¹ then, in the same way, by the continuous performances of actions which do not get exhausted (i.e. do not cease to be), he also creates the food etc. [66]

¹Vāc refers to Prāṇa, body to the sense-organs, and intellect to the internal organs.

भूतानि क्षीयमाणानि कर्मणा परमात्मनः ।
पुरुषेणेह जन्यन्ते तस्मात्स पुरुषोऽक्षितिः ॥६७॥

Since these foods (lit. elements), continuously decreasing, are created by the (manifest) Puruṣa, through his activity (or the activities of Sūtra), i.e. by the highest Ātman; therefore, that Puruṣa (is described as) not having any destruction. [67]

पूर्वकर्मोपभोगो यः पुरुषाणां शुभाशुभः ।
तस्मादासङ्गवैशेष्यादन्यस्य प्रक्रिया पुनः ॥६८॥

Whatever, auspicious or inauspicious, be the enjoyment by the Puruṣas of the *karmans*,¹ done earlier owing to the particular attachment of the Puruṣas to them, the latter (i.e. enjoyment) goes on being created (*prakriyā*) again and again. [68]

The underlying thought in the verse is: As the enjoyment of this life is the result of the formerly performed *karmans*, so there is the effect of the enjoyment for the mixed life through (or, as the result of) the activity. That is done in this life, thus, there will be continuity, i.e. absence of decrease, in the enjoyment or food.

¹This refers to *karman* done in earlier life (or lives).

तत्रैवं सति सासङ्गाः प्रायेण प्राणिनो यतः ।
अतः कामाशयवशात्सृज्यतेऽन्नं मुहुर्मुहुः ॥६९॥

This being so, since the beings are generally having attachment to the objects or enjoyments, therefore the food is again and again produced on account of the contents of the desires (of the present life). [69]

क्षीयन्तेऽन्याश्च भोगेन चीयन्तेऽन्याश्च कर्मणा ।
भूतमात्राः प्रदीपस्य संतानेनार्चिषो यथा ॥७०॥

(Thus) some elements and their *mātrās* decrease through their enjoyment (by the Puruṣas) and some others are created by (their) activities. This is in the same way as the continuity of a lamp which gives rise to (more) flames. [70]

परस्परात्तृभोज्यत्वसंस्कारोपनिबन्धनम् ।
विज्ञानात्मभिरारब्धं बभ्रमीत्यखिलं जगत् ॥७१॥

Thus, this entire world keeps on revolving as it is set in motion (lit. is begun) by the Vijñānātman, depending on various impressions such as being mutual eaters and having characteristic of what is to be enjoyed. [71]

विज्ञानात्मा हि यः कश्चित्कर्मणा येन केनचित् ।
साधिभूताधिदैवस्य जगतः सर्गकारणम् ॥७२॥

Whoever¹ be the Vijñānātman and whatever¹ be his activity, that is the cause of the creation of this world together with what is related to the elements and what to the gods. [72]

¹This indicates the process mentioned in the verse irrespective of the states of the Vijñānātman, whether high or low, and the nature of the activity, whether rigorous or mild.

श्रुत्यैतत्स्वयमेवोक्तं कर्म न क्षीयते यथा ।
दैववागादिसंपत्तिस्तथा त्र्यत्रात्मदर्शिनः ॥७३॥

This is stated by the Śruti itself, viz. activity never ceases to be; so also (never cease to be) the becoming of the divine wealth as well as that of Vāc etc. in the case of the one who knows (lit. sees, i.e. understands) the nature of the three foods. [73]

This has a reference to BU 1.5.2 and 18.

इदं तत्तदिदं चेति त्रिषु कालेषु नित्यताम् ।
प्राहास्य विद्यमानस्य विक्रियामात्रमेव तु ॥७४॥

In the statement *idam tat* and *tad idam*¹ the Śruti has declared the perennial nature of this existing world, in all three times; the world is merely the modification(s) indeed (*tu*). [74]

This verse expresses Bhartṛprapañca's idea about the non-origin and, therefore, the perennial nature of the world.

¹BU 1.4.7: *tad dhedam* ... which, according to NKL, is *sāmānādhikaranyāśruti*.

यद्यत्कामयते चास्मादविद्याकामकर्मणाम् ।
ब्रह्मण्यवस्थितस्यापि त्वक्षयत्वं श्रुतिर्जगौ ॥७५॥

The Śruti has stated *yad yad kāmayate cāsmāt* and thereby declared the non-destructible nature (of the world) which has been abiding in the Brahman. [75]

कृत्स्नप्राप्त्या क्षयो नातो विद्यते कामकर्मणोः ।
प्रमाणासंभवात्तस्मादसमीचीनमुच्यते ॥७६॥

Therefore, by obtaining fullness,¹ there is not destruction (or loss) of (both) the desire and activity. Since there is the authoritative means (to show that); therefore, what you have

said is not proper.²

[76]

¹*kṛtsna* here stands for Sūtra; this is to achieve the fullness of Sūtra.

²This argument of Bhartṛprapañca is against Kevalādvaitavāda. According to him, it is to refer to the statement that knowledge and activity destroy both the forms of human being and Sūtra.

व्यक्ततायाः क्षयो यस्तु कारणात्मतया श्रुतः ।
तादृक्क्षयः सुषुप्तेऽपि नैवास्माभिर्निवार्यते ॥७७॥

And what you have said as heard in the Śruti, viz. the destruction of the manifestation (of the object(s))¹ as having the nature of the cause and also a similar destruction (seen by us) in the sleep state,² is not denied by us.

[77]

Liberation is attained by the Kevala Advaita as complete removal of the notion of cause and effect. Bhartṛprapañca opposes only on the ground that since such removal of cause and effect relation is revealed in sleep therefore liberation should not be specifically mentioned as different from sleep. Therefore there is no end of effort to acquire the knowledge of Brahman without it.

¹Cf. *yat prayanty abhisamviśanti* (Taittirīyopaniṣad 3.1).

²Read SP: *svāpe 'pi siddhes tadartham samuccayānuṣṭhānam vyartham ity arthah.*

प्रत्यक्तत्त्वपरिज्ञानजन्मैव ध्वंसहेतुताम् ।
द्वैतस्यैति पुमर्थश्च नातोऽन्यत्किंचिदिष्यते ॥७८॥

And this statement of yours, viz. the very birth of the complete knowledge of the true nature of the inner self becomes the cause of the destruction of duality (and) there would not be desired any other end of human life.

[78]

This verse discards the authority of the Śruti in relation to

pursuit of the end of human life.

तमेतमिति च तथा सर्वेषामपि कर्मणाम् ।
प्रत्यग्ज्ञानसमुत्पत्तौ विनियोगः प्रदर्शितः ॥७९॥

In the Śruti statement *tam etam* there is clearly shown the employment (or usefulness) of all the activities in causing the rise of the knowledge of the inner self. [79]

Bhartṛprapañca asserts that activity done according to the Śruti injunction is helpful towards the rise of knowledge and thus the Karma- and Jñāna- Kāṇḍas are complementary together; cf. SP: *prāṇādīkānvayānurodheneti yāvat*.

भिद्यते हृदयग्रन्थिश्छिद्यन्ते सर्वसंशयाः ।
क्षीयन्ते चास्य कर्माणि तस्मिन्दृष्टे परावरे ॥८०॥

“The knot of the heart is loosened; all doubts are cut off; and all the activities of this person come to a stop¹; immediately as the highest one is known (lit. seen).”² [80]

This is a verse from *Muṇḍakopaniṣad*, viz. 2.2.9. Translation is reproduced from Hume's edition.

This refers to that the *karman* in this verse is taken by Bhartṛprapañca as an aid to knowledge. Hereby he justifies his theory of the combination of knowledge and activity.

¹Literally, they become destroyed.

²Literally, the one, who is the high and the low, is experienced.

भोगक्षयेण काम्यानां निषिद्धानां च कर्मणाम् ।
क्षय आरब्धकार्याणां ज्ञानिनोऽपि न बोधतः ॥८१॥

In the case of the knower (of the Brahman) also, the cessation (lit. destruction) of the activities, which he has begun in this life in relation to the rituals, both desired and prohibited, comes into effect only through enjoying, i.e. experiencing the

(same) results. But (this is) not so happening from only a person's knowing (about the nature of the Brahman) from Śruti. [81]

आभवादजितानां तु सर्वेषामपि कर्मणाम् ।
क्षयोऽनारब्धकार्याणां सम्यग्ज्ञानप्रसूतितः ॥८२॥

There is cessation of all the activities (whose effects) a person has obtained from his very birth, but in the case of the activities which he has not begun (there is similar) removal revealed from the rise of proper knowledge (of the Ātman). [82]

ज्ञानोत्पत्तौ क्षये मानं कर्मणां विद्यते यथा ।
कृत्स्नप्राप्त्या क्षये मानं न तथा किञ्चिदिष्यते ॥८३॥

As there obtains in the rise of knowledge (about the nature of the Brahman) the means towards the destruction (lit. diminishing) of (ritual and other) activities, so do we not notice (lit. desire) any means towards the destruction (of the same) in securing (the nature of) fullness:¹ a means to their destruction. [83]

This verse answers a possible argument that obtaining oneness with Sūtra can, like the knowledge (about the nature of the Brahman), effect the destruction of the effects of activities.

¹This is becoming one with Sūtra.

Verses 84-89 discuss ignorance as the delimiting agent.

परिच्छेत्री न चाविद्या तमोरूपा हि सा यतः ।
आच्छादिकातः सा युक्ता समस्तव्यस्तरूपिणः ॥८४॥

(A possible objection of Bhartṛprapañca:) 'And ignorance also is not (i.e. cannot be) a delimiting adjunct (of the Ātman), since it is of the nature of darkness'. (Answer is given:) 'It is merely a cover and therefore (there is) the mention of

it (in the view of Bhartṛprapañca as of the Ātman having) the form of totality and individuality'. [84]

The argument of Bhartṛprapañca conveys that ignorance can affect the Brahman by obscuring all its forms.

न चापि मिथ्याविज्ञानं परिच्छेदकमिष्यते ।
परिच्छिनत्ति किं व्योम नीलज्ञानं मनागपि ॥८५॥

(But) ignorance is not false knowledge (which is) accepted (lit. desired) as a delimiting adjunct. Does (indeed) the knowledge (i.e. the viewing) of the blue¹ (really) cover the sky, even a little? [85]

¹This refers to false knowledge that the sky is blue.

सतो हि व्यञ्जकं मानं न तु तत्कुम्भकारवत् ।
मेयवस्त्वनुरोधित्वात्परिच्छेदकता धियः ॥८६॥

A means of knowing reveals only that which is existent, but it is not like a potter (a creator in relation to a pitcher). Knowledge (lit. intellect), (however) has the nature of a delimiting factor, since it follows¹ the object to be known.

[86]

This refers to the cause and effect relation between things if the cause has in it its effect in a potential form. The simile given in the second half of the first line refers to instance of opposite nature; that is to say a potter does not have in him the effect, viz. pot, in a potential form. Only clay can be called the cause of a pot. Thus it refers to the nature of a delimiting factor where the means has a relation to the effect, that is: the nature of the cause is in agreement with that of the effect. This is noticed in intellect with the impression on it of the object to be known, for only then the object is grasped.

¹That is, it covers or (fully) grasps.

यथावस्त्वनुरोधित्वमज्ञानस्यापि चेन्मतम् ।
मुक्ते मेये सदा मुक्तिर्बन्धो वा स्याद्विपर्यये ॥८७॥

If it is held that ignorance also has the character of being in agreement with the thing (i.e. object to be known) as it is, then the object to be known, being (already) liberated, there would ever be the state of liberation, and, if otherwise, (there would ever be) bondage. [87]

This verse answers the possibility of holding ignorance also as being in agreement with the individual just like *dhī* 'intellect', viz. the inner self as said in previous verse. This is because there would be in that case, at all time, the state of liberation or bondage.

नात्मानात्मीयकार्यस्य स्यादुपादानकारणम् ।
अतादात्म्यान्न हि घटं जनयन्तीह तन्तवः ॥८८॥

The Ātman cannot be the material cause of the product of non-Ātman because of (their) not having one nature; indeed threads do not (i.e. cannot) produce a pitcher. [88]

This verse emphasises the necessity of *tādātmya* 'having one nature' of (what are a cause and the effect). This is clarified by an instance of threads and a pitcher, which do not have *tādātmya* between them.

परात्मनः स्वतोऽविद्या बहिष्ठे कामकर्मणी ।
आगते न त्वविद्याया भवतैवैतदुच्यते ॥८९॥

Ignorance on the part of the highest Ātman comes into existence, on its own but (i.e. and) the externally obtaining desire and its object have not come from (i.e. are not produced by/from) ignorance—(and) this (i.e. latter) is what you yourself have said. [89]

Read SP: *kṣīter ūṣaravad avidyā parasmāt svato jāyate kāmakarmanī tu savāsane pūrvapūrvakāmādivaśād uttarottare pratīcy utpadyete nāvidyākṛte ity etad bhartṛprapañcair evocyate.*

Verses 90-101 refute the view that desire and activity related to it effect removal of ignorance.

न चाप्यविद्यामसतीं शक्नुतः कामकर्मणी ।
तदकारणतः कर्तुं मृत्स्नेभाश्वादिकं यथा ॥९०॥

Also, desire and its object are not capable (of producing) ignorance which did not exist before, because they are not the cause of its production, like softened clay which can produce an elephant, a horse etc. [90]

Verses 90-101 refute that desire and its object can produce ignorance which is already destroyed by knowledge.

न चात्यन्तासतो जन्म कुर्याल्लोकेऽपि कारणम् ।
नर्ते धरां सुवृष्ट्यापि पद्मिनीसंभवोऽम्बरात् ॥९१॥

Indeed, in the world, no cause can effect the rise of what is absolutely never-existent; there never can be the rise of a lotus-creeper, even if there are good rains coming from the sky unless there is the earth (for its basis of origin). [91]

ब्रह्मैव चेदविद्याया जन्मनः कारणं मतम् ।
तस्मिन्सति समुच्छित्तिरविद्यायाः कथं भवेत् ॥९२॥

(A question is asked:) If it is held that the Brahman itself is the cause (or, origin) of ignorance, how could there be the destruction of ignorance while that (viz. the Brahman) ever continues to exist? [92]

आत्यन्तिकी समुच्छित्तिः स्याच्चेन्मोहस्य कारणे ।

सत्येव नश्वरस्यास्य स्वतः किं साधनैर्वद ॥९३॥

If there would be absolute destruction of ignorance while the cause of this perishable ignorance has continued to exist, then what is necessity of the means of the destruction of this perishable one? Tell me. [93]

न चेत्ते शक्नुतोऽविद्यां रक्षितुं कामकर्मणी ।
विद्यमानां विनष्टां तु कर्तुं ते शक्नुतः कथम् ॥९४॥

If those, viz. desire and its object (which we have already stated), are not capable of protecting ignorance while it exists, how would they be able to achieve (lit. do) that, when it becomes destroyed? [94]

कामकर्मादिहानेऽपि यद्यविद्यावशिष्यते ।
नेतीति वचसो व्याख्या तथा सति विरुध्यते ॥९५॥

(An objection is raised:) If ignorance continues to exist even when desire and (its related) act are given up, then the explanation of the statement *neti neti* would be opposed. [95]

नेतीति प्रथमः शब्दो मूर्तामूर्तनिषेधकृत् ।
द्वितीयो नेति यः सोऽथ भावनाप्रतिषेधकृत् ॥९६॥

(The answer is:) The first word *neti* is for denying what has a form and what does not have a form, and the second (word) *neti* is for setting aside the *bhāvanā* 'impression' of it. [96]

This verse shows Sureśvara's opposition to the explanation of *neti neti* which is given by Bhartṛprapañca.

भावनादिविशेषेषु यच्छान्तेष्ववशिष्यते ।
निष्कलं तत्परं ब्रह्म नेति नेत्युपदिश्यते ॥९७॥

What continues to exist (lit. remains) even when particular

impressions are destroyed, is then taught (i.e. described) the spotless, the highest Brahman in the words *neti neti*. [97]

This is the meaning of the sentence *neti neti*; it opposes Bhartṛprapañca's explanation of the sentence as given under Mūrtāmūrta Brāhmaṇa.

ज्ञातं ब्रह्म यथावच्च न चापागात्ततस्तमः ।
इत्येतदविरुद्धं स्यात्प्रसादाज्जातवेदसः ॥९८॥

That the Brahman is known as it is and that ignorance did not go away from it would not be a contradictory (statement of Bhartṛprapañca) (only) on account of the favour of Fire. [98]

Here Sureśvara is mocking at Bhartṛprapañca, who, by having the favour of Fire, claims to have the right understanding about the nature of reality.

द्वैतार्थस्य विशुद्धिश्च कीदृश्यत्र विवक्षिता ।
अद्वैतानभिसंबन्धो नाशो वा मलशुद्धिवत् ॥९९॥

What kind of purification of the world consisting in duality is intendedd (by him)?, and also a non-relation to non-duality?, or even the destruction which can be compared with wiping away of dirt? [99]

¹This refers to the Bhāṣya of Bhartṛprapañca.

समस्तव्यस्तसंदृष्टौ नाद्वैताद्वैतता पृथक् ॥१००॥

In the view of totality in difference, there cannot be duality as existing apart from non-duality. [100]

तयोरैकात्म्यतो युक्ता नापि तन्नाश इष्यते ।
नष्टे द्वैतेऽखिले न स्यात्समस्तव्यस्तदर्शनम् ॥१०१॥

Owing to their having a unified nature, the destruction of them also cannot be postulated. When duality is destroyed in its entirety, there would not be any experience (lit. seeing) of totality and duality. [101]

Verses 102-107 refute the postulation of the theory of totality and individuality in relation to reality.

शीतोष्णयोरिव कथं परस्परविरोधिनाः ।
एकत्र समवायः स्यात्समस्तव्यस्तधर्मयोः ॥१०२॥

How can there be an invariable association, in one place, of the properties belonging to totality and individuality, which are mutually opposed in qualities like hot and cold? [102]

अपूर्वादिषु जीवत्सु श्रुतिवाक्येषु शक्यते ।
नेश्वरेणापि निर्वक्तुं समस्तव्यस्ततात्मनः ॥१०३॥

It is not possible for even the Lord to explain (as coming from) the Śruti sentences the totality and individuality with reference to the Ātman, while there are (postulated) *apūrva* etc. and living (transmigratory) beings! [103]

This is for specifying that the Śruti sentences are in stark opposition to the view of Bhartṛprapañca.

न च कुम्भादिवदृष्टिरात्मनोऽव्यतिरेकतः ।
अनात्मत्वप्रसक्तिः स्याद्द्रष्टृदृश्यप्रभेदतः ॥१०४॥

Also, there cannot be any seeing of the Ātman as of the pot etc. on account of its having no (association with) any differences; (again) there would be the contingency of holding its nature as that of some non-Ātman on account of (holding) distinction between the seer and (what is) seen. [104]

नो चेत्समस्तदृष्टयैव व्यस्तदृष्टिः समाप्यते ।
आत्मनीति श्रुतेर्वाक्यमप्रमाणं प्रसज्यते ॥१०५॥

If this is not so, then the seeing of individuals is already pervaded by the seeing of totality and (thereby) the Śruti statement *ātmani* ...¹ would be contingently unauthoritative.

[105]

This argument is based on the opposition to Bhartṛprapañca's view by CU and *Muṇḍakopaniṣad*.

¹Cf. *ātmani vijñāte sarvam idaṃ vijñātam bhavati*.

येनाश्रतं श्रुतमिति कस्मिन्न्विति तथा वचः ।
इत्यादि सविरुद्धं स्यान्न चापीहापरा मितिः ॥१०६॥

Also, in that case, the statement(s) of the Śruti, viz. *yenāśrutam śrutam* ...,¹ *kasmin nu* ...² etc.³ would be quite opposed; and there is not any other knowledge possible in his view. [106]

¹CU 6.1.3.

²*Muṇḍakopaniṣad* 1.1.3.

³The word 'etc.' points to *ekam evādvitīyam* (CU 6.2.1).

समस्तव्यस्तसंदृष्टौ न किञ्चिदपि दृश्यते ।
पूर्णाज्ञानैकहेतुत्वाद्रज्जुसर्पादिदृष्टिवत् ॥१०७॥

In the view of totality and individuality there is not seen any means to knowing it, (in respect of the Brahman) seeing so would be like one's seeing a serpent etc. in the place of a rope (etc.)¹ owing to (the Ātman) being a whole and (is yet seen variously) owing to just one cause, viz. ignorance.

[107]

¹Sureśvara's use of 'etc.' after a serpent entails this second 'etc.'. Use of such similes as are not fully expressed is usual in Sureśvara's verses.

Verses 108-115 discuss the futility of holding the view of totality and individuality in respect of the Brahman.

अणुप्रत्येकशः सर्वान्स गृह्णीयादयत्नतः ।
द्वैतभेदानिमान्सर्वानेकैकस्य न वेत्ति यः ॥१०८॥

(Holding that view) a person might be able to collect (i.e. get to know) each one of the numerous atoms, without much effort, even if he does not know each one of these so many different objects that comprise duality! [108]

सर्वेष्वपि च दृष्टेषु द्वैतभेदेषु केनचित् ।
आनन्त्यं ब्रह्मता चास्य दुर्घटा स्यात्तथा सति ॥१०९॥

Then, if (by any chance) somebody has seen all the different objects of duality, there will be infiniteness of them and in that case, getting to know the Brahman would be extremely difficult. [109]

This emphasises the impossibility of knowing all the different objects which are held to comprise the Brahman.

द्रव्यदृष्ट्या समीक्ष्यन्ते धर्मा नीलादयो यथा ।
आत्मदृष्ट्या तथेक्ष्यन्ते नानात्मानो विरोधतः ॥११०॥

As the properties blue etc. can be seen (i.e. known) on seeing (i.e. knowing) the substance (viz. a lotus), so cannot be seen the non-Ātmans on seeing the Ātman because of the opposition (between them¹). [110]

¹Namely, the non-Ātman and the Ātman. They do not have *tādātmya* as blue and a lotus have.

तथा चेहागमवचः पराञ्चीति विरुद्धताम् ।
आत्मानात्मार्थसंदृष्टयोः स्फुटं नः प्रत्यपीपदत् ॥१११॥

To that effect, here is a statement of the Śruti, viz. *parāñci khāni ...*¹ which clearly denies the opposite character of the experiences of the Ātman and the non-Ātman. [111]

¹*Kāthopaniṣad* 4.1.

आत्मा वा अर इत्युक्तौ नैवानात्मेक्षणे विधिः ।
अनूद्यैव यथाप्राप्तमात्मदृष्टिर्विधीयते ॥११२॥

In the statement *ātmā vā are ...*¹ there is not at all an injunction regarding seeing the non-Ātman (as the Ātman); but it is the seeing of the Ātman prescribed only after restating (the various non-objects that is only the Ātman in reality to be).² [112]

¹BU 2.4.5 (=4.5.6). Yet more more proper example is CU 6.7.1: *ya ātmā ... so 'nveṣṭavyaḥ sa vijijñāsitavyaḥ*.

²Cf. BU 4.4.6.

यत्र यत्र विधिर्दृष्टस्तत्र तत्रात्मकर्मकः ।
कृत्स्नानात्मानुवादेन प्रत्यग्दृष्टिर्विधीयते ॥११३॥

And wherever is there noticed¹ such an injunction, it has been only with reference to the Ātman as the object of it. There is a specific laying down the seeing of the inner self by merely reaffirming non-Ātmans. [113]

¹Cf. CU 6.8.7: *aitadātmīyam idaṃ sarvaṃ*

साध्यसाधनसंबन्धविज्ञानं नान्यतः श्रुतेः ।
तदन्येषु पदार्थेषु प्रत्यक्षादिप्रमाणतः ॥११४॥

The knowledge of the relation of what is to be accomplished and what is the means to accomplishing it is not obtained from elsewhere than in the Śruti (related to rituals)—and that is only in relation to objects other (than the Brahman); because

they can be perceived by the means such as direct perception.¹

[114]

¹That is to say: The nature of a sacrifice etc. can be known from other means.

सर्वमानातिवर्त्यात्मप्रतिपत्तौ ततः श्रुतिः ।
निमित्तत्वेन सन्मानं सुषुप्तोत्थापकौकितवत् ॥११५॥

From that (it follows that) the Śruti, being superior to all (other) means, is a good means¹ for getting to know the Ātman just like a statement which awakens a sleeping man.

[115]

¹Because it removes ignorance about the Ātman.

&verses 116-121 point out that the Mantra in the Śruti does not refer to the combination of knowledge and activity as a means to kaivalya.

मन्त्राम्नायोऽप्युपन्यस्तो यथेह न विरुध्यते ।
तथोदके प्रवक्ष्यामः सर्वं भद्रं ततोऽस्त्वदम् ॥११६॥
परापरत्वभेदेन द्वे विद्ये समुदीरिते ।
विद्याविद्ये इहोच्येते तमोवस्त्ववसानतः ॥११७॥

As to how a Mantra from the Śruti is so stated as not opposed to (the combination of knowledge and action), we shall say later; let (only) this much be therefore well-said: [116]

There are two lores stated in the Śruti in relation to their difference as one being higher and the other the lower, viz. there is a statement made about knowledge and ignorance for showing that they effect the end of ignorance. [117]

तपो विद्या च विप्रस्य निःश्रेयसकरं परम् ।
तपसा कल्मषं हन्ति विद्ययामृतमश्नुते ॥११८॥

(It is said) that penance and knowledge (of the Ātman) is for a Brāhmaṇa the best cause of the highest bliss; the Brāhmaṇa destroys (his) sin by penance and obtains the immortal Brahman by knowledge. [118]

This is a verse taken from *Manusmṛti* 12.104, with a slight variation: *kilbiṣaṃ* is used there instead of *kalmaṣaṃ*.

ध्वस्ताध्यात्मादिसंभेदः प्रत्यङ्मोहैकमात्रभाक् ।
द्रष्टव्य इत्यादिविधौ प्रवर्तेत जडः कथम् ॥११९॥

How would a dullard (i.e. non-intelligent person) proceed to follow the injunction '(The Ātman) should be seen ...,' (the one) who has destroyed (i.e. is not aware of) the (confusing) mix up (of matters) pertaining to the body and who entertains merely delusion in regard to the inner self? [119]

इत्यादि पूर्वमेवोक्तं दूषणं दूषितात्मनाम् ।
आत्मानमेवेत्यत्रैव न भूयोऽत्राभिधीयते ॥१२०॥

This and such other (arguments) are the blamish which is already mentioned in respect of those who have spoiled themselves (by holding wrong theories),¹ in relation to the passage *ātmanam eva* ...; therefore, that is not stated here again.² [120]

This refers to BU 1.4.8.

¹The word *dūṣitātman* means one who has obtained and entertained the wrong information about the Ātman.

²In respect of the fault in the theory of Bhartṛprapañca.

सुविस्पष्टार्थतो भाष्यं टीकां नैव व्यपेक्षते ।
तस्माद्भाष्याक्षरैरेव शेषोऽर्थोऽत्र प्रतीयताम् ॥१२१॥

The Bhāṣya (of my teacher) does not at all expect (any comment on it) because of its extremely clear meaning;

therefore, let the remainder of the matter in the Brāhmaṇa be known from the words (lit. letters) in the Bhāṣya themselves.

[121]

Verses 121 to (the end, viz.) 165 are exposition of BU 3.2.12. There is decision regarding the abode of a transmigratory being on death.

ग्रहातिग्रहरूपं तत्प्रयुक्तं केन बन्धनम् ।
प्रयोजकावधृतये याज्ञवल्क्येत्युवाच ह ॥१२२॥

(Uṣasta) then said, 'O Yājñavalkya, who caused (lit. employed) the bond which has the nature of the organs and their objects;¹ (this he asked) with a view to ascertaining what caused (that bond)'. [122]

After some other thoughts have been expounded, there is now discussion taken up of the BU text proper.

¹This refers to *graha-atigraha* in BU 3.1.

कर्माश्रयत्वतो लिङ्गादविद्वानिह गृह्यते ।
प्रकृताया विभक्तेश्च विभक्त्यन्तरसंश्रयात् ॥१२३॥

Here (i.e. in this context) is understood (a man) who does not know (about the Brahman), because of the characteristic (of him), viz. his being the performer (lit. substratum) of (ritual) activity, and also because the (grammatical) case (of a *puruṣa*), (already) under reference has changed into (lit. taken recourse to) another case. [123]

In BU 3.2.12, there was reference to a man who knows the Brahman (*vidvān*) in the words *yatrāyam puruṣaḥ* ... and in BU 3.2.13 also there is reference to a man in the words *yatrāsyā puruṣasya*. Therefore, on account of the proximity (*saṃnidhi*) of the two forms *ayam* (in the nominative) and *asya* (in the genitive), a doubt arises if there is here in Bu 3.2.13 a knower

of the Brahman under reference. The verse discards the idea of a knower of the Brahman. The performance of ritual activity is a clear characteristic (*linga*) of a non-knower of the Brahman. This is a stronger reason for understanding the reference to a non-knower of the Brahman than the proximity already pointed out. Besides, the change of grammatical case—from the nominative to the genitive—can be an added reason. The reference by SP to *yad āgneya ...* and that by NKL to *sarvanāma-prasiddhamātrālambanam* may be further useful!

यत्रास्याविदुषः पुंसो मृतस्यायुष्परिक्षयात् ।
स्वयोनिं वाक्समप्येति वातं प्राणोऽनुगच्छति ॥१२४॥

When (*yatra*), i.e. after the loss of life in the case of the non-knowing man, his speech merges into its source and so also does *prāṇa* 'of principal wind' enter into the Wind, [124]

This refers to the merger of the organs into the elements which have been their sources.

अग्न्यादिदेवतांशा ये भोगार्थं कर्मणार्जिताः ।
वागादिशब्दैरुच्यन्ते त एवात्र न पौरुषाः ॥१२५॥

the words *vāc* etc. express those different parts (in relation to the deities) such as Agni etc. that have been won by the (ritual) activity (of a person) for the enjoyment (of the different things in life)—they are (intended here, and) not those parts which belong to a human body. [125]

This verse explains what are called in the preceding verse sources of different organs.

SP shows the relation of this verse to BU 1.5.15.

पुंसः कर्मक्षये स्वांशान्संहरन्ति यथायथम् ।
अग्न्यादिदेवताः सोऽयमुपसंहार उच्यते ॥१२६॥

The deities, Agni and others, withdraw their own respective portions (in a human body), when there is the complete cessation (lit. decrease) of a man's (ritual) actions—this is what is called *upasaṁhāra* 'withdrawing'. [126]

पुंसो देहग्रहे भूयो देहस्थानेषु देवताः ।
अंशं निदधति स्वं स्वं कर्मभोगप्रसिद्धये ॥१२७॥

These (very) deities, each of them, place their portions in various parts (lit. places) of the body of a man, when he again assumes a body in order that (the man) acquires the enjoyment of (i.e. the results of) his (earlier) activity.¹ [127]

¹The singular form is *jātāv ekavacanam*.

हृद्याकाश इहात्मेति स्यादाकाशाप्ययत्नतः ।
प्रश्नस्य विषयत्वेन विज्ञानात्मोपयोगतः ॥१२८॥

It is *ākāśa* in the heart which is (to be understood as) the Ātman, since even the Ātman¹ has a merger (in the sky); (it refers to) the mention of the knowing individual self as the subject-matter of the question.² [128]

This explains the meaning of the word *ātman* in *ākāśam ātmā*.

¹This does not refer to *mukhyātman*, which is said to merge into *bhūtākāśa*.

²Cf. the question *kvāyam*

अधिष्ठातृवियुक्तानि न्यस्तदात्रोपमानि हि ।
वागादिकरणानीति नालं पुंभोगसिद्धये ॥१२९॥

The various organs, viz. *vāc* etc., which are (then) separated from the superintending one (i.e. the inner self), are indeed similar to a weapon for digging, which is laid down (by a person) and are not capable of effecting (i.e. bringing about) the enjoyment of the human being. [129]

This justifies the propriety in the question with reference to even a subtle body (*liṅgadeha*) which, though accompanied by the individual self (*jīva*), is not possessed of the (gross) limbs that can secure for it the enjoyment of objects.

विदेहदेवतः क्वायं भवत्येष पुमानिति ।
आश्रयं क्वेति पुंसोऽसावप्राक्षीन्मुनिसत्तमम् ॥१३०॥

'Where is there this¹ man, who is now without a body and the deities (of the organs in it)? and where?—thus he (viz. Ārtabhāga) asked the great (*sattama*) sage about the support.²

[130]

This clarifies the question under comment.

¹*eṣa* explains *ayam* in the question.

²*āśrayam* (in accusative) refers to the object of the verb, in answer to *kva*.

किं कारणात्मतामेति किं वा केनचिदात्मना ।
अवतिष्ठत एवायं किं वा कर्मैव संश्रितः ॥१३१॥
गुणान्वा यदि वेशानं कालं वा दैवमेव वा ।
यदृच्छां संततिं शून्यं विनाशं वेति भण्यताम् ॥१३२॥

Is it that he (i.e. the departed man) becomes the Ātman which is the cause? or does this one find support in (i.e. the help of) some Ātman? or does he resort to (some) activity itself?

[131]

or some Guṇas? or some lord (or god)? or time? or Time? or chance? (or the world of deities?) or continuity (of knowledge)? or void? or destruction? Let (this) be told? [132]

Here Sureśvara refers to various theories about the support for a man's self after death. The first question refers to the Ātman (i.e. the inner self) about which there existed ignorance, the second to some Ātman which some fellow-Vedāntins

(*svayūthyas*) have posited as the cause of the transmigratory being (cf. CU 8.3.4: *eṣa samprasādo 'smāc charīrāt*) Then the questions arise respectively from the Mīmāṃsakas, the Sāṃkhya, the Naiyāyikas, the Astrologers, the Mythologists, the Lokāyatas, the Yogācāras, the Mādhyamikas, and finally the Jīvakārya-tvavādins (viz. minor sect of Advaitavādins, SP calls them *svayūthya*).

प्रश्नेन भावितस्तुष्टः पाणिमस्याग्रहीदृषिः ।
अन्यासाधारणं प्रश्नमप्राक्षीदिति विस्मितः ॥१३३॥

The seer who was impressed and pleased by (his) question, took hold of his hand, surprised that he was (at the thought) 'This one has asked me some uncommon question.'¹ [133]

¹The singular is expressive of the many questions converging on one point.

असाधारण्यसिद्धयर्थमावामेवेत्यतोऽवदत् ।
विद्यागुप्तिश्च बहुशः श्रुतावपि समीक्ष्यते ॥१३४॥

Therefore, in order to make clear (lit. establish) the uncommonness (of the question), the seer said 'Let only two of us ...'. (This he did because), in the Śruti also, there is many times noticed secrecy (maintained) about the lore (taught, or talked about). [134]

SP and NKL refer to some passage from the Śruti, viz. *Śātyāyana* 33 and SP further cites *Manusmṛiti* 2.109 and 113-114. These are meant to support this verse.

आवयोरेव विज्ञानं यथेदं प्रागभूदितः ।
आवामेव तथैवोर्ध्वं वेदिष्यावो यथोदितम् ॥१३५॥

'Let this knowledge, which has been there herebefore, be known only for two of us; so shall we, only two of us make it known

to others hereafter, as said (below).

[135]

This verse explains the significance of *āvām* Yet read SP: *idaṃ vijñānam iti prayojakagocaram ucyate etasya prayojaka-vijñānasya yathoditam svarūpam ity arthaḥ*.

सजने प्रश्न एतस्मिन्ख्याप्यमाने त्वयोदिते ।
न सिध्येदावयोरुक्तं प्रयोजनमिदं ध्रुवम् ॥१३६॥

This question will not be decided, if it is being explained (while we are) among (the assembly of) the people. This is certainly the purpose in the statement 'Between only two of us ...'.

[136]

This brings out the purport of *na nāv etat sajane*.

न त्वन्योक्तिपरित्रासाद्याज्ञवल्क्योऽब्रवीदिदम् ।
जल्पे वाद्यतिरेकेण नान्यो वक्ति यतस्ततः ॥१३७॥

Indeed, Yājñavalkya did not say this for fear that somebody else might say (something about the matter) because, in any discussion (*jalpa*),¹ none else than the speaker (*vādin*) speaks.

[137]

¹*jalpa* is a kind of disputation (overbearing reply and disputed rejoinder). Cf. *ubhayapakṣasādhanavatī vijigīṣukathā* (*Gautama-sūtravṛtti* 1.2.2). Read further SP: *vijigīṣus tatrādhikriyate yathā-huḥ, vijigīṣuṇā saha jalpavitanda iti. tathā ca tadīyaśaktinirṇaya-paryantaṃ nānyapravṛttir ity arthaḥ*.

परिशिष्टानपि प्रश्नानुत्क्रम्य व्याकरोदसौ ।
सजनादिति नातः स्यादन्योक्तिभयकारणम् ॥१३८॥

(Later), having gone beyond (the place of the assembly), he explained even the remaining questions, therefore, from the word 'from among (the assembly of) the people' there is not

to be understood any cause of fear.

[138]

Since Yājñavalkya made answers to other questions as well, it is not proper to suppose that he was afraid of the people around. The reason why he preferred to go away from it is already stated in the second line of the preceding verse.

साध्वेतदिति संभाव्य सजनादुत्सर्पतुः ।

याज्ञवल्क्यार्तभागौ तावुत्क्रम्य च जजल्पतुः ॥१३९॥

Having considered that this was the proper thing to do, both of them, viz. Yājñavalkya and Ārtabhāga, moved away from among (the assembly of) the people, and having gone to another place, spoke to each other.

[139]

This is the meaning of *tau ha*

सजनात्तावथोत्क्रम्य मिथस्तत्र यदुच्यतुः ।

तत्सर्वं श्रुतिराचख्यावस्मत्प्रियचिकीर्षया ॥१४०॥

All that, which the two talked between themselves after having gone to another place away from (the assembly of) the people, the Śruti has clarified with a desire to do what is good for (lit. dear to) us.

[140]

कर्मादिपरतन्त्रत्वात्स्वाश्रयो नायमिष्यते ।

संसारभूमिर्वर्तित्वान्न चात्मा कारणाश्रयः ॥१४१॥

This is not taken (lit. desired) to be (that man's) own support on account of his dependence on (his own earlier) activity, (but) because he is (still) in the world of transmigratory existence,¹ it is his inner self (viz. the Ātman) which is the cause, the support.

[141]

This verse has a reference to *kenacid ātmanā* ... mentioned in verse 131 above.

¹This points to the continuance of the enjoyer-enjoyed relation.

अचित्कत्वात्प्रधानादि पुंसो न स्थानमिष्यते ।
न कर्म तत्फलं वेत्ति न च कस्यैति संगतिम् ॥१४२॥

Pradhāna etc.,¹ being devoid of sentience, would not be accepted (lit. desired) to be the resort for the man; nor (also) does he resort to (any) activity, since he does not know the result of it,² nor also does he get united with Sūtra.³ [142]

This refers to the possible alternative supports of Guṇa, Kāla and Fate which are mentioned in verse 132 above.

¹This is to preclude the idea of an insentient support for the man. The mention of Pradhāna is owing to the mention of Guṇa.

²The man does not know if the (newly acquired) state was the result of any (particular) activity. The view of the Mīmāṃsakas is thus refuted.

³This refers to Ka as Hiranyagarbha, i.e. Prajāpati or Sūtra. There is not authoritative means to show that the man, becoming Sūtra, acquires (another/some) body.

न चेश्वरे स्थितिस्तस्य शास्त्रानारम्भसकिततः ।
कृतनाशकृतप्राप्ती प्राप्नुतो नुस्तथा सति ॥१४३॥

Not also (is possible) the man's stay with/in (i.e. in the form of some) lord/god since that would involve the contingency of non-following (the dictates of) the scriptures;¹ for, that being so, there would result for the man the loss of (the result of) what he has performed and acquisition (of a result of) what he has not done.² [143]

This refers to yet another alternative, viz. Īśana 'a Lord' mentioned in verse 132 above.

¹The man's stay with/in a lord (or god) would have already secured for him either heaven or liberation and thus there would

result the want of effectiveness (i.e. uselessness) of the activities to be performed according to the dictates of the scriptures.

²Also, the man would secure all enjoyment through the favour of the lord (or god) and that should mean his continued existence in the world of enjoyments! And that would invite the two well-known faults: *kṛtahāni* and *akṛtābhyāgama*.

दैवाधिष्ठित एवायं कर्मकालवशानुगः ।

प्रवर्ततां चेत्पुरुषो नैवमप्युपपद्यते ।

जडत्वादिति पूर्वोक्तो दोषोऽत्रापि च विद्यते ॥१४४॥

If (it is held that this) man would be active, being guided (lit. superintended over) by deities¹ or being under the sway of (previous) activity or time (or Time);² that also would not be reasonable; for in this (case) also, there would be the fault, viz. on account of (their) being insentient, as already stated.

[144]

This also has a reference to verse 132 above. Also by referring to the world of deities (*daiva*), Sureśvara's objectors who seek to avert the two faults mentioned in just the preceding verse require an answer—that also is given here.

¹This is not an effective alternative, since deities, though sentient, are themselves not independent—they depend on the aid of the organs and the insentience of these latter continues to become the basis of the fault. This has to be remembered, even if the other two faults, viz. *kṛtahāni* and *akṛtābhyāgama* are averted.

²'time or Time' also does not have independence. Yet, cf. SP: *agnyādidevatānāṃ caitanye 'pi svātantryābhāvāt tadyuktasya kālāder na bhoktrāśrayatvam ity arthaḥ*. Actually, this note suffers some confusion of understanding on our part.

सदेवताकं पूर्वोक्तं समर्थमिति चेन्मतम् ॥१४५॥

प्रवृत्तिरप्रवृत्तिर्वा देवतैश्वर्यतः सदा ।

नियमे हेत्वसद्भावाच्च स्यान्नैयमिकी स्थितिः ॥१४६॥

If it is held that the propounding (*samarthana* of) the earlier stated (view) that (the man's support) is having the deities (associated) with it, then (the question would be) 'Is there any activity or non-activity obtaining even owing the powers (*aiśvarya*) of the deities?' (It [145]
is so asked since) there is no reason for determining (*niyame*) the same (i.e. either of them), that (viz. one of them) will be (ever) obtaining as a rule (*naiyamikī sthitiḥ*). [146]

न चापि केवलं कर्म पुंसः स्यादाश्रयो यतः ।
अचेतनत्वानित्यत्वदोषदुष्टं पुरोदितम् ॥१४७॥

Nor also is (or, can be) mere activity the support for the man, since it is affected by the (two) faults, viz. insentience and transitoriness—as has been stated (by us) earlier.¹ [147]

¹Cf. the second line of verse 142 above.

मयायमनुयातव्यः कर्ता चायं ममाभवत् ।
कालादिविषयं ज्ञानं ध्वंसिनः कर्मणः कुतः ॥१४८॥

How (or, whence) can there be (on the part of that man) the knowledge of the flitting (*dhvaṁsin*) activity with regard to the time for (in that he would be required to hold:) 'This one (i.e. deity) is to be followed by me as he has been for me the agent (of the activity). [148]

This verse clarifies the thought (already) expressed in verse 142 above, viz. *na ca kasyaiti saṁgatim*.

यत एवमतः सर्वे कालदैवेश्वरादयः ।
कर्मप्रधानाः पुंसः स्यादाश्रयोऽयमनुत्तमः ॥१४९॥

Since this is so, therefore all (of) Time, deities, Lord and others, who have (ritual) activity as (their) principal (guiding

force), would be the best support for that man. [149]

This implies that none of Time and others can be determined to be the impeller (*prayojaka*) of activity and therefore only *karman* has to be accepted as that.

हठो यदृच्छा नियतिः कारणत्वेन नाश्रिताः ।
संततौ चानवस्थानान्नाश्रयत्वं प्रमाणतः ॥१५०॥

Absolute (or necessary) force, chance, (and) fate¹ are not resorted to (by that man) as being the cause (of activity).² and, in respect of continuity,³ (it has to be said that) there is unsteadiness⁴ and there cannot be in that the nature of a resort (for him). [150]

¹SP and NKL point out that these words (each one of them) convey the meaning 'the nature of things (*svabhāva*)'.

²Namely, *prayojaka* or *pravartaka*.

³There is here reference to the Yogācāra view.

⁴*anavasthāna* means *kṣaṇikatva* 'momentariness'.

न कर्म पूर्वस्कन्धेषु नष्टत्वादुपपद्यते ।
न चेह परिणामः स्यादुत्तरस्कन्धसंगतौ ॥१५१॥

Activity cannot be reasonably held to obtain in (or, to belong to) the earlier existing *skandhas* 'aggregates (of elements)' which have already been destroyed (i.e. not existing any more); nor also could there be (understood their) full development (or, resulting into effects) noticeable for (i.e. as related to) the later *skandhas*. [151]

अनिष्ठितं न कर्मापि फलायालं भवेत् क्वचित् ।
न चैकत्रैकदा स्थानं विरोधाज्जन्मनाशयोः ॥१५२॥

Nor also activity, which has ceased to continue,¹ would anywhere yield a fruit (i.e. result) and there cannot be the

existence, at (just) one place and one point of time,² of the origin and the destruction (of activity) owing thier (mutual) opposition. [152]

¹This is based on *kṣaṇikatva* 'momentariness' of activity also.

²This is on account of the momentariness (i.e. the flitting character of activity).

न च स्कन्धातिरेकेण स्थिरः कश्चिदपीष्यते ।

भोगमोक्षाभिसंबन्धी यं प्रत्येतत्प्रवर्तते ॥१५३॥

Nor is any thing other than *skandha* accepted (by the holders of the theory of momentariness) as steady towards which this (viz. activity) and a person, intending to secure (lit. related to) enjoyments and/or liberation, proceeds (or strives). [153]

This is to refute the theories which hold that there are momentary *skandhas*.

अनारम्भश्च शून्येऽपि यथायमुपलभ्यते ।

मितेश्चासंभवाच्छून्यं सर्वथा नोपपद्यते ॥१५४॥

And since there is noticed this inaction (lit. non-beginning of activity)¹ and there is impossibility of (the existence of) knowledge (for more than a moment),² (the theory of) *śūnya* 'void'³ does not at all⁴ appear to be reasonable. [154]

¹This pertains to what is prescribed by scriptures.

²That momentariness of it cannot be proven by any means of knowing.

³That is *jīvanāśa* (SP).

⁴SP states: *pramāṇato yuktitaś ca*.

यत एवमतो न्याय्यं कर्मैवास्य समाश्रयः ।

संसारभूमौ पुंसः स्यात्कालादेस्तत्प्रधानतः ॥१५५॥

Since this is so, it is only reasonable to hold that the support of this man is only activity, right from the time that he has been on the level of transmigratory existence where activity is the principal thing. [155]

Here Sureśvara affirms his own view, after completing the refutation of others' views.

कर्मप्राधान्यमेवातः स्वयमेवाब्रवीच्छ्रुतिः ।
कालदैवेश्वरादिभ्यः कालादेस्तत्प्रयुक्तितः ॥१५६॥

Therefore, the Śruti of itself declared the principal significance of activity since it is urged by Time, the deities, the lord from the beginning of time. [156]

सति कर्मणि वैचित्र्यं भूतानामुपपद्यते ।
कर्मशब्देन विद्या च भावना कर्म चोच्यते ॥१५७॥

There results variety of elements (only) when there is activity. The word activity expresses knowledge, meditation and activity.¹ [157]

¹This is the meaning of the word *karman* in *karma haiva tad ūcatuḥ*.

देहारम्भे न शुद्धस्य कर्मणः शक्तिरिष्यते ।
तस्मान्नितयमप्येतत्कर्मशब्देन भण्यते ॥१५८॥

In any act of the body, it is not accepted that (there is need of) capacity for activity alone. Therefore, this triad also is expressed by the word *karman*. [158]

This explains the purpose of the second line of the preceding verse.

एवं तौ संप्रधार्यैतदुक्तदोषानभिप्लुतम् ।

यियासोः परलोकाय कर्मैवाश्रयमूचतुः ॥१५९॥

Having thus decided together—this which is free from blemishes¹ that are mentioned—they declared that activity¹ alone is the support for one who is desirous of going to the yonder world. [159]

¹This refers to the *karman* mentioned in verse 157 above.

कारणानां यथोक्तानां यच्च तौ प्रशशंसतुः ।
कर्मैवोक्तेषु सर्वेषु प्रशशंसतुरादरात् ॥१६०॥

And among the various causes, which the two mentioned (as a support for such a man), only that which those two praised is just activity alone (as stated above). [160]

कारणत्वाविशेषेऽपि किं प्रधानमितीक्षणे ।
कर्मणः स्यात्प्रशंसैवं तत्प्राधान्योपपत्तितः ॥१६१॥

When one thinks about what is (of) principal (importance), when there is no specification made about what has the nature of the cause, there can be only a praise of action, since it is only reasonable to hold the prominence of it. [161]

वशीकृत्येश्वरादीनि कारणानि स्वतन्त्रवत् ।
कर्म सिध्यद्यतो दृष्टं प्रधानं कर्म तेन तत् ॥१६२॥

Since activity¹ is seen to succeed (in bringing about its effect(s), like an independent (cause), after bringing under its control the (other) causes, viz. the Lord and others; that activity¹ is the principal (among all causes). [162]

¹This also refers to 'activity' mentioned in verse 157.

क्रियां प्रत्यगुणीभूतं नेश्वराद्यपि सिध्यति ।
कर्मातस्तेषु सर्वेषु प्रधानमिति भण्यते ॥१६३॥

Īśvara 'Lord' etc., which has not become subservient to activity,¹ does not succeed (in being the support for that man), therefore, 'activity' among all of them is described as the principal among them all. [163]

¹The word *kriyā* stands for *karman*.

यस्मादेवमतः प्रेतो देवताविरहेऽपि ना ।
 देहादस्मात्परिभ्रष्टः कर्मप्राधान्यसंश्रयात् ॥१६४॥
 पुण्यः पुण्येन भवति पापः पापेन कर्मणा ।
 इति श्रौतं वचो ज्ञेयमागमैकप्रमाणतः ॥१६५॥

Since this is so, therefore, a man who has departed from this (world) and separated from this body, (superintending over his various organs) [164] becomes, owing to his principal support in activity, pious by pious activity and/or sinful by sinful activity, even in the absence of the deities; this statement from the Śruti has to be known from the lone authority of the Śruti. [165]

इति श्रीबृहदारण्यकोपनिषद्भाष्यवार्तिके तृतीयाध्यायस्य
 द्वितीयं ब्राह्मणम् ॥२॥

BRHADĀRANYAKOPANIṢAD-
BHĀŚYA-VĀRTIKA

3.3

Bhujyu Brāhmaṇam

All these worldly dealings—(even) vaidika dealings cause but transmigratory existence.

संसारान्मुच्यमानानां तथा संसरतामिह ।
देहादिनाशे तुल्येऽपि तत्रैकेषां पुनर्भवः ॥१॥
देहाद्यात्यन्तिकी हानिरन्येषां यत्र कारणे ।
सति चासति चैवं स्यात्तत्प्रयोजकमीरितम् ॥२॥

It was told (in the earlier chapter) that, in the case of some of those who are being released from the transmigratory world and are also are transmigratory here (i.e. in this world), there is (noticed their) rebirth, even when the destruction of the body etc. is quite the same and, in the case of some others, the loss of the body etc. is absolute—and also which would occur (owing to the cause,) whether present or absent. [1-2]

This refers to BU 3.2.1 and BUBV 3.2.1-7.

ग्रहातिग्रहरूपस्य मृत्योः कर्मेति निश्चितम् ।
कियती कर्मणस्तस्य व्याप्तिः स्यादिति भण्यते ॥३॥

It is decided that (the cause¹ of) Mr̥tyu, which is of the nature of *graha* and *atigraha*, is (Vedic activity). Therefore, now is stated (in respect of the question) 'how much could be the extent of that (Vedic) activity.' [3]

This states the purpose of this Brāhmaṇa.

¹This refers to *prayojaka* in verse 2 above. Here, the reference is to BU 3.2.1-7.

साधारण्यविशेषाभ्यां कर्मणश्च व्यवस्थितिः ।
विशेषावस्था प्रागुक्ता सामान्यं त्वधुनोच्यते ॥४॥

There is clear demarkation (*vyavasthiti*) of Vedic activities owing to the generality¹ and the particularity (of them); the particular nature (*avasthā*) of them is explained earlier² and now is discussed the generality (of them). [4]

There is a reference here to the effect of *karman* in a general (*samaṣṭi*) and a particular (*vyasṭi*) form. Cf. BU 1.3.12: *so 'gnir abhavat* which is for the *vyasṭi* form of *karmaphala*.

¹This refers to the *samaṣṭi* form of the result, viz. attainment of the form of Sūtra.

संसारे कियती व्याप्तिरभिव्यक्तस्य कर्मणः ।
सामान्यात्मविशेषाभ्यामित्येतद्भुज्युनोच्यते ॥५॥

Bhujyu states (lit. asks) here as to how much is the extent of Vedic activity in this world which has revealed itself in the general and the particular forms.¹ [5]

¹The general form is *abhivyakta* in the sense of Sūtra. It is very minute whereas the particular ones are very clearly visible as gross objects, viz. cattle and other wealth.

प्रत्यग्याथात्म्यमोहस्य कार्येयत्तेह भण्यते ।
एतस्यां सम्यगुक्तायां नानुक्तमवशिष्यते ॥६॥

Here is (now) stated the extent (of the result) to be effected (by Vedic activity), viz. delusion regarding the true nature of the inner self¹ (*pratyak*). When this is clearly (or well) explained, there is nothing to be left to be explained. [6]

This is to clarify the statement in verse 3 above.

¹Note the difference from the 'individual self' (Jīva).

भ्रूणहत्याश्वमेधाभ्यां न परं पापपुण्ययोः ।
इत्येवं धर्मकाराणामपि वाक्यानि कोटिशः ॥७॥

There cannot be a greater sin or merit than the killing of a foetus or (the performance of) an Aśvamedha, respectively —thus there are numerous statements of those who write on Dharma.¹ [7]

SP refers here to *Manusmṛti* 12.55 and a verse *dharmarajjvā vrajed ūrdhvam pāparajjvā vrajedadhaḥ* (source not known). Also he refers to CU 5.10.7, but NKL states *brāhmahatyāśvamedhābhyāṃ na param puṇyapāpayoḥ* (source not known).

¹That is 'law-givers' as generally translated.

पापस्य कर्मणः कार्यमन्यत्रापि मितं यतः ।
नेहातो भण्यते भूयोऽनर्थत्वाच्चाप्यनादरः ॥८॥

Since the result of an activity resulting in sin¹ is known² from other sources, therefore, it is not stated here again; and also because that, being undesirable, there is disregard for it. [8]

¹NKL refers to the statement in BU 1.3 etc. These are naturally disregarded or avoided, while the Vedic activities are not so disregarded. The underlying thought is: Vedic activity, be it of any kind, is not regarded as resulting into sin; it may result into *adr̥ṣṭa* or attainment of Sūtra form.

²This is for *mitam*.

स्वतश्च तज्जिहासायाः सिद्धत्वात्नेह कीर्त्यते ।
परमोदारफलता त्वश्वमेधाख्यकर्मणः ॥९॥

An activity involving sin is not discussed here, because desire to abandon it occurs by itself; but (the result) of the activity called Aśvamedha (is intended), as there is profuseness of

the rich fruit of it. There can be no Vedic instruction regarding doing activity which results in sin. [9]

This is the underlying thought in the verse.

Now follows a doubt regarding the nature of Vedic activities.

निःशेषपुरुषार्थानां पुण्यं कर्म हि साधनम् ।
इत्याहुः श्रुतयः सर्वाः स्मृतयश्चाप्यनेकशः ॥१०॥

Indeed, activities which are meritorious are the means to the entire collection of the ends of human life—thus have all the Śrutis and the Smṛtis mentioned on several occasions. [10]

Here is understood the sentence in the Śruti regarding the desire for heaven (*svargakāmaḥ yajeta* and the desire to know the Brahman of BU 4.4.22 etc.) *dharmāt sukhaṁ ca jñānaṁ ca* (source not known), *Gītā* 3.20 and 5.2 are referred to by SP.

पुरुषार्थत्वसामान्यात्स्वर्गादिपुरुषार्थवत् ।
पुण्यसाधनताशङ्का मुक्तेरपि यतस्ततः ।
तदाशङ्कानिवृत्त्यर्थं प्रारब्धैषोत्तरा श्रुतिः ॥११॥

Since there can be a doubt that, in the case of liberation also, (Vedic) activity can be, means to merit, as in the case of the desire for obtaining the human goal of heaven (*svargakāma* ...)—for, they are all, ends of human life in common—therefore, this subsequent Śruti has begun with an intention to remove that doubt. [11]

ज्ञानोपबृंहितस्यापि क्रतुराजस्य कर्मणः ।
संसारविषयैवाप्तिर्मुक्तौ सा न मनागपि ॥१२॥

In the case of the activity in respect of the best of sacrifices, which is strengthened by knowledge, the attainment is only

in the sphere of transmigration (*saṁsāra*), (but) in respect of liberation, that (attainment) does not appear to be even a little. [12]

This verse explains what is meant by *āśāṅkānivṛtti* in the preceding verse.

The basis of this verse is *jñānasahitakarman* which also results in transmigratory existence. Therefore, it is to be clarified as to how the activity for achieving liberation is not related to transmigratory existence.

प्रत्यग्याथात्म्यसंमोहः क्रियाकारकरूपवान् ।
प्रथतेऽपास्तनिःशेषक्रियाकारकवस्तुनि ॥१३॥

In respect of the thing, which has (by its nature) kept from the entire activity and its means, there is clearly seen delusion regarding the true nature of the inner self.¹ [13]

¹Cf. verse 6 above.

अनिर्ज्ञातात्मयाथात्म्यैर्यत्तु कैश्चिदिहोच्यते ।
फलाभिसंधिरहितं विद्येतं कर्म मुक्तये ॥१४॥

[This verse raises an objection of those who consider ritual activity accompanied by knowledge as the cause of liberation.]

Now, as regards what is said by some, who have (really) not known the true nature of Ātman, viz. activity which is accompanied by knowledge and which, without any connection with desire for (or hankering after) the result, leads to liberation. [14]

बन्धहेत्वपि मोक्षाय विरुद्धफलकृद्यथा ।
विषदध्यादिवदिति तथोदाहृतिरुच्यते ॥१५॥

To show as to how (the ritual activity), which is the cause

of bondage, can lead to liberation, viz. as the cause of an opposite result,¹ there is an example stated in the word *visadadhyādivat*.² [15]

The *bandhahetu* is used as an adjective of *karman*.

¹The thought is: ordinarily any activity leads to bondage and liberation is the absence of bondage. Therefore, ritual activity is supposed to produce bondage and not freedom from bondage.

²This is a reference to BUB and BUBV. Cf. verses 31-32 below.

इत्युक्तपरिहारार्थं नैतत्सम्यगितीर्यते ।
अनारभ्यत्ववचनं तद्धेतुप्रतिपत्तये ॥१६॥

Therefore, to obviate its (argument), it is rightly stated: 'This is not so' and, in order to declare the reason for it, there is a statement made about (liberation) as not having any beginning. [16]

Here Sureśvara introduces the statement of BUB: *anārabh-yatvān mokṣasya*.

आरभ्यत्वाभ्युपगमे मुक्तेस्तत्स्याद्यथोदितम् ।
अनारभ्या त्वयं मुक्तिस्तत्सिद्धेर्ज्ञानहेतुतः ॥१७॥

If it is accepted that liberation is a thing having a beginning, only then would that, which is said (by those already referred to in verse 14 above) hold good, but this, viz. liberation, is what is never begun and what establishes itself only on account of knowledge. [17]

It is clearly denied that there is connection of liberation with any ritual activity.

ब्रह्म वा इदमित्युक्तेः प्रागपि ज्ञानजन्मतः ।
जगद्ब्रह्मात्मसंसिद्धेर्नातो मुक्तिः क्रियोद्भवा ॥१८॥

On the basis of (the Śruti) statement *brahma vā idam ...* (BU 1.4.10), there is established the existence of the Brahman as (the true nature) of the world, even before knowledge (of the Brahman) has arisen; therefore, from this (it is clear that) liberation is not a product of Vedic activity. [18]

The purport of this verse is to indicate that there does not exist any illustration for establishing liberation as an effect of (some) Vedic activity.

यदि वस्तु स्वतो मुक्तं परतो बद्धमिष्यते ।
मोक्षाय यत्नः फलवांस्तदा स्यान्न विपर्यये ॥१९॥

[This verse proceeds from a doubt regarding the Brahman as bound by something else or as free from bondage, by its own nature.]

If the thing (viz. reality or the Brahman) is taken to be free (from bondage), by its own nature, and bound by another, only then there would be (an effort) which would effect the result (i.e. liberation); otherwise, (it would not be) so. [19]

The argument in the verse: The cause of bondage of the Brahman may be real, i.e. existing apart from it, or that is imaginary. It is really in the first case that an effort for liberation is meaningful. If the cause of bondage is not real, there is no need of any effort!

विद्याभिव्यञ्जिकैवेयं स्वतः सिद्धस्य वस्तुनः ।
आरम्भकत्वं जगति तस्या नैवोपपद्यते ॥२०॥

In respect of the thing which is established by its own nature, this knowledge is only (its)¹ revealer; indeed, in respect of that, there does not appear in the world its potence (to begin, i.e. to cause) that (liberation). [20]

This verse is called for by verse 17 above, cf. *jñāna hetuṭah*.

In this world, the example of clay can be shown as the cause of a pitcher etc., but nothing can be shown as the cause operating for effecting liberation.

¹That is, of the Brahman.

अज्ञानमात्रव्यवधौ वस्तुनि व्यापृतिर्मितेः ।
आरभ्येऽर्थेऽफलं ज्ञानं व्यञ्जकत्वात्प्रदीपवत् ॥२१॥

In respect of the thing (i.e. reality) which is covered with ignorance only, there can be knowledge (alone) operative. (But) in respect of an object to be produced, knowledge is inoperative just, like a lamp, on account of its having a potence (only) to reveal an object. [21]

Just as a lamp reveals an already existing object, but it does not produce the same, so knowledge also reveals the already existing Brahman, it does not produce it.

न चाविद्यातिरेकेण मुक्तेर्बन्धोऽन्य इष्यते ।
निवृत्तिः क्रियते यस्य विद्येतेनेह कर्मणा ॥२२॥

It is not accepted that there is any bondage, in the case of liberation¹ except ignorance, viz that which is removed by ritual activity, accompanied by knowledge. [22]

¹That is, in the case of the Brahman, which is ever free or in the state of liberation.

अविद्यानाशमात्रश्च मोक्ष आत्मन इष्यते ।
यतस्ततोऽतिरेकेण मोक्षोऽनित्यो भवेद्ध्रुवम् ॥२३॥

Since (also) it is accepted that liberation of the Ātman is merely the destruction of ignorance (about its nature), therefore, in case there exists any apart from that, then

liberation would certainly be non-eternal.

[23]

This is another reason for not accepting knowledge accompanied by ritual activity as a means to liberation.

सम्यग्ज्ञानातिरेकेण न चान्येनास्ति निहनुतिः ।
प्रत्यङ्मोहस्य नातः स्याज्ज्ञानकर्मसमुच्चयः ॥२४॥

There cannot be the destruction (lit. concealment) of delusion (about the nature of) the inner self by any means other than proper knowledge about it. Therefore, there is no combination of knowledge and activity (as the means to liberation). [24]

निर्ज्ञातविषयत्वाच्च कर्मशक्तेर्जगत्यपि ।
दृष्टं हि कर्मणः कार्यमुत्पत्त्यादिचतुष्टयम् ॥२५॥

Also, because the effects of the force of the ritual activity are very clearly known in respect of its objects, viz. the result of the ritual activity (is known everywhere),¹ in this world, viz. those four, beginning with production.² [25]

¹This is the meaning given by SP, thus *sarvatrāpītyaperarthah*.

²Those are production, attainment, modification and purification (polishing). According to SP, liberation cannot be accomplished thereby.

उत्पत्त्याप्तिविकारा हि संस्कारश्च क्रियाफलम् ।
नातोऽन्यत्कर्मणः कार्यं नातो मुक्तौ तदिष्यते ॥२६॥

Indeed production, attainment, modification and also purification (polishing) are the results of activity;¹ (and) there is no other (effect to be produced) by activity, therefore, that (viz. activity) is not accepted (as a means) in respect of liberation. [26]

SP states, the purpose of *hi* is to suggest that there is not

any fifth kind of effect produced by a cause.

¹The sigular form *kriyāphalam* is used for the sake of metre.

न चान्यतम एतेषां मोक्षो युक्त्योपपद्यते ।
उत्पत्त्यादिप्रकाराणामनित्यत्वसमन्वयात् ॥२७॥
अविद्यामात्रव्यवधिर्यतो मोक्षोऽभ्युपेयते ।
तदन्यव्यवधाने हि प्रमाणं नोपपद्यते ॥२८॥

None of these four kinds of effects can be understood with the reason in respect of liberation, since they are invariably connected with non-eternality. [27]

Since liberation is accepted as having only ignorance as the cause of its obscurity, there indeed does not stand to reason (that there is) any authoritative means of proving it to be covered by anything. [28]

The thought is: Liberation is eternal, while all the effects are non-eternal, and therefore, liberation cannot be any one kind of the effects enumerated.

The second line of this verse anticipates an argument that there can be for liberation a covering other than ignorance.

विनाशिफलवत्त्वं चेत्केवलस्यैव कर्मणः ।
विद्येतस्य तु तस्यैव फलं ध्रौव्यं भवेदिति ॥२९॥

Since ¹ mere ritual activity is associated with (only) a perishable result therefore, the result of the same (*karman*) which has accompanied knowledge is eternality—this is the objection. ² [29]

¹*cit ... iti* is for 'since ... therefore'.

²This is the force of *iti*, referring to *codyavivarāṇa* (SP).

पूर्वशक्तिनिरासेन शक्त्यन्तरसमुद्भवः ॥३०॥
वस्त्वन्तरसमायोगाद्विषादेर्दृश्यते यतः ।
प्रमाणासंभवान्मैवं वोचो लौकिकवस्तुवत् ॥३१॥

(An argument can be made thus:) 'There can arise another potence (in a certain cause) by setting aside the earlier (existing) potence, [30]
since this is noticed in the case of poison (and others) on account of their mixture with other things. (The answer to the argument is:) Do not say so, since there does not possibly exist any other authoritative means for knowing (such a mixture of it with another thing) as in the case of (other) worldly things. [31]

As poison and others can render unusual effects on account of the other things accompanying them, *karman* cannot have similar mixing with other helping causes which can produce another effect.

नागमादपरं मानं मक्तावभ्युपगम्यते ।
विषदद्यादिवत्तस्मान्नैतत्सूक्तं भवेद्वचः ॥३२॥

In relation to liberation, there is not accepted any means other than Āgama (i.e. Vedāntic tradition) which is authoritative¹ as in the case of poison, curds etc.; therefore, this statement is not properly made. [32]

The purport of the verse is to point out that any argument regarding liberation cannot be made on the basis of an illustration (SP). Cf. [Vol.1:Introduction on *dr̥ṣṭānta*].

¹The first line anticipates and answers away an argument that obligatory religious performance associated with knowledge, can produce liberation. In other words, this would be the means of effecting liberation.

उक्तकार्यातिरेकेण विषदद्यादिवन्मितिः ।
कार्यान्तरसमुत्पत्तौ कर्मणोऽपि न विद्यते ॥३३॥

There is no knowledge about Vedic activity in relation to causing any one of the (four) effects beside those which have

been stated in the same way as in the cause of poison and food etc. [33]

The verse aims at pointing out that any obligatory Vedic activity, be it associated with or not associated with knowledge, cannot produce liberation.

साध्यावृत्त्यात्मकं ज्ञानं कर्मैवावस्तुतन्त्रतः ।
ज्ञानं हि वस्तुतन्त्रं स्यान्न तु तत्कारकाश्रितम् ॥३४॥
कर्मैतं कर्म तेनेदृग्विद्येतं न कथं चन ।
क्रियासमुच्चयोऽतोऽयं न तु विद्यासमुच्चयः ॥३५॥

Knowledge, which is of the nature of repetition of what is to be accomplished,¹ is only a (kind of) activity, since it depends on what is not-the-thing², (or, reality, *avastutantra*) and knowledge is indeed dependent on the thing² (or, reality) but it is not (ever) dependent on any means of activity. [34] Therefore,³ such kind of activity (as you have mentioned) is only accompanied by (another) activity; indeed it is not connected with knowledge in any way. Therefore, this is (only) a combination of activities but not of knowledge and activity. [35]

¹The words 'to be accomplished' refer to the mode of worship which implies a worshipper's act in relation to the object of worship, and, therefore, it is *kartrtantra* 'dependent on an agent'. Read SP: *sādhyam dhyeyam vastu tatra pratyāvṛttirūpopāstir avastutantratvāt karmaivety arthaḥ*.

²This refers to *vastu* the Brahman.

³According to SP this word suggests that *Upāsana* is a *mental* activity.

साध्यसाधनसंबन्ध आगमैकप्रमाणकः ।
मुक्तेश्च साधनत्वेन कर्म नैव श्रुतं श्रुतौ ॥३६॥

The relation between what is to be accomplished and what accomplishes it is understood to be having Āgama 'traditional

scriptures' as authoritative means; but nowhere in the Śruti is heard any activity as a means to achieving liberation. [36]

The first line of this verse sets aside the idea that *pratyakṣa* etc. can lead one to understand that liberation is but an activity, whether associated or not associated with knowledge—see SP and NKL in relation to the first line, to state that the effects of the relation of *sādhya* and *sādhana* (SP) belong to the other world (Cf. the words *pāralaukika iti śeṣaḥ*) and the second line emphasises the absence of any activity in relation to liberation. Here also both SP and NKL make a mention of the Vedic passage *apāpma somam amṛtā abhūma* (Ṛgveda 8.48.3; Taittirīya Saṃhitā 3.2.5.4) as a Vedic passage related to activity (*karma-sthāvaka*).

अज्ञानहानं नो मुक्तिस्तस्याः कर्म न साधनम् ।
न हि कर्म तमो हन्ति तमसीवोत्थितं तमः ॥३७॥

For us, liberation consists in the abandonment of ignorance; an activity is not a means (for achieving it). Indeed an activity does not destroy darkness in the same way as a darkness arising from (another) darkness (does not destroy it).¹ [37]

¹Here *tamas* is equated with *ajñāna*. Yet, in the first line, *ajñāna* refers to *avidyā* and it is so understood in the simile also. But there it relates to ignorance about the nature of worldly things giving rise to the notion of another worldly thing (cf. SP: *rajjavajñāne ... bhujajñānam*).

अविद्यैकोद्भवत्वं स्याद्यद्यपि ज्ञानकर्मणोः ।
मेयैकात्म्यानुरोधित्वं तथाप्यंतिशयो धियः ॥३८॥

Even though both knowledge and activity are of the nature of having arisen from mere ignorance, knowledge¹ has an excellence in that it follows (or emphasises) oneness in nature with what is to be known. [38]

¹Here, the word *dhī* is used for *jñāna*.

नात्माविद्यामतिक्रम्य कर्मैकात्म्यानुरोधि हि ।
तमोमात्राभिजनतो नातोऽविद्यां निहन्ति तत् ॥३९॥

For, activity cannot, without transgressing ignorance, follow (i.e. lead to) oneness with the Ātman (understand the singleness of the Ātman). Therefore, that does not (i.e. cannot) destroy ignorance by merely being born from ignorance. [39]

स्वतःसिद्धात्मवस्त्वेकमात्रोत्थानत्वकारणात् ।
ज्ञानं हन्ति तमोऽशेषं न तु कर्म तमोन्वयात् ॥४०॥

Because it is associated with mere rise (of the knowledge) of the single Ātman, which is established by itself, knowledge destroys ignorance completely but *karman* does not do so, owing to its association with ignorance.¹ [40]

¹*tamonvayāt* is for *tamomātrabhijanataḥ* in the preceding verse. Also *svataḥ* ... *mātroththānatva* is for ... *mātroththānavattva*.

अज्ञानादित्रयं प्रत्यगाभासं यद्यपीष्यते ।
ज्ञानवज्ज्ञानसंभूतेनैव प्रागभ्युपेयते ॥४१॥

Even if it is accepted then the appearance (or notion) of the inner self (is rooted in) the triad beginning with *ajñāna*;¹ yet it is not accepted before the rise of knowledge (though) it is associated with what is possessed of knowledge. [41]

¹These are *ajñāna*, *mithyājñāna* and *saṁśaya*.

कर्मातः कारणं मुक्तेर्न कथं चन युज्यते ।
साक्षादविद्याप्रध्वस्तौ पारंपर्यात्तु युज्यते ॥४२॥

Therefore, in no way can *karman* be reasonably accepted as

the cause of liberation. It is, however, accepted as reasonable only after the destruction of ignorance itself (and this) in an indirect way. [42]

This verse clarifies in the second line that the discussion, done so far, is not opposed to the Śruti sentence regarding *vividiṣā*, viz. *tam etam vedānuvacanena brāhmaṇā vividiṣanti dānena tapasānāśakena* (BU 4.4.22).

मुक्तौ च कर्मसाध्यायां किमेकैकं विमुक्तिदम् ।
किं वा संभूय सर्वाणि कर्माणि घ्नन्ति संसृतिम् ॥४३॥

And, when thus liberation is (said to be) achieved by activity, which one of them causes liberation? or whether all the activities (operating) together bring about the cessation of (lit. destroy) transmigration? [43]

सकृद्भूयःप्रयोगाद्वा यावज्जीवप्रयोगतः ।
एकादिदक्षिणास्वेतं विकल्पस्तुल्य इष्यते ॥४४॥

(In both these alternatives), there are three alternatives thus: whether (liberation is effected) by performance (of the activity) only once, or by repeated performances, or by continuing to perform them till the end of life; and whether by offering a fee of one or many or all cows? [44]

काम्यैर्वा यदि वा नित्यैः सर्वैर्वा मुक्तिरिष्यते ।
श्रौतैर्वा यदि वा स्मार्तैर्यदि वोभयकर्मभिः ॥४५॥

Or, is liberation accepted to be resulting from (or, effected by) actions related to desire? or obligatory rituals? or from (the performance of) all of them? or is it by (only) the Śrauta rites? or only the Smārta rites? or by both of them together? [45]

तेषां च ज्ञानसंयोगे प्रधानगुणभेदतः ।

त्रिधा विकल्पो विज्ञेयो विमुक्तिफलसिद्धये ॥४६॥

And also, in combination with knowledge, there should be accepted three alternatives, as both of them (i.e. knowledge and activity) are together being equally important, or related as the principal and the subordinate. (Thus) there should be understood a threefold option in respect of the accomplishing of the result, viz. liberation. [46]

एकैकं मुक्तिकृच्छ्रेत्स्याद्यवव्रीह्यादिहोमवत् ।
एकेनैव कृतार्थत्वान्नानुतिष्ठेत्ततोऽपरम् ॥४७॥

If each one brings about liberation, even as the offering of barley or rice grains etc., then, because the end is achieved by any single one of them, one should not perform any other (action). [47]

प्रयोगे दक्षिणायां च समानोऽयं परिक्रमः ।
अथ संभय सर्वाणि मुक्तिं कर्माणि कुर्वते ॥४८॥
एकैकमर्थं ध्रुवं प्रापत्सर्वेषामपि कर्मणाम् ।
दर्शादिवत्फलैकत्वात्तच्चानिष्टं प्रसज्यते ॥४९॥

This manner of activity is similar in respect of the performance and also of offering fees. (As for other alternatives,) if all the actions combined together bring about liberation, [48] then, indeed, there would result only oneness of activity in respect of all of those activities and there would contingently result the undesired effect, as in the case of the rite of *darśa* etc., since they have only one result. [49]

अन्यद्वि मुक्तिफलतः काम्यानां श्रूयते फलम् ।
तेषां मुक्तिफलत्वं तु न श्रुतेर्नापि चान्यतः ॥५०॥

(Also,) in respect of ritual activities proceeding from desire, there is heard (in the Śruti) a result which is other than the result, viz. liberation. It is not heard either from the Śruti

or from elsewhere that they have liberation as their result.

[50]

न च गोदोहनन्यायः काम्यकर्मसु युज्यते ।
तेषां मुक्तिफलत्वे हि न मानं विद्यते यतः ॥५१॥

Nor also does the procedure in the example of Godohana¹ stand to reason, in respect of the rites done with desire, since there is indeed not any authoritative means to inform that they result in liberation.

[51]

The verse emphasises *śrutivirodha* to the alternantive in respect of *kāmyādi* rites.

SP quotes here, very possibly, the view of Bhartṛprapañca: *yathāhuh anyārtham api saṁnihitam auyena sambadhyata iti*.

¹It is the rule about the result from Godohana. It cannot be reasonably understood in respect of ritual acts performed with desires.

Cp. *kāmyasūktānām mahāvrate ājyaśāstratvena yathoktānām godohananyāyena puruṣārthatvam eva na kratvarthatvam* (Taittirīya Āraṇyaka Sāyaṇabhāṣya 1.1.1.16). Also cf. Śābara's *Bhāṣya* on Jaimini Sūtra 4.1.2.2.

Sureśvara states in the verse that this example of Godohana is not reasonably accepted in relation to more than one *kāmyakarmans* functioning together.

सर्वं चाप्यप्रमाणं स्याद्यदुक्तं भेदलक्षणम् ।
मुक्तिं सर्वाणि कर्माणि यदि संभूय कुर्वते ॥५२॥

If it is held that all the ritual activities (performed) together would bring about liberation, all that is said (in Mīmāṃsā) by way of defining the distinctions (of activities) would be unauthoritative.

[52]

This argument, which is related to the performance of all the rites together as a means to liberation, points to the

contingent unauthoritativeness in the Mīmāṃsā text that discusses the variety of different ritual activities.

साध्यसाधनबद्धिर्नो वचनात्पारलौकिकी ।
न चाश्रौषं श्रुतैर्वाक्यात्कर्म मोक्षफलं क्वचित् ॥५३॥

For us, the knowledge regarding what is to be accomplished and what accomplishes it in relation to the other world comes from the statement (in the Śruti). And I have not anywhere heard from (any) sentence or from the Śruti that ritual activity has liberation as its result. [53]

न तत्र दक्षिणा यन्ति विद्ययैव तदाप्यते ।
वेदाहमिति मन्त्रश्च ज्ञानान्मार्गान्तरापनुत् ॥५४॥

The sentences *na tatra dakṣiṇā yanti*,¹ *vidyayaiva tadāpyate*² and also the Mantra *vedāham ...*³ set aside any other thing than knowledge as the way (to liberation). [54]

¹Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa 10.5.4.16.

²Not traced.

³Taittirīya Āraṇyaka 3.12.7.

न कर्मणा कनीयस्ता वृद्धिर्वा नान्तरात्मनः ।
नित्योऽस्य महिमेत्येवमुदकैऽपि प्रवक्ष्यते ॥५५॥

By (the performance of a) ritual activity there does not result inferiority and superiority in respect of the inner self;¹ its greatness is eternal—thus it would be declared later also. [55]

This verse seems to be based on BU 4.4.23.

¹The mention of the inner self refers to state of liberation. No excellence is added to it or diminished from it by any activity. The attainment of oneness with the single Ātman, which is implied in liberation, cannot be produced.

क्षयी कर्मजितो लोको नित्यो ज्ञानजितस्तु यः ।
इति स्पष्टं श्रुतेर्वाक्यं कस्मान्नाद्रियते त्वया ॥५६॥

‘The world that is obtained by ritual activity is perishable, whereas that which is obtained (lit. won) by knowledge is eternal,’ thus there is a clear statement in the Śruti; why do you not (accept) this regardfully? [56]

समुच्चयश्चाप्यसकृत्पुरैव सुनिराकृतः ।
भूयोऽपीह प्रवक्ष्यामः प्रसङ्गान्नातिविस्तरात् ॥५७॥

As for the combination¹ of knowledge and activity, it is well refuted (by us) already and here we should discuss it again, but, now, only because it is occasioned and (we shall state the refutation) not in extent. [57]

¹SP refers to the threefold combination already mentioned, i.e. knowledge and activity are on equal footing, they are related as the principal and the subordinate and *vice-versa*.

सन्निपत्य न च ज्ञानं कर्माज्ञानं निरस्यति ।
साध्यसाधनभावत्वादेककालानवस्थितेः ॥५८॥

Knowledge and activity, being together,¹ cannot set aside ignorance because of their relation as an end and a means and because they cannot belong to one point of time. [58]

Performance of rituals is a means of purification of *manas* and knowledge is the end to be accomplished. Therefore, they must belong to two different points of time and, as a result, there cannot be any relation between them as the principal and the subordinate.

¹The word *sannipatya* means ‘coming/falling together’, the idea of it occurs again in the note on verse 66 below.

बाध्यबाधकभावाच्च पञ्चास्योरणयोरिव ।

एकदेशानवस्थानात्र समुच्चयता तयोः ॥५९॥

And, since they are in a relation of what is to be stultified and what stultifies, they cannot belong to one place, in the same way as a lion and a ram; therefore there cannot be a combination of the two. [59]

This is to set aside the idea that knowledge and activity can combine, being on equal footing. The simile of a lion and a ram vividly points to the impossibility of their being together.

Here we should remember that activity is *bādhya* while knowledge *bādhaka*.

बाध्यबाधकभावेन काममस्तु समञ्चितिः ।
स्वशक्त्यनपहारेण दाह्यदाहकयोरिव ॥६०॥

(Yet one might argue:) Let there be a combination of the two standing in relation of what is to be stultified and what stultifies it. (But this cannot be) since neither of them will have given up its own nature¹ in the same way as what is burnt and what burns. [60]

Fire and grass cannot remain together because fire burns it. In the same way *bādhya* and *bādhaka* cannot coexist.

¹It literally means 'potence'.

अयथावस्त्वविद्या स्याद्विद्यैतस्या विरोधिनी ।
समुच्चयस्तयोरेवं रविशर्वरयोरिव ॥६१॥

Ignorance is a thing¹ which is not the thing (i.e. reality) as it is and activity is opposed to it; therefore, a combination of the two, thus (proposed), will be like that of the sun and darkness. [61]

¹It is merely an appearance of something which is later proven as not existing; for example, a serpent appearing in place of

a rope. That is, both of them cannot have their effects at one and the same time. Such is the case of knowledge and activity.

वस्त्वधीना भवेद्विद्या कर्त्रधीना क्रिया तथा ।
कर्त्रीदि चात्ममोहोत्थं स्वतोऽकारकतात्मनः ॥६२॥

Knowledge is dependent on the thing (i.e. reality or the Brahman) and (*tathā*) activity is dependent on an agent (of an activity) and (the notion of) the agent etc. are but the products of ignorance. So also, in the case of the Ātman, there is no agency of an act of its own.¹ [62]

¹It is only through ignorance that the variety such as an agent is superimposed on the Ātman.

बृहस्पतिसवे यद्वत्क्षत्रियो न प्रवर्तते ।
ब्राह्मणत्वानहंमानी विप्रो वा क्षत्रकर्मणि ॥६३॥

As Kṣatriya does not proceed to perform the Bṛhaspatisava sacrifice because he does not have the Ego (i.e. awareness) of (possessing) Brāhmaṇahood. So also, a Brāhmaṇa does not enter on an activity prescribed for Kṣatriya (because he does not have the Ego or awareness of being a Kṣatriya).¹ [63]

¹SP points out that this clause is warranted by the word *vā* in the verse.

विदेहो वीतसंदेहो नेति नेत्येव बोधितः ।
देहाद्यनात्मदृक्त्वद्वत्तत्क्रियां वीक्षतेऽपि न ॥६४॥

A person, who does not have the Ego of having a gross body (*videha*) and who is devoid of any subtle body (*vītasandeha*), is enlightened (by the words in the Śruti) *neti neti*. In the same way, (in the self), which looks on a body etc. as some non-Ātman, does not ever consider (lit. see) any act to be performed by that (as its own). [64]

The words *videha* and *vītasandeha* are used by Sureśvara with special meanings. Read SP: *sthūladehābhimānahīno videhaḥ saṁśayādidharmakasūkṣmadehābhimānaśūnyaś ca vītasandehaḥ*. Also, cf. NKL.

मृत्स्नेभके यथेभत्वं शिशुरध्यस्य वल्गति ।
अध्यस्यात्मनि देहादीन्मूढस्तद्विचेष्टते ॥६५॥

As a child superimposes the character of a (real) elephant on elephant made of clay and chatters (about it), so also a foolish person superimposes on the Ātman (within him) a body etc. and performs activities. [65]

स्थाणुं चोरधियालाय भीतो यद्वत्पलायते ।
बुद्ध्यादिभिस्तथात्मानं भ्रान्तोऽध्यारोप्य चेष्टते ॥६६॥

As holding (considering) a pillar to be a thief, a person becomes fear-stricken and runs away, similarly, a person who has mistaken (the real nature of the Ātman) superimposes on it intellect etc. and (thus) deluded keeps on doing activities. [66]

The doubt underlining this verse is based on *yad eva vidyayā karoti* (CU 1.10) and *jñātvā karmāṇi kurvīta* (not traced).

Earlier, there is refutation of the idea of the combination of knowledge and activity that have occurred together (*sannipatya*) here it is meant that the combination proceeds from the cause, viz. ignorance and what causes it, viz. false knowledge.

स्थाणोः सतत्त्वविज्ञानं यथा नाङ्गं पलायने ।
आत्मनस्तत्त्वविज्ञानं तद्वन्नाङ्गं क्रियाविधौ ॥६७॥

As the knowledge of the true nature of a pillar is not a part (i.e. cause) of (the ignorant's) running away, similarly, in the performance of rituals, the knowledge of the true nature of the Ātman cannot be its part (i.e. cause). [67]

यद्धि यस्याविरोधेन स्वभावमनुवर्तते ।
तत्तस्य गुणभूतं स्यान्न प्रधानाद्गुणो यतः ॥६८॥

What indeed follows in nature, something without opposing it, is to be considered as the subordinate to that, for, the subordinate does not overpower¹ the principal one. [68]

Here Sureśvara states the idea of what can stand in relation as principal and subordinate.

¹The word in verse is *pradhānād* explained as *pradhānam atti (iti)*.

अज्ञानमनिराकुर्वज्ज्ञानमेव न सिध्यति ।
विपन्नकारकग्रामं ज्ञानं कर्म न ढौकते ॥६९॥

Knowledge would certainly not be (lit. establish) itself, if it is not setting aside (or, stultifying) ignorance; therefore, knowledge does not promote (*dhaukate*) the conglomeration of various factors of activity which are set to naught (by it).

[69]

हेतुस्वरूपकार्याणां प्रकाशतमसोरिव ।
मिथो विरोधतो नातः संगतिर्ज्ञानकर्मणोः ॥७०॥

Therefore, there cannot be the occurrence together of knowledge and activity, which have their means of knowing them, the nature of them, and the effects of them, mutually opposed, as in the case of light and darkness. [70]

Read SP and note in NKL edition: *jñānasyamānam hetuḥ svarūpaṁ vastuprakāśakatvaṁ kāryam avidyādhivastiḥ. karmaṇo hetur avidyārāgādi svarūpaṁ aprakāśakatvaṁ kāryam utpattyādi.*

सकृत्प्रवृत्त्या मृद्नाति क्रियाकारकरूपभृत् ।
अज्ञानमागमज्ञानं सांगत्यं नास्त्यतोऽनयोः ॥७१॥

The knowledge (about the nature of the Ātman) from scriptures by its occurrence only once completely destroys ignorance, assuming the forms of activity and what effects them; therefore, there is no going together of these two. [71]

सर्वथा नैव घटते ज्ञानकर्मसमुच्चयः ।
विद्ययैव तमोहानादकार्ये कर्म किंफलम् ॥७२॥

Everywhere (or, At any time), thus, a combination of knowledge and activity can never occur. Because of knowledge alone there is effected destruction (lit. abandoning) of ignorance (lit. darkness). Therefore, in respect of what is not to be effected (*akārya*), what is the purpose (lit. result) of activity? [72]

न मानं किञ्चिदप्यस्ति ज्ञानकर्मसमृच्चितेः ।
प्रत्यक्कैवल्यसंसिद्धौ ज्ञानादेव तमोहतेः ॥७३॥

There is not any authoritative means of knowing the combination of knowledge and activity, because it is through knowledge alone that there is effected destruction of ignorance, towards effecting (lit. establishing) the singleness of the inner self. [73]

उत्पत्त्याद्यतिरेकेण संसारविनिवृत्तये ।
कर्मणोऽपि तथा मानं न किञ्चिदुपपद्यते ॥७४॥

So also, there is not reasonably postulated any authoritative means to conveying that activity also can lead to cessation of transmigration, besides (the four, viz.) production etc. [74]

In verses 75-78, Sureśvara states the prima facie view that the performance of obligatory ritual leads to liberation.

अस्ति मानं यतो नित्यं कर्म सर्वत्र चोद्यते ।
न चोत्पत्त्यादिमत्किञ्चित्तत्र साक्षात्फलं श्रुतम् ॥७५॥

(A view is held:) Indeed there is an authoritative means (conveying that the performance of obligatory ritual leads to liberation), since the obligatory ritual is enjoined everywhere (in the Śruti) and yet, in those places, there is not any direct result heard. [75]

All the Śrutis agree in holding *yāvaj jīvam agnihotraṃ juhūyāt* Now, normally the Śruti does not lay down any act, unless it produces some result; therefore, in the absence of the mention of any one of production etc., we should take its result to be liberation. The *prima facie* view appears to have the words *karmanā pitṛlokaḥ* (BU 1.5.16) as the guiding force. This is a direct mention of the result heard.

विश्वजिद्वन्न सामर्थ्यं तत्र संभाव्यतेऽण्वपि ।
उत्पत्त्यादिफलोद्भूतौ मुक्तिरस्तु ततः फलम् ॥७६॥

So also, not even a little of effectiveness (lit. potency) is to be thought of in that (obligatory ritual), as in the case of the sacrifice called *viśvajit* (where there is not a mention about the rise of the result, viz. production etc.; therefore, let the result be liberation. [76]

There is a text *viśvajitā yajeta* which prescribes *viśvajit* sacrifice, yet there is not any mention made of the result effected by it. Therefore in this case they adopt Mīmāṃsā rule *sa svargaḥ syāt sarvān praty aviśiṣṭatvāt* 'Let that be heaven, because that is not specially mentioned apart from activity'. The *prima facie* view states that, in a similar way as *viśvajit*, the obligatory ritual also should be taken to have a result, viz. they should produce liberation.

SP refers to a passage in the Śruti *yad yad dhi kurute jantus tat tat kāmasya ceṣṭitam* (source not known).

पुरुषार्थेऽसति फले विधानं नोपपद्यते ।

नित्यानां कर्मणां तस्मिन्सत्येव घटते यतः ॥७७॥

There cannot be reasonably any injunction (regarding a rite), unless there is some purpose (or end) of human life (to be achieved by it), since only that being there, the obligatory ritual can be acceptable. [77]

दुःखात्मकेषु नित्येषु समीक्षापूर्वकारिणः ।
पुरुषा न प्रवर्तेरन्न चैतेभ्यः फलं भवेत् ॥७८॥

(If, on the contrary,) the obligatory rituals are of the nature of (i.e. intending) merely to effect misery, then, men, who enter on activity after having thought over it, would not enter on them, if they did not produce any (useful/desired) result. [78]

In verses 79-133, Sureśvara states for the refutation of the prima facie view.

नैवं वाक्यात्फलं यस्मात् किञ्चिदपि लभ्यते ।
तत्सामर्थ्यश्रवाभावात्फले नातो मितिश्च नः ॥७९॥

It is not so, since, for us, there does not follow that result, viz. liberation, from a sentence 'from which no knowledge regarding the fruit of activity is obtained.' That is (only) because there is not heard (anywhere) its effectiveness (or, potence) (in respect of liberation). [79]

This argument is related to a certain authoritative means of knowing called Arthāpatti. Therefore, as in the case of *viśvajit*, where heaven is accepted as its result, the Siddhāntin would accept liberation as the result of the obligatory ritual, inasmuch as there is want of any authoritative means to that effect.

प्रमाणबलतः प्राप्तमपि भूरि न वार्यते ।
अणुमात्रं न तद्ग्राह्यं वस्तु यन्निष्प्रमाणकम् ॥८०॥

If, on the strength of some authoritative means, a lot of activities are known (lit. obtained), that would not be set aside by us. (But) not even a little of the thing known (from any injunction is set aside by us) when it is without any authority (for it). [80]

पुमाशयवशाच्चेयं फलकलृप्तिस्त्वयोच्यते ।
अन्यानपेक्षं सन्मानं प्रमेयार्थसमर्पकम् ॥८१॥

Also, this method¹ is upheld (lit. stated) by you, with the intention of a man in view. As against this, (we accept) that, as an authoritative means which informs us about some thing to be known,² (when it is) not dependent on any other (object). [81]

In the first line, the Siddhāntin points out the purposefulness of Arthāpatti for one who expects some worldly ends of human life. In the second line, the Siddhāntin states what can really be the authoritative statement of the Śruti, viz. it should be in relation to the knowledge of the Brahman.

¹That is, acceptance of Arthāpatti.

²That is, the Brahman.

प्रत्यवायाद्यभावश्च फलं नित्यस्य कर्मणः ।
कलृप्तं सत्कल्प्यते कस्माद्विमुक्तिर्नित्यकर्मणः ॥८२॥

And, the result of the (performance) of the obligatory ritual is the absence of any untoward thing etc.¹; then, why imagine (i.e. posit) liberation as the result of the obligatory ritual when there is existing one, viz. that is (already) stated? [82]

¹ādi stands for *pāpanivṛtti*.

तावतैव कृतार्थत्वाद्विधेर्नित्यस्य कर्मणः ।
विमुक्तिफलसंबन्धे न मानं विद्यते ततः ॥८३॥

If only thereby¹ the injunction regarding the obligatory ritual became powerful, then it does not remain as an authoritative means (to show) its relation to the result, viz. liberation. [83]

Read SP: *klptakalpyamānayoḥ klptam balavat iti nyāyavirodham arthāpatteh*, which is the basis for this verse.

¹This refers to *pratyavāyādyabhāvaḥ* in the preceding verse.

अन्यथानुपपत्त्या चेद्विश्वजिद्वत्प्रकल्प्यते ।
फलं कथं नु न भवेद्विश्वजिन्न्याय ईर्यताम् ॥८४॥

If, owing to the absence of any other reasonable basis (for an injunction regarding the obligatory ritual), the result is considered as one similar to (that of an injunction regarding) the *viśvajit* sacrifice, then, let it be told why (you do not accept) the example of *viśvajit*. [84]

This is related to verse 76 above.

काम्याग्निहोत्रवन्नित्यं काम्यं चापि प्रसज्यते ।
फलेनास्याभिसंबन्धान्निष्कामं नित्यमुच्यते ॥८५॥

And, there would be a contingency that an obligatory ritual is based on some desire just like Agnihotra, which is based on some desire, since it (viz. an obligatory ritual) has connection with a result; but it is free from any desire. [85]

मतं चेन्न फलत्वेन मोक्षो नित्योऽभ्युपेयते ।
प्रतिज्ञातार्थहानाप्तेनैवमप्युपपद्यते ॥८६॥

If it is held that liberation is not an invariable result (of an obligatory ritual), then there would follow the abandoning of what is enunciated;¹ and (your argument) also would not be reasonable. [86]

The verse is based on the argument that liberation is the result of an obligatory ritual which is not connected with the results of a Vedic sacrifice invariably.

¹This refers to the earlier statement that the obligatory ritual results in liberation.

आरभ्यमाणता मुक्तेः प्रत्यज्ञायि त्वयैव सा ।
विरुध्यतेऽफ्लोक्त्यैवमारभ्यं स्याद्यतः फलम् ॥८७॥

You yourself have already enunciated that liberation is what can be begun (to be produced) and that is opposed by the statement that there is no result, for, (it is already taken for granted) that a result is begun by the performance. [87]

The verse explains, as earlier enunciated, how there is subsequent abandoning of the view enunciated.

मुक्तेश्च कर्मकार्यत्वे विशेषो भवतोच्यताम् ।
स्वर्गादिभ्यो विनाशादौ मोक्षे तेऽनिर्वृतिर्यतः ॥८८॥

Further, in holding liberation as the effect of some activity, what difference of it from heaven etc. can be pointed out by you?—this is because there can be (the end, lit. destruction, of the same) and, thus, you do not have final peace in liberation. [88]

The argument is: The *prima facie* view holds liberation as the result of some activity (here, an obligatory ritual), therefore, it means that it has an end. Therefore, liberation is not thus perennial peace.

अथोपचारतो मोक्षः कार्यं स्यान्नित्यकर्मणः ।
ज्ञानकार्यवदित्येवं मतं चेन्नैवमिष्यते ॥८९॥
अज्ञानध्वंसकारित्वान्मोक्षो ज्ञानस्य भण्यते ।
उपचारात्कार्यमिति तदसत्त्वान्न कर्मणः ॥९०॥

If it is held: 'Liberation is metaphorically (*upacārataḥ*) held as the effect of obligatory ritual, like the effect of knowledge,' then, (the answer to this argument is:) This is not accepted (lit. desired); [89]

liberation is described as the effect of knowledge, because it (viz. knowledge) has the potency of effecting the destruction of ignorance and that, the effect can metaphorically occur, is impossible to happen. Therefore, (liberation is not the result) of (obligatory) ritual. [90]

व्यवधानापनुज्ज्ञानं न कर्माज्ञानहानिकृत् ।
यतोऽतो नोपचारेण कर्मणो मुक्तिकार्यता ॥९१॥

Since knowledge is (i.e. acts as) the remover of what obscures (the real nature of the Ātman) and not (any) ritual activity does bring about the abandonment of ignorance; therefore, it is not reasonable to say that ritual activity has liberation as its result. [91]

This verse explains *tad asatvān na karmanah* (in the preceding verse).

न चाज्ञानातिरेकेण व्यवधानान्तरं मतम् ।
निवर्त्यत्वेन मोक्षस्य कर्मणा यन्निवर्त्यते ॥९२॥

And it is not accepted that beside ignorance there can be (or, is) any cause of obscurity (of the real nature of Ātman), which is removed by an activity as what is to be removed in respect of liberation. [92]

The word *vyavadhānāntara* is understood by the commentator (of SP) to refer to some cause other than ignorance and capable of obscuring the nature of the Ātman.

विरोध्यन्तरविध्वंसो दृष्टो लोके विरोधिना ।

तमःप्रकाशवत्कर्म नाज्ञानेन विरुध्यते ॥९३॥

It is seen in the world that there is destruction of opponent by another who is opposing him, in the same way as light (opposes) darkness. And a ritual act is not opposed by any ignorance. [93]

Here it is argued that the performance of ritual activity itself proceeds from ignorance alone and, therefore, it cannot remove ignorance which obscures the true nature of Ātman. This refers to the meaning of *vyavadhānāntara* in the preceding verse.

मतमज्ञानमेवैतत्कर्म नाशयतीति चेत् ।
नाविरोधात्तमो हन्ति कर्म किञ्चित्कदा चन ॥९४॥

If (again) it is held that this (performance of) the activity destroys only ignorance, there is still no opposition between the two and thus it cannot be that the activity can destroy ignorance. [94]

अज्ञानमनभिव्यक्तिर्बोधोऽभिव्यक्तिरात्मनः ।
बाध्यबाधकभावोऽयं विरोधाद्धटते तयोः ॥९५॥

Ignorance consists in not allowing (the true nature of the Ātman) to be revealed, whereas knowledge consists in the revealing of the nature of the Ātman, therefore, the relation of what is to be stultified and what stultifies it can occur between the two, owing to the basic opposition of them. [95]

This verse completes the argument which is stated in verse 93 above.

विरुद्धधर्मकत्वं तु मिथो नाज्ञानकर्मणोः ।
बाध्यबाधकभावोऽयं न तयोर्युज्यते ततः ॥९६॥

But, in the case of ignorance and ritual activity being mutually

contradictory and the consequent relation of the stultified and stultifier cannot stand to (any) reason. [96]

कर्मणोऽदृष्टसामर्थ्यं यद्यज्ञानापनुन्मतम् ।
ज्ञानेनाज्ञानविध्वस्तेः प्रात्यक्ष्यात्तदसद्वचः ॥९७॥

If it is held that the potency of the *adr̥ṣṭa* resulting from activity is the remover of ignorance, then, a statement of that could not hold good, since the destruction of ignorance by knowledge is a matter of direct perception. [97]

Read SP: *dr̥ṣṭe sati adr̥ṣṭakalpanānyāyyā*.

तुषतण्डुलनिर्मोके प्रत्यक्षे ह्यवघातजे ॥९८॥
सामर्थ्यात्तद्विनिष्पत्तिर्नाग्निहोत्रादिकर्मणः ।
कल्प्यते तद्वदेवेह प्रत्यक्षेणावबोधतः ॥९९॥
प्रत्यगज्ञानविध्वंसे सामर्थ्यान्नित्यकर्मणः ।
न युक्तोऽज्ञानविध्वंसो बलात्कल्पयितुं त्वया ॥१००॥

When the removal of husk from rice (grains) as resulting from their being pounded is a matter directly perceived, [98]
effecting this¹ result by (the performance) of Agnihotra etc.,
owing to the potency, being imagined (is unreasonable); in
the same way, (there is the destruction of ignorance) by
knowledge directly perceived. [99]

Therefore, it is not reasonable that you hold per force² that
there can be destruction of ignorance about (the nature of)
the inner self owing to the potency of obligatory ritual. [100]

¹That is, *tuṣataṇḍūlanirmoka*.

²That is, without any authoritative means.

कर्मभिश्चाविरुद्धं यद्देवताद्रव्यतत्त्वगम् ।
समुच्चयेत तज्ज्ञानं न तु कर्मविरोधि यत् ॥१०१॥

(Only) that knowledge, which pertains to the nature of the

deity and the material, is not opposed to ritual activity and is combined with them; but not (that knowledge) which is opposed to ritual activity. [101]

This verse is based on the *prima facie* view which seeks to find support in the argument *yad eva ...* in CU 1.1.10.

कल्प्ये चादृष्टसामर्थ्ये नित्यानां कर्मणां त्वया ।
विरुद्धं कर्माभिः किं वा यदुत्पत्त्यादिवर्जितम् ॥१०२॥

Even if you were to imagine the potency of *adrṣṭa* in the case of the obligatory ritual, (you have to point out) if it is opposed to the actions or it is devoid of (any relation to) production etc. [102]

This argument proceeds from granting the potency of *adrṣṭa* and its answer indicates that, in the case of liberation, its relation to production etc. cannot be entertained.

न जन्यजनकं वस्तु न द्रव्यगुणकर्मभिः ।
जन्यते यत्फलं तादृक्कल्प्यतां नित्यकर्मणः ॥१०३॥

Let that kind of result of the obligatory ritual be imagined which does not bring about a thing which creates what is to be created and also which is not produced by materials, various qualities and activities. [103]

We follow the reading in the NKL edition as opposed to *janyam janakam* in the AnSS edition.

किं वोत्पत्त्यादिमत्किञ्चित्सामर्थ्यं यत्र कर्मणः
तादृक्फलं प्रकल्प्यं स्याद्यथा न्याय्यं तथास्त्वह ॥१०४॥

That kind of result should be imagined towards which a ritual activity has some potency, associated with production etc.; let that be here, in this respect, in accordance with what is suitable

(nyāyya).

[104]

अवश्यं चेत्प्रकल्प्यं स्यात्पुंस्प्रवृत्तिप्रयोजकम् ।
तदुत्पत्त्यादिमत्स्वेव युक्तं कल्पयितुं फलम् ॥१०५॥

If that (kind of result) is necessary to be imagined as promoting a human being's activity, it is proper to imagine such one as is suitably connected with things that are related to production etc. [105]

अर्थापत्तेश्च तत्रैव क्षीणत्वान्मोक्षकल्पने ।
न सामर्थ्यं यतस्तस्मान्न युक्ता मुक्तिकल्पना ॥१०६॥

Since (the means of knowing, viz.) Arthāpatti has exhausted itself in conveying only that,¹ it does not have potence to convey the notion of liberation; therefore, it is not reasonable to propose liberation (as the result of obligatory ritual). [106]

¹Namely, referring to production etc.

नित्यस्य कर्मणः कार्यं पारिशेष्यसमाश्रयात् ।
युक्ता कल्पयितुं मुक्तिरन्यस्यासंभवो यतः ॥१०७॥

(One can argue thus:) 'Because it is by resorting to the principle of residuum that we have to imagine the effect of obligatory ritual; it is (only) reasonable to think of liberation, since there is no possibility of another. [107]

मोक्षात्फलान्तरैर्योगः काम्यानां स्याच्छ्रुतत्वतः ।
नित्यकर्माभिसंबन्धो मुक्तेः स्यात्पारिशेष्यतः ॥१०८॥

'In the case of the rituals proceeding from desire, there is connection of them with results other than liberation; for, they are (so) heard; but the relation of obligatory ritual should be (only) to liberation, owing to the principle of residuum. [108]

मैवं कर्मफलव्यक्तेरानन्त्यादुपपद्यते ।
पारिशेष्यनयद्वारा मुक्तेः कर्मफलात्मता ॥१०९॥

(The answer is:) Do not say so, since there stands to reason the idea of the appearance of the result of ritual activity in innumerable ways, (but) liberation as the result of obligatory ritual (as posited by you) is only through the principle of residuum.

[109]

The idea of this verse is to be explained in the following verse.

पुंस्कामविषयाणां तु नेयत्तेहोपपद्यते ।
काम्यकर्मफलानां हि तथा तत्साधनस्य च ॥११०॥

And (*tu*) there is here¹ no reasonable counting (*iyattā*) pertaining to men's desires; so also, of the result of the rituals proceeding from desires, and, indeed, in a similar way of the means of obtaining the same.

[110]

¹This refers to *karmaphalabhūmi*, the word for activity and its result.

देशकालाद्यनियमात्पुमिच्छानामनन्तता ।
तथा तत्साधनानां च काम्येष्टार्थप्रयुक्तितः ॥१११॥

There is innumerableness of the desires of men owing to non-restriction in respect of the region and time (for them); so also, (it is there) in respect of their means, since they are employed towards the results suitable as the objects of desire.

[111]

NKL paraphrases *kāmyeṣṭa* as *kāmayogyatvād iṣṭa*.

प्रतिप्राणि च वैचित्र्याद्देशकालादिहेतुतः ।

इच्छातत्साधनानां च स्यादानन्त्यं तथा सति ॥११२॥
 पारिशेष्यनयो न स्यात्सर्वज्ञस्याप्यनन्ततः ।
 न च कर्मफलत्वेन पारिशेष्यं प्रसिध्यति ॥११३॥
 नित्यकर्मफलत्वेन मुक्तेरपि परिग्रहात् ।
 न पारिशेष्यसंसिद्धिस्तथापीहोपपद्यते ॥११४॥

Further, owing to the variety caused by region and time etc.¹
 (and) from person to person (*pratiprāṇi*), there would be
 innumerableness of the desires and the means of fulfilment
 of them. (And) that being so, [112]
 there would not be (involved) the principle of residuum in
 the case of even the omniscient (person), owing to innu-
 merableness² and there cannot thus be established the nature
 of the result of (the obligatory ritual) by the principle of
 residuum. [113]

Even by accepting liberation as the result of the obligatory
 ritual, its nature, as determined by the principle of residuum
 cannot be here³ reasonable. [114]

¹This refers to *icchā*.

²*anantataḥ* stands for *anantatvataḥ*.

³That is, in Vedānta.

नित्यकर्मफलत्वं चेन्मुक्तेरप्यभ्युपेयते ।
 कर्मकार्यसजातित्वात्पारिशेष्यनयः कुतः ॥११५॥

If in the case of liberation also its nature as the result of
 obligatory ritual is accepted then owing to its being same kind
 of effect produced by activity how could there be the principle
 of residuum applicable? [115]

अर्थापत्तिक्षयोऽतः स्यादन्यथाप्युपपत्तिः ।
 उत्पत्त्यादेरन्यतमो न च मोक्ष इहेष्यते ॥११६॥
 उत्पत्त्यादिविरुद्धत्वान्मोक्षरूपस्य नित्यतः ।
 नोत्पाद्यो वा विकार्यो वा विकारप्रतिषेधतः ॥११७॥

Therefore, there would be given up (lit. loss of the notion of) Arthāpatti, since there can be expectation (of the result of obligatory ritual) in some other way; (then) any one of production etc. cannot be here³ accepted as liberation. [116]
And, since its nature is ever opposed to production etc., therefore, it can never be produced, nor can it be modified, as there is rejection (of the notion of) modification. [117]

NKL edition begins verse 116 as *arthāpatteḥ kṣayo 'taḥ*

व्रीहिपात्रादिवन्नापि मोक्षः संस्कार्य इष्यते ।

असाधनत्वान्नाप्याप्यः प्रत्यङ्मात्रस्वभावतः ॥११८॥

Further, liberation is not accepted a thing to be purified like rice grains, utensils etc. So also, because it is not associated with any means, it is not what is to be obtained, since only such is the very nature of the inner self. [118]

नित्यस्य सर्वकर्मभ्यो वैलक्षण्याच्च कारणात् ।

कारणानुविधायित्वात्फलमप्यस्तु चेत्तथा ॥११९॥

(It can be argued:) 'Since there is reason for obligatory ritual to be different from all (other) rituals' the result of them, viz. to be in conformity with the cause, should also be likewise different.' [119]

नैवं कर्मत्वसारूप्यात्सालक्षण्यं भवेन्न किम् ।

काम्यकर्मफलैर्नित्यफलस्येत्यभिधीयताम् ॥१२०॥

'(This is the answer:) No, it is not so. Why should there not be similarity of the results (of obligatory ritual) with the result of other rituals proceeding from desire? Let this be told.'

[120]

वैलक्षण्यं निमित्ताच्चेन्न नैमित्तिकतुल्यतः ।

क्षामवत्यादिवन्नित्यं कस्मान्न स्यात्सलक्षणम् ॥१२१॥

If the *prima facie* view will be 'dissimilarity (of the result) is on account of the cause'; the Siddhāntin's view is: 'No, (there could not be dissimilarity), since they are not on a par with what proceeds from some causes¹ exactly in the same way as the rituals called Kṣāmavatī;² why then should not the obligatory ritual have the same character as any other rituals? [121]

The idea of the *prima facie* view is: Other rituals proceed from desires on the part of sacrificers, while obligatory rituals do not proceed from them. This explains why they are dissimilar.

¹The cause for an obligatory ritual is the statement in the Śruti *yāvajjīvam juhūyāt* which means that those rituals have to be performed as long as one is alive.

²This is a ritual prescribed for one whose house goes on fire on account of the ritual fire. SP refers in full the passage from *Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa*. SP adds more examples of some rites which are performed for some reason. Therefore, it is understood, on the basis of them, that obligatory rituals are on a par with Kṣāmavatī etc.

न हि लौकिकचक्षुर्भिवैलक्षण्यात्समर्थ्यते ।

उलूकचक्षुषोऽरूपाद्रसादिग्रहणं क्वचित् ॥१२२॥

It also cannot justify (that obligatory rituals differing from other rituals must have the result, viz. liberation), because of its dissimilarity (with the means to it) in the same way as the eyes of an owl are different from the eyes of human beings; because, in the case of an owl's eyes, there is never noticed perception of taste etc. [122]

A very fastidious argument from the *prima facie* view: Just as an owl's eyes are different from a human's eyes, so obligatory rituals, though with the result, viz liberation, should be different.

This is answered by pointing out that the eyes of an owl cannot perform any function other than seeing. The argument is clarified by the following verse.

रसादिग्रहणे शक्तिलोके दृष्टा न चक्षुषः ।
सामर्थ्यस्याग्रहात्तस्मात् विरुद्धा प्रकल्प्यते ॥१२३॥

In the world, there is never noticed the capacity of the eyes for experiencing taste, (therefore, that capacity to taste), though opposed (i.e. different), is never imagined (to be in an owl's eye), for (the simple reason that). [123]

सामर्थ्यं यस्य यत्रैव दृष्टं तत्रैव तस्य तत् ।
सुदूरमपि गत्वेह ह्यतिशीतिरपीष्यते ॥१२४॥

A capacity which is seen in respect of what must belong only to that; therefore, even if one goes so far as to cite the example of an owl's eyes. there is still here, in this respect, a certain excellence also.¹ [124]

This refers to men's eyes which are, in the act of perceiving, superior to the eyes of owls (*atīṣīti*). The idea is that liberation cannot certainly be the result of obligatory rituals though they might produce some other results.

कर्मकार्यान्तरं नित्यं विषदध्यादिवद्ध्रुवम् ।
यदारभत इत्युक्तं तच्चाप्यस्तु स्वर्गोचरे ॥१२५॥

And, as to what is said, viz. obligatory rituals, indeed begin to produce some other effects of the activities, in the same way as poison, curd etc.;¹ let that be in respect of their own objects . [125]

This refers to verse 32 above.

¹They are the four, viz. production etc.

यदेव विद्ययेत्यादि श्रुतेरपि वचस्तथा ॥१२६॥

In the same way is to be understood the statement from the Śruti, viz. *yad eve vidyayā*.¹ [126]

¹Cf. CU 1.1.10: *yad eva vidyayā karoti śraddhayopaniṣadā tad eva vīryavattaram bhavati*.

देवयाजिसकाशाच्च विशेषश्चात्मयाजिनः ।
तदाहुरिति विस्पष्टं श्रूयते श्रुतिवाक्यतः ॥१२७॥

And it is clearly heard in a statement of the Śruti, which (begins) with the words *yad āhuḥ* that there is some (particular) distinction of one who offers a sacrifice to the Ātman from one who offers a sacrifice to (some) deity/deities. [127]

This is a reference to *Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa* 11.2.6.30. SP clarifies the meaning by the statement: *sarvakratuyājīnām ātmayājī viśiṣyate*.

मनुनाप्यात्मयाजीति यदुक्तं परदर्शने ।
तत्रापि च समं पश्यन्नात्मयाजी भवत्ययम् ।
समदृष्टिप्रशंसैषा यदि वा भूतपूर्वतः ॥१२८॥

Manu also has said *ātmayājī* in respect of seeing the highest (Ātman); in that statement, there is a praise in the words *samam paśyann ātmayājī bhavaty ayam* of seeing all things as equal. And, this may be (a praise of the subsequent condition) to that, in which (the sacrificer) was earlier. [128]

SP refers to *Manusmṛti* 12.82, 83, 86 and 91 in support.

आत्मसंस्कृतये कर्म यः करोति यथाविधि ।
आत्मयाजीति मनुना स एवेहाभिधीयते ॥१२९॥

Here,¹ Manu has spoken of that person as *ātmayājī* who

performs the ritual activity according to the prescription for purifying himself. [129]

This has a basis in the *Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa* cited above. Also refer to the preceding verse.

¹See the passage referring to it in the last verse mentioned in the note on the preceding verse, viz. 12.86.

सुसंस्कृतधियः पुंसो यथोक्तैः कर्मभिः समम् ।
इह वामुत्र वा ज्ञानं जायते मोक्षकृद्ध्रुवम् ॥१३०॥

In the case of a person, who has purified his intellect by the (performance of) rituals that are prescribed (for him) knowledge there immediately arises, whether in this world or in the yonder, which certainly leads to (his) liberation. [130]

Cf. *mahāyajñaiś ca yajñaiś ca brāhmīyaṃ kriyate tanuḥ* (*Manusmṛti* 1.28).

ब्रह्मा विश्वसृजोवाक्याद्देवसाष्टर्यतिरेकतः ।
भूतापीति मनुः साक्षाद्दर्शयत्यविनश्वरीम् ॥१३१॥

(Also) in the sentence *brahmā viśvasṛjaḥ*, Manu has made (lit. makes) a clear (*sākṣāt*) mention of the eternal merger (of beings) into the basic elements over and above (their) assuming similarity with the deities (superintending over their organs). [131]

SP states as the basis of *brahmā* ... (*Manusmṛti* 12.50), viz. this verse from *Manusmṛti* 12.24, 26, 30, 41 and 51. Also he cites further *Manusmṛti* 12.88cd, 89, 90ab.

अत्येतीति तु ये पाठं कुर्वते तेऽविपश्चितः ।
यथोक्तदोषदुष्टत्वान्नात्ययो बोधतोऽन्यतः ॥१३२॥

Those who recite *atyeti*¹ as against this word *apyeti*² are

not intelligent, since there is not any other transgression (*atyaya*) than the knowledge (of the results of the rituals), owing to the fact that (that *atyaya*) is beset with faults which we have shown. [132]

¹Sureśvara has earlier (in verse 131) mentioned *bhūtāpīti* on the basis of Manu's text before him (as related to the reading) *apyeti*. Now he controverts the reading *atyeti* (adopted by others) which signifies the result that is effected by ignorance.

स्पष्टार्थमुत्तरं भाष्यं न व्याख्यानमपेक्षते ।
यतोऽत उत्तरो ग्रन्थः सम्यग्व्याख्यायतेऽधुना ॥१३३॥

Since the subsequent commentary (by Śāṅkara) ¹ is clear in meaning, it does not require any explanation by us. Therefore, now is explained the subsequent portion of the text.² [133]

¹Refer to BUB (p.410 line 5 to p.414 line 4): *na cārthavādatvam adhyāyasya ... brāhmaṇam ārabhyate*.

²Read: *karmaphalasya saṁsārasya pradarśanāyaiva*.

Verses 134-142 are an exposition of the BU 3.3.1.

प्रयोज्यस्य हि बन्धस्य प्रयोजकमिहोदितम् ।
प्राधान्येनेह कर्मैव तदन्यत्तूपसर्जनम् ॥१३४॥

Here ¹ was stated the cause of bondage for one on whom ritual is enjoined. And now ² is principally ³ pointed out that ritual activity itself is the cause and (any) other (cause) is merely (*tu*) subsidiary. [134]

¹This refers to the portion of the Ārtabhāga Brāhmaṇa.

²This refers to the Bhujyu Brāhmaṇa.

³This is to exclude time etc.

परिच्छिन्नापरिच्छिन्नं तच्च कर्म स्वभावतः ॥१३५॥

परिच्छिन्नस्य संव्याप्तिर्व्याख्याता पूर्वमेव तु ।
अपरिच्छिन्नसंव्याप्तिर्भुज्युप्रश्नेन भण्यते ॥१३६॥

And that ritual act is by nature limited and unlimited (both).

[135]

To begin with (*tu*), the extent of what is limited has been already explained¹ and now, in the form of the question by Bhujyu,² is stated the extent of what is not limited. [136]

¹This refers to the Udgītha Brāhmaṇa.

²Add: also in the form of the answer by Yājñavalkya.

ब्रह्माण्डाद्वहिरन्तश्च समष्टिव्यष्टिरूपिणः ।
व्याप्तिर्हिरण्यगर्भस्य बन्धज्ञानाय भण्यते ॥१३७॥

Now is told (for the full) knowledge about the bondage (caused by activity) the magnitude of Hiranyagarbha, who assumes outside the world and inside it, the forms, viz. (i) unified form and (ii) particular (*samaṣṭi-vyaṣṭi*). [137]

The purpose of this verse is to point out that there is not left out even a bit of Hiranyagarbha's magnitude. The kind of this magnitude is expected to effect aversion to ritual activity and aspiration for liberation.

वैषम्यप्रतिपत्त्यर्थं प्रश्नस्य त्रासजन्मने ।
प्रतिवादिधियो यत्नाद्भुज्युनाख्यायिकोच्यते ॥१३८॥

Now, a narrative is purposely (*yatnāt*) told by Bhujyu for (Yājñavalkya's) grasping the difficulty¹ of the question and also for affecting confusion² on his part. [138]

¹SP paraphrases *vaiṣamya* as *alaukikārtha* 'non-worldly nature of the thing asked'.

²SP paraphrases *trāsa* as *vyāmoha* and further states that 'full confusion' is the means to win victory over the opponent in

a bet; *jalpa* and *trāsa* could be alternatively translated as trouble or fear.

लोकानामवसानानि पर्यपृच्छाम तं यदा ।
गन्धर्वं तत्र काले तमथाब्रूम क्व तेऽभवन् ॥१३९॥

Then 'at that time'¹ we had asked that Gandharva the limit of various regions; and then we asked (*abriūma*) 'where did they² go?' [139]

Here, in this verse, Sureśvara is very cryptic while summarizing the contents of the beginning of the narrative.

¹SP states that 'at that time' is the meaning of the word 'then'.

²For the name of these, see *Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa* 13.5.4.1-3.

अप्रसिद्धाभिधानोक्त्या वादिव्यामोहसिद्धये ।
अश्वमेधकृतो वक्ति भुज्युः पारिक्षिता इति ॥१४०॥

Bhuju mentions the performers of the Aśvamedha sacrifice as the names (of Pārikṣitas), in order that there is confusion on the part of the opponents (*vādins*) by the utterance of a name not as well-known names. [140]

SP explains the name Pārikṣitas as derived from *parikṣit* 'that whereby is destroyed the sin all around, such as *brahmahatyā*

Cf. BUB for quotation: *bhrūṇahatyāśvamedhabhyām na param puṇyapāpayoh* as a line for defining a sin; it is stated there as from some Smṛti (not traced).

पारिक्षिताः क्व तेऽभवन्नित्युक्तिस्त्रिरिहोदिता ।
त्रिरुक्तेरुपयोगोऽयं विभागेनोपवर्ण्यते ॥१४१॥

Where did they go, the Pārikṣitas? In this, there is first the statement of the name three times in the narrative, (therefore)

this mention of the name three times it is now (or, here *ayam*) explained, one after another (*vibhāgena*). [141]

प्रश्नार्था प्रथमोक्तिः स्यात्प्रत्युक्त्यर्था तथा परा ।
तृतीया याज्ञवल्क्यार्थं तिस्रोऽप्युक्तीरितीरयेत् ॥१४२॥

The first statement is for asking a question (to the Gandharva) and the second is (in relation to) the answer (by him) and the third (is a question) put to Yājñavalkya—thus should one say that there are three statements. [142]

Now, in verses 143-144, there is exposition on the meaning of BU 3.3.2. This begins with the description of the magnitude of the universe (bhuvana) and then discusses the question: 'Where were the Pārikṣitas?'

भानुस्यन्दनगत्याध्वा मितो यावानहर्निशम् ।
द्वात्रिंशद्गुणितस्तावान्व्याप्तो भानुगभस्तिभिः ॥१४३॥

Thirty-two times of (whatever be the extent of) the path covered, (*mita*)¹ by the movement of the sun's chariot in a day and night is pervaded by rays of the sun.² [143]

¹This is from verb root *mā* 'to measure'.

²SP states that this refers to the expanse of the earth that is covered by rays of the sun and the moon both. Perhaps this is suggested by *aharniśam*. This is based on a passage:

*ravicandramasoryāvān mayukhair avabhāsyate /
sasamudrasaricchailā taratī pṛthivī smṛtā //*

द्वात्रिंशद्विरहोरात्रैर्यावन्तं देशमुद्रजन् ।
मण्डलीकुरुते भानुस्तावांल्लोकरवेरितः ।
शरीरमेतद्वैराजं देवताकरणं महत् ॥१४४॥

And that much region which is so described¹ (in popular speech) as the sun encircles by (continuously) moving for

thirty-two days and nights—this is the body² of Virāj; and that is great³ body of the deity.³ [144]

¹*lokaraveritaḥ* is paraphrased by SP as *lokaśabdaḥ tenerita ukto viṣayīkṛta iti yāvat*.

²SP states that this refers to fire as based on the Śruti: *agnir mūrdhā*.

³This refers to the grossness of the one unified form mentioned earlier.

इयानेव तु देशोऽयं प्राणिनां भोगसिद्धिं कृत् ।
अग्न्यादिदेवतानां च व्याप्तिरेतावती मता ॥१४५॥

Only this much is the region which brings fulfilment of the desires of beings (*bhogasiddhi*). So also, this much is understood to be the extent of the deities, Agni etc. (related to sense-organs)? [145]

This verse explains words *taṁ samantam* in BU 3.3.2.

लोकात्परं निरालोकः सर्वप्राणिविवर्जितः ।
पर्येति लोकं द्विस्तावत्पृथिवी पूर्वमानतः ॥१४६॥

Beyond (this) region, there is what is called Nirāloka, which is devoid of all beings.¹ And, as for (*tāvat*) the earth, it pervades double that region whose extent is stated earlier.² [146]

¹This is to point out that it is not *bhogabhūmi* 'region for the enjoyment for beings'.

²This is the meaning of *taṁ samantam*. Yet the translation is doubtful!

लोकालोकगिरेर्भागः सर्वप्राणिविवर्जितः ।
समुद्रो द्विगुणो भूमेः परस्तादवतिष्ठते ॥१४७॥

That portion of Lokāloka mountain is devoid of all beings. Beyond the earth there exists an ocean³ which has double the magnitude of the earth. [147]

यं घनोदमिति प्राहुः पुराणज्ञा विपश्चितः ।
ब्रह्माण्डसंपुटस्तस्मात्परेणाभ्येति सर्वतः ॥१४८॥

That region have the wise knowers of Purāṇas called Ghanoda. And beyond that, there exists all around the cover of the universe. [148]

SP states for this the Purāṇic authority, viz. verses from the *Vāyupurāṇa* 1.49.153; 1.50.82; *Brahmāṇḍapurāṇa* 1.19.160; 1.21.24.

पृथिव्यनन्तरं साक्षात्समुद्रः श्रूयते श्रुतौ ।
अण्डाद्वहिः पुराणे तु विरौधे स्मृतिबाधनम् ॥१४९॥

In the Śruti is directly heard that there is an ocean immediately after (i.e. around) the earth, but, in the Purāṇa, it is stated to be outside the universe. In such a conflict, there is (to be accepted) the stultification of the Smṛti.¹ [149]

SP clarifies this conflict by citing an illustration: there is a Smṛti text *audumbharī sarvā veṣṭayitavyā* and it is opposed by the Śruti text *audumbharīm spr̥ṣṭvodgāyet*. There is thus a conflict in this case. One might hold the Smṛti text as based on some Śruti which is to be inferred (as in the case of *aṣṭakā*). But this is of no help, since, when there is a direct statement from the Śruti opposed to some such inferred Śruti, the former prevails. See *virodhe tv anapekṣam syād ... asati hy anumānam* (Jaimini Sūtra 1.3.3).

¹This refers to Purāṇa.

व्याख्येह संप्रवृत्तेयमश्वमेधकृतां पथः ।
स चैवं शक्यते वक्तुं लोकालोकादिमानतः ॥१५०॥

This is thus stated as the description (*vyākhyā*) of the path of the performers of the Aśvamedha sacrifice.¹ And it is pertinent here to state that in order to describe in relation to the 'magnitude of *loka* 'world' and *aloka* etc.² [150]

¹There can be doubt as to why there has been given the magnitude of the universe. That is answered in second line.

²The word 'etc.' refers to earth.

यथोक्तपरिमाणेन ध्यानकर्मविवक्षया ।
लोकालोकादिकार्याणां परिमाणवचस्ततः ॥१५१॥

Therefore, there is a statement about the magnitude of *loka* and *aloka* etc., which are the effects of the rituals, with the intention to explain the nature of meditation on them as having the magnitudes (of each as) stated. [151]

अस्ति तावदयं लोको यथोक्तपरिमाणवान् ।
भानुप्रकाशसंव्याप्तो विराजो विस्तृतिस्त्वयम् ॥१५२॥

To begin with, there is, indeed, this world having the magnitude which is stated and is pervaded by light of the sun¹—and this is the extent of Virāj. [152]

This explains *ayam ekaḥ* in 3.3.2.

¹Cf. SP: *bhānuśabdas candramaso 'pi bhavaty upalakṣaṇam*.

ततो लोकाद्विनिष्क्रम्य द्विगुणा पृथिवी स्थिता ।
समन्ताद्विगुणोऽब्धिश्च संवेष्टय पृथिवीं स्थितः ॥१५३॥

Having come out of the Loka, there exists the earth (which is) double in size. And all around the earth exists the ocean, having twice its dimension. [153]

This verse refers to *tam* ... in 3.3.2.

तं समुद्रं समुत्तीर्य यदन्यत्परतस्ततः ।
गन्तव्यमुपमानोक्तिः क्रियते तस्य सांप्रतम् ॥१५४॥

That other thing, which is beyond that, i.e. after crossing the ocean, is to be reached. And now there is presented a statement of a simile for it. [154]

This verse is introductory to *yāvatī kṣurasya* ... in 3.3.2.

कपालसंधिगं व्योम सामर्थ्यात्परिमाणतः ।
यावतीत्युपमोक्तेह श्रुत्याविष्क्रियतेऽनया ॥१५५॥
तेन पारिक्षितान्खेन चित्यात्मत्वमुपागतान् ।
अन्तः संस्थाप्य नयति समष्टिव्यष्टितामसुः ॥१५६॥

There exists the sky in the hole of the cover (of the world) as is determined by (its) magnitude. Here is the simile stated in the word *yāvatī* ... And hereby (i.e. through the hole ...) ¹ is explained (the simile) by the Śruti. [155]

That the Ātman leads the Pāriksitas, the Aśvamedha sacrificers, who have come to attain the status of the worship-deserving Ātman (i.e. Sūtra), namely those who, after having well-controlled them as either joined together or as several (attained the same). [156]

¹ Because the world described earlier has such a large magnitude, one could only posit the idea of a hole.

चित्यात्मात्र सुपर्णः स्यादादित्यात्माथवोच्यते ।
इमं देशं यतः प्राप्तानादित्याद्युक्तवर्त्मना ॥१५७॥

In this context, the worship-deserving Ātman is the eagle (*suparṇa*) ¹ or perhaps it is of the nature of Āditya, ² because (this one Ātman leads them) who have reached this place by the path beginning with sun (as) already described. [157]

This explains the meaning of *tān indraḥ* ... in 3.3.2.

¹*suparṇa* can stand for Virāj or Sūtra.

²*suparṇa* may be a metaphorical description of the sun.

एवं पारिक्षितान्सर्वानग्निरिन्द्रो वियत्पथा ।
निर्गमय्याण्डतः प्रादाद्वायवे सूक्ष्मरूपिणे ॥१५८॥

Having thus led all those sacrificers of the Aśvamedha by the path in the sky,¹ Agni-Indra took them out and finally handed them over to Vāyu which has a subtle form.² [158]

¹This refers to *kha* in verse 155 above.

²This is based on BU 3.7.2: *vāyur vai gautama tat sūtram*. Also Vāyu is known to have a more subtle form than Sūtra.

अश्वमेधमखापूर्वं देवताग्निरिहोच्यते ।
वायुवेष्टनमेतच्च यदपूर्वमिहोदितम् ॥१५९॥

Here, the deity is named Agni, as the *apūrvā* produced (by the performance of) the Aśvamedha sacrifice; and this is covering (of the Pāriksitas) by Vāyu which is mentioned here as *apūrvā*. [159]

Cf. *apūrvam eva phalapradam, tad eva dharmāṇām prayojakam. vighrahavyas tu devatā naiva santi. agnyādyabhāve 'pi apūrvā-sattvād eve ...* (*Vṛtti on Mīmāṃsādarśana* by Kevalānanda 9.1.4)

वायुरेव ततोऽपूर्वमभिव्यक्ततनुर्मतः ।
अनन्तरमपूर्वस्य कार्यं निर्दिश्यतेऽधुना ॥१६०॥

Therefore Vāyu itself is considered to be possessed of a perceptible form. Now is mentioned later the effect of (i.e. produced by) *apūrvā*. [160]

पारिक्षितानथादाय वायुः स्वात्मसमाश्रयान् ।
आपाद्य गमयामास तत्र प्राणैकरूपिणः ॥१६१॥

Later, Vāyu took with it the performers of the Aśvamedha sacrifice, who had resorted to it and brought them to the form of only Prāṇa as their (final end). [161]

अश्वमेधकृतो यत्र पूर्वे तस्थुरितो गताः ।
वाय्वात्मा गमयामास समष्टिव्यष्टितामये ॥१६२॥

Where the performers of the Aśvamedha sacrifice had earlier stayed, there did the Ātman, in the form of Vāyu, lead them so that they obtained the collective or particular forms. [162]

अश्वमेधमखापूर्वफलप्रकथनेन या ।
प्रवृत्ताख्यायिकां सेयं समाप्तानवशेषतः ॥१६३॥

Thus here ends fully that narrative, which had begun with the statement of the result of the Aśvamedha sacrifice, in the statement of *apūrvā*. [163]

प्रश्नशेषमथेदानीं स्वयमेव श्रुतिर्जगौ ।
यदि वा याज्ञवल्क्योक्तिरेवमेवेति यद्वचः ॥१६४॥
तस्मादित्यादिकं वाक्यं श्रुतेरिति च निर्दिशेत् ।
वायुमेव स गन्धर्वः प्रशशंसातिविस्मितः ॥१६५॥

Now, the Śruti itself has stated (lit. sung) the remaining part of the question. Or it could perhaps be, the words *evam eva* are the statement made by Yājñavalkya. [164]

One should point out that the statement beginning with the word *tu tasmāt* is made by the Śruti (itself). That Gandharva, who was greatly wonderstruck, praised only Vāyu. [165]

This explains the purpose of the later part of the Śruti: *evam* ... in 3.3.2.

वायुं मुक्त्वा बहिर्यस्मान्नान्यस्या विद्यतेऽबहिः ।
देवताया गतिस्तस्माद्वायुर्ज्यायानिहैकलः ॥१६६॥

Since Vāyu, being kept aside, there cannot be the existence (lit. movement) of any other deity, therefore, it is Vāyu alone who is superior (to others). [166]

यत एवमतो ज्ञेयो वायुरेव न चापरः ।
व्यष्टिः समष्टिरित्येवमण्डादन्तर्बहिश्च सः ॥१६७॥

Since this is so, therefore, Vāyu alone has to be known and not any other, as particular or collective forms—thus he is both inside and outside the universe. [167]

These explain the meaning of *tasmāt* ... in 3.3.2.

व्याप्तिर्विशेषरूपेण व्यष्टिरित्यभिधीयते ।
सामान्येन समष्टिश्च वायुरेव द्विधा स्थितः ॥१६८॥

The word *vyāṣṭi* is used in the sense of pervasion by some particular form and *samāṣṭi* in (the sense of) a general form; thus it is that Vāyu alone that remains (in this universe) in a twofold form. [168]

This is the meaning of *vayur eva* in 3.3.2.

वस्तु यल्लक्ष्यते किञ्चिज्जगत्यसिंमश्चराचरे ।
सामान्येन विशेषेण वायुरेव तदीक्ष्यते ॥१६९॥

Whatever thing is noticed in this world, which moves and which does not move, is understood only as Vāyu in a general and a particular form. [169]

न सामान्यविशेषाभ्यां वायोरन्यस्य वस्तुनः ।
संबन्धो वायुरेवेति सावधारणवाक्यतः ॥१७०॥

(In this context) no other thing than Vāyu has any relation to the general and the particular forms, for (it is known from

(the emphasising statement) *vāyur eva* 'Vāyu alone'.

[170]

अन्ययोगव्यवच्छेदे प्रशंसेयमसोर्भवेत् ।
न त्वयोगव्यवच्छेद उत्कर्षस्तादृगिष्यते ॥१७१॥

In case there is another thing determined as related (to the general and the particular forms) then, that would be the praise of the inner self (i.e. Asu/Prāṇa), but that kind of excellence, resulting from such an improper relation, is not accepted (here).

[171]

अश्वमेधक्रतोरेष समष्टिव्यष्टिलक्षणः ।
महिमाविष्कृतः श्रुत्या विद्यायुक्तस्य संभ्रमात् ॥१७२॥

This is (thus revealed) as the greatness of the Aśvamedha sacrifice, which is characterized as having a unified and a particular form, because they might posit a confusion on the part of one connected with knowledge.

[172]

समष्टिव्यष्टिरूपं यो वायुमात्मेति संश्रितः ।
सोऽपहन्ति पुनर्मृत्युं मृत्युमात्मानमेत्यसौ ॥१७३॥

He, who has resorted to Vāyu as the Ātman, having unified and particular forms, averts (lit. destroys) death (which might come) again; he reaches his Death, viz. Ātman.

[173]

इति श्रीबृहदारण्यकोपनिषद्भाष्यवार्तिके तृतीयाध्यायस्य
तृतीयं ब्राह्मणम् ॥३॥



**BRHADĀRANYAKOPANIṢAD-
BHĀṢYA-VĀRTIKA**

3.4

Uṣasta Brāhmaṇam

BU 3.1 to 3.3 dealt with transmigration of a being and 3.4 to 3.9 refer to the knowledge which destroys ignorance, the basis of the undesirable things. This is explained in verses 1-3ab.

ऐकात्म्यानवबोधस्य कार्यमुक्तमशेषतः ।
तन्मूलध्वस्तयेऽथोर्ध्वं परो ग्रन्थोऽवतार्यते ॥१॥

The entire world of effects resulting from non-knowing of the singleness of the Ātman has been described. (Now) for the purposes of the removal (lit. destruction) of that root(-cause) is introduced the subsequent part of the Upaniṣad.¹ [1]

¹The subsequence part refers to 3.4 to 3.9 and not merely to 3.4.

पुण्यापुण्यप्रयुक्तः सन्ग्रहातिग्रहबन्धनः ।
आब्रह्मास्थाणु चाजस्रं यः संसरति मूढधीः ॥२॥
सोऽयमुक्तस्तथोत्कर्षः परः पुण्यस्य चोदितः ।

He, who, from the Brahman up to a pillar,¹ being incited by merit and demerit and having the bondage of *graha* and *atigraha*, is of deluded (or, foolish) intellect and ever keeps on transmigrating. [2]

This, then, is put forth here (in 3.1-3.3), as the excellence of merit, [3ab]

¹This refers to various transmigratory forms of the Ātman.

मुमुक्षुरस्ति नास्तीति परो ग्रन्थोऽवतार्यते ॥३॥

देहेन्द्रियमनोबुद्धिवेदनाव्यतिरेकतः ।
अस्तित्वे तस्य संसिद्धे तन्मुक्त्यै यत्यते यतः ॥४॥

And the subsequent part (of the Upaniṣad) is introduced (with a view) to determining whether there is or is not one desirous of liberation,¹ [3cd]
since there is an effort made towards liberation of the one whose existence has been established to be beside the body, the sense-organs, *manas*, intellect and various sensations (of misery). [4]

¹With reference to *mumukṣu* here, Read SP: *māṭṛsākṣī taddvārātmanyadhyastasaṁsāro mumukṣus tvamartho 'tra nir-dhāryata ityarthah*.

भविष्यल्लोकसंबन्धी येषामागमतो मतः ।
न तान्प्रति समारम्भः सिद्ध एव हि तान्प्रति ॥५॥

This beginning (or the act) is not meant for them, who have known from traditional scripture that (the self) is connected with (or, related to) the world. That one is already established from them. [5]

The idea is that this Brāhmaṇa does not seek to inform them who have already made up their mind about the self as related to rituals.

कर्त्रात्मनः पुरा सिद्धेर्बुद्ध्याद्यव्यतिरेकतः ।
कर्त्रादेरिह साक्ष्यात्मा दृष्टेर्द्रष्टोच्यतेऽधुना ॥६॥

Now is here discussed (lit. described) the witness of the agent etc., apart from (or beside) intellect etc.,¹ the seer of the sight, since the self as the agent is already established (for the others). [6]

The seer of the agent of activity etc. is described here as

one eligible for receiving the instruction regarding the Brahman. That one is not established in the earlier portion of the Veda which is related to rituals and also that is not found necessary to explain.

¹This refers to the organs, the body and the feelings of sorrow etc.

विषयो ब्रह्मविद्याया योग्यः क इति चिन्त्यते ।
विषयेऽवधृते यस्मादुपदेशोऽर्थवान्भवेत् ॥७॥

It is thought here as to who is the eligible recipient (*viṣaya*) of the lore of the Brahman, since instruction would serve the purport or be meaningful, if (and when) the recipient is determined (or clearly stated). [7]

SP refers to the authority of Śaṅkara for doing this in the words *ābrahmastambaparyanta* ... and also to the practice of the learned as recorded in *Nyāyavārtika: śamāya śāstram jagato jagāda*.

ब्रह्मणो वोपदेशः स्यादथवाब्रह्मणो भवेत् ।
ब्रह्मत्वस्य स्वतः सिद्धेर्ब्रह्मणि स्यादनर्थकः ॥८॥
उपदेशशतेनापि ब्रह्मत्वं न कथं चन ।
स्वतोऽब्रह्मत्वतस्तस्य नातोऽब्रह्मण इष्यते ॥९॥

(One would ask:) 'Is this instruction about the Brahman or non-Brahman, since the nature of the Brahman is already established, (and this instruction) would be purposeless if it is related to the Brahman?' [8]

Since, in the case of him who is himself non-Brahman, even despite endless¹ instruction, there cannot be effected the character of the Brahman; therefore, it is not accepted (that this is an instruction related to the Brahman) for one on account of one's being non-Brahman. [9]

An opponent's view is expressed.

¹Literally, by hundreds of words of instruction.

Now, there is in verses 10-14 exposition on 3.4.1.

To begin with there is explanation of the question (*praśnavākya*), in more than one way.

सर्वस्यैकात्म्ययाथात्म्यात्र चाब्रह्मेह लभ्यते ।
क्षेत्रज्ञेश्वरसंभेदशङ्कानुत्त्यर्थमुच्यते ॥१०॥

Here,¹ a person, who is non-Brahman, is not accepted (as the recipient of the lore of the Brahman), because all the things in the universe are really in the nature of oneness with the single Ātman; (and yet the Śāstra) is begun for the removal of the confusion regarding the knower of field, the lord. [10]

The answer to the preceding verse is given here.

The idea is to remove every doubt regarding the real non-difference of the inner self and the Brahman. It is only ignorance which obscures the true nature of the inner self. SP points out that the nature of the Brahman has been already discussed possibly in 2.5.

¹This refers to 'in this Śāstra'.

यदित्यनेन निर्देशो विशेष्यस्य विवक्षितः ।
सामान्यमात्रविज्ञानाद्विशेषस्याप्रतीतितः ॥११॥

By the word *yat* is intended the reference to that which is to be described, since the knowledge of that particular would not result from the knowledge of any common individual. [11]

साक्षादित्यादिकं सर्वं तद्विशेषणमुच्यते ।
विशिष्टार्थावबोधित्वान्नीलरक्तोत्पलादिवत् ॥१२॥

In the words beginning with *sākṣāt* are used here the qualifiers¹ of that (Brahman), since they convey (lit. inform) the knowledge of the qualified just as the words *nīlotpala*, *raktotpala* etc.

[12]

¹In the verse only the singular is used for conveying the aggregate of the qualifiers. They are *sākṣāt*, *aparokṣāt*, *sarvāntara*.

यदित्यादिपदानां च सामानाधिकरण्यतः ।
विशेषणविशेष्यत्वं श्रुत्यैवेहावसीयते ॥१३॥

Here,¹ the words *yat* etc. have *sāmānādhikaranyā* 'the nature of belonging to the same case', in the sentence, their function (lit. nature), as qualifiers of what is to be qualified is here understood conclusively (*avasīyate*) by the Śruti itself, on the face of it (*śrutyaiva*). [13]

¹This refers to the things stated in the text; *iheti padārthoktiḥ* (SP).

साक्षादित्यभिधानेन प्रत्यक्षोऽर्थोऽभिधीयते ।
मनसोऽग्रहणं तस्य न दृष्टेरिति वारणात् ॥१४॥

By the word *sākṣāt* is mentioned (or signified) a thing directly perceptible; the perception of it is not by *manas*, since there is a rejection (of the same) by the words *na dr̥ṣṭeḥ*. [14]

This states the meaning of *sākṣāt*.

यदि वा द्रष्टरि प्राप्ते साक्षादिति विशेषणात् ।
तत्प्रसङ्गनिवृत्त्यर्थमपरोक्षादितीर्यते ॥१५॥

Or, perhaps, an actual seer may become known from the qualifier (word) *sākṣāt* (by way of contingency), therefore is stated the word *aparokṣāt* for averting (or obviating) that contingency. [15]

Here is explained the meaning of *aparokṣāt*.

द्रष्टृदर्शनदृश्यार्थप्राप्तावाद्यविशेषणात् ।
लोकवत्तन्निषेधार्थमपरोक्षादितिर्यते ॥१६॥

From the (use of) the first adjective one might imagine (i.e. think of) an object which can be one of the three, viz. the seer, the act of seeing and the object to be seen, as in the worldly life; therefore, in order to reject that, the (other qualifier) *aparokṣāt* is used (in the Śruti). [16]

This is an alternative explanation of the use of two qualifiers, *sākṣāt* and *aparokṣāt*. This is made clear in the next verse.

द्रष्टृदर्शनदृश्यार्थसंभेदविषयस्य हि ।
निषेधायापरोक्षाङ्गीरभिन्नार्थग्रहाय तु ॥१७॥

Indeed also for rejecting (the idea of) an object, which is combined (or, mixed) as the seer, the act of seeing and the object of seeing, the word *aparokṣāt* is used and only (*tu*) in order to convey (or refer to) an object which is not different. [17]

This verse explains the significance of the qualifier *aparokṣāt*.

द्रष्टृदर्शनदृश्यार्थसंभेदस्य निषेधतः ।
दृष्टिमात्रं स्वतः सिद्धं विशेषणफलं भवेत् ॥१८॥

The outcome of the use of the qualifier (*aparokṣāt*) would get itself, i.e. only seeing, established, by the rejection of the combined (or, mixed) objects, viz. the seer, the act of seeing and the object of seeing. [18]

एकं सदेकरूपं च यदि नामोक्तलक्षणम् ।
निर्द्वयं सद्द्वयं वेति नोक्तहेतोस्तदीक्ष्यते ॥१९॥
यतोऽतोऽद्वयसिद्धयर्थं ब्रह्मेत्येतद्विशेष्यते ।
अव्यावृत्ताननुगतं अस्तु ब्रह्मेति भण्यते ॥२०॥

Since (*yataḥ*),¹ indeed, that thing whose character is stated, is not understood (*īkṣyate*) from the reason given, viz. whether it is one, existing in uniform nature and devoid of any duality or associated with duality, [19]

therefore, in order to establish that this Brahman is one without a second, it is qualified by the word *etat*— thus it is said that the Brahman is a thing not distinguished from any other or not similar to any other. [20]

This is to distinguish the Ātman from any one of the Puruṣas accepted by the Sāṃkhyas, existing within a human body and is, therefore, directly perceived by one.

¹This word is taken from verse 20a.

अपुमर्थमिदं प्राप्तं न चेदात्मैव तद्ववेत् ।
यतोऽत आत्मरूपार्थमात्मेत्येवं विशेष्यते ॥२१॥

If this (i.e. what is to be qualified) is not the Ātman then there would not obtain (i.e. result any one) end of human life; therefore, it is further qualified as the Ātman for conveying the nature of the object of Ātman.¹ [21]

¹This clarifies that the Puruṣa in the sentence has the sense of *ātman*.

सजातीयासजातीयद्वितीयार्थानभिप्लुतम् ।
सांख्यराद्धान्तपुंवत्तत्प्राप्तं नानात्वदर्शनात् ॥२२॥
यतोऽतस्तन्निषेधार्थं सर्वान्तर इतीरणम् ।
सर्वेषामान्तरो योऽर्थो नाना स कथमुच्यते ॥२३॥

Since (*yataḥ*) this Ātman is not affected by any other object of the same kind or of another kind in a way similar to Puruṣa in the Sāṃkhya doctrine, since that (there) has plurality, [22] therefore, in order to reject the same,¹ there is a statement *sarvāntara* 'one within all'. How can such a thing be described as that which exists in plurality within many? [23]

This is explained in the following verse by citing usual examples of superimposition.

¹This refers to Puruṣa of the Sāṃkhyas.

स्रग्वत्सर्पादिवलुप्तानां प्रत्यङ्मात्रैकरूपतः ।
प्रत्यग्वस्तूपरोधेन नानार्थो नावशिष्यते ॥२४॥

There does not remain any idea of many objects as obscuring the nature of the inner self, since those objects are (only) imagined in the way a serpent etc. (is imagined) in the place of a garland etc., since (all those) are but having the nature of the inner self. [24]

प्रत्यग्रूपावबोधस्य भावाभावात्मवस्तुषु ।
सर्वत्राव्यभिचारित्वादात्मा सर्वान्तरौ भवेत् ॥२५॥

Since the experience of the inner self is invariably noticed in all, viz. positive entities and (also) negative entities, therefore, the Ātman is what exists within all. [25]

यत्साक्षादपरोक्षाभ्यां ब्रह्म वेह विशिष्यते ।
सर्वान्तरगृहीत्या च प्रत्यगर्थस्य संगतिः ॥२६॥

Or, by the word *yat* is the Brahman qualified here by the words *sākṣāt* and *aparokṣāt* and, further, by the use of the word *sarvāntara* there is mentioned its oneness with the thing, viz. the inner self. [26]

This explains the significance of the words *sākṣāt* and *aparokṣāt*.

साक्षादित्यव्यवहितमगौणमपरोक्षतः ।
इति द्वयं प्रतीच्येव संभाव्यं ब्रह्मणीरितम् ॥२७॥

The word *sākṣāt* means 'not obstructed or obscured by anything else' and the word *aparokṣāt* conveys that (Brahman) is 'not

subordinate', it is 'immediately perceived', thus, these two (qualifiers) are possible only in the case of the inner self which is expressed as in the case of the Brahman. [27]

This is clarified in the following verse.

तथा सर्वान्तरत्वस्य भेदवृत्तिविरोधतः ।
संभावनाद्वितीयत्वाद्ब्रह्मण्येवात्मसंस्थितेः ॥२८॥

That way of being within all by overcoming varied functioning is impossible only in the case of the Brahman, since it is without any second and it exists as the Ātman within every one. [28]

यतोऽत एकवाक्यत्वे ब्रह्मात्माख्यपदार्थयोः ।
द्वैतसंसर्गबाधेन पूर्णं वस्तु प्रतीयते ॥२९॥

Therefore, since the two things called the Brahman and the Ātman (i.e. the inner self) have just one purport, therefore, there is understood here, by the rejection of any association with duality, a thing which is complete. [29]

यदि वैकविशेष्येण विशेषणतया युतिः ।
साक्षादित्यादिकानां स्यान्मिथोऽन्योऽन्यानपेक्षतः ॥३०॥

Or perhaps, the words *sākṣāt* etc.¹ would join together as qualifiers of (just) one object to be qualified without having non-expectancy for one another. [30]

¹This refers to *aparokṣāt*, *sarvāntara*.

एकवस्त्ववसायित्वादन्योन्यार्थानुरोधतः ।
विशेषणानि सर्वाणि विशिषन्त्युत्पलादिवत् ॥३१॥

All these adjectives qualify the same object, since they confirm the meaning of one another and they end in (qualifying only)

one thing like in the case of (each of the words *nīla* etc. with reference to) lotuses etc. [31]

The word 'etc.' refers to other worldly objects.

उपात्तस्वविशेष्याणि साक्षादित्यादिकानि हि ।
परस्परोपरोधेन स्वविरुद्धार्थहानतः ॥३२॥

Indeed, the qualifiers *sākṣāt* etc. are taken to have qualified their own objects to be qualified, by having regard for one another and by abandoning any meaning opposed to themselves. [32]

स्वार्थासंत्यागमार्गेण नानासंसर्गबाधनात् ।
भेदहेतुतमोघातिप्रत्यग्याथात्म्यशेषमुषी- ।
जन्मनैवाप्तमाप्नोति स्वतोऽमेयं वचःश्रवात् ॥३३॥

By not giving up their own meaning and by stultifying the effect(s) of varied things and by the rise of faith in the true nature of the inner self, which destroys the cause of the variety, i.e. ignorance, one obtains (that) which is already obtained, viz. the unknowable, on hearing the sentence of the Śruti. [33]

This verse emphasises the nature of the inner self, the knowledge of which removes ignorance, when the Śruti statement has given rise to it (viz. knowledge).

सामानाधिकरण्योक्तेर्विशेषणविशेष्यतः ।
लक्ष्यलक्षणगत्यातो यथोक्तार्थं प्रपद्यते ॥३४॥

A person understands the matter as stated (in the Śruti) owing to the statement (of the qualifiers which) belong to the same grammatical case (or, thing, viz. the Brahman), from the (relation clearly stated of) the qualifiers and the qualified and (also) by getting to know the description (lit. defining) of what

is to be described (lit. defined).

[34]

The words *sākṣāt* etc. are put in the same case (*sāmānādhikaranyā*) and stand as the qualifiers of the qualified, viz. the Brahman, and therefore the knowledge about the inner self is easily obtained by an individual.

सर्वार्थं यदि वाद्यं स्यात्साक्षादिति विशेषणम् ।
अपरोक्षान्तमथवा ब्रह्मान्तं वोत्तरस्य तु ॥३५॥

Or perhaps, the first qualifier *sākṣāt* could be with reference to (or, could stand for) all other (words as qualifiers) or the qualifier (could be) ending in *aparokṣāt*, or even perhaps (*tu*) the ending word *brahman*, in relation to the later words. [35]

This verse states another arrangement of the words which are used as qualifiers.

Now, a statement is made as to which meaning (proposed) should be accepted.

यत्साक्षाच्चापरोक्षाच्च ब्रह्मणः स्तो विशेषणे ।
वाक्याद्ब्रह्माभिसंबन्धात्तदन्यस्य तथाश्रवात् ॥३६॥

That (the two words) *sākṣāt* and *aparokṣāt* are two qualifiers of the Brahman is understood from the Śruti which is related to the Brahman, since a relation to any other (objects) is not so heard. [36]

This points to the use of *sākṣāt* and *aparokṣāt* together as qualifiers of only (*sarvāntara*) *brahman*.

यदव्यवहितं द्रष्टुर्व्यवधानेन केनचित् ।
प्रत्यङ्मात्रस्वभावत्वाद्ब्रह्मणोऽव्यवधानता ॥३७॥

The Brahman, which is not obscured for a seer by any obstacle,

being of the nature of only the inner self, does not have any obscurity about it. [37]

अव्यावृत्ताननुगतं ब्रह्मागौणं प्रचक्षते ।
अपरोक्षाद्भवेत्तादृङ्नातोऽन्यादृक्कथं चन ॥३८॥

They state that the Brahman, which is not distinguished from (any other things) and which is not similar to (any other), is not subordinate (to any one/thing else); this can be so because of its being directly perceived. Therefore, it is not like any other (thing/person) in any way. [38]

सर्वानात्मनिषेधेन बोध आत्मन्यथैकले ।
परमार्थं त्वसंप्राप्य निषेधो नेष्यते यतः ॥३९॥

There is knowledge in respect of the Ātman alone by rejecting all non-Ātman(s) since any rejection is not accepted (lit. desired) (in this case), without having obtained the knowledge of the highest (reality). [39]

व्यतिरेकान्वयाभावैः कार्यं वस्त्वभिलप्यते ।
कारणत्वनिषेधेन ब्रह्मात्मानं प्रपद्यते ॥४०॥

The thing (i.e. the inner self), which is of the nature of an effect, can be described in relation to its absence and/or presence¹ (in relation to the others), therefore, one obtains (the knowledge of) the thing (i.e. the inner self), viz. the Brahman, by denying the idea of its being a cause (of any other thing). . [40]

The idea is to reject that the Brahman can be the cause of any other thing.

¹Translation follows the variant reading *-yabhyāṃ vai kāryaṃ* which is mentioned in AnSS edition and is adopted by NKL.

एतावन्मात्रयाथात्म्यात्कार्यकारणवस्तुनः ।

अव्यावृत्ताननुगतं ब्रह्मात्मैव ततो भवेत् ॥४१॥

Thus, the inner self, having only this much as its true nature and being in itself a thing both the cause and the effect, becomes (viz. is) the Brahman, which is not distinguished from (any other thing) and not similar to (any other). [41]

This refers to verse 24 above which refers to usual knowledge of things as that of a serpent etc. superimposed on a rope etc.—that is to say, the Brahman is without a second and exists only as the inner self.

यश्चात्मैव भवेत्प्रत्यक्सर्वान्तरतमस्तथा ।
तमेवलक्षणं मह्यं यथावद्वक्तुमर्हसि ॥४२॥

(Uṣasta said to Yājñavalkya:) ‘That inner self, the Ātman, which is thus existing within all—please explain that to me in a clear way (*yathāvat*)¹ as having those characteristics. [42]

¹Śaṅkara has offered an explanation of this *yathāvat*: as a person holds horns of cows in his own hands and points out to the other persons, ‘this is a cow’.

सामानाधिकरण्योक्तेर्ब्रह्मात्मार्थोभिधायिनोः ।
ऐकार्थ्यमेतयोर्न्याय्यं मिथोऽर्थावसितेस्तथा ॥४३॥

Owing to the use of the words signifying the Brahman and (the inner) Ātman as being in the same grammatical case relation (*sāmānādhikaranyā*), it is only logical to accept them to have only one meaning; in that way there is the understanding of (the real) meaning. [43]

ब्रह्मात्मैकस्वभावेन साक्षादिति विशेष्यते ।
असंभवात्तदन्यत्र ब्रह्मत्वस्य यतस्ततः ॥४४॥
आत्मापि ब्रह्मणोऽन्यत्र नैव संभाव्यते यतः ।
सामानाधिकरण्योक्तिस्तस्माद्ब्रह्मात्मशब्दयोः ॥४५॥

The Brahman, being of the nature as of (the inner) self, is described as directly perceived, since there cannot be the nature of the Brahman elsewhere than in it. [44]

The inner self also cannot really exist elsewhere than in the Brahman, therefore, there is the use of the two words *brahman* and *ātman* in the same grammatical case relation. [45]

These two verses explain the significance of the words *brahman* and *ātman* in the same grammatical case relation.

विशेषणविशेष्यत्वे मिथो ब्रह्मात्मनोरतः ।
अब्रह्मानात्मापह्नुत्यासंसर्गैकात्म्यधीर्भवेत् ॥४६॥

Thus, the mutual relation of the qualifier and the qualified exists between the Brahman and the (inner) self. There will arise knowledge of their oneness, which is not associated with (anything else), owing to the rejection (thereby) of the non-Brahman and the non-Ātman. [46]

ब्रह्मणोऽप्यात्मनो मोहादब्रह्मत्वं न वस्तुतः ।
आत्मनोऽपि परोक्षत्वं ब्रह्मणोऽपि तमोन्वयात् ॥४७॥

The Brahman is not Brahman, in reality, but (it is so) on account of ignorance on the part of the inner self; similarly, the inner self also has the nature of not being directly perceptible on account of the association of the Brahman with ignorance. [47]

तमसो ज्ञानविध्वस्तावब्रह्मानात्मताहतेः ।
अपूर्वाद्यात्मकं ब्रह्म निःसंसर्गं प्रपद्यते ॥४८॥

(A person) realises the Brahman which is of the nature of *apūrva* etc.¹ and which is without a contact (with any other thing), when ignorance is destroyed by the knowledge through the removal of the nature of non-Brahman, i.e. non-Ātman.

[48]

¹This stands for *anapara* and other adjectives in BU 2.5.19.

प्रत्यग्याथात्म्यविज्ञानात्तत्तमो नात्मबाधतः ।
प्रत्यङ्मात्रावशेषत्वात्स्यामपूर्वादिमानहम् ॥४९॥

(Uṣasta thinks to himself:) 'By knowing the true nature of the self (within me) and the stultification of the ignorance about it (inner self) thereby let me be one having *apūrva* etc., remaining only the inner self'. [49]

Verses 50-60 clarify the purport of Yājñavalkya's answer.

प्रणिधायान्मनि दृष्टिं प्रत्यग्बोधैकरञ्जिताम् ।
प्रतिवक्त्येष इति तं याज्ञवल्क्योऽप्युदारधीः ॥५०॥

Yājñavalkya also, being a knower of the excellent (Brahman), answered him, considering 'This one is asking the questions, after having fixed his eye on the Ātman, (the eye) which is tainted by² only knowing of the inner self. [50]

¹This is for *udāradhīḥ* where it is excellent *brahman* (SP), but we can translate it as 'possessing excellent intelligence'.

²*rañjita* is indicative of 'being inclined towards' receiving that knowledge.

आत्मप्रमातृमानादेरनेकस्येह संभवात् ।
प्रत्यक्षार्थस्यैष इति न विद्मः को विवक्षितः ॥५१॥

Since there is here¹ the possibility of varied (lit. manifold) reference to the Ātman, the knower and the non-Ātman, therefore, we do not know who is intended by the word *eṣa* 'this one' as the directly perceptible thing. [51]

This explains the significance of the word *eṣa*.

¹This refers to the sphere of worldly dealings.

विवक्षितार्थविज्ञप्त्यै त आत्मेति ततोऽवदत् ।
सर्वान्तरगृहीतिस्तु तत्पूर्वोक्तोपलक्षणम् ॥५२॥

Therefore, in order to convey to him (or inform him of) the intended thing, (Yājñavalkya) then said to him *ta ātmā* 'your (inner) self' and (*tu*) the mention of *sarvāntara* '(existing) within all' is only a pointer to the one that is mentioned (just) before. [52]

¹This refers to *ta ātmā*.

क्षोण्यपक्रममाकाशात्षष्ठ्यन्तेनाभिधीयते ।
आत्मैति च प्रमात्रादेरागमापायसाक्ष्यपि ॥५३॥

By the word ending in the genitive case suffix (i.e. by *-te*) is expressed what begins with the earth and ends with *ākāśa*¹ and the word *Ātman* (is used) for expressing the witness of the knower etc.² (of the inner self) which come into existence and which depart (from it). [53]

¹This refers to five elements.

²Cf. verse 51 above.

मातृमानप्रभेदेऽपि प्रतिदेहं न भिद्यते ।
साक्षी बाह्यार्थवद्यस्मात् आत्मेत्युच्यते ततः ॥५४॥

The witness (viz. the *Ātman*) does not differ from body to body, even if there is a variety of the knowers¹ and (their) means of knowing (or, knowledge) even like (that in) the external objects. [54]

¹Those are the worldly knowers. So it is said *ta ātmā*.

व्यभिचारो मिथो यद्वत्प्रमात्रादेः स्वसाक्षिकः ।
सर्वमात्राद्यभावार्थसाक्षित्वान्न तथात्मनः ॥५५॥

As there is mutual variability among the knower etc.¹ that is witnessed by one's own (Ātman); similarly, there is not such variability in the case of the Ātman, since it is the witness of the absence of all these knowers etc. [55]

¹This refers to the worldly knower, his instrument of knowing and the worldly objects.

साक्षादित्यादिभिः प्रत्यक्प्रत्यग्दृष्ट्या यदेक्ष्यते ।
 प्रत्यग्वस्त्वतिरेकेण नान्यदात्मा तदेक्ष्यते ॥५६॥
 प्रत्यङ्मात्रैकयाथात्म्यादात्माविद्यातदुत्थयोः ।
 तावन्मात्रावसायित्वं सम्यग्बोधादतस्तयोः ॥५७॥

When, with the help of qualifiers as 'directly perceptible' etc., the inner self¹ is viewed as the self within² then it is viewed that the Ātman is not anything else beside the thing known as the sentience within, [56]
 therefore, by knowing the true nature of the inner self, ignorance about the Ātman and also (about) what arises from that finally come to an end only in that, viz. knowing the true nature of them.³ [57]

¹This is for the embodied self.

²This is characterized as an individual's sentience.

³That is, ignorance ... from that.

आत्मनोऽनवशेषेण तदन्यार्थस्य संगतेः ।
 साक्षादित्यादिकं सर्वं संभाव्यं स्याद्विशेषणम् ॥५८॥

On account of the association of the individual self with other objects, in their entirety, it is possible to use (of it) all qualifiers viz. *sākṣāt* etc. [58]

This verse explains how the Ātman is described as *sākṣāt* etc. by accepting the individual self in relation to the objects outside

it.

प्रत्यक्तयैवावसितेः प्रतीचोऽन्यस्य वस्तुनः ।
व्यतिरेकैकरूपस्य व्यतिरेको न लभ्यते ॥५९॥

On finally knowing the nature of (the inner self) as the sentience within, there does not remain any thing in existence outside the inner self, for the other thing has the form only of what is other than the self. [59]

This verse denies the association of the nature of the inner self with anything outside it, as the general property obtaining in various particular individuals belonging to some one genus.

विरोधादन्वयो नास्य खण्डादौ गोत्ववत्तथा ।
व्यतिरेकोऽपि नैकात्म्ययाथात्म्यादुपपद्यते ॥६०॥

And this one¹ does not have any relation (to the particulars) in the same way as cowness has (with a cow called) Khaṇḍa etc. Also there cannot reasonably be any other forms/things on account of their true nature being the single Ātman. [60]

As cowness exists in every individual cow and is yet different from it, similarly, the inner self cannot exist in what is non-Ātman, for that would involve contradiction and also any non-Ātman cannot exist apart from the the inner self since they exist only in the inner self. That is to say, the other things do not exist at all.

¹This refers to the inner self.

Verses 61-74 discuss the question of Uṣasta (in the words) katama etc.) and the answer to it by Yājñavalkya.

प्रत्यङ्मात्रतयैवातोऽनात्मात्मनि विलीयते ।
तवात्मेत्यपि निर्णीतौ नैव स्यात्प्रश्ननिर्णयः ॥६१॥
ममात्मनामनेकेषां संभवादप्रबोधतः ॥६२॥

Thus, the non-Ātman merges in the Ātman, as being only the inner self. And yet there would not be a decision given in respect of (Uṣasta's) question when it is said by way of decision *tava ātmā*, [61]
 since, owing to the possibility of there being many Ātmans, I shall not understand (which Ātman is mine). [62]

Verse 61 intends to introduce the question of Uṣasta: 'Which is the Ātman that is within all?'

This is clarified in verse 62, also see the next verse.

पिण्डान्तस्तावदात्मैको लिङ्गान्तस्तु तथा परः ।
 बुद्धिसाक्षी तृतीयः स्याद्योऽयं संदिह्यते तथा ॥६३॥

There is a doubt thus: whether that Ātman is (i) of the nature of (gross) body,¹ (ii) of the nature of the subtle body, (iii) the witness of intellect. [63]

¹*piṇḍānta* is understood as *piṇḍasvarūpa*, similarly *lingāntās*, *lingasvarūpa*.

यत एवमतो ब्रूहि कतमोऽत्र विवक्षितः ।
 साक्षादित्यादिमानात्मा निर्धार्येदंतयान्यतः ॥६४॥

Since this is so, tell me which one (of the three) is intended, the one which is having (the qualifiers) *sākṣāt* etc., by distinguishing it from others thus: this is the one. [64]

This explains the meaning of the question which Uṣasta put to Yājñavalkya.

याज्ञवल्क्योऽपि तं प्राह यः प्राणेनेति लिङ्गतः ।
 प्राणादेः प्रत्यगात्मानं बुबोधयिषुरञ्जसा ॥६५॥

Yājñavalkya also declared to him in the words *yaḥ prāṇena* ... (and thus) by the indication, since he wished to inform

him about the inner self in a smooth way (using the words)
prāṇa etc. [65]

प्राणनाद्यनुमानेन ग्राहयित्वा धियः परम् ।
ततोऽवबोधयिष्यामि यथोपात्तविशेषणम् ॥६६॥
इत्येतद्धृदये कृत्वा याज्ञवल्क्यो निराह तम् ।
यः प्राणेनेति वचसा न लिङ्गादुक्तबोधनम् ॥६७॥

And Yājñavalkya explained the matter to him, thinking to himself,¹ 'I shall first make him know the highest Ātman by the indications² breathing etc. and then instruct him (about the same) as having the qualifiers that are (already) used. [66]

Since by the statement *yaḥ prāṇena* ..., viz. the indication, there cannot be instruction given (to him) about what is promised (lit. said).³ [67]

Yājñavalkya has here given the same meaning as in the Mahāvākya, *tat tvam asi* and, therefore, it is stated that Yājñavalkya first clarified the meaning of *tvam-padārtha* and then explained the nature of *tat-padārtha*.

¹Literally, keeping this in his heart.

²Literally, by inference, but we have used 'indication' so that this verse is in conformity with verse 65 above, where the word *lingataḥ* is used.

³This refers to the Brahman or the Ātman.

मुखसंचारिणाप्राणो यः प्राणेनानितीक्षिता ।
सर्वप्रत्यक्तमः सोऽयमात्मा सर्वान्तरावधिः ॥६८॥

The one, who is not Prāṇa,¹ (is mentioned) in the word *prāṇena* and that one, which breathes by that *prāṇa*, that moves in the mouth, is the seer, the innermost in all (beings)—this is the (inner) Ātman with the limit that it is within all beings.²

[68]

¹This is *aprāṇa*, rightly separated by SP from *mukhasaṃcārīṇā*.

²This is *sarvāntara*.

सुप्तेऽस्मिन्करणग्रामे योऽसुप्तोऽलुप्तदृष्टितः ।
वासनारूपकान्पश्यन्प्राणान्प्राणिति वायुना ॥६९॥

The one, who, on account of not having lost the capacity to witness and has not gone to sleep (even) when the entire collection of sense-organs has fallen asleep, seeing all those *prāṇas* 'organs' which are of the nature of desires, exhales in the form of wind. [69]

अनात्मत्वमतः सिद्धं प्राणादेः करणोक्तितः ।
प्राणात्मत्वाच्च बुद्ध्यादेः पिण्डान्तस्याप्यनात्मता ॥७०॥

From this¹ is established the nature of *prāṇas* and others as the non-Ātmans, so also, because intellect and others are of the nature of *prāṇas* 'organs' the gross body also is non-Ātman. [70]

The first refers to external organs and the second refers to threefold internal organ. Hereby is thus explained the nature of *piṇḍa* mentioned in verse 63 above.

SP as usual refers to two passages from *Kauṣītakyupaniṣad* 3.3: (a) *yo vai prāṇaḥ sā prajñā yā vā prajñā sa prāṇaḥ*, (b) *prāṇa eva prajñātamedam śarīram parigrhyotthāpayati*; as well as BU 1.5.21: *tasmāt ete etaivādyānte prāṇāḥ*.

¹That is, the mention of all organs.

दृश्यत्वाद्घटवद्देहः प्राणादेः करणत्वतः ।
अनात्मत्वप्रसिद्धिः स्याल्लिङ्गपिण्डात्मनोरतः ॥७१॥

The body is like a pitcher, since it is a thing perceptible (*drśyatva*) and *prāṇas* and others, being organs (of the body) they are established as non-Ātmans and from this it becomes clear that both the subtle and the gross (bodies) (are

non-Ātmans).

[71]

प्राणादिकार्यकरणैः स्वतोऽसंहत एकलः ।
तच्चेष्टां कुरुतेऽकुर्वन्नयस्कान्तो मणिर्यथा ॥७२॥

This one (viz. Ātman) alone, not combined with various means of activity, viz. *prāṇas* etc., does perform the activities of them, and (yet) (not doing them), is just like a lodestone.¹ [72]

SP rightly separates the Samdhi in *kurutekurvan* as *kurute akurvan*.

¹Sureśvara does not elaborate the simile. But he means: this lodestone causes activity in the pieces of iron, only being in their nearness and is taken to be doing those activities itself. In the same way, the Ātman is said to be doing activities of the organs. The cause of this is mere nearness of the Ātman and various organs.

लोकेऽनधिष्ठितस्येह केनचिच्चेतनावता ।
न दृष्टा नियता चेष्टा रथादेर्जडरूपिणः ॥७३॥

There is never seen any definite activity of a chariot etc., which is insentient in nature, unless that is superintended over by someone possessing sentience. [73]

This argument is similar to the one in BSB 2.2.2 (pp.492-493): *nahi mṛdādayo rathādayo vā svayam acetanāḥ santaś cetanaiḥ kulālādibhir aśvādibhir vānadhiṣṭhitā viśiṣṭakāryābhimukhapravṛt-tayo dṛśyante*.

देहेन्द्रियमनोबुद्धिप्राणादेर्नियतेक्ष्यते ।
प्रवृत्तिर्येन तेनैभ्यो ज्ञात्मान्योऽभ्युपगम्यताम् ॥७४॥

That, on account of which definite action of the body, the organs, *manas*, intellect and *prāṇas* is noticed, is different from these all, the knower—let this be understood. [74]

This verse explains the intention of the earlier verse.

From verse 64 up to the end there is discussion of 3.4.2, with some other points relevant upon the same.

प्रतिज्ञाय पुरा साक्षाद्गामहं दर्शयामि ते ।
अशक्नुवंस्तथा कर्तुं लिङ्गेन प्रतिबोधयेत् ॥७५॥
यथा कश्चित्तथैव त्वं प्रतिज्ञाय परात्मनः ।
साक्षात्त्वं तदसंपाद्य लिङ्गेनावेदयस्यमुम् ॥७६॥

(Uṣasta argues:) 'As someone, who first makes a promise, 'I shall show (you) a cow itself,' and then, being unable to do so, would give information about a cow by some characteristic, [75]

in the same way, you first promised to inform me about the direct perceptibility of the highest Ātman and, without doing that, you are (now) instructing me with the help of some indication. [76]

यथाप्रतिज्ञमेवातो यथा पृष्टं तथैव तत् ।
मह्यं प्रतिवचो वाच्यं दोषस्तु स्यात्ततोऽन्यथा ॥७७॥

Therefore, an answer is to be given to me, in the way as it was promised, and also, in the way, I had asked; therefore, an answer should be given to me, otherwise there would come to you a blame. [77]

यथाप्रतिज्ञं प्रत्युक्तिमवोचामासकृत्तव ।
ततोऽप्यपरितुष्टस्त्वमन्यथैव बुभुत्ससे ॥७८॥

(Yājñavalkya answered:) I ¹ have given you an answer as was promised (by me), more than once, and yet, not being satisfied (therefore), you wish to know in another way.² [78]

This explains the significance of verse 78.

¹In the text the plural (*avocāma*) is used out of confidence in himself as having the correct knowledge himself.

²That is, to know the Brahman as any other object of the world.

उक्तवत्तर्मातिरेकेण नात्मवस्तु घटादिवत् ।
शक्यते प्रतिनिर्देष्टुं प्रमाणागोचरत्वतः ॥७९॥

The (real) thing, viz. the Ātman, cannot be directly pointed out as a pitcher etc. by mentioning it, in a way other than one adopted by me, owing to its being an object of what are (commonly known as) the means of knowing. [79]

वेद्मीति यद्वलादात्थ न वेद्मीत्यपि यद्वलात् ।
तदृष्टयैवेह तं दृष्ट्वा ब्रूह्यवद्यं यदीक्षसे ॥८०॥

(Still Uṣasta asked,) 'Give me a faultless answer, if you see that one, viz. on seeing which, i.e. on account of whose strength, you say 'I know' and also, on account of whose strength, you (also) say, 'I do not know'. [80]

Verses 81-139 are the discussion of BUB regarding vastu-svabhāvyā, being based on two dr̥ṣṭis: the popular and that which is in the nature of the thing (i.e. reality).

अप्रमेयं हि यद्वस्तु न तच्छक्यं प्रमाणतः ।
कुम्भवत्प्रतिनिर्देष्टुं यथा तदभिधीयते ॥८१॥

Indeed, that thing, which is not possible to be known, cannot be shown by any means of knowing, as a pitcher (can be)—how this is so is now explained. [81]

This introduces BUB: *vastusvābhāvyāt*.

द्रष्टृदर्शनदृश्यानां संहतानां परस्परम् ।
साक्षित्वमात्मनो नित्यं वस्तुस्वाभाव्यमुच्यते ॥८२॥

What we understand by 'that which is in the nature of the thing' is the eternal character of the witness, viz. the Ātman, in respect of the mutually related (things, viz.) the seer, seeing and the object of seeing. [82]

प्रमात्रादिप्रवृत्तेः प्राक्सदानस्तमितोदिता ।
अकारकात्मना तस्थौ प्रत्यग्दृष्टिरसंगतः ॥८३॥

Before the beginning of the activity of the knower etc., there has ever been the absence of that which did not have an end (lit. setting) and a rise. The seer, viz. the inner self, (indeed) remained as not connected (with the activity) as instrumental. [83]

अकार्यकारणात्मैतद्वास्तवं रूपमात्मनः ।
सकृद्विभातमैकात्म्यं वितमस्कमभेदकम् ॥८४॥

This is real (or, natural) form of the Ātman, viz. the nature of not being effects and their causes; the singleness which is not associated with ignorance and devoid of any distinct objects within it has flashed forth only once. [84]

This is to say that the nature of the Ātman does not occur every time, as and when there is any cause and effect relation noticed in any happening of the world.

एतत्तमोऽभिसंबन्धात्साक्षित्वं प्रतिपद्यते ।
तमोमात्रैकहेतुश्च मोहसंगतिरात्मनः ॥८५॥

In the case of the inner self the nature of being the witness is reasonable only as depending on its connection with this ignorance. Indeed the association of the Ātman with delusion has only one cause, viz. ignorance. [85]

कूटस्थदृष्टितन्मोहौ दृष्ट्याभासश्च तत् त्रयम् ।

कारणं जगतः साक्षी नियन्तेति च भण्यते ॥८६॥

The twofold ignorance in respect of the immutable and also its (capacity of) seeing and the semblance of seeing—all these three are the basis of (the existence of) this world, (And) that witness is really (the one), called the controller. [86]

It is thus emphasised that ignorance about the nature of the Ātman is the basis of all worldly dealings and the seer.

कारणत्वं न कौटस्थ्यात्तन्मोहविरहाद्वेत् ।
जाड्यान्वयाच्च बुद्ध्यादेर्युक्ता तत्कारणानुमा ॥८७॥

The nature of being the cause (which is stated of the Ātman) is not on account of its immutability; it could not be there while there does not exist ignorance about it. The inference of the cause of that is reasonable in respect of intellect etc. (only) owing to their association with insentience. [87]

प्रमात्राद्यतिरेकोऽपि वस्तुनो बोधरूपिणः ।
अज्ञातस्य प्रमेयस्य युक्तः स्वध्वान्तसाक्षिणः ॥८८॥

Also, the existence of the knower etc. beside the thing having the form of the knowledge (viz. Ātman) is reasonable, (only in the case of) the knowledge, (which has not been known,) is the witness of ignorance (about itself). [88]

कूटस्थदृष्टेः साक्षित्वं जडस्येव न युज्यते ।
साक्ष्यार्थानभिसंबन्धात्तस्मिन्सत्यपि नाचितेः ॥८९॥

The nature of being the witness cannot be said to belong to the immutable seer,¹ as in the case of the non-sentient; nor also can it be of the non-sentient even if that (viz. the immutable seer) exists in it, for there is no close connection of the witness and the object of seeing.² [89]

SP rightly points out how the two lines of the verse answer away the doubt thus: (*kinī ca*) *cetanasya vācetanasya śuddh-asyājñāsyā vā*.

¹That is, while it is without its false attributes, viz. organs etc.

²In the case of any seeing only the sentient can be said to be capable of it.

तस्मात्परस्य साक्षित्वं स्वमोहाभासवर्त्मना ।
कार्यकारणसंबन्धे चिदाभासस्य संगतेः ॥९०॥

Therefore, in the case of the highest Ātman, the nature of being the witness is only by way of the appearance of ignorance about its own, because the cause and effect relation can go well with only the appearance of sentience.¹ [90]

¹That is to say: not the real sentience.

प्रमात्राद्यभिसंबन्धो यथानुभवसिद्धिकः ।
तथैव तदभावोऽपि सिद्धोऽनुभवमात्रतः ॥९१॥

As the relation of the seer etc. is established by one's experience, similarly, the absence of the same also is established by only experience. [91]

अनन्यहेतुकं तावत् त्रयमेतद्यथोदितम् ।
प्रमात्रादिपदार्थस्तु धर्माधर्मादिहेतुकः ॥९२॥

As this triad, which is already mentioned, does not have any cause other (than the Ātman) and the things, viz. the seer etc., are really having the cause in Dharma and Adharma¹ etc.² [92]

¹*dharmādharmā* mean *punya-karman* 'holy activity (according to scriptures)' and *apunya-karman* 'what is opposed to *punya-karman*' respectively.

²This refers to attachment etc.

बुद्ध्यादेरभिसंबन्धो जन्मनैव चिदात्मना ।
घटाद्यर्थोभिसंबन्धो धर्माधर्मादिकारणः ॥९३॥

The close (*abhi*) relation of intellect etc.¹ to the sentient Ātman is by the very birth (of an individual). As against this, the connection (of the sentient, viz. the Ātman) with objects like a pot etc.² has Dharma and Adharma etc.³ as the cause (for it). [93]

This verse is based on the relation of the seeing Ātman to the various organs in the body, which is to attribute blemish to an individual self while its connection with external objects like a pot is occasioned only by its having merit and demerit to his credit.

¹This stands for various organs.

²Other objects like *paṭa*, *raju* etc. are meant.

³See note 2 on verse 92 above.

प्रमातृदृष्टिरेकात्र शब्दाद्यर्थावलेहिनी ।
भूरिसाधनसापेक्षा सुखदुःखफलप्रदा ॥९४॥

Here (in this context), the one capacity of looking that belongs to the knower, touches (i.e. is connected with) the objects such as words;¹ it expects (i.e. depends on) many means (of acquiring them) and it brings as its result happiness or misery. [94]

Verse 93 has anticipated the twofold character of *dr̥ṣṭi* (capacity to see) thus the one is in the nature of the seer, i.e. the Ātman (*paramārthadr̥ṣṭi*) and the other relates to the worldly doings proceeding from ignorance, thus it is not *paramārthadr̥ṣṭi* but *vyāvahārikī* (or *laukikī*) *dr̥ṣṭi*. This verse explains the capacity of seeing on the part of a worldly seer.

¹This refers to *rasarūpagandha*.

क्षणप्रद्वंसिनी चेयं तद्धेतोर्भङ्गुरत्वतः ।
प्रतिदेहं विभिन्ना च त्वसाधारणकारणात् ॥९५॥

And that (*dr̥ṣṭi* other than *paramārthadr̥ṣṭi*) gets destroyed within a moment (i.e. does not remain permanently), because the cause of it is perishable¹ and that differs from body to body, because it has for it particular causes. [95]

This explains particular experiences of every individual.

¹This refers to the objects of seeing that are not permanent, products as they are of ignorance.

क्रियाकारकरूपेयमक्रियाकारकात्मना ।
तावन्मात्रैकयाथात्म्यात्तया व्याप्तैव जायते ॥९६॥

And this one, (viz. *laukikī dr̥ṣṭi*), which is of the nature of activity and the cause for activity, becomes revealed to one as pervaded by the Ātman, which is without any activity and also without any means of activity. [96]

Though SP and NKL do not explain the Saṃdhi in *akriyākārakātmanā* it is to be understood as *akriyā-akāraka-ātmanā* because that one (*laukikī dr̥ṣṭi*) is having only the other (viz. *paramārthadr̥ṣṭi*) as its real nature. In the case of an individual, the capacity to see and to use the means to activity depends on its relation to the inner sentience, on account of the ignorance which has pervaded it (viz. that capacity).

कात्स्नर्येन यत्र वृत्तिः स्याद्व्याप्यव्यापकवस्तुनोः ।
व्याप्तिस्तत्रैव मुख्या स्याद्रज्जुसर्पीदिवस्तुवत् ॥९७॥

Pervasion, in its primary sense, is understandable in the case of two things which are what is to be pervaded and what pervades it and also only there where the function or existence¹ (of the two is understood) in its entirety, this is as in the

case of things like a rope and a serpent etc.²

[97]

This explains the nature of pervasion.

¹Here, there is a reference to the double meaning of the word *ṛtti* derived from the verb root *ṛt* in two different senses; (i) to be and (ii) to function.

²As usual, Sureśvara does not refer to other pairs of things that provide examples of superimposition like *rajju-sarpa* which is mentioned. This is meant by *ādi*.

देशकालादिसंभेदादसाधारणतत्त्वयोः ।

व्याप्तिर्न घटते साक्षाद्विमवद्विन्ध्ययोरिव ॥९८॥

There cannot directly occur pervasion (of two things) having distinct (lit. uncommon) natures, on account of the differences in respect of region, time etc., as in the case of Mt. Himālaya and Mt. Vindhya.

[98]

प्रमात्रादिव्यपेक्षेयं लौकिकी दृष्टिरात्मनः ।

तत्प्रत्यगात्मदृष्टिस्तु विज्ञेया पारमार्थिकी ॥९९॥

This worldly capacity of seeing on the part of the Ātman is dependent on a seer etc.;¹ as against this, the capacity to see, on the part of the inner self, has to be known as belonging to the highest reality.

[99]

Here, Sureśvara uses the words *laukikī* and *pāramārthikī* to distinguish between two *dṛṣṭis*.

¹This refers to *pramāṇa* and *prameya*.

परमार्थात्मदृष्टयेयं लौकिकी दृष्टिरात्मनः ।

षड्भावविक्रियामेति व्याप्तैवाकाशकुम्भवत् ॥१००॥

Keeping in view that highest reality (i.e. Ātman), (one has to say that) this worldly capacity to see, on the part of the Ātman, undergoes sixfold modifications and it is thus pervaded

like a pitcher by the sky.¹

[100]

¹Here, Sureśvara is very cryptically expressing the simile. Actually, Sureśvara should have used *kumbhākāśavat*, but, for metre's sake, he has used *ākāśakumbhavat*, since *ākāśa* is the pervader while *kumbha* is what is to be pervaded.

धर्माधर्मानपेक्षत्वाच्चैतन्याभासतां प्रति ।

घटाद्याभासवत्तस्मान्नात्माभासो विनश्चरः ॥१०१॥

And, since in relation to appearance of sentience it does not expect *dharmādharma*, therefore, what appears as the semblance of Ātman is not perishable like what appears as a pitcher etc.

[101]

निष्क्रियश्चेतनः साक्षी सक्रियोऽचेतनः पराङ् ।

व्यावृत्तश्च प्रमात्रादेः सिद्धः साक्षी सुषुप्तगः ॥१०२॥

The sentient one, who is devoid of any activity, is the witness, while the non-sentient which is active is existing outside; (therefore) the witness which belongs to the state of sleep is established as distinguished from a seer etc. (of the worldly dealings).

[102]

This verse intends to distinguish between *paramārthadr̥ṣṭi* 'seeing in relation to reality' and *laukikī dr̥ṣṭi* 'seeing in worldly dealings'.

न चेदनुभवव्याप्तिः सुषुप्तस्याभ्युपेयते ।

नावेदिषं सुषुप्तेऽहमिति धीः किंबलाद्भवेत् ॥१०३॥

If pervasion of the experience of one who is sleeping is not accepted, then on what strength would there arise the awareness 'In my state of sleep, I did not know (anything)?'

[103]

The argument is: The individual self, being pervaded by the highest reality, viz. Ātman, alone can have post-sleep-state awareness 'I had not known any object'. That awareness (*dhit*) can arise only from *parāmarśa* 'realising the oneness of what was seen earlier' as continuing in the later moment. The words 'I did not know anything only point to the one who can be aware but has no awareness whatsoever'.

बुद्ध्यादेः प्रविलीनत्वाद्देहादेश्च जडत्वतः ।
लोष्टादेरिव नैव स्यान्नाज्ञासिषमितीक्षणम् ॥१०४॥

Since intellect etc.¹ have merged² and since the body etc.³ are insentient, therefore, there would not occur the thought (*īkṣaṇa*) 'I did not know' in the same sense as in the case of a lump of clay etc.⁴ [104]

In the first line of the verse, there are two parts; one referring to intellect and the other to body and others. This is based on the concept of the subtle and the gross form of bodies.

¹This refers to the internal organs, *manas* and *ahaṁkāra*.

²That is, in the sky in the heart, as mentioned in 2.1.

³This refers to the external organs.

⁴This refers to stone, pillar and such other things outside a body.

चिदाभासैकमात्रेण तमःसिद्धिर्न मातृतः ।
संवित्तन्मोहचिद्विम्बैः प्रात्यक्ष्यं कर्तृरूपिणः ॥१०५॥

Ignorance (lit. darkness) is established only on account of the semblance of the sentient and not on account of the seers (in the worldly sense of it); for what has the form of the agent of an activity can be directly perceptible only through being the reflections of the sentience, which is really knowing one (as associated with) ignorance about itself. [105]

The notion of an agent in the case of the individual self arises

out of its true nature of being one with the sentient Ātman. The singular form *karṭṛrūpiṇaḥ* and the plural form ... *bimbaiḥ* would mean that there is a reference to many situations in an individual's life.

स्मृतिनिश्चितिसंशीतिरागादिहिरुगात्मसु ।
अहंरूपेण योऽन्वेति स प्रमाता परो मतः ॥१०६॥

He, who continues to be existing in the form of ego in (the individual selves) which (really) stay away (*hiruk*) from memory, determining, doubt, attachment etc.¹ is understood (in the world) as the knower. [106]

What we call the knower is really the individual self affected by its ignorance about its true nature. SP states that this is in accordance with the *nyāya* 'maxim/rule' *anviṣṭaḥ syāt paramātmāiva pāpmadoṣādivarjitaḥ*.

¹This refers to sin, desire and so on.

स्मरणादिविभागेन ज्ञातर्येकत्र यत्पृथक् ।
प्रथतेऽनेकरूपाभं तज्ज्ञानं ज्ञातृकर्तृकम् ॥१०७॥

That is knowledge which appears just in one knower and is also distinct from it; with the knower as its agent (for acquiring it); (and) it appears in many forms, owing to the division, viz. memory etc. [107]

Now, in this verse, Sureśvara states what is known in the world as knowledge.

विभिन्नो बहिराभाति जातिरूपक्रियादिमान् ।
विभिन्नोऽनुभवादेव ज्ञातुर्ज्ञानात्स गोचरः ॥१०८॥

What has the characteristics genus, form, activity etc. appears outside (and) only as distinct from experience itself and it is the object (knowable) from the knowledge of the knower.

[108]

This relates to what is known as *ajñeya* in worldly knowledge.

संवित्तन्मोहधीवृत्तिशरीरादिविशेषणम् ।
भोक्तरीह यदाभाति तत्प्रमाणफलं स्मृतम् ॥१०९॥

What appears (in the enjoyer or experiencer) ¹ as his attributes, viz. intellect, its function, the body etc. that arise out of ignorance about the knowing one, is known as the result arising from the authoritative means. [109]

This verse explains the nature of the result from a knowledge situation which is discussed in the earlier verse.

¹This refers to the Ātman existing in the body in the form of the individual self. Refer to 2.1.

कर्तृत्वं करणत्वं च कर्मत्वं चात्मसाक्षितः ।
व्यतिरेकेण कर्त्रादेः सिद्धेर्नात्मत्वमस्त्यतः ॥११०॥

The nature of being an agent, the means and the object of knowing (and the result) ¹ (appear) to be established beside the Ātman, the witness; therefore, they do not have the nature of the Ātman apart from this one (*ataḥ*, i.e. *sākṣiṇaḥ*). [110]

Verses 106-109 discussed the nature of *jñātr*, *jñāna*, *jñeya*, *phala*, where *kartr̥tva* means *mātr̥tva*, where as *karaṇatva*, *jñāna*; *karmatva*, *jñeya*; *phala* are left unexplained. Here, *kartr̥* in the first line refers to a false agent and that in the second line to the real agent.

¹This is the force of *ca* which is repeated in the line.

साक्षित्वेनात्मनः सिद्धिर्मात्रादिव्यतिरेकतः ।
न कर्तृता प्रमात्रादेः साक्ष्यत्वेनैव तत्क्षयात् ॥१११॥

Establishing (i.e. deciding that) the Ātman as the witness is

different from the experience/acceptance of an agent etc.¹ The agent etc. do not have the nature of the agent etc., since those lose (their so-called status) immediately after their being perceived as the object by the witness. [111]

The thought at the basis of the verse is to set aside the notions of (i) the Mīmāṃsakas who hold the individual self in connection with intellect as the agent, (ii) the Buddhists who hold intellect itself as the Ātman, and (iii) the followers of Cārvāka, who hold only the body as the means.

¹*mātrādi* can be alternatively translated as the organs etc., viz. those which are useful for knowing (i.e. witnessing). Yet, see *pramātrādi* in the second line.

प्रत्यङ्मोहजबुद्ध्यादिजडरूपप्रधानतः ।
कर्तृत्वमात्मनो युक्तं चित्प्राधान्याच्च भोक्तृता ॥११२॥

It is only proper to hold that the Ātman is the agent, as it is the principal one in relation to the insentient forms (viz. intellect etc.) which come into existence from ignorance about the inner self and the nature of the enjoyer on the part of it is owing to the prominence of sentience. [112]

This reasserts that the inner self is really the witness, though called as the agent on account of relation to intellect etc.; it is the enjoyer when the sentience is given prominence.

अव्याकृतव्याकरणे यदुक्तं सर्वमेव तत् ।
अनुसंधेयमत्रापि वस्तुतत्त्वविशुद्धये ॥११३॥

Or that, viz. what was stated in respect of manifestation of the unmanifest, has to be understood here also, so that the true nature of the thing (viz. the highest reality, the Ātman) is clearly understood. [113]

This verse has a basis in BU 1.4.7.

स्वमहिम्ना न संसिध्येत्स्वतोऽनवगमात्मकम् ।
भावाभावौ न वस्त्वेति प्रत्याख्यातं यदात्मना ॥११४॥

What is itself of the nature of non-knowledge (i.e. that which is non-sentient) does not get established through its own strength. (Indeed) the (real) thing (i.e. the inner self), however, does not attain the state of a positive entity and/or a negative entity, since that (the existence of *bhāva* or *abhāva*) is rejected by (the existence of) Ātman. [114]

तस्मादजायमानैव जायमानेव लक्ष्यते ।
संवित्तिस्तदसंबोधहेतूत्थानात्मजन्मना ॥११५॥
तद्विनाशेऽपि तत्साक्ष्याद्विनश्यन्तीव लक्ष्यते ।
यतोऽतः कार्यतां तस्या नेश्वरोऽपि प्रसाधयेत् ॥११६॥

Therefore, the awareness on the part of the Ātman appears as becoming born, even if it is not being born, (this is) on account of the coming into existence of the non-Ātmans caused by ignorance about it (i.e. the Ātman). [115]

And (*api*), when that non-Ātman becomes destroyed, the awareness of that Ātman appears to be getting destroyed, since that is also being witnessed by the Ātman; therefore, not even the lord¹ can establish the nature of being an effect in the case of that (sentience). [116]

In the first line of verse 115 is stated the so-called birth of an individual (i.e. the inner self) and the second line gives the reason for it, viz. ignorance about its nature and consequently there arises the body etc.

¹It signifies the great knower.

अज्ञानभूमिगं वस्तु मानसंगतिमाप्नुवत् ।
मेयत्वं लभते नान्यद्यच्च त्यक्तक्षितिद्वयम् ॥११७॥

The (real) thing that has fallen in the state of ignorance gets

into association with the means of knowing etc. and therefore attains the status of what is to be known and it is not the other, viz. the highest reality, the Ātman which has given up the basis¹ of duality, viz. the cause of duality, i.e. ignorance.

[117]

¹This refers to *kṣiti*.

हेतोः कार्यसमुत्पत्तेः सिद्धेः प्रागपि संविदः ।
कार्यकारणताहीना तस्मात्संवित्प्रतीयताम् ॥११८॥

Therefore, since sentience (lit. the knowing one) is established to be existing even before its cause, viz. the rise of effects, let the sentience be understood as devoid of any relation consisting in cause and effect.

[118]

शून्यस्यापि हि शून्यत्वं तत्साक्षिणि सतीक्ष्यते ।
असाक्षिकं चेच्छून्यत्वं साक्षिवत्स्यादसाक्षिकम् ॥११९॥

The character of *śūnya* as *śūnya* also is seen, only if there is a witness of that. (But) if the character of *śūnya* does not have any witness to see it then it would be like¹ the witness having no witness to see it.

[119]

¹This implies *svaprakāśatva* 'self-illuminating character' of *śūnya* and, in that case, Sureśvara points out that there is not any controversy between him and the one who holds the concept of *śūnya*; in other words, *śūnya* and *paramātmā* are the same, therefore the word 'like' means 'identical with'.

साक्ष्यसाक्ष्यपि संसिद्ध्येत्स्वार्थत्वान्न तु शून्यता ।
पाराध्यात्स्वार्थविरहे षष्ठगोचरवद्भवेत् ॥१२०॥

And also, the witness of what is to be witnessed (*parātmā*) would get self-established, because it has its own object to illuminate, but not so does *śūnyatā*. Because, it is then for

serving the purpose of another¹ and in the absence of any purpose of its own, it would be like an object of the sixth sense.²

[120]

¹It is taken for granted that what is *jaḍa* serves the purpose of another and *śūnyatā*, being *jaḍa*, is to serve some other's purpose and therefore it is not free like the Ātman.

²This refers to *manas*, therefore *ṣaṣṭhagocara* means *mano-gocara*, that is merely *kalpita* 'imaginary'. Also, cf. BSB 2.1.2: (*alokavedaprasiddhatvāt tu mahadādīnām*) *ṣaṣṭhasyevendriyārthasya (na smṛtir avakalpate)*. This should explain what is *ṣaṣṭhagocara*; on this see [vol.1:1982] p.280.

देहान्तः प्रत्यगात्मायं पञ्चधा गम्यते मितेः ।
एककारणसाक्षित्वकर्तृदुःखित्वरूपतः ॥१२१॥

This individual self, which exists in the body, is known from experience¹ to be fivefold, viz. having the five forms, being one (person), being the cause, being the perceiver, being the agent being miserable.²

[121]

¹This is for *miti* standing for *anubhava*.

²The word 'misery' stands for happiness and misery both, because what is called happiness is, in fact, the undesired condition of the inner self and, therefore, the misery. See verse 125 below where *duḥkha* means *sukhaduḥkha*.

श्रुतितो लिङ्गतः साक्षात्कार्यकारणसंगतिः ।
यतोऽनुभूयते तस्मात्कारणत्वं परात्मनः ॥१२२॥

Since the association of the effects and their causes is experienced from both the Śruti and also the characteristic marks (*linga*), therefore, the highest Ātman has the nature of a cause.¹

[122]

¹This is noticed from *Taittirīyopaniṣad* 2.1: *tasmād vā etasmād*

ākāśaḥ sambhūtaḥ which refers to the cause and effect relations obtaining between the Ātman and the world, so also *linga* 'characteristic' of which we can understand the cause and effect relation—this is at the worldly level referring to the individual self and the various objects outside.

प्रत्यक्साक्ष्यतिरेकेण नाभावोऽपि प्रसिध्यति ।
किमु भावो जगत्समिन्साक्षी चानन्यसिद्धिकः ॥१२३॥

And negative entity also does not get established without (any reference to) the inner self which is the witness. What then can be said about a positive entity, when, in this world, the witness does not get itself established by another? [123]

यथोक्तानुभवारूढो बुद्ध्यन्तोऽपि प्रसिध्यति ।
माता मातरि मानं च मानान्मेयं प्रसिध्यति ॥१२४॥

A knower, associated with intellect which has received experience that is mentioned,¹ does not get established by itself; and when this knower gets established, the act of knowing also gets established and, consequently, the object to be known also gets established by that act of knowing. [124]

¹This refers to the word *miti* in verse 121 above.

सुखी गौरो धनी गोमान्बाह्यमेयसमाश्रयात् ।
प्रमाणभूमौ स्थित्वैतदुक्तं सर्वं प्रसिध्यति ॥१२५॥

And all that is said in the field of the worldly dealings is after our depending on the outside objects of knowing, viz. (as seen) in the statement, 'I am happy,'¹ 'I am fair,' 'I am wealthy,' 'I am possessed of cattle'. [125]

¹This has a reference also to *duḥkhitva*, which is stated in verse 121 above.

प्राक्प्रमात्रादिसंभूतेर्यत्प्रमात्रादिकारणम् ।
अनन्यानुभवात्माभं तत्प्रमाणं सदादृशेः ॥१२६॥

What appears as the cause of the knower etc., viz. what has the appearance of experience of itself (lit. of none other), is the means of knowing of the ever-seeing one, even before knower etc. has come into existence. [126]

मेयमानप्रमात्रादिविभागस्तत्र नेक्ष्यते ।
प्रत्यग्बोधैकयाथात्म्यवस्तुमात्रोपरोधतः ॥१२७॥

The division such as the object of knowing, the means of knowing and the knower etc. is not expected there; because there is only the existence of the thing itself, which is the true nature of merely the knowledge about the inner self. [127]

This verse aims at rejecting the acceptance of Arthāpatti as a means of getting to know the highest Ātman.

ईदृगेव फलं चात्र मानमेयादिकं तथा ।
कुतो भेदावकाशः स्यादद्वयैकप्रमात्मनि ॥१२८॥

Such alone is the result here and so also the means of knowing the object of knowing.¹ How can there be place/scope for discreteness in respect of the Ātman, which is merely devoid of duality? [128]

¹This refers to the imaginary (*kalpita*) nature of things related to the worldly life.

प्रमाणवर्त्मनायातमिदं मोहापनुत्तये ।
वस्तुवृत्तेन नैवालं शास्त्रानारम्भसकिततः ॥१२९॥

And this one,¹ which is thus understood by accepting the function of the means of knowing, is for the removal of ignorance; indeed, by the very nature of itself, it is not enough

(for that purpose, for otherwise) there would result the contingency of the absence of any Śāstric activity. [129]

The first line stresses the importance of the function of the means of knowing etc. in getting to know the highest reality; this would explain the purpose served by the Śāstras, which are really speaking about what are the results of superimposition.

¹This refers to the sentience which is not associated with duality.

उक्तार्थापरिहारेण तदज्ञानजभूमिषु ।
व्यवहारः प्रमात्रादेः स्वप्नमायेन्द्रजालवत् ॥१३०॥

By not giving up the matters already stated, the dealings of the knower etc. at various levels, caused by ignorance about that reality, are like a magic show, i.e. as if seen in a dream.

[130]

This refers to what was thought in the Śāstra.

अविचारितसंसिद्धितमोवत्स्यात्तदुद्ववम् ।
कृत्स्नं जगदतो मोहद्वस्तौ द्वस्तं भवेच्चित्तिः ॥१३१॥

This entire world would be like ignorance which gets established even without thought; so also its products and the world become destroyed, when there would be the destroyer of knowledge, viz. while there rules the sentience (alone). [131]

We follow the reading *citi* (locative singular of *cit*) at the end, as is known from the NKL edition and the variant reading of the AnSS edition.

भिन्नमानप्रमात्रादौ कार्यकारणवस्तुनि ।
अभिन्नमातृमानादिरात्मैवैकोऽद्वयः स्वतः ॥१३२॥

While the things, standing in the relation of cause and effect,

viz. the diverse means of knowing and the knowers etc.,¹ there exists the Ātman, which itself is not associated with any duality and which is not differentiated in different knowers, means of knowing etc.¹ [132]

¹This refers to the objects of knowing.

न देशकालावस्थादावपेक्षास्त्यात्मनः स्वतः ।
अनन्यापेक्षसंसिद्धेर्देशादेस्तदपेक्षतः ॥१३३॥

In the case of the Ātman itself, there is no dependence on (lit. expectancy of) space, time, condition etc., since it gets established without dependence on any other—and space etc. do have such dependence. [133]

देशकालनिमित्तादिव्यपेक्षं वस्तु यद्ववेत् ।
तदेव तदपेक्षं स्यान्न तु देशादिसिद्धिदम् ॥१३४॥

A thing, which depends on¹ space, time or any other causes (for its coming into existence), would be expecting the same (lit. that); but not that which causes space etc.² [134]

This explains further the thought in the preceding verse.

¹Namely, to be in relation to.

²This refers to time.

कारकादिवशाद्यावत्किञ्चिद्वस्तूपलभ्यते ।
क्रियाफलं तद्विज्ञेयमनपेक्षिततत्त्वकम् ॥१३५॥

Whatever thing is seen by us on account of the means of its production etc. is to be understood as the result of an activity (and) not depending on its own nature. [135]

The nature of a thing is determined by its causes and it comes into existence through the working of its productive causes. One might therefore compare those things with the Ātman whose

nature is determined by some cause and, for this reason an assertion is made here, viz. that the Ātman does not come into existence through the operation of any productive causes.

वस्त्वधीना यतो विद्या कर्त्रधीना क्रियाखिला ।
कर्त्रादि चात्ममोहोत्थं वस्तु सिद्धं स्वतोऽद्वयम् ॥१३६॥

(This is so), because knowledge¹ depends on only the thing (i.e. reality) and not on worldly knowledge, whereas all activities depend only on some agent and (the notions of) an agent etc.² arise out of ignorance about the Ātman. (As against this), the thing, viz. the Ātman, is established by itself and is without any duality. [136]

¹This refers to knowledge of the Brahman alone.

²This refers to *kāraka* and *kriyā*.

कारकाण्युपमृद्नाति विद्या बीजमिवोषरम् ।
तत्कारणोपमर्दित्वाज्जन्मनैव न कारकम् ॥१३७॥

Knowledge destroys the notions of the productive causes in the same way as a barren land destroys the seed; it (viz. knowledge) is a productive cause, because it rises¹ alone. It has the nature of being destructive of the causes of the same.² [137]

The simile is explained thus. In a barren land, there is not any potency of creating any effect from the seed, similarly the knowledge about the Brahman does not have any potency in producing things.

The second line explains the significance of the simile as we have explained.

¹This refers to productive causes.

²The rise is indicative of the repetition (*abhyāsa*) of the process in relation to it. It signifies the absence of ignorance.

प्रमातृपरिणामत्वात्प्रमासिद्धिः प्रमातरि ।
प्रमात्रव्यवधानेन संविदैव न वृत्तिभिः ॥१३८॥

There is verbal knowledge (of something) established in the case of the knower, (only) as a modification of the knower; (now,) owing to the absence of any obscuring factor for the knowing one (in *sanvid*), there is knowledge established not by any modifications etc. (of *sanvid*). [138]

This verse is based on the worldly notion of the knowledge of things. A thing is known by an agent when there is some kind of modification that occurs in the case of the knower. It is quite contrary in the case of the knowledge obtained by the Ātman, for the Ātman does not undergo any modification, when it is said, it knows.

मात्रन्तरे व्यपेक्षायां मातुर्मनान्तरे मितेः ।
दुर्वारत्वात्प्रसङ्गस्य ह्यनवस्था प्रसज्यते ॥१३९॥

Against the above, if a statement, is made that the knowledge occurs in the case of the knowledge (viz. the Ātman), depending on some other knower, then, in that case, there will be the contingency of *infinite regress* for the reason that it cannot be averted. [139]

In verses 140 onwards up to the end, there is the discussion of pramāṇa-prakriyā used in the worldly dealings.

प्रमात्रतिशयेनैव कारणं स्यात्प्रमात्रपि ।
विज्ञानातिशयं सिध्येन्मानं निश्चयवत्तथा ॥१४०॥

Through the excellence of only the knower, a certain means of knowing also becomes the cause (of knowledge) and the excellence of the knowing sentience (*vijñāna*) and the knowledge comes to have the form of (definite) decision. [140]

pramātrātiśaya requires some explanation here: (i) *pramātr* is basically *nirvikāra*, but a certain excellence in it has to be accepted so that there can be knowledge received by it, as we say. This knowledge is *vijñānātiśaya*. (ii) *niścayavat māna* is knowledge in the form of a (definite) decision. This can result, only if there is *vijñānātiśaya* as mentioned above. Thus, in this worldly situation of knowing, there is mutual dependence of the knower and the knowable.

मेयासाधारणात्मोत्तरूपवान्निश्चयो यथा ।
बाह्यमेयप्रधानत्वे सत्यसाधारणार्थधीः ॥१४१॥

Since, decision is of the nature of the peculiar (or, uncommon) nature of the eternal object and there results, therefore (or, in that case), the understanding of an incomparable object of reality. [141]

This verse refers to the firm impressions of the external objects produced on intellect.

मानव्यापारकाले स्याद्बाह्यमेयोपसर्जनम् ।
आभासादिप्रमाणान्तं तद्विशिष्टफलोत्थितेः ॥१४२॥

This inclination towards an external object would be possible only at the time of the function of the organs (*māna*), up to the point that there is (some) specific effect produced by that from the semblance (of the knower) up to the functioning organs. [142]

The inclination should have subservient relation to the knower, the impressions of the knower to have known that, and the function of various organs.

प्रमाणव्यापृतेस्तुर्ध्वं वासनाधानकारणात् ।
मेयोपसर्जना बुद्धिः स्मृत्या साक्षात्प्रतीयते ॥१४३॥

And after the function of the means of knowing is over (i.e. completed) intellect becomes subordinate to the object of knowing, on account of the fixing of impressions of the same on it and this is directly perceived (experienced) by memory. [143]

This is to stress the importance of intellect in respect of memory.

साक्षात्कुर्वत्स्वमात्मानं यदालम्बनंतां व्रजेत् ।
कार्यकारणरूपस्य तदेवालम्बनं मतम् ॥१४४॥

That¹ is held to be the basis of that (viz. intellect) which, directly perceiving itself, becomes the support (or, abode) of that¹ and also of what has (i.e. assumes) the form(s) of effect(s) and cause(s). [144]

NKL concludes: *ato nādvaitahāniḥ ity arthah.*

¹This refers to the inner self or sentience.

पूर्वोपलम्भसंस्कारसमुत्थस्मृतिविभ्रमात् ।
वस्तुवृत्तातिवर्त्येष व्यापारः सार्वलौकिकः ॥१४५॥

This is the activity of all people which, owing to the error consisting in becoming (the subject of) memory, arise as it does from the impression(s) obtained earlier. [145]

This stresses on the significance of the adjective *meyopasarjanā* of intellect (in verse 143 above)—it is, in reality *anālingita-bāhyārtha* 'not related to (or, based on) any external object(s)'.

मेयाभिसंगतेः पूर्वं ज्ञानं ज्ञातृसमाश्रयम् ।
ज्ञातृत्वसिद्धये ज्ञानं ज्ञातृत्वं तत्कृतं यतः ॥१४६॥

(Even) before its connection with some object of knowledge, intellect¹ is supported (i.e. based/abiding) in the knower (i.e.

sentience within) and it becomes the knower, since its nature of being the knower (of external objects) is caused/produced by that (viz. sentience within). [146]

From verse 142 up to 146 there has been discussed the nature of what are called the means of knowing.

¹This is for *jñāna* in the first line.

वासनाबलतः स्पष्टं बहिर्वद्यन्मतौ स्थितम् ।
भावनागोचरं ज्ञानं बाह्यवस्त्ववलम्बनम् ॥१४७॥

Knowledge (in memory) is (in reality) an object of the impression(s) which has (or, have) remained in intellect (*mati*, i.e. *buddhi*) owing to the power (lit. strength) of the impression(s) and becomes clear (i.e. visible), being (as it were) supported in (or, based on) external object(s). [147]

There is no doubt about that the words *vāsanā* and *bhāvanā* refer to the impressions (without any material difference between them).

अपेक्षावृत्तवद्वस्तु यावत्किञ्चिदिहेक्ष्यते ।
मातृमात्राश्रयं तत्स्यान्न स्वतःसिद्धिनिष्ठितम् ॥१४८॥

Whatever is noticed here (i.e. in worldly activities/dealings) as a thing whose usefulness (*vr̥tta*) is dependent (on) another (or, having expectation of another), is only based/abiding in the knower (i.e. sentience within) and (therefore) it would not be established by itself.¹ [148]

This explains away the nature of the world (or, transmigratory existence) as coming of its own; refer to *vastusvābhāvya* in verse 82 above—cf. *vastusvābhāvya* BUB on 3.4.2 (p.422).

¹That is, it has no existence on/of its own.

अन्तःकरणवृत्तिर्या चक्षुरादिसमाश्रया ।

रूपादिविषयाभासा लौकिकी दृष्टिरुच्यते ॥१४९॥

The popular conception is what is known/called as the function¹ of the internal organ,² that depends (lit. rests) on the eye etc.³ and which is in the form of the appearance of the object such as form.⁴ [149]

¹This refers to modification.

²This refers to *buddhi* and *manas*.

³This refers to the other external organs.

⁴This refers to the objects of other sense-organs.

तस्याश्च क्रियमाणत्वाज्जन्मनाशाभिसंगतिः ।
आत्मदृष्टिस्त्वयं नित्या जन्मनाशादिवर्जिता ॥१५०॥

And, since it is being created, therefore it has a close (*abhi*) association with the origin and the destruction. And, as against that, this perception by the Ātman is ever-abiding and not associated with the origin and the destruction etc.¹ [150]

¹The word 'etc.' refers to the other modifications beside *janman* and *nāśa*; viz. *bhāvavikāras*.

कार्यकारणयोस्तत्त्वं प्रत्यगात्मा चितिर्यतः ।
तस्मान्नित्यश्चिदाभासो बुद्धौ तत्प्रत्ययेषु च ॥१५१॥

Since the real nature of what are known as effect(s) and cause(s) is the inner self, the sentience, therefore, there is invariable (*nitya*) appearance of the sentience in intellect and its cognitions. [151]

प्रत्यक्चिदुपरक्तायां बुद्धौ धर्मादिहेतुकः ।
आकारो जायतेऽनित्यो दुःखशब्दादिलक्षणः ॥१५२॥

There is ever produced on intellect, which is tinted by sentience within, the form characterized by sorrow, word etc. that is

caused by Dharma etc.

[152]

स्थास्नौ प्रत्यक्चिदाकारे बाह्यहेतुनिबन्धनः ।
आकारो जायते बुद्धेरागमापायधर्मवान् ॥१५३॥

(Also) there is ¹ produced, in the eternal shape of the sentience within, a certain form related to (i.e. determined by) the external cause(s), which has the properties of the origin and the destruction (which are really of) intellect. [153]

¹It means: it appears to be

उपाधिभूतया दृष्ट्या हानोपादानरूपया ।
एकाश्रयत्त्वतः स्थास्न्वी संसृष्टेवोपजायते ॥१५४॥

That ever-abiding sentience appears affected as it were by the (proper) perception which has become its limiting adjunct and which is of the nature of abandoning and receiving (i.e. grasping some things), on account of its having the same substratum (as intellect), viz. the body. [154]

There follows the explanation of *sā*

बुद्धितद्वृत्तिसाक्षित्वाद्बुद्धितत्प्रत्ययैरजः ।
गृह्यतेऽविद्ययाभिन्नो मणिर्यद्वदुपाश्रयैः ॥१५५॥

Owing to ignorance, the unborn (sentience) is taken to be non-distinct from intellect and its modifications, owing to its ¹ character of being the witness of the same, in the same way as a jewel appears to be affected by what are reflected ² in it. [155]

¹That is, of the unborn sentience.

²Literally, what have resorted to it.

कर्तृकार्यावभासित्वात्कर्तृकार्याभिधायिभिः ।

लक्ष्यते नामभिः साक्षी साक्षात् त्वभिधीयते ॥१५६॥

The witness is indicated by the names that express (what is meant by) the agent(s) and (their) effect(s), because it makes known (lit. brings light to) the agent(s) and the effect(s). Yet, it is not (so) called directly. [156]

तज्जन्मनाशसाक्षित्वादजोऽनाशी स्वयंप्रभः ।
जायते नश्यतीत्येवं तत्साक्ष्यप्यभिधीयते ॥१५७॥

(Thus,) the unborn, the imperishable, the self-luminous is said to be born and to perish on account of being the witness of the origin and the destruction of that,¹ even though it is merely the witness of the same. [157]

¹This refers to what have been referred to in the preceding verse.

दृष्टेर्जडस्वभावायाः परार्थायाः स्वतश्चितिम् ।
न पश्येः प्रत्यगात्मानं द्रष्टारं दृश्ययानया ॥१५८॥

You will not (be able to) see¹ the inner self, the seer, which is, in its own right, sentience by this visible (sight), which is insentient in nature and is subservient to another. [158]

This gives the meaning of *na dr̥ṣṭer*

¹Literally, you may not see.

दिदृक्षितपरिच्छिन्नपराग्नूपाद्यपेक्षया ।
तद्विरुद्धं कथं पश्येर्दृष्ट्या तत्कर्मभूतया ॥१५९॥

How will you (be able to) see (that), which is opposed to what is visible by the sight of what has become the object of sentience, what is dependent on external for seeing etc. and what are limited and (are yet) sought to be seen. [159]

द्रष्टुर्हि व्यापृतिर्दृष्टौ दृष्टे रूपादिकर्मणि ।
ताभ्यां तत्प्रत्यगात्मानं कथं पश्येत्चित्तिं स्वतः ॥१६०॥

Indeed the function of the seer is seen in the sight,¹ in respect of what is seen, viz. the object such as form etc. (Therefore,) with these two, how can you see the inner self, viz. the sentience itself?

[160]

नाकारकं समीक्षेत द्रष्टृदर्शनगोचरान् ।
कारकत्वमृतेऽविद्यां कूटस्थस्यात्मनः कुतः ॥१६१॥

How can that, which is not connected with any activity (*akāraka*), see the object of the sight of the seer? How can there be on the part of the immutable Ātman any character of one which is connected with activity, unless there is ignorance?

[161]

कारकं सत्तथैकात्म्यं न कथं चन वीक्षते ।
अविद्यानन्वयाद्वास्वत्प्रत्यग्ज्योतिःसतत्त्वतः ॥१६२॥

Also, the existent (even if it is) connected with activity, can in no way see the singleness of the Ātman, because of its non-connection with ignorance and (also) because of its being, by the nature of itself, the flame within.

[162]

येन चक्षुरिदं दृष्टं चक्षुषा यत्र पश्यति ।
ब्रह्म विद्धि तदेव त्वं न तु तद्यदुपासते ॥१६३॥

Do you know that alone as the Brahman, on account of which this eye is seen and that which the eye does not see, but not that which they worship (as the Brahman).

[163]

It shows the agreement of the sentence *na dr̥ṣṭer* ... with another Śruti; cp. *Kenopaiṣad* 1.5 and 7.

मनसा मनुते यत्र येन चाहुर्मनो मतम् ।

ब्रह्म विद्धि तदेव त्वं न त्विदं यदुपासते ॥१६४॥

Do you know only that as the Brahman, which cannot grasp (any object) with the help of *manas* and that by which, they have said, *manas* is understood. Do you know that alone as the Brahman and not that which they worship (as the Brahman). [164]

Cp. *Kenopaniṣad* 1.6.

इत्येवमादिवाक्यानि यथोक्तार्थसमर्थने ।
श्रौतानि शतशः सन्ति दृग्मेयत्वसिद्धये ॥१६५॥

There are hundreds of the Śruti sentences, (like those mentioned above) as beginning with these (words) and others (are) in support of what is stated, i.e. for proving the imperceptibility of the seer.¹ [165]

¹This refers to the Ātman.

एतन्मोहसमुत्थत्वात्प्रमात्रादेर्मनागपि ।
नैकात्म्यं शक्यते द्रष्टुं क्लृप्तहेतोरबाधया ॥१६६॥

It is not possible to see,¹ even to a (very) little extent, the singleness of the (worldly) seer and others,² because of their having arisen from the delusion about this (inner self), because of their being (only) imagined—(and this) without being unstultified.³ [166]

So far, Sureśvara explained the passage *na dr̥ṣṭeḥ* ..., following BUB.

¹The AnSS edition reads *vaktum*, but we adopt *draṣṭum* which is noted as a variant reading in the AnSS edition and which is confirmed by NKL edition also, for, it yields better sense.

²This refers to *pramātr* etc.

³Sureśvara uses the unusual word *abādhā* for *abādha*.

Now follows in verses 167-174 the explanation by *Bhartṛprapañca* of *na dr̥ṣṭeḥ*

दृष्टिभेदमकृत्वैव दृष्टेरित्यादिकां श्रुतिम् ।
केचिद्व्याचक्षते धीराः प्रसादाज्जातवेदसः ॥१६७॥

(But) some intelligent scholars,¹ owing to the favour of Agni, explain the Śruti passage beginning with (*na*) *dr̥ṣṭer* ... without differentiating the (popular) seer (and the actual) seer.² [167]

¹Translation also retains the plural which Sureśvara has used for the singular, referring to *Bhartṛprapañca*.

²The word *dr̥ṣṭibheda* is understood here as *dr̥ṣṭyoh bhedaḥ*.

दृष्टेः कर्तारमात्मानं न पश्येः क्रियमाणया ।
दृष्ट्या रूपानुपातिन्या न क्रिया कर्तृकर्मिका ॥१६८॥

You do not see the agent of the activity of seeing, viz. the Ātman by your act of seeing which you are performing (lit. is being performed by you) and which follows the forms (to be seen). (And) the activity cannot (lit. does not) have the agent for an object. [168]

दृष्टेरिति च षष्ठीयं क्रियमाणत्वहेतुतः ।
कर्मण्येव तु विज्ञेया नासावर्थान्तरे यतः ॥१६९॥

And, since the genitive in the form *dr̥ṣṭeḥ* has to be understood in the sense of the object, the activity of seeing is being performed, for it does not belong to anything else.¹ [169]

¹The implication of *karmani ṣaṣṭhī* is that there is no subject-object relation. *dr̥ṣṭi* stands for both *draṣṭṛ* and *dr̥śya*.

दृष्टिकर्तृत्वमाचष्टे तृजन्तेन तथात्मनः ।
यतोऽतः कर्मदृष्ट्या तं द्रष्टारं नानुपश्यति ॥१७०॥

So also he explains the nature of the agent in the act of seeing (by the use of form of the verb root *drś*) which ends in suffix *tṛc*, viz. as that of the Ātman. Since this is so, Uṣasta does not see the seer. [170]

कर्मेप्सिततमं रूपं दृष्टेः कार्यत्वहेतुतः ।
चक्षुर्मनो वा बुद्धिर्वा कर्तुः करणमिष्यते ॥१७१॥

The most desired (thing), viz. the object (of the action) of seeing, is the form, for the reason that it is to be accomplished. An eye, or *manas*, or intellect is accepted (lit. desired) as the means of the agent. [171]

विज्ञानात्मा तु कर्तात्र स्वातन्त्र्यात्सर्वकर्मसु ।
फलं रूपोपलब्धिश्च कर्तुर्दृष्ट्यवसानजम् ॥१७२॥

And, the inner self is here the agent because of its liberty with reference to all actions (to be performed by it) and the result is getting (to know) the form which comes (into effect) at the agent's (act of) seeing. [172]

साधनत्वेन कर्तात्र दृष्टाववसितिं गतः ।
क्रियासिद्ध्युत्तरे काले फलं कस्यापि वेष्यते ॥१७३॥

In this, viz seeing, the agent has (finally) become (lit. ended in becoming) the means (of seeing).¹ (And) in the time after the activity (of seeing) is accomplished, the result is desired² to accrue to anyone. [173]

SP appears to quote Bhartṛprapañca while explaining the word *sāadhanatvena* in the words *uktaṃ hi kriyāsāadhanatvena viniyukta iti* and also, while explaining *kriyā*, *uktaṃ hi kriyāsiddhyuttarakāle phalaṃ kasyāpi bhaviṣyatīti*.

¹The actual agent, viz. sentience, appears to have become instrumental, i.e. subordinate, in the activity of seeing.

²This indicates that sentience comes to have or enjoy (to say so) the result, i.e. it becomes the *phalin*, or the *svāmin* as mentioned in the next verse.

स्वामिनो यदि वान्यस्य कर्म प्रत्येव च क्रिया ।
कर्म दर्शयितव्यं स्याद्दृष्ट्या द्रष्टा न दृश्यते ॥१७४॥

That activity towards its object (i.e. result) can be (said to be) of the master¹ or someone else;² (but) the object³ has to be pointed out (and) the seer is not seen by the means/act of seeing. [174]

This is for explaining *kasyāpi* in the preceding verse.

¹This is sentience (*jīva*) within.

²That is an adjunct (*upādhi*) of sentience.

³Read SP for clarity of the idea: *kriyā hīpsitatamaṃ karma praty abhimukhībhūtety uktatvāj jñānaṃ saṃvedanapalakaṃ kriyā sā rūpādiviṣayā nātmaviṣayety arthaḥ*.

तत्रैवं सति तं दृष्टेर्द्रष्टारं कर्मभूतया ।
दृष्ट्या पश्येः स्वमात्मानं न कथं चन कर्तृतः ॥१७५॥

This being so, you may see the seer of the seeing with the help of (or, by the means called) the organs of seeing—but, in no way, your own self (i.e. the inner self) as the agent (of seeing). [175]

This concludes the statement about result of what is called seeing.

Now follows the refutation of the view of *Bhārtrprapañca*.

व्याख्यानमेतन्महतां न साधु प्रतिभाति नः ।
न्यायाक्षरानुपात्तत्वाद्यथा तदभिधीयते ॥१७६॥

This explanation of the great (masters) does not appear to

us proper. How this is so, because of their non-acceptance of reasonable arguments is (now) stated. [176]

यथाप्रश्नमियं तावत्प्रत्युक्तिर्नोपपद्यते ।
यतो द्रष्टर्यसंभाव्यं कृत्स्नं प्रश्नविशेषणम् ॥१७७॥

To begin with, this answer to the question which is asked does not stand to reason, since all the specifications¹ (mentioned) in the question are not possible (to find/obtain) in the (case of the) seer.² [177]

¹The singular (-*viśeṣaṇam*) in the question is for the plural (i.e. *jātāv ekavacanam*).

²This refers to the inner self, i.e. the Ātman. This is understood from the next verse.

साक्षादित्यादिकं यस्मान्न मनागपि युज्यते ।
विशेषणं यथोक्तं तत्कारके दृष्टिकारिणि ॥१७८॥

(This is so) since the specification, viz. that which begins with (the word) *sākṣāi* etc., as stated (in the question), is, not even a little of it, reasonable in the case of that which causes the (act of) seeing, viz. the agent. [178]

क्षेत्रज्ञपरमात्मानौ नापि प्रश्ने विवक्षितौ ।
एकार्थयोगाद्वाक्यस्य नैकोक्तौ स्याद्द्वयार्थता ॥१७९॥

Also, (both) the knower of field and the highest Ātman, were not referred to¹ in the question, since (the rule is that) a sentence has only one (meaning to convey) and (therefore) it cannot have (i.e. convey) two things (or, meanings) when (only) one is mentioned (or, stated).¹ [179]

¹That is, it was not the intention of the questioner to convey both of them.

²Read SP: *arthaikatvād ekaṁ vākyam iti nyāyāt*. That means:

the sentence *sākṣāt* ... can refer only to the individual self, or to the Ātman; here, the former!

न चेप्सिततमत्वं स्याद्द्रष्टुर्दृष्टेरसंभवात् ।
दृष्ट्यन्तरस्य द्रष्टुश्च न च द्रष्ट्रन्तरं तथा ॥१८०॥

Also, there is not, in respect of the seer, the nature of being the most desired thing, since there is not the seeing (of it) possible and also there is not any other act of seeing with respect to that seer by another seer. [180]

¹This refutes the nature of *dr̥ṣṭi* '(act of) seeing' as an object obtained by the agent (viz. *draṣṭr*) that being based on the notion of the genitive as expressive of an object (*karmanī ṣaṣṭhī*).

तदभ्युपगमे वः स्यादनवस्थानिवारणा ।
दृष्ट्यन्तरेण संव्याप्तिर्नातो दृष्टेः कथं चन ॥१८१॥

In case you accept that,¹ there would be unavoidable *infinite regress*, therefore, there will not be, in any way, the pervasion of one seeing by another seeing. [181]

¹This refers to two (acts of) seeing and two seers.

तथा द्रष्टृगृहीत्यैव कामितार्थसमाप्तिः ।
निरर्थकमिदं च स्याद्दृष्टेरिति यदुच्यते ॥१८२॥

And, by the acceptance of an other seer in that way, the desired thing¹ (or, result) would have been achieved (lit. obtained)¹ and, therefore, (it would follow that) this (statement), viz. what is said in *dr̥ṣṭeḥ* ..., would be meaningless. [182]

¹This refers to (the act of) seeing.

²Read SP: *yathā dr̥ṣṭer iti ṣaṣṭhī na karmanīty uktam tathā draṣṭety api kartari na sambhavatīti*.

सदैवाव्यभिचारित्वाद्दृष्टिद्रष्ट्रोः परस्परम् ।
विशेषणविशेष्यत्वं व्यभिचारे सतीष्यते ॥१८३॥

(This is so) because both seeing and seer cannot exist without each other. The relation of qualifier and qualified is accepted only when they exist apart from another.¹ [183]

¹On this, SP gives the example of the word *nīlotpala* which means that *nīlatva* and *utpalatva* would be invariably connected with each other. One cannot think of *nīlotpala* in the absence of either *nīla* or *utpala*.

न च प्रमादपाठोऽयं सर्वेषामविगानतः ।
विध्यशेषत्वतो नापि चार्थवादत्वमिष्यते ॥१८४॥

This is not a mistaken reading, because all the followers¹ (of this Upaniṣad) have not (shown) any difference in (respect of) their recitation² of it. [184]

¹Supply: of both Kāṇva and Mādhyandina recensions.

²*avigāna* is 'absence of *vigāna*' where *vi* stands for variety but better twofold, therefore, *avigāna* means twofold recitation.

³The translation of *vidhyaśeṣatvato* is only tentative—there is not certainty about its correctness.

अहंद्दृष्ट्यधिगम्यत्वमपि द्रष्टुरिहेष्यते ।
प्रत्यक्षमाविरुद्धत्वं तथा चोक्तैः प्रसज्यते ॥१८५॥

Here (i.e. in this) is accepted (lit. desired) the nature of the seer as what can be known (or, understood) through (the acceptance of) the notion of *aham* 'ego'; (and) then, in that case (*tathā*) there follows contingently the opposition to the directly perceived knowledge. [185]

मेयमानप्रमातृणां प्रात्यक्ष्यं प्रागपीरितम् ।

व्याख्या व्यरोधि तेनेयं दृष्टेरित्यत्र या कृता ॥१८६॥

It has been earlier said that the object to be known, the means of knowing, the agent of knowing are all directly perceptible, therefore, this your explanation which you have offered in respect of the statement *dr̥ṣṭeh* is opposed. [186]

This makes reference to verse 169.

यथोक्तादात्मनोऽन्यद्यत्कार्यकारणरूपकम् ।
आर्तं विनाशि तत्तुच्छं शुक्तिकारजतादिवत् ॥१८७॥

Anything else than the Ātman, about which there is the statement made, viz that which is of the nature of cause and effect, that is afflicted, and perishable is insignificant just like silver in the shell etc.¹ [187]

¹This refers to other well-known instances of superimposition.

एतदेवमनार्तं स्यात्स्वतःसिद्धत्वकारणात् ।
सदैकानुदितालुप्तप्रत्यग्दृष्टिसतत्त्वकम् ॥१८८॥

Thus, this is ever unafflicted, for the reason that it has established itself, in its own right—(this one) which is ever single,¹ which has not come into existence² and which, in its nature, is such that it has not lost the awareness (lit. seeing) of being the inner self. [188]

b:

¹That is, without a second or without duality.

²That is, which does not originate from anything else.

हेतूक्तिरथवातः स्यादुक्तवस्तुस्वभावतः ।
तदन्यभावासंसिद्धेरार्तत्वं हेतुमद्भवेत् ॥१८९॥

Or, this is¹ therefore the statement of the reason, viz. it is the nature of the thing (viz. reality)² which has the nature

of being (ever) existent, (just) single,³ unborn⁴ and having
a never-lost awareness of the inner self. [189]

¹Literally, would be.

²That is, the Ātman.

³That is, not having any second.

⁴That is, unoriginated.

इति श्रीबृहदारण्यकोपनिषद्भाष्यवार्तिके तृतीयाध्यायस्य
चतुर्थं ब्राह्मणम् ॥४॥

BRHADĀRANYAKOPANIṢAD-
BHĀṢYA-VĀRTIKA

3.5

Kahola Brāhmaṇa

Sureśvara gives his ideas about the connection of the fifth Brāhmaṇa with the earlier Brāhmaṇa of the third chapter.

आदावभिहितं सर्वं बन्धनं सप्रयोजकम् ।
अस्तित्वव्यतिरिक्तत्वे बद्धस्य च विनिश्चिते ॥१॥

In the beginning¹ is stated (about) the bondage in its entirety together with its causative factors.² And further³ were determined the existence and the distinction of the one who was in bondage,⁴ (as apart from the highest Ātman). [1]

¹This refers to the contents of BU 3.1-3.3.

²This refers to the transmigratory existence with the various actions and results etc. which are associated with the individual self.

³In the fourth Brāhmaṇa.

⁴Transmigratory self (i.e. the individual or inner self) which is shown as existing apart from the highest Ātman. Incidentally, this refers to the desire for liberation on the part of the individual self.

संसारानर्थसंप्राप्तिहेतोर्विध्वस्तयेऽधुना ।
संन्यासैकसहायात्मयाथात्म्यज्ञानमुच्यते ॥२॥

Now it is for the removal (lit. destruction) of the cause(s) which are the causes of the occurrence of the undesirable transmigratory existence (of the inner self) that there is stated the true nature of the Ātman which has renunciation alone as its aid.

[2]

This verse presents Sureśvara's idea of the contents of the fifth Brāhmaṇa.

उत्पन्नसम्यग्ज्ञानस्य संन्यासो लक्षणं यतः ।
साधनं च तदुत्पत्तौ संन्यासोऽतोऽत्र भण्यते ॥३॥

Since renunciation is the characteristic of one in whom the right knowledge¹ has occurred, here is therefore stated the means to the rise of that.² [3]

¹This refers to the knowledge of the true nature of the Ātman. The use of the word *samyagjñāna* is in conformity with the practice of the writers on philosophical matters during 4-5 centuries around Sureśvara.

²This is *samyagjñāna*.

प्रवृत्तिलक्षणो योगो ज्ञानं संन्यासलक्षणम् ।
तस्माज्ज्ञानं पुरस्कृत्य संन्यसेदिह बुद्धिमान् ॥४॥

'Yoga has activity as its (main) characteristic and knowledge is characterized by renunciation. Therefore, an intelligent person in worldly existence (*iha*) should renounce, keeping knowledge as the principal thing in view.' [4]

This verse appears to be a quotation, as NKL mentions this as a *vākyāntara*, viz. *smṛtivākyam* (as the edition of NKL points out).

Now follows in verses 5-14 the statement of *Bhārṭṛprapañca*'s opinion on the issue discussed above.

उषस्तप्रश्न एवायं कहोलेनापि पृच्छ्यते ।
तत्किमर्थं पुनः प्रश्नः स एव कृतनिर्णयः ॥५॥

A question can be asked: 'In this Brāhmaṇa is asked by Kahola

the same question as asked by Uṣasta in the earlier Brāhmaṇa; therefore, why this question again, when its decision is already made?' [5]

प्रष्टृभेदाददोषश्चेन्मैवं प्रत्युक्तिभेदतः ।
एकार्थप्रश्नवाक्यस्य ह्येका प्रत्युक्तिरिष्यते ॥६॥

(The answer is:) 'If one were to say that, "this is not a fault, since there is difference between two questioners", let this not (be said) owing to the difference in the two answers. One should note that (there is only one (uniform or the same) answer desired in the case of a statement related to only one question.' [6]

Bhārṭṛprapañca sets aside the *praṣṭṛbheda* in relation to one and the same question as the basis of setting aside the notion of repetition, because there is *pratyuktibheda*. In BU 3.4, the *pratyukti* 'answer' was *na dr̥ṣṭeḥ draṣṭāram paśyeh* ... while, in BU 3.5, the answer is *yo 'śanayāpipāse śokam moham jarām mṛtyum atyeti*.

पुनरुक्तं न च न्याय्यमेकप्रवचने क्वचित् ।
न चेह लौकिको जल्पः प्रष्टृभेदो यतो भवेत् ॥७॥

Nowhere¹ in one single exposition² is repetition reasonable. Further, this is not a single popular discussion (*jalpa*)¹ where there could be a difference of questioners (that would result in avoiding repetition). [7]

SP points out that the differences of speakers can be understood in popular conversations since it is merely based on imagination (i.e. wrong notions), but there is no real difference of speakers in *apauruṣeya śruti*.

¹This refers to *śāstrīya* and *laukika vyavahāras*.

²This refers to the branch of Vedic learning according to SP.

³The word *jalpa* should not be understood in its Nāya sense. It is to be understood as a mere conversation among people on some matter.

समानशब्दौ तेनेमौ स्यातां भिन्नार्थवाचकौ ।
कहोलोषस्तवक्त्रोक्तौ प्रश्नाविति विनिर्णयः ॥८॥

Therefore, the decision is that the two questions coming from the mouths of Kahola and Uṣasta are expressive of different meanings, even though they have the same¹ expressions in them. [8]

¹In Vedic language *samāna* means only *eka*; Sureśvara uses the word in the same sense.

क्षेत्रज्ञात्मानमप्राक्षीदुषस्तो न परं पदम् ।
अप्राक्षीत्परमात्मानं कहोलोऽपि न दुःखिनम् ॥९॥

(To explain:) Uṣasta asked about the Ātman which is the knower of the field and not (that which is) the highest being (lit. place). Also Kahola put a question about the highest Ātman and not the one who is grief-stricken. [9]

It seems that Sureśvara has based verse 9 on some statement in Bhartṛprapañca's Bhāṣya on BU thus: *yathāhuḥ pūrvah praśnah paramātmaviṣeśo 'yam vijñānātmaviṣaya iti. pīrva* refers to Kahola in verse 8 and, consequently, the second question is understood as coming from Uṣasta. SP refers to the Bhāṣya on Mādhyandina recension in this respect.

एकदेश उपन्यासादैकार्थ्यमवसीयते ।
मिथःसंकीर्णधर्मोक्तौ यथायोगं व्यवस्थितिः ॥१०॥

The oneness of the two meanings (of the two questions) is determined by their introduction into one part (of the instruction).¹ (And) with respect to the statement of properties

of both, being mixed together, there should be the division of the same in a suitable way (*yathāyogam*).² [10]

¹This refers to *ekapravacana* in verse 7 above. Also *ekadeśa upanyāsāt* refers to the same idea.

²This literally means 'in a way' as the contexts would demand.

Verses 11-12 explain the nature of the word *mithaḥsaṅkīrṇa-dharmoktau* in verse 10.

यदन्तरतमत्वं प्रागुक्तं तत्परमात्मनि ।
तदेकदेशाभिहितेर्विज्ञानात्मानमेष्यति ॥११॥

What was stated as being the innermost (or, nearest) with reference to the highest Ātman can belong to the *vijñānātman* also because of the statement (*abhihiti*) about it in the same portion (*ekadeśa*). [11]

Read SP: *ekasmin prakaraṇe dvayor ukter antaratamatvam paramātmāny ucyamānaṃ vijñānātmani siddham bhaviṣyatīti tadukter ity arthaḥ*.

शोकमोहाद्यतीतत्वं प्रकाशात्मकता तथा ।
विज्ञानात्मनि चोक्तापि परमात्मानमेष्यति ॥१२॥

So also, the nature of being beyond grief and delusion and also the nature of being self-illuminating, though stated in respect of the inner self, would belong to the highest Ātman (as well). [12]

This verse follows the reasoning in verse 11. That is to say, in verse 11, the properties of the *paramātmān* were extended to the *vijñānātman* and, in the same way, in verse 12, the properties of the *vijñānātman* are extended to the *paramātmān*. This brings out the significance of NKL (*imaṃ nyāyam anyatra yojayati*). *nyāya* means 'way' only here.

Whatever was mentioned in regard to the *vijñānātman* in BU 4.3 (Jyotis Brāhmaṇa) is extended to the *paramātman*.

पञ्चमाध्यायशेषेण परमात्मविनिर्णयः ।
षष्ठे तु वक्ष्यतेऽध्याये विज्ञानात्मविनिर्णयः ॥१३॥

There is decision (about the nature of the *paramātman*) as a part (viz. remainder) of the fifth chapter (according to the modern count, the third chapter); and the sixth one (viz. the fourth) will be stated as decision regarding the nature of the *vijñānātman*. [13]

SP, while explaining last line, refers possibly to Bhartṛprapañca's comment; *uktaṃ hi pañcamādhyāyaśeṣeṇa paramātmmano nirṇayo vakṣamāna iti* and, introducing the second line, it comments *jyotir brāhmaṇāder uṣastaprakaraṇaikavākyatām āha ṣaṣṭhe tv iti*. Also it states *yathāhuh śāṣṭheṇa vijñānātmana iti* (possibly again Bhartṛprapañca's words).

उपन्यासो द्वयोरत्र विज्ञानात्मपरात्मनोः ।
व्यज्ञाय्यपुनरुक्तत्वं न्यायमार्गसमाश्रयात् ॥१४॥

Thus is known here the introduction (of the ideas) of the *vijñānātman* and the *paramātman* and thus is there absence of repetition on account of resorting to the way (*nyāya*) (as we have shown). [14]

This is Bhartṛprapañca's conclusion regarding the connection of BU 3.5 to the earlier portion of BU.

Now follows in verses 15-54 the refutation of Bhartṛprapañca's view. There is an affirmation that two questions pertain to just one reality, viz. the *Ātman*.

इति व्याचक्षते केचित्प्रश्नावेतौ यथोदितौ ।

Thus have (some scholars) explained these two questions as have been mentioned. [15ab]

न सम्यगेतद्व्याख्यानं यथा तदभिधीयते ॥१५॥

But this exposition of them is not proper. How this is so is now explained (lit. stated). [15cd]

प्रत्युक्तेरेष त इति प्रश्नयोरुभयोरपि ।
क्षेत्रज्ञपरमात्मानौ नात्रात्मानौ विवक्षितौ ॥१६॥

From the answer *eṣa te* and also from both of the questions (let it be understood that) here¹ are not intended (the two, viz.) the knower of the field and the highest Ātman. [16]

This is Sureśvara's remark pertaining to the answer stated in BU 3.5.

¹This is for *pratyukti*.

प्रश्नोक्तिरेकरूपा च प्रत्यभिज्ञायतेऽञ्जसा ।
प्रत्युक्तिश्च तवात्मेति भिन्नार्थे वचसी कथम् ॥१७॥

It is clearly (or easily) understood (lit. recognized) that the statement of the question (in both the Brāhmaṇas) is of one and the same form (and therefore¹) how could the two statements, viz. the answer in the words *tava ātmā* be the conveyer of different meanings? [17]

¹Read SP: *praśnaikarūpya samuccayārthaś cakārah*.

एकत्र च न संभाव्यावात्मानौ द्वौ शरीरके ।
आत्मप्रत्यय एकार्थस्तथा श्रुतिवचांस्यपि ॥१८॥

There is no possibility (of the existence) of two Ātmans in one abode (*ekatra*), viz. the body; also (*tathā*) the awareness of the Ātman (on the part of an individual) can be (i.e. is)

on account of only one thing (*arthah*); also, there are statements in the Śruti¹ (to this very effect). [18]

This is yet another argument of Sureśvara, viz. the two sentences forming the answers in the two Brāhmaṇas do not refer to different things or objects (*artha*). SP points out that the argument in this has in view the notion of the differences in the two Ātmans on account of different conglomerations (of organs etc.), in accordance with the principle (*nyāya*) understood in the *guhādhikaraṇa* (BSB 1.2.11-12)

¹SP and NKL point to but one verse *eko devaḥ sarvabhūteṣu ...* (Śvetāśvataropaniṣad 6.11). Cp. *Kāthopaniṣad* 1.2.1ff.; 1.3.1; (the basis of the *guhādhikaraṇa*) *Taittirīyopaniṣad* 2.1; *Muṇḍakopaniṣad* 3.1.1; *Gītā* 13.2.

एकात्मकाः सर्वदेहा विवादो येष वर्तते ।
शरीरत्वाविशेषत्वात्प्रतिवादिशरीरवत् ॥१९॥

All the bodies (of individuals) in respect of which there is dispute (regarding the existence of different selves in them) have only one Self, since there is non-distinction in respect of their being a body even as there is a body of the opponent (or, disputant, *prativādin*). [19]

This has reference to SV.

सर्वान्तरावसानस्य साक्षादित्यादिकस्य च ।
ऐकार्थ्यात्प्रश्नवाक्यस्य नात्मानौ द्वौ विवक्षितौ ॥२०॥

There are not intended to be expressed two (different) Ātmans (in the question) because the sentence forming the question has only one object (meaning) to convey, viz. what ends in (the statement about) who is inside all and who is directly perceptible etc.¹ [20]

¹Namely, *gauṇa* 'metaphorical' and *aparokṣa* (which are

expressed in the next verse in the word *avyavadhānāt*).

अगौणाव्यवधानादिविशेषणविशेष्यता ।
नानेकस्यात्मनो न्याय्या तदसंभवहेतुतः ॥२१॥

It does not accord with reason to say that there is a statement of more Ātmans than one, which are the substantives of the attributes *agaṇa* and *avyavadhāna* etc., as their specifiers; since there is impossibility of them (being so). [21]

In the answer that is given to the questions of both BU 3.4 and 3.5, the words *agaṇa*, *avyavadhāna* etc. are used as adjectives of only one Ātman which can be only one and not more than one. The thought is: *agaṇa* means 'not subordinate (to any one else)'. This is not possible in respect of more Ātmans than one. Similar is the case of *avyavadhāna* etc.

व्यर्थोपनिषदारब्धिर्यदि भेदो भवेत्तयोः ।
अनिर्मोक्षप्रसक्तिश्च क्षेत्रज्ञपरमात्मनोः ॥२२॥

If there were meant difference between the two individual self and the Ātman, then the activity¹ of Upaniṣad would be futile and also there would contingently follow the absence of liberation for the knower of the field and the highest Ātman.² [22]

¹*ārabdhiḥ* is *ārambhah*. for *ārabdhi* is in the sense of activity, see *Raghuvaṃśa* 2.31: *vāmetaras tasya karaḥ prahartuś citrārpitārambha ivāvatasthe*.

²This refers to its condition of being overpowered by ignorance.

अकृत्स्नदृष्टिविषयो निषेधोऽपि न युज्यते ।
प्रविष्टस्य न चेत्कात्स्न्यं विज्ञानात्मन इष्यते ॥२३॥

Also it would not be reasonable to reject what is not the

object of incomplete (lit. not full) object, if completeness of the *vijñānātman* were not accepted in the case of (Ātman) who has entered (into a body). [23]

This verse has for its basis the rejection in BU 1.4.7: *sa yo 'ta ekaikam upāste na sa veda akṛtsno hy eṣo 'ta ekaikena bhavati*.

वस्तुवृत्तानुरोधेन नातो भेदोऽस्ति कुत्रचित् ।
वस्तुवृत्तानभिज्ञानाद्भेदः स्वप्नेन्द्रजालवत् ॥२४॥

Therefore, there is nowhere any distinction¹ (noticeable) if we follow (i.e. understand) the nature (*vr̥tta*) of the thing (viz. Ātman). There could be distinction² on account of non-recognition of the nature of the (real) thing (viz. the Ātman) like in a dream or magic show.³ [24]

¹Such as *vijñānātman* to be different from the Ātman.

²This refers to awareness of diverse object.

³Also, read Mammaṭa's *Kāvyaprakāśa*: *tathaiva tatra tasyeva* (Pāṇini Sūtra 5.1.116) *ity anenevārthe vihitasya vater upādāne* (*upamā*) and Bhīmacārya Jhalkikar's comment on the same, viz. *tatra tasyeva iti pāṇinisūtre tena tulyaṃ kṛyā ced vatiḥ* (Pāṇini Sūtra 5.1.115) *iti pūrvasūtrāt vatiḥ ity anuvartate* (*kṛyā ced iti tu nānuvartate*).

एक एव ततः प्रश्नो न प्रश्नद्वयमिष्यते ।
कंचिद्विशेषमापेक्ष्य पृष्ठो भूयोऽपि पृच्छ्यते ॥२५॥

Therefore, it is accepted that there is only one question and that there are not two of them; yet it is with some particular difference in view that this question, though already asked, is asked once again. [25]

उपदेशस्य विषयः प्रश्नप्रत्युक्तिवाक्ययोः ।
निरधारि पुरा तस्य याथात्म्यं त्वत्र पृच्छ्यते ॥२६॥

Earlier, there were determined the thing (i.e. the objects) to be imparted in the (two) sentences forming the question and the answer and here is now a query made about the true nature of that (Ātman). [26]

This verse points to the particular difference between the two answers of BU 3.4 and 3.5 to one and the same question. This is thus to justify the purport of BU 3.5 as distinct from that of BU 3.4.

These two verses now clarify the difference between the two answers in two Brāhmaṇas.

बुद्ध्यन्ताद्वयतिरिक्तोऽस्ति साक्षी प्रश्नस्य गोचरः ।
योग्यः प्रत्यङ्ङिति ज्ञेयः पूर्वप्रश्नार्थसंग्रहः ॥२७॥

The purport (lit. gist) of the first question is to be understood thus: The proper object of the question (and also of its answer) is the inner self, (viz.) the witness who is beyond (or above/apart from) the organs up to intellect.¹ [27]

The first three quarters of the verse clarify the intention of the question asked earlier, and also the answer to it.

¹Literally, the organs which end in intellect. That is, the external and the internal (viz. the threefold *antaḥkāraṇa*) organs.

अशनायाद्यतीतत्वं पूर्वोक्तस्यैव वस्तुनः ।
द्वितीयेनोच्यते तत्त्वं प्रत्यङ्मोहनिवृत्तये ॥२८॥

By (answer to) the second (question) is stated the real nature of the thing which is just the same as that stated in (the answer to) the earlier question, viz. being beyond hunger etc.—this for the sake of the removal of ignorance on the part of the individual (self). [28]

This explains: (*dvitīye tu*) *tasyaivātmano 'śanāyādisaṃsārādhara-*

mālītātvaṃ in BUB (p.428).

In brief it is stated that BU 3.4 pertains to proving the existence of the self as distinct from all the organs up to intellect and its being the witness within an individual. In the answer to the second question in BU 3.5 the emphasis is on pointing out its being beyond hunger etc.

यथाप्रश्नं प्रतिवचो न सम्यग्दितं परा ।
इति मत्वाथवाप्राक्षीत्पृष्टमर्थं पुनर्ऋषिम् ॥२९॥

Or, (perhaps Uṣasta) once again asked the sage (Yājñavalkya) about the same matter (in BU 3.5 here), after having thought that earlier a good answer was not made with reference to the question. [29]

This is another way of explaining the *raison d'être* of the question in BU 3.4.

This is clarified in the next verse.

साक्षादित्यादिना पृष्टं साक्षादित्यादिलक्षणम् ।
यथा संभाव्यते नेदृक्प्रत्युक्तौ किञ्चिदीक्ष्यते ॥३०॥

(That is to say:) There is not seen in this (lit. such an) answer like what is possible (as an answer, viz.) what (can serve as proper) description of the directly perceptible in respect of what is asked in the words directly perceptible etc. [30]

असंतोषात्कहोलोऽत उषस्तप्रश्नमेव तु ।
भूयोऽप्राक्षीन्मुनिं विद्वान्याथात्म्यार्थावबुद्धये ॥३१॥

Therefore, the learned Kahola asked the sage (Yājñavalkya) once again the same question as was asked by Uṣasta, because he was not satisfied regarding the first answer (and because) he wanted to secure (proper) knowledge of the true nature of the thing (i.e. the Ātman). [31]

एष आत्मेति प्रत्युक्तिर्यः प्राणेनेति चापरा ।
तावन्मात्रोक्तितो नासौ प्रश्नार्थोऽवधृतो भवेत् ॥३२॥

(This is to mean:) one answer is in the words *eṣa ātmā ...*¹ and the second in *yaḥ prāṇena ...*² (and therefore) from only that much of the statement there would not be fully understood the object of that question. [32]

This verse serves merely as a further clarification of the preceding verse.

The references to the Upaniṣadic sentences in the verse imply the unity of thought in various Upaniṣads (*sarvavedānta-pratyayatva*). (BSB 3.3.1-4, pp.734-749)

¹CU 8.1.16; 8.3.4-5; cf. *Maitrāyanyupaniṣad* 7.7.

²BU 1.4.1.

ननूर्मिषट्कातीतत्वं दुःखित्वं चाद्वयात्मनि ।
एकदैकत्र न स्यातां प्रकाशतमसी यथा ॥३३॥

(An objection can be raised:) But being beyond the group of six human infirmities (*ūrmi*)¹ and being miserable cannot be at one point of time and together (*ekatra*) in the non-dual Ātman as (there cannot be) light and darkness (together). [33]

¹This refers to the six human infirmities. They are *śoka*, *moha*, *jarā*, *mṛtyu*, *aśanāyā*, *pipāsā*— cf. *Bhāgavata Purāṇa* 10.70.17: *śokamohau jarāmṛtyū kṣutpipāse śaḍ ūrmayaḥ / prāviśad yanniviṣṭānāṃ na santy aṅga śaḍūrmayaḥ //*

नैष दोषस्तदज्ञानमिथ्याधीभ्रमहेतुतः ।
संसारितात्मनः क्लृप्ता कृष्णिमेव नभस्तले ॥३४॥

(The answer is:) 'No, this is not a fault because it is on account of the delusion caused by the absence of knowledge and the wrong knowledge (on the part of one) about that (viz. the

Ātman). That there is accepted the characteristic of a transmigratory being as darkness is understood (to be obtaining) on the surface of the sky. [34]

बृहद्विचारे सम्यक्च प्रागप्येतद्विचारितम् ।
विरुद्धागमविषयप्रविवेकप्रसङ्गतः ॥३५॥

And this was earlier discussed properly (i.e. in full) in our discussion of the SV¹ (and) where there was an occasion of setting aside the thought (*viṣaya*) of the opposed traditions (or theories).² [35]

¹Cf. *sambandhagranthe* as the note by the editor of NKL and cp. SV 111-126.

²Cf. SP: *madhubrāhmaṇānte*.

रज्जुत्वाहित्वयोर्यद्वदेकस्मिन्नपि वस्तुनि ।
स्वतस्तन्मोहतश्चैव संभवस्तद्वदात्मनि ॥३६॥
मुक्तत्वं च सितत्वं च परस्परविरुद्धयोः ।
धर्मयोः समवायः स्यान्न तु नीलोत्पलादिवत् ॥३७॥

As the characteristic of a rope and that of a serpent can of themselves become possible in the case of just one object because of the delusion (or ignorance) about that (thing), so (also) in respect of the Ātman, [36] there can be the simultaneous occurrence, *samavāya*,¹ of mutually opposite properties, viz. (in the words)² 'being liberated' and 'being in bondage' and (i.e. but) this cannot be as in the case of a blue lotus.³ [37]

¹This is not to refer to the invariable connection between properties and an object as understood in logic.

²Cf. SP: *sitatvaṃ cety asmād ūrdhvaṃ itiśabdādhyāhāraḥ*.

³Here, there is no specific mention of *nīlatva*, *utpalatva* which have to be understood for clearly apprehending the simile.

एवं विरुद्धधर्मत्वे न च दोषोऽस्ति कश्चन ।
 नामरूपादिसद्भावो दोषश्चेदिह चोद्यते ॥३८॥
 नेह नानेति वचनादेकमेवेति चोक्तितः ।
 नैवं परिहृतेस्तस्य मृद्दृष्टान्तादियुक्तिभिः ॥३९॥

Thus (*evam*)¹ there is no fault whatever even if (the inner Self and the Ātman) are taken to have mutually opposed properties. And, if there is pointed out here² a fault, viz. the existence of name, form etc.,³ [38]
 it is not so, since there is already a refutation of it from the Upaniṣadic statement *neha nānā*⁴ and *ekam eva*⁵ and so also from the reasonable illustration of clay⁶ etc. [39]

¹This is to refer to the condition of ignorance on the part of individual about the true nature of the Ātman.

²That is, in respect of the view of Advaita.

³The word 'etc.' points to activity.

⁴Cf. BU 4.4.19 = *Kāthopaniṣad* 4.11.

⁵CU 6.2.1.

⁶CU 6.2.1.

Now follows the refutation of Bhartṛprapañca's view proper in clear terms.

अगृह्यमाणं सत्तत्त्वं विपरीतमिवेक्ष्यते ।
 यथावस्त्वीक्ष्यमाणं तु यथावस्त्वेव वीक्ष्यते ॥४०॥

The existent thing (viz. reality), not being grasped (as it is) is grasped is stated (lit. seen) as it (really) exists. [40]

The use of verb root *īkṣ* has two ideas associated with it: (i) action of seeing which is merely physical and (ii) grasping (understanding) the nature of seeing.

यदत्र चोद्ये वक्तव्यं तत्पुरैवासकृद्बहु ।
 सम्यगुक्तं तदखिलमिह स्मर्तव्यमादृतैः ॥४१॥

What is to be stated with the (hypothetical) objection here in this regard, has been already¹ well stated many times at length;² or that is to be remembered by those who have a curiosity (lit. regard) for it (i.e. truth in it).³ [41]

¹SP refers to the statement in SV.

²Read SP: *tatroktasyālpavād buddhyasaūkaryam ity āśaṅkya āha (idam)*.

³This is for word *iha* which SP explains referring to doubt if there is duality and whether there is truth (*dvaitasatyatvaśaṅkā*).

अविचारितसंसिद्धिमोहोपहतचेतसाम् ।
अप्यद्वयं परं ब्रह्म द्वयवत्प्रथते मृषा ॥४२॥

(For) in the case of those whose intellect or mind is struck (or overpowered) by ignorance which is established even without a thought,¹ even the non-dual Brahman appears falsely as having duality (associated) with it. [42]

¹Translation is based on the variant reading noted in AnSS *avicāritasamsiddhamoho* Cf. verse 73 below.

The two following verses explain the significance of -vat in the word dvayavat in the previous verse.

यथा विशुद्धमाकाशं तिमिरोपप्लुतो जनः ।
संकीर्णमिव मात्राभिश्चित्राभिरुपलक्षयेत् ॥४३॥
तथेदममलं ब्रह्म निर्विकारमविद्यया ।
कलुषत्वमिवापन्नं भेदरूपं प्रकाशते ॥४४॥

As a person affected by (the disease of the eye called) *timira* sees the extremely (vi) clear sky as marked by (lit. scattered over by) variegated appearances¹ (of colours), [43]
similarly, this spotless Brahman which is without any modifications appears (*prakāśate*) to have acquired the nature of

distinct (appearances) since it has come to be soiled, owing to ignorance. [44]

¹We should mark here Sureśvara's peculiar use of *mātrā* which on other occasions means sense-organs—here it refers to the objects that are seen, viz. colours such as blue, yellow etc. (this is implied by the words *viśuddham* in verse 43 and *amalam* in verse 44. Read SP: *mātrābhir mīyamānanīlapītādiviṣayair iti yāvat*; also NKL: *mīyante iti mātrāḥ*, this clearly refers to the objects to be seen.

तस्यैकमपि चैतन्यं बहुधा प्रविभज्यते ।
अङ्गाराङ्कितमुत्पाते वारिराशेरिवोदकम् ॥४५॥

The sentience in it,¹ even though one, is divided variously (lit. into many), just like the waters of ocean, which are marked by various sparks at the time of the deluge. [45]

The mythical ocean has submarine fire covered underneath it. At the time of the deluge, that fire flashes forth in the form of sparks, marking the waters therewith.

¹This refers to Brahman in verse 44 above.

बाध्य एवात्मसंमोहो न त्वसौ बाधको यतः ।
प्रत्यग्याथात्म्यविज्ञानं न बाध्यं बाधकं यतः ॥४६॥

Ignorance about the Ātman is certainly to be stultified, since it is not indeed the stultifier; the knowledge of the true nature of the inner self is not stultified since it is the stultifier.¹ [46]

This verse is based on the doubt expressed only briefly by SP thus: *brahmaṇo 'vidyayā dvayavadbhāne 'pi tasyāṃ labdha-padāyāṃ vidyāyogān nānarthadhvastir ity āśanikyāha*.

¹Read SP: *na hi sati tamasi savitā nodeti tadvad vidya-mānāyām avidyāyām vidyā nānāvakāśā tathā ca sā svodaya-*

nānantarāyakatvenābodham dhunvatī tajjam api dhunotīti bhāvaḥ.

स्वभावानपहारेण संगतिः स्यात्ततस्तयोः ।

इति चेतसि संधाय सर्वयोगेश्वरेश्वरः ॥४७॥

मोहापनुत्तये प्राह प्रपन्नाय किरीटिने ।

बाध्यबाधकरूपं च न व्येतीति प्रकाशयन् ॥४८॥

या निशा सर्वभूतानां तस्यां जागर्ति संयमी ।

यस्यां जाग्रति भूतानि सा निशा पश्यतो मुनेः ॥४९॥

Therefore, having kept in mind that the two¹ are associated with each other, thanks to their own natures being unremoved, the Lord of the lords of all Yogas [47]

said to Arjuna (lit. Kirīṭin) who had submitted himself before him, for the removal of ignorance, (thereby) revealing (to Him) that the natures of the two are as the stultified and the stultifier: [48]

During that, which is night for all beings, a person with restraint (on himself) keeps awake. And that (period of time), during which beings are awake, is night for the wakeful (*paśyataḥ*) seer. [49]

Verse 49 is *Gītā* 2.69.

¹This refers to *vijñāna* and *avijñāna*.

ज्ञानाज्ञाने ततोऽपेक्ष्य व्यवहारोऽयमात्मनि ।

शास्त्रीयो लौकिकश्चातो विरोधोऽत्र न शङ्क्यते ॥५०॥

Therefore, depending on knowledge and ignorance about (the nature of) the Ātman (occurs there) this dealing (of the people), viz. that which is according to the scriptures and that which is popular. Therefore, there cannot be entertained in this regard any doubt that there is any opposition. [50]

उत्पन्नात्मप्रबोधानामात्माविद्यातदुद्भवम् ।

सम्यग्ज्ञानाग्निना नित्यं दह्यमानं प्रजायते ॥५१॥

In the case of those in whom there has arisen the (true) knowledge about (the nature of) the Ātman, ignorance about the Ātman together with its effect is ever (seen) to be burnt by the fire of right knowledge. [51]

Note SP: *tadīya* (= *jñāni*) *sarvavyavahārasya bādhitatvenānuvṛttir asakṛd ukteti bhāvaḥ* and also the editor of the NKL: *jñāninaḥ sarve 'pi vyavahārāḥ bādhitānuvṛttir iti bhāvaḥ*, since NKL points out *jñānino 'pi sarvasya vyavahāradarśanāt* as the *prima facie* objection.

ऐकात्म्यवस्तुयाथात्म्यमभिप्रेत्यात उत्तरः ।
साक्षादित्यादिकः प्रश्नो यदेवेतिपुरःसरः ॥५२॥

Therefore, the later question beginning with the word *sākṣāt* (and) preceded by (the words) *yad eva* has proceeded from the acceptance of the intention of the true nature of the thing which is of (uniform) nature of singleness. [52]

प्रत्याहैष त आत्मेति याज्ञवल्क्योऽपि पूर्ववत् ।
संभाव्यते यतोऽत्रैव साक्षादित्यादिलक्षणम् ॥५३॥

Yājñavalkya also answered, as before, *eṣa ta ātmā*, since that description (lit. definition) *sākṣāt* etc. is possible only here.¹ [53]

¹That is, in respect of the Ātman mentioned in the *ukti-pratyuktī* of the preceding Brāhmaṇa.

निःशेषनिर्णयोक्तीच्छुः कहोलोऽप्याह पूर्ववत् ।
कतमो याज्ञवल्क्येति स तं प्रत्याह शुद्धधीः ॥५४॥

Desirous (to hear) the statement which conveys complete decision, Kahola also asked, as before, *katamo yājñavalkya* ... (and he) of pure knowledge (lit. intellect) answered him. [54]

Now follows in verses 55-88 the exposition of *yo 'śanāyāpipāse*

....

योऽशनायापिपासादीन्धर्मान्सर्वान्विरोधतः ।
 अतीत्य वस्तुवृत्तेन स्वमहिम्नि व्यवस्थितः ॥५५॥
 अशनायापिपासे यस्तद्वेतोरत्ययात्सदा ।
 अत्येति वस्तुवृत्तेन स साक्षादिति गृह्यताम् ॥५६॥

The one who remains in its own greatness, viz. in the state of it (lit. the thing) as it is, transcending all the properties, viz. hunger, thirst etc. which oppose the same, [55]
 let that be understood as the Ātman that ever overcomes (lit. transgresses) hunger and thirst by its own nature (lit. by the nature of itself) since it overcomes the cause(s) (of the same).¹
 [56]

¹*taddhetoh* is the same as *aśanāyāpipāsāhetoh*.

शोकादासङ्गबीजाद्धि जज्ञाते ते यथोदिते ।
 इच्छाविशेषास्ताभ्यां च जज्ञिरेऽन्ये सहस्रशः ॥५७॥

Because indeed those two,¹ which are mentioned, have come from the seed, viz. grief and attachment, and from them proceeded in thousands (various) particular desires.² [57]

¹*aśanāyā* and *pipāsā*.

²This refers to *Gītā* 2.62cd: *saṅgāt sañjāyate kāmāḥ kāmāt krodho 'bhijāyate*.

आत्मात्येतीति' संबन्धो योऽशनायादिलक्षणान् ।
 क्रियार्थोऽत्येतिशब्दश्चेन्न क्रियार्थो विवक्षितः ॥५८॥

If it is said: 'In the statement, viz. the Ātman overcomes the objects such as hunger, there has been (used) the word *atyeti* which has the meaning of an activity'; then that is (to be

refuted as) not (being) so; it is (indeed) not intended to convey the meaning of an activity. [58]

औष्ण्यं शैत्यं यथात्येति वस्तुवृत्तेन सर्वदा ।
गर्ताद्यत्ययवत्त्वत्र न मानादुपपद्यते ॥५९॥

As reality (lit. thing) by its own nature ever overcomes heat and cold (so this is ¹); and here is it not reasonable (to accept the idea of) transgressing of some ditch by one; since there is the means (i.e. Śruti to convey that the Ātman does not do any activity). [59]

¹Namely, the Ātman overcomes

अशनायापिपासे द्वे एव नात्येति केवले ।
शोकश्च यस्तयोर्बीजं तमप्येषोऽतिवर्तते ॥६०॥

(It is not to be supposed that the Ātman) overcomes only the two, viz. hunger and thirst, but this one is (lit. goes) beyond grief and (attachment) ¹ also, which is the seed (i.e. origin) of them. [60]

¹This is because of force of *ca* which indicates *moha*, Refer to verse 36 above (and 62 below).

शोकोऽत्रारतिमात्रं स्याच्चेतसो यानवस्थितिः ।
मोहं चात्येति वैचित्यं विषयापहृतिं धियः ॥६१॥

Grief is merely absence of joy (and satisfaction) viz. that which is unsteadiness in the heart; and (that the Ātman) overcomes ignorance is only the absent-mindedness, which is merely the removal of the objects (i.e. the rest) of intellect. ¹ [61]

¹We have adopted NKL reading here; but AnSS reads: *viṣayāpahṛtiṃ* 'removal of objects ...' This becomes obvious from the following verse. Also cf. verse 68 below.

स्वतोऽनानात्मकेऽज्ञानाद्यत्रानात्मसमीक्षणम् ।
मिथ्याज्ञानमनात्माभं मोह इत्युपदिश्यते ॥६२॥

Delusion is stated to be the seeing of various objects in the place of reality, which by its nature (*svataḥ*) is not of the nature of variety; that is to say: (ignorance) is false knowledge which appears in the form of the non-Ātman objects. [62]

The concealment of reality which is understood in the previous verse results into the apprehension of variety of objects in the place of reality. Thus *apahnūti* leads to *apahṛti* of reality. This, in a way, justifies the reading in AnSS edition. That reading is like using *rājapuruṣaḥ* in the place of *rājā* in the statement of *rājā gacchati*.

सर्वग्रप्राणधर्मत्वादशनायापिपासयोः ।
समासेनाभिधानं स्याद्यदि वा शोककार्यतः ॥६३॥
असमासेन निर्देशो भिन्नकार्यत्वकारणात् ।
प्रवृत्तिररतेः कार्यं मोहस्यानर्थसंप्लुतिः ॥६४॥

Owing to (the fact) that hunger and thirst are the properties of the all-devouring¹ Prāṇa, there is here the statement of them in the form of a compound. Or (perhaps), since they are the effect of grief (and attachment),² [63]
there can be the mention of them severally (lit. not in the form of a compound) for the reason that those two are the effects of different causes. (That is to say:) (Any human) activity is the effect of unsteadiness and, being overcome by undesirable (variety), it is the effect of ignorance. [64]

¹It is necessary to read the verse as we have given. The basic edition of AnSS reads *sarvagraḥ* which is a nominative form and stands unconnected with the remaining words. Also the reading in NKL edition viz. *sarvatra* is not at all imperative or useful.

²The verse uses only *śoka* but *āsaniga* is necessarily implied; cf. verse 67 below.

जरेति परिणामः स्याद्वलीपलितलक्षणः ।
देहस्य मृत्युर्विच्छेदो वियोगो देहलिङ्गयोः ॥६५॥

The word *jarā* 'old age' is the result of (growing) characterized by wrinkles and grey hair on the body and death in the end, i.e. a separation of the (gross) body and the subtle (form of the body or *Prāṇa*).¹ [65]

¹The word *linga* is somewhat vague. It can perhaps mean the *lingadeha*, or perhaps sentience within the body as understood by the Sāṃkhyas.

प्राणाधिकरणे पूर्वे शोकमोहौ मनोगतौ ।
जरामृत्यु तु देहस्य धर्माविति विनिश्चयः ॥६६॥

In the earlier topic of *prāṇas*,¹ it is clearly determined that grief and ignorance belong to *manas* (and) old age and death are the properties of the body. [66]

This refers to verse 33 above where there was mention made of six *ūrmis*. This verse points out that the *prāṇas* are basis of them all.

¹It is not clear as to what is meant as *prāṇādhikaraṇa*.

अशनायादिसंबन्धो नात्मनो वास्तवो मतः ।
अनिर्मोक्षप्रसक्तिः स्यात्तस्य चासङ्गरूपतः ॥६७॥

(Actually), the relation of the *Ātman* to hunger etc. is not considered to be real, for there would be the contingency of (an all-time) absence (i.e. impossibility) of liberation, if (it would have been accepted that) the *Ātman* has the nature of (being affected by) attachment (*āsaniga*). [67]

यत एवमतः प्रत्यग्याथात्म्यानवबोधतः ।
अशनायादिसंबन्धः सम्यग्बोधादतो हनुतिः ॥६८॥

Since this is so, the relation (of the Ātman) to hunger etc. is (to be understood as resulting) from the non-grasping of the true nature of the inner self. Therefore, there is concealment (i.e. removal of the same) on account of properly knowing (the nature of the Ātman). [68]

The word *hnuti* in this verse confirms the correctness of the word *viṣayāpahnuṭi* in verse 61 above.

यः स्वकारणसंसर्गः कार्याणामत्ययो भवेत् ।
अनात्यन्तिकरूपत्वादत्ययोऽसौ न गृह्यते ॥६९॥

That overcoming effect, which would be (understood) as their merging into (lit. contact with) their own causes, is not understood here as the overcoming (of hunger etc.), since these are not the final forms (of the Ātman). [69]

तत्कारणनिषेधो यः स्वमहिम्नैव वस्तुनः ।
तमत्ययं मोक्षविधौ तद्विद्वांसः प्रचक्षते ॥७०॥

While explaining the nature of liberation, the knowers of that (viz. lore of liberation) explain that since, the overcoming by reality (of them)¹ as by the very greatness of reality, there is already a warding (i.e. negation) of causes of them.¹ [70]

¹*aśanāyāpipāse*. Cf. the next verse.

अशनायापिपासाभ्यां तस्मात्तत्कारणग्रहः ।
संवर्गात्मातिवर्तित्वात्तत्कार्यातिगतिस्ततः ॥७१॥

Therefore, from hunger and thirst is understood the cause of the same and from that there is overcoming of that¹ owing to the fact that the *saṁvarga* of them (viz. the Ātman) is

beyond the same.²

[71]

¹Namely, *kāraṇa* of hunger etc. is mentioned in the first line.

²This also refers to *śoka*, *āsaṇḍa* which are cause of hunger etc.

मृत्युनैवेत्युपक्रम्य तथा च श्रुतिरब्रवीत् ।

लक्षणं ह्यशनायेति प्राणमृत्युप्रबुद्धये ॥७२॥

It is to that effect that the Śruti has stated the characteristic (of death) to be hunger, after it has begun with the word *mṛtyunaiva*¹ with a view to informing about the death of *prāṇas*.

[72]

¹This refers to BU 1.2.1.

अविचारितसंसिद्धप्रत्यगज्ञानलक्षणम् ।

अशनायापिपासादिधर्मिणं प्राहुरीश्वरम् ॥७३॥

They have described the lord¹ to be possessed of such properties as hunger and thirst, (and which are at that time) having the character of ignorance on the part of the inner self which is established even without a thought.²

[73]

¹This refers to the Ātman who is at times called *deva*, *īśvara*.

²The first line indicates the correctness in reading verse 42 above as *avicāritasamsiddhamoho*

तत्प्रत्यगात्मयाथात्म्यभास्वज्ज्ञानोदयात्तमः ।

प्रध्वस्यात्मायमत्येति तदुत्थं वस्तुवृत्ततः ॥७४॥

This Ātman completely destroys the darkness by the rise of bright knowledge, viz. the knowledge of the true nature of the inner self, and overcomes what has arisen from that (ignorance) by the very nature of its being the thing (i.e. reality).

[74]

आत्मासामान्यचैतन्यरूपोत्थेनात्मगं तमः ।
जग्ध्वा मानेन निःशेषं प्रत्यङ्पूर्णोऽवशिष्यते ॥७५॥

The Ātman remains as the inner self in its fullness, viz. after having destroyed (lit. devoured) the darkness on its part¹ by the knowledge² which has arisen in the form of incomparable sentience. [75]

SP thoughtfully shows that *ātmāsāmānya* is to be read as *ātma-asāmānya*.

¹In the word *ātmagam*, *ātman* is a reflexive pronoun.

²*mānena* is to be understood as 'by *mā*(=*jñāna*)'.

यस्मादेष स्वतो बुद्धो निरविद्यः स्वतस्ततः ।
शुद्धश्चातोऽद्वितीयत्वात्प्रत्यङ्मुक्तः स्वतस्ततः ॥७६॥

Since this inner self who has, by its very nature, of knowledge (lit. being enlightened), dispelled ignorance, it is therefore (entirely) pure and, owing to its incomparableness, attains liberation by itself. [76]

In both of the verses, i.e. 75-76, in the word *pratyani* is properly understood as nominative singular form of *pratyak*.

एवं ध्वस्तात्ममोहस्य कुतोऽविद्योत्थवस्तुभिः ।
प्रतीचोऽस्त्यभिसंबन्धो ह्यशनायादिलक्षणैः ॥७७॥

How could there be a close relation of the inner self which has thus destroyed its own ignorance¹ with the objects that arise from ignorance, viz. those which are characterized by hunger etc.? [77]

¹Sureśvara uses the word *ātman* in *ātmamohasya* as a reflexive pronoun.

यथा विशुद्धमाकाशं सति वासति वा मले ।
नीहारादौ तथैवात्मा कार्यकारणवस्तुनि ॥७८॥

As the sky is completely clean (*viśuddha*) even when there is (i.e. may be) and is not (i.e. may not be) any dirt or spot such as frost etc.; similarly the Ātman is (entirely pure) even while (there is not) anything like cause(s) and effect(s). [78]

प्रत्यग्याथात्म्यदृष्ट्यात्मा कारणं स्वतमोवधि ।
बाधित्वाज्ञानसंसारौ यात्यपूर्वादिरूपताम् ॥७९॥

Since it sees (i.e. realises) the true nature of being the inner self, the Ātman is ever the cause (only) so long as it has its own darkness (viz. ignorance); later, after having stultified ignorance and transmigratory existence it regains (lit. attains to) its nature (which is described) in *apūrva* etc.¹ [79]

¹Cf. BU 2.5.19.

शोकमोहावतः स्यातां सूत्रकार्योपलक्षणम् ।
जरामृत्यू विराजश्च सर्वकार्योपसंहतिः ॥८०॥

Therefore, grief and ignorance are the indication of the effect (or activity) of Sūtra (and) old age and death are of Virāj, that is to say: there is a complete withdrawal of all that are effects. [80]

The last phrase *sarvakāryopasaṁhrtiḥ* is taken in the NKL edition as *sarvakāryopasaṁhrtelḥ* which is supported by the variant reading noted in the AnSS edition. In case we accept that, the alternative translation would be: because there is complete withdrawal

अध्यात्माद्यधियज्ञादेराधिदैवतरूपता ।
पुरोक्तार्थवती चैवं सति सर्वा भवेद्ध्रुवम् ॥८१॥

The nature (of the Ātman) which is to be in the form of the superintending deity related to the body and to sacrifice, as was stated earlier, would indeed (*dhruvam*) be all that meaningful only thus. [81]

This has reference to speech etc. merging into Agni as stated in BU earlier in *so 'gnir abhavat ...* and also to the word of Udgītha in connection with the lore of the Brahman (*udgīthopāsanā*). Thus it refers to the result of the worship of Udgītha.

सर्वाण्युपासनान्येवं ब्रह्मविद्याभिसंगतेः ।
विद्याधिकार उक्तत्वादर्थवन्तीति निश्चितिः ॥८२॥

Thus, all the (different) modes of worship, being described in the topic of the lore of the Brahman, would be connected with the lore of the Brahman and described thus (as said in the preceding verse) become meaningful (i.e. purposeful)—this is the decision. [82]

प्रतीचोऽसङ्गयाथात्म्यान्मोहादेशचाप्यवस्तुतः ।
प्रत्यङ्मात्रावशेषत्वात्कुतः षष्ठ्यर्थसंभवः ॥८३॥

On account of the true nature of the inner self, viz. being unattached (to *śoka*, *moha* ...), *moha* etc. are not real but they remain only as the inner self; therefore, how could there be understood any relation (of them to it) as the meaning of the genitive case shows? [83]

This means to say that *pratīcaḥ śokamohau* could be understood as reasonable; cf. SP: *ṣaṣṭhyarthah sambandhah sa naika-smin yukto dviṣṭhatvād ity arthah*.

हेतुहेतुमदुक्त्यैतद्व्याख्येयं त्रयमात्मनि ।
आनन्दवद्वाशङ्क्योक्तयोऽशनायेतिपूर्विका ॥८४॥

This triad¹ should thus be explained in relation to the Ātman by stating them as the cause and the effect.² Or, the statement (in the Śruti) which begins with the word *yo 'śanāyā* is made only after holding (*āśanikya*) that (the Brahman) consists of bliss.³ [84]

¹*mūlakāraṇa*, Sūtra and Virāj.

²Literally, what has a cause.

³The reading in AnSS and NKL editions is: *ānandavad vā* separated from *śanikyoktir* ..., but it is better to take as we have done, i.e. both *-dvā* and *śanikyoktir* together. If we accepted the reading in the two editions, we would be forced to take *śanikya* for *āśanikya*— a mere irregularity. And the translation of 85cd would be: Or, having taken (lit. doubted) it (viz. the triad) as full of joy, there follows the Śruti statement beginning with the words *yo 'śanāyā*. Or, we could make a bold indication in that text of both the editions as *śanikoktiḥ* for *śanikyoktiḥ*! Cf. introductory words of SP under verse 85: *śanikottarasya* and also *śanikānivr̥ttiyartham* in NKL edition.

स्वाभाविकत्वं मा प्रापच्छोकादेरात्मसौख्यवत् ।
यस्मिन्सत्येव यत्सत्स्यात्तस्मिन्सत्त्वसति तन्न सत् ॥८५॥

(This is so done in the Śruti) lest *śoka* etc. would occur in the Ātman as its natural property like bliss. (For the rule is) that which would be existent while only another existed but what could not exist while another would not be in existence. [85]

The second line of the verse is a mere statement about the Anvaya and Vyatireka relation between the pair, *śoka* and *moha*, and the inner self.

अशनायादिकांस्तस्मात्कार्यकारणलक्षणान् ।
तद्विरुद्धात्मविज्ञानाद्ध्वंसित्वात्मैकलो भवेत् ॥८६॥

Therefore, after having dispelled (lit. destroyed) hunger etc. which have characteristic of effect(s) and cause(s) by having rightly known (Virāj, i.e.) the true nature of the Ātman which is opposed to them (i.e. śoka etc.), the Ātman would remain only by itself (i.e. as one without a second). [86]

परमात्मस्वभावोऽयं स्वयं श्रुत्या प्रपञ्चितः ।
एतमेव तमात्मानं विदित्वोक्तैर्न वर्त्मना ।
व्युत्थाय ब्राह्मणा यत्नाद्विक्षाचार्यं चरन्ति हि ॥८७॥

Thus, the Śruti itself having stated at length (*prapañcita*) (the true) nature of the highest Ātman, in the manner expressed in the words *etan eva tam ātmānam viditvā ... vyutthāya brāhmaṇā yatnād bhikṣācāryaṁ caranti*. [87]

This refers to BU 3.1.6. The third line of this verse does not occur in the NKL edition and also in the two manuscripts consulted for preparing the AnSS edition.

अधिकारिविशेषस्य ज्ञानाय ब्राह्मणग्रहः ।
न संन्यासविधिर्यस्माच्छ्रुतौ क्षत्रियवैश्ययोः ॥८८॥

The mention of 'a Brāhmaṇa' (in the Śruti) is to specify the particular eligible person(s) since there is not in the Śruti any injunction regarding renunciation in the case of a Kṣatriya and/or a Vaiśya. [88]

Verses 89-142 pertain to the topic of the renunciation of the three castes found in BUB. Verses 89-92 pertain to the Smṛti: brāhmaṇaḥ kṣatriyo vāpi vaiśyo vā pravrajat grhāt.

त्रयाणामविशेषेण संन्यासः श्रूयते श्रुतौ ।
यदोपलक्षणार्थं स्याद्ब्राह्मणग्रहणं तदा ॥८९॥

In the Śruti is heard renunciation as prescribed for the three castes without any specifications, to indicate which is therefore

there the mention of Brāhmaṇa as indicative of them (viz. a Kṣatriya and a Vaiśya). [89]

The verse states Sureśvara's opinion as against that which is expressed in BUB (as recorded in the preceding verse). This implies a wrong interpretation in the BUB.

The basis for Sureśvara's argument seems to be a Smṛti a statement: *brāhmaṇaḥ kṣatriyo vāpi vaiśyo vā pravrajat grhāt*; this implies some Śruti. It is understood by the Śruti under *smṛtyadhikaraṇa* of BS that the basis of a statement merely occurring in a Smṛti should indicate an earlier existent Śruti as understood from the words *śiṣṭācārānumitaśruteḥ pramāṇatvam* (BSB). Here *śiṣṭācāra* leads to imply Smṛti also.

कर्माधिकारविच्छेदि ज्ञानं चेदभ्युपेयते ।

कुतोऽधिकारनियमो व्युत्थाने क्रियते बलात् ॥९०॥

If it is accepted that knowledge can completely set aside (*vicchedi*) any eligibility for a (ritual) activity, then why put forth the acceptance of a restrictive rule regarding eligibility in respect of (a person's) rising to activity (*vyutthāna*)? ¹ [90]

¹We have translated here the word *vyutthāna* in the sense of the rising to activity by those who seek to know the Ātman, yet *vyutthāna* is by derivation (*vyutpatti*) to mean 'a rising activity' (*utthāna*) which is opposed (*vi-*) to usual activity (*karman*). For this *vyutthāna* cf. verses 119 and 125 below. That is rising above all desires (*eṣaṇās*). Also cf. *eṣaṇāprātikūlyena nirvyāpāratayā-vasthānaṁ vyutthānam* (in the words of SP under verse 126 below).

प्रत्यग्याथात्म्यविज्ञानस्वभावश्चेत्समर्थ्यते ।

व्युत्थानं यस्य यस्य स्यात्स स व्युत्थातुमर्हति ॥९१॥

If it is upheld that the Ātman exists as (having the nature of the true) knowledge of the true nature of the inner self,

then each such person is (to be accepted) as eligible in the case of whomsoever there is activity of rising stated. [91]

एवं चेद्ब्राह्मणोक्तिः स्याद्धवस्ताविद्यगृहीतये ।
स ब्राह्मण इति स्पष्टं श्रुतिरन्ते च वक्ष्यति ॥९२॥

If it is thus, the mention of Brāhmaṇa (in the Śruti) would lead to the acceptance of a person who has destroyed his ignorance; as the Śruti does clearly state in the end *sa brāhmaṇah*. [92]

Verses 93-142 pertain to the Śruti: *etaṃ vaitamātmānam*

प्राणस्वान्ततनधर्मा अशनायादिलक्षणाः ।
य एते सर्वभूतेषु वर्तन्तेऽम्भःप्रवाहवत् ॥९३॥

All these characteristics (lit. properties) of the *prāṇas*, *manas*,¹ (and) the body, viz. those which are characterized by hunger etc., do (continue to) occur in all of the beings (ever) like a stream of water.² [93]

¹This is the meaning of *svānta* in the text.

²This indicates continuous flow of them.

संसारोऽनर्थ इत्येष प्रत्यङ्मोहैकहेतुकः ।
यतो बिभ्यति भूतानि परोत्कर्षगतान्यपि ॥९४॥

Thus, the transmigratory existence is having for its cause merely the ignorance about the (true) nature of the inner self; (and) from that all beings entertain fear even though they have attained great excellence. [94]

कारणं प्रत्यगज्ञानं कार्यं संसार उच्यते ।
तद्विरुद्धात्मकः प्रत्यङ्ब्रह्मापूर्वादिवाक्यतः ॥९५॥

(Thus) it is said that ignorance about (the true nature of)

the inner self is the cause and the transmigratory existence is the effect and (also) the inner self is of the nature which is opposed to (that of) them,¹ i.e. the Brahman, as (is) understood from the statement beginning with *apūrvam* [95]

Thus, only the *mūlakāraṇa*, viz. the Ātman is said earlier as the reality and Sūtra and Virāj are not.

¹This refers to both *kārya* and *kāraṇa*.

एतं तमिति वाक्येन दृष्ट्यादेः साक्षिणं श्रुतिः ।
 अनुद्यापेतदुःखेन साक्षात्संगतिमब्रवीत् ॥९६॥
 तं दृष्ट्यादिदृशं साक्षादात्मानं कल्पितात्मनाम् ।
 तमेतमिति विज्ञाय यथाव्याख्यातलक्षणम् ॥९७॥

The Śruti has restated (this truth) in (lit. by) the statement *etaṃ tam* ... thereby referring to the seer of seeing etc. and expressly stated the connection of it with the one devoid of misery, [96]

viz. having known from the sentence *taṃ etaṃ* ... that one, the directly perceptible Ātman, who is the seer of the organ of seeing etc., as has been explained earlier, in the case of those who have imagined (i.e. tried to guess) the nature of the Ātman. [97]

Sureśvara states here *etaṃ tam iti* ..., dropping *vai* in the original BU passage. This is for the sake of metre. Already, he has paraphrased that passage in verse 87 above as *etaṃ eva tam ātmānam* Of course, it cannot be ruled out as impossible to write verse 96 thus *etaṃ vā iti vākyena* Yet, we do not propose any emendation.

उषस्तोक्तो विशेष्योऽत्र कहोलोक्तो विशेषणम् ।
 एवं संसारविध्वस्तस्तद्धेतोर्ज्ञानहानितः ॥९८॥

Here¹ the one who is inquired about (lit. stated or asked) by Uṣasta is who is to be qualified here in this Brāhmaṇa

whereas the statement of Kahola is the qualifier—thus, there is destruction of transmigratory existence which results from knowledge about the cause(s) of the same. [98]

¹That is, in this connection.

घटाकाशो महाकाश इत्युक्तेः केवलं वियत् ।
यथाधिगम्यते तद्वत्साक्षादित्यादिलक्षणः ॥९९॥
भेदसंसर्गहीनोऽर्थस्तद्धेतुध्वंसवर्त्मना ।
एतस्मादेव विज्ञेयो वाक्यान्नान्यप्रमाणतः ॥१००॥

As from the statement 'sky in a pot' and 'sky (viz. ether)' (*ghaṭākāśa* and *mahākāśa*) is understood merely the sky,¹ in the same way, the Ātman is specified as directly perceptible etc.;² [99]

having no contact with any distinct object since that is so by way of destruction of the cause of that (transmigratory existence); it is to be known from (i.e. by) only the sentence (of the Śruti) and not by any other means of knowing. [100]

¹That is as unqualified.

²This refers to *aparokṣāt*, *sarvāntarāt*.

साक्षादित्यादिकं सर्वमपस्तप्रश्नगोचरः ।
योऽशनायेति चात्रोक्तौ संभाव्यं तदशेषतः ॥१०१॥

All that, viz. what begins with the word *sākṣāt* is the subject matter (*gocara*) of the question put by Uṣasta and here in the statement *yo 'śanāyā* all that is to be considered (as the subject-matter). [101]

This refers to the relation between the two answers given to Uṣasta and Kahola, viz. as the specified and specifier. See verse 98 above.

SP remarks, by way of conclusion, *tasmād asmaduktam viśeṣaṇaviśeṣyatvam eṣṭavyam iti śeṣaḥ*.

सामान्यमात्रप्रत्युक्तेर्न यथापृष्टवस्तुधीः ।
पूर्वत्राभूद्यथा साक्षादिति प्रत्युक्तितो मतिः ॥१०२॥

There (does not arise) the knowledge about the thing that is asked only by answering (the query) in general terms (*sāmānyamātrapratyukti*) as, for instance, there arose earlier from the answer (to Uṣasta's question) (in the words) *sākṣāt* etc.

[102]

Now follows the discussion on *viditvā vyutthāya*.

पौर्वापर्यं यथायोगं क्त्वान्तयोः पदयोर्द्वयोः ।
पूर्वं यदि विदित्वेति तदा द्वेधा प्रकल्पनम् ॥१०३॥
ज्ञानस्वभावाद्युत्थानं ज्ञेयवस्तुपरोधतः ।
व्युत्थाने चोदनापेक्षा नाधिकारौपमर्दतः ॥१०४॥
शाब्दी वा प्रतिपत्तिः स्याद्व्युत्थानादेः प्रयोजिका ।
विध्यर्थो ह्यपि बाल्यादिस्तथोद्धर्ममपि दृश्यते ॥१०५॥

There should be in the sequence (viz. the earlier and the later) of the two forms which end in the suffix *-ktvā* in a way that is suitable (*yathāyogam*). If it is held that *viditvā* is to be understood as referring to the earlier (of the two actions), then, in that case, there can be twofold presentation of the thought (*prakalpana*).

[103]

(One of the two possibilities is:) If rising to activity has occurred after knowledge of the true nature (of the reality), then, in view of that thing to be known, there is need of some injunction (*codana*) for rising to activity and not (to convey the idea) regarding setting aside (lit. destroying) the eligibility (of person) to activity.

[104]

Or perhaps, it is held that knowledge arising from (hearing) the word (i.e. Śāstra) causes the rising of a person to activity, then, in that case, there is heard (lit. seen) later the meaning of the potential such as childhood etc.

[105]

These verses are based on a doubt if the two forms in *-ktvā* should refer to the sequence in which they are heard, or otherwise.

The first alternative is answered in verse 104 and the second alternative in verse 105.

व्युत्थायाथ विदित्वेति पौर्वापर्यं यदेष्यते ।
व्युत्थानसाधना विद्येत्ययमर्थो भवेत्तदा ॥१०६॥

When again the sequence¹ is accepted to be *vyutthāya viditvā*, then, in that case, the meaning (to be understood) is that the knowledge (of the Brahman) is the means for persons' rising to activity. [106]

Now the sequence understood is *vyutthāya viditvā*.

¹This refers to the *pāṭhakrama* 'order in which the two words' (*viditvā vyutthāya*) occur in the sentence *evam vai tam (tam etam)*?

विदित्वा कथमित्यस्य प्रत्युक्त्यर्था परा श्रुतिः ।
तस्मादित्यादिका योज्या न्यासहेतुत्वसिद्धये ॥१०७॥

(A question could be:) 'How can the subsequent Śruti which purports to give an answer¹ be related to the form *viditvā*?' Therefore, there is need to understand the answer beginning with the words *tasmāt* etc. as having the purpose of being the cause of renunciation.² [107]

¹This refers to answer to the question of Kahola.

²Sureśvara uses the word *nyāsa* in place of *saṃnyāsa*.

तस्मादेवंविदित्येवं तथा चोद्धर्षं प्रवक्ष्यति ।
निःशेषकर्मसंन्यासं विद्यायाः साधनं श्रुतिः ॥१०८॥

(For) Śruti will subsequently¹ declare thus in the words *tasmād evamvid ...*— (thus) it (points to that) the knowledge (of the

Brahman) is a means to renunciation of entire activity. [108]

¹NKL refers to SV 219 for this.

संन्याससाधनं ज्ञानं निर्वक्त्यत्रापि च श्रुतिः ।
यथा तथा पराश्चात्र श्रुतयः सन्ति कोटिशः ॥१०९॥

And here also the Śruti clearly states knowledge as the means to liberation; and there are numerous¹ subsequent Śruti statements (to show) as to how that is so. [109]

¹This is the purport of the word *koṭīśaḥ*.

ज्ञानानरोधिनी यद्वत्प्रवृत्तिः प्राणिनामिह ।
तथेहापि श्रुतिर्विक्ति प्रत्यग्याथात्म्यवेदिनाम् ॥११०॥

As there is here (in this world) activity of living beings (only in) accord with the knowledge (already acquired), so also (i.e. in this respect also) the Śruti states (i.e. refers to the activity) of those who have known the true nature of the Ātman. [110]

Now follows an explanation of *putraiṣaṇā*, *vittaiṣaṇā* and *lokaiṣaṇā* in verses 111-117.

पुत्रोत्पत्तिं समुद्दिश्य दारान्परिजिघृक्षति ।
यतो दारार्थं उद्योगस्ततः पुत्रैषणोच्यते ॥१११॥

Since a man wishes to take to a wife with (a desire) to beget a son, therefore, his activity with respect to the wife is called *putraiṣaṇā*. [111]

In other words, the desire of a man for a son takes the form of the desire for a wife—this is *putraiṣaṇā*.

पुरुषार्थाय यन्नालं लब्धात्मापि कुठारवत् ।
अप्रविश्य प्रयोगं तद्विस्तमित्युपदिश्यते ॥११२॥

What, even after coming into existence (*labdhātma*), is not capable of (securing) the end of man's life (*puruṣārtha* called Dharma), is, without being put to use, just like an ax, mentioned by the word *vitta* 'wealth'. [112]

Here is the idea of *vitta* as understood by Bhartṛprapañca.

यत्त्वात्मलाभमात्रेण पुरुषार्थसमाप्तिकृत् ।
व्युत्थानं तद्वलादेव न तु यत्स्याद्गवादिवत् ॥११३॥

As against this, that which brings about the accomplishing of man's end, by mere coming into existence on account of its own strength, is (what is called) man's rising to activity which is not like (coming into existence of) a cow etc. (which is included in *vitta*). [113]

This is for setting aside the view of Bhartṛprapañca that man's rising to activity towards securing wealth is inclusive of man's worship etc., i.e. meditation and so on. This is in explanation of the basis of the view expressed in the preceding verse.

प्रत्यगज्ञानसंभूतकामोत्थं साधनात्मकम् ।
देवतादिपरिज्ञानं मन्त्रवद्वित्तमुच्यते ॥११४॥

That is *vitta*, which is like a Mantra, (viz. preceded by) a complete knowledge of the deity etc. (of the sacrifice) and is of the nature of its means which has arisen from some desire caused by ignorance of the inner self. [114]

This gives Sureśvara's own idea about *vitta*.

नात्मानं लभते कर्म यतो वित्तमृते ततः ।
वित्तैषण्यं कर्मार्था न लोकार्थेति निश्चितिः ॥११५॥

Since (a ritual) activity does not come into existence without

a person's having wealth, therefore, this desire for wealth is only for effecting (a ritual) activity. It is not for securing (another) *loka*— this is the decision. [115]

This is yet another explanation by Sureśvara of the word *vitta*.

नित्यकर्मप्रसिद्धयर्थमतो वित्तमिहेष्यते ।
न चेज्जामि भवेद्वाक्यं पृथग्लोकैषणाग्रहात् ॥११६॥

Therefore, it is held that wealth in this world is for the purpose of a man's performance of (his) daily (ritual) activity. If this is not so (understood), then the Vedic sentence (which refers to *eṣaṇās*) would be merely a repetitive sentence. [116]

लोकानुद्दिश्य यः कामस्तत्साधनसमाश्रयः ।
लोकैषणैति तामाहुः काम्यकर्मार्थमुद्यमम् ॥११७॥

That desire which depends on various means towards acquisition of *lokas* is called *lokaiṣaṇā*, i.e. it is an activity towards (accomplishing) the desired (ritual) activity. [117]

The nature of *lokaiṣaṇā* is clarified here.

यतोऽसाधनसाध्यं तं प्रत्यगात्मानमात्मना ।
साक्षादित्यादिनाज्ञासीद्विरुद्धं साध्यसाधनैः ॥११८॥
साध्यसाधनरूपाभ्यस्तस्मादुक्तार्थवेदिनः ।
व्युत्तिष्ठन्त्येषणाभ्यस्ते तद्विरुद्धात्मकत्वतः ॥११९॥

Since one knows from (i.e. by) the Śruti statement the Ātman as directly perceptible etc. and as opposed to the means of accomplishing what is to be accomplished, i.e. the inner self which could be known without any (commonly known) means, [118]

therefore, those who know the meaning of what is said in the Śruti, rise above the (three) desires which are of the nature of the means towards what is to be achieved owing to its

being of the nature opposed to them.¹

[119]

¹That refers to *sādhyasādhanarūpa*.

अज्ञानकामजन्यत्वं वाङ्मनःकायकर्मणाम् ।
सोऽकामयत इत्येवं पुराप्युक्तं तमस्विनः ॥१२०॥

In the case of a person who is overpowered by ignorance (lit. darkness), it is already pointed out that, since the activities of speech, *manas* and body have the nature of what is produced by desires; therefore, he desired (to perform them). [120]

यदज्ञानात्प्रवृत्तिर्या तज्ज्ञानात्सा कुतो भवेत् ।
प्रत्यग्ज्ञानोदयेऽतः स्यान्निवृत्तिः सर्वकर्मणाम् ॥१२१॥

How could there be a (person's) activity (pertaining to ritual etc.) after knowing the ignorance through which there has proceeded his activity? That is to say (therefore) that, after the rise of the knowledge (of the true nature) of the inner self, there would result the cessation of his activities. [121]

जिज्ञासुरपि चैतस्य यथोक्तस्यात्मवस्तुनः ।
सर्वैषणानिवृत्त्यैव तज्ज्ञानं समवाप्नुयात् ॥१२२॥

And, in the case of a person who wishes to know this thing (reality) called the Ātman, as stated, he would secure the knowledge of that by the very withdrawing from all desires. [122]

यस्तु त्यक्तुं न शक्नोति रागादिप्रबलत्वतः ।
रागादिहेतुनाशार्थं कार्यं कर्मैव तेन तु ॥१२३॥

But, a person who, owing to the great strength (*prabala*) of attachment etc., is unable to give up activity has to do that (viz. activity) for the removal (lit. destruction) of attachment etc. [123]

This is supported by a citation from *Gītā* 6.3 in the following verse.

आरुरुक्षोर्मुनेर्योगं कर्म कारणमुच्यते ।
योगारूढस्य तस्यैव शमः कारणमुच्यते ॥१२४॥

In the case of a wise man who wants to take to Yoga, performance of (ritual) activity is a cause, but, in the case of that person, when he has already taken to Yoga, that¹ becomes a cause for tranquillity (lit. pacification of desire etc.)

[124]

¹This refers to the performance of ritual activity.

न्याय्यां वृत्तिं समुल्लङ्घ्य तद्विरुद्धतया स्थितिः ।
व्युत्थानमिति तामाहुर्व्युत्थानज्ञा महाधियः ॥१२५॥

Since *vyutthāna* is a person's remaining in the state which is opposed to that (commonplace) functioning which is in accordance with *eṣaṇās* (*nyāyyā*), by transgressing it; therefore, the great thinkers who have known what is *vyutthāna*, have so called that state.

[125]

This is explained in the next verse in the light of an example of a popular word.

सामन्तो व्युत्थितो राज्ञा विरोधेन व्यवस्थितौ ।
व्युत्थानशब्दो लोकेऽपि प्रसिद्धोऽत्र तथैव सः ॥१२६॥

Even in this world, the word *vyutthāna* is known as expressive of a tributary king who, bearing in his heart an enmity (*virodhena*), has been remaining in opposition to a (sovereign). (Therefore) the word (*vyutthāna*) is used here in the same way.

[126]

SP has clearly pointed out the basis for the use of the word *vyutthāna* thus: *lokavedayoḥ śabdārthāviśeṣād aviśiṣṭas tu vākyārtha iti nyāyāt*.

भिक्षया लक्ष्यते चर्या ह्याकिंचन्यैकसंश्रया ।
अममापरिग्रहोक्तेर्निष्कर्मा मुनिरुच्यते ॥१२७॥

By the word *bhikṣā* is indicated a person's conduct of activity (*caryā*) which is based on (or rooted in) the state of having nothing. Therefore, a person is called a wise man who does not do any activity owing to there being the statement about him as not possessing anything as 'mine'. [127]

एषणा कामपर्यायः कामश्चाप्राप्तगोचरः ।
अवाप्ताशेषकामेऽसौ भवंस्तन्मोहतो भवेत् ॥१२८॥

The word *eṣaṇā* is a synonym for *kāma* 'desire' and *kāma* is an object (i.e. a thing) which is not obtained. Therefore, (that *kāma*) being in the case of a person who has not obtained all the desires,¹ would be caused by ignorance about the nature of that (*kāma*). [128]

¹NKL edition reads: *avāptāśeṣakāmo 'sau bhavans ...* despite NKL proper as: *bhavan kāma iti śeṣaḥ* and also *anāptakāmābhāve 'pi ...* as the introductory to the next verse. As such, that reading deserves little (or, no) consideration!

आनन्दैकस्वभावत्वान्नात्मनः सुखकामिता ।
विरोधात्सुखरूपस्य न दुःखेन समागमः ॥१२९॥

The Ātman does not (seem to be) given to (securing) happiness owing to its being of the nature of only happiness, (and therefore,) owing to the opposition of its being of the nature of happiness, there does not follow any contact (or union of it) with misery. [129]

बुभुक्षादिनिषेधोऽयं तथाप्यात्मन उच्यते ।
सर्वानर्थैकमूलस्य प्रत्यङ्मोहस्य हानये ॥१३०॥

So also there is the denial of a wish to eat/enjoy on the part of the Ātman. And that (is held to) result in removal of ignorance about the inner self, which (i.e. ignorance) is the only root of all undesirables. [130]

निरेषणैकयाथात्म्ये न यथावस्तुकामधीः ।
निरेषणात्मसंबोधाद्वाध्यैवेयमतो भवेत् ॥१३१॥

Therefore, this inclination of the mind (*dhī*) for knowing the thing (viz. reality) as it is would not be existing in the state of being (one) in nature with the desireless (Ātman) alone, and it would not be an object of stultification on account of the Ātman that is desireless. [131]

SP points out that this verse refers to the discussion in the preceding verses and purports to negate the cause of transmigration in the case of the inner self, i.e. the six *ūrmis* mentioned in verse 32.

फलार्थैषणयैकत्वप्रसिद्धयर्थमतः श्रुतिः ।
प्रवक्तुमुपचक्राम पुत्रवित्तैषणैकताम् ॥१३२॥

Therefore has the Śruti proceeded to establish the singleness of the desire for the result as the single desire in the two desires for a son and for wealth. [132]

SP points out: *śrutivaśād ekaivaiṣaṇety arthaḥ*.

यतो धनाभिलाषोऽयं कृतदारस्य सार्थकः ।
पुत्रैषणातोऽभिन्नैव ज्ञेया वित्तैषणात्मनः ॥१३३॥

Since this desire for wealth¹ is meaningful in the case of one who has taken to a wife, therefore the desire of a person

for wealth is to be known as non-distinct from desire for a son. [133]

¹Here Sureśvara states it to signify *dāna*.

साधनत्वाविशेषत्वात्पुत्रवित्तैषणात्मनोः ।
एवं चैकत्वमनयोरिह व्याख्येयमादृतैः ॥१३४॥

Owing to the non-distinction between the two desires for a son and for wealth in the case of a person as the means, persons who have a regard (for the Vedānta doctrine) have to explain it, thus as in the sense of the oneness of the two (stated above). [134]

This explains the purport of first line of verse 132 above.

साध्यैषणाप्रयुक्तत्वात्पुत्रवित्तैषणात्मनः ।
एका लोकैषणैवेयं त्रिधातो व्यपदिश्यते ॥१३५॥

Therefore, this single desire for *loka* is mentioned to be threefold as the desire for a son and the desire for wealth are (merely) propelled (*prayukta*) by just one desire (for *loka*) to be obtained. [135]

This is an explanation of *yā vittaiṣaṇā* in BU.

SP quotes: *uktam hi sarvaphalārthaprayukta eva hi sarva-sāadhanam upādatta iti*. Possibly, this is the citation from *Bhāṣya of Bhartṛprapañca*.

स्वमहिम्नैव निष्पत्तिर्न विना साधनं यतः ।
साध्यस्य साधनादानमतः साध्यानुरोधतः ॥१३६॥

Since a thing cannot be achieved through its greatness, i.e. not without any means, therefore, here is to be mentioned (lit. taken up) a means in accordance with the nature of what is to be achieved. [136]

This explains the meaning of *ubhe hi* in BU.

अपास्ताशेषानर्थाप्तपुरुषार्थत्वतः स्वतः ।
तन्मोहमात्रजे तस्मादेषणे प्रत्यगात्मनि ॥१३७॥

Therefore, there are two desires in the case of the inner self that are caused by mere ignorance (lit. delusion) about it for the reason that by its very nature it has had achieved the end of life by the removal of all the undesirables without any remainder (i.e. in their entirety). [137]

ब्रह्माज्ञानं यतो हेतुरेषणानां न वस्तुतः ।
परमार्थविदां न स्युरेषणा या यथोदिताः ॥१३८॥

Since ignorance about (the nature of) the Brahman is the cause of (all) the desires and (it is) not (so) in reality, therefore, in the case of those who have known the highest reality there do not obtain desires which are stated. [138]

आप्ताशेषपुमर्थत्वान्नापेक्षा साधनं प्रति ।
साध्यत्वेऽपि हि सिद्धस्य किंत्वसाध्यस्य वस्तुनः ॥१३९॥

Since they have obtained all the ends of life, they do not have any expectancy for (or dependence on) any means—this is so even in the case of an object to be acquired that has been (already) acquired and not in the case of that (object) which cannot be obtained. [139]

This verse raises a point regarding giving up the performance of ritual actions in the case of (i) one who is a knower and (ii) one who seeks to know. The first alternative is taken up in the present verse and the second alternative will be taken up in verse 141 below.

सर्वोपाया निवर्तन्त उपेयावसितौ यतः ।

चरितार्थत्वतोऽमीषां नापेक्षा सिद्धवस्तुनः ॥१४०॥
 अप्यज्ञातात्मयाथात्म्यो जिज्ञासुर्योऽत्र वस्तुनि ।
 सर्वकर्मपरित्यागो ज्ञानाप्त्यै तस्य साधनम् ॥१४१॥

Since, in respect of having obtained what was to be approached, all the means become inoperative (lit. return), therefore, in respect of a thing obtained, these (means) are not acquired (lit. expected) owing to the end (of life) already being achieved; [140]

also, in respect of him, who desires to know (the thing) in this (i.e. the context of the knowledge of the Brahman), since he has not known the real nature of the Ātman. There is the giving up of all activities (ritual and others) for obtaining the knowledge. [141]

This clarifies the thought in verse 139 up to *siddhasya*.

तस्मादेवंविदित्यत्र श्रुतिः स्पष्टं यथोदितम् ।
 निःशेषकर्मसंन्यासं स्वयमेव प्रवक्ष्यति ॥१४२॥

The Śruti itself will clearly state (i.e. prescribe) the renunciation of entire activity in the words *tasmād evamvid* (BU 4.4.23). [142]

Verses 143-156 discuss the nature of sentience relating renunciation as the cause of right knowledge (of reality).

प्रत्यग्याथात्म्यविज्ञानसाधनत्वप्रसिद्धये ।
 श्रुत्यन्तरेषु तद्वच्च सन्ति वाक्यान्यनेकशः ॥१४३॥

And, in the same way, there are in other Śrutis numerous sentences which go to establish that renunciation is a means (to liberation) to acquire the knowledge of the true nature of the inner self. [143]

मुक्तेश्च बिभ्यतो देवा मोहेनापिदधुर्नरान् ।

प्रावर्तन्त ततो भीताः कर्मस्वज्ञाततत्त्वकाः ॥१४४॥

सर्वकर्माण्यतस्त्यक्त्वा प्रत्यक्प्रवणबुद्धयः ।

मोहं भित्त्वात्मसंबोधाद्ययुः कैवल्यमुत्तमम् ॥१४५॥

(And gods) being afraid of liberation being obtained by men, wrapped up human beings in ignorance (and) then they (i.e. human beings), being afraid thereby, entered upon the (performance of) activities, [144]

therefore, they who had their intellect inclined towards (acquiring the knowledge of true nature of)-inner self having abandoned all activities, (and) having destroyed (lit. broken) ignorance (lit. delusion), attained to the excellent state of singleness (i.e. liberation) through the true knowledge of self.

[145]

These two verses are from the tradition of the Bhāllavis as is clear from the following verse. (Not traced for us!)

इति भाल्लविश्रुतिवचः सम्यग्ज्ञानस्य जन्मने ।

संन्यासं साधनं वक्ति वाङ्मनःकायकर्मणाम् ॥१४६॥

Thus is the statement in the Bhāllavi Śruti which states renunciation of the activities of speech, *manas* and body as a means to the rise of right knowledge. [146]

पराञ्चि खानीति तथा पराक्प्रवणसाधनम् ।

निषेधत्यात्मविज्ञाने मन्त्रवर्णोऽपि काठके ॥१४७॥

Also, there is in the Kāthaka tradition a certain Mantra which rejects in the verse *parāñci khāni*¹ the means inclined towards (acquiring the knowledge of) the external objects as a means to acquiring the knowledge (of the true nature) of the Ātman.

[147]

¹Kāthopaniṣad 4.4.1.

वेदान्तविज्ञानसुनिश्चितार्थाः ।
 संन्यासयोगाद्यतयः शुद्धसत्त्वाः ।
 मन्त्रोऽपि चैकात्म्यविनिश्चयाय ।
 निःशेषकर्मोज्झतिमाह साक्षात् ॥१४८॥

By the verse, 'Those who have well determined for themselves the knowledge of the Vedānta (thought), being pure in their mind (*śuddhasattvāḥ*), the ascetics, by resorting to renunciation ...,'¹ (the Śruti) has directly expressed the renouncing of entire activity (as a means) for ascertaining the oneness (of the inner self, i.e. the Ātman) in nature. [148]

¹*Muṇḍakopaniṣad* 3.2.6ab.

ब्रह्मचर्यं समाप्य गृही तस्माद्भवेद्विजः ।
 गृहाश्रमं समाप्याथ वानप्रस्थं समापयेत् ॥१४९॥

Therefore, having lived up to the end of the stage of celibate, a twice-born should become a householder. 'Then, after having lived up to the end the stage of householder, he should complete the stage of forest-dweller.'¹ [149]

¹This seems to be a Śruti stating *kramasannyāsa* for a twice-born.

यथोक्ताश्रमवासार्थं सामर्थ्यान्नियमो भवेत् ।
 एवं सति समर्थः स्यात्सर्वाश्रमसमुच्चयः ॥१५०॥

Owing to the propriety,¹ in relation to (*-artham*) adherence to the stage of life there should be (accepted) a restrictive rule which is (already) mentioned. This being so, there will be a meaningful² combination of all the stages of life. [150]

¹*sāmarthya* 'propriety', or force of singnificance of the particular stage of life which is relevant.

²*samartha* here is to indicate what is useful.

वानप्रस्थाश्रमाद्धूर्वं प्रव्रजेदविचारयन् ।
प्रत्यक्षश्रुतिमूलोऽयं सर्वाश्रमसमुच्चयः ॥१५१॥

At the end of the stage of forest-dweller, a person should take to renunciation (even) without thought, (for) this combination of all the stages of life is having a direct basis in the Śruti statements. [151]

Thus, verses 149-151 refer to the performance of different duties in different stages of a person's life and finally to renunciation, so as to be in suitable combinations.

कषायं पाचयित्वा च श्रेणीस्थानेषु च त्रिषु ।
प्रव्रजेच्च परं स्थानं पारिव्राज्यमनुत्तमम् ॥१५२॥
इति व्यासस्मृतौ वाक्यं प्रत्यक्षश्रुतिबन्धनम् ।
तथान्यान्यपि विद्यन्ते वाक्यान्यत्र सहस्रशः ॥१५३॥

(Thus) having brought to fruition, lit. ripeness, (*pācayitvā*) (the various sinful activities)¹ in the three stages of life in (their fixed) order (*śreṇī*), a person should attain to the final (*para*) stage of life, viz. renunciation which is incomparable. [152]

This is a statement in the Smṛti by Vyāsa which has a directly firm connection (*bandhana*) with the Śruti; so also, there are other thousands of statements in this respect. [153]

Verse 152 is in support of the idea of *kramasaṃnyāsa*. And cf. *Mahābhārata* 12.237.3 with variation *tu* for *ca* and *śreṇīsthāneṣu* of *śreṇīsthaneṣu*. Also, *Mārkaṇḍeyapurāṇa* 152.153 as quoted by NKL.

¹This is for *kaṣāya* 'impurity'; referring to the word *pāpman* and *āsaṅga* mentioned in BU 1.3.2, 7 and, in particular, 10-11; *Jaiminīyopaniṣad* 2.1.10; 1.3.6, 7, 10, 11.

ब्रह्मचर्याश्रमादेव यदि वा प्रव्रजेद्विजः ।

गृहाच्च प्रव्रजेत्तद्वत्प्रव्रजेच्च वनात्तथा ॥१५४॥

Or perhaps a twice-born might renounce (directly) from the stage of celibate or from the house (i.e. from the stage of householder) or perhaps he might renounce from the forest (i.e. the stage of forest-dweller). [154]

This verse points to the opposition of the Śruti to renunciation as related to the sequence of the stages of a person's life. The word *dvija* refers to the three castes.

विकल्पेनैव व्याख्यात एकद्वित्रिसमुच्चयः ।
कषायपक्वितमापेक्ष्य विकल्पोऽयं त्रिधोदितः ॥१५५॥

Thus has been explained the combination of (renunciation with one or two or three of the stages of a man's life). And this option¹ is (thus) mentioned as of three types, keeping in view (*āpekṣya*) the result (lit. ripeness) of simple activities. [155]

¹The statement giving the three options in verse 154 is specified in this verse.

परीक्ष्य लोकानित्यादि तथा चाथर्वणे वचः ।
विरक्तः कर्मभूमिभ्यो ज्ञानं प्रति नियुज्यते ॥१५६॥

And to this effect is there a statement (in the tradition of) Atharvans also as begins with (the words) *parīkṣya lokān*¹ Thus a person who has become averse to the various levels of (a human being's) activity is enjoined to secure knowledge. [156]

¹Cf. *Muṇḍakopaiṣad* 1.2.12.

Verses 157-164 discuss the meaning of *vyutthāya* as what leads to renunciation according to the Śruti and having knowledge as its means but not *tridaṇḍasaṃnyāsa* as stated by *Smṛtis*.

सर्वकर्मपरित्यागात्संत्यक्ताशेषसाधनः ।

श्रुत्युक्तोऽत्र परिव्राट्स्यादैकात्म्यज्ञानजन्मने ॥१५७॥

(Therefore) here (in this context of pursuit of the knowledge of the Brahman) is a person mentioned by the Śruti as a person who has, by giving up performance of all activities, abandoned the entire means to their fulfilment as one who should become a mendicant in order that there is (for him) the rise of knowledge of the singleness of the Ātman. [157]

मुण्डोऽपरिग्रहश्चेति प्रत्यक्षश्रुतिवाक्यतः ।

तद्विरुद्धं स्मृतेर्वाक्यं नापेक्ष्यं दुर्बलत्वतः ॥१५८॥

And, there is a directly expressed statement in the Śruti that (a person should be a mendicant, lit. a person who has shaven his head, and should have no belonging of his own; (and) the statement in the Smṛti is opposed to that; therefore, it should not be regarded (as proper or as a conveyer of truth), owing to its having no strength. [158]

This points to the conflict between the Śruti statement regarding renunciation and the Smṛti sentences (e.g. Dakṣa Smṛti) regarding the same.

विगीता च विरुद्धा च दृष्टार्था दृष्टकारणा ।

इति वेदविदाप्युक्तं तदप्रामाण्यकारणम् ॥१५९॥

(The Smṛti) has sung (some) matter(s) variously;¹ (it is) opposed (to the Śruti); it has (for its subject matter) things that are seen;² and it (mentions) causes that are seen³—this has the knower of the Veda⁴ also spoken of (i.e. pointed out) the reason for its unauthoritativeness. [159]

¹That is, in a way so as to involve self-contradictions.

²This refers to the perceptibility of the things.

³That is, proven by other means of perception (also).

क्रियमाणानि कर्माणि यथा स्युः फलसिद्धये ।
तदक्रियोक्ता श्रुत्येह तथात्मज्ञानजन्मने ॥१६०॥

Here ¹ is stated by the Śruti the non-performance of them, for the reason that the (ritual) activities would produce results; this is so said by the Śruti for the rise of the knowledge about (the nature of) the Ātman. [160]

If the Śruti has occasionally spoken of renunciation of different duties in relation to various stages of a man's life, that is to be understood as speaking about the means to acquiring the knowledge of the Brahman.

¹That is, in respect of the rise of the knowledge about the Ātman.

सत्यानृते सुखदुःखे वेदाँल्लोकद्वयं तथा ।
संन्यस्यात्मानमन्विच्छेदित्यदुष्टं स्मृतेर्वचः ॥१६१॥
त्यज धर्ममधर्मं च तथा सत्यानृते त्यज ।
उभे सत्यानृते त्यक्त्वा येन त्यजसि तं त्यज ॥१६२॥

Therefore, the statement in the Smṛti (should be understood) as faultless (*aduṣṭa*) and (conveying this:) a person should seek (the knowledge of) the Ātman after he has renounced truth and untruth (and) happiness (as well) and misery; the Vedas and also the two worlds (*iha-* and *para-* lokas). [161]
Give up the duties which are prescribed for you (*dharma*) and also those prohibited (*adharma*); and also give up (the notions of) truth and untruth; and also that with (the help of) which you have abandoned them.¹ [162]

¹Cf. *Āpastambīyadharmasūtra* 2(9).21.13.

नैष्कर्म्यसाधनेष्वेवं श्रुतयः स्मृतिभिः सह ।
मुमुक्षुं विनियुञ्जन्ति सदात्मज्ञानजन्मने ॥१६३॥

Thus, the Śrutis having agreement of the Smṛtis with themselves, ever enjoin a person seeking (or desiring for) liberation on accepting the means¹ of achieving *naiṣkarmya* 'actionlessness' so that there is rise of the knowledge about (the nature of) the Ātman. [163]

¹This refers to *śamadamādisādhanasampat*.

तथानधिकृतानां च संन्यासस्य विधानतः ।
काणकुब्जादिविषया न्यासक्लृप्तिरतोऽशुभा ॥१६४॥

Similarly, there is no prescription as regards renunciation in the case of those who are not eligible, viz. those who are one-eyed and hunch-backs and the like. Therefore, entertaining the idea of renunciation (in respect of Smṛtis) is inauspicious.¹ [164]

¹That is, unacceptable or unauthoritative in every way.

Verses 165-167 explain the objection in BUB: vyutthāya ... as referring to an injunction regarding renunciation.

सत्सु प्रत्यक्षविधिषु यथोक्तेष्वफलः श्रमः ।
भिक्षाचर्यं चरन्तीति विद्यर्थः क्रियते महान् ॥१६५॥

(Therefore) when there are specifically stated injunctions, clearly understood, as stated before, the effort (towards performance of them) is futile. As such, the purpose of the injunction that is proposed in the Śruti statement *bhikṣācaryam caranti* is futile. [165]

तिष्ठतासेदिति चात्रापि प्रत्यक्षः श्रूयते विधिः ।
तस्मिन्सति वृथा कस्माज्जनोऽयं परिखिद्यते ॥१६६॥

(An objection:) 'Also, there is here directly heard an injunction

in this (text, viz. in the words) 'Let him rest (on)...', while it is there, why then is this person fatiguing himself uselessly?

[166]

This refers to the Śruti which is expressed in Śaṅkara's commentary on *vyutthāya* as an injunction regarding renunciation. This shows how Sureśvara expresses his disagreement with his preceptor Śaṅkara, though mildly.

In verses from 67 onwards Sureśvara discusses the meaning of the sentence tasmād brāhmaṇaḥ pāṇḍityam nirvidya bālyena tiṣṭhāset.

साध्यसाधनरूपाभ्यां विरुद्धं प्रत्यगीक्षणम् ।
यतो यथोक्तं तत्सिद्धौ तस्मादेतद्विधीयते ॥१६७॥

Since seeing the inner self is opposed (to activities) which have the nature of what is to be achieved and (also) the means of achieving the same, as said so far, therefore, the following (lit. this) is now stated in proof of the same.

[167]

Verses 168-191 explain the passage tasmād brāhmaṇaḥ.

व्युत्थायातो यथोक्ताभ्य एषणाभ्यो निरेषणः ।
पाण्डित्यमथ निर्विद्य बाल्यं परिसमापयेत् ॥१६८॥

Therefore, having risen above the desires that have been stated, one who has become devoid of desires, should have fully acquired, i.e. known (*nis-vidya*) what is erudition and then (*atha*) rest on the strength¹ (of renunciation enjoined, i.e. heard, in the Śruti).

[168]

¹*bālya* is (*kartum*) *sāmarthyam balavattvam* which is acquired after knowing the meanings of Vedic words; cf. verse 176 below.

पदार्थाधिगतिः पूर्वं ततस्तदभिसंगतिः ।

विरुद्धार्थहनुतिः पश्चात्ततो वाक्यार्थबोधनम् ॥१६९॥

In the first instance, there is acquiring the meaning (of the words in the Śruti statement), then (understanding) the proper connection in them, later discarding (lit. concealing) the opposed teachings and thereafter acquiring the meaning of the sentence (is known as erudition). [169]

This gives the meaning of *pāṇḍityam*.

This is called *caturvidha jñāna*.

एकैकशयेन नीत्वाथ निष्ठां पाण्डित्यलक्षणाम् ।
बाल्यं चैव यथायोगमन्वयव्यतिरेकतः ॥१७०॥

Then, having firmly secured the final condition (*niṣṭhā*), characterized as erudition, following (the four elements stated in the preceding verse) one after another,¹ he should (rest on) the strength² in a suitable way (*yathāyogam*) by the method of Anvaya and Vyatireka. [170]

¹This is for *ekaikaśa* 'one by one' from *Śābarabhāṣya* 10.6.45.

²This is by *bālya* which is the same as *balavattva* or *balabhāvaḥ*.

अद्वितीयार्थनिष्ठत्वमात्मप्रत्ययशब्दयोः ।
तथा चात्मैकनिष्ठत्वमद्वितीयस्य मानतः ॥१७१॥
ऐकार्थ्यान्नेह संसर्गस्तद्विरुद्धार्थयोरिव ।
अशनायाद्यतिक्रान्तदृष्टिद्रष्टृपदार्थयोः ॥१७२॥

The two words *ātman* and *pratyaya* (can) pertain (only) to that object which is without a second (and) in the same way, that (object) which is without a second can abide (only) in the Ātman and it becomes known from an authoritative means (viz. the Śruti). [171]

Between the two things signified as the meanings of the two words *dr̥ṣṭi* and *draṣṭṛ*, which are above (lit. have transgressed) hunger etc., there cannot obtain any contact as between two objects (of nature) opposed to them, since they are (i.e. exist

as) but one thing.

[172]

Verse 171 refers to the *bālyā* 'strength' in the two words *ātman* and *pratyaya* and verse 172, to that in the sentence. Thus verse 172 refers to acquiring *pāṇḍitya* or *caturvidha jñāna*.

Verse 172 points to *bālyā*.

पण्डेति बुद्धिनामैतत्सा जाता यस्य मानतः ।
तं पण्डितमिति प्राहुः सोऽत्र श्रुत्या नियुज्यते ॥१७३॥

The word *pāṇḍā* 'erudition' is the word used of (lit. name given to) knowledge (obtained) through intellect and they call him *pāṇḍita* 'an erudite person' in whom has arisen that *pāṇḍā* from (various) means (of knowing). It is that person who is enjoined here (in the injunction)¹ in the Śruti. [173]

This explains the meaning of *pāṇḍā*.

¹This refers to *pāṇḍityam bālyena tiṣṭhāset*.

यत्पण्डितस्य कर्म स्यात्तत्पाण्डित्यं प्रचक्षते ।
अप्राप्ततत्त्वनिष्ठोऽतः पाण्डित्ये विनियुज्यते ॥१७४॥

Whatever is the activity of an erudite man is what they call erudition, therefore (that person) who rests himself on (the condition of) not having known the true nature (of reality) is enjoined by this injunction to acquire erudition. [174]

शास्त्राचार्यात्मतो निष्ठां नीत्वात्मप्रत्ययं यतिः ।
तिष्ठासेदथ बाल्येन कृत्स्नानात्मधियो हनूतिः ॥१७५॥
बाल्यशब्दाभिधेया स्यात्तां समाप्य शद्धीः ।
मुनिभावं ततो गत्वा ब्रह्मैव ब्राह्मणो भवेत् ॥१७६॥

Having secured the final condition (of erudition) in respect of the knowledge of the Ātman, from scripture and/or the preceptor, a mendicant should rest himself on that strength; the removal (lit. concealment) of the knowledge of all the

non-Ātmans

[175]

is signified by the word *bālya*; ¹ having obtained that (strength), a person of purified intellect should have attained the nature of a wise person and then become the Brahman, i.e. Brāhmaṇa. ²

[176]

This explains *atha munih amaunaṃ ca maunaṃ ca*

¹With reference to *bālya* SP states: *balan nāmātmavidyayā-śeṣaviśayadr̥ṣṭitiraskaraṇam atas tadbhāvaḥ bālyam [tena tiṣṭhāset]*.

²Actually this refers to a person belonging to the Brāhmaṇa caste, but here it means one who knows the Brahman.

निःशेषमात्मसंबोधं कुर्यादिति विधीयते ।

तिष्ठतासेदिति संबन्धः सर्वत्र विधिना भवेत् ॥१७७॥

What is enjoined here is: he should bring about the full knowledge about the Ātman. (And) there is connection of the word *tiṣṭhāset* everywhere (as implied) by the injunction. ¹

[177]

¹SP clarifies this by stating the injunction in its fullness.

प्राणेन प्राणितीत्युक्तो दृष्टेर्द्रष्टेति चोदितः ।

स आत्मानुभवात्सिद्ध आ देहादा परात्मनः ॥१७८॥

What is mentioned in the word *prāṇena prāṇīti* ¹ and pointed out as *dr̥ṣṭer draṣṭā* is that Ātman established through experience, (as obtaining in the things) from the body to the highest self.

[178]

¹Cf. *Kenopaniṣad* 1.9: *yat prāṇena na prāṇīti* and *BU* 1.5.1: *yat ca prāṇīti yac ca na*.

अस्य प्रत्यक्पदार्थस्य ह्या समाप्तेर्विधीयते ।

धीः पाण्डित्यगिरा साक्षादन्वयव्यतिरेकतः ॥१७९॥

It is indeed of this very thing, the inner self, that is about which is here enjoined up to the end (of the injunction, viz. the acquisition of knowledge), which is expressed by the word *pāṇḍitya*, (and which is) directly known by the method of Anvaya and Vyatireka. [179]

तथैव योऽशनायेति परमात्मापि शब्दितः ।
तस्य निष्ठाविधानार्थं बाल्येनेति परं वचः ॥१८०॥

In the same way, the highest self also is mentioned in the words *yo 'śanāyā* ... (and) the subsequent statement in the words *bālyena* ... is for the purpose of enjoining the acquisition of that (knowledge about the Ātman). [180]

नान्यत्रेहाद्वितीयार्थात्साक्षादात्मार्थसंभवः ।
इत्यर्थोऽत्र विधेयः स्यादन्वयव्यतिरेकतः ॥१८१॥

Here in this injunction the object to be enjoined cannot be other than the one without a second, for, it means to have only the directly perceptible Ātman as the thing. (This is known) by the method of Anvaya and Vyatireka. [181]

SP points out: This is ascertaining the meaning of the word *tvam*, i.e. understanding the true nature of transitory being.

अद्वितीयपदार्थस्य तथा नैवात्मनोऽन्यतः ।
संभवोऽस्तीतिविध्यर्थस्तिष्ठासेदिति भण्यते ॥१८२॥

In the verb *tiṣṭhāset* is expressed the purpose of the injunction, viz. to point out that there is not any possible existence of any object, which is without a second, that is other than the Ātman and this is expressed in the potential mood expressed by the verb *tiṣṭhāset*. [182]

This is the purpose of the words *bālyena tiṣṭhāset* in ascertainment of the nature of the inner self (*tatpadārtha* as SP

called it).

विशेषणविशेष्यत्वसंबन्धोऽथ पदार्थयोः ।
विरुद्धार्थनिवृत्त्यात्र मुनिरित्यभिधीयते ॥१८३॥

There is between the two meanings signified by the two words (viz. *bālyā* and *pāṇḍityā*) the relation of the qualifier and the qualified¹ and therefore (*atha*) through (this) averting of there being opposed senses of them, there is here² stated (who is a) *muni* 'wise (person)'. [183]

This verse expresses the meaning of the word *muni*, i.e. a wise man who is aware of the oneness of the individual self and the Ātman.

¹SP explains *viśeṣaṇaviśeṣyatvasambandha* as *sāmānādhikaranya*, i.e. their obtaining/abiding in but one thing.

²In the sentence *atha munir amaunaṁ ca maunaṁ ca nirvidya*

ब्रह्मात्मनोरसंसर्गस्तद्विरुद्धार्थयोरिव ।
पदार्थैकत्वतो भेदो द्वावन्तद्वस्तौ निवर्तते ॥१८४॥

There is want of connection between the Brahman and the Ātman as distinction consists between two objects of opposite natures. Therefore, there being only oneness of the thing (viz. reality) when there is removal (lit. destruction) of ignorance (lit. darkness) recedes as there is/remains only one object (i.e. reality). [184]

सामानाधिकरण्यं च विशेषणविशेष्यता ।
लक्ष्यलक्षणसंबन्धः पदार्थप्रत्यगात्मनाम् ॥१८५॥

There exist between the thing (i.e. reality) and the individual selves abiding in (just) one object, the relation of the specifier and the specified, and also (the relation of) the indicator and what is indicated. [185]

SP points to the sequence in understanding just one (full) meaning from a Vedic sentence. This is further clarified in the next verse.

सामानाधिकरण्यादेर्घटेतरखयोरिव ।

व्यावृत्तेः स्यादवाक्यार्थः साक्षात्तत्त्वमर्थयोः ॥१८६॥

Owing to the warding away of (such relation as) (their) abiding in (just) one object, like that in the case of the skies in a pitcher and elsewhere, the meaning of the objects *tat* and *tvam* would become directly perceptible to us, (they would) not (be) the meaning of the sentence (viz. *tat tvam asi*). [186]

चिदज्ञानैकहेतुत्वाद्वातव्यानां चिदात्मनि ।

मोहध्वस्तौ प्रतीचोऽन्यो नातोऽर्थोऽत्रावशिष्यते ॥१८७॥

For this reason there does not remain here any object other than the inner self when there is removal (lit. destruction) of delusion on the part of the sentient Ātman about the objects which are (only) to be abandoned as they are caused by ignorance about the sentient one. [187]

आत्मधीविषयं नैति तदज्ञानैककारणः ।

अनात्ममानमेयोऽर्थो यतोऽतः केवलात्मता ॥१८८॥

Since an object to be known is related to the means of knowing, (both of them) being non-Ātmans; therefore, in respect of the knowledge about the Ātman, the Ātman does not become an object to be known; for it has only ignorance as the cause (for its existence). Therefore, there is the nature of the Ātman alone (as what is to be known). [188]

समाप्त्यामौनमखिलं बाल्यपाण्डित्यलक्षणम् ।

निर्विद्य च तथा मौनं पदार्थद्वयसंगतिम् ॥१८९॥

अथ ब्राह्मण इत्युक्त्या फलावस्थास्य भण्यते ।

In the statement *atha brāhmaṇaḥ* there is here stated the state of the result (acquired) by this individual when he has completely known (*nirvidya*) the connection between two *padārthas* viz. *bālyā* and *pāṇḍityā* having finally obtained the condition up to being a *muni*¹ which is indicated by *bālyā*, *pāṇḍityā* and also having completely known the condition of *muni*.

[189-190ab]

This has a reference to verse 176 above. This explains what is meant by *amaunam ca* and the purport of *atha brāhmaṇaḥ*.

¹This refers to meditation(s) on various objects, before one becomes a *muni* 'wise person'. The translation gives the purport of *amaunam* which literally means 'the condition of not being a *muni*'.

भेदसंसर्गहीनोऽर्थः स्वमहिम्नि व्यवस्थितः ।
साक्षादित्यादिरूपोऽथ ब्रह्म ब्राह्मण उच्यते ॥१९०॥

The meaning of *brāhmaṇa* is the Brahman which is a thing devoid of any contact with distinction (i.e. a distinct object) remaining in its own greatness and having the nature directly perceptible etc.

[190c-f]

इमामवस्थां संप्राप्य सर्वो ब्राह्मण उच्यते ।
ब्राह्मण्यं गौणमन्यत्र पूर्वभूमिषु नागजसा ॥१९१॥

Every being (i.e. each of all beings) is called a *Brāhmaṇa* after he has obtained this state; the nature of being a *Brāhmaṇa* is elsewhere related to (a being's having certain) qualities this belongs to the earlier stages; it does not go well with the consequent stage.¹

[191]

¹That is, after knowing the Brahman.

Verses 192-204 are the exposition of the meaning of the question

sa brāhmaṇaḥ kena syāt.

केनाथ ब्राह्मणः स स्यादिति प्रश्नमपृच्छत ।
उक्तोपायातिरेकेण पृच्छयते साधनान्तरम् ॥१९२॥

Then (Kahola) asked the question: 'whereby would he (i.e. a being) be a Brāhmaṇa?'; this is to say: (in this question is asked information about some other means) which are in addition to the known (lit. stated) ways of asking.¹ [192]

¹This is clarified in the next verse.

यज्ञादिलक्षणं तावत्पारंपर्येण साधनम् ।
निर्ज्ञातिमागमात्तस्मात्पृच्छयते साधनान्तरम् ॥१९३॥

Usually, one comes to know about the nature of the means which is characterized as a sacrifice etc. and its means as a sequel (which are) known from the scriptures; therefore, here is asked (a question about) another means of knowing (*kenātha brāhmaṇaḥ*). [193]

चतुर्णां कतमेनेति न तु प्रश्नोऽत्र युज्यते ।
कैवल्यश्रममादाय ब्राह्मण्यस्य समाप्तिः ॥१९४॥

Here (i.e. in respect of liberation) it is not a proper question as to which of the four (stages of life) is meant (by *kena*), because the state of a Brāhmaṇa (*brāhmabhāva*) is (accepted as) obtained by one, on having resorted to the stages of life marked by *kaivalya* 'being alone'. [194]

न चाश्रमान्तरं युक्तं मुनेर्व्युत्थायिनः सतः ।
कृतार्थस्याकृतार्थस्य तस्य नैवाश्रमान्तरम् ॥१९५॥

In the case of a wise man¹ (*muni*) who has risen (*vyuthāya*), it is not proper to entertain the idea of any other stages of life, for, in the case of him, who has known (lit. obtained)

reality (viz. already being one with reality) and also in the case of one who has not known reality, there cannot be any other stage of life.

[195]

¹Cf. SP: *kṛtārthaḥ sākṣātkṛtabrahmā munih.*

प्रश्नोऽयं साधनज्ञप्त्यै ब्राह्मणस्येह पृच्छयते ।
किंसाधनो ब्राह्मणः स्यादिति साधनमुच्यताम् ॥१९६॥

This question (viz. *kenārtha ...*) is asked here about a Brāhmaṇa in order to inform one about the means to attaining it; that is to say, with a view to (answering the question) *kiṃsādhano brāhmaṇaḥ syāt* 'what *sādhana*s should a Brāhmaṇa possess?' —(is it said) 'let the means be told'.

[196]

प्रश्नप्रतिवचस्तेन ब्राह्मणः स्याद्यथोदितः ।
येनानवाप्तज्ञानोऽपि भवेदीदृश एव ना ॥१९७॥

Therefore, the answer to the question is: So then a man would become a Brāhmaṇa, as said, even if he would not have obtained knowledge, i.e. who has become such.¹

[197]

¹Cf. by SP: *nirvyāpāra* 'not doing any action'.

उक्तब्राह्मणसादृश्यं सर्वकर्मनिरासतः ।
नैष्कर्म्यसाधनेनैव ब्राह्मणः स्याद्यथोदितः ॥१९८॥

There would be similarity of this man with a Brāhmaṇa, as stated, on account of having abandoned all activities, for, he would be a Brāhmaṇa as described by the very means consisting in actionlessness.

[198]

इत्येषोऽर्थो विधेयोऽत्र येनेति वचसा श्रुतेः ।
स्मृतयोऽपीममेवार्थं तत्र तत्र प्रचक्षते ॥१९९॥

Such meaning should be understood here ¹ by the statement

of the Śruti yena The Smṛtis also have spoken here and there of this very thing.² [199]

¹That is, in respect of liberation which is the end of a thinker.

²The word *api* suggests similar statements in the Śruti; cf. verse 204 below.

लोकेऽस्मिन्द्विविधा निष्ठा पुरा प्रोक्ता मयानघ ।
ज्ञानयोगेन सांख्यानां कर्मयोगेन योगिनाम् ॥२००॥

In the world, there is a twofold system of discipline as stated by me, O sinless one, this was declared by me before; the one followed by the Sāṃkhyas consisting in the pursuit of knowledge and the other by the Yogins, consisting in the pursuit of activity. [200]

This is a verse from *Gītā* 3.3.

इमौ द्वावेव पन्थानौ कर्मतत्यागलक्षणौ ।
सजातीयाद्विनिष्क्रान्तावनुत्क्रान्ततराविमौ ॥२०१॥

These only are two ways, characterized by (the performance of) action and by abandoning the same—that is, these two consist in being different from (any path of activity apparently) of similar nature and both being followed (i.e. adopted for performance by people) more (than any other path).¹ [201]

¹This is, on the authority of SP, a verse of Vyāsa, i.e. *Mahābhārata* comparable to 12.233.6:

*dvāv imāv atha panthānau yatra vedāḥ pratiṣṭhitāḥ /
pravṛttilakṣaṇo dharmo nivṛttiś ca subhāṣitāḥ //*

संन्यास एव ताभ्यां च विशेषेणातिवर्तते ।
तथा किं प्रजयेत्यादिः पन्थाः कर्मत्यजां श्रुतः ॥२०२॥

But it is only renunciation which excels them by its peculiarity,

viz. that it is heard as the way for those who abandon action altogether with the question, 'What is the purpose of having an offspring?'¹ [202]

¹Cf. *kim prajayā kariṣyāmo yeṣāṃ no 'yam ātmāyaṃ loka iti* (BU 4.4.22).

ब्रह्मचर्याश्रमादेव प्रव्रजेदिति भरिशः ।
 संन्यासमेव ब्रुवते मुक्तये सर्वकर्मणाम् ॥२०३॥
 श्रुतयः स्मृतयश्चोच्चैः शुद्धन्यायसमाश्रयात् ।
 सर्वकर्मनिरासेन ब्राह्मण्यं लभते ततः ॥२०४॥

That one should renounce right after the stage of celibate is stated (by the Śrutis and others) many times. Only renunciation of all the activities effects (or is the cause of) liberation: They say [203]
 aloud, i.e. the Śrutis and the Smṛtis say by resorting to the way of purity (*śuddhanyāya*)¹ does one obtain the status of a Brāhmaṇa.² [204]

¹This refers to the way of understanding the true nature of the Ātman and existence of a liberated person.

²This refers to the Brāhmaṇa stated in verses 190-191 above.

Verses 205-206 state another exposition of the passage sa brāhmaṇaḥ kena syāt.

केनेति यदि वाक्षेप उत्पत्त्यादेरसंभवात् ।
 साधनानामिहैकात्म्ये तथा च प्रागवादिषम् ॥२०५॥

Or, if in the words *kena* ... there is stated an objection: 'Owing to the impossibility of origination etc.,¹ there is (mere) oneness of all the means of activity'—so have I said earlier.² [205]

¹They are *utpatti*, *saṃskāra*, *vikāra*.

²This is according to SP's reference to SV.

साधनेनैतदैकात्म्यं येन येन चिकीर्ष्यते ।
तेन तेनेदृगेवात्मा नातिशीतिर्मनागपि ॥२०६॥

By whichever means this oneness of the Ātman is sought, through this means (of activity), by that everyone (is understood) the Ātman only in this way, there is not even a little excellence elsewhere. [206]

Verses 207-214 are yet another exposition of the same thing as above.

अथवा लक्षणोक्तिः स्याद्यथोक्तब्रह्मवेदिनः ।
येनेदृगेव चिहेन ब्राह्मणस्तेन लक्ष्यताम् ॥२०७॥

Or, this is the statement of the characteristic of one who has known the Brahman as said earlier; for, by such a characteristic is to be indicated (a Brāhmaṇa). [207]

देहेन्द्रियमनोबुद्धिधर्मानेषोऽत्यवर्तत ।
प्रत्यगैकात्म्यसंबोधात्तद्वैर्लक्ष्यते कथम् ॥२०८॥

This one has arrived beyond (or risen above) the properties of the body, organs, *manas* and intellect. How then would this one be characterized by the properties of them on account of his having attained the knowledge of the oneness of the inner self with the Ātman? [208]

The properties considered here are inclusion of *śamadama* etc. This is one alternative regarding the meaning of the properties.

सर्वसंसारभावोऽस्य न यथा लक्षणं तथा ।
सर्वाभावोऽपि नैव स्याल्लक्षणं ब्रह्मवेदिनः ॥२०९॥
वेद्यानुरोधतो यस्मात्तद्विदो न्यायलक्षणम् ।
भावाभावद्वयध्वंसि ब्रह्म वेद्यं च तद्विदः ॥२१०॥

The description of this one is not such as this person's being subject to transmigration. So also there would not be, in the case of this one, the absence of all that as such is the characteristic of the knower of the Brahman; [209] since, for the knower of that,¹ the nature of reason² is/should be in accordance with³ the object to be known (*vedya*). (And), the object to be known by/for the knower of that is the Brahman which destroys (the notion of both) existential and non-existential (entities). [210]

This is the second alternative about the properties alluded to in verse 208 above, i.e. it does not mean that absence of transmigration is a characteristic of the knower of the Brahman. From this it should be concluded that the proper description of the knower of the Brahman is that he has the right knowledge about the nature of the Brahman. Absence of any properties spoken about or transmigration does not form an essential characteristic of the knower of the Brahman. That characteristic is his being aware of the oneness of the self within himself and the highest Ātman.

¹This refers to the seeker of liberation/the Brahman.

²Translation follows the reading in both the AnSS and NKL editions. Yet the variant reading *nyāyylakṣaṇam* which is noted in the AnSS edition cannot be neglected. Hence the translation could be: the proper reason

³Or, following the nature of.

येनेदृगेव तेनेति तस्मादाह श्रुतिः स्फुटम् ।
मुमुक्षोर्लक्षणं तादृक्श्रद्धधाना यदब्रुवन् ॥२११॥

Therefore has the Śruti clearly stated *yena* ..., stated characteristic of one desirous of liberation since (the knowers) having similar faith have said so. [211]

सुषुप्तेऽप्यतिमूढस्य सर्वसंसारनिहनुतिः ।

गम्यते लक्षणं तादृङ् न चासौ ब्रह्मविन्मतः ॥२१२॥

In the case of even a stark foolish person there is noticed in the state of deep sleep the concealment (i.e. unawareness) of all transmigratory existence; therefore a person of that kind is not known as a knower of the Brahman. [212]

¹This is to justify the argument in verses 209-210.

आत्मनो ब्रह्मतेहोक्ता न त्वनात्मन ईरिता ।
यथोक्तज्ञानतो ऽवस्तिरार्तश्रुत्यात उच्यते ॥२१३॥

Thus, here is stated the condition of the inner Ātman as of the nature of the Brahman, but certainly not of any non-Ātman; therefore, from the knowledge, as is imparted here, there is stated by the Śruti the destruction of transmigration by using the word *ārta* 'afflicted'. [213]

अतो ब्राह्मण्यतोऽन्यद्यत्क्रियाकारकलक्षणम् ।
आर्तं विनाशि तज्ज्ञेयं ब्रह्मानार्तं यतस्ततः ॥२१४॥

From this (it follows that) whatever is different from *brāhmaṇya* 'the state of being a Brāhmaṇa' and is having the characteristic of (some) activity is afflicted, perishable; therefore, what is sought to be known¹ is the Brahman which is unafflicted. [214]

¹That about which there is question in the beginning of this Brāhmaṇa.

इति श्रीबृहदारण्यकोपनिषद्वाण्यवार्तिके तृतीयाध्यायस्य
पञ्चमं ब्राह्मणम् ॥५॥

BRHADĀRANYAKOPANIṢAD-
BHĀṢYA-VĀRTIKA

3.6

Gārgī Brāhmaṇa

यः सर्वान्तर इत्युक्तस्तन्निर्णयविवक्षया ।
आ शाकल्यात्परो ग्रन्थ इतो व्याख्यायतेऽधुना ॥१॥

Now is explained hereafter the subsequent text (of the Upaniṣad) up to Śākalya (Brāhmaṇa)¹ with an intention to make a decision with regard to that (Ātman) which is described (i.e. stated)² as that which is within all. [1]

¹This refers to the 6th, 7th and 8th Brāhmaṇas. Śākalya (Brāhmaṇa) is the 9th.

²Add: in the two preceding (i.e. 4th and 5th) Brāhmaṇas.

विशेषणस्य सर्वस्य साक्षादित्यादिकस्य च ।
सर्वान्तरविनिर्णीतौ निर्णयः स्यात्कथं न्विति ॥२॥

How indeed would there be a decision of all attributes, viz. those beginning with *sākṣāt* 'directly perceptible' etc., while there is decision (only) of what is within all? [2]

The intention of what follows is to explain the significance of the various specifiers of the inner self to which a reference was made in the questions of both Uṣasta and Kahola.

अशनायाद्यतिक्रान्त्या प्रश्नार्थाविष्कृतिः कृता ।
न सम्यगिति मन्वाना गार्ग्यपृच्छदतः पुनः ॥३॥

Thinking that there was not sufficient clarification offered about what was asked in the question(s) by stating the transgression of hunger etc., Gārgī then asked a question again. [3]

क्षित्यादेर्वियदन्तस्य यावन्नैकात्म्यमुच्यते ।
निर्णीतार्थो न तावत्स्यात्प्रश्नः साक्षादिति रितः ॥४॥

So long as the oneness of the nature in respect of (this world), beginning with the earth and ending in the sky is not stated, the question (that was) stated in the words ... *sākṣāt* ... would not have been (finally) answered (lit. decided). [4]

The thought in this verse is clarified in the following verse.

बुभुक्षाद्येकदेहस्थनिषेधादनिषेधतः ।
क्षित्यादेर्वियदन्तस्य नातः प्रश्नार्थनिर्णयः ॥५॥

(That is to say:) From the negation (of the Ātman being) the world, beginning with the earth and ending with the sky, (and) from the negation of the desire for eating etc. (on the part of the inner self that is within a body), therefore, (it is said) that there is no decision about the matter under question. [5]

Now follows a statement that all the worlds, viz. from the earthly world to that of Brahman, are woven lengthwise and crosswise—this is in the manner of inference.

य एते पार्थिवा भावा लोष्टकुम्भादयो मताः ।
तेषामन्तर्बहिर्व्याप्तिः पृथिव्यैवैह लक्ष्यते ॥६॥

These things, which are known as made of earth, viz. a clod of clay, pitcher and others, are understood to have their pervasion by the earth within and without. [6]

This expresses the commonly known pervasion of all the *lokas* 'worlds' as being at the basis of the question by Gārgī.

यथैव पार्थिवा भावाः पृथिव्यैवं धरित्र्यपि ।

अद्विरन्तर्बहिश्चेयं व्याप्तैवेह समीक्ष्यते ॥७॥

As these earthly things are pervaded by the earth, so this earth also is pervaded by water both within and without—this is being considered here. [7]

एवं दृष्टं यतस्तस्माद्गार्गी प्रप्रच्छ लिङ्गतः ।
प्रश्नं यदिदमित्येवं याज्ञवल्क्यं महाधियम् ॥८॥
ओतप्रोतात्मना कार्यं येन येन समाप्लुतम् ।
तस्य तस्यान्यसंव्याप्तिर्दृष्टा लोके क्षितैर्यथा ॥९॥

Since this is so noticed, therefore, on the basis of (the method of) inference,¹ Gārgī asked Yājñavalkya of great intelligence² a question *yad idam* [8]
(for) it is noticed, as in the case of the earth, that there is pervasion of every effect by whichever (cause, lit. everyone of the causes) it (viz. effect) is pervaded (lit. covered) lengthwise and crosswise (i.e. fully).³ [9]

¹The word *linga* is used in this sense in the *Sāṃkhyakārikā*. Read SP on verse 9: *lingaśabditaṃ anumānam*.

²SP clarifies: *prṣṭaniṣṭānikanaśaktimattvaṃ mahādhītvam*.

³After explaining the meaning of this verse SP observes: *anyathā saktumuṣṭivad viśaraṇayāpatter ity arthaḥ*. This is based on BUB (p.443, line 11): *anyathā saktumuṣṭiviśīryeta*.

The form of inference (*linga* in the preceding verse) is stated in BUB (p.443, lines 12-13): *yat kāryam paricchinnaṃ sthūlaṃ kāraṇenāparichinnena sūkṣmeṇa vyāptam ity (anumānam) dr̥ṣṭam*.

This verse expects a statement about what pervades the earth; this is stated by the next verse.

अद्विश्चेयं क्षितिर्व्याप्ता तस्मात्तासामपीष्यते ।
अन्येन केनचिद्व्याप्तिर्व्यापकत्वाद्यथा भुवः ॥१०॥

And this earth is pervaded by the waters; therefore it is

accepted that there is pervasion of them also by yet some other thing, owing to its pervading capacity (as is noticed earlier) in the case of the earth. [10]

प्रत्युक्तिर्गार्गी वायावित्येवमेवोत्तरेष्वपि ।
वाक्येषु प्रतिपत्तव्या प्रत्युक्तिप्रश्नयोर्गतिः ॥११॥

The answer is: 'O Gārgī, it is in Vāyu (that the waters are woven lengthwise and crosswise or, in other words, pervaded). In the same way, again, it is to be understood in later sentences, in respect of the answer(s) to the question (put by Gārgī). [11]

पार्थिवाप्यौ समाश्रित्य तेजोऽभिव्यज्यते यतः ।
धातु न तु स्वतन्त्रं सन्नावदत्तेजसीत्यतः ॥१२॥

Since fire is revealed only after it has resorted to the two elements (*dhātū*) of earth and waters, therefore that (i.e. fire) not being independent, (Yājñavalkya) did not say (that the pervasion of the waters is) in fire. [12]

It is said in the Śruti: *agner āpah*. This should have invited Yājñavalkya's answer: 'The pervasion of the waters is by fire.' Yet, owing to its dependence on (pieces of) wood and lightning (which resides in, i.e. pervaded by, water, he referred to the pervasion of the waters by Vāyu).

सूक्ष्मताव्यापिते ज्ञेये भूम्यादेरुत्तरोत्तरम् ।
अक्षरात्मावसानानां पूर्वपूर्वप्रहाणतः ॥१३॥

Therefore, in respect of every object to be known as pervaded by subtlety, i.e. by every other more subtle object, among each subsequent object of knowledge, beginning with the earth etc. and ending with the imperishable Ātman, after every former (of the objects) is pervaded (lit. given up). [13]

आरम्भकबहुत्वाच्च बहूक्तिरिह गृह्यते ।
आत्मनोऽन्यद्यतः सर्वं पञ्चभूतात्मकं विदुः ॥१४॥

In the (statement of the question) mention is made of many objects, since there is plurality (or, maniness) of those which produce (other objects) and since all else than the Ātman have they known as comprised of five (great) elements. [14]

While concluding, SP (on this verse) quotes a line (from Bhartṛprapañca's comment?): *uktam hi na ca paramātmāno 'rvāk tadvyatirekeṇa vastvantaram astīti*.

द्वात्रिंशद्गुणितो मार्गो रथगत्या विवस्वतः ।
य उक्तस्तस्य संस्थित्या तस्थुरिन्द्रान्तदेवताः ॥१५॥

On the path of the sun, which has been stated as multiplied twelve times by the movement of its chariot, have the deities up to (their king) Indra remained,¹ owing to its steadiness.

[15]

¹Add: following the rule of pervasion.

स्थूलसूक्ष्मात्मना सर्वास्तारतम्येन संस्थिताः ।
व्याप्यव्यापितयान्योऽन्यं सर्वतःपरिमण्डलाः ॥१६॥

All (those deities) who have stayed in the gross and subtle form(s), (have remained there) in their mutual relation of the pervader and the pervaded (and) having everywhere the measure of an atom.¹

[16]

This refers to their atomic size; yet, when compared among themselves, the more gross atomic form of one is pervaded by the more subtle atomic form of another.

प्रजापतिर्विराडत्र योऽण्डस्यान्तर्व्यवस्थितः ।
ओतप्रोतानि तत्त्वानि तेन पूर्वाणि सर्वशः ॥१७॥

Here (i.e. among these deities), Prajāpati Virāj, who resides within this egg (of the universe), has woven lengthwise and crosswise all of the elements stated earlier. [17]

This distinguishes Prajāpati Virāj from all other deities since he is the pervader of all of them.

तस्योत्प्रोतभावोऽयं ब्रह्मलोकेषु भण्यते ।
अण्डारम्भकभूतानां ब्रह्मलोकाभिधेय्यते ॥१८॥

This nature (*bhāva*) of him (i.e. Prajāpati Virāj), i.e. as having woven lengthwise and crosswise (the entire universe) is (widely) spoken of in the Brahmalokas, (since) the name Brahmaloka is used (lit. accepted/desired as used) in respect of the elements which have been the producers of (*ārambhaka*) the egg (viz. the universe). [18]

तदेतल्लोकनिर्माणमोत्प्रोतात्मनोदितम् ।
अण्डान्तमेव व्याख्यातं किमन्यदवशिष्यते ॥१९॥

This is then (or thus) the creation of the worlds, viz. what ends in the egg, which is explained to be of the nature of what is woven lengthwise and crosswise (by Prajāpati Virāj); what else does there remain (to be mentioned)? [19]

समष्टिव्यष्टिभावेन वायुः सर्वाश्रयः पुरा ।
व्याख्यातो यः स वक्तव्यस्तदर्थः प्रश्न उत्तरः ॥२०॥

That Vāyu which was earlier¹ explained as the support of all, owing to its being their totality as well as each individual (i.e. all of the elements) has to be described and, therefore, there is the subsequent question (asked). [20]

¹This refers to the statements in Bhujyu's question and the answer to it.

ओताः प्रोताश्च कस्मिन् ब्रह्मलोका इतीर्यताम् ।
इति पृष्टोऽब्रवीद्गार्गि मातिप्राक्षीः कथं चन ॥२१॥

‘May this be told as to what it is in which are woven the Brahmaloka and others lengthwise and crosswise.’ Thus asked, (Yājñavalkya) said, ‘O Gārgī, in any way do not ask too much.’

[21]

मातीत्य प्रश्नविषयं गार्गि प्राक्षीः कथं चन ।
मा ते मूर्धा व्यपप्तेति त्वामहं वारयाम्यतः ॥२२॥

(This is to say:) ‘In no way, do you ask, O Gārgī, leaving aside (or setting aside the limit of) the line of question;¹ lest your head should fall² off, therefore, do I warn you’.

[22]

This clarifies Yājñavalkya’s reply yet further.

¹This refers to the reasonable range of queries.

²*vyapapta* is used by Sureśvara for the form *vyapaptat* — in BU.

उचितोऽस्या भवेत्प्रश्नो देवता येन पृच्छयते ।
वर्तते यस्तमुल्लङ्घ्य सोऽतिप्रश्नोऽनुमोच्यते ॥२३॥

(To explain it further:) The question would be reasonable only in that there is a query made about the deity. And (that question of hers) which transgresses the limit (of what is reasonable) is called too much of a question, viz. an inference.

[23]

That is to say, hereby is mentioned only an inference, which is the limit of argument.

या तमर्हति पूर्वोक्ता सातिप्रश्न्येह देवता ।
तदन्यत्वादिमां त्वाहुरनतिप्रश्न्यनामिकाम् ॥२४॥

That deity, which is stated earlier, deserves that (viz. the question to be asked). There the deity (mentioned) is one beyond reason and (now) this one (about which Gārgī asked), they have been described as a deity by name, 'Beyond question.'¹ [24]

¹That is, about whose name there cannot be put any question.

तामेतामनतिप्रश्न्यामतिप्रश्नेन साहसात् ।
पृच्छन्त्या मूर्धपातस्ते स्यादेव स्वापराधतः ॥२५॥

(Yājñavalkya meant:) Your head might fall off through your own fault (lit. offence), while you are asking so boldly (or, rashly) about this deity which is beyond question in your question (which is) beyond limit. [25]

स्थूलान्यनुमया युक्तं प्रष्टुं तत्त्वानि कामतः ।
इयं तु न तथा स्थूला यां त्वं पृच्छसि देवताम् ॥२६॥

(This is to say:) It is reasonable to put a question at will (only) about the elements in general (lit. that are gross) and which are (known by) inference, but this deity about which you are asking is not similarly (or in any way) gross. [26]

अचिन्त्या चाप्रतर्क्या च प्राणभावेन च स्थिता ।
नातोऽन्येन प्रमाणेन प्रष्टव्या देवतागमात् ॥२७॥

(That deity) is beyond thought, beyond reasoning and has remained there as life (of everything). Therefore, that deity should not be sought (lit. questioned about) by any other means than by tradition.¹ [27]

¹That is, Upaniṣadic thought.

एतस्मादेव हेतोस्तां तर्कशास्त्रेषु तार्किकाः ।

नैवानुमिन्वते त्रासात्पृथिव्यादीन्यथा तथा ॥२८॥

For this very reason, Logicians do not (seek to) infer that (deity), (only) though fear,¹ as they do here and there, in the case of the earth etc. [28]

¹Namely, that their head might fall off.

प्राणोऽयमनिर्वक्तो हि कस्तं निर्वक्तुमर्हति ।
मानान्तरेणागमतो मा प्राक्षीरित्यतो वचः ॥२९॥

Since this *prāṇa* 'life of all deities' is not (i.e. cannot be) described, who indeed can describe that by any means other than mere Tradition? Therefore are uttered the words (of Yājñavalkya), 'Do not ask (beyond limit)'. [29]

इति श्रीबृहदारण्यकोपनिषद्भाष्यवार्तिके तृतीयाध्यायस्य
षष्ठं ब्राह्मणम् ॥६॥



BRHADĀRANYAKOPANIṢAD-
BHĀṢYA-VĀRTIKA

3.7

Antaryāmi Brāhmaṇa

यत्पिपृच्छिषितं गार्ग्या समष्टिव्यष्टिलक्षणम् ।
लिङ्गेनोद्दालकः सूत्रं तदपृच्छदथागमात् ॥१॥

Whatever, viz. that which was characterized as totality and severality, was sought by Gārgī, by means of inference, through her question, now, Uddālaka asked that (same), about Sūtra as is conveyed by tradition. [1]

तथा च तन्नियन्तारं जगज्जन्मादिकारणम् ।
आगमाद्गौतमोऽप्राक्षीद्याज्ञवल्क्यमुदारधीः ॥२॥

So also did Gautama, of great intellect (*udāradhī*), asked of Yājñavalkya about the controller of that (universe), the cause of the origin etc. of the universe, as (coming or known) from tradition. [2]

सूत्राद्यागमसंप्राप्तिं सोऽथाख्यानैकवर्त्मना ।
व्याचख्यौ गौतमः साक्षाद्गन्धर्वाल्लब्धवानिति ॥३॥

Gautama explained (to Yājñavalkya), in the form of a narrative, what he learnt as tradition about Sūtra etc., saying that he had learnt it directly from a Gandharva. [3]

Sureśvara avoids the details of the narrative. He dwells only on those points from the narrative which are relevant upon the query.

ब्रह्मेह परमात्मोक्तो लोका भूरादयस्तथा ।

देवास्त्वग्न्यादयो ज्ञेया वेदाश्चैव प्रसिद्धितः ॥४॥

In this (context), the Brahman is said to be the highest Ātman and the *lokas* as *bhū* 'earth' and others, and the deities again (*tu*) are to be known in Agni and others. Further, the Vedas are (to be known) from traditional knowledge (*prasiddhi*). [4]

ब्रह्मादीनि च भूतानि ग्रथितान्यक्षसूत्रवत् ।
सूत्रेण ध्रियमाणानि सदैवेशयतानि च ॥५॥

The elements, beginning with the Brahman, are woven together by Sūtra, as in a wreath of beads, ever held fast¹ and controlled by the Lord (i.e. Sūtra). [5]

¹That is, they are sustained or supported.

सूत्रेण विधृतं चान्तर्यामिणा संयतं तथा ।
आत्मानं वेद भोक्तारं वेद सर्वं जगत्तथा ॥६॥

Also he knew the entire universe as supported by Sūtra, controlled by (him), the inner controller. Also he knew the Ātman, the enjoyer. [6]

सूत्रान्तर्यामिरूपेण यो वेदैतान्पुरोदितान् ।
स एव ब्रह्मलोकान्तान्वेदेत्येषोऽस्य संग्रहः ॥७॥

This is in brief (the thought) of this:¹ Being in (i.e. having) the form (or, nature) of Sūtra, he knew all these that are described before—he alone knew the worlds up to (lit. ending in) the Brahmaloka. [7]

¹That is, the Upaniṣadic passage: *sa brahmavit ... sa sarvavit*.

अभ्यन्तरतमं सूत्रं ब्रह्मलोकावधेरपि ।
सूक्ष्मं हि तदतीवोक्तं सर्वसत्त्वसमाश्रयम् ॥८॥

Sūtra is the nearest within and is subtler (than all universe) up to (i.e. ending in the Brahmaloka, and it is extremely subtle and is said to be the resort of all beings. [8]

The basis of the thought in the preceding verse is stated now.

Now verses 9-24 are the exposition of BU 3.7.2.

Verses 9-24 explain the meaning of Vāyu read in BU words vāyur vaigautama

सर्वसाधारणं कर्म यदभिव्यक्तमिष्यते ।
वाय्वात्मना परिच्छिन्नं तदास्ते कारणात्मनि ॥९॥

Whatever is accepted as the clearly visible common activity is pervaded by what is of the nature of Vāyu; and that (activity) rests on its cause, viz. the Ātman (=Sūtrātman). [9]

नात्मानं लभते कर्म यतोऽसंश्रित्य साधनम् ।
वाय्वाश्रितमतः कर्म स्वरूपं प्रतिपद्यते ॥१०॥

Since an activity does not come into existence (i.e. get performed), unless it has rested (i.e. depended) on a means, therefore, any activity only resting on Vāyu becomes what it is. [10]

Read SP: *na hi spandasyādhāraṇam prāṇād ṛte kāraṇam asti tadviśeṣaṇam arthavad ity arthaḥ.*

साधारणस्य यो वायुर्विशिष्टस्य च धारकः ।
समष्टिव्यष्टिभावेन कर्मणः सर्वदेष्यते ॥११॥
तं वायुं तच्च कर्मैह य उपेत्य व्यवस्थितः ।
वायुकर्माभिमानी सन्पुमान्वायुः स उच्यते ॥१२॥

That Vāyu, which is the supporter of an activity, whether common and particular, is ever accepted in the form of totality and severality. [11]

Whoever stands resting on that Vāyu and that activity (of it), being aware that he is doing the activity resting on Vāyu, is the person (lit. a man), viz. Vāyu. [12]

That is the inner sentience (Jīva) which is, in fact, a form of Vāyu, viz. Sūtra. Jīva is here the effect of Sūtra's action, his nature of performance of sacrifice etc.

स एष वायुः सत्रात्मा देवः सर्वाश्रयः प्रभुः ।
देवतालिङ्गकर्मादि सर्वमत्रैव संश्रितम् ॥१३॥

This is (then) that Vāyu of the nature of Sūtra, the divine support of all and the lord, (and) all has rested on this, viz. the deities, the subtle body,¹ the activity etc.² [13]

This explains the word *sūtra* in the words of BU *tat sūtram*

....

¹This is for *liṅga*.

²The word *ādi* refers to *apūrvā* 'result of ritual activity'.

अनेन विधृतं जन्म वायुनेदं शरीरकम् ।
यच्चोत्पित्सु परं जन्म धृतं तदपि वायुना ॥१४॥

By this Vāyu is supported the origin (of any being), this body (and) that later life, which is about to originate is also supported by Vāyu. [14]

विष्टम्भकं पृथिव्यादेः सूक्ष्ममाकाशवत्स्थितम् ।
यदात्मकमिदं लिङ्गं यत्सप्तदशमुच्यते ॥१५॥

This (subtle) body,¹ which remains as the support of the elements, viz. the earth and others, and has remained subtle like the sky, is described as made up of seventeen.² [15]

¹This is *liṅga* noted in verse 13 above.

²The word *saptadaśa* means *saptadaśaka*, i.e. made up of

seventeen, viz. the ten organs, the five elements, *antahkaraṇa* (viz. *manas*, *buddhi*, *ahaṅkāra* and *cit*) and *prāṇa*.

यस्यावहादयो भेदाः सागरस्योर्मयो यथा ।
वासनानां च सर्वामाश्रयो यस्तु कथ्यते ॥१६॥

That Vāyu is mentioned here as one, whose various forms, viz. *āvaha* and others,¹ are like various waves of the ocean, and who is the support of all impressions.² [16]

¹They are *pravaha*, *nivaha*, *saṁvaha*, *udvaha*.

²Thus there is once again a reference to Sūtra who in the form of Vāyu is the support of all being.

यत एवमयं लोकः परश्चायं च सर्वतः ।
भूतानि चैव सर्वाणि वायुना ग्रथितान्यतः ॥१७॥

Since this is so, therefore, this world and the yonder world as also the elements are woven (lit. tied) together by Vāyu. [17]

This explains the meaning of BU words *vāyunā hi ... sandrbdhāni bhavanti*.

तस्यापसर्पणेऽङ्गानि नालं स्युः कर्मणे मृतौ ।
इत्यर्थे लोकसंसिद्धां प्रसिद्धिं श्रुतिरब्रवीत् ॥१८॥
वायुनैव धृताङ्गानीत्यत्र लोकेऽपि विद्यते ।
प्रसिद्धिरिति तामाह तस्मादित्येवमादिना ॥१९॥

When this Vāyu recedes (i.e. goes away from a body) at the time of death, various parts do not remain capable of doing any activity. To convey this popularly known matter, the Śruti has stated here (that known fact). [18]

Even in popular life the fact is known that the organs (of a body) are supported by only Vāyu; therefore has the Śruti stated the same in the words beginning with *tasmāt* [19]

वायुनैव धृतं यस्माल्लिलङ्गदेहादिकं ततः ।
ज्ञातयः पुरुषं प्रेतमाहुः कार्यं मृतेरिदम् ॥२०॥

Since the subtle body and others are supported only by Vāyu, therefore do the relatives of a man say about the departed one (*preta*)¹ as the effect of death. [20]

This explains the meaning of *tasmād vai gautama ...* in BU.

¹In common parlance *preta* refers to one (spirit) departed from a dead body; here it refers to the subtle form of a human being after death, i.e. departure from the body.

यथास्याङ्गानि लक्ष्यन्ते विस्रस्तानि न पूर्ववत् ।
मृतमेनं तथा मन्ये नेदृक्चिह्नं मृतिं विना ॥२१॥

As the dissipated organs of this one are not visible (lit. seen) as before, therefore, I think,¹ this one (they call) dead, because there cannot be such an appearance (lit. sign) except when there has occurred death. [21]

¹Sureśvara has used the first person singular form *manye*, but that is to be understood as *manyate* (third person singular form) 'people think so'—this is indicated by '(they call)'.

वायुनैव यथाङ्गानि संदृब्धानि यदा तदा ।
कर्मण्यानि भवन्त्यस्य न तु तानि तथा यतः ॥२२॥
तस्मात्प्रवसितप्राणो मृतोऽयं नात्र संशयः ।
यथोक्तसूत्रसद्भावे प्रसिद्धिर्गौतमेदृशी ॥२३॥

Since, when these organs (of a human being) are well bound together by only Vāyu, then, therefore, they do not remain capable (or, they) become incapable, of performing activities;¹ but, in the case of this one who is dead, those (organs) are not likewise. [22]

Therefore, this dead man is indeed one from whom Prāṇa

(i.e. Vāyu) has departed; there is no doubt about this. Such, O Gārgī, is the known fact regarding his becoming Sūtra, as stated before. [23]

This is the description of a dead body.

¹*karmanya* is derived from *karman* by the addition of the suffix *-yat* according to Pāṇini's rule 4.4.98: *tatra sādhu*.

सम्यगुक्तमिदं सूत्रं याज्ञवल्क्य यथा तथा ।
तदन्तर्गतमात्मानं ब्रह्मन्तर्यामिणं मम ॥२४॥

As, O Yājñavalkya, this is well explained in the same way, tell me, about that inner controller, viz. the Ātman within (me). [24]

This is an exposition of the words *evam eva* ... in BU.

Verses 25-47 are the exposition on the inner controller.
This is the exposition of BU 3.7.3.

सूत्रादप्यन्तरतमस्त्वन्तर्याम्यधुनोच्यते ।
कार्यकारणभावोऽयं यस्मिन्नुक्ते समाप्यते ॥२५॥

And (*tu*) now is being explained the inner controller who is yet more near (or, within) than Sūtra and in whose being described this (known) cause and effect relation becomes complete (i.e. completely explained). [25]

This explains the purport of *yaḥ prthivyām*

तिष्ठन्पृथिव्यां योऽत्र स्यात्सोऽन्तर्यामीति गृह्यताम् ।
इत्युक्तावतिसंव्याप्तिप्रसक्तावुत्तरं वचः ॥२६॥
अन्तरो यः पृथिव्याः स्यात्क्षितेरभ्यन्तरो हि यः ॥२७॥

Let it be understood here that that one is the inner controller who is abiding in the earth.... (Yet, for fear of making too

wide a statement there now follows the subsequent statement (of the Śruti).¹ [26]

The Śruti state '(The inner controller is he) who is within the earth' means '(It is he) who is the innermost within the earth.'² [27]

¹This seeks to avoid the feeling that all those who abide in the earth are like that inner controller. It can be taken as a parenthesis.

²This refers to the elemental/material earth.

पृथिवी देवता तर्हि त्वदुक्तार्थसमन्वयात् ।
इति दोषापनुत्त्यर्थं यं न वेदेति भण्यते ॥२८॥

Then, in order to avoid the following blame (being given to Yājñavalkya), viz. 'From well construing together your words (it would mean:) 'The earth is a deity,' the sage says, '(It is he) whom (the earth) does not know.' [28]

¹Sureśvara uses *prthivī* for divine deity and *kṣiti* for material earth.

सूत्रेण ध्रियमाणेयं महाभूतशरीरिणी ।
अहमस्मि पृथिव्येका बिभर्मि जगदव्ययम् ।
इत्येवमभिमाना या नान्तर्यामीति सोच्यते ॥२९॥

This earth, having the body made up of great element, is supported by Sūtra. The one who has the ego, 'I, the earth, alone support the world ever', is not called the inner controller. [29]

¹*avyayam* is an adverb, modifying the verb *bibharmi*; (it does not get connected with *jagat* as its adjective).

पृथिव्यपि च यं देवं न वेद स्वात्मनि स्थितम् ।
सोऽन्तर्यामीति मन्तव्यो न त्वयं देवता क्षितिः ॥३०॥

Let that be known as inner controller, the god whom even the earth did not know as dwelling within itself. And this earth is not to be taken as a deity. [30]

This explains the thought of verse 29.

क्षितौ करणवत्यां किमन्योऽपि करणादिमान् ।
नैवं यतः पृथिव्येव शरीरं यस्य नापरम् ॥३१॥

(A question is asked:) 'Is there anyone else, being possessed of limbs etc., within the earth which also is possessed of various means of activity?' (The answer is:) 'No, it is not so, since the earth itself is the body (of that one),¹ i.e. who does not have any other (body). [31]

¹This refers to the inner controller.

क्षमाकार्यकरणेनैव कार्यवान्करणी च यः ।
न कार्यं करणं चास्य किञ्चिदात्मीयमिष्यते ॥३२॥

(The inner controller is he) by the very producing the effect(s) of the earth is (said to be) having produced the effects (of the same) and as having organs (for himself). But, there is not (really) accepted of this one any activity and the means of achieving it as his own. [32]

अन्तर्यामी परः साक्षादशरीरोऽगुणोऽद्वयः ।
विलक्षणोऽतो विज्ञेयः पृथिवीदेवतात्मनः ॥३३॥

The inner controller is to be known as the one, who is directly perceptible, bodiless, propertiless, one without duality and of a different nature from that who is having the nature of the deity within the earth. [33]

स्वकार्यभूतां तामेव पृथिवीं मोहवर्त्मना ।

तत्र लब्धविशेषः संस्तामेवायं नियच्छति ॥३४॥

This one having acquired a particular (appearance) there (in that earth), controls that very earth which has been his own effect owing to the ignorance (about the nature of itself).

[34]

अदाहकोऽपि वह्निः सन्दाह्यद्रव्यसमाश्रयात् ।

तत्र लब्धात्मकस्तस्य दग्धा दाह्यस्य न स्वतः ॥३५॥

यथा ज्ञातैवमेवात्मा देवताद्यात्मकार्यगः ।

देवतादिशरीराद्यैर्देवतादीन्त्रियच्छति ॥३६॥

As fire, being one that does not burn while it is residing in the material to be burnt,¹ becomes one that burns what is to be burnt,² when it has obtained its form²—and not on its own;

[35]

in the same way, the Ātman, who is the knower while it is residing in deities and others who are its own products, controls the deities and others by means of the bodies etc. of those deities and others.

[36]

¹This is wood/faggot.

²Or, when it is produced/enkindled.

स्वतस्त्वकरणोऽदेहो निर्गुणोऽभेद एव च ।

चिदाभासस्वमोहोत्थकार्यैस्तद्वानिवेक्ष्यते ॥३७॥

(That one) who is by nature devoid of any organ and/or a body, who is devoid of any property and, who is without any differentiation (in itself), having the appearance of sentience becomes visible as having them viz. the effect arising from its ignorance, on account of the effect.

[37]

चतुर्धा प्रविभज्यैनं सात्वताः पर्युपासते ।

तथा हैरण्यगर्भीयास्तथा पाशुपतादयः ॥३८॥

This one do the Sāttvatas worship after having divided him into four parts, similarly (do the) worshipers of Hiranyagarbha and similarly, the Pāsupatas and others.¹ [38]

They are the followers of the Pañcarātra school who have posited a fourfold appearance of reality, viz. Vāsudeva, Saṅkarṣaṇa, Pradyumna and Aniruddha. This is supported by SP by quoting:

param brahma param dhāma caturātmakam avyayam //
prīṇayed vāsudevaṁ ca mūrtitrayasamanvitam //

also from another:

yā vai sarveśvarī śaktir īśvarākhyā niyāmikā //
jñānādibhedabhinnena ādyena caturātmanā //
(*Pauṣkarasaṁhitā* p.36, line 260, Melkoṭe: 1934)

and yet another:

antaryāmī ca sarveśaṁ devānām puruṣottamaḥ //
(*Pauṣkarasaṁhitā* p.36, line 258)

SP quotes verses in support of the Pāsupata or Māheśvara view:

nirañjane pare vyomni nityasthaḥ kārāṇo 'vyayaḥ //
sāñjanam śaktikarāṇair adhitiṣṭhati śaṅkarah //
sthitau sa kārakānetān samākranya svatejasā //
yunakti svārthasiddhyartham bhūtair anabhilakṣitaḥ //
(*Mrgendratānta* 1.4.1-2)

¹This refers to all the Seśvaravādins. The followers of Hiranyagarbha are understood by SP as the followers of Yoga school by NKL; it specifically understands them as such: cf. the quotation (constructed together from the citations in the two commentaries thus:) *uktam hi praṇidhānād vā kleśakarmavipākāśair aparā—mr̥ṣṭaḥ puruṣaviśeṣa īśvaras tatra niratiśayaṁ sarvajñabījaṁ sa pūrveśān api guruḥ.*

NKL also adds the thinkers who hold Him as the all-knowing maker of the universe.

कृष्णद्वैपायनो व्यासो वेदात्मा ध्वान्तहानिकृत् ।
प्राहेममेव बहुशः प्राणिनां हितकाम्यया ॥३९॥
नारायणः परोऽव्यक्तादण्डमव्यक्तसंभवम् ।

अण्डस्यान्तस्त्वमे लोकाः सप्तद्वीपा च मेदिनी ॥४०॥

Vyāsa, Kṛṣṇadvaipāyana, the knower of the very soul of the Veda, the remover of ignorance (lit. the destroyer of darkness) has said on many occasions, with a desire of doing good (about) only this one to human beings. [39]

"I am Nārāyaṇa beyond the invisible and this egg, which has come from (that) invisible, and these *lokas* and the world comprising seven islands are within that egg." [40]

The first line of verse 40 with a slight alteration, i.e. *avyaktadaham* instead of *avyaktāt*, is from *Mahābhārata* 2.App.I. 21.253; *Brahmāṇḍapurāṇa* 1.5.109, and the second line is from *Vāyupurāṇa* 1.50.79; *Brahmāṇḍapurāṇa* 1.21.21.

तस्मै नमोऽस्तु देवाय निर्गुणाय गुणात्मने ।
नारायणाय विश्वाय देवानां परमात्मने ॥४१॥
एतमेव समुद्दिश्य मन्त्रो नारायणस्तथा ।
वेदविद्भिर्महाप्राज्ञैः पुरुषैर्विनियुज्यते ॥४२॥

To that one (is offered) my obeisance, to that god, to the one without any property of (*Prakṛti*), who is the very essence of property, to Nārāyaṇa, to Viśva, the highest god of gods. [41]

It is with the intention of addressing this very god that the highly intelligent knowers of the Veda have have thought of (lit. have employed) the Mantra, viz. Nārāyaṇa [42]

The word *nārāyaṇa* indicates the god of thousand heads etc. as described in the Vedic Mantra:

sahasraśīrṣaṃ devaṃ viśvākṣaṃ viśvaśambhuvam /
viśvaṃ nārāyaṇaṃ devaṃ akṣaram paramam padam //
(*Taittirīya Āraṇyaka* 10.13.28)

प्रत्यग्ध्वान्तं चिदाभासं स्वकार्यनियमात्मकम् ।
तदुपाधिर्नियन्तैष परः प्रोक्तो न तु स्वतः ॥४३॥

(They have called him) as having the nature of the control (i.e. the controller) of his own effects, (viz. with reference to) the darkness (i.e. ignorance) about the inner self (and also) the appearance of sentience—(however) he is having them as his limiting adjuncts, he is called the highest controller, but not because of (his) own nature. [43]

The verse is very cryptic!

सर्वज्ञः सर्वशक्तिश्च सर्वात्मा सर्वगो ध्रुवः ।
जगज्जनिस्थितिध्वंसहेतुरेष सदेश्वरः ॥४४॥

This is the Lord who is ever omniscient, omnipotent, the self of all, omnipresent, immovable, the cause of the origin, sustenance and merger of the universe. [44]

स एषोऽभ्यन्तरो देवः सर्वकारणकारणः ।
नियच्छति क्षितिं देवीं सर्वावस्थासु सर्वदा ॥४५॥

This one is the god within (every body), the cause of all causes; he controls the earth and divine goddess (within it) and also in all its states (or conditions). [45]

This is the meaning of *eṣa ta ātmā* in BU.

The other paryāyas in the BU 3.7.4-13 are to be taken as explicable in the same way. There is now reference to BU 3.7.14ff.

तेजःसामान्यमात्रं स्यात्तदधिष्ठातृदेवता ।
एवं तमस्यपि ज्ञेयं क्षेत्रज्ञश्चात्मसंज्ञितः ॥४६॥

Similarly, Light is merely the common fire, the deity superintending over it. Thus it should be known in the case of the word *tamas* also; and the knower of the field is (to be understood as) mentioned by the word *ātman*.¹ [46]

This explains the words *yas tejasi ...* in BU. Here in this verse *tejas* and *tamas* are used in contrast.

¹This refers to the Mādhyandina reading *ya ātmani tiṣṭhan ...* where the word *ātman* refers to *jīva* and therefore the word *kṣetrajña* is introduced.

देवतास्थानकरणत्रयं प्राणगिरोच्यते ।
नियच्छति यतो गन्धे त्रयमप्येतदीश्वरः ॥४७॥

In the word *prāṇa*¹ are described the three, viz. the deities, the bases (i.e. abodes) of the deities (organs) and the organs, since the Lord controls all these three,² even in *gandha*.³

[47]

This explains what is meant by *prāṇa* in the words *yaḥ prāṇe tiṣṭhan* (in BU 3.7.16). And also *yo vāci* (in BU 3.7.17).

¹This refers to the sense of smell.

²This refers to *devatā*, *sthāna* and *karāṇa* stated in the first part of the verse.

³This refers to smell grasped by the organ of smell, mentioned by the word *prāṇa*. But it indicates the feeling of touch, form, taste.

Verses 48-60 are the exposition of the *śruti adṛṣṭo 'draṣṭā ...* (in BU 3.7.23).

पृथिवी यं न वेदेति यदुक्तं तस्य निर्णयः ।
अदृष्टोऽश्रुत इत्युक्त्या क्रियते ज्ञानशुद्धये ॥४८॥

There is now a decision regarding what was stated in *prthivī yaṁ na veda* by the statement *adṛṣṭo 'śrutah ...*; this is done for the sake of clarification of the knowledge (on the part of one).

[48]

द्रष्टृदर्शनदृश्यानां प्रत्यग्दृष्टिसमीक्षणे ।

जाड्यपारार्थ्यहेतुभ्यां शक्तिर्नास्ति मनागपि ॥४९॥

There is not even a little of capacity (i.e. meaningfulness) in the seer, the means of seeing¹ and the objects of seeing with respect to seeing well the inner self on account of the causes (which are marked by their) grossness and subservience.

[49]

This explains why the individual controller is not like the inner self as the agent of various activities.

¹*darśana* is from verb root *drś* by Pāṇini's rule 3.3.117: *karaṇādhikaraṇayoś ca*.

न द्रष्ट्रोर्दृश्ययोर्नापि तथा दर्शनयोर्मिथः ।

ग्राह्यग्राहकसंबन्धस्तत्साक्षी न च वीक्ष्यते ॥५०॥

In the two seers, the two objects of seeing and also in the two acts of seeing, there does not obtain (any) mutual relation as that of what is grasped and one who grasps;¹ the witness of all that is not seen.²

[50]

¹This refers to the (worldly) seer and the inner self which is really the seer etc., owing to *avidyā* 'ignorance'.

²This refers to the inner self which is not affected by *avidyā* and is, therefore, the witness.

रूपादिदर्शनान्तस्थ आगमापायसाक्ष्यसौ ।

नित्यात्मदृष्टिश्चिन्मात्रः पश्येत्तं पृथिवी कथम् ॥५१॥

The one who resides within the seer¹ of the forms etc. and the witness of the coming into existence and the departure from existence of objects is the sentience alone who ever has the consciousness of the eternal self. How then would the earth be able to see that?

[51]

Earlier it was mentioned that the inner controller resides within

the earth etc., that is to say, it is present even in the deities who have their abodes in them. Yet, while the deities can see various organs and activities and what is to be seen by them, it (viz. the inner controller), though within all of them, can never be seen by them.

¹*darśana* in this sense is according to Pāṇini's rule 3.3.115: *kdr̥tyalyuṭo bahulam*.

मागोचरातिवर्तित्वादसाधारणदृष्टितः ।
द्रष्टुरन्यस्य चाभावान्न तं पश्यन्ति देवताः ॥५२॥

Owing to its being beyond the objects of knowledge and owing also to having uncommon (capacity of) seeing, and also thanks to the absence of any other seer, the deities (of the organs) cannot (i.e. do not) see it. [52]

This explains the thought in the preceding verse.

दृष्टेर्द्रष्टारमित्यत्र यः साक्षी प्रागुदाहृतः ।
अन्तर्यामीति सोऽत्रापि नातोऽन्योऽस्तीति भण्यते ॥५३॥

The words *nāto 'nyo 'sti* are stated to point out that the witness here, who was earlier mentioned in the words *dr̥ṣṭer draṣṭā* ... is mentioned here also as the inner controller. [53]

बुद्ध्यन्तः पर एवात्मा विज्ञानात्मेति भण्यते ।
बुद्ध्यागमापायसाक्षी नियन्तैवोच्यते परः ॥५४॥

It is (only) the highest Ātman, who is within intellect, and (also) is stated as the knowing self (*vijñānātman*). The highest (Ātman) is called the controller (and) the witness of the coming into existence and departure from existence. [54]

अव्यावृत्ताननुगतः पूर्णः स्वात्मन्यवस्थितः ।
संसारहेत्वसंबन्धः सर्वो ब्रह्मेति भण्यते ॥५५॥

That one (viz. the inner controller) who is not distinguished from anything else and not similar to anything else and complete (in itself) is residing in one's self and, though having no relation whatever to what causes transmigration, is stated as the Brahman. [55]

कार्यकारणरूपस्य संसारस्य मृषात्मनः ।
अपूर्वानपरानन्ततत्त्वं ब्रह्मैव वाक्यतः ॥५६॥

Indeed, it should be known from (the Śruti) statement that it is the Brahman alone which is the reality, viz. *apūrva*, *anapara*, *anantara*, of this transmigratory existence which has the nature of the form of effects and their cause and (consequently) unreality. [56]

पृथिव्यादेश्च द्रष्टृत्वं तथान्तर्यामिणः श्रुतम् ।
द्रष्टृभेदः प्रसक्तोऽतो नान्योऽतोऽस्तीति भण्यते ॥५७॥

It is so heard (from the Śruti) that the inner controller has the capacity to see (the objects) such as the earth; therefore, there follows the contingency that there is distinction of the seer (from the object seen). For this reason, it is said (in the Śruti) *nānyo 'to 'sti*. [57]

एष एवैकलो द्रष्टा कारकादिविवर्जितः ।
संभाव्यते तदज्ञानकार्यमात्रस्तमस्विभिः ॥५८॥

Just this one is the single seer, who is devoid of all instruments etc. related to activity and is yet grasped (in this world as the seer etc.) by those who are overpowered by mere darkness which is the effect of ignorance about the nature of it. [58]

मां प्रत्येवैतीह यथासाधारण्येन भास्करम् ।
संभावयन्ति द्रष्टारस्तथाज्ञास्तदबोधजैः ॥५९॥

As they, i.e. those who see, find (i.e. consider) the sun as

‘This one is coming to me (alone),’ i.e. in an uncommon way; so also do the ignorant (think) about that (inner self by such means as are) caused by ignorance about it. [59]

दृष्टिरेकैव सर्वत्र सर्वानात्मविलक्षणा ।
आभाति बहुधैवेयं तदविद्योत्थहेतुभिः ॥६०॥

Thus, there appears the varied act of seeing (which is in reality only) one but everywhere different in nature in all non-Ātmans on account of the causes which have arisen from ignorance (about the true nature) of it. [60]

इति श्रीबृहदारण्यकोपनिषद्भाष्यवार्तिके तृतीयाध्यायस्य
सप्तमं ब्राह्मणम् ॥७॥

BRHADĀRANYAKOPANIṢAD-
BHĀṢYA-VĀRTIKA

3.8

Akṣara Brāhmaṇa

Verses 1-3 state the topic of Sūtra 'the inner controller' in connection with BU 3.7. This incidentally relates to BU 3.8.1-2.

अशनायादिनिर्मुक्तं साक्षादित्यादिलक्षणम् ।
अतोऽक्षरं प्रवक्तव्यं निरुपाध्यात्मनि स्थितम् ॥१॥

(It is stated in the earlier Brāhmaṇa, that the inner controller and Sūtra) is devoid of hunger etc. and is characterized by properties such as directly perceptible etc. Therefore, now is to be revealed (i.e. explained) (that one) as imperishable and existing in the individual self, as having no limiting adjunct whatsoever. [1]

यदुद्दिश्य प्रवृत्तैषा व्याख्या सर्वान्तरं प्रति ।
तदक्षरं प्रवक्तव्यमित्यर्थेषोत्तरा श्रुतिः ॥२॥

The subsequent (portion of the) Śruti has proceeded for the purpose of revealing the imperishable with reference to which was this explanation offered as to what obtains in everyone (lit. all). [2]

गौतमेन पुरा पृष्टे सूत्रान्तर्यामिवस्तुनी ।
ओतप्रोतात्मतां गार्गी तयोरेवान्वपृच्छत ॥३॥

Earlier, Gautama asked questions about two things, viz. Sūtra and the inner controller. (And) Gārgī (now) asked about them, having the nature of the pervader, i.e. the one who has woven them lengthwise and crosswise. [3]

There now follows in verses 4-12 the exposition of BU 3.8.3 which answer the question about the basis of this world together with Sūtra. This, there is an answer to Gārgī's first question: *yad ūrdhvaṃ yājñavalkya divo yad arvāk pṛthvyāḥ yad antarā dyāvāpṛthivī ime yad bhūtaṃ ca bhavac ca bhaviṣyac cety ācakṣate.*

दिवो यदूर्ध्वं वस्तु स्यात्सद्वासद्वा विशेषितम् ।
अर्वाग्यच्च कपालात्स्यान्मध्ये यच्च कपालयोः ॥४॥

(In what is woven lengthwise and crosswise) the thing which is above heaven, which is distinguished as existent and non-existent and which is below the shell (in the form of earth) and whatever (exists) between two potsherds (in the form of both heaven and earth)? [4]

ऊर्ध्वं दिवः कपालाद्यदधो यच्चाधरात्पुटात् ।
यस्य मध्ये कपाले ते यच्च भूतादिलक्षणम् ॥५॥

Namely that which is above the shell (in the form of heaven) and that which is below the other shell (*puta*) and also that which is between the two shells characterized as what has been there etc. [5]

In verses 6-7, Sureśvara explains *bhūtādi* in BU 3.8.5 which he thinks is not stated (i.e. *anukta*) in BUB.

पदार्थगतिमेवं वा व्याचक्षीताविरोधतः ।
भूतं यत्समतिक्रान्तं भवद्यदधुनातनम् ॥६॥
भविष्यच्च यदागामि नातीतं नापि वर्तते ।
इत्याचक्षत इत्युक्त्यानुमादोषोऽपनुद्यते ॥७॥

Or rather, one should explain the nature of the final becoming (or, end) of the things in such a way as not to involve opposition (to the Śruti).¹ (To explain) *bhūta* 'what was' is 'what has already gone (i.e. occurred before)' and *bhavat* 'being'

is what belongs to the present.

[6]

Also *bhaviṣyat* 'what will be' is what will come into being and *atīta* 'what has never occurred before' and is not at present occurring. In the phrase *ity ācakṣate* (the Śruti) has set aside any (possible) fault in the description.

[7]

These verses justify the argument in the preceding verse.

¹Sureśvara has said *avirodhataḥ* with a view to stating (in the words of SP) the following: *bhāṣyānukto 'pi padārtho vākya-rthāvirodhitvād dr̥śyate cen na kṣatiḥ*.

एतदेवंविधं सूत्रमागमज्ञाः प्रचक्षते ।

ओतं प्रोतं च तत्कस्मिन्निति पृष्टो ब्रवीहि मे ॥८॥

"Thus have the knowers of tradition mentioned Sūtra of this nature. Now tell me, (O Yājñavalkya,) since you are asked, in what is (Sūtra) woven them lengthwise and crosswise?"

[8]

सूत्रे तावदिदं सर्वमोतं च प्रोतमेव च ।

वर्तमाने जगत्काल इति तावत्सुनिश्चितम् ॥९॥

To begin with, it is well decided that, all this world is woven lengthwise and crosswise in Sūtrātman (at the present time).

[9]

NKL offers this explanation: *vyāśraṁsiṣata* (corrected word from BU 3.7.2) *ity uktatvāt vāyau sadbuddhidarśanāt sūtrosyāpi tadāśrayatvaṁ vartamānakāle siddham*.

जगच्चाप्यनभिव्यक्तमाविर्भवति सांप्रतम् ।

व्यक्तिश्चेयं सतो युक्ता नासतो घटते यतः ॥१०॥

So also, the world that is (yet) unmanifest will soon be appearing and further this manifestation is reasonably accepted as from the existent, because it would not be possible (to occur at the moment) out of what is non-existent.

[10]

अभिव्यक्तं च सदिदं पुनरव्यक्ततामितम् ।
वायुना विधृतं तस्य रूपं यद्वार्तमानिकम् ॥११॥

This existent (world), which is manifest and will once again become unmanifest, has its own form supported by Vāyu,¹ viz. that is its present form. [11]

¹This refers to that which is equated to Sūtra as seen earlier.

अतीतानागतयोस्तु कालयोर्जगदात्मनः ।
सत्ता येनात्मना कस्मिन्नोता प्रोतेति भण्यताम् ॥१२॥

And (therefore), of whatever nature be the existence of it (world) in the past and the future periods of time, let that be told in what that is woven lengthwise and crosswise. [12]

*Now follows in verses 13-22 the exposition of BU 3.8.4.
The exposition that the ether forms the support of the world etc.*

प्रत्युच्चार्याथ गार्ग्योक्तमाकाशे प्राब्रवीदृषिः ।
ओतप्रोतकतां वायोर्जगतोऽसौ प्रयत्नतः ॥१३॥

Having purposefully¹ repeated the statement of Gārgī, the seer (ṛṣi) answered, 'Vāyu is that in which the world is woven lengthwise and crosswise'. [13]

¹Read SP: *prayatnas tu praśnābhyāsadvārā pratyukter abhyāsaḥ*.

क्षमाद्येतत्सूत्रपर्यन्तं नाशादूर्ध्वं जनेः पुरा ।
आकाशे तदविज्ञातं सत्तामात्रेण विद्यते ॥१४॥

(That is to say:) This (world), from the earth up to Sūtra, has been, before its origin, existent in the ether and also it will be there, after its destruction, only as an existent. [14]

This is Yājñavalkya's answer in brief.

यावद्वि जनिमत्किञ्चिन्नामादिप्रविभागवत् ।
आकाशस्तस्य सर्वस्य तत्त्वमत्र विवक्षितम् ॥१५॥

Whatever is here in this world has an origin and it has the divisions, viz. name etc.¹ The ether is the support of all that—this is intended to be (i.e. offered as) the truth (or reality). [15]

¹The word 'etc.' stands for form and activity.

व्यतिरेकं सतो नेदं लभतेऽनात्मकत्वतः ।
नाप्यन्वयं तदव्याप्तेर्नाप्यभावः सतीष्यते ॥१६॥

That (existent world), being a non-Ātman, does not attain (i.e. come to possess) any separate existence apart from the real existent. So also, it would not attain similarity (*anvaya*), since it is not pervaded (by any thing else). The condition of being a negative entity is also not accepted in respect of the (really) existent. [16]

सदतो जनिमत्तत्त्वं सर्पादे रशना यथा ।
सत्तत्त्वव्यतिरेकेण नान्या जनिमतो गतिः ॥१७॥

Therefore, the existent is reality which is (i.e. appears as) associated with origination; this is like a rope which comes to have the nature of reality with respect to a serpent etc.¹ That which has an origin cannot be explained as an existent apart from the existent reality. [17]

¹The word 'etc.' is redundant; but it means something else than the serpent.

सदेवेदमतः सर्वमुद्भूतिस्थितिहानिषु ।

सदेवेति तथा स्पष्टं छान्दोग्योपनिषद्वचः ॥१८॥

Therefore, all this is only the existent reality, in its states of origin, sustenance, and merger; to this effect, there is a clear statement of CU: *sad eva ... (ekamevādvitīyam)*.¹ [18]

¹CU 6.2.1.

अर्वागेवाक्षराज्ज्ञेया सत्तेयं जगतो निधिः ।
कार्यकारणनिर्मुक्तमक्षरं वक्ष्यते यतः ॥१९॥

The decision¹ (is): This existence of the world has to be understood as that which obtains only below (or up to) the imperishable, since it (viz. the imperishable) will be declared (by the Śruti) as free from all causes and effects. [19]

¹The word *nidhi* is paraphrased by SP as *nidāna* which is in the sense of decision. Refer to our book [Vol.8:1997] 2.1.27.

सर्वशक्तिरियं शक्तिर्या सदित्यभिधीयते ।
न च सत्तेति सामान्यं प्रत्ययार्थासमीक्षणात् ॥२०॥

This power, which is omnipotent and which is described (or called) as the existent, since there is not accepted (here) to be the common property, owing to meaning of the suffix *-tā*,¹ viz. '(the) nature' (of some *sat* 'existence'). [20]

¹NKL refers to Pāṇini Sūtra 5.1.119: *tasya bhāvas tatalau* conveying the sense of the suffix (*pratyaya*), this is explained further in the next verse.

न सतो व्यतिरेकेण सतोऽन्यो भाव ईक्ष्यते ।
अप्यभावो न लभते किमु भावोऽतिरेकताम् ॥२१॥

There is not any other thing beside the existent, as having

the nature of an existent. So also, the absence (of anything else) is not noticed, what then to say of something in addition to it? [21]

सदन्यबुद्धिगम्यस्य श्रुतिस्तस्मादनेकशः ।
अब्रवीद्भ्रान्तिमात्रत्वं मृत्तिकादिनिदर्शनैः ॥२२॥

Therefore, the Śruti has several times declared that it is merely the delusion in respect of what is (considered as an object) grasped by intellect as other than the existent, (this is done) by (citing various) examples of clay etc.¹ [22]

¹These examples are noticed in CU in the dialogue between Śvetaketu and Āruṇi in 6.1.4-6.

Now follows the exposition of the difference between ether and the inner controller.

आकाशवचसात्मैव ज्ञेयो नान्योऽत्र कश् चन ।
सर्वान्तरत्वं नान्यस्य युज्यतेऽनात्मनो यतः ॥२३॥

Here is to be understood by the word *ākāśa* only the Ātman and none else, because the nature of being within all cannot be reasonably ascribed to anything else that is non-Ātman. [23]

This is in refutation of the view of Bhartṛprapañca who holds the inner controller to be within the undifferentiated *ākāśa*.

आकाशो वा इति तथा ब्रह्मैव श्रुतिरब्रवीत् ।
कारणं चात्मनो नान्यन्नयन्तेषूपलभ्यते ॥२४॥

So has the Śruti stated in the words *ākāśo vai*¹ that there is only Brahman and even in the Vedānta texts² there is not noticed (i.e. mentioned) anything else than the Ātman as the cause (of this illusory world). [24]

¹CU 4.1; on *ākāśa*, refer to *ākāśādhikaraṇa* in BS 1.1.22-24, and, according to SP, *daharādhikaraṇa* in BS 1.3.14-21 also.

²This is for *trayyanteṣu*.

जगज्जनिस्थितिध्वस्तिनियमाद्यर्थकार्यपि ।
नात्मनः कारणादन्यः कश्चित्संभाव्यते श्रुतेः ॥२५॥

It cannot be understood from the Śruti that anything else than the Ātman is the cause, viz. the one who effects such things as the origin, sustenance, merger and control of the world.

[25]

एषोऽन्तर्याम्येष योनिः सर्वस्य प्रभवाप्ययौ ।
माण्डूकेयश्रुतिवच इति स्पष्टमधीयते ॥२६॥

So is this clearly stated (lit. recited) in the *Māṇḍūkyaopaniṣad* ¹ in the words *eṣo 'ntaryāmy eṣa yonih sarvasya prabhavāpyayau* 'This one is the inner controller, the source of all (and also) the origin and the end'.

[26]

¹*Māṇḍūkyaopaniṣad* 6.

नातोऽन्तर्यामिणः कल्प्यमन्यदव्याकृतं बुधैः ।
अक्षरान्तेषु तत्त्वेषु नाव्याकृतवचो यतः ॥२७॥

Therefore, the wise ones should not entertain the idea of another who is the inner controller, viz. that which is not unmanifest, since there is not a mention made of any unmanifest among various principles ¹ 'ending in imperishable'.

[27]

¹Those are various expressions used in the explanation of the different things in the world.

तद्वेदमिति चात्रापि जगदेवाभिधीयते ।

अव्याकृतगिरा तस्य व्याकृताव्याकृतत्वतः ॥२८॥

In the statement *tad dhedam* also, it is only the world that is expressed by the word 'unmanifest', because it has not (yet) become possessed of the nature of the differentiated and the undifferentiated. [28]

The employment of the word *eva* in this verse points to that the imperishable (*akṣara*) is not anything else than the inner self. This is based on the idea of the sameness of the world which is mentioned in BU 1.4.7 as both *vyākṛta* and *avyākṛta*.

सर्वस्यैष वशीत्युक्त्वा यतस्तस्यैव वेद्यताम् ।
यत्नात्प्राह श्रुतिस्तस्माद्यन्ताव्याकृतमुच्यते ॥२९॥

Also, having stated *sarvasyaiṣa vaśī*¹ (about the controller of all), the Śruti has emphatically (*yatnataḥ*) stated that it alone has the nature of what is to be known; therefore, (we can conclude that) the controller is called the undifferentiated. [29]

¹BU 4.4.22.

विद्या कर्म च संस्काराः प्रत्यगज्ञानतत्त्वकाः ।
देहग्रहणहेतुत्वं येषां नः श्रुतिरब्रवीत् ॥३०॥

One's knowledge, activity and impressions are things which have the nature of the ignorance about (the nature of) the inner self, in respect of which the Śruti has told us their being the cause of (one's) having a body. [30]

Sureśvara takes for this verse a support of the view of Bhartṛprapañca, who has not really made any difference between the unmanifest reality and the inner controller for explaining his ideas.

अविचारितसंसिद्धिप्रत्यगज्ञानसंस्थितिः ।

त्रयमेतत्सदा ग्राह्यं न कार्यं कारणं विना ॥३१॥

It should always be understood that this triad¹ consists in the existence of ignorance in respect of the inner self and which is established even without thought;² (because) there cannot be any effect without a cause. [31]

¹This refers to *vidyā*, *karma*, *saṃskāra*.

²This is for *avicāritasaṃsiddha*.

कर्मैवैतन्नयं तच्च नात्मानं लभते यतः ।

कारकाणि विनोत्पत्तौ प्रयोगमनुरुध्यते ॥३२॥

And since the triad which is but activity does not come into existence without (some) instrument of activity, therefore it rests on the employment of them. [32]

This states the view of Bhartṛprapañca; Sureśvara derives from it strength of his argument.

SP apparently cites the words of Bhartṛprapañca in support: *tathāhuh sarvāntaram vijñānātmarūpam mahārajanādilakṣaṇam trayamapy etat karmaiveti*.

प्रयोगरूपेणैवातो वेष्टितं कर्म तिष्ठति ।

कारणात्मनि संसृष्टं नान्यथातोऽस्य संस्थितिः ॥३३॥

Therefore, activity stands as determined (lit. encompassed) by (the triad in the) form in its employment in combination; for, that cannot come to exist in any other way. [33]

सप्रयोगगणः सर्वः सौक्ष्म्येण परमेण तु ।

प्राक्फलोद्भवतो नष्ट्वा प्रतीचि व्यवतिष्ठते ॥३४॥

And (*tu*) this group (of *kāraṇas*) together with their employment exists in the inner self in its most subtle form,

getting destroyed (in their apparent form) before the rise of their result. [34]

This also is on the basis of the view of Bhartṛprapañca as quoted by SP: (*saprayogagaṇam karma*) *vināśottarakālam pareṇa saukṣmyeṇa vyavatiṣṭhate astitvamātreṇa*.

प्रत्यक्संवित्तिवस्तुस्थः प्रमाणविरहादयम् ।
न ज्ञातः कुम्भवन्नापि चित्स्थत्वात्खरशृङ्गवत् ॥३५॥

But, this (group as mentioned above), existing in the consciousness of the inner self, does not become known because of the absence of any means of knowledge in the same way as a pitcher becomes (known); (and) also since it exists (only) in sentience, it is like the horn of a mule.¹ [35]

¹We do not see any horn of a mule; therefore, the simile only indicates the existence of the group of instrumentals (*kāraṇas*) in some unseen form like that of a mule's horns!

न चायं नेति नेतीति कारणत्वादिहोच्यते ।
विशेषस्याग्रहात्तद्वद्ब्रूयते नेदमित्यपि ॥३६॥

Further, there cannot also be a statement made regarding this, in the words *neti neti*,¹ for the reason that it is a cause. So also, it is not taken as in the words *nedam* 'not this', because there is not postulated any particular characteristic of it. [36]

In an example like *nedam nabhaḥ* there is an awareness of some characteristic of *nabhas* understood; but, in the case of group activity etc. existing in the inner self in a concealed form, no particular characteristic is observed.

¹BU 2.3.6.

क्षित्यादिसूत्रपर्यन्तं नियम्यापेक्षयोच्यते ।

नियन्ता कारणं चेति न तु सूत्रान्तिकेऽसति ॥३७॥

It is said to be the controller and the cause, since there is dependence on what is to be controlled, viz. what begins with the earth and what ends in Sūtra. But (this is) not (so) when it is not in the vicinity of Sūtra. [37]

After stating the view of Bhartṛprapañca, Sureśvara says by way of conclusion how that view is useful in the discussion under comment.

Unless and until there is ignorance about the nature of reality, there cannot be any notion of the earth etc. up to Sūtra and also of their controller.

It is helpful to read SP (at length): *sati sābhāse pratyagajñāne sūtrāntikaśabde niyamyakāryāpekṣayā niyantrkāraṇavyapadeśo nānyatheti bhartṛprapañcānām api matam. trayam api karmaiveti hi vadanti; tac ca kārakādhīnam āvidyam iti sādhitam ato matāntare 'pi svāvidyādhīnakarmakāryajagadapekṣatvān niyantrtvāder nāntaryāmikāraṇakṣarabheda iti bhāvaḥ.*

स्वात्मानुभवतन्त्रत्वात्प्रत्याख्यातुं न शक्यते ।
व्यावृत्तिविधिरूपाभ्यां सुषुप्तिरनुभूयते ॥३८॥

(Also) it (viz. ignorance) cannot be denied, since it depends on one's own¹ experience (of it). (And) sleep (i.e. ignorance) is experienced in the form of keeping from (activity) and performance (of it in the state of waking). [38]

This is clarified in the following two verses. About the meaning of *vidhi* here, we are not certain.

¹In the word *svātmā*, the component (of the compound) *ātman* is a reflexive pronoun.

व्यावृत्तः शुक्लपीतादेरन्धकारोऽनुभूयते ।
तथा विधिमुखेनापि द्विरेफोदरवत्तमः ॥३९॥

Darkness is directly experienced (i.e. becomes known) as distinguished/distinct from white and/or black (substances); so also (it becomes known) from an instructive statement, viz. 'Darkness is like a bee's belly.' [39]

स्वप्नबोधात्तदा तद्वद्विविक्तोऽर्थोऽनुभूयते ।
मूढोऽस्मीत्यपि साक्षाच्च मोहोऽयमनुभूयते ॥४०॥

After rising from sleep, the object which is experienced is known to be distinct (from that in the dream). Similarly, in the experience 'I have been a fool', ignorance is directly experienced. [40]

मूढोत्पत्तेः पुरा मोहः प्रत्यग्वस्त्वनुरोध्यभूत् ।
तदुत्पत्तौ ससंवित्को मोहो मूढप्रधानकः ॥४१॥

Before the origin of ego,¹ there was delusion which had obstructed the real nature of the thing (i.e. reality), viz. inner self. And whenever there is rise of it, ignorance is accompanied by a sentience and it is principally guided by ego. [41]

¹*mūḍha* is ego, which has arisen from delusion. This is because there is in one the rise of ego only when there is delusion.

सोऽयमैकात्म्यगर्भः सन्मोहः सर्वस्य कारकः ।
धर्मो च सर्वधर्माणां न परोक्षस्ततोऽश्ववत् ॥४२॥

Thus, delusion, being non-dual Ātman in its embryonic stage, is the producer of activity among all. That is the one possessing properties (known) and is not beyond all the properties, even like a horse. [42]

In the last part of the verse, there is simile based on dissimilarity (*vaidharmya*). The basis for this is a verse from the *Śloka-vārtika*, viz. 7.358:

paśyataḥ śvetimārūpaṃ heṣāśabdaṃ ca śṛṇvataḥ /

khuranispeṣaśabdaṃ ca śveto 'śvo dhāvatīti dhīḥ //

यन्तृत्वहेतुविध्वस्तावेष संपद्यतेऽक्षरम् ।
कूटस्थस्य द्वितीयेन संबन्धोऽबोधकारितः ॥४३॥

This one becomes the imperishable, when there occurs the destruction of the cause, viz. the capacity of a controller. The relation of the immutable with any second (thing or person) is only caused by the absence of knowledge (of its true nature).

[43]

Now begins the discussion of the second question of Gārgī.

प्रश्नोऽयं न तृतीयः स्यात्प्रतिज्ञातत्वतो द्वयोः ।
पूर्वोक्तस्यैव दाढ्यार्थं प्रश्नोऽयं पृच्छयते पुनः ॥४४॥

This¹ is not the third question (put by Gārgī), since the two questions have been already asked. And (it should be noted that) this question is asked with a view to lending strength to what was asked earlier.²

[44]

¹This refers to Gārgī's speech *yad ūrdhvam*

²Read SP: *dvābhyām praśnābhyām ity upakramāt (ataḥ) pr-
ṣṭasyaiva punarvacanam.*

पृष्टं भूयोऽपि चापृच्छदुक्तधीदृढनिश्चितौ ।
परायत्तप्रबोधोऽपि शक्तो वक्तुं यतस्ततः ॥४५॥

She once again asked what was asked earlier, in order that whatever knowledge or information was stated by Yājñavalkya was firmly confirmed. This is because it is possible for one to impart instruction that has depended on (yet) another (person altogether).¹

[45]

¹Here we get in Sureśvara (and possibly in Śaṅkara also) some expression in the popular belief in the existence of spirits

such as ghosts, who can make some person speak or blurt anything. Hereby, Sureśvara suggests that Gārgī wished a positive confirmation of the instruction as by Yājñavalkya himself. That is to say she wanted to ascertain if Yājñavalkya was not influenced by any being like a ghost etc.

एवेत्यवधृतेर्यद्वा पूर्वप्रश्नार्थशेषता ॥४६॥

Or rather, (there is to be understood) the remainder of the question (asked) earlier—(this is understood) from the specifying by (the word) *eva*. [46]

The word *eva* occurs in *ākāśe eva tad otam*

किमनेकत्र लीनिः स्यात्सत्रस्यापि क्षितेरिव ।
आकाश एव किं वा स्यादित्येवं पूर्वशेषता ॥४७॥

(The intention of the question is:) Is it that even the Sūtra merges into many objects like the earth? Or, does it merge only in ether? Such is the nature (of the question), viz. the remainder of the earlier (question). [47]

मोहोच्छित्तिर्यथावस्तुसम्यग्ज्ञानप्रसूतितः ।
सम्यग्ज्ञानप्रसिद्धयर्थमतः प्रश्नोऽयमुत्तरः ॥४८॥

The destruction of delusion results from the rise of proper knowledge of the thing as it is. Therefore, this subsequent question is asked with a view to rousing (or securing) the rise of proper knowledge. [48]

This is the purport of the question *kasmin nu khalv ākāśah....*

सूत्रादिक्षितिपर्यन्तमर्वाग्यन्तुरचेतनम् ।
निष्प्रमाणं यतस्तस्मात्पृच्छयते सप्रमाणकम् ॥४९॥

Since all the non-sentient below the controller, viz. all that,

which begins with Sūtra and ends in the earth, is without any authoritative means (for proving its existence), therefore, is the question asked about what can be understood with an authoritative means (of proof).¹ [49]

This expresses the general purport of Yājñavalkya's argument. The particular purport however, is given in the following verse.

¹This explains the two words here, viz. *niṣpramāṇa* and *sapramāṇaka* which distinguish between the Brahman for which there is an authoritative means, viz. Āgama (which leads to the right knowledge of reality), while all of the worldly things are understood by what are known as authoritative means, though in fact they lead to illusory knowledge.

सूत्रं तावत्सुदुर्ज्ञानमाकाशस्तु ततोऽप्यति ।
तस्मात्परतरं तत्त्वं दुर्वचोऽपि बृहस्पतेः ॥५०॥

Insofar as Sūtra is concerned, it is very difficult to perceive (lit. know), whereas the ether is yet more (difficult to know) than that. The (highest) reality is yet further more (difficult) to know; it is, even for Bṛhaspati, very difficult to speak about it.¹ [50]

The following verse clarifies the thought in this verse.

¹This points to the lord of speech

सूत्रान्तं वस्तु निर्देश्यमनिर्देश्ये प्रवेशितम् ।
यन्तरि व्योम्नि तदपि दुर्वाच्यमतिसूक्ष्मतः ॥५१॥

The things ending in (i.e. up to) Sūtra,¹ though they can be easily shown (lit. pointed out), are (said to have) merged in what cannot be shown, viz. the controller, the sky; that also is very difficult to speak about, because of its being extremely subtle (in form). [51]

¹We have translated as 'things', because the singular stands

for plurality of things (*jātav ekavacanam*).

सर्वमानातिवर्त्येकमुक्तं प्रत्यक्चिदात्मकम् ।
अव्यावृत्ताननुगतं ततोऽप्यक्षरसंज्ञितम् ॥५२॥

It is said that the thing having the nature of inner sentience, is beyond (lit. transgress) all means (of knowing); it is not distinguished (from any other thing) and is not similar (to any other thing) and, that is (beyond Sūtra) and is called the imperishable. [52]

This points to the extremely subtle form of the imperishable.

अज्ञातज्ञाततोऽन्यत्वान्निर्देश्यं न तदक्षरम् ।
साक्षादित्यादिरूपत्वान्नापि स्यात्तदपह्नुतिः ॥५३॥

That imperishable cannot be shown, since it is other than (i.e. different from) any unknown knower (or thing) and also since it has a form which is directly perceptible etc. There is not any concealment of it (i.e. of its existence) possible. [53]

अपि चेद्वक्त्यनिर्देश्यं कथंचिन्मोहविभ्रमात् ।
तथा विप्रतिपत्तिः स्यादनुक्तौ च पराजितः ॥५४॥
इति चेतसि संधाय याज्ञवल्क्यमपृच्छत् ।
गार्ग्यक्षरमनिर्देश्यं तां चासावब्रवीदिदम् ॥५५॥

Furthermore, if he (i.e. Yājñavalkya) were to state it (that the imperishable is) as what cannot be pointed out, somehow because of the play of delusion,¹ then, in that case, there could not be a dispute (i.e. disagreement in argument), and, in case there was no statement (made by him), he was (to be considered as) defeated. [54]

Having entertained this thought in mind (*sandhāya*), Gārgī asked Yājñavalkya (her question) and he (i.e. Yājñavalkya) said to her that it was difficult to show. [55]

This expresses the purport of the argument in Yājñavalkya's description of the imperishable, in a general way.

¹SP points out that *mohavibhramāt* means *gotṛṣṇāblāt*.

Verses 56-129 are the exposition of BU 3.8.8.

Now there is the exposition of the word akṣara.

एतद्वै तदिति प्राह प्रत्यक्साक्षिकमक्षरम् ।
अपास्ताशेषनिर्देशं यदनन्यप्रमाणकम् ॥५६॥

In the words *etad vai tat*, he pointed out that the imperishable has the inner self as its witness; also (in that he stated) that it refused every description and does not have a single (authoritative) means (for proving its existence). [56]

This explains the meaning of *idam* in Yājñavalkya's answer.

यत्साक्षाच्चापरोक्षाच्च ब्रह्मात्मेति विशेषितम् ।
प्रत्यक्तया तदैकात्म्यं स्वयमेव प्रतीयताम् ॥५७॥

Since the Brahman is specified in the words *sākṣāc cāparokṣāc ca*, as being within (an individual); therefore, let its singleness be understood from itself. [57]

न व्यावृत्तं विशेषेभ्यो नानुवृत्तं च गोत्ववत् ।
अव्यावृत्ताननुगतं चैतन्यं संविदीक्ष्यताम् ॥५८॥

It is not distinguished from what are particulars¹ and it is not repeatedly occurring (*anuvṛtta*) (in many individuals), like cowness (in all cows), (therefore) the sentience, the knowing one; be considered as not distinguished from or similar to (any other things). [58]

This verse explains the meaning of *avyāvṛttānanugata*. It means to say: It is not like a pitcher which is an object of direct

perception.

¹They are things known as having some specific attributes.

यस्मात्प्रसिद्धं नास्त्यन्यत्प्रसिद्धं यत्र कस्यचित् ।
अनन्यममषष्ठ्यर्थं वैशब्दस्तत्प्रसिद्धये ॥५९॥

Since there is not any other thing known, what is not known to any one, what is not known (lit. whose knowledge cannot be obtained) by any other (means of knowing)¹ and what is not (the object for one) expressed in the genitive (form); (therefore) the word *vai* is for establishing that (i.e. the object of that knowledge).²

[59]

¹This is for *ananya-ma*.

²This is for *aṣaṣṭhyartha*; but the correctness of the interpretation is doubtful.

साक्षादित्यादिवाक्येन योऽशनायादिना तथा ।
प्रत्यङ्ङभिहितो यत्नात्तन्निरा सोऽत्र युज्यते ॥६०॥

Since the inner self was specifically (*yatnāt*) described by the sentence beginning with the word *sākṣāt* and also by (the statement) *yo 'śanāyā*, therefore that one is here reasonably understood (*yujyate*) by the word *tat*.¹

[60]

¹This refers to the word *tat* in the question of Kahola. But, according to the editor of NKL it occurs in the statement *tat akṣaram gārgi*.

प्रत्यक्षासन्ननिष्ठत्वादेतच्छब्दस्य कुम्भवत् ।
यदेतदिति तत्साक्षाद्यथावत्प्रतिपद्यताम् ॥६१॥

Since the word *etat* is related to (*niṣṭhā*) what is directly perceived and near at hand, like a pitcher, therefore, the phrase *yad etat* should be understood in the same way as (conveying the idea of) that which is directly perceptible, as before

(*yathāvat*).

[61]

प्रत्यक्षैकप्रमाणोऽर्थो लौकिकोऽपि न शक्यते ।
प्रत्यक्षवद्वोधयितुं किमु प्रत्यङ्निरञ्जनम् ॥६२॥

Also it is not possible to say about a thing known in worldly dealings (*laukika*) as having direct perception as the means of knowing (it) like a thing which is directly perceptible.¹ What then to say about the inner self which is untinted (by any means of perception)?

[62]

¹This refers to agent (*pramātr*) of an act of perceiving other things directly.

क्षराद्विरुद्धधर्मत्वादक्षरं ब्रह्म भण्यते ।
कार्यकारणवद्वस्तु क्षरमत्र निषिध्यते ॥६३॥

The Brahman is described as imperishable on account of its having properties which are opposed to (those of) the perishable. Herein, a thing associated with cause and effect relation, viz. the perishable, is denied (or, refused).¹

[63]

¹This is the meaning of *a-* (really *nan*) in the word *akṣara*.

हानिवृद्धिस्वभावेन कारणात्मैव वर्तते ।
तत्प्रत्यगात्मा तद्धीनः कूटस्थोऽनन्यमानगः ॥६४॥

There exists only the Ātman marked as the cause (of some other object(s)) on account of its nature of losing and/or increasing its properties (lit. nature). (And) the inner self of it,¹ which is devoid of that,² is immutable and unknowable by any other means.

[64]

¹This refers to Jīva which is affected by delusion.

²This refers to the nature of the *kāraṇātman* mentioned in the first line of the verse.

ब्राह्मणास्तद्वदन्तीति स्वापराधनिषेधगीः ।

नात्माज्ञानाय सा युक्ता स हि साक्षात्तदीक्षते ॥६५॥

The statement (of Yājñavalkya), viz. *brāhmaṇā vadanti*, is for averting (any notion regarding) his own fault.¹ It is not made by him for (conveying) his (own) ignorance (about the nature) of the Ātman; for he sees (i.e. perceived) that² directly. [65]

¹The fault would consist in two things—(i) *avācyokti* which would lead to dispute, and (ii) *anukti* which would indicate his ignorance.

²This is for *tat*, i.e. the *akṣara* Brahman (in neuter), since already the masculine word *ātman* is used.

निर्देश्यत्वानुमादोषप्रसङ्गविनिवृत्तये ।

आगमैकप्रमाणत्वे वदन्तीत्यभिशब्दनम् ॥६६॥

The utterance of (the word) *vadanti* is for the purpose of avoiding contingency of the fault, viz. the quality of the (Brahman) as a thing which can be shown and the fault in the inference (about it) and also pointing to that (the argument of Yājñavalkya) as having only tradition as the authoritative means (of proving reality). [66]

एतावदेव प्रत्यक्षं सर्वयाथात्म्यवेदिनाम् ।

ब्राह्मणानामतो युक्तं फलपर्यवसायिनाम् ॥६७॥

Since only this much (of the great) magnitude is directly perceptible to Brāhmaṇas, who have been the knowers of the true nature of all (things of the world) and have secured the (final) result,¹ therefore, (the meaning of them) is (only) according to reason (or, reasonable). [67]

¹Namely, attainment of liberation. This points to the correctness and propriety in Yājñavalkya's answer.

ध्वस्तात्माज्ञानतत्कार्याः प्रत्यग्याथात्म्यबोधतः ।
वदन्ति ब्राह्मणास्तेऽतस्त्यक्तसर्वैषणास्पदम् ॥६८॥

Brāhmaṇas, who have destroyed their ignorance about the (inner) self and also the effects thereof, say (this) after (their having attained) the knowledge of the inner self (as it is). Therefore, it (viz. what they say) deserves to be called what is above (lit. has cast off) all desires.¹ [68]

¹This is *eṣaṇātraya*, viz. *putra* 'son', *vitta* 'wealth' and *loka* 'fame'.

एतदेव तु विज्ञाय व्युत्तिष्ठन्त्येषणात्रयात् ।
यतोऽतस्तत्स्वसंवेद्यं गार्ग्यक्षरमिदं ध्रुवम् ॥६९॥

Since they (viz. the Brāhmaṇas) rise above the three desires, only on knowing this (*etadeva*), therefore, this, which is known by it, O Gārgī, is certainly the imperishable. [69]

This verse sums up the thought in Yājñavalkya's statement *etat ... gārgi*.

Now follows in verses 70-110 a discussion on the purport of *asthūla* etc. in BUB 3.8.

तेषां चेत्स्यात्स्वसंवेद्यं निर्देश्यं तद्वटादिवत् ।
अस्थूलत्वान्न तच्छक्यं निर्देष्टुमिति सोऽब्रवीत् ॥७०॥

If this, i.e. what is known by itself, is for them a thing that can be pointed out like a pitcher etc., then it is not possible to point out that, on account of its non-grossness—this he (i.e. Yājñavalkya) said. [70]

अक्षरं यदि न स्थूलमणु तर्हि तदिष्यताम् ।
यतस्तत्प्रतिषेधार्थमनृण्विति जगाद ताम् ॥७१॥

Since (one would say:) 'If the imperishable is not gross, then let it be accepted as atomic in size'; therefore, Yājñavalkya said in order to reject that (argument), to her, '(it is) *anāṇu* 'non-atomic'.' [71]

परिमाणमहाभतप्राणनामान्वयादयः ।
कारणाद्या निषिध्यन्ते क्रमेण प्राप्त्यपेक्षया ॥७२॥

Here are negated the causes etc.,¹ viz. magnitude, great elements, *prāṇas*, names, continuity (of properties) etc.,² in their order stated, with an eye on (the argument regarding) their existence. [72]

¹This word 'etc.' here refers *rasa*, *gandha*, *cakṣuṣ*, *śrotra*, *vāk* and *manas*.

²This 'etc.' refers to fire, waters

प्रसज्यपर्युदासाभ्यां नञर्थः कोऽत्र गृह्यते ।
स्थूलापह्नुतिरेकत्र पर्युदासे तदन्यता ॥७३॥

(The objector might ask:) 'Which of the two meanings of *nañ* is understood here, viz. *prasajya*(*pratiṣedha*) 'negation of the possible contingency' and *paryudāsa* 'negation'? In one there is the rejection (lit. concealment) of what is gross¹ and in the second, i.e. *paryudāsa* (there is the idea of) its being something else (than grossness etc.)², [73]

¹This would only mean the absence of grossness etc.

²This will involve non-acceptance of Advaita 'non-duality (of reality)'.

स्थूलापह्नुतिरत्र स्याद्वस्तु यत्पारमार्थिकम् ।
नाभावनिष्ठोऽन्यत्रापि निषेधः किमुताक्षरे ॥७४॥

(The Siddhāntin answers:) 'Here there is rejection (of the idea

of its being) gross, since the thing is having the nature of the ultimate reality. Elsewhere (i.e. in popular dealings) also, there cannot be a negation of a negative entity which is not directly perceptible. How then could one say that there is a negation of the imperishable?'¹ [74]

The imperishable is the thing which is really in existence. It is not directly perceptible and, therefore, the fault, viz. the concealment of grossness cannot be brought against one who describes the imperishable as *asthūla* 'non-gross'.

¹This also is what cannot be directly perceptible.

पर्युदासेऽपि क्लृप्तानां न पृथक्त्वेन संस्थितिः ।
रज्जुसर्पादिवत्तस्मान्नोभयत्रापि दोषता ॥७५॥

In *paryudāsa* also, there is not an existence of what are imagined (or hypothesized) as different (from what exists in reality), as in the case of a rope and a serpent etc. Therefore, there is not thus in both the cases any possibility of a fault (*doṣatā*). [75]

दृष्टोऽपवादो लोकेऽस्मिन्नुत्सर्गविषये सति ।
स्थूलादेरपवादोऽयं निर्द्वये घटते कथम् ॥७६॥

(An objector would say:) 'There is exception seen in this world in respect of what is stated as a general rule. Therefore, how would this exception (or rejection) of gross etc., be properly (spoken) of what is devoid of duality? [76]

उत्सर्गस्यास्ति विषयो योऽनिर्ज्ञातात्मतत्त्वकः ।
अपवादस्य विषयो ज्ञातात्मैकसतत्त्वकः ॥७७॥

(The Siddhāntin answers:) The subject(-matter) of a general rule is that whose nature is not known, (whereas) the subject(-matter) of a rule for exception is of the nature of what is essentially known.¹ [77]

This verse sets aside the possible counter-argument that, even in respect of reality, there could be pointed out a case of exception to the general rule.

¹The translation of *jñātātmaikagatattvaka* had to be a bit hackneyed! It could alternatively be '... is of the nature of only known thing.'

अध्यस्तदिङ्निषेधश्च व्योम्न्येकस्मिन्यथा तथा ।
उत्सर्गापवादविधिनिषेधा एकलात्मनि ॥७८॥

As there could be a negation of the different quarters which are superimposed on a single (i.e. undifferentiated) sky; so also, there are, in respect of the non-dual Ātman, general rules, exceptions, injunctions and prohibitions. [78]

The argument in verses 76-78 is in respect of the negation of what can occur as *prasajya*(*pratiṣedha*), whereas, in verses 79-81, there is an argument about *paryudāsa*.

यदि वाक्षरयाथात्म्यं स्थूलादेरिह भण्यते ।
स्रग्वाथात्म्यमहेर्यद्वत्तथास्याक्षरमात्रतः ॥७९॥

Or rather, here is stated the nature of the imperishable, as it is, (in respect) of gross (objects of the world), as the true nature of a wreath (of flowers, in respect) of a serpent, since this one (viz. the Ātman/inner self) is only the imperishable. [79]

स्थूलादिहेतोर्दाहो वा द्रव्यान्तस्य प्रत्यगात्मनि ।
अस्थूलोक्तिसमुत्थात्मयाथात्म्यज्ञानवहिना ॥८०॥

Or rather, there is, in respect of the inner self, the destruction (lit. burning) of the cause, viz. gross(ness) etc., viz. the ignorance (about the nature of the inner self), by the fire (which is effected) by the fire in the form of the knowledge

of the true nature of the Ātman which arises from the statement (about it as) non-gross. [80]

क्षित्यादौ वियदन्तेऽस्मिन्स्थलादेः संभवो ननु ।
तदोतप्रोतवाक्येन तच्च सर्वं निराकृतम् ॥८१॥

(An objection is raised:) 'There is indeed the possibility (of the existence) of the gross etc., from the earth up to sky'. (The answer is:) 'But (ca) all that is refuted in the statement about its being woven lengthwise and crosswise.' [81]

The objection is based on the idea of properties in discretely existent objects and the answer to it is based on the rejection of them all on the ground of the absence of any substratum for them.

तस्याक्षरे कः प्रसङ्गो यतस्तत्प्रतिषिध्यते ।
अपि खे तदसंभाव्यं किमु तत्प्रत्यगात्मनि ॥८२॥

How could there be the contingency of the occurrence of those properties in the case of the imperishable, since all of that is rejected (as existent)? In the case of sky also, it is impossible (that they¹ occur therein), what then to say (about its impossible occurrence) in the inner self. [82]

Sky cannot be differentiated into this part or that. This holds good in the case of inner self also; cf. verse 78 above.

¹These are properties already mentioned. This refers to *sthūlādi* etc. which is negated in *apsu ... pṛthivyādaḥ*.

समस्तव्यस्ततां केचिद्ब्रह्मणः प्रतिजानते ।
यतोऽतस्तन्निषेधार्थं निषिद्धं सन्निषिध्यते ॥८३॥

Since some scholars¹ postulate that the Brahman has its appearance of totality and severality; therefore, here is rejected what is already rejected only for the sake of refutation (lit.

rejection) of that.

[83]

¹According to SP, these are individuals who may be some Vedāntins with only slight differences with the Kevalādvaitins. However, NKL states that the word *kecit* points to these just mentioned and Bhartṛprapañca also; this is possibly because the verse uses the word *samastavyastatā*.

व्यक्तावस्थाथवैतेषां निषिद्धा कारणात्मनि ।
शक्त्यवस्थानिषेधोऽयं क्रियते त्वक्षरात्मनि ॥८४॥

Or perhaps, the unmanifest existence of these¹ is rejected (as obtaining) in the Ātman which is their cause.² As such, this is rejection of the state of (having) the ability (to produce them) in respect of the imperishable Ātman. [84]

¹This refers to discrete objects.

²This is held as the cause of the discrete objects, through ignorance.

एवं च सति तत्पूर्णं ब्रह्म कृत्स्नं च युज्यते ।
अन्यथाकृत्स्नमेव स्यादनिर्मोक्षश्च सज्यते ॥८५॥

Such being the case, it is only reasonable (to understand) the Brahman as full and complete; otherwise, it would be only incomplete and there would result only absence of liberation. [85]

This seeks to establish that the scripture regarding liberation (viz. *ātmajñānāt mokṣaḥ*) is only purposeful.

न वा निषेधः स्थूलादेस्तस्य प्रागेव सिद्धितः ।
तन्निषेधानुवादेन प्रतीचि ब्रह्म बोध्यते ॥८६॥
स्थूलादिमैयमामातृनिषेधफलं स्वभम् ।
विद्धि सर्वान्तरं ब्रह्म साक्षादित्यादिलक्षणम् ॥८७॥

Or perhaps, there is no rejection of what is gross etc., because that is already established and, therefore, by mere repeating the rejection in respect of the inner self, it is the Brahman which is made known. [86]

Therefore, know you the Brahman as the existence within all and having the characteristic of being directly perceptible etc., (that Brahman) which is self-luminous (and) as resulting from the rejection of the objects to be known, such as gross etc. right knowledge and the means of knowing (the objects). [87]

The sentence *asthūlam* ... is thus described here as not meant for the rejection of objects which are gross etc.; it is an *anuvāda* 'repeated statement' for conveying the real nature of the inner self as the Brahman.

सर्वेषामपि चोद्यानामेवं सति न संभवः ।
नेति नेतीतिवद्व्याख्या सर्वापीह समीक्ष्यताम् ॥८८॥

This being so, there cannot be any other possible counter-objection (*codya*). (Therefore), let here be understood (lit. well seen) that this explanation here¹ is like that in the statement *neti neti*. [88]

¹That is, in the statement *asthūlam anāṇu* ...

स्थूलादिपरिमाणं हि द्रव्यमात्रव्यपाश्रयम् ।
तस्माद्द्रव्यनिषेधोऽयं परिमाणनिषेधतः ॥८९॥

Since the reference to magnitude in *sthūla* etc. is supported only in substance, therefore, this is the rejection of the substances through the rejection of the magnitude (understood from the word *asthūla*). [89]

In verses 89-92 is explained the significance of the rejection (*niṣedha*) as pertaining to substances.

सर्वथापि तु यत्किञ्चिद्वाचो गोचरतां गतम् ।
प्रमाणस्य च तत्सर्वमक्षरे प्रतिषिध्यते ॥९०॥

In every way, then, there is rejected, in the case of the imperishable whatever has become the object of speech and (also) of the means of knowing. [90]

In the sentence *asthūlam* ... the Upaniṣad uses different words for the purpose of rejecting every argument based on the use of different words in language for describing the various objects of knowing. Cp. SP: *uktaviśeṣaṇiṣedho 'nuktaviśeṣaṇiṣedhopa-lakṣaṇam iti bhāvaḥ*.

विशेषप्रतिषेधे च क्रम आश्रीयते ध्रुवम् ।
सामर्थ्यादेव नान्यस्मात्कारणादिति निश्चयः ॥९१॥
पूर्वोत्तरनिषेधयानां सामर्थ्यादेव च क्रमः ।
पूर्वस्मिन्प्रतिषिद्धेऽन्यः सामर्थ्यादेव ढौकते ॥९२॥

There is a definite sequence accepted (lit. resorted to) in rejecting the particular (attributes); this is owing to propriety (*sāmarthyā*) and not because of any other reason; such is the decision. [91]

And the order of the former and the subsequent properties (of objects), to be rejected, is owing only to propriety, since the latter, being rejected, pushes itself there (*dhaukate*) owing to its propriety. [92]

अस्थौल्यादणु तत्प्राप्तं तन्नानण यतोऽक्षरम् ।
ह्रस्वं नैव यतोऽह्रस्वं नापि दीर्घं यतोऽक्षरम् ।
अदीर्घमित्यतो द्रव्यं न स्यादक्षरमव्ययम् ॥९३॥

(To explain:) It is not gross, therefore it is to be accepted (*prāpta*) as subtle (and) it is not subtle, since it is the imperishable. It is not all short and because it is neither short nor long, since it is the imperishable. From being not long, it is not (to be accepted as) a substance—it is the imperishable

(and) never diminishing (or, never varying).

[93]

Verses 93-107 clarify the thought in the two preceding verses.

आदित्यवर्णवचनादस्तु तद्रोहितात्मकम् ।
नैवं यतोऽलोहितं तत्सर्वरूपादिवर्जितम् ॥९४॥

(One might say:) 'On the basis of the statement (about it as) *ādityavarṇa*, let that (imperishable) be red in colour'. (The answer is:) 'No, it is not so, since it is devoid of all, viz. form etc., therefore, it is not red'.

[94]

अपां गुणोऽत्र स्नेहः स्याच्छायादीप्तिरिहेष्यते ।
तमो ध्वान्तमिति ज्ञेयमतमोऽक्षरमुच्यते ॥९५॥

Here (i.e. in the word *asneha*) *sneha* means the property of waters; so also, *chāyā* is accepted to mean the absence of brightness. (Also) *tamas* is to be taken as the object called darkness (i.e. ignorance) and, therefore, is called the imperishable (which is) free from darkness.

[95]

SP has rightly observed on *chāyādīpti* that *adīptir iti cchedah*.

न भूतं तत्पृथिव्यादि नापि भूतगुणास्तथा ।
सर्वान्तराधिकाराद्धि तथोभयनिषेधतः ॥९६॥

It is not any element such as the earth etc., not also the properties of the elements; this is so, because there is a rejection of both¹ for the reason that the topic or context is of what is within all.

[96]

This explains *arasam agandham*.

¹Namely, the elements and their properties.

अस्तु सङ्गात्मकं तर्हि वासनासङ्गदर्शनात् ।
नैतद्यतोऽसङ्गमिदमसङ्गो हीति वक्ष्यति ॥९७॥

(One would say:) 'Let there be the reference to what has the nature of attachment, since there is noticed attachment of impressions to it.' (This is refuted:) 'This is not the case, it is without any attachment to anything. (The Upaniṣad itself) will declare (about the Ātman) as 'this one devoid of (any) attachment.'¹

[97]

¹Cf. *asaṅgo na hi saṃyate* ... (BU 4.2.4; 4.4.22; 4.5.15).

नापीन्द्रियमिदं ज्ञेयं यतोऽचक्षुष्कमक्षरम् ।
नेन्द्रियाण्यस्य विद्यन्ते नापि तत्स्वयमिन्द्रियम् ॥९८॥

Let this not be known as a sense-organ also, because (it is said that) the imperishable does not have an eye. This is to say: it does not have any sense-organ and also it is not itself a sense-organ.

[98]

विज्ञानलक्षणं तेजोऽतेजस्कमिति वार्यते ।
कस्मादेतन्न तत्सर्वं यतोऽप्राणं तदक्षरम् ॥९९॥

(One might say:) (It is to be known) as light which is characteristic of knowledge (on the part of an individual). But this is rejected by the use of the word *atejaska* 'not having light'. (One asks a question:) 'Why is this not all that?' (The answer is:) 'Because the imperishable does not have any *prāṇa*.'

[99]

कारणप्रतिषेधेन कृत्स्नकार्यनिषेधतः ।
पूर्णं तदक्षरं ज्ञेयं साक्षादित्यादिलक्षणम् ॥१००॥

(Thus) by rejecting (it to be) the cause and also (from the rejection of the idea of) all effects, let the imperishable be understood as full, having the characteristics such as directly perceptible etc.

[100]

अक्षरं येन रूपेण स्थूलं वस्तु निषेधति ।
तेनैवाण्वादि निःशेषं तस्य सर्वविरोधतः ॥१०१॥

With that nature, whereby the imperishable opposes (lit. rejects) any gross object (does it oppose) all the objects beginning with the subtle in their entirety, for it is opposed to all of them. [101]

अन्येनान्येन रूपेण विरुद्धान्हन्ति पावकः ।
विरोधिना यथा तद्वन्नेह स्थूलाद्यपाक्रिया ॥१०२॥

As fire burns all the opposed objects, by assuming different forms which are opposed (to the objects to be burnt), so (is not to be accepted) the rejection of the gross etc. [102]

The argument in the verse is based on *vaidharmya*. Fire can be different in forms, as the one in the stomach of an individual and another in some mountain valley etc. and can help digestion and burn logs of wood (and other objects). But the imperishable does not undergo any change of form and does not consume (i.e. reject) other objects, viz. the gross etc., because none of them really exists beside itself.

मानित्वादिनिषेधः स्याद्यथैकाक्रियरूपतः ।
प्रत्यक्कूटस्थरूपेण तथा सर्वनिषेधकृत् ॥१०३॥

There is rejection here of (the imperishable as) having any means of activity—since it is only of the nature of what is not the performer of any activity. Further, being the inner self, the immutable, it rejects all (other objects). [103]

कूटस्थबोधपर्णत्वं प्रत्यक्त्वं वस्तुनः स्वतः ।
एतदस्य विरोधित्वं कार्यकारणवस्तुभिः ॥१०४॥

(Thus, therefore) the thing (viz. Ātman) itself is really in the form of the inner self and also has the nature of the immutable

and being full of knowledge. This is its character being opposed to all things (that can be differentiated as) cause(s) and effect(s).

[104]

द्वारं मुखं प्रतीकं वा यदि वा लिङ्गमुच्यते ।
निषेधोऽमुखमित्येवं त्रयस्याप्यभिधीयते ॥१०५॥

The word *mukha* is understood in the sense of a door or an opening, or even as some characteristic mark (*liṅga*), therefore, in the word *amukham*, there is rejection of all the three of them.

[105]

This is the explanation of the word *amukham*.

मात्रेति मानमिच्छन्ति मेयोऽर्थस्तेन मीयते ।
अक्षरे तदसंभाव्यममात्रं तद्यतस्ततः ॥१०६॥

They understand the word *mātrā* in the sense of the means of knowing, for hereby an object to be known becomes known. (But) all that is not possible (to think of) in the case of the imperishable; therefore, it is (described in the word) *amātra*.

[106]

This explains the word *amātra*.

मात्रादिलक्षणा यत्र सामग्री वस्तुनीष्यते ।
तत्प्रमेयमिति न्याय्यं न तु वस्त्वद्वयं स्वतः ॥१०७॥

It is reasonable that, only that has to be known as the object of knowledge, in respect of which there is expected every aid (*sāmagrī*) such as characterized by the word *mātrā*; but not the thing (viz. reality) which is by nature non-dual. [107]

व्याप्यव्यापकसंबन्धा न चाप्यक्षरवस्तुनि ।
न तदशनातिवाक्येन यतस्तद्वार्यते द्वयम् ॥१०८॥

Also, in respect of the imperishable thing (viz. reality), there is (not to be entertained) the relation as obtaining between the pervaded and the pervader, for, in the sentence *na tad aśnāti*, that pair¹ is denied. [108]

¹This is for *vyāpya* and *vyāpaka* objects.

निषिद्धमखिलं वस्तु यत्किञ्चिज्जगतीक्ष्यते ।
अवशिष्टं च यत्तच्च न प्रमाणोपपादितम् ॥१०९॥
एवं चेदक्षरं तादृक्कथमस्तीति गम्यते ।
न हि प्रमाणविरहादस्ति वस्त्विति वीक्ष्यते ॥११०॥

All the things that are seen in this world, without any exception, are rejected; therefore, that which remains (in reality) is not explained (or presented) by any means of knowing. [109]
(An objector asks:) 'If such is (the nature of the imperishable), then how does it become known; because, in the absence of any means of knowing, nothing is understood as existing?' [110]

Verses 109-110 are the refutation of an objection that the earlier argument would lead to acceptance of *śūnyatā*.

सिद्धसाध्यत्वतो नैवं तथा चोक्तोत्तरत्वतः ।
भावाभावातिरेकित्वादभ्युपेतं त्वयोच्यते ॥१११॥

So also, (the imperishable) is not like this (viz. *śūnya*), because it has the nature of what is established and what is to be established (both); for that has been so given in (your) answer (i.e. proof).¹ You have yourself² accepted that as existing beside a positive entity and (also) a negative entity. [111]

¹This refers to *svaprakāśatva* of the imperishable.

²This refers to an objector.

Verse 112-129 are the discussion of the existence of the imperishable on the basis of *pramāṇa* and tradition.

मानाभावे च तत्रेति व्यतिरेकः कुतोऽन्वयम् ।
मानाभावं किमद्राक्षीर्येनैवमभिधीयते ॥११२॥

Further, the absence of any means being accepted, there is no rule based on the idea of Vyatireka of that;¹ how then there could be the rule based on the idea of Anvaya? And have you known the absence of means of proof on the basis of which you state that this (the imperishable) does not exist?

[112]

सर्वं हि मानं लोकेऽस्मिन्वस्त्वभिव्यक्तसाधनम् ।
तदभावेऽनभिव्यक्तं वस्तु नास्तीति दुर्वचः ॥११३॥

Indeed, all the means of knowing, in this world, is an aid to the manifestation of (an existent thing) and, in the absence of that, it is difficult to say that the unmanifest thing does not exist.¹

[113]

¹Read SP: *na hi dīpābhāve tadabhivyaṅgyam ghaṭādi tamas-āvr̥tam nāstīti suvacanam iti hiśabdārthaḥ*. It is impossible to say that a pitcher does not exist, while it is not brought to notice by some light which shines on it.

स्थलाद्यनेकधर्माणां निषेधायासकारणात् ।
अस्तित्वमक्षरस्येह सिद्धं तावद्गात्मनः ॥११४॥

On account of the effort (of the Śruti) for rejecting many objects such as the gross¹ here (i.e. in the passage of the Śruti) is established the existence of the imperishable, which is the Ātman, that has the nature of the seer of them all (*tāvat*).

[114]

¹This refers to the properties which begin with the gross.

स्वमहिम्ना त्वभावोऽपि सेद्धुं नैवात्मवत्क्षमः ।

तत्पारार्थ्यजडत्वाभ्यां मित्यभावस्तथा समः ॥११५॥

Even the absence of that¹ cannot be reasonably² established owing to its own greatness,³ as in the case of Ātman; because, owing to their being helpful towards something else and being insentient, therefore (*tathā*) the absence of any knowledge (of them) is similar (to that of the object to be known).⁴ [115]

¹This refers to the absence of *mānameya* as in verse 112.

²This is for *kṣama*.

³That is, owing to its not being *svaprakāśa*.

⁴NKL adds: *svataḥ asiddhāḥ ity arthaḥ*.

मामेयमात्रसद्भावात्तेभ्योऽत्यन्तनिवृत्तिः ।
स्वमहिम्ना प्रसिद्धेश्च कुतोऽभावस्य संभवः ॥११६॥

Since (the imperishable) is altogether away from (*atyantanivṛtti*), those (viz. knowledge and object of knowing), while there exist only knowledge and object of its knowing, and that (the imperishable) becomes established by its own greatness; therefore, how could there be possible the non-existence of it? [116]

स्वतो माफलरूपत्वान्न माकार्यं प्रमाणतः ।
नास्तीति तु विना मानं न सिध्येत्कुम्भवत्स्वतः ॥११७॥

It being itself right of the nature of the result of knowledge it cannot be by any means of knowing (shown as) the result of (another)¹ knowledge; and (*tu*) that it does not exist cannot be proved without any (authoritative) means just on its own like a pitcher.² [117]

¹Read SP: *mānena saṁvidantaram tatra kāryam iti na mānataḥ śakyam vaktum ity arthaḥ*.

²Read SP: *vimatam meyaṁ jaḍatvād ghaṭavad anyathā svarūpahānir iti bhāvaḥ*.

कुम्भ आरोप्यते यद्वत्प्रकाशो भानुसंगतेः ।
भानुप्रकाशसंबन्धे भानोर्नान्यदपेक्षते ॥११८॥

As a pitcher is imagined (i.e. becomes known) as existing (*prakāśa*) when it is in contact with the sun; so, in the case of the existence of the sun (*prakāśatva*) nothing else than the sun such as relation to the light of the sun is expected. [118]

The sun exists in its own light: it doesn't require the aid of anything else as in the case of a pitcher which requires that. So also the imperishable, being *svaparakāśa*, does not require any aid of anything else. This is clarified in the following verse.

स्वतोऽवगतिसंबन्धात्तथाभावोऽवगम्यते ।
तथावगतिसंबन्धे नापेक्षावगतेः स्वतः ॥११९॥

A negative entity is not¹ understood from itself, owing to its relation to knowledge. So also, even while it has relation to knowledge knowledge itself does not have any dependence (on another). [119]

¹Cf. SP: *uttarārdhe sthitam naipadam pūrvārdhe 'pi sambadhyate*.

अतोऽवगत्यभावोऽपि न स्वतोऽवगतिं विना ।
सिध्यतीह ततोऽस्तित्वं स्वत एवाक्षरात्मनः ॥१२०॥

Therefore, the absence of knowledge also cannot become established, through itself, unless there has been the experience of it (which is other than itself); from that (it follows here that) there is existence of the imperishable Ātman only on account of itself. [120]

उक्तो निरन्वयोऽभावो न बौद्धादिसमाश्रयात् ।

तत्त्वमस्यादिवाक्योत्थविज्ञानविरहात्क्वचित् ॥१२१॥

This continuous absence of any relation is not stated (by the Śruti) by resorting to views of the Buddhists and others anywhere, while there is the absence of the right knowledge which arises from sentence(s) such as *tat tvam asi*. [121]

नान्यदज्ञानतोऽस्तित्वं द्वितीयस्यात्मनो यथा ।
निवृत्तिस्तद्वदेवास्य नागत्यात्मनोऽपरा ॥१२२॥

As there is not an existence of anything other than the Ātman unless without there being ignorance of the nature of the Ātman, similarly there is not any other distinction (*nivṛtti*) of this one (viz. the imperishable) from being aware of itself as knowledge. [122]

अकार्यकारणं साक्षादित्यादिगुणलक्षणम् ।
कूटस्थमक्षरं ध्वान्तध्वस्तौ स्यान्नो निरन्वयम् ॥१२३॥

For us, the immutable (and) the imperishable, which is neither effect nor cause,¹ (and) characterized by properties such as direct perceptibility; would not remain there, when ignorance (lit. darkness) is destroyed without anything left of it. [123]

¹In other words, 'is not cause(s) and effect(s)'. This might be better.

नास्यास्तित्वे यथा मानमेकत्वादक्षरात्मनः ।
तन्नास्तित्वेऽपि च तथा तयोस्तस्मात्प्रसिद्धितः ॥१२४॥

As there is not any means of knowing the existence of this one, which is the imperishable Ātman; so also, there is not any means of knowing its non-existence, since the two¹ have not come into existence, (unless) from (ignorance about it). [124]

¹The refers to *māna-meya*.

सत्त्वं वा यदि वासत्त्वं कार्यकारणवस्तुनः ।
अतद्वद्बोध एवैतत्सिध्यतीव न तु स्वतः ॥१२५॥

Be it either existence or non-existence of the thing(s) known as effect(s) and/or cause(s), knowledge of the same as (reality), is not what becomes established there through the knowledge of that; but this one (the inner self) itself. [125]

यत एवमतो नेह कश्चिद्विप्रतिपद्यते ।
अक्षरात्मनि नास्ति तत्त्वे तस्माद्वेतूक्तिरिष्यते ॥१२६॥

Since this is so, no person has difference of opinion here (i.e. in this respect); therefore, there is no expectation in reality of any proof(s) (or reason(s)) for proving its existence. [126]

यतो विप्रतिपद्यन्ते त्वन्तर्यामिणि वादिनः ।
तत्सिद्ध्येऽनुमायत्नः क्रियतेऽतः परोक्तिभिः ॥१२७॥

But, since objectors have difference of opinions about (the nature of) the inner controller, therefore, there is an effort made towards establishing it by the subsequent statements (in the Śruti).¹ [127]

¹This refers to *etasya vā akṣarasya praśāsane ...* in BU 3.8.9.

ईशितव्यार्थसंबन्धादन्तर्याम्येतदक्षरम् ।
चैतन्याभासमोहाख्यवर्त्मनैव न तु स्वतः ॥१२८॥

On account of there being the object(s) that require to be controlled, there is this imperishable inner controller. If then, in the way that it is so understood, owing to the delusion regarding it to be semblance of sentience, but it is not so because of its nature. [128]

The idea of the inner controller arises out of ignorance about the real nature of it, that is to say, owing to the acceptance of discrete object(s), thanks to ignorance.

अनुमानश्रुतिस्तस्मादागात्तस्यैव सिद्धये ।
कारणात्मनि संसिद्धे सर्वं सिद्धं भवेद्यतः ॥१२९॥

Therefore, there is (made) the Śruti statement regarding the inference of it for proving (the existence etc.) of it; (this is so), since everything else becomes known (lit. established), when the Ātman, which is the cause (of the existence of those things), becomes known. [129]

SP observes that inference becomes useful owing to the fact that even in BS 1.1-2: *janmādy asya yataḥ is svarūpalakṣaṇasiddhi* of the Brahman.

Verses 130-162 are the exposition of BU 3.8.9.
Now there is the exposition of inference establishing the existence of the inner controller.

एतस्य वा अक्षरस्य प्रशासनविधौ सति ।
सर्वतःस्थिरमर्यादं जगदेतद्विवर्तते ॥१३०॥

When there is the description of controlling (other things), there is the statement *etasya vā akṣarasya*; thus this, which has fixed limits on all sides of it, undergoes various changes. [130]

This is a brief explanation of *etasya vā ...*, viz. the statement of the inference in BU.

प्रशासने यथा राज्ञोऽभिन्नमर्यादिकाः प्रजाः ।
पृथिव्याद्यास्तथैवेमा अक्षरस्य प्रशासने ॥१३१॥

As, under the rule of a king, the subjects do not transgress

any limits of conduct, so do all these, viz. the earth and others, (not do it) under the rule of the imperishable. [131]

SP has properly shown the Saṃdhi of *rājñō 'bhinna-* as *rājñō* and *abhinna-*.

विवादगोचरापन्ना यन्तृपूर्वा जगत्स्थितिः ।
व्यवस्थितत्वाल्लोकस्य राजपूर्वा स्थितिर्यथा ॥१३२॥

The sustenance of this world, which is preceded (i.e. governed) by the controller, has become the object of disputation even like the sustenance of the people, which is established or determined, as being (preceded or governed) by the king. [132]

सूर्याचन्द्रमसौ तज्जकार्याभिज्ञपुरःसरौ ।
सर्वप्राण्युपकारित्वात्प्रासादस्थप्रदीपवत् ॥१३३॥

The sun and the moon, which head as the knowers of its effect(s), are, owing to their being useful to all beings, like a lamp placed in a mansion. [133]

This refers to a lamp put in a mansion for a specific purpose, similarly, the sun and the moon know what they have to (do (i.e. produce) for the benefit of the world, viz. heat, cool, light, (both) bright and delightful.

This justifies the word *tajjakāryābhijñā-*. This explains the word *vyavasthā* in verse 137 below, which is implied in this verse also.

सूर्याचन्द्रमसावीशौ मर्यादां नातिगच्छतः ।
येनेह विधृतौ नित्यं सोऽन्तर्यामीति गम्यताम् ॥१३४॥

Both the sun and the moon, who are lords,¹ do not transgress the limit (for their functions); therefore, that one is to be the knower of the inner controller, by whom these two are ever specifically sustained (*vidhrta*). [134]

Cf. the direct perception of the lord in *eṣa setur vidharaṇaḥ* (BU 4.4.22).

¹This refers to the deities in the physical sun and the moon.

कुसूलवन्न भिद्येते सांशत्वात्पततोऽपि न ।
गुरुत्वाल्लोहवत्पृथ्वी द्यौरपीत्यतिविस्मयः ॥१३५॥
चैतनावत्स्वतन्त्रत्वाद्देवतात्मत्वकारणात् ।
नान्तरेण नियन्तारं तयोरेषा व्यवस्थितिः ॥१३६॥

These two, being made up of parts though, do not, like a granary, flitter away, and fall.¹ Thus, it is, indeed, a great wonder that the earth, which, owing to its weightiness, and heaven also (do not fall). [135]

This condition of their sustenance cannot be without any controller of them, (even though) both of them are independent like one possessed of sentience and also are of the nature of deities. [136]

The first line of the verse explains the not-falling-apart of the sun and the moon of the previous verse and also of heaven and the earth, and, therefore, this translation can be taken to be predicated of the second line.

In verse 136, there is an emphasis on *dyāvāpṛthivī* as two dieties; cf. *sūryācandramasāvau īśau* in verse 134 above.

¹This indicates the breaking into pieces and (the consequent) falling apart of heaven and the earth.

संयुक्तयोर्वियोगोऽपि न तयोरीक्ष्यते क्वचित् ।
प्रशासनमृते शास्तुर्न व्यवस्थेदृशी भवेत् ॥१३७॥
द्यावापृथिव्योर्लोकेऽस्मिन्नन्यथेयं समीक्ष्यते ।
स्वभावमतिलङ्घ्यैते तिष्ठतः शास्तृशासने ॥१३८॥

Never is observed the separation of these, which are (always) in union; such a condition of sustenance (*vyavasthā*)¹ could not be without the rule of some controller. [137]
As this is noticed in the case of heaven and the earth, so

it is noticed in this world also. (That is to say:) these two, overpowering their own nature,² stay under the control of the controller. [138]

What is stated in the preceding verse is rejected in Vyatireka form, that is by resorting to the proof of knowledge called Arthāpatti.

¹Cf. verse 134, where this word is used.

²That is, they would flutter easily, as said in verse 135 above.

निमेषादिविभक्तानां कालांशानां व्यवस्थितिः ।
या स्वलिङ्गाजहद्वृत्त्या तदीशस्य प्रशासनम् ॥१३९॥

The condition of the different parts of time, which is divided into (parts) such as *nimeṣa*¹ etc., which obtains as there is the rule of their lord through his not giving up his characteristic.² [139]

¹This refers to the smallest unit of time which is taken for the wink of an eye.

²This refers to the cause, viz. the overture by time (*kalayitṛtva*).

नियतैव प्रवृत्तिश्च स्रोतसां महतामपि ।
नान्तरेण नियन्तारं संभाव्येत्यवसीयताम् ॥१४०॥

In the case of great streams of water (i.e. rivers) also their movement (lit. activity) is only determined. Let it be understood that it would not have been that one is not possible without a controller. [140]

दुःखार्जितधनत्यागिनुतिश्च जगतीक्ष्यते ।
नेयं युक्ताप्रसिद्धेशे तत्कर्मफलदायिनि ॥१४१॥
दातृप्रतिग्रहीत्रोश्च क्रियात्यक्तव्ययोस्तथा ।
अन्वक्षमेव विलयो दृश्यते सार्वलौकिकैः ॥१४२॥
तथापि तान्प्रशंसन्ति दुःखार्जितधनत्यजः ।

अपि सम्यक्प्रमाणज्ञास्तच्च नर्ते महेश्वरम् ॥१४३॥
 दानादिकर्मणः साक्षात्पश्यन्तः फलसंगतिम् ।
 प्रमाणज्ञाः प्रशंसन्ति यच्च तच्च सतीश्वरे ॥१४४॥

Also it is noticed in the world that there is praise (offered to) them, who give away (their own) wealth, which is obtained by them with effort (lit. misery or trouble). And it¹ would not have been proper, under some controller yielded the result(s) of their doing. [141]

Also the end of both the giver and the recipient as also of the activity and the giving away (of wealth) is directly perceived by all of this world. [142]

And yet they offer praise to them who give away their hardly earned wealth. And those, who know the science of the means of (right) knowing (state that) that happening is not without (having the notion of) the great lord.² [143]

That the knowers of means of knowing praise the connection with the result of activity such as making gift, (as if) directly perceiving the same is (possible) while there is (accepted) lord. [144]

¹This refers to praise (*nūti*).

²This refers to the learned Mīmāṃsakas, who are considered as authority on the system of sacrifices and their results and who therefore have to accept the idea of an overlord. Thus, this is the proof of the lord who controls all the activities, ritual and others.

शास्तर्यसति तत्कर्मफलवैचित्र्यवेदिनि ।
 सर्वज्ञेऽनुपपन्नं स्यात्कर्मज्ञानफलप्रदे ॥१४५॥

In the absence of the controller, the knower of the variety of the results of his activities, (and) the omniscient, the one who brings (lit. gives) the fruit/result of knowledge and activity, (all the above-mentioned praise of a giver of gifts) would have been unreasonable/unproved. [145]

Now follows, in verses 146-162, the refutation of the view that the result is obtained only by accepting the existence of *apūrva* which is produced by sacrificial activity.

नाप्यनीशमपूर्वं च प्रकल्प्यं फलसंगतौ ।
यतोऽपूर्वस्य संसिद्धौ प्रमाणं नोपपद्यते ॥१४६॥

So also, one should not accept *apūrva*, which is not the lord, in order that there is connection (of an activity) with a result, for the reason that there does not reasonably exist any means of knowing that could/would lead to establishing *apūrva*. [146]

नियन्तुरपि चेन्मैवं श्रुतेर्वस्तुन्यपि ध्रुवम् ।
प्रामाण्यस्य पुरोक्तत्वात्तत्सिद्धेश्चानुमानतः ॥१४७॥

(An objector would say:) 'But this¹ should be held in the case of the controller as well.² (The answer is:) 'Do not say so, because there has been already mentioned the unfailing (*dhruvam*) authoritativeness of the Śruti in respect of the thing (i.e. reality, viz. the existence of the inner controller). And also because that (controller) becomes established by inference (proper). [147]

¹It is the argument put forth in the preceding verse.

²This is to distinguish the *antaryāmin* from *apūrva* (both being only what is posited).

अर्थापत्तेरपूर्वस्य कल्पनापि न युज्यते ।
अन्यथाप्युपपन्नत्वादर्थपत्तेः क्षयो यतः ॥१४८॥

Also even postulating the concept of *apūrva* on the basis of Arthāpatti is not reasonable; since (the existence of that (*apūrva*) is shown to be unreasonable) in an other way of reasoning (*anyathā*), and, therefore, it is better to give up (the concept of) Arthāpatti. [148]

सेव्यात्सेवाफलप्राप्तिदर्शनान्न त्वपर्वतः ।
सेवायाश्च क्रियात्मत्वाद्दानयागादि च क्रिया ॥१४९॥

(This is also) on account of seeing that a person obtains the result of his services from (his master), who is to be served, and not from *apūrva*. And service is of the nature of some activity, therefore, making of gifts and/or performing (of sacrifices) is an activity. [149]

This is to state that there cannot be a seen reward brought to a person by *apūrva*. This is how direct perception does not justify the concept of *apūrva*.

दानादिफलसंप्राप्तिः सेव्याद्ववितुमर्हति ।
क्रियात्मकत्वाद्दानादे राजसेवाफलाप्तिवत् ॥१५०॥

Obtaining the result such as gift etc. is possible only from (some master), who is to be served. This is so, since (making of) gifts etc. is of the nature of an activity like obtaining the reward (lit. result) of a service to a king. [150]

सर्वकर्मफलप्राप्तिरीश्वरादेव नान्यतः ।
इत्याह भगवान्व्यासः सर्वज्ञोऽपि महामतिः ॥१५१॥

'Obtaining the result of all activities is possible only from the lord and not from any other', so said the omniscient revered Vyāsa of great intellect: [151]

This is stated in the actual words of Vyāsa, viz. *Gītā* 18.46.

यतः प्रवृत्तिर्भूतानां येन सर्वमिदं ततम् ।
स्वकर्मणा तमभ्यर्च्य सिद्धिं विन्दति मानवः ॥१५२॥

"That from which proceeds activity of (all) beings, that by whom is all this (world) extended—having worshipped him

by one's own activity, a human being attains liberation." [152]

अपि दृष्टक्रियाधर्मसामर्थ्यमनिरस्य तु ।
फलाप्तिकल्पनासिद्धावपन्यायोऽन्यथा भवेत् ॥१५३॥

(Also, if one holds) that there is obtaining of a result even (tu) without giving up (the idea of) the capacity of a directly perceiving propriety, in an activity that would be wrong reasoning (*apanyāya*). [153]

लोकदृष्टक्रियाधर्मसामर्थ्यत्यागलक्षणः ।
अपन्यायो न युक्तोऽतो न्यायवर्त्मासमन्वयात् ॥१५४॥

Therefore, wrong reasoning, which consists in (lit. is of the nature of) abandoning the capacity of and propriety in the activity known among the people, is not acceptance (lit. improper), for that does not go well with reasoning. [154]

कल्पनाधिक्यतश्चैतदपूर्वं नोपपद्यते ।
कल्प्य ईशोऽथवापूर्वं किं कल्प्यमुपपद्यते ॥१५५॥

And this *apūrva* does not appear reasonable owing to having an additional (entertaining of) some notion also. (Therefore, the question is:) 'Whether one has to imagine that there is a lord or there is to be imagined (*apūrva*)— what is reasonable? [155]

सेव्यात्क्रियाफलप्राप्तिर्दृष्टेयं न त्वपूर्वतः ।
नाप्यपूर्वं क्वचिद्दृष्टं तन्मानासंभवादिह ॥१५६॥

It is seen that there is obtaining of the result of an activity from (a master), who is to be served, but (it is not seen to have been obtained) from *apūrva*. Also nowhere is *apūrva* seen (i.e. perceived), because here (in the worldly and Śāstric dealings) owing to the absence of any means of knowing that (to be so). [156]

अपूर्वं निष्प्रमाणं च दातुं शक्तिरथास्य च ।
फलदातृत्वसामर्थ्ये दानं चाभ्यधिकं तथा ॥१५७॥

apūrva is (thus) without any means of knowing (associated) with it (i.e. for proving it). Nor also has it the capacity of a maker of gifts and the granting of gifts is an additional thing in comparison with the capacity to yield results. [157]

इह त्वीशातिरेकेण नान्यत्किञ्चित्प्रकल्प्यते ।
परिशिष्टस्य कल्प्यस्य सेव्ये दृष्टत्वकारणात् ॥१५८॥

But, here there is nothing else accepted or imagined (to be in existence) beside the lord. And this is so, for the reason also that (in the other view) there is accepted a thing to be granted (in addition to) the master (to be served). [158]

देवाश्च पितरश्चैव मनष्याणामधीनताम् ।
नाप्नुयुर्हव्यकव्यार्थं यदि नाभूत्प्रशासिता ॥१५९॥

Gods and manes also would not receive objects, viz. *havya*, *kavya* and through that dependence on human beings, if only there did not exist the controller (of the various ritual activities). [159]

यदज्ञानाज्जगत्यसिंमस्तीव्रानर्थपरंपरा ।
ज्ञानाच्च मुक्तिः संसारात्कथं नास्ति प्रशास्तृ तत् ॥१६०॥

How could there not be that controller, owing to the ignorance about whom there is in this world a severe sequence of miseries and owing to the knowledge (about whom) there is liberation from transmigratory existence? [160]

ननु क्रियात एवेयं संसारोच्छित्तिरिष्यते ।
नैवं यतो न कर्मभ्यो मुक्तिः संभाव्यतेऽश्रुतेः ॥१६१॥

(An objector's view:) 'But it is from activity that there is accepted (to come into effect) the removal (lit. destruction) of transmigratory existence.' (The answer:) 'Not so, because liberation does not come from activities, as (it is not so heard) in (lit. from) the Śruti. [161]

यथा च कर्मणा मुक्तिर्न कथं चन यज्यते ।
तथोक्तत्वात्पुरा नैह भूयो वक्तव्यमिष्यते ॥१६२॥

Further, as it is stated earlier, liberation is not in any way connected with activity and therefore it should not be said again and again. [162]

Sureśvara intends to point to the earlier statement (like this:) *na paramaśruter eva tebhyo muktyayogaḥ kiṃtu nyāyavirodhāc ca* (SP).

Now follows the exposition of BU 3.8.8.

असंभवो यथा मुक्तेः क्रियासाधनसंश्रयात् ।
तथेयं श्रुतिरप्याह यो वा इत्यादिवाक्यतः ॥१६३॥

As to how there is impossibility of (securing liberation) by resorting to the means in the form of activity, there is this Śruti statement, viz. *yo vā*¹ [163]

Read SP: *na karmabhyo muktir ity atraivāntaravākyam avatārayati.*

¹This is about the imperishable inner controller. *tad akṣaram* is connected by *yaḥ* (in verse 163), *yāt* in *yad abodha* (in verse 164) and also in *yat kārpanyam* (in verse 165). This justifies adjectival clauses in our translations.

उदारफलदायीनि बहुशोऽनुष्ठितान्यपि ।
क्षयिष्णुफलवन्त्येव कर्माणि यदबोधतः ॥१६४॥

(This is to say:) Activities (are considered as) yielding abundant results, even if they are performed many times but have only the perishable results to yield, since there exists ignorance (on the part of a person). [164]

तथा च यत्परिज्ञानात्कृत्स्नकार्पण्यनिःसृतिः ।
कथमेवंविधं गार्गि नास्तीत्यक्षरमुच्यते ॥१६५॥

So also, on account of the all-sided knowledge about whom there is annihilation (complete loss) of entire misery (*kārpanya*), how, O Gārgī, it is (i.e. can be) said that the imperishable of this nature does not exist? [165]

सर्वे कार्पण्ययुक्ताः स्युर्यदि न स्यात्तदक्षरम् ।
ईक्ष्यन्ते चाप्यकृपणास्तच्च सत्येव यन्तरि ॥१६६॥

All would be affected by misery (*kārpanyayukta*), if there did not exist that imperishable. And, they are free from misery and that is possible (only) if there is a controller. [166]

यो वा एतदिति स्पष्टं श्रुतिरप्याह यत्नतः ।
अक्षराज्ञानतः पुंसां कार्पण्येनावियुक्तताम् ॥१६७॥

The state of men's being unseparated from the condition of misery is owing to their ignorance (about the true nature of the inner self). [167]

The AnSS shows a variant reading: ... *pumsām kārpanyenāpi yuktatām*— this also conveys the same meaning; yet the translation could be: The state of men's being connected with misery is owing to their ignorance....

अक्षरं यो विदित्वास्माल्लोकाद्गार्गि प्रमीयते ।
निवर्तते स कार्पण्यात्तज्ज्ञानाद्ध्वान्तबाधतः ॥१६८॥

He who departs from this world after knowing this

imperishable, O Gārgī, keeps himself from misery owing to stultification of darkness by the knowledge of the perishable.

[168]

यस्त्वक्षरपरिज्ञानान्मृत्युमृत्युः प्रमीयते ।
स एव ब्राह्मणो नान्यो जगत्यध्यवसीयताम् ॥१६९॥

And one, who departs from this world, who has effected the end of death (*mṛtinṛtyu*) by complete knowledge of the imperishable is alone Brāhmaṇa in this world and none else.

Let this be concluded (or, the conclusion).

[169]

सर्वज्ञः सर्वकृच्चासौ निरस्ताशेषसंसृतिः ।
प्राप्ताशेषपुमर्थश्च ब्राह्मणोऽत्राभिधीयते ॥१७०॥

Here, that one is said to be Brāhmaṇa, who is omniscient, omnipotent and has cast off transmigratory existence in its entirety and obtains all the ends of human being(s), without exception.

[170]

Now follows in verses 171ff. the exposition of BU 3.8.11.

ज्ञेयत्वसिद्धये प्राह यथोक्तेश्वरवर्त्मना ।
अक्षरस्य श्रुतिः साक्षात्तद्वा इत्येवमादिना ॥१७१॥

In the words *sākṣāt tad vā* ..., has the Śruti spoken about the imperishable to be known as the object (in one's life), in the way there description (of it by the word) *īśvara*. [171]

The purpose is to justify the use of other words (appearing as adjective), which are not to be taken as expressive of any limiting adjuncts (*upādhis*).

एतदस्य प्रशास्तृत्वं स्वमोहाभासहेतुकम् ।
नेति नेत्यादिवाक्येभ्यो दृष्टिमात्रात्मवस्तुनः ॥१७२॥

This is the nature of this controller, caused by the semblance owing to ignorance about itself; this is clear from the sentences such as *neti neti*, viz. of that thing called the Ātman, which is merely the seeing one. [172]

इत्येतत्प्रतिपत्त्यर्थं तद्वा एतदिति श्रुतिः ।
मागोचरातिवर्तित्वाददृष्टं स्यात्तदक्षरम् ॥१७३॥

In order that one understands this, there is the Śruti statement *tad vā etat* The imperishable would be not directly perceptible, because it transgresses (the world of) objects, that are the objects (of what is called) knowledge. [173]

This is to ward off the idea of *pramāṇaprameyavyavahāra* being useful in knowing the imperishable lord the inner controller.

अभावत्वनिषेधार्थं द्रष्टृक्षरमिहोच्यते ।
कूटस्थदृष्टिमात्रत्वान्न तु द्रष्टृत्वमुच्यते ॥१७४॥

Here the imperishable said to be the seer: (this is) for rejecting its non-existence. And (*tu*), since it is merely the immutable seeing, there is not stated its capacity for seeing. [174]

This verse rejects the idea of the imperishable's association with any sort of activity.

ओतप्रोतगिराशेषदृश्यवस्तुनिराकृतेः ।
अकारकाद्वयत्वाभ्यां द्रष्टृत्वं नाक्षरात्मनः ॥१७५॥

Because there is rejection of the perceptible things, in their entirety, by the words *otaprota*, therefore there is not the property called seeing (said to be existing) in the imperishable Ātman, its being unconnected with any instrument of activity and one without duality. [175]

In this, the idea of the innate properties of the perceptible

and also any contingent idea of duality are rejected.

Verses 176-181 state that the things in the world are, in reality, but the immutable perishable.

बहुद्रष्टृनिषेधार्थं नान्यदित्याद्युदीरणम् ।
विजातीयसजातीयवस्त्वन्तरनिषेधतः ।
कूटस्थमेकं चैतन्यं सिद्धं श्रुत्यनुसारतः ॥१७६॥

Also the statement—(it is) ‘not anything else’ is for the purpose of rejecting (the existence) of many seeing ones. (Also) by the rejection of any other thing of a different nature or of similar nature is established the immutable sentient, which is just single—this is in keeping with Śruti’s teaching. [176]

This is the purport of *nānyat* in BU.

एतस्मिन्नक्षरे गार्गि स्रजि क्लृप्तफणीन्द्रवत् ।
ओतः प्रोतश्च निःशेष आकाशोऽकारणात्मनि ॥१७७॥

In this imperishable which is not of the nature of cause, O Gārgī, is woven lengthwise and crosswise the entire ether like an imaginary serpent (lit. king of cobras) that is seen in a wreath of flower. [177]

अक्षरं स्वात्मसंमोहात्कारणत्वं निगच्छति ।
तथा कार्यत्वमप्येतन्निरवद्यं तदेकलम् ॥१७८॥

And (yet) the imperishable, which is spotless or free from any blemish and which is single, becomes a cause on account of the delusion about its own nature and also the effect. [178]

This is to state about an inner self of the individual as not different from the imperishable.

सर्वस्याक्षरमात्रत्वान्न किञ्चिन्नोपसंहृतम् ।

प्रत्यग्विरोधतस्तद्वन्न किञ्चिन्नापि निहनुतम् ॥१७९॥

All that (exists in the world), being (only) the imperishable (in reality), there is not anything that is not withdrawn (within itself by the imperishable). Similarly, there would not be any opposition of the inner self, (being posited) and there would not be any thing (that might be) concealed. [179]

This is to reaffirm the significance of the word *ekala* in verse 178 above. It affirms the *aikalasya* 'oneness/identity (of all)'.

तथा ज्ञेयस्य सर्वस्य ज्ञाताज्ञातविभागिनः ।
उक्ताक्षरात्मावसितेर्न किञ्चिदवशिष्यते ॥१८०॥

Also, there is nothing excluded owing to (i.e. in the light of) the conclusion (about the existence of) only the imperishable, from the (already) explained (lit. stated) words (lit. letters) (of the Śruti) as (non-distinct from) all the objects to be known, being divided into known and unknown (objects). [180]

नानुत्पन्नमितो ज्ञानात्किञ्चिदप्यवशिष्यते ।
नाप्यध्वस्तं तथाज्ञानं कृत्स्नज्ञेयसमाप्तिः ॥१८१॥

(It follows that) there does not remain anything else than knowledge, which is not produced from this (exposition). Nor also is ignorance not destroyed; for there has been acquired (the knowledge of) whatever is to be known. [181]

इति श्रीबृहदारण्यकोपनिषद्भाष्यवार्तिके तृतीयाध्यायस्य
अष्टमं ब्राह्मणम् ॥८॥

**BRHADĀRANYAKOPANIṢAD-
BHĀṢYA-VĀRTIKA**

3.9

Śākalya Brāhmaṇa

Verses 1-6 pertain to the introductory explanation of BU 3.9.

सूत्रादिकार्यमार्गेण यन्तृत्वं कारणात्मनः ।
यदभ्यधायि प्राक्श्रुत्या तदेवानूद्य पूर्ववत् ॥१॥
साक्षादित्यादि याथात्म्यं भयोऽप्यात्मन उच्यते ।
नियम्यदेवताभेदव्याससंक्षेपवर्त्मना ॥२॥

What was earlier stated in the Śruti, viz. that the nature of the Ātman as being the controller of what is the cause¹ (of the world), by way of describing the effects (of it), viz. Sūtra etc.,² is first restated, and [1]

There is once again stated in the words beginning with *sākṣāt*, the true nature of the Ātman in the way that (there is a description of them) in their extent and in groups, based on distinction, viz. as the deities which are to be controlled.³ [2]

¹This is according to accepted limiting adjuncts of the Ātman.

²This refers to BU 3.7.3.

³This refers to *vikṣepa*, *saṁhāra* in verse 7 below.

चिदाभासं स्वमज्ञानं संनिपत्य तदक्षरम् ।
कारणं सत्स्वकार्येषु नियन्तृत्वं प्रपद्यते ॥३॥

The ignorance (about the nature) of its own (which is) the (varied) appearance of sentience, come together and then that perishable, being the cause, attains the character of the controller in respect of its own effects. [3]

Though the imperishable, is immutable and without any attachment, it is stated to be the controller owing to the appearance of the ignorance associated with it—this is stated in the verse.

सुषुप्तप्रलयावस्थप्राणात्माक्षरमुच्यते ।
स ब्रह्म त्यदिति तथा श्रुतिरप्याह तत्स्फुटम् ॥४॥

That imperishable is called *prāṇa* 'wind' and the inner Ātman, in the two conditions, viz. being in sleep state and the (final) merger of the world; it is so stated in the Śruti also clearly *sa brahma tyat*.¹ [4]

This verse is intended to convey the objection that *prāṇa* here means wind which goes out from body, this on the basis of the Śruti *prāṇam tarhi vāg apyeti*.

¹BU 3.9.9.

इत्यन्तर्याम्यवस्थायां स्थित्वैकां प्राणदेवताम् ।
सूत्राद्यवच्छेदवशात्सर्वमेतन्नियच्छति ॥५॥

Thus, the imperishable controls all this (world) after having controlled the single deity called *Prāṇa*, first being in the condition of the inner controller and then being delimited by the conditions of being *Sūtra* etc. later. [5]

This explains the twofold state of the imperishable as the inner controller in human body and one outside it.

नानात्वैकत्वरूपाभ्यां सा पुनः प्राणदेवता ।
स्थिता जगदिदं व्याप्य प्राणिकर्मवशादियम् ॥६॥

And (*punaḥ*) this deity called *Prāṇa* exists in the form of varied objects and as a single (object/being) after having pervaded this world owing to (the influence of) the activities of various beings (in it). [6]

Verses 7-10 are the exposition of the extent and the grouping of the deities in the various objects of the world, BU 3.9.1. This goes to explain Śākalya's question.

तस्या विक्षेपसंहारौ शाकल्यः पर्यपृच्छत ।
नियन्तव्यनियन्तृत्वसंबन्धस्य प्रसिद्धये ॥७॥

Śākalya asked about that deity multiplying itself into various objects (*vikṣepa*) and withdrawing them within itself (*saṁhāra*) in order that there is established the intended relation of what is to be controlled and the nature of the controller. [7]

देवसंख्यां स संपृष्टो निविदैव प्रपेदिवान् ।
देवा निविदि यावन्तो वैश्वदेवस्य संश्रिताः ॥८॥
तावन्त एव सोऽसुः स्याज्जगत्यस्मिंश्चराचरे ।
आनन्त्यं बहुशब्देन देवानां प्राब्रवीन्मुनिः ॥९॥

Asked about the number of the deities, he (viz. Yājñavalkya) answered that the number of them becomes known in the *nivid*¹ itself, (since) the deities are as many as are included in the *nivid* to the Viśvadevas [8] and that Ātman (*asu*) becomes (i.e. is) as many as they are in this world, moving and non-moving; infiniteness (in number) of the gods is stated by the seer in the use of the word *bahu* (in his answer). [9]

¹BUB explains *nivid* as the words in the Mantras which are addressed to Viśvadevas, stating the number of various deities in the same; cf. *nivin nāma devatāsaṁkhyāvācakanī mantrapadānī kānī cid vaiśvadeve śastre śasyante tānī nivitsaṁjñākānī* (BUB p.470).

त्रयस्त्रिंशत्प्रभृत्येषां षडादिषु यथाक्रमम् ।
संहतिः प्रातिलोम्येन व्यूहस्त्वागणनाक्षयात् ॥१०॥

(In the statement of the *nivid*), the number (of the deities) is given as the collection¹ (of them) in (the words) thirty-three, and then in six etc. in order; but their extent¹ is given (by Yājñavalkya) in reverse order (*prātilomyena*)² up to the end of enumeration (i.e. in the infiniteness of them). [10]

¹*saṃhṛti*, *vyūha* stand for *vikṣepa*, *saṃhāra* in verse 7 above.

²That is, not following their statement in the text of BU.

Verses 11-31 are the exposition on the contents of BU 3.2.2-9 together.

कतम इति पृष्टोऽथ वस्वादीन्प्रत्यपद्यत ।
वसूनप्यथ संपृष्टः सोऽग्न्यादीन्प्राब्रवीद्वसून् ॥११॥

Then (since he was) asked about how many of the Vasus (are there) ..., he said about the Vasus (and) then, when he was asked about the Vasus in particular, he stated them as Agni and others. [11]

संहतात्मप्रभेदा हि सैवैका प्राणदेवता ।
वसुत्वमष्टधा भिन्ना बिभर्ति जनिमत्स्थितौ ॥१२॥

That deity Prāṇa, being single in itself and with the various forms of itself collected in itself, assumes the nature of the Vasus, differentiated in eightfold, and remains in the condition of the beings (*janimat* of the world). [12]

वसु कर्मफलं चाहुः कर्मणः साधनं वसु ।
यस्मात्तदेषु निहितं तस्मात्ते वसवः स्मृताः ॥१३॥

They have said that the word *vasu* means the result of ritual (activity) and also they call *vasu* as the means (of performing the ritual activity).¹ And since that¹ is dependent on (lit. placed in) these, therefore they are known as Vasus. [13]

The verse is based on deviation of the word *vasu* in BU from the verb root *vas* 'to stay or to enable others to stay' as given in BU and BUB.

¹The word *sādhana* refers to *karmasādhana*.

पुरुषे ये दश प्राणा इन्द्रियाणि सहात्मना ।
मनसैकादशात्रैतान् रुद्रानित्याचक्षिरे ॥१४॥

And these ten organs viz. *prāṇas* which are in a human being's (body), together with *ātman* which is the same as *manas*, are together these eleven Rudras; so have they said. [14]

Here the word *ātman* is specifically paraphrased as *manas* in BU, followed by BUB and BUBV.

रोदयन्तो द्रवन्त्येते रुदन्ति च यतस्ततः ।
रुद्रा इत्यभिधीयन्ते प्राणा एकादशोदिताः ॥१५॥

Since they make a being cry or/and depart (from its body) and also they themselves cry, therefore they are called Rudras. Thus are mentioned the *prāṇas* 'organs'. [15]

This verse explains *te yadā*

This deviation of Rudra is presented by BU, BUB and BUBV.

आददाना यतो यन्ति मर्त्यानां स्थितिकारणम् ।
मासाभिमानिनो देवा आदित्यास्तेन ते स्मृताः ॥१६॥
आयुर्वीर्यं स्मृतिं प्रज्ञां सौकुमार्यं वपुःश्रियम् ।
आददाना यतो यन्ति तेनादित्या अमी स्मृताः ॥१७॥

Since they become the sustenance of the mortals, while they go on receiving (what is stated below), they are therefore known as *Ādityas*, the deities identifying themselves with the months (*māsābhimānin*); [16]

(that is to say:) Since they go on receiving, the life span, strength, memory, intelligence, softness (*saukumārya*) and the

splendor of the body, therefore these are called Ādityas. [17]

Verses 16 explains *ete hi* ... and verse 17 supplies further clarification of the same.

इन्द्रश्च देवता ज्ञेया मेघनादाभिमानिनी ।
स्तनयित्पुरिह ज्ञेयस्तथा यज्ञः प्रजापतिः ॥१८॥

So also Indra is to be known as the deity of the thunder of a cloud identifying itself with it (*abhimānin*). He is to be known here (as signified by the word) *stanayitnu*. Similarly, sacrifice is to be known as Prajāpati. [18]

This verse explains the significance of *stanayitnu* and Prajāpati.

This completes the list of thirty-three gods whom Yājñavalkya had in mind; these are: eight deities called Vasus, twelve Ādityas, eleven Rudras, Indra and Prajāpati. This is in accordance with the BU statement.

वीर्यं वज्रोऽशनिरिति स्तनयित्पुरिहोच्यते ।
पशुसाधनको यस्माद्यज्ञस्तस्मात्पशुः स्मृतः ॥१९॥

Strength is the thunderbolt called Aśani, Stanayitnu. Since a sacrifice has animals as the means for its performance, therefore, *yajña* is known as animal. [19]

This is the meaning of *aśani*.

अग्न्यादिषु यतः षट्सु यथोक्ताः सर्वदेवताः ।
षट्संख्यामेव संयान्ति षडग्न्याद्यास्ततः स्मृताः ॥२०॥

Since in the six, viz. Agni and others, are mentioned in brief (i.e. are included) all the deities as six in number, therefore these are known as the six, viz. Agni etc.¹ [20]

This clarifies *ete hīdam*

¹The six are Agni, Vāyu, Prthivī, Antarikṣa, Āditya and Dyau.

आधाराधेययोरैक्यात्पृथिव्यग्न्यादिषु त्रिषु ।
त्रयो देवास्ततोऽग्न्याद्याः कृत्स्नान्तर्भावकारणात् ॥२१॥

(In Yājñavalkya's statement in BU) the three gods, Agni and others,¹ (are comprised) in the earth and Agni etc.,² since, owing to (the acceptance of) the oneness (or, identity) of the support and the supported,³ (thus) on account of the inclusion of all (of them in them). [21]

From *ādhārādheya* ..., the verse explains *ima eva* ... in BU and in *kṛtsnāntar* ..., there is explained *eṣu hi*

¹This refers to Vāyu and Antarikṣa (i.e. Dyaus).

²There are three pairs meant: Earth and Agni, sky and Vāyu, and heaven and sun.

³'The supported' means 'what is to be supported (by the support)'.

अन्नं प्राणश्च देवौ द्वौ द्वयोरेष विनिर्णयः ।
एतावन्मात्रयाथात्म्यं सर्वस्य जगत्स्ततः ॥२२॥

Food and Prāṇa are two deities. This is the decision regarding the two (mentioned in Yājñavalkya's statement). Therefore, the real nature of the entire world is only of this magnitude.

[22]

योऽयं पवत इत्युक्तिरध्यर्धस्य विनिर्णये ।
एकत्वात्पवमानस्य तदाहुरिति चोदना ॥२३॥

(Yājñavalkya's) statement *yo 'yam pavate* is for the explanation (or, decision) (in respect) of the god (who is) named as one and half, but owing (to the statement) of only one in the Śruti injunction¹ which decides (the character of *adhyardha*).

[23]

¹This refers to *yo 'yam pavate....*

एकसंख्यैव नान्यास्ति द्विसंख्याया यतस्ततः ।
 पृष्ठोऽध्यर्ध इति प्राह सोपहासमृषिः सुधीः ॥२४॥
 वायुर्वा देवता कृत्स्ना तदन्यस्य तदात्मनः ।
 अर्धत्वं स्यात्कनीयस्त्वाद्व्याप्यस्याग्न्यादिरूपिणः ॥२५॥

Since there is not mentioned the number (called) one beside number two, therefore, the intelligent/brilliant sage (Yājñavalkya) said in scorn/ridicule *adhyardha*, when he was asked (the number). [24]

Vāyu in its entirety is indeed deity, since whatever else than that there is, it is of the nature of that (Vāyu), as such there would be halfness (*ardhatva*) of the deity in the nature of Agni and another, owing to its being younger and being pervaded (by Vāyu). [25]

This explains *yad asmin ...*, which is Yājñavalkya's answer. Also, it extends the Vedic meaning, viz. about the number, to another sphere (i.e. of the deities).

ऋद्धिं प्रापद्यतः सर्वं वायौ सति चराचरम् ।
 तस्मादध्यर्ध इत्येवं वायुमाचक्षते बुधाः ॥२६॥

Since all (else), moving and non-moving obtained richness owing to the presence of Vāyu, therefore (it is that) the learned people call Vāyu (*Adhyardha*). [26]

This explains the words *yad asmin*.

संख्याप्राधान्यमध्यर्धे विदग्धेन विवक्षितम् ।
 सर्वमृध्नोति यत्प्राणे तेनेति श्रुतिहृद्गतम् ॥२७॥

All that was intended by Vidagdha¹ (Śākalya) was the prominence given to the number in the word *adhyardha*. Therefore, the intended meaning of the Śruti word *adhyardha*

is all that whichever prospers through (only) Prāṇa. [27]

In the first line, the literal sense of *adhyardha* 'one and a half' is indicative of ridicule. This is clarified by the derivation of *-ardha* from the verbal root *ṛdh* 'to prosper'.

The next verse clarifies the derivational sense.

¹There is a play on the word *vidagdha* which has the sense 'intelligent one'. This is used of Śākalya and is understood by Yājñavalkya in mere ridicule!

अन्नाशितृत्वसिद्धयर्थं यथा व्युत्पत्तिरुच्यते ।
अन्नेनाश्नुत इत्येवमध्यर्धस्यापि योजना ॥२८॥

'Since there is stated in the Śruti the derivation (of the word *adhyardha*) for establishing the sense of 'being the eater of (all) food' on the basis of the statement *annena aśnute*'—such is the derivation offered.¹ [28]

Read the note of the editor of NKL edition: *asmin sati sarvam adhyārdhnot iti vyutpattir ity arthaḥ*.

¹*Aitareyopaniṣad* 2.1.2: *annena hīdam sarvam aśnute prāṇaḥ*.

जनिमत्सर्वभूतानां प्राणेऽन्तर्भावहेतुतः ।
प्राणो देवोऽत एवैकस्तस्यैव महिमा परः ॥२९॥

For the reason that all the beings which have an origin are included in Prāṇa, there is only one god Prāṇa and its greatness is the highest. [29]

This brings out the significance of the word *prāṇa* in *katama eko deva iti prāṇa iti sa brahme tyad ity ācakṣate*. Cf. the next verse also.

भरणात्सर्वकार्याणां प्राणो ब्रह्मेति भण्यते ।
त्यदित्याचक्षते तस्मात्प्राणं ब्रह्म परोक्षतः ॥३०॥

On account of its supporting (*bharaṇa*) all effects¹ Prāṇa is called the Brahman. Therefore, they describe Prāṇa, the Brahman, as *tyat* in indirect manner.² [30]

¹They are worldly objects.

²This is a peculiar Brāhmaṇical tendency to explain certain names as intentionally changed, i.e. they are indirect names of the deity: cf. oft-repeated phrase in the Brāhmaṇas *tad etad ... ācakṣate parokṣeṇa, parokṣapriyā vai devāḥ*.

साक्षान्निर्देशनुत्तर्यं कारणत्वावबुद्धये ।
प्राणं ब्रह्म त्यदित्याहुः पारोक्ष्येण महाधियः ॥३१॥

The highly learned men have described in indirect manner Prāṇa in the words *brahma tyat ...*, in order that the direct mention (*sākṣānnirdeśa*) of it is avoided and that one comes to know (that Prāṇa) as the cause (of discrete objects in the world). [31]

In this verse Sureśvara emphasises the character of Prāṇa as the Brahman which is not directly perceptible.

Verses 32-57 discuss the contents of BU 3.9.10-17 and they are the discussion on Prāṇa being conceived as eightfold in the manifestation of the Brahman.

करणेष्वेषु सर्वेषु तथा कार्यात्मकेषु च ।
अध्यात्मादिषु कात्स्नर्येण तेषु तेष्ववतिष्ठते ॥३२॥

(That Prāṇa) resides in each of all the organs (*karaṇas*) and also those which are of the nature of effects (of the same) and abide in the body (*adhyātma*) etc. [32]

This is for introducing the words of the Śruti *pṛthivy eva yasyāyatanam anger loko*

अष्टधातः पुनस्तस्य भेदोऽयमुपवर्ण्यते ।
अधिकारविशेषेण पृथिवीत्यादिनाधुना ॥३३॥

From this follows the mention of the eightfold distinct appearance (*bheda*)¹ in the words *pr̥thivī* ... in relation to some specific topics.² [33]

¹These are *pr̥thivī*, *kāma*, *sāmānyātman*, *ākāśa*, nightly darkness, bright form, residing in a common abode and finally residing commonly in the semen.

²Cf. the note by the editor of the NKL edition: *adhikāra-viśeṣeṇa pr̥thivyādaḥ svāmitvena sambandhaviśeṣeṇa*; this is based on the end of SP on this verse.

अनन्तभेदभिन्नस्य पुनरप्यष्टधोच्यते ।
देवतासमुदायस्य भेदः संक्षेपलक्षणः ॥३४॥

Here are stated the distinct appearances of (the deities in) the groups of the deities as being eightfold, even though it (viz. the reality) has differentiated itself into innumerable (forms)—this is for securing brevity in the statement (*saṁkṣepa*).¹ [34]

¹This, the innumerable forms, is for making the meditation on them easy, cf. *dhyānasaukaryārthan saṁkṣepoktir iti bhāvaḥ* (SP).

पृथिव्यायतनं यस्य तत्स्थोऽग्निर्लोक एव च ।
तस्यालोकनहेतुः स्यादग्निर्देवस्य सर्वदा ॥३५॥

And¹ the cause of the appearance of that deity called Agni is ever with reference to that Agni which is the world, reside as it does in it, the one who has ever the earth as its support. [35]

The statement is to be connected with the statement in the

verse BU 3.8.10: *tam yo vidyāt sa veditā*

मनश्च ज्योतिर्विज्ञानं संकल्पादिस्वलक्षणम् ।
स्वरूपं वा मनोज्योतिर्यस्य देवस्य भण्यते ॥३६॥

And that deity, about whom is stated *mano jyotiḥ*, is *manas* having the nature of light, viz. knowledge (*vijñāna*) and having the forms of design (*saṃkalpa*) etc. [36]

As in the case of the preceding verse, this also is connected with *tam yo vidyāt*

क्षितिदेहोऽग्निनयनो मनःसंकल्पसाधनः ।
यः पृथिव्यभिमान्यत्र सर्वस्यैव परायणम् ॥३७॥
आध्यात्मिकस्य सर्वस्य कार्यस्य करणस्य च ।
परायणमवष्टम्भ आत्मनः स्यात्तथाविधम् ॥३८॥
याज्ञवल्क्येह यो विद्याद्वेदिता स्यात्स एव तु ।
पण्डितो न त्वनेवंविद्यथा त्वं पण्डितायसे ॥३९॥

The one who identifies oneself with *Prthivī* is (the *Ātman*) having the form (lit. body) of the earth, eye in the form of fire and having *manas* and (its various) designs as the means (of activity)—it is the ultimate end (lit. goal) certainly of (*eva*) all things (in the world). [37]

That kind of becoming the final goal of the *Ātman*¹ means its being the support of the entire (world of) effects and means of activity residing in the body. [38]

O Yājñavalkya, one who knows (thus), in this (context), is alone the knower, (and) a learned man, but certainly not one who does not know like this and like yourself who boast of being a learned man. [39]

These verses sum up the thought in the three sentences beginning with *prthivy eva*.

¹This is for *Prāṇa*.

इयता यदि पाण्डित्यं लभ्यते वेद तर्हि तम् ।
शारीरः पार्थिवेऽशेऽत्र देवोऽध्यात्माभिमानवान् ॥४०॥

If the status/character of a learned man can be obtained by (only) this much (knowledge), then know him (as one) here, in this earthly part that god who has assumed a body and identified himself with it.¹ [40]

This explains the meaning of *veda*

¹This is clarified in the second line of the next verse.

पृथिव्येवाहमित्येवं योऽभिमानो व्यवस्थितः ।
लोमत्वङ्मांससंघातः कार्यं तस्यायमेव तु ॥४१॥

He, who has (thus) identified himself, saying 'I am the earth itself', is but a conglomeration of hair, skin, flesh, yet he is but the effect of the same. [41]

The two lines refer to the two forms of the Ātman, viz. Pṛthivī and its effects, which belong to it which comprise the body (*śārīra*).

स एष देवो यः पृष्टो वद भयोऽप्यहल्लिक ।
यतोऽसमाप्तमेवेदं दर्शनं ते विवक्षितम् ॥४२॥

'It is this god about whom you are asked, tell me, (O Śākalya) O Ahallika,¹' (answered Yājñavalkya), 'since this view of yours, viz. what you have intended to express, is only incomplete.'² [42]

This explains *sa eṣa* ... in BU.

On the verse, read SP: *ukta devasambandhitvena vācyasya hetoḥ aprṣṭatvād ity arthaḥ*.

¹It is established by some as a ghost. Ahallika is a proper name as explained in verse 83 below and this justifies the translation of the word *ahallika* as 'O ghost,' given by some

translators. But this is, in all likelihood, another name given by Yājñavalkya to Śākalya.

²That is, incompletely expressed.

तस्य का देवतेत्येनमप्राक्षीत्क्षोभितो रुषा ।
तं प्रत्याहामृतमिति याज्ञवल्क्योऽपि देवताम् ॥४३॥

Being excited (by these words), (Śākalya) asked angrily 'Which is the deity of that?'. To him then answered Yājñavalkya, 'That deity is immortality'. [43]

The first line explains the question of Śākalya as expressed in *tasya* ... and the second, the answer of Yājñavalkya.

यतो यो लभते सिद्धिं तस्यासावेव देवता ।
विवक्षितेह विज्ञेयामृतमित्यादिलक्षणा ॥४४॥

'That is the deity for a person from whom he secures the desired object (*siddhi*). Therefore, in this (our conversation), the deity intended (*vivakṣita*) is characterized as *amṛtam* [44]

The first line explains the *devatā*.

योषिज्जग्धस्य योऽन्नस्य रसः स्यात्परिणामजः ।
मातृजस्यासृजो हेतुरमृतं सोऽत्र भण्यते ॥४५॥

That sap of food, which is eaten by woman and is thus the modification of it, is the cause of the blood of the mother; that is here described as *amṛta*. [45]

This explains what is meant by *amṛta*.

रसाच्छोणितनिष्पत्तिः शोणिताद्वीजसंश्रयात् ।
शरीरं जायते साक्षाद्येन शरीर उच्यते ॥४६॥

That (deity) is called as residing in the body, since a directly perceptible body originates from the resort in the blood and the seed, since the origin of the blood is from the sap (of eaten food). [46]

अन्येऽमृतमिदं प्राहुर्दिव्यं चान्द्रमसं पयः ।
तत्पर्जन्यादिना जातं दाढर्यकृत्क्षितिदेहयोः ॥४७॥

Others have called this *amṛta* as the divine water which has originated from the moon and that, causing solidity (or firmness *dārdhyakṛt*) in the earth and the body (i.e. human body), thus being born from the rain etc.¹ [47]

This is another explanation of *amṛta*.

¹This stands for showers, life-giving energy.

उत्तरेष्वपि वाक्येषु यथोक्तमुपपादयेत् ।
न्यायः साधारणं सर्वं विशेषस्तु प्रवक्ष्यते ॥४८॥

In the subsequent sentences, also one should everywhere (*sarvam*) adopt a common way of explanation (*nyāya*) and the particular (meaning which is to be conveyed in each of them) will be stated (in what follows). [48]

योषित्समागमेच्छेह काम इत्यभिधीयते ।
हृदयं बुद्धिरालोकः सर्वं तेन हि पश्यति ॥४९॥

Here (i.e. in this context), the expression *kāma* is used for conveying the sense of the desire for union with a woman, because a human being's heart, intellect and sight, all of them, see only through that. [49]

This explains *kāma eva yasya*

स च काममयो देवः कामभावनयाञ्जितः ।
देवतास्य स्त्रियो ज्ञेयाः कामः स्त्रीतो हि जायते ॥५०॥

And that is the deity consisting in desire, (fully) tainted with the feeling of *kāma*. The deity for it are women, because *kāma* is produced on account of (or from) a woman. [50]

शुक्लादीन्यत्र रूपाणि भास्वराण्युत्तरत्र तु ।
सावित्रः पुरुषस्तस्य चक्षुः सत्यं च देवता ॥५१॥

Forms such as white (mentioned here) and (*tu*) bright (forms) (mentioned) later are the man in the sun and his eye, viz. *satya* is the deity. [51]

Up to verse 51, there was a statement made of the threefold appearance of the deity in the body and this verse extends the same explanation to other statements about the sky etc.

रूपभास्करसत्येषु त्रिधैषोऽपि व्यवस्थितः ।
पूर्ववच्चोत्तरत्रापि सर्वत्रैव त्रिधा त्रिधा ॥५२॥

Thus, this one has remained threefold in the form, in the sun and in *satya*. As in the case of the earlier in the later statements also, the deity in every one of them is to be considered as threefold. [52]

प्रतिश्रवणवेलायां श्रोत्रे यः संनिधीयते ।
स त्वयेहाभिनिर्दिष्टो दिशस्तस्यापि देवता ॥५३॥

The one, who is brought into the vicinity of the ear at the time of listening¹ (to someone else's speech) is here² mentioned by you, (O Śākalya), and the deity of that is the quarters. [53]

This explains *sa evāyam śrautaḥ*. This refers to *ākāśa*.

¹The preposition *prati* does not cause here the usual change of meaning (viz. promising).

²This refers to the sky.

अन्धकारस्तमो ज्ञेयं तथा छायामयः पुमान् ।
मृत्युश्च देवता तस्य तमसैव मृतिर्यतः ॥५४॥

(By the word) *tamas* is to be understood dark (or, darkness); so also, one having shadow (is to be known as) a man and for that man the deity is death, since death is caused by darkness alone. [54]

This explains *tama eva*

रूपायतनदेवस्य प्रतिबिम्बोदयाश्रयः ।
विशेषकार्यं प्राणोऽसुस्तस्यापीहाधिदेवता ॥५५॥

For the god residing in the form, the support is the rise of a reflection, and the particular effect of that is *Prāṇa*, and here also the deity is *asu*. [55]

सामान्याम्मयदेहस्य विशिष्टाः कार्यमस्य ताः ।
वरुणो देवता तस्य वरुणाद्धि स जायते ॥५६॥

Those specified (waters) are the effect of this one, who has assumed a body which consists in the commonly known waters; its deity is *Varuṇa*, because he is born from *Varuṇa*. [56]

This explains the meaning of *āpa eva*

शुक्रस्नायवस्थिमज्जानो भवन्ति पितृतो यतः ।
प्रजापतित्वं पितरि तस्मादेतदिहोच्यते ॥५७॥

Since semen,¹ muscle, bones and marrow originate from father, therefore, the nature of *Prajāpati* (obtains) in father and this is therefore stated here. [57]

¹NKL reads *śukla* in place of *śukra*.

Verses 58-63 are the discussion of BU 3.9.18.

यावत्किञ्चिद्विजानाति शाकल्यः सर्वमेव तत् ।
पर्यपृच्छद्यथाशक्ति मुक्त्वा दिग्ज्ञानमात्रकम् ॥५८॥

Whatsoever Śākalya knew, all that he asked according to his ability, only with reference to (just some) knowledge about quarters. [58]

अवशिष्टं यदप्यस्य तन्मां पृच्छतु कामतः ।
इति चेतसि संधाय याज्ञवल्क्योऽभ्यभाषत ॥५९॥

'And also¹ whatever is left (in your mind), you do ask me freely (*kāmataḥ*), (O Śākalya).' with this thought in mind, Yājñavalkya spoke to him. [59]

¹*api* is for conveying 'though not asked by Śākalya'. This is the substance of Yājñavalkya's thought. This is expressed in yet another way in the following verse.

अतिनिर्बन्धतो वापि निषेद्योऽयं प्रमादवान् ।
इत्येतद्धृदये कृत्वा कारुण्यात्तमथाब्रवीत् ॥६०॥

'Or, this person (i.e. Śākalya), who has committed a fault (viz. asking rather boldly), should rather be warded off.' Having this in mind, (Yājñavalkya) said to him out of compassion (or pity). [60]

मय्यग्नौ शिशुवन्मोहात्प्रविशन्तं न कश्चन ।
त्वां वारयति यत्नेन साधुब्राह्मणसंसदि ॥६१॥

'While you are entering into the fire, viz. in me, owing to your ignorance, (just) like a child, nobody here in the assembly of good Brāhmaṇas wards you off carefully.¹ [61]

Verses 60-61 point to the ignorance of Śākalya who is, in

scoff as it were, called elsewhere as *vidagdha*. Cf. verse 27 above.

Verse 61 explains *tvām svit*

¹This is for *yatnāt* which is clarified by SP thus: *sabhāto bahirṇayanādi yatnaḥ*.

सर्वेषामपि नूनं त्वं हन्तव्यत्वेन संमतः ।
अकृत त्वां यतो विप्राः संदंशं मयि पावके ॥६२॥
तस्माद्बुध्यस्व शाकल्य महद्भयमुपस्थितम् ।
अतिनिर्मथनादग्निश्चन्दनादपि जायते ॥६३॥

Indeed, for all these, you are considered unanimously (*sammata*) as fit to be killed, since these Brāhmaṇas have made (i.e. used) you into a pair of tongs towards me (who am considered by them) as fire. [62]

Therefore, be on your guard (lit. wakeful), O Śākalya; there has occurred great danger for you; (you must know that) even from (the wood of) sandal tree there is fire produced by rubbing the same for a longer time (*ati*, lit. too much). [63]

Yājñavalkya gives the reason for warding Śākalya from asking any (other) question. The idea is: The Brāhmaṇas in the assembly, who were fully aware of the powers of Yājñavalkya, a knower of the Brahman, have only pitilessly pitched Śākalya against him only to be crushed.

The explanation in the second line of verse 63 is to indicate that there can arise anger in the mind of even a knower of the Brahman, despite his tranquillity.

Verses 64-69 are the discussion of BU 3.9.19.

विषायतेऽमृतमपि यथा पथ्यं मुमूर्षतः ।
तथैव नाग्रहीत्सूक्तं शाकल्यः कालचोदितः ॥६४॥

Since even nectar, which, though (beneficial) for one, acts as poison for one who is about to die,¹ therefore Śākalya, who was (as it were) goaded by death², did not accept that

good advise (*sūkta*).

[64]

This is to explain the BU sentence *yā*

¹Though the literal meaning is 'one who wishes to die,' it is not so meant!

²This is *kāla*.

ब्राह्मणैर्घातयिष्यामि मां जिघांसन्तमाश्विमम् ।
इत्यर्थं कोपकृद्वाक्यं शाकल्यो मुनिरब्रवीत् ॥६५॥

With this thought in mind (*ityartham*), viz. 'I shall get killed by (these) Brāhmaṇa this one who wishes to (i.e. can) kill me ¹ (only) quickly,' ² the sage Śākalya said to him this (lit. the sentence) that would cause his anger.

[65]

This is the purport of *kālacoditaḥ* ... in the preceding verse.

¹SP refers to the commonly accepted code of conduct (*nyāya*): *jighāṃsantaṃ jighāṃsīyān na tena bhrūṇahā bhavet*.

²SP explains the significance of these words thus: *śāpadānāt prāg evety āśuśabdārthaḥ*.

अङ्गारावक्षयणोक्त्या विद्वान्किं ब्रह्म श्रेयसः ।
अत्यवादीस्त्वमज्ञः सन्का विद्या फलिनी तव ॥६६॥

'It is to be understood by your statement regarding (the pair of tongs for) picking up cinders that you are a knower of the Brahman so that you have spoken ill (lit. too much) about the respectable Brāhmaṇas, though you are ignorant, while the lore of yours has really yielded fruit?'

[66]

The meaning of the BU sentence *yad idam* is under reference.

From SP we can infer that the intention of Śākalya was to hint at Yājñavalkya's eye on cows as the reward for whatever he said.

दिग्विभागाधिकारेण यथोक्ता एव देवताः ।
पञ्चधेहोपदिश्यन्ते तदेतदनुवर्ण्यते ॥६७॥

In the following verses (viz. verses 70ff.) are enumerated the deities, which are stated, as fivefold in relation to the topic of the division of quarters. [67]

This states the purport of *diśo veda*.

का विद्या सफला साक्षात्तवेतिप्रश्नवादिनम् ।
सदेवाः सप्रतिष्ठाश्च दिशो वेदेत्यथाब्रवीत् ॥६८॥

To him who asked 'Which lore of yours has directly yielded fruit?', he (Yājñavalkya), then said, 'I have known the quarters together with their deities and their abodes'. [68]

This is the meaning of the BU sentence *diśo veda*

सदेवसप्रतिष्ठादिशरीरं प्रतिजज्ञिवान् ।
आत्मानं स मुनिः पृष्टो यतस्तं पर्यपृच्छत ॥६९॥

Since the sage answered¹ (about) the Ātman as having a body, together with the deities and their supports etc.² (in it), he (i.e. Śākalya) asked him a question. [69]

¹Cf. the word *pratiśravaṇa* in verse 53 above—it is equivalent to *pratijñāna* (as understood from *pratijajñivān*).

²The word 'etc.' refers to the questions (*diśa*).

Verses 70-79 state the fivefold mode of worship in accordance with the different quarters such as the east, as but the worship of *Prāṇa*. Also, this is an exposition of BU 3.9.20-24.

सदेवाः सप्रतिष्ठैता दिशोऽहमितिवादिनम् ।
प्राच्यां किंदेवतोऽसीति विदग्धस्तमपृच्छत ॥७०॥

To him who said, 'I have known the quarters together with those deities and their abodes, Vidagdha questioned, 'What do you have as the deity in the east?' [70]

This is the meaning of *kimdevato 'syām*.

In this verse, Sureśvara uses *sapraṭiṣṭhāitāḥ* which is the case of double Saṁdhi, viz. that of *sapraṭiṣṭhāḥ etāḥ*. Sureśvara often follows the Vedic style of Saṁdhi.

पूर्वदिगात्मभूतं मां त्वं विद्वद्यादित्यदेवतम् ।
इत्युक्ते तमृषिं भूयः स प्रतिष्ठामपृच्छत ॥७१॥

When it was said (in answer that), 'Do you know me as one having become the Ātman of the eastern quarter, viz. as one having the sun as the deity,' Śākalya once again asked the sage about the abode of it. [71]

This is the meaning of the BU sentence *sa ādityadevataḥ*

सर्वरूपात्मकः सूर्यश्चक्षुष्येव प्रतिष्ठितः ।
सर्वरूपेषु चक्षुश्च रूपाणि हृदये तथा ॥७२॥

'The sun, who reveals itself in the nature of all forms, has his abode just in the eye and the eye has it in all the (visible) forms and, further, the forms (have it) in the heart. [72]

This explains the word *cakṣuṣi*.

रूपारब्धमिदं चक्षु रूपाणामेव तद्ग्रहात् ।
अभिव्यङ्ग्यसजातीयो व्यञ्जको रूपदीपवत् ॥७३॥

This eye is supported¹ in the forms, because it is only the forms which it (viz. the eye) grasps. What reveals some object belongs to the class of what is being revealed, as, for instance, a lamp and the form (are of the same class). [73]

The first line is justified by the generally accepted truth. This is an instance of the figure of speech, called *Arthāntaranyāsa*.

¹This is from the word *ārabdha* which is derived from *ārabh*, (equivalent to verb root *ālabh* also) 'to hold'.

अशेषविषयात्मत्वं मनोबुद्धयोर्विनिर्दिशेत् ।
सर्वगोचरभासित्वात्तादात्म्ये तच्च युज्यते ॥७४॥

One should point to the fact that *manas* and intellect have (or grasp) the nature of the worldly objects without exception (*aśeṣa*); and that is justified when we accept similar ¹ nature of them all because (*manas* and intellect) are capable of making all the objects apparent (to an individual). [74]

This stands for *tādātmya* 'oneness (in nature)' of *manas* and intellect with the objects revealed by them.

एष एवानुसंधेयो न्यायो योऽयमिहोदितः ।
वक्ष्यमाणासु सर्वासु दिक्षु प्रत्येकशः क्रमात् ॥७५॥

This very way of explanation (*nyāya*) which is stated here is to be extended to all the other quarters which will be mentioned, each one of them in order. [75]

प्राच्यां रूपोपसंहारो दिक्त्रये कर्मसंहतिः ।
ध्रुवायां संहतिर्नाम्नो हृद्येवं सर्वसंहतिः ॥७६॥

(Such is the intended thought of the Śruti:) In the eastern quarter there is a mention of all forms (collected together), in the three quarters, there is mention made of all activities in their collection. In the quarter above (called *dhruvā* = *ūrdhvā*), there is the mention of all the names together and, similarly, in the heart, there is the mention of all ¹ (of their collection). [76]

A note by the editor of the NKL edition under verse 76 above

would prove useful in understanding the relevant verses together that is, with reference to the five alternatives (*paryāyas*) in the sentences beginning with *hr̥daya hy eva rūpāṇi ... ūrdhvāyām*

¹This refers to the world which is made up of *nāmarūpa-karmāṇi*.

केवलं कर्म याम्यायां प्रतीच्यां पुत्रजन्म च ।
ज्ञानयुक्तमुदीच्यां च कर्मैवमुपसंहतम् ॥७७॥

In the direction of Yama, there is only (collection of) activities, in the west, there is (only) the birth of a son, and, further, in the north, there is collected in a similar manner (that) activity which is combined with knowledge. [77]

This refers to the three quarters (*diktraya*), mentioned in the preceding verse.

नाम्नश्चाप्युपसंहारो ध्रुवायां हृदि वर्णितः ।
एवं क्रमेण निःशेषं जगद्ध्युपसंहतम् ॥७८॥

The collection of all the names is also mentioned as belonging to the quarter above (*dhruvā*). This is described as supported in the heart. Thus is the entire world collected together—in this order. [78]

This explains BU sentence *dhruvāyām*

सामर्थ्याच्च मनोऽप्यत्र विज्ञेयमुपसंहतम् ।
रूपादिपञ्चकं यस्मात्तद्द्वारेणाश्रितं हृदि ॥७९॥

Owing to the significant power (*sāmarthya*) of (the word) *manas* also, it is to be known as merged (lit. collected together with others); it is supported in the heart through that very manner as the five things, viz. form etc.¹ [79]

This sets aside the doubt if *manas* were not included in the merger, for it was not mentioned in *niḥśeṣaṃ jagad upasaṃhṛtaṃ hr̥di*

¹This refers to *rūpa, rasa, gandha, sparśa, śabda*. Read NKL: *rūparasagandhasparśasaṃjñaviṣayapraṇcam manovikalpitaṃ atah manasa upasaṃhārābhāve tadvikalpitānāṃ hr̥di upasaṃhārā-nupapattirūpasāmarthyāt mano 'pi upasaṃhṛtaṃ draṣṭavyam ity arthaḥ—* also similarly explained in SP.

निःशेषं ब्रह्मलोकान्तं संहृत्य हृदयात्मना ।

याज्ञवल्क्यं स्थितं भूयो विदग्धः पर्यपृच्छत ॥८०॥

After Yājñavalkya stopped after mentioning the entire world ending in the Brahmaloḥka as what merged (lit. is collected together) as the form of (the Ātman) in the heart, Vidagdha (i.e. Śākalya) once again asked him (a question)! [80]

This introduces the question in *kasminn nu hr̥dayam*

सर्वोपसंहृदयं ब्रूहि क्वैतत्प्रतिष्ठितम् ।

Do you state where then does the heart abide?, viz. that which collects all (the world).

Now follows up to verse 84 the exposition of BU 3.9.25.

इत्युक्तोऽहल्लिकेत्येवं संबोध्योत्तरमब्रवीत् ॥८१॥

Thus asked, (Yājñavalkya) addressed him (by the word) O Ahallika and then made an answer. [81]

Here is taken up the exposition of the word *ahallika*. The AnSS edition reads *ahāllika* which we have ignored. In fact BU and also Sureśvara in BUBV elsewhere (cf. verse 42 above, e.g.) *ahallika*.

अहल्लिकेति वचसा नाधारान्तरमुच्यते ।
आद्युदात्तत्वलिङ्गेन ह्यभिधानं विदग्धवत् ॥८२॥

By the word *ahallika*, it is stated that there is no need of another as a support.¹ By the characteristic of the word as having an acute initial vowel, (it is understood) as a proper name like (the name) *Vidagdha*. [82]

From the statement of Sureśvara of *ādyudāttatvalinga*, we have to understand that the BU text also shows the use of accents in it. It seems from SP that Sureśvara bases his explanation of the initially accented name on (the similarly accented), on the basis of BUB (p.487): *nāmāntareṇa sambodhanam kṛtavān*; cf. NKL on this verse.

One can refer to SP for the derivational explanation of *ahallika* which the AnSS edition uses. The initial accent of this word compares well with the name *Vidagdha*.

¹It is to refer only to the heart as the support and nothing else.

प्रेतीभतोऽसि नूनं त्वं प्रेतवद्भाषसे यतः ।
लीयतेऽहनि रात्रौ च व्यज्यतेऽहल्लिकस्ततः ॥८३॥

Indeed you have become a ghost (lit. dead body) and indeed you speak like a ghost which disappears (*līyate*) in the day and appears in the night; therefore (you are) *Ahallika*. [83]

This explains the purpose of BU sentence *yatra etat*

मत्तः शरीरात्क्वान्यत्र मय्येवातः प्रतिष्ठितम् ।
अस्मदन्यत्र मन्वीथा यत्रेदं हृदयं क्वचित् ॥८४॥

Where else could (that heart be), if away from me, i.e. from my body? Therefore, (it is clear that) it is firmly fixed¹ in me (only). You consider that (the heart is) elsewhere than in me (and) this heart is somewhere else (then). [84]

This is the purport of *yatraitad anyatrāsmat*

¹This is for *pratiṣṭhita* and comes from *pratiṣṭhā* which we translated in earlier verses as 'abode', meaning: it is an abode. See verses 68-72 below and cf. *āyatana* 'support'.

यद्येतद्देहतोऽन्यत्र हृदयं स्यादवस्थितम् ।
हृद्वियुक्तं तदा देहमद्युः श्वानो मृतं ध्रुवम् ॥८५॥

If this heart had abodes elsewhere than in this body, then indeed would have dogs eaten the body which would certainly be as a dead one.

[85]

This explains *yad dhyetad*

Now follows in verses 85-101 the exposition of 3.9.26.

न त्वयं मृत इत्यस्मात्कारणादवसीयताम् ।
वनसिंहवदेवैतद्वयमन्योऽन्यसंश्रयम् ॥८६॥

Then let this not be concluded that this one (the Ātman residing in and identified with the body) is dead. Let this pair¹ be considered as supported in each other, just like a forest and a lion.²

[86]

¹This refers to the heart and the body.

²Commentators do not explain the word of *vanasinhavat*, yet we are in a position to explain the significance of the simile owing to word *anyonyasamśraya* with reference to the heart and the body. The simile of a forest and a lion is therefore to be understood thus: There cannot be a forest which does not afford any abode to a lion and so also there cannot exist a lion without a forest, for its residence; forest and lion are mutually dependent. That establishes the significance of the simile. This is clarified with reference to heart and body in the next verse.

नर्ते लिङ्गं शरीरस्य स्थितिः काचिदिहेष्यते ।
न शरीरं विना लिङ्गं कस्मैचित्कर्मणे क्षमम् ॥८७॥

Nowhere is it held (lit. desired) that a body can sustain without (the basic) subtle one; similarly, a body which is without the basic subtle one is not capable of performing any activity.

[87]

This justifies the opinion regarding the mutual dependence of heart (the subtle one) and body. That subtle one is explained by SP as subtle body (*sūkṣmadeha*).

न ह्यन्योऽन्यातिरेकेण संहतानां क्वचित्स्थितिः ।
संहतं च प्रतीचोऽन्यज्जगदेतच्चराचरम् ॥८८॥

Indeed, those which are combined together (or dependent on one another)¹ cannot exist without one another. And (therefore) this world, which is made up of moving and non-moving objects, is combined (with the inner self) and does not therefore exist elsewhere than in the inner self.

[88]

The first line presents a general rule and that is justified by the second line; this can be understood *vice versa*.

¹This is for *saṃhata*.

कार्यत्वाद्द्वयमप्येतद्यतो न स्वाश्रयं ततः ।
तत्प्रतिष्ठामथाप्राक्षीच्छाकल्यो निर्णयेच्छया ॥८९॥

Since both these have the nature of effects, therefore they do not really have a basis (or, an abode) in themselves; therefore, Śākalya, who wishes to have a decision in the matter, then asks about their basis (or, abode).¹

[89]

¹This explains the question in the Śruti *kasminn nu tvam*

....

द्वावप्येतौ ममात्मानौ प्राण एव प्रतिष्ठितौ ।
 प्राणोऽपाने स च व्यान उदाने व्यान आश्रितः ॥९०॥
 समाने च तथोदानः सूत्रात्मनि समाश्रितः ।
 एवमेष समानान्तः शाकल्यप्रश्ननिर्णयः ॥९१॥

Both of these are my Ātmans and abide in *prāṇa* 'the principal wind in the body' and that *prāṇa* in *apāna* and that (in turn) in *vyāna* and further *vyāna* (also) is supported by *udāna*. [90] *udāna* again is supported in *samāna*, viz. the one of the nature of Sūtra—thus this is, that is, up to that which ends in *samāna*; this is the decision about the question asked by Śākalya. [91]

देहहृद्वायवोऽन्योऽन्यप्रतिष्ठाः संहतत्वतः ।
 प्रयुक्ताः कर्मणा पुंसां वर्तन्ते भोगसिद्धये ॥९२॥

Like the heart and the body, the (five) winds also are mutually dependent,¹ because they are combined together and then they are (capable of) fulfilling existence (lit. enjoyment) of men, when connected with (i.e. employed for) their activity. [92]

¹That is, rest or abide in on one another.

सकारणमिदं सर्वमाकाशान्तं यथोदितम् ।
 ओतं प्रोतं च यत्रेदं तदक्षरमथोच्यते ॥९३॥

Thus, all this, up to what ends in *ākāśa*, as stated so far, has a cause for it and that is the one in which is woven lengthwise and crosswise (the entire world made up of cause(s) and effect(s)) and that is then called the imperishable. [93]

This is the explanation of *sa eṣā*

विहायाख्यायिकारूपं स्वेनैव वचसा श्रुतिः ।
 पुरुषार्थं समापित्सुः स एष इति चावदत् ॥९४॥

(Then suddenly) Śruti gives up (the narration in) the form of the narrative and, on its own, states "Thus this one, wishing to secure the end of man's life".¹ [94]

¹That is *sa eṣa*

प्रशासन इदं तस्थौ यस्यान्तर्यामिरूपिणः ।
स एष नेति नेतीति मधुकाण्डेऽपि वर्णितः ॥९५॥

This one is so described in the Madhu Kāṇḍa also,¹ this one is described in the words *neti neti*, who is the inner controller (and) under whose control has remained this world. [95]

¹This is a reference to 2.3 (Mūrtāmūrta Brāhmaṇa), by the force of *api*, 4.2 (Kūrca Brāhmaṇa) is referred to, according to SP. NKL says 4.3.6 which is not Kūrca Brāhmaṇa.

ननु ब्रह्माधिकारत्वात्कथमात्मेत्यनूद्यते ।
नैष दोषोऽतिरेकेण नात्मनो ब्रह्मता यतः ॥९६॥

(Objection:) 'Indeed this being the topic of the Brahman, how can it be restated in the word *ātman*?' (Answer:) 'This is not a fault, since the nature of (the Ātman) as the Brahman is not what exists in addition to it.' [96]

ग्राह्यत्वं शरणं सङ्गो भयं चाज्ञानकारणम् ।
तदत्ययाद्भयान्तानि न सन्ति प्रत्यगात्मनि ॥९७॥

(The attributes, viz.) being an object to be grasped, (and) to be fissiparous, attachment, fear, the cause of ignorance and ending into only fear on account of the loss of it (i.e. inner self). These do not belong to the inner self. [97]

निरविद्योऽसितो भास्वदविलुप्तचिदात्मकः ।
यत एवमतो नास्य नाशान्ता विक्रियात्मनः ॥९८॥

Since (this one is) unaffected by ignorance, unbound, luminous, having never lost its nature as sentience, therefore there cannot be any modification of the Ātman which ends in destruction.

[98]

कार्यधर्मानतीत्यैतांस्तद्धेतोरप्यतिक्रमात् ।
अपूर्वानपराद्येकः पूर्णः स्वात्मन्यवस्थितः ॥९९॥

(Thus,) this one, all alone, complete in itself and (having the characteristics) *apūrva* 'having no cause (for it)', *anapara* 'having no effect (of it)' ¹ etc., has remained in its (unaffected) nature by transgressing these attributes of effects (which are mentioned in the preceding verse).

[99]

¹BU 2.5.19; 3.8.8(Mādhyandina).

श्रुतिः स्वेनैव वचसा साक्षादित्यादिलक्षणम् ।
समापय्यात्मविज्ञानं भूयोऽप्याख्यानरूपकम् ॥१००॥
गृहीत्वा परिपप्रच्छ शाकल्यमभिमानिनम् ।
याज्ञवल्क्यात्मिका भूत्वा ह्यतिनिर्बन्धकारिणम् ॥१०१॥

Having thus completed the statement of the characteristics (of the Brahman) *sakṣāt* etc. (which were already expressed), the Śruti took up once again the form of (a statement of) the narrative in its own words: asked Śākalya who was full of pride (*abhimāna*), and was very much insistent, by assuming the role of Yājñavalkya for itself.

[100-101]

This verse explains the connection of the earlier sentence *etāni aṣṭau* ... with the question of Yājñavalkya that is put to Śākalya.

Verses 102-122 pertain to Yājñavalkya's question to Śākalya.

धनं निसृष्टं राज्ञेह ब्रह्मिष्ठोद्देशतो यतः ।
प्रष्टुं नैवाधिकारोऽतोऽब्रह्मिष्ठस्येह विद्यते ॥१०२॥

Since, here,¹ there is given away some reward (lit. wealth or money) intended for the best knower of the Brahman, therefore one should not understand here that a non-knower of the Brahman is fit to put such a question. [102]

This verse indicates that one should not take that Śākalya put a question because he is not fit to put such a question.

SP and NKL have rightly shown the dissolution of the Saṃdhi of *-tobrahmiṣṭha* into *to 'brahmiṣṭha*.

¹This refers to giving away of plentiful gifts to Brāhmaṇas.

अब्रह्मिष्ठत्वसिद्ध्यर्थमतोऽप्राक्षीद्रुषान्वितः ।
स याज्ञवल्क्यः शाकल्यं सापराधत्वसिद्ध्ये ॥१०३॥

Therefore, in order to establish (the characteristic of Śākalya) as a non-knower of the Brahman and also of an offender (in asking questions), Yājñavalkya, full of anger, asked him the question (which is stated in the Śruti). [103]

SP states in its introductory to verse 104 the view that the BU passage *sa eṣa neti neti* and the sentence *etāny aṣṭau ...* are to be considered as one question.

स एष नेति नेत्याद्यः प्रश्नो वायं समीक्ष्यताम् ।
मध्ये वाक्यच्छिदोऽभावादिति शब्दस्य पूर्ववत् ॥१०४॥

Or, let the sentence *sa eṣa neti neti* be considered as the first question, since there is not between (that sentence and the other beginning with *etāny ...*) a word *iti*¹ which breaks the two (sentences as parts of one and the same sentence). [104]

¹Such a word *iti* occurs between sentences *kasminn nu hrdayam* and *tad dhetuḥ ...* This indicates that the words *sa*

eṣa neti neti and *etāny* ... are but one sentence—there is no *vākyabheda*.

समासव्यासरूपेण शाकल्यो यदपृच्छत ।
ततः परस्ताच्छाकल्यं याज्ञवल्क्योऽप्यपृच्छत ॥१०५॥

Since Śākalya asked¹ (his question), referring to the collected form and discrete forms together, Yājñavalkya asked Śākalya a question thereafter. [105]

¹Sureśvara uses the verb root *praccha* as in *Ātmanepada*.

ऐकात्म्ये सर्वमेवेदं कार्यकारणलक्षणम् ।
समापनीयं निःशेषं समासव्यासवर्जिते ॥१०६॥

(The intention in Yājñavalkya's question is:) All this world, having characteristic of cause(s) and effect(s), has to be concluded as being (only) one with (i.e. in the form of) the *Ātman*, without (any division into) collected and discrete (objects). [106]

अपि शास्त्रार्थसंबन्ध उत्तरस्याः श्रुतेरयम् ।
तदनुक्तौ यतः पूर्वं सर्वं स्यात्तुषकण्डनम् ॥१०७॥

Also this is the relation of the matters in the Śāstra¹ and the subsequent Śruti, because if this were not pointed out, all that has been said earlier would only be considered as pounding the chaff. [107]

¹Namely *ekarase sarvasamāptes tadviśeṣatā*. Or, *akhaṇḍātmani* (NKL).

अष्टावायतनान्यत्र पृथिव्यादीनि निर्दिशेत् ।
अग्न्यादयस्तथा लोका अमृताद्याश्च देवताः ॥१०८॥

In this context, one should point to the earth etc.¹ as the

eight resting places (or supports) and so also Agni and others² as the *lokas* 'regions', and the deities beginning with Death.³

[108]

¹This refers to *kāma*, *rūpa* (this is in the general sense of form), *ākāśa*, *tamas*, *udaka*, *rūpa* (this is bright form), *retas* 'semen'.

²This refers to *hṛdaya*, *cakṣus* and *śrotra*.

³This refers to women, *satya*, quarters, Death, *asu*, Varuṇa and Prajāpati.

शारीरप्रमुखास्तद्वदष्टौ ज्ञेया यथोदिताः ।
पुरुषाः सर्व एवामी पुनर्दिक्षुपसंहताः ॥१०९॥
दिशश्च हृदये सर्वाः समाने हृदयादिकम् ।
एवं समाने संक्षेपो विकासोऽनन्तदेवताः ॥११०॥

So also should be known eight Puruṣas, as stated, viz. with the body as the first¹ among them, (and) all these are again collected in the quarters,²

[109]

and all the quarters (which are together supported) in (but) one heart (and) the heart etc. (supported) in but one (body); Thus is, in *samāna* the collection (i.e. summarising in brief of all of them in but one support). (As against this), the manifestation (of but one basis) is (in the forms of) innumerable deities.

[110]

¹This refers to *kāmamaya*, *ādityapuruṣa*, *śrotrapuruṣa*, *chāyā-maya*, *putramaya*.

²This is the purport of *sa yas tān*

प्रत्यग्याथात्म्यमोहस्य महिमैष त्वयोदितः ।
यतोऽविद्यैव प्रथते कार्यकारणरूपिणी ॥१११॥

This is so far described by you as the greatness (i.e. effect) of ignorance about the true nature of the inner self; therefore, it is to be understood as only ignorance that takes the form

of the effect(s) and the cause(s), showing (*prathate*) itself in its extensive existence. [111]

This reveals that Śākalya's knowledge was nothing else than ignorance about reality. This is clarified in the following verse.

स्वात्माविद्यानुरोध्येव समासव्यासतामगात् ।
आत्मा स्वतस्तु भास्वच्चिन्मात्रः पूर्णो निरञ्जनः ॥११२॥

The Ātman assumes the (various) forms (lit. states) of (various) collections and their expanse only in consonance with ignorance about itself; however, it is merely sentience which is brilliant, complete in itself, and untainted (by anything else). [112]

The second line brings out the intended meaning of the verbal form *atyakrāmat* in the Śruti.

यः स एतांस्त्वया पृष्टांश्चतुरोऽप्यष्टकानिह ।
निरुह्य कार्यतां नीत्वा प्रत्युह्याथात्मकारणे ॥११३॥

(I am saying about that) which has made apart (*niruhya*) all of these, viz. all the four groups of eight, about which you asked, as (rendered into) effects, and having collected them together (*pratyuhya*) in their cause, viz. Ātman; [113]

This is a kind of paraphrase of *sa yas tān*

This (viz. the manings of *niruhya* and *pratyuhya*) is further explained in the following two verses.

विभज्य कारणादुच्चैर्नीत्वा कार्यात्मतां मुहुः ।
वस्तुवृत्तेन निःशेषान्कार्यकारणलक्षणान् ॥११४॥
योऽत्यक्रामदनानात्वो भेदसंसर्गवर्जितः ।
तं त्वौपनिषदं देवं साक्षादित्यादिलक्षणम् ॥११५॥

that is, (about) that divine being of the Upaniṣads who is characterized by the words *sākṣāt* etc. and who does not have

any contact with duality (lit. discrete objects) and having no variety in him, whose real nature went beyond all (discrete objects) that are characterized as effect(s) and cause(s) in their entirety, after having separated (himself) from the cause and rendered them into the nature of effects.

[114-115]

आस्वेवोपनिषत्स्वेनं यतो व्याचक्षते बद्धाः ।
कर्मकाण्डे विरोधित्वान्नैवैनं व्याचक्षिरे ॥११६॥

Since the learned describes (i.e. explains the nature of) this one only in the Upaniṣads, they have not spoken about the same in the Karmakāṇḍa, owing to the opposition (of its nature to the matter in them).

[116]

This is the meaning of the word *upaniṣada*.

तं त्वौपनिषदं धीरा ब्रह्मात्मानं प्रचक्षते ।
तं त्वा पृच्छामि शाकल्य तं मह्यं ब्रूहि तत्त्वतः ॥११७॥

The wise ones describe that as the Brahman, the Ātman and Puruṣa of the Upaniṣads. About that one, I ask you, O Śākalya, tell me his true nature.

[117]

This is the meaning of the sentence *taṁ tvā prcchāmi*

न चेद्वक्ष्यसि तं मे त्वं मूर्धा ते विपतिष्यति ।
न विजज्ञौ च शाकल्यस्तमात्मानं यथोदितम् ॥११८॥

If you do not tell me that, then your head will fall off. But (ca) Śākalya did not know that, viz. the Ātman who is described (as above).

[118]

NKL edition reads ... *sākalyaḥ taṁ* ... (i.e. without Saṁdhi).

ततः स याज्ञवल्क्योत्थशापवाक्याख्यवह्निना ।

दग्धः सद्यो ममारैव ब्रह्मविद्विड्ज्वरान्वितः ॥११९॥

Being burnt by the fire in the form of (lit. called) words of the curse of Yājñavalkya, he, (Śākalya) the hater of the knower(s) of the Brahman and, affected by heat, immediately died. [119]

This is the meaning of *tasya ha mūrdhā vipapāla*.

कर्मप्रकरणे नायं श्रुतः पूर्वं कदा चन ।
नित्यं ह्युपनिषत्स्वेव श्रूयते वैदिकीष्वयम् ॥१२०॥

This one is not ever heard earlier in the section on ritual activities; indeed, it is ever heard only in the Upaniṣads which belong to the Veda. [120]

SP states: *yathāhuḥ— yasyaitac chārīraṃ so 'pi tair yajñāyudhair yajñāyudhīti*. Also cf. NKL (note): *yathoktam anupayogād adhikāravirodhāc ca, (kiṃ ca aupapātikasūtre) sa eṣa yajñāyudhī yajñamānaḥ aṇjasā svargaṃ lokaṃ jayati*. The editor of the NKL has borrowed material from SP's comment on the immediately following verse. This can be read with profit.

कर्मकाण्डादपच्छिद्य तेनात्रैवैष भण्यते ।
अपि प्राप्तं कर्मकाण्डे तद्विरोधात्तु नाब्रवीत् ॥१२१॥

Therefore, this one (the Aupaniṣada Puruṣa) is first taken away from (i.e. not mentioned in) the Karmakāṇḍa and stated only here (i.e. in the Upaniṣads) yet, implied (*prāpta*) through necessity, in the Karmakāṇḍa¹ (also), Śākalya did not mention that owing to his opposition to the (matter related to) ritual activities. [121]

¹Read SP: *uktam hi— dr̥ḍhatvam etadviśayaś ca bodhaḥ prayāti vedāntaniṣevaneneḥ* (Ślokavārttika 21.148).

प्रत्यग्ज्ञानस्य नैवातः कर्मणा स्यात्समुच्चयः ।
ऐकात्म्यवस्तुविज्ञानं कर्मभिर्हि विरुध्यते ॥१२२॥

Therefore, the knowledge of the inner self cannot have combination (with ritual and its activity), since the knowledge of reality viz. the singleness of the Ātman is opposed to (them).

[122]

In verses 123ff. there is incidentally a reference to the theory of the combination of knowledge and activity (of Bhartṛprapañca) and then follows its refutation.

अपरे पण्डितमन्याः सम्यग्ज्ञातात्मतत्त्वकाः ।
कर्मव्यध्वेषु कुर्वन्ति यथावस्त्वात्मबोधनम् ॥१२३॥

Others, who consider themselves (learned) Paṇḍitas, who (think that they) have well thought about the truth of the Ātman state (lit. make) the knowledge about one's own self only in the context of matters which are not in the domain of activity.

[123]

The holder of the theory of combination (i.e. Bhartṛprapañca) understands (of knowledge of the Ātman and ritual activity) the unity of the Vedic texts in such a way that, in one part of it, there is the context of activity and, in the other, that of reality--this justifies their theory of combination.

वस्तुतन्त्रं न हि ज्ञानं कर्तृतन्त्रं क्रिया यथा ।
कर्मव्यध्वोपरोधेन ह्यन्यथात्वं प्रपद्यते ॥१२४॥

(But the following is said in refutation:) 'Indeed, knowledge which is dependent (only) on the thing (viz. reality) is not dependent on (mere) activity in the same way as (activity depends on the agent); therefore, it (viz. knowledge) comes to have dissimilarity (with activity) owing to its opposition to the way of activities that are of opposite character.

[124]

This is the refutation of the theory.

यत्कर्तुमन्यथा कर्तुमकर्तुं वापि शक्यते ।
स्वातन्त्र्यात्तत्र भवता क्रियतां तद्यथेष्टकम् ॥१२५॥

Whichever is possible (for one) to do or to do otherwise or not to do, may that be done according to one's (own) will, owing to one's freedom¹ (to do that activity). [125]

This verse is based on the acceptance of the combination of repeated performances of some activity and the provisional activity (of obtaining knowledge), for both of them have same nature.

¹*yatheṣṭakam* is for *yatheṣṭam*, an example of the use of *svārthaka*.

वस्तुवृत्तानुरोधेव यत्तु ज्ञानं भवेदिह ।
व्यभिचारं न तद्याति पुरुषेच्छावशात्क्वचित् ॥१२६॥

But what knowledge arises out of this (viz. the Upaniṣad) is merely in consonance with real thing as it is and that never varies (lit. becomes of different nature), owing to the (changing) wish(es) of a man. [126]

This verse shows the intention of the author to discard the theory of combination of knowledge and activity.

उपवादिनेह विदुषो न भाव्यं कस्य चित्क्वचित् ।
एवंविदपि सञ्शत्रुरपवादादभूद्यतः ॥१२७॥

Nowhere should one be a person speaking against (*upavādin*)¹ a knower (of the Brahman), since even such a knower would become an enemy (of the knower of the Brahman), owing to (i.e. by) his ill talk (*upavāda*). [127]

This is to explain *tasmān nopavādī syāt* in BUB.

¹SP paraphrases this as *paribhava-kartr* 'one who insults'.

दग्धक्रोधनिदानः सन्याज्ञवल्क्योऽपि शत्रुताम् ।
शाकल्यस्यापि संयात उपवादैकदोषतः ॥१२८॥

Even Yājñavalkya who had burnt the cause ... of anger became an enemy of Śākalya also,¹ only on account of one fault, viz. talking in opposition (*upavāda*). [128]

SP points out the force of *śākalyasya api* thus: of Śākalya also, though he was a Brāhmaṇa.

तस्मान्नैवोपवादी स्याद्याज्ञवल्क्योऽपि शत्रुताम् ।
यस्मादगात्कष्टतरं नोपवादादतः परम् ॥१२९॥

Therefore, one should not be speaking against a kower of the Brahman, since Yājñavalkya also came to have enmity with Śākalya. As such, there cannot be anything more painful than speaking against (the knowledge of the Brahman). [129]

The force of *api* is to emphasise the nature of the knowledge of Brahman as full of tranquillity.

परलोकविनाशोऽपि विद्वद्विद्वेषकारणात् ।
अग्निहोत्राग्निसंस्कारं यतो नावाप शापतः ॥१३०॥

(In the case of Śākalya), destruction (i.e. leaving no possibility) of another world results from the cause, viz. hatred towards the learned (possessing the knowledge of the Brahman), because, owing to the curse (of Yājñavalkya), he did not have any ritual of the fire of Agnihotra (performed after his death).

[130]

परिमोषिणो यतोऽस्थीनि धनशङ्काप्रचोदिताः ।
तान्यप्यस्यापजहुस्ते ब्रह्मविद्वेषहेतुतः ॥१३१॥

That also was on account of his hatred of the knowledge of the Brahman, viz. that the robbers stole away his bones, impelled as they were by a doubt (i.e. a feeling that) those (bones) were wealth. [131]

This justifies the statement in verse 127 above: *upavādineha vidhuṣo na bhāvyam kasya cit kva cit*.

Now follows in verses 133 up to the end the purport of BU 3.9.27 and 28.

अनात्मार्थनिषेधेन यो नेतीति पुरोदितः ।
 विधिद्वारेण तस्यैव निर्देशार्थं परा श्रुतिः ॥१३२॥
 मूलं च जगतो वाच्यमत आख्यानतोऽपि च ।
 जित्वा देया द्विजान्गाव इत्यर्थं चोत्तरा श्रुतिः ॥१३३॥

The subsequent Śruti (which is), by way of an injunction, intends to point to that very (Ātman), that was earlier stated (in the words) *neti* ... by rejecting (the idea of its being) a non-Ātman, [132]

and the Śruti subsequent to this proceeds from the narrative to state about the cause of the world, and has also the purport, viz. cows are to be given to one, when one has conquered Brāhmaṇas in discussion. [133]

Now follows in verses 134-150, which occur at the end of BU 3.9.27 (viz. as BUB 3.9.28) the exposition of the meaning of the questions put by the objector.

साधर्म्ये सति वैधर्म्यं शक्यं प्रष्टुं यतस्ततः ।
 साधर्म्यमुच्यते श्रुत्या तद्वनस्पतिमर्त्ययोः ॥१३४॥

Since it is possible to ask about the dissimilarity (of things) even while (there is) similarity (between/among them), therefore in the (subsequent) Śruti is stated similarity between a tree

and a mortal.

[134]

बीजाद्वनस्पतेर्जन्म मूलाच्चेहोपलभ्यते ।
मर्त्यस्य जन्ममूलं यत्तद्ब्रूत ब्राह्मणा मम ॥१३५॥

It is noticed here (in this world) that there is origination of a tree from a seed and/or root, therefore, tell me O Brāhmaṇas, that which is the cause of the birth of a mortal. [135]

रेतो मूलं न वो वाच्यं जीवतस्तद्धि जायते ।
न मृतस्येह रेतोऽपि विद्यते कस्य चित्क्वचित् ॥१३६॥

You do not have to say that semen is the cause, since that is indeed produced only from living being. And there is nowhere and at no time noticed semen to exist in the dead. [136]

अपि धानारुहो वृक्षो बीजात्तज्जन्मदर्शनात् ।
मृतस्य बीजस्थानीयं न च किञ्चिदिहेक्ष्यते ॥१३७॥

A tree is noticed to sprout forth from a seed, therefore it is said to be arising from a seed. But, in the case of a dead man, there is not noticed here (i.e. in this world) anything that can be taken as the seed. [137]

धानारुहो यथा वृक्षः साक्षादव्यवधानतः ।
मर्त्यजन्म तथा साक्षाद्यतस्तदभिधीयताम् ॥१३८॥

Since it is directly perceptible that a tree is sprouting from a seed, without anything intervening, similarly, let it be told me from which there is the birth of a man without anything intervening. [138]

यथानुभूतशक्तीह बीजं वृक्षस्य दृश्यते ।
न च तादृङ्मृतस्यास्ति यस्मात्तस्य पुनर्भवः ॥१३९॥

There is noticed here (in the case of a tree) the seed whose capacity (lit. power) has revealed itself; but nothing like that is seen in the case of a man from which he becomes reborn.

[139]

दृष्टः काण्डरुहोऽपीह वृक्षस्तद्वच्च नेष्यते ।
हस्तपादादितरिच्छन्नात्र मृतस्य पुनर्भवः ॥१४०॥

So also is noticed a tree which proceeds from even a branch; but there is not noticed (lit. accepted) here the rebirth of a man who is dead, from his hand or feet etc. that is cut off from his dead body.

[140]

मूलाद्वीजाच्च वृक्षस्य साक्षाद्यद्वत्समुद्भवः ।
तद्वन्मृतस्य वक्तव्यं न तु पुत्रप्रपौत्रवत् ॥१४१॥

There is directly perceived that a tree proceeds (i.e. grows) from a seed or from a root; it cannot be said in the same way that there is the birth of a man, who is dead, from a son or grandson.

[141]

This concludes the meaning of *dhānārūhaḥ*

For *putraprapautravat*, refer to Pāṇini Sūtra 5.1.116: *tatra tasyeva*.

समूलबीजं चेद्वृक्षमावृहेयुस्तदोभयम् ।
मर्त्यः स्विन्मृत्युना वृक्णः कस्मान्मूलात्प्ररोहति ॥१४२॥

If they would cut off a tree together with its root(s) and seed, then both (of them, would not appear again);¹ (therefore, I would ask), 'From what cause (lit. root) there is born (lit. arises or springs) a man, (if/when) he is cut off by death?'

[142]

This is a very cryptic and therefore quite obscure verse of Sureśvara. Therefore, the translation of it is based on the original

verse in BU.

मतं न जायमानोऽस्ति जातत्वादेव कारणात् ।
पुमाञ्जनिष्यमाणो वा संसारस्य प्रवाहतः ॥१४३॥

If it is held that he would not be born, since he was already born (earlier), then (it could be asked) 'Would there be (at all) a man born in the stream of transmigratory existence?'

[143]

This is the meaning of *jāta eva*

प्रवाहरूपी संसारो दीपार्चिर्वदवस्थितः ।
न जायते जनिष्यन्वा तस्मादस्तीह कश् चन ॥१४४॥

Transmigratory existence, which has the form of streams, is noticed here (to be) like the flame of a lamp. Therefore, no one here (i.e. in this world) is born and would become born (again).

[144]

जात एवेत्यतोऽसाधु यदुक्तं पूर्वपक्षिणा ।
जनित्वा म्रियते सर्वो मृत्वा भूयश्च जायते ॥१४५॥

As to what the *prima facie* view has stated, viz. *jāta eva*, it is not well said, (because) all beings die (only) after having begotten (an offspring) and also would be born again after dying.

[145]

This has reference to the verse cited in BU: *jāta eva na jāyate ko nv enam janayat punaḥ* and explains the meaning of *naṁ* (i.e. *na*) in the same.

निर्बीजस्य च जन्मेह नागमात्र च युक्तितः ।
ब्रूतातो जगतो मूलं यतो भूयोऽभिजायते ॥१४६॥

Further, in this (world), there is never the birth of what has

no seed whatever; this (i.e. such birth) cannot be (argued) on the basis of tradition and reason. Therefore, tell me the cause of the world from which it becomes born (once) again.

[146]

तत्पृष्टं जगतो मूलं न विदुर्ब्राह्मणा यतः ।
अतो जिता हता गावो याताः सर्वे यथायथम् ॥१४७॥

Since the Brāhmaṇas did not know that cause of the world, which was inquired about, therefore all (the cows) were won and carried (by Yājñavalkya) and all (the Brāhmaṇas) went away as they had come (*yathāyatham*).

[147]

पृष्टं यद्याज्ञवल्क्येन न विदुर्ब्राह्मणाश्च यत् ।
श्रुत्या स्वतन्त्रया तन्नो ब्रह्माविष्क्रियते परम् ॥१४८॥

That which Yājñavalkya had inquired about and which the Brāhmaṇas did not know is revealed to us by the Śruti which is independent¹ as the highest Brahman.

[148]

¹SP explains the 'independence' of the Śruti as *ākhyānato vyutthiti* 'giving rise to a thought by mere expression (about it)'.

साक्षादित्यादिना प्रोक्तस्तथा सर्वान्तरश्च यः ।
अस्थूलोऽनणुरित्येवमक्षरात्मावधारितः ॥१४९॥
नेति नेतीति यश्चोक्त इहौपनिषदः पुमान् ।
तस्य साक्षादयं श्रुत्या निर्देशः क्रियतेऽधुना ॥१५०॥

That Ātman is affirmed in the words: 'The one who is described in the words *sākṣāt* etc. and also as (abiding) within all, (the one that is) not gross, not subtle etc.'

[149]

And about that one, who is described, in this context, as the Puruṣa of Upaniṣads and in the words *neti neti* is directly stated in the Śruti about that (again).

[150]

Now follows in verse 151-177 the exposition on the Śruti sentence *vijñānam ānandam brahma*.

Verses 151-165 refer to the word *vijñāna* and 166-177, the word *ānanda*.

विज्ञानमिति चैतन्यं कटस्थमभिधीयते ।

न कारकं न धात्वर्थो नापि यत्स्यात्क्रियाफलम् ॥१५१॥

It is said (that the Ātman is) knowledge (*vijñāna*), sentience (*caitanya*) and immutable (*kūṭastha*); that is not the means to (any) activity, nor is it the meaning of some verb root, nor also, the result of any activity. [151]

This is the meaning of *vijñāna* used for the Brahman.

न चापि तदभावश्च नेत्यस्थलादिशास्त्रतः ।

अभावस्यापि तत्साक्ष्यात्तदभावः कुतो मितेः ॥१५२॥

Not also¹ is there the absence of that (Brahman or Ātman). This is on the basis of the scriptural text *neti* and *asthūla* etc. And (if it is accepted that there is) the absence of that, (even that) becomes what is directly perceived and, thus, since there is knowledge about it, how could there be its absence? [152]

¹Also (*api*) refers to *kāraka*, *kriyā* and *kriyāvat*.

एतावन्मात्रयाथात्म्यात्कार्यकारणवस्तुनः ।

अतस्तत्त्वमसीत्युक्त्या तादात्म्यं प्रतिपाद्यते ॥१५३॥

Since reality which consists in effect(s) and cause(s) has only this much as its true nature, therefore, in the statement *tat tvam asi*, there is proposed the identity (of the cause(s) and effect(s)). [153]

tādātmya is to be understood as *aikātmya*.

निर्धताशेषदुःखौघहेतुत्वात्सुखमेव तत् ।
अर्थैष एव परमो यो वै भूमेतिशास्त्रतः ॥१५४॥

That is only bliss on account of its causing the destruction of the entire flow of misery. This is on the basis of the scriptural text *atha eṣa eva paramaḥ ... (and) yo vai bhuīmā*.¹

[154]

This is the meaning of *ānanda*.

¹Cf. BU 4.3.33 and CU 7.23.1.

विषयेन्द्रियसंबन्धाद्यत्तु दुःखं सुखायते ।
आद्यन्तवत्त्वात्तद्दुःखं दुःखसंस्कारजं तथा ॥१५५॥

And whatever misery arises from a connection between objects of desire and the relevant sense organs appears as happiness. (Happiness) is only misery on account of its having a beginning and an end (for it); so that is produced by (merely) impressions (on intellect) made by misery.

[155]

This explains the true nature of the bliss and of what arises from existence of sense-organs, viz. only misery.

अव्यावृत्ताननुगतभास्वद्विज्ञानमात्रतः ।
निरविद्याद्वयत्वात्तत्साक्षाद्ब्रह्मेति शब्दयते ॥१५६॥

That is described by the word *brahman* because it is merely brilliant knowledge, which cannot be distinguished from and is not similar to (any other thing); and because it is non-dual, having been bereft of ignorance and what is directly perceived.

[156]

साविद्यः प्रत्यगात्मा यो वियद्योनिरुदाहृतः ।
अन्तर्याम्यादिरूपेण स एव प्रथते मृषा ॥१५७॥

That inner self, which is associated with ignorance and which is stated to be the origin of the sky, is the one that reveals itself as an appearance (of the Ātman), (and exists) in the form of the inner controller. [157]

अदृष्टफलसंप्रेप्सोर्दृष्टकर्मफलत्यजः ।
रातेर्धनस्य दातुस्तद्ब्रह्मेदं स्यात्परायणम् ॥१५८॥

This Brahman is ¹ the ultimate goal of the giver of wealth, viz. of the *rāti* ² 'gift'; i.e. for one who has a desire for the unseen result and who has given up (some) seen result. [158]

There is a play on the words *dr̥ṣṭa* and *adr̥ṣṭa*. Actually, *adr̥ṣṭa* stands for some unseen power generated by ritual activity, as the Mīmāṃsakas have postulated. This explains the meaning of the word *rāti* as the giver of (some) gift.

¹*syāt* is for *asti*.

²This is equated with *dātr*.

अस्मिन्प्रशास्तरि सति क्रियातत्फलसंगतेः ।
नियमो युक्तिमानेष कर्मिणामुपपद्यते ॥१५९॥

This rule (holds good) in the case of the performers of (ritual activities), since the ritual activity and its results are properly connected (with them only) when this one (viz. the inner self, the Ātman) exists as the controller. [159]

एवं संसरतस्तावत्परं ब्रह्म परायणम् ।
जगतश्चाप्युपादानं स्वात्माविद्यासमन्वयात् ॥१६०॥

Thus, for a transmigratory being, the ultimate goal is the highest Brahman. Also that is the material cause of this world, owing to its invariable association with ignorance about its own (real) nature. [160]

This explains *tiṣṭhamānasya*

निविवृतसोस्तु संसारान्मुनेस्त्यक्तैषणस्य च ।
तद्विदस्तिष्ठमानस्य समाप्तिः स्यात्परायणम् ॥१६१॥

Since that is ¹ the ultimate goal for a person who is desirous of withdrawing from transmigratory existence, (and also) of the stage (of him) who has abandoned (all) the desires, i.e. *eṣaṇātraya*, the knower of the Brahman, and being devoted to (the world of) it. [161]

¹*syāt* is for *asti*.

दग्धमोहान्धकारस्य प्रत्यग्बोधाग्निना मुनेः ।
एकात्म्ये वर्तमानस्य ब्रह्मात्मास्य परायणम् ॥१६२॥

The Brahman, the Ātman, is the ultimate goal of this sage who has removed (lit. burnt) his own darkness in the form of delusion by the fire of knowing about (the true nature of) the inner self and is thus in the state of oneness with the (single) Ātman. [162]

तद्विदो ब्रह्मणश्चेह भेदहेतोरसंभवात् ।
ब्रह्मैव ब्राह्मणः साक्षादुपचारात्परायणम् ॥१६३॥

Since, for a knower of Brahman, (who is) the Brahman (itself), there could not be any possibility of the existence of what might cause the distinctions (i.e. distinct objects), therefore the Brahman itself is called Brāhmaṇa (and) the directly perceived ultimate goal, by way of a metaphor (*upacāra*). [163]

यत्र वा अन्यदित्येवं यत्र त्वस्येतिवाक्यतः ।
इत्युक्त्यर्थोपरोधेन व्याचक्षीत परायणम् ॥१६४॥

And, following the meaning of the sentence *yatra vā anyat* ...¹ and also *yatra tvasya* ...,² one should explain (the nature of) the ultimate goal. [164]

¹BU 4.5.15.

²BU 4.3.31.

तस्मात्तमस्विनो ब्रह्म भेदेनैव परायणम् ।
 ध्वस्ताविद्यस्य चैकात्म्यात्कैवल्येन परायणम् ॥१६५॥

Therefore, the Brahman is the ultimate goal for the ignorant (lit. one who is overcome by darkness) by (mentioning the Brahman as) being distinct (from him). On the contrary, in the case of him who has destroyed ignorance and its effect, it is the ultimate goal by itself, owing to his being one with it in nature. [165]

Now follows in verses 166-176 an exposition on the word ānanda.

ब्रह्मण्यनन्दशब्दोऽयं प्रयुक्तः सुखवाचकः ।
 संवेद्ये च सुखे लोक आनन्दाख्या प्रयुज्यते ॥१६६॥

This word *ānanda* is used for the Brahman and is used as expressive of (only) happiness; and when happiness is being experienced, the word *ānanda* is used in the worldly conversation (*loka*). [166]

विशेषणतयानन्दशब्दोऽन्यत्रापि दृश्यते ।
 वेदान्तेष्वत आनन्दो विचार्योऽयं प्रयत्नतः ॥१६७॥

The word *ānanda* is seen to be in use elsewhere also as a qualifier¹ (of someone or something else); therefore, there is no particular effort made to ascertain the nature of *ānanda* 'bliss' (as used) in the Vedāntic text. [167]

¹This is clarified in the following verse.

आनन्दो ब्रह्मेति तथा तैत्तिरीयश्रुतौ श्रुतम् ।
 अथैष एव इति च तथोदके प्रवक्ष्यते ॥१६८॥

So it is heard in the *Taittirīya Śruti*: *ānando brahma ...*¹ and also will it be stated later in *athaiṣa eva...*³ [168]

There is noticed the absence of Saṃdhi in *athaiṣa eva iti*, this is Vedic practice.

¹*Taittirīyopaniṣad* 2.4.

²BU 4.3.33.

भ्रमा तत्सुखमित्येवं छान्दोग्योपनिषद्वचः ।
संवेद्योऽयं किमानन्दः किं वा नेति विचार्यते ॥१६९॥

Such also is the statement of CU¹ *bhūmā tat sukham*; (therefore,) it is discussed whether this *ānanda* is what can be experienced (and also) whether it is not so (experienced). [169]

¹CU 7.23.1.

ब्रह्मण्यानन्दः संवेद्यो लौकिकानन्दवद्यदि ।
युक्ताः शब्दास्तदैते स्युर्ब्रह्मण्यानन्दवाचकाः ॥१७०॥

If (it is held that) *ānanda* in the Brahman is also what is experienced like any worldly happiness; (then we have to say:) 'these words are¹ properly used (ever) as expressive of the bliss in Brahman. [170]

¹*syuh* is for *santi*.

संवेद्यानन्दरूपं तद्वाक्याच्चेत्परिनिश्चितम् ।
प्रमाणावगतेस्तत्र किं चिन्त्यमिति चेन्मतम् ॥१७१॥

(An objection:) If it be held: 'What is there to be thought over (or, considered) if the nature of the bliss, which is to be experienced, is ascertained from a (Śruti) statement, for that is understood (from a Śruti statement) as the means of

knowing?'¹

[171]

This expresses an objection to the proposed explanation in verse 169 above about the nature of the bliss as an object to be known.

¹Or, ... that has been understood as a (proper or an authoritative) means of knowing.

नान्योऽन्यातिविरुद्धार्थवाक्यानां तत्र दर्शनात् ।
अतिप्रमाणविषयं ब्रह्म सर्वत्र विश्रुतम् ॥१७२॥

(The answer is:) 'No other thought is necessary, since there are noticed in the Śruti such sentences as do not have mutually opposed meanings in their extreme measure and also as is well known everywhere that the Brahman is beyond the world of objects for (various) means of knowing.'

[172]

This is clarified in the following verse.

यत्र त्वस्येति वचनं न दृष्टेरिति चापरम् ।
विदिताविदिताभ्यां तदन्यदेवेति च श्रुतिः ॥१७३॥

There is a statement (in the Śruti), viz. *yatra tv asya*¹ and also (yet) another *na dr̥ṣṭeḥ* ...² also there is a sentence *tad anyad eva*.³

[173]

¹BU 4.5.15.

²BU 3.4.2.

³*Kenopaniṣad* 1.6.

निरानन्दं तथा केचित्कैवल्यं प्रतिजानते ।
तेषामपि निषेधार्थं कर्तव्यातो विचारणा ॥१७४॥

Some (thinkers) affirm that liberation consists in merely (achieving) segregation (of oneself from worldly objects), which is devoid of any (worldly) bliss, therefore, in order to reject

their views also, the proposed¹ consideration should be done.

[174]

¹See verse 169 above.

विकल्पासंभवश्चात्र वस्तुवृत्तत्वकारणात् ।
क्रियायां स्याद्विकल्पोऽयं न तु वस्तुन्यसंभवात् ॥१७५॥

There is no possibility of any option regarding (the nature of the Brahman) since it pertains merely to the nature of the thing as it is; such an option is possible only in respect of an activity, but it is not at all possible in respect of the thing (viz. reality).

[175]

In the Karmakāṇḍa, we come across sentences like *udite juhoti* and *anudite juhoti* and these create the idea of an option regarding the relevant ritual activity. But, here, in respect of bliss arising from liberation, such an option cannot be entertained.

वादिविप्रतिपत्तेश्च केचिदिच्छन्ति वादिनः ।
असंवेद्यं सुखं मोक्षे केचिन्नेति प्रचक्षते ॥१७६॥

Some opponents think that happiness is not what is (i.e. can be) experienced in liberation and some others that this is not so, for thus is there difference of opinion amongst the opponents.

[176]

This is an additional argument for discussing the thought about the options, as mentioned in verse 169 above.

कर्तव्योऽतो विचारोऽत्र युक्तिमार्गेण यत्नतः ।
सम्यङ्निश्चयसिद्ध्यर्थं पक्षयोरुभयोरपि ॥१७७॥

Therefore, in respect of this (i.e. bliss in liberation), there has to be a thought given to (the doubtful nature of it) by resorting carefully¹ to way of reasoning, so that there can

be a definite decision (regarding the views) of the two opposing sides. [177]

SP states *parapakṣanirākaraṇe* for *yatnāt*.

Verses 178-185 are the prima facie view in regard to the proposed discussion.

संवेद्यानन्दकं तावद्ब्रह्मेतीहावसीयताम् ।
जक्षत्क्रीडन्नममाण इत्यादिश्रुतिवाक्यतः ॥१७८॥

To begin (our) argument, let it be concluded that the Brahman is that wherein bliss is (certainly) experienced; this from the sentence in the Śruti beginning with (the words) *jakṣat kṛīḍan ramamāṇaḥ*¹ [178]

¹CU 8.12.3.

नन्वेकत्वे विभागोऽत्र नास्ति कारकसंश्रयः ।
भूरिकारकसाध्या च क्रिया लोकेऽपि दृश्यते ॥१७९॥

(But one might object:) Indeed, there cannot be (the existence of) any discrete objects in what is just a single thing, so that it is related to some means (*kāraka*). (Indeed) an activity even in the worldly sphere is noticed as what has to be accomplished by many means (of activity). [179]

The *prima facie* view anticipates an objection from the Siddhāntin that one should not object to the acceptance of the division of an activity as related to the various means of knowing.

विज्ञानस्य क्रियात्वाच्च न सिद्धिः कारकैर्विना ।
नातः संवेद्य आनन्दो ब्रह्मणीहोपपद्यते ॥१८०॥

Since knowing (*viññāna*) is an activity, it cannot be accomplished

without any means; therefore, it can be held as reasonable that there cannot be bliss in the Brahman, as what can be experienced (by some means). [180]

नैष दोषोऽस्ति विज्ञानं स्यादेवानन्दगोचरम् ।
विज्ञानमानन्दमिति शब्दप्रामाण्यकारणात् ॥१८१॥

This is not a fault, since knowing would have bliss as its object, for this is (already) known from the scriptural authority saying *vijñānam ānandam brahma*. [181]

ननु सत्स्वपि वाक्येषु नैतदध्यवसीयते ।
प्रत्यर्थिनि श्रुतेर्वाक्ये सत्यैकात्म्यावबोधिनि ॥१८२॥

(But one might object:) 'This cannot be so decided, even while there are such sentences, while there is an opposing statement of the Śruti which informs about the singleness of the Ātman. [182]

मानान्तरविरोधेन न हि लोकेऽपि किं चन ।
मानं प्रवर्तते तस्मान्नैतदध्यवसीयते ॥१८३॥

Indeed, there is not any means of knowing in this world which can be operative (in effecting right knowledge), while there is opposition of any other means; therefore this is not so decided.¹ [183]

¹As said in verse 184.

व्यञ्जकत्वाच्च मानानां सिद्धवस्तुप्रयोज्यता ।
कारकत्वेऽप्यकार्यत्वाद्दुःसंभाव्यं त्वयोदितम् ॥१८४॥

And since the means of knowing reveal to one (their objects) and are the causes of already existing things to be instrumental (to some activity); therefore, (the Brahman) not being the effect, what you have said¹ is not possible. [184]

¹This refers to the argument in verse 183 above.

ननु सुख्यहमस्मीति विज्ञानमनुभूयते ।
प्रतीच्यानन्दविषयं न प्रत्यक्षं विरोध्यतः ॥१८५॥

(The *prima facie* view still persists:) 'But, indeed, knowledge (*vijñāna*) of one is experienced (in the form), 'I am happy' and, therefore, direct perception of the object, in the case of the inner self, is not opposed (in nature to *vijñāna*). [185]

Verses 186-205 are the exposition by the Siddhāntin: 'In liberation, bliss is not an object of existence.'

नैतदेवं यतो मोक्षे विज्ञानं नोपपद्यते ।
देहाभावो हि मोक्षोऽयं करणानि न सन्त्यतः ॥१८६॥

This is not so, since any (worldly) knowledge (of someone), in the state of liberation, is not reasonable; indeed this liberation consists in the absence of body and, therefore, there are no organs (by which one knows the objects etc.) [186]

करणाद्यनपेक्षस्य न च विज्ञानसंभवः ।
तथा सति शरीरादेरुपादानमनर्थकम् ।
तथैकत्वविरोधान्न संवेद्यानन्दकं परम् ॥१८७॥

There is no possibility of any knowledge of one, since that one is not dependent on organs etc. That being so,¹ the acceptance of a body etc. (in the case of the liberated) is meaningless and, so also, owing to being opposed to the state of liveness (i.e. singleness of the Ātman), the highest Brahman cannot have bliss as the (external) object of its knowing. [187]

We have accepted the reading of NKL edition and also a variant reading in AnSS edition which reads *karaṇādyanapekṣaḥ san na*. Doing this, we arrive at a suitable translation, avoiding

uncouth construction of the AnSS text.

¹In the state of liberation.

Verses 188-191 are the prima facie view's counterobjection.

यद्यानन्दात्मकं ब्रह्म नित्यमात्मानमात्मना ।
तद्विज्ञानस्य नित्यत्वाज्जानीयान्नित्यमेव तत् ॥१८८॥

If the Brahman has the nature of bliss, then the knowledge (of it) would be eternal and occur of itself; and, therefore, one's knowing that bliss would always be occurring. [188]

जले जलं यथा तस्मिन्संसार्यप्येकतां गतः ।
सर्व एकीभवन्तीति न पृथक्त्वेन संस्थितः ॥१८९॥

As water (poured) into water (is not distinct from that latter), so also a transmigratory existent being, who has obtained oneness (with the Ātman), would not remain apart (from it), since (there is a Śruti statement) *sarva ekībhavanti*.¹ [189]

¹*Muṇḍakopaniṣad* 3.2.7.

तदानन्दात्मकब्रह्मविज्ञानाय मनागपि ।
न तदेकत्वतो वेत्ति ब्रह्मानन्दं स्वकं तथा ॥१९०॥

Therefore, that Brahman is not even a little capable of knowing about the Brahman which has the nature of bliss. And so, owing to its being single (i.e. without a second), the Brahman does not know its own bliss. [190]

मुक्तोऽपि न च संसारी तयोरेकत्वहेतुतः ।
मुक्तो वेत्ति परानन्दमिति तस्माद्वचो मृषा ॥१९१॥

Also, a liberated one is not (any more) a transmigratory being, for the reason that they are (not existing) as only one single (entity); therefore, the statement that liberated person knows

the highest bliss is (indeed) false.

[191]

ब्रह्मानन्दमथान्यः सन्वेद मुक्तो घटादिवत् ।
ब्रह्मत्वमन्यो वेदेति तदैकत्वं विरुध्यते ॥१९२॥

If (it is argued that) one remaining different (from the Brahman) knows the bliss of the Brahman just in the same way as a person (knows) a pitcher (remaining apart from it); then (this is to be said in answer:) 'In that case, the oneness (attained by a liberated person) is opposed (i.e. becomes rejected)'.

[192]

प्रेत्य संज्ञेह नास्तीति श्रुतिरेव निषेधति ।
मुक्तौ विभागविज्ञानमेकत्वादेव कारणात् ॥१९३॥

Also, the Śruti itself rejects (that idea) as it says *pretya sañjñeha nāsti*.¹ In liberation any knowledge of difference such (as the knower and the known) arises only from one cause, viz. the single Ātman.

[193]

This is justified in the following verse.

¹The actual words of Śruti are *na pretya sañjñāsti* (BU 2.4.12; 4.5.13).

स्त्रीपुंढृष्टान्तवचनं यद्वै तदिति चापरम् ।
ज्ञात्राद्यसंभवं वक्ति कूटस्थैकत्वकारणात् ॥१९४॥

There is stated in the illustration of man and woman,¹ viz. *yad vai tad* ... and also another which states the impossibility of the knower and the others, and only for one reason, viz. immutability.²

[194]

¹*tad yathā priyayā striyā sampariṣvaktō na bāhyaṃ kiṃ cana veda nāntaram* ... (BU 4.3.21).

²This refers to BU 4.3.23: *yad vai tan na paśyati paśyan vai tan na paśyati*.

नेति नेत्यादिभूयांसि विरुध्यन्ते वचांस्यपि ।
कारकाद्यभ्युपगतौ मुक्तौ ब्रह्मणि केवले ॥१९५॥

Also, many Śruti sentences such as *neti neti* would also be opposed (i.e. become rejected), if it is accepted that, in liberation, there are instruments of activity etc., while there exists only the absolute Brahman. [195]

विज्ञानानन्दयोश्चैक्यादसंयोगविभागतः ।
आनन्दज्ञानविषया कल्पनेयं वृथा श्रमः ॥१९६॥

Therefore, owing to the oneness of knowledge and bliss and also the absence of conjunction of separation (of the same), (entertaining) this notion about the existence (i.e. knowledge) of bliss is merely (an activity inviting) fatigue (i.e. futility). [196]

अज्ञानान्यार्थविज्ञानप्रसक्तावेव युज्यते ।
वेत्ति ब्रह्म सुखमिति न तु ज्ञानघनात्मनि ॥१९७॥

The statement, 'The Brahman knows (viz. experiences) bliss' is reasonable only when there is the contingency that there is knowledge of an object other than ignorance; but (it is) not so, when there is existent only the Ātman which is a solid mass of knowledge. [197]

This rejects the idea of *brahmajñāna* being a composite entity of the knowledge of the Brahman and of the bliss.

अज्ञानान्यार्थविज्ञानप्रसङ्गाङ्गीकृतावपि ।
जाड्यं जन्मादिबद्धत्वं ब्रह्मणः प्राप्नुयाद्ध्रुवम् ॥१९८॥

And in case one were to accept the contingency that there exists for knowledge an object other than ignorance, there would certainly follow then insentience and the state of being

bound by birth etc. in the case of the Brahman.

[198]

तस्माद्विज्ञानमित्यादि यथावस्थितवस्तुनः ।

वचोऽन्वाख्यायकं ग्राह्यं न ज्ञानादिविधायकम् ॥१९९॥

Therefore, the statement which states about the thing as it exists, viz. *vijjānam* ... is to be accepted as authoritative, and not that which describes (the acquisition of) knowledge etc.¹

[199]

¹This refers to *gūṇitva* of the Brahman.

जक्षदित्यादि यच्चोक्तं तच्चापि न विरुध्यते ।

सर्वात्मकत्वाद्विदुषः सर्वतःपाणिपादवत् ॥२००॥

As to what is said, viz. *jakṣat* ...¹ also, it is not opposed on account of (the knower) of the Brahman having become the nature of all (*sarvātman*) and one possessed of hands and feet on all sides.¹

[200]

¹CU 8.12.3; cf. verse 178 above.

²*Gītā* 13.13: *santaḥpāṇipādaṃ tad sarvato akṣīśiromukham*.

योगिदेवादिदेहेषु जक्षणाद्युपपत्स्यते ।

सर्वात्मकत्वाद्विदुषः स्याद्विमुक्तिस्तुतीरणम् ॥२०१॥

The statement about *jakṣaṇa* etc. would have become reasonable in respect of the bodies of yogins, gods and others, but (referring to that) in the case of the knower (of the Brahman) would be on account of his being of the nature of all is merely the expression of praise related to liberation.

[201]

मतं जक्षणवन्मुक्तौ सर्वात्मत्वात्परात्मनः ।

दुःखित्वमपि संप्राप्तं कुम्भीपाकादिदेहेषु ॥२०२॥

(Objection:) If it be accepted that there is a liberation together with *jakṣaṇa* etc. in the case of the highest Ātman, on account of its being the nature of all, then, there would follow even the state of unhappiness which is noticed in beings who are residents of the Kumbhīpāka (hell). [202]

नैवं नामादिसंभतिपिण्डप्राणादिसंश्रय-
संपर्कजनितभ्रान्तिदुःखित्वाद्यस्तिहेतुतः ॥२०३॥

(Answer:) This is not so, because (all) that has resulted from the delusion of being miserable, owing to the error produced by the contact with name etc., birth and assuming a body or organ etc. [203]

विषयप्रविभागश्च विरुद्धवचसां मिथः ।
प्रागेवास्माभिरुक्तोऽसौ यथावदुपपत्तिभिः ॥२०४॥

And the division of the sentences (of the Śruti) (as mutually) opposing as subject matter has been already explained by us earlier with suitable reasons. [204]

This refers to Madhu Brāhmaṇa.

आनन्दब्रह्मविज्ञानपदार्थैकत्वहेतुतः ।
नीलोत्पलादिवन्नातः संसर्गो ब्रह्मणीष्यते ॥२०५॥

Therefore, since there is only one object to be known, viz. bliss, the Brahman, there is not accepted in the case of the Brahman any kind of contact (between a thing and a property) as in the case of a blue lotus etc. [205]

In the statement about a blue lotus, we accept the invariable contact of blueness and the object lotus, but such a contact does not obtain among knowledge, bliss and Brahman.

Now follow the concluding verses which are statements about

the bliss of the Brahman as the highest one.

मर्त्याच्छतगुणेनात उत्तरोत्तरवृद्धितः ।
कार्यकारणरूपस्य निष्ठानन्दः परो मतः ॥२०६॥

Therefore, it is accepted as the ultimate end of what have the forms of cause(s) and effect(s) in such a way that it goes on increasing from (every state of) a mortal's happiness by becoming a hundredfold. [206]

साधनादिव्यपेक्षैव सुखसंवित्तिरिष्यते ।
लौकिकी नश्वरी सापि दुःखसंस्कारजा तथा ॥२०७॥
कैवल्ये न तु सापेक्षा सर्वसाधननिःस्पृहा ।
आत्मैवानन्दयाथात्म्यं नातो ज्ञानादिसाधनम् ॥२०८॥

Knowledge of happiness in the world is accepted as only dependent on the means (of securing effects) and also that it is produced from the impressions of misery; [207]
but, in absolute oneness, that (existence of happiness is) not so dependent (on the means etc.); it is without any dependence on (lit. the desires for) all the means. Since the Ātman alone has bliss for its true nature, it is not having any means of knowing etc. [208]

न जडं ज्ञानरूपत्वादानन्दत्वात् निःसुखम् ।
नान्तवद्ब्रह्मरूपत्वादिति वाक्यप्रमाणतः ॥२०९॥

vijñāna (i.e. Brahman) is not insentient, because it is the very nature of knowledge; it is not without any happiness, because it is itself bliss; and it is not with an end (since it is of the nature of the Brahman—this (is known) from the authoritative sentence (in the Śruti). [209]

आनन्दैकस्वभावोऽस्य सुषुप्तेऽध्यवसीयते ।
व्यावृत्ताशेषमात्रादेरनन्यानुभवात्मना ॥२१०॥

The nature of this one as consisting in bliss is determined (i.e. becomes known) in the state of sleep, since all the organs have withdrawn (from their activities) and there is merely the experience (of its existence) on the part of the Ātman. [210]

इति श्रीबृहदारण्यकोपनिषद्भाष्यवार्तिके तृतीयाध्यायस्य
नवमं ब्राह्मणम् ॥९॥

इति श्रीमत्परमहंसपरिव्राजकाचार्यभगवत्पूज्यपादशिष्य-
श्रीसुरेश्वराचार्यविरचिते बृहदारण्यकोपनिषद्भाष्यवार्तिके
तृतीयोऽध्यायः ॥३॥



**BRHADĀRANYAKOPANIṢAD-
BHĀṢYA-VĀRTIKA**

4.1

Ṣadācārya Brāhmaṇa

This relates to acquiring (the knowledge of) the Brahman as vijñāna (and) ānanda through the (knowledge about the) deities Vāc and others.

Verses 1-2 point out the connection between the earlier (i.e. the third) Adhyāya and this Brāhmaṇa (4.1) which marks the beginning of a new (i.e. the fourth) Adhyāya.

आनन्दं ब्रह्म विज्ञानं साक्षादित्यादिलक्षणम् ।
पञ्चमान्ते विनिर्णीतं जल्पन्यायेन सांप्रतम् ॥१॥
वागादिदेवताद्वारा भूयस्तस्यैव वित्तये ।
षष्ठ आरभ्यतेऽध्यायो वादन्यायेन यत्नतः ॥२॥

In the end of the fifth¹ Adhyāya, it is decided, by way of² *jalpa*³ (as to) what has the characteristics of being bliss, (particular) knowledge,⁴ directly perceptible etc.,⁵ (and) now

has (lit. is) begun the sixth⁶ Adhyāya, in the way of *vāda*,⁷ so that there (results) the knowledge about the same through (identifying it) with the deities Vāc and others,⁸ with an effort (for presenting it).⁹ [1]

[2]

¹This is the third Adhyāya according to modern count.

²That is, in the manner of.

³This is conversation between two parties, one wishing to secure the conquest of the other by vanquishing it in speech, just like the fight between two players in the game of chess—cf. SP: *caturaniganirvartyajayaparājayapradhānanyāyena*.

⁴This means: that which does not involve subject-object relation in the worldly manner.

⁵This refers to *sākṣāt*, *aparokṣāt* and *sarvāntara* (about the Brahman).

⁶This is the fourth Adhyāya according to modern count.

⁷This is like instruction imparted by a preceptor to his pupil which is aimed at ascertaining the truth of a doctrine or system.

⁸This is on the basis of SP: *vāgādyadhiṣṭhātrīṣv agnyādidevatāsu brahmadṛṣṭidvārety arthaḥ*.

⁹SP explains this as one's effort at establishing the correctness of one's own doctrine or system, by first refuting the opponent's (or opponents') view or views and then affirming the same with reason.

SP introduces the next verse thus: *paraparājayam ātmavijayaṃ ca nyāyato labdhavatas tattvanirdhāraṇe buddhisvāsthyam bhavatīty adhyāyayor utthāpyotthāpakarūpaṃ sambadham uktvā*

In verses 3-9, there is expositioin of BU 4.1.1.

योग्यकालावबोधार्थमासांचक्र इतीरणम् ।
कल्पं बुद्ध्वाथ तमृषिराजगाम महीपतिम् ॥३॥

The use (lit. utterance) of (the verb) *āsāṃcakre* is for conveying (that it was) suitable time (for one to inform/instruct the king regarding some matter). Then, having known that as suitable time (*kalpa*),¹ the sage approached the king. [3]

¹Add 'for going to the king's presence' to complete the sense.

पशूनिच्छन्किमागास्त्वं प्रश्नान्वा सूक्ष्मनिर्णयान् ।
वक्तुं किमागतोऽसीति नृपः पप्रच्छ तं मुनिम् ॥४॥

The king asked the sage, 'Why! Have you come (to me) with a wish for cattle? or, to answer (my) questions (which require) careful (lit. subtle) decisions?' [4]

This explains the BU sentence *kimartham acārīḥ paśūn icchann anyantān iti*.

धनार्थं ब्राह्मणा यान्ति राजानमिति युज्यते ।
न त्वनापदि विद्यार्थं तं यान्तीह द्विजोत्तमाः ॥५॥

It is understandable that the Brāhmaṇas approach a king for (obtaining) wealth (from him).¹ Not, however, do excellent Brāhmaṇas approach him here,² unless in the absence of difficulties (and) for (securing) knowledge (or lores).³ [5]

¹Cp. *Yājñavalkyaśmṛti* 1.100: *upeyād īśvaram caiva yoga-kṣemārthasiddhaye*.

²SP points out that *iha* means to the *śāstrīyavyavahārabhūmi*.

³This is intended for setting aside the view of some that Yājñavalkya approached the king for *yogakṣema* and also for acquiring *vidyā* 'knowledge', with a view to imparting it to others. They have in mind, perhaps, Gārgya who approached the king Ajātaśatru for *vidyā* (BU 2.1).

नान्यत्र क्षत्रियाद्विद्या यत्र संभाव्यते क्वचित् ।
उपसीदन्ति तत्रैव ब्राह्मणाः क्षत्रियान्सदा ॥६॥

(Again) it is possible that knowledge (of a certain lore (*vidyā*)) does not obtain elsewhere than in a Kṣatriya (*yatra*). Only in that case (*tatraiva*) do Brāhmaṇas approach (lit. sit near unto) Kṣatriyas. [6]

This brings out the significance of the use of *anāpadi* in the preceding verse. Reference to Ajātaśatru Brāhmaṇa (BU 2.1) is obvious.

याज्ञवल्क्यस्य शिष्यत्वे ग्रन्थच्छायापि नेष्यते ।
जनकस्यैव शिष्यत्वे ग्रन्थच्छायोपलक्ष्यते ॥७॥

There is not even a small portion of the text (of the Upaniṣad) pointing to Yājñavalkya's being a pupil (of Janaka); but, on the contrary, there is noticeable some portion of the text

pointing to Janaka's being (his) pupil.

[7]

The verse aims at driving away a doubt, viz. the text of BU indicates that Yājñavalkya was a pupil of Janaka (cf. SP quoting: *uktaṃ cācāryatvaṃ hitvā*). This can be so doubted, on the basis of Yājñavalkya's words *tac cṛṇavāma*. Yet the remark of SP may be noted: *ekavacanabahuūktibhyāṃ rājño muneś ca śiṣyā-cāryatve bhāsete sambhavati cācāryaśyāpi śiṣyabuddhiśodhanā-rthaṃ tam prati praśnavākyaṃ iti bhāvaḥ*.

अण्वन्तानिति शब्दोऽयं न स्यात्पशुविशेषणम् ।
उभयं त्वित्यतः शेषाद्द्वयं पृष्टमतौ भवेत् ॥८॥

This word *aṇvanta-* is ¹ not an adjective of (the word) *paśu-*; ² (for), from the remaining part (of the text), ³ viz. from the remainder (i.e. the subsequent words) *ubhayam ...*, it becomes ⁴ (clear) that both (the things are intended to be sought). [8]

¹ *syāt* is for *asti*.

² This is suggested on the basis of *sāmānādhikarāṇya* 'being in the same case' of the two words *paśūn* and *aṇvantān*.

³ This is *ubhayam eva śamrāt*.

⁴ *bhavet* is for *bhavati*.

तद्धेतुहेतुमत्त्वस्य प्रसिद्धयर्थमथावदत् ।
इच्छाम्युभयमप्येतदित्येवं ह्यन्यथा वदेत् ॥९॥

Then, in order to clarify the relation of (his asking the questions and receiving the gift of cows) as the cause and the effect, (the sage) said, 'I wish these (lit. this) both of them'. (Otherwise), he would have indeed said (some other words).

[9]

SP clarifies the force of *ubhayam api*: this is indicative of that the things he wishes to secure are equally important.

In verses 10ff. there is exposition on the remaining six *kaṇḍikās* (together), i.e. from 4.1.2 onwards.

वाग्देवताग्निरत्र स्यात्तथायतनमिन्द्रियम् ।
ब्रह्माकाशः प्रतिष्ठा च नामोपनिषदुच्यते ॥१०॥

In this ¹ context/text, the deity of *vāc* is Agni, the organ is the abode and the Brahman, viz. the ether, is the support. So also is the name (viz. *Prajñā*) the *upaniṣad* (viz. the secret name).²

[10]

¹That is, in the sentence *vāg vai brahman*. The exact reference to the sentence is: *vāg evāyatanam ākāśaḥ pratiṣṭhā prajñety enad upāsīta*.

²This refers to *prajñety etad upāsīta* where *prajñā* is the name for the Brahman.

करणायतनान्देवान्स्वप्रतिष्ठान्ब्रजेत् सः ।
प्रज्ञाद्युपनिषत्कान्यो ध्यानाद्देवो भव्रेदिह ॥११॥

And (*tu*) the (worshipper's) self (*Jīva*) becomes (lit. goes to) the deities which have the organs for their abodes, viz. those who have *Prajñā* and others as their names, (the one) who, by worship of (i.e. meditation on) them (first) becomes (lit. would becomes) here ¹ a god.

[11]

This explains *devo bhūtvā ...* in the various *kaṇḍikās*.

¹This refers to the worldly life of one.

देवतायतने चैव प्रतिष्ठोपनिषत्तथा ।
षट्स्वप्येतेषु विज्ञेयमेतदेव चतुष्टयम् ॥१२॥

In (all) these six (*paryāyas*) has to be known this very quartet, viz. the deity, (its) abode, (its) support and its secret name.

[12]

This is to state that, in 4.1.2-7 also, the quartet mentioned there has to be understood in a similar way to that in 4.1.1.

मातृमानिति हेतूक्तिः सम्यक्वक्तृत्वसिद्धये ।
सम्यक्त्वप्रतिपत्त्यर्थं तथैव स्यात्परं वचः ॥१३॥

The use of (the word) *mātrmān* is the statement of the reason for one's being a good speaker.¹ In the same way, the subsequent (use of) the words (also) is for understanding the rightness (in the speech of everyone).² [13]

¹This refers to the good quality of a speaker obtaining in the knowers of the Brahman, viz. Śailini and others.

²This is based on the phrase in BU *avadato hi kiṃ syāt*. The rightness or correctness (or, even, reasonableness) of the words of Jitvan and others are: *aprāṇato hi ...*, *apaśyato hi ...*, *aśṛṇvato hi ...*, and *ahṛdayasya hi ...*

यस्मादवदतो लोके पुरुषार्थो न कश्चन ।
दृष्टो वा यदि वादृष्टो वाग्ब्रह्मातः प्रतीयताम् ॥१४॥

Since, for any one, who does not speak, there is not (secured) any one end of life, whether seen or unseen, therefore, let it be understood that *vāc* 'speech' is the Brahman. [14]

¹This clarifies *avadato hi ...* mentioned above.

न चेदायतनाद्युक्तमेकपाद्ब्रह्म तर्हि तत् ।
असमस्तमिदं ब्रह्म न युक्तं समुपासितुम् ॥१५॥

(An objector's statement:) 'If (the knowledge of) the abode etc. that is (thus) mentioned is only a foot of the Brahman, then it is not reasonable to worship (i.e. meditate on) this (incomplete) Brahman'. [15]

This explains the answer of Yājñavalkya *ekapād vā etat samrāt*.

स त्वं जानंश्चतुष्पान्मे ब्रह्म व्याख्यातुमर्हसि ।
वागेवायतनमिति याज्ञवल्क्योऽप्युवाच तम् ॥१६॥

(The king said), 'Then you, who know (that), should explain to me (the nature of) the four-footed Brahman'¹ (and) Yājñavalkya answered him in the words *vāg evāyatanam*

[16]

¹This is for *sa vai no brūhi* in BU. The pronoun, i.e. you, is indicative of the sage's compassionate nature (*anugrahaśīlatva*).

वागेवायतनं तस्य वागेव करणं भवेत् ।
ब्रह्माकाशः प्रतिष्ठा स्यात्प्रज्ञास्योपनिषत्तथा ॥१७॥

(He said), 'Vāc is the abode of that, *vāc* is the organ for it; the Brahman is the ether, its support, and the secret name of it also is Prajñā.

[17]

This is only to remind the king of what is said earlier (in verse 10 above).

प्रज्ञेयं किं ततो भिन्ना प्रतिष्ठायतने यथा ।
किं वाभिन्नेति मे ब्रूहि प्रज्ञोपनिषदं स्फुटम् ॥१८॥

(Again, the king said), 'Tell me clearly if this secret name Prajñā is different from that (i.e. the Brahman), as the abode and the support (are different from it), or not different (from the same)'. [18]

This is to present the question *kā prajñatā* of twofold nature.

स्वयमेव तु वाक्प्रज्ञा ब्रह्मणो न तु भिद्यते ।
कुतः प्रज्ञात्वसंसिद्धिर्वाच इत्येतदुच्यते ॥१९॥

(Yājñavalkya answered), 'Vāc itself is Prajñā and (*tu*) it is

not differentiated from the Brahman'. (The king asked, once again,) 'Whence does Prajñā come (to be established)?'; *vācaḥ* ... 'from *vāc*' was (lit. is stated as) the answer (of Yājñavalkya)'. [19]

यत एवमतो वाचं परं ब्रह्मेति चिन्तयेत् ।
 विराङ्गुहीतिरत्र स्यात्साधारणग्रहात् ॥२०॥
 तथा देवतया सत्रं नियन्तापि वियङ्गिरा ।
 कारणाद्यखिलं विश्वं देवतावधि भण्यते ॥२१॥
 यतो वागाद्युपास्त्यत्र तस्मात्सर्वं विवक्षितम् ।
 एनं भूतानि सर्वाणीत्युपासनफलाभिधा ॥२२॥

Since this is so, therefore, a person should look upon *Vāc* as the highest Brahman. Here (in this respect), there is the understanding (lit. acceptance) of *Virāj*, on account of the mention (lit. inclusion) of organs,¹ together with their support (viz. the body). [20]

So also, by (the mention of) the deity (of each), *Sūtra* (is understood)² and by the word expressive of the sky (is understood) the controller³—thus is mentioned this entire universe beginning with the causes⁴ up to (lit. ending with) the deities. [21]

Since all this here is intended to be (consisting in) the worship of *Vāc* etc., therefore, there is a mention (made) of the result of the worship, such as 'To this one (come) all the elements'. [22]

The purport of these three verses is that the whole of the world is to be worshipped as identical with the Brahman.

¹This refers to the mention of *vāc*, *cakṣus*, ... as *āyatana*s, since again these organs are gross.

²In *vāg vai brahma* ... is expressed *Sūtrātman*, having the subtle forms of *Agni* and others.

³This is conveyed by *ākāśaḥ pratiṣṭhā*.

⁴The effects are implied.

देवो भूत्वेति देवान्हि प्रधानफलकीर्तनम् ।
विद्वान्य एवमित्युक्त्या साध्यसाधनसंगतिः ॥२३॥

Since *devo bhūtvā devān* is, indeed,¹ the statement of the principal result; therefore, by the words *vidvān ya evam ...* (there is to be understood) the connection between the end(s) and the means.² [23]

¹This is for *hi*; it indicates that devotion expressed in repeated worship(s) is effective in producing oneness of the worshipper(s) with the deity (i.e. deities).

²This is the purport of *ya evam ...*, having reference to knowledge and activity of the various worships.

देवो भूत्वेति जीवन्संभावनोपचयात्तरः ।
वैलक्षण्यमुपास्तीनां भण्यते ब्रह्मबोधतः ॥२४॥

In the words *devo bhūtvā ...* is expressed the thought that a man, who by the increase in his devotion, becomes on the strength of it (one with the deity worshipped), while he is alive—thus there is expressed the different natures of these worships from that of the knowledge of the Brahman.¹ [24]

¹NKL brings out this only succinctly thus: *yathā brahmadhīḥ sattāmātreṇa phalahetuḥ naivam devatādhīḥ abhyāsaṁ vinety arthaḥ*.

तथैव वचसोक्तिः स्याद्देवो भूत्वेति संभवात् ।
प्रतिवाक्यं बहुवितश्च षण्णामेकत्वसिद्धये ॥२५॥

So is the statement in the words *devo bhūtvā ...*, for that (becoming) is possible and the repeated (lit. many times made) statement in each sentence (of the six *pariyāyas*) is for establishing the oneness of (all) the six (deities). [25]

प्रागपि ब्रह्मविज्ञानाद्ब्रह्मैवाभूद्यथा तथा ।

देवोपासनतः पूर्वं नाभूद्देव उपासकः ॥२६॥

As it was said earlier (in the repeated statement) *brahma-vijñānād brahmaivābhūt*, so here (also has to be understood that) a worshipper (of a deity) could not (i.e. did not) become a deity before the worship/worships was/were offered to the deity. [26]

This is to point out the difference between *brahmopāsti* and the *upāsti(s)* of other deities. In the first, the worshipper was already, before the worship of it, the Brahman, whereas, in the latter, the situation was not the same.

भावनोपचयाद्देवो भूत्वा विद्वानिहैव तु ।
देवानप्येति सोऽग्न्यादींश्शरीरत्यागतः परम् ॥२७॥

A learned man, by the increase in his devotion, first becomes a god¹ here itself, but he becomes one with (i.e. merges in) the deities, Agni and others, (only) after he has given up (i.e. becomes bereft of) his (worldly) body.² [27]

¹That is, 'comes to have a nature similar to that of the god whom he worships'.

²This refers to the devotee's *tādātmya* with the deity.

उत्पत्त्याद्यात्मकं कार्यं साध्यं सर्वस्य कर्मणः ।
उपासनं च कर्मैव युक्तमुक्तमिदं ततः ॥२८॥

All effects, which have the nature of being a product etc.,¹ can be obtained by (performance of) activities, therefore, it is only properly said that worship is but (some) activity. [28]

¹This is the well-known *utpattyādicatuṣṭaya*.

ब्रह्म वा इदमित्येवं तथा ब्रह्मैव सन्निति ।
प्रागपि ब्रह्मविज्ञानातिसिद्धं तादात्म्यमुच्यते ॥२९॥

In the statements (of the Śruti) *brahma vā idam* and also *brahma vai san* ... is established the identity (i.e. oneness) (of a worshipper) with the Brahman even before the knowledge of the Brahman (has occurred to him). [29]

This implies that the removal of ignorance on the part of a worshipper means the occurrence to him of the knowledge of the Brahman. Also, it indicates how the worship of the Brahman is distinct from any other worship to which the preceding verse has referred.

हस्त्यृषभमिति चोक्त्या भण्यते गुरुदक्षिणा ।
स च तां नाग्रहीदत्तां पिता म इति हेतुगीः ॥३०॥

In the statement *hastyrṣabham* is mentioned the fee (to be offered) to the preceptor and *pitā me* ... is the expression of the reason why he (i.e. the preceptor, viz. Yājñavalkya) did not accept it. [30]

Read SP: *śiṣyaṃ kṛtārtham akṛtvā tato dakṣiṇā na grāhyeti pitur mama cābhiprāyo na ca tvam adyāpi kṛtārthaḥ paradhī-virahād atas tvatto dakṣiṇa na grāhyeti.*

नन्वनुशिष्ट एवायं पूर्वोक्तैरनुशासनैः ।
पितृव्रतोपरोधोऽत्र नातः कश्चन विद्यते ॥३१॥

(A doubt:) 'But this (king) was already instructed by the teachings which have been stated earlier; as such, there is not (in the instruction now imparted by Yājñavalkya) any swerving from his father's vow.' [31]

The doubt is: Even if Yājñavalkya accepted the fee, there should not be understood his swerving from the vow of his father (SP).

नात्मविद्यातिरेकेण पितुर्वस्त्वन्तरे यतः ।
 असमाप्तेः पुमर्थस्य मतं नास्यानुशासनम् ॥३२॥
 यस्मिञ्ज्ञातेऽखिलं ज्ञातं कृतमाप्तं च कामितम् ।
 तित्यक्षितं च संत्यक्तं पितुस्तदनुशासनम् ॥३३॥

(The answer is:) 'Since, according to his father, there was no completion (of a preceptor's task) if the instruction were different, viz. it was about (i.e. pertained to) a thing other than the Ātman. It is not for this one (i.e. Yājñavalkya) an instruction proper. [32]

That would be his father's instruction, which being obtained (lit. known), all could be known; all the desired could be done and obtained, and all that was sought to be abandoned was given up. [33]

यतो वस्त्वन्तरं नान्यदात्मनो विद्यते परम् ।
 सम्यक्तज्ज्ञानमेवातस्तदन्यत्र मृषा मतिः ॥३४॥

Since there cannot be (lit. is not) any other thing beyond (i.e. higher than) the Ātman, the only proper knowledge is (the knowledge about the nature) of that; knowledge in any other respect is (only) false. [34]

आत्मज्ञानोदयायैव याज्ञवल्क्योऽप्यतोऽवदत् ।
 उपासनान्यशेषाणि तथा कर्माण्यशेषतः ॥३५॥

Therefore, Yājñavalkya also spoke (what he knew) with a view to the rise of the knowledge about (the true nature) of the Ātman (on the part of Janaka and others), viz. all the (different) modes of worship and also (ritual) activities in their entirety. [35]

इति श्रीबृहदारण्यकोपनिषद्भाष्यवार्तिके चतुर्थाध्यायस्य
प्रथमं ब्राह्मणम् ॥१॥

**BRHADĀRANYAKOPANIṢAD-
BHĀṢYA-VĀRTIKA**

4.2

Kūrca Brāhmaṇa

Verses 1-35 are the exposition of 4.2.1.

These contain a certain opinion expressed by Bhartrprapaṇca in verses 14cd-18 and its refutation in verses 19-29.

अनुशिष्यापि स नृपं यदा नैच्छद्भनं नृपात् ।
अननुशिष्टहेतूक्त्या मती राजस्तदाभवत् ॥१॥

When, even after instructing (about the thing), the sage did not wish (to receive) any wealth from the king, he wondered (i.e. began to think) about the cause for the statement (as to how he was) not instructed. [1]

यथोक्ता नानुशिष्टिश्चेत्कीदृक्तदनुशासनम् ।
संभावितानुशिष्ट्यर्थं तं राजोपससाद ह ॥२॥

(He asked,) if there was not any instruction, as it was promised, what kind of instruction was it then? (Therefore,) the king approached unto him, for the instruction for which he wished. [2]

SP states the reason for the king's approach, viz. the Śruti statement *ācāryavān puruṣo veda* (CU 6.14.2) and also the Smṛti *ācāryopāśanaṃ śaucam*.

उपासनानां सर्वेषामैकात्म्यज्ञाननिष्ठता ।
ब्रह्मविद्याधिकारत्वादित्येतदधुनोच्यते ॥३॥

All the modes of worship¹ culminate (i.e. have an end) only in one's (acquiring the) knowledge of oneness (with the Ātman).

(And) since there is the topic regarding the lore of the Brahman, this is now (being) explained hereafter. [3]

¹Namely, those which were stated earlier.

कूर्चादुत्थाय विधिना तं राजोपससाद ह ।
भगवन्ननुशाधीति यथेहाभिमतं तव ॥४॥

The king got up from his exalted seat,¹ sat at the feet of Yājñavalkya (and said to him), 'Instruct me, revered sir,' as you would like (to instruct) in this matter.² [4]

This is the meaning of *janaka ha*

¹For *kūrca* as paraphrased by Śaṅkara in *viśiṣṭa*.

²*iha* stands for the statement about the highest man of the Upaniṣad, as clarified by SP.

यथा जिगमिषुः पान्थो रथं वा नावमेव वा ।
आददीताप्तिसिद्धयर्थं गन्तव्यस्य तथैव च ॥५॥
यथोक्तोपनिषद्विस्त्वं संस्कृतात्मासि भावितः ।
एवं वृन्दारकः पूज्य आढ्यो मानुषवित्तवान् ॥६॥
तथैवाधीतवेदश्च युक्तः साधनसंपदा ।
गतिसाधनवत्त्वाच्च गन्तव्यमनुमीयते ॥७॥

(Yājñavalkya said,) 'As a person, who sets out to travel, would choose (or, secure) either a chariot or a boat in order that he would attain to the goal desired (or, to the desired destination), just (*eva*)' similarly, [5]

on account of having known the secret name¹ as are stated (earlier), you have enriched yourself (*saṃskṛtātmabhāvitah*); thus, you are *vṛndāraka* 'worship-deserving', *ādhyā* 'possessing all the wealth for me', [6]

so also, you have studied the Vedas and are possessed of all the wealth of means (to knowledge). (And) because you have all the equipment for getting to know (*gati*) the Brahman,² his goal is (easily) understood (lit. inferred). [7]

This explains *yathā vai samrāt*

¹This refers to BUBV 4.1.11 and the relevant passages from BU.

²We have understood this as the meaning of *gati* in view of the subsequent verses 21-23.

अध्यात्मादिव्यवच्छेदान्मुच्यमान उपासनैः ।
आविरिञ्चादितो भूप यास्यसि क्वेति भण्यताम् ॥८॥

‘Tell me, O king, where you will go when, on account of your performance of worships you will move from (this world) up to the Brahman, being released from the (limiting) adjuncts of (i.e. pertaining to) the body etc.’ [8]

पप्रच्छ याज्ञवल्क्योऽत इतस्त्वं क्व गमिष्यसि ।
सर्वस्यैवात्मभूतत्वाद्गन्तव्यं न स पश्यति ॥९॥

That is Yājñavalkya asked him: ‘Where will you go from here?’ This was because everything had become (for the king) the Ātman, and (therefore) you do not know the goal (lit. where to go)’. [9]

ननुक्तोपनिषद्भिर्हि गन्तव्यं प्राक्प्रबोधितम् ।
देवौ भूत्वेति वचसा तत्कस्मादिह पृच्छयते ॥१०॥

(An objection is raised:) ‘Why, by the secret names (which were told him), the goal has been already pointed out to him and also in words *devo bhūtvā* ...; why then is here (a question) asked him (about the goal)?’ [10]

नाहं वेदेति च नृपो जानन्नप्यब्रवीत्कथम् ।
नैष दोषो यतोऽप्राक्षीद्याज्ञवल्क्यो नराधिपम् ॥११॥
पूर्वभर्मेर्मुच्यमान उत्तरां कां गमिष्यसि ।
देवतौपासनाद्येतज्ज्ञानोत्पत्त्यै विवक्षितम् ॥१२॥

How (again), the king who knew (what was told him) said, 'No I do not know'? (The answer is given:) 'But this is not a fault, since Yājñavalkya asked the king, [11] 'What later region would you go, being released from the former region?' This has been intended for effecting the rise of knowledge of this (i.e. the Brahman) from the worship of the deities etc.¹ [12]

¹SP clarifies as *śuddhidvārā dhīsādhanaṁ karma grhyate*.

उपासनानि सर्वाणि परविद्याधिकारतः ।
क्रममुक्तिफलानीति क्व गमिष्यसिगीरतः ॥१३॥

Since there is the topic of the lore of the highest (Brahman), all modes of worship result into gradual liberation (and), therefore, there is a question (lit. statement) 'Where will you go?'. [13]

राज्ञस्तु तदविज्ञानान्नाहं वेदेति युज्यते ।

And, owing to the king's ignorance about that, it is rightly answered (lit. said) by him, 'I do not know'. [14ab]

Now follows the view of *Bhārtrprapañca* on BU passage *itah*

अन्ये गतिविवक्षार्थं मुनेः प्रश्नं प्रचक्षते ॥१४॥

The other thinkers explain the sage's question as purporting to explain (the king's) movement.¹ [14cd]

¹This refers to the outcome of the king's performance of various worships, viz. the goal which he had in mind.

साक्षाद्ब्रह्मविदप्येष नात्माप्तौ गतिविनृपः ।

परमात्मैव गन्तव्यः परमात्मविदा ननु ।
अथ कः संशयो येन स तेनैव नियुज्यते ॥१५॥

Since this king, though he knew (or learnt) about the directly perceptible Brahman, was not a knower of his movement (really, reaching) up to the attainment of the Brahman, (a question can be asked:) 'But, indeed, should it not be that the highest Ātman is the goal for one who has come to know about the highest Ātman? Then, therefore, what doubt can be there so that the king should be impelled (i.e. instructed) thereby?' [15]

गतिर्न विदिता तस्य तां स तस्मै विवक्षति ।
एवमर्थमुपोद्धातमेवं स कृतवान्मुनिः ॥१६॥

The goal was not known to him, therefore, the sage intends to tell him about that. For introducing this matter, therefore, the sage began thus (by asking the question). [16]

श्रुतौ यद्यपि नैतस्यां श्रूयते गतिचोदना ।
तथापि गतिरेवेयमुत्तरत्र स्फुटं हि तत् ॥१७॥

Even though there is not heard in the Śruti any injunction regarding a movement, there is yet a movement (necessarily) understood, since it is very clearly stated later. [17]

This refers to *yaiṣā hṛdayād ūrdhvā nādy uccarati*

गतिविज्ञानवैकल्यात्परमात्मविदप्यसौ ।
न जाने क्व गमिष्यामि कथं वेत्यब्रवीन्नृपः ॥१८॥

On account of not having the knowledge of that movement, the king, though he learnt about the highest Ātman, said, 'I do not know, where I would be going and how?' [18]

Now starts the refutation of Bhartṛprapañca's view.

इति व्याचक्षते केचिद्ग्रन्थमेतं महाधियः ।
श्रुत्यक्षरानुसारेण नायमर्थोऽत्र लभ्यते ॥१९॥

Thus have some highly learned men explained this text, but on following closely the words (lit. letters) of the Śruti, such a meaning¹ does not become known. [19]

¹Namely, movement for *gati* is to be understood in the sense of knowledge. See verse 29 below. Also, almost all verbs, having the sense of movement, mean knowing as well.

ब्रह्मवित्त्वे तु राज्ञोऽस्य मितिं नोपलभामहे ।
ग्रन्थे नानन्तरे यस्मादात्मज्ञानं समीरितम् ॥२०॥

We really do not find in the immediately preceding portion of the text any indication about the king's having secured the knowledge about the Brahman, viz. that there was imparted to him (the definite) instruction about the Brahman. [20]

गत्यर्थो नापि च प्रश्नः क्व गमिष्यसिलक्षणः ।
गन्तव्यं पृच्छ्यते यस्मात्र पिपृच्छिषिता गतिः ॥२१॥

Also, the question worded (characterized as expressed in the words) in *kva gamisyasi* does not purport to mean movement; since what is sought to be known is the god, not the 'movement' which is put under question. [21]

यत्साक्षादित्युपक्रम्य य आत्मेत्युपसंहतेः ।
तदन्यस्य तदात्मत्वाद्ब्रह्मणि स्यात्कथं गतिः ॥२२॥

Having begun with (the words) *yat sākṣāt* and having concluded (in the words) *ya ātmā*, (the question is raised,) 'How could there be a movement unto the Brahman and of that which is other than that and also as the nature of that.' [22]

This is clarified in the following verse.

गतिगन्तव्यगन्त्रादेरोत्प्रोतात्मवर्त्मना ।
ब्रह्मात्मनि समाप्तत्वाद्गतिः का परमात्मनि ॥२३॥

What movement can there be towards (lit. into) the highest Ātman, when (all the universe) is contained in the Brahman, the Ātman, in the manner that all movement, all goals of movement and all the goers are expressed as woven lengthwise and crosswise (in the Ātman)? [23]

अब्देशा पृथिवी कृत्स्ना तेजोदेशं तथा जलम् ।
वायुदेशं तथा तेजो विद्यद्देशोऽनिलोऽखिलः ॥२४॥

The entire earth is but the region of waters, so also, all water is the region of lustre and also lustre is the region of wind and the entire mass of wind is the region of ether. [24]

This refers to BU 4.1 as intended in verse 23 above.

स्वार्थदेशः परार्थोऽर्थः स्वप्नदर्शनवद्यतः ।
आत्ममात्रैकयाथात्म्यान् मुक्तौ स्याद्गतिस्ततः ॥२५॥

Since the region belonging to one particular thing becomes the region of another, as in the case of the objects seen in a dream; therefore, there is no movement with respect to liberation, because it consists only in being the single Ātman, i.e. its (coming to have its) own true nature. [25]

ब्रह्मैव सन्नवाप्नोति ब्रह्मेति वचनं स्फुटम् ।
गन्तृगन्तव्ययोर्भेदे विरुध्येत न संशयः ॥२६॥

In that sense, there is clear statement of the Śruti *brahmaiva sann avāpnoti brahma* and this Śruti statement would undoubtedly oppose (or thwart) any distinction accepted between the goer and the goal. [26]

क्रियाकारकभेदे हि गतिः सर्वत्र दृश्यते ।
गन्तव्य आत्मनि कुतः क्रियाकारकसंभवः ॥२७॥

Indeed, there' is movement seen wherever there is distinction of an activity and what is connected with it (*kāraka*) and if the Ātman is taken as the goal, where is then the possibility of activity and what is connected with it? [27]

नैवात्र गतिरस्तीति स्पष्टमागमशासनम् ।
सर्वमात्मैव ब्रह्मैव तथा च श्रुतिशासनम् ॥२८॥

There is again a clear statement from tradition that there is no movement whatever in this respect;¹ so also, there is an affirmation in the Śruti *sarvam ātmaiva brahma*. [28]

¹The second line is a brief expression for the Śruti statements BU 2.4.6: *idam sarvaṃ yad ayam ātmā*; and *Muṇḍakopaniṣad* 2.2.12: *brahmaivedam*.

तमोमात्रातिरेकेण व्यवधानान्तरं न च ।
यस्मादस्ति ततो मुक्तौ नात्मनो गतिरिष्यते ॥२९॥

And since there is not any other obstruction (to knowing it) beside merely ignorance (lit. darkness) about it, therefore it is not accepted that there is in the state of liberation movement unto (lit. into) the Ātman. [29]

Now, in verses 30-35, there is exposition on the statement in the Śruti *nāham*

अध्यात्मादिपरिच्छेदाद्यथोक्तोपासनाश्रयात् ।
विमुच्यमानः क्वेतस्त्वं गमिष्यसि वदाशु मे ॥३०॥

(The meaning of Yājñavalkya's words is:) 'Tell me quickly where you will go, being released from this (body or

transmigratory existence) by resorting to the (various) modes of worship which are stated (earlier) and whereby you would have put an end to what pertains to the body etc.' [30]

नाहं तद्भगवन्वेद यत्र यास्याम्यतः परम् ।
देवतावर्त्मना नाहं गन्तव्यं वेद्मि किं चन ॥३१॥

(The king said:) 'I do not know. O revered sir, as to where else I shall go from this (world), going by the way (on which I have to go) to deities (also); I really do not know anything as goal'. [31]

देवतावाप्तिमात्रं हि त्वत्तः प्राक्श्रुतवानहम् ।
उक्तोपासाफलं नातो गन्तव्यं वेद्मि किं चन ॥३२॥

'It is only from you that I have heard attaining to the deity earlier, as a result of the modes of worship that was stated; therefore, I do not know whatever be the goal.' [32]

इत्युक्तवन्तं प्रत्याह तद्वक्ष्यामि तवाधुना ।
मुच्यमानोऽथ यत्र त्वं गमिष्यसि नराधिप ॥३३॥

To him who had said thus, the sage (*ṛṣi*) answered, 'I shall now tell you where, viz. being released from here, you will go, O king'. [33]

अविद्यामात्रविध्वस्तौ यतोऽनाप्तवदाप्यते ।
गमिष्यसीत्यतो वक्ति स्वास्थ्यं यातो यथा तथा ॥३४॥

He states, 'You will go,' since after there is destruction of only ignorance, that which was as if not obtained before, is obtained. It is like when one attaining one's natural health. [34]

अतोऽवगतिरेवात्र गतित्वेन विवक्ष्यते ।
प्राप्तोऽसीति यतो ज्ञानजन्ममात्रं प्रवक्ष्यति ॥३५॥

Even (like this *api*) in this world eminent persons hate the mention of their names directly and they like (lit. desire) (their own) mention (made) as persons of such and such name (*amukamiśrāḥ*). [43]

Verses 44-85 are exposition of the meaning of BU 4.2.3, first, description of *Taijasa* (form of being) and explanations of the words *Indra*, *Indrāṇī*, thier union and thier covering.

तस्यैवात्रपतेर्जाया येयं सव्येऽक्षिण संस्थिता ।
भोग्यत्वात्सा विराडुक्ता तद्भोक्ता दक्षिणाक्षिणः ॥४४॥

This one, who is (abiding) in the right eye of that (being), is the wife of the enjoyer (lit. lord) of the food(s); because she is an object of enjoyment,¹ she is called *Virāj* and the enjoyer of her is the one who is (abiding) in the right eye. [44]

This explains *athaitad vāme ... patnī virāt*.

¹This is the reason for her being called *Virāj*.

एकस्यैव हि देवस्य विभागः स्थानभेदतः ।
अग्नीषोमात्मना श्रुत्या ध्यानार्थमिह भण्यते ॥४५॥

The Śruti has stated here the (fourfold) division¹ of just² one god, belong as the divisions do to different places (in the body),³ viz. being of the nature of *Agni* and *Soma*; (this) for the sake of meditation. [45]

¹This is in accordance with the AnSS edition. The NKL edition reads *vibhāgāḥ* '(four) divisions'. These are: *Viśva* and *Taijasa*, who are really of the nature of *Agni* and *Soma*, and *Indra* and *Indrāṇī*.

²The word *hi*, translated as just, points to the imaginary (*aupādhika*) differences, not real ones.

³The reading *vibhāgaḥ* is adopted on the basis of SP and the NKL edition. The reading *vibhāgāḥ* does not make any significant sense.

नानयोर्व्यतिरेकोऽस्ति भोक्तृभोग्यात्मनोः क्वचित् ।
प्रधानगुणभावेन सर्वत्रैते व्यवस्थिते ॥४६॥

There is never any (real) difference of these two, who are of the nature of the enjoyer and the object of enjoyment, (since) these two everywhere (or, at all times) ¹ abide (together) as the principal one and the subordinate. [46]

¹This refers to the two states of dream and sleep.

तयोः समागमश्चास्मिन् हृद्यन्तस्थे सुषौ मिथः ।
संस्तुतोऽत्रैति संस्तावो हृद्याकाश इहोच्यते ॥४७॥

And the union of those (two) occurs (i.e. takes place) in the hollow inside the heart; here the word *saṁstāva* means *saṁstutah* 'where the two have a union', that refers to the sky (i.e. space) in the heart. [47]

This explains *tayor eṣa ... ākāśaḥ*.
Cp. *Maitrāyanyupaniṣad* 7.11.

ऊर्ग्रसो लोहितस्यात्र पिण्डो यः सोऽन्नमेतयोः ।
अन्नं दामेति यत्पूर्वं व्याख्यातं शिशुबन्धनम् ॥४८॥

Here, ¹ strength is the fluid, i.e. blood, the lump is the food for the two; that the food is the cord, what is earlier explained as the bond for the young one of a calf (*śiśu*). ² [48]

¹This is a reference to (the hollow of) the heart.

²Refer to BU 2.2 and relevant verse from BUBV.

मिथो नाडीशतानद्धं तयोः प्रावरणं तथा ।

तज्जालकमिवाभाति बहुच्छिद्रत्वसाम्यतः ॥४९॥

So also, the covering for both of them (*mithaḥ ... tayoḥ*) is well-woven (*ānaddham*) by hundreds of veins¹ and it appears like a net on account of their similarity of having many holes.²

[49]

¹Cf. *śataṃ caikā ...* (*Kāthopaniṣad* 6.16; CU 8.6.6).

²That the heart has many holes is known from *tasya ha vā etasya hrdayasya ...*; cp. CU 3.13.1.

तयोः संचरतोर्मार्गो यैषोर्ध्वा हृदयाद्गता ।
जाग्रद्देशाप्तये ज्ञेया नाडी स्वप्नाख्यभूमितः ॥५०॥

The path for the two, who move about from the state (lit. level) of a dream for attaining to the state of waking, is this vein which has proceeded from (lit. of) the heart upwards.

[50]

This explains *athainayor eṣā*.

अन्नस्य प्रविवेकार्थं भोक्तुः सौक्ष्म्यार्थमेव च ।
नाडीनां परिणाहोऽथ सम्यक्श्रुत्येह वर्ण्यते ॥५१॥

Now, here¹ is fully (*samyak*) described by the Śruti the extent (or expanse) of the veins² in order to distinguish the foods³ of the enjoyer and to cover their subtle nature.

[51]

¹That is, in this sentence.

²Cf. BU 2.1.19.

³Actually the *kārikā* uses *annasya* in the singular; but, since two foods (*annadvaya*) are meant for Viśva and Taijasa, the translation uses 'foods' (in the plural). That helps the intended function of distinguishing (*praviveka*).

नाड्योऽतिसूक्ष्माः पुंसोऽस्य व्यवहारप्रसिद्धये ।

सहस्रभेदसंभिन्नकेशैकांशसमा हिताः ॥५२॥

The veins of this *puruṣa* are extremely fine (in dimension)¹ and are equal (in size) to one part of a hair made (lit. divided) into a thousand (parts),² so that they are helpful³ for fulfilling (his) purpose.⁴ [52]

¹Literally, subtle in form.

²Cf. also BU 4.3.20.

³That is, they can effect the enjoyment (lit. dealing/doing) of him.

⁴Namely, deriving enjoyment which belongs to either the state of waking or that of dream.

नोपमेह यतस्तासां सौक्ष्म्ये जगति विद्यते ।
तस्मात्केशविभागोऽयं नाडीसौक्ष्म्यार्थमुच्यते ॥५३॥

Since there is not noticeable in this world anything to compare with them, in respect of extreme fineness or subtle dimension, there is here mentioned this division of a hair, for referring to their extreme fineness. [53]

यथा संचरणी नाडी प्रोक्तेयं देवतात्मनोः ।
देवतानां तथान्यासां नाड्यो ज्ञेयाः सहस्रशः ॥५४॥

As this vein is said to be the path for the two of divine nature (or, of the nature of deities), so also are to be known (as existing) thousands of veins¹ for other deities also. [54]

¹SP quotes the following verse in support:

*ekonatrinṣal lakṣāṇi tathā nava śatāni ca /
śatpañcāśad vijānīyāt śīrā dhamanisaṁjñitāḥ //*

NKL also quotes this with *yad āhuh*

शब्दाद्यत्रवहाः सूक्ष्माः श्रोत्रादिकरणाश्रयाः ।
देवता देवतात्मानं तर्पयन्तीह ताः सदा ॥५५॥

Those subtle (or, extremely fine) veins, which have their supports in the organs, viz. ears and others, are carriers of foods such as words etc., ever bring satisfaction (or pleasure) to the deities and the Ātman of the deities.¹ [55]

This explains what is said in verse 52 above (viz. *hitāḥ*).

¹This is for *devatātman* which can be taken as the inner organ (*antahkaraṇa*).

अतिसूक्ष्माभिरेताभिर्जग्धमन्त्रं समास्रवत् ।
देवता आस्रवत्येतद्व्याप्नोत्येतद्यथोदितम् ॥५६॥

The food eaten (by a person), flowing through these extremely subtle (veins), reaches (lit. flows up to) the deities, i.e. this (food) pervades this (body), as described (earlier). [56]

सर्वास्वेव हितास्वासु सर्वा अध्यात्मदेवताः ।
चरन्त्यूर्गसपूर्णासु भोगार्थं पुरुषस्य तु ॥५७॥

In all of these helpful (*hitā*) (veins), which are filled with (i.e. full of) strength and the fluid, all the deities, which are related to (the organs of) the body, flow on (*caranti*) only (*tu*) for the enjoyment of the man (*puruṣa*). [57]

This precludes the idea of the veins being the enjoyers of food.

स्वचिदाभाससंव्याप्तिः पुंभोगः सुखदुःखयोः ।
सोऽप्यस्य देवतातन्त्रो देवताश्चात्रसंश्रयाः ॥५८॥

Man's enjoyment of happiness and/or misery is (but) the pervasion (occupying) by the semblance of his¹ own sentience. And that also is for him dependent on the deities (abiding in the body) and those deities also have their support in food. [58]

This verse has an argument to offer on the question as to how the immutable sentience has hunger—this question is (as quoted by SP): *maṇḍalaṃ tasya madhyastha ātmā dīpa ivācalaḥ* (*Yājñavalkyasmṛti* 3.109).

¹This refers to the man, i.e. the sentient Ātman within him which is in reality the semblance of the Ātman.

अन्नं नाड्याश्रयं सूक्ष्मं तच्छ्रुत्येहोपवर्ण्यते ।
एताभिरित्यतो यावच्छारीरादिति चोदना ॥५९॥

That food, in its subtle form, taking resort in the vein(s) is here described/stated by the Śruti sentence from *etābhiḥ* ... up to *śarīrāt*.¹ [59]

¹This is: *etābhir vā etad āśrayati, tasmād eṣa praviviktāhārātara ivaiva bhavaty asmāc chārīrād ātmanaḥ* (BU 4.2.3).

प्रविविक्ततरोऽन्नांशस्तर्पयन्प्राणदेवताः ।
प्राप्नोति लिङ्गमाहारः स तस्येत्यभिधीयते ॥६०॥

The extremely fine portion of the food, bringing pleasure to the deities of *prāṇas* 'organs', reaches *linga* 'the subtle (*antaḥkaraṇa*)' and that, it is said, is the food for that (sentience within).¹ [60]

Read with profit some portion from the NKL thus: *yaḥ annāṃśaḥ lingam indriyāṇi tarpayan ... antaḥkaraṇaṃ vyāpnoti sa āhāraḥ tasya lingasyeti vighrahavākyagataṣaṣṭhyā nirdiśyate*. It is apparent that the word *linga* has to be read twice and in two senses.

¹This is referred to as *pumān* in verse 58 above.

चीयमानादितो देहाद्रसाद्यन्नेन भौतिकात् ।
प्रविविक्ततराहारो लिङ्गात्मायं पुरोदितात् ॥६१॥

This subtle sentience (*lingātman*) is (said to be) one who has (i.e. eats) a finer food than that (worldly) body, which is made up of elements and kept on becoming nourished (lit. fat and fat) by the food consisting in juices etc., as already stated.

[61]

This explains BUB on BU 4.3: *tasmāt praviviktāhārād api pravivikrāhāratarah eṣa lingātmā*.

रसादिः प्रविविक्तः स्यात्पुरीषादिव्यपेक्षया ।
रसादेरपि सूक्ष्मोऽयमाहारो लिङ्गतृप्तिकृत् ॥६२॥

The fluid (food) is, in comparison with the excreta etc., finer and this food which causes satisfaction to the *linga(-ātman)* 'the subtle sentience' is finer than the fluid food also.

[62]

यत एवमतः प्राह तल्लिङ्गं स्थूलदेहतः ।
प्रविविक्ततराहारं श्रुतिः सूक्ष्मान्नसंस्थितेः ॥६३॥

Since this is so, therefore, the Śruti has stated that the *linga(-ātman)* 'the subtle sentience' is, in comparison with the gross body, one of finer food—(this is so) on account of its sustenance from/on fine food.

[63]

यतोऽतिसूक्ष्मो लिङ्गात्मा नातोऽयं स्थूलदेहवत् ।
देहादेहान्तरं गच्छन्केनचित्प्रतिहन्यते ॥६४॥

Since the *linga(-ātman)* 'the subtle sentience' is extremely subtle (in form), therefore it is not, like a gross body, obstructed (lit. struck down) by anyone, while going from one body to another.

[64]

This supplies the reason as to why the subtle sentience takes 'finer food'.

इवेत्यनर्थकं केचिदेवार्थेन विरोधतः ।

एवार्थस्योपमामन्य इवार्थे चावधारणम् ॥६५॥

iva (in this sentence) is without any meaning. (Yet) some (scholars)¹ hold (it to be having) the meaning of *eva*, in opposition to the meaning of *iva*, and postulate that there is a simile -*anya iva*. (But) the specification (by *eva*) is to be understood for conveying the sense of *iva*.² [65]

The verse seems to be somewhat difficult! It seeks to explain the meaning of *iva* in *praviviktāhārātara ivaiva bhavati*.

The following verse explains the view of Bhartṛprapañca which is here hinted at.

SP is more extensive and clear than NKL. As such, the notes are based on SP. And they are more extensive as well.

¹This is a reference to Bhartṛprapañca. His view is brought out by SP thus: *liṅgātmā praviviktāhārātara evety avadhāryate tasyopamām ivaśabdārtham āhur iti yojanā. uktam hi yathā khalu bāhyasya piṇḍasyopacayārtham āhāras tathā tasyāpīty etatsāmānyāt praviviktāhārātara ivaiveti*.

²This is Sureśvara's own view (so SP). This is explained by SP thus: *tathā ca yathā praviviktāhāro viśvas tathāyam api taijaso na praviviktāhāra eva kiṃ tu praviviktāhārātara iva yathā ca kāraṇātmā pravivikatahārātara eva na tathā liṅgātmā kiṃ tu praviviktāhārātara iveti dvayor ivaivaśabdayor arthaḥ*.

लिङ्गाहारादप्यणीयान्यतः प्राज्ञात्मनस्ततः ।

उपमार्थमिवेत्येतत्पदमत्र प्रयुज्यते ॥६६॥

Since the nourishment/food (*āhāra*) of Prājña is finer than the nourishment/food of the subtle (*liṅga*) self, therefore, is used here the word *iva*, which conveys the sense of a simile.

[66]

This verse supports Sureśvara's view stated in the preceding verse. Also, as NKL remarks, it is in approval of Bhartṛprapañca's explanation of the process (*prakriyā*).

कदम्बपुष्पवत्सैषा देवता हृदयाश्रया ।
बहिर्गतासु नाडीषु विषक्ता हृदयादधि ॥६७॥

This deity, who has a support in the heart, has clung to the veins which have gone out from the heart, just like a Kadamba flower.¹ [67]

¹The veins look like the fibrelike petals of a Kadamba flower, which spread out in various directions from a round-shaped central bulb that looks like the lump of the heart.

यथेयं देवता सर्वास्तथान्या अपि देवताः ।
साधारणत्वात्सर्वासां कार्यस्य करणस्य च ॥६८॥

As (is described) this deity,¹ so also (are to be understood) all other deities, because there is similarity of their functions and organs (with which they are associated). [68]

This verse explains *evam ekaikā devatā* in BUB.

तत्रैकस्या यदा कार्यं दृष्ट्यादि स्यादुपस्थितम् ।
गुणभावं तदा यान्ति सर्वास्तां प्रति देवताः ॥६९॥

In that (situation also), if there was to be performed a function such as seeing,¹ then all those deities would come to have a subordinate position (i.e. role to perform) with respect to it (i.e. the relevant deity).² [69]

¹The words 'such as seeing' refers to other functions, viz. hearing, touching, smelling and speaking.

²NKL cites a Śruti in this context: *vācam vadantīm sarve prāṇā anuvadanti* (*Kauṣītakyupaniṣad* 3.2).

नाड्यन्तरेष्वपि तथा सर्वासां संहतत्वतः ।
एष एव क्रमो ज्ञेयः प्राधान्यगुणभावयोः ॥७०॥

In respect of other veins as well, this very order (*krama*) of position of the principal and the subordinates, should be understood on account of their being in close connection. [70]

एवं च सति यावत्यो नाड्यो हृदयबन्धनाः ।
संवत्सराश्च तावन्तस्ते प्रजापतयोऽग्नयः ॥७१॥

This being so, there are (to be understood) as many Samvatsaras and Prajāpatis, fires, as there are veins having been bound to the heart. [71]

This has reference to the words *yathā keśaḥ* ... in BU.

प्रतिभागं समाप्तत्वात्पूर्वोक्तस्येह वस्तुनः ।
देवतातो यथाध्यात्ममधिभूतं तथैव सा ॥७२॥
अधिदैवं च विभ्वीयं द्वैतैकत्वेन विष्टिता ।
यथास्य नाड्यः पुंसः स्युरध्यात्मं सर्वतो गताः ॥७३॥
अधिभूतं तथास्यैव वायुमय्यः समन्तगाः ।
एतस्मादेव निःसृत्य शरीरात्सर्वतो गताः ॥७४॥

Since the (real) thing (viz. Sūtra) is obtaining in every part (of the body), it is (understood) here as the deity (to be worshipped). (As it is understood) in the sphere of a body, so it is (to be understood) [72]

in the sphere of deities also. This all-pervading (deity) is resting in them (*viṣṭhita*) as one in duality. As the veins of a man have moved (or, run) everywhere (or, in all directions) in the sphere of a body [73]

so (also) in the sphere of the elements (the veins) of this (man) move everywhere, being in the nature of Vāyu. From this very body have they moved out and gone everywhere (or, in all directions). [74]

In relation to verse 72, SP quotes *yathāhuḥ pratyavayavam kṛtsnasya parisamāptatvāt saishā yathādhyātmam evam adhibhūtam*

adhidaivam cetyādi. Also in relation to *yathāśya* ... in verse 73, it quotes *uktam hi yathādhyātman nādyah samantāc charīra-vartinya evam asyaiva puruṣasyādhyātmikasyā- dhidaivātmanā vakṣyamāṇasya prāṇanādyo vāyumaṃya iti*. Further, in relation to *etasmād eva* ... in verse 74, it quotes *uktam ca etasmād eva śarīrād abhiniḥsr̥tya sarvaṃ jagad āpūryāvasthītā iti*. [We wonder if all the three citations are from the commentary of Bhartr̥-prapañca—the first is probably from him.]

अधिभतात्मनैवायं नाडीलक्षणवर्त्मना ।

आपूर्येदं जगत्सर्वं स्थित आध्यात्मिकः पुमान् ॥७५॥

This *puruṣa*, who is related to the body,¹ remains by pervading (lit. remains after filling) the entire universe by his form, which is related to the sphere of elements, in the manner of (being possessed of) the nature of the veins (thus described before).²

[75]

¹This refers to the individual self which is transmigratory.

²This refers to *niḥsr̥tya śarīrāt sarvato gatāḥ* in the preceding verse and indicates how the individual self pervades the whole universe, which is the object of the individual's worldly knowledge.

नाड्य आध्यात्मिकस्येव ह्यधिदैवात्मनस्तथा ।

विराजो रश्मयो ज्ञेयाः प्रत्यंशावसितास्तथा ॥७६॥

The veins are to be known as the rays of Virāj; they are like those of (Puruṣa), the one who resides in the body (of an individual) as also of the one who resides in the deities. And also they are residing in every part¹ of the Ātman. [76]

¹This refers to the sun and other bodies having rays.

आध्यात्मिकस्येव पुंसः कृत्स्नाध्यात्माधिभूतयोः ।

अनन्तभिन्नकार्येषु समाप्तिर्देवतात्मनः ॥७७॥

The divine Ātman has pervaded all the bodies performing functions extremely distinct from one another as it does the various limbs of (Puruṣa) residing in a body and of the one residing in different elements. [77]

This is supported by SP which apparently quotes Bhartṛprapañca: *yathāhuhḥ yathāivādhyāpratyavayavaṃ kārtsnyena samāptir evaṃ vairājasyāpy ātmanaṃ pratyavayavam ādhyātṃmikādhibhūtādhidaivikeṣv iti.*

There is now explanation of the detailed description of the entire universe in order to convey that all of it is for the true knowledge of the Ātman.

आध्यात्मिकं परिच्छेदमुक्तदर्शनवर्त्मना ।
देवतासुपसंहृत्य विराज्यपि च देवताः ॥७८॥
विराजं चोपसंहृत्य प्राणविज्ञानविग्रहे ।
हिरण्यगर्भे तं चापि सर्वकारण आत्मानि ॥७९॥

Having (thus) concluded (the description of) the pervasion (by the Ātman) of what resides in bodies—in accordance with the view (of Bhartṛprapañca)—and also in Virāj and (then) those of deities and Virāj in what (is said) to constitute the body of Prāṇa, the knower, i.e. Hiraṇyagarbha and finally in the Ātman which is the origin (lit. cause) of all. [78-79]

अध्यात्मदेवताः सर्वा हृदि नीत्वात्मनस्ततः ।
हृदयाद्युक्तनाडीभिः संदध्यात्सूर्यरश्मिभिः ॥८०॥

After leading (lit. taking) all the deities in the sphere of the body to one's heart and then (taking them) from the heart, through the veins, may he connect (them) with the rays of the sun. [80]

रविहृन्मध्यगं यायात्ततो रश्मिभिरावृतः ।
हिरण्यगर्भमात्मानं ततस्तत्कारणं बुधः ॥८१॥

Then, may the wise, wrapped by the rays, go so as to reach the centre of the sun's heart, then to Hiranyagarbha, the Ātman, then to the cause of it (i.e. Hiranyagarbha), the Ātman. [81]

वैश्वानरात्तदात्मानं प्राप्तस्य हृदि तैजसम् ।
हिरण्यगर्भं तं चापि प्राणात्मन्युपसंहरेत् ॥८२॥

Then he ¹ should merge ² in the heart Taijasa, which is reached (lit. obtained) from Viśva ³ as its Ātman, and also that one, i.e. Hiranyagarbha in the Ātman which is his Prāṇa (i.e. the inner self). ⁴ [82]

¹This refers to a seeker of liberation.

²The words 'should merge' mean this: The seeker of the knowledge of the true nature of the Ātman should conclude that (i.e. Taijasa) as having merged into the heart where the inner self resides.

³Viśva is mentioned in this verse as Vaiśvānara; cf. NKL: *vaiśvānarād iti viśvād iti yāvat*.

⁴The verse concludes with the thought that the seeker of liberation has completely lost the awareness of the body.

प्राणशब्देन चाप्यत्र कारणात्माभिधीयते ।
बीजं कार्यस्य सर्वस्य प्राज्ञश्चेति निरुच्यते ॥८३॥

And the word *prāṇa* here expresses the Ātman which is the cause, (for) it is explained that Prājña is the root cause (lit. the seed) of all (the world of) effects. ¹ [83]

The verse explains the meaning of the word *prāṇa* which is used in this context.

¹This is based on the idea that the effect merges into its cause. And Prājña is understood as the origin of the world of objects (i.e. effects). The next verse clarifies this idea.

कार्याणां कारणं मुक्त्वा नान्यत्रास्त्यप्ययो यतः ।
तस्मात्कारणसंप्राप्त्या यायान्नेतीत्यकारणम् ॥८४॥

Since the effects do not merge elsewhere than in (lit. leaving aside) their cause; therefore, let that inner self proceed, with a desire to merge into (its own) cause.¹ [84]

This verse justifies the idea of the merger of an individual self (from the dream state) into Prājña.

Here, our translation follows the verse up to ... *kāraṇa-samprāptyā* (this is *hetau tṛtīyā*) *yāyāt*. The last part *netītyakāraṇam* is a puzzle for us!

साश्रयैः करणैर्हीनो ग्रस्ताध्यात्माधिदैवतः ।
प्राणात्मा एक एवास्ते प्रज्ञानघनविग्रहः ॥८५॥

Bereft of the organs with their supports and having given up (lit. devoured) the (related) deities in the sphere of the body, there remains only Prāṇa, the single Ātman,¹ who has the form of the mass of excellent (*pra*) knowledge. [85]

This refers to the Turīya Ātman above Viśva, Prājña and Taijasa. Also that is *akāraṇātman*.

¹SP points to the absence of Saṃdhi in *prāṇātmanā ekaḥ*, which is Sureśvara's following the practice of Vedic times.

Now follow in verses 86-113 the introductory remarks and exposition of 4.2.4, together with the observations on the faults in the exposition by *Bhārtrprapañca*.

निर्विभागात्मनस्तस्य प्राञ्चः प्राणाः पुरास्य ये ।
प्राची दिगेव संवृत्तास्तदवच्छेदहानतः ॥८६॥
दक्षिणा दक्षिणे प्राणाः प्रत्यञ्चश्चापि पश्चिमाः ।
उदीची दिगुदञ्चश्च सर्वे सर्वा दिशस्तथा ॥८७॥

(Now, the following is stated about) the organs of that person

who is now of the nature of one that is undivided:¹ Those which were earlier mentioned as turned eastwards became the eastern quarter, after the limits² (on them) have been lost, [86]

those which (had turned) southwards³ became the southern quarter, and those turned westwards became the western quarter and those turned northwards became the northern quarter—thus all (the organs) became all quarters. [87].

In these verses Sureśvara states about the movements of a man's organs while he is in sleep or is liberated. About Viśva and Taijasa there was already some mention made.

¹This refers to a man who is either in sleep or is liberated.

²In the states of waking and dream, the organs of the man had been connected with his body in certain fixed places. Yet, in the states of sleep and liberation, they do not have any fixed places for them.

³The word *dakṣiṇe* is not like the words *prāṇāḥ*, *pratyañcaḥ* and *udañcaḥ*. Therefore we have put the words 'had turned' in round brackets.

यत्साक्षिकी तमःसिद्धिस्तत्कार्यस्य च लक्ष्यते ।
तद्भावाभावयोरात्मा न कार्यं नापि कारणम् ॥८८॥

And that, on account of which, the witness,¹ darkness exists, is noticed (as the merging place) of the effect;² yet the Ātman³ is neither effect nor cause of their existence and/or non-existence. [88]

¹This refers to the individual self, i.e. the inner self which is overpowered by darkness.

²This refers to darkness and its effects (*avidyā* and *tajja*).

³This is reality, the inner self unaffected by darkness.

तेनैव ज्ञात्मनाशेषं तद्ध्वान्तं ध्वान्तजं तथा ।
जग्ध्वा नित्यात्मना विद्वान्पूर्णदृष्ट्यावशिष्यते ॥८९॥

With that knowing Ātman itself, the knowing man,¹ first destroys (lit. eats up) that darkness and also what is produced by darkness, and then comes to remain in the form of the eternal Ātman² and with a full vision. [89]

¹This is the seeker of liberation.

²That is, after liberation, he does not remain a transmigratory being, subjected to miseries.

एष मार्ग उपन्यस्त ऐकात्म्यज्ञानजन्मने ।
न त्वर्चिरादिवत्तस्य प्राप्तये गतिकल्पना ॥९०॥

This is thus presented the way to the rise (lit. birth) of the knowledge of the singleness of the Ātman.¹ And (*tu*) there is not (here associated with it) any notion of moving to (it), as (there is) in the case of (the way unto) the flame etc.

[90]

This is the conclusion of Yājñavalkya's statement regarding the result to be attained through the knowledge about Viśva etc.

¹That is, to attaining liberation.

आत्मत्वादाप्ततत्त्वोऽयं न देशाद्यन्तरायवान् ।
ज्ञानं मुक्त्वा ततः प्राप्तौ नान्यत्किंचिदपेक्षते ॥९१॥

Because he is himself the Ātman, he has attained the truth (about the nature of the Ātman) and he does not have any obstacle in the form of other regions (to deter him).¹ [91]

¹This is to say about the *arcirādi(mārga)* mentioned in the preceding verse. On that he, the departed person, has to move from one region/place to another. In becoming one with the Ātman, by knowing the same as it is, there is not any movement—naturally not from region to region.

प्रत्याययैवं परात्मानं मुनिराह नराधिपम् ।
प्राप्तोऽस्य भयमित्येवं भयहेतुविनाशतः ॥९२॥

Having thus (made him) understand about the highest Ātman,¹ the sage said to the king, 'You have (now) attained (to that which is) free from fear,' This is so owing to the destruction of the cause of fear. [92]

¹That is, having informed him about the nature of it.

²This is *avidyā* 'ignorance' as stated in just the next verse.

भयहेतुरविद्यैव सा च दुःस्थितसिद्धिका ।
प्रागप्यैकात्म्यविज्ञानादविचारितसिद्धिका ॥९३॥

The cause of fear is just *avidyā* 'ignorance' and that brings about sorrowful (or, miserable) condition (*duḥsthita*). It is established (as existent) even without any thought (about it), even before knowing fully (*vi-jñāna*) about the singleness (or uniqueness) of the Ātman. [93]

यतोऽतः प्रत्यग्याथात्म्यभास्वद्विज्ञानभास्कर-
प्रसूतिमात्रादेवास्या ऽवस्तिरात्यन्तिकी भवेत् ॥९४॥

Since (this is so), therefore there comes to be the absolute (i.e. ever-lasting) destruction of this one only by the rise of the sun in the form of the bright knowledge about the true nature of the inner self. [94]

This is the purport of *prāpto 'si*.

प्राप्तोऽसीति च निर्देशाज्ज्ञानमेवात्मनो गतिः ।
ज्ञानादन्या गतिश्चेत्स्यात्प्राप्स्यसीत्येव तं वदेत् ॥९५॥

From the statement (lit. mention) 'You have (now) attained' it is to be understood that attaining (i.e. attainment) by the

inner self is nothing else than (i.e. just the same as) knowing (about the true nature of) the Ātman. If there were meant any *gati* 'movement' other than knowledge (about it), the sage should have said to him, 'You will reach (the Ātman)'. [95]

This is to affirm that the Ātman is not a *prāpya* or *āpya* '(an object) to be reached/obtained'.

ज्ञानतुल्याममन्वानो दक्षिणां गुरवे नृपः ।
अभयं त्वामिति प्राह याज्ञवल्क्यं स पार्थिवः ॥९६॥

The king was unable to think about any fee to be paid to the preceptor as befitting the knowledge (which he imparted to him). The king said to Yājñavalkya, 'May freedom from fear (come) to you'. [96]

This explains *sa ha*

उचिता दक्षिणैषैव योक्तेहाभयलक्षणा ।
सम्यग्ज्ञानारुयदानस्य तदन्या संसृतिर्यतः ॥९७॥

Proper/suitable is only this fee, mentioned as indicated by (the word) *abhaya* 'freedom from fear' for the gift called right knowledge; since any other (gift) than that would have meant only transmigratory existence. [97]

Read SP on this: *na hi saguṇāyām api vidyāyām योग्या दक्षिणास्ति kim tu vaktavyam itarasyām yady apy "asmā imām adbhiḥ parigrhītāṃ dhanasya pūrṇām dadyād etad eva tato bhūya"* iti śruter iti bhāvah.

यच्चाभयं वेदयस इति प्रत्यूचिवानृपः ।
तत्तमोऽवस्तितः कार्यं नान्यदस्तीति लिङ्ग्यते ॥९८॥

And that, which the king said in answer (to him), viz. (in the words) *cābhayaṃ vedayase* 'You make known freedom

from fear,'¹ is the effect (produced) by the destruction of darkness; and not any other—this is indicated (or, understood).

[98]

¹Or, 'You impart instruction to me about freedom from fear'.

अभयस्य प्रदातृत्वान्नन्ववाप्ताभयो गुरुः ।
अभयं त्वामिति कथं राज्ञाशीस्तं प्रतीर्यते ॥९९॥

'But (one would ask:) 'Indeed, because he is one who imparted (instruction of) freedom from fear, the preceptor, he is free from fear, how then could/can the king convey/speak to him '(May) freedom from fear (come) to you' as his best wish?'

[99]

इत्यस्य परिहारोक्तिं केचिदाचक्षते बुधाः ।
शब्दादवाप्तमभयं न तु साक्षाच्चकार तत् ॥१००॥

On this, some wise man¹ states (by way of) an explanation: 'By his very words came to (the preceptor) freedom from fear, but he did not, in fact (*sākṣāt*) effect it'. [100]

¹This (actually in plural 'wise men') is a reference to Bhartṛprapañca with mock respect.

साक्षात्करणसिद्धयर्थमतो राजाब्रवीन्मुनिम् ।
अभयं त्वामिति वचस्तद्वयस्याप्राप्तमुच्यते ॥१०१॥

Therefore, the king said to the sage the words *abhayaṃ tvāṃ* 'freedom from fear ... to you', in order that he should actually get it—it is meant (lit. said) that this (viz. freedom ...) was not obtained by him. [101]

In connection with this verse, SP quotes (probably from the commentary of Bhartṛprapañca): *uktaṃ hi prāptam abhayaṃ yājñavalkyena nāprāptam na tu sākṣātkṛtam iti ato rājāśīr ucitety*

arthah.

यदि वा द्विविधो मोक्षो जीवत्येव शरीरके ।
एकः साक्षात्कृतब्रह्मा मृतेरुर्ध्वं च तल्लयः ॥१०२॥

Or perhaps, there is a twofold liberation (attained by one) while the body continues to be with life in it (lit. continues to live) (and) one (type of it) is wherein the Brahman is directly perceived and the other (type consists in) the merger of that (viz. the body) into it (viz. the Brahman) after death.

[102]

SP and NKL report that this is an alternative explanation offered by Bhartṛprapañca. SP quotes: *yathāhur dvididho mokṣo 'sminn eva śarīre sāksātkṛtabrahmā mukta ity ucyate na brahmaṇi līnas tasya śarīrapātottarakālam brahmaṇi layo dvitīyo mokṣaḥ sa tvāśāsītavya iti.*

Now follows in verses 103-113 the discussion on the faults in the explanation offered by Bhartṛprapañca.

एवं परिजिहीर्षन्ति न तु न्यायोक्तिरीदृशी ।
प्राप्तोऽसीति मुनेरुक्तेः परिहारो न युज्यते ॥१०३॥
तज्ज्ञानमात्रमैवोक्त्वा प्राप्तोऽसीति यतोऽवदत् ।
तत्साक्षात्करणान्नान्यस्तल्लयो वात इष्यते ॥१०४॥

Thus he¹ wishes to explain (the question). But such cannot (lit. is not) an answer with reason. The explanation of the sage's statement *prāpto 'si* 'You have come to ...' is not proper/reasonable,

[103]

since he (i.e. the sage) said 'You have come to...' after stating merely the knowledge of it.² Or perhaps, it is held (lit. desired) that there is not any other merger of it than having direct perception of it.

[104]

Verse 104 points to that there is no necessity of the king's

good wish. It would not at all be any means to attaining oneness with the Brahman.

¹Actually, the plural in the original would expect it. 'They wish ...'. But that is really not warranted by English language.

²Here *tat* (used three times) refers to the Brahman.

शाब्दविज्ञानमात्रेण नाचार्यत्वे नियुज्यते ।
श्रोत्रियं ब्रह्मनिष्ठं च गुरुं यायादिति श्रुतेः ॥१०५॥

(It should be remembered that) no person would be accepted (lit. appointed) as a preceptor, only for his having known fully ¹ what is contained (only) in words, for, there is a statement in the Śruti, 'May a man approach a Śrotriya, devoted to (the worship of) the Brahman, as (his) preceptor.'² [105]

¹Cf. *vi-jñāna* in verse 90 above.

²Cp. ... *gurum evābhigacchet ... śrotriyam brahmaniṣṭham* (*Muṇḍakopaniṣad* 1.2.12).

अभयं वेदयसीत्येतन्न चासाक्षात्कृते परे ।
शाब्दमात्रपरिज्ञाने राज्ञो युक्तं प्रभाषितुम् ॥१०६॥

Also, the statement *abhayam vedayasi* 'You make known to me freedom from fear'¹ is not (properly addressed to another person) when the highest Ātman is not directly perceived (by him). [106]

¹Cf. note 1 on verse 98 above.

असाधारणधर्मोत्थं विज्ञानं वस्तुनि प्रमा ।
शब्दमात्रप्रमोत्थं तु न मानं वस्त्वसंश्रयात् ॥१०७॥

Right knowledge in respect of the (real) thing¹ consists in full knowledge which has arisen from (knowing) the uncommon property (of it).² But (*tu*) (the full knowledge) which arises from merely understanding right (meaning) of the words, is

not the means of knowing (the Brahman), since it does not pertain to (or, relate to) the (real) thing. [107]

¹This is the Brahman.

²This refers to *aikātmīya* of the Brahman or the nature of it as *avyāvṛttānanugata*.

साक्षात्कृतैकतत्त्वस्याप्यैकात्म्यप्रलयं प्रति ।
किं समाशङ्क्यते येन तदाशीः संप्रयुज्यते ॥१०८॥

(The king thought to himself:) what (more) is expected (lit. entertained in mind) by (Yājñavalkya) who has directly perceived (i.e. experienced) the one reality (which can lead) to his merger in oneness with the Ātman, so that he has expressed (words of) blessings. [108]

ज्ञानानुरूपामेवातो दक्षिणां दित्सुरब्रवीत् ।
अभयं त्वामिति नृपो यथोक्तज्ञानलिङ्गनम् ॥१०९॥

Therefore, wishing to offer (unto him) the fee which was befitting (his) knowledge,¹ the king said (the following words to him), '... May freedom from fear come to you' which is indicative of (his) knowledge that was expressed (by him).² [109]

¹Namely, *brahmavidyā*.

²This refers to Yājñavalkya.

साक्षाज्ज्ञानातिरेकेण नालमन्यद्विमुक्तये ।
यथा तथासकृत्पूर्वमवोचाम पदे पदे ॥११०॥

We (i.e. I) have said it on many occasions and in many places that any thing (i.e. knowledge) other than (i.e. different from)¹ knowledge obtained by direct perception (of the Brahman) is not capable of (effecting) liberation. [110]

¹Or, which is beside (or away) from

भवानप्यहमेवेति यदा साक्षाद्विनिश्चयः ।

विदेहादि तदा विश्वं त्वत्तः कस्येति कथ्यताम् ॥१११॥

If there is a clear (or, directly expressed) decision, viz. 'I am you also'; then may you tell me.¹ 'To whom else than yourself should this world, viz. (the country of) Videha etc. belong'.

[111]

¹Literally, let this be told: 'To

ममेव भवतोऽपीदं न च किञ्चिदसंगतम् ।

अभावाच्च त्वदन्यस्य सर्वमात्मेति शासनात् ॥११२॥

(In holding) 'As this is mine, so it is yours also,' there is nothing unreasonable (in saying this), since there is none else than yourself (to be thought of) and also for the instruction in (your words) 'All (this) is the Ātman'.

[112]

अहं ममेत्यविद्याधीः सहेतुर्नाशिता यदा ।

पूर्णात्मनि तदा दृष्टे कः कस्मै किं प्रदित्सति ॥११३॥

When the wrong awareness, 'I (am this) and (this is) mine'¹ etc. is destroyed, together with its cause,² then the full/complete Ātman being seen (the question would arise:) 'who wishes to give what and to whom?'

[113]

¹This refers to *ahaṁkāra* 'ego which is the result of delusion'. This justifies the use of the word *avidyādhīḥ*.

²This is ignorance about the real nature of the Ātman, or false perception of reality, viz. delusion.

**BRHADĀRANYAKOPANIṢAD-
BHĀṢYA-VĀRTIKA**

4.3

Jyotis Brāhmaṇa

Verses 1-9 discuss the introductory in BUB.

नामरूपादिमत्कार्यं यः प्रविष्टः स्वमोहजम् ।
जलार्कवदकृतस्नत्त्वमापेदेऽविद्यया परः ॥१॥
तदविद्यापनुत्त्यर्थं गार्ग्यकाश्यादिच्छद्मना ।
अपूर्वादिस्वभावोऽयं प्रविष्टः प्रतिपादितः ॥२॥

The highest (Ātman), who (first) entered into its effects, viz. name, form etc. which are caused by delusion about itself, and then attained to the state of incompleteness,¹ like (the reflection of) the sun in waters,² owing to ignorance (about it); [1]

i.e. this one, who is (really) of the nature of *apūrva* etc., is stated as one who has entered (into other things) in order that ignorance about it is removed; (this) under the pretext of (the narrative of) Gārgya, Kāśya etc.³ [2]

This argument is based on BU 4.3.11 which is later explained in verses 951ff.

¹That is, lost its fullness.

²This refers to earlier chapters.

³SP states *ādi* to refer to the other questioners who put different questions to Yājñavalkya.

आगमादेवमात्मानं प्रतिपाद्याथ तर्कतः ।

स एव पञ्चमेऽप्युक्तः साक्षाज्जल्पैकवर्त्मना ॥३॥

Having first expounded (the nature of) the Ātman on the

basis of traditional scripture, (it is ¹ later pointed out that) the same Ātman has been stated in the fifth Adhyāya by way of stating *sākṣāt* ² etc. in the manner of *jalpa*. [3]

¹This has a reference to *na tam paśyati kaś cana ...* in BU 4.3.11. Cf. verses 951ff. for fuller exposition.

²SP clarifies *sākṣād aparokṣād ityādinoktalakṣaṇaḥ*.

वादन्यायेन तस्यैव प्रतिपत्त्यर्थमञ्जसा ।
षष्ठे क्रमादुपन्यस्तं जाग्रदादिचतुष्टयम् ॥४॥

In the sixth Adhyāya, there is introduced by way of refutation, ¹ (of others' views), in the course of the discussion, matter related to the four states of waking etc., in order that in the same (Ātman) should be properly (*añjasā*) grasped. [4]

¹This refers to the manner in chapter 4.1 and 2ff.

Now follows explanation of *tad eva punar ...* in BUB in verses 5-7 and of *ākhyāyikā tu ...* in BUB in verses 8-9. .
Actually, verses 9-47 discuss the thought contained in BU 4.3.1.

इन्धतैजससौषुप्ततुरीयाण्येव सांप्रतम् ।
संश्रित्य पूर्वं एवार्थं इह साक्षाद्विभाव्यते ॥५॥
विसंवादनिरासेन सद्भावश्चात्मनः पुनः ।
व्यतिरिक्तत्वशुद्धत्वस्वयंज्योतिष्ट्वनित्यता ॥६॥
स्वतोऽनतिशयानन्दस्वाभाव्यैकात्म्यनित्यता ।
दृष्टिमात्राद्वयत्वं च तर्केण महतात्मनः ॥७॥
विभाव्यते सुविस्पष्टं वादन्यायेन यत्नतः ।
विद्यायाः संप्रदानादिविध्यार्थारण्यायिकात्र च ॥८॥

Now is explained ¹ here that same thought (*artha*) by referring (lit. resorting) to (the forms) *indha*, *taijasa*, *saṁsupta* and *turīya* ² [5]

Now, here is (clearly explained) by way of discussion and

also by refutation of the difference (of opinions of others), the existence of the Ātman as having the nature of being distinct, pure, self-illuminating light, eternal, [6] most excellent happiness (in its own right) and being only one at all times, the seer alone having no duality associated with it—all this is stated at length (*mahatā tarkaṇa*) with reasons, [7] (all this) is clearly clarified with effort (and) by way of refutation (of others' views). Also here is introduced a narrative related to imparting of instruction etc.² [8]

There are references to the four states in which the Ātman abides.

¹SP defines this *vibhāvyate* as *prakāśyate*.

²SP clarifies etc. in the sense of instructor and his act of instruction to the instructed.

याज्ञवल्क्योऽथ जनकं योगक्षेमार्थमभ्यगात् ।
न वदिष्ये नृपेणाहमिति बद्ध्वा व्रतं किल ॥९॥

Then, Yājñavalkya came unto Janaka for livelihood and well-being, possibly (*kila*) making a resolve (*vrataṁ baddhvā*), 'I shall not speak (i.e. declare) to the king (anything). [9]

This introduces *sam enena vadisyē* in BU.

संवदिष्ये नृपेणाहमिति वा तं जगाम सः ।
समित्यस्याभिसंबन्धादेनेनेत्येवमुच्यते ॥१०॥
अविवक्षुरपि प्राह यत्पृष्टं जनकेन सः ।
तत्र हेत्वभिधानार्थं वरदानं श्रुतिर्जगौ ॥११॥

Or, (he did so, with the idea) 'I shall speak to (lit. converse with) the king,' he (Yājñavalkya) came to him (king). The word *enena* is used (lit. uttered)¹ because (the preposition) *sam* is connected with (the preposition) *abhi*. [10]

Since he (i.e. Yājñavalkya), though not desirous of speaking,

i.e. declaring, to the other, said to Janaka the Śruti stated (lit. sung) in this respect the gift of a boon with the intention of stating the reason (for his so doing). [11]

This is an alternative introductory remark that understands the sentence in BU as *sam enena vadiṣye*.

¹It is clear that Sureśvara reads BU text *sa mene na vadiṣya iti* ... as *sam enena vadiṣya iti* SP states that the second line is for explaining away a doubt by any one regarding the explanation which is given in the first line as not in conformity with the original text.

There is now stated in verses 12-14 the purpose of the second explanation of sam enena vadiṣye.

एनेन संवदिष्येऽहमिति व्याख्यायते यदा ।
 तदाख्यायिकया हेतुस्तयोः संवाद इष्यते ॥१२॥
 राजैव पूर्वं पप्रच्छेत्येतस्माद्गम्यते शुभा ।
 लिङ्गाद्व्याख्योत्तरा पूर्वा न साध्वीत्यप्रमाणतः ॥१३॥
 न वदिष्येऽहमित्यत्र व्रते हेतुर्न वीक्ष्यते ।
 यतोऽसंतोषतस्तस्मात्कृता व्याख्योत्तरा शुभा ॥१४॥

When the Śruti states (*vadiṣye*) it is this explained in the sense *enena samvadiṣye 'ham*, then there is understood (lit. desired) ¹ conversation of the two as the reason for this narrative. [12]

By this (explaining it) is understood that it was the king himself who asked the question first. The second explanation which I (i.e. Sureśvara) have offered), is more suitable (*śubha*) owing to the propriety (*linga*) ² and then the first (explanation) is not suitable, for that has no reason to be so; [13]

since, in (holding the option) *na vadiṣye 'ham*, there is not noticed any reason (indicative of) the (sage's) resolve, therefore it is that this second explanation is given by us (and it is) more suitable. [14]

NKL (ms. p.572) reads *anena* for *enena* in verse 12.

Verse 12 is the reason for Sureśvara to offer the second explanation of the BU passage and also the reason for holding that there is no change of resolve (*vratabhaṅga*).

SP on verse 13 states *tatra mānābhāvāt*.

These verses are for justifying why the second explanation is offered and also for pointing out that as more suitable than that which is stated in the preceding verse.

¹The verb in the text is *isyate* and not *ucyate* as shown by a variant reading.

²*linga* is taken in the sense of *sāmarthyā* 'propriety'.

Now is explained *tatra evānuktiḥ* in BUB, in verses 15-17.

नाप्राक्षीत्तत्र यद्राजा वरदानादनन्तरम् ।
प्रश्नानुक्तिर्विरुद्धत्वाद्विद्यायाः कर्मभिः सह ॥१५॥
स्वोत्पत्तावेव विद्येयं हेत्वन्तरमपेक्षते ।
प्रत्यगात्मतमोऽवस्तौ नासावन्यदपेक्षते ॥१६॥
स्वरूपलाभमात्रेण यतोऽविद्यां निहन्त्यतः ।
प्रयोगमपि विद्येयं नोपरुध्यति दात्रवत् ॥१७॥

That the king did not ask (any question about the Ātman) immediately after the gift of the cows was made was because the question and the answer about the lore (of the Brahman) were opposed to (the exposition of) the rituals.¹ [15]

This lore (of the Brahman) expects some other (thing) as the cause only for its rise,² but it does not expect anything else for the destruction of ignorance (lit. darkness) about (the nature of) the inner self. [16]

Since this lore (of the Brahman) by its mere rise destroys delusion, therefore it does not expect any performance of an activity, like an instrument of cutting (*dātra*).³ [17]

These verses explain *tatraivānuktiḥ* ... in BUB.

¹This has reference to the exposition on the Agnihotra ritual in the earlier portion of the *Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa*. Refer to verse 11 above for justifying Sureśvara's position.

²Refer to *sarvāpekṣādhikaraṇa* (BS 3.4.26-27), for the argument the first line of this verse. Its second line implies the necessity of fire and sacrificial sticks in the performance of rituals.

³This is an illustration based on dissimilarity of properties of *vidharmyadr̥ṣṭānta*, or, NKL (ms. p.572): *vyatirekadr̥ṣṭānta*). In connection with rituals which we learn from scripture about the necessity of instrument of cutting but that instrument also does require further effort by a person using it and only afterwards it can produce the desired effect. Such is not the case of the lore about the Brahman (SP, NKL).

verses 18-20 bring out the intention behind the question; *kiṃ vācīr ayam*

व्यवहर्तुमशक्तोऽयं देहो मृत्पिण्डवत्स्वयम् ।
परतन्त्रव्यवहृतिः स्वतो जाड्यस्वभावतः ॥१८॥

The body, which is, like a dead body, unable to act on its own; because its activity, which is caused by its dependence on others,¹ is on account of its innate nature of being insentient. [18]

¹This refers to various means required for performing ritual activity for some end. SP states *parādhīnavyavahāratvāj jaḍa-adr̥ṣṭhādivad iti*.

पृथिव्याद्यद्यवस्यायं स्वयं ज्योतिरनुग्रहात् ।
कर्मासनादि कुरुते तस्माच्च फलसंगतिः ॥१९॥

Since this one, self-illuminating light, by favouring the earth etc., i.e. residing in them, does perform activities such as sitting etc. and therefore there is its association with the result. [19]

The basic idea of this is: What is by nature insentient requires for the performance of any activity an impulse from some sentient one. And also cf. BS 2.2.1-10.

यत एवमतोऽप्राक्षीद्याज्ञवल्क्यं नराधिपः ।
किंज्योतिरयमित्येवं प्रत्यग्ज्योतिर्बुभुत्सया ॥२०॥

Since this is so, therefore the king asked Yājñavalkya (the question) *kiṃ jyotir ayam ...*, with the desire to get to know (the nature of) the inner light. [20]

Verses 21-23 state the nature of the (self-illuminating) puruṣa.

करणानि च देहश्च पुरुषोऽत्र विवक्षितः ।
आसनादिक्रियाकारी पौठक्षेत्रादि कर्म च ॥२१॥
किं स्वावयवसंघातभिन्नजात्यतिरेकिणा ।
ज्योतिषा व्यवहार्येषोऽसंहतेन पुमानिति ॥२२॥
किं वा तद्विपरीतेन ज्योतिषेत्यभिधीयताम् ।
किं चांतो यदि नामैवं शृण्वतो यत्प्रसिध्यति ॥२३॥

Here are intended the body, the various organs and the transmigratory being, as the cause of the performance of activities, such as sitting down etc. and activity a seat and a field etc. [21]

Tell me, if this person (*puruṣa*) does (all worldly) activities, being unrelated to (or, uncombined with) the light which is besides (that one) and of a kind (or, species) different from the cogglomeration of its (own) limbs. [22]

Or (does it act) contrarily through (that) light? (If it is asked:) 'What indeed comes from this?', then, listen what is the outcome (from this). [23]

This is the analysed thought contained in the king's question.

Verses 24-27 explain kiṃ cātaḥ ... in BUB.

तयोः पूर्वोक्तरूपेण ज्योतिषानुग्रहो यदि ।
अप्रत्यक्षेऽपि तस्मिन्स्तत्पुंस्क्रियालिङ्गदर्शनात् ॥२४॥
अनुमास्यामहे ज्योतिस्तादृगेव तदा वयम् ।

अथ तद्विपरीतेन संगतिर्ज्योतिषेक्ष्यते ॥२५॥
 तथाभूतं तदा ज्योतिरनुमास्यामहे वयम् ।
 अथोभयात्मतादृष्टा तदापि स्यादनिश्चितिः ॥२६॥
 इत्येतदभिसंधाय पप्रच्छ जनको मुनिम् ।
 स च पृष्टो यथाप्रश्नं प्रत्युत्तरमभाषत ॥२७॥

If there is help (lit. favour offered/made) by the light which is mentioned¹ first, then, in that case, (the light) remaining invisible also, there would be the indicative sign of the action of the transmigratory person (*puruṣa*), [24]

and then we shall infer the light to be of that nature. If again it is accepted (i.e. desired) that there is the combination (of the transmigratory person) with the light which is opposite in nature² then we shall infer the light of that type. [25]

If again it is well that (the combination is) of both the types then also that light would not be seen and thus there would be no decision.³ [26]

Having kept this in mind, Janaka asked the sage (his question) and he also, thus asked, made a reply, according to the question.⁴ [27]

¹This refers to *atirekiṇā jyotiṣā* in verse 22 above.

²This refers to *saṃhatajyotiḥ* in verse 23.

³SP has rightly pointed out the dissolution of the *Samdhi ubhayātmataḍṛṣṭā* into *ubhayātmata* and *adrṣṭā*.

⁴SP states *bubhutsayā praśnam anatikramyati yāvat*. Cf. verse 28 above.

verses 28-39 explain *na caivam ... in BUB*.

नन्वेवं कौशले राज्ञः किमर्थं पृष्टवान्मुनिम् ।
 स्वयमेवानुमायेद्गज्योतिः किं न प्रपद्यते ॥२८॥

(A doubt has arisen:) Indeed, when the king has the ability

(to decide matters), why did he ask the sage? why does he not understand the light to be of such and such type, after inferring its nature himself? [28]

सत्यमेवं तथाप्येष नृपः पप्रच्छ तं मुनिम् ।
लिङ्गलिङ्ग्यभिसंबन्धदुर्ज्ञेयत्वात्सुसूक्ष्मतः ॥२९॥

(The answer is:) "This is truly so and yet the king asked that sage (the question), because of the extremely subtle and obscure relation between indicator and the indicated activity".¹ [29]

¹SP paraphrases *lingalingyabhisambandha* as *vyāpyavyāpakayos tat sambandhaḥ*.

बहूनामपि संमोहो लिङ्गादिषु समीक्ष्यते ।
किमुतैकस्य वक्तव्यं पर्यपृच्छदतो नृपः ॥३०॥

Such a confusion (or, uncertainty) is noticed on the part of even many (wise persons), what then to say of one person?¹ Therefore, the king asked the question. [30]

¹This refers to Janaka.

सूक्ष्मधर्मविवेकार्थमत एवाब्रवीन्मनुः ।
दशावरा पर्षदिति ह्यपेक्षन्ते च सद्वियः ॥३१॥

It is only for this reason that, for clearly ascertaining matters of subtle nature (*sūkṣmadharma*), Manu has said,¹ "an assembly is made up of at least ten persons—thus do persons of great intellect expect."² [31]

¹*Manusmṛti* 12.110. SP quotes *Manusmṛti* 12.109-112.

²This refers to the help of many people for deciding subtle matters.

याज्ञवल्क्यादिरूपेण श्रुतिरेवाथवा स्वयम् ।
अनुमावर्त्मना ज्योतिः साक्षात्तः प्रत्यपीपदत् ॥३२॥

Or, the Śruti itself has, assuming the form of Yājñavalkya and others, declared that light is directly visible to us, (this) by way of inference. [32]

नृपाभिप्रायवित्प्राह याज्ञवल्क्योऽपि तं नृपम् ।
यथोक्तज्योतिषः सिद्धावादित्यज्योतिरित्ययम् ॥३३॥

Yājñavalkya also, understanding the king's intention, assured the king, with a view to establishing the light to be of that nature,¹ that this one is the light of the sun. [33]

¹This refers to *asaṁhatajyotiḥ*.

देहावयवसंघातजातिसंस्थानतत्क्रिया-
देशाद्यत्यन्तसंभिन्नतद्विलक्षणभास्वर-
स्वप्रतिष्ठैकभान्वाख्यज्योतिषैव पुमानयम् ।
आस्ते पल्ययते कर्म कृत्वा भूयो निवर्तते ॥३४॥३५॥

This individual (transmigratory being) sets down, goes out, does activity and, once again, returns together with this light, called the sun, which is entirely different from the body, the conglomeration of organs, their various arrangements within, their activities and the place (which forms the basis) etc.¹ and which is full of lustre different from them all and existing in its own right. [34-35]

¹*kāla* is meant here.

मध्ये जडस्वभावोऽयं ज्योतिषोर्वर्तते पमान् ।
बुद्ध्यादिविषयान्तो हि प्रत्यक्चैतन्यबिम्बितः ॥३६॥

This individual (transmigratory being) of insentient nature abides between the two lights;¹ since the inner sentience is

reflected in various insentient (objects or things) such as the intellect² etc. and their conglomeration, i.e. the body. [36]

The argument of verses 34-36 is based on the acceptance of *dehātimavāda*. This explains why the transmigratory being is described as *jaḍasvabhāva*.

¹This refers to *ādityajyoti* and less bright conglomeration of body etc.

²The word *buddhyādi* refers to various organs.

प्रत्यगेकस्वयंज्योतिःस्थिरासंहतनिष्क्रिय-
तद्विरुद्धरवीन्द्रादिज्योतिषोर्मोहहेतुकः ॥३७॥
मातृमानप्रमेयात्मा कर्तृसाधनकार्यवान् ।
अशनायादिसंसारधर्मापायागमात्मकः ॥३८॥

The inner self is one, self-illuminating, steady, ever abiding as uncombined with the body etc., devoid of any activity and being affected by the cause, viz. delusion about the two lights, viz. the sun and the moon, those which are of opposite nature, [37]

of the nature of one, who is the knower, means of activity (of knowing), (and) the object of knowing, the performer of an activity

being possessed of the means (of producing some effects) and of the products (lit. those things to be produced) of that activity); the one having the nature of hunger etc. which are the characteristics of transmigratory existence and their appearance and disappearance(s). [38]

तद्विरुद्धात्मकेनैव ज्योतिषोद्दीपितेक्षणः ।
आदित्येन सदैवास्ते यात्यायाति करोति च ॥३९॥

That transmigratory being, with its eyes brightened by the luminary ever abides with the sun, who is a light of the opposite nature, goes out and comes back and performs the activities.

Verses 40-42 bring out the purpose of *eva* in *ādityenaiva* in BU 4.3.2; verses 43-44 offer another purpose of the same word.

आदित्यात्परमेवेति नादित्यस्यावधारणे ।
पिण्डप्राणादिधर्मेभ्यो वैधर्म्यावधृतौ यतः ॥४०॥

In the words *ādityāt param eva*, (the word) *eva* is not for restricting it to *āditya* alone, since it is for restricting the sense of transmigratory being's dissimilarity from the properties of the body, organs etc.¹ [40]

BU 4.3.2 *ādityenaivāyam* is being explained only to differentiate *jyotis*. Read SP *anugrāhyād anugrāhakaṃ jyotir ativilakṣaṇam iti niradhārayitum evakāro nādityam avadhārayitum ity arthaḥ*.

Similar use of *eva* in the subsequent paragraph also is not for restricting.

¹This refers to activity.

आदित्यावधृतिश्चेत्स्यान्नेन्द्रादेः स्यादनुग्रहः ।
तस्मात्पिण्डादिवैधर्म्यमेवेतीहावधार्यते ॥४१॥

If there were restriction with regard only to the sun, then there it would not have been (possible to think of) the favour of the moon and others;¹ therefore, it is only the dissimilarity (of them with the body etc.) that is emphasised here. [41]

¹This refers to fire and speech (sound).

नृपस्त्ववेति संश्लेषादादित्यस्यावधारणम् ।
मत्वास्तमित इत्येवं मुहुर्विप्रमचूचुदत् ॥४२॥

But because of proximity of *eva* with *ādityāt*, the king, he took that there is emphasis on (only) *āditya* and therefore he again put a question to (lit. urged on) the Brāhmaṇa sage (in the words) *astamite*. [42]

Verses 43-44 present another way of understanding the word *eva*.

आत्मैव ज्योतिरथवा रविसोमाग्न्युपाधिगम् ।
अवधियत एवेति तमेव इति च श्रुतेः ॥४३॥

Or, only the Ātman is the light, or, is the light as having the delimiting adjuncts (in the form of) the sun, the moon and fire—that is asserted/emphasised. (This is prompted) by the Śruti (stated) *tam eva*¹ [43]

The subject of this verse is the word *ātman*. It may be understood possibly to have the purpose of setting aside the accepted meanings, the sun etc. as the light.

¹This refers to *tam eva bhāntam anubhāti sarvam*.

रवीन्द्रादिपदार्थेभ्यो ह्यनुमानैकवर्त्मना ।
स्वार्थं विज्ञापयिष्यामि विभज्यातः परा श्रुतिः ॥४४॥

(With the idea:) 'Let me convey (lit. instruct) my thought (*svārtha*) by only resorting to inference from the things, viz. the sun, the moon etc.,' the subsequent Śruti proceeds by making them apart from one another. [44]

This verse intends to answer any doubt regarding the Śruti *ātmaivāśya ...* as meaningless.

Verses 45-50 bring out the purpose of more than one verb. In verses 48-49, there is explanation of BU 4.3.2-4.

ज्योतिषोऽत्यन्तवैधर्म्यप्रसिद्धयर्थं विशेषणम् ।
आस्त इत्यादि सुबहु श्रुत्योपन्यस्तमादरात् ॥४५॥

In the verbs (lit. words *āste*) and others,¹ which are more than one, are distinguishing mark(s) (*viśeṣaṇam lingam*) which

the Śruti has purposefully (lit. respectfully) introduced, for establishing clearly the completely distinct nature of the light.

[45]

This establishes the purpose of the words *āste*

¹This refers to *palyāyate karma kurute viranyati*.

भयसां चाप्यपन्यासो बाह्यानां ज्योतिषामिह ।
लिङ्गस्याव्यभिचारार्थं बुद्धिवाक्कायकर्मणः ॥४६॥

And this introduction of more lights than one here is to convey (or indicate) the invariable (association of) the indicators (viz. activities) of the intellect (and the organ of) speech and the body.

[46]

Read SP: *anekaparyāyopanyāso bahavo hi dr̥ṣṭāntāvyāptim dradhayatīty arthaḥ*.

आदित्येनैव चेत्पुंसोऽनुग्रहो भवतोच्यते ।
तस्मिन्नस्तंगते पुंस आसनादि कुतो भवेत् ॥४७॥

If it is said by you that, by (making a reference as) *ādityenaiva* 'there is stated a favour done to a transmigratory being,' then the question is: 'How could sitting etc. be possible for a man when that (viz. the sun) has set?'

[47]

चन्द्रमा एव पुंसोऽस्य तदा ज्योतिरनुग्रहे ।
तस्याप्यस्तमयैऽग्निः स्यादासनादिप्रवृत्तये ॥४८॥
आदित्यादित्रयं ज्ञेयं ज्योतिषामुपलक्षणम् ।
मण्यादीनां प्रवृत्तिर्हि पुंसां तैरपि दृश्यते ॥४९॥

Then it is only the moon which is to do the favour to the man; and on the setting of that also there would be fire to do (the favour viz.) the activity of sitting etc.

[48]

The triad,¹ beginning with the sun, should be known as indicative of the lights (for the man), because the activity of

shining stones (*maṇis*) is seen to be (favourable) for man only through them (i.e. the triad). [49]

It is noticed that men are empowered to act by the light coming from jewels, but these also become helpful only through the light of the sun and others.

¹These are the sun, the moon and fire.

Verses 50-68 explain BU 4.3.5.

तेष्वप्यस्तमितेष्वस्य पुंसो वाग्ज्योतिरिष्यताम् ।
वाक्च शब्दोऽत्र विज्ञेयो ज्योतिष्कार्यसमन्वयात् ॥५०॥

When these (viz. the triad) also have set, let the light for the man be in speech; here, the word *vāc* is to be known (as the light) on account of its association with the activity of light. [50]

jyotiskārya consists in making a man undertake activity; it is only sound, which is a product of speech organ that makes a man's mind active; therefore *vāc* is to be understood in the sense of sound.

Verses 51-56 explain BUB: vāgiti sparśādīnām upalakṣaṇam.

स्पर्शादिविषयाणां वागिह स्यादुपलक्षणम् ।
यतः स्पर्शादिनाप्येषां प्रवृत्तिर्दृश्यते नृणाम् ॥५१॥

Here (i.e. in this context) speech is to indicate the different objects (of senses) of touch etc., since there is noticed activity of man on account of (i.e. when urged by) touch etc. [51]

बाह्यादित्यादिज्योतिर्भिः पमान्संदीपितेन्द्रियः ।
प्रत्यक्चैतन्यसंदीप्तः सर्वाश्चेष्टाः प्रपद्यते ॥५२॥

A man has his organs of activity incited by external lights

such as the sun, but he takes to all activities (only) when incited by the inner sentience. [52]

Read SP referring to another question, viz. that connected with the light different from the external lights.

सर्वेष्वेतेषु शान्तेषु ज्योतिःष्वक्तेषु कर्मणे ।
पुमान्किञ्ज्योतिरेवायं तमस्यन्धेऽभिधीयताम् ॥५३॥

(Question is asked:) 'When all of these lights, which are stated earlier, have been extinguished (i.e. ceased to work), what light does this man (come to have) in pitch-dark (andhe)? Let this be said.' [53]

This indicates another question referred to by SP.

सर्वचेष्टानिरोधोऽस्य पुंसः प्राप्तस्तदासति ।
यथोक्तज्योतिषि ततो न स्युश्चेष्टा यथोदिताः ॥५४॥

(This is so,) because there would follow the cessation of all activities of a man, when none of the (already) mentioned lights exists and then there would not be the (already) mentioned activities. [54]

स्मृतिस्वप्नसमाधाने पुरुषस्य समीक्ष्यते ।
चेष्टातः पूर्ववत्तस्य ज्योतिस्तत्रानुमीयते ॥५५॥

While explaining the memory and the dream of a man, his activity is noticed even as before and (therefore) there¹ is a light inferred to be existent (within the same). [55]

¹This refers to memory and dream.

बोद्धुः कर्तुश्च पुंसोऽस्य प्रवृत्तिर्येह का चन ।
यथोक्तज्योतिर्विरहे नासौ दृष्टा कदा चन ॥५६॥

Whatever activity is seen here on the part of a man, who knows and who acts, is not even seen in the absence (*virahe*) of the light that are (already) mentioned. [56]

Verses 57-61 state that all other dealings of a human being are determined by the presence of the other lights.

भान्वाद्युद्दीपिताक्षः सन्प्रमात्रादिः प्रसिध्यति ।
ततः कर्त्रादिसंसिद्धिः प्रमाकर्मफलं ततः ॥५७॥

(That) there is a knower etc. becomes apparent when a human being has his eyes lightened up by the sun etc.; therefore it is only from that there is established the coming into existence of the agent etc. and then the knowledge, activity and the result (also come into being) therefrom. [57]

This refers to a person's activities in the waking state.

कूटस्थानित्ययोर्भासोर्मध्यवर्ती पुमानयम् ।
वाङ्मनःकायकर्माणि सर्वदैव प्रपद्यते ॥५८॥

This man is thus existing between the two, immutable light and the non-eternal light, and ever performs various activities of speech, *manas* and body. [58]

This refers to the *kūṭastha* for explaining the activity of a man in his dream; refer also to verse 52 above when *pratyakṣecaitanya* is mentioned.

ध्वान्तादिविषयान्तोऽर्थो जडत्वान्नात्मसिद्धिकृत् ।
आत्मज्योतिरभावेऽतो नाभावमपि विन्दति ॥५९॥

An object falling within the compass of darkness etc., being insentient, does not help to prove the existence of the Ātman; therefore, in the absence of the light of the inner self, that does not come to have (its own) absence as well. [59]

आगमापायिज्योतिर्भिर्धर्माधर्मनिबन्धना ।
संगतिः पुरुषस्यास्य निर्हेतुः प्रत्यगात्मना ॥६०॥

The association of this transmigratory being with the lights that come into existence and depart from it, is dependent on merit and demerit, (whereas that) with the inner self has no cause (for its existence). [60]

कुम्भस्य वियता यद्वन्निर्हेतुः संगतिः सदा ।
विनश्वरी सहेतुश्च जलक्षीरादिसंगतिः ॥६१॥

It is like a pitcher which has an all-time association with the sky, (even) without having a cause for it, (and) its association with water and/or milk is transitory (*vinaśvarī*) and has a cause for it. [61]

In this verse Sureśvara gives an illustration to justify the statement, in the preceding verse regarding a man's twofold association (i) with various objects of ignorance and (ii) with the inner self.

Verses 62-66 clarify that the light of the inner self is not associated with any external object(s) (dharma(s)).

यथेहासंहतान्येव भान्वादीनि प्रकुर्वते ।
अनुग्राहेण पुंसेह सर्वदानुग्रहं मुहुः ॥६२॥

As the sun etc., though (*eva*) being uncombined (with the man), do favour a man, who is to be favoured; so also, here (in the case of the inner self), it ever does favour to a man. [62]

अकारकात्मकान्येव पुंसः कारकरूपिणः ।
नाकृत्वा तानि कुर्वन्ति प्रकाशं गतिवद्यतः ॥६३॥

(This is so,) since not without doing any activity of their own (and yet) being no causes (*kāraṅkas* of, or factors related to) activity, those (lights) produce lumination, like a movement, in the case of a man who is of the nature of agent. [63]

व्यञ्जकानां हि सर्वेषां न स्वरूपातिरेकतः ।
व्यङ्ग्येष्वतिशयो दृष्टस्तिष्ठतो नु गतिर्यथा ॥६४॥

In the case of them, there is not seen any excellence of their own in the things revealed beside (themselves) having only their nature (of a light); this occurs in the same way as (the existence of a capacity to) move (appear) in the case of one who is (merely) standing. [64]

आत्मज्योतिस्तथैवेदं सदानस्तमितोदितम् ।
भान्वादिष्वपि सर्वेषु तदेव प्राग्विवक्षितम् ॥६५॥

Exactly of the same nature is this light of the inner self which has never set or has not ever risen; in the case of all of the sun etc. also, it is intended to convey (the situation to be) just the same. [65]

पुंस्प्रवृत्तिरियं लिङ्गं यथोक्तज्योतिषो भवेत् ।
सर्वत्राव्यभिचारित्वात्तथा स्वप्नादिभूमिषु ॥६६॥

As this activity of a man is an indicator of the light¹ which is described; so also it invariably exists owing to its presence everywhere in the states of dream etc. [66]

¹This refers to the inner self who is responsible for a man's activities in his waking state and dream state as well. That is to say, the inner self is never absent in a man.

Verses 67-72 are an exposition of BUB: *jāgradviṣaye hi*
From verse 69 up to 275 there is exposition of BU 4.3.6.

जाग्रत्काले नरस्यास्य भान्वादिय्योतिषा यदा ।
चक्षुराद्यनुगृह्येत स्फुटा व्यवहृतिस्तदा ॥६७॥

When, in the state of dream, the eye etc. of this man etc. would be favoured by the light of the sun etc., there is (man's) activity already visible; [67]

एवं जागरिते तावदादित्याद्युक्तलक्षणम् ।
विभिन्नासंहतज्योतिरनुग्रहपुरःसरः ।
पुंव्यापारः सदक्षोत्थप्रमाणप्रमितः स्फुटः ॥६८॥

Thus, in the state of waking (of a man), there is clearly visible the man's activity, which is grasped by (various) means of knowing through capable organs, which is determined (lit preceded) by the favours of the uncombined lights, which is distinct and which has the character of the sun etc., as stated before. [68]

Regarding the translation of the first line, the variant reading *lakṣaṇaḥ* is adopted. If the reading above, viz. *-lakṣaṇam* is accepted, the alternative translation would be: "Thus in the state of waking of a man, (there is operative the light) of the sun etc. whose description is (already) given".

लिङ्गलिङ्ग्यभिसंबन्धो यस्मादेवं मितस्ततः ।
सर्वज्योतिरभावेऽपि तादृगेवानुमीयते ॥६९॥
ज्योतिर्जागरिते यद्वद्रवीन्द्रादि समीक्ष्यते ।
नरव्यापारलिङ्गेन धूमाग्निवदसंशयम् ॥७०॥

Since thus is known the relation between the indicator and the indicated; so also only a similar relation is inferred even in the absence of all (those) lights, [69]
as light, such as the sun, the moon etc., is undoubtedly noticeable in the waking state of a man through the characteristic, viz. man's activities, just like (the existence of) fire is noticeable through smoke. [70]

This refers to *asamhatatva* character of light which is not combined with various organs etc. of a man.

लिङ्गात्सामान्यतो ज्ञाते विशेषेणाप्यनीक्षिते ।
भान्वादिवदतो राजा भूयः पप्रच्छ तं गुरुम् ॥७१॥

Since (such uncombined lights) as the sun etc., become (thus) known in a general way by (their) common characteristic of them, even though their particularity is not directly seen; the king again asked the preceptor his question. [71]

शान्तेषु सर्वज्योतिःषु पूर्वोक्तेष्वस्य देहिनः ।
किंज्योतिरिति मे ब्रूहि पुंव्यापारानुभूतितः ॥७२॥

'When all these lights, which are stated before, have become extinguished, what then has this man for a light for himself?' Tell me from the experience of a man's activity. [72]

This verse states the king's question in brief. This is further clarified in the following verse.

Verses 73-77 point to ignorance as the cause of a desire to know the undoubted self-illuminating light.

सर्वज्योतिरुपरतौ भूरिव्यापारकारणम् ।
स्वयंज्योतिष्कमपि तं राजा पप्रच्छ मोहतः ॥७३॥

Out of his delusion, the king asked him (Yājñavalkya) the cause of the multiple/various activity (of a man) (even) when all the lights have gone out, though that is self-illuminating (light). [73]

यत्प्रसादादविद्यादि सिध्यतीव दिवानिशम् ।
तमप्यपह्नुतेऽविद्या नाज्ञानस्यास्ति दुष्करम् ॥७४॥

(This is so because) ignorance conceals even that through whose favour ignorance etc. it is, as it were, established day and night; there is nothing difficult for ignorance (to effect). [74]

स्वतो बुद्धं स्वतः शुद्धं स्वतो मुक्तं निरात्मिका ।
अविचारितसंसिद्धिरविद्या लिङ्गते कथम् ॥७५॥

(The question is:) 'How does ignorance which does not have any specific nature and which gets established even without a thought, embrace (i.e. obscure) the naturally enlightened, pure and free (i.e. liberated inner self)?' [75]

निःसङ्गस्य ससङ्गेन कूटस्थस्य विकारिणा ।
पूर्णस्यानात्मना योगो वास्तवो नोपपद्यते ॥७६॥

There does not reasonably exist any real association of (the inner self which is) devoid of any contact with another, immutable and complete or full in itself with a non-Ātman (which is in) contact (with another) and which undergoes modification.¹ [76]

¹The adjective *apiūrṇena* is implied through the force of *īrṇasya* in contrast.

सर्वज्योतिरुपरमे किंज्योतिरिति चोदिते ।
आत्मैवास्येति जनकं याज्ञवल्क्योऽप्युवाच ह ॥७७॥

When he was asked the question, 'What light has one when all (other) lights are extinguished?', Yājñavalkya, on his part (*api*), made, an answer to Janaka, 'The inner self indeed is for this one (the light)'. [77]

verses 78-80 affirm that the Ātman is self-luminous.

आत्मप्रत्यय आत्मैको द्वितीयः पुनरात्मनः ।

अनात्मप्रत्ययोऽतोऽहं स्वत एवास्मि केवलः ॥७८॥

Only the single inner self has the awareness of its own existence, whereas a second, who can be different from the inner self, has the awareness of the non-Ātman (associated with the inner self); therefore, I myself am absolute (or only by myself). [78]

न सामान्यं विशेषं वा प्रत्यग्धीरवगाहते ।
तद्याथात्म्यात्प्रतीचोऽतः सम्यग्दृष्ट्या न वीक्ष्यते ॥७९॥

The knowledge on the part of the inner self does not pertain to (lit. enter into) what is general or what is particular, since that is the true nature of the inner self and, therefore, that is not seen as with a proper vision. [79]

It is because of ignorance on the part of the inner self that the world, made up of what is general and what is particular, becomes apparent; therefore the inner self cannot really notice either or both of them.

नाविद्याघस्मरैकात्म्यसम्यग्दृष्ट्या समीक्ष्यते ।
आत्माविद्या तदुत्थो वा बाध्यत्वाद्गज्जुसर्पवत् ॥८०॥

Ignorance about the self or what comes from it is not seen as the proper act of knowing because of its real oneness with what destroys ignorance, since that (ignorance) is what is stultified as a serpent noticed in place of a rope (is stultified).

[80]

Verses 81-85 discuss an objection: 'How can there be only question about the nature of the Ātman which is devoid of both generality and particularity?'

आध्यात्मिकस्य नेत्रादेर्बाह्यज्योतिरसंगतौ ।
तद्द्वारेण प्रकाशोऽयं न मनस्युपजायते ॥८१॥

Thus) in the absence of (any) association of the eye etc., which belongs to a body, with the external light there would not enter into *manas* any information (lit. light) through them.¹

[81]

For normal viewing of objects, there is a need that some sense organs are in association with an external light so that the shape of the object gets fixed in the *manas* of a person. In the case of the inner self as a knower, there is no such mechanism, or sense organs and *manas* and, therefore, there can be no viewing of objects.

This is a reference to the waking state of an individual.

भान्वाद्यनुग्रहाभावे तस्मादेष पुमानिह ।
प्राप्तोऽद्रष्टा तथाश्रोता स्मृतिस्वप्नादिभूमिषु ॥८२॥

Therefore, in this, i.e. in respect of memory and in the state of dream etc., there being absence of any helping light as of the sun etc., a person becomes non-seer or non-listener.

[82]

मनसैवेक्षते यस्मात्सर्वानिन्द्रियगोचरान् ।
तदभावे पुमानेष किंज्योतिरिति कथ्यताम् ॥८३॥

Since a person sees all the objects of all sense organs only through the help of *manas*; therefore, in the absence of that,¹ i.e. *manas*, what light can this person have? Let this be told.

[83]

This refers to BU 1.5: *manasā manute* But cf. SP: *yadyaśvapne mano 'sti tathāpi tasya viṣayatvān na prakāśakateti vyakhyate* where *viṣayatva* determines *viṣayākāreṇa pariṇamana* and excludes *prakāśakatvarūpa* (of *manas*).

आत्मैवास्य तदा ज्योतिर्भवतीत्यभ्यधादृषिः ।

आत्मनैव तदा चेष्टां ज्योतिषा संप्रपद्यते ॥८४॥

Then the Rṣi said 'The inner self itself serves (lit. becomes) for this person as the (external) light; (and) only through (the help of the inner self, the (illuminating) light can this person perform any activity'. [84]

Further, read SP: *svapnādaṁ vāsanārūpā dhīr ātmajyotir dīpitā svavyāpāraṁ karotīty arthah.*

प्रत्यक्षाद्युपलब्धौ यो बुद्धौ संस्कार आहितः ।
कर्मणोद्भावितः सोऽयं स्मृतिरूपेण जायते ॥८५॥

That impression, which has been impressed on the intellect for acquiring the knowledge of directly perceptible things etc., becomes here (*ayaṁ jāyate*) visible (in this person) in the form of some memory, caused as it is by (an earlier) activity. [85]

Verses 86-93 point out that the intellect etc. can illuminate external objects owing to their being in the vicinity of the inner self.

आत्मा स्वाभाससचिवो धियमिच्छादिरूपिणीम् ।
अनुगृह्णाति कर्मोत्थां प्रत्यगज्ञानकारणात् ॥८६॥

The inner self, who has its own appearance as a helper favours (a man with) some knowledge which has the form of desire etc. that is produced by (earlier) activity,¹ on account of ignorance on the part of itself, i.e. the inner self. [86]

¹Cf. SP: *svapnādibhāvinyah smṛtīcchādivṛttayah sarvāḥ*. Also NKL (ms. p.577): *svapnakālīnāḥ sarvāḥ smṛtayo buddher vyāpāra ity arthah.*

यथा प्रकाशयत्येकः कृत्स्नं लोकमिमं रविः ।

क्षेत्रं क्षेत्री तथा कृत्स्नं व्यनक्तीति तथा स्मृतिः ॥८७॥

In this sense, there is a (statement in the) Smṛti. As only one sun illumines this entire world, so does the possessor of the field (i.e. the inner self) reveal the entire field. [87]

prathā ... kṛtsnam vyanakti forms a quotation, viz. *Gītā* 13.33, with only one variation viz. *vyanakti* standing for *prakāśayati*.

नानासंस्कारसंसर्गिप्रत्यगज्ञानमेव तत् ।
बुद्ध्यादिस्मृतिरूपेण प्रथते कर्मणो वशात् ॥८८॥

That (memory) is but ignorance on the part of the inner self, which is associated with numerous impressions; (that ignorance) reveals itself (*prathate*) in the form of memory of cognition of the intellect etc. through the force of (earlier) act. [88]

Read NKL (ms. p.577): *icchāder buddhikāryatvenāvidya(?)syāt* *anāntareṇaiva nirapekṣatvād atrāha*.

भान्वादिवदतो बुद्धिं स्वाभासैकसहायवान् ॥
अनुगृह्णाति कूटस्थः स्वात्माविद्यानुरोधतः ॥८९॥

Therefore, the immutable inner self does help a person just as the sun and others, having its own appearance as the helper, and in accordance with the ignorance about itself. [89]

Read NKL (ms. p.577), introductory remark: *ajñānasye-* *ādihetutve tasmād ātmano 'nugrāhakatvam iti phalitam āha*.

अनुग्राह्याभिसंबन्ध एकजातिसमन्वयात् ।
आदित्यादेरिहावाप्तिरात्मनोऽज्ञानवर्त्मना ॥९०॥

Here, in the case of the inner self, the relation of the sun etc. to a person to be helped is through (the force of), i.e. by way of ignorance and (also) on account of its being one

in nature with the only one (*ekajātisamanvaya*).

[90]

For clarification, read SP: *iha buddhyādāv ajñānadvārātmanas tādātmyasaṃgatir atah sājātyābhāve 'pi sākṣitvalakṣaṇam anugrāhakatvam.*

चिदाभाविद्ययैवात्मा कटस्थोऽप्येति साक्षिताम् ।
आगमापायिरूपेषु स्थितौऽनेकेषु चैकलः ॥९१॥

The inner self, even though immutable, comes to possess the nature of witness only through the ignorance in the form of the semblance of sentience among numerous objects (of that knowledge) which have the forms of what comes into existence and what departs from it. (And) that (inner self) remains just alone (amongst many). [91]

Read NKL (ms. p.577) introductory remark: *anugrāhakatvaṃ nāma sākṣitvaṃ tat kūtasthasyātmano 'nupapannam atrāha.*

दृश्यार्थवदभिन्नोऽयं द्रष्टृदर्शनसाक्ष्यपि ।
द्रष्टृदर्शनभेदेऽपि न भेदोऽस्य मनागपि ॥९२॥

Even though this one is the witness of the seer and the act of seeing, it is non-distinct like the object to be seen;¹ thus, even when there is such a distinction as the seer and the act of seeing, there is not even a little of difference/distinction in respect of this one (i.e. the inner self). [92]

The basis of this verse is the doubt: Just as there are discrete objects of different sense organs, so also, owing to the discreteness among the objects to be witnessed, there should be discrete (or distinct) witnesses of them. Therefore, it is not proper/reasonable to hold that there is only one witness for the various/numerous objects to be witnessed.

¹Actually the objects to be seen are but the product(s) of ignorance and, as such, not distinct from the inner self.

कारणान्वयवद्बुद्धेश्चिदाभासोऽपि सर्वदा ।
चिदाभासातिरेकेण बुद्धेः परिणतिर्वृथा ॥९३॥

The semblance of sentience arises on account of the intellect which has a (continued) association with its cause, viz. ignorance and, therefore, that modification of the intellect, which is held to be apart from the semblance of sentience is (only) futile. [93]

This verse affirms that the semblance of sentience does continue to be existing in the different organs such as the intellect.

Verses 94-95 affirm that the inner self is the witness of the objects to be seen.

विषयः प्रत्यगात्मा च स्वाभासेन विशेद्वियम् ।
स्वाभासवत्स्वयं साक्षाद्वियत्कुम्भादिगं यथा ॥९४॥

And the inner self, (becoming) the object(s) to be seen enters through its own semblance into the intellect, in the same way as the sky itself enters into a pitcher etc. itself becoming the semblance of it (in various forms). [94]

योऽप्यविद्यादिसंबन्धः सोऽप्यविद्याप्रकल्पितः ।
वास्तवस्त्वभिसंबन्धो नोपपत्त्यात्मनो यतः ॥९५॥

And that relation (of the inner self) to ignorance etc.¹ is also produced by ignorance, since it is not for any reason that there is any real association (*abhisambandha*) of the Ātman (with ignorance). [95]

¹This refers to the world produced by ignorance.

In verses 96-99 is pointed out that the Ātman does not have the nature of agent of any activity.

यथा ज्ञानप्रकाशाभ्यां संप्लुतावेव नान्यथा ।
कुम्भादेः कर्मयोग्यत्वं स्यादेवं धिषणादिसु ॥९६॥

As a pitcher etc. can become useful for any activity of a man owing to only knowledge and light, when there is only ignorance;¹ (and) not otherwise; similarly, in the case of the intellect etc. should it be held as (possible).² [96]

¹*sampluti* stands literally for overpowering (of the inner self by the so-called) knowledge (of external objects) and light (of the external sun).

²That is, *jñāprakāśābhyām samplutāv eva*.

चिद्वाह्याकृतिसंबन्धे कर्मणेऽलं भवेन्मतिः ।
तयोर्भिन्नाश्रयत्वे तु दुःख्यस्मीति न सिध्यति ॥९७॥

Only when there is association of sentience with the external appearances (of objects), a person's thought/intention can result into some activity, but, in their having the different abodes, there cannot be established (the experience) 'I am miserable'.

[97]

This explains the *dārṣṭāntika* intended in verse 96 above.

कौटस्थ्याद्विक्रियाभावान्निश्चितकत्वाद्विकारिणः ।
आत्मनः स्यादिदं विश्वमन्धकारप्रनृतवत् ॥९८॥

For the inner self, which has (owing to ignorance) become subject to modification and is associated with absence of sentience this (entire) world would be like (some) dance (performed) in darkness—since it has (in reality) the nature of being immutable and absence of any modification in it.

[98]

घटाद्याभासवत्तस्मान्मोहादेरभ्युपेयताम् ।

चिदाभासोऽपि सर्वत्र न वेद्मीत्यनुभूतितः ॥९९॥

Therefore, let this be accepted that like the appearance of a pitcher etc., this semblance of sentience also has resulted from delusion; for there does not everywhere obtain the experience, 'I do not know'. [99]

एषोऽस्यानुग्रहः श्रुत्या प्रतीचोऽत्र विवक्षितः ।
भान्वनुग्रहवत्पुंस आसनादिप्रसिद्धये ॥१००॥

This help of the inner self in the case of an individual is intended by Śruti. It is like the favour of the sun for a human being which lead to his activities of sitting etc. becomes possible. [100]

Read NKL (ms. p.578) for explanation of the idea: *cidābhāsavyāptirūpa ity arthaḥ*.

This is to bring out how the inner self also serves as some external light for a man even like the sun and others for sitting etc.

Verses 101-105 explain what is the Ātman and also that it becomes the inner self of an individual.

आत्मेति प्राणपिण्डादितदंशसमुदायतः ।
तज्जात्याकृतिसंबन्धगुणकर्मविलक्षणः ॥१०१॥

What is called the Ātman is different in characteristic from (a conglomeration, viz. organs and) body consisting of them which are its parts and also in respect of their activities, properties related to thier forms and genera of them. [101]

तत्सतत्त्वं तदात्मत्वादज्ञानाद्यवभासयत् ।
ज्योतिरेकात्मकं नित्यमसाधारणमानगम् ॥१०२॥

Being the inner self (of an individual being) the Ātman¹ is

the nature of that. It is the light which reveals (or manifests) ignorance etc. Having the nature of only one it is eternal and it cannot be understood from common means of knowing.

[102]

¹SP states this as that characteristic of the Ātman which distinguishes it from the sun etc.

तदन्यस्य जडत्वाच्च नान्यप्रत्यक्षमिष्यते ।
तथानतिशयत्वात्स्यान्न पुमन्तरगोचरः ॥१०३॥

And since everything else is only insentient, it (viz. the inner self) is therefore not accepted as what becomes directly perceptible, so also, because it does not have any other things excelling it, it is not to be an object for any other person.

[103]

शब्दादिगुणहीनत्वात्प्रत्यक्त्वासंहतत्वतः ।
दृष्टिमात्रस्वभावाच्च नात्मा दर्शनमर्हति ॥१०४॥

The Ātman cannot become visible (or, become an object of seeing), since it is devoid of any properties such as sound etc. and also because of its being within (an individual being), since it is uncombined with (the organs etc.) and also because it is only of the nature of the seeing one, or the seer. [104]

Read NKL (ms. p.578): *bāhyāviṣayatve hetvantaram āha.*

देशान्तराद्यसंबन्धान्मोहाद्यव्यवधानतः ।
न च मोहादिवत्प्रत्यक्तथा दर्शनमर्हति ॥१०५॥

Because it has no connection with any region other (than its own) and has not (any) hindrance (to its existence) such as delusion etc., the inner self cannot become an object of seeing like (the objects of) delusion etc. [105]

This is to explain why the Ātman cannot be known by inference.

Verses 106-111 affirm that the Ātman is not a light similar to other lights such as the sun.

नादित्यादिसजातीयमात्मज्योतिरितीष्यताम् ।
तन्मानानवगम्यत्वादादित्यादेश्च तद्ग्रहात् ॥१०६॥

Let not this light of the inner self be accepted as of the same type (as the light of) the sun etc., because that (i.e. the inner self) cannot be grasped by any means of knowing (other than the scripture) whereas (the light of) the sun and others can be grasped by that (means of knowing).¹ [106]

¹In the second line the word *tat* is used twice: the first refers to the Ātman and the second to the means of knowing.

अनुग्राह्यसजातीयं यच्च ज्योतिरिहेष्यते ।
तच्चक्षुरादिकरणग्राह्यं दृष्टं घटादिवत् ॥१०७॥

And whatever light is here accepted as that which belongs to the type (or class) of what requires help (i.e. external object) is noticed to be what can be grasped by means of the sense-organs such as the eye etc., even like a pitcher. [107]

Here Sureśvara points out that the other kinds of light like the sun etc. which could be objects grasped like other worldly objects are grasped by the Ātman.

न चाप्रमेयमिति तच्छशशृङ्गादिवन्मतम् ।
तदनन्यमिति व्याप्तेः प्रत्यक्त्वाद्दिनकृद्यथा ॥१०८॥

So also it is not considered to be similar to the horn of a hare because it is not (at all) an object of knowing. This is because it does not have anything else (existing beside it) and it is inside (of a human body) and is like the sun (an

illuminator).

[108]

The point of similarity here is only the illuminating character. Also cf. NKL (ms. 579): *svaprakāśatayāparokṣānubhava ity arthaḥ*. And SP: *prakāśarūpatve dr̥ṣṭāntaḥ*.

प्रत्यक्षमानगम्यत्वं विषाणस्यावधारितम् ।
स्वभावस्तमृते शृङ्गं स्वभावमतिवर्तते ॥१०९॥

What is certain as the nature (*svabhāva*) of a horn is its being known by (the means called) direct perception. But, (that is so done) without (the help of) it;¹ thus (the existence of the horn of a hare) transgresses the nature (of objects). [109]

Read SP *mānayogyasya tadaviṣayatve yuktam asattvam iti bhāvaḥ*. And read the introductory in SP: *ātmajyotiṣo meyatvād ṛte sattve śaśaṣṛṅgasyāpi kiṃ na syāt tatrāha*

¹Or, in the absence of (the light of) the inner self.

मानपादोपजीवित्वं स्वभावोऽनात्मवस्तुनः ।
मात्रादिसिद्धिदस्यैष स्वतःसिद्धेर्न सर्वदा ॥११०॥

The nature of a thing other than the Ātman is to be dependent on the means of knowing and, therefore, this one (i.e. the inner self), which helps establishing the (commonly accepted) means of knowing etc. gets established by itself and is not ever (dependent on any means of knowing). [110]

Verses 111-115 affirm the Ātman as self-illuminating and also an illuminator of the intellect etc.

अस्तं यातेषु सर्वेषु ज्योतिःषूक्तेषु वासनाः ।
ज्योतिः प्रत्यक्स्वयं दृष्टमासनाद्याः प्रकाशयेत् ॥१११॥

The light within (viz. the inner self) would itself, it is known (lit. seen), illuminate the impressions such as (having) a seat,¹

when all the said (or, already mentioned) lights have set (i.e. disappeared). [111]

This is to conclude the thought in *ātmanaivāyam*

¹Read SP: *svapnādāv āsanādīnāṃ vāsanāmātratvenābhāsatvam ity abhipretya vāsanāpadam*.

एष आत्मा स्वयंज्योती रविसोमाग्निवाक्षु यः ।
यातेष्वस्तं दृशैवास्ते भासयंश्चित्तचेष्टितम् ॥११२॥

This Ātman, the self-illuminating light, does exist with his power of seeing, revealing the activities of (human) intellect, when the lights, viz. the sun, the moon, fire, and speech have set. [112]

आत्मप्रत्ययमामेयः सर्वेषामपि देहिनाम् ।
यतोऽतोऽनात्मयोगोऽस्य न मानादवसीयते ॥११३॥

Since (this Ātman) is, for all the human beings without exception (*api*) an object to be grasped (only) by the knowledge in the form of (the individual being's) awareness (of the inner self), therefore its association with any non-Ātman cannot be inferred (lit. concluded) with the help of any other means of knowing. [113]

This is the same idea of BSB 1.1.1 (p.78-81): *tatpunar brahma prasiddhāprasiddham vā syāt ... sarvo hyātmāstitvaṃ pratyeti na nāhamasmūti*. Read SP: *svaprakāśatvād evātmano na karṭṛtvā-dyanātmamayogaḥ svaprakāśe mānāt tadasiddhes tasya tadaviṣayatvāt tasyāpi svataḥsiddhāv anatirekāḍ ity arthaḥ*. Yet NKL (ms. p.579) briefly thus: *svaprakāśasya karṭṛtvādisambandho na mānagamyā ity arthaḥ*.

न चेदात्मेतिधीमानात्प्रतीचोऽन्योऽर्थ ईक्ष्यते ।
प्रमान्तराविरोधेन य आत्मेत्युपपद्यते ॥११४॥

(And) if (this were) not (so), then (it would be that) an object other than the inner self understood from the awareness (I myself am) the Ātman. (But the Upaniṣadic assertion) *ya ātmā ... is (only) reasonable, in the absence of any (other) conflicting knowledge.* [114]

We demur in respect of the accuracy in our translation. SP supports the argument by citing CU 8.7.1: *ya ātmāpahatapāpmā vijarah* and refers to the citation in the verse as from BU 3.4.1: *ya ātmā sarvāntarah* More clear (though brief) in NKL (ms. p.579): *ya ātmā sarvāntara iti vākyaṁ cātmano na karṣṭvādir ity āha na ced iti.* This supports our addition of '(And)' in the translation, for connecting this verse with the preceding.

आत्मा ब्रह्मेति वाक्येभ्यस्तथा चेदं प्रतीयते ।

प्रत्यक्षाद्यनवष्टब्धमैकात्म्यं बाधवर्जितम् ॥११५॥

So also, this is understood from sentences (like) 'Ātman is the Brahman' that the nature of its being unopposed (by any other means of knowing) such as direct perception and devoid of any stultification. [115]

So far there has been the discussion on the nature of the Brahman, and now in verses 116ff. is presented the argument made by one who holds the body as the Ātman (dehātmavādin), viz. Cārvāka.

In verses 116-123, the support for that view is noted as lying in direct perception.

ननु देहाद्यभिन्नत्वादात्मनो मुक्तता कुतः ।

प्रत्यक्षेण विरुद्धत्वादैकात्म्यं चापि न श्रुतेः ॥११६॥

Now, (a question is asked:) 'Indeed, since the Ātman is not distinct from the body etc., how could there be for it the state of liberation? And, since it is opposed to direct perception (also) its singleness cannot be upheld as stated by the Śruti.

[116]

तथा हि क्षितितोयाग्निमरुतां योगजं मतम् ।
प्रत्येकं शक्त्यभावेऽपि चैतन्यं मदशक्तिवत् ॥११७॥

To explain this: It is held by us¹ that like the power of intoxication, the sentience is the product of the combination of (the elements:) earth, water, fire and wind, even if each of them individually does not have the power (of intoxicating).

[117]

Sureśvara uses here a simile in quite an incomplete form. What is meant is: Certain things, when put together, can produce intoxication, but not each one of them can. SP only refers to *kinva* as one of the intoxicating things, it does not mention others. NKL (ms. p.579) refers to some betels, betel plant (*nāgavallī*) and the pot in which these things are kept. When these things are together, they can produce toxic product and not otherwise.

¹This refers to *dehātmavādin*.

अहं मनुष्य इत्येवं सामानाधिकरण्यतः ।
प्रत्यक्षबुद्धिर्देहेऽस्मिञ्जायते कृष्णसर्पवत् ॥११८॥

It is only on account of the existence together of the elements in one thing (*samānādhikaraṇa*), viz. in this body, that there arises the knowledge/awareness by direct perception *pratyakṣabuddhi* 'I am a man'; it is just like (the perception, 'This is) a black serpent'.

[118]

Even here, as in the preceding verse, Sureśvara uses a simile in its incomplete form. What is meant is that the cognition 'This is a black serpent' is the cognition of black and serpent in one (and the same) thing; similarly, the elements, being together, give rise to the cognition of a sentient person. Probably therefore this idea is clarified (by Sureśvara) in the following verse.

न चाहंबुद्धिगम्योऽर्थो दृष्टो देहातिरेकतः ।
सर्पादेरिव काष्ण्यादिर्देहधर्मस्ततश्चितिः ॥११९॥

There is not seen apart from a body, a thing known from the cognition having the form 'I am (this)'; in the same way as the property of being dark etc. of a body of a serpent and there arises then the knowledge (as said before). [119]

ननु युक्ता पराभूते प्रमातुर्व्यतिरेकतः ।
सर्पादौ धर्मसंबन्धप्रमा नात्मन्यभेदतः ॥१२०॥

(Counterargument:) 'Indeed, the awareness of the connection of a property, viz. blackness, is noticed by a knower in a serpent etc. as apart from (the body), which has been outside it; but it is not so in the case of the Ātman as it does not exist apart from it. [120]

The basis of the verse is the relation between *dharma* and *dharmin* in the case of the Ātman: its sentience cannot be made apart from it, while it can be so done in the case of a black serpent.

जडस्वभावतश्चापि काष्ण्यादिर्धर्मतेष्यते ।
स्वसंविदितमात्रत्वान्न त्वेवंरूपता चित्तेः ॥१२१॥

'Also, blackness etc. is understood as a property (of a serpent etc.) owing to their being insentient in nature, but such is not the nature¹ of sentience (*citi*) which is merely of the nature of being self-revealed.' [121]

¹This is *dharmatā* 'being a property of another'.

यथैकबुद्धिनिर्ग्राह्यं द्रव्येणेह विशेषणम् ।
नैवं चित्काययोः सिद्धिश्चिच्छक्त्यविषयत्वतः ॥१२२॥

'As there is here, in the case of a black serpent, the specifier

(*viśeṣaṇa*) understood only from a single cognition caused by substance (i.e. the thing *dravya*), so this is not known, i.e. established (*siddhi*) in the case of sentience and the body, because the nature of sentience cannot be an object (of such direct cognition).’ [122]

नैवं येनैव मानेन सत्ता संविद ईक्ष्यते ।
तेनैव धर्मता तस्याः काष्ण्यादेरिव मीयते ॥१२३॥

(The counterobjection is answered:) ‘This is not so; the cognition (of sentience) as being a property (of a body) is grasped by that very means (of cognition) whereby the existence of it is cognized, in the same way as blackness etc. of a serpent etc.’ [123]

Verses 124-126 state the *Siddhāntin*’s doubt and also its answer in respect of the *dehādi* as *buddhigrāha*.

ननु देह इदंबुद्धिर्घटादाविव जायते ।
प्रत्यग्बुद्धिस्त्वहंभागे नानयोर्धर्मधर्मिता ॥१२४॥

(A further counterargument:) ‘But (let me point out) the cognition of a body as this one arises as in the case of a pitcher etc. whereas the awareness of the inner self on the part (of sentience) *aham* does not (so arise and, therefore) there is no relation of a property and a substance (to which it belongs).’ [124]

यथैव पारिहार्यादि हेमैकद्रव्यनिष्ठितम् ।
अलब्धात्मकमन्यत्र लब्धात्मकमिवेक्ष्यते ॥१२५॥
तथैव वस्तुस्वाभाव्याच्चिच्छक्तिर्भूतनिष्ठिता ।
अहमित्यादिबुद्धीनां व्यवहाराय कल्पते ॥१२६॥

(Answer:) As a bracelet etc., made of only one substance viz. gold, does not obtain as existing anywhere else (than in gold), [125]

similarly, owing to the nature of the things, the quality of sentience, residing in the elements becomes helpful in (the worldly) dealings whose cognition is of the form 'I ...'. [126]

The argument of the *dehātmavādin* is: There can be different ornaments made of gold and they look apart from each other, but their real existence is in the form of gold. Similarly it is held that the dealing of the world 'I am this...' can occur only when sentience is produced by the combination of various elements mentioned earlier.

Verses 127-128 discuss the absence of sentience in a dead body.

चैतन्यं देहधर्मश्चेन्मृतावविकलस्य तत् ।
कस्मान्न गम्यते साक्षाज्जीवदेहगतं यथा ॥१२७॥

(A counterargument:) 'If sentience is held as a property of a body, why is it not cognized (*gamyate*) in the whole of the body when a man is dead in the same way as it is directly cognized in the living body?' [127]

नैष दोषश्चतुर्णां हि भूतानां संहतिस्तनुः ।
ततो वायावपक्रान्ते चैतन्यमपि नश्यति ॥१२८॥

(The answer:) 'This is not a fault (in our view), because body is a conglomeration of the elements and when the wind has departed from that (conglomeration), even sentience gets lost.' [128]

The argument is: If wind separates from earth, water, fire (verse 117 above) sentience ceases to be product of all the elements together. This means the loss of *caitanya*.

Verses 129-131 discuss the distinction of sentience and body:

स्वप्नदेहादिसंबन्धिप्रत्यभिज्ञाबलान्ननु ।

व्यतिरेकश्चित्तेः सिद्धो भूतेभ्यो जाग्रतोऽप्यतः ॥१२९॥

(Another counterargument:) 'But, indeed, on the strength of recognition which is related to the body of the dream,¹ the existence of sentience as apart from the elements is established (in the same way as) from this (its existence apart) from the elements is established'. [129]

¹NKL (ms. p.580) uses *supta* in place of *svapna*.

देहान्तरविनिर्माणं जाग्रच्चैतन्यवद्ध्रुवम् ।
करोति भूतसंघातः स्वप्ने बालयुवादिवत् ॥१३०॥

(Answer:) 'Certainly it is (only) the conglomeration of elements that produces another body (in the dream) as (it produces) sentience in (the body of) the waking state; this is like (the bodies) of a small boy and a young man. [130]

न चात्र प्रत्यभिज्ञास्ति मिथ्यापरिणतेस्तव ।
नैव बाल्यादिवद्यस्मात्स्वप्ने देहः प्रतीयते ॥१३१॥

Further, there is not here (any) recognition, because this development is, in your opinion, a false modification—(this is so) since, in the dream, a body is not at all seen as (it was) in boyhood etc. [131]

Verses 132-135 discuss a doubt and its refutation regarding the perennial character of the Ātman on the ground of one's memory of the past life.

जातिस्मरणदृष्टान्तादात्मा नित्यो मतो यदि ।
व्रणं पूर्वकृतं दृष्ट्वा देहः किं नोच्यते ध्रुवः ॥१३२॥

If, on the basis of the remembrance of past life as an example, it is held that the inner self is eternal; then, why is it that, on having seen a scar made in earlier life (on the body) it

is not seen in (said to be possessed by) this body? [132]

प्रत्यभिज्ञानतस्तत्र ध्रौव्यं चेदात्मनो मतम् ।
स्वप्नात्मप्रत्यभिज्ञेयं मृषार्था सापि पूर्ववत् ॥१३३॥
सशल्यदेहशयीनि भूतान्येव तथाविधम् ।
देहान्तरं करिष्यन्ति प्रत्यभिज्ञा यदीष्यते ॥१३४॥

If the Ātman is held to be eternal on the basis of recognition, then this recognition of sentience of the dream state also should be ever as before false. [133]

If (the notion of) recognition be held (lit. desired), then (it must follow that) the elements which would lie (in the deep sleep state) with a wounded body would then produce a body of the same kind. [134]

These two verses explain the nature of *jātismaraṇa* mentioned in verse 132. It could be either memory or recognition but both these verses explain how these two means are useless for establishing the Ātman as distinct from the body.

Verses 135-137 discuss if the lights outside the body and that within are of the same kind.

तान्येवैतानि भूतानीत्येवं तद्वत्प्रजायते ।
प्रत्यभिज्ञा स एवाहमिति तद्वद्वेत् किम् ॥१३५॥

(Counterargument:) As there arises the cognition, 'These elements are just the same as before,'¹ then, why is it that there would not arise (the recognition), viz. 'I am the same'? [135]

In the end of the AnSS edition, we find *yadvadbhaven na kim* in 135d, but that seems to be faulty inasmuch as that reading does not balance with *yadvad* in 135b, therefore, we have emended the text accordingly, even if there is no variant noted in the footnote of the edition and also on the page of the

manuscript of NKL it is missing and therefore no help could be derived from it.

¹Namely, in the earlier existing body.

यच्चैतदात्मज्योतिष्टवं व्यतिरिक्ततयोदितम् ।
आदित्यादिलयेनेह भौतिकं त्वेव तद्ववेत् ॥१३६॥

And the nature of the light in the form of the inner self, which has been mentioned as (existing) apart (from the organs and the body etc.) in a way similar to the merger of the sun etc. (in the sea etc.) would indeed be only belonging to the elements. [136]

This is clarified in two following verses.

उपकारि सजातीयमुपकार्यस्य वस्तुनः ।
जगत्सिमन्यतो दृष्टमादित्यश्चक्षुषोर्यथा ॥१३७॥
शब्दादिभिर्हि घ्राणादेर्नोपकारः समीक्ष्यते ।
विजातीयैरतो ज्योतिर्भूतजातीयमिष्यताम् ॥१३८॥

Since we notice in this world that the things which help the thing which requires to be helped belong to the same species (or, kind) as of that (i.e. the latter), as in the case of the sun for the two eyes, [137]

and, indeed, since there is not noticed any help offered by words etc. to the senses of smell and others, as they belong to different species (or, kind), therefore, one should accept (lit. desire) the light to be belonging to the species (or, kind) of the elements. [138]

In these verses, there are examples given as demanded by yaya and Vyatireka relation also. The word *yataḥ* 'since' in verse 137 is to be connected with *ataḥ* in verse 138.

भौतिकस्यैव कुम्भादेर्भौतिकैरेव वीक्ष्यते ।
उपकारो जगत्सिमन्नादित्याद्यैर्यथा तथा ॥१३९॥

As, it is noticed in this world that the (things) pitcher etc. which are made up of elements are helped by such others as the sun that (also) are made up of element, so is this.¹

[139]

This verse is to reaffirm what is said in the two preceding verses.

¹We have to supply: that the bodies are helped by the lights (viz. the sun and others).

देहादेर्यदि नामेदं ज्योतिरर्थान्तरं मतम् ।
तथापि नासजातीयं व्यञ्जकत्वात्प्रदीपवत् ॥१४०॥

If this light (of the inner self) is considered to be an object as different from the body etc.,¹ even then it does not belong to the same species as of them, because it is only a revealer of them like a lamp.

[140]

¹This refers to the organs also.

Verses 141-143 express another doubt in this regard.

ननु देहासजातीयमन्तस्थातीन्द्रियत्वतः ।
यद्यद्देहासजातीयं ज्योतिर्दृष्टं तदिन्द्रियैः ॥१४१॥

But, this (light of the inner self) does not belong to the species (or, kind) of the body owing to its being inside and, therefore, is beyond the sense-organs. (And) whatever light is of the species of the body is seen (i.e. grasped) by the sense-organs.

[141]

The objection has *antasthatva* and *atīndriyatva* of the Ātman as the twofold basis of the argument. Sureśvara uses *antasthā-tīndriyatvataḥ* for *antasthatva-atīndriyatvataḥ*.

मैवं नैकान्तिको हेतुश्चक्षुरादीन्द्रियैः स्फुटम् ।
अन्तस्थानि यतोऽक्षाणि प्रत्यक्षाणि न चात्मवत् ॥१४२॥

(Answer:) Do not say so, because the logical basis of the argument does not lead to but one conclusion, since the organs are internal and not directly perceptible even like the inner self. [142]

It is the fallacy of contradicted middle (*bādhita*).

आदित्यादिसजातीयमात्मज्योतिरतीन्द्रियम् ।
अन्तस्थातीन्द्रियत्वाभ्यां चक्षुरादीन्द्रियं यथा ॥१४३॥

And so, the light of the inner self, which is beyond the sense-organs, is of the same species (or, kind/type) as of (the lights of) the sun and others and it is like the organ of the eye on account of its being internal and beyond the organs. [143]

So far the dehātmavādin has argued about the light of the inner self as being of the same species as of the elements. Hereafter, in verse 144 onwards to verse 147 he makes an argument that inference does not help to understand correctly the nature of the light of the inner self.

विशेषेऽनुगमाभावः सामान्ये सिद्धसाध्यता ।
इत्यादिदोषदुष्टत्वाच्च नोऽनुमितिः प्रमा ॥१४४॥

For us (*dehātmavādins*), inference is not (i.e. does not lead to) right knowledge, because it is violated by faults such as absence of inference (of the *vyāpti*) in case (it is) a particular (proposition) and proving (what is already) proved in case (it is) a general (proposition). [144]

The first line is a quotation from *Nyāyamaiṅjari* 1.108.21.

अनुमानबलेनैव देहादिव्यतिरेकतः ।

प्रत्यगात्मा स्वयंज्योतिः साध्यते तच्च नानुमा ॥१४५॥

(For) only through the strength of inference the inner self is proved to be apart (or, distinct) from the body etc. and self-illuminating; (but) (there can be) no inference! [145]

प्रत्यक्षैकप्रमाणेन देहे चिद्धर्मकेऽञ्जसा ।

गृह्यमाणेऽनुमानेन न तच्छक्यं प्रबाधितुम् ॥१४६॥

When the body is (lit. can be) clearly (or, in a smooth way) taken as having the properties of sentience by means of direct perception alone, then it is not possible to stultify that (perception) by inference. [146]

The argument is that there is opposition of inference to direct perception of sentience belonging to the body and the property of the same.

दर्शनादिक्रियां कर्वन्सर्वदाव्यभिचारतः ।

प्रत्यक्षेणैव दृष्टौऽयं देहो नातस्ततोऽपरः ॥१४७॥

This body, which has been performing such activities as seeing etc. invariably is directly perceived and, therefore, it is not any other than that.¹ [147]

¹Or, there cannot be any body beyond a seen body.

In verses 148-149, it is stated that the body is not the Ātman since it is different from sentience.

दर्शनादिक्रियाकारि देहश्चेदभ्यपेयते ।

कस्मादविकलस्यैव दृष्ट्यादिर्न तथेक्ष्यते ॥१४८॥

(Objection:) 'If this body is taken to be that which performs activities of seeing etc., then why is it that seeing etc. is not

noticed as belonging to it when it is not devoid of (sentience)?' [148]

This has a basis in the states of sleep and stupour (i.e. fainting away) when the function of seeing etc. is not perceptible.

नैष दोषो भवेदत्र प्रत्यक्षप्रमितत्वतः ।

न हि दृष्टं समुल्लङ्घ्य ततोऽन्यद्वलवन्मतम् ॥१४९॥

(Answer:) This is not a fault here¹ (as you have put forth), since it is directly perceived, because indeed no other (argument) is considered to be strong in supercession of what is directly perceived. [149]

This is a reply made by *dehātmavādin* who is also a *svārthavādin*. SP clarifies this thus: *dr̥ṣṭam api nyāyavirodhe (na) tyājyam*.

¹Cf. SP: *kādācitkadarśanādarśanayor iti śeṣaḥ*.

Verses 150-152 explain the BUB: *na hi khadyote ...*

भास्वराभास्वरत्वं च प्रत्यक्षेणैव वीक्ष्यते ।

खद्योतस्यानुमानेन न हेत्वन्तरकल्पनम् ॥१५०॥

It is only directly perceived in the case of a glow worm that there is brightness or the absence of brightness; there is no other reason to be entertained in that respect. [150]

This is to point to the absence of some property of a thing which is unseen sometimes as implied in verse 148 above—that may be the result of some adventitious situation as in the case of a glow worm. The absence of brightness of it can be caused by the flutter of its wings!

हेत्वन्तरेऽनुमेये च किञ्चित्सामान्यगन्धतः ।

सर्वं सर्वस्य लिङ्गं स्यात्तच्चानिष्टं प्रसज्यते ॥१५१॥

Also, if an object is to be inferred on the basis of some other logical reason owing to the semblance of some general character, then all can be the indicator of all and there would result what is undesirable. [151]

The argument of this verse is based on the following (faulty syllogism); *vahniḥ anuṣṇaḥ vastutvāj jalavat* and it is answered *na ca vahneḥ anuṣṇatvam yuktam pramitapadārthavyavasthā-dausthyaprasaṅgāt*.

न च नास्ति पदार्थानां लोकेऽसाधारणः क्वचित् ।
स्वभावोऽग्न्यादिकानां हि नोष्णत्वाद्यन्यहेतुतः ॥१५२॥

Further in the world, any characteristic of the things is not uncommon, for being hot etc. which is the nature of fire etc. and is not caused by other causes. [152]

SP carefully points out the Samdhi of *loke* and *asādhāraṇaḥ*.

Verses 153-155 explain BUB: *na ca padārthasvabhāvaḥ*

प्राणिधर्माद्यपेक्षं चेदुष्णत्वादि हविर्भुजः ।
नैवं तत्रापि दोषस्य प्रसक्तेरनिवृत्तितः ॥१५३॥

If it is held that being hot etc. of fire depends on the merits etc.¹ of living beings, it is not so. Even there (i.e. in the case of depending on merits) also necessarily (or contingently) follow the fault since there is no cessation of regress (in the form of dependence on yet another merit). [153]

¹This implies demerits also.

तदप्यस्त्विति चेन्मैवं धर्मादेरप्रसिद्धितः ।
धर्माभ्युपगमे दोषो ह्यनवस्था प्रसज्यते ॥१५४॥

If (you were) to say: 'Let that¹ also be there', 'do not (say) so, since merit etc. are not accepted (by you),² (also) in accepting merit, there arises the fault of infinite regress. [154]

¹This refers to *dharmādyapekṣam*, i.e. *dharmāntarāpekṣam* as understood from the preceding verse.

²Add—in your system.

न चानवस्थया सिद्धिरभिप्रेतस्य वस्तुनः ।
तदलं क्षितितोयाग्निमरुतां परिणामजे ।
चेतोवत्यक्षसंवेद्ये कष्टकल्पनयानया ॥१५५॥

And, owing to infinite regress, there cannot be established the thing which is desired (or, held, by you). Thus (or, therefore), enough of (i.e. give up) this overstressed (*kaṣṭa*) notion of (or, in regard to) the perceptible sentient being which is the product, i.e. modification (resulting) from (the combination of) earth, water, fire and wind. [155]

Verses 156-159 bring out the internal contradiction in (or self-refutation) of the view of Cārvāka.

सर्वतीर्थदृशां सिद्धिः स्वाभिप्रेतस्य वस्तुनः ।
यदभ्युपगमादेव तत्सिद्धिर्वार्यते कुतः ॥१५६॥

Why are you refuting/discarding that [or, why is that being denied/rejected by you] on the acceptance of which the propounders (lit. seers) of all theories have established that? [156]

This refers to the basic concept of all the theorists, viz. what is to be established is the experience of the unknown (or, unexperienced).

प्रत्यक्षेण विरुद्धत्वं न तावदुपपद्यते ।
विषयाभावतस्तस्य प्रामाण्यं दुर्लभं यतः ॥१५७॥

To begin with, being opposed to direct perception is not reasonable, because it is difficult (or, impossible) to accept the validity of it in the absence of any objects to be grasped.

[157]

The thought in the verse is: Only in respect of the Ātman one can posit the Śruti as the means of knowing, but, in respect of everything else, it is direct perception which is capable of proving their existence.

सर्वतीर्थदृशां तावत्सामान्यं मानलक्षणम् ।
अज्ञातार्थाधिगमनं त्वदुक्ते तत्र युज्यते ॥१५८॥

In the case of all the propounders of theories, there is (noticed) one common characteristic of a means of knowing, viz. its capacity to inform others of what is not known. But, in your view, that is not reasonable.

[158]

The idea is: all the direct perception or any means of knowing is not informative of what has been unknown/unobtained.

प्राक्प्रमाणसमत्पत्तेर्देहादेर्विषयस्य ते ।
प्रमाणहेतोः कैः स्यादज्ञातत्वमितीर्यताम् ॥१५९॥

Let it be told that as even before the means of knowing (object) have come into being by which means there can be unknownness (or, the absence of knowledge) of the object, viz. the body etc. which can be known only by some means of knowing.

[159]

Verses 160-164 explain BUB: *anadhigatārthagatṛtvam prāmāṇyam tava ajñātaviṣayāpekṣam*.

स्वतः सिद्धोऽथवासिद्धो देहादिस्ते भवन्भवेत् ।
प्रमाणानां प्रमाणत्वं नोभयत्रापि लभ्यते ॥१६०॥

For you, the body etc. will be either established by itself or non-established, even though certainly existent (*bhavann eva*); but, in both cases, the means of knowing (accepted) would not have the character of being the (authoritative) means.¹

[160]

This verse introduces the impossibility of proving by the means of knowing what is to be known for certain; read NKL (ms. p.583): *prakārāntareṇa prāmāṇyānupapattiṃ vaktuṃ vikalpyati* (SP with *pratyākhyātum* for *vaktum*).

¹This means: There is not any means for knowing what is already known, since *deha* is known (*jñātārthajñāpana*).

प्रमाणान्यन्तरेणापि देहादिश्चेत्प्रसिध्यति ।

वद प्रमाणैः को न्वर्थो न हि सिद्धस्य साधनम् ॥१६१॥

If the body etc. become established, even without any means of knowing; tell me then 'What is the use of the means of knowing?' Indeed there is never any proving of what is already proven.

[161]

The thought in this verse is: A means of knowing is meaningful only if it proves an unknown thing (though in existence) and, therefore, the *dehātmavādin* notices that there is a body etc. even without any means for proving its existence. This is impossible to think of.

स्वतोऽसिद्धेऽप्रमेये च नासतो व्यञ्जिका प्रमा ।

नाभिव्यनक्ति सविता खरशृङ्गं स्फुरन्नपि ॥१६२॥

Right knowledge does not reveal an object which is not established by itself, and which has not been an object of knowledge and is not one that reveals a non-existent thing. The sun, even when it shines, does not ever reveal horn of a donkey.¹

[162]

SP thoughtfully breaks up the Saṁdhi of *siddhe'prameye* into *siddhe* and *aprameye*.

¹This is *khara* in the verse, but SP introduces the stanza by referring to a hare's horn.

प्रमाणव्यतिरेकेण नाप्यसत्त्वं प्रसिध्यति ।
सत्त्ववन्नापि चाभेदे मानमेयौ प्रसिध्यतः ॥१६३॥

Also, the non-existence of anything is not (or, cannot be) established without any means of knowing. Nor can the means of knowing and the object of knowing get established like an existent thing, the two cases being non-different in that.

[163]

यदि मानातिरिक्तार्थोऽमितः संभाव्यते तदा ।
तं बोधयद्भवेन्मानं न तु तत्कुर्वदिष्यते ॥१६४॥

If it is held that an unknown thing exists even when it is without any means of proving it; then, in that case, (beyond/beside) the means of knowing is accepted as one that informs us, not as one that is creating it.

[164]

This verse points out that the means of knowing cannot be a productive cause of the thing to be known; it is only informative of that.

अबुद्धबोधनं मुक्त्वा नान्यत्कार्यं क्वचिद्यतः ।
सत्त्वं वा यदि वासत्त्वं नातो मेये प्रमाणतः ॥१६५॥

Since, except informing of what is not known, there is not anything (else) to be done (by a means of knowing), therefore, there is not existence or non-existence in respect of object to be known with the help of a means of knowing it.

[165]

In verses 166-167, it is asserted that a *pramāṇa* is *ajñātārtha-*

jñāpaka.

मानव्यापारतः पूर्वं सिद्धामेवावबोधयत् ।
शुक्तिकां मानतां याति नासिद्धं रजतादिकम् ॥१६६॥

What informs us about a mother-of-pearl, which has been already existent even before the operation of the means of knowing it, becomes a means of knowing, but it is not (a means of knowing which informs us) of the already non-existent silver etc. [166]

शुक्तौ रजतविज्ञानाच्छुक्तिवन्नामितं यतः ।
रजतं विद्यते किञ्चिद्विज्ञातं चात्मवस्तुवत् ॥१६७॥

Since, there does not exist silver as a mother-of-pearl, even before the silver in the mother-of-pearl was not known; therefore, it is not like the thing, viz. the Ātman, which has been already known (to everyone). [167]

The verse points to the wrong apprehension of silver in a mother-of-pearl as contrasted with the inner self of which everyone is aware.

Verses 168-170 establish that a mother-of-pearl is not supported by any pramāṇa.

नातिरेकान्वयाभ्यां यद्वस्तु संभाव्यते कथम् ।
तत्प्रति स्यात्प्रमाणत्वं शुक्तिकारजते यथा ॥१६८॥

How can there be authoritativeness of a means in respect of that thing which cannot be said to be in existence by means of showing the Anvaya and the Vyatireka of the same as it is in the case of the silver seen in a mother-of-pearl? [168]

The character of a means of knowing as informer of what is expressed and is yet to be known cannot occur in the mistaken

awareness of silver in a mother-of-pearl.

किं मानसंगतेरर्थे जातेयमवबुद्धता ।

किं वा प्रागपि संबन्धाद्बुद्धोऽर्थोऽभून्न मानतः ॥१६९॥

(Let this be clarified:) Was this character of having been known there (in the silver in a mother-of-pearl) produced by its association with any (other) authoritative means of knowing, or was it there even before its association with that so that this known thing, viz. the silver, is to be known without any means of knowing? [169]

बोधात्मकत्वं च मितेः किमासीन्मेयसंगतेः ।

प्राग्वा मेयाभिसंबन्धान्मितेर्बोधात्मता भवेत् ॥१७०॥

Or, did right knowledge consist in the nature of the awareness (on the part of the knower), because of its being in association with the object to be known? or, could there be (the nature of it) already (i.e. even) before its association with the object to be known? [170]

Verses 171-174 affirm that anubhava makes known the ajñātatva of object.

नार्थानधिगतत्वं च प्रमाणेभ्यः प्रसिध्यति ।

रूपानधिगतत्वं नो न श्रोत्रादेः प्रमाणतः ॥१७१॥

Not again does the unknownness of an object get established by (or, with the help of) the means of knowing. (For example,) the unknownness of a form is not acquired by us through the means of hearing etc. [171]

मानव्यापारतश्चेत्स्यान्मेयानधिगतिस्तदा ।

तद्व्यापारात्पुरा मेयः स्यात्स्वतोऽधिगतात्मकः ॥१७२॥

If the unknownness of an object to be known comes from

the activity (or, operation of a means of knowing), then, even before the operation of the same, the object to be known should have been an already known object. [172]

यत एवमतोऽवश्यं प्रमाणव्यापृतेः पुरा ।
मेयोऽनधिगतः सिद्धो ह्यभ्युपेयोऽवबुद्धवत् ॥१७३॥

Since this is so, the object to be known is to be accepted, like (every other) unknown object, as what was certainly not known before the means of knowing has been operative. [173]

न चानाहितसन्मानस्वतश्चिन्मात्रविग्रहात् ।
प्रत्यगैकात्म्यतोऽन्यत्र यथोक्तां धुरमुद्धहेत् ॥१७४॥

And, the inner self, (merely) by having a body in (the form of) sentience alone, cannot bear the said burden, when a proper (i.e. good/valid) means of knowing (it) has not been operative, elsewhere (when it is) than in oneness with the Ātman.¹ [174]

This statement aims to emphasise that the sentient inner self alone can determine what can be described as *ajñāta*.

¹Cf. SP: *anāhitam viṣayīkartum na pravartitam nirduṣṭam mānam yatra svataś cinmātrarūpe tatpratyaqbhūtam aikātmyam tadatirekeṇa pramāṇabalān nājñātatvādi siddhyatīty arthaḥ*. Yet, remaining unsatisfied, SP offers an alternative explanation thus: *ad vā yad anāhitam anādy anantaṁ sadekatānam sarvasādhakam svataś cinmātraśarīram pratyaqbhūtam aikātmyam tadatirekeṇa pramāṇato 'jñātatvādi siddhyatīty arthaḥ*. Our translation follows the first alternative.

We have introduced the text of the first line of the verse from AnSS edition, yet we suspect that the line should be read: *anāhitasanmānam svataś* (referring to *pratyak*):

Here Sureśvara emphasises that the inner self (*anubhava*) alone can be considered as the self-establishing means. But any other means of knowing cannot exist by itself. That is, unless it is

related to some other existing object of knowing.

Verses 175-178 oppose that *ajñātatva* can be known with the help of some means of knowing.

न ह्यज्ञाते यथा ज्ञाते विशेषणविशेष्यता ।
ततश्च नैतत्संसिध्येदज्ञानादि प्रमाणतः ॥१७५॥

Indeed, there does not exist, the relation as the specifier and the specified in¹ respect of what is not known (before) as (there exists) in respect of what becomes known. And, from this, ignorance etc. (about a thing) gets established from some (other) means of knowing. [175]

This verse seeks to emphasise that ignorance of a thing before and the knowledge of it later depends only on one's experience.

¹Naiyāyikās postulate a special contact of a sense (e.g. an eye) with negation, e.g. of a pot on the ground, technically known as *viśeṣaṇaviśeṣyatā* 'the relation of the qualification and the qualified' to explain the perception of a negative entity (e.g. absence of a pot on the ground).

प्रमाणाच्चानधिगतौ तन्निवृत्तिः कुतो भवेत् ।
न दाहज्वरनुत्थर्थमग्निना स्याद्विषविक्रया ॥१७६॥

Again, that (ignorance) which is not known by any means of knowing, how could that disappear (withdraw itself)? Indeed, there cannot be (useful) any activity of a physician, with fire as its means, for the removal of burning fever. [176]

साक्ष्यमातृप्रमारूपं मानभूमौ यथेक्ष्यते ।
नाज्ञातेऽनुभवादेशां कश्चिदन्यस्तथेक्ष्यते ॥१७७॥

As, in this field of a means of knowing, it is expected that there are forms of what is to be perceived, of the perceiver and of right knowledge; so, in respect of what is unknown

there is not expected any means of knowing other than experience (*anubhava*). [177]

Sureśvara brings out the unique character of the experience of the Ātman in comparison with the knowledges of various external objects by different means of knowing.

प्रमाणव्यापृतेरुर्ध्वं ज्ञाताज्ञातद्वयं मिथः ॥
संधत्तेऽनुभवेनैव न तदन्येन केनचित् ॥१७८॥

That pair of the known and the unknown gets united only after the means of knowledge has (or, have) operated, through the experience (of the pair) and not by any other means. [178]

The witness gets established by itself, even before the operation of any means.

यदि नाम न मानानि व्याप्रियन्ते विनिश्चितेः ।
प्राक्तथाप्यपलापोऽस्या नानुभूतेर्घटादिवत् ॥१७९॥

If, indeed, the means of knowing are accepted as not operative before the decision was arrived at, there cannot be the denial of experience (i.e. the inner self) as that of a pitcher. [179]

एवं सिद्धेऽप्यनुभवे स्वमहिम्ना पुरा मितेः ।
प्रमाणोत्पत्तिरन्वेष्ट्या प्रत्यग्ध्वान्तापनुत्तये ॥१८०॥

Thus, when experience (i.e. the inner self) being established, on its own strength, before its being known (by other means) one has to look for the existence of the means (of knowing it), in order that the darkness about the inner self is removed. [180]

verses 181-185, it is argued that the witness cannot remove ignorance unless there has occurred knowledge with the help

of the means of knowing.

अवबुद्धस्वभावोऽपि सहतेऽनवबुद्धताम् ।
वस्तुत्वान्न तमो हन्ति तथापि प्रमितिं विना ॥१८१॥

(The inner self), though its own nature is known, does tolerate (i.e. allow) the state of its being unknown, but, being the real thing it does not remove ignorance (i.e. the darkness) without getting the knowledge of it (through the means of knowing).

[181]

Verse 181 expresses the same idea as in the preceding verse.

प्रमाणफलकारुढं स्वतमो हन्ति नान्यथा ।
वस्तु मेयाभिसंबद्धं मानं तद्वत्तमोपनुत् ॥१८२॥

The (real) thing, when united with (lit. mounted on) the board of some means of knowledge, can destroy darkness, not otherwise. Similarly, a means of knowledge, (only) when associated with object of knowing can be the remover of darkness about that (viz. the real thing).

[182]

प्रत्यक्षमानसिद्धयर्थं तस्मात्प्रत्यक्षवादिना ।
प्राङ्मानादभ्युपेयोऽर्थो योऽज्ञातत्वादिसिद्धिकृत् ॥१८३॥

Therefore, in order to establish the direct perception as the means of knowledge, the theorist, who propounds merely direct perception (as source of knowing), has to accept that, even before that means of knowing became operative, there was that object of (its) knowing in existence, so that it effected the unknownness etc. of it.

[183]

वागादिव्यापृतेः कर्ता शब्दादिगुणलाञ्छितः ।
प्रत्यक्षो गम्यते मात्रा प्रतीचोऽत्यन्तभेदतः ॥१८४॥

The agent of the activities of speech etc., which is possessed

of the properties, words etc., is directly perceived by the knower as apart from the inner self, on account of its extreme difference (from it). [184]

श्रोत्रादिव्यापृतो माता दुःखादिगुणवान्पराङ् ।
कर्तेवानुभवेनैव प्रतीचा गम्यतेऽञ्जसा ॥१८५॥

The knower, who has been engaged in (the activity of) the ear etc., is possessed of the properties, viz. misery etc. and external, is smoothly experienced as the agent (of those activities), only by experience (i.e. inner self). [185]

Verses 186-188 conclude that the inner self is self-luminous and is destroyed every sin.

अनन्यानुभवः प्रत्यङ्ग प्रमात्रादिगोचरः ।
यतोऽपहतपाप्मादि युक्तं स्यात्तद्विशेषणम् ॥१८६॥

Since the inner self does not experience any thing else than itself and is not an object to be known through the help of the knower etc.;¹ therefore, it is only proper that there are qualifiers of it like one whose sin is destroyed etc. [186]

¹The word *ādi* refers to activities and the means of them.

लोकायतस्य बौद्धस्य कणभोज्याक्षपादयोः ।
प्रत्यक्षेणैव मानेन विमुखीकरणं कृतम् ॥१८७॥

In respect of the Lokāyata, the Bauddha, (the followers of) Kaṇāda and Akṣapāda, there is (thus) a clear refutation, effected by only that means, viz. direct perception (of the inner self). [187]

This verse refers only to those who do not regard the scripture as informative of the Ātman and who hold only logic (or, rather, direct perception) as the means of knowing.

प्रमाणफलयोर्भेदस्तथा मानप्रमेययोः ।

स्वतःकूटस्थचित्सिद्धिरैकात्म्यं चानुभूतितः ॥१८८॥

Also, there is distinction between the means of knowing and the result which is achieved by (i.e. comes from the relation of) the means of knowing and the object of knowing. The existence of the immutable sentience is established by itself and the singleness of the self is by experience. [188]

Verses 189-198 establish that the Ātman is the cause of direct perception etc. becoming authoritative means of knowing.

प्रत्यक्षं मानमेवेदमिति यस्मात्प्रसिध्यति ।

प्रत्यक्षदृक्स्वयंज्योतिस्तदात्मेत्यभ्युपेयताम् ॥१८९॥

मेयादींस्तदभावं च संशयानृतनिश्चयान् ।

विविच्य योऽनुगृह्णाति शब्दादींश्च जडान्पृथक् ॥१९०॥

Therefore, may you accept that there is the Ātman, the inner self, the seer, the self-illuminating direct perceiver (of all things) and (the one) light on account of whom there can be established direct perception as the means of knowing; [189] (and also) the one, who favours a knower by distinguishing between (the presence of) the objects of knowing as also their absence, and discriminating between doubt, falsehood and definite knowledge and further the insentient word etc. as apart from one another. [190]

These two verses point to the entire world of the means of knowing and the consequent knowledge of the same as dependent merely on the inner self which is sentient.

देहेन्द्रियमनोबुद्धीः सुखादींश्च घटादिवत् ।

तमेकमन्तरात्मानमप्रत्यक्षं प्रपश्य भोः ॥१९१॥

Indeed, my dear sir (*bhoh*), see just as a pitcher etc. that

the single inner self, who does not directly see just as a pitcher etc. that single inner self, and the body, the organs, *manas*, the intellect, happiness etc. (as well) [191]

In this verse, there is a mild rebuke to one who does not want to accept the existence of the inner self as he does that of a pitcher.

द्रष्टृदर्शनदृश्यांश्च यः स्वप्ने प्रसमीक्षते ।
तदभावं सुषुप्ते च स आत्मेत्यभ्युपेयताम् ॥१९२॥

Let it be known that that who well sees (*prasaṁīkṣate*) in the dream state the seer, the act of seeing and the objects to be seen and also, in the deep sleep state, the absence of them is the Ātman. [192]

चक्षुरादीन्द्रियाणां च न च स्वप्नेऽस्ति संभवः ।
सुषुप्ते चानुभूतिस्तु तयोरव्यभिचारिणी ॥१९३॥

Further in the dream state the existence of the organs such as the eye etc. is not possible yet, in the deep sleep state, the experience of both¹ of these is unfailing. [193]

¹The word 'both' includes the waking and dream states.

प्रमाणं मेयविषयं तत्फलं मातृसंश्रयम् ।
यत्साक्षिकं द्वयं सिध्येत्स आत्मेत्यभ्युपेयताम् ॥१९४॥

An authoritative means of knowing has for its object the things to be known and the result (lit. fruit) of that abides in (or, occurrence to) the knower (of them). (Therefore,) let that be known as the Ātman on account of whose being the witness there is said to exist the pair, viz. the means of knowing and the knower. [194]

मानस्य हि फलं यत्र न तन्मानस्य गोचरः ।

तस्य मेयैकनिष्ठत्वात्फलं तु स्यात्प्रमातरि ॥१९५॥

That in whom there accrues the result (lit. fruit) of (the operation of) the means of knowing that cannot be the object of the means of knowing, since that operates only in (i.e. is related only to) the object of knowing. The result would, nevertheless, be accruing to the knower (viz. the inner self).

[195]

This is to point to the distinction between the means of knowing and the one who profits thereby, i.e. it distinguishes the knower (the Ātman) from the means of knowing (i.e. the body and its organs etc.).

प्रत्यक्षं वर्तते यत्र तत्फलं तत्र नेक्ष्यते ।

तत्फलं वर्तते यत्र मानं तत्र न वर्तते ॥१९६॥

Where there obtains (the means, viz.) direct perception, there is not accepted the existence of the result of it (i.e. the object to be known, lit. result from it) and, where the result of that (means) obtains, there does not obtain the means of knowing.

[196]

tatphalam in both the lines mean *pratyakṣaphalam* and, in the first line, it is related to the knower. The verse refers to the difference between the means of knowing and the knower.

एवं सति प्रमामातृफलमेयात्मनां तव ।

कुतः प्रत्यक्षतासिद्धिर्यदि नात्माभ्युपेयते ॥१९७॥

This being so, how could there be, for you, the possibility of establishing that direct perceptibility in the case of those that have the nature of being the knower, knowledge and the object of knowing, if (the existence of the Ātman is not accepted?

[197]

It appears that the AnSS edition has used the word *pramā* in the sense of *pramāṇa*. Further noted the variant reading *pramātrtvaphala*- note in the edition—but, in that case, the word *mātr* is omitted.

The introduction in SP: *mātrāder mānāviṣayatve...* indicates that variant reading is less acceptable.

व्यभिचारिषु सर्वेषु प्रत्यगात्मैकसाक्षिषु ।
प्रत्यक्प्रत्यय एवैकः सर्वत्राव्यभिचारवान् ॥१९८॥

While, then, all these, which have the seer in (the form of) only the inner self, are variable, there is only experience within (viz. the Ātman) as invariable everywhere (or, at all times).

[198]

The reference to variability of those related to experience as the mechanism of knowing points to the correctness of reading in the preceding verse.

In this verse, i.e. 199, there is now the conclusion of the discussion about the witness as distinct from the body.

एवं प्रत्यक्षतस्तावद्देहादिव्यतिरेकतः ।
तथानुभवतः साक्षादात्मायं प्रतिपादितः ॥१९९॥

Thus, on account of the distinction (of it) from the body etc. being directly perceptible, and also from experience (it becomes clear that here) it is the Ātman that is talked about (or discussed by all thinkers).

[199]

Verses 200-201 show that the reasons adduced by the prima facie view are not sound.

यच्चैतत्कृष्णसर्पादिदृष्टान्ताद्भवतोदितम् ।
अहं मनुष्य इत्यादि तत्र प्रतिविधीयते ॥२००॥

And, as to what you have said, viz. 'I am a man' etc. on the basis of (or with the support of) the illustration of a black serpent etc.,¹ there now follows an argument in refutation. [200]

¹This has reference to verse 118 above.

चैतन्यं कायधर्मश्चेन्मनुष्योऽसाविति प्रमा ।
असाधारणतो न स्यादहं वेद्मीतिवत्तदा ॥२०१॥

If (the) sentience is (taken) as a property of body, then the knowledge that it is a man would not arise (lit. be) on account of its being uncommon like (the knowledge or awareness expressed in the words) 'I know'. [201]

The argument is: sentience, being a property of body, the experience that 'I am a man' would not be peculiar to only one body and it would refer to a number of bodies. Such is not the matter of fact, when a person says 'I know'—for this would point to only one particular individual.

In verses 202-212, it is argued that there would be only disorder in the things of the word, if sentience were accepted as a property of a body.

समवेतं हि यद्यत्र चैतन्यं स्याच्छरीरके ।
तस्यैव तद्ववेत्साक्षान्नान्यदेहाश्रितस्य तत् ॥२०२॥

Wherever in a body sentience would be invariably associated it (sentience) would be directly perceived only in that (body), (and) that would not be belonging to any other body. [202]

The point of argument is: sentience cannot be a property of body and it pervades all the bodies (therefore, there is directly perceived the experience in 'I am' with reference to any one of them. This indicates the all-pervading experience of sentience.

करणव्यापृतिं चर्ते मनुष्योऽस्मीति धीर्भवेत् ।
पूर्ववन्न तु तत्तादृग्देहाद्विन्ना ततश्चितिः ॥२०३॥

Also, there would not result the awareness, 'I am a man', as before, without the operation of the organs (or, the means of knowing), but, it is not distinct from the knowledge of body; therefore (it is to be accepted that) there is sentience (as a property) not belonging to the body). [203]

न चाहंबुद्धिनिर्ग्राह्यमिदं धीग्राह्यगोचरः ।
विरोधात्त हि शीतत्वमुष्णस्याग्नेर्विशेषणम् ॥२०४॥

So also, what can be grasped as knowledge of myself (lit. I) is not an object which can be grasped in the knowledge 'This one is', because of the mutual difference; indeed being cold cannot be a specifier of hot fire. [204]

On this point, NKL (ms. p.586)) makes a brief and yet clear remark: *ahamdhīvedyaṃ caitanyam idaṃdhidedyadehaviśeṣaṇam na bhavati pratyaktvaparavirodhād ity arthaḥ*.

कायस्यापि न चैतन्यमेवमेव विशेषणम् ।
विरोधिना जडत्वेन व्याप्तेः किमु परस्य तत् ॥२०५॥

In this very way, sentience cannot be a specifier of the body, because of its pervasion by insentience which is its opposite. What to say (i.e. how could it be said) then that (it is a specifier of any) other (than the body)? [205]

विशेष्यमपि नाप्नोति धर्मान्तरविशेषितम् ।
विशेष्यमात्रनिष्ठत्वादन्यत्र स्यात्कथं नु तत् ॥२०६॥

Even what is to be specified does not come to be specified by any other property,¹ because (the distinct property of it) belongs only to what is to be specified; how, indeed, could

that be elsewhere than in that.

[206]

This verse explains the thought in the preceding verse more specifically. This is to mean: If sentience could not be taken to be the specifier of the body, it would not be a specifier of any other.

¹Also *viśeṣita* is to be understood with *viśeṣaṇena*.

विशेषणविशेष्यत्वे संगतिश्चेद्वेत्तयोः ।

एकप्रत्ययगम्यत्वं स्यात्तदा कृष्णसर्पवत् ॥२०७॥

If there would have been an association together of those two (viz. sentience and body), owing to their being the specifier and what is specified (by it); then, there could have been the occurrence of them together only in one cognition as in (the cognition of) a black serpent.

[207]

This is another argument to assert that sentience and body cannot be related as a property and the substance which is possessed of it. These two are noticeable in different objects, the property, viz. black and a serpent are noticed in only one object. In other words, a *dharma* and *dharmin* have an invariable association (that is, the relation *samavāya*); but it does not obtain between sentience and body, whereas it is seen to obtain in black and serpent as in a black serpent?

आविद्वदङ्गनाबालं देहादौ घटवन्मतिः ।

पृथक्त्वेन भवन्तीयं कथं स्याच्चिद्विशेषिता ॥२०८॥

Thus, this awareness in respect of a body etc. occurs among persons, from a knower to women and children as in the case of a pitcher. How could that awareness, being peculiar, be considered as specified?

[208]

Sureśvara argues: the awareness 'this is a pitcher' is peculiar to one pitcher. And the awareness of this body etc. as associated

with sentience is similar to the same and; therefore, can belong to only the particular body; how could that belong to all bodies, without exception.

Verses 209-214 affirm that direct perception, though related to an object perceived, cannot belong to the knowing self.

मातारमपि नाप्नोति यत्प्रमेयैकनिष्ठितम् ।

प्रत्यक्षं तस्य का शक्तिः स्वार्थायां चिति वर्तितुम् ॥२०९॥

And, that (means of knowing, viz.) direct perception cannot belong (only) to the object of knowing. How can it have the power to specify sentience as an object to be referred to (by it)? [209]

असाधारणरूपोत्थज्ञानेनैव प्रमीयते ।

यथा घटस्तथैवात्मा नानात्मप्रत्ययप्रमः ॥२१०॥

As a pitcher is grasped only by the cognition which arises in a peculiar form (of something), so is not the Ātman which becomes known from (only) one's awareness of some non-Ātman (objects)? [210]

स्वार्थं सन्न परार्थस्य स्वातन्त्र्यात्स्याद्विशेषणम् ।

न च चैतन्यमिदं किञ्चित् चैतन्याल्लभ्यते पृथक् ॥२११॥

Being a referent to a certain object, a specifier cannot be a referent to another, with (every/any) liberty. And, further, that which refers to (lit. leads to the knowledge of) sentience, cannot obtain elsewhere than in (that) sentience.¹ [211]

¹ Namely, obtain apart from sentience.

ग्रहीत्रेव हि चैतन्यमात्मनोऽनात्मनस्तथा ।

ग्रहीतुर्ग्राह्यता लोके न न्यायेनोपपद्यते ॥२१२॥

It is only sentience that can be the cognizer of the Ātman as well as of the non-Ātman; therefore, the character of being an object of cognition cannot be reasonably attributed to the cognizer. [212]

प्रत्यक्तया विभिन्नस्य चैतन्यस्य विशेषणम् ।
पराकत्वान्नापि कायः स्याच्छीततेव विभावसोः ॥२१३॥

Not also can a body being quite distinct from (i.e. outside) sentience be the qualifier of sentience, which is inside (the body); this is like coolness which is distinct from fire. [213]

पारिहार्यादिगं हेम्नि प्रमाणं मेयनिष्ठितम् ।
कथमात्मचित्तौ तत्स्यात्तद्विरुद्धार्थसिद्धये ॥२१४॥

Also how can a means of knowing (e.g. direct perception) related to gold existing in bracelet etc., which is an object to be known by that means, be a means of cognizing the Ātman, i.e. for establishing a thing which is opposite of it in nature? [214]

Verses 215-219 go to refute the idea of the origination of sentience from the elements.

भूतेभ्यश्च चिदुत्पत्तिर्न प्रत्यक्षप्रमाणिका ।
भूतान्वयस्य चासत्त्वान्नापि लिङ्गात्प्रसिध्यति ॥२१५॥

And the origin of sentience from the elements does not have direct perception as the means of knowing it and, owing to the absence of its association with the elements, it (viz. sentience) cannot be proved through *linga* (i.e. inference). [215]

मृतोऽस्मीत्यपि संवित्तिश्चैतन्यापगमे कुतः ।
जाड्यात्स्यान्नापि कायस्य चिदभावश्चित्तेः कुतः ॥२१६॥

How again can there be on the part of a person the cognition,

viz. 'I am dead' when sentience has departed (from him), owing to (the presence only of) insentience? So also, how could (there be the awareness that) there is absence of sentience, unless there had been sentience (existing earlier)?

[216]

नापि स्वप्नानुभूतेश्च मिथ्यात्वं स्वप्नवन्मतम् ।
बोधानुभववत्तस्या बाधको नेक्ष्यते यतः ॥२१७॥

Nor also is the falsehood of experience (i.e. the inner self, the experiencer) in a dream considered like that of a dream(-object) because there is not noticed any stultifier of it like the experience in the waking state which is associated with it.

[217]

This refers to the argument in verse 131 above.

वायोरपि समुत्क्रान्तिः प्रत्यक्षान्नावसीयते ।
चित्तेस्तद्भावभावित्वाद्वायुरेवास्तु चेतनः ॥२१८॥

The departure of the wind from a body also is not determined on the basis of direct experience therefore; let wind itself be sentience inasmuch as it is capable of producing sentience by its (own) being.

[218]

This refers to the argument in verse 128 above.

चैतन्यं भूतकार्यं चेत्कायवत्तिष्ठतां चितिः ।
चितिवन्नश्यतां यद्वा कायोऽयं हेतुनाशतः ॥२१९॥

If sentience were the product of the elements, may then sentience stand as a body; or, let this body perish (i.e. disappear) just like sentience owing to the destruction of its cause (viz. the elements).

[219]

In verses 220-223, it is argued that the body in the dream state

could also be real like the body in the waking state.

जाग्रच्छरीरवच्चेत्स्यात्स्वप्नकायोऽपि भूततः ।
सत्यभूतैकहेतुत्वान्मिथ्यात्वं तस्य किंकृतम् ॥२२०॥

If the body in the dream state has also originated from the elements even as the body in the waking state, then, on account of what could there be unreality of it (viz. the body in the dream state), when the cause of its origin is real, viz. the existing elements? [220]

सत्यो वा यदि वा मिथ्या स्वप्नदेहोऽभ्युपेयते ।
चित्तेरव्यभिचारित्वात्तथापीष्टं प्रसिध्यति ॥२२१॥

The body in the dream, be it accepted as real or as unreal, there would be the unfailing (existence of) sentience in it and, in that case, would get proved (what we have posited as truth). [221]

तस्मान्नृहस्तिदेहादौ जाग्रत्स्वप्नादिभूमिषु ।
भिन्नः शरीरतः सिद्धः प्रमाता प्रत्यभिज्ञया ॥२२२॥

Therefore, it is settled that in the bodies of a man or an elephant etc., and in the states of waking or dream etc., the knower is proved as distinct from the body through recognition. [222]

There was already a reference made to *pratyabhijñā* in verses 129-131 above.

देशकालवयोजातिरूपशक्त्यादिभेदतः ।
देहे न प्रत्यभिज्ञा स्याज्जाते स्मर्तारि युज्यते ॥२२३॥

And recognition does not occur in the case of a body in respect of its differences (from other bodies) in place, time, age, species, form and capacity etc.; it (viz. recognition) is

understandable (only) in case the one who recollects was born.

[223]

This verse points out the vyāptibhaṅga in respect of anugrāhya and anugrāhaka as belonging to one species.

अनुग्राह्यसजातीयं न च प्रत्यक्षमानिनः ।

ज्योतिः साधयितुं युक्तमनुमानद्विषः सतः ॥२२४॥

And it is not proper for one who holds (only) direct perception as the means of knowing, (at the same time) hating inference (as a means of knowing) to posit a light as belongs to the species of what is to be favoured.

[224]

Verses 225-228 refute the hypothetical sājātya.

सजातीयगिरा चात्र भवता किं विवक्षितम् ।

सामान्यमथवा व्यक्तितर्यदि सामान्यमुच्यते ॥२२५॥

सजाति नास्ति सामान्यमनवस्था तथा सति ।

निःसामान्यानि तेनाहुः सामान्यानीति वादिनः ॥२२६॥

(And tell me again) what is intended (or, held, lit. mentioned) by you in the (use of the word *sājātya* 'belonging to the same species'); whether it is generality or individuality? If it is understood (lit. mentioned as) generality;

[225]

then, generality cannot have any other thing which belongs to the same species; for that being so, there would result *infinite regress*. For that reason, those who are engaged in (this) discussion have stated that generalities do not have (any) generality among them.

[226]

SP states by way of conclusion of the verse: *uktam hi—āmānyaviśeṣeṣu sāmānyaviśeṣābhāvāt tata eva jñānam iti.*

भौतिकत्वेन चेज्ज्योतिर्देहानुग्राहकं मतम् ।

देहेऽपि तस्य सद्भावनापेक्षा स्यात्तदा रवौ ॥२२७॥

If it is held that the light (of the sun and others) is helpful to the body on account of its being made up of the elements; then, there being a (continuous) existence of the same even in the body, there would not be any need of the sun (etc. as helpers). [227]

विशेषश्चेदपेक्ष्यः स्याद्यो देहेऽस्मिन्न विद्यते ।
नानुग्राह्यसजातित्वं तस्यानुग्राहकत्वतः ॥२२८॥

If again it is held that some particularity (of that light) is expected; then it does not exist in the body; the character of belonging to the same species as of what is to be helped does not, therefore, belong to it, on account of its being the helper. [228]

This verse points out that the sun etc. cannot belong to the same species as of a body.

देहात्स्याद्विन्नजातीयं वस्तु देहावभासि यत् ।
विवादगोचरापन्नं भास्वरत्वाद्भवीन्दुवत् ॥२२९॥

If that thing which reveals the body, belongs to a species different from that of the body; then it becomes the subject matter of dispute on account of its being luminous like the sun and the moon. [229]

This verse points to actual vyāptibhaṅga.

नानुग्राह्यसजातीयं नाप्यनुग्राहकं तथा ।
घटौ घटं रविर्वेन्दुं नानुगृह्णाति कुत्रचित् ॥२३०॥

Also, what helps is not of the same species as of what is to be helped (for) nowhere does a pitcher help (another) pitcher, nor does the sun (help) the moon. [230]

Verses 231-232 explain *niyamadarśanāt* in BUB and point out illustrations of the presence of *anugrāhya-anugrāhaka* relation between things of the same species.

सजातीयासजातीयैर्देहोपकृतिरिष्यते ।

क्ष्माबग्निवायुभिः साक्षान्नातो नियम इष्यते ॥२३१॥

It is accepted by you that there is a direct favour made for the body by what belongs to and what does not belong to the species of it, viz. earth, water, fire and wind (as helpers of a body); therefore, no rule (in this regard) is (i.e. can be) accepted. [231]

विजातीयोपकारश्चेद्भवता नाभ्युपेयते ।

चतुर्भूतात्मको देह इत्येतत्कथमुच्यते ॥२३२॥

If you do not accept that the favour is done by what does not belong to the same species as of the body; then, how is it stated (by you) that the body is of the nature of four elements? [232]

The argument is: Four elements, which do not belong to the same species as of one another and also of that of the body, how can the *dehātma-vādin* reject the idea of help offered by what does not belong to the same species as that of the helped.

Verses 232-234 state the illustration of *abhāva* as helpful to others.

अभावोऽप्युपकुरुते लोकेऽस्मिन्भाववद्यतः ।

नातोऽनुग्राहकत्वादिनियमोऽयं समञ्जसः ॥२३३॥

Since (it is noticed that) in this world a negative entity also helps an entity, just like a positive entity; therefore this rule of yours, i.e. regarding the helper etc.¹ is not reasonable. [233]

SP cites here the example of a thorn which beomes helpful

to any walker by its absence. Thus the absence of something, whether or not it belongs to the same species can be helpful.

¹The word *ādi* refers to *sājātya*.

पार्थिवैः पार्थिवस्याग्नेरुपकारो यथेन्द्रैः ।
वैद्युतस्य तथैवाद्विरुपकारः समीक्ष्यते ॥२३४॥

As an earthly pieces of wood offer help to fire which belongs to the earth, so also is help noticed to be offered by waters to the fire in lightning. [234]

The instance in the verse points to the absence of *sājātya* in things which are helpful to others.

Verses 235-238 point to the absence of any rule regarding not doing any help.

अद्विः काष्ठैश्चोपकारः पावकस्यैव वीक्ष्यते ।
अग्न्यम्बुभिश्च शमनं तथाग्नेरेव दृश्यते ॥२३५॥

And, the help is noticed to be made by waters and pieces of wood only to the fire; so also is noticed the extinction of the very fire by the waters in the fire, while it is (existing in lightning). [235]

This verse points out that a rule regarding *sājātya* or *vaijātya* of the helper and the helped is not necessarily to be accepted. This is clarified in the next verse.

सजातीयासजातीयनियमोऽतो न युज्यते ।
उपकारापकारत्वे पूर्वोक्तेनैव वर्त्मना ॥२३६॥

Therefore, this rule regarding the oneness of species and the distinction in respect of the species is not reasonable. The qualities of being helpful or of not being helpful (do obtain) there, in the way stated before. [236]

This refers to the two preceding verses.

Verses 237-238 refer to the argument in the *prima facie* view mentioned in verse 142 above, which pertains to *antahsthatva* and *atīndriyatva* of *ātmajyotis*.

यच्चाप्यक्षैरनैकान्त्यं हेतोरभिहितं पुरा ।
तच्चाप्यसत्त्वयाभाणि धर्मित्वेन परिग्रहात् ॥२३७॥

As to what you have said about the argument, in respect of the (different) organs as leading to more than one conclusion, that also is (to be held as) false, since you have accepted (lit. said) that is accepted by you as having them (viz. the organs) as properties.

[237]

सेन्द्रियस्यास्य देहस्य पुरुषोक्त्या परिग्रहात् ।
न ह्येकदेशः साध्यस्य दृष्टान्तत्वाय कल्पते ॥२३८॥

Owing to the acceptance of this body as being possessed of the (different) organs in the statement about a person, (if follows that) indeed a part of what is to be proven cannot be mentioned as an illustration.

[238]

SP on these two verses is very prolix and can be read with profit.

Verses 239-240 pertain to the *prima facie* view on 239 in regard the *Ātman* to be inferred.

लिङ्गस्य मात्वसंसिद्धौ दूषणं दूषणं भवेत् ।
विशेषेऽनुगमाभाव इत्यादि यदुदीरितम् ॥२३९॥
सामान्येतररूपत्वात्साध्यस्याग्न्यादिरूपिणः ।
अपि दोषद्वयं न स्यादेकरूपे हि शङ्क्यते ॥२४०॥

As to what is said: (i) there is fault in accepting (as a rule)

inference leading to right knowledge,¹ and (ii) with regard to a particular, it (viz. inference) cannot be useful;² it has to be considered a faulty argument. [239]

Since in the case of fire etc. which are the object(s) to be inferred, there are (two) forms, viz. (i) a general form and (ii) particular form(s); there cannot (lit. should not) arise the two faults. There is scope for your doubt only when there exists an object in just one form. [240]

Here now begins the refutation of the *prima facie* view stated in verses 144-147 above; it refers to *siddhasādhyatā*.

The *prima facie* view is about the real nature of the body which is directly perceived and, therefore, leaves no scope for inference (of it).

¹The *prima facie* view is: *anumānam mānam eva na*.

²With reference to an *ekarūpa* object, one could raise the objection: *vyāptyabhāva*. This is because, according to the Siddhāntin, the Ātman has not two distinct forms, viz. *sāmānya* and *viśeṣa* and thereby leaves no scope for *aumāna*.

न चेन्द्रियाणि ते सन्ति प्रत्यक्षैकप्रमाणिनः ।

अनुमानादृते तेषां संसिद्धिर्नेष्यते यतः ॥२४१॥

And, for you, who hold only direct perception as the means of knowing, there do not (lit. cannot) exist the organs of sense, because establishing (the existence) of them is not be accepted (by you) in the absence of (i.e. without the acceptance of) inference (as a means of knowing). [241]

ग्राहकग्रहणग्राह्यभावाभावविभागवित् ।

स्वार्थमन्यानपेक्षं सच्चैतन्यं नाक्षमानगम् ॥२४२॥

Indeed, sentience, which is a knower of (such) distinction (as) what grasps (cognizes), the act of grasping, what is to be grasped, the positive entity and the negative entity and what is existent for its own purpose and without any expectancy

of (or dependence on) another thing, it is (certainly) not grasped by direct perception. [242]

In verses 243-244 it is pointed out that there is absence of sentience in case there is no body present.

न च तद्भावभावित्वं व्यतिरेकाप्रसिद्धितः ।
देहाभावे ह्यभावोऽस्याश्चित्तेः स्यात्किंप्रमाणकः ॥२४३॥

And, without establishing (its existence) apart (from the body), there cannot be its existence only while there is existence of the body; indeed, by what means (of cognition) is there (proved) the absence of this sentience while there is absence of the body? [243]

अनुमानाप्रमाणत्वं न प्रत्यक्षेण साध्यते ।
लिङ्गेनापि तत्सिद्धौ त्वदुक्त्यैव विरुद्धता ॥२४४॥

In respect of inference, its character of not being a means of knowing is not (cannot be) established by direct perception; (and) to be established by your very statement with the help of *linga* or reason (i.e. inference) there would result self-contradiction (lit. opposition). [244]

Verses 245-247 explain sāmānyato dr̥ṣṭasya in BUB.

त्वदशेषप्रवृत्तीनां निरोधश्च प्रसज्यते ।
लिङ्गस्येहाप्रमाणत्वे निश्चेष्टं स्याज्जगत्तथा ॥२४५॥

And there would contingently result the cessation (lit. stopping, or, opposition) of all of your activities; and also the entire world would be devoid of all activities if inference is not here a means of knowing its true nature. [245]

It is held that all the dealings of the world proceed from a commonly accepted inference of related things and, therefore,

the non-acceptance of inference as a means to knowledge would result into entire absence of activities.

वागभिव्याहृतिश्चेयमपि ते न प्रसिध्यति ।
नैवात्मप्रतिपत्त्यर्थं भारत्युच्चार्यते त्वया ॥२४६॥

Further, this employment of speech by you would not be useful (lit. would not yield the desired end);¹ for, certainly you do not utter speech for conveying to yourself (i.e. your thoughts or intentions). [246]

On this, read SP: *paraprayuktaśabdaśravaṇānantaram ātmano jñānam upalabhya svadr̥ṣṭāntād itarasyāpi svakīyaśrotuḥ svaprayuktaśabdaśravaṇād arthajñānam anumāya svayaṁ śabdam prayuikte tadanumānam pramāṇam anyathā vākyaprayogā-narthakyān na hi svapratipattiyartham tad uccāryate etena vākyasyāpi prāmāṇyam prayetaryam iti bhāvaḥ.*

¹What you accept as possible.

विवादगोचरापन्ना प्रमाणमनुमेष्यताम् ।
अनुमानत्वतो लिङ्गाद्दूषणानुमितिर्यथा ॥२४७॥

Let this inference, which has become the subject of dispute, be understood as the authoritative means, for the reason that the inference of a fault is by distinguishing mark (*liṅga*) owing to its having the nature of inference.¹ [247]

It is asserted by Sureśvara that the *dehātma*vādin rejects *anumiti* as a means of knowing only by depending on some inference which really disproves his position, because that argument itself is a kind of inference.

¹We may note here that the word *liṅga* 'a characteristic as smoke of fire' is used often (even by Sureśvara) in the sense of inference (*anumāna*).

In verses 248-249 there is presented BUB's refutation of the

argument about a glow worm; the reference is to verses 150-152.

खद्योतादिप्रकाशस्य यच्चानित्यत्वमुच्यते ।

पक्षादिव्यवधानत्वात्तच्चास्माकं न तान्प्रति ॥२४८॥

As to what is said about the flittering nature of the light of a glow worm etc.,¹ it is to be understood as having the character of what is obscured by the wings etc. which bring about that loss of light (for us) the observers and not for those beings themselves.

[248]

¹The use of the word *ādi* is meaningless since in the verse under dispute there is no mention made of any being other than a glow worm.

भावाभावग्रहो नापि सिध्येत्प्रत्यक्षमानतः ।

विद्यमानार्थसंबन्धात्प्रत्यक्षस्येह सर्वतः ॥२४९॥

The acceptance of a positive entity and/or a negative entity would not be established by means of direct perception, because everywhere (or, in all circumstances) there arises direct perception on account of its relation to some existing object(s).

[249]

verses 250-252 is stated that a negative entity cannot be an object of direct perception.

अथाभावोऽपि तद्ग्राह्य इति चेदभिधीयते ।

प्रत्यक्षाभावसंसिद्धौ किं प्रमाणमितीर्यताम् ॥२५०॥

If it is said that a negative entity also is an object of it (i.e. direct perception), it should be told as to what is the authoritative means for establishing directly perceptible negative entity.

[250]

प्रमातृमानाभावोऽपि भवता प्रतिपाद्यते ।

यद्भावेऽपि न यन्मानं तदभावेऽपि तत्कथम् ॥२५१॥

Also, it is asserted by you that there is an absence of a means of knowing which grasps an object (viz. a negative entity). How can that be (a means of knowing) a thing when it is absent, while it has not been a means of knowing a thing when it was present? [251]

व्यावर्तते स्वभावश्चेदित्येतदतिदुर्घटम् ।
स्वभावो वस्तुनस्तत्त्वं तत्त्वात्तत्त्वं न हीयते ॥२५२॥

(To say) that it is only the nature of the thing that (sometimes) changes—this is difficult to happen, (because) the essence of a thing is its own nature and that essence of that thing is never lost. [252]

In verses 253-254 is stated the prima facie view that dharma etc. yields results, by its very nature.

धर्मादेः फलदातृत्वं स्वभावोऽवश्यमेव तत् ।
अभ्युपेयस्त्वयापीह यथा तदपि मे शृणु ॥२५३॥

It is said that merit has a capacity to yield fruit; it is certainly so according to us also but you also have to accept that (existence of) merit; how?, listen to that also. [253]

क्रियातः स्तुतिनिन्दादेः सुखदुःखादिलक्षणम् ।
धर्माधर्मफलं साक्षात्प्रत्यक्षेणानुभूयते ॥२५४॥

The result(s) of *dharma* and *adharma* is (or, are) experienced directly by direct perception, (as it is seen) that from some action, viz. praise and/or censure, there results the experience of happiness and/or misery. [254]

Verses 255-260 state the incongruity in thus giving merit and demerit any scope (or, place) in the opponent's view; they go

only with āgama, i.e. Veda.

आगमैकप्रमाणत्वात्कथं धर्माद्युदाहृतिः ।
अथाभ्युपगमाद्युक्तं वेदाभ्युपगतिस्तथा ॥२५५॥

How is there your introducing merit and/or demerit (in your scheme), because that is known only from Āgama, as a means of knowing? Also if you accept that (viz. Āgama) as authoritative means, then is reasonably understood in your doctrine, because of the acceptance of Veda. [255]

मानातराभ्युपगमाद्भवतश्च तथा सति ।
स्वसिद्धान्तविरोधोऽयं बलादायात्यनीप्सितः ॥२५६॥

That being so,¹ there would be (your) acceptance of another means of knowing and thus there would perforce occur an opposition to your own doctrine, much though it is not desired by you. [256]

¹Namely, your introducing merit and/or demerit.

दग्धृत्वादिस्वभावोऽग्नेः शक्तिश्चेद्भवतोच्यते ।
प्रत्यक्षात्तदसंसिद्धेर्विरोधस्तेऽनुमाश्रितेः ॥२५७॥

If you hold the capacity for burning the very nature of fire, then, that being unestablished by direct perception, there arises opposition (to your view); because of your holding to (or acceptance of) inference. [257]

This refers to verse 152 above. In this connection, read NKL (ms. p.591): *dahan- ādyagneḥ svabhāva ity uktam. tatra dahan- ādikāryaṃ svabhāvaḥ śaktir vā. nādyas tasya vināśitvāc chaktir eva ced atrāhadagdhṛtvād iti. pratyakṣeṇa siddher asiddher mān- tarasvīkāre siddhāntavirodha ity arthaḥ*. SP also states likewise. The argument is: If burning is the effect of fire, it (viz. the latter) must continue to exist in the form of its effect—but,

fire becomes extinguished, i.e. it is no more noticed to exist. This is to say: burning is not the effect of fire. So also, *śakti* 'capacity for burning' in fire has to be 'inferred' from the effect; it is also not directly perceived.

मदभ्युपगमो यद्वद्वक्तोऽपि तथा यदि ।
सर्वमानाभ्युपगमात्र किञ्चिन्नोऽस्ति दुःस्थितम् ॥२५८॥

If your acceptance of the view (i.e. of inference) is similar to the acceptance (of it) by me, then, there will not be any bad situation, for you will have accepted all the means of knowing (which are acceptable to me). [258]

Read with profit NKL (ms. p.591): *pramāṇatvād āyātah pravāhaḥ kena vāryata iti nyāyād anumānatvam apīṣṭam iti ced atrāha—madabhyupagama iti. lingaśabdādipramāṇye dehātirikṭātmādisiddhir ity arthaḥ.*

त्वदभ्युपगमार्थाय यत्नोऽयं क्रियते मया ।
अभ्युपेतो मदुक्तश्चेत्सिद्धं नः स्यात्प्रयोजनम् ॥२५९॥

I have made this effort (to establish your view about inference; thus, there is acceptance by you (of inference) which I have spoken of; then there is achieved our purpose.¹ [259]

This is just a reassertion/clarification of the idea in the preceding verse.

¹This leads to the validity of our acceptance of *ātmajyotis* through inference.

अनवस्थेति योऽप्युक्तः सोऽपि दोषो निराकृतः ।
सर्वमानाभ्युपगमात्रानवस्था ततो बलात् ॥२६०॥

And, as to what you have posited as, (the fault) consisting in *infinite regress*; even that fault is explained away, because on accepting all the means of knowing (as in our view), there

would not result *infinite regress*, through the force of it. [260]

This refers to verse 154 above.

Verse 261 affirms the establishing of the *Ātman* as apart from the body. In verses 262-266, there is explanation of *svapnasmrtyoh* ... (in *Śābarabhāṣya*) which gives blame to *dehātmavāda*.

देहादिव्यतिरिक्तोऽत आत्मा सिद्धो यथोदितः ।
आदित्याद्यसजातीयः पूर्वोक्तादनुमानतः ॥२६१॥

Therefore, the *Ātman*, which we have said to be apart from the body etc.,¹ is (thus established) as not belonging to the same species as the sun etc.,² on the basis of inference as is already explained by us. [261]

This refers to *Śābarabhāṣya*. (possibly SP quotes:) *śarīraṃ nātmā śarīrād anyad ātmeti śarīrapraṭiṣedhenaivātmo pradiśyata iti ... pūrvoktād atīndriyatvādihetor iti yāvat*. Yet, NKL (ms. p. 591) introduces verse 261 thus: *antasthatvādihetārāddhyattam (?) nigamayati*.

¹This refers to the organs of the body.

²This refers to the moon, fire, speech.

दर्शनादिक्रियावांश्चेद्देह एवाभ्युपेयते ।
दृष्टस्यैव स्मृतौ न स्यात्स्वप्ने चार्थस्य दर्शनम् ॥२६२॥
बाह्यादित्यादिविरहे करणव्यापृतिं विना ।
जाग्रद्वद्वीक्षते स्वप्ने दृष्टपूर्वं यतो नरः ॥२६३॥

If it is accepted (by you) that it is only the body that performs the activities such as seeing;¹ then, because there will be only the memory of what is already seen there would not be² the direct perception of any object in a dream, [262] since a man sees in the dream state what is seen earlier, as in the waking state, even without any activity of the organs even while the external sun etc. are absent.³ [263]

See (in this context) Sūtra of Akṣapāda (Nyāyasūtra 3.1.14): *tadātmaguṇasadbhāvād apratisedhaḥ*. Also read the introductory in NKL (ms. p.591): *ātmano dehādivyatiriktatve hetvantaram āha darśanā iti*.

¹Namely, remembering and recognising.

²That is: it would not be reasonable to postulate that

³SP points out the remaining part implied by the verse: *ato dehasya na draṣṭṛtā*.

सामग्र्या स यथा पूर्वमद्राक्षीच्छिखरं गिरेः ।
तथा विनैव स्वप्ने तदात्मा पूर्ववदीक्षते ॥२६४॥

For, the Ātman sees in the dream state, as before (i.e. in the waking state), that peak of the mountain, which he saw earlier with the necessary mechanism (*sāmagri*)¹ for it, even without it.² [264]

¹That is, various organs, *manas*, the intellect.

²Read SP: *na khalv anyo jāgarty anyah svapitīti śeṣaḥ*.

उत्खातनयनश्चायमनुत्खाताक्षवद्वटम् ।
स्वप्ने समीक्षते नात आत्मनोऽन्यः प्रपश्यति ॥२६५॥

This person, whose eyes are taken out (i.e. which are not in operation), sees in the dream a pitcher (just) like a man whose eyes are not taken out; therefore, it cannot be said that anyone else than the Ātman sees (i.e. can see the objects).

[265]

See SP (introductory remark): *atiriktasyaiva draṣṭṛtvam ity atra hetvantaram*.

ततश्चैतद्वेत्ति सद्धं यः स्वप्ने कुम्भमीक्षते ।
विचक्षुः प्रागपि घटं स एवैक्षिष्ट चक्षुषा ॥२६६॥

And from that this becomes established: He, who, without eyes, sees a pitcher in the dream state, himself has seen even before (i.e. in the state of waking) that pitcher with his eye(s).

[266]

Verses 267-268 state another reason for the nature of the body as non-Ātman; also, they explain (at the same time) BUB: *dehasyaiva draṣṭṛtve*

मृतौ चाविकलस्यैव दर्शनादेरसंभवात् ।
न स्याद्देहस्य तच्चापि देहो द्रष्टा भवेद्यदि ॥२६७॥

And, in death, there is no possibility of seeing by the body (though it is not) short of (any limbs etc.). If it (were held) that it is the body who would see; that (seeing) also would not be possible.

[267]

नेक्षितृत्वेऽक्षबुद्ध्यादेः प्रत्यभिज्ञोपपद्यते ।
न भिन्नद्रष्टृकं यस्मात्प्रतिसंधानमर्हति ॥२६८॥

In the case of the organs, the intellect etc., recognition is not reasonably acceptable in relation to (the body's) being the seer; since what is seen by someone cannot be remembered (or recognised) by some other person.

[268]

Refer to verse 263 above.

Verses 269-270 explain BUB: *yad aham adrākṣam.*

यमद्राक्षं पुरा कुम्भं तमेवाद्य स्पृशाम्यहम् ।
इत्येतत्प्रतिसंधानं न भिन्नद्रष्टृकं भवेत् ॥२६९॥

'It is the same pitcher which I formerly saw that I touch today.' Now, this recognition cannot be one which has another seer (as the agent).

[269]

Again, there is a reference to *Nyāyasūtra* quoted above under verse 263.

This refers to *yad aham adrākṣam* ... in BUB.

प्रतिसंधानकृत्तर्हि मनः संस्कारसंश्रयात् ।
नैवं तस्यापि मनसो विषयत्वेन दर्शनात् ॥२७०॥

(You might state:) 'Let then *manas* be the one that recognises, on account of its resorting to the impression (of the earlier experience)'. That also is not so, since *manas* also has been accepted as an object of seeing. [270]

This refers to *Nyāyabhāṣya*, *Nyāyasūtra* 3.1.19.

This refers to *manaso 'pi* ... in BUB.

Verses 271-272 explain BUB: *manaso 'pi* ... for showing that *manas* also is non-Ātman.

शब्दादिखचितं साक्षात्स्मृतिस्वप्नगतं मनः ।
कुम्भवद्वीक्ष्यते यस्मान्नात आत्मा मनोऽपि नः ॥२७१॥

Since *manas*, which is firmly connected (*khacita*) in the words etc. and related directly to memory and/or the dream state, is itself seen as a pitcher (is seen), therefore, *manas* is not for us the Ātman (that sees). [271]

SP indicates the thought *tasya viṣayatvād anātmatva*.

भावाभावौ प्रमात्रादेस्तद्विलक्षणरूपभृत् ।
प्रत्यक्समीक्षते नित्यं नातो द्रष्टृ भवेन्मनः ॥२७२॥

The inner self ever sees the presence and the absence of the *pramātr* etc.,¹ possessing such a form (nature) as is different from theirs. Therefore, *manas* can not be the seer.

[272]

¹This 'etc.' seems to refer to *pramāṇa* and *prameya*?

Verses 273-275 bring out that the body is (or, cannot be) the experiencer.

भोग्यत्वं चास्य देहस्य प्रत्यक्षैकप्रमाणकम् ।
प्रत्यक्षाप्रमितं कस्माद्भोक्तृत्वं तस्य कल्प्यते ॥२७३॥

And that this body has the nature of an object of enjoyment is (a matter) having only direct perception as the means of knowing it. Therefore, (the question is:) How could enjoyership be posited of that, which does not become known by direct perception? [273]

अयंरूपेण भोग्योऽर्थो ह्यहंरूपेण भोजकः ।
विरुद्धरूपौ प्रत्यक्षाद्भज्येते भोज्यभोजकौ ॥२७४॥

An object of enjoyment is grasped in the form (expressed) by the word *ayam* and the enjoyer is grasped in the form expressed by (the word) *aham*. Therefore, these two, being possessed of opposite forms, become known by direct perception. [274]

इत्यलं शुष्कतर्कोत्थवाङ्मात्राक्षेपदूषणैः ।
पुंसां पुमर्थसिद्ध्यर्थं प्रक्रान्तमभिधीयते ॥२७५॥

This (much) is enough of the objections and the blemishes in *prima facie* view in words which come from reasoning (which is) dry (as dust). Now is stated what has been (already) introduced, with a view to establishing the ends of life for men. [275]

The second is an introductory to the subsequent portion of the Śruti.

Now BU 4.3.7 is under reference, verses 276-279 relating to

the question *katama ātmā*.

आत्मैवास्येत्युपश्रुत्य पूर्वोत्तरविरुद्धताम् ।
आशङ्क्य जनकोऽप्राक्षीदात्मायं कतमो न्विति ॥२७६॥

On having heard (the words) *ātmaivāśya*, Janaka entertained (a feeling that there is) opposition between the aforesaid (or, earlier statement) and the subsequent. (Then) he asked, 'Which one indeed is the Ātman?' [276]

देहादिसंहतावस्थामात्मेति ह्यभिधाधियौ ।
सुप्रसिद्धे जगत्यस्मिन्नायोषिद्बालपण्डितम् ॥२७७॥

In respect of this conglomeration of body etc., there are well known in this world the name and the cognition, viz. this one is the inner self—(and) this is (known to all) from a woman and a child up to a learned man. [277]

पुंव्यापारस्य संबन्धो देहादिव्यतिरेकिणा ।
ज्योतिषानात्मना पूर्वं लिङ्गेन प्रतिपादितः ॥२७८॥

Earlier, it was shown by means of inference that the relation of a man's activity is to the light which exists apart from the body and the non-Ātman object. [278]

आत्मैवास्येति वचनात्पूर्वोत्तरविरोधतः ।
संजातसंशयो राजा याज्ञवल्क्यमपृच्छत ॥२७९॥

(Therefore) owing to the statement: *ātmaivāśya*, which involves contradiction between the earlier and the later statements, the king with a doubt arisen in his mind put a question to Yājñavalkya. [279]

Verses 280-285 refute the apparent contradiction between the earlier and the subsequent statements.

अर्थान्तरं चेद्देहादेरात्मज्योतिर्विवक्षितम् ।
पूर्वोत्तरविरोधोऽयं तदा नैवेह ढौकते ॥२८०॥

If it is intended that the light of the inner self is an object other than the body etc., then this contradiction between an earlier and the later statement would not push forward itself.

[280]

आत्मशब्दश्च लोकेऽस्मिन्प्रसिद्धोऽनेकवस्तुषु ।
साक्षिबुद्धिशरीरान्तेष्व्वात्मबुद्धिसमन्वयात् ॥२८१॥

And, in this world, the word *ātman* is known (as used) with reference to many things, viz. the witness, the intellect and (the organs etc.) up to the body, on account of their close association with the inner self and the intellect.

[281]

इतमचप्रत्ययस्तस्माद्बह्वर्थस्यात्र संभवात् ।
कतमो भवतात्मेति ज्योतिष्ट्वेन विवक्षितः ॥२८२॥

Therefore, the use here of the suffix *-datamac*¹ (in the question *katama*) in the statement *katamo bhavatātmā* is intended to stand for (or, relate to) the light, since there are many meanings here possible.

[282]

¹This is a grammatical term for the suffix *-tama* which is noticeable in superlative forms of words.

इति पृष्टोऽनुमानेनाविरुद्धं प्रत्यपीपदत् ।
आत्मज्योतिः सुविस्पष्टं राजानं योऽयमित्यतः ॥२८३॥

Thus asked, (the sage) very clearly pointed out to the king, in the sentence *yo 'yam* ... It is the light of the *Ātman* (the inner self) so that it is not opposed to inference.

[283]

भान्वादिज्योतिषा तावद्व्यवहर्तुरनुग्रहः ।

कृष्णसारादिदेशेषु स्वान्तस्यानुग्रहस्ततः ॥२८४॥

As for the help by the light of the sun etc., there is a help to a person who undertakes an activity, in relation to the regions of the black pupil of the eyes etc. and then there will be a help offered to his mind (*svānte*). [284]

मनःप्रधानः संघात आत्मचैतन्यबिम्बितः ।
अभिव्यक्तस्मृतिः सोऽथ बाह्यां चेष्टां प्रपद्यते ॥२८५॥

The conglomeration (of the body), which has *manas* as the principal (element in it), is having the reflection of sentience (or, the inner self) and then that (i.e. body), becoming awakened with the memory in it, takes to external activity. [285]

SP cites *yathāhuh— smṛtyāśrayaś ca prāṇabhṛtām sarve vya-vahārā iti*; (this is possibly from *Bhārṭṛprapañca*).

Verses 286-288 state that there appear through imagination many *Ātmans*.

पिण्डस्तावदिहात्मैको द्वितीयो लिङ्गसंज्ञितः ।
चिद्विम्बितावधिरचान्यश्चतुर्थो नेति नेति यः ॥२८६॥

To begin with, the first lump here is the inner self, the body, the second one, called *liṅga*, yet another is the one having confinement or limit by the reflection of sentience¹ and the fourth is what is described (in the words) *neti neti*. [286]

¹Read SP: *cidbimbitāvadhir ity antaryāmī sākṣi cocyate*.

बाह्यान्तज्योतिषोर्मध्ये देहो बुद्ध्यादिसंहतः ।
वर्तते वाङ्मनःकायक्रियाकारी सुखादिमान् ॥२८७॥

The body connected with (or, made up of) the intellect etc.

exists between the external and the internal lights and is the performer of activities through (i.e. with the help of) speech, *manas* and the entire body thus becoming possessed of happiness. [287]

भान्वादिज्योतिषा सोऽयं सम्यक्संदीपितेक्षणः ।
तद्द्वारेद्धमनाः स्मृत्वा बाह्यां चेष्टां प्रपद्यते ॥२८८॥

This one (i.e. the body), whose eye¹ is well enlightened by the light(s) of the sun etc.² and, through that,³ has the *manas* (in it) incited and then, having remembered (all that), takes to external activity. [288]

¹This stands for other organs also.

²This stands for the moon, fire and speech.

³*taddvārā* is explained by SP as *ādityādyanugrāhītendriyadvārā*.

Verses 289-294 explains the extent of favour done by the lights of the sun and others.

धर्माधर्मसमुत्थोऽस्य बाह्यज्योतिरनुग्रहः ।
हेत्वन्तरानपेक्षस्तु प्रत्यग्ज्योतिरनुग्रहः ॥२८९॥

The favour done by the external lights for this one (viz. this individual) arises from the merit and demerit (of him), but that favour done by the internal light is not dependent on any other cause (viz. external light). [289]

देहैकदेश एवास्य देवतानुग्रहस्ततः ।
कृत्स्नाध्यात्माधिदैवादावात्मज्योतिरनुग्रहः ॥२९०॥

From that it follows that the favour of the deities is only in respect of some part of the body, whereas the help of the light of the inner self is for the entire (worlds)¹ related to the body and deities. [290]

¹*adhyātma* and *ādhibhautika* are implied.

न तत्र सूर्यो भातीति तथा चाथर्वणे वचः ।

यथा प्रकाशयत्येक इति चाप्यैश्वरी स्मृतिः ॥२९१॥

To this effect is there a statement in the Ātharvaṇa (Śruti): *na tatra sūryo bhāti*¹ and also there is a Smṛti coming from the Lord, viz. *yathā prakāśayaty ekaḥ*.² [291]

¹*Kāthopaniṣad* 5.15.

²*Gītā* 13.33.

अस्थास्नुत्वाच्च धर्मादेः प्रयोज्यं साधिदैवतम् ।

अध्यात्ममधिभूतं च तेनास्थास्न्वात्मसाक्षिकम् ॥२९२॥

Owing to the not ever-lasting nature of merit etc.. The one which is related to deities, to the body and to the elements are to be connected/construed (accordingly). Thus the one not ever-lasting has the Ātman as the witness. [292]

बाह्यज्योतिरभावेऽतो वाङ्मनःकायहेतुके ।

स्वप्नादिव्यवहारेऽस्मिञ्ज्योतिरात्मैव नापरम् ॥२९३॥

Therefore, in the dealing(s) in the dream state etc. which have speech, *manas* and body as the cause, there is only the inner self as the light and not any other, during absence of the external light(s). [293]

देहेन्द्रियमनोबुद्धिव्यतिरेकप्रसिद्धये ।

योऽयमित्युच्यते प्रत्यग्ज्योतिषो भानुवद्वचः ॥२९४॥

Therefore, in order to establish the distinction (of the inner self) from the body, organs, *manas* and the intellect, there is the statement made *yo 'yam* This is a statement of the light within, as there can be other statement(s) about the sun (etc.). [294]

Verses 294-299 are the statement about the ever-existing light of the Ātman.

स्वयंप्रमाणकस्तावत्साक्ष्यन्तोऽर्थो व्यवस्थितः ।
भावाभावौ प्रमात्रादेस्तत्प्रसादात्प्रसिध्यतः ॥२९५॥

Now, thus, there has been (properly) established the (real) thing which has itself as the means to prove its (own) existence, viz. that which is in the witnessing (one) within (each individual). The existence and non-existence of a knower etc. would be determined (or, established) by the favour of that (witness). [295]

तदाभासानुविद्धेन प्रमात्राहंवपुर्भृता ।
प्रमाणादेः प्रसिद्धिः स्यान्मेयस्यापि प्रमाणतः ॥२९६॥

There is proven (or, established) the existence of the means of knowing etc.¹ only through a knower, who is penetrated by the semblance of that (Ātman), and which is possessed of a body marked by *aham* 'ego' and so also of the existence of the object of knowing through that (very) means of knowing. [296]

¹The word *ādi* refers to ignorance and its effects.

प्रमाणव्यापृतिफलप्रसिद्धिश्च प्रमातरि ।
अवगत्यवसाना स्यात्प्रमातः प्रत्यगात्मनि ॥२९७॥
यतोऽवगतिरेवात्र प्रमात्रादिविशेषणा ।
साक्षात्प्रमाफलं न्याय्यं प्रत्यगात्मैकसाक्षिकम् ॥२९८॥

And, securing of the result of the activity of the means of knowing (is seen) in the knower, having his knowledge as the end and that also would be in the intellect finally. [297]
Since it is only knowledge, which is specified by knower etc., therefore, it is only to be considered as reasonable (*nyāyya*)

that the direct result of right knowledge is having the inner self as the witness. [298]

प्रत्यविचदाकृतिर्बुद्धौ मेयार्थाकृतिवत्स्थिता ।
बुद्धिः कारणसंस्थैव कृत्स्नव्यवहृतिक्षमा ॥२९९॥

The shape of the inner sentience exists in the intellect in the same way as the shape of an object of knowing. (But) the intellect is only dependent on its cause which is the inner self and is then capable of (doing) all the dealings. [299]

Verses 300-304 explain the word *ayam* in *yo 'yam*.

यः पृष्टः स परावृत्तिप्रमामेयातिलङ्घितः ।
प्रत्यक्षेणैव मानेन त्वयमित्यभिधीयते ॥३००॥

The one, about which a question was asked, is that who exists beyond (lit. has transgressed) all the object(s) of knowing in (any) knowledge, which is a modification¹ of the thing outside (the body). But the word *ayam* (with reference to the inner self) is used with the help of only direct perception as the means of knowing. [300]

The verse states the meaning, of different words in *yo 'yam* in BU.

In the verse, there is reference to two pronouns *yaḥ* and *ayam*; *yaḥ* has reference to what is not directly perceived, whereas *ayam* refers to what is only visible.

¹This is for impression on the intellect. The knowledge about anything outside the body is in the shape of an impression of on the intellect.

पराञ्चीति च मन्त्रोक्तिः साक्षादात्मेति च श्रुतिः ।
पराङ्मानाप्रमेयत्वमात्मनः प्रत्यबूबुधत् ॥३०१॥

The statement in the Mantra *parāñci khāni*¹ and also the

Śruti (statement), *sākṣād ātmā*, have (each) revealed (the nature of) the Ātman being imperceptible through the external means of knowing. [30]

¹*Kāthopanīṣad* 4.1.

कुम्भाकारेण कुम्भार्थो यथा प्रत्यक्ष ईक्ष्यते ।
विज्ञानेन तथा प्रत्यङ्मात्माकारेण गृह्यते ॥३०२॥

As the object (called) a pitcher is directly perceived by the potter in the shape of a pitcher, similarly is the inner self perceived in some (particular) shape by the internal organs (*viñāna*).¹ [302]

¹Refer to BUBV 2.1.190; this is the intellect. Yet read SP: *ātmākāreṇa viñānēti sambandhaḥ*.

घटासामान्यरूपोत्थप्रत्यक्षैकप्रमाणकः ।
घटार्थोऽव्यभिचारित्वात्तयोर्मानप्रमेययोः ॥३०३॥

The object, viz. a pitcher, has for it only one means of knowing, viz. direct perception, which has arisen from the particular (lit. special) form of the pitcher, because the means of knowing an object to be known have an invariable character (i.e. relation) between them. [303]

आत्मासाधारणात्मोत्थभास्वच्चैतन्यरूपिणा ।
प्रत्यक्षेणेक्ष्यते नित्यमात्मनात्मा त्वकारकः ॥३०४॥

But, the Ātman which is not a means to any activity¹ is ever perceived by direct perception which has the shape of the bright sentience that arises from the exceptional (lit. uncommon) nature of itself. [304]

Thus is distinguished the knowledge of the inner self from the knowledge of any worldly object.

¹This is so said for averting the contingent notion that the inner self is related to an object and also some activity.

अनात्माकारमानेषु ह्यन्योन्यव्यभिचारिषु ।
प्रत्यक्प्रत्यय एवैकः सर्वत्राव्यभिचारवान् ॥३०५॥

While (all other objects are) having the shapes of the mutually variable non-Ātman (objects), the Ātman is alone whose knowledge is invariable everywhere/at every place (*sarvatra*).

[305]

Direct perception of external object varies from object to object, yet, in the case of the inner self, the knowledge (or experience) of it is never variable.

यत एवमतः प्रत्यक्प्रत्ययेनोपदिश्यते ।
तदन्यधीगृहीतौ स्याद्यतोऽनात्मत्वमात्मनः ॥३०६॥

Since this is so, therefore, the inner self is expressed through the experience by direct perception. (And,) in case it was taken to be any other (object), the Ātman (i.e. the inner self) would be (known as) some non-Ātman.¹

[306]

¹SP adds: *ato na vedyateti śeṣaḥ*.

अपास्तान्यव्यपेक्षं चेदात्मदृष्ट्या समीक्षितम् ।
जगदात्मैव कृत्स्नं स्यान्न ह्यज्ञातोऽवशिष्यते ॥३०७॥

If the entire universe were to be seen as the Ātman, which has given up its dependence on other (organs etc.); then, there would not remain anything else as an unknown object.

[307]

In verses 308-323, there is exposition on the word vijñānamaya. Yet, in verses 318-323, there is a reference to the view of Bhaṭṭa-prapañca on the notion of vijñānamaya.

अयमित्यभिधायोग्यबहोरर्थस्य संनिधिः ।

विज्ञानमय इत्युक्तस्तदवच्छिद्यते यतः ॥३०८॥

In the word *ayam*, (there is expressed) the proximity of many (or, numerous) objects (which are) suitable for expression, since the expression *vijñānamaya*¹ is for delimiting the same.²

[308]

¹Refer to BUBV 2.1.187.

²This refers to *bahu artha* mentioned in the first line.

विज्ञानमय इत्यस्माद्व्यपदेशान्निवर्तते ।

ज्योतिरात्मा जडाद्देहात्तस्याचैतन्यरूपतः ॥३०९॥

Owing to the mention (of it as) *vijñānamaya*, the light of the inner self is distinguished¹ from the inert body, which has the nature of insentience.

[309]

¹Here the verb *nivartate* is to be understood in the sense of *vyāvartate*.

विज्ञानमित्यनेनात्र बुद्धिरेवाभिधीयते ।

बुद्ध्युपाध्यविविक्तश्च विज्ञानमय उच्यते ॥३१०॥

It is the intellect itself which is here expressed by the word *vijñāna* and (that one) which is not distinct from the adjunct, viz. the intellect, is expressed (by the word) *vijñānamaya* 'mostly consisting in particular knowledge'.

[310]

बुद्धिविज्ञानसंपृक्तो यस्मादेष प्रमीयते ।

राहुवच्चन्द्रसंपृक्तः प्रत्यग्ज्ञानमयस्ततः ॥३११॥

Since this one is known (*pramīyate*) as marked by (the impression in the form of the intellect, therefore the inner self, which is mostly of the nature of (particular) knowledge, is to be considered like Rāhu who is fully associated with

the moon.

[311]

The knowledge about Rāhu cannot be entertained unless he is associated with the moon:¹ so also is the knowledge of the inner self to be taken as associated with the impression on the intellect.

¹BUB adds the sun also.

द्रष्टृत्वाद्यभिसंबन्धोऽकारकस्यापि सर्वदा ।
बुद्धियोगकृतोऽतोऽयं विज्ञानमय उच्यते ॥३१२॥

Since this connection with seership is ever understood of even non-agent¹ (inner self), caused as it is by its association with the intellect, therefore, this (the inner self) is described as *vijñānamaya* 'mostly consisting in some particular knowledge'.

[312]

¹The inner self is always *akāraka* 'not connected with activity'; therefore, a non-agent.

आत्मानात्मावबोधाय यतो धीरेव कारणम् ।
सर्वार्थकरणं सातो दीपो ध्वान्ते यथा तथा ॥३१३॥

Since, for understanding the Ātman and non-Ātman, it is only the intellect which is (the determining) cause, therefore, it is a means to understanding of all (the objects), it is like a lamp that is (a means of seeing) in darkness. [313]

विज्ञानालोकसंपृक्तं मेयं वस्त्वखिलं यतः ।
विजानाति मयट् तस्मात्प्रायार्थोऽत्रावसीयते ॥३१४॥

Since a person knows all the things, which are objects of knowing that are associated with the light of *vijñāna* 'the intellect', therefore it is concluded that the suffix *-mayat* is here understood to be in the sense of 'mostly consisting (in

some particular) knowledge'.

[314]

यावांल्ल्युडर्थस्तेनायं तदविद्यैकहेतुतः ।
अविशिष्टौ मतो यस्मात्तदाभासैकवर्त्मना ॥३१५॥
विज्ञानमय इत्येवं तस्मादात्माभिधीयते ।
सर्वधीवृत्तिसाक्षित्वात्तादात्म्याच्चाप्यनात्मनः ॥३१६॥

Since this one is taken to be not specified by the meaning of the suffix *-lyut*,¹ of whatever extent, on account of only one cause, viz. ignorance about it, therefore, by way of the semblance of it, [315]
is the inner self thus expressed by the word *viññānamaya*. (This is so) on account of its nature, viz. being the witness of all the modifications of the intellect and also identified with them. [316]

¹Cf. Pāṇini 3.3.117: *karaṇādhikaraṇayoś ca*, here it has the following purpose to serve, viz. *karaṇe*: The affix *lyut* comes after a root when the relation of the word to be formed to the verb is that of an instrument.

सर्वार्थग्रहणं तस्मात्परोऽवस्थितदीपवत् ।
प्रधानं करणं बुद्धिर्द्वारमात्रं ततोऽपरम् ॥३१७॥

Therefore, the inner self's grasping of all the objects (becomes possible) as by a lamp with reference to (objects that are) in front of it. Intellect is the principal organ (of the knowledge) and whatever else than that there is merely a door to it (i.e. the intellect). [317]

व्याचख्युर्मयटं ये तु विकारार्थे महाधियः ।
स्वव्याख्यानविरोधः स्यात्तेषां चानर्थसंगतिः ॥३१८॥

But those, who is possessed of great intellect, have explained the suffix *-mayat* in the sense of modification¹ have an opposition in or to their own explanation and that would be

(in association) with the undesired.

[318]

The discussion of the explanation of *vijñānamaya* as given by Bhartṛprapañca is now begun and it is pointed out that it is beset with self-contradiction.

Refer to BU 4.4.5 and 2.1.17 regarding *vijñānamaya*.

¹Read SP: *vijñānam param brahma tatprakṛtiko jīvo vijñānamaya iti bhartṛprapañcoktam.*

आत्मनश्चापि निःशेषविकारप्रतिषेधतः ।

न जायत इति स्पष्टं श्रुतिमन्त्रोक्तिसंश्रयात् ॥३१९॥

But this is so because of the refusal (or, denial) of every modification in the case of the Ātman; (and) this becomes clear by turning (lit. resorting) to the Mantra in the Śruti *na jāyate*¹

[319]

¹*Kāthopaniṣad* 2.18: SP refers to *Gītā* 2.20.

अनिर्मोक्षप्रसक्तिश्च विकारश्चेत्परात्मनः ।

मयण्नातो विकारे स्यात्प्रायार्थस्त्वत्र युज्यते ॥३२०॥

And, if there is modification held (in the case of the Ātman); then, there would result contingently the absence of liberation for the highest Ātman. Therefore, the suffix *-mayat* is not (to be understood) in the sense of modification, but meaning 'mostly consisting in' is here reasonably acceptable.

[320]

यदि वाज्ञानतस्तस्य विकारो जगदिष्यते ।

रज्ज्वाः सर्पादिको यद्वन्न तथा दोष इष्यते ॥३२१॥

If, owing to ignorance (about the nature of the Ātman), the universe is held to be its modification, as a serpent etc. is of a rope (etc.); then, (it is to be said,) that kind of fault is not accepted (or, desired).

[321]

विज्ञानमय इत्यत्र वाक्ये प्रायार्थतेष्यते ।
पृथिव्यादिमयोऽप्यात्मा यस्मादूर्ध्वं प्रवक्ष्यते ॥३२२॥

(And) in this sentence *vijñānamaya* ... -*mayat* is desired having the sense 'mostly consisting in', since there will also be said later that the Ātman is *prthivyādimaya*.¹ [322]

¹The use of -*mayat* with more nouns than one points to the said meaning.

संदिह्यमानः सर्वत्र पदार्थोऽन्यत्र निश्चितात् ।
प्रयोगात्सुविनिश्चेयो न्यायाद्वात्यन्तनिश्चितात् ॥३२३॥

On the basis of a rule, which is (already) well settled, the meaning of a word, being under doubt, is to be properly settled from its use elsewhere. [323]

SP points out why the meaning of -*mayat* in the *vijñānamaya* in the sense of 'mostly consisting in' should be determined by the use of that word in that sense elsewhere. For this, SP cites examples from the field of the Mīmāṃsā statement *puroḍāśaṃ caturdhā kṛtvā barhiṣadam karoti* would require specification of *puroḍāśa* and thus that specification becomes available in the mention of *āgneyam caturdhā karoti* in the text of another school. So also, the statement *aktāḥ śarkarā upadadāti* requires the knowledge of the material for anointing *śarkaras* and this is understood from a statement elsewhere *tejo vai ghṛtam* which conveys that material to be ghee. In this way, the meaning of *vijñānamaya* has to be ascertained as 'mostly consisting in', knowledge, as understood in BU 4.4.5. In this connection SP states some relevant passage from *pramāṇalakṣaṇa*. NKL (ms. pp.595-596) repeats the same idea.

In verses 324-329 is explained the significance of the word *prāṇeṣu*.

देहादिवेन्द्रियेभ्योऽपि व्युत्थापनचिकीर्षया ।
 प्राणेष्विति श्रुतिर्विक्त प्राणाः पञ्चदशोदिताः ॥३२४॥
 तेभ्यो निर्धारणार्थाय सप्तमीयं प्रयुज्यते ।
 प्राणेषु योऽर्थोऽनुगतः स आत्मेत्यवधार्यताम् ॥३२५॥

The Śruti statement uses here the word *prāṇeṣu*, with the desire of conveying the rising of the Ātman from the organs as from the body; and there are mentioned fifteen organs (*prāṇas*),¹ [324]

(and) in order to distinguish specifically (the Ātman) from them is used here the locative case. (This yields the meaning:) it should be known for certain (*avadhāryatām*) that, what has continued to be (existing) in the *prāṇas* 'organs', is (but) the Ātman. [325]

¹The fifteen organs are: five sense-organs, five organs of activity and five winds.

प्राणेष्व्वात्मीयरूपेषु प्रत्यक्त्वेनावभाति यः ।
 स एवात्मेति विज्ञेयस्तेषु सर्वेष्वनात्मसु ॥३२६॥

That one, who appears to be present within the *prāṇas*, which have the nature of belonging to the Ātman, has to be known as the Ātman, in all of them that are non-Ātman. [326]

SP remarks *na hi karaṇeṣu dīpavat ātmasambhāvanety arthaḥ*.

मतं प्राणसजातीया धीरेवात्मेति चेन्न तत् ।
 यतो धीव्यतिरेकार्थं हृदीति श्रुतिरभ्यधात् ॥३२७॥

If it is held that the intellect, which belongs to the same species as *prāṇas*, is itself the Ātman, it is not (to be held) so, because the Śruti has stated (in this context) the word *hr̥di* in order to distinguish the Ātman from the intellect. [327]

हृच्छब्देन च धीरेव तात्स्थ्यादत्राभिधीयते ।

स्वार्थस्तस्यां य आभाति स आत्मा बुद्धिवृत्तिदृक् ॥३२८॥

re, by the word *hr̥di* is expressed the intellect itself, owing its existence in that. (And) that one, which flashes forth that (the intellect) as its own meaning is the Ātman, the support of the modifications of the intellect. [328]

BU 2.1.17.

हृदीत्याधारनिर्देशाद्धीस्था आत्मेति शङ्क्यते ।
वृत्तयोऽतो निवृत्त्यर्थमन्तरित्युपदिश्यते ॥३२९॥

is suspected here that the Ātman is the modification of the intellect, from the mention of the support for the intellect by the word *hr̥di*; therefore, in order to ward off that suspicion here stated the adverb *antah* in the Śruti. [329]

ss 330-333 clarify what is meant by the word *ātman*.

देवताविषयप्राणबुद्धितद्वृत्तितः परः ।
प्रत्यक्तया यः प्रथते ज्योतिरात्मा स ईक्ष्यताम् ॥३३०॥

at Ātman which reveals itself as the inner one, being above the deities, the object(s) of knowing, the organs, the intellect and its modification(s), is to be seen as the light. [330]

ग्राहकग्रहणग्राह्यरूपोऽनात्मा प्रवाहवान् ।
बुद्ध्यादिर्विषयान्तोऽर्थो यत्साक्षिक इवेक्ष्यते ॥३३१॥

what is the Ātman) through whose being the witness is seen the entire world of objects (*viṣayānta*) to be known including the intellect etc. which is in the stream of the non-Ātman object(s) having the nature of what grasps, the act of grasping and the object of grasping. [331]

भूत्वाभवंस्तथाभूत्वा भवंश्चेहातथात्मना ।

अज्ञातोऽलुप्तदृष्टिर्यः स आत्मा ज्योतिरुच्यते ॥३३२॥

That one which, having come into being, does not attain that nature (*tathā*),¹ and (now) here without having come into being, which appears what it had not been, viz. not of that nature, the unknown and the one whose power of seeing is not lost is understood as (lit. called) the Ātman, the light.

[332]

SP does not show here Samdhi's of *bhūtvā abhavan* and *tathā abhūtvā*, as it does elsewhere. Yet, it refers to the basic thought in BS 2.3.17: *nātmaśruter nityatvāc ca tābhyah*.

¹That is, having the nature of the intellect etc.

आगमापायितासिद्धिर्बुद्ध्यादेर्यत्समाश्रयात् ।
साक्षादात्मेति तं पश्य प्रत्यग्दृष्ट्यैकमात्मनि ॥३३३॥

See that as the directly perceptible Ātman, after resorting to which the intellect etc. have their character of coming into existence and departing from it established, (thus) looking on that single Ātman as the inner self (or one within). [333]

परागर्थानुसारिण्यो यतो धीवृत्तयस्ततः ।
विशेषणादन्तरिति व्यावर्त्यन्ते पराक्त्वतः ॥३३४॥

Since the modifications of the intellect are in agreement with the external objects that are outside, therefore, by the specifier *antaḥ* they are distinguished (from the inner self) on account of their being external. [334]

This verse states that the word *antaḥ* is for setting aside the inner self's being any modification of the intellect.

Verses 335-336 explain the significance of the word *jyotis*.

कारणं तर्हि बुद्ध्यादेरात्मेत्यत्र प्रसज्यते ।
कार्यस्यान्तर्यतो दृष्टं सर्वत्रैव च कारणम् ॥३३५॥

(One would say here:) 'Then it contingently follows here that the Ātman is the cause of the intellect etc. since (at all times) it is noticed that a cause continues to be inside the effect.'

[335]

जाड्यं चात्मन इच्छन्ति कणभुङ्मतजीविनः ।
तेषां विप्रतिषेधार्थं ज्योतिरित्यभिधीयते ॥३३६॥

Those ¹ who follow (lit. conduct themselves according to) the view of Kaṇāda, postulate (lit. desire) that the Ātman has insentience. Therefore, with a view to refuting them, it is said in the Śruti (about the Ātman that) it is a light. [336]

¹Those are the Vaiśeṣika, the Naiyāyika, and the followers of Prabhākara Mīmāṃsā.

In verses 337-345 is pointed out another significance of the word jyotis.

योऽयमित्यादिना यद्वा यथोक्तस्यात्मवस्तुनः ।
प्रकृतज्योतिःसंबन्धो ज्योतिरित्यभिधीयते ॥३३७॥

Or, (it is like this: In the statement of Śruti) *yo 'yam* ... there is expressed the relation of the (real) thing, viz. the inner self to the light under discussion and the same is called *jyoti*.

[337]

उपादानं हि बुद्ध्यादेरात्माविद्येति भण्यते ।
सकृद्विभातं चिन्मात्रं ज्योतिरित्युपदिश्यते ॥३३८॥

The Ātman is indeed (*hi*) taken as the material cause of the intellect etc. is ignorance; (thus) only sentience, which has flashed forth (only) once, is stated as the light. [338]

वस्तुवृत्तेन प्रध्वस्तनिःशेषाज्ञानमात्मनः ।

ज्योती रूपमिदं भास्वत्प्रत्यङ्मात्रसतत्त्वकम् ॥३३९॥

In reality, this is the (proper) form of the inner self, viz. this light which has the nature of being the bright light alone whereby is destroyed the entire ignorance. [339]

ज्योतिः संविच्चितिः प्रत्यङ्ङात्मेति व्यपदिश्यते ।
स्वार्थं यत्प्रथते नित्यं जाग्रत्स्वप्नसुषुप्तिषु ॥३४०॥
बुद्ध्यादिषु परार्थेषु ह्यागमापायिवस्तुषु ।
स्वयं रूपेण यो भाति स्थासुः स्वार्थः स भण्यते ॥३४१॥
ज्योतिरित्यस्य बुद्ध्यादेरागमापायसिद्धिदः ।
स्वयंमातृक एवायमात्मत्वादेव कारणात् ॥३४२॥

(This) inner self is mentioned (in this context of the text) as Jyotis, Samvid, and citi, the one which ever reveals itself, for its own sake, in the states of waking, dream and deep sleep. [340]

The one is said to be (living for its own self) who in its own form shines as the permanently abiding thing while (the external objects, viz. the intellect etc., are things as come into existence and depart from it. [341]

What is called as this light causes the coming into existence and departing from it of the intellect etc. and is its own knower, because being the (highest) Ātman it is the cause. [342]

The use of the word *svārtha* 'having a purpose its own' in verse 340, is emphasised, because this is distinct from *parārtha* 'other objects of desire'.

अनेनैव यथोक्तेन ज्योतिषा सकलं जगत् ।
षड्भावविक्रियामेति निर्विकारेण भास्वता ॥३४३॥

Thanks to this very light, viz. the one which does not undergo any modification, the bright one, which is thus described, the entire universe undergoes the sixfold states¹ of modifications. [343]

¹*jāyate asti vipariṇamate vardhate apakṣīyate vinaśyati* (Nirukta 1.2).

अचेतनोऽपि बुद्ध्यादिश्चेतनावानिवेक्ष्यते ।
देहेन्द्रियमनोबुद्धिसंघातो वायुभिः सह ॥३४४॥

The intellect etc., which is a conglomeration of the body organs, *manas* and the intellect, together with life-breaths,¹, though insentient it is, is seen here possessed of sentience as it were.

[344]

¹Here the word *vāyus* mean five winds in the body.

यथा प्रकाशयत्येकः कृत्स्नं लोकमिमं रविः ।
क्षेत्रं क्षेत्री तथा कृत्स्नं व्यनक्तीति स्मृतेर्वचः ॥३४५॥

There is in statement from a *Smṛti*: as this single sun illumines this entire world, so does the knower of the field reveal the entire field.

[345]

This is *Gītā* 13.33.

Verses 346-347 explain *yathā mārakato maṇiḥ* in *BUB*.

आत्मच्छायं पयोऽशेषं यथा मारकतो मणिः ।
परीक्षणाय प्रक्षिप्तः कुर्यादात्मा तथैव च ॥३४६॥
बुद्ध्यादिदेहपर्यन्तं प्रत्यगज्ञानहेतुकम् ।
जडस्वभावकं नित्यमवभासयति स्वयम् ॥३४७॥

As an emerald jewel put (into milk) for examining (its quality), makes the entire milk as possessed of the colour belonging to itself, so is the *Ātman*.

[346]

The inner self itself ever illumines whatever has ignorance (about the *Ātman*) as a cause, viz. the world of objects beginning with the intellect etc. and ending in a body, which

have insentience as their nature.

[347]

Verse 346 means: the Ātman makes all the non-sentient objects as sentient objects by being in their midst.

In verses 348-356 is presented the existence of ignorance.

बुद्ध्यादिष्वपि सक्ष्मेषु यत्सक्ष्मतममुच्यते ।
बुद्ध्यादिकारणं नित्यमात्माविद्येति भण्यते ॥३४८॥

Even among the intellect etc. which are subtle, that which is described as the most subtle, is the eternal Ātman and the cause of the intellect etc.—this is called ignorance. [348]

अपि कूटस्थवपुषः प्रतीचः सङ्गकारकम् ।
तत्त्वमस्यादिवाक्योत्थज्ञानबाध्यं च यद्विदुः ॥३४९॥
यन्निमित्तं च साक्षित्वं कारणत्वं तथात्मनः ।
सर्वकार्यविनाशेऽपि यद्वीजमवशिष्यते ॥३५०॥
तदात्मज्योतिषेद्धं सन्नित्यमेवावतिष्ठते ।
उत्पत्तिस्थितिभङ्गानां न वेद्मीति च साक्षितः ॥३५१॥

That¹ which causes the connection/association (with external objects) of even the inner self, having an immutable form and which, they have known, as what can be stultified by the knowledge arising from the sentence such as *tat tvam asi*²—

[349]

(that)¹ on account of which there arises the nature of being a witness in the Ātman and also of being a cause (of external objects) and seed of which remains even when all (the world of) effects has come to be destroyed,

[350]

that, kindled by the light of its own and ever existent, continues to be amongst (the variety of) origination, sustenance and destruction as the witness of them, (in the form of the experience (or, awareness):) 'I do not know'.

[351]

¹This occurs in verse 351 below; it is to be continued in

verses 350-351.

²CU 6.8.7ff.

कूटस्थ एव साक्ष्यत्र स्वमोहाभासहेतुतः ।
अविचारितसंसिद्धि तमोऽनुभवसंश्रयात् ॥३५२॥

It is the very immutable sentience which is here the witness on account of the cause, viz. the semblance of its own delusion. (Here is) ignorance which is established without thought as its resorting to the experience (i.e. awareness of the same).¹
[352]

¹This is clarified in the next verse.

निःसाक्षिके न वेद्मीति न कथंचित्प्रसिध्यति ।
तथा कूटस्थसंवित्के नितरां नैतदिष्यते ॥३५३॥

There would (or, does) not in any way arise (the awareness: 'I do not know' in (a body which is) devoid of a witness; so (also) this is not at all accepted (lit. desired in a body) which has (in it) the immutable witness.¹
[353]

¹This refers to the pure state of Ātman while it is unaffected by any delimiting adjunct. In this context, SP refers to a verse: *svayaṃ sedhum asāmārthyāt sādhakāntarahānataḥ / bādhakasya ca sadbhāvāt tamasā sāksitāciteḥ //*

ऐश्वर्यं कारणत्वं च साक्षित्वमपि चात्मनः ।
सदेशितव्यकार्यार्थसाक्ष्यार्थेनास्य संगतेः ॥३५४॥

The nature of the Ātman as being the lord, the cause and the witness also can be (understood) on account of its association with (the objects) only in the sense of its ever being the witness of the objects to be effected and lorded over.
[354]

Read SP: *na hi sāpekṣaṃ svarūpaṃ svābhāvikam asvābhāvikam cāvidyaṃ rajatavad ity arthaḥ*. Also it adds: *ye tu kecid aiśvaryaṃ anāropitaṃ āśrayante te punar aiśvaryaṃ kāraṇatvaṃ cety-ādivārtikārthaṃ nālocayante*.

आत्माज्ञानमतः प्रत्यक्चैतन्याभासवत्सदा ।

आत्मनः कारणत्वादेः प्रयोजकमिहेष्यते ॥३५५॥

Therefore, here (i.e. in this context) is accepted that ignorance about the Ātman like the appearance of sentience of the inner self leads to the Ātman as ever the cause etc.,¹ i.e. its productive (force) [355]

¹This refers to *aiśvarya* in verse 354 above.

चैतन्याभासवत्प्रत्यङ्मोहान्तात्प्रत्यगात्मनः ।

बुद्ध्यादेर्विषयान्तस्य सिद्धिः स्यात्साक्षिणस्ततः ॥३५६॥

(Only) then, there can be established the existence of all the objects such as the intellect etc. consequently from the inner self as the witness (of all) which have consisted in the delusion in respect of the inner self which has (lit. is possessd of) the appearance of sentience. [356]

This verse states the reason for holding ahaṃkāra as the foremost in this acceptance of superimposition.

स्वकारणाभिसंबन्धाच्चैतन्याभासता धियः ।

जायतेऽतोऽभिमानोऽस्यां जायते महतामपि ॥३५७॥

The appearance of sentience arises in this (superimposed) intellect on account of its close (*abhi*) connection (or, association) with its own cause; (indeed), there occurs ego in the case of even the great (thinkers).¹ [357]

¹SP cites in the explanation of this verse : *uktam hi— aham*

iti tāvat prathamam 'dhyāsa iti, tatra vidvatbhrāntir api sādhanam ityarthah.

Verses 358-363 are the exposition on BUB: buddhis tāvat

कारणानन्तरत्वाच्च तथा स्वच्छस्वभावतः ।
चैतन्याभासवत्येषा धीः पूर्वमभिजायते ॥३५८॥

Further, this intellect is the first to become possessed of the appearance of sentience, because it is immediate to ¹ its cause (i.e. sentience) and also because of its having a pure (lit. clear) nature. [358]

¹It means; being in the extreme nearness.

तस्मादात्माभिमानो हि बुद्धौ जनिमतां सदा ।
जायते सर्वभूतानामपि सर्वविदामिह ॥३५९॥

Therefore, in the case of all the beings that are born (*janimat*), there arises the intellect and the ego about themselves, even ¹ in the case of those who know of all of the objects (of the world). [359]

¹SP explains the purpose of the word *sarvavidām api* thus: *aviduṣām īdrg abhimāno na viduṣām ity āśanikyāhāpīti.*

चिदाभासोऽथ मनसि बुद्ध्यनन्तर्यकारणात् ।
मनःसंबन्धतश्चैवमिन्द्रियेष्वभिजायते ॥३६०॥

Then, there occurs the appearance of sentience in the *manas*, since it is immediate to the intellect and (then) owing to their connection with *manas* that ¹ comes to exist in the organs also. [360]

¹This is appearance of sentience.

मनःकरणसंबन्धाद्देहेऽप्यस्योपजायते ।

एवमाभासयत्यात्मा कृत्स्नं कार्यं सकारणम् ॥३६१॥

On account of the connection with *manas* and the organs in the body also there arises (that awareness, viz. ego).¹ Thus does the Ātman cause its own appearance in the entire (world of) effects together with the causes of the same. [361]

This is understood by *tour de force* in these verses; cf. the next verse also.

सौक्ष्म्यस्य तारतम्येन स्थितस्य विषयावधि ।

आत्माभिमानधीः पुंसां जायते नियता ततः ॥३६२॥

(Then) from that there is produced in men the awareness of their own ego, on account of the gradation of the subtlety which exists in them as far as the extent (i.e. the entire world) of objects. [362]

नित्योऽनित्यानामिति च येन सूर्यस्तथा परः ।

न तत्र सूर्यो भातीतिमन्त्राम्नायौ ह्यनेकशः ॥३६३॥

There are to this effect many statements in the tradition, viz. the Mantras: *nityo 'nityānām*,¹ *yena sūryas tathā parah*,² *na tatra sūryo bhāti*.³ [363]

¹ *Kāthopaniṣad* 5.12.

² *Taittirīya Brāhmaṇa* 3.12.97.

³ *Kāthopaniṣad* 5.5.

Verses 364-368 are an explanation of the word *puruṣa*.

आत्मन्येवं प्रबुद्धेऽस्मिञ्ज्योतिषि ध्वान्तनाशतः ।

सर्वस्यैवात्मयाथात्म्यादात्मा पुरुष उच्यते ॥३६४॥

Thus, in this light, viz. the Ātman, which is awakened, there

arises (the knowledge of) the true nature of the Ātman (present) in everything on account of the destruction of the ignorance (lit. darkness). Therefore, the Ātman is called Puruṣa.

[364]

आत्माज्ञानसमुच्छित्तौ तज्जस्य न हि वस्तुनः ।
प्रत्यग्रूपात्पृथग्रूपं संभाव्यं केनचित्क्वचित् ॥३६५॥

When there is the complete destruction of the ignorance about the inner self, at no time or nowhere should anyone think of a different nature of what is born of that ignorance as different from the nature of the inner self.

[365]

स्रगज्ञानसमुच्छित्तौ न तज्जस्यान्यतः स्रजः ।
रूपं संभाव्यतेऽह्यादेरेवमात्मस्वरूपतः ॥३६६॥
न कार्ये कारणे वापि तदभावेऽथवान्यतः ।
प्रत्यङ्मात्रैकयाथात्म्याद्रूपं संभाव्यतेऽण्वपि ॥३६७॥

When ignorance about a wreath of flowers is removed (lit. destroyed) there cannot possibly exist any form of a serpent on account of the effect (lit. product) of that (viz. ignorance) or of the wreath itself which is other than one of itself (viz. the wreath).

[366]

Similarly, it is not possible to think of even a little of a form (what is called) the effect, or the cause of that effect, or in the absence of (or, on account of) any other (thing); because of the nature of the reality consisting in the mere inner self alone.

[367]

अव्यावृत्ताननुगतप्रत्यङ्मात्रावशेषतः ।
पूर्णत्वात्पुरुषो ज्योतिरात्मैवैकोऽभिधीयते ॥३६८॥

Since the Puruṣa remains only as the inner self, which is neither distinguished from nor similar to (any other thing) and on account of his eternity/fullness, that (viz. Puruṣa) is called the

lone Ātman, the light.

[368]

सद्भावेऽपि च भान्वादेः पाराथ्याद्देहवन्न तत् ।

स्वार्थस्य ज्योतिषोऽभावे भावत्वायापि च क्षमम् ॥३६९॥

Even though the sun and others exist, they are not able to reveal their object (to the individual being), because they have, like a body (etc.), the nature of being subservient to others, in the absence of the (inner self's) light. [369]

We think that the thought here is: in the absence of the inner light, the usually known lights also are, like the body and its organs, incapable of revealing objects to anyone. It is only the light of the Ātman in their body that illuminates, viz. that causes the existence of, other object. The sun and others cannot do so. Yet, to be frank, we demur about the correctness/accuracy of the translation of this verse which is (according to us) slightly awkward in expression!

देहादेर्व्यापृतिश्चेत्स्याज्जडादित्यादिहेतुतः ।

भवेन्निःसाक्षिकैवेयमन्धकारप्रनृत्तवत् ॥३७०॥

If the activity of the body etc. could be on account of (or, produced by) the insentient cause, viz. the sun etc.; then, that would be just like a dance performed in the dark, without having any witness to see it. [370]

स्वार्थात्मज्योतिषैवातो भावाभावात्मतां जगत् ।

लभते तमृते यस्मान्नेयात्संभावनामपि ॥३७१॥

Therefore, the existence and the non-existence of the universe comes to obtain only an account of the light of the Ātman, which is for its own sake; since, in the absence of that (viz. the Ātman) the universe would not be a thing to think of.

[371]

यदेतद्धृदयमिति तथा चागमशासनम् ।

प्राणिव्यवहृतिः सर्वा प्रत्यगात्माभिमानतः ॥३७२॥

To this effect is there an instruction in tradition, viz. *etad hrdayam*;¹ all the activity of beings proceeds from (their) ego (of being) the self-within.² [372]

¹Also see: *Aitareyopaniṣad* 3.2: *hrdayam manaś caitad ubhayaṁ samvidavabhāsitatvāt sannvinmātram* (as quoted by SP).

²SP quotes: *uktam hi— svābhimāno hi sarvaprāṇinām samvyavahāra iti*.

Verses 373-384 explain BUB: *yady apy evam etat*

सर्वाभिमानहेतुं च चिदाभासं पुराब्रवम् ।

सम्यङ्मारकतदृष्टान्तदर्शनेनात्मवस्तुनः ॥३७३॥

And I have already clearly stated (lit. spoken) that the appearance of sentience is the cause of all ego, by citing (lit. showing) the illustration of emerald.¹ [373]

¹This refers to verse 346 above.

Verses 374-379 explain *yady apy evam etat ... in BUB*.

यद्यप्येवमिदं वस्तु यथोक्तमहिमं परम् ।

तथापि तज्जागरिते शक्यं दर्शयितुं न तु ॥३७४॥

Even though this thing (viz. reality, the inner self) is the highest and is having greatness¹ as already stated; yet, it is not possible to show it (to others) to be present in the state of waking.

[374]

The inner self, though it is an object of knowledge, cannot be pointed out like any external object.

¹Sureśvara uses the word *yathoktamahimam* which is

ungrammatical. But he does this under the force of metrical exigency.

आत्मबुद्धिमनश्चक्षुर्विषयालोकसंकरात् ।
जाग्रद्वृत्तौ न तच्छक्यं ज्योतिर्दर्शयितुं ततः ॥३७५॥
स्वप्ने बुद्ध्याद्युपरतौ वासनामात्रशेषतः ।
ज्योतिर्दर्शयितुं शक्यं स समान इतीर्यते ॥३७६॥

(Since) it is not possible to point out that light (of the Ātman) in the state of waking, owing to being there confused mixture of the Ātman, the intellect, *manas*, eyes, objects (of knowing) and light; [375]

as such, it is possible to show that light as the remainder of only impressions, when, in the state of dream, the intellect etc. have stopped (functioning); hence it is stated here (about it as) *sa samānah*. [376]

कथं चैवंस्वभावस्य तदज्ञानजभूमिषु ।
व्यवहारः प्रतीचोऽस्य स समानाद्यतो वचः ॥३७७॥

How again could there be any dealings of this inner self which has such nature (as described earlier) in the states caused by ignorance about itself? Hence, there follows the statement *sa samānah* [377]

Read SP: *ātmano nityamuktasya saṁsāritvam avidyeti vaktum uttaro granthaḥ ity arthaḥ*. Also read NKL (ms. p.598): *svato muktasyāpi saṁsāritvam ajñānād iti vaktum uttaro grantha ity arthaḥ*.

ज्योतिर्भ्यो देहतो लिङ्गाद्बुद्धयन्ताच्चातिरेकतः ।
योऽञ्जसा दर्शितस्तस्य विशुद्धयै वोत्तरं वचः ॥३७८॥

Or, the subsequent statement (i.e. *sa samānah* ...) is for clarifying that (the inner self) which was very clearly described

as existing apart from (other) lights, the body, the subtle body and (the bodily organs) ending in the intellect. [378]

स्वयंज्योतिः शरीरादेर्बुद्ध्यन्तादनुमानतः ।

निष्कृष्याभिहितो योऽत्र स समानः स्वमोहतः ॥३७९॥

That one, the self-shining, which is described here¹ by (resorting to) inference² after separating (i.e. understanding it as apart) from the body etc. which end up in the intellect, is *samāna* 'the same', on account of its own delusion (about itself). [379]

¹Alternatively, 'this' refers to the immediately preceding portion of BU 4.3.7 (SP).

²SP explains *anumānataḥ* as *vyavahāraliṅgāt iti yāvat*.

Verses 380-383 clarify the meaning of the word *samāna*.

समान एकः सन्नात्मा स्वात्माविद्यातदुद्भवैः ।

अज्ञानमिथ्याविज्ञातप्रत्यक्त्वादात्मवस्तुनः ॥३८०॥

केनैक इत्यपेक्षायां हृदयेनेति भण्यते ।

सधीरिति श्रुतेरत्र हृदीति प्रकृतत्वतः ॥३८१॥

In the expectancy (of an answer to the question) *kenaikah* 'With what is it identical?', it is stated in the Śruti in the word *hr̥dayena*; *samānaḥ*¹ means 'becoming identical (with)', the Ātman becomes possessed of the intellect² (or, comes to have awareness of the external objects), owing to the (inference of) ignorance/delusion about itself (i.e. its own nature) and the products/effects of the same, for the reason that the (real) thing, the Ātman, is but the inner self (or, but within an individual being) which is falsely understood through (that) ignorance—as, in this respect, there is already the beginning with the word *hr̥di*. [380-381]

¹SP points to *ekah sann anusacaratīti sambandhaḥ*. Also NKL

introductory (ms. p.598): *evam arthasaṁkṣepakam uktvā vākyam yojayati svayaṁ jyotiriti samānaśabdārtham āha samāna iti.*

²Here Sureśvara refers to the Mādhyandina text *sadhiḥ* which states that the Ātman and the intellect are but one.

अविचारितसंसिद्धि यत्तु बुद्ध्यादिकारणम् ।
कूटस्थात्मैकचैतन्यबिम्बितं सत्स्वदोषतः ॥३८२॥
स्वात्माविद्यावधिः सोऽयं परः कारणमुच्यते ।
साक्षी चेता जगद्बीजमन्तर्यामीति च श्रुतौ ॥३८३॥

All that (or, whatever is known as the) cause, viz. the intellect etc., which is established even without a thought, being a reflection of the single sentience, i.e. the immutable Ātman (is so) on account of the defect in it. [382]

And, this one, the highest, is stated to be the cause, so long as it is delimited by ignorance about itself; this one is further stated in the Śruti as the witness, the knower, the seed of the universe and the inner-controller. [383]

Read in this context NKL introductory (ms. p.593): *svāvidyayāpy ekatvaṁ sāmānyaśabdenoktaṁ tatra kim phalam ity āha.*

Verses 384-388 point to the connection of the unattached Ātman with the intellect etc. through the semblance of sentience.

बुद्ध्यादिकार्यसंस्थस्य कूटस्थासङ्गरूपिणः ।
सर्वं स्यात्कारणत्वादि तदाभासैकवर्त्मना ॥३८४॥

All, viz. being the cause (of all the effects) etc., is (said) in respect of this one, who abides in the effect(s) of the intellect etc. and, is in reality, the immutable and unattached (by anything outside), only by way of pointing to the semblance/appearance of the same in others. [384]

चैतन्याभासवपुषा कूटस्थैकत्वमिष्यते ।

कारणस्य स्वकार्यैश्च तदबोधसमन्वयात् ॥३८५॥

Oneness (or, singleness) of the immutable is accepted (lit. desired) in its form of semblance of sentience, because, indeed, owing to its own ignorance, the cause¹ (that it is) has an invariable relation to its effects. [385]

This explains the significance of the word *tadābhāsaikavartmanā* in the preceding verse.

प्रतीचोऽनवशेषेण कार्यकारणसंगतिः ।

तयोस्तु सावशेषेण प्रतीचा संगतिस्त्विदम् ॥३८६॥

In respect of the inner self, there (certainly) is the association of the causes and the effects in their fullness but this association of the same with the inner self (it has to be understood) with some remainder.¹ [386]

Read NKL (ms. p.599): *yathā pratyak prthak tiṣṭhati tathā prakāraṇe pratīcā sambandho ity arthaḥ*.

¹That is, not in their fullness.

नात्मत्वाद्व्यतिरेकोऽस्य कार्यकारणभूमितः ।

न सामान्यं विशेषो वा कात्स्न्यदात्मा ततो भवेत् ॥३८७॥

This one (i.e. the inner self) does not have an existence apart from the levels of the effects and the causes, because of its being the Ātman. Neither generality nor particularity would be (thought of this one) wholly on account of the completeness of it, consequently there would exist only the Ātman. [387]

Read SP (introductory): *tarhi tābhyām ātmano bhedas tatrāha*.

अनात्मनस्तु या सिद्धिः सा सर्वाव्यतिरेकतः ।

जाड्यात्सापेक्षतः सातो मृषासिद्धिरुदाहृता ॥३८८॥

Whatever (may be adduced as the) proof for the existence of the non-Ātman, it is on account of non-exclusion (from the inner self) (and) that (proof) has dependence on insentience; therefore, that is pointed out as false proof. [388]

It is asserted that the non-Ātman can be said to exist only on account of the ignorance about the Ātman.

SP remarks *sarvāvyatirekataḥ* is Saṁdhi of *sarvā* and *avyatirekataḥ*.

Verses 389-391 explain what is samānatva.

किं पुनः स्यात्समानत्वमात्मबुद्ध्यादिवस्तुनोः ।
विवेकतोऽननुभवो वराहोरगवत्तयोः ॥३८९॥

What again can be *samānatva* 'oneness' between the Ātman (on one hand) and the external objects, the intellect etc. on the other? The absence of experience (of the oneness) between the two (will result) from proper discrimination, (it would be like that) between a pig and a snake. [389]

Read NKL (ms. p.599): *pūrṇaṁ samānaśabdasyaikyam artha ity uktvā tasyārthāntaram āha.*

यत्तत्तयोः समानत्वं रज्जुसर्पादिवन्मतम् ।
आत्माविद्यैव संबन्धस्तस्मादात्मन इष्यते ॥३९०॥

That (which is said to be the) oneness of the two is held like that between a rope and a serpent etc.¹ Therefore the relation (of the Ātman with non-Ātman), viz. ignorance about (the nature of) the Ātman is posited to the Ātman. [390]

¹This is the usual way of Sureśvara in the use of meaningless 'etc.'.

अकारकस्वभावस्य परमार्थात्मवस्तुनः ।

अविद्याकल्पितैव स्यात्संगतिः खेऽसितादिवत् ॥३९१॥

the association of the (real) thing, viz. the highest Ātman, which does not have the nature of a *kāraṇa* 'a factor connected with an activity', (with non-Ātman) is merely imaginary (lit. imagined) on account of ignorance (about the nature of the Ātman); (it is) like (the association of) dark etc. with the light.

[391]

verses 392-397 affirm that the sameness/oneness of the Ātman is merely imaginary.

कूटस्थात्मचिदाभेऽस्य प्रत्यग्ध्वान्ते हि तद्वैः ।
विषयान्तैर्भवेद्भ्रान्तिः सामानाधिकरण्यतः ॥३९२॥

This would have a delusion (individual being, or, this inner self) in respect of what has the appearance of sentience, viz. the immutable self, while there is ignorance (lit. darkness) about (the nature of) the inner self, on account of the products of it (viz. that ignorance) ending in various external objects and that is) owing to their existence in one (and the same) substratum, i.e. the body.¹

[392]

The *sāmānādhikaranyā* refers to the existence together of ignorance about sentience and the inner self in the same body.

विकारिणः प्रकाशस्य नीलरक्तादिसंगतेः ।
नीलादिविक्रिया युक्ता परिणामस्य न त्वसौ ॥३९३॥

It is reasonable to accept the modifications blue etc. as belonging to light, that is possessed of (or, is said to have) modifications, (only) on account of its association with (some substances) blue, red etc.; but it is not of the modification.

[393]

परिणामो हि मोहादेश्चिदाभासः सदेष्ट्यते ।

परिणामान्तरप्राप्तिस्तस्यापीति न युज्यते ॥३९४॥

Indeed modification is ever held as the appearance of sentience (in the intellect etc. that is) delusion/ignorance (but) it is not reasonable that undergoing some modification be (accepted) of that (sentience) also. [394]

In the edition of MRI, the reading in this verse is *mohādeś cidābhāṣyaḥ* (a variant *cidābhāṣyaḥ* is also shown). That seems to be supported by SP which states *cidātmaprakāśya*

सुखिदुःखित्वसाक्षित्वं दुःस्थितं स्यात्तथा सति ।
सुखाद्यनुगमात्तस्य व्यतिरेकः सुदुर्लभः ॥३९५॥

If that were so, the nature of being happy or miserable or the witness (posited of sentience) would be in an ill condition (*duḥthita*).¹ It is extremely difficult to have a distinction of it from *kūṭastha*, since it is ever associated with happiness etc.² [395]

¹That is, wrongly spoken of; or, contradicted.

²This refers perhaps to bliss.

नर्ते स्याद्विक्रियां दुःखी साक्षिता का विकारिणः ।
धीविक्रियासहस्राणां साक्ष्यतोऽहमविक्रियः ॥३९६॥

There cannot be (a being) miserable unless without some modification (in him). What capacity could there be in the case of one who undergoes modification to be the witness? Therefore, (sentience, characterized by) *aham*, the witness of thousands of modifications in the intellect. It remains without any modification. [396]

This refers to the temporarily accepted modification of the inner self.

परिणाम्यात्मनोऽप्येवं कटस्थावगतेरिव ।

न युक्तः परिणामोऽयं लौकिकस्यापि नेष्यते ॥३९७॥

This condition of the inner self which has thus undergone modification is not reasonable on account of its being known as immutable. Even the modification of things occurring in the ordinary life (e.g. milk into curd) is not (really) accepted.

[397]

It is useful to read in this context NKL (ms. p.600) introductory: *pramāṇaḥ pariṇāmaḥ svīkrītyātmanaḥ pariṇāmo āstīty uktam idānīm tasyāpi pariṇāmo mithyety āha ...* and later *kṣīrāder iva mātuh pariṇāmaḥ kiṃ na syād atrāha laukikasyeti. tathābhūtasyātathābhūtasya vānyathābhāvo na sambhavatīty arthaḥ.* Read also the concluding remark in SP: *tathā ca kṣīrādipariṇāmo 'pi prāmāṇiko na bhavatīti bhāvaḥ.*

This verse is the final deduction from the meaning of the word *samāna* as presented in BUB.

धीस्वान्तेन्द्रियसंघाते चिदाभासैकवर्त्मना ।

सर्वात्मकत्वं संयात आत्माविद्यावशादतः ॥३९८॥

Therefore, the Ātman has appeared through becoming only reflection (lit. appearance) of sentience in the conglomeration of the intellect, *manas* (*svānta*) and the organs, as being the nature of all (this) owing to ignorance (about itself). [398]

In verses 399-400, Sureśvara states his own meaning of the word *samāna*—and a different one.

समानः कारणात्मा वा यत्र सर्वोपसंहतिः ।

कारणात्मा हि संवर्त्य कार्यात्मत्वं प्रपद्यते ॥३९९॥

(Or perhaps the word) *samāna* means sentience (as) of the nature of origin (of all variety), wherein there is (later) the

merger of all (that variety). Indeed, what is the origin (of variety) does undergo a modification, and become possessed of the nature of the effect. [399]

अपेक्षाज्ञानमात्रैकहेतुत्थानत्वकारणात् ।
न कार्ये कारणे वातो वस्तुतत्त्वं समीक्ष्यते ॥४००॥

Therefore, the reality of the thing (viz. sentience) is not accepted (lit. seen) in either an effect or its cause, because of their having arisen only from one cause, viz. ignorance (rooted in their mutual) dependence. [400]

अन्वयव्यतिरेकाभ्यां नातो वाक्यार्थबोधनम् ।
वस्तुतत्त्वावसायोऽतो वाक्यादेव प्रमाणतः ॥४०१॥

Therefore, there cannot be a (proper) understanding of the meaning of the sentence¹ by the method of Anvaya and Vyatireka. Consequently, the decision regarding the nature of reality is only from the Vedic sentence which is the authoritative means. [401]

¹This is: *sa samānah*.

अतः सर्वविकल्पानामविद्यामात्रहेतुतः ।
विषयत्वं समापेदेऽविकल्पोऽपि स्वतः परः ॥४०२॥

Therefore, in the case of all the notions entertained there has occurred the nature of the object of cognition only for one reason, viz. ignorance, even if the highest self is of itself without any such notions (of duality to be entertained). [402]

Verses 403-406 explain ubhau lokān anusamīcarati.

समान एव सँल्लोकौ प्राप्तप्राप्तव्यलक्षणौ ।
अनुक्रमेणाविद्यावान्सदा संचरतीश्वरः ॥४०३॥

Being, just the same, the Lord (viz. the inner self) ever moves unto the worlds having the nature of what is obtained and what is to be obtained, gradually (but at the same time) being associated with ignorance about (the nature of) itself. [403]

देहेन्द्रियाद्युपादानत्यागसंतानलक्षणः ।

प्रबन्धशतसंपातैः संचरत्येष न स्वतः ॥४०४॥

This one, characterized by its continuous taking up and abandoning the body and organs etc. moves falling in hundreds of worldly bonds and not on its own. [404]

Any statement about sentience as being associated with body etc. originates in ignorance about its nature. No other causes would make it undergo any modification.

We have ignored the edition of MRI which has the first line as one word in *dehendriyādi ... prabandhaśatasampātaiḥ*.

कार्यैकनीडमेवास्य चिदाभासैकहेतुतः ।

संसारित्वं यतो नातः स्वतः संसारितात्मनः ॥४०५॥

Since the nature of being transmigratory of this (inner self) has the support (lit. nest) only in the various effects, due to only one cause, viz. the appearance of sentience; therefore, there is really no transmigratory character of the inner self.

[405]

अकार्यकरणोऽप्यात्मा बुद्धिप्राणादिहेतुगः ।

अविद्यया चिदाभासः संसारीवावभासते ॥४०६॥

The inner self, though not related to the effects and the cause (or the organs (*karana*)), (thus) existing in the causes such as the intellect and *prāṇas* 'organs', the semblance appears like a transmigratory being through only ignorance. [406]

Verses 407-415 explain the sentence *dhyāyatīva*

असंभवः स्वतो यस्मात्तदबोधाच्च संभवः ।
 क्रियाकारकरूपस्य तस्माच्छ्रुत्याभिधीयते ॥४०७॥
 क्रियाकारकरूपस्य मिथ्यात्वं प्रत्यगात्मनि ।
 ध्यायतीत्यादिवाक्येन प्रत्यक्कौटस्थवित्तये ॥४०८॥

Since there cannot be the origin of what has the nature of activity and its instrument from themselves and also have their origin in ignorance about it (i.e. the inner self), therefore has the Śruti declared [407]

in the sentence *dhyāyati* 'it meditates ...' the unreal character of what has the nature of activity and its instrument while there exists (only) the inner self, so that the immutability of the inner self becomes known. [408]

ध्यायतीव स कौटस्थ्यात्तथा लेलायतीव च ।
 ध्यानादिकारिसाक्षित्वान्नात्मा ध्यानादिकार्यवान् ॥४०९॥

That one (the inner self), on account of its immutability, meditates, as it were, and, so also, performs activities, as it were. The inner self, being the witness of one who does meditation etc., is not the performer¹ of any activity such as meditation.² [409]

¹Or, possessed of any

²This stands for activity like speaking and smelling.

निःशेषबुद्धिवृत्तीनां ध्यानं स्यादुपलक्षणम् ।
 लेलायनं क्रियाणां च सर्वासामुपलक्षणम् ॥४१०॥

Meditation should be (taken as) indicative of all the modifications of the intellect; and performance of activities is indicative of all (other) activities. [410]

SP points out that this proceeds from the argument at BU

3.4.2. Cf. further BU 4.3.23.

ध्याता ध्यानं तथा ध्येयं त्रयं स्वात्मैकसाक्षिकम् ।
करणं कर्म कर्ता च नातो ध्यात्रादिसाक्षिणि ॥४११॥

The meditator, the act of meditation and the object of meditation—(this) triad has only the inner self as the witness; therefore, the means of action, the action and the agent of it do not exist in the witness of the meditator etc. [411]

SP: This points to the *tatasthya* 'indifference or aloofness of the inner self, as the witness of activity'. Read NKL (ms. p.601): *dhyānāder anātmadharmatvaṃ drśyatvena sādhyati dhyāteti*.

बोद्धुः कर्तुश्च संबन्धो ज्ञानेन क्रियया यथा ।
कूटस्थसाक्षिसंबन्धो बोद्धृकर्त्रोस्तथैव च ॥४१२॥

As there is connection of a knower and an agent (in any worldly dealings) with knowledge and activity, so also, there is a connection of the immutable witness with the (two, viz.) the knower and the agent. [412]

This relates to the connection which is in fact unreal, because the knower and the agent are of the nature of ignorance/superimposition. Read also NKL (ms. p.601) introductory: *dhyānāder drśyatvaṃ asiddhaṃ svaprakāśatvād atrāha boddhur iti*.

सर्वस्य प्रत्यगात्मत्वात्कूटस्थैकचिदात्मनः ।
अतोऽस्यानभिसंबन्धः सर्वप्रत्यक्त्वहेतुतः ॥४१३॥

Since all (this)¹ has the inner self as its (real) nature, therefore, there is no connection of the immutable and the single sentience with this (world of the knower and the agent), because of its being inside (the body). [413]

SP briefly points out the argument *sambandhasya dviṣṭhatvād ekatrāyogād iti bhāvaḥ*

¹This refers to every knower and the agent mentioned in the previous verse.

एकनीडत्वहेतुत्था साक्षिणः साक्ष्यसंगतिः ।
न तु मोहोत्थचिद्विम्बहेतुवृत्तव्यपेक्षया ॥४१४॥

The connection of the witness with the object to be witnessed has arisen from the cause, viz. belonging to (but) one substratum (lit. nest);¹ but, it is not through its dependence on the nature² of its cause, viz. the reflection of sentience which arises from delusion. [414]

NKL (ms. p.601) which introduces the second line thus: *ajñāna caitanyapratibimbasya hetubhūtaṃ yad bimbabhūtaṃ caitanyam svasvarūpeṇaiva sāksitvaṃ kiṃ na syād atrāha*.

¹Read NKL (ms. p.601): *ekasmin kūṭasthe caitanye 'vidyā-tatkāryasya cidābhāsasya ca sthitatvāt tadamśasākṣiṇaikāśraya-tvasaṃgater yuktaṃ sāksitvaṃ ity arthaḥ*.

²*vṛtta* here seems to be for *svabhāva*.

कूटस्थात्मैकहेतुत्थचिद्विम्बो मोहगस्तु यः ।
स्वोपादानानुरोधितत्वात्केनचिन्नास्य संगतिः ॥४१५॥

Because that which is reflection of sentience that originates in the one cause (viz. the immutable) and is the product of (or, belonging to) delusion of this one's (about the nature of the Ātman), and because of not following (the nature of its own material for creation, this one does not have connection with anyone. [415]

Verses 416-422 discuss the quality of a meditator, attributed to the pure inner self.

चिदाभासाश्रयाज्ञानात्कार्यसंगतिहेतुतः ।

स्वाभासान्तः परोऽप्यात्मा ध्यायतीवेति वीक्ष्यते ॥४१६॥

On account of the ignorance about the basis of the appearance of sentience and its connection with the effects (of the same), the inner self, which is inside (a body) as its appearance, though beyond (all that), is seen by the Śruti as 'It is meditating, as it were'.¹ [416]

¹This meaning is in keeping with the word *dhyāyatīva*.

प्रत्यङ्मोहैकमात्रोत्थं ध्यानलेलायनादिकम् ।
तन्मिथ्याप्रतिपत्त्यर्थमिवेति व्यपदिश्यते ॥४१७॥

By (the use of the word) *iva* is mentioned the meditation, the performing of activities etc. as born of only delusion about the inner self, so that the unreality of it becomes known. [417]

This brings out the significance of *iva*, to be followed by an illustration in the next verse.

अभ्रयानं यथाज्ञानाच्छशभृत्यध्यवस्यति ।
क्रियाकारकवद्बुद्धिं तथा तत्साक्षिणीक्षते ॥४१८॥

As (a person) attributes the movement of clouds to the moon through his ignorance,¹ so also, does (a transmigratory being) see in the witness (viz. the inner self, the existence of) the intellect which is possessed of the various instruments of activity. [418]

¹SP rightly points to the Samdhi of *yathā* and *ajñānāt*.

धर्मधर्म्यभिसंबन्धान्यथा मोहैकसंश्रयात् ।
अस्पृशन्नपि नीलं खमिति संभावयेत्तथा ॥४१९॥
आत्मप्रत्ययगम्येऽर्थे निष्क्रियेऽकारकेऽफले ।
क्रियाकारकवद्वस्तु संभावयति तज्जडः ॥४२०॥

As (a person) would think of the connections between properties and things which are possessed of them, through (his) dependence on delusion alone, (as for example in) 'The sky is blue,' even if he is not touching it, so also [419] does a dull person (*jada*) see (i.e. think of) a thing, related to activity and its instrument even if the thing is to be understood (merely) by the experience of the inner self which is without any activity, not an instrument (of it) and does not (yield) any result. [420]

Here is presented one more illustration for averting the notion that the moon also has her own movement.

तस्मात्संभावनामात्रः संसारः प्रत्यगात्मनि ।

उक्तेऽर्थे संशयश्चेत्स्यात्प्रत्यग्दृष्ट्या समीक्ष्यताम् ॥४२१॥

Therefore, transmigration in relation to the inner self is merely an imaginary (thought) (and) in case there is a doubt about the thing stated, let that be seen with the help of experience.¹

[421]

¹*pratyakdr̥ṣṭi* is equated by SP with *vidvadanubhava* 'experience of the knowers'.

आत्ममात्रावसायित्वान्नानात्मार्थस्पृगीक्ष्यते ।

आत्मधीरात्मसंबन्धो नातोऽनात्मन ईक्ष्यते ॥४२२॥

The awareness of the inner self is not related to (lit. does not touch) a non-Ātman object, since it is finally ending in mere inner self; therefore, the connection of the inner self with any non-Ātman is not experienced (lit. noticed). [422]

Read NKL (ms. p.601) introductory: *vidvadanubhavo 'py ātmani sukhy aham iti saṁsāraṁ gocarayed atrāha—ātmamātreṭi*.

In verses 423-435 Sureśvara takes the support of the explanation

presented by *Bhartrprapañca* of the sentence *sa samānaḥ* *san* and it is to be in conformity with the earlier BUB.

In verses 423-427 Sureśvara states that exposition given by *Bhartrprapañca* as acceptable.

ससमानोक्तिसंबन्धमन्यथान्ये प्रकर्तते ।
 धीमनश्चक्षुरादीनि भिन्नरूपाणि सर्वथा ॥४२३॥
 नानाज्योतीषि सिद्धानि संहतानि मिथस्तथा ।
 विलक्षणानामपि सतां सामान्यं संहतात्मनाम् ॥४२४॥

(But) others posit the connection of the statement *sa samānaḥ* ... (with other statement) in yet another way: the intellect, *manas*, eyes and others are wholly different in nature [423] and have been established as (related to) different lights as mutually connected together; therefore, there is a common nature of them, even though they are of different natures.¹

[424]

¹SP explains thus: *ekādaśendriyāṇy ādityādiḥjyotiranugrhitāni vilakṣaṇāni prasiddhāni tathāpi mithaḥsamhatyakārīṇiṣṭhānīty arthaḥ*. NKL (ms. p.601) adds: *saṃbhūyakāritve ko hetur iti ced ekadehasthitatvena sādrśyam ity āha*.

सालक्षण्येऽपि च सति बुद्धेरेव विलक्षणः ।
 भोक्तृत्वं नाम धर्मः स्याच्चक्षुषो दर्शनं यथा ॥४२५॥

Even though there is (thus) commonness of nature among them, there is yet the property viz. being the enjoyer which distinctly belongs to the intellect alone, as (one's capacity for) seeing belongs to the eye¹ (alone). [425]

SP on the purport of this verse: *uktaṃ hi— sālakṣaṇye 'pi saty eva buddher eva dharmo vilakṣaṇo 'sya bhoktrtvam iti*.

¹The single eye refers to two eyes of any/every individual—the suppressed notion in the simile is: yet every seer has a different experience of the object seen.

बुद्ध्यादिव्यतिरेकोऽयं नैवं सत्युपपद्यते ।
प्रतीच उपपन्नस्तु स समान इतीर्यते ॥४२६॥

This being so, the distinction among the intellect etc. does not appear reasonable; but that is reasonable in the case of the inner self and, therefore, it is said *sa samānah* ... [426]

This is the meaning of BUB: *tatra katham vyatiriktatopapadyate iti phaloktiḥ*.

समानः सन्नुभौ लोकौ स्वप्नबुद्धान्तसंज्ञितौ ।
जन्मेदं च परं चैव संसरत्येष न स्वतः ॥४२७॥

Being the same this one self moves unto both the worlds which are said to be that of dreaming and that of waking. So also, this birth and yet another; but (this one) does not transmigrate on its own. [427]

Verses 428-430 present the logical justification of Bhartṛprapañca's view.

बुद्ध्यादिव्यतिरिक्तोऽयं न चेदात्मा भवेत्तदा ।
भूतमात्राविशेषत्वादुभयोरपि लोकयोः ॥४२८॥
उभयत्रापि युगपद्भोगः स्यान्न तु दृश्यते ।
तद्भावभावतस्तस्मादन्यज्ज्योतिरितीक्ष्यताम् ॥४२९॥

If the Ātman were not distinct from the intellect etc., then because of its non-distinction from whatever are beings it would have had in both of the worlds, [428]

(yes) at both the places, a simultaneous enjoyment (of various experiences in life); but this is not so known (lit. seen). Thus, since (the experience of) enjoyment would result from experience of that, viz. the inner self, therefore, let it be accepted that the light (of the inner self) is other (than the intellect etc.) [429]

SP on *buddhyādivyatikṛta* is: *uktaṃ ca— sa eṣa yadi vyatikṛto na syād ubhayor api lokayor bhūtasamudāyāviśeṣād ubhayatrāpi bhoga utpadyeta, na tu bhavatīti*. Also, on *tadbhāva* ..., *vyatikṛtātmajyotiḥ bhāve bhogasya bhāvād anyathā cābhāvād vyatikṛtatvam ātmajyotir ity arthaḥ*. Also note its remark that *vyatikṛta* is stated as an alternative for *samāna*.

पर्यायेण समानः सल्लोकौ यस्माद्ब्रजत्ययम् ।

आत्मा बुद्ध्यादितस्तस्माद्व्यतिरिक्तोऽवसीयताम् ॥४३०॥

Since being common, this (inner self) alternatively moves to two worlds, therefore, let it be concluded that it is distinct from the intellect etc. [430]

Verses 431-434 state that the enjoyment in a body are not for deities in the body.

देवताभोगशङ्का च विद्यते नेह का चन ।

उत्क्रान्तिस्वप्नकालेषु ताः प्रयान्ति यथागतम् ॥४३१॥

Further, there is not any kind of possibility (or, suspicion) that there is enjoyment (by the intellect etc. through) the deities, (for,) those depart as they had come, at the times of moving out of the body and of the duration of dream state. [431]

Read NKL (ms. p.602) explains thus: *devatānām bhoktrtve svapnabhogye na syāt tadadhyātmāparicchedaṃ tyaktvādhi-daivikātmanā sthiter ity arthaḥ*.

ईश्वराणां न च न्याय्यो भोगः प्रत्यवरस्तथा ।

देवताभ्योऽन्यदेवातो ज्योतिरात्मेति गम्यताम् ॥४३२॥

And, in the case of the lords a suitable and/or lower enjoyment is not reasonable; therefore, let it be understood that the light,

viz. the inner self, is altogether different from deities. [432]

विभुत्वाद्देवतानां च भोगः स्यादैककालिकः ।
न चासावस्ति तेनान्यदात्मज्योतिः प्रतीयताम् ॥४३३॥

Also, because of the all-pervading nature of the deities, the enjoyment of them would be simultaneous, but that is not so; therefore, let it be understood that the light, viz. the inner self, is altogether (a) different (light). [433]

स्वार्थचिन्मात्रभोक्तुश्च प्रात्यक्ष्यात्तद्विरोधिनः ।
न भोक्तृत्वं विना मानादाशङ्का निष्प्रमाणिका ॥४३४॥

Since there is direct perceptibility (in the case) of only sentience, (which is existing) for its own purpose, there cannot be the character of an enjoyer (in the case) of that which is opposed to it (viz. sentience). (Consequently) any notion (*āśaṅkā*), which is without any means of knowing (it), would be devoid of authority. [434]

Verses 436-443 discuss the illustration of a boat as given by Bhartṛprapañca for explaining the meaning of the sentence dhyāyati

अभिव्यञ्जकधर्मा वा परिस्पन्दात्मकास्तथा ।
नात्मनोऽस्य स्वतः सन्ति तत्साक्षित्वात्तु ते मृषा ॥४३५॥

Also (*vā*), the properties that are revealers and are of the nature of movement are not there in the inner self, by its own nature; and (*tu*) they are false, because of their having that¹ as the witness. [435]

¹That is, the inner self.

Verses 436-443 discuss the illustration of a boat as given by Bhartṛprapañca.

बद्धिस्थश्चलतीवात्मा ध्यायतीव च कल्प्यते ।

नौगतस्य यथा वृक्षास्तद्वत्संसारविभ्रमः ॥४३६॥

It is imagined that the inner self which is abiding in¹ the intellect,² seems to move, as it were and seems to meditate; this is as to a man, who is going in a boat, that the trees appear (to be moving). Similar to this is the transmigratory existence as an erroneous notion (in respect of the inner self).

[436]

This means: reflected in.

This is the same as *hr̥d*.

तटस्थनरवन्नावो नौस्थो नैवेक्षते गतिम् ।

नौगत्येकप्रयुक्ततत्त्वान्नाव्येकाग्रेक्षणोऽपि सन् ॥४३७॥

A man seated in a boat does not notice (i.e. become aware of) the speed of the boat, just as a man standing on the bank (of the river) sees it; being one who has fixed his eyes on the boat on account of his being affected (*prayukta*) by the movement of the boat.¹

[437]

A man in a boat feels that it is he who is moving, thus has superimposed the movement of the boat on himself and, therefore, though he looks attentively around himself, he does not make out that it is the boat that is moving and not himself.

यथैवं धिषणैकत्वे ध्यानलेलायने धियः ।

साक्षी स्वात्मातिरेकेण न पश्येन्नौस्थवत्पृथक् ॥४३८॥

Since this happens while there is activity of the intellect and when a person has entertained the oneness (of the inner self) with the intellect, the witness (viz. the inner self) does not see outside itself in the way of the man going in a boat not seeing (things) outside himself.

[438]

तटस्थनरवद्यस्माद्व्यानकम्पादिधर्मिकाम् ।
धियं साक्षीक्षते तस्मात्प्रत्यग्ध्यानादिवर्जितः ॥४३९॥

Since the witness sees the intellect having the properties of meditation and activity (lit. trembling) etc. (connected with it) like a man on the bank (of a river), therefore, the inner self is without any (performance of) meditation etc. [439]

नौप्रयुक्तातिरेकेण न नौस्थस्य गतिस्थिती ।
यतोऽतस्ते न जानाति नावो नौस्थस्तटस्थवत् ॥४४०॥

Since the states of movement and steadiness (in the case) of a man going in a boat are not beside those (that are) caused by (the movement and steadiness of) the boat, therefore, he does not know them as belonging to the boat as a man on the bank (of the river) knows. [440]

नौसतत्त्वापरिज्ञानाद्विपरीतप्रकल्पना ।
नौः स्थिता तीरजा वृक्षा द्रुतं यान्तीति निश्चितिः ॥४४१॥

The decision is this: This is an instance of wrong notion (which results) from the non-knowing of the nature of the boat; this notion is (like this): the boat is steady and the trees which are really on the bank (of the river) move quickly. [441]

This has reference to verse 436.

चैतन्याभासपर्यन्तं साक्षिणः परमात्मनः ।
बुद्ध्याद्यव्यतिरेके हि न स्याद्विवृत्तिसाक्षिता ॥४४२॥

The highest Ātman cannot have the nature of being the witness of modification of the intellect till when there is the appearance of sentience in (external things) up to the intellect. In the absence of any distinction (of the Ātman) from the intellect etc., there is no possible being the witness of the modification(s)

of the intellect.

[442]

निःशेषधीविकाराणां यस्मात्साक्षित्वमात्मनः ।

वैलक्षण्यमतः सिद्धं विकारिभ्योऽस्य साक्षिणः ॥४४३॥

Since the Ātman has the nature of being the witness of all the modifications of the intellect, therefore is established complete distinction of this witness from what undergoes modification.

[443]

In verse 444 is a repetition of the imaginary nature of transmigration in the case of the Ātman.

साक्षितत्वापरिज्ञानात्तद्विरुद्धार्थकल्पनम् ।

साक्षिसाक्ष्यादिमिथ्याधीस्तत्त्वज्ञानान्निवर्तते ॥४४४॥

It is on account of not knowing well the true nature of the witness that there arise the notions about external objects which are in nature opposed to it and this false knowledge of the witness and the witnessed etc.¹ recedes (or ceases to be there) on knowing the truth about it, i.e. sentience.

[444]

¹This refers to such discrete objects as the enjoyer and the objects of enjoyment.

Verses 445-448 explain the sentence sa hi svapnobhūtvā

कृतः पुनरिदं ज्ञानं धीसमानाश्रयत्वतः ।

लोकसंचरणाद्यस्य तत्साक्षित्वान्न तु स्वतः ॥४४५॥

‘How again does this knowledge result if (sentience) has the same support as (that of) the intellect?’¹ It is because of its being the witness which appears to be resulting from its movement etc. in the worlds,² but not on account of its own nature?

[445]

The doubt is expressed and answered on the basis of the sentence *sa hi* ... in BU.

¹This is also *hr̥d* in the body of an individual.

²This refers to meditation, seeing, worshipping and speaking, singing and so on.

स हीतिहेतुनिर्देश उक्तसिद्धयर्थमिष्यते ।

स आत्मा यः स्वयंज्योतिरनुमानेन दर्शितः ॥४४६॥

The statement of the reason in the words *sa hi* is intended (lit. desired) for proving what is stated earlier, viz. the inner self, which is self-luminous (and) what was established (lit. shown) by inference. [446]

प्रत्यङ्ङविद्यया यां यामवस्थामभिमन्यते ।

तत्तन्नामाप्युपादत्ते स्वप्नो भूत्वेत्यतो वचः ॥४४७॥

The inner self assumes each one of the names and the states whichever it has an awareness of,¹ therefore, there is a statement *svapnobhūtvā* 'having become *svapna*'.² [447]

This explains the meaning of *svapna* in no customary way and the derivation of the word in the sense proposed.

¹Alternative translation is: of which it comes to have the feeling of 'this is mine,' (ego).

²*svapna* is used as the name for the inner self.

बुद्धिजागरणे यद्वज्जागर्मीत्यभिमन्यते ।

बुद्धिस्वापेऽपि तत्साक्ष्यात्स्वप्नो भूत्वेति मोहधीः ॥४४८॥

As the inner self comes to have the awareness, 'I am awake,' when there is the waking state of the intellect, therefore, because of its being the witness of that (viz. the intellect) even in the sleeping state, it comes to have the deluding knowledge (or awareness) 'Having become the dream' [448]

This explains the meaning of *svapna* in the light of an illustration.

verses 449-455 explain *lokam imam*

इमं लोकमिदं जन्म स्वप्नो भूत्वातिवर्तते ।
स्वाप्नान्भोगांस्ततो भुङ्क्ते जाग्रद्वावनयाञ्जितः ॥४४९॥

(The inner self) on becoming *svapna*, goes beyond this world (and) this (worldly) life, then it enjoys the objects of enjoyment which belong to the dream state, having been (already) tainted by the impressions of the waking state. [449]

धर्मादिकारणोद्धूतवासनाराशिसाक्षिता ।
आत्मनोऽकारकस्यैव भोग इत्यभिधीयते ॥४५०॥

Being the witness of the entire mass of the impressions which has arisen from causes such as merit etc. is called enjoyment by the inner self, it is not at all an agent [450]

This explains why the inner self, though it is an enjoyer, is described as the pure inner self, untainted by enjoyment etc.

जाग्रल्लोकं यतो हित्वा स्वप्नलोकं प्रपद्यते ।
तस्मादसङ्गोऽकर्ता च स्वयंज्योतिरितीक्ष्यताम् ॥४५१॥

Since (this inner self) comes to the world of dream state, after it has left (lit. abandoned) the world of the waking state, therefore it, viz. the self-luminous, is described as unconnected (with the objects) and non-agent (of any activity). So this should be understood. [451]

आत्माविद्यैव मृत्युः स्यान्नित्यस्यापि मृतेस्ततः ।
मृत्युर्वै तम इत्याह श्रुतिरप्यात्मनिहृवात् ॥४५२॥

Death¹ is merely ignorance about the Ātman and, therefore,

there is death even of that eternal one.² The Śruti also has (for the moment) ignored (the true nature of) the Ātman and said 'Indeed, death is darkness (*mṛtyur vai tamah*)'.³ [452]

In the word *mṛtyorūpāṇi* (BU 4.3.7), the meaning of *mṛtyu* is expressed. The cause for that expression is also given.

¹This is yet another meaning of death.

²This is the result of ignorance, since the Ātman does not really die.

³BU 1.3.28.

स्वतो मृतस्य मरणं नाविद्यातो यतोऽन्यतः ।
अविद्यामात्मनो मृत्युं तस्मादाहुर्विपरिचतः ॥४५३॥

Since the death of a person, who is dead, as the course of his life would have it (*svataḥ mṛtaḥ*), is not on account of ignorance but from (some) other cause, therefore, the wise ones have said, 'Ignorance is death of the Ātman'.¹ [453]

¹*Īsopaniṣad* 11: *avidyayā mṛtyuṃ tīrtvā vidyayāmṛtam aśnute*.

प्राणोत्क्रान्तिनिषेधोक्तिर्यत आत्मावबोधतः ।
सम्यग्ज्ञानस्य बाध्योऽर्थस्तस्मान्मृत्युरितीर्यते ॥४५४॥

Since there is a statement (in the Śruti) of rejection about the movement (after death) of Prāṇa, on account of the knowledge of its own nature (on the part of the Ātman),¹ therefore, it is said that death is the thing to be stultified by right knowledge. [454]

This is another reason why ignorance about the Ātman alone is considered as death. Cf. BU 4.4.6: *na tasya prāṇā utkrāṃanti*.

¹It is possible to understand the word *ātman* as reflexive pronoun or as having the sense of the Ātman.

रूप्यते यैरसौ मृत्युः कार्याणि करणानि च ।
तानि रूपाणि भण्यन्ते मृत्योस्तस्य परात्मनः ॥४५५॥

The effects and the means of bringing them about are those by which death is seen; they are called the forms of that death of the highest Ātman. [455]

This explains the meaning of word *rūpa*. Read SP: *paramā-
anas tadupādheḥ sābhāsasyājñānasyeti yāvat*.

verses 456-460 is stated an alternative view, viz. all the products non-Ātman are called *mṛtyu*.

विषमस्थं यतः सर्वं प्राणव्यापत्तिकारणम् ।
तुषाग्रमात्रमपि हि मृत्युः सर्वमिदं ततः ॥४५६॥

Since all (this world of external objects), which is in (some) danger (*viṣamastha*) is the cause of the death of *prāṇas*; therefore, all this, even if it is of the measure of the lip of chaff, is, indeed,¹ death. [456]

This is to say in the words of SP: *sarvam anātmajātam mṛtyuḥ*. *rvam idam* refers to this whole world; cf. the next verse.

¹Read SP: *kaṇṭhādiniṣṭhasyordhvam adhaś ca nirgantum
amarthasyālpīyaso 'py annapānāder mṛtyuhetutvam anubha-
siddham iti hisabdārthaḥ*.

मौढ्यं जाड्यमविद्या स्यान्नित्यबुद्धात्मवस्तुनः ।
अनात्मनि च तद्दृष्टं तेन मृत्युरिदं जगत् ॥४५७॥

On the part of the thing, viz. the Ātman, there would be foolishness, (or, delusion)¹ insentience and ignorance, whereas that is seen in what is non-Ātman and, therefore, this universe is (subject to) death. [457]

¹Read SP: *ajñānam hi maudhyāparyāyam mṛtyuḥ*.

न हि प्रमाणतो मृत्युः शक्यो दर्शयितुं ततः ।
रूपाणि मृत्योस्तेन स्युः कार्याणि करणानि च ॥४५८॥

Since it is not possible to show that there is death (of the Ātman), by some means of knowing, therefore, it is (possible to show) the effects,¹ and their causes (in the world of external objects) as the forms of death. [458]

¹Śaṅkara refers to the body and organs as effects and their causes.

अतिक्रामति तान्यात्मा जाग्रत्स्थानाश्रयाण्यतः ।
क्रियाफलाश्रयाण्येष तस्माच्छुद्धो ध्रुवश्च सः ॥४५९॥

Since¹ the Ātman goes beyond those places of resort in the waking state, on which the actions and their results depend, therefore, that (Ātman) is pure and immutable. [459]

¹This is how, the word *atah* has to be understood and not in the usual sense of 'therefore'.

अस्ति शुद्धो ध्रुवश्चात्मा स चैक इति यत्स्थितम् ।
अस्यैवार्थस्य दाढ्यार्थं पूर्वपक्ष उदीर्यते ॥४६०॥

What is thus established, viz. that there exists only one Ātman, pure and immutable; therefore, there is (now) stated the *prima facie* view for justifying (lit. making firm) that meaning. [460]

In verses 461-467 there is shown the fault in the Buddhist (i.e. the Sautrāntika school) view in accordance with the *prima facie* view (which is explained further).

ननु धीव्यतिरेकेण धीसाक्षी नाधिगम्यते ।
धिया समान इत्येवं यः प्रागात्मोपपादितः ॥४६१॥

'But,' (it is objected,) 'there is not known any witness of the intellect that is apart from the intellect (viz. the one, the Ātman), who is earlier presented as one equal to the intellect.'

[461]

This is an objection, based on the reference to verse 445 above. It relates to some Buddhist view—the view of the Sautrāntikas, called *bāhyārthavādin* (s).

तत्सद्भावे न नो मानं प्रत्यक्षानुमयोर्यतः ।
किञ्चिदप्यस्ति तत्सिद्धिरतः स्यान्निष्प्रमाणिका ॥४६२॥

(The answer:) 'Because there does not exist for us, beside direct perception and inference, any (other) means of (ascertaining) its existence; therefore, any postulation (or, affirmation) of its existence does not have (or, cannot be) an authoritative means (for the knowledge of its existence).'

[462]

The argument is based on some Buddhist acceptance of only direct perception and inference for knowing any object. This points to the wrong in the acceptance of the existence of the Ātman through any other means of knowing, (for, it simply does not exist or, become available).

पूर्वधीव्यतिरेकेण तत्कालीना परा यथा ।
न धीः प्रत्यक्षगम्यैवं नात्मा प्रत्यक्षगोचरः ॥४६३॥

'As there does not exist, as directly perceptible, any other (intellect), beside the already existing intellect, as belonging to that time; so there does not exist the Ātman as an object of direct perception.'

[463]

This is to explain (how and) why the Ātman cannot be directly perceived. Read SP: *yathaikasmin samtāne pūrvajñānātirekeṇa*

jñānāntaram tattulyakālaṁ na pratyakṣam tathātmāpi dhīvyatirikto na pratyakṣa ity arthaḥ. NKL (ms. p.604) repeats this.

न चानुमानतस्तस्य सद्भावोऽप्यवधार्यते ।
सति धर्मिणि धर्माणां चिन्तेयमुपपद्यते ॥४६४॥

‘Also, it is not possible to determine its¹ existence with the help of² inference, since such a thought (or, consideration) about the properties becomes (or, is) reasonable (only) if there exists an object which has properties.’³ [464]

¹That is: of the Ātman.

²Or, by means of inference.

³It is held by the Advaita Vedāntin that the Ātman is devoid of any properties. Therefore, it is not possible to infer the existence of the Ātman on the basis of (or, on seeing) some properties of the same in the same way as *dhūmād* (= *agnidharmād*) *agnibhāvaḥ*. This is clarified by SP thus: *yad drśyaṁ tat svātiriktadrśyaṁ yathā ghaṭo drśyā ceyaṁ dhūr ity anumānāt tatsiddhir* (i.e. *ātmasiddhir*) *iti (āśaikā)*.

व्यङ्ग्यव्यञ्जकयोर्यत्तु सादृश्यभ्रमकारणात् ।
तद्विवेकापरिज्ञानाद्युक्तं तच्चाभ्युपेयते ॥४६५॥

‘That is accepted as a properly distinct (property) from what is to be revealed and the revealer (only) on account of the non-grasping of the distinction between the two, which is caused by falsely (or, wrongly) conceived similarity between them.’ [465]

The argument is: One accepts the distinction between what is to be revealed (*bhāṣya*) and what reveals it (*bhāṣaka*), e.g. a pitcher and light, but this distinction is rooted in the error of not understanding the real nature of the *bhāṣya* (here, the Ātman) and the *bhāṣaka* (intellect).

व्यङ्ग्यव्यञ्जकयोर्भेदस्तत्संबन्धात्परा यतः ।
प्रमान्तरोपलब्धोऽतः काममस्तु तयोर्भिदा ॥४६६॥

'Since the distinction between what is revealed and what the revealer is known even before their conjunction¹ by another way of knowing,' therefore, there will be distinction between the two.' [466]

This is acceptance of the *prima facie* view only for argument's sake, or, for the time being.

¹Cf. *mithaḥ saṁśleṣāt* (SP), for *sambandhāt* (and *yogāt* in the next verse).

सादृश्यतस्त्वभिन्नोऽयमिति भ्रान्तिरियं मता ।
तद्वेदस्योपलब्धत्वात्तद्योगात्प्राक्प्रमाणतः ॥४६७॥

And this one, viz. this (Ātman) is non-distinct (from the intellect) on account of the similarity (of their properties) is to be considered as false perception (or error) because, even before (the operation of) the means of knowing, this distinction between the two is known (lit. obtained) and through their conjunction.¹ [467]

¹Cf. note 1 under verse 466.

Verses 468-472 point to the absence of any means of knowing the distinction between the Ātman and the intellect.

धीरेव चित्स्वरूपेयं प्रथते ग्राहकात्मना ।
तथा विषयरूपेण सैवैका प्रथते द्विधा ॥४६८॥

This intellect itself, which has the nature of sentience, appears (or, acts as) one having the nature of the perceiver and that one itself, though one, appears as twofold by assuming the nature of the object (perceived). [468]

This explains, according to the *prima facie* view, the opposition to accepting oneness of the Ātman and the intellect owing to the opposition to direct perception.

नातो धीव्यतिरेकेण प्रत्यगात्मोपलभ्यते ।
प्रत्यक्षतोऽनुमानाद्वा यो धीसाक्षीति भण्यते ॥४६९॥

Therefore, individual self is not known (or, does not obtain) in addition to the intellect, through direct perception or inference, the one which is described as the witness of the intellect. [469]

This verse states the result of the one intellect appearing as twofold (as stated in the preceding verse).

यश्च पूर्वमुपन्यस्तो दृष्टान्तो भेदसिद्धये ।
व्यङ्ग्यव्यञ्जकवद्भेदः साक्षिसाक्ष्यार्थयोरिति ॥४७०॥
त्वदभ्युपगमादेव तदभ्युपगतं मया ।
परमार्थेन तत्रापि नैव भेदोऽस्ति कश्चन ॥४७१॥

And, that example (*dr̥ṣṭānta*) which was adduced before for establishing the distinction between the witness and the object to be witnessed, viz. as having distinction between what is revealed and the revealer, [470]

that¹ was accepted by me, for the time being, only because of your acceptance (of it); but, there does not exist there also any distinction whatsoever in reality. [471]

These verses give reason for the acceptance of the Siddhāntin's view only for argument's sake, as in verse 466 above.

¹The word *tat* refers to (*dr̥ṣṭānta*) 'example'.

अवभासात्मकः कुम्भः क्षणमात्रस्थितिर्यतः ।
अन्योऽन्यश्च प्रबन्धेन यतस्तत्रापि जायते ॥४७२॥

Since a pitcher, which is really of the nature of an appearance,

exists only for a moment, therefore, owing to the continuity (*prabandha*), there comes into being another, (as stated) there.¹

[472]

It is implied that what is sought to be proved is only a weak statement; cf. SP: *ataḥ sādhyavikalateti śeṣaḥ*.

¹This refers to (*dr̥ṣṭānta*).

Verses 473-474 introduce the discussion regarding the faults in the *Vijñānavāda* doctrine. In verses 4743-477 is stated the view of *Vijñānavādin* Buddhist and later in verses 478ff. the view of *Śūnyavādhin* Buddhist.

विज्ञानमात्रमथवा वस्तु स्यात्पारमार्थिकम् ।
क्षणभङ्गि घटाभासं क्लृप्तानेकविशेषणम् ॥४७३॥

Or rather, let (that) thing (viz. the *Ātman*) be the reality called *vijñāna*; it perishes in a moment and is like their appearance of a pitcher with its many attributes imagined. [473]

SP clarifies this thus: *vyavahārārtham viśinaṣṭi ghaṭeti; katham tarhi paṭādivyavahāras tatrāha kl̥pteti*.

एवं च सति दृष्टान्तो भवतो नोपपद्यते ।
सर्वस्य ज्ञानमात्रत्वात्तदन्यासंभवत्त्वतः ॥४७४॥

And, this being so, the illustration, which you have given, does not stand to reason;¹ since all being merely, (*vi*)*jñāna*,² there is no possibility of existence of any other than that. [474]

¹SP clarifies: *āśrayahīnatvād iti bhāvaḥ*.

²For metre's sake, Sureśvara uses only *jñāna* for *vijñāna*, see the next verse also.

तस्यैव ज्ञानमात्रस्य ग्राह्यग्राहकलक्षणम् ।
मलं प्रकल्प्य तत्स्वास्थ्यं शुद्धिं व्याचक्षतेऽपरे ॥४७५॥

(Yet) some others¹ first imagine impurity of the same which is merely (vi)jñāna, viz. having the characteristics of what is to be grasped and what grasps, and then later explains its purity, viz. being in its own (real) state. [475]

¹ A section among vijñānavādins themselves.

अभिन्नोऽपि हि बुद्ध्यात्मा विपर्यसितबुद्धिभिः ।
ग्राह्यग्राहकसंवित्तिभेदवानिव लक्ष्यते ॥४७६॥

Indeed, the Ātman, (which is not distinct) from the intellect, is accepted (lit. seen, *lakṣyate*) by those, whose intelligence has gone wrong, as having the distinction of the cognized, cognizer and cognition. [476]

SP seems to hold this argument as the Vārtika of Dharmakīrti: *tat kalpitatve kīrtivākyam udāharati*.

तस्यापि शुद्धरूपस्य शान्तिमन्ये प्रचक्षते ।
मलवत्संवृतं रूपं यस्मात्तस्यापि कल्पितम् ॥४७७॥

And (yet) others¹ postulate the annihilation (*śānti*) of even that, which has only pure nature, since, in their view, even concealed nature possessing impurity, of that (pure vijñāna) is imagined. [477]

SP states: *asyārthaḥ— arthābhāve katham jñānam jñāyate 'rtho 'neneti vyutpatteḥ—*

*pararūpaṃ svarūpeṇa yathā samvriyate dhiyā /
ekārthapratibhāsinyā bhāvān āśritya bhedinah //
tayā samvrtanānātvāḥ samvṛtya bhedinah svayam /
abhedina ivābhānti // (Pramāṇavārtika 1.69-70)*

yathāha—

*anādivāsanodbhūtavikalparinirmitaḥ /
śabdārthas trividho jñeyo bhāvābhāvobhayāśrayaḥ //*

(*Pramāṇavārtika* 1.206cd-207ab)

¹Namely, the *sūnyavādin* Buddhists.

Now is controverted the view that the *Āgama* does not establish such existence of the *Ātman*.

आत्माद्यर्थे च संवादाभावाद्वाक्यस्य नेष्यते ।
 प्रत्यक्षवत्प्रमाणत्वं नापि प्रत्यक्षतो गतिः ॥४७८॥
 अनुमानविरोधाच्च न नित्यात्मादिसंभवः ।
 प्रमान्तरविरोधेन न प्रमेहास्ति का चन ॥४७९॥

And, owing to the absence of its correspondence to the thing (called the) *Ātman* etc.,¹ the sentence, is not accepted (lit. desired) as authoritative like direct perception; and further, there is no way (of knowing the real thing) other than direct perception; [478]

and also there cannot be the existence of the (so-called) eternal *Ātman* etc.² possible on account of the opposition of inference; and, in this respect, there is not any right knowledge whatsoever on account of the opposition of other³ ways of knowing. [479]

SP supports the argument thus: *yathāha*—

smṛtiḥ pūrvānubhūte 'rthe darśanam vārtamānike /
tayor atyantabhede ca kasyādhedaḥ pratīyatām //
śabdau bhinnau svarūpeṇa vācyo 'rtho 'py atibhedavān /
sa ity eṣa parokṣārthe pratyakṣe cāyam ity api /
tasmān mithyā vikalpo 'yam bhinneṣv ekārthatāgrahaḥ //
 (source not traced)

¹Read NKL (ms. p.605): *ādīpadān nityatvādigrahaḥ*.

²Cf. SP: *ādīpadena dharmādyuktiḥ*.

³Cf. this refers to *pratyabhijñā* 'remembrance'.

प्रत्यक्षस्यार्थसंवादादनुमित्यविरोधतः ।
 सौगतं दर्शनं पथ्यं दोषवत्त्वन्यदर्शनम् ॥४८०॥

The Buddhist¹ view is helpful² since it is in agreement with

(or, corresponds to) the object which is directly perceptible and since it is not opposed to inference; whereas (*tu*) the other view is faulty. [480]

Read NKL (ms. p.605) introductory: *kṣaṇavādo 'pi mānāhīno mānaviruddhaś cet tatrāha pratyakṣasyeti. pratyakṣam vartmānam bodhayad avartamānatāvyāvṛttam bodhayatīti tasya kṣaṇikārthenasamvādā (sic) vakṣyamānakṣaṇikatvānumānena ca samvādāt kṣaṇavāda eva sādhuḥ ity arthaḥ.*

SP adds the following: *pratyakṣasyeti. asyārthaḥ— asti pratyakṣasya kṣaṇikādāv arthe sarvajñoktisamvādah. yathāha— sarvajñavacanārtheṣu kṣaṇikanairātmyādiṣu yat saṁśayaviparyāsa-rahitatayopadarśitārthaprāpakam jñānam tat sarvajñavacanārtthā-visamvādīty ucyate iti (not traced).*

tad dhi vartamānam grhṇad avartamānavyāvṛttam eva grhṇāti. uktam hi— tasya viśayaḥ svalakṣaṇam iti (Nyāyabindu 1.12)

¹This stands for the view of different Buddhist sects mentioned earlier.

²Namely, free from blemishes.

कल्पनेतरतः सर्वं सम्यङ्मिथ्येति मानतः ।

सर्वशून्यस्य मोक्षत्वादनावृत्तिश्च सेत्स्यति ॥४८१॥

On the basis of the means of knowing, all that is considered in the other view as correct/true (*samyak*) and/or false, is merely imagination and owing to the acceptance that the nature of liberation (consists in) what is devoid of all (so-called existing things), there would result (lit. be secured) non-return (to transmigratory existence). [481]

SP states: *na hi pratyakṣam anumānam vā tatra mānam grāhyaprāpyabhedenā kṣaṇikāder eva tadviśayatvopagamāt. yathāha— caturvidhasya pratyakṣasya svabhāvayogitayā svalakṣaṇākhyas caturarthah satyasvabhāvo grāhyo viśayas tadanyagrahane prayojanābhāvāt prāpyam tu satyeṣu nairātmyād iti (possibly this latter is a statement from the Bhāṣya of Bhartṛprapañca); and*

so anumānasya tu yathoktanairātmyādisāmānyalakṣaṇam eva
śayaḥ prāpyaṁ tad eveti ca (not traced).

ere there is a reference to verse 468 above and there is an
objection (codana) raised by Siddhāntin.

ग्राह्यग्राहकयोर्भेदो ननु भेदानुभूतितः ।
भेदस्यैवं च मिथ्यात्वं प्रत्यक्षेण विरुध्यते ॥४८२॥
ग्राह्यादिभेदवद्रूपं प्रत्यक्षं लिङ्गसंमतम् ।
एकस्योभयरूपत्वं पण्डितैः सुनिराकृतम् ॥४८३॥

Indeed, the distinction between what is grasped and what grasps
(becomes known) on the basis of the experience of the
distinction; thus there is falsity in the distinction and which
is opposed to direct perception. [482]

(Thus) a form (of knowledge) having the distinction of what
is grasped etc.¹ is directly perceptible and confirmed by its
characteristic(s) (and) the twofold nature of just one (form)
has been ever disproved/refuted (*sunirākṛta*) by the learned.²

[483]

SP in all probability quotes the view of Bhartṛprapañca thus:
thāhuh— yadi vijñānād anyo nāsti katham tarhi jānātīty ucyate
nāntīti jñānasya kartur abhidānaṁ śabdenopalabhyate. tatraiva-
bdo 'rthavān kalpayitavya iti.

¹The word 'etc.' refers to what grasps and the means of
grasping.

²This is on the authority of SP. This refers to earlier authorities
with Śabara at their head.

verses 484-485 refer to fivefold knowledge arising from direct
perception which gives (i.e. causes) the error, viz. awareness
distinct objects—*prima facie* view.

ज्ञानाभेदात् तत्सिद्धिस्तदध्यासात्तथा परम् ।
प्रथते भेदवज्ज्ञानं न क्वचिद्वस्तुसंश्रयात् ॥४८४॥

But (*tu*) references to oneness of *avabhāśya* and *avabhāśaka* gets established on account of non-differentiation in the knowing one and the other (gets established) by a superimposition of it on that.¹ Appearing any knowing one with differentiation in is established nowhere on account of its relation (*saṁśraya*) to another thing. [484]

The earlier stated objection to accepting *jñāna* as Ātman is answered by *prima facie* view.

ग्राह्यग्राहकमित्येवं नैव तत्प्रथते यतः ।
नीलपीतादिविज्ञानं नीलमित्येव तद्यतः ॥४८५॥

Since what is grasped and what grasps do not become established (*prathate*) for the reason that¹ *vijñāna* 'particular knowledge' of blue and yellow etc.² is that it is exactly the blue etc. [485]

¹SP explains the meaning of second *yataḥ* in the verse is *ataḥ*.

²The word 'etc.' refers to various objects of seeing.

This verse states that savikalpaka knowledge is but false.

अतस्मिंस्तद्ग्रहात्सर्वं मिथ्या स्यात्सविकल्पकम् ।
असंपृक्तस्य सम्यक्त्वं स्वरूपेणावभासते ॥४८६॥

Hence, all that is false which has various notions associated with it, since there is acceptance of that (*viz. vijñāna*) in what it is not (and) the truth of what is not associated with it appears only on account of its own form. [486]

SP justifies/supports *svāsamprkṛtasya* thus:

*vijñānaṁ jaḍarūpebhyo vyāvṛttam upajāyate /
iyam evātmasaṁvittir āśya yā jaḍarūpatā //*

(*Tattvasaṃgraha* 2000; *Tarkabhāṣā* 10.29).

The words *atasmims tadgraha* remind one of Śaṅkara's accepted definition of *adhyāsa* in *adhyāsabhāṣya* of BSB: *adhyāso nāma atasmims tadbuddhir*

Verses 487-490 refer first to the error in knowledge, according to the *Vijñānavādin* and then state its refutation (in 489-490).

नन विज्ञानमात्रेऽस्मिन्सम्यङ्मिथ्यात्वधीगतिः ।

निर्विकल्पे कथं ते स्याद्वद भेदोऽत्र किंकृतः ॥४८७॥

ज्ञानरूपं यथा शुद्धं क्षणं चैवावभासते ।

विकल्पकं तथैव स्याद्विभागस्तेन दुष्करः ॥४८८॥

इदं मिथ्येति चैतस्मान्मिथ्यात्वस्य कथं ग्रहः ।

विकल्पश्चेन्न मिथ्यात्वान्न चान्या गतिरस्ति वः ॥४८९॥

Indeed, how could there be in respect of intermediate perception, the understanding (*dhīgati*) about what is true and/or what is false, while there exists merely this *vijñāna*? Tell me: By what is caused this distinction?¹ [487]

Since (*yathā*) the pure form of *vijñāna* appears only for one moment just as (*tathaiva*) what entertains the notion (of another) also exists for a moment; therefore (the desired) division is very difficult to make! [488]

And, further, how could there be the grasping of the falsehood (of what is grasped) in the form, 'This one is false on account of this one'? And if there is no entertaining of (any) notion because of its false character, you do not have any other way.² [489]

This is the argument (*codana*) raised by Siddhāntin.

¹The implication in the argument is: If that *vijñāna* of a subject momentary, there could not be *vijñāna* of the object in another moment. This is explained in the next verse.

²Namely, other than accepting the distinction between what grasped and what grasps

मिथ्यामिथ्याविकल्पो हि स्थायित्वे वस्तुनो भवेत् ।
क्षणवादे विनष्टानां कस्य किं केन गृह्यते ॥४९०॥

Indeed (*hi*), entertaining different notions, viz. 'this is false' and/or 'this is true', can be (possible) if there is a thing which is permanent; and, (in the opinion) of those who are lost in (holding) the theory of momentariness, in falsehood, how could there be grasping of something, by someone else and by what (means)? [490]

In verses 491-494, the Buddhist answers away the objection of the Siddhāntin.

मैवं बाधात्तु मिथ्यात्वसिद्धिः स्यान्मृगतोयवत् ।
बाह्यस्याप्यग्रहो बाधान्न तु स्थिरतया मतः ॥४९१॥

Do not say so, because on account of the stultification of what is perceived (by the perceiver) falsehood would get established in the same way as (the falsehood of) mirage. The stultification even of the external object(s) is not accepted on account of its (similar) stultification and that (viz. any external object) is not held (by the Buddhists) as permanent (lit. steady). [491]

ननु द्रवस्तस्य मिथ्यात्वसिद्धिः कथमिहेष्यते ।
नैवं दृष्टत्त्वतः सिद्धेर्दृष्टे नानुपपन्नता ॥४९२॥

(Once again the Siddhāntin would ask:) 'Indeed, how do you accept as established the falsehood of what has perished (just after one moment), since on account of its being established as what is perceived, what is (actually) seen cannot be unreasonable?'¹ [492]

SP states the usual adage: *na hi dr̥ṣṭe 'nupapannam nāma*.

¹The Vedāntins hold *dr̥śyatva* as the reason for proving

mithyāṭva.

बाह्यवादेऽपि मिथ्यात्वं ज्ञानबाधेन जायते ।

स्थिरस्यैव हि मिथ्यात्वं न चेदं राजशासनम् ॥४९३॥

In the accepted view of (the existence of) external objects (by the *bāhyārthavādins*) also, there results falsehood through the stultification of *jñāna* and, in the case of (what is accepted by you as) permanent there is no falsehood; and, further this is not a command of a king.¹ [493]

¹The view of the Siddhāntin, who is here an opponent, is not like a command of a king, which ought to be accepted.

इत्यादिकल्पनाः प्रत्यगैकात्म्याज्ञानहेतुजाः ।

विभीषिका इमाः सर्वा वेदवर्तमानुगामिनाम् ॥४९४॥

This and such other notions are produced from ignorance about the nature of the inner self as being only one; all these are (just) scarecrows (put before) those who follow the instruction (lit. path) of the Veda. [494]

This is the Buddhist's answering away the Siddhāntin, the believer in the Veda.

This view is supported by SP with quotations in some texts. P observes: *adhyakṣam tāvad vartamānagrāhiḥ pūrvottara-avacchedakam. yathāha—*

vastutām hi paricchindad avacchindad avastutām /

tadbāhyāsambhavam śaṁsad vastujñānam pravartate //

(not traced)

SP further adds: *anumānam api tanniścāyakam. uktam hi—*

yat sat tat kṣaṇikam sarvam iti vyāptiḥ pratīyate /

sattvam akṣaṇike bādhat kṣaṇikam niyatam yataḥ //

further clarifies that there is no difference whatever between them (*na vastuto bhedaḥ*) and also none between *kriyā* and *karana* us: *yathāha—*

*kṣaṇikāḥ sarvasaṃskārā asthirāṇaṃ kutaḥ kriyāḥ /
bhūtir yeṣāṃ kriyā saiva kārakaṃ saiva cocyate //*
(Tantravārtika 170.10 on 1.3.10).

It adds: *na ca śabdārthasambandhaḥ saṃketād anyo 'sti. yathāha—
śabdāḥ saṃketitaṃ prāhur vyavahārāya sa smṛtaḥ* (Pramāṇa-
vārtika 1.92).

Also, *na cākṛtiḥ śabdārthaḥ .. apohas tu tadarthaḥ. uktam hi—
dhiyaṃ vastupṛthagbhāvamātrabījaṃ anarthikāṃ /
janayaty atha tatkāriparihārāṅgabhāvatā //*
*vastubhedāśrayāc chārthe na viśaṃvādikā matā /
tato 'nyāpohaviṣayā tatkartāśritabhāvataḥ //*
(Pramāṇavārtika 1.113-14).

Verses 495 begins to explain *na svātmānavabhāsatvād ghaṭādeḥ*
in BUB.

विभीषिकानिषेधार्थमत्र प्रतिविधीयते ।
बाह्यार्थवादिदोषोक्तिस्तत्र तावदिहोच्यते ॥४९५॥

For rejecting (i.e. for ignoring) the scarecrow(s) here is now
a reply given in the statement of the faults in the arguments
of those who hold the external objects (as true); and, in that
respect, the following is stated: [495]

In verses 496-800, there is refutation of the *bāhyārthavāda*; i.e.
na svātmānavabhāsyam ghaṭādi.

स्वात्मावभास्यः कुम्भादिर्दीपादिश्चापि नान्यतः ।
इत्यादेर्न्यायबाह्यत्वं यथा तदभिधीयते ॥४९६॥

(Now) is explained (lit. will be said) as to how¹ it is illogical
(lit. outside logic (to hold)) that a pitcher etc.² is illuminated
(or, made known) by itself and also that a lamp etc.³ (is)
not (illuminated) by another. [496]

¹See *ityādeḥ* where *-ādi* refers to the tentatively accepted

duality of *avabhāśya* and *avabhāśaka*.

²This refers to the light which is associated with a pitcher (*sāloka*, *ghaṭa*).

³This refers (either) to another lamp, or (this might be better) to the intellect (*buddhi*).

स्वात्मावभास्यो बाह्योऽर्थ इत्येतदसमञ्जसम् ।

नानन्यव्यञ्जकत्वं स्याद्यस्मात्कुम्भादिवस्तुनः ॥४९७॥

It is unreasonable (lit. foolish, or not wise) (to hold that) an external object is illuminated by itself, since, in the case of thing(s), viz. a pitcher etc., there cannot be the nature of what is not illuminated by another (viz. light). [497]

This explains *na svātmāvabhāśakatvaṃ ghaṭādeḥ* (BUB p.541). It is clarified in the next verse.

तमस्यवस्थितः कुम्भः स्वात्मना नावभासते ।

तदन्यदीपयोगे तु नियमेनावभासते ॥४९८॥

A pitcher, which is (remaining) in darkness, does not illuminate itself (lit. does not become apparent to one of its own); but it becomes apparent invariably, when (it is) in conjunction with (some) light (which is) other than itself. [498]

The second line emphasises the fact that the form of a pitcher cannot become apparent of its own.

संश्लिष्टयोरपि तयोरन्यत्वमिति निश्चयः ।

संयोगे च वियोगे च विशेषस्य समीक्षणात् ॥४९९॥

And, even while the two¹ are in conjunction, it is certain that they are distinct (from each other), because the distinction (between them)² is well observed (whether there is) conjunction and/or disjunction (of them).³ [499]

- ¹These are the pitcher and the light.
²Namely, that they are two different particulars.
³The disjunction is noticed particularly when light is in conjunction with a piece of cloth and as disjuncted from the pitcher, as clarified in the next verse.

अन्यत्वमेव विज्ञेयमालोकघटयोस्ततः ।
 रज्जुकुम्भादिवन्नैक्यं विशेषस्य समीक्षणात् ॥५००॥

(Then,) it should be understood (or, known) that light and a pitcher are certainly distinct (from each other), owing to the distinctness seen (between them) and (that there is) not oneness (of them) in the same as (there does not exist oneness) between a rope and a pitcher.¹ [500]

This is the final statement regarding *vyāpti* which is understood in the argument.

¹This implies the distinction between the intellect and the Atman which is its illuminator. Cf. *naikyam buddhitadava-
 bhāsakayoḥ* and also, *yadbhāsyam tatsvātiriktabhāsyam yathā ghaṭo
 bhāsyā ceyam dhīḥ* (SP).

In verses 501-505 is stated a *prima facie* view: *dīpasya svā-
 bhāsyatvam*.

ननु दीपः स्वमात्मानं स्वात्मनैवावभासयन् ।
 दृष्टो दीपप्रकाशार्थं न हि दीपान्तराहतिः ॥५०१॥

(An objection by the *prima facie* view:) 'Indeed, a lamp is seen as illuminating itself by itself; and indeed bringing another lamp is not noticed for illuminating a lamp'. [501]

This stresses over the self-illuminating nature of a lamp. Read, or clearly getting at the purpose of this verse, NKL (ms. p.608):
*vam api dhīḥ svātiriktāvabhāsyā avabhāsyatvād ghaṭavad ity
 numātum śakyam dīpe vyabhicārād iti codayati nanv iti.*

नावभास्यत्वतुल्यत्वाद्दीपस्यापि घटादिभिः ।

घटवन्नात्मनात्मानं प्रकाशयति दीपकः ॥५०२॥

(The answer to the objection:) '(This is) not so because of the similarity of a lamp also with a pitcher and others (viz. external objects) on account of its requiring illumination (by another)—(indeed) a lamp does not illuminate itself by itself, (just) as a pitcher (does not, i.e. cannot, do it)'. [502]

The implication is: A lamp and a pitcher are both things which are illuminated by another; yet, unlike a pitcher, a lamp, despite its illuminating other things, is illuminated by a sentient being which is associated with the intellect. This is clarified in the next verse.

NKL (ms. p.608) on this verse is somewhat puzzling—read: *ghaṭādibhir ālokasya jadatvam aviśiṣṭam ato ghaṭavad ālokaḥ svātmānam prakāśayatīty arthaḥ*.

घटप्रदीपयोस्तावद्व्यङ्ग्यव्यञ्जकसंगतिः ।

तदन्यात्मैकनिर्ग्राह्या प्रत्यक्षेणानुभूयते ॥५०३॥

As for the case of (both) a pitcher and a lamp, there is an association of what is to be revealed and what is the revealer (and) that is grasped as illuminated by the Ātman which is other than them by direct perception. [503]

Read SP (for clarification of the argument) introductory: *yo bhāsyah sa svetarabhāsyō yathā ghaṭo bhāsyas cāyam ity ukte drṣṭānte vipratipattim āśaikyoktam smārayati*.

व्यतिरिक्तात्मविज्ञानव्यङ्ग्यत्वं घटवन्न सः ।

दीपो व्यभिचरत्यत्र तच्चाप्यनुभवाश्रयात् ॥५०४॥

एवं च सति दीपादेर्भिन्नजातीयचैतन-

व्यङ्ग्यत्वं घटवत्तावदवश्यम्भावि गम्यताम् ॥५०५॥

That lamp does not vary in its nature of being illuminated by the knowing of the Ātman (i.e. the intellect of an individual¹ which is) distinct/apart from itself and, (is heretofore), like a pitcher. Further, this also (is understood) here² by resorting to (one's own) experience. [504]

This being so, let it be understood that there is (i.e. occurs) invariably in a lamp etc. the nature of being illuminated by some sentience which is, in nature, different from itself, in the same way as in a pitcher.³ [505]

The argument is: as a pitcher cannot be noticed (i.e. illuminated), if it is without any light which illuminates it, so also a lamp, though illuminator of other objects, is not seen when there is absence of the intellect.

¹The meaning of *ātmajñāna* is an individual's intellect.

²That is, in everyday life.

³The word *ghaṭavat* is to be understood as *ghaṭe iva* by Pāṇini's rule 5.1.116: *tatra tasyeva*.

Verse 506 expresses a doubt that there is dissimilarity of a lamp and a pitcher.

ननु कुम्भादिवैधर्म्यं प्रदीपस्य समीक्ष्यते ।
नात्माभिव्यक्तये दीपो ह्यन्यमापेक्षते स्वतः ॥५०६॥

(An objection:) 'Indeed, the distinction of a lamp from a pitcher etc. is noticed. Indeed, a lamp does, not on itself, depend on (or, expect) another for its being revealed'. [506]

The argument is: A pitcher invariably expects light to illuminate it, whereas a lamp, which is an illuminator of other objects, does not so need it.

Further, read NKL (ms. p.608): *dīpasya svābhāsanāt prāg asaṭo viśeṣasyottarakālasattve tasya svābhāśakatvaṃ yukataṃ na ca dīpe svasmād anyasmād vābhāṣyatvopayogī viśeṣo 'sty ato dīpo svātmānam bhāṣayatīti vaco riktam ity arthaḥ*.

Verse 507 states that a lamp cannot be an illuminator of itself, owing to there being no particular distinct quality.

व्यनक्ति नात्मनात्मानं प्रदीपो घटवत्सदा ।
स्वतो वा परतो वास्य विशेषाभावहेतुतः ।
विशेषेऽसत्यसाध्वेतद्वतोदाहृतं वचः ॥५०७॥

(Just) like a pitcher, a lamp does not ever illuminate itself, since there is (noticeable) an absence of any particular difference (of it) from itself or from other, owing to the absence of any particular cause (of difference). (And) when there is not (any such) difference, this statement of yours¹ is not reasonable (lit. well-made). [50]

This verse explains the thought in BUB: *na svataḥ parato vā viśeṣābhāvāt*. NKL (ms. p.608) remarks only this: *tasmān na svābhāsyateti śeṣaḥ*.

¹That is, the one made in the preceding verse.

Verses 508-511 affirm that, as a rule, a lamp can illuminate only other substances.

दीपस्य घटवद्यस्माद्विन्नविज्ञानगम्यता ।
घटाद्यर्थाविशिष्टैव यत्त्वेतदभिधीयते ॥५०८॥
दीपोऽयमात्मनात्मानं व्यनक्तीति न तच्छुभम् ।
प्रागूर्ध्वं तदभिव्यक्तेर्विशेषस्यासमीक्षणात् ॥५०९॥

Since a lamp has, like a pitcher, the nature of being known by another, (who is) knowing (viz. the intellect),¹ (and what is) non-different from that of objects such as a pitcher. And now, as to what you have said, [50]

(‘viz.) this lamp illuminates itself, on its own,’ is not good (i.e. reasonable), because of the non-observation of its difference (from others) which is not seen, before and/or after. [50]

प्रदीपासंनिधौ यद्वत्कुम्भस्य प्रसमीक्ष्यते ।
 संनिधौ च विशेषो न प्रदीपे तद्वदीक्ष्यते ॥५१०॥
 आत्मत्वान्न हि दीपस्य कम्भादेरिव संनिधिः ।
 असंनिधिर्वा न्याय्योऽयं भेदेऽसौ द्रव्ययोर्यतः ॥५११॥

As the particularity (in form etc.) of a pitcher etc. is noticed when a lamp is not in the nearness (of it), but it (viz. any particularity) is not seen in the case of a lamp, even while that (lamp) is in the nearness (of the pitcher etc.; [510] because, the proximity of, or distance from a pitcher etc. (in the case) of a lamp is not in accordance with reason, owing to its own nature (viz. of being an illuminator itself), since this (particularity) is noticeable when there are two (different) *dravyas* (substances). [511]

This is based on the idea of a pitcher, which is to be revealed, and a lamp, which reveals it. In the case of the lamp, however, the case is different in that the lamp itself is the revealer of objects, The nature of being illuminated (i.e. seen) in the case of a lamp is owing to the grasping of it by an individual's intellect. SP points out verse 510 as a *vaidharmya dr̥ṣṭānta*.

एकाग्निव्यक्तेर्न यथा दाह्यदग्धत्वसंगतिः ।
 द्वयोरपि समानत्वाद्व्यङ्ग्यव्यञ्जकता तथा ॥५१२॥

As, there is not (i.e. cannot be) the presence together of what is to be burnt and what burns, while (there exists only) one, (substance, viz.) individual fire; so also, there (is not) the presence together of what is to be revealed and what reveals (in the case of but one lamp), since both of them are but one. [512]

This argument presupposes the difference between a lamp and a pitcher as two different objects being revealed by an individual's intellect and with the help of some light.

यत एवमतोऽसाधु भवतैतदुदाहृतम् ।
अभिव्यनक्ति दीपोऽयमात्मनात्मानमस्ववत् ॥५१३॥

Since this is so, it is not reasonably (or, well) said by you that a lamp reveals itself, since (it does) reveal itself by itself like a thing other than itself (viz. there is a pitcher, another thing). [513]

Verses 514-517 are a refutation of the notion that a revealer (or, an illuminator) is itself what is to be revealed (by itself), so that it becomes known.

विज्ञानमपि तद्विन्नजातिचिद्ग्राह्यमिष्यताम् ।
व्यञ्जकत्वाविशेषत्वाद्रविचन्द्रप्रदीपवत् ॥५१४॥

Let *vijñāna*¹ also be accepted as what is grasped by sentience which is of a genus/kind different from that of it (viz. *vijñāna*), since it does not have any difference in respect of being a revealer, like the sun, the moon and a lamp. [514]

¹Cf. SP: *yad vyañjakam tat svavijātīyavyaṅgyam*. In the next verse, this is paraphrased as or stated to be, *bodha*.

संचेत्यते यथा दीपो विज्ञानमपि तत्तथा ।
संशयो निश्चयश्चायमित्येतच्चानुभूतितः ॥५१५॥

As a lamp is revealed (by the intellect), so also is (revealed) even *vijñāna*. That there is a doubt and there is, similarly (*ca*), a decision (about its being what is revealed) proceed from (a person's own) experience (of them). [515]

चिद्व्यञ्ज्यत्वे च बोधस्य साक्षादवधृते सति ।
किं ग्राह्यज्ञानगम्यत्वं किंवा ग्राहकगम्यता ॥५१६॥

When it is directly confirmed that cognition is revealed by

sentience (a question arises:) 'What is it, viz. being grasped by the knowledge of what is to be known/grasped? or, is it being known/grasped by what/who grasps?' [516]

Cf. SP *prakṛtaṃ jñānam bodhaśabdārthaḥ*.

तत्र संदिह्यमानेऽर्थे यथालोकं विनिश्चितिः ।
लोके सिद्धा च दीपादेर्भिन्नग्राहकगम्यता ॥५१७॥

In this (lit. that) case, let there be a decision in respect of the doubtful matter, as (there is one) in the world. In the world, it is established that a lamp etc.¹ is grasped (cognized) by who is different (from the former). [517]

¹*ādi* refers to the sun, the moon and others which can illuminate other objects; see verse 514 above.

Verses 518-520 affirm that the *Ātman* is different from (what is) the one that grasps.

ग्राहकग्रहणग्राह्यभावाभावविभागवित् ।
ग्रहणादेश्च यो भिन्नः स आत्मेत्यवगम्यताम् ॥५१८॥

Let that be known as the *Ātman*,¹ who knows the division of the presence and the absence of what/who grasps, (the means of) grasping and what is grasped and who is different (from all of them). [518]

This refers to *vijñāna* of the Buddhists which has to be taken as being known to sentience.

¹This refers to sentience which is capable of understanding the different things mentioned in the verse.

ननु ज्ञानादिगम्यत्वे ज्ञानाद्यन्तरसंश्रयात् ।
अनवस्थेति दुर्वारा नैष दोषः कुतो यतः ॥५१९॥
स्वतो हि ग्राहकादीनां ग्राहकत्वादिसिद्धितः ।

ग्राहकाद्यन्तरापेक्षा नैव स्यादविशेषतः ॥५२०॥

(An objection:) 'But, indeed, when knowledge¹ is (to be taken as) what is grasped (only) by resorting to another knowledge etc.,² there is (acceptance of) *infinite regress*, which is unavoidable!' (The answer is:) '(No!) this is not a fault'. It may then be asked:) 'Why/Whence?', (and the answer is:) 'Since, [519] indeed, what/who grasps etc. do get established (or, come into existence) by themselves as what/who grasps etc. and do not expect (or, depend on) other(s) as what grasps, there being non-difference among them (in this respect)'. [520]

¹This seems to stand for *vijñāna* in the Buddhist's view.

²This stands for *vijñānāntara*.

Verse 521 points out that being an illuminator is the nature of knowledge.

स्वमहिम्नैव चेन्न स्याद्ग्राहकादि ततोऽन्यतः ।

न स्यादतिशयाभावाद्ग्राहकाद्यन्तरादपि ॥५२१॥

If what/who grasps etc.¹ would not come into existence by its own excellence, then that² would arise from another (and) also from any other that grasps etc.¹, there being no excellence³ in the same (i.e. the other that grasps etc.¹). [521]

¹This understands *grahāṇa* and *grahāṇa* (of those) which were already mentioned in verse 518 above.

²This refers to *grāhakādi* (i.e. *grāhaka* and *grahāṇa*).

³That means: they do not have the capacity to illuminate them etc.

Verse 522 states as the prima facie view, the result, viz. infinite regress.

ननु ज्ञानस्य तद्विन्नग्राहकग्रहणे सति ।
करणान्तरव्यपेक्षायामनवस्था प्रसज्यते ॥५२२॥

(An objection:) 'Indeed, when it is held that there is (need) for any knowledge of (i.e. of *viññāna/jñāna*) another that grasps (etc.), there would be need of yet an other and (so on), which would mean *infinite regress*'. [522]

In verses 520-521 there was an argument regarding *infinite regress* in respect of *grāhaka* and *grahaṇa*. And now it is related to the organs which act as the means of grasping the objects.

Verses 523-530 are the refutation of the aforesaid infinite regress.

नियमाभावतो नासावनवस्था प्रसज्यते ।
ग्राह्यग्राहकसंबन्धे नियमो न हि वीक्ष्यते ॥५२३॥

(The answer:) 'There would not contingently follow *infinite regress*, for there is not seen any rule¹ (invariable relation) (in respect) of what grasps and what is/are grasped'. [523]

¹Cf. SP: *niyamo 'tiriktakaraṇasya*.

ग्राह्यग्राहकसंभिन्नं दीपवत्करणान्तरम् ।
यथा सर्वत्र नैवं स्याद्ग्राह्यग्राहकसंगतौ ॥५२४॥

As there is everywhere no other means (or, organs) which is mixed (i.e. existing together) of what is to be grasped and what/who grasps, as (in the case of) a lamp,¹ (so are other things also), viz. what is to be grasped and what/who grasps. [524]

This is an argument based on *vaidharmya* = *dr̥ṣṭānta*.

¹Cf. SP: *vatih svarūpaviśayaḥ*; it means the need of an eye that grasps the existence of a lamp, though it (viz. the latter) illuminates other objects.

घटस्य दर्शनं तावत्प्रदीपादिपुरःसरम् ।
प्रदीपवीक्षणे नैव प्रदीपान्तरमार्गणम् ॥५२५॥

In other words (*tāvat*), the seeing of a pitcher is (invariably) preceded by (the existence of) a lamp etc. (which illuminates the former); but, in seeing a lamp, there is no necessity of (having the help of) another lamp. [525]

तस्मान्नैवानवस्थेह कथंचिदपि शङ्क्यते ।
करणद्वारिका नापि ग्राहकद्वारिका तथा ॥५२६॥

Therefore, there is not (or, cannot be) here,¹ in any way, possible to entertain suspicion about (i.e. the contingent fault of) *infinite regress*— not through (the need of) even² some means as also³ not through (that of) one who grasps. [526]

¹Cf. SP: *iheti buddhyādeḥ sākṣivedyatvoktiḥ*.

²This is *api* which necessitates the inclusion (or, postulation) of *infinite regress* related to the *kārya* 'action' (viz. *grahana*), as SP points out.

³The word *tathā* is for the inclusion of the result expected from action.

ग्राहकाद्यतिरेकेण तद्विरुद्धात्मवस्तुनः ।
सद्भावं प्रागवोचाम प्रत्यक्षैकप्रमाणतः ॥५२७॥

(And) I have already¹ stated (i.e. postulated) the existence of the thing (called) Ātman beside (i.e. in addition to) what/who grasps etc. (and that is) opposed (in nature) to it²—this on the authority of just direct perception.³ [527]

¹This is reference to SV.

²Refer to *tat* in *tad-viruddhātmavastunaḥ*.

³That is, *anubhava* 'experience'.

प्रत्यक्षादनुमानाच्च तथा चैवागमादपि ।

ग्राहकाद्यतिरिक्तरिचतिसिद्धस्तत्साक्ष्यतः परः ॥५२८॥

It is on the basis of direct perception, and of inference, as also of scripture, that there is established (the existence of) sentience which is beside (or apart from) what/who grasps etc. and its witness—and also higher than (lit. beyond) the same (lit. this one).¹ [528]

¹SP adds: *ato na tasmin vivaditavyam ity arthaḥ.*

लोकायतविचारेऽपि प्रत्यक्षैकप्रमाणतः ।

स्वतोऽलुप्तदृशोऽस्तित्वं प्राक्साक्षात्प्रतिपादितम् ॥५२९॥

In the discussion about (the view of) the Lokāyata also, there has been clearly/specifically (*sākṣāt*) propounded earlier¹ the existence of one who never loses (or, has never lost) (the power of) seeing, by oneself—(and that) on the authority of just one means of knowing, viz. direct perception.² [529]

This is said with a view to the opinion of them who do not accept inference as a means of knowing.

¹This is a reference to the passage which begins with the word *sarvatīrthadrśām* (in verse 4.3.158 above).

²SP adds: *anumānādivivādaś ca nirastas tatraiva.*

अन्तरेणापि मानानि प्रमातृत्वादिसाक्षितः ।

कूटस्थदृष्टेरस्तित्वं प्रागपि प्रतिपादितम् ॥५३०॥

Already, in earlier (portions) there is established the existence of the immutable seer, even in the absence of (i.e. without using) any authoritative means (of knowing) and (that was established) as being the witness of the nature of a knower etc. [530]

Verse 531 enunciates what the Vijñānavādin holds.

बाह्यार्थवादिनि ध्वस्ते तद्वद्विज्ञानवाद्यथ ।

ननु नास्त्येव बाह्योऽर्थ इति प्रत्यवतिष्ठते ॥५३१॥

Now,¹ after (the view of) those (Buddhists)² who hold the external existence of objects and, in the same way (of the others),³ there follows (the view of those) who hold (the view of) *vijñāna*. Indeed, they rise against (the view of the Vedāntin), holding that there does not at all exist any external object.⁴

[531]

¹SP observes that Sureśvara has followed in his discussion the same order in the refutation of the Buddhists' views as in BSB.

²These are the Sautrāntika Buddhists.

³The followers of the Yogācāra school; this is implied by *advat*, as SP points out.

⁴These hold only *vijñāna* as reality/real.

Verses 532-537 explain BUB: *nanu nāsty eva*, in this context.

ननु नास्त्येव बाह्योऽर्थो घटदीपादिलक्षणः ।

विज्ञानव्यतिरेकेण तस्य मानासमीक्षणात् ॥५३२॥

But, indeed, there does not exist, beside (i.e. in addition to) *vijñāna*, (any) external object, characterized as a pitcher etc., for there is not noticed any means of knowing (the same).

[532]

Here begins the statement of the Vijñānavādin Buddhist against the Vedānta view.

यद्वि यद्व्यतिरेकेण वस्तु नेहोपलभ्यते ।

तावदेवास्तु तद्वस्तु स्वप्नभूमिगवस्तुवत् ॥५३३॥

Let there be only that (much of¹ a) thing, without (i.e. apart

from) which another thing does not exist here;² and that thing is just like the thing(s) seen in the dream state?³ [533]

¹This is for *tāvat*— perhaps 'identical with that other thing'.

²*iha* refers to the waking state.

³Cf. SP: *yad yadvyatirekeṇānupalabdham tat tatas tattvato na bhinnam yathā svāpno 'rtho jñānātirekeṇānupalabdhas ca bāhyo 'rtha ity arthah.*

स्वप्नविज्ञाननिर्ग्राह्यं स्वप्नज्ञानातिरेकतः ।

नास्ति वस्तु यथा तद्वज्जाग्रद्वाह्यार्थवस्त्वपि ॥५३४॥

As there does not exist¹ a thing, which is obtained (i.e. known/grasped) in the dream state, as beside (i.e. apart from) the consciousness (of it obtained only) in the dream state; in the same way, there does not exist any external thing (known/grasped only) in the waking state.² [534]

This verse seeks to establish that the argument (in the preceding verse) is not weak.

¹Literally, is not true.

²SP adds: *jāgrajjñānātirekeṇānupalabdhatvāt.*

जाग्रत्कुम्भादिकं वस्तु जाग्रज्ज्ञानातिरेकतः ।

न सत्यं ग्राह्यतः स्वप्नज्ञानग्राह्यघटादिवत् ॥५३५॥

A thing such as a pitcher (grasped/known) in the waking state does not exist beside (i.e. apart from) the consciousness (of it obtained only) in the dream state, for it has the nature of what is (or, can be) grasped/known like a pitcher etc. which is (or, can be) grasped/known by the consciousness in the dream state (only). [535]

This argument is based on the reason that both types of things are what are (or, can be) grasped/known.

एवं च सति विज्ञानव्यतिरेकेण कुम्भवत् ।

अपि प्रतीचोऽसत्त्वं स्याज्ज्योतिषः स्थास्नुरूपिणः ॥५३६॥

This being so, there would (or, could) be non-existence (or, untrueness) of even the inner self, which is (according to you) a flame and has an eternal form, in the same way as a pitcher, beside (i.e. apart from the existence of some) consciousness.

[536]

SP puts the argument briefly thus: *jñānamātram sarvam itihite sati ... kṣaṇikajñānātirekenātmāpi nāsti*.

बाह्यार्थेऽपहृते चैवं प्रदीपादेरसंभवात् ।

दृष्टान्तो भवतः कः स्यात्कामितार्थप्रसिद्धये ॥५३७॥

And when any/an external object is (can be) thus denied,¹ there would not be (possible) the existence of a lamp etc.; (and then) what could be your illustration for establishing/proving the thing which you have desired.²

[537]

¹Literally, taken/proven away (as untrue).

²Namely, the Ātman (beside the intellect etc.) that grasp external objects.

verses 538-543 answer away the Vijñānavādin's view (and illustration) by stating 'there is an illustration for proving the Vedāntin's view'.

वस्त्वन्तराभ्युपगमाज्ज्ञानतो ज्ञानवत्त्वया ।

दृष्टान्तोऽस्त्यैव नो भूयान्न चेन्न भवतोऽप्यसौ ॥५३८॥

There is certainly (eva) an example (possible) for us (to give) since, by/from knowledge¹ there can be acceptance/grasping of another thing (viz. the Ātman), and owing to its being possessed of (i.e. its consisting in) knowledge. If it would not be there for us (i.e. in our view), then it could not be there

for you (i.e. in your view) as well!

[538]

Cf. SP has put this succinctly thus: *asty eva jñānād anyo 'rthas tvayā nesyaṭe cej jñānamātram sarvaṃ svapnavad iti bhavato 'pi na siddhyati, dr̥ṣṭāntābhāvād ity arthaḥ*— cf. verses 532-33 for the Vijñānavādin's view.

¹That is, *anubhava/avagati* 'experience'.

धीमानाज्ज्ञानमेवेदमभ्युपेत्य ततोऽपरम् ।
जाग्रत्स्वप्नादिकं वस्तु तन्मिथ्येति निषिध्यते ॥५३९॥

Having accepted *jñāna* 'consciousness'¹ itself as 'this (thing)' by the means of knowing, viz. the intellect, you reject the other thing(s) such as (that perceived/grasped) in the waking and/or the dream (state) as false.² [539]

The argument is: There is first the acceptance of the means, viz. the intellect, to lead to the understanding of *jñāna* and then there is, with the help of that latter, the denial of everything else—this is reciprocal (or, mutually) dependent, i.e. self-contradiction!

SP supports the argument in this verse, citing the following verse thus: *uktam hi*—

*tasyām yad rūpam ābhāti bāhyam ekam ivānyataḥ /
vyāvṛtam iva nistattvam parīkṣānāṅgabhāvataḥ //*
(*Pramāṇavārtika* 1.77)

Yet, it is worth noting that the AnSS edition reads a variant *dhīrūpān mānāj jñānam eva cedam* in SP for *-jñānam evedam* which, we think, yields good sense.

¹This is to be understood for *vijñāna*.

²That is, non-existent.

भावो वा यदि वाभावो ज्ञानवन्माननिश्चितः ।
नास्तीति ब्रुवतो लज्जा धाष्टर्यादेव न जायते ॥५४०॥

Be it a positive entity or a negative entity, it is determined

is possessed of (or, marked by) *jñāna* 'consciousness' through
 a means a knowing (and therefore) while you say that there
 does not exist (any means of knowing), you do not come to
 feel any shame—only through (your) audacity! [540]

SP supports the Siddhāntin's argument, viz. that there cannot
 denying of external object(s), citing a verse: *yathāha—*
dharmadharmaivavyavasthānam bhedo 'bhedaś ca yādṛśaḥ /
asamīkṣitatattvārtho yathā loke pratīyate //
 (*Pramāṇavārtika* 1.86)

अपि ज्ञानातिरेकेण बाह्योऽर्थोऽभ्युपगम्यते ।
 दीपकुम्भादिको बुद्धैर्व्यवहारप्रसिद्धये ॥५४१॥

And it is as different (or, apart) from knowledge that (the
 existence of) an external object such as (that of) a lamp,
 pitcher and so on is accepted even by the Buddhists, in
 order that their worldly activities¹ are performed (lit.
 established). [541]

This is an additional argument, beside that in the preceding
 se.

¹That is, worldly dealings.

सर्वस्य ज्ञानमात्रत्वान्ननु नाभ्युपगम्यते ।
 मया ज्ञानातिरेकेण तन्मानासंभवादिह ॥५४२॥

An objection:) 'But, indeed, since all is but consciousness,
 that is not accepted by me (i.e. a Buddhist) as existing beside
 i.e. apart from) consciousness for, in our activities, there is
 no means for proving that'. [542]

SP supports the argument in the verse by citing—
jñānād avyatiriktaṃ ca katham arthāntaram vrajet /
tasmān mithyāvikalpo 'yam arthesv ekātmatāgrahaḥ //
 (*Pramāṇavārtika* 1.72cd-73ab)

ज्ञानं घटो दीप इति शब्दार्थज्ञानभित्तये ।

अवश्यमभ्युपेयोऽत्र भेदो मानप्रमेययोः ॥५४३॥

In this context (viz. that of activity), one has to accept, by all means, the distinction between a means of knowing and an object of knowing, in order that there is secured the division of knowledge into the meanings of the (different) words such as knowledge, a pitcher (and) a lamp. [543]

Verse 544 affirms the need of a pramāṇa for knowing both bheda and abheda of jñāna and artha.

प्रमाणं भवता वाच्यं भेदाभेदत्वसिद्धये ।

नावयोर्निष्प्रमाणोक्तं यतः संगच्छते सुधीः ॥५४४॥

You have to point out a means of knowing that is useful for ascertaining (lit. establishing/proving) the nature (of thing(s)) as different or non-different since, for both of us, good understanding (or, valid knowledge) would not be (lit. go) without a (proper) means of knowing. [544]

Verses 545-546 point out that even the Buddhist has to accept discrete objects of knowledge for vyavahārasiddhi.

मामेयसंगतिफलभित्त्यभ्युपगमस्त्वया ।

कार्य ऐक्ये यतोऽमीषां व्यवहारो न सिध्यति ॥५४५॥

You have to accept (lit. make) the distinctions, viz. knowledge, the object(s) of knowledge, the connection between them and the result, since, in accepting the oneness of these, there is not (or, will not be) possible (any) activity, (or, worldly dealing). [545]

SP supports the argument in this verse by citing—

tat tathaiva samāśritya sādhyasādhanaśāṁsthitil /

paramārthāvatārāya vidvadbhir avakalpyate //
(*Pramāṇavārtika* 1.87)

उपादित्सन्ति मानानि ह्यज्ञातार्थोपलब्धये ।
अतोऽभ्युपेयोऽज्ञातोऽर्थः प्रमाणत्वप्रसिद्धये ॥५४६॥

Indeed, they desire to accept (i.e. understand) the means of knowing for getting to know (lit. securing) the objects which have not been known (before), therefore, one has to accept (i.e. hold that there is) the object which has not been known (before), for that would (i.e. in order that it would) secure their nature as the means of knowing. [546]

SP rightly points to the dissolution of the Saṃdhi: *ajñāto arthaḥ*.

Verses 547-541 state that *ajñātatvāsiddhi* leads to *pramāṇasiddhi* which, in turn, leads to the acceptance of the earlier unknown as established by the witness.

न च प्रमाणतः सिद्धिरज्ञातत्वस्य शक्यते ।
अन्योन्याश्रयतादोषः सत्येवं प्रसजेद्यतः ॥५४७॥

Also, it is not possible to get to know (or, to establish) the nature (of object(s)) as not having been known before, with (the help of) the means of knowing; therefore,¹ this being so, there contingently follows (or, would contingently follow) the fault (in your² argument) of reciprocal dependence (or having mutual dependence). [547]

¹Here *yataḥ* is for *ataḥ*.

²This refers to the *Vijñānavādin*.

प्रमाणाच्च न तत्सिद्धिस्तस्य मानविरोधतः ।
मानैश्चेदविरोधः स्यात्कुतोऽज्ञातत्वनिहनुतिः ॥५४८॥

And that¹ is not established by any means of knowing, on

account of its opposition to (i.e. the non-acceptance of) any means of knowing; (and) if it does not have any opposition to the means of knowing, (then, it is to be asked) 'Whence could there be the concealment (of an object of knowing), as what has not been known before?' [548]

The second line of this verse presents the argument by way of *vyatireka*.

¹That refers to *ajñāta artha*.

न स्वरूपेऽथवा स्वांशे मानमेयत्वसंभवः ।
सर्वदातिशयाभावाद्बोधाच्चाव्यतिरेकतः ॥५४९॥

Neither in its ¹ own form (i.e. fullness), nor in its part, can there be possible the state of being of (both) the knowledge and the object (of that knowledge), for (in that case) there would ever be the absence of (any) excellence ² and also a non-distinct cognition. ³ [549]

SP succinctly points out the exact import of the argument thus:
aṁśayor jñānād abhedo bhedo vā nādyo mānameyavyavasthāsiddher na dvitīyas tadbhedāpatter ity arthah.

¹That is, of *vijñāna* 'consciousness'.

²Namely, that which consists in the acquisition of some information/knowledge of some object not known before.

³In other words, there would not newly occur any knowledge.

प्रमाणं यदि विज्ञानं मेया नीलादिरूपता ।
मिथस्तयोरपेक्षा का यत उक्तं प्रसिध्यति ॥५५०॥

If consciousness were accepted as the means of knowing, then being possessed of the form of blue etc. would be the object of knowing and, therefore, ¹ what mutual dependence (lit. expectation) could there be between the two, viz. that from which would get established what is said (earlier)? ² [550]

¹This is for *yataḥ* which is the same as *ataḥ*.

²Namely, oneness, or rather, co-existence of *vijñāna* (*pramāṇa*) and its object (*meva*) as understood in the argument of the preceding verse.

आकारतद्वतोर्भेदो यदि नामाभ्युपेयते ।
अस्तु कामं प्रमामेयसंगतिर्गम्यते कुतः ॥५५१॥

Or, if (*yadī nāma*) it is accepted that there is the distinction (between the two) as that between a form and what has that form; well, let that be there,¹ (but) how (or, whence) is there understood (in your view) the connection of knowledge and the object of the knowledge? [55]

¹This is tentative (or, for argument's sake) acceptance.

Verses 552-556 affirm the need of accepting the witness for holding that there is one who grasps the connection between *māna* and *meva*.

कार्याशाद्यभिसंबन्धान्मानमेयत्वसंगतिः ।
अन्यैव तु विभिन्नात्मा वस्तुनोर्मानमेययोः ॥५५२॥

The connection between being knowledge and being an object of knowledge is (or, can be) owing to the close association of the (various) parts such as the effect(s)¹ (so it might be argued by the *Vijñānavādin*), but that connection of the things (called) knowledge and the means of knowledge is of a different kind (altogether)!² [55]

¹This refers to what are implied in the notions of *aṁśāṁsin* (cf. verse 549 above) and *ākārākārins* (cf. verse 551 above).

²This is well brought out by SP thus: *mānameyatvasaṁgate tadanyatamatve 'pi tatsādhakena bhāvyaṁ na hi jñānābheden tatsiddhis tasyās tanmātratvābhāvad iti*.

मानांशो यस्य मेयः स्यान्मेयांशो वा भवेत्प्रमा ।
संबन्धाभावतस्तस्य मानमेयौ न सिध्यतः ॥५५३॥

That knowledge and the object of (that) knowledge do not become/get established (or, proved as such) for him, (in whose view) there is a part of knowledge as the object of its knowledge and (*vā*) a part of the object of (some) knowing and right knowledge is a part of that means of knowing, since, (for him) in that case, there is no (possibility) of any connection (between them noticed).¹ [553]

¹ Possibly, this refers to (*saṃgati*)-*sādhakābhāva* as understood in note 2 on the preceding verse.

मानमेयत्वयो रूपं यस्मान्नैवेह गम्यते ।
मानमेयत्वसंसिद्धिर्नातस्तत्रोपपद्यते ॥५५४॥

Since here¹ is not (clearly or distinctly) understood the form of what is knowledge and what, the means of (that knowledge) each, there is not there¹ any proving of what is knowledge and what the means of (that) knowledge. [554]

¹ The words *iha* (in the first line) and *tatra* (in the second line)—expressive of the sense conveyed by locative case—convey the sense of (any) knowledge (situation).

एकस्मिन्नपि चेन्मानमेयत्वादिप्रकल्पना ।
साध्यानां साधनैकत्वादसाध्यासाधनात्मता ॥५५५॥

And, if there is (entertained) the notion of knowledge, the object of (that) knowledge etc.¹ in just one (place/thing), then what are to be accomplished, being just one (i.e. the same) with what accomplishes (them), there would not be understandable (lit. established) the nature of what is/are accomplished and what accomplish/accomplishes the same.²

[555]

¹The word 'etc.' indicates the notions of part(s) and whole(s) and/or the effect(s) and the cause(s).

²This refers to their identity (*anyonyābheda*).

फलानां साधनानां च भेदाभावे प्रसज्यते ।
शास्त्रोपदेशानर्थक्यं तत्कर्तुश्चापि मूढता ॥५५६॥

By (lit. in case) there is accepted the absence of distinction between what are the results and what the means of accomplishing (the same), there would contingently follow the purposelessness (lit. meaninglessness) of the instruction (imparted) in the authoritative texts and also foolishness (or, mistakenness) of the author of the same. [556]

For clearer expression of the argument here, read SP with profit.

Verses 557-562 explain BUB: *vijñānavyatirekeṇa bāhyārthābhyupagamāt*.

विज्ञानव्यतिरेकेण प्रतिवाद्यादिवस्तुनः ।
त्वदभ्युपगतेर्भेदः स्यात्प्रमाणप्रमेययोः ॥५५७॥

(Also) by your ¹ acceptance of such objects as the counter-disputant etc. ² beside (i.e. in addition to) consciousness, there would (contingently) follow (lit. be) the distinction between what is the means of knowing and what the object of knowledge. [557]

¹This refers to the *Vijñānavādin*, who himself is a *vādin* 'discussant'.

²This refers to to (vi)vāda 'dispute/debate' and also the *doṣas* 'defects' therein.

न ज्ञानमात्रमेवेदं भवताप्यभ्युपेयते ।

प्रतिवाद्यादिकं वस्तु तस्य दूष्यत्वकारणात् ॥५५८॥

Even you have not understood (or, accepted) that (all) this (world) is merely knowledge (*vijñāna*— here, *jñāna*), for the reason that there is (in your opinion or scheme of preachings) the existence of things (or, objects) such as a counter-disputant, to be given blame to (for holding wrong opinions). [558]

प्रतिवाद्यादिदूष्यस्य न स्वांशशित्वसंगतौ ।
निराकर्तुमभिप्रायः समूढस्यापि जायते ॥५५९॥

There would not occur to even an extremely foolish (person) the idea of refuting (lit. setting aside) an opponent etc. who is blamable, when there is accepted the relation of the parts and the whole(s) consisting of them. [559]

भिन्नग्राहकसंवेद्यं घटदीपादि सद्ध्रुवम् ।
जाग्रद्भूमिष्वतस्तस्य जाग्रत्स्थप्रतिवादिवत् ॥५६०॥

(Certainly) a pitcher, a lamp etc. is an existent (object), which is to be (or, becomes) known by another who (i.e. the seer) grasps it,¹ in the states of waking etc.;² therefore, (there would be external existence established) of the opponent etc.³ [560]

¹This points to the distinct seers in the states of dream and waking.

²The word 'etc.' refers to the dream state.

³SP rightly observes: *svātiriktagrāhaka-grāhyatvasattve 'pi sthāyitvaṃ ceti pratijñā draṣṭavyā*.

संतत्यन्तरवद्यद्वा विज्ञानान्तरवत्तथा ।
इत्येवमादि सौलभ्यं दृष्टान्तानामिहेष्यते ॥५६१॥

Similarly, (the existence of distinct external objects) is like distinct continuities/series (in respect of individuals)¹ or distinct consciousnesses.² This (illustration) and such others³ being

there, it is accepted that the illustrations have a great ease (in conveying the desired conclusion). [561]

¹SP points out to Caitra *saṃtāna* and Maitra *saṃtāna* for worldly connections—that refers to continuity in the existence of the same person.

²This indicates the non-continuity of consciousness, i.e. series of consciousness.

³The word *ādi* refers to the illustration of the disputants and others, stated earlier.

विज्ञानव्यतिरेकेण नातो विज्ञानवादिना ।
कूटस्थदृष्टिरात्मैको निषेद्धं शक्यते परः ॥५६२॥

Therefore, it is not possible for a Vijñānavādin to reject (the postulation by the Vedāntin) of the Ātman, the immutable, witness (or one who sees) the one who is single, and the highest as beside (or, apart from) consciousness. [562]

This is to affirm the Vedāntin's postulation of the Ātman as apart from any object of knowing.

Verses 563-564 state the prima facie view in regard to the non-difference between knowledge and its objects, determined on the basis of the dream state experience.

ननु स्वप्ने न वस्त्वस्ति विज्ञानव्यतिरेकतः ।
न जाग्रद्वस्तुवत्तत्स्याज्ज्ञानमात्रस्वरूपतः ॥५६३॥

(An objection:) 'But, indeed, there is not in the dream state anything beside (or, as apart from) consciousness, like a thing seen/experienced in the waking state, because of its having the nature of only consciousness'. [563]

This argument proceeds from the Vijñānavādin's position that a thing of the dream state is not different from consciousness,

as noticeable from verses 532 and 535 above.

विभागं लभते ज्ञानाज्ज्ञानवत्स्वप्नवस्तु चेत् ।
स्वमहिम्नैव तत्सिद्धेः कथं नास्तीति भण्यते ॥५६४॥

(The objection continues:) 'If (again) a thing (noticed) in dream state comes to have difference from consciousness, just as consciousness appears distinctly, then, since there is the proof of (or, establishing) it, on its own strength (lit. power/greatness), how is it said to be not existing?' [564]

SP brings out the twofold character possible of the thing of dream state thus: *svapnavastu jñānād bhedena drśyate na vā*. The verse then refers only to the first alternative, viz. the thing (perceived) in the dream state is seen as different from consciousness.

Verses 565-568 state that the external objects do exist even if they are not grasped as distinct.

ज्ञानस्यैवार्थरूपं तद्धोधवच्चेत्प्रकल्प्यते ।
परमार्थसतोऽसत्त्वं किंमानमिति भण्यताम् ॥५६५॥

(The objection continues:) 'If that form of (what is perceived) as an (external) object is but (that) of consciousness and also it is taken (or, considered) as having that knowledge (as its form), let it be told then as to what could be the means for knowing the non-existence of what 'is really an existent'. [565]

This is with reference to the second alternative mentioned in the note on the preceding verse.

विज्ञानव्यतिरेकेण नीलादिविषयो यदि ।
भावो वा स्यादभावो वा सोऽस्त्येवेति विनिश्चितिः ॥५६६॥

(The Vedāntin's answer:) 'If the (external) objects such as blue etc. are beside (or apart from) consciousness, then they might be positive entities¹ or negative entities,¹ they do exist—this is certainly the decision. [566]

¹The singular in *bhāvaḥ* etc. stands for the plural (*jātāv* *avacanam*).

स्वप्नादौ भवतैवायं जाग्रदनुभयते ।
घटादिज्ञानविषयः स कथं नेष्यते त्वया ॥५६७॥

This object of knowledge such as a pitcher is experienced by you yourself in the dream state etc.¹ as (it is experienced) in the waking state; how then is it not acceptable to you (as external)? [567]

SP observes significantly: *tatra cakṣurādyabhāve 'pi mano 'sti ca samanantarapratyayo 'nyad veti cintāntaram iti bhāvaḥ*.

¹SP states that this 'etc.' refers to *smṛtisamādhānādi* where *smṛti* 'memory', *samādhāna* 'answering away or query' and others—but the question is: 'what does this last 'and others' refer to?

यद्वस्त्वनुभवप्राप्तं तच्चेन्नास्तीति भण्यते ।
ज्ञानेऽपि स्यादनाश्वासस्तस्यानुभवसिद्धितः ॥५६८॥

If it is said that the thing, which is known by experience, does not exist; then, there would be disbelief (or, lit. absence of satisfaction) in even consciousness, for that (also) comes from (i.e. established by) experience. [568]

This is pointed out as a fault on the part of the Vijñānavādin, *bāhyārthasyānubhave 'pi asattvam*. This becomes clearer from the next verse.

Verses 569-573 state another reason for holding the object of

knowledge as different from knowledge.

ज्ञानादतिशयो यद्वन्नास्तीतीह तथैव सन् ।
घटोऽन्यो ह्यनुभूतेः सन्नास्तीति कथमुच्यते ॥५६९॥

‘How is it said (i.e. posited by you) that the existent pitcher (known from) experience as another, even if it remains the same there,¹ as (you have posited) that an object does not have any excellence² arising from knowledge?’ [569]

This is yet another argument to state that there is distinction between consciousness and the object(s) of experience.

¹This refers to the dream state.

²Cf. SP: *atiśayavacano 'nyaviṣayah*.

तदन्यकालासंदृष्टेरिति चेदसदुच्यते ।
क्षणान्तरे क्षणादृष्टेरसत्त्वं वः प्रसज्यते ॥५७०॥

If it¹ is said to be non-existent because it is not seen at a time other than one of that (viz. the dream state etc.); then there contingently follows for you (i.e. in your opinion) the non-existence of an object even when it is in some moment, for it is not seen in another moment?’¹ [570]

¹Cf. SP (a little modified) for clarification: *svakṣaṇe sattvena dr̥ṣṭasya kālāntare 'nupalambhād svakṣaṇe 'py asattv(am)*.

हेमन्तेऽनुपलब्धत्वाद्ग्रीष्मधर्मापनिहनुतिः ।
प्रतिज्ञातुमशक्या स्यात्तथा शून्यत्वमापतेत् ॥५७१॥

It would be impossible to affirm the non-existence (or, absence) of a feature of the Grīṣma (i.e. extremely hot summer) season because it has not been found¹ in Hemanta (extremely cold winter) also; (for, in holding that) there would (contingently) follow (complete) void.² [571]

That is, it is not experienced.

Cf. *sarvaśūnyatā* in SP.

देशकालादिगावस्थाभेदेनैवाखिलं यतः ।

वस्तु सिद्धं जगत्सिंस्तदपहनूयते कथम् ॥५७२॥

Since all things (*akhilam vastu*) in this world are known (lit. established) together with their differences in respect of the conditions belonging to (different) regions, (periods of) time, quarters¹ etc. how can that be denied (lit. concealed or kept out of view)? [572]

This is one more argument to support the existence (or, the absence of void) of external objects.

P adds: *vipakṣe vibhāgadhīr virudhyetety arthaḥ*.

The editor of the edition of MRI offers an ingenious explanation of *ādigāvasthā* ... thus: *deśe kāle vā gāminī yāvastheti* ... *aha*.

विज्ञानव्यतिरेकेण घटो नास्तीति जल्पतः ।

नास्त्यर्थोऽपि कथं जीवेदस्त्यर्थविरहादिह ॥५७३॥

In the case of him, who is of the opinion (lit. is saying) that there does not exist a pitcher (and the like of it) as distinct from consciousness, there does not exist any useful thing (*artha*); how would he then (be able to) live here (i.e. in this world)¹ in the absence of useful things? [573]

P points out to the import of this verse thus: *bāhyā-palāpino vyāghātāpattēś ca tadapalāpāsiddhiḥ*.

Alternatively, in the dealings which involve the presence or the absence of useful things—cf. *bhāvābhāvavyavahāra-niḥ* in SP.

verses 574-576 state that holding the non-existence of the existent things would lead to the non-existence of any object of knowledge.

अस्त्यर्थवत्स्वमात्रेण नाभावोऽस्ति विना सता ।
यथास्ति तव विज्ञानमेवं कुम्भाद्यपीष्यताम् ॥५७४॥

There does not obtain any negative entity in the absence of (some) existing (or, positive) entity, in the same way as there exists for you consciousness; let it be (then) accepted that (there exist) such objects as a pitcher. [574]

अस्त्यर्थव्यतिरेके हि न किञ्चिदपि सिध्यति ॥५७५॥
अस्त्यर्थव्यतिरेकेण विज्ञानादि यदीष्यते ।
अब्राह्मणादिवत्तत्स्यादसदेवेति निश्चितिः ॥५७६॥

Indeed, there cannot obtain (lit. be established) (the existence of) anything as distinct from¹ a positive entity. [575]
(Therefore,) if consciousness etc.² is accepted (lit. desired, as existent) beside (i.e. apart from) positive entities;² then all that (also) would be non-existent like a non-Brāhmaṇa etc.³—this is the decision. [576]

¹That is, as apart from, beside, or in addition to.

²The word 'etc.' refers to *kṣaṇikatva* etc.

³This is a truncated illustration. It is clarified in SP thus: *na hi brāhmaṇāder anyasya brāhmaṇādibhāvas tathā sato 'nyasya na sattety arthaḥ*. The word 'etc.' can be taken to refer to Kṣatriya, Vaiśya and Śūdra.

Verses 577-578 state the view of the Kṣaṇabhāṅgavādin that things are only momentary can be shown with the help of inference.

प्रतिक्षणविनाशीनि द्रव्याणीत्यवगम्यताम् ।
तेषामन्ते विनाशित्वात्प्रदीपादिविनाशिवत् ॥५७७॥

(An objection by Kṣaṇabhāṅgavādin:) ¹ 'May the substances ² be understood as perishable at every moment, since they are finally perishable like a lamp etc. which are perishable'. [577]

Cf. SP for clarification of the argument: *yad ante vināśi tat atikṣaṇavināśi yathā dīpo 'nte, vināśi ca sarvam ity anumānā-*
haḥ.

¹This is a section of the Buddhists who hold that all is momentary.

²This is for *dvaryāṇi*, viz. *jñānajñeyavastūni* (SP).

वैधर्म्येण च दृष्टान्तः प्रतिज्ञातार्थसिद्धये ।
प्रतिसंख्यानिरोधोऽत्र सर्वं सुस्थं भवेत्ततः ॥५७८॥

'The illustration is based on dissimilarity (of properties) in order to establish/prove the matter that is (first) enunciated, (for) herein there is conscious annihilation¹ of an (external) object—then (or, as a consequence), all (of our opinion) would be well-established.'

[578]

¹Cf. SP: *pratisaṃkhyānirodhaḥ sa ca buddhipūrvako bhāva-*
śaḥ.

verses 579-581 state the refutation of the inference by the *anābhāṅgavādin*.

अनुमानप्रयोगेऽस्मिन्प्रतिज्ञार्थः सुदुर्लभः ।
आवृत्तिवीप्सासद्भावात्क्षणिकोक्तेः प्रमाणतः ॥५७९॥

The Vedāntins'¹ refutation:) 'In this adducing of inference, the matter (i.e. the subject to be proved) of the proposition is very difficult to hold/accept on account of the falsehood in the repetition¹ and by the authoritative means, viz. the statement about momentariness.

[579]

Add: of some one act or by some one agent. See verse below for the explanation of *āvṛttivīpsā*.

अनेकव्यापृतिमती ह्यावृत्तिर्जगतीक्ष्यते ।

एकस्मिन्देवदत्तादौ सा च बौद्धस्य नेष्यते ॥५८०॥

It is known (lit. seen/accepted) in the world that repetition consists in more than one performance of some act in one agent, viz. Devadatta or someone else) and that (viz. *āvṛtti*) is not accepted by the Buddhists.¹ [580]

¹This is because they hold momentariness of all, i.e. persons, things and acts.

निर्व्यापाराः सर्वभावाः क्षणिकाश्चेति निश्चितेः ।
गतः प्रत्यागतश्चेति सावृत्तिः स्यात्सुदुर्लभा ॥५८१॥

Since there is the decided view (of them) that all entities (*bhāvāḥ*) are devoid of any activity and also momentary, that repetition, viz. that consisting in (such actions mentioned in words) 'he went and he came back', is very difficult for them to hold/accept. [581]

SP states: *yathāha— kṣaṇikāḥ sarvasaṃskārā asthirāṇāṃ kutaḥ kriyā iti* (*Tantravārtika* 170.10 on 1310; this is already cited by SP under verse 494 above).

Verses 582-585 show unreasonableness of repetition in *Kṣaṇa-bhaṅgavāda*.

नानार्थवाचिनां लोक आश्रयाश्रयिणामिह ।
व्याप्तिः क्रियागुणाभ्यां या सा वीप्सेत्यभिधीयते ॥५८२॥
युगपत्सापि बौद्धस्य न कथं चन युज्यते ।

In the world, that is said to be *vīpsā* where there is pervasion (or, connection) of many objects¹ by actions and/or properties, i.e. qualities, and of what are supports and supported.² [582] And that is also simultaneous³—yet somehow it is not acceptable/reasonable for a Buddhist. [583ab]

¹Cf. *parjanyo vrkṣam vrkṣam pariśiṅcatīti sarvavrkṣāṇāṃ tattaddeśasya ca secanakriyayā yugapad vyāptiḥ* (SP).

²Cf. *grāmo grāmo ramanīya iti sarvagrāmāṇāṃ taddeśasya ca yugapad ramanīyagunatvena vyāptiḥ*.

³Refer to the word *yugapad* in both the notes above.

कर्तृक्रियादिसादृश्यात्सान्यत्वेऽपीति चेन्मतम् ॥५८३॥

भूयोऽपि भुञ्जते गेहे ब्राह्मणा इति दर्शनात् ।

एतच्चानुपपन्नं स्यादुपचारपरिग्रहात् ॥५८४॥

If (the said) Buddhist (holds that) repetition and/or pervasion (is noticeable) even in different (objects, persons and actions) on account of the similarity (of them), [583cd] since it is noticed that (many) Brāhmaṇas eat food in (some/the same) house many times (or again and again) this also would be (i.e. is) unreasonable, owing to the acceptance (by the Buddhist) of a metaphorical statement (*upacāra*).¹ [584]

¹Cf. *mithyātvād upacāravijñānasya* in Śaṅkara's Bhāṣya on CU 16.3.

मुख्यस्यासंभवे यस्मादुपचारो न युज्यते ।

अभ्युपेतार्थहानं च तदभ्युपगमे सति ॥५८५॥

Since, in the absence of the principal (matter),¹ (this) metaphorical statement does not become reasonable in case that opinion (of the Buddhist) were accepted, there (would be) giving up what is taken up as the subject matter (viz. the existence of external objects). [585]

¹This refers to *mukhyavīpsā*.

Verse 586 states the unreasonableness of *vīpsā* in the Kṣāṇa-*hanigavāda*.

क्षणिकाः सर्वसंस्कारा इत्याद्यभ्युपगम्यते ।

क्षणिकाः सर्वसंस्कारा इत्यादिवचनैरियम् ।

वीप्सा व्याहन्यतेऽतश्च क्षणिकोक्तिर्न युज्यते ॥५८६॥

It is held (lit. understood) that all impressions are momentary and so on.¹ (Therefore), by such statements as² 'All impressions are momentary' is opposed (lit. struck down) the desire of pervading³ and, for this (reason (*ataḥ*)), the statement (about) momentariness (of objects)⁴ is not reasonable. [586]

¹The words 'and so on' (*ādi*) points to the lines *asthirāṇāṃ kutaḥ kriyāḥ* (quoted under verses 494 and 581) and *bhūtir yesāṃ kriyā saiva kārakaṃ saiva cocyate* (quoted under verse 494).

²The words 'such ... as' (*ādi*) signify/indicate many of the statements, as for example (SP quotes:)

*yāvad yāvac ca bhāvo 'yam pratyakṣeṇa pratīyate /
tāvat sa vartamānastho nānyakālavīśeṣaṇaḥ //
ekakṣaṇaś ca kālo 'yaṃ vartamāno vyavasthitaḥ /
tasmāt pratyakṣaḥ sarvaṃ kṣaṇikatvam matam mama //*
(source not traced)

³Pervading (*vīpsā*) indicates repetition (*āvṛtti*) —SP; these are already mentioned together in verse 579 above.

⁴Read SP: *kṣaṇikoktis tatsādhikā pratikṣaṇavināśīni dravy-
āñītipratijñeti yāvat.*

Verses 587-589 refute the alternative notion of momentariness.

अथापि क्षणिकानीति मत्वर्थोऽत्र विवक्ष्यते ।

सिद्धसाध्यत्वमेवं स्यादिष्टैव क्षणसंगतिः ॥५८७॥

Or, if in the word *kṣaṇika* is intended the meaning of *-matup*,¹ there would then be the fact (or, nature of the argument) of establishing what is (already) established and the connection of moments is just what we desire/accept.² [587]

¹The word *kṣaṇika* is understood as *kṣaṇavān*, i.e. the word *kṣaṇa* has taken the suffix *-matup*. Therefore, it means 'having

a moment', therefore 'momentary'.

²This would mean: relation between, at least, two moments.

स्थिरस्य वस्तुनोऽवश्यं निमेषक्षणलक्षणैः ।
कालभागैर्भवेद्योग इति नः सिद्धसाध्यता ॥५८८॥

(And thus) there would be involved the connection of the eternal (lit. steady) thing with (various) divisions/parts of time such as (or lit. characterized as, or, measured by) the wink (of an eye) and this would be, according to us, establishing what is already established. [588]

Here is rejected the second alternative.

क्षणिकार्थस्तिरोभाव इति चेदभिधीयते ।
अभ्युपेतार्थहानिः स्यात्तथापीष्टं न सिध्यति ॥५८९॥

If it is said that the meaning of (the word) *kṣanika* is 'disappearance (of a thing within a moment)', that would invite loss (or giving up) of what is (already) held/ accepted—and, even in that case (*tathā*), what is desired does not become established. [589]

In verses 590-618 there is explanation of the notion *kṣanikatva* and its refutation.

व्यक्तधर्मनिवृत्तिर्या कारणात्मतयेष्यते ।
स्थिरस्य धर्मिणः सेह तिरोभावगिरोच्यते ॥५९०॥

Here is expressed in the word *tirobhāva* that which is accepted/desired as withdrawal of some property, which has been visible/apparent (in some thing), (thus) consisting in becoming (its own) cause, belonging to the steady (object) which is possessed of that property. [590]

Here there is in these verses the rejection of the third

alternative.

यद्युत्पन्नानि नश्यन्ति स्यात्तदा सिद्धसाध्यता ।
 यस्मादादिमतां नाशः सर्वैरेवाभ्युपेयते ॥५९१॥
 यतो जनिमतावश्यं विनष्टव्यं तदन्ततः ।
 तथाभ्युपगतार्थस्य हानिः स्याद्वो न संशयः ॥५९२॥

If (again it is held that) 'What are produced (or, have come into existence) perish', then (also) there would (follow) the nature of what is to be established/proved in the case of what is (already) established/proved; (this is so) because it is agreed among all that what have a beginning do perish, [591] (also) because whatever has an origin (lit. birth) has finally to come to perish; (and) in that case (also), there would be for you the loss/abandoning of what is (already) held—this is beyond doubt (or, doubtlessly so!). [592]

These verses refute the fourth alternative.

अथोत्पत्तिक्षणे नाशो भवताभ्युपगम्यते ।
 सर्गनाशौ तदैकस्मिन्काले प्रसजतो ध्रुवम् ॥५९३॥
 ततश्च कार्यानुत्पत्तिर्यदि वा सर्वदास्तितता ।
 तद्विरोधाविरोधाभ्यां ध्रुवं प्राप्नोत्यनीप्सितम् ॥५९४॥

If (again) you accept that there is destruction/perishing (of an external object) in the same moment as of its origin, then there would certainly be the contingency that both the origin and the destruction occur (just) in the same (lit. one) moment, [593]

and from that would follow the non-origin of what is (called) an effect; or, perhaps, its all-time existence. Also, on account of their mutual opposition and mutual non-opposition being simultaneously occurrent, there will certainly follow what is not desired (by them). [594]

This is yet another alternative explanation, with comment on

the Kṣaṇikavādin's argument.

विरुद्धयोश्च क्रिययोरिष्टत्वादेककर्तरि ।
एककाले विरुद्धत्वात्सर्वलोको विरुध्यते ॥५९५॥

Also, because two opposing/opposite activities¹ are accepted as belonging to (i.e. performed by, just) one agent and because they are opposed in belonging to (just) one (moment of) time—the entire world (i.e. worldly experience)² is opposed.

[595]

¹These are the origin and the destruction/perishing referred to earlier in verse 593 above.

²Or, worldly notion about opposition of activities/actions.

अथाज्ञातानि नश्यन्ति जायमानानि वेति चेत् ।
तथाप्यसन्प्रतिज्ञार्थो न ह्यभावस्य नाशिता ॥५९६॥

Also, if it is held that those (objects which are) not known ever perish or (which) originate (lit. become born), then, in that case also, the matter in the proposition enunciated will not dispose (lit. destroy) a negative entity.¹

[596]

¹This refers to the proposition *ajātāni naśyanti*. SP brings out the import thus: *ajātasyāśattvād asataś ca saṃtānasyevānāśād ity arthaḥ*.

कातिशीतिरजातस्य विनाशागमने सति ।
प्रतिज्ञापदयोश्चात्र विरोधः स्यात्परस्परम् ॥५९७॥

What difference¹ can there occur in what has not originated (lit. what is not born), when there comes (to occur) the destruction? (Thus) there would be mutual opposition of (the two) words² in the enunciation (of the proposition).

[597]

This is another reason as to why the destruction of the

non-born is impossible.

¹Literally, excellence, i.e. change, or additional property.

²That is, *ajāta* and *nāśa*.

नश्यत्युत्पद्यमानोऽर्थ इत्येतन्मग्धभाषितम् ।
सर्वलोकविरुद्धत्वान्मानैश्चापि विरुध्यते ॥५९८॥

That an object, which is coming into existence (lit. being born), comes (also) to destruction is the statement of a foolish (or, ignorant) person, because it is opposed to the world (i.e. world's experience) and also because it is opposed (i.e. disproved) by (various other authoritative) means of knowledge.¹ [598]

The idea of verse 595 is repeated, because the Kṣaṇa-bhaṅgavādin would point to the opposition of the worldly acceptance about the nature of things to the singleness of the Brahman (i.e. Ātman).

¹The Vedāntin wishes to affirm that the singleness of the Brahman can be grasped/understood from one's own experience (cf. *sarvo hy ātmāstitvam pratyeti* in BSB under 1.1.1) and from the Vedānta texts (i.e. *śabda/śruti*).

अथोत्पन्नस्य नाशोऽयं द्वितीये स्यात्क्षणे यदि ।
प्रत्यभिज्ञामृते नायं प्रतिज्ञार्थः प्रसिध्यति ॥५९९॥

(If) again (it is held that) this destruction of the object(s) that is (or, are) born occurs in the second moment (of its/their existence), then (it has to be pointed out that) the matter (lit. subject) in the enunciated proposition does not get established, except by recognition.¹ [599]

¹Add: of the object of the second moment as the same as of the earlier/first moment.

य एव जायते कर्ता स एवायं विनश्यति ।

क्षणद्वये यथा स्थायी तद्वदस्तु क्षणान्तरे ॥६००॥

(The Kṣaṇabhaṅgavādin might say:) 'That one becomes born as the agent (of some activity) and the same one perishes—as (your) eternally abiding (Ātman) belongs to the two (lit. pair of) moments; so should (that object in your view continue to) be in the second (lit. other) moment.¹ [600]

¹That is, let that also be abiding in the second moment. Cf. SP puts it as: *sthāyī janmanāśakarteti śeṣaḥ*.

मतमुत्पद्यते नासौ नापि साक्षाद्विनश्यति ।
आदिमध्यान्तहेतूत्थविकल्परहितोऽपि वा ॥६०१॥

(The Vedāntin replies:) 'It is held (by us) that that one does not become born (lit. get produced), nor also does it actually (*sākṣāt*) perish (or, come to destruction/an end); or rather, it is without any such notions as arise in the beginning, in the middle and in the end. [601]

SP supports the argument in the second line by saying: *uktaṃ hi—*

*saṃsrjyante na bhidyante svato 'rthāḥ pāramārthikāḥ /
rūpaṃ ekam anekaṃ ca teṣu buddher upaplavaḥ //*

(*Pramāṇavārtika* 1.88) —thus it reminds one of the falsehood in the activity of the Ātman's adjunct, viz. *buddhi*.

हेतुप्रतिज्ञयोः स्पष्टो विरोधः स्यात्तथा सति ॥६०२॥
मतमन्ते विनाशश्चेत्कोऽयमन्तस्त्वयोच्यते ।
क्षणस्यान्तर्बहिर्वेति न तथाप्युपपद्यते ॥६०३॥

That being so,¹ there would be a clear opposition between the reason (*hetu*) adduced and the enunciated proposition. [602]

If it is held by you that there is destruction (of an object that is born) in the end, then what (i.e. of what nature) is

this end (that) is so called by you? whether it is within that moment (of the object's birth) or outside it?— But, so also, it is not reasonable. [603]

¹SP explains *sarvavikalpaśūnye bodhe sati*.

क्षणान्तश्चेद्भवेत्ताशः क्षणिकत्वं विहन्यते ।
क्षणान्तरेऽपि नाशोऽयं पूर्वाभावान्न युज्यते ॥६०४॥

If the destruction be at the end of that moment, then (your proposition of) momentariness is disproved (lit. struck down). Also this (said) destruction, if it is held to be in another (i.e. second) moment, is not reasonable (to be stated in your proposition), since there is absence of (lit. does not exist) earlier moment. [604]

This clarifies the unreasonableness in the enunciated proposition, as mentioned in the preceding verse. SP explains the argument thus: *ekasmin pūrṇe* (v.l. *pūrve*) *kṣaṇe kṣaṇikasya sthitir iṣṭā sā ca kṣaṇamadhye nāśe na sidhyati ... kṣaṇasya bahir nāma kṣaṇāntaram tatra nāśo na kṣaṇasya yuktaḥ pūrvakṣaṇottaravartino jñānasyottarakṣaṇasambandhānupagamāt*. This is further explained in the next verse.

उत्तरक्षणविध्वस्तौ न हि पूर्वो नियुज्यते ।
तस्योत्तरत्रासद्भावाद्घ्नौव्यं च स्यात्तथा सति ॥६०५॥

Indeed, in the destruction (of the object) in the later/subsequent (i.e. second) moment, the former (i.e. earlier moment) cannot be involved (lit. employed, as the agent of the destruction), because of its non-existence in the later (moment); (and) if it were so, there would be permanence (of it). [605]

In support of this argument: SP cites: *yathāha—
asato bhāsanāyogād utpādasya ca hānitaḥ /
kāryakāraṇayor ittham vastutvaṁ kena vāryate //*

(source not traced)

आदिमध्यान्तभागत्वे निरंशत्वं च दुर्घटम् ।
क्षणस्य संततौ चापि सिद्धसाध्यत्वमुच्यते ॥६०६॥

In the nature (of an object as) having a beginning, existence (for some time) and an end, it is difficult to suppose (or happen that there is in it) partlessness; (and) in (your) holding the continuity of a moment,¹ there is (to be) stated the situation (i.e. nature) of being established (in the case) of what is (already) established.² [606]

¹SP paraphrases *kṣaṇa* as *jñāna*.

²SP clarifies this thus: *yadi vikalkpāḥ samtatim anupatanto na jñānam anupatanti tadā vijñānam sarvavikalpam iti siddham eva tvayā sādhyate*.

असत्तश्च समुत्पत्तावन्ते च क्षयसंगतेः ।
द्विविनाशप्रसक्तिः स्यात्क्षणिकत्वं च हीयते ॥६०७॥

Again, (in holding) what is non-existent has an origin and is also connected, in the end, with destruction, there would be contingent the two times' destruction and that would lead to abandoning (or, disproving the theory) of momentariness. [607]

न चेदुत्पत्तिरसतो न विनाशः सत्स्तथा ।
कूटस्थवादसक्तिः स्यान्मिथ्यासंगतितस्तयोः ॥६०८॥

If (you held that) there is no origination of a non-existent, then there is not likewise its destruction as well. (But in our view, there is) no (such) contingency, for the two¹ have (only) false connection between them (or association). [608]

¹SP considers an alternative reading for *mithyāsaṅgatis tayoh*, viz. *mitho 'saṅgatis tayoh*— that is to be translated thus: for

there is no connection between the two (viz. *jñāna* and *vikalpa*, i.e. the knowing Ātman and the supposed external objects).

अन्त्यो नाशो महाश्चेत्स्यान्नाशः सातिशयो यतः ।
विशेषाभावतो नैवं तस्यानतिशयत्वतः ॥६०९॥

(The objector argues:) 'Since the last ¹ destruction was great, ² the destruction (which I posit now) is with some additional (feature of it)'. (The Vedāntin's answer:) 'This is not so, for there is not any difference of that destruction from this, as it (i.e. this latter) does not have any (new) distinctive (feature acquired)'. [609]

For a detailed discussion on this point, read SP which is very lucid.

¹This refers to the *prāgabhāva* 'previous non-existence' of the external object under discussion.

²There is comparison of the *prāgabhāva* with *dhvaṃsābhāva*; the latter being lesser in importance, according to the objector.

मत्वर्थानुपपत्तेश्च क्षणिकत्वाद्यसंभवः ।
द्रव्यतन्नाशयोर्यस्मान्नैवेहास्त्येककालता ॥६१०॥

'Also, because the sense of the possessive suffix *-matup* is unreasonable, ¹ there is impossibility of momentariness etc. (there being); ² (this is so), because there is not simultaneity in the point of (lit. the sameness of) the time between (the existence/origination of) a substance (i.e. object) and its destruction/perishing.' [610]

¹This is already pointed out in verse 587 above.

²The word 'etc.' refers to destructibility etc.

न च नाशस्य कालोऽस्ति क्षणमध्ये तथा बहिः ।
क्षणान्तरं बहिर्यस्मात्क्षणमध्ये ध्रुवत्वतः ॥६११॥

'Also, the time of (i.e. taken for) destruction does not occur in or outside the moment (when the object is said to originate and to perish (or, come to destruction)); because another moment is outside the moment (under reference) on account of the (object's continued) existence in that moment.' [611]

The purport of the argument is that there is no properly conceived relation of the object's destruction to the moment when it originated and existed.

धन्यासीदिति दृष्टश्चेन्न लक्षणविरोधतः ।

लक्षणे वर्तमानस्य कालस्य श्रवणं यतः ॥६१२॥

(An objection:) 'But (the sense of *kṣaṇika* as *kṣaṇavān* i.e. *kṣaṇa* with the suffix *-matub* is reasonable as) in the words 'he was a *dhanin*'¹ 'possessed of wealth,' it is seen that the sense of *dhanin* is understood as the reason even when he is seen today (without wealth). (The answer:) 'No, it is not so, since that would invite the fault in respect of the *lakṣaṇa* (seeing (some object)), for there in *lakṣaṇa* there is a reference to (lit. hearing of) the present (period of time)'.¹ [612]

¹SP clarifies this thus: *tad asyāsty asminn iti matub iti lakṣaṇe tamānakālasyāstīti śravaṇād bhūte bhāvinī vā na tatprayoga arthaḥ*. That means: the word *dhanin* would convey the simultaneous existence of wealth and the possessor of it at the present time.

त्रिकाललक्षणार्थं चेदस्तीति यदि भण्यते ।

तादर्थ्ये कारणाभावान्नैतदप्युपपद्यते ॥६१३॥

If one were to say the word *asti* is used (in *tad asyāstīti matub*) for indicating/conveying (all) the three times (i.e. periods of time); this also is not reasonable, since there is no reason (i.e. cause)¹ for (the word's) having that (proposed) sense. [613]

¹This is *hetu*.

प्रत्यक्षेण विरोधाच्च न क्षणस्य विनाशिता ।
 प्रत्यक्षानुमयोर्नापि विरुद्धाव्यभिचारिता ॥६१४॥
 सिद्धसाध्यत्वमथवा नङ्क्ष्यतीति मतं यदि ।
 क्षणिकत्वस्य हानिः स्यात्किं नश्छिन्नं तथा सति ॥६१५॥

‘Also, on account of the opposition of direct perception a moment does not have the nature of what is momentary. So also there is not mutual non-concomitance of direct perception and inference.’ [614]

‘Or, if it is held that the fault of what is to be proved is what is already proved will (itself) cease to be; then, there would be abandoning (or giving up) of (the view of) momentariness, (and) in that case, what will be lost of us (or, in our view)?’ [615]

SP offers on these two verses quite an elaborate explanation; it may be read with profit.

अर्थक्रियादिलिङ्गेन विरोधित्वाच्च नेष्यते ।
 क्षणिकाः सर्वभावाः स्युरिति यत्प्राक्समीरितम् ॥६१६॥

‘And (your) proposition, viz. ‘All external objects are momentary,’ which is stated (by you) earlier, is not accepted (by us), on account of its being opposed to the reason (*linga*)¹ in the form of practical activity.’ [616]

This argument is based on *arthānupattivirodha*.

¹Cf. SP: *lingaśabdenānupapattiḥ*.

शाल्याद्युद्धहनादि स्यादुत्पित्सोर्वा जनिस्तथा ।
 अर्थक्रिया न मानं वस्तुनैव विरोधतः ॥६१७॥

'There would be (the activity, viz) bringing etc.¹ (seeds of) paddy etc.² and, so also, the production (lit. origination) of that which is about to appear (lit. is to be produced) — this successful/practical activity is not (for you) a means of knowing (the continued existence) of (external objects), since there would be opposition to that means. [617]

This is further reaffirmed in the next verse.

¹This 'etc.' refers to the sower's going out for the seeds. These are mentioned in view of the word *utpitsoḥ* which follows.

²This 'etc.' stands for barley (and other corns).

क्षणिकत्वं न भावानां कथंचिदपि युज्यते ।
नष्टेन नश्यता वापि न शाल्याद्याहृतिक्रिया ॥६१८॥

In no way (then) the (postulation of) momentariness of (external) objects can be reasonable (lit. accepted); (for) the activity of bringing (the seeds of) paddy etc. (can-)not (be accomplished) by the (objects') having been destroyed or being destroyed. [618]

This is the statement of the result of *arthāpatti*, viz. being a means of proving momentariness of objects.

verses 619-620 reject (or refute) the two alternatives expressed *naṣṭena* and *naśyatā*.

संतत्योत्पद्यमानैश्चेत्फलहेत्वात्मभिर्भवेत् ।
भावैरर्थक्रिया सर्वा यथा दीपादिभिस्तथा ॥६१९॥
उत्पित्स्वजातं सज्जातमनष्टं वाभ्युपेयते ।
निनङ्क्षु नश्यन्नष्टं च प्रत्यभिज्ञामृतै कथम् ॥६२०॥

If (it is held by the objector:) 'All that successful practical activity¹ can (or, might) be accomplished by (the external objects) which are being produced in continuity (or, series) and have become the cause(s) of the result(s), in the same

way as it (viz. various activity is accomplished) by a lamp etc.,² [619]

(and) it is accepted that what is about to be produced (or is to come into existence) as unborn and (lit. or (vā)) what is born as non-destroyed', (then it can be asked, in return/refutation) 'How can what is about to get destroyed or is being destroyed and (what is) destroyed (be understood) without (there being) recognition?' [620]

¹This refers to *arthākriyā* mentioned in verse 617 above.

²The word 'etc.' refers to a pitcher, for example.

Verses 621-626 explain away the view: *saṃtatyā kāryam*

प्रबन्धेनार्चिषो धर्मा धर्मिण्यग्नौ व्यवस्थिते ।
अर्थक्रियां वर्तमानाः कुर्युर्ग्रामाद्यवासिवत् ॥६२१॥
दीपादिवदसंभाव्या भवतोऽर्थक्रिया यतः ।
क्षणिकत्वे न सा युक्ता तद्धेतुविरहात्सदा ॥६२२॥

(It is decided that) the activities (lit. properties)¹ of some flame abiding at present in fire, which remains there ever, by their (being in) series (*prabandhena*) would accomplish (or, serve) the purpose of the object(s), like some person, who (continues to exist for more than one moment) would have reached some village, town etc.;² [621]

since the performance of an activity by an object (or objects) is not possible, like in the case of a lamp etc.,³ when there is accepted the momentariness (of the object(s)), that⁴ owing to the absence (of the same as the) cause(s).⁵ [622]

¹*dharma* means *kriyā* 'activity (which is *sādhya*)' and *guṇa* 'property (which is innate)'.

²This 'etc.' would refer to the other activities of the person, performed by him, on reaching the village/town.

³The word 'etc.' refers to a pitcher (and other objects).

⁴This refers to *arthakriyā*.

⁵The word 'cause(s)' can be understood in the sense of 'agent(s)'. SP clarifies this thus: *maitrādes tu svato bhaṅguratve na kadācid api śālyāharaṇādyarthakriyā yuktā tatkartur abhāvādity arthaḥ*. Yet, one could understand it with reference to the momentarily existing objects which would not be able to be the cause of that activity.

नानुत्पन्नस्य हेतुत्वमुदकाद्याहतौ भवेत् ।

उत्पित्सूत्पद्यमानाभ्यामसत्त्वात्तद्वदेव न ॥६२३॥

There would (or, could) not be the action of a cause (viz. agent) in such (activity) as fetching water, (while its agent) has not come into being; so also, that would not be there in the case of what is about to be (born or produced, or to come into existence) and/or what is being (born or produced),¹ because of its non-existence. [623]

SP points to the absence of the cause (i.e. agent) of an activity in respect of (i) what is not born (or produced), (ii) what is about to be born or produced (or, to come into existence), (iii) what is being born (or, coming into existence); (iv) what is (already) destroyed (or, has already perished), (v) what is about to be destroyed (or, about to perish), and (vi) what exists in some moment. The first line is the refutation of (i), the second, of (ii) and (iii). The remaining (alternatives), viz. (iv) and (v) are refuted in verse 624 and (vi) in verse 625, below.

¹-*vat* in *tadvat* is according to Pāṇini 5.1.115: *tena tulyaṁ kriyā ced vatih*.

कर्मलोमादिवत्तद्वन्नापि तत्स्याद्विनश्यता ।

म्रियमाणो न शक्नोति पुत्रं जनयितुं क्वचित् ॥६२४॥

In the same way, (it would not be there) as in the case of the hair¹ on (the body of) a tortoise; also, it cannot (be accomplished) by one that is being destroyed (or, is perishing), (for), indeed, a dying person can nowhere (*na kvacit*)² be

capable of begetting a son.

[624]

¹SP refers in this context to *kūrmakṣīra* also.

²In *kvacit*, there is reference to only a place.

हेतुत्वं लभते नापि तथैवावस्थितः क्वचित् ।
आ कार्यावसितेः स्थाने सिद्धान्तस्ते विनश्यति ॥६२५॥

And, nowhere can it become (lit. attain the status of) cause (viz. agent), being (i.e. continuing to exist) in that moment, till there is completion of an activity; (for), in that case, your doctrine (of momentariness) becomes lost (i.e. defeated). [625]

SP brings out the import of the verse, saying that (i) in the moment of the object's origination (or, coming into being), it cannot do any activity (as said earlier) and (ii) it cannot continue to exist in the moment when that activity is performed.

विनाशक्रियया व्याप्तमुत्पन्नं चेद्विनश्यति ।
फलहेतुप्रबन्धेनेत्येवं सुस्थमिदं भवेत् ॥६२६॥

(An argument of the objector:) 'If what has come into existence (or, being) is (already) pervaded by destruction (i.e. becoming destroyed, or perishing), by the continuity of the cause of the result (viz. causing the activity), this (opinion/view of ours) becomes well-proposed'. [626]

In verses 627-631 the notion of saṃtāna is introduced by the objector and refuted by the Siddhāntin.

संतानानपपत्तेश्च नैवमप्युपपद्यते ।
संतनोतीति संतानः कर्ता चेदभिधीयते ॥६२७॥
तस्य चैकत्वनाशित्वात्संतानो नोपपद्यते ।
नाप्यपादानतः सिध्येन्न वाधिकरणाश्रयात् ॥६२८॥
न चान्यस्मिन्विभक्त्यर्थे यथोक्तेनैव हेतुना ।

Thus also (the view) is not tenable, if (i.e. when or for) the agent is called *saṃtāna* 'stream of consciousness' on the basis of (*iti*) the derivation (of that word from the verb root *tan* 'to stretch/extend' with the prefix *sa-*), viz. he who continues (to be). [627]

And, owing to its singleness and perishability, continuity cannot be tenable. Nor also can that (viz. continuity) get (or, be) established by (the object's) being an *apādāna* '(point of) departure, or a thing from which another departs', nor also by resorting to an *adhikaraṇa* 'a support'. [628]

Nor, also, in any other meaning signified by the (relevant grammatical) case—this on account of, or, owing to) the reason which is (already) stated. [629ab]

SP points out that the *saṃtāna* can be either a *kāraka* '(that which is) related to an activity-expressing verbal form', or a *bhāva* 'thing coming into existence'. Be it one of the notions signified by the grammatical case relevant: (i) the agent, (ii) the point of departure, (iii) the support, (iv) the object, (v) the instrument, (vi) the recipient in an activity. The second line of verse 627 and the first of 628 reject the notion (i); the second line of verse 628 rejects the notions (ii) and (iii); and verse 629ab refutes the remaining, i.e. notions (iv)-(vi); (for detailed explanations, see SP with profit); or it rejects a positive entity, this being stated in verses 629cd, 630 and 631 below.

संतानो यदि धात्वर्थो भावश्चेदभिधीयते ॥६२९॥

भवितारमपेक्ष्यैव भावः सिध्येन्न सोऽन्यथा ।

न चासौ लभ्यते तादृग्भविता हि विनश्चरः ॥६३०॥

If it is held (lit. said), 'Continuity is a positive entity, signified by the verbal root', [629cd]

(then the answer is:) 'A positive entity would come into existence (or, come to be established) only after depending on (lit. on having expected) what will come to be; (and) not otherwise. But (*ca*) that one one does not obtain (lit. is not

found), for the one of kind/sort of a thing/person is going to be is (only) perishable/destructible.' [630]

The argument in verse 630 is based on the question: Is continuity (*saṃtati*), i.e. the stream of consciousness (*saṃtāna*) in existence? or that it does not exist? The verse under reference (i.e. 630) discusses the first alternative—but, there also, out of the two sub-alternatives which are there—two in number: (i) permanent and (ii) momentary—the first of these is considered.

नित्यं भवितृतन्त्रत्वात्संतानस्याप्यनित्यता ।
धातूपसर्गयोरर्थस्त्वत्पक्षे न च लभ्यते ॥६३१॥

Even the stream of consciousness is impermanent, since it is ever dependent on what will come to be; and, moreover, the meaning conveyed by the preposition (*sa-*) and the verb root *tan* together is not in tune/agreement (lit. obtained) with your view. [631]

Verses 632-637 set aside (or, reject) the etymological meanings of the word *saṃtāna*.

नैकीभावो न विस्तारः क्षणिकत्वेऽस्ति युक्तिमान् ।
अतीतानागतानां च मिथः कालासमागमात् ॥६३२॥
वर्तमानस्य चैकत्वात्संतानो नोपपद्यते ।
संतानिभ्यश्च संतानोऽभिन्नो भिन्नोऽथवा द्विधा ॥६३३॥

Neither becoming one nor continuation (of something which is already in existence) is adduced with (good, i.e. valid) reason; for there is no connection (lit. conjunction) with one another (of two moments) of time, viz. that which is already gone by and that which is yet to come. [632]

Since the present moment of time is just single, its being the continued stream of consciousness is untenable. And (there are further questions that arise:) 'Is the stream of consciousness non-distinct from those which form into a stream? or, is it

distinct from the same? or, is it twofold (i.e. both non-distinct and distinct)?' [633]

The first two of these questions are answered in the next verse (i.e. 634) and the third, in verse 635.

अभेदेऽनित्यतासक्तिः स्थास्नुर्भेदे प्रसज्यते ।
कार्यकारणभावश्च न च वः स्यादभीप्सितः ॥६३४॥

If (it is held that it is) non-distinct, then (it would be contingent to accept that) it is not permanent and if (otherwise, i.e.) distinct, then (contingently) it would be permanent. And, as a consequence, the relation (between the two) as cause and effect, which you have wished to hold, would not follow (or, be there). [634]

SP cites, in support of this argument, the following thus: *yathāha— samtānaś ca pūrvāparībhūtānām kṣaṇānām sākṣād upādānopādeyabhāvenotpāda evocyata iti.*

भिन्नाभिन्नत्वपक्षोऽपि विरोधान्न च युज्यते ।
स्वसिद्धान्तस्य च ध्वस्तिर्न च संगच्छते जनः ॥६३५॥

Also the view that the two are both distinct and non-distinct is not tenable (i.e. reasonable, or, proper) because of the opposition (obtaining between them).¹ And no person would tolerate (lit. go with)² the refutation of his own doctrine/view.

[635]

¹ Namely, they do not occur at one and the same moment.

² One wonders if the verbal form *sangacchate* expects the accusative case of *dhvasti*.

संतानिनां स्वसंतानाद्विन्नाभिन्नत्वकल्पने ।
वाच्या दोषा यथायोगं संतानार्थानुरोधतः ॥६३६॥

In regard to accepting the (simultaneous) distinction and non-distinction of those that have continuum from their (own) continuance, there are to be pointed out (lit. stated) such blemishes as are in consonance with the thing (known as their) continuum. [636]

SP observes: *bhede samtānasvātantryādyāpattir abhede kṣaṇi-
katādihānir bhedābhede siddhāntavirodha ity arthaḥ.*

अवाच्यमिति पक्षश्चेन्मैवं तस्याप्यसंभवात् ।
अन्यानन्योभयात्मत्वकल्पने ह्यसदेव तत् ॥६३७॥

If there is the view; '(The nature of) the stream (or, continuum) of consciousness is indescribable', (it should be pointed out:) 'Even that is not possible (or tenable), for, indeed, that (viz. the threefold) acceptance of it as (altogether) distinct/different, or as non-distinct, or both, all that is but non-existent (or false)'. [637]

Verses 638-639 discard the view that there is the existence of another.

अवाच्यं यद्यनन्यत्वे ह्यन्यत्वे वाच्यमेव तत् ।
अथावाच्यं तदन्यत्वे इतरत्रास्तु वाच्यता ॥६३८॥

If it be (accepted as) indescribable, while it is non-distinct, it should then be regarded as describable while it is distinct. And, if it is indescribable while it has distinction, then let there be (accepted) describability in what is otherwise (or, elsewhere). [638]

Verses 639-646 set aside the notions of describability and/or indescribability both.

अन्यानन्यत्वयोश्चात्र वाच्यावाच्यत्वयोस्तथा ।
परस्परविरोधित्वान्न स्यादेकत्र संगतिः ॥६३९॥

Further, in respect of them as being distinct and non-distinct¹ and also in respect of their being describable and indescribable, their existence together (or association)² would not be (possible) owing to their being mutually opposed. [639]

¹Sureśvara uses *anyānanyatvayoḥ* for *anyatva-ananyatvayoḥ*; so also *vācyāvācyatvayoḥ* for *vācyatva-avācyatvayoḥ*.

²Literally, going (or, being) together.

वाच्यं वा यदि वावाच्यं कस्मादित्यभिधीयताम् ।
परबुद्धौ समारोप्यमवश्यं वस्तु चेद्वेत् ॥६४०॥

Also, (be it said that) the stream of consciousness is describable or indescribable, then it should be told (as to) why/whence (that is so); if there is/be inevitably/necessarily (some) thing on which another (or, substance) is superimposed. [640]

न चावाच्यं भवत्पक्षे किञ्चिद्वस्त्वभ्युपेयते ।
वक्तव्यभावं भवान्यत्र तत्र वस्तुनि का कथा ॥६४१॥

Also, nothing is accepted in your view as indescribable; what talk can be there (lit. in that thing) in respect of which (lit. where) you mention that it is a negative entity?¹ [641]

This is based on an argument of the objection: *saṃtāna*, though it is an object and has a property, viz. absence of describability.

¹SP brings out the purport of the second line thus: *ākāśaḥ pratisaṃkhyānirodhaś cety abhāvam api bhavān yadā vadati tadā saṃtāne vastuni vācyatvābhāvakathāpi na te yuktety arthaḥ*.

तद्रूपं चेदवाच्यत्वं भवताभ्युपगम्यते ।
नैवं साधारणत्वात्स्यात्पुद्गलादेरपीष्यते ॥६४२॥

Also, if you hold that indescribability is the nature of the form of that; this is not so, because, owing to its being a

common property, it would/could be accepted in the case of matter etc.¹ also. [642]

SP mentions, in this context, that even atoms etc., which are external, are indescribable—and this is acceptable to the objector.
¹This is *pudgala*, a term among the Jains in particular; it means: matter, externally existing atoms etc. The word etc. refers to other external objects.

अतोऽसाधारणं वाच्यं रूपं संतानवस्तुनः ।
 अथावाच्यत्वमेवास्य रूपमित्यभिधीयते ॥६४३॥
 उक्तं तर्हि त्वया रूपं संततेर्घटरूपवत् ।
 यदसाधारणं यस्य रूपं तत्तस्य भण्यते ॥६४४॥
 ततश्चावाच्यमिति ते प्राप्ता स्वोक्तिविरुद्धता ।
 तथा संतानविच्छिन्नकल्पनापि न युज्यते ॥६४५॥

Therefore, it is to be said that the nature (lit. form) of the thing called continuum is uncommon. Now, if (i.e. when) it is said that this one (viz. the stream of consciousness) has indescribability as its nature (lit. form), [643]

then, you have admitted (lit. said) that the nature (lit. form) of continuum is like the nature (lit. form) of a pitcher. Whatever is the uncommon nature of some thing has (lit. is) to be called (i.e. accepted) as its nature (lit. form). [644]

Therefore, (now your acceptance that) indescribability (is the nature (lit. form) of the continuum) means (your accepting) opposition to your own proposition (lit. statement). And, in that case (*tathā*), (thus entertaining) the notion of break in the continuum is not tenable. [645]

संतानस्याव्यवच्छिन्नौ सर्वदैव प्रसज्यते ।
 सभागसंततिः सा हि नाविच्छेदमृते यतः ॥६४६॥

(And,) in the absence of the break in the stream ..., there will ever be contingent the continuity of what has (or, is made up of) parts, since that (viz. *sabhāgasantati*) cannot be without

the absence of break. [64

In verses 647-648, Sureśvara discards the existence and/or non-existence of *saṁtāna*.

अनित्यत्वप्रसङ्गाच्च न सती संततिर्भवेत् ।
इत्युक्तेन प्रकारेण संतानासंभवो ध्रुवः ॥६४७॥

Also, on account of the contingency, viz. impermanence being there, there would not be an existent continuum. Thus, in the manner stated, there is certainly the impossibility of a continuum. [64

फलहेतुनिषेधाच्च न युक्तं सर्वथा वचः ।
संतत्या जायमानैस्तैरिति यद्व्याहृतं पुरा ॥६४८॥

Also, because of the rejection (or denial) of the cause of (any) result, the opinion (lit. say of the opponent) is, in no way, (supported) by reason. (And) what was said earlier, viz. *saṁtatyā jāyamānaiḥ*, is refuted (lit. answered away) earlier. [64

यच्च दीपप्रकाशादिक्रियावदिति चोदितम् ।
साधयार्थेन समानत्वात्तदप्युक्तमशोभनम् ॥६४९॥

And, as to what was stated as a counterargument (*codita*) viz. 'like the activities such as illuminating by a lamp,'¹ that also is an improper statement because of its being similar to what is to be established.² [64

¹Cf. the verse *prabandhenārciṣo dharmā dharmiṇi ...* in verse 521 above.

²Cf. SP: *dr̥ṣṭāntasyāpi pakṣatulyatayā kṣaṇikatvāsammater ity arthaḥ*. This is explained in the next verse.

अर्थक्रिया यथा नास्ति रथादेरुक्तहेतुतः ।

दीपादेरपि नैवासावस्ति तेनैव हेतुना ॥६५०॥

As there is not in the case of a chariot etc.¹ any activity towards (effecting a certain) object on account of the said reason,² it is not there in the case of a lamp etc.³ also, for the same reason. [650]

This would be the outcome of the objector's proposition.

¹The word 'etc.' refers to other inanimate objects.

²Namely, *kṣaṇikatva* 'momentariness' (SP).

³The word 'etc.' refers to a pitcher and other similar existent objects.

क्षणिकत्वं यथा नास्ति रथादेर्येन हेतुना ।

दीपादेरपि तेनैव क्षणिकत्वाद्यसंभवः ॥६५१॥

(Then) as momentariness does not occur (or, is not to be accepted) in the case of a chariot etc. for the reason (which is earlier adduced); therefore, for that very reason, there is not possible, in the case of a lamp etc., momentariness etc.¹

[651]

¹The word 'etc.' refers to *saṃtati* 'continuum'.

एककालौ मतौ यच्च नाशोत्पादौ तुलान्तवत् ।

अहेतुफलतासक्तेर्न चैतदुपपद्यते ॥६५२॥

And, as to that the destruction/perishing and origination are held to be belonging to one and the same time,¹ just like two pans of a balance,² that also is not tenable, since there would contingently follow the situation that there is result (produced even) without (or, in the absence of) a cause (being operative). [652]

¹SP clarifies it thus: *na hi bīje sthite 'nikuro jāyate naṣṭād eva tasmāt taddr̥ṣṭer iti yan matam ity arthah*. See next verse.

²SP adds: which are not related as a cause and its effect; t adds a simile 'like two horns (of an animal)'.

जनकव्यापृतेः पश्चाज्जन्यो निष्पद्यतेऽङ्कुरः ।
कार्यकारणताभेदस्तयोः स्याद्विन्नकालतः ॥६५३॥

(Actually) it is after the functioning of what produces (*janaka*, viz. a seed) that there comes into existence a sprout which is to be produced (lit. born (*janya*)) and the relation of the two as distinct, viz. the cause and the effect, would occur as at two different (points of) time. [653]

न चेत्कारकभेदोऽत्र कालभेदोऽथवेक्ष्यते ।
कुतो हेतुफलत्वं स्यात्सव्येतरविषाणवत् ॥६५४॥

If (suppose) one were to ignore the distinction between the two as *kāraṅkas* (viz. the agent and the object connected with the verbal root *pad* with the prefix *ut-*), how (or, whence) could there be their relation as cause and effect as (it would not exist) between the left and the other (i.e. right) horns (of an animal)? [654]

This verse denies the relation of a seed and the sprout (arising from it), since they (i) belong to two different points of time and (ii) are both momentary.

न च हेतुफलत्वं स्यादेककालीनयोस्तयोः ।
वैनाशिकेन सत्त्वेन त्वयाभ्युपगमात्तयोः ॥६५५॥

Also, there would not be between the two the relation of cause and effect, if (and when) they would be belonging to (only) one (point of) time; for, in your opinion (or view), they are (each) connected with perishability.¹ [655]

¹Read SP: *tayor ékasmin kṣaṇe sattvenābhyupagamād viṣāṇavat āryakāraṇatvābhāvasyeṣṭatvād iti yojanā*.

Verses 656-658 are in refutation of accepting any effect, with the help of ārambhavāda and pariṇāmanavāda.

न विकारो न चारभ्यं बौद्ध कार्यमसंभवात् ।

विकारे सांख्यसिद्धान्त आरम्भेऽत्यन्तभिन्नता ॥६५६॥

An effect is, O Buddhist,¹ neither a modification nor what is to be begun (by something else); (for) in holding (the effect as) a modification, (you would have taken) the position of the Sāṃkhyas and in holding (that there is) a beginning (of the effect, i.e. its coming into existence), (your acceptance would have) their total distinction.² [656]

¹It appears from an alternative explanation in SP: *yadi vā bauddhasyābhimataṃ kāryam* that one could read in the first line word as *bauddhakāryam*; cf. the MRI edition (p.986) which so reads.

²Possibly this would show the relation of cause and effect to be untenable, because they are unlike each other. The idea underlying this is: *kāraṇaguṇāḥ kāryaguṇān ārabhante* is an accepted principle of the Sāṃkhyas and others.

सत्त्वाद्विनिष्ठितार्थश्च सत्स्रोतोन्तरनिष्ठितः ।

घटस्तम्भादिवन्नापि मृद्वत्परिणमेत्स्वयम् ॥६५७॥

Further, an (externally existent) object,¹ which has originated from (another) existent (object) is made firm in another existing stream; also it would not modify itself in the same way as a pitcher, a pillar etc. (or) as a clay (do not modify themselves).² [657]

SP clarifies: *kāryakāraṇayor atyantābhede tadbhāvasyaivāyuktir ity arthaḥ*.

¹This also stands for a stream, in view of *-srotontara*.

²This denies the Buddhist's non-acceptance of *pariṇāmanavāda*

(of the Sāṃkhyas). Cf. SP: *kṣaṇikatvāc ca brahmaṇo vaiṣamyādity arthah*.

नापि चारभते कार्यं पुरतः कुम्भकारवत् ।
असत्त्वान्न द्वयं तेऽस्ति सांख्यकाणादपक्षवत् ॥६५८॥

Also, (what is momentary in nature) cannot begin (to produce) an effect, as does a potter. The pair (viz. a cause and its effect) cannot exist (or lit. are not in existence), as in the views of the Sāṃkhyas and the followers of Kaṇāda on account of its momentariness.

[658]

In verses 659, Sureśvara states his own refutation of *kṣaṇikatvavāda*.

इत्यादिदूषणान्यत्र वक्तव्यानि सहस्रशः ।
न च प्रमाणसद्भावः सर्वस्य ज्ञानमात्रतः ॥६५९॥

These and such other blemishes¹ can be stated (or, pointed out), (yes) in thousands. And, here (i.e. in respect of this theory of the Buddhists), there is not available (lit. is the absence of) any means of knowledge (in that theory) for the reason that (all is) merely consciousness.²

[659]

¹SP summarises these very clearly and also, points out that they do not beset the Vedāntin's theory thus: *yat tu vedā na ramāṇam nāpy apauruṣeyā nityā vā saṃketaś ca sambandhaḥ*.

²This is against the Vijñānavādins, the Yogācāra followers.

Verses 660-664 relate to the refutation of the Mīmāṃsakas' view that the Ātman has the nature of insentient knowledge.

शून्यत्वमपि नैव स्यादेतस्मादेव कारणात् ।
अहंप्रत्ययगम्यत्वमेकत्वादात्मनो न च ॥६६०॥

Also there cannot be the nature of (all as) void, this, also,

for this very reason (which is pointed out). Nor again is there the singleness¹ of the Ātman, which can be understood from the consciousness of I (i.e. that 'I exist')—(as in the view of the Mīmāṃsakas).² [660]

This brings in, further, an argument against the Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsakas (also), which is continued in the next verse as well.

¹It appears from SP (and also AnSS edition's variant reading) that the verse read: ... *gamyatvam etasmād ātmano* Also, SP notes: *ekatvād iti pāṭhe 'py ayam evārthaḥ*, i.e. it makes *etasmāt* and *ekatvāt* synonymous!

²The Mīmāṃsakas have come into the discussion, only incidentally, 'for this very reason (which is pointed out', which means, 'owing to the absence of any authoritative (or, correct) means of knowing (reality). This seems to refer to BUB: *pratyagātmagrāhyatā cātmano 'ham iti mīmāṃsāpakṣaḥ pratyuktaḥ*.

अंशंशित्वेऽपि नैव स्यात्पूर्वोक्तादेव कारणात् ।
क्षणभङ्गे च भावानां प्रत्यभिज्ञाद्यसंभवः ॥६६१॥

In (holding the view:) there being the relation of part(s) and the whole (in respect of what are conceived as cause and effect(s)) also,¹ (that view can-)not be (tenable), for that very reason (already) pointed out (lit. stated). And, further, in (accepting) the momentariness of (external) objects, there is no possibility of a recognition (being there)² etc.³ [661]

¹The thought of refuting (incidentally) the view of the Mīmāṃsakas (intended in the preceding verse) is still persisting.

²Once again, this is a reference to the view of the Buddhist; cf. SP *siṃhāvalokananyāyena baudham prati doṣāntaram āha*.

³The word 'etc.' refers to memory and the subsequent performance of activity (SP).

पूर्वदृष्टे पुनः सोऽयमिति बुद्धिर्न युज्यते ॥६६२॥

भेदः स एवायमिति कालरूपादिभेदतः ।

यदि नाम तथाप्यैक्यं तयोरनुभवाश्रयात् ॥६६३॥

In the case of (some one), who is seen again, it is not proper/reasonable to entertain the knowledge, viz. 'This one is the same'; [662]

(because) this (knowledge), 'This one is but the same', is related to the difference in (points of) time and nature/form'. If again, there is yet oneness of the two on the basis of (one's) experience, it is on the basis of (their) sameness/identity. [663]

सादृश्यात्प्रत्यभिज्ञानं कृत्तकेशनखादिवत् ।

इति चेन्नैतदेवं स्यात्सादृश्यासंभवात्तव ॥६६४॥

If it is held (by the Buddhist:) 'There can be recognition (by one) on the basis of the similarity in appearance, as in the case of hair and/or nails, cut earlier (and now grown),' then it has to be said in answer:) 'No, this one is not like (what) you (would hold), for (in) your (view of the world of objects) there is impossibility (for any supposition of) similarity'. [664]

ie, Sureśvara refers to BUB: *sādrśyāt pratyabhijñānaṃ kṛtto-
takeśanakhādīṣv iveti cet*

ses 665-671 refute the view: *sādrśyāt pratyabhijñā*.

सादृश्यासंभवश्चापि सर्वस्य क्षणिकत्वतः ।

नाप्यनेकार्थदर्शयिस्ति सादृश्यं स्याद्यतस्तव ॥६६५॥

and the impossibility (for any supposition of) similarity is owing to momentariness of all (as you have been holding) and, also because, according to you (*tava*), this (notion of) similarity does not relate to (lit. does not see) more things than one. [665]

सादृश्यान्न च केशादौ स एवायमितीक्षणम् ।

केशादिजातेरेकत्वाद्धीरियं तन्निबन्धना ॥६६६॥

Again, in respect of hair etc.,¹ there cannot be any grasping (lit. seeing) on the basis of the similarity that can be expressed as, 'This one is the same'; for, this is but a seeing, related to it, because of the oneness of the species of hair etc.¹,

[666]

¹The word 'etc.' refers to nails.

न हि लूनोत्थितेष्वेषु विना जातिसमाश्रयम् ।
त एवामी इति मतिः कस्यचिद्व्यक्तितहेतुजा ॥६६७॥

Indeed (*hi*), one cannot have a thought (or, knowledge) that has arisen on some (particular) object (appearing before one), viz. 'These are but the same' in the case of the hair, which have grown after they had been cut, unless one resorted to (or, unless there was (for one) the basis of) the species. [667]

अभ्रान्तस्य हि केशादौ यदा सदृशधीस्तदा ।
पूर्ववालैरिमे वालाः सदृशा इति जायते ॥६६८॥

Indeed (*hi*), in the case of anyone,¹ who is not mistaken (or, has not erred), when there arises (is) the knowledge of a similar (object/person), there appears a cognition as (for example) in respect of hair etc.,² that is of this form, viz. 'These hair are similar to what were (seen by me) earlier'.

[668]

¹This is owing to the force of *hi*; cf. SP: *ukte 'rthe sarvāvisamvādārtho hiśabdah*.

²The word 'etc.' refers to nails.

त एवामी इति मतिर्जायते न तु कस्यचित् ।
एकजातिनिमित्तातः प्रत्यभिज्ञेयमिष्यते ॥६६९॥

But, in the case of none, there arises the cognition (lit. notion),

'These hair are the same as those'. As such, this is understood (or, accepted) to be recognition, based (lit. caused) as it is on (their belonging to) the same species.¹ [669]

¹Cf. SP: *vyaktinimittatvāsambhavo 'taḥśabdārthaḥ*.

प्रत्यक्षं च तदेवेदमित्येतद्वस्तुकर्मकम् ।
उल्लिखज्जायते साक्षादतीतेऽहन्यधर्मकम् ॥६७०॥

And (this statement of yours), 'This is the same as that', is but the direct perception which has (some) thing as its object;¹ it arises, referring directly to it,¹ (from) what does not have the property (of that) when that has ceased to exist (lit. is bygone). [670]

Read NKL (ms. p.623): *bādhābhāvād abhrāntam ity arthaḥ*.

¹This refers to the grammatical object.

इदमेव तदेवेदमित्येषोऽनुभवो दृढः ।
प्रत्यक्षो बाध्यते नायमनुमानेन केनचित् ॥६७१॥

This firm direct experience (in the form), 'Just this, this one is only that' cannot (lit. is not) stultified by any inference.¹ [671]

¹On this, cf. SP: *agnyanuṣṇātānumānavat pratyakṣavirodhe mīkatvānumānaṃ nodetīti bhāvaḥ*. Also, *viparītam bādhyadhakatvaṃ pratyāha pratyakṣa iti*. This latter is clarified in the next verse.

verses 672-678 are in refutation of *anumānena pratyakṣabādhah*.

प्रत्यक्षेण विरोधे हि लिङ्गमाभासतां व्रजेत् ।
यतोऽतो नानुमानेन प्रत्यक्षस्यास्ति बाधनम् ॥६७२॥

Since, indeed, inference (*liṅga*) would be (so only) in

appearance, when (or, in case) there is its opposition to direct perception, therefore, there is not (i.e. cannot be) stultification of direct perception (of some thing) by inference (about it).

[672]

विज्ञातपूर्वकुम्भस्य पुनः कुम्भान्तरेक्षणे ।
सादृश्यप्रत्ययो युक्तौ न त्वसौ क्षणिकात्मसु ॥६७३॥

It is proper to entertain the notion (lit. experience) of similarity in appearance on (or while) seeing another pitcher to a pitcher, that is already (or, lit. earlier) known, but that cannot be (entertained) on seeing those (pitchers) which have the nature of momentary (objects).

[673]

पूर्वं दृष्ट्वापि चेत्तिष्ठेद्यावदागामिदर्शनम् ।
सादृश्यधीप्रसिद्ध्यर्थमित्यभ्युपगमेऽपि च ॥६७४॥
सिद्धा सादृश्यधीरेवं क्षणिकत्वं तु नश्यति ।
स्वरूपमात्रसंबोधि नात्मनोऽपि क्षयोदयौ ॥६७५॥
ज्ञानं प्रत्यभिजानाति ध्वंसित्वान्नापि चापरम् ।
सादृश्यक्षणिकत्वे द्वे त्वदिष्टे न प्रसिद्ध्यतः ॥६७६॥

If or even after seeing (some object) earlier, the (seer) remains (or, continues to remain) till when (he comes to have) the sight of (another thing) which is yet to come (to his) eyes/knowing, so that there can be (established/entertained the notion of) similarity—then, in this opinion (or, thus understanding) also,

[674]

there is established the understanding/grasping of similarity of appearance though, the (doctrine of) momentariness is lost i.e. has to be abandoned. (As against this) the knowledge which is the awareness (*sambodhi*) of only itself (lit. its own nature) does not recognise its own destruction and/or rise and not also another (thing) because of it (i.e. of this latter) being perishable. As a consequence, (therefore), the notions of similarity in appearance and momentariness, which are entertained (or, held) by you, do not become (or, get)

established.

[675-676]

न च स्मृतिस्तदेवेदमित्येवमनुभूतितः ।
वस्तूललेखी ह्यनुभवो नीलरक्तोत्पलादिवत् ॥६७७॥

Remembrance also is not experience referring to (some existing) object, on account of the experience (of it thus), 'This is only/just like that', since, indeed, an experience is ever referring to an object as of a blue or red lotus. [677]

नीलोत्पलानुभववत्तदेवेदमितीक्षणम् ।
अपूर्वार्थपरिच्छेदात्स्मृतिर्नातो भवेदियम् ॥६७८॥

This grasping (lit. seeing), viz. 'This is just that' is like the experience (i.e. seeing) of a blue lotus; (and), therefore, this would/could not be remembrance, for it covers (i.e. pertains to) an object not (seen) before.¹ [678]

¹That is quite some new object.

verses 679-682 refute the view that recognition is false, owing its basis in similarity.

मिथोविभिन्नरूपत्वात्सादृश्यं चेह दुर्घटम् ।
तदेवेदमिति मतौ वियन्नकुलयोरिव ॥६७९॥

Moreover, similarity of appearance is, in this case, very difficult to obtain on account of their having appearances (or, forms/nature) that are mutually different; as between the sky and a mongoose, in respect of the notion (i.e. knowledge), 'This is just that'. [679]

असाधारणरूपेण विभिन्नानां परस्परम् ।
क्षणानां क्षणिकानां वः सादृश्यं केन हेतुना ॥६८०॥

For (or, on account of, or, owing to) which reason do you

entertain (or, lit. there is for you, or, in your opinion) similarity (of appearance) ¹ between moments and/or momentary objects, which, by their uncommon (and, therefore, dissimilar) natures (i.e. forms or appearances), are mutually very different? [680]

¹This word refers only to objects which are momentary.

तेनेदं सदृशं वस्तु त्विति चापि न युक्तिमान् ।
व्यपदेशः पदार्थानां क्षणिकत्वात्स्वभावतः ॥६८१॥

The mention, 'This thing is similar (in appearance) to that', is also not reasonable (or, lit. with reason to support it), owing to the nature of the things being (only) momentary. [681]

इदं दृष्टमदोऽद्राक्षमिति नैवोपपद्यते ।
व्यपदेशः स्वभावेन व्यपदेष्टुर्विनष्टतः ॥६८२॥

Also, the mention, 'This was seen', or 'That I saw' is not tenable, because of the reference (to a thing) by (the mention of its very nature, while he, who thus makes the mention, is perishing. [682]

Verses 683-685 explain BUB: dr̥ṣṭavataḥ

व्यपदेशक्षणाभावात्पूर्वदृष्ट्यैव संक्षयात् ।
उत्तरानभिसंबन्धाद्व्यपदेष्टुः कुतो भवेत् ॥६८३॥
व्यपदेशो विना योगमतीतानागतार्थयोः ।
तत्स्थास्नुत्वाभ्युपगतौ क्षणिकत्वं विनश्यति ॥६८४॥

How could (there be that mention) ¹ by/of a person, since there does not remain the moment for making that mention, because (the moment for) the earlier seeing/experiencing (by him) is already gone? and also because there is no connection (of that moment) with the subsequent? [683]

Such a mention (is not possible) without the connection of the objects, viz. those bygone and those which have not (yet)

come; (and) in accepting the continuous existence (*sthāsnutva* 'lit. permanence') (of the two things, or the person who makes that mention),² (the theory of) momentariness gets lost (i.e. defeated/disproved). [684]

These verses are based on BUB: *dr̥ṣṭavato vyapadeśa-kṣaṇānavasthānāt*.

¹Namely, *tad evedam* mentioned in verse 679 or *idam dr̥ṣṭam* *ado 'drākṣam* in verse 682 above.

²That is, the person who had seen the object earlier.

जात्यन्धवन्न चादृष्ट्वा कश्चिद्व्यपदिशेदिह ।
सादृश्यधिषणां चेह न कश्चित्कर्तुमर्हति ॥६८५॥

And, further, nobody would make any mention (in such a case),¹ like the one who was born blind (and make such mention even) without seeing. So also, not anybody² would entertain (in such a case)¹ a notion of similarity (in appearance). [685]

¹This is for *iha*, referred by SP to *vyavahāradaśā*.

²SP qualifies this person by the adjective *prācīnadarśanaśūnya*.

Verses 686-687 conclude the discussion on the theory of momentariness.

प्रमाणविरहात्सिद्धा सेयमन्धपरंपरा ।
रक्ताम्बराणां सिद्धान्तस्तथाभ्युपगमात्स्वयम् ॥६८६॥

Thus, on account of the absence of an authoritative (or, trustworthy) means of knowing, it is established that this doctrine of the red-robed (monks) is but a line of blind men,¹ on account of the holding (lit. acceptance) of (the doctrine) by himself.² [686]

SP supports the thought of this verse by citing *yathāha*—

*riktasya jantor jātasya guṇadoṣam apaśyataḥ /
vilabdḥā bata kenāmī siddhāntaviṣamagrahāḥ //*
(*Pramāṇavārtika* 4.54).

¹That is, one blind man following another and so on.

²Add: owing to the absence of any trustworthy means of knowing (which is, here, propounding).

निरोधकाले चित्तस्य वासकत्वं न युज्यते ।
क्षणिकत्वादसंबन्धात्संतानान्तरबुद्धिवत् ॥६८७॥

At the time (i.e. after) the perishing (of consciousness), it is not reasonable to hold that consciousness has the capacity to give abode (to that which follows), owing to its being momentary (and therefore) the absence of connection (with it), like in knowledges (which occur) in another series of consciousness (that follows).¹ [687]

¹SP clarifies it thus: *bhinnaśaṃtānavartinyor buddhyor mithaḥ sambandhābhāvavad ity arthaḥ*.

Verses 688-689 explain BUB: *akṛtābhyupagamapraṇāśadoṣau*.

अकृताभ्यागमो दोषः कृतनाशश्च ते भवेत् ।
तस्माद्यः कर्मणां कर्ता स भुङ्क्ते कर्मणः फलम् ॥६८८॥

(And that) would invite for you the acceptance/holding of the acquisition of what has not been done and the destruction of what is done; therefore, (it is proper to hold that) the one, who is the agent of (some) deeds, enjoys the result of one's deeds.¹ [688]

¹The use of the singular form *karmanah* in apposition to the plural form *karmanām* earlier is to indicate the usually accepted principle *jātāva ekavacana*.

यस्मिन्नेव तु विज्ञान आहिता कर्मवासना ।

फलं तत्रैव संताने कार्पासे रक्तता यथा ॥६८९॥

(An argument of the objector) 'The result should occur in that very continued agent in which consciousness has occurred (lit. placed) the desire (or, impressions) for some activity, in the same way as redness (occurs) in (a gauge of) cotton.¹

[689]

The argument is based on the idea that the two faults which are pointed out in the preceding verse do not follow even when/if there is absence of a permanent nature of some thing.

¹SP clarifies this *dr̥ṣṭānta* thus: *yathā kārpaśabīje 'lakta-kādirasāvasikte tato jāyamānānikurādāv atyantabhinne 'pi rakta-tānuvartate*.

Verses 690-698 rejects the notions of the truth and/or the falsehood in holding *saṁtāna* in relation to *kartr̥tva* and/or *bhoktr̥tva*.

इत्यस्मिन्नपि सिद्धान्ते प्रसङ्गो न निवर्तते ।
संतानिव्यतिरेकेण यस्मान्नैव स विद्यते ॥६९०॥

(The Vedāntin's answer:) 'In this (proposition) also, a contingency is not (i.e. cannot be) avoided, since that¹ does not at all obtain as apart from what has a continuity'.² [690]

The argument in the second line presupposes the notion of the difference between the continued existence of both the agents and the enjoyer.

¹This refers to the activity by one resulting into the enjoyment of another.

²That is, unless there is oneness/sameness of the agent of an action and the enjoyer of its result/fruit.

संतानिनस्तु संस्कारा विद्यन्ते परमार्थतः ।
मिथश्चासंगतेस्तेषामतो दोषान्न मुच्यते ॥६९१॥

‘In reality, the impressions (of an earlier doing/intentions) of one, who has a continued existence, do continue to be (even later); therefore, (the objector) would not be left free from (having) the blemish (which is pointed out), for the two¹ have not been connected with each other.’ [691]

This argument has relation to the objector’s alternative notion that the agent of an action and his *saṁtāna* ‘continued (existence)’ are connected.

¹These are the agent of an action and his continued (existence) as an enjoyer of its result.

मानाभावान्न चेदिष्टा संततिर्येह कल्पिता ।
दोषोक्तिमात्रतस्तर्हि न पक्षः सिद्धिमश्नुते ॥६९२॥

(The objector would say:) ‘If it is not accepted that there is a connection of the two,¹ on account of there being no authoritative means of knowing (the same), then, it (viz. the connection) can be imagined’; (and the Vedāntin’s answer is:) ‘That view also cannot then be established just by the (earlier) statement of the fault’.² [692]

¹These are already clear from the preceding verses.

²Namely, what is imagined is non-existent (*asat*) and cannot, therefore, lead to any connection which is held as real (*sat*).

कार्पासबीजसंस्थैव योक्ता रक्तादिवासना ।
स्वाकारकार्यकृत्सैव न कार्यं कार्यकृन्मतम् ॥६९३॥

‘Also, the affording of an abode to redness etc. that is existing in the seed of cotton, as was (earlier) mentioned (by you), is itself the author (lit. maker) of an effect which (also) has its form (*ākāra*),¹ but it is not accepted/held (by you) as an effect.’²

[693]

¹Add: remaining in the later moment also; cf. SP: *sā sthāyiny eva svākāram anikurādikāryaṃ karoti*.

²SP adds: *nāsau kṣaṇikeṣu samtāneṣu hetuphalatve drṣṭānta ity arthaḥ*.

मिथः क्षणानां संबन्धः शृङ्खलाकटकादिवत् ।
सादृश्यव्यपदेशादि सर्वं सुस्थं भवेत्ततः ॥६९४॥
इत्येवं चेन्न तद्युक्तं क्षणिकत्वस्य हानितः ।
क्षणत्रयस्य संव्याप्तेः शृङ्खलाकटकादिवत् ॥६९५॥

(If it said:) 'There is connection between two moments as between a chain and its bits;¹ then, this (position of) similarity of appearance and the mention (as said above in *tad evedam*) would all be well-maintained (i.e. well argued)', then, [694] (the Vedāntin answers:) 'That is not reasonable (or, well argued), for that would entail the loss (or, abandoning) of (the principle of) momentariness, since there would be the inclusion (lit. pervasion) of (all) the three moments² as in the chain and its bits'. [695]

Here, Sureśvara has only briefly touched BUB which is clearer in details.

¹Or, a bridle and its bits.

²The first is when an object comes into being, the second, when it enters on producing an effect and, the third, when the effect has come into existence.

मम तवेत्यवच्छेदव्यवहारश्च त्रुट्यति ।
संबन्धाभावतस्तेषां क्षणानामपरस्परम् ॥६९६॥

'So also (*ca*) any dealings marked by the words 'mine' and 'yours' would come to naught (or, lit. would be cut short), owing to the absence of the mutual connection between the moments of them (marked by the notions of mine and yours).'¹

[696]

¹This is not possible because there is only one consciousness and which is momentary.

ज्ञानस्य च विशुद्धस्य स्वसंविन्मात्ररूपिणः ।
अन्यस्य तादृशोऽभावात्कुतो दुःखादिसंप्लुतिः ॥६९७॥

‘And, while consciousness, which is extremely pure and has the nature of knowing itself,¹ and, while there is the absence of any other (thing) of similar nature, how/whence could/can there be a flow of misery etc.? ² [697]

¹This is the use of genitive absolute construction.

²The word ‘etc.’ suggests the impossibility of holding consciousness (alternatively) as transitory, void and unreal; cf. verse 699 below.

न चानेकस्वभावांशवत्त्वं ज्ञानस्य संमतम् ।
स्वच्छैकरूपतस्तस्य दाडिमादिफलं यथा ॥६९८॥

‘Also, it is not held by you (or, acceptable to you) that consciousness which is pure and uniform is possessed of (or, made up of) parts of various natures¹ like a pomegranate or another fruit.’² [698]

¹Or, ... parts which differ with one another in nature.

²The different parts of the fruits yield different tastes.

Verses 699-700 set aside the notion that the whole of the object to be known is a part of knowledge.

प्रमेयत्वानुभूतेश्च न विज्ञानांशता तथा ।
अनित्यदुःखशून्यादेः पृथुबुधनादिरूपवत् ॥६९९॥

‘Again, on account of (consciousness) being cognized (or, experienced) as an object of knowing (in its pureness),¹ there cannot be parts of the cognition (or the cognizing?), viz. what

is momentary, misery and void etc., as (there are parts of the cognition of a pitcher) as the foot-bottomed form of it etc.'² [699]

¹Cf. the word *viśuddhasya* in the preceding verse.

²The word 'etc.' might suggest the pitcher's being useful for carrying water, its colour and so on.

ज्ञानमात्रमिदं सर्वं न ज्ञेयं विद्यते पृथक् ।

स्वप्नादिज्ञानदृष्टान्तात्प्रत्ययत्वादिहेतुतः ॥७००॥

'(Again, in your view), all this (what is postulated as the world of objects) is merely consciousness (and) there does not exist any object of knowing as different (from it); (therefore, the example understood in the preceding verse is not proper—this), on the basis of the example of the knowledge of the object(s) of the dream state and for the reasons, viz. (its/their)¹ being only cognition (awareness) etc.'² [700]

¹That is, of consciousness.

²Cf. *prṭhubudhnādirūpa* mentioned in the preceding verse.

Verses 701-703 refute the opponent's acceptance of inference on the ground that there is no statement in his scheme of enunciation, reason etc. that are members of any syllogism proper.

प्रतिज्ञाहेतुदृष्टान्तभेदस्तावत्परस्परम् ।

ज्ञानमात्रस्वभावत्वाद्भवता नाभ्युपेयते ॥७०१॥

'(Moreover,) you do not accept/hold such various distinct notions as enunciation (of a proposition), the reason (for it and) the example which have the nature only of (i.e. not distinct from) consciousness.' [701]

This verse stresses on the impossibility of drawing any inference regarding consciousness.

पक्षश्चायं प्रमाणेन प्रत्यक्षेण विरुध्यते ।

शरीराद्देशभेदेन भासन्तेऽर्था घटादयः ॥७०२॥

‘Again, this view is opposed by the means of knowing (called) direct perception. (See, for example) such objects as a pitcher¹ do become known as belonging to another place which is outside the body.’ [702]

This verse points to the opposition of direct perception.

¹These are a piece of cloth, a lotus and so on.

अभ्रान्तं चेन्द्रियज्ञानं तेषु चैवोपजायते ।

भिन्नाभिन्नविकल्पाहं त्वत्प्रत्यक्षं च नेष्यते ॥७०३॥

‘Further, in respect of them (viz. those objects), there arises with the help of the organs the knowledge which is not mistaken (or, not false) and, then, there is not accepted direct perception (which is held) in our view and which is prone/likely to cause various alternative notions of objects (such as) distinct and/or non-distinct (from one another).’ [703]

SP points out the difference between knowledge which is acceptable to the Vedāntin and consciousness which is held by the Buddhist.

Verses 704-709 are in refutation of the unauthoritativeness of savikalpaka jñāna in the opponent’s view.

दूरे स्थितं प्रपश्यामि यत्र दृष्टमिदं तथा ।

एवंप्रकारं प्रत्यक्षं स्वसंवेद्यं न बाध्यते ॥७०४॥

‘That, “I do not see what obtains in the distance and I have seen this one”—such is¹ direct perception; it is not stultified (by any other means), knowable/known as it is by itself.’ [704]

The argument is in this verse is: direct perception pertains to the different external objects and, therefore, it stultifies inference of consciousness. Cf. NKL (ms. p.625): *abādhatvān mānam evety arthaḥ*.

दुःखाद्यात्मकमेवेदं विज्ञानं चेत्त्वयोच्यते ।
तद्वियोगाद्विशुद्धं तदिति वः कल्पना कथम् ॥७०५॥
यतः संयोगिनिर्मुक्तौ वस्तु शुद्धमिहेष्यते ।
स्वरूपस्य तु निर्मुक्तौ किमन्यदवशिष्यते ॥७०६॥

'If it is held (lit. said) by you that this consciousness is of the nature of misery etc.¹ and also that it is extremely pure (i.e. unaffected by anything else) owing to the absence (*viyoga*) of that (viz. misery etc.¹)—how can that (*viññāna*) be pure in your proposition?' [705]

'for, indeed a thing is accepted as extremely unaffected (by anything else, i.e. pure) when it is released (or, is in state of detachment) from what was connected with it. (This is so, since) what else would remain there (than that/such thing) when its own nature is released (from what affected it)? [706]

The argument in these verses is: The nature of the real thing is unaffected by any other thing (for, it does not *really* exist) and, therefore, there is no necessity of postulating its attaining unaffectedness or purity.

Read, on this verse, NKL (ms. p.625): *asambhavaṃ sādhayati ata iti ... puṣpasya svābhāviko guṇaḥ śuklatvaṃ dravyāntareṇa puṣpakārane saṃskriyamāṇe 'pagacchati guṇāntaraṃ ca raktatvaṃ cōtpadyate tathā vijñānasya caturvidhabhāvanā prakarṣād duḥkhāgamo viśuddhiś cōtpadyata iti tanmatam anuradati svābhāvika . iti* (introducing the next verse).

¹The word 'etc.' should refer to momentariness, void and unreality (*asattva*).

स्वाभाविकगुणवस्तौ रागाद्यागन्तुकात्मता ।
दृष्टा पुष्पेष्विति वचो यच्चापि समुदाहृतम् ॥७०७॥

सम्यङ्निरस्तं तत्पूर्वं वियोगाच्चापि लिङ्गतः ।
संयोगपूर्वता तस्य लिङ्ग्यते मेषयोरिव ॥७०८॥

‘And, that statement which you had made, viz. “It is noticed in the case of flowers there is first the destruction of their natural (i.e. original) property¹ and there is the coming (or, appearance) of redness (or, any other colour)” [707] is earlier well disproved (lit. set aside as untenable) for the reason (*lingataḥ*), that there is absence (lit. separation) of (the cause).’ That (viz. the effect) is seen to have been preceded by a union (of the cause and the effect) as (that) of two sheep.² [708]

Read NKL (on these verses, ms. p.625): *ātmā kartrādirūpaś etyādaḥ svabhāve sthite tadvināśo na sambhavatīty uktam pariharati samyag iti. kiṃ ca puṣpasya śuklatvaṃ na svabhāvaḥ puṣpe saty api viyujyamānatvān malavad ato na puṣpaguṇo dr̥ṣṭānta ity āha viyogāc ceti. kiṃ ca śauklyasya svābhāvikatve ’pi sadr̥ṣṭāntatvam tasya dravyāntarenācchāditasya nāśābhāvād ity āha dravyāntareti* (introducing the next verse).

¹Alternatively, quality, viz. colour. Read the’ note on the preceding verse, for clarification.

²The example is not clear; nor also is it clarified by SP. Yet the idea at the basis is: *viyogaḥ samyogapūrvakaḥ*.

द्रव्यान्तराच्छादनाद्वा सहजस्याप्यनीक्षणम् ।
तद्द्रव्यसंक्षये यस्मात्पूर्ववत्सहजेक्षणम् ॥७०९॥

Or, perhaps, there can be obscurity (lit. non-seeing)¹ of a natural (property of a thing) by the covering of it by some other substance, because the natural appearance/seeing of (it becomes possible) after that substance has ceased to exist (or, lit. has come to perish). [709]

This is one more argument against the opponent which is under reference, as noticed from verse 707 above. Read also

the note on the preceding verse which introduces this verse.

¹That is, absence of the sight of it. SP clarifies this point with the following remark: *drśyate hi vastrāḍau haridrārāgāpagame athāpūrvam śauklyam iti bhāvah.*

This verse sets aside the notion about misery as jñānamala.

ग्राह्यग्राहकरूपेण यच्चापि मलकल्पनम् ।

अन्यसंसर्ग्यभावात्तत्तुषकण्डनवद्धृथा ॥७१०॥

And, the notion of (the authoritative) impurity (which is) entertained, owing to the nature (of consciousness as) that which/who grasps that which is to be grasped¹ is also baseless (i.e. meaningless), like the pounding of husk, since there does not exist any other (object) connected (with the earlier existing object).

[710]

¹It is assumed/accepted by the Vijñānavādin that consciousness *grāhyagrāhaka!*

verses 711-713 point to the difficulty in accepting the Buddhist's view that mokṣa also is like a bondage.

फलाश्रयस्य चाभावान्निर्वाणादि स्वलक्षणम् ।

फलं च घटते नेह युक्तिभिः शाक्यपुङ्गवे ॥७११॥

And, in (the postulated doctrine of) the brave (*paṇḍita*) follower of the Buddha, the result, viz. such as *nirvāṇa*,¹ which has its own characteristic, does not bear any relation to (or, lit. get connected with) arguments of reason, owing to the absence of the support for the result.²

[711]

¹*nirvāṇādi* implies *abhyudaya* 'rise in worldly prosperity'.

²This is because consciousness, remaining merely pure (i.e. unaffected in its nature), cannot be a support for anything. In other words, positing the idea of a support is not possible. As

such, the support for the result is a negative entity.

शल्यविद्धस्य तच्छल्यनिष्कर्षोत्थं सुखं फलम् ।
शल्यविद्धमृतौ कस्य फलं स्यादिति कथ्यताम् ॥७१२॥
न संयोगो वियोगो वा यस्य केनचिदिष्यते ।
विनाशतः स्वतस्तस्य कीदृशी फलसंगतिः ॥७१३॥

In the case of one, who is afflicted with some dart, the result (desired) is happiness, which arises from the removal of the dart, in the case of the death of one who is afflicted by that dart; therefore let this be told, as to whom there would accrue the result (when the dart is removed, lit. has ceased to be).

[712]

What sort of connection with the result would there be in the case of one, who meets with destruction, the one, in whose case someone (viz. the Buddhist) does not hold the occurrence of both connection and separation?

[713]

The argument seeks to refute the Buddhist's acceptance of momentariness. The sufferer, unless he continues to exist for a later moment, cannot have the resulting happiness!

Verses 714-715 are intended to support the Vedāntin's own view that all that misery originates in ignorance (avidyā).

भवत्पक्षेऽपि तुल्यं चेन्नाविद्यामात्रहेतुतः ।
कारकादिविभागस्य वस्तु पूर्णं स्वतो यतः ॥७१४॥

(A view of the objector:) 'This¹ is similarly (occurring) in your view also'. (The Vedāntin's answer:) 'No, it does not (so occur), because that (sort of occurring), or the division (of the objects) in various *kāraṅkas* etc., is owing merely to ignorance and the (real) thing (i.e. sentience) is complete in itself'.

[714]

¹This refers to the earlier verse.

पुरुषार्थात्मकं वस्तु कूटस्थं तत्स्वतो यतः ।
अविद्यया तथाभूतं तद्द्वैतवस्तौ किमपेक्षते ॥७१५॥

Since the immutable thing (viz. reality, i.e. sentience) is, in its own right, of the nature of (what is considered to be) the end/object of an individual's life, has become of that sort¹ only through ignorance, therefore, what does (or, will) it expect when that² is destroyed? [715]

That is, sorrow-stricken owing to the affliction caused by art.

This refers to ignorance.

verses 716-717 affirm the absence of any blemish in accepting worldly dealings as established by the witnessing principle, sentience.

अनुमानेन तादृक्षं वस्तु प्राक्प्रतिपादितम् ।
न चानुमाने दोषोऽपि तत्र कश्चिद्विभाव्यते ॥७१६॥

And) that kind of thing (viz. reality, i.e. sentience) is already established (or, explained).¹ Moreover, there is not (or, cannot) also² be entertained (or seen) any fault there (i.e. in the inference about it). [716]

Read SP: *vimato vyavahāro 'samhatajyotirnimitto vyavahāra-
tvād ādityādikṛtavyavahāravad ity anumānād brāhmaṇāda
uktam vastu sādhitam ity arthaḥ*. The reference is to BU 4.3.156-159.

SP relates the use of *api* 'also' to the earlier discussion on the Lokāyata view (cf. BUBV 4.3.156-159).

सहोपलम्भसंस्कारात्पुनर्धीर्यैकदर्शनात् ।
सानुमा संभवस्तत्र व्यभिचारस्य चेन्न हि ॥७१७॥

‘That is inference¹ which is one’s (entertaining) awareness (of some thing) again (for a second time) owing to (the) impression (of it as occurring, or having been) together (with another). (And, if one were to argue against this that) there is possibility of fallacious reasoning in that.’, (our, i.e. the Vedāntin’s answer is:) ‘Not, indeed, is there fallacious reasoning’.

[717]

¹SP clarifies the nature of inference by citing—

*sambandho vyāptir iṣṭātra lingadharmasya līṅginā /
vyāpyasya gamakatvaṃ ca vyāpyatvaṃ gamyam iṣyate //*
*yo yasya deśakālābhyāṃ samo nyūno ’pi vā bhavet /
sa vyāpyo vyāpakas tasya samo vābhyadhiko ’pi vā //*
tena vyāpye grhīte ’rthe vyāpakas tv aśya grhyate /
(Ślokavārtika 5(4).4-6ab).

Verses 718-721 refute the opponent’s view that there is, in the Vedānta exposition, the fault of vyāptyasiddhi.

ननु चाव्यभिचार्येव संबन्धो गमको भवेत् ।
सहोपलम्भमात्रेण न यतः पितृसूनुवत् ॥७१८॥

(An argument of the objector:) ‘But, indeed, (what you have called as) the invariable relation (between the pervader and the pervaded) would become a pointer (to the fallacy), since (that)¹ does not become (a sound reason for inference) by merely occurring together, as in the case of a father and his son.²

[718]

¹This refers to the invariable relation of *vyāpya* and *vyāpaka* owing to the occurrence together of two *dharma*s and *dharmin*s. SP refers, in this context, to *vyāpteś ca dr̥śyamānāyāḥ kaś cid dharmāḥ prayojakaḥ* (Ślokavārtika 5(4).13cd).

²SP explains this thus: *pitāputrau (śiṣyācāryau vā) saha sakṛd-dr̥ṣṭavat ’nyataradarśane ’nyatarabuddhir notpadyate*.

अस्त्वेवं शङ्क्यते नो चेद्व्यभिचारः स्वगोचरे ।
प्राथर्यते व्यभिचारो हि जाताशङ्के न गोचरे ॥७१९॥

Let this be so; if varying nature is not noticeable in the case of its object; for, they never entertain (lit. desire that there is) varying nature (of it) in relation to the object about (or, in relation to) which there has arisen a doubt.¹ [719]

¹That is, as to its veracity/validity.

सहोपलम्भमात्रेण सा तु सर्वत्र जायते ।
धियो नो विषये शङ्का व्यभिचारानुसारिणी ॥७२०॥

Yet, that (doubt) arises everywhere by the very occurrence of it together with itself; (and), in relation to (correct) knowledge, there is not any doubt about its varying nature.¹ [720]

¹SP supports this argument by citing—

yāvac cāvyatirekitvaṃ śatāṃśenāpi śaṅkyate /
vipakṣasya kutaś tāvad dhetor gamanikābalaṃ //
(*Nyāyakusumañjali* 1.182.5)

तदाशङ्कानिवृत्त्यर्थमतः कार्यं प्रयत्नतः ।
साध्याभावेन तद्धेतोरभावपरिमार्गणम् ॥७२१॥

Therefore, for averting (or, setting aside) the doubt about that,¹ a search has to be made, with effort, for ascertaining the absence of the reason of that² (indeed) in the absence of the thing to be proved. [721]

SP brings out the purport of this verse thus: *vyabhicāraśaṅkāyā* *loṣatve tannivṛttyartham vyāpakābhāvena vyāpyābhāvo jñātavya* *i phalitam.*

¹This refers to *vyabhicāra* 'erroneous or fallacious reasoning'.

²This refers to *sādhyaābhāva*.

Verses 722-725 refute the concomitance of vyatireka with the absence of the object to be proved.

साध्याभावे कथं हेतोरभाव इति कथ्यताम् ।
ज्ञानलक्षणसंप्राप्तावथवाप्यविशेषतः ॥७२२॥

Let this be told: (i) 'How can there be the absence of the reason while there is the absence of the thing to be proved? or, (ii) while all the signs (indicators/reasons *linga*) of knowledge (i.e. the knowledge of the pervader) or are noticed (lit. obtain) are generally noticeable?' [722]

The verse points out the faults in holding the *sādhyā* and *sādhaka* as different; as two alternatives.

यदि मालक्षणाप्तस्य साध्याभावादि भण्यते ।
तदा भ्राष्ट्राद्यदूरस्थे साध्याभावादि सज्जते ॥७२३॥

'If it is said that, there is the absence of the thing to be proved etc.,¹ with respect to (the concomitant) which is known through the operation of valid means of knowledge; then, there would contingently follow the absence of the thing to be proved while a cooking pot (of clay -*bhrāṣṭra*) or iron² etc. are not found in the far. [723]

SP clarifies the meaning of the verse thus: *saṃnikṛṣṭe loṣṭādaṁ yogyānupalabdheḥ sādhyāgnyabhāvam buddhvā tena dhūmābhāvadhīḥ tvannmate syān na cesyate loṣṭādāvagnyabhāvavad dhūmābhāvasyāpi sujñānatvād ato yogyānupalabdhisiddhāgnyabhāvasya na dhūmābhāvalingatety arthaḥ.*

¹The word 'etc.' refers to the absence of the *linga*; e.g. the absence of smoke which is the *linga* of fire.

²SP refers to a line from some lexicon: *klībe 'mbarīṣam bhrāṣṭro nā kandur vā svedanī striyām.*

प्रत्यक्षगोचरे साध्याभावश्चेत्प्रतिपाद्यते ।
प्रत्यक्षेणैव सिद्धत्वादनुमैवं वृथा भवेत् ॥७२४॥

If it is postulated in respect of what is directly perceived that there is absence of the thing to be proved; then, inference itself would be meaningless for the reason that (the thing to be proved) is already established by direct perception alone.

[724]

So far alternative (i) has been answered. In the following verse is answered alternative (ii).

अधित्यकादौ देशे तु ह्युपलब्धेरसंभवात् ।
मा भूदग्न्याद्यभावेऽपि कदाचिद्धूमसंभवः ॥७२५॥

And (*tu*) as in a region like the slope of a mountain,¹ there is no possibility of finding (or, obtaining the sign, i.e. *linga*), let there not be (understood) ever the presence of smoke, even while there is the absence of fire etc.²

[725]

¹The word *ādi* in *adhityakādi* refers to *upatyakā* 'region around (or, near) the mountain'.

²Possibly, this word 'etc.' refers to 'other things to be proved'.

Verses 726-728 set aside the notion of a rule that there is always *anvavyatireka* in *tarka*.

यद्येवमन्वयोऽप्यत्र नैव प्राप्नोति तत्कथम् ।
अन्यत्र यदि नाम स्याद्धूमभावेऽग्निभावता ॥७२६॥

If this¹ is so, then the concomitance also would not be noticed (or, obtain); how then could there be the presence of fire while there is the presence of smoke elsewhere?¹

[726]

This is to point out the absence of concomitance of what is to be proved and what its reason (*linga*).

¹*anyatra* means *sapakṣa* 'a similar instance' (SP).

दर्शनादस्तु सा कामं दर्शनाधीनसिद्धितः ।
अधित्यकादौ देशे तु यावत्साक्षात् दर्शनम् ॥७२७॥
तावन्नावसितुं शक्यं भवितव्यमिहाग्निना ।
इति धूमोपलम्भत्वाद्भ्राष्ट्रधूमोपलम्भवत् ॥७२८॥

Let that ¹ be there owing to the sight of it; since the existence (of anything) is dependent on the sight of it. In places such as the slope of a mountain, it is not possible to decide that there is fire on the same, so long as there is no direct sight of it, (only) on account of seeing (lit. finding) smoke there, as in the case of seeing smoke related to a cooking pot (of clay or iron). [727-728]

¹The existence of fire.

Verses 729-730 refute the idea of *anvayavyatirekagamyatva* in *tarka*.

इदं तावद्वदत्वत्र लिङ्गलक्षणतत्त्ववित् ।
धूमादिलिङ्गेनेहार्थो भवता कोऽनुमीयते ॥७२९॥

Let (then) the knower of the definition of the sign (*linga*) tell this: 'What is the thing that you infer here, ¹ from (i.e. on seeing) the sign such as smoke etc.?' ² [729]

¹That is the mountain (in relation to the proposition *parvato vahnimān* ...).

²This can refer to one of these: (i) Fire which is to be known, (ii) The mountain (i.e. some particular region), (iii) The relation of the fire and the mountain, only the sign itself. These are refuted in the next verse.

नाग्निस्तस्य प्रसिद्धत्वान्नापि देशः प्रसिद्धितः ।
न च संबन्धमात्रं स्याद्यथोक्तादेव कारणात् ॥७३०॥

It is not fire, for it is already known (i.e. seen). Also, it is not the region, for that also is known. Nor also is it merely the connection of these two¹ (since that cannot be described, or, ascertained) also for the reason already stated.² [730]

¹This is on the basis of sacrifice; but the verse does not appear clear in referring to the third alternative.

²This refers to establishing what is already established (*siddhasādhyatva*).

Verse 731 is for introducing the refutation of the authoritativeness of inference.

तस्मान्नैवानुमा नाम मानं युक्तिमदिष्यते ।
मेयाभावादिति प्राप्तावत्र प्रतिविधीयते ॥७३१॥

Therefore,¹ the means of knowledge, viz. inference, is not (found to be) reasonable;² for there is the absence of what is to be known.³ In this respect, (now), there follows our (i.e. the Siddhāntin's) answer:⁴ [731]

¹That is, owing to the difficulty in seeing clearly what is to be known and what indicates (or, leads to) the same.

²In other words, it does not have a good reason for the proof of the proposition.

³This implies the absence of what leads to the knowledge of it.

⁴From *atra pratividhīyate*, there is stated the refutation of the *prima facie* view which is stated earlier.

Verses 732-740 are a refutation of the alleged non-authoritativeness of inference.

सहोपलब्धिः संस्कारवशाद्ब्रूमादिदर्शनात् ।
अग्न्यादौ विप्रकृष्टेऽर्थे निश्चिता जायते मतिः ॥७३२॥

On account of the impression about their being found (or, noticed) together (and) on seeing the smoke etc.,¹ there arises a definite knowledge in respect of (the object) such as fire² (though) it is in the distance. [732]

¹The word 'etc.' would refer to other characteristics of other objects to be known.

²This is to indicate the other objects to be known.

लिङ्गात्तावदिदं ज्ञानं जातं बाधकवर्जितम् ।
उत्पन्नत्वात्तदुत्पन्नं नानुत्पन्नं कथं चन ॥७३३॥

As to the knowledge, which has arisen from the sign, it is free from any stultifier (of it);¹ and as (your argument about) that (viz. the knowledge) which has not arisen, it (is to be said that) it has (certainly) arisen, (and you cannot say), in any way, that it has not arisen.² [733]

¹This answers away the alternative (ii) noted above and rejects the idea of any stultifying cause as existence.

²The second line rejects alternative (iii).

जातं किमविनाभावसंबन्धेनेदमीदृशम् ।
किं वा नेति परीक्षेयं जातत्वात्स्यादपार्थिका ॥७३४॥

This query, viz. whether or not this knowledge, as described (in the preceding verses), was (at all) produced, thanks to their relation as invariably concomitant, is without any purpose/meaning,¹ for (the simple reason of its) being produced. [734]

This verse points to the alternative (iv) as not worth-considering.

¹In other words, this query is baseless.

सर्वथा फलवज्ज्ञानं जातत्वान्न तदन्यथा ।
 तस्मात्प्रत्यक्षवर्तिकचिद्व्यभिचारकृदञ्जसा ॥७३५॥
 यावन्नेक्षामहे तावन्नाप्रमाणमितीर्यते ।
 तदपह्वमानस्य तवात्यन्तमसंभवात् ॥७३६॥

Certainly, (or, lit. in every way), knowledge (produced) by inference) has a purpose to serve,¹ since it is produced;² it is not otherwise.³ Therefore, so long as we do not clearly see in it, as in direct perception, what causes variance we shall not say that it (viz. inference) is not authoritative.⁴ Since it is not altogether possible while you are seeking to deny (lit. conceal) it. [735-736]

¹That is, it is purposeful or useful.

²The known rule is: there can be no activity which has not any purpose whatever.

³Namely, unmeaningful or useless.

⁴This implies the denial of the usefulness of inference in the dealings of men, which do not have, in the eyes of the Vedāntin, a philosophically accepted reality. SP supports this implication by citing—

anye paraprakṛtānāṃ vyāptināṃ upajīvakāḥ /
drṣṭer api na tair iṣṭā vyāpakāṃśāvadhāraṇā //
 (Nyāyakusumanījali 1.183.3; Ślokavārtika 5(4).14cd-15ab).

And this leads to the statement in the last line, i.e. it sets aside the objector's view as put by SP thus: *sādhyasya durnirūpatvād anumānāprāmāṇyam*.

अत्राह यदि विज्ञानजन्ममात्रात्प्रसिध्यति ।
 प्रतिज्ञामात्रतः सिद्धेर्वृथा स्याद्धेतुकीर्तनम् ॥७३७॥

In this respect (or, at this juncture, the objector) says: 'Let that knowledge¹ be (accepted) as established by the mere rise (or, origin of consciousness; (and) thus) it, being established by mere enunciation (of the proposition), the statement of the reason (*hetu*) is futile (or, unnecessary)'. [737]

This verse brings out another argument of the objector, referring to the unauthoritativeness of inference (for, he has already considered direct perception likewise).

¹That which is taken as arising from inference.

बाढमेवं भवेदेतदाशङ्काकारणं न चेत् ।
किञ्चित्तत्रोपलभ्येत ह्यनवद्यं भवेद्वचः ॥७३८॥

(The Vedāntin's answer:) 'Well, it would be so; if there were not found any cause (for entertaining) a doubt whatever and (your) statement would be free from blemish'. [738]

SP clarifies it thus: *pratijñāvākyaṁ the vyāpake pratipanne viśeṣadarśanādi saṁśayakāraṇaṁ na dr̥śyate cet pratijñāvākyaṁ nirdoṣaṁ hetvanapekṣaṁ eva vyāpakaṁ niścāyayatīty arthaḥ*.

पुरुषादिनिमित्तस्तु जायते यत्र संशयः ।
अन्वयव्यतिरेकाभ्यां हेतोः स्यात्तत्र निश्चयः ॥७३९॥

Where, however, there arises a doubt that is owing to human fault or mistake etc.,¹ there is a decision arrived at (or made) in that case, with the help of the positive and the negative concomitance (of the reason and the object of knowledge). [739]

¹This refers to the defective speech, hearing, or any organ of man.

उत्पन्न एव ज्ञानेऽतस्तत्संदेहनिवृत्तये ।
अन्वयव्यतिरेकौ स्तो न ताभ्यामनुमेयधीः ॥७४०॥

Therefore, in respect of (some) knowledge, which has arisen (in a person, or, which has been produced in a person), the positive (and the negative) concomitance (of the means to

the knowledge and the object of it) serve (lit. are) useful in averting (any) doubt about it; it is not that the knowledge of the object to be known (is produced) by them.¹ [740]

This verse emphasises the usefulness of Anvaya-Vyatireka in inference.

¹Add: as held by the objector.

Verses 741-742 set aside the not finding/knowing of *svabhāvakārya* as causing inference.

संदेहनिर्णयादन्यत्स्वभावादि यदुच्यते ।
तस्यानुमित्यनङ्गत्वात्प्राप्तं तत्तुषकण्डनम् ॥७४१॥

(Further) as to what is said by you about things such as the nature of things (*svabhāva*) as other than doubt and decision, there follows only the act like pounding the husk, since (all) that is not a part of (or, an ancillary to) inference. [741]

These are *kārya* 'an effect' and *anupalabdhi* 'non-cognition' and they do not have any direct perception in relation to it.

अविनाभावसिद्धयर्थं नन्विदं वर्ण्यते त्रयम् ।
त्रिष्वेव त्वविनाभावाद्भद्रं तैरपि कीर्तितम् ॥७४२॥

Indeed, for establishing the invariable concomitance (of the object to be known and its sing), this triad¹ is stated (as) necessary; (and) it is only in these three that there obtains the invariable concomitance²—they (viz. the Buddhists) also have (so) stated. [742]

¹This refers to *svabhāva* 'a thing's own nature', *kārya* 'an effect' and *anupalabdhi* 'non-cognition'—these are noticed as under reference in the preceding verse. This is Dharmakīrti's view as specifically stated in verse 753 below.

²In connection with *avinābhāva*, SP quotes Kīrti (i.e.

Dharmakīrti?):

*pakṣadharmas tadamśena vyāpto hetus tridhaiva saḥ /
avinābhāvaniyamād dhetvābhāsāt tato 'pare //*
(*Pramāṇavārtika* 1.3).

Verses 743-748 reject the *svabhāva*hetu.

स्वभावादविनाभावे स्यादौष्ण्यस्याग्निलिङ्गता ।
स्वभावोऽथाविनाभावात्कार्ये प्राप्ता स्वभावता ॥७४३॥

Hotness is a sign of fire when it has, by its (very) nature, invariable concomitance (with it). If, on the other hand (*atha*), the nature (of smoke) is caused by (or, is owing to) its invariable concomitance (with fire), then, it would follow (contingently that the state of being hot) is (only) the nature of the effect¹ (viz. smoke). [743]

The verse is based on two questions, one in each line, which can be put to the Buddhists: (i) Is it that the nature of smoke has invariable concomitance with fire? Or (ii) Is it invariable concomitance of smoke and fire that produced the nature of the things related? The two lines are then in reply to the two questions respectively. SP brings out the purport of each.

¹Smoke is taken as the effect (*kārya*) of fire.

औष्ण्यस्वभावो दृष्टोऽग्निस्तस्यान्यत्रापि दर्शनात् ।
क्षितितोयाग्निमरुतां दृष्टा स्पर्शस्वभावता ॥७४४॥

It is experienced (lit. seen) that fire has hotness as its nature (i.e. natural characteristic). But that (viz. the nature of being hot) is seen elsewhere also!¹ Also, it is noticed that the nature of having touch (as a characteristic) occurs (or, is found) in earth, water, fire and wind.² [744]

The verse is very cryptic. In the first line, *auṣṇyasvabhāva* is used as an adjective of fire, i.e. the word is a Bahuvrīhi

compound and the word *tasya* implies *auṣṇyasvabhāvasya* which has to be taken as a noun, i.e. the word is a Karmadhāraya compound. Then, the second line refers to some examples of things, which have the same nature, but that is not the invariably concomitant characteristic of each of them. The point which the verse establishes is: The nature of a thing does not result into it invariable concomitance with that thing alone. Cf. the introductory remark in the comment on the next verse: *anuṣṇyādira svabhāvo 'nekavṛttitvāt*.

¹This is a reference to the sun and, as *ādi* in SP (cf. *ādityādau*) implies, to some hot substances, like a heated piece of iron and hot water.

²In the scheme of *dravyas* 'substances', it is only *vāyu* 'wind' which has *sparsa* 'touch' as its distinguishing (*avacchedaka*) characteristic (see the definition in Logic: *sparsānumeyo vāyuh*) but that same 'touch' existing in *kṣityādi* (in the verse) is only an adventitious property.

मतं चेदस्वभावोऽसौ यो नैकार्थप्रवृत्तिमान् ।
धवादावपि तद्वृत्तेर्वृक्षात्मा शिंशपा न हि ॥७४५॥

If it is held that, what has its existence in more than one thing, is not the nature of (some one thing), then (we have to invite attention to the fact that it is not so), because of the existence of that ¹ in (other) trees such as Dhava (Grilea Tomentosa, or Anogeissus Latifolia) also; indeed, what is of the nature of a tree is not (invariably the tree) Śimśapā (Dalbergia Sissoi). [745]

Even this verse is, like the preceding, cryptic! It refutes the proposition that existence of a characteristic in many is like conjunction obtaining among many things.

¹This refers to the property, or characteristic, existing in more than one thing.

शिंशपा वृक्ष एवेति ह्यविनाभावकारणात् ।

क्षणिकत्वं न भावानां स्वभावः स्यात्तथा सति ॥७४६॥

Indeed, Śimśapā is certainly a tree (not anything else),¹ for the reason that there is invariable concomitance;² but/and that being so,³ momentariness would not be the nature of the positive entities.⁴ [746]

¹This is the implication of *eva* after *vrkṣaḥ*.

²Add: of the nature of being a Śimśapā and (also) being a tree.

³This is to say: if it be accepted in the way, viz. existing in more than one individuals (things/beings) and having different natures of them.

⁴Since *vrkṣatva* is the abiding nature of all trees, one could not say that it, as well as any tree (here, Śimśapā), is momentary.

तस्यानेकार्थशायित्वादहेतुत्वं प्रसज्यते ॥७४७॥

(For/And) it would contingently be a non-reason (*ahetu*) owing to its abiding in many (lit. more than one) effects. [747]

This is clarified further in the next verse.

क्षणिकत्वं यदैकस्य तदासाधारणात्मता ।

हेतोः साधारणात्मत्वं यदानेकस्य तन्मतम् ॥७४८॥

When momentariness (is accepted as a characteristic) of (only) one, then it has the nature of abiding in that particular (individual, i.e. object/person), for, when the reason is accepted as of general nature, then it is accepted (as abiding) in many.

[748]

Read SP: *kṣaṇikatvam ekasyaivānekasya vā, nādyah satī sapakṣe tadapraveśād asādhāraṇatvāpatter dvitīye prakṛtahetor anaikāntikatety arthaḥ*.

Now follows in verses 749-751 the refutation of the notion that an effect can be the reason for inference.

अग्नेर्धमाच्च धमस्य कार्यत्वस्य समीक्षणात् ।
अनैकान्तिकता हेतोः कार्यत्वस्येह सज्जते ॥७४९॥

And in the inference of fire from smoke (as the reason), since it is considered (lit. seen/accepted) that smoke is an effect of fire; therefore, there forcefully follows here (i.e. in so doing) that the reason, in being an effect, belongs not to one, i.e. to more than one, (effect). [749]

Read SP (for some clarification): *dhūmasya kāryatvam agnikṛtam pūrvadhūmakṣaṇakṛtam ca dr̥ṣṭam pūrvottarakṣaṇānām etuphalabhāvopagamād ato dhūmād atrāgnir iti na śakyam anumātum kāryatvasya dhūmāgnyavinābhāvahetor vyabhicāritvān na hi dhūmāgnyor anvayavyatirekau dhūmād api parasya utsiddher ity arthaḥ.*

यदि नाम सदा स्पर्शो वाय्वादावपि वर्तते ॥७५०॥
नैतावता भवेत्लोके गौरस्पर्शस्वभाविका ।
भुवो हि स्पर्शवत्त्वस्य लोकेऽस्मिन्सुप्रसिद्धितः ॥७५१॥

As indeed (the property of being an object of) touch ever abides in wind etc., (only) thereby it does not happen that earth, (an object) of the world, would be without the nature of touch—and, indeed, the nature of earth, as being possessed of the property of touch, is well known. [750-751]

SP puts the purport of this verse succinctly thus: *na hi abhāvasyāvinābhūtatvam niyatam*. This argument is Sureśvara's following what Śaṅkara has said. Cf. *svabhāsyāvinābhūtatve doṣam anubhāsyā* which is introductory to the comment on the next verse.

Now follows in verses 752-758 the refutation of the view that

the nature of an individual (i.e. a thing/person) is the reason for inference.

किं चाप्यव्यभिचारेण स्वभावत्वं विवक्षतः ।
स्वभावान्नैव संसिध्येद्वस्तुनोऽव्यभिचारिता ॥७५२॥

Moreover, (in your case) while you wish to state that the nature of an individual (i.e. a thing/person) is invariably (associated with it), then (it has to be pointed out that) being the invariableness of that (individual) thing does not at all follow from (lit. get established by) its nature. [752]

The next verse adduces support for the argument here.

त्रिष्वेव त्वविनाभावादिति यद्धर्मकीर्तिना ।
प्रत्यज्ञायि प्रतिज्ञेयं हीयेतासौ न संशयः ॥७५३॥

(This is so) because Dharmakīrti has affirmed the invariable nature of only three (things)—and this affirmation would undoubtedly be declined by you (who hold what is said (in the preceding verse)). [753]

This refers to the *pratijñāhāni* by a Buddhist follower as it is disregarding a noted Buddhist authority!

तथैवाव्यभिचारेण स्वभावत्वं विवक्षतः ।
पुरैवाव्यभिचारस्य संसिद्धेः किं ततोऽपरम् ।
स्वभावहेतुना साध्यं वद यत्ते विवक्षितम् ॥७५४॥

Furthermore, while you thus wish to state that the nature of an individual is invariably existing in it, (it has to be pointed out that) the absence of invariability, being already proved, what (other argument) can follow? Tell me, what do you wish to point out as the result (viz. inference) by (adducing) the nature of the individual as the reason (for it). [754]

Read SP: *avinābhūtatvādhīnam svabhāvatvamity atra doṣāntaram*
a.

अग्नेश्चाव्यभिचारित्वात्कार्यस्यापि स्वभावता ।
धूमस्याप्नोति भेदो वा द्वयोर्हेत्वोर्निवर्तते ॥७५५॥

(In the case that you accept) that, because of its invariable association with fire, there follows the nature of its effect (viz. smoke as invariably abiding in it), and (*vā*) then there does not (any more) remain (lit. there ceases to be) any difference between the two (viz. reason and the result from it). [755]

This is to point out yet another fault.

On this verse, read SP: *yady avyabhicāreṇa svabhāvaḥ sādhyate*
śo 'yaṁ śiṁśapātvād iti tadā dhūmasyāgnikāryasyāpi
svabhāvatā syād avyabhicārasya sattvāt. yathāha— kāryasyāpi
abhāvapratibandhe tatsvabhāvasya tatutpatter iti. tataś ca
abhāvakāryahetvor abhedadhvastes triṣv iti pratijñāyogāt ta ete
ryasvabhāvānupalabdhilakṣaṇās trayo hetava iti kathā vṛthety
haḥ.

कार्यत्वेऽपि च धूमादेर्न सोऽशोऽनुमितौ मतः ।
व्यभिचाराच्छराच्छृङ्गाच्छरस्योत्पत्तिरीक्ष्यते ॥७५६॥

And in the smoke's being the effect (of fire) that aspect (viz. invariability) is not accepted in drawing the inference (from it), on account of the variability, (just) like that (variability) is noticed in the origination of a *śara* from either a *śara* or a horn (of an animal). [756]

कार्यत्वान्नैव धूमादिरेति निश्चयहेतुताम् ।
व्यभिचारहेत्वसद्भावादग्नेर्हेतुत्वमेत्यसौ ॥७५७॥

Smoke etc. does not come to have the nature of the reason for a decision (i.e. inference), because of its being an effect of fire; (on the contrary), it comes to have the nature of

reason (for the inference) of fire owing to the non-existence of (any) variable (association of the two). [757]

Read SP: *avyabhicārasambandhād eva dhūmo 'gner gamako na kāryatvād ity arthah.*

अनेककारणं कार्यं यस्माद्दृष्टं शरादिकम् ।
तस्मादव्यभिचारेण कार्यमप्येति हेतुताम् ॥७५८॥

Since there is noticed an effect to have more than one causes for it, as *śara* etc. (for the existence of fire), therefore, even an effort (viz. smoke) becomes the reason for the inference (about the existence of fire)? [758]

Read SP in this context: *kāryasya kāraṇa mātragamakatvena tadviśeṣāgamakatvaṃ tadviśeṣāt taddhīs tu na kāryatvakṛtā kiṃ tv avyabhicārādinā tanmātrāt tanmātradhūr api tathaiveti bhāvaḥ.*

Verses 759-763 point out the instance of the (rise of) the *Kṛttikā* constellation to be the reason for inferring the rise of the *Rohiṇī* constellation, even if the former is not the cause for the latter.

अपेक्षाप्यत्र लिङ्गोक्तेः कार्यादौ नैव जायते ।
अकार्यश्चास्वभावश्च नालिङ्गं कृत्तिकोदयः ॥७५९॥

Also, there does not at all (*eva*) arise (i.e. exist) any need (lit. expectation) of the reason (for an inference) to be an effect etc. (in relation to some thing); (for) the rise of the *Kṛttikā* (constellation) is not an effect of and have the nature (similar to that) of the *Rohiṇī* (constellation). [759]

कृत्तिकात्वादिति ह्युक्तेनैव कार्यस्वभावयोः ।
अपेक्षा जायते किंतु ह्यन्वयेतरमात्रतः ॥७६०॥

Indeed, by merely stating¹ that there is (i.e. has arisen the constellation called) *Kṛttikā*, there does not at all follow any

(notion) of an effect or (its) nature (similar to that) of (Rohiṇī constellation); but the notion (of the rise of the latter) occurs (only) on account of the sequence (of the two, viz. Rohiṇī follows Kṛttikā). [760]

¹Alternatively, from the mere statement of.

अकार्यत्वास्वभावत्वादविनाभावमात्रतः ।
उदयः कार्तिको लिङ्गं प्रत्यासत्तेर्भवेद्ध्रुवम् ॥७६१॥

The rise of Kṛttikā, (though) not being an effect of or not having the nature of and not being in invariable association with it, becomes the reason (for inferring the latter's rise) certainly because of the proximity (of their appearances). [761]

रौहिणस्योदयस्यातो न स्वभावाद्यपेक्षते ।
यतोऽतो न स्वभावादेर्हेतुत्वमुपपद्यते ॥७६२॥

Since (thus) the rise of Rohiṇī does not, for this reason, expect the nature etc. (of Kṛttikā), therefore, it does not follow that the nature etc. have to be (or, have the capacity for being) the reason (for an inference). [762]

नात्मनि स्यात्स्वशब्दोऽत्र विरुद्धा स्वात्मनि क्रिया ।
कार्यस्यापि स्वभावत्वं भवेदात्मीयवाचके ॥७६३॥

In this context, (it should be remembered that) the element/member (lit. the word) *sva* (in the compound word *svabhāva*) does not (signify) the Ātman; (for) any activity in the case of the Ātman¹ is opposed (to its nature); also if (that word *sva* were taken to be) expressive of what belonged to the Ātman, then (it would mean that) the nature of the effect² (would be that of) the Ātman. [763]

Incidentally, Sureśvara discusses, in this verse, the significance of the constituent *sva* in the word *svabhāva*. He thinks of two

possibilities in this respect: (i) *sva* 'belonging to it, i.e. being its property (*guṇa*)'; but this cannot be accepted in the case of the *nirguṇa* Ātman; and (ii) 'belonging to itself as an activity' which also would mean what is contrary to the *akriya* Ātman.

¹SP strengthens this by citing: *uktam hi*:

*sa eva cobhayātmāyaṁ gamyo gamaka eva ca /
asiddhenaikadeśena gamyaḥ siddhena bodhakaḥ //*

²Cf. a citation in SP: *yathāhuh— na hy anyathā bhavaty eṣā vyāpyavyāpakatā tayoh*.

Verses 764-766 are an alternative refutation of the notion of *svabhāva* to be the reason for an inference.

किमात्मैव स्वशब्देन किं वेहात्मीय उच्यते ।
स्वभाव आत्मनो भाव इति चेद्वक्तो मतम् ॥७६४॥

(A question can be asked:) 'Is it the Ātman itself or what belongs to the Ātman that is expressed here¹ by the word *sva*? and also, is it (your) opinion that *svabhāva* means some becoming or modification of the Ātman?' [764]

¹Read SP: *svabhāvo gamaka iti vakyam ihaśabdārthaḥ*.

स्व एवात्मा स्वभावश्चेत्तदान्यस्य ह्यसंभवात् ।
व्यतिरिक्तस्य मेयस्य स्यादात्मैवात्मनोऽनुमा ।
तथा च पक्षहेत्वादेरनन्यत्वं प्रसज्यते ॥७६५॥

(The answer given is:) 'If one understands *sva* as the Ātman itself; then, since there is no possibility of (the existence of) another (to be inferred from it)—(for in that case) there would, indeed (*hi*); be the inference of the Ātman itself beside it as the object to be inferred. And, in that case, there would contingently follow the sameness of (both) the *pakṣa*; and the *hetu*¹ etc.² [765]

SP rightly introduces this verse thus: *gamyasvarūpam eva*

gamakam ity atroktan doṣam anudravati.

¹That is to say: *pakṣa* is not at all *saṁdigdhasādhya*!

²Read SP: *gamakasya gamyamātratve pakṣāder api gamakāntarbhūtasya gamyābhinnatvād ahumānapravṛttis tatas ca pakṣadharmas tadamśena vyāpto hetur iti vyartham syād ity arthaḥ.*

अथ स्वस्य स्वभावश्चेदात्मीयोऽर्थो विवक्षितः ।

आत्मीयः शिखिनो धूमस्तस्यापि स्यात्स्वभावता ॥७६६॥

And again (or, if then) it is intended to state that by *sva* is understood as an object that belongs to the Ātman—(then) there would follow (the difficult situation) that the smoke, which belongs to fire, is (i.e. has to be understood as) its nature!

[766]

Verse 767 refutes anupalabdhi as a means of inference.

संवित्तिभावयोर्भेदो यथैवं तदभावयोः ।

न भेदोऽनुपलब्धिर्वो नातो लिङ्गं कथं चन ॥७६७॥

As there is difference between knowledge and (its) object to be known; so there will be (that difference) between the non-existence of them (as well). Therefore, neither distinction (between some two individuals/things) nor between the non-existence (of them) is in any way the reason (for inference).

[767]

Read SP: *na saṁvedyābhāve lingam ekasminn eva lingalingitvāyogāt tathā ca pradeśaviśeṣe kvacin na ghaṭa upalabdhi-prāptasyānupalabdher iti pramattagītam iti bhāvaḥ.*

Verses 768-775 are an examination of the Buddhist view about svabhāva.

एवं लौकिकतादात्म्यतदुत्पत्ती प्रतीरितम् ।

अथ स्वप्रक्रियाकलृप्तं स्वभावादि परीक्ष्यते ॥७६८॥

Thus it has been stated with reference to what are worldly notions about *tādātmya* 'oneness of a thing with another' and *tadutpatti* 'the origin of a thing from another'. Now then is (will be) examined *svabhāva* etc. which is posited in (the Buddhist's) own process (of argument).¹ [768]

While clarifying the verse, SP states: *yathāha— svabhāva-pratibandhe hi saty artho 'rthaṃ na vyabhicarati sa ca tadātmatvād iti. kāryasyāpi svabhāvaḥ pratibandhaḥ tatsvabhāvasya tadutpatter iti ca—evam bauddhaporakriyāsiddhasvabhāvādy apy agamakam iti nirūpyate 'nantarasandharbhenety arthaḥ dvedhā hi tasya prakriyānyāpohasya gamyatvam gamakatvaṃ cety ekā. yathāha— tasmādapohaviṣayam iti liṅgam prakīrtitam / anyathā dharmiṇaḥ siddhāv asiddhaṃ kim ataḥ param // iti. tadviśiṣṭasya tathātvam ity anyā. uktam hi tadvyavacchedaviṣayam siddhaṃ tadvat tato 'param iti tatrāpi cānyā vyāvṛttir anyo vyāvṛtta ity api / śabdāś ca niścayāś caiva saṃketam anurundhate // iti ca.*

अन्यापोहनपक्षेऽपि शब्दव्यावृत्तिभेदतः ।

न हेतोः स्यात्स्वभावत्वं क्रियात्वं च न विद्यते ॥७६९॥

Also, in the view advocating the exclusion of another object through difference in words-distinction, there would be in the reason (for an inference) the nature of its own or of its activity.

[769]

Read SP on *śabdavyāvṛtti ...: śiṃśapāśabdārthāśiṃśapāvyāvṛtter vrkṣaśabdārthāvrkṣavyāvṛtteś ca mitho bhedaḥ aśiṃśapākhyā-pohasya ca na svabhāvatvaṃ nāpi kāryatvaṃ na hi mitho bhinnaghaṭapataṇayoh svabhāvatvaṃ kāratvaṃ vāsti tenātyantabhinnayor uktāpohayoh svabhāvatvādyabhāve 'pi gamyagamakatvopagamād anupalabdheś ca tatrāniṣṭeḥ svabhāvāder gamakatve vyabhicāra ity arthaḥ.*

वृक्षोऽयं शिंशपेत्यत्र त्ववृक्षार्थविविक्तकम् ।
 वृक्षव्यक्तिषु सर्वत्र रूपमस्ति किलेदृशम् ।
 अशिंशपाविविक्तं च तद्वदेवाभिधीयते ॥७७०॥

In the statement, 'This tree is Śimśapā', there is (effect-
 ed/achieved) distinction¹ of (the tree) from what is not a
 tree. In all the individual trees, there is indeed such a form
 of it (viz. it is a tree). Therefore, (in statements like that
 which is first made) is then (*kila*) expressed that which is
 distinct from non-Śimśapā tree. [770]

¹See SP on *viviktaka*: *kaḥ svārthe. bhāve niṣṭhā*. This means
vivikta is *viveka*.

तत्रावृक्षविविक्तेऽर्थे संकेतो वृक्षसंज्ञया ।
 अशिंशपाविविक्ते च संकेतः शिंशपेति च ॥७७१॥

There, in that case (viz. the statement), convention is (accepted)
 in respect of an object distinguished from a non-tree through
 the utterance of the word tree and further (*ca*¹) (there is)
 convention about what is distinct from a non-Śimśapā tree
 (only (*ca*¹)) in (the expression) Śimśapā. [771]

¹Cf. SP: *ekas cakāraḥ samuccaye dvitīyo 'vadhāraṇe*.

वृक्षोऽयं शिंशपेयं च भवेद्व्यवहृतिस्ततः ।
 शब्दार्थारोपणेनैव सविकल्पधियो जनिः ॥७७२॥

Therefore, your use (lit. dealing of) the words, 'This tree is
 Śimśapā', has achieved merely by putting together the word
 and the sense from which there is the rise of some particular
 knowledge. [772]

शब्दार्थापोहयोर्लिङ्गे ज्ञेया गमकगम्यता ।
 स्वभावकार्ये लिङ्गे स्तः स्वाभाव्यादि च लिङ्ग्यते ॥७७३॥

In respect of the *apohas* 'exclusions' (resulting from) the word and its sense (then) there is to be understood in the reason (of some inference) the relation of what conveys and what is to be conveyed.¹ And, (in respect of the reason) in the form of an object (or, a thing)) and (also) the effect, what is conveyed by them (lit. inferred from them) is the nature of (each of) them. [773]

¹This refers to the *saiketa* 'convention' regarding the word's meaning. On this, SP cites: *yathāha— te yathā vyatirikte 'vyatirikte vā prayoktum isyante tathā niyuktās tam apratiḥandhena prakāśayantīti.*

न तत्र तावद्विज्ञानं तद्ग्राह्येऽस्तीह वस्तुनि ।
स्वभावो वाथवा कार्यं विकल्पोऽयं मतौ यतः ॥७७४॥

This is so, because, in the first instance (*tāvat*), there is not here (in this expression) specific knowledge (which arises) about a thing to be grasped—if (or, when) one held that (there is) in it an option as regards the nature of the thing or its effect. [774]

न वस्तुस्पृग्विकल्पत्वाच्छब्दालम्बनमात्रतः ।
शब्दाः सन्तः कथं तेऽर्था ह्यर्हन्ति भवितुं क्वचित् ॥७७५॥

Words are not (or, lit. do not exist as) words only by referring to things or by (the meanings) dependence on words— how indeed (*hi*)¹ could they deserve to be their meanings? [775]

Read in this context SP: *śabdajñānānupatītyādiyogasūtre 'pi vikalpasya vastusaṃsparśitvaṃ nāstīti prasiddham astīti hi-śabdārthaḥ.*

Verses 776-778 point to the mutual dependence of meanings understood in the theory of exclusion (*apoha*).

स्वभावकार्यतासिद्धिरनुमानसमाश्रयात् ।

ताभ्यां चाप्यनुमासिद्धिरेवमन्योन्यसंश्रयः ॥७७६॥

There is (first) the understanding (or, establishing) of being the nature of a thing and/or the effect of it, by resorting to (the process of) inference and (then (ca)) by/from those two there is (some) inference achieved (or, drawn)—such is the mutual dependence (involved in the process). [776]

अशिंशपानिवृत्तिर्हि न स्वभावो भवेद्यतः ।

अवृक्षापोहरूपस्य तयोरत्यन्तभेदतः ॥७७७॥

Since indeed (*hi*), there would not be the warding away/avoiding (or, exclusion) of what is not a Śimśapā to be the exclusion of the nature of what is not a non-tree for the reason that the two are totally different (from each other). [777]

अप्यधूमनिवृत्तिश्चानग्निव्यावृत्तिरूपिणः ।

न कार्यं स्यात्स्वभावो वा तयोरत्यन्तभेदतः ।

तद्व्यवतेरग्निकार्यत्वान्न सा कार्यं भवेद्यतः ॥७७८॥

Also, avoiding/excluding non-smoke from what is pervasive of non-fire (do not convey) either its effect or its nature, as they are totally different (in nature). And from this (it follows that) the thing, not being an effect of fire, would not be any (i.e. of the nature of an) effect (as well). [778]

This also points to that *svabhāva* etc. is not a *gamaka/linga*.

Verses 779-781 purport to reject the possibility of any *gamyā-gamaka* relation obtaining in the theory of exclusion.

अथान्यापोहवद्वस्तु गम्यं गमकमेव च ।

वक्तव्यं तत्र किं मानमदृष्टौ न त्रिरूपता ॥७७९॥

Now, with reference to the thing, be it to exclusion, what one has to infer and wherewith to infer that, it is to be shown (lit. shown) as to what is the means of knowing (the excluded thing) which is not seen—not (indeed is it its) threefold (character). [779]

Read in this context SP: *apohavadvastuno gamakatve tasmīn kim mānam iti prṣṭe tvayā vācyam mānena gamakasyādrṣṭau tasya pakṣadharmatvaṁ sapakṣe sattvaṁ vipakṣād vyāvṛttir iti trirūpatāsiddhir anumānaṁ hi tri- rūpāl lingato 'rthajñānārtham iti sthiraṁ na hi dharmiṇy apramite dharmapratītiḥ tathā ca—hetos triṣv api rūpeṣu niścayas tena varṇitah / asiddhavi-parī-tārthavyabhicāri-vipakṣataḥ // ity upekṣitam iti bhāvaḥ.*

अशिशपानिवृत्त्यात्मरूपं वस्त्वेव चेन्मतम् ।
अवृक्षापोहरूपं च तयोर्गमकगम्यता ॥७८०॥

If it is held: 'It is only that thing which has a nature in not being a non-Śimśapā (tree) and its having a form of its own that is excluded, viz. a non-tree—then (it may be said) they have (between them) the *gamyā-gamaka* relation. [780]

अशिशपानिवृत्त्यात्मस्वभावाद्गमकं भवेत् ।
अवृक्षात्मनिवृत्त्यात्मगम्यं च स्यात्तदेव तु ॥७८१॥

Being of the nature of a non-Śimśapā (tree), it would be the *gamaka* 'means of inference' and that itself would be what (is to be inferred) in itself being inferred as not a non-tree. [781]

Verses 782-788 state Sureśvara's own opinion in respect of the refutation of the Buddhist's view.

स्वपक्षसिद्धयेऽप्येवं क्लिश्यतोऽपि न सिध्यति ।
पक्षोऽयं बुद्धभक्तस्य यथा तदभिधीयते ॥७८२॥

Now is stated as to how this view of the follower (lit. devotee) of the Buddha does not become established, even if he is thus taking pains to prove his own view (i.e. doctrine). [782]

अशिंशपानिवृत्तिर्वः कुतोऽज्ञायि प्रमाणतः ॥७८३॥

(A question can be put to him:) 'From what authoritative means of knowing, is it known, viz. this exclusion of what is a non-Śimśapā (tree)?' [783]

प्रत्यक्षेण न तावत्सा तस्य सद्वस्तुमानतः ।
लिङ्गान्तरस्य चाभावान्नापि लिङ्गात्प्रसिध्यति ॥७८४॥

'In the first instance, this¹ is not (or, cannot) be known by direct perception, since that is authoritative (in respect of) an existent object (only). And, also because there is no other (indicative) reason, it cannot become known (or proved) by (any) other (process of) inference.' [784]

¹sā refers to *aśimśapānivr̥tti* which is mentioned in the preceding verse.

उपलप्स्यामहे शब्दादेवैनामिति चेन्मतम् ।
अनादिमद्वयवहतेः संबन्धस्य च सिद्धितः ॥७८५॥

If it is held, 'We get to know this¹ from (the) word itself', '(It would mean that) there is established some relation (of that inference) to a dealing which has no beginning (at all).' [785]

¹Cf. note 1 on the preceding verse.

किंमानपर्वकोऽस्यार्थसंबन्ध इति नोच्यते ।
सिध्यत्यैवं भवत्पक्षो दोषोऽपि स्यादनीप्सितः ॥७८६॥

‘Also it is not pointed out (lit. said) as to the means which has preceded that relation (inferred) to the object. But that (thus) establishes in your view the undesired fault (viz. of becoming inconclusive) also.’ [786]

एवं यतोऽभ्युपगतौ लिङ्गं स्याच्छब्द एव तु ।
न स्वभावोऽथवा कार्यं प्रतिज्ञा च मृषा भवेत् ॥७८७॥

‘Since, in thus accepting (the process of inference), the reason (for it) will be only word—not the nature (of the thing) and (not) also its effect (of the thing inferred), so your starting proposition¹ would prove false/meaningless. [787]

¹Namely, *svabhāva* or *kārya* as the reason leads to inference.

त्रिष्वेव त्वविनाभावादिति योक्ता प्रयत्नतः ।
प्रतिज्ञार्थस्य संत्यागो न युक्तः शाक्यभिक्षुभिः ॥७८८॥

‘And (that initial proposition) which was put forth (lit. stated) with (all) effort, viz. owing to the invariable association (etc.) i.e. only in three (factors)—and it is not proper that the Buddhist (lit. Śākya) mendicants should give up their initial proposition.’ [788]

Verses 789-791 state answers to two doubts of the Buddhist.

ननु चांशिशपाद्यर्थविविक्तोऽर्थः प्रतीयते ।
शब्दादेव तु तज्ज्ञानादवृक्षार्थमतिर्भवेत् ॥७८९॥

But, indeed, the thing (or, object) which is distinct from being a non-Śimśapā, is understood only from the word (i.e. the Śimśapā tree); and there would arise the knowledge of that (i.e. which is a tree) (and) the knowledge of that (viz. which is not a tree). [789]

अंशिशपानिवृत्तिर्या कासाविह भवन्मता ।

नाभावोऽसौ यतोऽभावो मतो वोऽनुपलब्धतः ॥७९०॥

(A question can be put:) 'What again is that, in your¹ view, viz. the exclusion of (some) non-Śimśapā?' (It has to be observed:) 'It is not (certainly) a negative entity, since a negative entity is known in your view,² by its non-cognition (lit. not finding/seeing it).' [790]

¹The view of a Buddhist is meant.

²In this context, read SP: *yathāca— ekaḥ pratiśedhaḥetur iti*. Also: *aśimśpāvyāvṛttis tu śābdīṣṭā tathā ca tasyā nānyābhāvatety anyāpohavato 'pi gamakatvādy ayuktam ity arthaḥ*.

शिंशपानुपलब्धिश्चेदन्यव्यावृत्तिरूपतः ।

ततोऽभावात्तथा सिद्धोऽवृक्षाभावोऽपि सर्वदा ॥७९१॥

'If (again) it is (in your view) the non-cognition of the Śimśapā, in some form which is distinct from any other.'—(then it has to be observed) 'in that way, from any negative entity (there would) ever (become known) the absence of (any other) tree as well.' [791]

In verses 792-805 are stated the faults in understanding the absence of objects which are to be known from the absence of knowledge (of some other object(s)).

उपलब्ध्यभावतो नैवं यथा तदभिधीयते ।

कोऽभावानुपलब्ध्योर्वो भेदः स्यादिति कथ्यताम् ॥७९२॥

It is not thus as is stated (by you,¹ viz.) "From the absence of finding/knowing (a thing), (another becomes known)." Let it be told as to what distinction you have (or, you posit) between the absence of a thing and the non-cognition of it.

[792]

¹Cf. verse 767 above—this is pointed out by SP.

ननुपलब्ध्यभावो योऽनुपलब्धिः स उच्यते ।
भावाभावस्त्वभावोऽपि प्रसिद्धं जगति द्वयम् ॥७९३॥

(An argument could be:) 'But, indeed, not finding a thing is itself called (by us) the non-finding or, absence of it; for there is (already) known a pair in the world, viz. the absence of a positive entity and (also) a negative entity'. [793]

सत्यमेवं तथाप्यत्र प्रष्टव्यमवशिष्यते ।
किं चोपलब्ध्यभावेन सा सिद्धा किं ततोऽन्यतः ॥७९४॥

(To this, the answer is:) 'True, that is so; yet there is first to be asked/inquired (this): 'Is it¹ established by cognizing the absence of it or by a thing other than that?' [794]

SP clarifies the second line thus: *sā khalv anupalabdhir asiddhā siddhā vā jñeyābhāvam jñāpayen nādyā indriyātiriktānām jñātakaraṇatvāṅgīkārād anupalabdheḥ sattāmātreṇa gamakatve cātiprasaṅgād dvitīye 'pi sā kim upalabdhibhāvena siddhā kim vopalabdheti praśnārthaḥ.*

¹Namely, *anupalabdhī*.

घटाभावं घटो यद्वद्वटाभावत्वकारणात् ।
मिनोति नात्मनोऽभावमुपलब्धिस्तथैव च ॥७९५॥

As (the existence of) a pitcher fixes/sets up the absence of a pitcher, through the cause of being its absence; (but) it does not fix/set up, in the same way, its presence and also the absence of its own. [795]

SP makes a significant clarifying observation on this verse thus: *na hi svakṣaṇe satō 'pi dīpasya kṣaṇāntare svābhāvagamakateti bhāvah.*

माभावस्याप्यभावेऽस्मिन्संसिद्धेरनुभूतितः ।

सैवातोऽनुपलब्ध्युक्त्या भवद्विरुपवर्ण्यते ॥७९६॥

‘That which (or, since) it is described by you as the non-cognition (of the object) becomes established on the basis of experience even when there is absence (of any object to be known) while there is absence of (any) knowledge.’ [796]

भावाभावोऽपि किं चातः शृण्वतो यद्विष्यति ॥७९७॥

‘The absence of a positive entity also—but what (could result) from that?’ ‘Listen, what will happen (as a result of the same).’ [797]

उपलब्ध्या विनाभावाद्यद्यभावः प्रसिध्यति ।

तदोपलब्ध्यभावोऽसौ यो भावो भवतोच्यते ॥७९८॥

‘If a negative entity becomes established by (or, can be inferred from) some negative entity, while there is no cognition (of an object), then that absence of (any) cognition (of an object) becomes described by you as some positive entity.’ [798]

यदि तद्व्यतिरेकेण तदा वक्तव्यमेव ते ।

किंभूतं ते तदा चित्तमभावप्रसमीक्षणे ॥७९९॥

If (you consider it) to be apart from (or, beside) that, then you have to say what it is; of what nature your mind has become, then, when it is (an occasion) for consideration about the non-existence (of the knowable and the means of knowledge). [799]

उपलब्ध्यभावं मुक्त्वेह नान्यादृक्चित्तमीक्ष्यते ।

किं चोपलब्धितः सर्वसिद्धिमाप्नोति नान्यथा ॥८००॥

Here, i.e. in this case, is not noticeable any thing other than (which is) like that, except the absence of (object that is to be) the cognition, then what other than (mere) cognizing (some

object) would establish the existence of all? (It could) not (be) otherwise. [800]

न तादात्म्यतदुत्पत्ती मिथोऽयोगादपोहयोः ।
न स्वलक्षणयोस्तद्वन्नाप्यपोहवतोस्तयोः ॥८०१॥

There does not obtain (the relation of) *tādātmya* and *tadutpatti* between the two exclusions, owing to their not (having any) connection (between them), and similarly in the case of two also, involving mutual exclusion, (each of the two) have their own, i.e. peculiar characteristics of its own. [801]

नासत्सद्व्यतिरेकेण नासता च सदन्वितम् ।
सति नासदभावोऽपि ह्युक्तं तादात्म्यमागमात् ॥८०२॥

A non-existent object does not exist as apart from some existent (object), nor also is an existent (object) associated with (lit. followed by) a non-existent; for (*hi*) it is said that there is no *tādātmya*, viz. the presence of any non-existent in an existent—(so it is learnt) from tradition. [802]

यथासत्सति संवित्तौ सदप्येवं प्रतीयताम् ।
तदेतदिति च स्पष्टं श्रुतिरैकात्म्यमब्रवीत् ॥८०३॥

Just as a non-existent is a matter of (lit. in) one's knowledge, so is an existent to be understood (or, accepted) (while there is a non-existent)—and the Śruti has clearly declared that there is only oneness of the Ātman (i.e. there is only the single Ātman), in the words *tad etat*¹ [803]

¹Cf. BU 1.4.15; cf. NKL (ms. p.636): *tad etad brahmety upakramyāyam ātmā brahma sarvānubhūtir ity anubhavaikarasa-tvaśruter ity arthaḥ*.

न च भेदमनाश्रित्य स्वभावादि प्रसिध्यति ।
योगस्य भेदनिष्ठत्वान्न च भेदः पुरोक्ततः ॥८०४॥

Again, the nature of a thing etc. cannot become established, unless one has accepted duality (in the world). And since any (i.e. every) conjunction is based on (or, rests on) duality the distinction does not come about by (making) a statement about the same, beforehand! [804]

स्रजि सर्पादिकः क्लृप्तो नाभिन्नो भिन्न एव वा ।
यथोक्तन्यायमार्गेण स्वभावादि ततः कुतः ॥८०५॥

A serpent etc., (which is) imagined (or, is taken to be existing) in a wreath (of flowers), is not one and the same with it, nor is it distinct from it (in existence)—in this way (thus) stated,¹ then, how could there exist (such things as) one's own nature? [805]

¹Read NKL (ms. p.636): *yathā sarpādibhedādirūpeṇa dur-*
canam evam uktanyāyamārgena jagad atyantadurvacanam iti
vat.

verses 806-807 show that there cannot be any scope for (truth
the other theories.

एवमागमतः सिद्ध एकात्म्येऽनुभवाश्रयात् ।
नान्यसिद्धान्तसंसिद्धिर्लभ्यते सर्वतार्किकैः ॥८०६॥

Thus, when the singleness of the Ātman is established by (lit.
from) tradition and as it has a basis in (everybody's) experience;
there cannot, (therefore) be secured (any) success by others
who reason out their doctrines, established by them. [806]

स्वोक्त्यैवापह्नुतेः कृत्स्नवस्तुनोऽतो न यत्यते ।
निराचिकीर्षया शून्यवादिनोऽविषयत्वतः ॥८०७॥

Therefore, because of the rejection (lit. concealment) of all
the (other) objects in their (own) statement(s), there is not

any effort made (by us) with a desire to refute the opinion of those who hold the theory of the void. [807]

Thus far si refuted the Buddhist view on *svabhāva* as a reason for inference.

Now follows in verses 808-832ab the discussion on BU 4.3.8, after the Buddhist's view on *svabhāva* is refuted.

न मृत्यवः स्वभावोऽस्य कार्याणि करणानि च ।
कुतस्तदिति चेदाह स वा इति परा श्रुतिः ॥८०८॥

(It was stated that) the (various) activities and organs, which are deaths,¹ are not the nature of this one. (And) if one were to ask, 'Whence it is so?', (the question is answered in) the subsequent Śruti, beginning with (or, in) the words *sa vā* [808]

This is introductory to BU 4.3.8.

¹Cf. BU 4.3.7; this is actually the forms of death.

स्वप्नो भूत्वा यथात्येति मृत्यो रूपाण्यसङ्गतः ।
आत्मैकस्मिन्नपि तनौ म्रियमाणस्तथैव सः ॥८०९॥

As, after having become the dream,¹ the Ātman transcends² the forms of death just (*api*) in one body,³ owing to its being unattached (to the body, its organs etc.); so does it, in the same way, when it dies (lit. is dying).³ [809]

¹That is, objects of the dream.

²Read SP: *kāryakaranāny abhimānato grhītāny āsaṅgābhāvād ekasminn eva dehe sthite (yathā) atyeti*

³Cf. *atīkrāmati mṛtyo rūpāṇi* in BU 4.3.7. Read SP: *mriyamāṇo vartamānaṁ janma tyajāṇ janmāntaraṁ copādadānaḥ (kārya-karmaṇāny atīkrāmati)*.

शरीरमिति वाक्येन जायमानविशेषणम् ।
क्रियते न स्वतस्तस्य जन्माद्यैः संगतिर्यतः ॥८१०॥

By the sentence *śarīram* ..., there is used a distinguishing attribute of (the word) *jāyamāna*; since there is no connection of that (Ātman) with origination (lit. birth) etc.¹ [810]

This verse explains away the possible understanding of repetition in the statement *śarīram abhisampadyamānaḥ* after the use of the word *jāyamāna*.

¹This appears to refer to the known *bhāvavikāras* associated with whatever was born.

मोहाल्लिङ्गात्मनोत्क्रान्तः श्रुतकर्मानुरूपतः ।
मिथ्याभिमानतो देहं यदात्मैत्यभिमन्यते ॥८११॥
देहं संपद्यमानोऽजस्तदात्मा जायते खवत् ।
घटादिजन्मना तद्वत्तन्नाशे म्रियतेऽमरः ॥८१२॥

The unborn is said to be assuming a body when it identifies itself with the body as 'I am this', owing to its false identification with the body which is caused in accordance with the (performance of) ritual action(s) that were (i.e. prescribed in the scriptures), moving up as it is from the nature of a subtle body, through its ignorance (about its true nature), [811]

but (in reality) the Ātman becomes born in the same way as the sky (is said to be born) through the origination of a pitcher;¹ so also, like that (viz. the pitcher), the immortal one is said to die, when (there is) perishing of that (body). [812]

¹Actually, the sky is never born, but it becomes delimited by a pitcher, palms of a hand etc. and is said to have been born in different shapes. So does the Ātman, delimited by its adjuncts, appear to have been born.

Verses 813-821 explain the meaning of the word *vai*.

संपद्यमान एवात्मा जायते म्रियते यतः ।
न तत्पूर्वं तदूर्ध्वं वा तेन वा अवधारणम् ॥८१३॥

Since the Ātman (thus only apparently) assuming (a body, or bodies) is (said) to have been born and to die, so before that (false happening), or after that, or by that (viz. body assumed) is there (any) delimitation (of it). [813]

This clarifies the purport of *vai* in the relevant Śruti statement.

पाप्मेति देहसंबन्धहेतुमात्रमिहोच्यते ।
आ विरिञ्चात्तथास्थाणोः सर्वं कर्मात् उच्यते ॥८१४॥

(In the use of) the word *pāpman* 'sin' is stated merely the cause of the (Ātman's) association with a body (right up to that of) Viriñca; so also, all the activities are said to be of (i.e. performed by) the eternally abiding (Ātman). [814]

This explains the meaning of *pāpman* which consists in purposeful ritual activity.

ब्रह्मादीनां शरीराणि श्वसूकरशरीरवत् ।
यतो जिहासितान्येव तस्माद्धर्मेऽपि पाप्मणीः ॥८१५॥

Since the bodies of (the god) Brahmadeva and others are, like the bodies of dog(s) and pig(s), sought to be abandoned; the word *pāpman* 'sin' there signifies even *dharma*¹ 'religious duty'. [815]

¹It consists in the performance of ritual activities which aim towards obtaining some results.

दुःखाभावः सदेहस्य नैवास्तीति श्रुतेर्वचः ।
तस्माद्वैवोऽप्यनर्थः स्याद्देहो नाशाच्च सर्वदा ॥८१६॥

(Since) there is a statement of the Śruti, viz. that there can (never) be freedom from (lit. absence of) misery for one, who is possessed of a body;¹ therefore, the body of even a god also has ever the undesired (i.e. misery), owing to its perishing. [816]

कर्म नारभते यावद्दुःखादिफलमात्मनः ।
असत्समं भवेत्तावत्तदपूर्वात्मना स्थितम् ॥८१७॥

So long as ritual activity does not begin to produce for the Ātman misery etc.,¹ it would be as if non-existing (and) only till then remain as *apūrvā*.² [817]

¹The word 'etc.' refers to enjoyment of pleasures, hankerings for and/or impressions of the same.

²This is the well-known conceptual entity of Mīmāṃsā.

शरीरं पाप्मनां कार्यं धर्माधर्मात्मनामिदम् ।
तस्मिन्नात्माभिमानो यः सा संपत्तिरविद्यया ॥८१८॥

This body is the product (lit. effect) of *pāpmans* 'sins' which are of the nature of *dharma* 'religious duty' and *adharma* 'what is not religious duty'. (Therefore) the notion that of identity with it (i.e. *śarīra*) is becoming that (viz. *pāpman*) owing to ignorance (about the real nature of the Ātman). [818]

The verse explains the significance of the suffix *-bhiḥ* of the instrumental as expressive of the nature of *pāpman* to be the cause (*hetu*), or better the agent '*kartr*' of *śarīra-saṅghāta*.

देहकर्मक्षये देहपातश्चास्य यदा तदा ।
पाप्मनः कर्मकार्याणि विजहात्यमृतोऽव्ययः ॥८१९॥

When, after the exhaustion of the (result) of the activity performed through (the help of) the body, there is perishing

(lit. fall) of the body, the immortal and inexhaustible (Ātman) abandons all the performance of (religious) activities (arising) from *pāpman* 'sin'. [819]

This explains *sa utkrāman* ... in BU.

जहाति मृत्यो रूपाणि मृतिस्वप्नादिभूमिषु ।
न तु मृत्युमृते ज्ञानाज्जहात्यात्मा निजं तमः ॥८२०॥

(The Ātman) abandons the forms of death (that occurred) in the (various) states of dying, dream etc.,¹ but not death which occurs in the absence of knowledge; (then, after acquiring that) it abandons its own ignorance (lit. darkness). [820]

¹This indicates the waking state.

पाप्मादिप्रकृतादानत्यागाभ्यामनिशं यथा ।
धिया समानः सत्रात्मा संसरत्या विमोक्षतः ॥८२१॥
परलोकेहलोकौ च तथैवायमविद्यया ।
मृतिजन्मप्रबन्धेन संसरत्या विमोक्षतः ॥८२२॥

As the Ātman transmigrates, being the same as (lit. equal to) the intellect, by continuously performing and/or abandoning whatever *pāpman* 'sin', is taken up (or, begun) till (the moment of acquiring) liberation, [821]

so does this one transmigrate, till (the moment of acquiring) liberation, in this world and that beyond, owing to (its own ignorance, in (or, by) the chain of deaths and births. [822]

This is the purport of the complete sentence *sa vā* There is clarification of both the *dr̥ṣṭānta* 'example' and the *dār̥ṣṭāntika* 'what is supported by the example'.

यत एवमतः सिद्धा देहादिभ्योऽन्यतात्मनः ।
तत्संयोगवियोगाभ्यां स्रग्वस्त्राभरणादिवत् ॥८२३॥

Since this is so, therefore is established the difference of the Ātman from the body and others,¹ on account of (its) conjunction and disjunction from (them), like those of a wreath (of flowers), garments, ornaments etc.² [823]

¹The word *ādi* refers to the different states of waking and dream, the regions, the belongings and so on.

²The word 'etc.' refers to other decorations of a body.

न हि चिह्नत्रेण कर्णेन तद्वानस्मीति मन्यते ।
यथैवमवशिष्टेन तद्विशेषणहेतुतः ॥८२४॥

Indeed, a person, who has his ear cut off (from his body), does not think, 'I have it' (lit. I am possessed of it). Like this, (the Ātman) is (in conjunction with) the remaining (properties of a body),¹ because they are only for specifying (lit. qualifying) it.² [824]

¹This refers to the subtler forms of the body.

²That is, functioning as its adjuncts.

Verse 825 begins the discussion of the superimposed (i.e. imagined) relation of the body to the Ātman—it continues up to verse 830. There follows, in verses 826-828, the discussion on BU 4.3.9.

आभिमानिक एवास्य येन येन विशेष्यते ।
आत्माविशेषणोऽतः स्यात्स्रगाभरणवस्त्रवत् ॥८२५॥

Therefore, all, by whichever (it, i.e. the Ātman) is specified (or, qualified), is (the product) of (its) identity (with it); that is why the Ātman is unspecified, (by a body etc. which are) like a wreath (of flowers), ornaments and garments. [825]

ननु न स्तोऽस्य लोकौ द्वौ यावात्मा संचरत्ययम् ।
मृत्युजन्मप्रबन्धेन जाग्रत्स्वप्नाख्यलोकवत् ॥८२६॥

(An argument of the objector:) 'But, indeed, the two worlds, which the Ātman travels over, do not exist, owing to its continued connection with death (and) birth, like the two worlds of waking and dream states (which do not, in reality, exist)'. [826]

स्वप्नजागरितौ लोकौ यथा प्रत्यक्षमानतः ।
परलोकेहलोकौ तु न तथा मानगोचरौ ॥८२७॥

As the two worlds of waking and dream states (are grasped as external objects) by the means of knowing (called) direct perception, so (are not grasped), however, as external objects of (any) means, the two worlds, this and the one beyond. [827]

This verse is based on the introductory in BUB to BU 4.3.9.

प्रात्यक्ष्यादस्य लोकस्य नास्त्याशङ्कास्तित्तां प्रति ।
परलोकेऽपि नाशङ्का तत्सिद्धेरागमात्सदा ॥८२८॥

As to the existence of this world (of the waking state),¹ there is no doubt (at all), because of its being (the object of) direct perception; so in relation to the world beyond also, there should not be (entertained any) doubt, for it is established by the (Vedic)² tradition (as existing for) ever. [828]

This verse indicates the purpose of the sentence *tasya vā etasya* ... in BU 4.3.9.

प्रत्यक्संवित्प्रमाणत्वं परलोकेहलोकयोः ।
स्वप्नवन्नान्यमानत्वमित्यस्तित्वं विवक्षितम् ॥८२९॥
इत्याशङ्क्योत्तरो ग्रन्थस्तस्य वा इति भण्यते ।
इत्येष तावत्संबन्धस्तथान्योऽप्यभिधीयते ॥८३०॥

The world beyond and this world have the nature (of being

known through) the knowing by the inner self as the means (of knowing) and not of being known, like (the world of) the dream state, by any other means—if (only) the existence (of them) is intended (lit. sought to be stated)— [829]
 having (taken note of) this doubt has the Śruti stated the subsequent portion *tasya va ...* this is the relation (between the earlier and the subsequent portions)—to begin with¹—so also is (i.e. will be) another relation² stated. [830]

¹That is, it is stated in accordance with what is stated in BUB.

²This is to refer to the explanation offered by Bhartṛprapañca.

Verses 831-832 state the relation of the portion (to be under discussion) to the earlier portion.

आत्मा ज्योतिरिति ह्येकः समान इति चापरः ।
 पाप्मनो विजहातीति पदार्थाः सूत्रितास्त्रयः ॥८३१॥

(In this Brāhmaṇa) there are stated (lit. strung together) three things as the subject matter, viz. that one light (of the inner self) is the Ātman; the second is *samāna* and (the third), who gives up the sins.¹ [831]

There is in verses 831 and 832, Bhartṛprapañca's explanation about the relation between BU 4.3.7 and 4.3.8.

¹Note SP, after stating: *yathāhus tānyetāni trīṇi vastūny upanyastānīti*, it adds: *tathodāhṛtatadīyabhāṣyāvadyotī hiśabdah*.

स्वप्नेन निर्णयो वाच्य एतेषामित्यतोऽधुना ।
 तस्येति वर्ण्यतेऽथेदं विधिना येन तच्छृणु ॥८३२॥

Now, there is to be stated a decision (i.e. clear explanation) of these (portions) by (stating the illustration of) the dream (state). Therefore, then (*atha*), hear that by which, the injunction, that is explained in (the sentence) *tasya* [832]

In verses 833-836, there is stated by Sureśvara his own view regarding the relation between the earlier portion and that which follows.

अयं चाप्यभिसंबन्धस्तथा चान्योऽपि वर्ण्यते ।
स्वयंज्योतिर्य आत्मोक्तस्तस्याविद्याक्रियोद्भवाः ॥८३३॥
कर्मोपभोगसिद्ध्यर्थं वर्ण्यन्ते भूमयोऽधुना ।
इदं जन्म परं चैव स्वप्नस्तन्मध्यगस्तथा ॥८३४॥

And this also¹ is the close relation (of the same): In addition to this (*tathā ca*), there is yet another (relation) stated then. In respect of that Ātman, which is described as self-illuminated, there are now described the states (or, regions) which have arisen from its performance of activities, owing to (its) ignorance, in order that they are useful in causing the ritual action and the consequent enjoyment(s)—thus, (they are) this birth and (yet) afterwards also and similarly the dream state and that during the same (state).² [833-834]

¹*api* indicates Sureśvara's approval of Bhartṛprapañca's view.

²The states of the enjoyments are mentioned in the BU sentence *idaṁ ca paraloka*

भावि यज्जन्म यच्चेदं प्रत्यक्षमनुभूयते ।
एते एव विभोः स्थाने द्वे एवेत्यवधारणात् ॥८३५॥

The birth that will be and also this one, which is directly experienced—only these two are the two states (or regions) for/of this pervader of all; this is so specified in the words *dve eva*. [835]

This verse states the meaning of the BU sentence *tasya vā ... paralokasthānaṁ ca*.

ननु स्वप्नोऽपि लोकोऽस्य कथं स्यादवधारणम् ।

द्वे एवेति न संध्यत्वात्स्वप्नस्य स्थानयोर्द्वयोः ॥८३६॥

(A question is asked:) 'But, indeed, how could there be the specification *dve eva* to convey that for this one (viz. the individual/inner self) there is a world of the dream also?' (The answer is:) 'No, (this cannot be questioned,) since the dream state is the intermediate (state) between the two states (lit. abodes of the individual/inner self)'.¹ [836]

¹SP clarifies this thus: *na hi grāmayoḥ saṁdhis tāv apeksya tṛtīyo bhavaty ato 'vadhāraṇasiddhir ity arthaḥ*.

Verses 837-840 assert the notion of the third state, viz. dream.

संध्यं तृतीयमित्युक्तिः पूरणप्रत्ययश्रुतेः ।
न स्थानान्तरनिह्नूत्यै यत्तूक्तमवधारणम् ॥८३७॥
तदयोगव्यवच्छिन्न्यै नान्ययोगव्यपेक्षया ।
तस्मिन्संध्य इतीदं च तथा सति समञ्जसम् ॥८३८॥

The statement *saṁdhyam tṛtīyam* is for the hearing of (*śruti*, i.e. conveying) what completes the enumeration¹ (and) not for the averting (or, denial) of (the notion of) any other state (or, region). As for the specification, which is stated, it is for setting aside the (notion of) the absence of any non-connection (of the two, earlier stated) and not out of (any) consideration of (any) connection with (some) other state (or, region); and, in that case (or, that being so), the phrase *tasmin saṁdhye* would be consistent (or, having propriety). [837-838]

¹*pūraṇapratyaśruteḥ* is paraphrased in SP as *pūraṇapratyaśraṇāt*.

स्वप्नेहलोकयोस्तावत्सत्त्वं प्रत्यक्षगोचरम् ।
परलोकस्य सद्भावे किं प्रमाणमितीर्यताम् ॥८३९॥

(The answer is:) 'As for the existence of the two worlds (in the states), viz. that of the dream and this world, it is the object of direct perception. (But) in respect of the existence of the world yonder, what is the means (of knowing it)? Let this be told'. [839]

This verse is to introduce a doubt which evokes the reply in the immediately following sentence *tasmin saṁdhye sthāne*

अस्मिन्नेव तु स स्वप्ने स्थाने तिष्ठन्प्रपश्यति ।
एमं लोकं परं चात्मा कर्मज्ञानादिसंस्कृतः ॥८४०॥

Abiding (lit. standing, i.e. staying) in this very dream state, it, i.e. the Ātman, sees this world and that yonder, being (or, remaining) affected (lit. modified) by (the earlier performed) ritual activity, (worldly) knowledge etc.¹ [840]

¹The word 'etc.' stands for *vāsanās* 'impressions' of the two worlds, or of earlier life/lives. (Perhaps, this latter is explained in the next three verses.)

Verses 841-844 affirm the possible memory (in childhood) of the world of earlier life

भूतजन्मनि यद्वक्तं कर्म तद्भावंनाञ्जितः ।
पौर्वदैहिकमेवातो वयस्याद्येऽभिवीक्षते ॥८४१॥

(In the case of this person it so happens that) because he is tinged by the notions (or impressions) of that activity which was performed in the past life, in the first phase of his life; he sees in his dream state what was related to his earlier (or former) body. [841]

मध्ये वयसि कार्कश्यात्कारणानामिहार्जिताः ।
प्रायेण वीक्षते स्वप्ने वासनाः कर्मणो वशात् ॥८४२॥

(And) in the middle of his life, he sees in his dream state mostly¹ the impressions (of the objects of that time etc.) which he has gathered here (i.e. in this very life), on account of the grossness in his experiences² and (also) under the influence of his (worldly) activities. [842]

¹SP states: *ihāsamabhāvitam api svapne kadācid adṛṣṭavaśāt paśyati prāyeṇety uktam.*

²Read the paraphrase in SP: *kārkaśyam sthūlārthagrahaṇa-āmarthyam.*

यियासुः परलोकं तु कर्माविद्यादिसंवृतः ।
भाविनो जन्मनो रूपं स्वप्ने प्रायेण पश्यति ॥८४३॥

And (*tu*) when he is (now) about to depart for the yonder world, being covered with (the impressions of his) activities, ignorance etc.,¹ very (or, more) probably² he sees (his own) form in the forthcoming life (lit. birth). [843]

¹This refers to his hankering for the pleasure and the status, which he would hopefully get in the next life.

²According to SP, *prāyeṇa* indicates the objects of his sight, which do not, as a rule, present themselves before him. Yet, we think, the word conveys that sense which we have chosen under the preceding verse.

भुक्ततत्वादविवक्षेह व्यतिक्रान्तस्य जन्मनः ।
परलोकेहलोकौ तु गृह्येते संध्यसिद्धये ॥८४४॥

Here,¹ there is no intention (lit. desire) to say, in relation to this state, about what has been there in the past life, because that has been (already) experienced (by him). But, here are understood (lit. taken up) the yonder world and this world, in order that there be established the intermediate state. [844]

¹This refers to the dream state, as the intermediate state.

Verses 845-850 explain the statement *atha yathākramam*

सुखेन दर्शनं तावदैहिकस्येह जन्मनः ।

यथा तु परलोकस्य तथाथेत्यभिधीयते ॥८४५॥

As for the sight of this life here, it (occurs only) easily; and (*tu*) now is said as to how it also (would occur easily likewise) in the words *yathā tu paralokasya tathā*. [845]

This refers to the purpose of the Śruti statement *atha yathākramam*

स्वप्नस्थानं समाश्रित्य परलोकं प्रपश्यति ।

विधिना केन किं चात्मा समाश्रित्य प्रपश्यति ॥८४६॥

अथैतदुच्यते स्पष्टं तद्यथावत्प्रतीयताम् ।

येनाक्रामत्यमुं लोकं सोऽस्याक्रम इहोच्यते ॥८४७॥

In what manner this individual resorts to (i.e. abides in) the dream state and then well (*pra*) sees the yonder world and also what it is that the Ātman (later) resorts to (or, takes support of), is clearly stated in the sentence (beginning with the word) *atha*. Let this be understood properly. That is called here this individual's *ākrama* 'approach' by which he approaches that world. [846-847]

यादृक्साधनमस्येह परलोकाप्तये चितम् ।

आक्रमः स यथा यस्य सोऽयमात्मा यथाक्रमः ॥८४८॥

That is the (adopted) way of this (individual), i.e. the kind of means (which is) acquired (by him) for attaining to the yonder world. (As such) this Ātman is (described as) *yathākrama*, i.e. the one who has that as his (adopted) way.

[848]

यथाक्रमो यथोपायो विद्याकर्मादिलक्षणः ।

परलोकोन्मुखीभूतं तमाश्रित्याक्रमं स्वकम् ॥८४९॥

स्थानं निर्माय संध्याख्यं विपाकानुभयानयम् ।

अधर्मधर्मयोरात्मा दुःखानन्दान्प्रपश्यति ॥८५०॥

(The word) *yathākrama* (means) *yathopāya* 'having the means as (are) adopted by him'—thus *yathākrama*, he, who is characterized by (his) knowledge, activity etc.,¹ resorts to his adopted way which has turned upwards for (attaining to) the yonder world and then, [849]
having created that abode (or, resort) which is called *sandhyā* 'the intermediate one', this Ātman sees both sorts of results from the performance of non-duty and duty, viz. miseries and joys (or, happiness). [850]

This explains the meaning of *tam ākramam ... paśyati* in BU.
¹See note 1 on verse 843 above.

verses 851-854 refer to the result stated in *pāpmanah paśyati*.

पाप्मनोऽधर्मकार्याणि तथानन्दांश्च धर्मजान् ।

आगमादन्यतः साक्षात् तु पापादिदर्शनम् ॥८५१॥

(That means: he sees) the sins, viz. the effects of (the performances of non-religious) actions and, so also (*tathā*) joys (which are) the products (of the performances) of religious duty. (And) the sight of the sins (is so understood) on the authority of scripture, but it cannot be perceived directly. [851]

The first line is in explanation of what is said in the preceding verse.

धर्माधर्मप्रयुक्तो वा देवतानुग्रहात्तथा ।

आनन्दान्पाप्मनश्चित्रान्स्वप्न आत्मा प्रपश्यति ॥८५२॥

Or (perhaps,) being urged (or propelled) by *dharma* and

adharma as also on account of the favour(s) of the deity/deities, the Ātman sees in the dream state varied joys and (results of) sins. [852]

इह जन्मन्यसंभाव्यं स्वप्ने यस्मात्प्रपश्यति ।
परलोकाश्रयं तादृक्तस्मात्स्वप्नसमीक्षणम् ॥८५३॥

Since it sees in the dream state what is impossible to occur in this (actual) life, therefore, (there is) sight of the dream-(-objects) of that sort, which is supported (or, occurring) in the yonder world. [853]

संध्यस्वप्नविधिस्तावदेवं समुपवर्णितः ।
परलोकप्रसिद्धयर्थं तस्य वा इति वाक्यतः ॥८५४॥

Thus is described in the sentence *tasya vā* ..., in the first instance (*tāvat*) the manner of (the sight of the objects in) the dream state, intermeditae state, in order that (the nature of the objects in) the yonder world becomes clear (lit. established). [854]

Verses 855-856 explain sa yatra svapiti

यदुक्तं विरहेऽशेषसूर्यादिज्योतिषामयम् ।
पुमान्व्यवहरत्यात्मज्योतिषैवेति लिङ्गतः ॥८५५॥

As to what is said (earlier), viz. this individual (lit. man) does (all his) activities, even in the absence of all the lights such as the sun,¹ (it was so said) for the reason that he does so only with the light of the Ātman. [855]

¹This refers to BU 4.3.6. *ādi* means the moon, fire, and others mentioned in BU 4.3.1-6.

भान्वादिसर्वज्योतिभ्यो विविक्तोऽयं पुमानिति ।
क्व सिद्ध इति वक्तव्यं यथोक्तार्थप्रसिद्धये ॥८५६॥

Now is to be stated as to where is established that this individual (lit. man), who is quite distinct from all the lights such as the sun, in order that what is thus said (above) becomes established. [856]

This serves as an introductory to the discussion of the BU sentence *sa yatra*

verses 857-862 affirm that the *Kaṇḍikā* purports to explain *svayaṃ jyotiḥ*.

स्वयंज्योतिःप्रसिद्धिर्वा पूर्वमक्तानुमानतः ।
साक्षादव्यवधानेन तत्प्रसिद्धिरर्थोच्यते ॥८५७॥

Or rather, the proof (or, establishment) of the self-shining character of the Ātman was stated earlier in the form of an inference. Now is stated the proof of it by the direct experience of it without any obscuring force (or, any hindrance). [857]

स स्वयंज्योतिरात्मैव बाह्यज्योतिर्विवर्जितः ।
यथा भवति साक्षाच्च तथेदमभिधीयते ॥८५८॥

Now it is to be said as to how the Ātman, apart from (i.e. without having the help of) any external light, becomes self-shining in a directly perceptible manner. [858]

This is made clear by citing the example of the dream state experience. SP invites attention to the following statement (possibly of Bhartṛprapañca): *svayaṃjyotir ity upanyastam ātmā-jyotir ity anenābhidhānāntareṇa tannirṇayārtham svapnadr̥ṣṭānta-ādiyate*.

यत्र यस्यामवस्थायां स्वपितीत्यभिधीयते ।
पुरुषोऽजं स्वमात्मानं तदापीतो भवत्ययम् ॥८५९॥

yatra ... means: (that state or condition) wherein, it is said, (the man) sleeps, i.e. this one merges into itself, the unborn.

[859]

This is the meaning of the BU sentence *sa yatra praspapiti*.

जाग्रत्कर्मक्षयादात्मा बाह्यदेहाभिमानतः ।

व्युत्थाय स्वप्रधानः सन्स्वप्नमायां समीक्षते ॥८६०॥

On the cessation (lit. loss) of (all) external activity, the Ātman, having risen above (its own) identity with the external body, becomes prominent itself (or, independent, i.e. fully free) and sees the wondrous world of the dream state.

[860]

प्रवृत्तं फलदानाय यदिदं जन्म वर्तते ।

अस्येति लोकशब्देन तदेतदभिधीयते ॥८६१॥

Since this birth (of the Ātman) has been active towards bringing about (i.e. producing some) result(s), therefore, it is mentioned (or, referred to) by the word *asya* 'of this one', that signifies the world.

[861]

This explains the meaning of *lokasya* in the BU phrase *asya lokasya*.

जुहोत्यादिक्रियाद्वारा यस्मात्सर्वमवत्ययम् ।

सर्वावानिति तेनायमात्मा देहान्त उच्यते ॥८६२॥

Since this one favours¹ or protects all (viz. the superintending deities of the organs) by such (ritual) activities as (are signified by such verbs) as *juhoti* 'the (individual) makes an offering', therefore is this Ātman (which is) inside the body² is described as *sarvāvat*.³

[862]

This verse, which follows BUB, presents an example of the Brāhmanical explanation of the word *sarvāvat*. It is, nevertheless,

possible that the adjective form *sarvavat* can be derived as *sarva* with the *-matup* suffix (i.e. *vat*) attached to *sarva* and, in the Vedic text, it would cause lengthening of *a* in *sarva*; the meaning would be: 'of (this) all-inclusive (world)'. It is this explanation which is correct as shown by the next verse and also as it is in keeping with the Vedic style. Yet, Sureśvara takes *sarvāvat* to have been formed from *sarva* and *avat* and thus relegates to the background the said linguistic peculiarity in the Upaniṣadic word. This leads him to offer yet another (and correct) explanation of the word in the next verse.

SP refers this to BU 2.5.14-15.

¹This is the Vedic meaning of the verb root *av*. The other meaning 'to protect' also cannot be ruled out.

²*dehānta* is explained by SP as *buddhyādir dehāntaḥ kartā saṁbhātaḥ puruṣo yāgādidvārā*

³*sarvāvān* is explained by SP thus: *sarvaṁ devādi yato rakṣati tenāyaṁ lokyamānaḥ sarvāvān ity ucyata ity arthaḥ*. Yet, see the verse 864.

Verses 863-873 justify how *svakarman* is *sarvarakṣaka*.

कृत्स्नं जगदुपादाय क्रियैकैकस्य सिध्यति ।
जुहोत्यादिर्जगद्धेतुः सर्वावानुच्यते ततः ॥८६३॥

Since each (of the *saṁghāta*'s) activity can be accomplished after taking up the entire world (of objects etc. around); therefore the cause of the world consisting in making an offering etc.,¹ is called *sarvāvat* 'being possessed of all (material for sacrifice)'. [863]

This verse is based on the statements in the Madhu Brāhmaṇa conveying the sense: *sarvaṁ sarvasya kāryam syāt* (NKL); cf. SUBV 2.4.135-147; but verses 135 and 145 in particular.

¹The word 'etc.' refers to various such other activities of the sacrificer as *śamsati* in connection with the sacrifice.

अध्यात्मादिविभागेन सर्वा वास्यात्मनो यतः ।
भूतभौतिकमात्राः स्युः सर्वावानुच्यते ततः ॥८६४॥

Or, it is described as *sarvāvat* 'all-inclusive', since all the elements and their portions,¹ existing in the form of divisions, viz. *adhyātma* etc.² have originated from this (very) Ātman. [864]

This is an alternative explanation of *sarvāvat*, offered by Sureśvara. Cf. our note on the preceding verse.

¹Or, products/modifications.

²The word 'etc.' refers to *ādhibhautika* and *ādhidaivikā mātras*.

सर्वावतोऽस्य देहस्य स्वप्नभोगप्रसिद्धये ।
आदाय वासनामात्रां स्वप्नमायां तनोत्ययम् ॥८६५॥

This one produces (lit. stretches itself out into) the wondrous world of the dream state by taking up (or lit. deriving) from this body of the all-inclusive (form of its own) the portions of impressions, in order to secure the enjoyment of (the objects in) dream. [865]

अध्यात्मादिविभागेन मात्रा जागरिते यथा ।
भोगेनेहापचीयन्ते प्रचीयन्ते च कर्माभिः ॥८६६॥

As the portions (of *vāsanās*), existing in the divisions such as *adhyātma* etc., reduce (in quantity) through the enjoyment (of them), so do they grow also by (various) activities. [866]

This verse seeks to answer away a doubt that the *vāsanā-mātrā-kṣaya* might lead to liberation.

स्वप्नभूमावपि तथा कर्मणोत्थापिता इमाः ।
क्षयवृद्धिप्रबन्धेन मात्राः स्युर्वासनात्मिकाः ॥८६७॥

These portions (of *vāsanās*), which have increased even in

the dream state due to the (force of) activity in a continuous chain of loss and gain, are for the nature of impressions. [867]

धिया धियेति च तथा प्रागेतदुपपादितम् ।
हासवृद्धिप्रबन्धेन यथेदं वर्तते जगत् ॥८६८॥

So, that is already reasoned out earlier, in the words *dhiyā dhiyā*, in order to explain as to how this world goes on in a chain of decrease and increase. [868]

This is referring to BU 1.5.2, i.e. a passage in the Saptāṇṇa Brāhmaṇa.

स्वयमेव विहत्येति देवताप्रतिषेधकृत् ।
विशेषणं स्वयमिति देहपातेऽस्य भण्यते ॥८६९॥

The phrase *svayam eva*¹ *vihatya* rejects (or, effects in the rejection of) other deities; for, the specification of this one whose body has fallen (i.e. perished) is made by the word *svayam*. [869]

¹The word *eva* gives emphasis on the word *svayam*.

स्वात्मापसर्पणाद्देहं निःसंबोधं करोति यः ।
सुषुप्सुः कर्मणां ध्वस्तौ विहत्येत्युच्यते ततः ॥८७०॥

The one, who wishes to sleep and, therefore, renders its own body devoid of all consciousness by moving out of (lit. away from) it when activities have ceased (lit. have been destroyed), is referred to (in the use of the gerund) *vihatya* (as the agent of the activity mentioned thereby). [870]

भान्वाद्यनुग्रहाद्बोध आत्मनश्चक्षुरादिषु ।
देहस्य व्यवहारार्थं देहव्यवहृतिस्तथा ॥८७१॥
आत्मकर्मप्रयुक्तैव धर्मादिफलभुक्तये ।
कर्मणः फलभोगान्ते देहो यस्मात्पतत्ययम् ॥८७२॥

In the case of (the organs, viz.) the eye etc.,¹ cognition comes to them from (i.e. on account of) the Ātman, through the favour(s) of (deities such as) the sun² and which is for (facilitating) the activity (or, activities) of the body;³ and thus there is activity (or, are activities) of the body, caused only by the Ātman, for the experience (lit. enjoyment) of the results of *dharma* etc. (This is so), because this body perishes (lit. falls) at the end (i.e. after the exhaustion) of the experience of the results(s) of activity (or, activities). [871-872]

¹The word 'etc.' stands for the ear, the nose, the tongue and so on.

²This implies the deities superintending over the organs of the body. The verse does not state if the Ātman favours them; though that is intended; cf. verse 874 below.

³This refers to the waking state.

निर्मायेति स्वयं तद्वदात्मकर्मव्यपेक्षया ।

स्वप्नप्रपञ्चनिष्पत्तिर्यस्मात्तस्माद्विशेषणम् ॥८७३॥

In the same way, owing to the dependence on the activity of the Ātman, there arises (or, occurs) the world of activities in the dream state and, therefore, there is the specification (of the Ātman's activity in the words) *svayaṃ nirmāya*. [873]

Verses 874-876 explain the meaning of the word *vāsanāmaya* in the *Bhāṣya*.

अपास्ताशेषकरणदैवतस्यापि चात्मनः ।

क्रियाकारकसिद्धयर्थं भावनैवास्य कारणम् ॥८७४॥

And, also in the case of the Ātman, that has set aside all of the organs and their deities, it is only the impression which becomes the cause of its accomplishing various activities

through the agents and others related to them.

[874]

निर्मातव्योऽथ भोक्तव्यो यो लोकोऽभिहात्मनः ।
तेन तेन स्वरूपेण भावना व्यवतिष्ठते ॥८७५॥

Similarly (*tathā*),¹ whatever was the world² that was for the Ātman what was to be produced, and what, enjoyed, in the form of every one of them, remain there as the impression (to continue).

[875]

¹This is pointed out by SP: *athaśabdas tathāśabdaparyāyaḥ*.

²Add: Be it *ihaloka* or *paraloka*.

अपेतकारकत्वोऽपि कर्मोत्थापितभावनः ।
भावनाकारकेक्षित्वादात्मैकः कारकायते ॥८७६॥

The Ātman, though it had given up (or, set aside all) capacity of being an agent, had the impressions of activities aroused in itself and, therefore, being the witness of (those) impressions and means (or, aids) of activities, becomes an agent (connected with activities).

[876]

Verses 877-882 explain the distinct meanings of *svena*, *bhās* and *jyotiṣā*.

जाग्रतो यदुपात्तं प्राग्भावनालक्षणं स्वयम् ।
भास्वद्धीसंश्रयं ज्ञानं भाःशब्देन तदुच्यते ॥८७७॥

Whatever of the nature of impressions of earlier (state(s)) acquired by it from the waking state is but its knowledge, abiding in (or, dependent on) the intellect, and that is mentioned by the word *bhās* 'lustre'.

[877]

बुद्ध्यादिकरणोत्थाया व्यावृत्त्यर्थं विशेषणम् ।
स्वेनेति भासः प्रत्यक्चिदभिव्यक्तकृतोऽभिदा ॥८७८॥

(The word) *svena* is an adjective (or, specification) of (the word) *bhās* and of *jyotis* (used) for excluding (the idea of its having) arisen from the means of activity, viz. the intellect etc.,¹ and (it is) a conveyor of (that *bhās* also which) causes the manifestation of sentience within (i.e. the inner self). [878]

¹It conveys the activity in the dreams state also.

स्वशब्दाविह विज्ञेयावात्मीयात्मार्थवाचिनौ ।
भाज्योतिरनुरोधेन सामर्थ्यादेव कारणात् ॥८७९॥

The two (i.e. twice used) words *sva* (used) here (in the BU sentence) are to be understood as expressing the sense 'belonging to oneself', so as to be in consonance with the bright light, for the only reason of (or, in other words, so as to be having) suitableness. [879]

This is to explain the purposeful repetition of the adjective *sva* going with *bhās* (= *kuṭasthajyotis*) and *jyotis* 'the light within (and individual being)'—this latter is beset with limitation.

परार्था भावना यस्मात्स्वार्थं ज्योतिश्चिदात्मनः ।
उक्तार्थवाचिनौ तस्मात्स्वशब्दौ समुदाहृतौ ॥८८०॥

(This is so) because the impression is related to another object whereas the light of oneself is the light of the sentient Ātman itself. As such, these two (i.e. twice used) words *sva* are explained (here) as expressive of two said senses. [880]

This explains the suitableness already referred to in the preceding verse.

स्वयंज्योतिरिति प्रोक्तो निष्क्रियोऽकारकोऽफलः ।
यः स एव स्वयंज्योतिर्ज्योतिःशब्देन भण्यते ॥८८१॥

The one, who is described (lit. stated) as devoid of (any)

activity, and not an agent (of it), and also not having any result (of the same), the self-shining, is expressed here in (the word) *svayanjyotis* as *jyotis* 'light'. [881]

This is the meaning of the word *jyotis*.

निःशेषलोकधीवृत्तिसाक्षिणैवाविकारिणः ।
प्रतीच ईदृशी वृत्तिः स्वपितीत्यभिधीयते ॥८८२॥

What is expressed by the word *svapiti* is the kind of activity only of the inner self, the witness of the entire activity of people's intellect, (the one) who is immutable (or lit. does not undergo any modification). [882]

This states the meaning of *prasvapiti*.

In the first line there appears to be a case of double Saṁdhi thus: *-sākṣiṇaḥ eva ...* (= *-sākṣiṇa eva ...*, and then) = *-sākṣiṇaiva ...*

Verses 883-888 amplify the meaning of the word *prasvapiti*.

पीताध्यात्मादिकज्योतिर्जाग्रच्छब्दादिवर्जितः ।
वासनोपाधिरात्मैकः स्वयंज्योतिरितीर्यते ॥८८३॥

It is only the Ātman that is described as self-shining; the one which has pervaded (lit. drunk, or swallowed up) the lights such as the one belonging to a body,¹ beyond the expressions (lit. words) such as *jāgrat*² and also having the impressions as its delimiting adjuncts. [883]

¹This refers to the various organs in the body and also the deities superintending over them, viz. Āditya and others.

²These are *susupta* and *svapnāvastha*.

मातृमानप्रमेयादिसामग्री वासनात्मिका ।
स्वप्ने भाःशब्दवाच्यास्य स्वयंज्योतिष आत्मनः ॥८८४॥

For this self-shining Ātman, there is, in the dream state, the assemblage of the means of activity, viz. the knower, the means of knowing and to the object to be known,¹ which is (really) of the nature of impressions²—(and it is) to be expressed by the word *bhās*. [884]

¹*ādi* should refer to *kriyā* 'action', *deśa*, *kāla* and so on.

²This refers to the character of *vāsanās* as *upādhis* 'the delimiting adjuncts'.

प्रमातृत्वादिका सर्वा प्रथते विषयात्मना ।
भावना स्वार्थरूपस्य प्रतीचोऽलुप्तचक्षुषः ॥८८५॥

The (whole of the) impression (*bhāvanā*)— such as being the knower etc.¹ of (the Ātman), which has the form of its own object(s), viz. the inner self, the one who has not lost its power of seeing,² and appears (lit. extends itself) in the form of the objects (of its knowing). [885]

¹This is, in reality, the object of seeing by the inner sentience.

²*aluptacakṣus* justifies the word *svārtharūpa*.

मातारं मेयसंबद्धं जाग्रद्वृत्तौ यथेक्षते ।
निष्क्रियो वासनाराशिं स्वप्नभूमौ तथेक्षते ॥८८६॥

As the one, who is (really) without any activity, sees in the waking state the knower as related to the object of its knowing, so does it see, in the dream state, an assemblage of impressions. [886]

स्वयंज्योतिरयं प्रत्यङ्सर्वसाधननिस्पृहः ।
कूटस्थो वासनाः स्वप्ने चिदाभासाः करोत्ययम् ॥८८७॥

This inner self is self-shining, cherishing desire for none (or, lit. all) of the means and immutable. In the dream state, this

one makes the impressions as having the semblance of sentience. [887]

तत्संनिधौ चिदाभत्वं कार्यकारणवस्तुनः ।
यत्तदस्यात्मनो मोहाद्द्रष्टृत्वमुपचर्यते ॥८८८॥

(And) the semblance of sentience in the case of the things as cause(s) and effect(s), in the proximity of sentience, is but metaphorically attributed nature of the seer in the case of (or, as belonging to) this Ātman, which is caused by its ignorance (about its own true nature). [888]

Verses 889-892 affirm the seer Ātman to be (so-called) through delusion.

ज्योतिषाकारकेणात्मा वर्ततेऽसंस्पृशन्परम् ।
चिदाभा वासनाश्चैवं संगतिर्न तयोर्मिथः ॥८८९॥

The Ātman exists as (or, appears to be) without touching the other (object-world) by means of its (own) lustre, which is not (in any way) related to any activity, whereas (or, and) the impressions have the semblance of sentience; but there is not any connection between (or, contact of) the two. [889]

This justifies *mohād draṣṭṛtvam* in the preceding verse.

यथा जात्यमणेः शुद्धा ज्वलन्ती निश्चला शिखा ।
संनिध्यसंनिधानेषु घटादीनामविक्रिया ॥८९०॥
निःशेषबुद्धिसाक्ष्येवं परमात्मप्रदीपकः ।
संनिध्यसंनिधानेषु धीवृत्तीनामविक्रियः ॥८९१॥

As in a pure gem, there is noticed a natural brightly-burning and unmoved (lit. steady) flame, (and which) does not undergo any modification even while the pitchers etc. are in the proximity of and/or at a distance from it, [890]
so is this highest Ātman, which illuminates (all other things),

viz. the one, who is the witness of all of the intellects remains unmodified, even while it is in proximity of and/or at a distance from all the functions (or, modifications) of the intellects. [891]

न प्रकाशक्रिया काचिदस्य स्वात्मनि विद्यते ।
उपचारात्क्रिया सास्य यः प्रकाशस्य संनिधिः ॥८९२॥

(In fact) there is not any activity of illuminating in the nature itself of the Ātman, but that activity is (metaphorically attributed to it) and is really owing to (or, dependent on) the proximity of what is to be illuminated. [892]

This verse sets aside two notions: the light of the Ātman is (i) for illuminating itself and (ii) illuminating other objects.

Verse 893 explains the instrumental forms svena bhāsā as itthambhūtalakṣaṇe.

यदेवं वर्तनं श्रुत्या स्वपितीति तदुच्यते ।
इत्थंभूते तृतीयातः स्वेन भासेति गृह्यते ॥८९३॥

What is said to be such existence (lit. doing) of the Ātman, is described by the Śruti (in the word) *svapiti*. And, therefore, in the words *svena bhāsā* is understood (lit. accepted the use of) the instrumental case for conveying (the sense of) a mark or attribute (of the particular state).¹ [893]

¹Cf. Pāṇini 2.3.21: *itthambhūtalakṣaṇe*.

Verses 894-896 state that the intention of the above is to convey the non-agency of the Ātman (in any activity).

सामग्र्यभावान्नैवेह कर्तृत्वादि विवक्ष्यते ।
आत्मनोऽकारकत्वं च प्राधान्येन विवक्षितम् ॥८९४॥

Here,¹ agentship etc. is not at all intended (in any activity)

on account of the absence of the assemblage² of the means etc. and indeed it is intended (to bring out) mainly the non-agentship of the Ātman. [894]

The purpose of the verse is: The instrumental case in *svena* *tiṣā* is not a conveyor of either the agent or any means for as in *rāmeṇa śareṇa (hataḥ vālī)*.

¹This refers to the dream state.

²Cf. verse 884 above.

भान्वादिबाह्यज्योतिर्भिः संकीर्णः प्रागभूदयम् ।
अन्यस्य ज्योतिषोऽभावात्स्वयंज्योतिः पुमानयम् ॥८९५॥

Earlier, this (lustrous Ātman) was commingled with the external lights, viz. the sun and others; (but, now, in the dream state) this one is self-shining, because there does not exist any (such) light. [895]

नान्यत्र कारणाद्वृत्तिः कार्याणां जागरेऽपि हि ।
कारणं च तमस्व्यात्मा नातः स्वप्ने मनस्स्थितिः ॥८९६॥

Indeed, even in the waking state, the effects do not exist elsewhere than in their cause. But in the dream state the cause is the Ātman, which is possessed of the darkness (i.e. overpowered/covered by ignorance); therefore, there is no presence (or, working) of *manas*. [896]

verses 897-902 state the *prima facie* view in respect of the Ātman *akāraka* and also its refutation.

ननु जाग्रच्छरीरादेर्मात्रोपादानमीरितम् ।
तस्मिन्सति स्वयंज्योतिः कथमात्माभिधीयते ॥८९७॥

An objection:) 'Indeed, it was pointed out that, in the waking state, there is acceptance of the organs of the body (by the Ātman); therefore, (it may be asked:) while that (body)

continues to exist, how can this Ātman be described as self-shining?' [897]

This objection pertains to the BU sentence *atrāyam ... svayanjyotir bhavati*.

सत्यमेवं तथापीदं मात्रादानं परात्मनः ।
सर्वदा विषयीभूतं गन्धर्वनगरादिवत् ॥८९८॥

True it is that this is so said. Yet, the acceptance of the organs by the highest Ātman has always been an object (of reference) like the city of Gandharvas.¹ [898]

¹That is, it does not all exist; or it is purely imaginary.

एतस्मिन्ननृतोपाधौ शक्यो दर्शयितुं परः ।
वासनालक्षणे साक्षात्स्वयंज्योतिःस्वभावकः ॥८९९॥

(Therefore,) while there is this (really) delimiting adjunct (of the Ātman), it is possible to state (lit. show) that the highest (Ātman) which is of self-shining nature is directly perceived, (even) while the characteristic of having (some) impression (is obvious). [899]

सर्वोपाधिविनिर्मुक्तौ नैव शक्यः स ईक्षितुम् ।
सुषुप्त इव तेनासन्मात्रादानमिदं कृतम् ॥९००॥

(To say the truth,) it is not possible to perceive it (i.e. the Ātman) directly, when there has occurred its freedom from all delimiting adjuncts; therefore, this acceptance of the non-existing means of activity (by the Ātman) is like what occurs in the sleep state. [900]

ननु जाग्रद्वदीक्ष्यन्ते ग्रहीतृग्रहणादयः ।
स्वयंज्योतिः कथं तेषु सत्सु स्वप्नेऽभिधीयते ॥९०१॥

(An objection:) 'But, indeed, there are noticed (in the dream state) the one who grasps (lit. takes up) the act of grasping (lit. taking up (various objects)) etc., how then is the Ātman called self-shining, while those are (observed/known as) existing?' [901]

नैतदेवं कुतो जाग्रद्वैलक्षण्यात्मकत्वतः ।
स्वप्नस्य देहबुद्ध्यादेः स्वप्नवृत्तावसंभवात् ॥९०२॥

(The answer:) 'This is not so'. (Once again, a question:) 'Why is this so said?' (The answer:) 'Since the dream state is of an altogether different nature, (when compared to what occurs,) in the waking state. (The activities performed by the body, the intellect etc. are impossible in the dream state.' [902]

verse 903 explains *jāgarite hi* in BUB.

आत्मबुद्धिमनश्चक्षुरालोकार्थादिलक्षणम् ।
जाग्रदेव न तु स्वप्नो भावनामात्रशेषतः ॥९०३॥

It is only the waking state which is characterized by (various) objects, viz. the Ātman (i.e. the inner self), *manas*, light, the eye etc.;¹ but the dream state is not so, for there remain only impressions. [903]

This is clarification of the sentence *jāgarite hi* ... in BUB serving as introductory to BU 4.3.10.

¹This word 'etc.' refers to further distinctions/kinds of the means and their objects (SP).

Now in verses 904-928, there is a discussion on BU 4.3.10 and relevant BUB is introduced.

आविश्चकीर्षुः साक्षादिममर्थं च श्रुतिः परा ।
न तत्रेति प्रवृत्तैषा प्रत्यगात्मविशुद्धये ॥९०४॥

(Now,) for clarifying (lit. revealing) this thought (or, matter) in a forthright manner, there proceeds the following Śruti *na tatra* ... with a view to exposing the thing called the inner sentence. [904]

कर्मकृद्विषणान्तो यः कामाविद्यासमन्वितः ।
स्वापबोधाविमौ तस्य न तु तत्साक्षिणो दृशेः ॥९०५॥

These two, viz. the dream and the waking states, belong to (lit. are of) that one, who is an agent of activity (or, activities) abiding within the intellect and is beset with desire and ignorance, but, not the witness of them (viz. the two), the seer. [905]

This verse sets aside the two possibilities, viz. (i) the Ātman has impurities as his properties and (ii) there is only metaphorical purification of it.

Verses 906-908 explain the nature of the dream state.

कूटस्थज्योतिषैवास्ते स्वप्नस्थानेऽक्रियोऽद्वयः ।
चिदाभया वासनया तत्साक्षित्वं प्रकल्पते ॥९०६॥

This one, who does no activity and who is just single, remains in the dream state only as characterized by immutable lustre/light; its nature of being the witness of it¹ becomes possible² (only) through the impression which appears as the sentient. [906]

There is explanation here as to why the experiences in the dream state are not real in the case of the Ātman.

¹This refers to objects in dream state.

²Translation follows the reading in the AnSS edition; this is *karane tṛtīyā*. However, if the variant reading *prakalpayate* is accepted, the translation would then be: ... of it would be accepted/considered in the light of the impression ...; this would

lakṣaṇe tṛtīyā.

तत्प्रयोक्तृक्रियाभावाद्बुद्ध्यादिज्योतिषामिह ।
न व्यापृतिरतः प्रत्यङ्ज्योतिषा स्वेन वर्तते ॥९०७॥

In the case of the lights such as those of the intellect etc.,¹ there is no activity (possible), because of the absence of the compelling force for (or, behind) them; therefore, the inner self acts with its own light.

[907]

जाग्रद्वस्तनि सर्वाणि भावनामात्ररूपताम् ।
जाग्रत्कर्मक्षये यान्ति स्वप्नकर्मोद्भवे सति ॥९०८॥

At the end (lit. loss/cessation) of the activities in the waking state, all the things of the waking state become changed into (lit. go to) the form of mere impressions(s), i.e. when there arise the activities of the dream state.

[908]

verses 909-913 explain na atha rathāḥ sṛjate.

ता भावना उपादाय प्रत्यङ् स्वप्ने रिरंसया ।
करोत्येष रथाद्यर्थं स्वप्नभोगप्रसिद्धये ॥९०९॥
करणं कर्म कर्ता च कर्मैतत्कारकात्मकम् ।
प्रत्यङ्मोहैकनिष्ठं सच्चिदाभत्वात्तदात्मनि ॥९१०॥

Taking up those impressions (of the waking state), the inner self produces in the dream state the object(s) such as a chariot, with a desire to amuse itself, so as to secure the enjoyment(s) in the dream state.

[909]

and (the product(s) of) this activity, which has (or, have) the nature of what are related to the activity, viz. the means of an activity, the object (of it) and the agent (of the same), based on (or, supported in) only ignorance (about the nature) of the inner self, because they have the semblance of the (ever) existent sentence.

[910]

कार्यकारणरूपेण कर्मैतत्प्रथते जगत् ।
आत्मन्येतत्समध्यस्तमात्माविद्यैकहेतुतः ॥९११॥

This world, viz. the object (of activity), comes into being in the form of the cause(s) and the effect(s); (the one) superimposed on the Ātman on account only of ignorance (about the nature) of the Ātman. [911]

सर्वस्य कर्मणोऽत्यन्तमात्माकर्ता विलक्षणः ।
तत्संहतः स्वयं त्वात्मासंहतो निर्गुणः शुचिः ॥९१२॥

The Ātman is not the agent of all activity,¹ and is extremely different (from it), though commingled with it;¹ for, the Ātman is, in nature (i.e. by itself), non-commingled (with any other thing), devoid of any (or, every) property, (and just) pure. [912]

SP rightly points out the Samdhi in *ātmā* and *akartā*.

¹This commingling of the Ātman with the object-world is purely imaginary (or, a product of ignorance).

अविद्यया स्वमात्मानमशुद्धं मन्यते यदा ।
जाग्रत्स्वप्नसुषुप्तानि तदैतानि प्रपद्यते ॥९१३॥

When, owing to ignorance, (the Ātman) considers itself to be impure, it falls to (or, acquires) these (states), viz. of waking, dream and deep sleep. [913]

Verses 914-919 explain *na tatra rathāḥ*

रथा दार्वीद्यसद्भावान्न सन्ति स्वप्नदर्शने ।
न सन्त्यश्वादयस्तद्वद्रथयोगाः सवर्त्मकाः ॥९१४॥
रथादीन्सृजतेऽथात्र जाग्रत्कर्मादिहेतुकान् ।
अविद्याकामकर्माणि सृष्टिबीजमिदं दृशेः ॥९१५॥

At the time of the sight (of them) in the dream state, there

are no chariots (in existence) because there exists (or, is) no wood etc.;¹ similarly, there are no horses etc.² that are yoked to the chariots, and also the roads together with them. [914]
 (Under these circumstances) now, (the Ātman) creates³ the chariots etc., which have for their cause the activity etc.⁴ of the waking state—this, viz. ignorance, desire and activity, is the seed of the creation by (lit. of) the seer. [915]

¹This refers also to the other material which is used in chariot-making.

²Other animals are intended.

³The Ātmanepada form is worth-noting; the result of the action by the agent is acquired for only itself.

⁴The *kartr*, *karana*, *dravya* etc. are meant.

कर्मणो गमनस्येह साधनाभावहेतुना ।
 स्वप्ने मृषात्वमाहैवं गमनादेः श्रुतिः स्वयम् ॥९१६॥

Thus, the Śruti itself has stated the unreality (or lit. falsity) of (one's) movement (lit. going) during the dream state, because there is absence of any means of (that activity of) going. [916]

न कर्मफलमप्यत्र स्वप्ने तद्वैतसंभवात् ।
 नानन्दा अपि तत्रेति ह्यतः श्रुतिरभाषत ॥९१७॥

Also, there is not here in the dream state (produced any) result of (any) activity, since there is no cause (i.e. the means for the production) of it. Therefore, indeed, the Śruti has affirmed (lit. spoken) that "there are no joys" also. [917]

आह्लादाः स्युरिहानन्दा हर्षश्चात्र मुदस्तथा ।
 प्रकर्षगुणसंबन्धाः प्रमुदो मुद एव तु ॥९१८॥
 पल्वलास्त्वह वेशान्ताः प्रसिद्धार्थं तथोत्तरम् ।
 इत्येवमसतामेव स्रष्टात्मा स्वात्ममायया ॥९१९॥

Here, (i.e. in the sentence of the Śruti), *ānandas* mean

delights;¹ and *muds*,² joys; so also *pramuds* are just *muds* with greater quantity and/or quality of them. [918]

vāsanās mean tanks, and then (*tathā*) the subsequent part (of the Śruti)³ has the well-known meaning(s) (of the words). Thus the Ātman itself is the creator of all the non-existents, owing to its own *māyā* 'magical ignorance'. [919]

The verses point out that the words do not present repetition of meanings.

¹This refers to the general character of happiness.

²SP states: these joys are caused by the birth of a son (or of a daughter— *ādi*) etc.

³This refers to that part of the Śruti which actually precedes *sa hi kartā*.

Verses 920-921 reassert that creation proceeds from *māyā* 'delusion'.

चिदाभकारकोद्भूतवासनाकर्महेतुतः ।

स्वयं निर्माय सृजत इत्यकर्मापि भण्यते ॥९२०॥

For the reason¹ that there is activity of the impression(s) that has arisen from the *kāraka* 'instrument/agent of an activity'; (viz. the intellect), which has the semblance of sentience, (the Ātman), which, though non-performer of (any) activity, is said to have (first) created (the external objects etc.) and then performed (various) activity.² [920]

¹We have changed the reading of the AnSS edition on the basis of the variant reading in the footnote occurring there. This change yields a better understanding of the verse, which would have been awkwardly expressed (and also translated!) otherwise.

²Actually, the two verbal expressions *nirmāya* and *sṛjate* express but one sense, viz. creating. Yet we have connected the first with the objects and the second with any activity which has no purpose whatsoever. Cf. *Gītā* 18.9: *kāryam ityeva yat karma*

niyatam kriyate 'rjuna/ saigaṇ tyaktvā phalaṇ caiva ...//

अविचारितसंसिद्धं क्रियाकारकलक्षणम् ।

जाग्रद्भूमावपि मतं किमु स्वप्नैकनीडगम् ॥९२१॥

It is held that (this world) in the waking state is already established even without the need of any consideration (of cause(s)) as characterized by activity/activities and *kāraṇās* 'those related to the same (for accomplishing it)'. What then to say about that (world) which has a nest (i.e. support) in the dream state? [921]

Verses 922-928 explain sa hi kartā

रथादिवासनानीडचित्तवृत्तिसमुद्भव-

कर्महेतुत्वतः कर्ताकर्ताप्यात्माभिधीयते ॥९२२॥

Being (therefore) the cause of (all) activity which has arisen from the modification(s) of apparently sentient intellect¹ having a nest (i.e. support) in the impressions of chariot etc., the Ātman is said to be the agent (of the relevant activity), even though it is not an agent (of that activity). [922]

Our emendation of the text in AnSS edition in verse 920 above stands vindicated by this verse.

¹We have translated *citta* as 'apparently sentient intellect' with a view to differentiating it from the intellect which merely represents (in the first instance) an internal organ. See *Yogasūtra* 1.2: *yogaś cittavṛttinirodhaḥ* where there is reference to an individual's intellect which is associated with sentience within.

अकर्तुरपि कर्तृत्वं स्वात्माज्ञानैकहेतुतः ।

तदन्यस्येह कार्यत्वात्कर्तात्मैव तमोवधिः ॥९२३॥

The character of being an agent (of some activity) is attributed to even one who is not an agent (of that activity) for only

one reason, viz. ignorance about one's own inner self. That (viz. *kartr̥tva*) is attributed to one that is another (viz. the Ātman who is not an agent of any activity). Here,¹ because there exist (objects as) what are to be accomplished, the Ātman itself, being limited by darkness (i.e. ignorance), is called the agent (of some activity). [923]

¹That is, in the world of dealings (*vyavahārabhūmi*).

स्वप्नवृत्तावुपादानं साधनं वा न विद्यते ।
रथादेरसतस्तस्माद्द्रष्टैवात्मा न कारकः ॥९२४॥

In the dealings (*vṛtti*) of the dream state, there does not exist any material cause or any instrumental cause. Therefore, there being (real) non-existence of chariot etc., the Ātman is but the seer and not an agent (i.e. *kāraka* 'related to the activity of seeing'). [924]

अस्ति यत्राप्युपादानं साधनं वास्य जागरे ।
तत्राप्यात्मचिदाभासमनोबुद्ध्यादिकारकैः ॥९२५॥
रथादिवासनानीडधीवृत्त्युद्भवकारणम् ।
कर्म निर्वर्त्यते तेन स हि कर्तेति भण्यते ॥९२६॥

And, also wherever, i.e. in the waking state, there is this one¹ taken up (*upādāna*) as an instrumental cause; there also, the activity, which has an origin (lit. a cause) in the rise from the modification of the intellect,² which has a nest (i.e. support) in the impressions of chariot etc., is accomplished with such means (of activity) as the individual self, the semblance of sentience, *manas*, (previously acquired) knowledge³ etc.; it is the Ātman which is called the agent (of some relevant activity). [925-926]

These verses point to the Ātman's being a *kartr̥*— also not merely a *sākṣin* as said earlier—cf. *dr̥śi* in verse 915 above.

¹Here, there is reference to chariot etc.

²Sureśvara uses the word *dhī* and not *citta* which is used in verse 922 above; therefore, there is a little change in the translation—mostly the same phrase occurs in both the verses though!

³The word *buddhi* here does not refer to the internal organ. In every likelihood, it refers to the knowledge of the manner in which an activity is to be accomplished.

भान्वादेरिव कर्तृत्वं कर्त्राद्यर्थावभासनात् ।
बुद्ध्यादिकर्तृसाक्षित्वात्कर्तृत्वाद्यात्मनो भवेत् ॥९२७॥

As agentship of some activity is attributed to (lit. said to be of) the sun etc.,¹ on account of their illuminating the things/objects like an agent; so would there be agentship attributed to (or, said to be of) the Ātman, owing to its being the seer of the intellect etc. [927]

This verse justifies the reference to the Ātman in the words *na kārakah* 'not a *kāraka*' in verse 924 above.

¹There is here reference to the other lights like the moon, fire and so on, earlier in BU 4.3.3ff.; and also to various organs of the body.

क्रियाकर्तृत्वमेवास्य हेतुर्बुद्ध्यादिसंगतौ ।
यथावस्त्वपरिज्ञानाद्धीति हेतावतः पदम् ॥९२८॥

The word *hi* is used here (in the statement of the Śruti *sa hi kartā*) to convey (the sense of) the cause with reference to (the Ātman), because agentship of an activity can be mentioned of it, when there is its association with the intellect etc. (and) because there is complete (*pari*) ignorance about the thing (viz. reality) as it is. [928]

Now in verses 929-938, there is explanation of BU 4.3.11. Verses 929-937 explain the three verses in BU, which begin with the word *svapnena* and verse 928 presents an additional meaning

of *ekahaṃsa*.

स्वयंज्योतिष्ट्वमस्योक्त्वा बुद्ध्यादेश्चातिरेकताम् ।
मन्त्राञ्जगादाथात्रार्थे ब्राह्मणोक्तेरनन्तरम् ॥९२९॥

Having discussed (so far) the Ātman's nature of being self-shining and its distinction from the intellect etc.,¹ (the Śruti) recited (some) Mantras, in (order to convey) the same sense; now (*atha*) after (it has made) statements in the Brāhmaṇa¹ portion. [929]

This is a statement of the meaning of the BU sentence *tad ete*

¹The word 'etc.' refers to other organs of the body.

²There is here reference to the prose portion of Veda, viz. the non-Māntrika portion of the Upaniṣad.

स्वप्नवृत्त्या विहत्येमं जाग्रदेहं क्रियाक्षयात् ।
असुप्तो भावनारूपान्सुप्तान्प्राणान्प्रपश्यति ॥९३०॥

Having struck down (all) this body of the waking state through the annulment of activity, (this Ātman), who is not asleep, sees, in the dealings of the dream state,¹ the sleeping *prāṇas* 'organs' which are (really) the forms of impressions. [930]

¹*svapnavṛtṭyā* is to be understood for *svapnavṛttau*.

असुप्तोऽकर्महेतुत्वात्सुप्तान्प्राणान्क्रियोत्थितेः ।
कूटस्थदृष्टिस्वाभाव्यात्स्वप्न आत्मा प्रपश्यति ॥९३१॥

Thanks to its having the nature of being immutable, the seer, the Ātman, which is not asleep owing to its not being the cause of (any) activity,¹ sees in the dream state the *prāṇas* 'organs' which are asleep² on account of the rise of their activities. [931]

¹That is, *akarmaheturva* of the Ātman explains why it is not asleep; absence of sleep points to the ever obtaining nature of the Ātman as a knower.

²The sleep state of the organs in the body is characterized by their incapacity for knowing (or, experiencing) which causes activity in them. This is in contrast with the absence of (any) activity in the Ātman.

प्राणादिशुक्रमादाय कृत्वा तद्भावनामयम् ।
लोकमात्माक्रियः स्वस्थश्चाकशीत्यभिपश्यति ॥९३२॥

Having taken (or, picked) up the bright (flame, or lustrous form) of the *prāṇas* and others¹ and thereby rendering the world full of impressions of the same, the Ātman, which is non-active and remains (unaffected) in its (natural) state, observes them and shines on them. [932]

क्षीणस्वप्नोत्थसंभोगो जाग्रद्भोगाश्रयं पुनः ।
याति बुद्ध्यादिकं स्थानं पुमान्हंसाभिधो ध्रुवः ॥९३३॥

Having exhausted the enjoyment(s) which arose from the dream state, the Puruṣa, called swan,¹ goes (i.e. returns) to the ever-abiding place,² viz. the intellect etc. which is the seat (lit. support) of the enjoyments of the waking state. [933]

This explains *punar eti* in the verse cited in BU.

¹We have translated *haṁsa* literally as 'swan'. Yet it stands for the 'ever-abiding sentience', as the context makes it clear. Hume translates it as 'spirit', Röer, 'wanderer', Mādhavānanda in a simialr sense: 'one who moves', and which the next verse supports.

²We have rendered the word *sthāna* as seat (or place), despite the use of that word in nearby context means 'state' as e.g. in *svapnasthāna*. This is because of its specification by the word *buddhyādika* which is again stated to be *jāgradbhogāśraya*.

पर्यायेण यतश्चोभौ लोकौ हन्त्येकलः स्वतः ।
एकहंस इति प्रोक्तः पुराणज्ञैस्ततः प्रभुः ॥९३४॥

Since it moves,¹ all alone and on its own, to the two worlds² in succession, the Master (or, the Lord) is described by knowers of the Purāṇas³ by an attribute *ekahaṁsa* 'lone wanderer'.

[934]

¹SP states that the verb root *han* has the sense of moving; it cites *hana himsāgatyoh* as supporting evidence from (some) Smṛti.

²These are *ihaloka* and *paraloka* in relation to the two states of waking and dream.

³SP first explains *purāṇajña* as 'knower of the reality which is (both) beginningless and endless' and then understood *purāṇa* to refer to that class of ancient texts, called by the name Purāṇa. It cites the following for justifying the meaning of *haṁsa* as the eternal Puruṣa:

(i) *ekam pādamaṁ notkṣipati salilād dhaṁsa uccaran/
sa ced udakhidat pādamaṁ na mṛtyur nāmṛtambhavet//*

(Atharvaveda 11.4.21; cf. Nirukta 12.29)

*yoginas tam prapaśyanti bhagavantam sanātanam/
(not traced)*

(ii) *marīcir damano haṁsaḥ*

(iii) *eko naikaḥ savaḥ*

(Mahābhārata 13.135.91; Viṣṇusahasranāma 9.1)

(iv) *anantam acalam meruṁ haṁsam nārāyaṇam prabhum/
dhātāram ajaram nityam tam āhuh param avyayam//*

(Mahābhārata 1.57.86)

The editor of the BUBV from MRI adds: *kasmāt satatam ṛtvijaṁ sadā yāgādikam akurvāṇam yadi uddharet jñānāt tadā na saṁsārah nāpi mokṣo bhavet* (supported from Sanatsujātīya 512). Also, *haṁsaḥ viṣṇuḥ gacchati sarvaśarīreṣu iti haṁsaḥ*.

हिरण्यं ज्योतिर्विज्ञानं तावन्मात्रसतत्त्वकः ।

हिरण्मयस्ततो देवः स्वार्थेऽत्र मयडिष्यते ॥९३५॥

hiranya means lustre, (specific) knowledge (or, consciousness), i.e. having only itself (lit. that much) as its nature. Therefore, the shining one¹ is stated by the word *hiraṇmaya*— herein, i.e. in this word, the suffix *-mayat* is used as pleonasm.² [935]

¹For *deva* referring to the immutable Ātman, cf. *Gauḍa-pāḍakārikā* 1.9-10; 2.12.

²This means *hiraṇyamaya*; *hiraṇyamaya* does not have the usual sense of the suffix *-mayat* as adding to its own meaning. Read SP: *svārthe mayato vikārārthatvaṃ vyāvartayati*. That is, it has only redundancy.

परस्य पुरुषस्यायं तदबोधप्रकल्पनात् ।
साक्षिमात्रादिकस्तस्मात्पौरुषोऽयमितीर्यते ॥९३६॥

Since this one is for the other Puruṣa¹ because of its entertaining various notions on account of ignorance, and is merely the witness etc.;² therefore, it is described as belonging to Puruṣa. [936]

This verse explains the Mādhyandina recension's reading of the citation in BU: *hiranyaḥ pauruṣa ekahaṃsaḥ*.

¹This is a reference to the individual self. Hereafter also it is so used on many occasions.

²In the word *sākṣimātrādi*, *ādi* would indicate *akāraka*, *kūṭastha* etc. Yet see SP: *ādipadena meyaṃ kartā karmetyādiḥ vibhāgo grhītaḥ*— this possibly means the agent of an activity, the means to it etc. which are falsely conceived of, in the case of the Ātman.

पूरणान्निखिलस्यास्य कार्यकारणवस्तुनः ।
पुरुषोऽयं भवेदात्मा पूर्णत्वाद्वाद्वात्मानः ॥९३७॥

The Ātman becomes¹ Puruṣa owing to his bringing completeness to the entire mass of objects which comprise

the cause(s) and the effect(s). Or, (this is said) of the non-dual Ātman, because of its being complete in itself. [937]

¹This verse explains the word *puruṣaḥ* in the Kāṇva recension: *hiranyaḥ puruṣaḥ* ...; it offers two derivations: (i) from *pūraṇa* and (ii) *pūrṇa*.

हानेनाङ्गविकल्पानां नवानां संचयेन च ।
हंसत्वमृषयः प्राहुरात्मनः पारदर्शिनः ॥९३८॥

The Ṛṣis 'seers of old', who had seen the end/truth of the transmigratory world, have posited of the Ātman the nature of a *haṁsa* 'swan' on account of its giving up various limbs and assuming new ones.¹ [938]

This is another explanation of the word *haṁsa*. It refers to the immutable Ātman's assuming different bodies at different times on account of *vāsanās* 'impressions', as explained earlier.

¹SP supports this verse by another (yet very similar) verse thus:

hānena gatakalānām navānām sañcayena ca /
śarīrāṇām ajasyāhur haṁsatvam pāradarśinaḥ //
(*Brahmapurāṇa* 235.34).

Verses 939-941 explain BU 4.3.12 which begins with the word *prāṇena*.

प्राणेन ह्यवरं रक्षन्मरणाद्देहकं परः ।
बहिर्देहं चरित्वाथ पुनरैति यथागतम् ॥९३९॥

Guarding the lesser body with *prāṇas* 'life-breaths'¹ (and thus) from death, the 'highest'² (Ātman), after rambling out of the body,³ comes back to it later, in the same way as it had gone (out). [939]

This is to explain the verse *prāṇena* ... cited in BU.

¹ Here, *prāṇas* are the five winds in the body.

² Actually, *para* stands in opposition to *avara*; therefore it should be translated as 'higher'. But *para* in connection with the Ātman is ever the 'highest'!

³ In fact, Prāṇa (i.e. sentience) is inside the body, while in the dream state. Yet, it is devoid of any false notion of its identity with the body etc., and, therefore, it is said to be outside the body (SP).

नाडीस्त्यक्त्वा यतः स्वप्ने जाग्रद्भोगप्रदाः पुमान् ।
स्वप्नभोगप्रदा याति बहिर्नीडादतस्तदा ॥९४०॥

Since, after leaving the veins (which bring or yield to it) enjoyments of the waking state, that Puruṣa goes to (those) in the dream state which bring to it the enjoyments of the dream state, therefore, it is (said to be) outside the nest.¹

[940]

This verse clarifies how the seer (Puruṣa) is, in the dream state, outside the body.

¹ This refers to the body; cf. verses 921-22 and 926 above.

कर्मणोद्भाविता यत्र वासना कामरूपिणी ।
तामादायैति देहं स्वं हंस आत्मामृतोऽव्ययः ॥९४१॥

This swan, the Ātman, the immortal one (and) the never-diminishing (or, never-perishing) one, moves to its own body,¹ whenever there is aroused by activity the impression, that assumes the form of (various) desires, after it has taken (or picked) up the same.

[941]

¹ It is difficult to say definitely which body is meant. SP paraphrases *svam deham* as *svakarmocitam deham* and adds *apne gacchatīty arthah*. This indicates that the body of both the waking and the dream states is but one, the only difference being that the body in the dream state is, for enjoyment of

objects, falsely considered as identical with that in the waking state.

Verses 942-943 explain BU 4.3.13, viz. *svapnānta*

कर्मज्ञानानुरूपेण रूपमुच्चावचं मुहुः ।
स्वप्नमायाप्रपञ्चस्थ आत्माप्नोतीव निष्क्रियः ॥९४२॥

Time and again, the actionless Ātman obtains, as it were,¹ high and low forms in keeping with its knowledge about the activity. when it abides in the magical world of ignorance of the dream state. [942]

This is the meaning of *svapnānte*

¹iva 'as it were' justifies the actionlessness of the Ātman (SP).

नर्मार्थो जक्षतिर्ज्ञेयो हर्षार्थो मोदतिस्तथा ।
अविद्यया भयं चेह स्वप्ने तद्धेतुत्वसंभवात् ॥९४३॥

The verb root *jakṣ* is to be understood in the sense of having a *tête-à-tête* (or, enjoying humour); so also the root *mud* in the sense of feeling (or, deriving) delight. Here, in the dream, fear is (caused) by ignorance, since there is no (real) cause for it. [943]

This summarises the meaning of *uteva strībhīḥ*

Verses 944-968 explain the meaning of BU 4.3.14 and also discuss, at some length, some *prima facie* view concerning the same.

आराममेव मायोत्थं स्वप्ननिर्माणलक्षणम् ।
मायिनस्तस्य पश्यन्ति न तं पश्यति कश्चन ॥९४४॥

(Only) those, who are under the influence of ignorance, see (the Ātman's) sport which arises from magical ignorance and

which is the sign (or, the indicator) of the creation of the dream state, (and) yet nobody sees it. [944]

बुद्ध्यादेर्व्यतिरिक्तत्वं स्वयंज्योतिष्ट्वमागमात् ।
आत्मनः प्रतिपाद्याथ लोकतोऽपि विभाव्यते ॥९४५॥

It is noticed that, after having (thus) expounded on the basis of scripture(s) the distinction of the Ātman from the intellect etc. and its having the nature of being self-shining, the Śruti (explains the same) by citing an example from the world also. [945]

Verses 946-953 introduce *taṃ nāyatam* ... in the sentence from BU.

सुप्तं न बोधयेद्वाढमिति वादो हि लौकिकः ।
किमर्थमिति चेत्तत्र लोकः कारणमीक्षते ॥९४६॥

Indeed, there is a popular saying: 'One should not wake up a person who is in deep sleep'. (If one were to ask:) 'Why is this so?', then, in that respect people see a reason.¹ [946]

This refers to BUB which SP has put this way: *bhṛśaṃ suptaṃ kṛtsā na bodhayed ity atra praśnapūrvakaṃ hetumāha*.

¹This is given in the next verse.

प्रबोधनाडीस्त्यक्त्वात्मा स्वप्ननाडीरयं गतः ।
इति लोकप्रसिद्धत्वात्तस्मिन्ल्लोकोऽनुशास्ति तत् ॥९४७॥

(The reason is:) Because it is well known among people that the Ātman (of/in the sleeping person) has entered into (lit. gone into) the veins (which appear to exist) in the dream state, after it has abandoned (its stay in) the veins (of the person who is) in the waking state. (Therefore), in the case of him,¹ people instruct (that way).² [947]

¹Add: who is in the sleep state. Instead of *tasmin*, there is a reading *tasmāt*, as noted by SP. However, it seems to be inferior and SP has correctly kept from adopting it.

²That refers to the popular saying, viz. an instruction, as it were.

नाडीव्यत्यासगमनशङ्क्यैवानुशासति ।
सुप्तं न बोधयेद्गाढमिति तद्दोषदर्शिनः ॥९४८॥

For fear that there might be a reversal in respect of the individual self's going to the veins, they (the knowers among the people), who notice a harm (lit. a fault), arising out of that, instruct (others, or anyone), 'one should not awaken a person who is in deep sleep'. [948]

Śaṅkara has added here *sahasā* 'all of a sudden', though BU does not use the word. Sureśvara ignores Śaṅkara's statement; except by qualifying *suptam* with the use of *gāḍham*.

यथायोगमयं नाडीर्गाढं सुप्तः प्रबोधितः ।
न प्रपद्येत तेनायं स्यात्सुदुःखभिषक्क्रयः ॥९४९॥

This one, who is in deep sleep, when awakened, would not (be able to) go to the right veins and would become very difficult for doctors (or, medicine-men) to cure (or, treat). [949]

This explains the *doṣa* 'a harm' which is under view, according to the preceding verse. SP adds (following BUB): *tenāndhyabādhiryādiprasaṅgeneti yāvāt*.

देहप्रवेशनिर्याणहेतोर्देहाद्गृहादिवत् ।
बुद्ध्यादिव्यतिरिक्तत्वमात्मनोऽस्यावसीयताम् ॥९५०॥

Let it be understood (lit. concluded) that there is distinction of this Ātman from the intellect etc., as in the case of a

person who has it from his body, since he is the agent (lit. cause) of entry into and/or exit from the same. [950]

This is the conclusion drawn from the popular notion as well as from Mantras and Brāhmaṇas. SP asserts that the self-shining nature of the Ātman is also emphasised.

अध्यात्मादिपदार्थेभ्यो विविक्तं स्वात्मनि स्थितम् ।
तं न पश्यत्यहो कष्टं दौर्भाग्यं दुष्टचेतसाम् ॥९५१॥

It is, (therefore), a pity (or, great sorrow) that there is misfortune in the case of them, whose mind (*cetas*) is affected by the fault, viz. in that (any) one (of them) does not see the Ātman (sentience), though it is abiding in his own self (or, himself—a reflexive pronoun), as completely distinct from the (external) objects such as those that belong to the body etc.¹ [951]

¹This refers to *ādhidaivika* and *ādhibhautika* objects also.

प्रत्यक्षगोचरं देवं लोकं चातिप्रमादिनम् ।
दृष्ट्वा श्रुतिः शिरस्ताडमनुक्रोशति दुःखिता ॥९५२॥

Having taken note of (lit. seen) the shining one and also the extremely (or, too much) faltering people, the Śruti, becoming full of sorrow/grief, commiserates with them, beating its head, (as it were!). [952]

प्रत्यक्षतममप्येनं वितमस्कं स्वयंस्थितम् ।
अहो कष्टं न पश्यन्ति कं याम शरणं वयम् ॥९५३॥

What a pity (or, great sorrow) that they do not see this (Ātman) which is the most direct (to perceive), which is devoid of (all) ignorance (in reality) and which exists in its own right! Whom shall we approach, as a shelter? [953]

Verses 954-960 decide the *paurvāparya* of the Śruti sentences on the basis of *arthakrama*.

स्वयंज्योतिष्ट्वमारभ्य यच्छ्रुत्योक्तमिहात्मनि ।
उच्यते पूर्वपक्षोऽयं तस्य सिद्धान्तरूपिणः ॥९५४॥

(Now,) in respect of what is said by the Śruti about this¹ Ātman, viz. (in the statement) beginning with (the mention of) its having the self-shining nature, there is not stated (what is an argument against the same, i.e.) the *prima facie* view on what has the nature of the proved doctrine. [954]

This verse relates the Śruti statement *atho khalvāhuḥ* ... to the earlier passage, viz. the *prima facie* view.

¹This refers to *sa yatra prasvapiti* ... (BU 4.3.9).

स यत्रेति ह्यतः पूर्वं पूर्वपक्षत्वहेतुतः ।
अथो खल्वाहुरित्यादिग्रन्थं पश्येत्तथा क्रमात् ॥९५५॥

Therefore, one should consider (or understand) the passage beginning with (the words) *atho khalvāhuḥ* as the *prima facie* view even first, in the sequence, before the passage *sa yatra* [955]

On this suggested sequential order, SP makes the following interesting observation: *pūrvapakṣānantarabhāvī siddhānta itī karmasyocitatvād arthakrameṇa pāṭhakramasyāgnihotrayavāgupā-kavad bhaṅgād ity arthaḥ*.

स्वप्नस्य जाग्रत्स्थानत्वमथो खल्वितिवाक्यतः ।
यानि ह्येवेति हेतूक्तिः प्रतिज्ञातार्थसिद्धये ॥९५६॥

From the clause (lit. statement) *atho khalu* ... (one has to) understand (as the enunciation:) the dream (state) has but the nature of the waking state (and) in (the clause) *yāni hyeva*, there is (made) the statement of reason for proving the matter

enunciated.

[956]

This is an analysis of the statement of the *prima facie* view.

जाग्रत्समीक्षणं यासु पुंसो नाडीषु तास्विदम् ।
स्वप्नेक्षणं विजानीयान्नान्यत्रेति विनिश्चयः ॥९५७॥

This seeing (i.e. experience) in the dream state, on the part of (or, for) the individual self, should be, one should understand, possible in those veins in which it is there for it, in the waking state: this is the decision to be understood.

[957]

This is the statement of the reason adduced in the *prima facie* view.

स्वप्ने तमेव चात्मानं सप्तोऽयमभिमन्यते ।
यमनस्तप्रबोधस्थं न ततोऽन्यं कदा चन ॥९५८॥

In the dream state (a person considers) that the same Ātman whom he identifies (thus:) 'This one is asleep' (as the Ātman), from whom the experience of the waking state (*prabodha*) has not disappeared, (it is certainly) not any other than that (viz. of the waking state).

[958]

This points to the sameness of the Ātman in the two states of waking and dream.

जाग्रद्वन्धुपुरग्रामपश्वारामादिलक्षणान् ।
स्वप्ने प्रत्यभिजानाति तानेव न ततोऽपरान् ॥९५९॥

It (i.e. the Ātman) recognises in the dream state those very (objects) belonging to the waking state, i.e. those which are characterized as relatives, cities, towns (or villages), animals and gardens etc. and not any other than them.

[959]

This refers to the identity of the objects seen in both the states.

The printed text is a corrupt printing of the line.

अपूर्वमेव सं पश्येत्स्वप्नदृग्जाग्रतो यदि ।
उक्तस्वप्नो भवेदन्यो यथा पूर्वगतस्तथा ॥९६०॥

If the seer in the dream state would see some never-before-(existing or) seen object (as different/distinct from that) of the waking state, then the dreaming person would be¹ other than that, just like one who had appeared for the first time in the waking state (*pūrvagataḥ*). [960]

This is the concluding verse of the *prima facie* view.

This is here the expression of the same idea as in verse 958 above, but only by way of *vyatireka* mode of argument.

¹On the basis of SP, the preposition *sam-* in the first line is understood with the verb *bhavet* in the second line to yield the form *sambhavet*. However, it was possible to connect *sam-* with *paśyet*, these together (in the same line) would form the verb *sampaśyet*. Thus, it could be a later writer's adoption of the earlier tendency noticeable in Kālidāsa: ... *taṁ pātayāṁ prathamam āsa* (*Raghuvamśa* 9.61), (cf. Mallinātha on this: *kr̥ñcānuprayujyate liti— ity akr̥ñcāśabdasya vyavahitaviparyasta-prayoganivṛttyarthatvāt pātayāṁ prathamamāsa ity apaprayogaḥ iti pāṇinīyāḥ yathāha vārtikakāraḥ— viparyāsanivṛttyartham vyavahitanivṛttyartham ca iti*) and also yet earlier in Vedic Sanskrit where the preposition generally stood apart from the verbs. The verb *bhavet* in the second line would yield the same sense as understood from *sambhavet*. This would mean that the preposition does not modify the sense of the verb. Also, another alternative could be: read *sa* (and not *sam*) to go with *svapnadṛk*— this could be more natural, perhaps! But, this is without any manuscript evidence and would, therefore, be an emendation which, as far as possible, one should avoid.

Verses 961-964 refute the reality of objects in the dream state.

इत्येवमाहुः केचित्तु न तु तद्युक्तिमद्वचः ।
अयुक्तिमद्यथा चैतत्तत्पूर्वं प्रतिपादितम् ॥९६१॥

Thus, indeed (*tu*), have some (thinkers) said; but (*tu*) that statement (of theirs) is not (supported) with (good) reason. How it is not (supported) with (good) reason is already¹ expounded. [961]

Now is introduced the refutation of the *prima facie* view.

¹That is, in the BU passage *na tatra rathāḥ*

अत्रायमित्यनेनात्र पूर्वपक्षनिराक्रिया ।
न्यायेनोक्तेन पूर्वेण वक्ष्यमाणेन च ध्रुवम् ॥९६२॥

In the statement *atrāyam* ..., there is (stated) the refutation¹ of the *prima facie* view; i.e. (of the view) stated in the earlier statement with reason (in *atho khalvāhuḥ* ...) and, certainly, what will be said now hereafter. [962]

¹SP takes *dhruvaṃ nirākriyā* together.

न जाग्रद्वेशगः स्वप्नो जाग्रत्सामग्र्यभावतः ।
अध्यात्माद्यर्थविरहे यतः स्वप्नान्प्रपश्यति ॥९६३॥

The dream (experience) does not belong to the state/region of the waking state, on account of the absence of the ensemble of the means of the waking state—this, on the ground that one sees (the objects of) the dream state (even) in the absence of such things as belong to the body.¹ [963]

¹These are other various *kāraṇas*, particularly the *karaṇas* 'instruments' of activity.

स्वयंज्योतिष्ट्वमस्योक्तं स्वप्ने चाकारकात्मता ।

मृत्युरूपात्ययश्चैवं प्रतीचः पूर्ववाक्यतः ॥९६४॥

Already there is stated the nature of this (Ātman) as being the self-shining (thing), whereas, in the dream state, (it has) the nature of not being a *kāraka* (or, of being a non-*kāraka* 'not connected with activity in any way'). Also (there is understood) from the preceding sentences¹ the transcending (by it) of the (various) forms of death. [964]

¹SP invites attention to *atrāyam puruṣaḥ svayanījyotiḥ* (BU 4.3.9), *na tatra rathāḥ* (BU 4.3.10) and *atīkrāmati mṛtyo rūpāṇi* (BU 4.3.7).

Verses 965-970 state the king's intention in asking his question again. Also, from verse 969 up to verse 1063, there is discussion of the thought in BU 4.3.15.

कामादयः स्वभावोऽस्य मृत्यवोऽथ न वा भवेत् ।

इत्याशङ्क्य नृपो दोषं याज्ञवल्क्यमपृच्छत् ॥९६५॥

Now, having doubted if the deaths (i.e. the forms of death), viz. desire and others,¹ were or were not² the nature of this (Ātman), the king asked Yājñavalkya about (some) harm³ (involved). [965]

¹There is reference here to the effects of desire.

²That is, if death was not the Ātman's nature—a definite reply is sought.

³This means: There may not occur liberation, in case death was the Ātman's nature. The word *doṣa* is already used in this sense in verse 948 above. It could alternatively refer to a fault in reasoning as well!

पृष्टं वस्तु सुनिर्णीतं मयेतिप्रकृतोक्तिततः ।

निविवृत्सुं नृपो विप्रं भूयोऽपृच्छद्विमुक्तये ॥९६६॥

For securing (the knowledge) for liberation, the king again asked the sage, who was (now) about (lit. wishing) to turn away (as is understood) from the statement of the matter in hand (i.e. under discussion— *prakṛta*), viz. 'the matter which was asked (lit. put in the form of a question) is well settled by me'.

[966]

स्वयंज्योतिष्ट्वमुदितं मुक्तेरङ्गममन्यत ॥९६७॥

न चाङ्गनिर्णयोक्त्यैव निर्णयं मन्यतेऽङ्गिनः ।

यतोऽतो मोक्षमुद्दिश्य याज्ञवल्क्यमपृच्छत ॥९६८॥

He (i.e. the king) thought, (thus far) is told (me) about the Ātman's having the nature of the self-shining (thing, viz. reality) and which is (but) ancillary to (the knowledge about) liberation,

[967]

and since they do not consider it to be the decision about the principal thing (as given) by the statement about what is ancillary;¹ therefore, he asked Yājñavalkya with regard to (or, with a desire of acquiring the knowledge of) liberation.

[968]

¹In connection with the first line of verse 968, SP observes how Sureśvara keeps in view a principle of interpretation according to Mīmāṃsā which is thus stated: *aṅgini hi darśādaṁ nirṇīte grāhakagrahaṇasāmarthyād aidamarthyenāṅgāni nirṇīyante, śrutyādīni tu dvārārpakāṇi na tv aṅganirṇayād evāṅginirṇayo nyāyābhāvāt*.

आसङ्गप्रविवेकार्थं स वा इत्यादि भण्यते ।

कामादिप्रविवेके हि मोक्षयोग्यत्वमात्मनः ॥९६९॥

The statement *sa vā ...*¹ is (i.e. will be) made for completely (*pra-*) separating attachment. Indeed, the Ātman² becomes eligible for (securing) liberation (only) when there is complete separation of desire etc.³

[969]

¹This occurs in 4.3.15, to be discussed soon.

²This is the individual self (i.e. Ātman).

³kāmādi explains āsaṅga 'attachment'.

कामाद्यात्मगुणश्चेत्स्यादनिर्मोक्षः प्रसज्यते ।
न हि गुण्यविनाशेन तद्गुणस्य निराकृतिः ॥९७०॥

If desire etc. is a property of the (individual) Ātman, then there would contingently arise absence of liberation; for, without the destruction of one which is having a property, there cannot be the removal of that property. [970]

Verses 971-974 explain the meaning of rūpāṇy evātikrāmati na mṛtyum.

रूपाण्येवायमात्मात्र मृत्योः स्वप्नेऽतिवर्तते ।
न तु मृत्युं यतः स्वप्ने मोदत्रासादि दृश्यते ॥९७१॥

It is only the (various) forms of death which the Ātman transcends in the dream state, but not death itself; since, in the dream state, there are experienced (lit. seen) joy, feeling of trouble etc. [971]

मोदत्रासादिको मृत्युः स्वभावो न यथात्मनः ।
तथात ऊर्ध्वं प्रब्रूहि भगवन्मे विमुक्तये ॥९७२॥

Please tell me, O revered master, as to how joy, feeling of trouble etc. are death and not the nature of the Ātman, in order that there will result (for me) liberation. [972]

सहस्रदानं त्वत्तस्य स्वयंज्योतिष्टवस्तुनः ।
निर्णयाघाटविज्ञप्त्यै नाशेषप्रश्ननिर्णयात् ॥९७३॥

As to (tu) the (promise of the) gift is for firmly (or, completely or finally) giving the decision about the thing (told), viz. (the Ātman's) having the nature of being self-shining; it is not

(given) for the decision of (or, regarding) the entire question (viz. the way of acquiring liberation). [973]

स्वयंज्योतिः स वा एष यः पुरा प्रतिपादितः ।
स्वप्नभूमावसङ्गोऽसौ संप्रसादे प्रसीदति ॥९७४॥

This (Ātman), which was earlier explained to be self-shining in the dream state,¹ was itself stated in the (Śruti sentence) *sa vā eṣa*, as the same one becoming pleased (or, feeling happy) in deep sleep,² while remaining unattached (to any objects).

[974]

¹Cf. BU 4.3.9.

²This is the meaning of *samprasāda*, though it literally means 'complete tranquillity'.

Verses 975-979 state the meaning of the word *samprasanna*.

अपां कतकसंपर्काद्यथात्यन्तप्रसन्नता ।
अपास्ताशेषसंसारभावनस्यैवमात्मनः ॥९७५॥
स्वास्थ्यं प्रसन्नतैतस्मिन्सुषुप्ते भवतीत्यतः ।
संप्रसादमिमं प्राहुः सुषुप्तं तद्विदो जनाः ॥९७६॥

As there comes (i.e. results) extreme clarity in water owing to its contact with a clearing nut (i.e. seed of the Kataka plant), so does tranquillity (lit. clarity) and its own nature come to (i.e. exist in) this (Ātman) in the deep sleep state—in this Ātman, which has abandoned the entire impressions of the transmigratory existence; [975]

therefore, have the knowers of that (viz. the nature of the Ātman) described the deep sleep¹ state as complete tranquillity (of the Ātman). [976]

¹Read quotation in SP thus: (*uktam hi:*) *samprasāda iti suṣuptasthānam ucyate samyak prasīdaty asminn iti nirvacanād (iti).*

मात्रादानं यदकरोदात्मा स्वप्नरिरंसया ।

तत्क्षये स निरासङ्गः स्वात्मन्येव प्रसीदति ॥९७७॥

Since the Ātman (the individual self) took (or, picked) up the portions (of impressions), with a desire for enjoyment in the dream, so it (becomes) unattached (to the same) when the same (i.e. portions of impressions) get exhausted and, (therefore), becomes completely tranquil in itself. [977]

जाग्रद्व्यपेक्षया स्वप्ने किञ्चिच्छेषः प्रसीदति ।

तस्याप्यस्तमयात्प्राज्ञे समिति स्याद्विशेषणम् ॥९७८॥

Only a bit of that (belonging to the individual Ātman) becomes tranquil in the dream state as compared to (what belongs to) the waking state, (therefore), in the case of that (individual self, called in the deep sleep state by the name) Prājña, the preposition *sam-* functions as (lit. is) a modifier (of the root *prasada*). [978]

केवलाज्ञानमात्राधिरिह प्रत्यङ् व्यवस्थितः ।

कारणात्मा यतस्तस्माज्जाग्रत्स्वप्नाख्यकार्यकृत् ॥९७९॥

Since, here,¹ the inner self remains with its delimiting functions² only in the form of ignorance;³ the one which has the nature of being the cause is, therefore, in the waking state the cause (lit. maker) of the effect called the dream state.⁴ [979]

This describes the nature of Prājña which is mentioned in the preceding verse.

¹That is, in the deep sleep state.

²Sureśvara uses the word *ādhi* for *upādhi*, abbreviated obviously for metre's sake.

³This is indicative of the gross effects/products of ignorance.

⁴SP supports this by citing (*uktaṃ ca*) *suṣuptākhyam tamo*

'jñānam bījaṃ svapnaprabodhayoh.

Verses 980-987 explain the statement in BUB *katham sampannah.*

कथं केन क्रमेणात्र प्रत्यगात्मा प्रसीदति ।
इत्येतदधुनाचष्टे रत्वेत्यादिगिरा श्रुतिः ॥९८०॥

Now, the Śruti states in the words (lit. statement) which begin with *ratvā* as to how,¹ i.e. in what manner, the inner Ātman becomes here² completely tranquil. [980]

This is to state the purpose of the following portion of the sentence, viz. *ratvā cartivā*

¹This refers to *katham* in the BUB question *katham samprasannah.*

²That is, in the deep sleep state.

स्वप्नभूमावयं रत्वा क्रीडां कृत्वात्ममायया ।
चरित्वा च विहृत्यात्मा वासनामात्रसाधनः ॥९८१॥

This (Ātman), after having had enjoyment, i.e. having (variously) played/sported through its own (*ātman*— a reflexive pronoun) *māyā* 'magical ignorance' and after having had rambled, (now) having only impressions for its instruments (becomes completely tranquil in its Prājña form),¹ [981]

¹This is to be understood from verse 987 below, in the words *prājñe prasīdati.*

दृष्ट्वैवेत्येवशब्देन कारकत्वं निवार्यते ।
पुण्यपापफलं चेह पुण्यपापगिरोच्यते ॥९८२॥

By (the use of) the word *eva* in *dr̥ṣṭvaiva* is rejected (or, denied) (the Ātman's) agentship (lit. in relation to activity); so also by the word *punya-pāpa* is meant (lit. stated) the result, viz. merit and demerit. [982]

This explains *dr̥ṣṭvaiva* ...; this explanation continues up to verse 985 below.

अस्य जाग्रदवस्थायामिन्द्रियार्थादिसंभवात् ।
क्रिया निर्वर्त्यते सा च सुखादिफलदात्मनः ॥९८३॥

In its waking state, (the relevant) activity is (i.e. can be) accomplished, since there is the possibility (of the existence) of the organs and their objects and that (viz. activity) is, for the Ātman, what yields enjoyment (lit. result) etc. [983]

This explains why the relation of the Ātman to any activity is rejected in the preceding verse.

स्वप्ने तु कारकाभावात् क्रियासिद्धिरात्मनः ।
चिदाभं वासनामात्रं प्रथतेऽतोऽविकारिणः ॥९८४॥

Insofar as (*tu*) the dream state (is concerned), there is no accomplishing (lit. securing the completion of) any activity by the Ātman owing to the absence of any *kāraṇa* 'instrument (of activity)' possessed by it); therefore, there prevails only the impression, which has the semblance of sentience, (on the part of) the Ātman, which does not undergo any modification. [984]

SP points usefully to the dissolution of the Saṃdhi: *ato avikāriṇaḥ*.

यतोऽत्र न क्रिया तस्मादवदधे श्रुतिः स्वयम् ।
दृष्ट्वैवात्मा न कृत्वेति प्रत्यङ् तस्मान्न कारकः ॥९८५॥

Since there is (i.e. can be) no activity (performed by the Ātman), therefore has the Śruti itself affirmed emphatically in *dr̥ṣṭvaivātmā na kṛtvā* 'the Ātman, only after seeing and not after doing', therefore, the inner self is not an agent of

any activity.¹

[985]

Here concludes the explanation of the use of *eva*.

¹According to SP, this conveys the immutability of the Ātman.

पुण्यपापफलं चेह पुण्यपापाभिधं मतम् ।
कार्यं कारणवत्तस्मादुपचारात्समीरितम् ॥९८६॥

It is understood that 'the result of merit and demerit' has for it the expression 'merit and demerit'. Therefore, it is said by way of indication (or, metaphorically, *upacārāt*) that the effect is just the same as (or, similar to) the cause.¹ [986]

¹SP clarifies this by *gobhiḥ śrīṇīta* 'mix with cows' as standing for *gopayobhiḥ śrīṇīta* 'mix with the milk of cows', which is accepted in the practice of Mīmāṃsā.

स्वप्नकर्मव्युपरमे ततः प्राज्ञे स्वयंप्रभः ।
प्रसीदति परो देवः प्रतीच्येव परे पदे ॥९८७॥

Then, after the cessation of (all) activity in the dream state, the highest,¹ the shining one, the self-shining (Ātman) becomes completely tranquil in (becoming one that is known by the name) *Prājña*,² (thus merging) only (or, just) in the inner self, the highest state (of its own). [987]

¹This indicates the oneness of the *vijñānātman* 'knowing individual) Ātman' with the highest (*para*) Ātman.

²The words *prājñe prasīdati* stand connected with *ratvā* ... mentioned in verse 981 above.

Verses 988-991 state the significance of the word *punaḥ*.

पुराप्यसकृदात्मायं स्थानात्स्थानान्तरं गतः ।
यतोऽतः पुनरित्येवं संप्रसादाप्तितोऽभिधा ॥९८८॥

Since this Ātman has earlier also moved several times from one state to another, therefore, it is said 'again', i.e. in the sense, 'after acquiring complete tranquillity'.¹ [988]

¹This refers to *punaḥ pratinyāyam ... svapnāyaiva*.

आनुलोम्यं सुषुप्ताप्तिरेवमुक्तेन वर्त्मना ।
तद्व्युत्थानं प्रतिलोम्यं स्वप्नादिस्थानसंचरः ॥९८९॥

In this way which is thus described, there is in direct order the obtaining (lit. experiencing) of the deep sleep state and, in the reverse order, its swerving away from the activity (i.e. movement) in the dream state etc. [989]

प्रतिलोम्यार्थ एवातः प्रतिशब्दोऽयमिष्यते ।
विपरीतागतिः स्वप्ने प्रतिस्थानं तथैत्यजः ॥९९०॥

Therefore, this word (i.e. preposition) *prati*¹ is desired (or, is understood) to have the sense of the reverse order; so, the coming into the dream state (of the Ātman) is its reverse (lit. inverted) movement—thus the unborn moves back to every state. [990]

This is further explained in the next verse.

¹In both the forms: *pratiyoni* and *pratinyāya*.

यथार्थे प्रतिशब्दोऽयं निश्चयार्थे निरित्ययम् ।
अयनं गमनं च स्यादायो धातोरिणो घञि ॥९९१॥

This word (i.e. preposition) *prati* is in the sense of *yathā* 'as'¹ (and) this (preposition) *nis*, in the sense of *niścaya* 'definiteness/certainty'; *ayana* is (lit. would be) *gamana* 'going' and the word *āya* is (derived) from the verbal root *in*² with the affix *ghan*³ added to it. [991]

This explains the word *pratinyāya* by dividing it into its

components: *prati*, *ni* and *āya* (which is equal to *ayana*).

¹This refers to the earlier mentioned direct order in verse 989 above.

²Cf. Pāṇini's *Dhātupāṭha*: *in gatau*.

³The suffix *-ghanī* is added to roots when mere action is denoted; cf. Pāṇini 3.3.18: *bhāve (ghanī)*. SP states the full *prakriyā* 'progress' in the formation. Yet, cp. Pāṇini 3.3.38: *para anupātyaye naḥ* leading to the formation *paryāya*.

Verses 992-1000 clarify the meaning of the word *yoni* in the Mādhyandina recension of BU.

श्रोत्रादिकरणान्यत्र मात्रादानस्य कारणम् ।

योनिशब्दाभिलष्यं स्याज्जाग्रद्देहसमाश्रयम् ॥९९२॥

In this (state),¹ the organs such as the ears are the cause of (the Ātman's) taking (or, picking) up the portions (of the impressions) and what is to be expressed by the word *yoni* is² (all of that, viz. the organs etc.) what has for its abode (lit. support) in the body of the waking state. [992]

The Mādhyandina recension relevant here is; *sa vā eṣa etasmin apnānte ratvety upakramya pratiyony ādravati buddhāntāya*.

¹The dream state is under reference. Yet, SP suggests as the alternative, the waking state.

²This is for *syāt* 'would be'.

मात्रादानस्य या यस्य योनिरासीत्पुरात्मनः ।

तामेवायं पुनर्योनिं स्वप्न आत्मा प्रपद्यते ॥९९३॥

Whichever was the *yoni* 'abode (or, support)' of/for which(ever) Ātman's taking (or, picking) up of the impressions,¹ to that very *yoni* does that (i.e. this, which is under reference)² Ātman go (lit. resort) again, in the dream state. [993]

This explains the meaning of *ādravati* after that of *yoni* has

been stated.

¹This is referring to the *yoni* in the waking state.

²This is sentience which is not the same as the individual sentience that is mentioned in the translation as whichever.

यथादानं कृतं पूर्वं मात्राणां स्वप्नसर्जने ।

स्वप्न आदाय ता मात्राः स्वाप्नीं योनिं प्रपद्यते ॥९९४॥

As there was done the action of taking (or, picking) up the impressions (by the Ātman) earlier,¹ so (i.e. in the same manner) does (the Ātman), after having taken (or, picked) up those impressions, go (i.e. take) to the impressions of the dream state, at the time of the occurrence of the dream state.

[994]

This is the meaning of *pratiyony ādravati svapnāya* as read in the Kāṇva recension of BU. For elaborate explanation of this, see SP.

¹This refers to the waking state.

प्रतिन्यायगिरा चास्य यथावत्तर्माभिधीयते ।

प्रतियोनिरवेणैव यथास्थानमिहोच्यते ॥९९५॥

By the word *pratinyāya*, with reference to this Ātman's movement in the state, is stated the meaning *yathāvartma* 'in accordance with the manner'. (And) by the utterance (lit. sound) *pratiyoni* is expressed here¹ the sense of *yathāsthāna* 'in accordance with the state'.

[995]

This explanation befits the reading of both the recensions of BU. Yet for elaborate details, read SP.

¹That is, in the sentence under reference or consideration.

यस्माद्यस्मादुपादाय मात्राः स्वप्नं चकार सः ।

तत्र तत्रैव ता धत्ते मात्राः स्वात्मांशुभिः सह ॥९९६॥

After having taken (or, picked) up the impressions, from whichever (objects) that (Ātman), made the dream state, there (i.e. in each of them) it puts (or, places) those impressions, together with its own rays. [996]

This is the conclusion about the meaning of the sentence under reference, in accordance with its reading in the Mādhyandina recension of BU.

येनैव वर्त्मना यातः पुनस्तेनैव वर्त्मना ।
याति मात्राः समादाय कर्मवायुसमीरितः ॥९९७॥

By whichever way it had gone, it goes back by that very way among (them), after having taken (or, picked) up the impressions, impelled (or, urged) onwards as it is by the wind in the form of activity.¹ [997]

This is the meaning of the sentence according as it is read in the Kāṇva recension of BU.

Read SP: *svapnagativartma karmādīty etat prakāṣayitum gaṇ-
am viśinaṣṭi karmeti.*

स आत्मा पुण्यपापोत्थं फलं नानाप्रभेदकम् ।
तत्र स्वप्नविधौ तिष्ठन्पश्यतीह समीक्षते ॥९९८॥

That Ātman, staying (lit. standing) there, i.e. in the activity of the dream state, sees the result arising out of merit and demerit and which has numerous different objects in it. (So also) does it see here (i.e. in the waking state).¹ [998]

This is the meaning of *sa yat tatra*

punya-pāpottham phalam nānāprabhedakam is implied after *ikṣate*; cf. verse 1000 below. The word *iha* means *jāgradvidhi* in contrast with *svapnavidhi*.

नैनं स्थानान्तरं प्राप्तं ग्रामाद्ग्रामान्तरं यथा ।

शुभाशुभं यदद्राक्षीत्तत्साक्षादनुगच्छति ॥९९९॥

Whatever auspicious and/or inauspicious (this Ātman) saw (in the dream state),¹ does not actually follow (it) when it has gone to another state (viz. the waking state), as that (auspicious and/or inauspicious) follows a person (who goes) from one village (or town) to another. [999]

This is the explanation of *ananvāgatas tena*.

¹This is under the influence of *svapnavidhi*, i.e. *svapna* which the preceding verse has referred to.

शुभाशुभक्रियैवेह पश्यतीत्यभिधीयते ।
न तु यद्वास्तवं वृत्तं पश्यतीत्यक्रियात्मनः ॥१०००॥

It is said, (the Ātman) sees here¹ just the auspicious and/or inauspicious (activity and /or its result)— but it does not see² what is the real state (*vṛtta*)³ of the non-active (Ātman). [1000]

¹This refers to both the states which involve activity arising out of ignorance.

²This is not the 'seeing' by the immutable Ātman.

³This is from the verb root *vṛt* 'to be', and means '(actual) being' which signifies its form (*rūpa*), as SP points out.

Verses 1001 and 1002 state the reason for holding irrelevance of the *ananvāgatatva* which is enunciated.

तेनानन्वागत इतिप्रतिज्ञातार्थसिद्धये ।
असङ्गो हीति हेतूक्तिः प्रतिज्ञार्थोऽथवा भवेत् ॥१००१॥

The sentence *asaṅgo hi* is the statement of the reason for proving the matter which is enunciated, viz. *tenānanvāgatah* Or, it could be the thing enunciated (itself).¹ [1001]

¹This is said with a view to reversing the relation between

the two sentences, that are relevant here. And this becomes clear from the next verse.

यदैवं पूर्वमेव स्यात्तदा हेतुवचः स्फुटम् ।
तेनानन्वागत इति प्राक्कृतेनैव कर्मणा ॥१००२॥

(And) when it is (taken) like this,¹ then the earlier sentence of the Śruti would be the clear statement of the reason, viz. *tenānanvāgataḥ*; (this is) because of the action done earlier.²

[1002]

¹This is as was said at the end of the preceding verse in 'Or, ... itself'.

²This is to refer to the dream state.

Verses 1003-1005 state the view that *asaṅgatva* is *pratijñā* 'enunciation' and *ananvāgatatva*, the *hetu* 'reason'.

सासङ्गत्वं समाशङ्क्य प्रवृत्तैषा यतः श्रुतिः ।
अनन्वागत इत्यस्य हेतुत्वं हिगिरोच्यते ॥१००३॥

Since this Śruti sentence (*sa vā eṣa etasmin samprasādaḥ* ...) proceeds on the basis of (lit. after having entertained) the doubt about (the Ātman's) being attached (to desire etc.); therefore, the nature of the sentence *tenānanvāgataḥ* as the reason is expressed by the word *hi*.

[1003]

This is to justify the view expressed in the preceding verse. SP has elaborated on the details involved in the argument of this verse.

न कर्म कुरुते स्वप्ने कारकाणामसंभवात् ।
फलमात्रमयं तत्र भुङ्क्ते स्वाभासवर्त्मना ॥१००४॥

In the dream state (the Ātman) does not perform any activity, on account of the absence of any *kāraḥ* 'objects related

to any activity'; only the result does (this one) enjoy there, being in the form of its own semblance. [1004]

न हि निष्पद्यते स्वप्ने क्रिया जागरिते यथा ।
कर्त्रादिकारकस्थाने नातोऽन्वेत्यक्रियात्मनः ॥१००५॥

(It means:) Because, in the dream state, any activity there does not come to any effect (i.e. is not performed) as in the waking state, which is the abode of (or, place for) what are *kāraṅkas* 'related to activity'; there does not continue to exist (lit. follow), in the case of (the Ātman) who is not of the nature of performing any activity. [1005]

Verses 1006-1009 state that the Śāstra begins with the idea of its non-relation to (any) activity in the dream state.

यदि स्थानान्तरं प्राप्तमन्वियात्स्वप्नजा क्रिया ।
शास्त्रारम्भो वृथैव स्यात्स्वप्ने को नापराध्यति ॥१००६॥

If activity, which belonged to the dream state, followed in (lit. goes to) the other state,¹ then the purpose (lit. activity) of scripture would be futile; who (indeed) does not falter² (lit. commit an offence) in the dream state. [1006]

¹That is, state of waking, for example.

²That means 'who is not under the influence of ignorance?' This is offence against the immutable action! Further, cf. the word *vibhrama* in the next verse. Yet, SP understands 'who does not commit offences which render him ineligible for actions prescribed in scripture?', we wonder if that is *really* meant.

अपेतसाधनस्यापि पश्यतः स्वप्नविभ्रमम् ।
बिभर्ति वासनैवास्य क्रियाकारकरूपताम् ॥१००७॥

In the case of a person, who sees the error¹ (caused) in the dream, while all instruments (of activity) have departed

(or, gone away) from him, it is only impression (of the earlier experience or activity) that assumes the form of activity and its related objects. [1007]

¹The word *vibhrama* 'error' conveys the idea of the influence (or, effect) of ignorance. This, we think, justifies our understanding of *ko nāparādhyati* in the preceding verse.

फलसंभोगमात्रं च यस्मात्स्वप्ने समीक्ष्यते ।
फलान्तरारम्भविधिर्नातः स्यादक्रियात्मनः ॥१००८॥

Since there is noticed in the dream state enjoyment of the results (of activity); there is not (seen) any understanding or acceptance of an activity for other result(s), on the part of the non-active (Ātman). [1008]

Cf. the comment of SP: *pratītyatiriktam svapne sukhādi nīṣkriyasyātmano na sidhyatīty arthaḥ*.

न करोति यतः स्वप्ने क्रियामिव समीक्ष्यते ।
प्रक्रियाफलसंयोगो नातो बोधेऽस्य वीक्ष्यते ॥१००९॥

Since (the Ātman of the dreamer) does not perform any activity (but) sees that activity, as if it were, (performed), therefore, it is noticed that there is not any of this Ātman's relation to (or connection with) the result of what (seemed to have) had begun. [1009]

Verses 1010-1013 state yet another reason for holding falsehood of the activity in the dream state.

तृप्तः स्वप्नेऽथ संबुद्धः क्षुत्परीतः प्रबुध्यते ॥१०१०॥
यस्मादनृतमेवेदं यत्किञ्चिदिह वीक्ष्यते ।
प्रत्यङ्ङकारकस्तस्माल्लिप्यते न क्रियाफलैः ॥१०११॥

And (also) (*atha*) one, who is in the dream stated satisfied,¹

is known to have become awake, hunger-stricken (or, over-powered by hunger), [1010]

since this is so, viz. whichever is seen here (i.e. in the dream state), is false, therefore, the inner self which is not an agent (lit. a *kāraka* 'related to activity'), is not affected by (lit. smeared with) the results of activity. [1011]

स्वप्नस्कन्ननिमित्तं तु प्रायश्चित्तं यदुच्यते ।
सत्येन्द्रियविकारत्वात्तच्चापि न निराश्रयम् ॥१०१२॥

And (*tu*) what is prescribed (lit. stated) as an expiation occasioned by (a person's) emitting semen in the dream state¹ is also not without a cause (lit. basis) for it, since that has the nature of being some deviation (from the normal state) of a real² organ. [1012]

¹In this connection, SP cites the following:

*svapne ced indriyadaurbalyāt striyaṃ drṣtvā kṣared yadi /
prāyaścittaṃ tu tasyoktam prāṇāyāmās tu ṣoḍaśa //*
(*Vāyupurāṇa* 1.18.14; *Līṅgapurāṇa* 1.90.17)

²The word 'real' does not refer to philosophical real, but to what is considered to be so in usual life.

स्वप्नस्कन्नं यथा स्वप्ने तथा बोधेऽपि वीक्ष्यते ।
आत्मचैतन्यवत्तस्मात्प्रायश्चित्तं तदुद्भवम् ॥१०१३॥

As emitting semen is noticed (as occurring) in the dream state, so is it noticed in the waking state also, like the sentient. *Ātman* (in a person);¹ therefore, there is (prescribed for it) an expiation caused for (or, arising from) it. [1013]

¹The word *ātmacaitanya* could be translated alternatively as 'one's own sentience'. That is to say, the word *ātman* is to be (or, can be) taken as a reflexive pronoun. The idea seems to be like this: Be it the dream state or the waking state, one's sentience has always remained in one; so does remain the

expiation for emitting semen, in both of the two states.

एका तावदियं व्याख्या यथोक्तैषोपवर्णिता ।
व्याचक्षतेऽन्यथा चेदं वाक्यमेतद्यथोदितम् ॥१०१४॥

So far (*tāvat*) is given one interpretation (of the sentence *ananvāgataḥ* ...) as was stated by (Śaṅkara in BUB). And yet (*ca*) there are some others,¹ who explain this sentence in a manner which is like this one, already stated.² [1014]

¹SP mentions the other scholar to be Bhartṛprapañca.

²This suggests Sureśvara's approval of the other view.

Verses 1015-1020 present the explanation as given by Bhartr-prapañca.

अनन्वागतवाक्येन विवेकः कर्मणः कृतः ।
असङ्गवचसा त्वस्य कामनिर्मोक उच्यते ॥१०१५॥

(Thus) there is distinction established (lit. made) of an activity (from the Ātman). And (*tu*) by the statement (about its being) unattached is pointed out this one's release (or, freedom) from desire. [1015]

This verse points out the purport of the two sentences *ananvāgataḥ* ... and *asaṅgaḥ* ... It may be noted that *karmaviveka* is ancillary of *mokṣajñāna*.

ननु नैव क्रिया साक्षाद्भानवृद्धी प्रतीष्यते ।
अपि जागरितस्थाने कामो हेतुर्यतस्तयोः ॥१०१६॥

But, indeed, (one might argue), '(In the dream state), activity is not considered to be responsible (or, cause) for the direct abandoning or entertaining (desire); for, in the waking state also, desire is the cause of the two'. [1016]

SP cites an opinion on this: (*yathāhuh*) *jāgaritadeśe 'py upacayāpacaye na kriyaiva hetuḥ, kiṃ tarhi, kāmo hetur (iti)*—possibly a statement of the objector's view by Bhartṛprapañca. A refutation of this is given by him in the manner stated in the next verse.

अकामस्य क्रिया यस्मान्निष्फलैव समीक्ष्यते ।
स यथाकाम इत्यादि तथा चोद्धर्षं प्रवक्ष्यते ।
इत्यस्य परिहारार्थमसङ्गो हीति भण्यते ॥१०१७॥

‘(That should not be so understood) because, in the case of the desireless (Ātman), activity is looked upon only as unproductive of (i.e. not producing) any result. So also will this be stated later, viz. *sa yathākāmaḥ* This is (stated here) for the refutation (of the above objection); (indeed) it is said *asaṅgo hi*’ [1017]

The purport of the answer is: The Ātman does not have any desire at all.

यमासङ्गमिह स्वप्ने कामं त्वमनुपश्यसि ।
स्वपतो न भवेत्काम इत्येतदभिधीयते ॥१०१८॥
असङ्गो हीति वाक्येन तद्वतोऽसंभवादिह ।
ग्रस्तमत्र मनः कामि वासनामात्रशेषतः ॥१०१९॥

This is said here: That desire will not be one entertained by the sleeping (Ātman): the attachment, which you see here, i.e. in the dream state, as desire; [1018]

since, there is impossibility here of its being here in one with that (desire), as (conveyed) by the sentence *asaṅgo hi* It is *manas* that has a desire, affected (lit. swallowed up) as it is by the remainder only of (or, in) impression (of objects). [1019]

यतोऽतोऽसङ्ग एवायं पुरुषः स्वप्नभूमिगः ।
बहिः कुलायादित्युक्तं पाप्मनो विजहाति च ॥१०२०॥

Since this Puruṣa (i.e. the individual self) in the dream state is only unattached to this (*ataḥ*, with reference to desire) and it is (already) said (about it) *bahiḥ kulāyāt* '(it is) outside the nest'.¹ (Also) further, *pāpmano vijahāti*, 'it gives up sins'.²

[1020]

¹Cf. BU 4.3.12.

²Cf. BU 4.3.8.

In verses 1021-1024, it is pointed out: (In the dream state) it is *manas* that becomes modified as the objects and therefore there is no desire on the part of it.

देहाश्रयादृते कामाः सन्ति नान्यत्र कुत्रचित् ।
स्वप्नप्रपञ्चः सर्वोऽपि वासनामात्रमेव तु ॥१०२१॥

Desires do not exist without the shelter of a body and not at all elsewhere; all this (extensive) world of the dream state is indeed (*tu*) the impressions (of objects therein) only. [1021]

SP supports this, citing (probably from *Bhārṭṛprapañca*) thus: (*yathāhuh*) *śarīrasambandhinaś ca kāmā mṛtyo rūpāṇi pravibhaktas cāyam śarīreṇa bhavati (iti)*.

व्याचक्षाणो यतः स्वप्नं ज्ञानमात्रं प्रभाषते ॥१०२२॥
जाने पत्रायुतं जातं जाने पितरमागतम् ।
तथा चैवर्गिरा युक्तान्स्वप्नान्व्याचक्षते जनाः ॥१०२३॥

Since, explaining (the nature of) the dream state (and the world in it), he (i.e. Yājñavalkya) talks merely (about) knowledge (of the Ātman); [1022]

(thus:) 'I know about ten thousand of sons' and also, 'I know about the father who has come'. So also, by similar words (*tathā caiva*) do the people speak about dreams. [1023]

रथादेरसतो यद्वत्स्वप्ने निर्माणमीक्ष्यते ।
शरीरेन्द्रियकामादेरसतस्तद्वदेव तु ॥१०२४॥

As one sees, in the dream state, the creation of a non-existing chariot etc.¹; so also (does one see the creation of) the non-existing body, organs (in the same) and desire etc.² [1024]

SP quotes (apparently from Bhartṛprapañca) thus: (*yathāhuh*) *yathaiva rathādīnām asatām nirmāṇam bāhyānām tathā śarīreन्द्रियānām cāntarānām (iti).*

¹This refers to other external objects.

²The activity and its result connected with every one of them is intended.

Verse 1025 affirm that the desire (created) in the dream state is also false.

रथेन्द्रियादिवत्तस्मात्कामोऽप्यत्र समीक्ष्यताम् ।
स्वप्नेऽतोऽयं निरासङ्गः पुमानभ्युपगम्यताम् ॥१०२५॥

Let this be known (or, considered, lit. seen) that desire here, i.e. in the dream state also, is (false), like a chariot, organs etc.;¹ therefore, let this Puruṣa be understood as having no attachment (whatsoever). [1025]

This is to state the result from the falsity in *kāma*. In support, SP quotes thus: (*uktaṁ hi*) *yahtaiva sarvasyāsato vinirmāṇam asato darśanam evam asyāpi śarīrendriyapakṣabhūṭasyāsato darśanam (iti).*

¹Namely, products of imagination.

Verses 1026-1029 state yet another meaning of the word *asaṅga*.

कौटस्थ्यं यदि वा पुंसोऽसङ्गशब्देन भण्यते ।
क्रियाश्लेषमृते यस्मान्नाद्यक्षफलसंगतिः ॥१०२६॥

Or rather (*yadi vā*), the immutability of the Puruṣa is thus expressed by the word *asaṅga* 'unattached'; since, without association to (or, connection with) activity, there can be no conjunction of the witness (or, seer—*adhyakṣa*) with the result.¹ [1026]

¹SP states: (*uktaṃ ca*) *śuddho 'yam puruṣaḥ (iti)*.

ननु कर्ता पुमानेष स हि कर्तेतिवाक्यतः ।
नैवं स्वप्ने यतः पुंसः कर्तृत्वं भावनाकृतम् ॥१०२७॥

(One would object:) 'But, indeed, this individual self is the agent (of activity), on the basis of the sentence *sa hi kartā*'. (The answer is:) 'No, it is not so, since agentship (of the activity) in the individual self is produced by impressions (of the external objects)'. [1027]

कर्तृकार्यावभासित्वाज्जाग्रत्कालेऽपि चात्मनः ।
कर्तृत्वं न स्वतः स्वप्ने किमु वक्तव्यमिष्यते ॥१०२८॥

Even in the waking state, there is no agentship of the (individual) Ātman (of an activity) in its own right, since the agent and the activity (both) are (only) apparent (i.e. false). What then could be said as regard dream state? [1028]

अविद्यास्रोतसैवास्य क्रियाकारकतात्मनः ।
तत्स्थचैतन्यबिम्बेन भुङ्क्तेऽसौ कर्मणः फलम् ॥१०२९॥

This (individual) has the nature of being (both) the activity and its means only through the stream (i.e. force/influence) of ignorance. It enjoys (or, experiences) the result of (the) activity only by the reflection of sentience in it (viz. ignorance).¹ [1029]

¹SP explains this succinctly thus: *na hi tadasyakriyāphala-ākṣitvātiriktaṃ kriyāpekṣam astīty arthaḥ*.

Verses 1030-1044 affirm that the nature of (the Ātman as) the agent is also belonging to the earlier period of the waking state.

कर्त्रादिसाक्षिणोऽस्याभूत्कर्तृत्वं यत्पुरात्मनः ।
स हि कर्तेति तस्यैव वचनं स्यात्पुनःश्रुतिः ॥१०३०॥

In the (sentence of the Śruti) *sa hi kartā*, (there is mention made of) the Ātman, the witness of the agent etc. as, being the agent of activity, in the earlier¹ (state) and there would itself be a mention made again (*punah*)² in the Śruti (statement). [1030]

¹This is to refer to the waking state.

²This excludes the reference to the dream state.

नन्वस्यैव तु तत्कर्म भावनापेक्षयाखिलम् ।
प्रवर्तते कथं तस्य कर्तृत्वं विनिवार्यते ॥१०३१॥

(An objector asks:) 'But, indeed, that entire activity proceeds only from this one, through dependence on the impressions (of external objects); how is then rejected its being the agent of activity?' [1031]

This argument proceeds from the notion of *arthāpatti* 'contingency' *sarvam api karma kāmāpekṣayātmanah sukhādi dātum pravartate, na ca phalam akartṛstham muktiṃ vinā siddhyati, 'śāstraphalam prayoktari' tallakṣaṇād iti nyāyāt ...* (SP).

कामं प्रवर्ततां कर्म न च दोषोऽत्र कश्चन ।
भावेनेयं यतः कर्मगुण एव सती सदा ।
स्वसाक्षिणं भावयन्तौ न त्वसावात्मनो गुणः ॥१०३२॥

(The answer:) 'Well,, let there be (lit. proceed) activity, but (*ca*) there is no difficulty (lit. fault) in this (happening), since this impression (of the external objects) itself, being subordinate

to (or, helpful to—lit. a property of) activity, ever brings about (the notion (or being) of) its witness—but that is not (really) the property of the Ātman'. [1032]

SP supports this, citing (the opinion/remark probably of Bhartṛprapañca): (*yathāhuh*) *bhāvanā hi karmaguṇa eva satī lpayatīty arthah*.

पुष्पगन्धः पुटस्थोऽपि पुष्पस्यैव यथा तथा ।
बुद्ध्यादिकारकस्थस्य भावना कर्मणो गुणः ।
आत्मनस्तूपचारात्स्यान्न तु साक्षाद्गुणो भवेत् ॥१०३३॥

'As the fragrance of a flower, which is abiding even in its calyx, belongs only to the flower, so is the impression (of external objects) a property of activity which is abiding in the *kāraka* 'instrument of activity' such as the intellect etc. It would be (described as) of the Ātman, (only) metaphorically, but not of it (which is) actually (perceptible *sākṣāt*).' [1033]

SP clarifies the example, citing (*uktaṃ hi*) *yathā puspagandhaḥ puṭam bhāvayati, sa puspaguṇa eva na puṭaguṇa, evam bhāvanā karmaguṇa eva nātmaguṇaḥ (iti)*. Also, with reference to the 1st line, SP appears to quote from Bhartṛprapañca: (*yathāhuh*) *bhāvanānuranjite vijñānātmavijñāne kartrtvopacārah (iti)*.

उत्पत्तौ भोगकाले च कर्मादायैव भावनाम् ।
स्वात्मानं लभते यस्मात्तां विना तदनर्थकम् ॥१०३४॥

'Since activity, whether at (the time of its) origination or at the time of its enjoyment (i.e. being enjoyed), comes into being only after taking (the support of) the impression (of the external objects), therefore, it would be meaningless (if it is) without the same. [1034]

SP supports this argument, quoting: (*uktaṃ ca*) *tām evānuranjanām kartrtvenāṅgīkurute karmotpattibhogālayoh (iti)*.

कर्मणोऽपि तथात्यन्तं प्रयोगैकसमाश्रयात् ॥१०३५॥
 बुद्ध्याद्यर्थाभिसंबन्धपक्षतैवावसीयते ।
 न त्वात्मगुणता तस्य कर्मणः स्यात्कदा चन ॥१०३६॥

Further, in respect of activity also, necessarily through being supported (i.e. caused) only through the employment (of them), [1035]

there can certainly be decided the participation of its close association (or, connection) with the intellect and other objects—but never can that activity be of the nature of the Ātman's property. [1036]

SP supports the argument, citing (*tad uktam*) *karmaṇo 'py antam prayogāśritatvād buddhyādisaṃnikarṣapakṣataiva na kadācanātmagunatā (iti)*.

प्रयोगापेक्षमेवास्ते कर्म बुद्ध्यादिसंक्षये ॥१०३७॥
 स्वात्मनः प्रतिलाभाय न त्वात्मानमपेक्षते ।
 सभावनमतः कर्म प्रतीचः प्रविविच्यते ॥१०३८॥

After the intellect etc. have perished,¹ activity remains (i.e. continues to be) only as dependent on the employment (of the same)² [1037]

and (*tu*), it does not depend on the Ātman, in order that it comes into being (lit. it occurs).³ Therefore, being associated with the impression (of the external objects) is the activity distinguished from the inner self. [1038]

¹What is meant is: there is not absolute perishing of the intellect etc.; they continue to exist only in their subtle forms—their gross forms are completely obscured/lost. SP supports this, citing (*uktam hi*) *buddhyādikṣaye 'pi karma prayogāpekṣam evāste svātmalābhāya nātmānam apekṣate (iti)*.

²Activity does require the help of *kāraṇas*, which are required to continue to exist (at last), in their subtle forms—the

employment of these becomes then helpful in the activity of the yonder world.

³In *svātmalābha*, the word *ātman* is a reflexive pronoun. Therefore, *svātmalābha* is the same as *svarūpalābha*.

तस्मात्कर्मगुणस्यैव कर्मस्थस्यैव सर्वदा ।
साक्ष्यात्मा भावनारूपकामस्य स्वप्नसद्गति ॥१०३९॥

Therefore, in its abode (or, state) of the dream, the individual self (i.e. the *Ātman*) is ever the witness of only what is subordinate¹ to activity (and) which exists only in activity.

[1039]

SP supports this (apparently with the remark of Bhartr-
prapañca) thus: (*tad āhuḥ*) *tasmād ayaṁ etasmin svapne
karmaguṇasyaivāsaṅgasya karmasthasya draṣṭā pravivikta ātmā
nirāsaṅgaḥ (iti)*.

¹Cf. *karmaguṇa* mentioned in verse 1032 above. It refers to the *bhāvanā* 'impression (of the external objects)' which belongs only to the activity (*karman*).

आसङ्ग आत्मनश्चेत्स्यात्साक्षाच्चैतन्यवद्गुणः ।
न पश्येदात्मवत्कामं कर्मस्थं स्वप्रबोधयोः ॥१०४०॥

If attachment were a property of the individual self, in the same way as sentience (which is) actually (perceptible), then it would not (i.e. would not be able to) see the desire related to (lit. residing in) activity, in (i.e. during the time of) the states of dream and of waking, as (it does not see) the *Ātman*.¹

[1040]

¹Cf. the use of the suffix *-vat* (in *ātmavat*) which is in accordance with Pāṇini 5.1.115: *tena tulyaṁ kriyā ced vatih*.

एवं चावस्थिते पक्षे श्रुत्याकारि समञ्जसम् ।
प्रसिद्धवदुपादानमसङ्गो हीति सादरम् ॥१०४१॥

When the point under discussion remained (in the condition) thus, the Śruti respectfully¹ adopted a clear (lit. smooth, for understanding) use of the words *asaṅgo hi*, as some well-known use.²

[1041]

¹The actual purport of *sādaram* is not clear to us. However SP introduces it with the remark: *abhyāsaṁ tātparyalīṅgaṁ dyotayati*.

²The idea of similarity, at the basis of this use *prasiddhavat*, still demands clarity.

न कर्मोपचयोऽतोऽत्र स्वप्ने जाग्रद्वदिष्यते ।
सर्वासङ्गविनिर्मोकाद्वासनामात्रशेषतः ॥१०४२॥

Therefore, owing to the complete release from all attachment and the remainder in the form of only the impression (of the external objects),¹ there is not accepted (or, understood) here, i.e. in the dream state, accumulation of activity, as in the waking state.²

[1042]

¹SP supports the argument in this verse, citing (*uktaṁ ca*) *yasmāc cāsaṅgo 'to na karmopacayaḥ svapnaḥ (iti)*.

²This shows the distinction of the waking state from the dream state.

नायं कर्ममयो यस्मान्न च काममयः स्वतः ।
प्रत्यगज्ञानतस्तस्मात्तन्मयत्वमिवेक्ष्यते ॥१०४३॥

Since this one (viz. the inner self, the Ātman) is not connected with (or, made up of) activity, it is not, on its own, full of (or, connected with) desire also. Therefore, it is understood (lit. seen) due to the ignorance that the inner self is, as it were, full of (or, connected with) that (viz. activity and/or desire).

[1043]

नानासाधनसंबन्धात्कर्तृत्वं जगतीक्ष्यते ।

अयं त्वसङ्गो येनातो न करोति न लिप्यते ॥१०४४॥

Agency (of some activity) is understood, in this world, on account of his connection/association with (or, relation to) numerous (lit. varied) instruments (of that activity). But, since this one (viz. the inner self) is unattached (to any of them), it neither does any activity, nor is it affected by (lit. smeared with the same).. [1044]

Verse 1045 states that the inner self, which is not attached to anything is both immutable and just single (i.e. without any second).

मूर्तामूर्ताद्यपह्नुत्या ह्यात्मनस्तत्त्वमब्रवीत् ।

नातोऽनात्माभिसंबन्धः कूटस्थैकात्म्यहेतुतः ॥१०४५॥

(The Śruti) has described (or declared) the true nature of that (sentience) by the rejection of its being either gross or subtle in form.¹ Therefore, for the reason of being immutable and (just) single, it has not any connection whatsoever with any non-Ātman. [1045]

Now, there is here reference to the stage of deep sleep; it continues in three verses which express the objection. The word *śuṣupta* means, in this context, *śuṣupta* 'the deep sleep state'.

¹SP points to *neti neti* (BU 3.9.26), in particular, and *asthūlam* (BU 3.8.8).

Verse 1046 points out to the question connected with *samprasāde* .
atvā caritvā

सुषुप्ते नन्वसंबोधाद्रत्वादि कथमुच्यते ।

न त्वित्यपि तथा वाक्यं न बाह्यं चेति वक्ष्यति ॥१०४६॥

(An objection:) 'But, indeed, in the deep sleep state, there

is not any awakening (to the external objects), how then (has the Śruti made the statement) *ratvā* etc.?'¹ (The answer:) 'So also, there is a statement (in the Śruti), viz. *na tu ...*,¹ and also it will state *na bāhiyam*'² [1046]

¹BU 4.3.23 and 30.

²BU 4.3.21.

Verses 1047-1048 point out a counterquestion: there is no *asaṅgatva* in the dream state.

स्वप्ने रत्वाद्यथ मतं नैवमप्युपपद्यते ।

अनन्वागतगीः कुप्येत्स्वप्नेऽन्वेत्येव तत्कृतम् ॥१०४७॥

If it is held that (the statement) *ratvā ...* (is held as true), then also, it is not to be accepted as tenable, since, otherwise the statement (or, the word) *ananvāgata* would be opposed (lit. get agitated)—in dread also it does follow what is done.¹

[1047]

¹SP brings out this argument thus: *svapne ratyādi* (cf. v.l. *ratvādi*— better!) *drṣṭam cet sa yat tatretyādi virudhyeta tatra kṛtasya taddraṣṭṛgāmitvād ity arthaḥ*.

यथा जाग्रत्कृतं कर्म कर्तारमनुगच्छति ।

जाग्रत्स्थं स्वप्नकर्मैवं स्वप्ने समधिगच्छति ॥१०४८॥

As the activity, which is done (by one) in the waking state, follows (or, accompanies, lit. goes together with) its agent (in/of state); so does the activity which is done in the dream state goes together with (the agent) in that state. [1048]

We think, this verse explains what is said in the preceding verse in *svapne 'nvety eva tat kṛtam*.

Verse 1049 explains away this said fault—one opinion of some.

इत्येवं चोदिते केचित्परिहारं प्रचक्षते ।

पदच्छेदेन कुशला अरत्वेत्येवमादिना ॥१०४९॥

When there is such a question asked, some clever persons answer: ¹ 'By the break-up of the words in the Samdhi thus: *aratvā* etc.' ² (this can be answered away). [1049]

¹This is an answer, according to some fellow Vedāntins. Yet it does not meet with Sureśvara's approval, as is clear from the next verse.

²Read, according to these, one should read: *samprasāde aratvā*. SP adds *acaritvā, adrṣtvā ... iti nañanvayapadacchedena vākye yākyāyamāne nāvadyam* [Add: *śrutivākyam* or *asmanmatam*].

Verse 1050 states Sureśvara's seeing a fault in the preceding view.

स यत्तत्रेत्यसङ्गोक्तेर्नेदमप्युत्तरं भवेत् ।

दृष्टिं तत्रापि चाद्यस्य परिहारं प्रचक्षते ॥१०५०॥

But, this also is not (or, would not be) an answer, ¹ since there is (soon to follow) the statement (of the Śruti) *sa yat tatra ...* and which tells about the nature of the Ātman's being unattached (to any desire or activity). (And therefore) the others ² also state their refutation (of the view under dispute) by having (accepted) the superimposition of seeing (there also). ³ [1050]

¹This is Sureśvara's mild disapproval of the explanation stated in the preceding verse.

²The other Vedāntin—these are acceptable to Sureśvara.

³That is, in deep sleep.

verses 1051 states that the dream state etc. are also (the results of) superimposition (*drṣṭi*).

अस्ति भोगः सुषुप्तेऽपि तथा चानन्दभुङ्मतः ।

ऐश्वरो वात्र भोगोऽस्ति सर्वस्थानाभिमानतः ॥१०५१॥

In the deep sleep state also, there is enjoyment, (for) in that sense (of an enjoyer) is the Ātman understood as the experiencer of joy (or, happiness).¹ Or, this experience may be belonging to the Lord,² on account of its identifying (itself with one belonging to all the states) [1051]

¹Cf. *ānandabhuk tathā prājñah* (Gaudapādakārikā 1.3, with reference to Māṇḍūkyaopaniṣad 5).

²Cf. *īśānah prabhuh* ... (Gaudapādakārikā 1.10, with reference to Māṇḍūkyaopaniṣad 6).

Verse 1052 is the statement of yet another notion about *susuptih*

कार्यभूमिगतो ह्यात्मा सुषुप्तं प्रसमीक्षते ।

कार्यस्य कारणव्याप्तेर्न सुषुप्तपरोक्षता ॥१०५२॥

Indeed, the individual self (the Ātman), which has been abiding in (some) stage (of the nature) of (a certain) effect, experiences (lit. sees) the state of deep sleep. (And), since the effect is (ever) pervaded by its cause; therefore, the deep sleep state does not have the nature of being imperceptible. [1052]

The objection is based on the acceptance of a person's becoming awake or dreaming as connected with deep sleep; in other words, the former are the effects of the latter. And, since a cause and its effect(s) have the same properties, the deep sleep state also must be like the state of waking and the dream state is perceptible. For yet more details, reads SP with profit.

In verse 1053, Sureśvara states his decision in this regard.

यदि वा स्वप्न एवास्तु रत्वादि यदुदीरितम् ।
स्वप्नयोरभितः प्राज्ञादनन्वागतताप्यतः ॥१०५३॥

Or rather, let *ratvā* etc., which is mentioned, be in (connection with) the dream state alone; on account of *Prājña*.¹ With the dream state on both the sides,² the (individual self's) nature of not being followed (by desire and activity) is also (justified) thereby. [1053]

Cf. SP for elaborate details.

¹This indicates the deep sleep state.

²That is, both before and after the state of deep sleep.

Verses 1054-1062 state the conclusion of the three states from the deep sleep of the individual self as stated in *samprasāde ratvā*

त्रिधा त्रिधा वा क्लृप्तेः स्यादेकैकस्येत्यदोषता ।
जाग्रत्स्वप्नसुषुप्तानां जाग्रत्स्वप्नसुषुप्ततः ॥१०५४॥

Or, there could be the absence of blemish in (holding) *ratvā* ... in relation to the deep sleep state, by dividing in threefold (nature of) each one of the states of waking, dream and deep sleep, on account (of the existence) of (one in deep sleep) in the states of waking, dream and deep sleep. [1054]

In verses 1055 and 1056 Sureśvara explains the threefold division of *jāgrat*; in 1057-1059, of *svapna* and finally in 1059, of *susupta*.

कार्याकार्यादि यत्साक्षात्प्रमाणात्प्रसमीक्षते ।
जाग्रज्जागरितं तादृकतत्स्वप्नो यन्मृषेक्षणम् ॥१०५५॥
कामादिविषयासक्तेर्न किञ्चिद्विविनक्ति यत् ।
जाग्रत्सुषुप्तं तादृकस्यान्निर्विवेकस्वभावतः ॥१०५६॥

The waking state of (the individual self) is of that sort when

it sees, by means of direct perception, what is to be done and what not etc.;¹ the dream state (of the same)² is (also) similar, viz. false (i.e. unreal). [1055]

Owing to its attachment to such objects as desire; and that sort of state wherein (it) does not (i.e. cannot), in any way, ascertain (the nature of objects), is the state of deep sleep of (the individual) in the waking state—this, on account of its nature of being devoid of (any capacity for) ascertaining.

[1056]

This is division of the waking state into three states, as intended in verse 1054 above.

¹This is to refer to *bhaksya*, *abhaksya* and so on.

²That is, in the waking state.

सुप्तोऽपि कर्म कुरुते नरः स्वप्ने प्रबोधवत् ।
 स्वप्नजाग्रत्तथारूपं स्वप्नः स्वप्नात्मकोऽत्र यः ॥१०५७॥
 दृष्ट्वापि यत्समाख्यातुं प्रबुद्धो नैव शक्नुयात् ।
 तादृक्स्वप्नसुषुप्तं स्यात्सुषुप्तं च त्रिधोच्यते ॥१०५८॥
 सुषुप्तजाग्रन्मूढः स्याच्छान्तोऽसौ स्वप्न उच्यते ।
 ऐकात्म्यतत्त्वासंबोधः सुषुप्तः प्राज्ञ उच्यते ॥१०५९॥

In the dream state, the individual self, though in sleep, does activity as in the waking state—that nature is the waking state of the dream state; and the dream (in this) is what is of the nature of a dream (i.e. being related to the false objects);

[1057]

and, the deep sleep state is of that sort when, after waking up (in the dream itself), it is unable to tell what it had seen; further, the deep sleep state also is described as threefold:

[1058]

the awakened person in the state of deep sleep is (lit. would be) ignorant (fully); it is said to be dreaming while it is pacified and, with no knowledge of its nature of singleness; it is said to be Prājña of the dream state.

[1059]

त्रिविधत्वात्सुषुप्तस्य सर्वं रत्वादि युज्यते ।
दृष्टान्तः संप्रसादो वा स्वप्नजाग्रदवस्थयोः ॥१०६०॥

In view of (this) threefold nature of the deep sleep state (then), all (of the statement), viz. *ratvā* ... is reasonable (as connected with it). Or, (the state of deep sleep) yielding complete happiness is an example for (distinguishing it from) the dream and the waking states. [1060]

Translation of the second line of this verse has in view the next verse.

यथा रत्वाद्यसंभाव्यं संप्रसादे तथैव च ।
इतरत्रापि विज्ञेयं तत्र वस्त्वसमीक्षणात् ॥१०६१॥

As *ratvā* ... is not possible in the case of the state of (deep sleep, i.e. in) experiencing complete happiness, so is it to be accepted elsewhere as well, because of (the individual self's) not seeing the thing (i.e. reality).¹ [1061]

¹SP indicates a variant reading in the second line: *tattva-amīkṣaṇāt*; but that does not seem to make any material difference. Also, there is no manuscript evidence showing such variant reading in the Kārikā proper!

यत एवमतः कर्मकामदोषविवर्जितः ।
पुरुषोऽयं स्वतः सिद्धो यथोक्तेनैव वर्त्मना ॥१०६२॥

Since this is so, therefore, this (individual self, viz. Puruṣa) is established as devoid of the blemishes, viz. activity, desire etc., in the manner stated.¹ [1062]

¹This is to state: as was shown earlier by pointing out how desire is subordinate to activity, that activity was dependent on the employment of the *kāraṇas* 'means of activity' etc.

Now follows in verses 1063-1080 an objection to *asaṅgatva* being considered as the cause/reason (in verse 1063) and also discussion on BU 4.3.16 and 17.

असङ्गत्वादकर्तेति नन्वसिद्धोऽयमुच्यते ।

स्वप्ने कामस्य दृष्टत्वाद्यत्र काममिति श्रुतेः ॥१०६३॥

(A doubt:) 'But, indeed, the statement of the reason: viz. the individual self is a non-agent, since it has no attachment, is not (properly) proved (or, stated); and that because it is understood from the Śruti statement *yatra kāmam* ... there is desire noticed in the dream state. [1063]

इत्यस्य परिहारार्थं स वा इत्यादिकं वचः ।

पुनः स्वप्नसमारम्भो गतत्वात्किमितीर्यते ।

बुद्धान्तादेर्यथा तद्वन्नातः स्यात्पुनरुक्तता ॥१०६४॥

For the refutation of this¹ (which is just stated) 'Thus, there is the statement (in the Śruti) *sa vā* ...'.² On this, one would yet once more say:) 'Why is the activity of the dream state thus stated again, since it has been already mentioned (lit. has already gone, in the earlier discussion)'. (The answer:) 'There is no repetition in the use of the words in respect of the waking state and another,³ (there is,) (therefore, no repetition of those words)'. [1064]

¹This refers to the use of the words *ratvā caitvā*

²There is reference here to *sa vā eṣa etasmin* ... (BU 4.3.16).

³This is the dream state (beside it).

निशायां संप्रवृत्तायां संहताक्षस्य निद्रया ।

अवस्थां तैजसीं भुक्त्वा स्वापो भवति देहिनः ॥१०६५॥

When the night has set in, the one in a body (i.e. the individual self) has his eyes closed by (i.e. under the influence of) sleep, i.e. after it has experienced the state of being Taijasa, the

one in the body (comes to have) deep sleep.

[1065]

स आनन्दः परो ज्ञेयः सुखदुःखविवर्जितः ।
सततं सर्वभूतानां तिष्ठत्येष पुरीतति ॥१०६६॥

That ¹ should be known as the highest delight, it is free from happiness and/or sorrow; ever does this one ² abide in the Purītat vein ³ of (each of) all beings. [1066]

¹This refers to the state of deep sleep. This implies oneness of *avasthā* 'the (deep sleep) state' and *avasthāvat* 'the one having it', viz. the inner self.

²The word *eṣa* refers to its being the nearest (i.e. being one with the inner self).

³This points to the inner self's existence as the Brahman (SP).

तत्र रत्वा यथाकामं कंचित्कालं यदृच्छया ।
तामवस्थां तिरश्चक्र आधियासुस्ततोऽपराम् ॥१०६७॥

Having experienced delight there for some time, according to its will, it somehow ¹ abandons that state, wishing to come to a state other than that. ² [1067]

This sets aside a notion that the state of deep sleep is that of liberation, wherefrom there cannot be any movement of the individual self to some (or any) other state.

¹This is for *yadr̥cchayā* which means without any controller for its so doing.

²This would refer to the dream state (SP). But, that is made clear in the next verse.

भावनाविग्रहो भूत्वा तत्र स्वप्नरिरंसया ।
उच्चावचानि वस्तूनि भावनातः करोति सः ॥१०६८॥

Having (then) assumed the form of the impression(s) (of the external objects), that (individual self) produces from that (or,

those) impression(s) many objects, high and low, with a desire to deriving delight (from them) in the dream state. [1068]

This emphasises the unreality of the individual self's doings.

गतौ प्राणवियोगः स्याद्यथाकालस्य चेक्षणम् ।
तदसंभाव्यदेशादौ दर्शनात्तन्मृषात्मता ॥१०६९॥

If (there were actual) movement, there would have been death, lit. separation of life(-breaths); also there would be the seeing (by a dreaming person of objects) having relation to some specific time (or, period of time). On account (again) of the sight of impossible objects (of the dream state), there is falsity (in them). [1069]

यावत्स्वप्नेऽस्ति वक्तव्यं प्राक्तदुक्तमशेषतः ।
तस्मान्नासङ्गन्धोऽपि स्वप्ने पुंसोऽस्य विद्यते ॥१०७०॥

Whatever has to be stated in respect of the dream state has been already¹ stated in fullness; therefore, in the dream state, there is not even a bit of (lit. smell of) attachment for the individual self (to desire etc.). [1070]

¹Refer to verse 1021ff. above.

Now follows, in verses 1071-1079, the discussion on BU 4.3.17. In verses 1071-1074, there is reason given for holding the waking state as false.

असङ्गत्वादसंबन्धो यथेह स्वप्नकर्मभिः ।
जाग्रत्यपि न कर्तायमेतस्मादेव कारणात् ॥१०७१॥

As there is not here¹ any (real) connection (of the individual self) with the activities in the dream state, on account of its being unattached; similarly, in the waking state also, this one is a non-agent (i.e. without any activity), for the same reason.

[1071]

There is stated here the oneness in nature of the inner self in both the waking and the dream states.

¹The dream state is meant.

असज्जाग्रदवस्थेयं जाग्रद्रूपत्वकारणात् ।
स्वप्ने जाग्रदवस्थावत्तथा चाद्यन्तवत्त्वतः ॥१०७२॥

This state of waking (of the individual self) is what is not existent owing to the cause, viz. its having the form of the one who is in reality not awake. So also, in the dream state, as in the waking state, (it is so) on account of its having a beginning and an end. [1072]

This is to reaffirm the unreal nature of the individual self's awakening (and also dreaming).

अज्ञानोत्थमिदं जाग्रज्जडरूपसमन्वयात् ।
तथापेक्षात्मकत्वाच्च मृगतृष्णोदकादिवत् ॥१०७३॥

This (waking state of the individual self) has arisen from (i.e. is produced by) ignorance, owing to its invariable association with insentient objects; so also, on account of its nature, viz. of being dependent (on something else), (it is) like the water of mirage. [1073]

निरासङ्गः पुमानेष स्वप्नबुद्धान्तयोरपि ।
संप्रसादे किमङ्गायं यत्र किञ्चिन्न वीक्ष्यते ॥१०७४॥

This individual (self) is devoid of any attachment whatsoever (*nirāsaṅga*), in both the waking and the dream states; what then to say about it in the deep sleep state, i.e. there, where nothing is seen? [1074]

Verses 1075-1076 state a *prima facie* view regarding the non-active

nature of the Ātman in the waking state.

ननु जाग्रदवस्थायां दृष्ट्वैवेत्युच्यते कथम् ।
प्रत्यक्षकर्तृता तत्र यत आत्मन ईक्ष्यते ॥१०७५॥

(A question:) 'But, how indeed is *dr̥ṣtvā* stated (of the individual self) in the waking state?' (and) this is asked because there is directly seen (the Ātman's) doing an activity. [1075]

नैवं कर्त्रादिसाक्षित्वात्तच्चिदाभासतस्तदा ।
कर्तृत्वमात्मनो बोध उपचाराद्यतस्ततः ॥१०७६॥

(The answer:) 'This is not so, since the direct perceiving of agentship is then (i.e. in that state) ¹ on account of the same being the semblance of sentience; the individual self as an agent of some activity and also its knowing (or, knowledge) are then taken only in a figurative sense'. [1076]

We have emended the first line of AnSS edition -*bhāsatas tathā* to -*bhāsatas tadā*. This is on the basis of the variant reading noted in that edition and also, in view of *jāgradavasthāyām* in verse 1075 which precedes.

¹The state of waking is under reference.

Verses 1077-1086 affirm the nature of the individual self as the agent of some action to be only metaphorical.

From verse 1081 to 1155 there is discussion on BU 4.3.18.

आत्मनैवायमिति च ध्यायतीवेति च श्रुतेः ।
नात्मनः कारकत्वं स्यात्सर्वावस्थातिलङ्घिनः ॥१०७७॥

From (the statements in) the Śruti *ātmanaivāyam* ¹ and also *dhyāyatīva*, ² (it follows that) there is not in the case of the individual self *kārakatva* (doership) 'what is associated with activity'—of (really that Ātman) which transcends all the states.

[1077]

¹BU 4.3.6.²BU 4.3.7.

वेदात्मापि तथा चाह प्रपन्नाय किरीटिने ।
 संसारहेतुनिबिडध्वान्तोच्चिच्छित्सयादरात् ॥१०७८॥
 अनादित्वान्निर्गुणत्वात्परमात्मायमव्ययः ।
 शरीरस्थोऽपि कौन्तेय न करोति न लिप्यते ॥१०७९॥

So also has the Ātman of the Veda said to Arjuna who took to him (or, sought shelter of him), with due regard (for him, the devotee), with a desire to destroy (lit. cut off) the pitch/thick darkness (in the form of ignorance) which is the cause of transmigration: [1078]

The highest Ātman is immutable (lit. undiminishable) owing to its having no beginning and having no attributes. And, though residing in a body, it does no activity, nor does it get affected (lit. smeared) thereby,¹ O son of Kuntī. [1079]

¹Cf. *Gītā* 13.31. Also note how Sureśvara identifies Lord Kṛṣṇa with Vedātman.

स्वप्नबुद्धान्तवाक्याभ्यां मृत्योरासङ्गलक्षणात् ।
 विविक्ततैवं यत्नेन निर्णीता प्रत्यगात्मनः ॥१०८०॥

Thus is decided with due care the nature of the inner self as being apart from death, which has the nature of being attachment, by (the statement of) the two sentences pertaining to the dream and waking states. [1080]

This has a connection with BU 4.3.18, which follows immediately, cf. *mahāmatsyākhyā* ... in verse 1116 below.

अन्योन्यपरिहारेण स्वप्नजाग्रदवस्थयोः ।
 कामकर्मात्मकासङ्गविविक्तत्वमिहोदितम् ॥१०८१॥

By mutual opposition (lit. setting aside, or disproving) of the (two) states of waking and dream, there is stated (or, brought out) here¹ the distinction (of the individual self in the two states) in respect of attachment that has the nature of activity and desire. [1081]

¹SP paraphrases this as *pūrvatra darśitam*.

Now follows in verses 1082-1152 the discussion on BU 4.3.18.

यथोदितार्थ एतस्मिन्दृष्टान्तोऽप्यधुनोच्यते ।
निरासङ्गत्वसिद्धयर्थं प्रत्यगात्माख्यवस्तुनः ॥१०८२॥

In relation to this matter, as stated before, there is now (to be) stated an example also; (this is) for the purpose of establishing the nature of the inner self (i.e. Ātman), viz. the (real) thing, as being unattached (to desire and activity). [1082]

This points out the purpose served by the example.

स्वातन्त्र्यप्रतिपत्त्यर्थं महानिति विशेषणम् ।
नादेयस्रोतसाहार्यो मत्स्यो दृष्टान्त उच्यते ॥१०८३॥

The adjective *mahān* (in this verse) is for conveying (lit. causing the understanding of) the independence¹ (of the Ātman). The example which is stated here is of the fish who is not overcome (lit. not flown away)² by the stream of a river. [1083]

¹Or, freedom of will. *asrotasāhārya* is to be split as *asrotasā ahārya*

²SP paraphrases *ahārya* as *akampya* 'unmoved'!

यथा सिन्धोर्महामत्स्य उभे कूले मिथः पृथक् ।
अनुक्रमेण संचरन्मत्स्योऽन्यः कूलतो मतः ॥१०८४॥

(That is to mean:) As a big fish, moving to the wholly distinct

(lit. mutually different) banks of a river,¹ i.e. here and there (i.e. in succession), is known (or, accepted) as distinct from (i.e. on account of its connection with) each bank. [1084]

¹It is worth-noting that Sureśvara has used the word *sindhu* the sense of a river, as in *Rgveda*, e.g. 1.61.1; 3.33.9; 7.61.7.

कलाभ्यां क्रमसंबन्धाद्व्यतिरेकाच्च कलतः ।
स्रोतोमध्ये द्वयाप्राप्तेरसङ्गोऽयं तिमिर्यथा ॥१०८५॥
जाग्रत्स्वप्नकुलाभ्यां क्रमसंबन्धतस्तथा ।
व्यतिरेको द्वयाप्राप्तेरसङ्गोऽयं पुमानपि ॥१०८६॥

(That means:) As this (big fish, called) Timi, is unattached (to any bank), which is not obtained (i.e. restricted, or made as its own) in any of the two banks, remaining in the midst of the stream (of the river), and distinct from (each) bank, while coming into contact with both of the banks in succession, [1085]

there is similar connection in succession (of the inner self) with the abodes (i.e. the nests, in the form of) the waking and the dream states. There is distinction of it from each owing to its not (really) obtaining in both (the states)—(therefore) this inner self also is unattached (to anything else). [1086]

In verse 1086, Sureśvara has explained what is exemplified (*prastāntika*).

Now is introduced here (in verse 1087) the view of Cārvāka to be followed by a statement and the refutation of it by *praprāṇa* in verses 1088ff.)

युगपत्स्याद्द्वयोर्भोगो जाग्रत्स्वप्नकुलाययोः ।
भूतमात्राविशेषत्वात्ताभ्यामात्मा न चैतृथक् ॥१०८७॥

the individual self were not distinct (from them both), there

would have been simultaneous enjoyment in both the abodes (lit. nests, in the form) of the states of waking and sleep, on account of the non-distinction of all the elements (which formed them). [1087]

This verse is based on the view of the *dehātmanvādin* 'the one who holds the body to be the Ātman'.

In verse 1088 is stated the intention of Bhartṛprapañca in regard to the illustration under reference.

संबन्धं कुर्वते केचिदन्यथैव महाधियः ।
महामत्स्यादिवाक्यस्य स यथोक्तस्तथोच्यते ॥१०८८॥

Some persons of great intellect¹ present (or expound) in another way the relation of the sentence about the big fish²—(now) that is being discussed (lit. talked about) in the way it is presented. [1088]

¹This is reference to Bhartṛprapañca.

²SP points to this relation as that between this sentence about the fish and the one about a woman in BU 4.3.21.

In verses 1088-1103, there is discussion on the view of Bhartṛprapañca in connection with the relevant example in BU.

बाह्यं कर्मास्य बुद्ध्यादिप्रयोगाश्रितमेव हि ।
पुंसः किल ततोऽभ्येत्य भावनाप्नोति देहिनम् ॥१०८९॥
तस्या विवेको व्याख्यातो यथोक्तवचसात्मनः ।
अविद्या त्वात्मविज्ञानसंश्रितैव न सान्यतः ॥१०९०॥

The external/outside activity of this individual self, indeed, is dependent on (or, rooted in) the employment of the intellect etc. (towards some purpose). Having proceeded (*abhyetya*) from that,¹ impression (of the external objects) the one which is embodied gets (attached) to (them). [1089]

The distinction of the individual self is explained by the sentence as stated.² As for (tu) ignorance, it is based on (or, related to) the knowledge on the part of the individual self and (it does) not (proceed) from elsewhere.³ [1090]

¹That is, the employment of the intellect etc. with reference to this. SP appears to quote from Bhartṛprapañca: (yathāhuh) *ya hi puruṣasya bāhyaṃ karma buddhyādiprayogāśritam (iti)*.

²That is, *asaṅgo hy ayam puruṣaḥ* (BU 4.3.15).

³To support this, SP quotes: (*tad uktam*) *tataḥ karmaṇo nāvanā sametyainam āskandati tayoṛ viveko 'saṅgo hītyādinoktaḥ (y arthaḥ)*.

यत्तद्विज्ञानमात्मीयं तद्विकृत्यावतिष्ठते ।

मिथ्याज्ञानग्रहायासावविद्या प्रत्यगात्मनः ॥१०९१॥

What is described as that specific knowledge on the part of the individual self abides in it (only) by affecting (or, modifying) it; it is ignorance on the part of the inner self for its grasping of false knowledge.¹ [1091]

¹Or, for its grasping the knowledge of false (i.e. unreal) object. SP clarifies the argument, citing (*uktam ca*) *tad eva vijñānaṃ kṛtya viparītagrahāya prakalpayati (iti)*. The word *mithyājñāna* seems to paraphrase the word *vijñāna* which is used in these two verses, viz. 1090 and 1091.

अविद्याविषसंदष्टं तज्ज्ञानं परमात्मनः ।

पारंपर्येण बुद्ध्यादौ स्थूलीभावं निगच्छति ॥१०९२॥

That knowledge of the highest self,¹ which is affected by the poison (in the form) of ignorance, attains in the intellect etc. gradually (*pāramparyeṇa*) to grossness.² [1092]

¹This reference to the highest Ātman is to indicate and affirm identity with the individual self.

²That is, there follows the unusual process as the intellect's assuming the form of the objects etc. (*viṣayākārabhavana*).

स्थलीभता बहिः सेयं प्रकाशत्वाय कल्पते ।
एवं बहिरविद्येयं निष्क्रामत्यात्मनः पृथक् ॥१०९३॥

This ignorance, thus known (*sā*), on becoming gross outside, results in this way into the manifestation (of various objects) ¹ and thus proceeds from the individual self, as distinct from it. [1093]

¹SP cites for support: (*uktam hi*) *sa vijñānaviśeṣo buddhi-paramparayā sthūlībhūto bāhyaḥ prakāśo vyavahārāya kalpate (iti)*.

Verses 1094-1100 explain the illustration of the big fish.

स्वप्ने विवेको व्याख्यातः कर्मणोऽस्यात्मनोऽधुना ।
अविद्याप्रविवेकोऽयं वक्ष्यतेऽस्यात उत्तरम् ॥१०९४॥

The distinction of activity from this individual self, in the dream state, is (thus/so far) explained; now hereafter ¹ will be explained (lit. stated) this distinction of this one from ignorance. [1094]

This points to the relation of the example of the fish to the earlier portion of the Śruti.

¹SP states, in connection with this, this comment (of *Bhārtr̥prapañca*): (*yadāhuh*) *ya āsaṅgakṛtaḥ saṁsargas tena viveko vyākhyāto yas tv avidyākṛtaḥ saṁsargas tena viveko vyākhyātavyaḥ (iti)*.

कर्मणा निर्मितं लोकमात्मा पश्यत्यविद्यया ।
तयोर्विवेकादुभयोः स्वाभाव्यं प्रतिपद्यते ॥१०९५॥

The individual sees the world which is created by ignorance (and), by (grasping) the distinction between the two, ¹ it attains

to its natural state.²

[1095]

¹That is, the world around and the world of the dream state.

²That is, the state of liberation. At this point, SP's remark becomes useful: *dvayor vivekāḍ ātmano muktir na karmamātra-vivekāḍ avidyāvivekābhāve tato 'narthodayād ity arthaḥ*.

रूपादिविषयासङ्गः करणैश्चक्षुरादिभिः ।

अनुप्रविश्य भोक्तारं रञ्जयित्वावतिष्ठते ॥१०९६॥

The attachment of the organs, viz. the eye etc., to the objects, such as the form, enters into the enjoyer and, tinting it (thereby), remains (there, in it).

[1096]

This points to the necessity of understanding the distinction of desire from the individual self.

विज्ञानं पौरुषं शुद्धं तेनासङ्गेन दूषितम् ।

तमेवासृत्य निर्गम्य बाह्यतो व्यवतिष्ठते ॥१०९७॥

Specific knowledge which abides in the individual self (only naturally)¹ is pure, but it is rendered impure² by that attachment;³ having followed⁴ (lit. flown) after that and then having proceeded outwards, remains there.

[1097]

¹This refers to the natural state of the self, as the knowing one (*cit*).

²With reference to this, SP quotes the comment (of Bhartṛprapañca?): (*yathāhuḥ*) *āsaṅgas tu viṣayendriyadvāreṇa bahisthaḥ samāgamyātmānam anupraviśati (iti)*.

³This is understood from the preceding verse.

⁴*āsṛtya* is possibly *anusṛtya*; cf. SP. Yet the variant reading, noted in the AnSS edition, viz. *āśṛitya* is not altogether an improbable reading of the original.

आसङ्गाविद्ययोरेवमन्योन्याश्रयतोदिता ।

अभावादनयोरात्मा स्वात्मस्थः संप्रसीदति ॥१०९८॥

Thus is explained the mutual dependence of attachment and ignorance; in the absence of these two, the individual self, remaining in its own (state), is completely joyful. [1098]

प्रसिद्धमेतल्लोकेऽपि यदि रोगादिसंगतिः ।

न भवत्यथ जल्पन्ति स्वस्थोऽयमिति लौकिकाः ॥१०९९॥

It is well-known also among the people (lit. in the world) that, if a person is not affected by (lit. has no connection with) (any) disease etc., the people say, 'This person is in good health (lit. in his own, natural condition)'. [1099]

निरासङ्गस्य विदुषस्तस्मान्मुक्तिं प्रतीमहे ।

स्यादन्यतरवैकल्ये न वेत्येतदनिश्चितम् ॥११००॥

Therefore, we hold (lit. believe) that liberation is (certain) for the knower (or, learned), who is unaffected (to activity etc.). It is not certain if that (viz. liberation) would be, or would not be, (possible) in (the condition of) being without (even) one of them.¹ [1100]

¹These two are *āśaṅga* 'attachment' through *kāma* 'desire' and *karman* 'activity'. There are under reference the verses 1097-1098 which have just preceded. Cf. the phrase in SP: *kāmakarmavivekayor anyatarasyāpy asattvena*

Verses 1101-1104 show the distinction between the individual self (viz. the *Ātman*) and ignorance, as stated in *tad yathā śyenah* ... up to the end of the illustration of the woman (cf. verses 1296 onwards).

तद्यथा श्येन इत्यस्माद्यावत्स्त्रीब्राह्मणादिति ।

अविद्याप्रविवेकार्थमेवमेतावदुच्यते ॥११०१॥

Beginning with (lit. from) the sentence *tad yathā śyenah*¹ ... up to the sentence about a woman,² this much (i.e. all this) is said for discriminating ignorance (from the individual self). [1101]

¹Cf. BU 4.3.19.

²This refers to the prose portion (i.e. Brāhmaṇa) in relation to a woman at BU 4.3.21.

स्वप्नजाग्रत्प्रचारेऽस्मिन्नात्मा श्येनः पतन्निव ।
परिश्रान्तः सुषुप्ताख्यं नीडं धावत्यथात्मनः ॥११०२॥

In this (known, or already described) activity in the dream and/or waking states), the individual self is like a flying falcon; (when) tired, it runs then to its own¹ nest (i.e. abode) called the state of deep sleep. [1102]

¹In *ātmanh* ... *needam*, the word *ātman* is a reflexive pronoun.

कर्माविद्याविनिर्मुक्त एतस्मिन्नेव लक्ष्यते ।
सर्वशोकातिगः स्वस्थः स्तिमितः स्वात्मनि स्थितः ॥११०३॥

It is only in this state that it (viz. the individual self) is seen as completely freed from activity and ignorance; (being) transcendent over all unhappiness (*śoka*),¹ resting in itself, motionless, it has (then) remained in itself.² [1103]

¹SP explains *śoka* as *kāma* (which is really the cause of it).

²In *svātmani*, *ātman* is once again a reflexive pronoun.

इति व्याचक्षते केचिन्महामत्स्यादिकां श्रुतिम् ।
तन्न्याय्यमथवान्याय्यं यत्नान्न्यायैः परीक्ष्यताम् ॥११०४॥

Thus have some (thinkers) explained the Śruti having its beginning in (the example of) the big fish. Whether this is reasonable or unreasonable, let it be duly examined¹ with

good reasons.

[1104]

In Sureśvara's opinion, verses 1101-1103 convey the view of some thinkers (identified by SP under verse 1116 below as Bhartṛprapañca) on the purport of the Śruti passages under reference (as above), viz. it seeks to discriminate ignorance from the individual self. This examination of the view runs up to verse 1115 below.

¹Due examination means, according to SP, an attempt to set aside (i.e. disprove) what Bhartṛprapañca has adduced as reason(s).

In verses 1105-1111, Sureśvara explains the faults in the view stated above.

आत्मवस्त्वतिरेकेण नास्ति वस्त्वन्तरं यदि ।

बाह्यान्तःप्रविभागोऽयं किमाश्रित्य प्रकल्प्यते ॥११०५॥

If there does not exist anything beside the (real) thing, i.e. the Ātman, then (the question is:) 'On what basis is this division into the external and the internal (objects) entertained?' [1105]

This refers to *bāhyaṃ karma* stated in verse 1089 above. The argument in this verse proceeds on the basis of the non-acceptance of anything other than Ātman.

विषयेन्द्रियादि यद्वस्तु नाविद्याव्यतिरेकि तत् ।

वस्त्वन्तरस्य सद्भाव एकात्म्यं बाधते यतः ॥११०६॥

Whatever thing there is, viz. the object(s), the organs etc., it is not distinct from ignorance; since, in (accepting) the existence of these other thing(s), the singleness of the Ātman becomes stultified.

[1106]

Here is rejected the idea of the existence of all the things other than the Ātman.

आसङ्गस्यागतिरतो विषयेन्द्रियवर्त्मना ।
न्यायाभावादयुक्तैव नाप्यविद्या तमानयेत् ॥११०७॥

Therefore, (the notion of) the advent of (any) attachment (to the Ātman) through the (external) objects and organs is only without any reason and, therefore, improper; even ignorance cannot bring (lit. produce) the same. [1107]

This verse has reference to the argument in verse 1089 above. It sets aside two possibilities: Desire affects the Ātman (i) through the external objects, and (ii) through ignorance.

मिथ्याज्ञानमृते नान्यत्कार्यं किञ्चिदपीष्यते ।
अविद्याया यतो नात आसङ्गाद्याहतिः स्वतः ॥११०८॥

Since, there cannot be any activity whatever (performed) without false knowledge (or the knowledge about the false, i.e. unreal, objects being there), on account of ignorance, therefore, there cannot be any bringing about of the attachment by the Ātman, of/on its own. [1108]

The verse states the reason for the argument in the preceding verse.

आत्माविद्याप्रसिद्धयैव ह्यविद्याप्यात्मनो यतः ।
न स्वतः परतो वातो वस्तुतः प्रत्यगात्मनि ॥११०९॥

Since there is (affection) of the Ātman by ignorance only owing to (the coming into existence of) ignorance; there is, in reality, not on the part of the inner self (ignorance), on account of itself or of another. [1109]

This argument relates to an earlier statement *avidyā tv ātmavijñānasaṁśritā* (cf. verse 1090 above).

निःशेषविक्रियावर्गप्रतिषेधश्रुतेस्तथा ।

आत्मज्ञानं विकृत्यास्तेऽविद्येत्येतच्च दुर्भणम् ॥१११०॥

Further (*tathā*), from the Śruti (statement) which denies (the existence of) the entire mass of modifications, (it is clearly) difficult to say that ignorance exists after modifying/affecting the Ātman's (capacity for) knowing. [1110]

This is to refute the argument *tad vijñānam ātmīyam* (cf. verse 1091 above).

प्रत्यक्चिदाभाविद्यातो ह्यविचारितसिद्धिका ।

सिद्धायते प्रतीचीयं प्राक्सम्यग्ज्ञानजन्मनः ॥११११॥

Therefore, this ignorance, which has the light of sentience within (an individual), has its proof which did not require any deliberation about it (and) this (i.e. it) finds itself (lit. gets established) in the inner self before (there is in it) the rise of the proper knowledge. [1111]

Verses 1112-1113 point out the want of thought resulting from ignorance, with the support from the sentence about the falcon.

जाग्रत्स्वप्नविवेकोऽतो वाक्यार्थप्रतिपत्तये ।

वाक्यार्थप्रतिपत्त्यैव प्रत्यग्ज्ञाननिहनुतिः ॥१११२॥

Therefore, the distinction (of the state of deep sleep from the states of waking and dream results in the understanding of the meaning of (the Śruti) sentence. It is only by the understanding of the meaning of (the Śruti) sentence that there occurs removal (lit. concealment) of the ignorance on the part of the inner self. [1112]

This verse pertains to *avidyāpravivekārtham* in verse 1101 above. For elaborate explanation, refer to SP.

जाग्रत्स्वप्नसुषुप्तेषु संचारोऽयं प्रमान्तरात् ।
सिद्धो यस्मादतस्तस्मिन्वाक्यं स्यादनुवादकम् ॥१११३॥

Since this movement (of the individual Ātman) in the (three) states of waking, dream and deep sleep becomes (i.e. is) established (proved) by another knowledge¹ (also), therefore there is, in that respect (*tasmin*), the sentence (of the Śruti) which is (merely) corroborative (or, repetitive). [1113]

¹SP paraphrases *pramāntara* as *pratisaṁdhāna*. The idea seems to be: this Śruti statement acts merely as a reminder of what is already known (viz. experienced).

Verses 1114-1116 point to the Śruti sentence regarding attaining to the Brahman in the state of deep sleep.

क्रमसंचारिणस्तस्य जाग्रत्स्वप्नसुषुप्तिषु ।
ब्रह्मत्वं नान्यतोऽज्ञायि वाक्यं तत्प्रतिपत्तिकृत् ॥१११४॥

The nature of that (individual self), which is successively moving in the states of waking, dream and sleep, is only being the Brahman—this does not become (i.e. is not) known from elsewhere; therefore, the sentence (of the Śruti) causes the understanding about it. [1114]

This is to state that what is called a Mahāvākya is not merely repetitive—it actually causes (i.e. leads to) understanding of the nature of the inner self as the Brahman. This is reasserted in the next verse.

आत्मनो ब्रह्मता साक्षाद्ब्रह्मणोऽप्यात्मता स्वतः ।
तत्त्वमस्यादिवाक्यस्य विषयोऽयमिहोदितः ॥१११५॥

That the individual self is the Brahman is directly perceptible. Also, that the Brahman is the individual/inner Ātman is, in its own right, (experienced/realised). (Thus) is stated here (in

this sentence of the Śruti) the subject-matter of the sentence
tat tvam asi. [1115]

This brings to an end Sureśvara's examination of the view of Bhartṛprapañca expressed in verses 1101 to 1103.

Read SP (for further clarification): *pratyakṣāder nirviśeṣe brahmātmaikye 'pravṛtter vākyaikagamyah tad ity arthah.*

महामत्स्याख्यदृष्टान्तः स्वप्नजाग्रदवस्थयोः ।

व्याख्यातोऽप्यन्यथा त्वन्ये दृष्टान्तं व्याचक्षिरे ॥१११६॥

Though the example (described as that) of a big fish for (explaining) the two states of waking and dream is (thus) explained, the others¹ have explained the example in another way. [1116]

It seems that SP considers that the above explanation has followed the lead of BUB.

¹This is once again to refer to the thinkers whose view was stated in verses 1101 to 1103 and examined in verses 1104-1115; SP identifies these thinkers as Bhartṛprapañca.

Now, in verses 1117-1127, Sureśvara puts forth his thoughts about another way of looking at that view—other than what is presented above.

विज्ञानं प्रस्तुतं तस्मिन्संदेहो नः प्रजायते ।

किमेतद्वैतिकं ज्ञानं भूतेभ्योऽन्यस्य चात्मनः ॥१११७॥

What is taken up (for discussion) is the (specific) knowledge (on the part of the inner self): 'In that respect, there arises, (in) our (opinion), a doubt. Is this the knowledge pertaining to the elements or does it pertain to the Ātman which is other than the elements?' [1117]

विज्ञानं भौतिकं तावद्धृतसंसर्गजन्मतः ।

यथैव बाह्यनयनप्रकाशार्थाभिसंगतेः ॥१११८॥

विषयज्ञानजन्मैवमात्मनो भूतसंगतेः ।

बुद्धीन्द्रियादिसंसर्गादभिव्यक्तिः समीक्ष्यते ॥१११९॥

संविज्ज्ञानविशेषस्य तथा सति न किं चन ।

व्यतिरिक्तस्य विज्ञातुर्विज्ञानेऽस्ति प्रयोजनम् ॥११२०॥

As for (*tāvat*) the individual self's (specific) knowledge, it occurs on account of its origin¹ from (its) contact with the elements, just in the same way (i.e. sight of things occurs) from the close contact of the external objects with the eye and light. [1118]

Similarly, the rise of the (specific) knowledge of the (external) objects, on the part of the (individual) Ātman, is owing to its association with the elements and the manifestation (of the same) and is perceived through the contact of the intellect, organs etc. [1119]

That being so, there is not a bit of the specific (or, matchless) knowledge of/by the knowing one² (the Ātman). And, there is a purpose (served) for a specific knower (i.e. the individual self) which is there in that specific knowledge. [1120]

In connection with the verses 1117, 1118, 1119 and 1120 only up to *saṁvijñānaviśeṣasya*, SP quotes the following: (*uktaṁ hi*) *athaiva bāhyacakṣuṣaḥ prakāśārthayoḥ saṁsargād viśeṣaprakāś-
nābhiv্যक्तिर एवम बुद्धीन्द्रियासंसर्गाद उपलब्धिविज्ञाना-
भिव्यक्तिः (iti).*

¹Translation adopts an emendation in the first line: *-janmataḥ* read for *-janmanaḥ*, a variant reading noted in the AnSS edition. This emendation is justified by the words *-arthā-
hisamgateḥ* (in 1118) and *bhūtasamgateḥ* (in 1119), both indicating the source, which occur in the next two lines.

²*saṁvid* is understood as connected with *jñānaviśeṣa* by the genitive case of it. It stands here for the individual self which is taken to accept sensations of the external objects. This is supported by the use of *saṁvid* in verse 1123 below.

इत्येवं चोदिते कैश्चिदत्र प्रतिविधीयते ।
 व्यतिरिक्तो न चेज्ज्ञाता भूतेभ्योऽभ्युपगम्यते ॥११२१॥
 तुल्यत्वाद्भूतमात्राणां स्वप्नजाग्रदवस्थयोः ।
 विज्ञानजन्म युगपत्तदा प्राप्नोति ते ध्रुवम् ॥११२२॥

Here, i.e. in respect of such an objecting statement of others, there is (the following) said in reply. If it is accepted that the knowing one is not distinct from the elements¹ — [1121] then, there will be for you (a contingent acceptance of) the simultaneous rise of (the specific) knowledge (of all kinds), since the positions of (all) the elements would be owing to their equality, their presence (i.e. operative) in the states of waking and dream. [1122]

SP adduces, in connection with the second line of verse 1121 and verse 1122, the support (of evidently the comment of Bhartṛprapañca) thus: (*yathāhuḥ*) *yadi vyatirikto vijñātā na syāt tena svapnakāle bhautikasyaiva jyotiṣo 'viśeṣārambhe sati svapnabuddhāntayor bhūtamātrāṇām aviśeṣeṇa vidyamānatvād yaugapadyenobhaya tropalabdhiḥ syāt (iti).*

¹The objecting argument comes from the *dehātmanavādin* 'the believer in the theory that the body is the self'.

From this verse up to verse 1130, there appear to be stated various views, to be refuted by the Vedāntin (or Sureśvara) later.

क्रमवृत्तेस्तु बोधस्य न बोधो भौतिकस्ततः ।
 अन्यस्यैव हि संवित्स्यात्स्वप्नबुद्धान्तनीडतः ॥११२३॥
 इत्यस्यार्थस्य विज्ञप्त्यै दृष्टान्तौऽत्राभिधीयते ।
 क्रमेण संचरन्नद्यां महामत्स्यो यथा बली ॥११२४॥

But, since there is (specific) knowledge (in the two states) occurring in succession, the knowledge is not, therefore, produced by/from the elements. Indeed¹ (specific) knowledge would occur from the (two) nests of dream and waking states,

for one other (than the body/elements). [1123]

(And) for conveying this meaning there is stated (by the Śruti) here the example (of the big fish), viz. 'As a big fish of great strength² moving in a river, in succession ...'.³ [1124]

¹On the word *hi* 'indeed', SP states: it is indicative of Bhartṛprapañca's comment: *yathoktabhartṛprapañcabhāṣyadyotī hiśabdah*.

²SP justifies the use of *balī* thus: *nādeyaśrotasā kampyātārāhityam balīyastvam*.

³SP states: *sañcaran vartata iti śeṣah*.

मत्स्याभिसंगतिर्यद्वत्पर्यायेणेह कुलयोः ।

क्रमेण ज्ञातृसंबन्धस्तद्वत्स्वप्नप्रबोधयोः ॥११२५॥

As there is connection of the two banks (of a river) here¹ with a fish, in succession, so there is the connection of the (specific) knower with the two (states of) dream and waking. [1125]

¹SP points to *iha* as having the sense of the river; *nadī saptamyarthah*.

व्यापित्वादात्मनोऽप्येवं युगपज्ज्ञातृतेति चेत् ।

भूतमात्रावदित्येवं समानं चोद्यमावयोः ॥११२६॥

(An argument against the Vedāntin:) 'If, owing to the pervasiveness of the Ātman, there will be simultaneously its nature of being the knower (of all experiences in the different states) as in the portions of (all) the elements, then the objections of both of us would be the same.¹ [1126]

¹*samāna* has the sense of *eka*.

कस्तर्हि क्रमहेतुः स्याद्देवताहेतुकोऽस्तु सः ।

क्रमेण वृत्तिस्तासां स्यादधिष्ठातृत्वकारणात् ॥११२७॥

(Yet another argument in objection:) (The question would be:) 'What then could be the cause of the succession?' (The answer would be:) 'Let it be that (the succession) has a cause in the (difference among) deities and their functions would be in succession, on account of their being the superintendents (of various organs)'.¹ [1127]

¹In connection with this SP quotes: (*tadāhuḥ*) *tāsāṃ cādhiṣṭhātrīṇāṃ paryāyeṇa vṛttir utpadyate (iti)*.

Verses 1128-1131 refer to the contingent simultaneity of the specific knowledge in the waking and dream states.

अत्रापि युगपज्ज्ञानमुक्तयोः पक्षयोर्यथा ।
व्यापित्वाद्देवतानां स्यात्स्वप्नजाग्रदवस्थयोः ॥११२८॥

(The answer:) 'Even here, there would be simultaneous rise of the (specific) knowledge (of the individual self), on account of the pervasion by the deities in both the states of dream and waking, as in the two views (already) stated'. [1128]

असंभवात्प्रयत्नस्य युगपद्देवतात्मनः ।
नातः स्याद्युगपज्ज्ञानमिति चेन्न तथापि तत् ॥११२९॥

(If it is said) 'There would not be (simultaneous rise of) the (specific) knowledge (on the part of the individual self), because of the impossibility (of simultaneous) efforts¹ of those,² which are of the nature of deities', (then the answer is:) 'No, that will not be (so), (for) even in that case (*tathāpi*), that (does rise simultaneously)'.³ [1129]

¹We understood *prayatna* in singular to stand for *prayatnas* in plural, because there are several deities of the organs involved in their various activities. It is, nevertheless, possible that Sureśvara has used the singular to indicate the simultaneity in

ose various efforts.

²*devatātmanah* is also in singular, though it is necessary to understand it as in plural, in view of the mention *devatānām* just the preceding verse. Possibly, Sureśvara has used the word *devatātman* in the place of *devatā*; the reason for that is not clear! The translation here tried to put it as those having the nature of a deity—only with a view to securing literal translation.

³The argument seems to be: the effort of an individual is not caused principally by each one of the deities of organs. It is the *dharma/adharma* acquired by the individual which is principally the cause of the individual's (specific) knowledge. This will be clarified in verses 1134 and 1135 below.

प्राहात्मपक्षवाद्यत्र सिद्धं नो यत्समीहितम् ।
कुतस्तदिति चेन्मतः शृणु सर्वं यथोच्यते ॥११३०॥

(The objector persisted:) 'The person, who holds the theory of the Ātman (as the ultimate and non-attached), has said, 'What we have stated (lit. wished) is proven (or, established)'. (Now I ask), 'How (does it become proven)?'. (The answer of the Vedāntin:) 'If (you say this, then) listen (as to) how that is so.' It is (now) being explained (lit. said). [1130]

सर्वत्र यौगपद्यं स्याद्विभुत्वाद्देवतात्मनः ।
ऐश्वर्याच्च प्रयत्नोत्थकार्येष्वस्यात्मनो न तु ॥११३१॥

There would be simultaneity everywhere in respect of the effects which arise from the efforts of (those) deities, on account of their pervasion by the Lordship.¹ But (this is) not (so, in the case) of the Ātman. [1131]

¹This points to how the effects of *dharma/adharma* cannot be uncontrolled as those of the deities' doings which are not determined (or, controlled) by any force outside themselves. Also, the individual self is not all-pervasive and entirely free or unbound

like the deities. SP supports this argument by some citation: (*uktaṃ hi*) *devatāyā vibhutvāt prayatnakāryeṣu yaugapadyaṃ na tu vijñātmanah* (iti).

Verses 1132-1135 state the reason for *devatānadhiṣṭhāna*.

अधिष्ठेयेन्द्रियाणां हि स्वप्नभूमावसंभवात् ।
व्यापारो नास्त्यतः स्वप्ने देवतानां मनागपि ॥११३२॥

Indeed, since, in the dream state, there is no possibility (of the functioning) of organs, which are to be superintended over (by their deities), therefore,¹ there is not even a little of the effort of the deities (possible). [1132]

¹Cf. SP: *adhiṣṭheyam antareṇādhiṣṭhātrtvāyogo 'taḥśabdārthaḥ*.

अतो भोक्ता स्वयंसिद्धो यथोक्तेनैव हेतुना ।
प्रयत्नायौगपद्येन स्वप्नजाग्रद्द्वयाद्विरुक् ॥११३३॥

Therefore, the enjoyer is (the individual self) which exists in its own right and which is apart (lit. far) from the two states of waking and dream, only for the reason which is stated (so far), viz. on account of the efforts (of the deities) not being simultaneous. [1133]

SP appears to quote from the comment of Bhartṛprapañca (cf. note on verse 1116 above) thus: (*yathāhuh*) *anena bhoktrtvaprayuktatvena hetunā prayatnāyugapadyena vyatiriktadraṣṭṛgrahanaśiddhiḥ* (iti).

आत्मनो भोक्तृतासिद्धिर्ज्ञातृत्वं च प्रसिध्यति ।
व्यापित्वेऽप्यस्य यत्नो य आत्मनः कर्तृतां प्रति ॥११३४॥
न संभवत्यसौ यत्नो यौगपद्येन नीडयोः ।
दृष्टत्वात्परिपाट्या स्यात्तस्माद्धृत्तिरिति स्थितम् ॥११३५॥

The nature of the Ātman's being the enjoyer has to be effected;

so also) its nature of being the knower will have to be effected. Whatever be the effort of this (Ātman)¹ towards being the agent of activity—even though it is a pervader— [1134]

It is not possible to be of the occurrence of the two nests simultaneously is not possible; owing to their occurring (lit. being seen) in succession; therefore, the existence (of the Ātman as the enjoyer has to be) in succession. [1135]

P clarifies the thought in the verse by citing (*yathoktam*) *ya hi svapnāntabuddhāntayor vyāpitve 'pi yo 'asau draṣṭṛtvena trtvam prati yatno na sa yaugapadyena sambhavati tasmāt tasya yāyena draṣṭṛtve pravṛttir ity avasthitam (iti).*

Verses 1136-1137 state: it follows from the preceding verses that Ātman is distinct from the body.

अयौगपद्यदर्शित्वमात्मास्तितत्वेऽनुमेष्यते ।

तथा तद्व्यतिरिक्तत्वे जाग्रत्स्वप्नकुलायतः ॥११३६॥

The nature of being the seer of the non-simultaneous occurrence of the two states of waking and dream) is accepted as a proof of the Ātman's existence, and so also of its being apart from (i.e. being unaffected by) the nests in the form of the waking and dream states. [1136]

As was said earlier, in verse 1126 above, that the *dehātmavādin* the Vedāntin have a common ground for proving their ideas; this is answered away in this verse. In the case of the Ātman accepted by the Vedāntin, it is *kramadraṣṭṛ*— such is not, cannot be, the position of the *dehātmavādin*.

P supports, citing (*tad uktam*) *upalabdhyayaugapadyam āstitve lingam (iti)*. This seems to be in conformity with the line of verse 1134 above.

न च स्वप्नविनिर्माणे देवताव्यापृतिर्भवेत् ।

यथास्वं स्थानमायान्ति ता मृतिस्वापयोर्यतः ॥११३७॥

Also, there would not be (i.e. is not) any activity (or, functioning) by deities in respect of the occurrence (lit. creation) of the dream state, since they go back to their own places (i.e. whence they have come) at the time of death and of dream. [1137]

The first line is the reaffirmation of the reason which is stated in verse 1132 above—and that reason is further supported by yet another, in the second line.

SP seems to quote from the comment of Bhartṛprapañca thus: (yathāhuḥ) *na hi devatānām svapnakāle svavyāpāras tā ucchakramiṣor lokāntaram prati viśeṣakāryāny ādhyātmikāni hitvā svāni sthānāni pratipadyante 'agnim vāg apyeti' ityādiśrutes tathā pratipitsor devatā apakrāntā bhavati (iti).*

In verses 1138-1144, there is stated a prima facie view regarding the creation of the world of the dream state by repeated activity of deities and also a refutation of it.

मतं यथा मृतौ देवास्त्यक्त्वा स्वं स्वमनुग्रहम् ।
 देहारम्भे पुनर्देवा यथास्वं कुर्वते क्रियाम् ॥११३८॥
 तद्वत्सुषुप्सोरुत्क्रम्य देवताः स्वाधिकारतः ।
 स्वप्नसर्गे पुनस्ताः स्वमधिकारं प्रकुर्वते ॥११३९॥

(The objector's doubt:) 'We have held that as the deities, each one of them abandons its own favoured (organ of the body) at the time of (a person's) death and again at the beginning of a (new) body (coming into existence), each commences (or, begins to perform) the function (which had been) its own (before), [1138]

in the same way, the deities, after leaving (lit. going out from the body of) one, who was asleep,¹ from their own spheres of activity, (begin) to perform (the activity) of their own spheres, once again, when there occurs (lit. is created) a dream'. [1139]

¹Sureśvara's use of *suṣupsu* is to be understood as *supta*.

इत्येवं चोदितेऽथात्र परिहारोऽभिधीयते ।

लिङ्गकार्यानिभिव्यक्तेर्नालं कार्याय देवताः ॥११४०॥

When such an objection is raised, there is (now) stated an answer for explaining it away (or, in refutation of it). 'It is to be understood that) the deities are not able to (or, are held to be unable to) perform their own functions,¹ since there has not been (or, is not) any manifestation of functions in the subtle form of the body (*linga-[deha]*)'. [1140]

SP justifies this thought by quoting: (*yathoktam*) *na hi devatā adācil liṅgaṃ jahāti, sā tv anabhivyakte liṅge nālaṃ viśeṣa-kāryāya (iti)*.

¹The singular form indicates plurality (of functions)— *jātāv avacanam*. This is in view of *devatāḥ* a plural form.

कारणान्यसमर्थानि यथा देहमृते मृतौ ।

स्वकार्यस्याभिनिष्पत्तौ तथा स्वप्नेऽपि देवताः ॥११४१॥

करणान्यनपाश्रित्य नालं स्वाधिकृतिं प्रति ।

स्वप्ने च करणाभावः श्रुत्यैव प्रतिपादितः ॥११४२॥

As, after death, causes (*kāraṇāni* which should be taken as *kāraṇāni* 'organs') cannot (lit. are not able to) bring about their effects, without (resting in) the body, so also are the deities unable while (a person is) in dream, [1141] without resorting to the organs (of the body), for (performing) their own functions. (And) the Śruti itself has declared the absence of the organs in the dream state.¹ [1142]

¹Cf. *prāṇaṃ tarhi vāg apyeti*, cp. CU 4.3.3.

यत एवमतः स्वप्ने नाशङ्का देवताः प्रति ।

अधिकारो यतस्तासामात्मनो देहसंगतौ ॥११४३॥

Since this is so, therefore, there cannot be (or, is not) any idea of (or, doubt if there are any) deities in the dream state, inasmuch as they can perform (or, have the ability to perform) their functions, only when the Ātman (i.e. the inner sentience) and the body are in contact (or, connection) with each other.

[1143]

मुक्तवैव देहसंबन्धं स्वप्नोऽयं प्रत्यगात्मनः ।
बहिष्कुलायवचनादेतच्चाध्यवसीयते ॥११४४॥

Only after it has left the contact with the body, there can be for the inner self this (state of) dream and that is concluded from the statement (in the Śruti) about (its being) outside the nest.¹

[1144]

This verse concludes Sureśvara's examination of another Vedāntin's (i.e. Bhartṛprapañca's) view.

¹Cf. BU 4.3.12.

Verses 1145-1146 state the opinion of Sureśvara himself.

नातो भौतिकमेतत्स्यान्नापि स्याद्देवताकृतम् ।
चैतन्यं स्वप्नगं स्वार्थं शरीरद्वयवर्जनात् ॥११४५॥

Therefore, in the dream state, this sentience (within the body) is not made of the elements; nor also is it made by deities; it exists, for its own sake, by avoiding (or, lit. giving up) the two bodies.¹

[1145]

¹These are the gross and the subtle bodies.

निरनुग्रहं निष्करणं वासनोपाधिमात्रकम् ।
स्वप्नदर्शनमेतत्स्यात्प्रत्यग्धीवस्तुसंश्रयम् ॥११४६॥

This sight of a dream is ¹ (then) without any favour (of the

deities), who are with (lit. without) any organs (of activity), and has only impression(s) (of the external objects) as its delimiting adjuncts, having a resort (i.e. basis) merely in the inner consciousness.² [1146]

SP supports the argument in the verse, citing (*uktam hi*) *ubhayor kālayor vyatirekād vyatirikto draṣṭā na bhautikaṃ darśanam nāpi devatākṛtam (iti)*.

¹This is for *syāt* which means *asti*.

²Sureśvara uses the word *pratyagdhī* which literally means 'the intellect within'; and it is to be understood as *pratyakcidrūpā dhī*.

Verses 1147-1152 state the view of *Bhartṛprapañca*: it is proper to hold *dehātmatvavyapoha*.

पृथक्त्वे वापृथक्त्वे वा भूतेभ्यो देवतात्मनः ।
किमर्थं देवताशङ्का क्रियते हिरुगात्मनः ॥११४७॥

'Be there the distinction or non-distinction of deities from the elements, why is there entertained a doubt that deities are apart (or far) from the individual self?' [1147]

Earlier, there was stated *Bhartṛprapañca*'s explanation of the example of a big fish, from verse 1116 onwards. And, taking the cue from *Bhartṛprapañca*'s explanation, Sureśvara refuted the argument of the *dehātmatvādin*s respectfully with a few details. In this verse are pointed out the shortcomings in the argument of *Bhartṛprapañca*. For elaborate details, SP should be consulted.

मत्स्यदृष्टान्तवचस एतावत्फलमिष्यते ।
मृत्युरूपमिदं सर्वं कार्यं च करणानि च ॥११४८॥

This much is accepted (lit. desired) to be the purpose served by stating the example of a big fish; viz. all activity and its means are (but) forms of death. [1148]

SP brings out the thought of this verse succinctly thus: *kāma-karmasahitaḥ saṅghāto mṛtyurūpo nātmadharma ity arthaḥ*.

ताभ्यां विलक्षणस्त्वात्मा स्वप्ने योऽयं प्रपञ्चितः ।
स्थूलसूक्ष्मशरीराभ्यां केवलश्चेतनोऽक्रियः ॥११४९॥

And (*tu*) this (individual) Ātman, which has been (so) extensively discussed in the dream state, is different from the gross and the subtle bodies; (it is) alone (and aloof/apart from),¹ sentient, and without any activity. [1149]

¹That is, non-attached to them.

तथैव कामकर्मभ्यामत्यन्तं स्याद्विलक्षणः ।
प्रयोजकाभ्यां देहस्य तथैव करणस्य च ॥११५०॥

In the same way, it is (lit. should be taken as) extremely (or, in extreme) distinct from desire and activity, also from those two, which cause (or, produce) the (movement etc.) of the body and its organs.¹ [1150]

¹These are the gross and the subtle bodies.

अविद्याकृतमेवातः संसारित्वं न तु स्वतः ।
अतोऽविद्यासमुच्छ्रितौ मुक्तिः स्यात्परमात्मनः ॥११५१॥

Therefore, the transmigratory nature is (for the Ātman) caused by ignorance and not on account of its own; and there would be liberation for it when (there has occurred) the removal (lit. destruction) of ignorance. [1151]

इत्यवतः पूर्ववाक्येन समदायार्थ ईदृशः ।
पौर्वापर्यं समीक्ष्यात्मा निष्क्रियः केवलोऽद्वयः ॥११५२॥

Thus is explained the total meaning (or, thought) by the earlier

statement.¹ Having then considered (*samīkṣya*, the relation of) the earlier and the later (portions, one comes to understand that) the Ātman is non-active, aloof (from every other thing)² and without duality.³ [1152]

¹The earlier sentence is *sa vā ayam puruṣo jāyamānaḥ* ... (BU 4.3.8) and the later, *tad yathā mahāmatsyaḥ* ... (BU 4.3.18).

²Cf. verse 1149 above.

³SP clarifies this thus: *pūrvatra vyākhyātavākyānām pūrvā-paribhāvam ālokya karmaṇā kāmēna dehadvayena ca viviktaḥ pratyagdhātur nityaśuddhatvādirūpo 'dhigata ity arthaḥ*.

Verses 1153-1155 introduce BU 4.3.19.

अपास्तकार्यकरणकर्मासङ्गो न तु क्वचित् ।
आत्मोपपादितः साक्षाद्वचस्येकत्र यत्नतः ॥११५३॥

Yet, nowhere has the Ātman been described directly in one sentence and with due care as one who has cast off all attachment to effects, their means and activity. [1153]

SP points out: *niḥśeṣaviśeṣaśūnye pratīci drṣṭāntopanyāso yat-*

सासङ्गश्च समृत्युश्च सकार्यकरणस्तथा ।
अविद्यया यतो बोध आत्मायमुपलक्ष्यते ॥११५४॥

Since this (individual) self is noticed to be having attachment (to objects),¹ death and also (some) activities and the means (to perform the same),² on account of (its having specific) knowledge through/by ignorance. [1154]

This states the reason for the Śruti's doing, which is mentioned in the preceding verse. The individual self's state of waking is under reference.

¹That is, in the description of the waking state.

²For a similar use of *kāryakāraṇa*, cf BUBV 4.4.150. Or, alternatively: with the effects to be accomplished and the means for accomplishing the same.

स्वप्ने तु वासनाकामसंयुक्तो मृत्युवर्जितः ।
संप्रसादे प्रसन्नश्च तथासङ्गोऽपि वीक्ष्यते ॥११५५॥

As for (that self) in the dream state, it is connected with impression(s) (of the external object(s)) and desire(s), free from death. So also, it is noticed in the state of deep sleep to be completely happy/joyful and non-attached (to anything else). [1155]

In verses 1156-1164, there is stated in general the meaning of the Śruti sentence about a Śyena.

तद्वा अस्यैतदित्यत्र यथोक्तं रूपमात्मनः ।
वक्ष्यमाणमतस्तस्य दृष्टान्तोऽयमिहोच्यते ॥११५६॥

The nature of the individual self which is stated (in the preceding portion of BU), is to be (lit. is being) stated in (the sentence) *tad vā asyaitad* ..., ¹ therefore is here stated the example.² [1156]

¹Cf. BU 4.3.21: *tad vā asyaitad aticchandā apahatapāp-mābhayaṃ rūpam*.

²The example of Śyena in BU 4.3.19.

स्वतो बुद्धं च शुद्धं च मुक्तं रूपमिहात्मनः ।
एकवाक्योपसंहारै न पुञ्जीकृत्य दर्शितम् ॥११५७॥

Here, the nature of the individual self (which has really) awakened (i.e. is possessed of knowledge) on its own, pure, and free (from all connection with other objects etc.), is not presented (lit. shown) after putting (the whole of) it in just one sentence as summary.¹ [1157]

¹SP paraphrases it thus: *nādhastāt piṇḍīkrtyoktam iti yāvat*.

तद्यथा श्येन इत्युक्त्या तद्दृष्टान्तप्रदर्शनात् ।
शुद्धबुद्धादिकं रूपमात्मनः संप्रदर्श्यते ॥११५८॥

By/in the statement *tad yathā śyenaḥ* ... there is presented (lit. shown) an example of/for it and thereby is revealed the nature (lit. form) of the individual self (as) pure, awakened etc.¹ [1158]

¹That which is stated in the preceding verse.

स्वप्नबुद्धान्तयोर्वेह दृष्टान्तः संप्रदर्शितः ।
संप्रसादस्य दृष्टान्तः श्येनेनाथाधुनोच्यते ॥११५९॥

Or, (it may be taken that) there is already given an example (to clarify the nature of the individual self) in relation to the states of dream and waking. (And) now is stated in/by the sentence about Śyena the example in relation to the state of deep sleep. [1159]

This is in keeping with the explanation in BUB.

श्येनः शशादो विज्ञेयो बृहत्कायश्च रोहितः ।
क्षिप्रः श्येनः सुपर्णस्तु बलवानल्पविग्रहः ॥११६०॥

A Śyena is to be known as the cater of rabbits, one possessed of a big body (or shape) and red (in colour), but/and (*tu*) a Suparna is a quicker Śyena, full of strength and (yet) of small size. [1160]

This verse explains away a possible doubt about repetition in the use (or, mention) of the words *śyena* and *suparna*.

श्येनः श्रान्तो यथाकाशे भक्ष्यहेतोः परिभ्रमन् ।

पक्षौ वितत्य नीडं स्वमेति हि श्रमहानये ॥११६१॥

यथा तथायमप्यात्मा जाग्रत्स्वप्नौ परिभ्रमन् ।

श्रान्तस्तच्छ्रमहानार्थं ब्रह्मनीडं प्रपद्यते ॥११६२॥

As when a Śyena, (while) hovering about in the sky for securing some prey, spreads its wings and flies unto its nest for overcoming (lit. driving away) its fatigue, [1161]

so also, in a similar way, this individual self performing activities in (lit. moving about) the states of waking and dream, takes to the nest¹ (in the form) of the Brahman, for overcoming (lit. driving away) its fatigue. [1162]

¹This is the meaning of *antāya dhāvati* in BU, cf. the next verse.

अन्ताय धावतीत्युक्तं तस्यान्तस्य विशेषणम् ।

यत्र सुप्तो न कर्मति जाग्रत्स्वप्ननिषेधकृत् ॥११६३॥

(The meaning of) *antāya dhāvati* is stated (in the preceding verse). Now, there is a specification (lit. qualification) of that nest (*anta*) in *yatra supto na kam ...*;¹ it (is for) rejecting (the idea of the states of) waking and dream. [1163]

¹That is, *yatra supto na kam cana kāmam kāmāyate na kam cana svapnam paśyati* (BU 4.3.19).

सुप्तस्तिषृष्ववस्थासु सामान्येन यतस्ततः ।

विशिनष्ट्यात्मनः स्वापं यत्र सुप्तगिरा स्फुटम् ॥११६४॥

Since, in (all) the three states, it is sleeping, (remaining the same individual self) in common;¹ therefore, (the Śruti) clearly specifies the sleep of the individual self in the word *yatra supta*² [1164]

¹This has a reference to Sureśvara's statement in verses 1054-1059 above about the threefold character of each of the

three states, wherein the deep sleep state is common.

²Cf. *yatra supto na kaṁ cana kāmam kāmāyate na kaṁ cana svapnam paśyati* (BU 4.3.19).

In verses 1165-1166 is stated the purpose of other specifications (of the inner self) in the sentence, *na kaṁ cana*.

न कंचनेति कामो यः स्वप्नजाग्रदवस्थयोः ।

निषिध्यते सुषुप्तेऽसौ तथा स्वप्नोऽपि यस्तयोः ॥११६५॥

By the use of the words *na kaṁ cana* is rejected whatever desire there is in the states of waking and dream, as existing in the deep sleep state; so also (is rejected) the dream state in the two.¹

[1165]

¹This points to the significant use of *na kaṁ cana svapnam* in the sentence cited above under note 2 on the preceding verse.

स्वप्ने वा कामविरहाद्यथोक्तेनैव वर्त्मना ।

जाग्रत्कामनिषेधोऽतस्तत्र कामादिसंभवात् ॥११६६॥

Or, because of the absence of desire in the dream state, in the way stated,¹ there is rejection of desire in the waking state (also), for there is possible (the existence) of) desire etc. (in that state).²

[1166]

This is an interpretation of *na kaṁ cana kāmam kāmāyate*.

¹This refers to the statement *asaṅgo hy ayam puruṣaḥ* in BU 3.16.

²SP clarifies the last part of the verse *tatra kāmādisambhavāt* thus: *sati mātari bādhavidhuro jāgrati kāmādiḥ* (svapne tu naivam y arthaḥ).

Verse 1167 points to the significant use of each of the specifications in every threefold state.

एकैकस्यामवस्थायां जाग्रत्स्वप्नसुषप्तिभिः ।
यदि वा विद्यते भेदः कंचनेति च लिङ्गतः ॥११६७॥

And, if there is any distinction of desire in each one of the (three) states, owing to (the threefold character of each of) the states of waking, dream and deep sleep, that (in the dream state is rejected in the words) *na kaṁ cana*,¹ which is (expressive of) the reason. [1167]

This also is yet another explanation of *na kaṁ cana svapnam paśyati*.

¹These words, followed by *svapnam*, become the *liṅga* (= *hetu*) 'reason' for the statement enunciated.

In verses 1168-1171, there are stated the Śruti supports for the thought in the preceding verse.

त्रय आवसथा इति तथा च श्रुतिशासनम् ।
जाग्रत्स्वप्नसुषुप्तानां त्रैविध्यप्रतिपादकम् ॥११६८॥

So also, there is a teaching of the Śruti (in the words) 'There are three abodes,'¹ which affirm the threefold character of each of the (three) states of waking, dream and deep sleep. [1168]

¹The full sentence is *tasya traya āvasathās trayah svapnā ayam āvasatho 'yam āvasatho 'yam āvasatha iti* (Aitareyopaniṣad 1.3.12).

तत्र त्रयाणां स्थानानां जाग्रत्स्वप्ननिषेधनम् ।
न कंचनेति वाक्येन तयोरेव ग्रहः श्रुतेः ॥११६९॥

With respect to that (*tatra*), there is rejection of (only two of them, viz.) the states of waking and dream, in/by the statement *na kaṁ cana ...*; '(because) there is mention (i.e. use— *graha*) made of only (those) two.'¹ [1169]

¹This is to refer to the actual mention of *jāgrat* and *svapna*.

स्वप्नं न कंचनेत्युक्त्या सर्वस्वप्ननिषेधनम् ।
इति प्रबोधस्वप्नाभ्यां विविक्तं स्थानमुच्यते ॥११७०॥

In/By the statement *svapnam na kaṇ cana*,¹ there is rejection of all (the three types of) the dream states²—thus, there is pointed out the (character) of the deep sleep state as distinct from the waking and dream states.³ [1170]

¹For metre's sake, Sureśvara has altered the order in the actual wording of the Śruti.

²These pertain to each dream state in all the three states, as postulated by Sureśvara under the lead of *Aitareyopaniṣad*.

³In connection with the waking state, SP specifically points out: *kāmaṇ na kaṇ canety uktyā sarvajāgranniṣedhanam ity api praṣṭavyam*. (SP also has altered the order in the actual wording of the Śruti.)

जाग्रत्स्वप्नात्मकौ पक्षौ वितत्यात्मात्ममोहवान् ।
भुक्त्वा भोगानथ श्रान्तः पक्षौ संहृत्य चात्मनि ॥११७१॥

Having spread out the two wings in the form of the waking and the dream (states), the individual self, having association with (lit. being possessed of) ignorance about its own nature, the tired one (returns to 80 the natural state of the Ātman), after having experienced (lit. enjoyed) the enjoyments, folding its wings within. [1171]

This explains the meaning of *antāya dhāvati*.

verses 1172-1184 bring out the significance of the words *saṁhatya pakṣau*.

अविद्यायामवस्थानं तदुद्धृतस्य वस्तुनः ।
संहृत्यपक्षोपमया श्रुत्येह प्रतिपाद्यते ॥११७२॥

By/In the simile expressed in the words *saṁhatya pakṣau*, the Śruti conveys here,¹ the dwelling² in ignorance of the (real) thing (i.e. the inner self) that has arisen from it. [1172]

SP puts this as: *sābhāsāyām avidyāyām jagato 'vasthānam ity arthah.*

¹That is, in respect of ignorance (*avidyā*).

²Or, abode, i.e. final resort.

संलयायेति यच्छुद्धं रूपं स्यात्प्रत्यगात्मनः ।
प्रत्यविचदाभ आगत्य ध्रियते प्रत्यगात्मने ॥११७३॥

In the word *saṁlayāya* (is conveyed or indicated) the pure form which is (lit. would be) of (i.e. belonging to) the inner self. The (inner self), having the semblance of the inner sentience, having approached towards that the inner self, is supported (by itself or by the Ātman absolute). [1173]

This verse explains the meaning conveyed by *saṁlaya*. It does not state the expressed sense of the word, but it points to what is exemplified, viz. the final abode of the individual self. It should be noted that Sureśvara's verse also, is like the one in BU itself, awkwardly expressed. BU refers to the bird's flight towards its nest thus: *viparipatya ... saṁhatya pakṣau saṁlayāya* which would expect the verb *upagacchati*— all the verbal forms being connected with the bird as the agent of the actions conveyed by each of them. Then comes the verbal form *dhriyate* in the passive and expects another agent offering the support, put in the instrumental case. Therefore, SP adds *āgatyā ātmānam dhārayati*, changing the passive form in the sense of the active—so is this done in BUB also. Hume's translation reads: 'As a falcon ... is borne down to its nest...' (*śyenah ... saṁlayāya dhriyate*); Röer also translates '... is drawn to his nest,' with a footnote to it 'of its own accord'. there is thus some difficult construction which is (to use the Greek expression) an *anakoluthon*. It seems

men that there is correpondence between *saṁlayāya dhriyate* and *dhriyate paramātmāne*. SP has supplied after *dhriyate* the agent *ātmanā*, which is a bit vague expression!

बुद्ध्यादिकार्यसंहारे प्रत्यक्चैतन्यरूपिणः ।
चिद्विम्बस्यापि संहारो जलार्कप्रविलापवत् ॥११७४॥

At the withdrawal (lit. destruction) of the effect, viz. of the intellect etc., there occurs the withdrawal (or, merger) of the reflection of sentience (absolute) which has been (earlier) in the form of sentience within (the body, viz. the individual self) as the merger of (the rejection of) the sun in water. [1174]

SP indicates Śaṅkara's argument in BSB under 2.3.7, which may be stated here (by us) in brief: ... *brahmaṇa evāvikṛtasya to 'py ekasyānekabuddhyādimayatvam ... upādhyutpattyāsyopattipralayena ca pralaya iti*.

अविद्यावान्पुरा योऽभूदविद्याकार्यगश्चितिः ।
अविद्यया विभागोऽस्य चिद्विम्बस्योपजायते ॥११७५॥

It is owing to ignorance that there is effected the division of the reflection of the sentience (absolute), viz. of that sentience (i.e. the individual sense) which has been earlier¹ affected by ignorance and residing in the effect(s) of ignorance. [1175]

This affirms the oneness of the individual self with the Ātman.

¹This refers to the two states of waking and dream.

प्रत्याख्यातैव साविद्या सकार्या सर्वदात्मना ।
प्रत्याचष्टे तु नाविद्या निरात्मत्वाच्चिदात्मनः ॥११७६॥

That ignorance, together with (all of) its effects, is ever abandoned by the Ātman; ignorance, however, does not give up (the sentient individual selves) owing to its nature of being

non-Ātman.

[1176]

अविद्यातज्जकार्याभ्यामात्मान्यानवशेषतः ।

संबध्यते स्वतोऽसङ्ग आत्मत्वादेव कारणात् ॥११७७॥

The individual self is connected with ignorance and its effects; yet, because it is (really) of the nature of the Ātman, it is, in its nature, non-attached (to any other thing). [1177]

अविद्या यच्च तत्कार्यमात्मानं स्वात्मसिद्धये ।

संबिभत्सत्यनात्मत्वादात्मा तन्नानुमन्यते ॥११७८॥

Ignorance and whatever is its effect, all that seeks (lit. wishes) to be connected with the Ātman, so that it can itself¹ come to be established (as existent); but the Ātman does not consent to that (happening),² because of its (viz. ignorance) being non-Ātman. [1178]

This verse suggests, as SP puts it: *tasyāvidyākṛtasambandhe 'pi na vāstavāsaṅgatahātih.*

¹In the word *svātmānam*, the element *ātman* is a reflexive pronoun.

²Or, as SP puts it, it does not tolerate any such connection.

निःसङ्गस्य ससङ्गेन कटस्थस्य निरात्मना ।

आत्मनोऽनात्मना योगौ वास्तवो नोपपद्यते ॥११७९॥

(To accept) a real connection of the Ātman, which is (by its nature) non-attached (to anything else) and immutable with the non-Ātman (i.e. ignorance which is associated with attachment to the external objects) and is without immutability is not reasonable.¹ [1179]

¹Or, as SP puts it: *niścalasvabhāvarahita.*

प्रत्याख्यातात्मनैवेयं प्रत्यगात्मानमेकलम् ।

अविद्यालिङ्गते वह्निं घृतपिण्ड इवोल्बणम् ॥११८०॥

This ignorance, (though) rejected by the Ātman, clings to the individual/inner self, which is (in reality) just single,¹ as does some lump of ghee (cling to) powerful fire. [1180]

This explains the unreal connection of ignorance with the Ātman.

¹SP explains it as *saṁbandhāsahiṣṇutva*.

अविचारितसंसिद्धा संगतिः परमात्मनः ।
अविद्यातज्जकार्याभ्यामेवमेवेति गम्यताम् ॥११८१॥

Let it be understood that this association of the highest Ātman with ignorance and its effect(s) is thus, i.e. likewise, only established without any deliberate consideration. [1181]

एवं सत्यस्य बाधः स्यात्परमार्थात्मसंश्रयात् ।
संसारानर्थसंबन्धहेतोरात्मप्रमाणतः ॥११८२॥

This being so,¹ there will (lit. would) be the removal (or, stultification) of this connection with the undesired thing, viz. transmigratory existence, by resorting (or, taking) to the Ātman, the highest (real) thing, by resorting to the means of (knowing) the Ātman.² [1182]

¹This refers to the relation of ignorance to the Ātman as described in the preceding verse.

²This is Śruti sentences like, for instance, *tat tvam asi* (as points out).

प्रत्यग्धीमात्रतः प्रत्यङ्ङद्वयत्वविशेषणः ।
निःसंबन्धात्मसंबन्धादनात्मा त्वात्मवन्न सन् ॥११८३॥

The inner self becomes related to the attribute of being without (or devoid of) duality, only through (the acquisition of) the

knowledge of the inner¹ Ātman; while, however, the non-Ātman, not being like the Ātman,² (does not abide) owing to its connection with what has no relation whatever (to it).³

[1183]

¹Sureśvara uses the word *pratyak* to refer to (i) the self in (or, in association with) a transmigratory being, and (ii) sentience *par excellence*, viz. Ātman.

²This is sentience *par excellence*.

³Namely, ignorance (*avidyā*); cf. verse 1179 above.

समस्तव्यस्ततामेवं सति व्याचक्षतेऽत्र ये ।
कर्षन्ति नासिकाग्रेण कर्णमूलं सुखेन ते ॥११८४॥

While this is so, those,¹ who expound this context (viz. the veracity in the theory of) the Ātman's comprising collectivity and particularity, are (only) happily scratching the ear by the tip of the nose!

[1184]

¹This is, on the authority of SP, reference to Bhartṛprapañca.

Verses 1185-1186 are for rejecting the existence of non-Ātman.

आत्मवस्त्वतिरेकेण नान्यद्वस्त्वस्ति मानतः ।
तन्मानमिति चेन्मैवं यतस्तत्प्राक्प्रबोधतः ॥११८५॥

There is no existent thing other than (or, apart from) the real thing, i.e. Ātman, (that can be known) by any means of knowing. If (however, one says that) 'There exist means',¹ (our reply is:) '(Do) not (say) so, it (may be said to exist before the rise of knowledge (about the real nature of the Ātman))'.

[1185]

This is an argument of one who holds the theory of *sama-stavyastatā* of the Ātman, i.e. Bhartṛprapañca, referred to in the preceding verse.

¹ Also, there are meant *pratyakṣa* etc. that are commonly known means of knowledge; the singular stands for the plural.

अस्तु वस्तुवन्तरं चान्यत्तस्याप्यात्माभिसंगतौ ।
को हेतुरिति वक्तव्यं नाविद्याकारकत्वतः ॥११८६॥

Well, (suppose) there is a thing other (than the Ātman); but then, in that case, it is to be told as to what would/could be the reason for its close association with (or, relation to) the Ātman. Also, that cannot be ignorance owing to its nature of not being (really) productive.¹ [1186]

¹ SP rightly invites attention to the Saṃdhi of *avidyā* and *ārakatvataḥ*.

समस्तव्यस्तताव्याख्या तस्मादन्धपरंपरा ।
वैश्वानरवरादेव न तु न्यायानुसारतः ॥११८७॥

Therefore, the explanation in the view (of those about the Ātman's comprising) collectivity and particularity (which has been under reference in the preceding verses) is but a line of blind men. It has proceeded (or, suggested itself) only through the favours of fire;¹ but² not in keeping with (accepted code of) reasoning. [1187]

This verse introduces the refutation of Bhartṛprapañca's view.

¹ This is often mentioned by Sureśvara in relation to the expounder of the theory, i.e. Bhartṛprapañca. This justifies SP referring the earlier verses to that thinker.

² SP reads in *tu* some more meaning thus: *anātmārthasyātmani vighaṭanābhāras tuśabdārthaḥ*.

It follows, in verses 1188-1194, the exposition of the example of a falcon, according to Bhartṛprapañca.

अस्य हि द्वैतविषये विज्ञानं भानुरश्मिवत् ।

विकीर्णं बोधदेशीयं समन्तात्प्रथते दृशेः ॥११८८॥

Indeed,¹ in the case of this seer (i.e. the individual self form of the Ātman), its (specific) knowledge is, like the sun's rays, spread all over the world (lit. area) of duality. [1188]

SP seems to quote from Bhartṛprapañca thus: *taduktam: asya i. dvaitaviṣaye viśeṣavijñānam ādityaraśmivad vikīrṇam jāgṛtadeśavat samantād avabhāṣata iti.*

¹This *hi* is, according to SP, *yathoktabhāṣyadyotaka*.

तत्र कर्मप्रसूतोऽयं कामः सर्वप्रवृत्तिकृत् ।
जाता कर्मण एवेयं भावनास्यान्तरात्मनः ॥११८९॥

There,¹ this desire, which is produced by/from activity, causes all dealings. (And) this impression² (of the external objects) which belongs to the inner self, is (also) produced only from activity.³ [1189]

¹This is a reference to *dvaitaviṣaye* which is already mentioned in the preceding verse.

²*bhāvanā* has its variant *vāsanā*, so noted in the AnSS edition. But that does not make any difference, since Sureśvara has used both these words synonymously.

³SP supports this, citing *uktam hi— tatra kāmāḥ karmanāḥ phalaḥ karmanā eva tu vāsaneti.*

यथालक्षणया कर्म कृतं भावनयात्मना ।
फलं तादृग्विधं दातुमेकीभवति सात्मनः ॥११९०॥

That impression becomes one with the Ātman, viz. that whose nature is already stated and through (the force of) which an activity is done by the individual self, in order to yield (to it) that kind of result which is in accordance with itself. [1190]

This refers to the experiences in the waking state.

तयानुरञ्जित इव ह्यात्मा कामान्परीप्सति ।

वासनालक्षणः कामः स्वप्नसर्गाय जायते ॥११९१॥

Thus,¹ the Ātman, (in this context, the individual self) which is tinted by it (viz. *bhāvanā* or *vāsanā*), as it were, wishes to acquire (the fulfilment of) desires, (and) desire,² characterized by (that) impression, leads to (lit. becomes born for experiencing) the creation (or, coming into existence) of the dream state. [1191]

This, now, refers to the dream state.

¹This is for *hi* which, according to SP, refers to the Bhāṣya under reference: *uktabhāṣyārtho hiśabdah*.

²For clarification SP seems to quote from Bhartṛprapañca: (*tadāhuh*) *tadanuranjito vijñānātmā kāmāṃ kāmayaṭa ity etad bhavati (iti)*.

सुखादिफलभोगाय स्वप्नः क्षुद्रस्य कर्मणः ।

परिच्छेदेन निर्मातृज्ञानं च प्रत्यगात्मनः ॥११९२॥

The dream state is for the enjoyment (or, experience) of the results, viz. happiness and/or misery,¹ of acts which are (in fact) insignificant. And, there is, on the part of the individual self, the knowledge of being the creator (of the objects etc. in that state), through its delimitation (by ignorance).² [1192]

¹SP apparently quotes from the comment of Bhartṛprapañca: (*tadāhuh*) *tatra kāmataḥ svapnanirmāṇaṃ sukhaduḥkhaṃ darśayati (iti)*.

²But SP states: *pratīco jñānam arthasya vāsanotthasya iścāyakam ity arthaḥ*; accordingly, the translation could be: ... (state) definitive of them. In this case, *paricchedena* is in the instrumental case, expressive of *itthambhūtalakṣaṇa* (Pāṇini 2.3.21) 'the mark or attribute' of that knowledge. Our translation takes the instrumental form of *avidyā* as expressive of the agent (Pāṇini

2.3.16).

विज्ञानानविधायी हि विकारः कर्मणो यतः ।

विज्ञानं विपरीतार्थदर्शनं चेह भण्यते ॥११९३॥

Since the modification (i.e. the effect) of activity is indeed¹ in accordance with the (specific) knowledge (of the individual self);² therefore, it is said that the specific knowledge (of it) here³ is caused by the sight of the object(s) affording wrong (view, i.e. unreality).⁴ [1193]

¹Indeed, for *hi*, is, according to SP, taken over by Sureśvara from the Bhāṣya under reference.

²SP states in this context: (*uktaṃ hi*) *vijñānam punar bhāvanāparicchedavinirmātr vijñānānuvidhāyino hi karmaṇo vikriyā (iti)*.

³Here means 'in the dream state'.

⁴Cf. SP: *viparītadarśanam avidyeti bhāṣyeṇa tat (=vijñāna) svarūpam āha*. SP justifies its explanation here of *paricchedena* in the preceding verse, thus: *arthopalabdhiṃ vinā karmaphala-bhogāyogāt tadvikriyā bhavati jñānānuvidhāyinī tato yuktaṃ jñānasya paricchedakatvam ity arthaḥ*.

साविद्या सति बाह्येऽर्थे द्रष्टव्येऽलं न चासति ।

कामः स एव बोधेऽस्य विज्ञानात्मन इष्यते ॥११९४॥

That ignorance is capable of showing (some thing), when there exists an external object and not (so) when there does not exist (any such object);¹ (and) that itself is called the desire of the individual self having (specific) knowledge, at the time when it is in the waking state.² [1194]

¹This leads to *mithyājñāna*; this is justified by SP which quotes: *yathoktam) sāpi sati dravye viparītaṃ grāhayed (iti)*.

²Translation follows the text *bodhe 'sya* as it is. There is, nevertheless, a note by the editor of the AnSS edition. *bāhyo*

'syeti syāt which means that the desire of the individual self is external (i.e. pertains to external object). And this seems to be more likely because (i) there is a Śruti statement: *jāgratsvapnayor jīvasya yaḥ kāmo 'vidyāśahitaḥ sa tato bahir-eveṣyate 'saigo hi ...* and (ii) apparently a quotation from the comment of Bhartṛprapañca: (*tadāhuḥ*) *sa eṣa bāhyo vijñānātmā ity uktam (iti)*.

Verses 1195-1202 present the conclusion drawn from the view of Bhartṛprapañca.

प्रयोक्त्री भावना तत्र कर्म त्वस्य विकारकृत् ।
विपरीतग्रहाय स्यादन्यथेति विनिश्चितिः ॥११९५॥

In that context, the impression (of external objects) is the cause of the employment (or, impelling) (of the individual self in an activity) and (*tu*) that activity is its modifier;¹ otherwise, there is a likelihood that its definite understanding would be wrong.² [1195]

¹Read SP: *kāmo bhāvanā puruṣaṁ viṣayeṣu pravartayati karma tasya sukhādivikāra-kāri*. Also read the quotation in SP: (*tad uktam*) *tatra prayoktrī bhāvanā karma vikarṭṛ (iti)*. Activity thus brings about some change in the individual self.

²Read SP: *anyathā viniścitiḥ mithyājñānam tadviparītagrahaṇaḥ etur na yathārtham paricchettum alam*.

कामेहाभावनाज्ञानपदार्थानां यथाक्रमम् ।
परस्परव्यपेक्षत्वादेवं स्यादेकवाक्यता ॥११९६॥

Thus, there would be the consistency in the meanings of the (different) words *kāma*, *īhā*, *bhāvanā* and *jñāna*, which are mutually dependent, in the order of their enumeration, having the capacity to present one cogently (meaningful) sentence.

[1196]

Read the quotation in SP: (*uktaṃ hi*) *evaṃ kāmakarma-bhāvanāvijñānānām parasparāpekṣatvād ekārthatā (iti)*.

तत्र भावनयैवात्मा कामान्कामयते तथा ।

विद्यया वीक्षते चार्थानविद्योत्थापितानिह ॥११९७॥

There, in that context, the individual self longs for desires only on account of the impressions (of the external objects) and, in the same way (*tathā*),¹ sees (i.e. understands), through (its acquired specific) knowledge (*vidyā*)² the (external) objects produced (lit. raised) by ignorance. [1197]

¹SP points to the use of *tathā* as a part of the example of *bhāvanā*. Yet, in the way which we have accepted it, that word connects the earlier part with *vidyayā vīkṣate* that continues the train of the thought smoothly.

²*vidyā* is understood here as *vijñāna*. The note by the editor of AnSS edition in relation to *vidyayā* reads: *avidyayeti cchedo 'pekṣito na veti vicāraṇīyaṃ vidvadbhiḥ*. Obviously, this note has arisen from the manuscript style of writing the original work in *saṃhitā* (= *paraḥ sannikarṣaḥ*) form, i.e. all the letters are written together, marking no division into distinct words and, therefore, there is every likelihood that ... *tathāvidyayāvīkṣate* ... could be split into the words *tathā avidyayā vīkṣate*, (though there is juncture of the two lines between *tathā* and *avidyayā/vidyayā*). It seems that there is a deliberate use of word *vidyayā* by Sureśvara, in contrast with *avidyā* (occurring later in a compound form though!) Also, let us not forget his use of the word *vijñāna* in the sense of wrong/false knowledge in contrast with its usual sense of right/correct knowledge.

Also, the apparent quotation from the comment of Bhartr̥prapañca: (*yathāhuḥ*) *tatra bhāvanayā kāmāyate vidyayā paśyati dvaitaviṣayaṃ (iti)* — though not clear in respect of the dissolution of the Saṃdhi, its use of the object *dvaitaviṣaya* points to the unusual sense of *vidyā*, which is offered by us, and not in the usually accepted sense. (It may be noted, in passing, that one

ms. of SP seems to read *kāmayate* 'vidyayā' as noted by the editor of AnSS edition and of MRI edition).

संप्रसादे तु बाह्यस्य वस्तुनोऽसंभवादिदम् ।
कर्म निस्पन्दमेवास्ते भावनापि च शाम्यति ॥११९८॥

But, in the state of deep sleep, this activity is only without any flutter, on account of the impossibility of (the existence of) any external object; so also does the impression (of external objects) dies down (or, lit. becomes quiet). [1198]

प्रयोज्यविरहात्कर्मकार्यस्यासंभवात्तथा ॥११९९॥
विद्यापि विपरीतस्य प्रविभक्तस्य वस्तुनः ।
अभावादविशेषात्मज्ञानोऽयं व्यवतिष्ठते ॥१२००॥

Owing to the absence of one, who should be incited (to act), and, so also (*tathā*), owing to the impossibility of there being any effect (to be produced by any) activity, [1199]
there is the (specific) knowledge (on the part of the individual self)¹ about (lit. of) a false thing separated (i.e. distinct) from itself (and) this (individual self) remains without any knowledge of any particular nature, owing to the absence (of any distinct thing).² [1200]

¹This is again a case where the Samdhi could be of *tathā* and *avidyā* (as doubted by the editor of the AnSS edition earlier; under verse 1197 above). He has, nevertheless, kept here from expressing the doubt. Possibly he is under the influence of the citation of SP from Bhartṛprapañca: (*tad āhuh*) *vidyāpi viparītasya pravibhaktasya grāhayitavyasyābhāvān na viśeṣavijñānāya kalpate (iti)*.

²In the last line, we understand the repetition of *pravibhaktasya vastunah*.

दाह्याभावाद्यथा वह्निः स्वात्मन्येवोपशाम्यति ।
कर्मण्यस्तमिते तद्वत्प्रत्यङ्ङास्ते स्वभावतः ॥१२०१॥

As fire goes out (i.e. becomes extinguished) on its own, when there is not a thing to be burnt; similarly, the inner self, by its nature, remains (non-attached to activity) when activity has disappeared (in the deep sleep state). [1201]

Compare the well-known saying: *atṛṇe patito vahniḥ svayam evopaśāmyati*.

एवं कृत्वेदमत्राह श्रुतिः कामं न कं चन ।

कामकर्मादिनिर्मुक्तं सुषुप्ते रूपमात्मनः ॥१२०२॥

Having done this,¹ here (i.e. in this context) the Śruti has stated *kāmaṁ na kaṁ cana*, (thereby referring to) the form (or, nature) of the individual self (which is not distinct from the Ātman) in the deep sleep state as totally free (*nirmukta*) from desire, activity etc. [1202]

¹SP states: *uktarītyā susupte kāmādidhvastir astīti kṛtvā*. Yet, it is possible to understand it to mean: 'having thus described the state of deep sleep (so far),' now the Śruti uses the example of *śyena* to corroborate the earlier statements.

Verses 1203-1205 reaffirm the need for carefully examining the explanation by *Bhārṭṛprapañca*.

इत्येवं श्येनदृष्टान्तः कैश्चिद्व्याख्यायि सादरैः ।

तत्र युक्तमयुक्तं वा श्रुतिवाक्यानुसारतः ॥१२०३॥

न्यायैर्जगति संसिद्धैः स्वयमेव विचार्यताम् ।

अपक्षपातपतितैर्विद्वद्भिर्वस्तुसिद्धये ॥१२०४॥

Thus, i.e. in this manner, was explained the example of falcon by some thinkers¹ who are full of respect (for the Śruti). What is correct or incorrect (lit. proper or improper) therein, in accordance with the statements in the Śruti, [1203] should be considered by the impartial learned, on their own,

(and) with the methods of reasoning (known) in the world, so that (the nature of) the real thing becomes (firmly) established. [1204]

¹Once again, this refers to Bhartṛprapañca.

एतदस्य स्वतो रूपं यदत्रोपप्रदर्शितम् ।
अविद्याकामकर्मादिविविक्तं यत्सुषुप्तगम् ॥१२०५॥

This is the form of this one, in its own right, which is described (or, revealed) here;¹ viz. that which belongs to the state of deep sleep, (and) is entirely distinct from ignorance, desire, activity etc.² [1205]

¹This refers to the portion of the Śruti explained a little before, just now.

²The word 'etc.' refers to the products of each of those which are mentioned.

Now, in verses 1206-1213, there are introductory remarks for the discussion of BU 4.3.20 in verse 1209 up to 1295; they bring out the nature of ignorance as of no significance whatever.

इतोऽन्यथा तु यद्रूपं जाग्रत्स्वप्नस्वलक्षणम् ।
तदस्य परतो ज्ञेयमात्माज्ञानैकहेतुकम् ॥१२०६॥

Whatever other form (of this one); which has the character of one in the states of waking and dream; that has to be known as away (i.e. different, *parataḥ*) from this one and should be known as having only ignorance about itself as its cause.

[1206]

यद्धेतुकमिदं रूपं साविद्यानर्थकारिणी ।
सा स्वतः परतो वास्येत्येतदत्राधुनोच्यते ॥१२०७॥

That ignorance, by which is caused this (above mentioned)

form (of the Ātman), is but the origin/maker of all that is undesirable/undesired. Now, then, is discussed whether it has come to be (so) on account of itself or of some other thing.

[1207]

न त्वागन्तुरविद्येयमनिर्मोक्षप्रसङ्गतः ।

आत्मस्वभावोऽविद्येयं न वेत्येतद्विचार्यते ॥१२०८॥

(One would say:) 'But, indeed, this ignorance is not adventitious; otherwise, there would occur the contingency of (one's) not attaining liberation. (Therefore), it is to be considered whether or not this ignorance is the nature of the Ātman.

[1208]

SP points out that this question is introduced in BUB and is repeated by Sureśvara accordingly.

अविद्याकामकर्मादिप्रविविक्तमिहात्मनः ।

रूपं पूर्वमुपन्यस्तं तस्य साक्षाच्चिकीर्षया ॥१२०९॥

In this respect, there is already stated earlier what form the Ātman has, viz. that which is fully distinct from ignorance, desire, activity etc.—(this was done) with a desire to make it directly understandable (or, perceptible).

[1209]

अविद्यायाश्च यत्कार्यं तच्च वाच्यमशेषतः ।

इत्याविष्कृतिसिद्ध्यर्थं परो ग्रन्थोऽवतार्यते ॥१२१०॥

(Nevertheless) whatever are the effects¹ of ignorance have to be pointed out (lit. stated) in their entirety (lit. leaving out none of them); in order, therefore, to reveal (or lit. to accomplish the description of) the same in the subsequent portion of the text.

[1210]

This is to state why the discussion on the veins is introduced

kāryam, though in singular, is understood for *kāryāṇi* in plural.

नाड्यायत्ता यतोऽविद्याकार्यदृष्टिरतः परम् ।

नाडीनां स्यादुपन्यासस्ता वा अस्येतिवाक्यतः ॥१२११॥

The answer:) 'Since the sight (i.e. clear understanding) of the effects of ignorance is dependent on the veins, therefore, there is taken up (lit. desired) the introduction (of the discussion about) the veins, from the sentence *tā asya*' [1211]

verses 1212-1217 refer to the portion on *nādīs* for proving the nature (or, character) of the dream objects.

यद्वा मृषात्वसिद्ध्यर्थं नाड्युपन्यास इष्यते ।

अत्यन्ततनुतो ह्यन्तर्विन्ध्यादेरीक्षणं कुतः ॥१२१२॥

or perhaps the introduction (of the thought) of veins is for the purpose of establishing/proving the false nature of that ignorance). (A question is asked in this context:) 'Whence can there be the sight of the mount of Vindhya and others beside (them, despite) indeed the extreme fineness (or, smallness) of the same?' [1212]

अविद्याकार्यमेतच्चेदविद्यावन्मृषेष्ण्यते ।

अतो मृषात्वसिद्ध्यर्थं तनुनाडीपरिग्रहः ॥१२१३॥

and this effect of ignorance is accepted (lit. desired to be), like ignorance (itself), false. Therefore, (it is) for proving its falsity that there is discussion taken up of the veins which are fine. [1213]

follows in verses 1214ff., word to word explanation of BU 20.

ता वा अस्य हिता नाम नाड्यः सूक्ष्मा हृदि स्थिताः ।

अपकर्षेतरौ याभिः कार्यस्यात्मा समीक्षते ॥१२१४॥

Those indeed are the veins of this (individual's body) named Hitā,¹ fine (in size), situated (or, resting) in the heart (of the same), and through which the individual sees the decrease and increase (lit. the otherwise) of the effect (of activity).²

[1214]

¹These are mentioned earlier also, in BUB 2.1.19 and 4.2.3.

²This line, viz. the second, is for explaining the purposful association of the veins and the individual self.

सहस्रतमभागेन केशस्य परिणाहतः ।

नाड्योऽणिम्ना समानास्ता नानान्नरससंभृताः ॥१२१५॥

Those veins are, in their magnitude, equal of a hair in its one thousandth part (of division) and they are full of various serums (lit. juices).

[1215]

तास्वन्नरसपूर्णासु स आत्माविद्ययात्मनः ।

रक्तपीतादिरूपत्वं मन्यते स्वप्नमध्यगः ॥१२१६॥

It is in those (veins), which are full of (i.e. filled with) the saps of foods that the individual self sees (lit. thinks as existing) the nature of being red and/or yellow (in colours as its own) on account of ignorance (which has affected it), while it is in (lit. the midst of) the dream state.

[1216]

रसवर्णानुरोधेन रक्तपीतादिरूपताम् ।

प्रतीचो भोगसिद्ध्यर्थं देवतैति मृषात्मिकाम् ॥१२१७॥

In accordance with the colour of the sap (of food) does the deity¹ attain the nature of the colour red and/or yellow, which is merely of false nature, in order that there is secured (lit. established) the experience (lit. enjoyment) of the inner self.

[1217]

¹SP clarifies this as *lingādiśabdā*, i.e. which can be described as having a subtle form, with respect to every kind of sap and/or organ. This *linga* is mentioned in BUB as *saptadaśaka* 'consisting of seventeen (organs)'—these seventeen are: five organs of the sense, five, of action, five vital airs, the intellect and *manas* alternatively, five elements, ten organs, vital force (in its fivefold aspects) and *manas* (in its 3/4 aspects).

Verse 1218 states the reason as to why there has been description of veins in the fourth Adhyāya (i.e. BU second Adhyāya).

बौद्धविज्ञानविक्षेपसंहारकथनाय तु ।
चतुर्थे नाड्युपन्यासो विज्ञानात्मविशुद्धये ॥१२१८॥

As for the introduction (of the discussion on the nature) of the veins in the fourth¹ Adhyāya, it was only for explaining the expansion and contraction of the intellect,² for (the purpose of) clarifying the nature of the individual self. [1218]

¹This is the old traditional reference to BU 2.1.

²The word *vijñāna* is used here in two senses: (i) the intellect *buddhi*, i.e. *buddhi*, on the aspect of the internal organs) and (ii) the Vedāntin's acceptance of that word in the sense of individual self which is possessed of specific knowledge (beside knowledge, of the Brahman).

Verse 1219 states the reason as to why there is description of veins in the sixth Adhyāya (viz. BU 4th Adhyāya).

देवतान्नरसाणुत्वज्ञानाय च पुनर्ग्रहः ।
षष्ठादौ सूक्ष्मनाडीनां तद्द्वारात्मावबुद्धये ॥१२१९॥

And this (introduction of the discussion of veins) once again is for the purpose of making known the subtleness of the sap of the food for the deities. (And) in the beginning of

the sixth¹ the (introduction of) subtle veins is for the purpose of getting to know (the nature of) the Ātman through them.

[1219]

¹This is traditional reference to BU 4.2.

Verse 1220 states the reason for introducing the discussion of veins here.

भोक्तुः स्वरूपविज्ञप्त्या इह नाडीपरिग्रहः ।
क्रियते कामकर्मादिविवेकस्य विवक्षया ॥१२२०॥

Here, the introduction (of the discussion on the nature) of the veins is brought in for conveying (or, making known) the nature of the experiencer (lit. enjoyer), with the intention of (lit. the desire to speak about) the discrimination among desire, activity etc.

[1220]

Verses 1221-1223 state why individual selves are different, even though sentience within is the same.

न विज्ञानात्मनो रूपं चैतन्यादन्यदिष्यते ।
स्वात्माविद्यैकहेत्वेव तस्य रूपान्तरं यतः ॥१२२१॥

It is not accepted (lit. desired to agree to) that the nature of the individual self (possessing specific knowledge) is different from (that of) sentience (absolute), since its other form is (grasped by one) as rooted in (i.e. caused by) only ignorance about its own nature.

[1221]

Read SP: *kāmādyātmano ... ity arthah.*

विज्ञानपुरुषाणां हि सर्वेषामेकरूपता ।
चैतन्यात्मतया ज्ञेया तदबोधात्तु भिन्नता ॥१२२२॥

Indeed, all of the individual selves have the sameness of nature,

which is to be known as being sentience; but there is noticed variety (among them) owing to the non-knowing of it. [1222]

अध्यात्मादिविभागोऽयं न स्वतः प्रत्यगात्मनः ।
तदबोधैकहेतुत्वादप्राप्तैकात्म्यवस्तुकः ॥१२२३॥

This division, viz. *adhyātma* etc.¹ does not exist in (or, is not of) the individual self, as being caused on account of itself; it belongs to the thing (of reality), which has not obtained (i.e. existed, its real nature, viz.) singleness, because of its having the non-knowing of itself as its cause. [1223]

¹The *ādhibhautika* and *ādhidaivika* are meant.

verses 1224-1225 state what obstructs the desires etc. in remaining their natural form.

लिङ्गमेव ततो रूपमात्माविद्यैकहेतुकम् ।
कर्मोत्था भावना याश्च रूपं ता अपि लिङ्गवत् ॥१२२४॥

Thence the subtle form¹ itself is having the cause only in ignorance about (the nature of) the inner self. Those impressions, which arise from activity, also are (having) a form similar to (that of) the subtle form.² [1224]

¹Cf. note 1 on verse 1217 above.

²Cf. Pāṇini 5.1.116: *tatra tasyeva*.

लिङ्गं चाप्यतिसूक्ष्मं तन्नाडीमध्यगतिक्षमम् ।
स्वामिकर्मवशात्तच्च रूपं गृह्णाति दैवतम् ॥१२२५॥

Also, the subtle form is extremely small in magnitude and is suitable (in size) for its movement through the veins (of the body) and a deity takes (or, assumes) that (subtle) form under the sway (or, influence) of the activity of the master (viz. the individual self). [1225]

Verses 1226-1231 state that the enjoyment/experience of the individual self is in consonance with the magnitude/form of the object(s) of experience.

भोगमात्रप्रसिद्धयर्थं चैतन्याभासमात्रतः ।

नानात्मरूपमात्मायं किञ्चिदन्यदपेक्षते ॥१२२६॥

Only for securing the experience (lit. enjoyment) does this individual self depend on this other insignificant thing, which has in it a variety of forms, only through the semblance of (its) sentience. [1226]

विज्ञानपुरुषः सोऽयमधिदैवादिवसनः ।

लिङ्गदेहानुरोधी सल्लिङ्गे कर्त्रादिविक्रियाम् ।

अविद्योपहतात्मा सन्नात्मत्वेनाभिमन्यते ॥१२२७॥

Having its nature (as) affected by ignorance, this known (so 'yam) individual self, becoming possessed of (specific) knowledge, having impressions which are rooted in *adhidaiva* etc.¹ and having regard to the subtle form, considers the modifications in the subtle form such as becoming the agent etc. to be belonging to itself. [1227]

¹*adhibhautika* is also meant.

लिङ्गस्य विक्रिया यापि सा रसानुविधायिनी ॥१२२८॥

अधिदैवादिदेहस्य रसहेतुः स्थितिर्यतः ।

एताभिर्वा इति तथा तेनैता इति च श्रुतिः ॥१२२९॥

And whatever be the modification in the subtle form, it also is agreeing with the serum (in the vein). [1228]

Since the sustenance of the body, which is *adhidaiva* etc.,¹ has the serum (in the vein) as its support (i.e. basis, or cause), therefore, there are the Śruti statements *etābhir vā ...* and also *tenaitāh* [1229]

¹adhibhautika is also meant.

रसोऽपि चायं जग्धान्नपरिणाममपेक्षते ।
यतोऽतो वातपित्तादीन्धातून्सोऽप्यनुरुध्यते ॥१२३०॥

And, since this serum also depends on the modification of the food which is eaten, therefore, that (viz. serum) also agrees with the humours, viz. wind, bile etc.¹ [1230]

¹The word 'etc.' refers to phlegm.

धातुरूपानुरोधी सन्नसो रक्तादिमेत्यथ ।
तं वर्णं देवतादेहो यथोक्तमनुरुध्यते ॥१२३१॥

Agreeing with the humour(s), that serum also then mixes into (lit. goes to) blood etc. and then the body of each of the entities comes to have that colour which is in keeping with what is said (viz. the colour of the serum as stated). [1231]

verses 1232-1237 state the *pranālī* 'manner' of enjoyment of individual self.

आत्मनोऽविक्रियस्यैव लिङ्गे स्वाभासवर्त्मना ।
दर्शनं शुक्लपीतादेर्जायते कर्मणो वशात् ॥१२३२॥

As a result of acts, the sight of the individual self, though (in reality) not undergoing (any) modification, also becomes in its subtle form as of one which is white, yellow etc. in colour, in the way of its semblance. [1232]

आत्मन्येष यतः सर्वस्तदविद्यैकहेतुकः ।
अध्यात्मादिप्रपञ्चो हि श्रुतिकारजतादिवत् ॥१२३३॥

All this extensive world of *adhyātma* etc., in the individual self, has for its cause only ignorance (about the nature) of

itself—it is like (that of) silver in a mother-of-pearl.¹ [1233]

¹The use of the suffix *-vat* is according to Pāṇini 5.1.116: *tatra tasyeva*.

सत्यानृतविभागोऽयं तथाप्यनृतवस्तुनि ।
जाग्रद्भूमौ प्रसिद्धोऽस्य लोके स्वप्ने यथा तथा ॥१२३४॥

So also, this division into truth and falsehood is (actually occurrent) in a false thing; for this individual self as (it is) well-known among people to be in the state of waking, so (it is) in the state of dream. [1234]

चित्स्वभावातिरेकेण नाविद्यादेः प्रसिध्यति ।
सत्यत्वमिव मानेन मिथ्यात्वमपि वस्तुनः ॥१२३५॥

As truth, so also falsehood, of the thing, viz. of ignorance etc.,¹ does not get established (or, proven) as existing apart (or, distinct) from what is of the nature of sentience. [1235]

¹This 'etc.' refers to the various effects of ignorance, desire and activity.

चिन्मात्रतैव तेनास्य कार्यकारणवस्तुनः ।
श्रुत्येहोच्चैः प्रत्यपादि तत्त्वमस्यादिरूपया ॥१२३६॥

Therefore (or, for that reason) has the Śruti, which is in the form of (sentences like) *tat tvam asi*, loudly (i.e. clearly or effectively) declared here¹ that this thing, viz. the effect(s) and the cause(s), is mere sentience (in reality). [1236]

¹That is, in the context of liberation.

मिथ्याभावनमात्राधेर्निरस्तविकृतेरिह ।
प्रतीचो दर्शनं स्वप्ने श्रुत्या मिथ्येति वर्ण्यते ॥१२३७॥

It is declared by the Śruti¹ that the experiencing (lit. seeing) on the part of the inner self, which is far away from any modification (or, has cast off all modifications), is false, on account of the delimiting adjuncts which are but falsely conceived notions. [1237]

¹SP refers to *yatrainam* ... to refer it to the dream state.

verses 1238-1241 bring out the purport of such distinctions as *kla* etc. in the Śruti.

शुक्लं स्यात्कफभूयस्त्वे वातपित्तसमागमात् ।
 नीलं कृष्णं च वातस्य परिणामं प्रचक्षते ॥१२३८॥
 पिङ्गलं पित्तबाहुल्याद्धरितो मन्दपित्तकः ।
 इति वैषम्यतो वर्णो धातुसाम्येऽतिलोहितः ॥१२३९॥

They describe the modification (of food which is eaten and has become the serum) as white, when there is phlegm in great measure (than other humours); as blue owing to the connection (or, mixing) of wind and bile; and black as (the modification) of/by wine. [1238]

(It is) brownish owing to the profuseness of bile (and) green owing to smaller/lesser measure of bile; thus, the colour is caused by the unequal proportion (of humours); but when the humours which have equality of proportion, (the food is) extremely red. [1239]

इत्येवमादि बहुधा परिणामं प्रचक्षते ।
 चिकित्साशास्त्रतत्त्वज्ञा जग्धस्यात्रस्य नाडिगम् ॥१२४०॥

Thus and in other ways¹ have they variously described the modification (into serum) of the food which is eaten in the veins; they, who know the science of medicine. [1240]

¹On this, SP offers a fairly long citation: (*uktam hi*) *tāsāṃ hāsvaṃ turīyāṃśavibhāgena pañcasaptatyadhikaśatam anila-*

raktam bhavati

Also, it adds: *suśruto 'py āha—*

arunāḥ śirā vātavahā nīlāḥ pittavahāḥ śirāḥ /

asṛgvahās tu rohinyo gauryaḥ śleṣmavahāḥ śirāḥ // iti

(*Suśruta* 3.7.18, but exactly the same).

and

yājñavalkyaś cāha—

anantā raśmayas tasya dīpavad vyavasthitā hr̥di /

sitāsītāḥ kaṇḍūnīlāḥ kapilāḥ pītalohitāḥ // iti

(*Yājñavalkya-smṛti* 3.166).

Verse 1241 is introductory to the description of the delusion on the part of the individual self which is described in 1242-1243.

अथैतस्मिन्नन्तरसपरिणामे यथोदिते ।

प्रत्यङ्मोहस्य यत्कार्यमधुना तत्प्रपञ्च्यते ॥१२४१॥

Now, as (or, since)¹ this modification of the food which is eaten into serum is thus described, there is described in full extent that which is the effect of ignorance about the nature of (or, on the part) the inner self.

[1241]

¹This for *athaitasmin* ... which SP explains as *nimitte saptamī*.

जगदात्मनि निर्माय साधिभूताधिदैवतम् ।

शुक्लाद्याकृतिनाडीस्थमात्मा पश्यत्यविद्यया ॥१२४२॥

Having created within itself, this world which, together with its *adhibhūta* and *adhidaivata* forms, abides in the veins such as are white in appearance (*ākṛti*) (and) the individual self sees (lit. within) owing to ignorance.

[1242]

अविद्यायाः परा काष्ठाथेदानीमुच्यते स्फुटम् ।

तत्कार्यतारतम्येन साविद्या भिद्यते यतः ॥१२४३॥

Now is stated clearly the farthest limit of ignorance, since

that ignorance has differentiated itself in accordance with greater or lesser measure of its effect(s). [1243]

This verse points out the purpose of the ensuring portion, even after the effect of ignorance is already explained in *atha yo 'nyām ...* (BU 1.4.10).

Now follows in verses 1244-1262 exposition on the nature of ignorance.

First, in verses 1244-1246, there is stated the rejection of distinctions in ignorance.

लिङ्गादिकार्यभेदेन साविद्या भिद्यते सदा ।
स्वतस्त्वविद्याभेदोऽत्र मनागपि न विद्यते ॥१२४४॥

That ignorance ever differentiates itself into the distinction(s) among the effect(s) of the subtle form etc. (In reality), however, there does not obtain (or, exist) any of (lit. even a little of) the distinctions in ignorance. [1244]

This verse discards the view of some Vedāntins (*svayūthyas*) who hold that there are distinctions in the nature of ignorance (SP). This explains *yāvanti jñānāni*

तल्लिङ्गं वासनानीडं सूक्ष्मं स्वच्छस्वभावकम् ।
नाडीगतरसोपाधिसंसर्गात्स्फटिकादिवत् ॥१२४५॥

The subtle form (produced from ignorance) is having its nest (i.e. basis or support) in the impression(s) (of the external objects), very minute, of a pure nature and, like a crystal etc., (possessed of that colour which is produced) by the contact of the attribute of the serum that flows (or exists) in the nerve. [1245]

धर्मादिप्रेरकोद्भूतरथस्त्रीहस्तिलक्षण-
नानाकृतिरसाद्यात्म ह्यात्मनोऽलुप्तचक्षुषः ।

प्रथते पुरतोऽविद्यामात्रतत्त्वं विनश्वरम् ॥१२४६॥

(That subtle form produced from ignorance,) which has various appearances of a chariot or of a woman or of an elephant, have their origin in the urging force of merit etc.¹ and, being of the nature of the serum etc.,² presents itself before the individual self that has not lost its vision—(and is) perishable and of the nature of ignorance. [1246] .

It is possible to read *dhamādi ... rasādyātma* as two words thus: *dharmādi ... nānākṛti* and *rasādyātma*; for, the original single word is an inordinately long compound! However, even the first word of this proposed division is equally long! Therefore, we have refrained from suggesting any emendation. Yet, as the translation shows, we can read the too long compound as a Dvandva compound comprising the two compounds. Accordingly, we have joined them by 'and'. So also is noticeable the division in the meaning offered by SP: *jāgradbhogadādrṣṭa ... nānākāropetam* and *aśītādi ... sahakṛtam*.

This refers to the distinct effects of ignorance in the waking state.

¹ The word 'etc.' stands for *adharma* and *adrṣṭa*.

² This 'etc.' refers to desire, impression and so on.

एवं तावदविद्यैकनीडानामदितो विधिः ।

भावनानां विनिष्पत्तौ बोधे स्वप्नेऽथ भण्यते ॥१२४७॥

Thus far (*tāvat*) are stated the modifications (or the world) of (ignorance) and (of the external objects) which have a basis (lit. nest) only in ignorance; now (*atha*) is stated (the happening) with regard to their rise (in the form of) cognition (in the dream state). [1247]

This refers to the distinct effects of ignorance in the dream state.

अथ यत्रात्ममोहोत्थं घनन्तीवैनमितीक्षणम् ।
जिनन्तीवैनमिति च मृषैवमभिमन्यते ॥१२४८॥

Now as regards that where there is the experience (lit. seeing) 'They are, as if, killing this one', which has arisen from ignorance (about the real nature) of the individual self, and also that 'They are as if¹ overpowering this one' (which) it (viz. the individual self) thinks falsely (to be about itself).

[1248]

¹iva 'as if' is expressive of fancy (*utprekṣā*); it indicates the falseness of the experiences.

नास्त्यत्र हन्ता जेता वा किंत्वज्ञानोत्थमेव तत् ।
वासनाविष्टविज्ञानो हननाद्यभिमन्यते ॥१२४९॥

There is (indeed) not any killer or any victor; it has arisen only from ignorance; (the individual self) having (some specific) knowledge, which has entered (lit. come to) it, thinks about the killing etc. (as pertaining to itself).

[1249]

अधर्मादिप्रकर्षोत्थं गर्तादिपतनादिकम् ॥१२५०॥
प्रतीचो दर्शनं स्वप्ने मूढस्येहोपजायते ।
मिथ्यात्वकारणं प्राह यदेवेति श्रुतिः स्वयम् ॥१२५१॥

The falling into a ditch etc.¹ is also what has arisen from the dominance of in demerit etc.,²
in this, (i.e. the dream state), the sight (of that) occurs to the inner self which is mislead (by ignorance); for, the Śruti itself has stated its cause, viz. falseness.³

[1251]

¹This refers to being caught in fire, running around and other activities which cause fear.

²By the word 'etc.' is meant increase in the force of ignorance and other effects of the same, together with those of demerit.

³This is the purport of the sentence *yad eva jāgrat paśyati*

....

Verses 1252-1253 state the purport of the Kaṇḍikā which begins with the word jāgrat

जाग्रद्विषय एवायं यदैक्षिष्ट पुराप्यसत् ।
तदत्र स्वप्नेऽसंभाव्यं मन्यतेऽविद्ययैव सः ।
नाविद्या नापि तत्कार्यं यस्मादात्मसमीक्षणे ॥१२५२॥

Whatever this (individual self) had seen earlier in the state of waking was also non-existent; and that (non-existent) it sees here in the dream state (though) not of possible occurrence, (considering it to be occurring) owing to ignorance alone—but, there would not (remain as truth, i.e. existent) either ignorance or its effect(s). [1252]

भयं त्वेकान्ततोऽविद्याकार्यमाहुर्विपरिचतः ।
यतो विज्ञाततत्त्वानां भीतिर्नास्ति कुतश्चन ॥१२५३॥

Fear is indeed the effect of ignorance alone—(so) have the wise people declared (lit. said), since there is not fear from anywhere (or, any source) for those who have known the truth. [1253]

एतदुक्तं भवत्यत्र पूर्वोपात्तस्य कर्मणः ।
फलं प्रबोधे यदुक्तं तच्छेषो भावनोच्यते ॥१२५४॥

This is (meant to be) said here: The remainder of whatever result was produced by an earlier (accomplished) activity was enjoyed in the waking state is known as impression.¹ [1254]

¹SP states about this *vāsanā sā ca svapne vyajyate*; this is through the force of the word *pūrvopātta*.

यदि नामावसितार्था फलं दत्त्वेह भावना ।
पुंभोगसमये कर्म प्रयुङ्क्ते सा पुनर्नवम् ॥१२५५॥

f when, after yielding its result, at the time of the individual self's experience (lit. enjoyment) here (i.e. in the waking state), it) has fulfilled (lit. completed) its purpose, the impression (of the external objects) does cause (lit. employ or bring about) a new activity. [1255]

It is understood that, despite their being numerous, the impressions are but one impression, since they originate only from ignorance and are essentially like one another.

उत्पत्तिभोगयोरेवं भावना कर्मणः सदा ।
प्रयोक्त्री भावनैवात्मकर्तृभोक्तृत्वयोर्मृषा ॥१२५६॥

Thus, at the rise and enjoyment (of the results) of an act, there is only the impression (that is the employing force). (And) that impression is the employing force in respect of the individual self's nature of being the agent (of that act) and also of being the experiencer (lit. enjoyer) which is (in fact) false. [1256]

In verses 1257-1267 it is stated that *sā vāsanā bhāvanākhyā ... ahkaranasthety ucyate nātmasthā*.

एवं सति प्रबोधे यद्भुक्तं प्राक्कर्मणः फलम् ।
तस्यानुवासना धीस्था भावनेत्यभिधीयते ॥१२५७॥

This being so, the impression, which comes to dwell in the intellect (of an individual), is but of the result (by an individual) of a previous activity, enjoyed in its waking state—it is called by that name (viz. the impression, *bhāvanā/vāsanā*). [1257]

आत्मचैतन्यबिम्बेन बिम्बिता धीर्यथा तथा ।
कर्मोत्थफलबिम्बेन बिम्बितेयं मतिः सदा ॥१२५८॥

As the intellect comes to have a reflection in it, on account

of (or, by) the image of sentience in the individual self, in the same way, does the intellect also come to have a reflection in it on account of (or, by) the image of the result arising from (an) activity. [1258]

This emphasises that the intellect has ever on it the image of the results of activity.

अविद्याग्रथितः सोऽयं परमात्माशरीरतः ।
कर्ता भोक्तेव चाभाति स्वप्नजाग्रदवस्थयोः ॥१२५९॥

This known (so 'yam) highest Ātman, which is (thus) affected by (lit. entangled in) ignorance, appears, on account of its being bodiless, like an agent (of an act) and/or an experiencer (lit. enjoyer of the result of it), in (both) the waking and dream states. [1259]

न चाविद्यातिरेकेण कौटस्थ्यात्प्रत्यगात्मनः ।
हेतुमन्यं प्रपश्यामः कर्तृत्वादिप्रसिद्धये ॥१२६०॥

In view of the immutability of the inner self, we do not think of any cause other than ignorance for effecting (lit. establishing) agentship etc. [1260]

रजोधूमतुषाराभ्रनीहाराद्यन्वितं वियत् ।
संभाव्यते यथा मूढैरात्मैवं कर्तृतादिभिः ॥१२६१॥

As the sky is considered by the foolish to have been covered (lit. associated) with dust, smoke, mist, clouds and fog¹ etc., so is the individual (considered by them as being) an agent (of an act) etc. [1261]

¹Yet read SP: *tuṣārapadena himasyoktatvān nīhāraśabdena tamo gr̥hyate*.

धर्मधर्म्यभिसंबन्धा नेक्ष्यन्ते मानतो यथा ।

वियत्येवं न वीक्ष्यन्ते प्रत्यग्दृष्ट्या यथोदिताः ॥१२६२॥

As the relations between properties and those who are possessed of them, are not seen (or, perceived) with the help of the (usual) means of knowing; so also are not seen by the sight of the inner self the things as they are enumerated (above) in (or, on the part of) the sky. [1262]

SP supports the thought in this verse by a citation: (*uktam hi*)

*ākāśam ekam hi yathā ghaṭādiṣu prthag bhavet /
tathātmaiko 'pyanekaś ca jalādhāreṣv ivāṁśumān //*
(*Yājñavalkyaśmṛti* 3.144).

In verses 1263-1288, there is exposition of the nature of *bhāvanā*(= *vāsanā*).

चैतन्याभाससंमोहं भावनेयं समाश्रिता ।
सत्य आत्मनि कूटस्थ आश्रिता इति भण्यते ॥१२६३॥

This impression has taken shelter of the semblance of sentience; it is said that it is based (or, resting) on the truth (i.e. reality) i.e. the Ātman, the immutable. [1263]

स्वामिन्येव यतः सर्वं समवैति क्रियाफलम् ।
ममाहमितिहेतुत्थं स्वामित्वं चाप्यबोधजम् ॥१२६४॥
देशकालादिहीनस्य ह्यनवच्छिन्नवस्तुनः ।
अहं ममेत्यवच्छेदो नात्माविद्यामृते यतः ॥१२६५॥

Since (or, as) the entire result of acts accrues to (or, gets invariably associated with) only the master; the notion of being a master (on the part of an individual, in respect of all acts) is aroused by (such) causes as '(This is) my belonging (or, doing)' or 'I (have done this)' arises from non-knowing (on the part of the individual self); [1264]
since, indeed, (any) such particularization as 'I' and/or 'mine'

in respect of the thing (viz. reality) which is not particularized (or, discriminated from any other objects) and which is above (lit. without or bereft of) a (certain) region and/or (period of) time cannot be without (there existing) ignorance (to cause it). [1265]

This affirms that *svāmitva*, *karṭṛtva* and *bhokṭṛtva* all belong to one, the individual self.

वासनैकाधिकरणश्चिदाभासोऽभिधीयते ।
भावनारञ्जितज्ञानो भवतीति न निर्द्वयः ॥१२६६॥

It is (only) the semblance of sentience, that is said to become the sole basis (or, support) of the impressions (and) it becomes possessed of (that) knowledge (which is) tinged with impressions—and not the one, which has not (any association with) duality. [1266]

भावनारञ्जितमतिसाक्षित्वादात्मवस्तुनः ।
भावनाश्रयवद्भाति प्रत्यङ्जडधियामतः ॥१२६७॥

Therefore (or, for this reason), the (real) thing (called) the inner self appears to persons of dull intellect, on account of its being the witness of the intellect, that it is tinged by the impression(s). [1267]

There follows in verses 1268-1288 the explanation of yad eva jāgrad bhayam.

बहुनात्र किमुक्तेन यदेवायं समीक्षते ॥१२६८॥
बोधे हस्त्यादिकं स्वप्ने तदेवाविद्ययात्मनि ।
संभावयति मिथ्यैव नभो नीलं यथा तथा ॥१२६९॥

Why say more? Whatever this one sees [1268]
in the state of waking, viz. an elephant etc., the same thing
in the state of dream (also), under the influence of (or, owing

to) ignorance and somehow considers (the same as real); (but that is) just false in the same way as the blue (appearance/colour of the) sky. [1269]

This concludes the meaning of *yad eva jāgrad bhayam ... anyate* in BU.

कार्यमेतदविद्यायाः प्रोद्धृतायाः प्रदर्शितम् ।
अथापकृष्यमाणायाः कार्यतः कार्यमुच्यते ॥१२७०॥

This/Thus shown (the nature of) the effect of ignorance which has appeared (in the form of the impression(s)). Now is (to be) stated the effect of (that ignorance) being withdrawn (or destroyed) since it is itself an effect. [1270]

देवादिविषयोद्धृतवासनास्य यदा तदा ।
जाग्रद्भूमावथ स्वप्ने जायते सैव भावना ।
देवो राजेव चास्मीति स्वप्नकर्मवशाद्विभोः ॥१२७१॥

When there arises in this (individual self), in its waking state, the impression, which has appeared as pertaining to gods etc., that same impression arises (in it) then, i.e. in the pervader, in its dream state (also); thus: 'I am god', or 'I am a king, as it were' owing to (or, under the influence of) the activity in the dream. [1271]

ध्वस्तात्ममोहतत्कार्यः स्यात्प्रबोधे यदा तदा ।
सर्वमस्म्यहमेवेदमिति स्वप्नेऽभिमन्यते ॥१२७२॥

If, (the individual self) is, in its state of waking, one who has destroyed the ignorance about itself and also the effect(s) of the same, then, in the dream state also, it considers (or, thinks) 'I myself alone, am all this'. [1272]

This is the meaning of *aham evedam ...* in BU.

अहमेवेति चिन्मात्रमात्मनोऽत्रावधार्यते ।
इदंशब्देन चाविद्याकार्यमत्र विवक्षितम् ॥१२७३॥

Here (i.e. in this sentence) is specified, in the words *aham eva*, merely sentience in the individual self and by the word *idam* is intended here (to be expressed) the effect of ignorance.

[1273].

अविद्यायाः समुच्छिन्नावलमेवमिदं वचः ।
सर्वः कृत्स्नोऽहमस्मीति तदैतदुपपद्यते ॥१२७४॥

Thus, this statement,¹ is capable for the destruction of ignorance; then² is it (or, does it become) reasonable (to say), 'I am complete (or the whole— *sarva*)',³ i.e. I am (the) entire (world that is considered to be existing)'. [1274]

¹This means *aham evedam*.

²The translation follows *tadaitad* ... in the AnSS edition. Yet, the variant reading (noted therein) would also yield a good sense: This, viz. 'I am ...', becomes reasonable.

³This indicates, as SP points out, *paricchedakābhāva* in relation to the individual self.

एषोऽस्य परमः पूर्णः कृत्स्नो लोकस्तु विद्यया ।
इतोऽपरे तु ये लोकास्तेऽस्याविद्याप्रकल्पिताः ॥१२७५॥

(And) this whole world is for this (individual self) *parama* 'complete/whole and fully (obtained)' through the knowledge (of reality).¹ The worlds which are other than this one are construction of imagination. [1275]

¹Cf. *vidyayāmṛtam aśnute* (Īśopaniṣad 11; Maitrāyaṇyupaniṣad 7.9).

देवो राजेव यत्स्वप्ने दर्शनं प्रत्यगात्मनः ।
विद्याफलं न तन्न्याय्यमिवशब्देन संगतेः ॥१२७६॥

Whether the thought (lit. seeing) of the inner self, in the dream state (be it) 'I am a god' or 'I am a king, as it were', is not the result of knowledge (of reality) (and) that is not according to the (usual) mode of reasoning, owing to its connection with the word *iva*. [1276]

घनन्तीवाविद्यया यद्वन्मन्यते स्वप्नभूमिगः ।
देवो राजेव चास्मीति मोहादेवं क्रियाफलम् ॥१२७७॥

As (the individual self) considers (or thinks), 'They are killing me, as it were!', owing to (its) ignorance, while it is in the dream state; so also (the thoughts), 'I am god' and 'I am king, as it were!', are the result of its activities arising from (its) ignorance (about its own nature). [1277]

verses 1278-1285 state that the awareness in the dream state in all this' pertains to the highest reality.

अहमेवेति न स्वप्नः साक्षादत्रात्मवस्तुनः ।
बोधेऽविद्यासहायत्वमिह त्वात्मैव निर्द्वयः ॥१२७८॥

(It might be argued:) 'In "I, myself alone, ..." is not a dream experience; since that is directly perceived (i.e. experienced) the (real) thing, viz. the individual self, in its waking state'. The answer is:) 'No, it is not so; there, in the waking state there is (its nature of) having ignorance as an aid, but here (in the dream state), there is only the individual self, all by itself, without any duality'. [1278]

यावत्किञ्चिदविद्योत्थमिदमा तदनद्यते ।
यथाव्याख्यातमैकात्म्यमहमित्याभिधीयते ॥१२७९॥

Whatever be the thing which has arisen from ignorance, it is referred to (lit. restated) by the word *idam* (and) by *aham* expressed the singleness of the individual self (i.e. Ātman),

as explained (before).

[1279]

शरीरान्तमिदं रूपं साधिभताधिदैवतम् ।
प्रतीच्यविद्ययाध्यस्तमहमैतद्विशेष्यते ॥१२८०॥

This form, which ends in a (worldly) body, together with its *adhibhūta* and *adhidaivata* (forms), is but superimposed on the inner consciousness, through ignorance (about its true nature)—this is discriminated (or, distinguished from all others) by the word *aham*. [1280]

अन्वयव्यतिरेकाभ्यां यथोक्ताभ्यां पदार्थयोः ।
विज्ञातयोरिदं वाक्यमहमेवेदमित्यतः ॥१२८१॥

Therefore, the sentence *aham evedam* (is expressive of the meanings together) of the two words, as explained (above) through the method of Anvaya and Vyatireka,¹ and are (therefore) known well. [1281]

¹See [Vol.1:1982] Introduction.

Verses 1282-1288 bring out the *sāmānādhikarānya* in the stultification of *idam sarvam aham eva*

बाध्यबाधकयोरेवं ज्ञातयोरुक्तवर्त्मना ।
प्रतीचि जायते ज्ञानं वाक्यादज्ञानहानिकृत् ॥१२८२॥

When the two (things— *padārthas*), viz. what is to be stultified and what stultifies, are thus known by the way stated (earlier), there arises from the Śruti sentence, on the part of the inner self, the knowledge that causes the destruction (lit. loss) of ignorance. [1282]

ज्ञानाद्धवस्ते हि तमसि धवस्ते द्वैते सहेतुके ।
सर्वः कृत्स्नो भवेदात्मा मनोवाचामगोचरः ॥१२८३॥

When darkness (i.e. ignorance) is destroyed by¹ knowledge, and (also) when (all) duality, together with its cause, is destroyed, all (appearance of the world) would become the whole (or complete) Ātman, (which is) not an object for *manas* and words of speech.² [1283]

¹The word 'by' expresses *hetau pañcamī*.

²This is based on the plural from *manovācām*.

स एष पर उत्कर्षो विद्यायाः संप्रदर्शितः ।
संप्रसाद इदं सर्वमात्मनैवावशिष्यते ॥१२८४॥

This is then stated (lit. shown/established) as the highest excellence of knowledge (of reality) in that all this remains in the deep sleep state, only in (lit. by) its (real form, viz.) the Ātman (absolute). [1284]

This is the meaning of *so 'sya paramo lokah ...* in BU 4.3.20.

एक आत्मेति तद्वद्धीः स्वप्नजाग्रदवस्थयोः ॥१२८५॥
अविचारितसंसिद्धिस्तथैवानात्मधीरपि ।
व्यभिचारस्वभावोक्ता प्रत्यगात्मैकसाक्षिका ॥१२८६॥

In the same way, there is the knowledge¹ (acquired) in the (two) states of dream and waking, [1285]
so also, there is knowledge¹ about the non-Ātman which has its proof (lit. is established) without (any) deliberate consideration—it is described as having the nature in variance with its witness in the inner self alone. [1286]

¹This is specific knowledge, involving subject-object relation among things/objects. Therefore, there is the deliberate use of the word *dhī*.

व्यभिचारिमतिष्वेवं बुद्धिरव्यभिचारिणी ।
व्यभिचारित्वसंसिद्धिहेतुरैकात्म्यनिष्ठिता ॥१२८७॥

Thus, among (the different individual selves) having varying intellects, there exists (in reality) knowledge which is not (at all) varying; the cause of the proof (of the varying intellect'), viz. variance, is resting in (i.e. dependent on) the singleness of the Ātman (absolute). [1287]

सत्यामपि त्वविद्यायां प्रमाणानुगमात्पुरा ।
वास्तवं वृत्तमीदृङ्गनः सिद्धं ह्यनुभवाश्रयम् ॥१२८८॥

And (*tu*), even while there exists ignorance earlier (as understood) from experience,¹ the real existence (lit. happening) is proved for us as having its basis in experience.² [1288]

This concludes the discussion on the sentence *aham evedam...* in BU.

¹This refers to the experience of the states of waking and dream.

²This is the experience of the single Ātman, not associated with duality.

Verses 1289-1295 are an introductor to the discussion of the meaning of BU 4.3.21. It shows the relation between the two, in respect of the statement about aticchanda.

अविद्याविद्ययो रूपं कार्यं चापि समासतः ।
व्याख्यातमेवं मानानां प्राक्सूतेरनुभूतितः ॥१२८९॥

Thus, the nature and the effect of ignorance and knowledge (about the true nature of the Ātman) is explained in brief, with the help of experience,¹ because of its occurrence before² the means of knowledge (begin, or have begun) to operate. [1289]

This is to begin the statement on the relation between BU

4.3.20 and 4.3.21.

¹SP takes *anubhūti* as indicative of Śruti.

²SP understands *prāk* in relation to the states of dream and deep sleep!

अनात्मवस्तुमानानां प्राग्नात्माभिसंगतेः ।

स्वतःसिद्धात्ममेयोत्थरूपतैव प्रतीयते ॥१२९०॥

Before there occurs the connection of the means of knowledge, which are non-Ātman objects, with the non-Ātman (viz. ignorance), there is experienced only (the thing's, i.e. the real Ātman's) having the nature (of knowledge) arising from the thing to be known, viz. the Ātman, which exists (or, is established) in its own right. [1290]

चिद्रूपैरेव तैः सद्विरनात्मार्थोऽपि शक्यते ।

प्रमातुं तदृतेऽनात्मा ह्यन्धकारप्रनृत्तवत् ॥१२९१॥

Only through them (i.e. the means of knowing), which are conceived as existent only on account of their being the semblance of sentience, even non-Ātman things¹ can become known; since, without that, non-Ātman things would be like a dance performance in darkness.² [1291]

This is to assert that the worldly knowledge and its means are basically non-sentient and, therefore, depend on the sentient Ātman for their worldly-being.

¹This plural is from the use of the word in the singular.

²That is, it would be meaningless, because that cannot be seen (i.e. experienced).

अनात्मापि विनात्मानं नैवानात्मायते यतः ।

अवस्तुत्वान्निरात्मत्वाद्धन्धयासूनुनृशृङ्गवत् ॥१२९२॥

Since, (thus,) the non-Ātman cannot behave as a non-Ātman, without (or, in the absence of) the Ātman; (therefore), it is

like the son of a barren woman or the horn of a man, owing to its nature of not being the (real) thing and not having the Ātman as the (essential) part of it. [1292]

जाग्रत्स्वप्नसुषुप्तेषु त्वात्माविद्या मृषा सति ।
व्यवहारपथं प्राप्ता स्वतःसिद्धात्मसाक्षिका ॥१२९३॥

In the states of waking, dream and deep sleep, however, ignorance about (the nature of the) Ātman enters into (i.e. influences) the way of worldly dealings, becomes self-established, and is having the Ātman as its witness—(all the while), remaining (only a) false (thing). [1293]

सर्वोऽस्मीति हि विद्येयमविद्यातोऽन्यदर्शनम् ।
उभयं संविदायत्तं दर्शनं प्राक्प्रमागमात् ॥१२९४॥

That (awareness), viz. 'I am all (this world)' is awareness (or, knowledge of the real, the Ātman) and any awareness (there could be) other than what is ignorance. Both of them are dependent on the knowing reality (*saṁvid*) and the sight of both of them (as two distinct knowledges) can be (or, is possible) only before the rise of right knowledge (about the Ātman). [1294]

This is to point out that such discrimination as *vidyā* and *avidyā* is based on the awareness of duality, i.e. absence of the knowledge about the Ātman as the single thing of reality.

Now follows in verses 1295-1355 the discussion on BU 4.3.21.

एषोऽस्य परमो लोको यः सर्वोऽस्मीति दर्शितः ।
अतः परं परावस्था निरविद्या प्रदर्श्यते ॥१२९५॥

For this one (viz. the individual self), this is the highest world which has been stated (lit. shown) in (the words) 'I am all (this world)'. Now, hereafter, will be explained (its) highest

self, (which is) altogether free from ignorance.

[1295]

अनाप्तकाममस्योक्तमात्माविद्यैकहेतुकम् ।

रूपं पूर्वमिह त्वस्य ध्वस्ताविद्यमथोच्यते ॥१२९६॥

That form of this one (i.e. the individual self or the Ātman)¹ was explained earlier¹ which did not have in it any desire obtaining (and) which had only one cause (of its existence), viz. ignorance about itself (or, the Ātman).²

[1296]

¹This refers to the dream state, that was described before this individual self's awareness in the form *aham evedam* was described.

²SP holds this reference as being to the Ātman (absolute).

छन्दः कामोऽधिकारात्स्यात्साहचर्याच्च पाप्मना ।

अतिक्रान्तं यतश्छन्दमतिच्छन्दमिदं ततः ॥१२९७॥

This (word) *aticchanda* is so formed (as meaning) that which has transcended *chanda*,¹ wherein *chanda* means desire, since that is the *adhikāra* 'topic (for discussion)' and also because of its association with sin.²

[1297]

In this connection, attention is to be invited to two more points: (i) The Mādhyandina recension reads *aticchandaḥ* for *aticchandā* in our text. It is a neuter form alright and goes well with *rūpam*. In BUB, we have first to understand *aticchandā(h)* as a qualifier of *lokaḥ* and later *aticchandā* as equivalent to *aticchandam*. In Mādhyandina, this is avoided.

¹It is pointed out in SP that this word *chanda* (ending in the vowel *a*) is to be understood as apart from *chandas* (ending in the consonant *s*); the first means 'desire' while the other 'a metre (in verse)'—like Gāyatrī etc. It is to be noted, however, that both Sureśvara and (consequently) SP have followed BUB.

²In Vedic literature, there occurs pairs of such words as end both in a vowel and in a consonant after that vowel. Thus, e.g.

barhi and *barhis*. It is, therefore, not likely that BU might have used the word *chandas* beside *chanda*. And Sureśvara seems to be aware of this which lead him to say *vivṛtiś chāndasi jñeyā* in just the next verse.

विवृतिश्छान्दसी ज्ञेया लक्षणासंभवादिह ॥१२९८॥

पाप्मशब्देन चात्र स्याद्धर्माधर्मपरिग्रहः ।

पाप्मनो विजहातीति तथा चैव पुरोदितम् ॥१२९९॥

Here,¹ this relation (or, change in the word) should be known as a Vedic (characteristic), since there is no indication (whatsoever of any other reason). [1298]

Also, by the use (lit. choice— *graha*) of the word *pāpman*, there should be understanding (lit. acceptance) of (the meaning) merit and demerit;¹ for, it is already said (so) in (actual words:) *pāpmano vijāhati*.² [1299]

¹That is, in using the long ending of the word *aticchandā*.

²Cf. BU 4.3.8. This explains the word *apahatapāpman*. All ritual activities are understood as causing sins.

Verses 1300-1304 state a justification of holding as real the form of the *Ātman*, which is noted in the word *apahatapāpman*.

अपेतकारकत्वादिहेतोरज्ञानतो हतेः ।

धर्माधर्मादिपाप्मानो रूपमात्मन उच्यते ॥१३००॥

सदापहतपाप्मेति भयहेतोश्च लङ्घनात् ।

आत्मनोऽस्याभयं रूपं सदानस्तमितोदितम् ॥१३०१॥

Because of the destruction of the ignorance which is the cause, viz. in the form of an instrument etc., (there results) it is said (the real) form of the *Ātman*, i.e. that which was earlier (in the form of) sins (consisting in) merit and demerit; [1300] (that was indicated) in the statement of its ever being *apahatapāpman* 'free from sin'; so also, on account of its transcending the cause of fear (viz. ignorance), there comes

to be that form of the Ātman which is free from fear. The word *sadā* conveys that (this form) has neither a beginning nor an end. [1301]

वास्तवेनैव वृत्तेन ज्ञेयकार्यसमाप्तिः ।
अतः सर्वं कृतं ज्ञानं नातोऽन्यदवशिष्यते ॥१३०२॥

(Thus) because of (the Ātman's) having accomplished all of its knowable activities by its real nature (lit. action); all (activities of the world) are (said to be) done by it (and) there remains nothing (to be done). [1302]

यत एवमतो यावत्किञ्चित्कार्यान्तरायकम् ।
मोहव्यवहितं वा यत्प्राप्तं तद्ब्रह्मबोधतः ॥१३०३॥

Since this is so, whatever (could occur as) an obstacle to the Ātman's (accomplishing) some task (lit. effect), or whatever is obscured by ignorance, becomes contained (i.e. accomplished and overcome respectively) by knowing the Brahman. [1303]

This is the meaning of the sentence *asyaitad aticchandā*

कामकर्ममहामोहरहितं रूपमात्मनः ।
श्रुत्या प्रदर्शितं साक्षात्करविन्यस्तबिल्ववत् ॥१३०४॥

That form of the Ātman, which is without the powerful/effective ignorance, which is (caused by) desire and activity, has the Śruti presented (lit. shown) as directly perceptible like a *bilva* fruit placed on (one's) hand. [1304]

Verses 1305-1322 pertain to a doubt that the Ātman's nature of being self-shining is also an effect that is produced.

स्वयंज्योतिष्ट्वमुक्तं यदात्मनः प्राक्प्रयत्नतः ।
तदप्यात्मन आगामि शङ्क्यते कामकर्मवत् ॥१३०५॥

(A doubt is raised:) 'It is feared (lit. doubted) whether what was earlier stated with great care as the self-shining nature of the Ātman would also come to be in the individual self, as associated with desire and activity'. [1305]

यस्मात्सषुप्त आत्मायं नात्मानं नाप्यनात्मनः ।
जाग्रद्वद्वेत्ति तेनास्य चैतन्यं कामकर्मवत् ॥१३०६॥

'Since this individual self, that is in the deep sleep state, does not know (anything), as in the waking state it knows either itself or (any) non-Ātman, therefore, its sentience is associated with desire and activity.' [1306]

नैतदेवं यतो भेदज्ञानं मोहोत्थकारक-
संश्रयादेव न पुनर्मोहाभावे तदिष्यते ॥१३०७॥

(The doubt is thus answered away:) 'No, this is not so, since this awareness of duality (has arisen) only because of its basis in those means of activity which are produced by ignorance; it is not accepted (to be coming) on account of the absence of ignorance'. [1307]

यत्र वा अन्यदित्येवं भेदज्ञानमभाषत ।
सत्येव प्रत्यगज्ञाने तस्याज्ञानसमन्वयात् ॥१३०८॥

(Also the Śruti) has stated¹ (or, described) the awareness of duality thus, i.e. in the sentence *yatra vā anyad eva ...*; for, while there has occurred the knowledge (about the true nature) of the inner self (or sentience), there could not be any association of it (i.e. the inner self) with ignorance. [1308]

¹Cf. BU 4.3.31.

यत्र त्वस्येति विध्वस्त आत्माज्ञाने प्रबोधतः ।
तत्केन कमिति श्रुत्या भेददृष्टिर्निषिध्यते ॥१३०९॥

When (on hearing the Śruti) *yatra tv asya ...*,¹ the ignorance (of an individual) about the self (or, Ātman) comes to be destroyed and (there has arisen) awakening (to its own nature), then (at that time), the Śruti rejects the notion (lit. seeing) of duality (in the statement) *tat kena kam*¹ [1309]

¹Cf. BU 2.5.15.

एकत्वमेव तेनात्र भेदादर्शनकारणम् ।
स्त्रीपुंद्ष्टान्तवचसा तदेतत्प्रतिपाद्यते ॥१३१०॥

Here therefore (or, thereby) the reason for (one's) not seeing duality is noticed—and it is this that is affirmed in the words expressing the example of a woman and a man (uniting with her). [1310]

चेतो नुरागसिद्धयर्थं प्रिययेति विशेषणम् ।
द्विष्टायां सत्यपि स्त्रीत्वे चेतो नैवानुरज्यते ॥१३११॥

The qualifier *priyayā* (of the woman) is (here used) for establishing (the rise of) love (or, attachment) in the heart (of the person); for, in the case of the woman (who is) disliked (lit. hated) by him, his heart would not at all be tinged (i.e. inspired or roused) by (any) longing for her. [1311]

अतीव कामवशगः स्त्रीगुणोपेतया स्त्रिया ।
प्रियया कामयन्त्या च परिष्वक्तः पुमानिह ॥१३१२॥

This person, quite affected (or, overcome) by desire is here¹ stated to be embraced by a woman, possessed of (all) feminine excellences, (which are very) dear to him, and longing (for him). [1312]

¹Read SP: *iheti pariṣvaṅgaphalavācyaṃ karmocyate pumān na iti sambandhaḥ.*

परिष्वक्तगिरा चात्र व्यामिश्रीभाव उच्यते ।
 पृक्तावयवयोः प्रीत्या स्त्रीपुंसोरपरस्परम् ॥१३१३॥
 उत्पन्नसंभोगफलः पुमान्मैथुनकर्मणि ।
 स न वेत्ति यथा बाह्यं सुखाविष्टो न चान्तरम् ॥१३१४॥

And, by (the use of) the word *pariṣvakta* here,¹ there is conveyed the sense of (their) becoming united; since a male comes to have in the act of copulation the result of the union accrued to him, when the sex-organs of the man and the woman have joined together with a feeling of love. And he does not experience (lit. know or become aware of) the joy coming from any external or internal (source).² [1313-1314]

¹This refers to the sentence in the Śruti: *yathā priyayā ... veda nāntaram*.

²Read the comment of SP at the end: *dvayor ukte karmani tatphale tadadhīnājnānasāmye 'pi prādhānyāt puṁso nirdeśaḥ*.

परिष्वङ्गाद्यथा पूर्वं वेद बाह्यान्तरं स्फुटम् ।
 परिष्वक्तस्तु नैवं स वेद बाह्यं न चान्तरम् ॥१३१५॥

As the man did know before the embrace (by/of the woman) clearly either external or internal (joy), so does he not know either external or internal (joy).¹ [1315]

¹Or, world; cf. the next verse.

तमोव्यवहितैकात्म्यस्तथाविद्योत्थकार्यगः ।
 वेद बाह्यं जगत्सर्वं स्वं चात्मानं तमस्विनम् ॥१३१६॥

The man knew (i.e. became aware of) all of the external world and also his own self as his (awareness of the) oneness with the Ātman was covered (or obscured) by ignorance and he himself was affected by (lit. was a part of) the effect arising from ignorance. [1316]

This verse explains the first line of the preceding verse. Also, from here onwards up to verse 1334 below, there is discussed the nature of the self in the deep sleep as equivalent to that of the Ātman absolute.

कार्यकारणरूपः संस्तद्विरुद्धैकरूपिणा ।

परिष्वक्तः पुमान्प्राज्ञे प्राज्ञेनात्मायमात्मना ॥१३१७॥

तमस्विनि निवृत्तेऽस्मिन्देहान्ते प्रत्यगात्मनि ।

वितमस्कात्मना योगे स्वप्नजाग्रत्क्रियाक्षये ॥१३१८॥

This individual self, being of the nature of effect(s) and cause(s), is embraced, in its Prājña¹ state by the Prājña² 'wise' Ātman which has a nature opposed to its (own nature); [1317]

and also when the inner self, having darkness (enveloping it), has returned inside the body³ (that is to say), when (all) activity of the dream and waking states has ceased to be (lit. has been completely diminished) and when (then) there is thus its union with the Ātman which is without any darkness. [1318]

These verses bring out the sense of *evam eva*.

¹This is the name given to the individual self in the sleep state.

²This attribute of the Ātman is taken in the sense: 'the fully knowing'; cf. *prajña* which is the same as *prājña* by the addition of the suffix *-a* as *svārthe* not modifying the original sense in any way; Pāṇini 5.4.38: *prajñādibhyaś ca*, laying down the *taddhita* suffix *-an*.

³The word *dehānte* is to be understood as 'inside the body' convey the sense of the individual self's entering into the intellect (*buddhi*) alone.

अविद्यान्वेति कार्यं स्वं न त्वात्मानमकार्यतः ।

कार्यं स्वकारणस्थं च न त्वात्मस्थमकारणात् ॥१३१९॥

Ignorance continues to be associated with (lit. follows) its effect, but not the Ātman, owing to its not being an effect (of ignorance); an effect (always) abides (here, merges) in its cause (here, impression or the intellect) but it does not abide (i.e. merge) in the Ātman which is not a cause (of it). [1319]

SP sums up the argument in the verse thus: *ajñānatajjayor anyonyam eva yogo nātmaneti samudāyārthah.*

आत्माभासोऽपि योऽज्ञाने तत्कार्ये चावभासते ।
कार्यकारणतारूपस्तमप्येषोऽतिवर्तते ॥१३२०॥
कूटस्थात्मानुरोधित्वात्तावन्मात्रात्मकत्वतः ।
न कार्यं कारणं चातः कटाक्षेणापि वीक्षते ॥१३२१॥

And this Ātman transcends also that semblance of the Ātman which appears (or, is felt) in ignorance and in its effect(s), and which appears to be in the form of effect(s) and cause(s) [1320]

and it does not cast even a glance at (both) the effect(s) and the cause(s), because of its being similar to (lit. following) (the nature of) the immutable and because of its being only that much (i.e. not being different from it). [1321]

विज्ञानात्मा परिष्वक्तः प्राज्ञेनैव परात्मना ।
भेदकारणविध्वस्तौ भेदधीर्विनिवर्तते ॥१३२२॥

(Thus) the individual self, which has (specific) knowledge, is embraced by the Prājña 'wise' Ātman, i.e. the highest Ātman (or, self) and the awareness (*dhi*) of distinct (or, variety in) objects becomes lost (or disappears), for there is the cause of the distinction removed (lit. destroyed). [1322]

यस्मादेवमतः प्राह न बाह्यमिति नः श्रुतिः ।
ऐकात्म्यमात्रावसितेर्न वेदान्तर्बहिस्तथा ॥१३२३॥

Since this is so, therefore, the Śruti stated for (or, told) us

(*naḥ*) *na bāhyam*; since also there is the end (of all distinctions) in the singleness of the Ātman, the individual self did not know anything within or without. [1323]

This is the meaning of *na bāhyaṃ kiṃ cana veda nāntaram*.

क्रियाकारकसंभेदहेतौ सत्यसतीदृशम् ।
सर्वदैवात्मनो रूपं निरस्ताशेषभेदकम् ॥१३२४॥

Whether or not there exists the cause for (any) distinctions consisting in activity and the means of it, such (alone) is ever the nature of the Ātman, from which has remained away the entire cause of distinction.¹ [1324]

¹SP states that *nirastāśeṣabhedaka* is the explanation of *īdrśa* 'ch'.

नात्मवृत्तमपेक्षयेदं नापि बाह्यस्य वस्तुनः ।
क्रियाकारकवद्वस्तु किञ्चिदीक्षामहेऽमितेः ॥१३२५॥

We do not accept (lit. see) anything, which comprises action and its means, by depending on (or, lit. having depended on) the nature (*vṛtta*) of the Ātman and also owing to non-grasping (lit. non-knowing) of any external object. [1325]

सर्वमन्यानपेक्षं सत्स्वात्ममात्रतयेक्षितम् ।
ऐकात्म्यतो हिरूपं न वस्तूत्प्रेक्ष्यतेऽण्वपि ॥१३२६॥

All this is understood (lit. noticed) as existing and not dependent on (any) other (thing) because of its being only the Ātman; not indeed an extremely small thing is seen to have a form (which is) apart (or, far) from the state (of the Ātman as) being single. [1326]

आपेक्षिकं तु यद्रूपं तन्मिथ्येत्युपपादितम् ।
स्वतो यद्वस्तुतो नास्ति तत्कुतौऽन्यव्यपेक्षया ॥१३२७॥

And (*tu*) whatever be the form (of a thing), which is dependent (on some other thing), is affirmed to be false; for, in its own right, it is not an existent (thing); how could it (then exist) through its dependence on another (thing)? [1327]

अतः सर्वानपेक्षं यत्स्वमहिम्नैव सिध्यति ।
तदेव परमार्थं स्याद्वस्त्वैकात्म्यस्वलक्षणम् ॥१३२८॥

Therefore, that is the highest reality which exists on account of its own power (or, greatness), as not dependent on all (other things), and has its peculiar characteristic, viz. singleness in nature. [1328]

यस्मादेवमतः प्राह तद्वा अस्येति नः श्रुतिः ।
उक्तात्मवस्तुनो रूपं कामाविद्यादिवर्जितम् ॥१३२९॥

Since this is so, the Śruti has therefore told (lit. stated for) us in *tad vā asya*¹ The form of the thing, which is described (thus), is devoid of desire and ignorance etc.² [1329]

¹*tad vā asyaitad āptakāmaṁ āptakāmaṁ akāmaṁ rūpaṁ.*

²This refers to the various effects of these.

कामकर्मादिवन्नेदं मृत्योर्धर्मो भवेदतः ।
चैतन्यं प्रत्यगात्मैव यस्मादुक्तेन हेतुना ॥१३३०॥

Since the inner self itself is sentience, for the reason stated above, therefore, this is not a property of death, like desire and activity. [1330]

आत्मत्वान्न विभागोऽत्र ज्ञातृज्ञानादिलक्षणः ।
अनपास्ततमस्कोऽपि भेदं नात्मनि पश्यति ॥१३३१॥

Because of its being the Ātman, there cannot be (lit. is not) here (i.e. in the individual self) a division characterized as

the knower, knowing etc.,¹ the one,² who has got over (lit. cast off) darkness, also does not notice any distinction (as existing) in the Ātman.³ [1331]

¹This refers to the means of knowing, the object of knowing and so on.

²That is, the individual self, who is getting rid of ignorance.

³This is because the absolute Ātman is devoid of any duality (dvaya). This indicates also the absence of duality for the person in the deep sleep state.

अविद्यावर्त्मदृष्टयैव ह्यविद्याकार्यवस्तुगम् ।
द्वैतमाभासते व्योम्नि नीलदिङ्मण्डलत्ववत् ॥१३३२॥

Indeed, only by the way of (one's being misled/overpowered by) ignorance, there appears (for that one) duality obtaining in things, which are the effects of ignorance, as (there appear for one) the blue (colour) and circle of (i.e. division in) quarters, in the sky. [1332]

This argument is in keeping with the Śruti statement *yatra dvaitam iva ...* (BU 2.4.14; 4.5.15) as SP points out.

Verse 1333 explains the meaning of the sentence *tad vaitat*.

निरविद्यं तु यद्रूपमनन्यापेक्षसिद्धिकम् ।
तद्वा अस्यैतदिति तच्छ्रुत्या निर्वर्ण्यतेऽधुना ॥१३३३॥

and (*tu*) that form (of the Ātman) which is not affected by (or, does not have) ignorance, and whose proof does not depend on another (thing) is now explained by the Śruti in the statement *tad vā asyaitat ... (rūpam)*. [1333]

Verses 1334-1336 explain the sentence about *āptakāma*.

सर्वैकात्म्यमिदं यस्मादात्मनो रूपमीदृशम् ।

तदाविष्क्रियते तस्मात्करविन्यस्तबिल्ववत् ॥१३३४॥

Since the form of the Ātman is such (as this, viz) all this is (but) the existent singleness of the Ātman, therefore, it is revealed (lit. made clear) like a *bilva* fruit placed on one's hand. [1334]

आत्मनो यदविद्योत्थं रूपं संसारभूमिगम् ।
अनाप्तकामं तत्सर्वमपेक्ष्येदमिहोच्यते ॥१३३५॥
आप्तकामादिकं सर्वं वस्तुवृत्तव्यपेक्षया ।
आप्ताप्तव्यादिहीनत्वादानन्दैकात्म्यवस्तुनः ॥१३३६॥

Having kept in view all that form of the Ātman, which (it seems) has arisen from ignorance, and which has not obtained (the fulfilment of) its desire(s) and, thus, belongs to the transmigratory world, this (i.e. the following) is stated here: [1335]

in *āptakāma* etc., that is (so described) in view of the nature of the (real) thing, since that thing, viz. joy, i.e. single (existence) of the thing called the Ātman, is devoid of what can be described as obtained and/or what is to be obtained. [1336]

Verse 1337 states the purpose of *āptakāma* etc.

पुमर्थः कामशब्दार्थो नान्योऽर्थः काम्यते यतः ।
आप्ताशेषपुमर्थोऽयं सर्वसाधननिस्पृहः ॥१३३७॥

The meaning of the word *kāma* is the end/goal of human (lit. man's) life, since no other object (than the Ātman) is desired. Therefore, this individual self is one that has obtained all the ends/goals of human life and is not at all desirous (*nispr̥ha*) of all of the means (of accomplishing various objects in life). [1337]

This verse asserts that the word *kāma* means *pumārtha*; it

s justified in the next two verses, in two alternative ways.

सत्यकामादिशब्देन यदप्यन्यत्र भाषितम् ।
एतद्वाक्यानुरोधेन व्याख्येयं तदपि स्फुटम् ॥१३३८॥

Whatever is understood (lit. said/mentioned) elsewhere by the word(s) *satyakāma* etc.¹ is also to be explained clearly in accordance with (or, following) this sentence.² [1338]

¹Cf. *satyakāmaḥ satyasaṅkalpaḥ* (CU 8.1.5), also *Maitrā-nyupaniṣad* 7.7.

²This refers to *aticchandavākya* (BU 4.3.21).

Verses 1339-1346 amplify the ideas in *āptakāma* etc.

आत्ममात्रं समुत्सृज्य सत्यत्वं नान्यतो यतः ।
तत्रैव निरधार्येतद्यत्र नान्यदिति श्रुतेः ॥१३३९॥

Since there would not be (obtained) the nature of what is true in any other thing, i.e. by excepting what is only the Ātman; this¹ is decided/determined (*niradhāri*) only there, i.e. in the Śruti *yatra nānyat*² [1339]

The translation has tried to put the meaning of the verse only too literally. Alternatively it could be: The nature of truth cannot be ascertained from (or obtained in) anything else than only in (the reality called) Ātman.

¹That is, *kāma* means *pumārtha*. The preceding verse stated the Śruti as an authority, whereas this verse points to the realising itself for causing realisation of Truth.

²Cf. CU 4.24.1: *yatra nānyat paśyati nānyac chruṇoti nānyad jānāti sa bhuīmā*.

सुखसंविद्धि काम्योऽर्थो बाह्यसाधनसाधनः ।
संविदेव सुखं यस्मादाप्तकाममिदं ततः ॥१३४०॥

(It is known that) an object which is desired and has (some) external means for obtaining (or, acquiring the same) yields (or, is the cause) of the experience of pleasure. (That is how) this (Truth, viz. Ātman) which is described as *āptakāma* 'what has acquired the end of human life,' i.e. the *saṃvid* 'knowing one' is itself pleasure.¹ [1340]

¹SP points to BU 3.9.28: *vijñānam ānandam brahma* as the basis of this argument.

कामकामिप्रभेदेन प्रतीचोऽस्याप्तकामता ।
हिरण्यगर्भवत्किं वा निर्भेदस्येह भण्यते ॥१३४१॥

This inner self has the nature of an *āptakāma* 'one who has obtained (the fulfilment of) desire(s)', through (its own) division into desire and the desirous. Or, here¹ is stated about this one, as in the case of Hiranyagarbha,² who is without any division in it. [1341]

¹That is, in the Śruti.

²Cf. Pāṇini .5.1.116: *tatra tasyeva*.

आत्मैव कामा निःशेषा नात्मरूपप्रभेदतः ।
आत्मैवेदं सर्वमिति प्रत्यङ्मात्रावशेषतः ॥१३४२॥

The Ātman alone is all desires without exception (*niḥśeṣa*); (they do not exist) as apart from the Ātman. The Ātman alone is all this; for there remains (here)¹ only the inner self. [1342]

¹Once again, this seems to be the reference to a person (or, the individual self) in deep sleep.

समस्तव्यस्तताशङ्कामुच्छेत्तुं चोत्तरं वचः ।
अकाममित्यतो ऽवस्तसमस्तव्यस्तरूपकम् ॥१३४३॥

And the later statement (of the Śruti) is for answering away (lit. destroying) any doubt/suspicion about (the Ātman's existence in) collectivity and particularity. That is to say, (the word) *akāma* conveys (the sense of) one who has removed (lit. destroyed) all collective and particular forms. [1343]

आप्तकामात्मकामत्ववचसैव निराकृताः ।
कामाः सर्वेऽकाममिति तथापि पुनरुच्यते ॥१३४४॥

(One can ask about the veracity in the notions about) all the desires (as existing) have been set aside by the very statement about the Ātman's being *āptakāmātmakāma* and yet there is once again stated (the meaning of the nature of the Ātman by the use of) the word *akāma*. [1344]

The doubt in verse 1344, which is based on the preceding verse is: the words *āptakāma* and *ātmakāma* have already set aside the notion of *śamastavyasta* nature of the Ātman, hence there is no need of using the word *akāma*. This is answered away in the next verse.

आत्माश्रयत्वं कामानां केचिद्व्याचक्षतेऽबुधाः ।
अतस्तत्प्रतिषेधार्थं भूयोऽकाममितीरणम् ॥१३४५॥

Some unwise persons posit the idea that desires have a support/basis in the Ātman and, therefore, (only) for rejecting that position there is the use of the word *akāma* once again (i.e. even after the idea to be conveyed by it is already conveyed by other words). [1345]

कामादिहेतुकः शोकः कामाद्यज्ञानहेतुकम् ।
तदभावादर्थैकात्म्यं शोकान्तरमितीर्यते ॥१३४६॥

Grief has desire etc. as its cause/origin (and) desire etc. have ignorance as their cause/origin. Owing to the absence of these then is expressed that the form of the Ātman is without any

grief.¹

[1346]

¹On *śokāntara* BUB comments *śokacchidra*, *śokaśūnya* or *śokamadhya*, i.e. 'essence of grief'. The Mādhyandina recension reads *aśokāntaram*; cf. verse 1350 below.

Verses 1347-1351 state another meaning of the word *śokāntara*.

यदि वा शोकवद्वस्तु शोकशब्देन भण्यते ।
गुणत्वाच्छोकशब्दस्य मतुपो लुप्तता भवेत् ॥१३४७॥

Or perhaps, a thing, which has *grief* associated with it, is described (or, understood) by the word *śoka*, the word *śoka*, being a conveyor of a property (*guṇa*) of some object (*dravya*), has possibly its possessive suffix (*-matup*) dropped.¹ [1347]

¹That is to say: *śoka* is *śokavat* 'one having grief,' the *-vat* (in Pāṇini's terminology *-matup*) is apparently dropped.

शोकार्हवत्पदार्थेभ्यो जात्यन्तरमिदं यतः ।
अहेतुफलरूपत्वाच्छोकान्तरमतो मतम् ॥१३४८॥

Since this (form of the *Ātman*) is different from (that of) the other objects, which can have (lit. deserve having) grief, therefore, it (i.e. the *Ātman* itself) is understood (i.e. known) to be *śokāntara* 'devoid of grief' for it is itself having a form which is not either a cause or a result.¹ [1348]

¹That is to say: it does not originate anything else and also is not an effect of something else.

शोकस्य प्रत्यगात्मा वा शोकान्तरगिरोच्यते ।
शोकहेतोरपि प्रत्यङ्मात्मा स्याच्छोकवान्कथम् ॥१३४९॥

Or, it is possible that the word *śokāntara* conveys the sense of the inner self on the nature of grief; thus, therefore, how

can the inner self, itself being the nature of grief, be grief? ¹

[1349]

¹In connection with this, SP makes a pertinent comment: *na i sarpasya rajjuṃ vinā sattvābāve tasyās tadvattvaṃ 'stīti bhāvaḥ*.

अशोकान्तरमिति वा श्रुत्यन्तरसमाश्रयात् ।

अशोकादपरोऽशोकोऽशोकान्तरमितीर्यते ॥१३५०॥

Or, by turning (lit. resorting) to another Śruti, (the word should read:) *aśokāntara* and that would then mean: an *aśoka* other than some *aśoka*, i.e. then *aśokāntara*.

[1350]

Sureśvara has taken for this verse, as its basis, the reading of the Mādhyandina recension of BU 4.1.22 which reads: *cchando 'pahatapāpmābhayaṃ rūpam aśokāntaram*; cf. note 1 in verse 1346 above. The text is commented upon by Vidyāranya who explains *aśokāntaram* thus: *na vidyate śokāntaram madhye asya tad aśokāntaram śokaśūnyam iti yāvat*. This, in purport, is comment agrees with the comment of BUB.

Sureśvara, however, gives his own interpretation of this reading of the Mādhyandina recension, in the next verse.

शोकायोग्यः शुचा हीनोऽशोकशब्देन भण्यते ।

यद्वान्तरयते शोकमानन्दैकस्वभावतः ।

शैत्यं हुताशवत्तस्माच्छोकान्तरमिदं भवेत् ॥१३५१॥

One who should not be (lit. does not deserve to be) in grief, (or, in other words,) one who is without grief, is mentioned by the word *aśoka*. Or perhaps, this one, who removes (or, takes away) grief (*śoka*), owing to its nature of being only joy/happiness (is *śokāntara*), like fire (which removes cold), is *śokāntara*.

[1351]

Sureśvara has first explained the word *aśoka* as read in the Mādhyandina recension, and then, following the Kāṇva recension,

offered his own explanation of the word *śokāntara*.

शोकादेर्जनकं यद्वा तच्छोकान्तं भवेत्तमः ।
तस्यारं छिद्रमेतत्स्याच्छान्दसी वर्णनिहन्तिः ॥१३५२॥

Or perhaps, that which causes (lit. originates) grief, viz. darkness (i.e. ignorance), is called *śokānta*; and this (viz. the Ātman) would (then) be *ara*, i.e. a hole in it (i.e. the piercer of it) and then there could be (or, has been) the loss (lit. concealment) of a letter (viz. *a*) in the Vedic manner. [1352]

This is yet another explanation of *śokāntara*, given by Sureśvara. According to him, the word *śokāntara* should have been *śokāntāra*, with the dropping of *a* in *ara* in Vedic manner!

अविद्याकामकर्माणि निःसङ्गत्वस्वभावतः ।
अतिवर्तत आत्मायं वस्तुवृत्तानुरोधतः ॥१३५३॥

This Ātman¹ transcends ignorance, desire and activities by its having the nature of one who is devoid of attachment in its entirety (*niḥsaṅga*) and being in accordance with the nature of the (real) thing. [1353]

¹Possibly, this is the reference to the individual self that is experiencing deep sleep; cf. the preceding verse.

स्वतो बुद्धं यतो वस्तु स्वतः शुद्धमतोऽद्वयम् ।
स्वतो मुक्तमतः सिद्धमविद्यातज्जहानतः ॥१३५४॥
यत एवमिदं वस्तु अतिच्छन्दादिलक्षणम् ।
निःशेषद्वान्तसंबन्धव्यतिक्रान्तमिदं ततः ॥१३५५॥

Since the (real) thing is, in its own right, enlightened/awake; in its own right, pure and, therefore, without any duality (associated with it); (being so) in its own right, (completely) free and therefore it is established/proven through (by abandoning, or, casting off) ignorance and its effect(s). [1354]

Since this is so, therefore, this thing, whose characteristic is *aticchanda* etc., has transcended the relation to darkness in its reality. [1355]

Now follows up to verse 1376 the discussion on BU 4.3.22.

जन्यकारणसंबन्धात्कार्यकारणसंगतेः ।

जन्यहेत्वतिवृत्तत्वात्पिताप्यत्रापिता ततः ॥१३५६॥

Since the cause and its effect are well acceptable¹ owing to the (invariable) connection (of the cause) with the effect (to be) produced (by or from it), therefore, here (in the illustration), the father becomes a no-father as the effect is beyond (or, above)² the effects of it, viz. the (one to be) produced.³ [1356]

In the translation, we have adopted the usual order of the mention of cause and effect, though not in strict conformity with their mention in the text.

¹*saṅgateḥ* is understood as *susambaddhatvāt*.

²That is, transcends; cf. verse 1369 below.

³This is the doing(s) of *janya*, viz. what is effected by the performance of *dharma* 'merit' or *adharma* 'demerit' by a son that is born of a father (who is the *kāraṇa*). SP clarifies it further as *suptau ca tatsambadhābhāvāt* (viz. *pitāputrayoḥ kārya-kāraṇatvopagamo*) *tannibandhanakāryakāraṇanivṛtter jāgarādaupitāpi susupte bhavaty apitā*) and adds *putre 'pi tulyam etad* *ty arthaḥ*.

अविद्यैव यतो हेतुः कर्तृत्वस्य न वस्तुतः ।

कर्तृत्वे सति कर्माणि नान्यथाकर्तुरात्मनः ॥१३५७॥

Since ignorance alone is the cause of agentship (in the case of the Ātman and) it is not (an agent) in reality; (therefore), on the part of the Ātman which (by its nature) is not an agent,¹ there could be activities only when (it is held to have)

agentship (and) not otherwise.²

[1357]

¹SP rightly points out the break-up of *nānyathākartur* ... into *nānyathā akartur*

²This suggests the absence of liberation (*anirmukti*), in case the Ātman is accepted as an agent of activities.

अविद्यायामतोऽसत्यां नात्मनः कर्तृकर्मणी ।
पितृपुत्रादिसंबन्धो नातोऽस्तीह सुषुप्तगे ॥१३५८॥

Consequently (*ataḥ*), while there is no presence (or existence) of ignorance, there cannot be agentship and objectship (acceptable) in the case of the Ātman.¹ (Indeed) here there is not (at all) any relation such as² that of a father and (his) son in the case of (the Ātman) which is in (deep) sleep.

[1358]

¹Read SP: *kartr̥tvasyāvāstavatvam akartuḥ karmābhāvaś cātaḥ-śabdārthaḥ*.

²The word *ādi* suggests the other relations (or connections) mentioned in BU 4.3.22.

असङ्गोऽयं स्वतो यस्मान्नातः केनचिदात्मनः ।
सर्वावस्थासु संबन्धः संबन्धोऽतोऽस्य मोहतः ॥१३५९॥

Since this one (viz. the Ātman) is by its very nature unattached¹ (to anything), therefore, there is no relation of the Ātman to any (of the) objects, in all the states of the Ātman (and), therefore, there can be its relation (to such objects only) on account of delusion.²

[1359]

¹That is, unrelated to, or, not affected by.

²This is *moha* for *avidyā* 'ignorance'.

Now follows up to verse 1369 the purport of *atra stenah* ... in BU.

शुभकर्माभिसंबन्धः केवलो नास्य वार्यते ।
निषिध्यते यतो योगः कुत्सितेनापि कर्मणा ॥१३६०॥

(However) the relation of this one to only auspicious activities is not set aside,¹ since there is (noticed in the Śruti passage the mention of) its connection with (other) censureable² (activities) also. [1360]

¹Or, denied; cf. *apahatapāpman* the Ātman on BU 4.3.21 above.

²Literally, censured.

विप्रहाटकहार्यत्र स्तेनशब्देन भण्यते ।
भ्रूणघनसहचारित्वाच्चाण्डालो ब्राह्मणीसुतः ॥१३६१॥
शूद्रेण जातो विज्ञेयः प्रातिलोम्योपलक्षणः ।
वरिष्ठब्रह्महा चेह भ्रूणहेत्यभिधीयते ॥१३६२॥

It is the stealer of a Brāhmaṇa's gold that is expressed by the word *stena*, on account of his association with the killer of (a Brāhmaṇa in the form of) a foetus.¹ A Cāṇḍāla is to be known as the son of a Brāhmaṇa woman, [1361]
born from a Śūdra—(thus) characterized by marriage² in reverse order. Here,³ the word *bhrūṇahā* is expressed in the sense of a killer of a Brāhmaṇa who is (of) the highest caste.⁴ [1362]

¹This refers to the future sacrificer, a Brāhmaṇa to be born.

²SP quotes:

*āyogavaś ca kṣattā ca cāṇḍālaś cādhamo nṛṇām /
prātilomyena jāyante śūdrād apasadās trayah //*

(*Manusmṛti* 10.16); and also

*brāhmanyām kṣatriyāt sūto vaiśyād vaidehakas tathā /
śūdrāj jātas tu cāṇḍālah sarvadharmabahiskṛtaḥ //*

(*Yājñavalkyasmṛti* 1.93); cf. *Manusmṛti* 10.11-12.

³Sureśvara points out the significance of the word *bhrūṇahā*

in BU 4.3.22.

⁴This explains the purpose of *viprahāṭakahārī*; also read NKL (ms. p.668): *saṃgavedāvadhyānī* (sic) *bhrūṇa iti*. Earlier, under verse 1361, NKL reads: *bhrūṇo garbhas tasya hantā bhrūṇaghnaḥ*.

उत्पन्नः क्षत्रियायां यः शूद्रेणैव स उच्यते ।

पौल्कसः पुलकसो ज्ञेयः स्वार्थ एव च तद्धितः ॥१३६३॥

He is designated as a Paulkasa who is begotten in a Kṣatriya woman by a Śūdra.¹ He is to be known as the same as Pulkasa; for (in Paulka there is addition of) a *taddhita* (secondary) suffix which conveys the same sense (as of the basic form).²

[1363]

¹SP supports this, citing *Manusmṛti* 10.18:

jāto niṣādāc chūdrāyām jātyā bhavati pulkasaḥ /

(*Manusmṛti* 10.17ab—reading *pukkasah* for *pulkasah*);

and also

viprān mūrdhāvasikto hi kṣatriyāyām viśaḥ striyām /

ambasthaḥ śūdryām niṣādo jātaḥ pāraśavo 'pi ca //

(*Yājñavalkyasmṛti* 1.91), cf. *Manusmṛti* 10.8.

²Read NKL (ms. p.668): *vayata e vāyasa itivad ananyārthatvāt (ta)ddhitasyāntapratyasyety arthaḥ*(sic)?

निकृष्टदेहसंबन्धप्रापकैरपि कर्मभिः ।

असंबद्धः सुषुप्तस्थः कर्महेत्वन्भिप्लुतः ॥१३६४॥

Though not connected with activities which cause connections with lower bodies,¹ (the Ātman) abiding in deep sleep and not overpowered² by causes of (those) activities, (is said to be so affected).³

[1364]

¹That is, with bodies of those born in lower castes.

²This is based on the variant reading in AnSS edition. Also cf. *anabhisambandhaḥ* in the next verse.

³This is to be supplied in view of SP's remark: *stenādi-*

ākyaatātparyam upasaṁharati.

तथैवानभिसंबन्ध आश्रमाख्यैश्च कर्माभिः ।

परिव्राट्श्रमणो ज्ञेयस्तापसाश्रमसंनिधेः ॥१३६५॥

In the same way, (the Ātman of) a wandering ascetic¹ should be taken (or understood) as having no connection (whatever) with activities known as (belonging to) various stages of life (and which are performed by him) owing to (his stay in) the proximity of ascetics' abodes.² [1365]

The text shows the absence of Saṁdhi in *parivrāṭśramaṇo*; usually *parivrācchramaṇo* is expected.

¹Cf. SP: *śramaṇaśabdasya kṣapaṇakarūḍhim āśanikyāha parivrāḍ* i. Also refer to the next verse.

²SP rightly points to these as *śubhāśubhadehasambaddhahetu*.

वर्णाश्रमादिहेतूनां सर्वेषामपि कर्मणाम् ।

उपलक्षणकृज्ज्ञेयः परिव्राट्तापसग्रहः ॥१३६६॥

(This) mention (*graha*) of a wandering ascetic should be taken as the cause for indication of all of the activities which arise from¹ various castes and stages (of life) etc.² [1366]

NKL (ms. p.669) introduces this verse thus: *āśramadvaya-
rahaṇam pariśiṣṭāśrama(?)varṇakarmanām upalakṣaṇam ity āha*.

¹Literally, having the cause in belonging to.

²The word 'etc.' indicates the age of a person and his abilities, f. SP: *ādiśabdena vayovasthādi grhyate*. But NKL (ms. p.669) reads: *ādipadena jātaputratvādigrahaḥ*.

इत्येवमादयोऽनन्ताः संबन्धा मोहहेतवः ।

नरेण परिसंख्यातुं न शक्याः कल्पकोटिभिः ॥१३६७॥

These and such others are numerous (lit. innumerable) relations (which are) the (various) causes of delusion;¹ they are not

possible for a human being² to count (or enumerate) (even) in crores of Kalpas.³ [1367]

¹Cf. the word *moha* and note thereon in verse 1359 above.

²Literally, a man.

³These are immense measures of time-periods; a *kalpa* is a period of four thousand three hundred twenty million years of mortals.

पुण्यापुण्ये हि निखिलसंबन्धस्येह कारणम् ।
प्राज्ञोऽनन्वागतस्ताभ्यां कर्महेत्वसमन्वयात् ॥१३६८॥

Indeed¹ merit and demerit are there² the causes of all (kinds of) relations (of man) to his different experiences of the results, i.e. *bhogas*. (Hence) *Prājña* (i.e. the *Ātman* in the state of deep sleep) is unaffected by them, since there is not any connection (of it) with the cause(s) of activities.³ [1368]

¹That is, 'Since this is referred to in BU third Ahdyāya also,' as noted by SP, in *pañcame 'py uktam etad iti*.

²That is, in the case where the *Ātman* is subjected to transmigration owing to delusion or ignorance; cf. SP: *ajñānottham kārakam taddhetus tasya 'nanvayād iti yāvat*.

³NKL (ms. p.669) explains: *ajñānasambandhābhāvena karmānanvayād asambandha ity arthah*.

परं रूपं समापन्नः कर्माविद्यानिमित्तकम् ।
पितृमात्रादिसंबन्धं सुषुप्ते सोऽतिवर्तते ॥१३६९॥

Having attained to (oneness with) the highest state¹ (of the *Ātman*), that one transcends,² in the state of deep sleep,³ (every) such connection with (or, relation to) father, mother and others⁴ that is caused by actions and ignorance. [1369]

¹Literally, form (which is connected with deep sleep).

²Cf. *ativṛttatva* in verse 1356 above.

³SP refers to *satā somya tadā sampannah*, CU 6.8.1.

⁴This refers to one's caste, stage of life, age and consequent duties laid down for one.

The explanation of the part of BU 4.3.22 above is hereafter, .e. up to verse 1407, stated in the form of a question and an answer to it.

जीवत्येव शरीरेऽसिंस्तत्स्थ एव कथं पुनः ।
सर्वसङ्गव्यतीतोऽयं भवतीत्यभिधीयते ॥१३७०॥

(A question can be asked thus:) 'How then can this one have transcended all the attachments, while abiding in this living body? ¹'—to this (an answer) is now stated. ² [1370]

¹This refers to the *transmigratory* existence of the Ātman.

²Add: in the statement *ananvāgatam*

यतोऽनन्वागतं रूपं सुषुप्तेऽस्यात्मनः स्वतः ।
उभाभ्यां पुण्यपापाभ्यां कुतस्तदपि चेन्मतम् ॥१३७१॥

Since the state ¹ of this Ātman which exists in its own right ² is not affected ³ by both merit and demerit, therefore, it might be thought, 'Why is that also so?' [1371]

This elucidates *katham punaḥ ... abhidhīyate* in the preceding verse.

¹Or, form; cf. verse 1369 and the note on it above.

²Or, is by itself (or, its own nature) not affected

³Or, touched.

हृदयातिक्रमाद्यस्मात्तद्धर्मानतिवर्तते ।
कर्मप्रयोजकान्कामांस्तस्मात्सुस्थं यथोदितम् ॥१३७२॥

(In answer to the above, it is said:) 'What has been stated (in *ananvāgatam* ...), is well stated, ¹ since (the Ātman), by

transcending the heart, goes beyond its properties,² i.e. desires which cause³ the activities (of transmigratory being)'. [1372]

This explains *tīrṇo hi ...* in BU.

¹Or, as to what has been stated stands (reasonable) alright. Cf. SP: *suptau karmāsambandhād aśeṣasambandharāhityam iti yāvat.*

²This refers to matters/factors related to desires; see the next verse and note thereon.

³That is, prompt.

हृदयस्यैव धर्मास्ते शोककामादयो यतः ।
तीर्णबुद्धिर्हि तद्धर्मास्तस्मादेषोऽतिवर्तते ॥१३७३॥

Since those properties, viz. grief, desire etc.,¹ are of the heart itself;² therefore, the individual, whose intellect has gone beyond³ the properties of that (heart), transcends (them all).

[1373]

¹Cf. BU 4.4.6 (the verse below, at the beginning of BU 4.4.7) which is identical with *Kāthopaniṣad* 6.14. These are *saṅkalpa*, *vicikitsā*, *śraddhā*, *aśraddhā*, *dhṛti*, *adṛti*, *hrī*, *dhī* and *bhī*, cf. BU 1.5.3 and *Maitrāyaṇyupaniṣad* 6.30.

²Read NKL (ms. p.669): *kāmādīnām ātmaguṇatvāt katham tadatikrama ity āha hr̥dasyeti.*

³Or, has transcended.

पुण्यपापाभिसंबन्धः स्वप्ने हृदयसंगतेः ।
वासनामात्रया त्वत्र सापि प्राज्ञे निवर्तते ॥१३७४॥

The connection¹ (of this transmigratory Ātman) in the dream (state) with merit and demerit is (but) owing to its association with² the heart, only in (the form of) impression(s); but that also refrains from³ (that) while it is (in the state of) Prājña.

[1374]

¹Or, affection.

²Cf. -*saṃgati* which is *susambaddhatva* in verse 1356 above.

³Or, keeps away from, recedes from.

करणत्वं विहायेह केवलाज्ञानमात्रकम् ।
स्वप्न आस्ते मनोरूपं वासनामयविग्रहम् ॥१३७५॥

In the dream state, there exists (of the transmigratory Ātman) only that form which consists in *manas*, that which has the form (i.e. nature) of impression(s), i.e. when it has given up its nature as an organ consisting only in ignorance. [1375]

This explains how *vāsanā* leads to the state of the transmigratory Ātman as that consisting in *manas*.

वासनामय एवातो भुङ्क्ते स्वप्ने क्रियाफलम् ।
न हि स्वप्नदृशो योगः स्वप्नेऽन्येनास्ति केनचित् ॥१३७६॥

Therefore, (this transmigratory Ātman) which consists mostly in impressions, experiences in a dream the result of an activity.¹ Indeed, in the dream state, there is no connection whatever of the seer of the dream² with another (external) object.² [1376]

This is to bring out that the Ātman cannot have any experience whatever; since, in reality, *manas* does not exist as an organ.

¹Or, of activities in the dream.

²According to SP, this indicates the absence of any experience gross objects.

From verse 1377 up to 1789, there is discussion on BU 4.3.23-31.

स्वाभासवर्त्मनैवास्ते जाग्रत्स्वप्नसुषुप्तिषु ।
अविद्याकामकर्मादि बिभर्तीव न तु स्वतः ॥१३७७॥

(The Ātman) abides in the waking, dream and sleep states

only by way of its semblance and, therefore, it appears to have¹ desire, activity etc. that are caused by ignorance;² but it does not have the same in reality.³ [1377]

This is a direct expression of Sureśvara's theory of *ābhāsa*.

¹That is, it is affected, as it were, by desire

²*avidyākāmakarmādi* is broken up as *avidyā-janita-kāma-karmādi*; SP supports this by the Śruti about the *asaṅgatva* of the Ātman, cf. BU 4.3.15.

³Or, by its nature.

चैतन्यमपि नैव स्यादात्मनः कामकर्मवत् ।

धर्मानन्वयतः प्राज्ञ इत्येवमभिचोदिते ॥१३७८॥

स्त्रीपुंद्दृष्टान्तवाक्येन परिहारश्च दर्शितः ।

विभागहेत्वसद्भावाज्जाग्रद्वन्नोपलभ्यते ॥१३७९॥

Further, in respect of what is pointed out, i.e. that sentience in the Ātman, is not ever a performer of (any) action (produced) from (some) desire and (thus), on account of any association (of it) with merit,¹ it is (designated as) *Prājña*,² [1378]

there is presented a refutation³ in the form of the statement of the illustration about⁴ a woman and (her) man; (it is thereby argued that) there is not noticed (any activity⁵ of them), owing to the absence of (any) cause of (their) distinction⁶ as in the waking state. [1379]

¹This implies *adharma* also, i.e. any activity; cf. verse 1374 above.

²Though this is the designation of the Ātman (viz. transmigratory being) in the deep sleep state, a derivational meaning of the name as *prakarṣeṇa ajñāḥ prājñāḥ*, with the *taddhita* suffix *-ka* causing no change of meaning, is also not kept out of view; cf. verse 1374 above.

³Or, an answer.

⁴That is, about the intercourse (*sampariṣvaniga*).

This is *dharma* (or *adharma*) as understood in BU sixth
yāya later.

Literally, division.

अविभागात्मतां यातं न पुनः कामकर्मवत् ।

साधितं च प्रयत्नेन स्वयंज्योतिष्ट्वमात्मनः ॥१३८०॥

That state of the Ātman, i.e. its being self-illuminating, has
not again attained¹ the nature of being undivided, like an
act of sexual love, and what is not brought with effort,² to
this state, i.e. to the state of being self-illuminating. [1380]

This implies being divided, or distinguished, like a woman
and her man.

Since there was no division, there was no need of (or,
reason for) rejoining the so-called divided parts, or distinguished
objects.

यद्यात्मायं स्वयंज्योतिः कामकर्मादिवत्कथम् ।

सुषुप्तेऽस्य स्वभावत्वाज्जह्याच्चैतन्यमित्यतः ॥१३८१॥

नास्य धर्मो भवेदेतत्सुषुप्ते तददर्शनात् ।

नात्मधर्मो विनष्टत्वात्तस्माच्चैतन्यमत्र तत् ॥१३८२॥

One may be asked, 'How can this Ātman, which is self-illuminated,
in the state of deep sleep, a performer of (any) activity
(produced) from (some) desire and (later) give up its
attentiveness,¹ (which it is possessed of) by its very nature?';

[1381]

The answer given is:) 'There is not noticed any merit,² on
the part of this one, in the deep sleep state, owing to the
loss of its own nature;³ therefore, it is (the same) sentience
(as before)'.⁴

[1382]

This is not to be understood as different from the Ātman.
cf. verse 1378 above and note 1 thereon.

dharma has here another meaning, viz. it is *prāṇaprada*

vastudharma.

⁴This is for reasserting that the Ātman of the transmigratory being is not, in reality, insentient.

अपि विप्रतिषिद्धं च यत्स्वयंज्योतिरात्मकम् ।
प्रत्यग्वस्तु न वेत्तीति भवतेहाभिधीयते ॥१३८३॥

Also, it is stated: 'What is contradicted here (i.e. in the deep sleep state) is that the inner reality (i.e. the being within the body), being in the state of self-illumination, does not know¹ (anything else)'. [1383]

¹Or, is not aware of. This affirms the existence of all-time awareness (or, ever knowing state) of the Ātman.

ऐक्यादनपलब्धिश्चेदनैकान्तिकता तथा ।
यतोऽभावैऽप्यसंवित्तिश्चैतन्यस्येह दृश्यते ॥१३८४॥
इत्यस्य परिहारार्थं परो ग्रन्थोऽवतार्यते ।
यद्वै तदित्युपक्रम्य प्रत्यग्वस्तुविशुद्धये ॥१३८५॥

If (it is argued that) there is no obtaining/seeing (of what is intended in the illustration) owing to the singleness (of the Ātman), then (it has to be observed that) there (follows) unsteadiness/uncertainty (of reasoning);¹ for, even in the absence (of any other external object), there is noticed on the part of sentience (i.e. Ātman) the non-awareness (of another object); [1384]

in order to refute/answer away this, there occurs the subsequent portion (of the Śruti) which, having begun with the words *yad vai*, (purports) to clarify/elucidate (the nature of) the inner reality. [1385]

The question mentioned in verse 1384 is answered away in verse 1385; cf. SP: *svaprakāśana na taj jaḍam iti tadviśuddhis tadarthaṁ codyaṁ samādheyam tadarthena yad vai tad ityādipravṛttir ity arthaḥ*.

So far, Sureśvara has explained the connection between the question and the answer to it, as stated in BUB.

¹Strictly speaking, it is according to Nyāya logic the fault consisting in the undistributed middle. This is explained by SP thus: *loke pāṣāṇādaḥ caitanyasyābhāve 'py anupalabdher aiikyasya utprayojakatvaṃ vyabhicārīty arthaḥ*.

Now follows the introductory to BU 4.3.23; its explanation begins, however, in verse 1414 below.

There is, first, in verses 1386-1396, a statement of the view of Bhartṛprapañca as regards the connection between BU 4.3.22 and 23 and, then, in verses 1397-1407, the refutation of that view.

तथा परोऽपि संबन्धः कैश्चिदत्राभिधीयते ।

Also, there is stated in respect of this (connection) another explanation offered by some others,¹ thus: [1386ab]

¹This refers to Bhartṛprapañca.

अशोकान्तरमित्युक्तं याथात्म्यं प्रत्यगात्मनः ॥१३८६॥
ज्योतिर्मात्रतयैवात्मा सुषुप्ते व्यवतिष्ठते ।

The nature of the inner Ātman, as it is, is stated in the words *aśokāntaram*;¹ [1386cd]

(for) in the form of light alone does the Ātman abide there in deep sleep.² [1387ab]

¹This refers to the word *śokāntaram* in the end of BU 4.3.21 earlier and explained in BUB thereon as *śokavarjitam* and so also in BUBV in verses 1347-1352 above.

²Read SP: *yathāhur aśokāntaram ity uktam tad evāsmiṃ kāle jñānātmanā jyotimātreṇa bhavati* (possibly from the commentary of Bhartṛprapañca).

कुतः पुनरिदं सिद्धं विशेषज्ञानसंक्षये ॥१३८७॥

(It may then be asked:) 'How/Whence is this proved, when there is complete loss (lit. destruction) of knowledge of (all) particular object(s)?' [1387cd]

ज्योतीरूपमिदं तत्त्वं सुषुप्ते व्यवतिष्ठते ।

उक्तं प्राग्व्यतिरेकेण स्वयंज्योतिष्ट्वमात्मनः ॥१३८८॥

This reality (*tattvam*) has the form of light and it abides in deep sleep (in that very form). (And) it was stated earlier in Vyatireka (form of argument) that (the nature) of the Ātman is being self-illuminating.¹ [1388]

¹SP cites (probably the actual words of Bhartṛprapañca): *uktam hi— vyatirekeṇa svayaṁjyotiṣvam iti* and further explains it as *vyatirekeṇa vinādityādinā vyavahārasya dr̥ṣṭatvād iti yāvat*.

ननुक्तं प्रागिदं सर्वं विशेषज्ञानमात्मनः ॥१३८९॥

अविद्यापक्षपात्येव न तत्स्याच्चित्तिवत्स्वतः ।

नैतदेवं यतोऽदर्शि पूर्वमेतत्स्फुटं मया ॥१३९०॥

(It may be asked:) 'Well, all this particular knowledge on the part of the Ātman is already stated earlier, [1389] as falling within the sphere of ignorance,¹ and it would not be, like sentience, existent in its own right'. (But it may be stated in answer to this:) 'No, this is not so, (for) this is clearly explained by me (that way)'.² [1390]

¹SP cites (probably the words of Bhartṛprapañca): *uktam hi— tadviśeṣavijñānam avidyāpakṣasyaiveti*. Cf. *avidyāpakṣabhāk*.

²Refer to BUBV 4.4.91, 100, 123. And, the next verse clarifies that view (in brief).

सर्वमेवाहमस्मीति यद्यपीदं विशेषवत् ।

विज्ञानं न तथापीदमविद्यापक्षभागिति ॥१३९१॥

Thus (have I said:) 'Even if all this, viz. "I am indeed all this (myself)", is a particular knowledge, it is still not the particular knowledge which falls within the sphere of ignorance'.¹

[1391]

¹SP clarifies this in fullness.

नानात्वदर्शनं यस्माद्भयादज्ञानजं मतम् ।
प्रतिपक्षमविद्याया अहमेवेदमित्यतः ॥१३९२॥

Since it is considered that the awareness (lit. seeing) of variety (of external objects) is, owing to its (causing) fear, a product of ignorance, therefore, (the knowledge), "I myself am (all) this", is (to be understood as) an opponent of ignorance.¹

[1392]

¹Cf. in this context *dvitīyad vai bhayam bhavati* (BU 1.4.2) and *yad eva jāgrad bhayam paśyati tad atrāvidyayā manyate* (BU 4.3.20).

तदेतन्मथ्यमानं सदैक्यदर्शनलक्षणम् ।
भवत्यतीव संशुद्धं प्रसन्नं व्यवतिष्ठते ॥१३९३॥

Thus, this existent (viz. Ātman), being distinguished¹ as having the characteristic of singleness (or, being alone), is (ever) extremely pure and abides (in its own right/state) as (only) clear (or, untainted by anything).

[1393]

¹SP rightly explains *mathyamāna* '(lit.) being churned' as *bhedadarśanād vivicyamānam iti yāvat* and refers probably to Bhartṛprapañca's explanation thus: *tad etad ekatvadarśanam mathyamānam sadā śuddham prasannam bhavatīti bhāṣye bhavatipadasyārtham āha*.

विशेषदर्शनासूतेरसंबोधस्तदात्मनः ।

देदीप्यमाना विज्ञप्तिर्विशेषात्मावतिष्ठते ॥१३९४॥

Then, since there is no seeing of any particular (objects), there is no awareness (of anything whatever) and, therefore, there remains/abides (only) resplendent special knowledge (*vijñapti*) which is the very (nature of the) knowing Ātman.¹ [1394]

¹SP seems to quote from Bhartṛprapañca: *uktam hi— svena viśeṣavijñānātmanā dedīpyamāno bhavatīti*.

सुषुप्तस्थानं रूपं तदेतत्प्राक्प्रदर्शितम् ॥१३९५॥
तत्रैतच्छङ्क्यते ज्ञानेऽसंबोधः कथमात्मनः ।
सति स्याच्चेदनाशङ्का स्त्रीपुंद्दृष्टान्तनिर्णयात् ॥१३९६॥
नैतदेवं यतस्तत्र सत्स्वेव ज्ञानहेतुषु ।
अविभक्तो विशेषेषु भवतीति प्रदर्शितम् ॥१३९७॥

Thus is shown/explained first this form (of the Ātman) in the deep sleep state. [1395]

In this respect, this is pointed out as a doubt, 'How can there be absence of any awareness on the part of the Ātman, when it is (in reality, in the very state of) knowledge?'. (To this an answer is given:) '(This) is not a doubt/question, as decided/settled by the illustration of a woman and (her) man, [1396]

(and also) since it is not thus (as you have held); because, there, the Ātman is undivided (i.e. unaffected/undifferentiated) even in the midst of particular objects—this is already pointed out'. [1397]

इह पुनर्न शक्यन्ते विशेषाः प्रसमीक्षितुम् ।
यतोऽत्राप्रविभक्तेन स्वेन बोधेन तिष्ठति ॥१३९८॥

(And), again, it is not possible to think of (various) particular (objects), since the Ātman abides here (in this state) in its (own form of the) knowing one. [1398]

असंबोधः सति ज्ञाने कथं स्यादिति शङ्क्यते ।

तम एवेति चेन्नैवं स्वयंज्योतिष्ट्वमात्मनः ॥१३९९॥

महतेह प्रयत्नेन यतः प्राक्प्रतिपादितम् ।

सिद्धान्तस्य स्थितत्वाच्च यथावदुपपत्तिभिः ॥१४००॥

What is doubted is: 'How can there be absence of (any) awareness, while there is (present) knowledge (in the form of the Ātman)?' (and) if (the answer is: 'Because there exists/is that Ātman as) darkness';¹ (then the argument is:) 'Thus, there is not self-illuminating nature of the Ātman', [1399] because (already) that has been earlier² propounded here,³ with great effort, and because the conclusion (*siddhānta*) has remained (unopposed)⁵ with suitable (*yathāvat*) reasons (or, well reasoned arguments). [1400]

¹SP seems to quote Bhartṛprapañca in *tad āhus tama evaitadrūpaṃ syān na jyotir iti*.

²Read SP: *prāg iti brāhmaṇārambhābhīdhānam*.

³SP states that *iha* refers to earlier statements in the Śruti.

⁴SP seems to quote Bhartṛprapañca thus: *uktaṃ ca—jyotī-rūpatvasya mahatā prayatnena vibhāvitatvād iti*.

⁵SP seems to quote Bhartṛprapañca thus: *tad uktaṃ sthitatvāc ca siddhāntasyeti*.

प्रदीपवद्विनष्टोऽयमिति चेदभिधीयते ।

प्रत्यभिज्ञानतो नैवं पूर्वदृष्टस्य वस्तुनः ॥१४०१॥

If (now) it is said (i.e. argued): 'This one becomes extinct/lost like a lamp', then it is said (in answer:) 'This is not so, since there is recognition (of the same as the real existent seen (in deep sleep) earlier'.¹ [1401]

¹Read SP (to understand this as discarding the Buddhist view of Kṣaṇavāda:) *utthitasya pūrvabodhe dr̥ṣṭam adhikṛtya pratyabhi-jñādr̥ṣṭeḥ svāpe pūrvadraṣṭur nāṣe draṣṭrantarasya cotthāne tadayogān na kṣaṇavādaśaiketi pariharati (pratyabhijñānata iti)*.

This is clarified further in the next verse.

यतः प्रत्यभिजानाति सुषुप्तादुत्थितस्ततः ।

सर्वावस्थास्वयं नित्य आत्मा नैव विनश्यति ॥१४०२॥

Since (the Ātman) recognises (itself) when awake from deep sleep, therefore, this Ātman is ever unchanged (*nitya*) in all the states (of it)—it never perishes.¹ [1402]

¹Read SP: *utthitasya yaḥ suptaḥ sa jāgarmūti pratyabhijñānād ātmano 'vasthātraye 'pi sthāyitvān nāsau svāpe naśyatīty arthaḥ.*

समस्तैरिन्द्रियैर्हीनः संप्रसन्नो निराकलः ।

सुप्तः स्वप्नान्न जानाति यः स आत्मैति भण्यते ॥१४०३॥

That one is understood (lit. called) as the Ātman, who, having had complete bliss (*samprasanna*), devoid of all organs, unagitated¹ (while it had) slept does not know (any objects seen in) dreams. [1403]

¹SP explains *nirākula* as *sthūlasūkṣmākulatāvikalah*.

नाद्राक्षं स्वप्नमद्येति प्रतिबुद्धोऽभिभाषते ।

जाग्रत्स्वप्नसुषुप्ते च तस्मादात्मा स एव सः ॥१४०४॥

When awake (from deep sleep), it says, 'I have not seen any dream, today'. Therefore, in (all the states, viz.) waking, dream and deep sleep, the Ātman remains the same. [1404]

स्वप्नमेति सुषुप्ताच्च स्वप्नाद्बुद्धान्तमेव च ।

इति श्रुत्या पुराप्युक्तं तस्मान्नात्मा विनश्यति ॥१४०५॥

And even earlier the Śruti has stated "It moves from the state of deep sleep to the dream state and from the dream state to waking state". Therefore, the Ātman (it has to be concluded) never perishes. [1405]

Cf. BU 4.3.15-17.

स्वयंज्योतिःस्वभावस्थस्तस्मादात्मा सुषुप्तगः ।

प्रत्यगज्ञानतत्कार्यैरसंस्पृष्टः स्वभावतः ॥१४०६॥

Therefore, the Ātman, abiding in deep sleep, remains in its own nature as the self-illuminated and is, by its very nature, untouched (i.e. unaffected) by the ignorance on the part of the inner self (in a body) and its effects.¹ [1406]

¹SP seems to quote Bhartṛprapañca thus: *uktam hi—svātmanaiva jyotiṣāvasthānam iti*.

यत्तु तच्छङ्क्यते कस्मादात्मा प्राज्ञे न पश्यति ।

चैतन्यात्मस्वभावोऽपि तच्चापि शृणु सांप्रतम् ॥१४०७॥

And, as to what is doubted, viz. 'Why does not the Ātman, in its state as Prājña, see (any external objects), though it has its own nature of being sentience?'; (it is said) 'Even that, do you now hear/listen'. [1407]

Now, in verses 1408-1536, Sureśvara explains the words in BU 4.3.23 before he takes up the refutation of the unacceptable notions in the view of Bhartṛprapañca in verse 1537 below. Verses 1408-1409 convey Sureśvara's own thought in this regard.

स्वभावो नात्मनः कामकर्माविद्यादिबोधवत् ।

असङ्गानन्वयोक्तिभ्यां कामादेश्च मृषात्वतः ॥१४०८॥

The nature of the Ātman is not like that of knowledge from (i.e. which is produced by) desire, activity, ignorance etc.,¹ because of the falsehood/unreality of desire etc.² (as understood) from the statements (in the Śruti about the Ātman's being) unattached/unaffected.³ [1408]

¹For expounding the compound *kāmakarmāvidyādijanya-bodhavat*, cf. verse 1377 above. The suffix *-vat* is understood with Pāṇini 5.1.116: *tatra tasyeva*.

²Cf. note 1 on verse 1373 above.

³That is, unattached to/unaffected by (any external objects).

चैतन्यमात्मनस्तत्त्वं कूटस्थं न तु कामवत् ।
अनाद्यविद्यायोगोऽस्य तत्कार्यैरादिमान्मतः ॥१४०९॥

Sentience (which is) the true nature of the Ātman is immutable; (it is) not like (that of) desire etc.;¹ the association of this one (viz. the Ātman) with the (so-called) beginningless ignorance and with its effects is held/understood to have a beginning.² [1409]

¹Cf. note 1 on the preceding verse.

²The word *ādimān* implies *antavān* 'that which has an end'.

Verses 1410-1411 convey an alternative explanation of *yad vaitat*

....

अज्ञानमिथ्याविज्ञानसंस्थस्यास्यात्मनः क्व नु ।
उपदेशादिसंबन्ध इत्येतदिह भण्यते ॥१४१०॥

'Where indeed can there be any possibility (lit. connection) of instruction about this Ātman which abides in (i.e. despite) absence of knowledge (or, ignorance) and false particular knowledge(s) about it?', (to this question an answer)¹ is stated here: [1410]

¹Read SP: *suṣupte saṁsāranirmuktam ātmatattvaṁ siddham tajjñānam mokṣāyeti vaktuṁ yadityādi vākyaṁ ity arthah*.

न पश्यत्येष आत्मात्र स्वयंज्योतिश्च स स्वतः ।
इति विप्रतिषिद्धं यत्तदैकात्म्यान्न दुष्यति ॥१४११॥

(An objection can be this:) 'In this (state of deep sleep), the Ātman does not see (any external objects) and yet it is, by its (very) nature self-illuminating'—this involves contradiction'.¹ (The answer to it is:) 'Owing to the singleness (of the Ātman) it is not (a) faulty (argument)'. [1411]

¹This is involved in the Śruti statement *paśyan na pasyati*.

Verses 1412-1420 are sureśvara's own explanation of *yad vai tat*

....

चोदितार्थानुवादोऽयं परिहारविवक्षया ।
यद्वै तदिति यत्नेन श्रुत्येह क्रियतेऽञ्जसा ॥१४१२॥

This¹ is a restatement of the objection with a desire to refute (the same); here (i.e. in the statement), viz. *yad vai tat* ..., is made and observation of the Śruti for clarity (*añjasā*). [1412]

¹This refers to the argument in the objection stated in the preceding verse.

न पश्यतीति मन्वीथाः सुषुप्ते यत्र तत्तथा ।
पश्यन्नेवाविलुप्ताक्ष आत्मायं वर्तते यतः ॥१४१३॥

What you think, viz. that (the Ātman) does not see (any external object(s)) in deep sleep, is not like that, since this Ātman is ever seeing, while seeing (reality) with the eye is (never) lost.¹ [1413]

¹SP observes: *kartr̥tvam vārayati avilupteti*.

न पश्यत्येव नन्वत्र चक्षुरादेरसंभवात् ।
करणान्यन्तरेणेह जात्यन्धादिर्न वीक्षते ॥१४१४॥

(It may be argued yet:) 'Indeed, it does not see (any external objects), for there is absence (*asambhava*) of eye etc.;¹ here

(i.e. in this world) a person who is born blind does not (i.e. cannot) see without (the help of) limbs'.² [1414]

¹The word 'etc.' refers to the other organs.

²Yet, actually, the eye alone is meant. Therefore, the implication is the absence of the eye (for seeing) in a dream.

नैतदेवं यतो द्रष्टुः कारकस्य समीक्षणे ।
करणानि व्यपेक्ष्यन्ते न त्वकारकेवीक्षणे ॥१४१५॥

(The following can be said in answer:) 'This is not (or, cannot be said) so, since (it is only) in the case of an agent of some activity (*kāraṇa*) that limbs¹ are expected; but not in the case of one (viz. the Ātman) who is not an agent (of any activity, and is yet in the act of) seeing'.² [1415]

¹See note 2 on the preceding verse.

²SP brings out the purport thus: *sākṣiṇaḥ ... naiva (kāraṇa-vyapekṣā) nityajñānatvāt*.

स्वप्नेऽपि चक्षुरादीनामपीतिः श्रूयते श्रुतौ ।
कुतः सुषुप्तौ तानि स्युर्यत्र तद्वासनापि न ॥१४१६॥

It is heard in the Śruti¹ that there is merger of the eye etc.² (in reality, viz. the Ātman), while a person is in the dream state also; how (then) can they be there in the deep sleep state, wherein impression (on the intellect) of that³ also does not exist? [1416]

¹Cf. BU 4.3.11: *asuptaḥ suptān abhicākaśīti*.

²See note 1 on verse 1414 above.

³SP adds: *tacchabdaś cakṣurādiviṣayaḥ*.

न पश्यतीति वचनं कारकादेरसंभवात् ।
वास्तवं वृत्तमापेक्ष्य पश्यन्वै तदितीयते ॥१४१७॥

The statement (in the Śruti) *na paśyan* ... is made on account of the absence (*asambhava*) of any means of activity (*kāraṇa*). And that statement, viz. *paśyan vai* ... is made with the actual happening (lit. activity) in the case of the reality, viz. the Ātman (*vāstava vṛtta*). [1417]

Thus is concluded the non-contradiction in the statement of the Śruti.

पश्यन्नेवायमत्रास्त इत्येतच्चेत्कुतो भवेत् ।
इत्यस्य हेतुसिद्धयर्थं न हि द्रष्टुरितीरणम् ॥१४१८॥

If there is (the statement in the Śruti, viz.) 'This one, (i.e. the Ātman), abides here (i.e. in the deep sleep state) as only the seeing one'—how/whence can it be (reasonable)?, to explain/establish the cause for it (viz. that happening/activity) is made (in the Śruti, yet another statement, viz. *na hi draṣṭuh* ...). [1418]

मेयमानप्रमातृणां व्यभिचारेऽपि चात्मनः ।
अनन्यानुभवादेव सिद्धिस्तद्धवंससाक्षितः ॥१४१९॥

And, (that is to say:) even in the absence (*vyabhicāra*) of the object of knowing, the means of knowing and the agent of knowing, there is established (the truth in the statement) on the strength of the exceptional experience of the Ātman through its witnessing the destruction of them all. [1419]

प्रमात्राद्यनभिव्याप्तं वस्तु पूर्वं समीक्ष्य हि ।
नाद्राक्षमिति संधत्ते दृष्टवत्स्वचिदात्मना ॥१४२०॥

Indeed (*hi*) having first well thought over the real thing (viz. Ātman) as (being) non-pervaded by (i.e. uncharacterized as) the agent of knowing etc.,¹ one's own sentience (i.e. the inner self) considers, 'I have not seen' as in the case of some seen object,² by itself. [1420]

¹Cf. *meyamānapramātr* in the preceding verse.

²*drṣṭavat* has the suffix *-vat* in accordance with Pāṇini 5.1.116: *tatra tasyeva*.

There is now in verses 1421-1432 fuller explanation of *na hi draṣṭuḥ* ... in BU 4.3.23.

यस्माद्द्रष्टुर्हि या दृष्टिर्यया द्रष्टा प्रसिध्यति ।
तस्या विपरिलोपोऽयं हेत्वभावान्न युज्यते ॥१४२१॥

(The Śruti statement means:) Since that (viz. the power of) seeing of the seer by which (i.e. being possessed of which)¹ is the seer established (as such)—this loss of it (which is meant) is (in reality) not reasonable on account of the absence of (any) cause (for that loss). [1421]

¹This is on the basis of SP: *trīyetthambhāve*.

नाशोत्पत्त्यादयो धर्मा हेतुमद्वस्तुनो यतः ।
निर्हेतुसाक्षिणो न स्युरागमापायिसाक्षितः ॥१४२२॥

Since the happenings (*dharma*), viz. destruction, origination etc.¹ are (possible only) in the case of the thing which has a cause for it;² they do not obtain in the case of the causeless witness on account of its witnessing the origin and the destruction (of them). [1422]

¹These are the well-known *bhāvavikāras*.

²Namely, which has an origin in something else. This is *jātāv ekavacanam* 'an expression in the singular for a class of things'.

नाशादि न स्वयं सिध्येद्विना नाशादिसाक्षिणा ।
नातो विपरिलोपः स्याद्द्रष्टुर्दृष्टेः कदा चन ॥१४२३॥

Destruction etc.¹ would not occur,² of itself, (if) without (i.e.

there is not assumed to exist) the witness of destruction etc.; therefore, there would never be the loss of the (power of) seeing of the seer. [1423]

¹The word 'etc.' implies (possibly) other known *bhāvavikāras*.

²Literally, become established; or, get to be known. Cf. SP: *vyathā jadatāhānir iti bhāvah*.

द्रष्टुरात्मैव या दृष्टिः प्रत्यग्दृष्ट्या समीक्ष्यते ।
तस्या विपरिलोपोऽत्र न कथं चन युज्यते ॥१४२४॥

That (power of) seeing, which is the very nature (*ātmaiva*) of the seer/witness, is well seen (or, known/understood) by the (power of) seeing that belongs to sentience within (viz. the transmigratory Ātman).¹ The loss (or, perishing) of that, here (i.e. in deep sleep), is in no way² understandable.³ [1424]

¹This refers to one's experience.

²That is to say: whether it occurs itself or is caused by something else.

³That is, it cannot stand to reason; or, it is not stated with itable reasoning.

आत्मैवात्मीयभूतस्य या दृष्टिरविनश्वरी ।
द्रष्टुर्विनाशिनस्तस्या नोच्छित्तिरुपपद्यते ॥१४२५॥

(Further) that imperishable (power of) seeing which belongs to the perishable (lit. perishing) seer (within),¹ that has (really) become (an aspect) of the (imperishable) Ātman,² is the very nature (*ātmaiva*) of it—the destruction (or loss) of it does not stand to reason. [1425]

¹This refers to the commonly known seer.

²This is to say that it is merely an adventitious nature (*upādhi*) of the Ātman. Therefore, being an *upādhi*, it cannot be destroyed (in the real sense of coming to destruction).

आगमापायिनो द्रष्टुर्दृष्टिस्तत्साक्षिणीं तु या ।
द्रष्ट्रादिलोपसाक्षित्वात्तस्या लोपो न युज्यते ॥१४२६॥

And (*tu*) that (power of) seeing which is the witness of that seer, that comes into being and perishes, is not understandably lost,¹ because of its being the witness of the loss of the seer etc. [1426]

¹That cannot perish in a way that is understood with suitable reason(s).

सत्येव साक्षिणि यतो भावाभावौ प्रसिध्यतः ।
जगतोऽतो न नाशः स्यादात्मदृष्टेः कुतश्चन ॥१४२७॥

Since the coming into existence and perishing of the world become understandable (or, lit. established), if and when there is (accepted the existence of) the witness. Therefore, there cannot be, on any account, perishing/loss of the (power of) seeing which belongs to the Ātman. [1427]

SP on this verse ends with *iheti hetuvākyoktiḥ*; why? There is not in the verse the word *iha*! Possibly, this should be the introductory to the comment on the next verse.

ननु विप्रतिषिद्धोक्तिर्भवतेहाभिधीयते ।
न विनश्यति सा दृष्टिर्द्रष्टुश्चेत्यतिसाहसम् ॥१४२८॥

(An objection:) 'But indeed you have said here what contains an internal contradiction, viz. (in the sentence) that (i.e. the power of) seeing does not perish and (all the same) it belongs to the seer¹—this is very bold!'² [1428]

¹It is the imperishable Ātman.

²That is, it defies all reason.

कर्तृकार्याभिसंबन्धो द्रष्टुर्दृष्टेरितीर्यते ।
ततश्चापरिलोपोऽस्याः कार्यत्वान्नोपपद्यते ॥१४२९॥

(Thus,) what is stated (by you) is: 'There is between the seer¹ and the (power of his) seeing the relation of an agent (of some activity) and (its) activity (which is accomplished)'. And (it is) from this that it becomes non-understandable (or, unreasonable) to hold that there is no perishing of this one (i.e. the power of seeing). [1429]

The verse explains why there was, in the preceding verse, reference to boldness, i.e. unreasonableness.

ननु न लुप्यत इति वचनान्न विलोप्स्यति ।
नैवं यतो मितिप्राप्तं वचो नाशं न वारयेत् ॥१४३०॥

But indeed (it may be argued:) 'It will not perish by merely making the statement, viz. it does not perish'.¹ (The answer is:) 'No, this is not so, since the statement obtained by (resorting to) inference² will not avert the (certain occurrence of) perishing'. [1430]

¹In this connection, read NKL (ms. p.672): *mānā-ntaraviruddham vacanam api na bodhayed anyathāndho maṇim avindad ityādeḥ svārthe mātva-prasaktiḥ*.

²That is, logical reasoning in 'whatever is produced perishes'. Cf. SP: *yat kṛtakam tad anityam ity vyāptyanugrhitānumāna-virodhād vaco na kāryanityatvabodhīty āha*.

सिद्धस्य व्यञ्जकं मानं न तु तत्कारकं यतः ।
उक्तेर्नातोऽविनाशित्वं द्रष्टुर्दृष्टेरिहेष्यते ॥१४३१॥

'Since a means of knowing is the revealer of an accomplished (already existing) thing and not its creator; therefore, the imperishable nature of the (power of) seeing of the seer is not accepted/understood here¹ from the mere statement (about

that effect).'

[1431]

¹The word *iha* means: 'in the argument about the imperishable (power of) seeing of the seer'—the statement which can be the basis of logical reasoning (alone).

नैष दोषो यतो द्रष्टुः श्रुतिराह विशेषणम् ।
द्रष्टुर्दृष्टेरिति ततो द्रष्टा नैवेह कारकम् ॥१४३२॥

(Further) this ¹ is not a fault, ² since the statement about (the power of) seeing (merely) made (lit. stated) the attribute of the power of seeing of the seer (and) from that (it follows that) here (i.e. in this case) the seer is not an agent (of any production). ³

[1432]

¹Namely, making the statement about the imperishable nature of the seer's (power of) seeing.

²That is, faulty argument.

³Namely, a *kāraṇa*.

There is in verses 1433-1440 an alternative explanation of *draṣṭur drṣṭer alopaḥ*.

देहान्तो दृष्टिकारी यो द्रष्टा धर्मादिहेतुमान् ।
दृष्टेर्द्रष्टुश्च लोपोऽत्र प्रत्यग्दृष्टयेकसाक्षिकः ॥१४३३॥

The seer is the one (abiding) inside the body, ¹ who does the action of seeing (and) is having merit etc. ² as its cause. (And) here (in the worldly happening mentioned as) perishing of the seer's (power of) seeing ³ has for it the witness the lone (seer who sees) within (the body). ⁴

[1433]

¹This is referring to the transmigratory Ātman.

²Refer to verses 1378 and 1382 above.

³Namely, in the state of deep sleep.

⁴It implies oneness of the seer within with the imperishable

Ātman.

प्राक्प्रमात्रादिसंभूतेर्या तु दृष्टिरकर्तृका ।
द्रष्टादिनाशसाक्षित्वात्सा दृष्टिरविनश्यती ॥१४३४॥

That (power of) seeing (of the seer)¹ is imperishable, viz. that which is a non-agent (of any activity) and (exists even) before the origination of the knower (of external objects) etc.²—this is so, because of its nature of being the witness of the perishing of the seer etc.³ [1434]

¹This is the imperishable Ātman.

²The means and the objects of knowing are meant.

³This refers to the worldly seer of the so-called (or, so-accepted) external objects.

दृष्टिरेव तु सा द्रष्टा न तु कारकलक्षणः ।
द्रष्टुर्विशेषणत्वेन दृष्टेरिति परिग्रहात् ॥१४३५॥

And (*tu*) it is but the (power of) seeing which is the seer but (*tu*) not that which is possessed of the characteristic of the agent (of the activity, viz. seeing)—(this is so), because of the employment (lit. acceptance) of (the word) *dr̥ṣṭi* as an attribute of (the word) *draṣṭr*. [1435]

SP rightly points out *sā dr̥ṣṭir eva draṣṭā na tatkartā* which is already stated as the reason/basis for the argument.

परिलोपो हि कार्याणां लोके सिद्धः स्वकारणे ।
नातः कारणरूपस्य नाप्यकारकवस्तुनः ॥१४३६॥

It is an accepted (lit. established) fact in this world that those things which are products merge (lit. perish) in their own cause;¹ therefore, (that fact² is) not (acceptable) in respect also³ of what is (both) the cause (of the supposed effects) and the real thing (viz. Ātman) which is not an agent (of

any activity).

[1436]

¹The singular form stands for the class of the factors which produce (some products).

²Namely, the nature of the thing as perishing.

³Read NKL (ms. p.673): *ajñānavan niranvayasya nāśaḥ syād atrāha nāpīti. kāryakāraṇavilakṣaṇatvān nityatvam ity āśayaḥ.*

अभावस्य च भावत्वाद्भावसिद्धेश्च दृष्टितः ।

दृष्टौ नाभावशङ्कातः सर्वसिद्धेस्तदन्वयात् ॥१४३७॥

(Further, since it is accepted here that) a negative entity becomes a positive entity and (that) positive entity becomes an acceptable (or) established thing (only) through the (power of) seeing; therefore, there cannot be entertained here any doubt about the perishing of the (power of) seeing as all (accepted things) become so through their being produced (lit. following) that (viz. the power of seeing). [1437]

न सुषुप्तप्रसिद्धिः स्याद्दृष्टेलोपो भवेद्यदि ।

जन्मनाशादिहीनेयमतो दृष्टिः परात्मनः ॥१४३८॥

The state of deep sleep would not occur (lit. get established) in case there would occur the perishing of the (power of) seeing; therefore, this (power of) seeing of the highest Ātman is not devoid of (or, beset with) origination, perishing etc.¹

[1438]

¹This is reference to the other *bhāvavikāras*.

शतृजन्तश्रवणादृष्टिश्चेत्स्यात्सकर्तृका ।

पश्यन्द्रष्टुरिति ह्येवं नैवं कर्त्राद्यसंभवात् ॥१४३९॥

(If it is argued:) 'In the words *paśyan* and *draṣṭuḥ* there are heard the forms ending in suffixes *-śatr* and *-tr* and, therefore, *drṣṭi* '(the power of) seeing' is indeed (lit. should be taken

as) thus, having (some) agent', (the answer is:) 'This is not so, on account of the absence (or, impossibility) of an agent etc.'¹ [1439]

¹The word 'etc.' implies the material, the instrument(s), and the purpose which are related to an activity. This becomes clear from the next verse.

नेह बुद्ध्यादिसद्भावस्तदापीति श्रुतेर्भवेत् ।
सुषुप्तेऽतो न धात्वर्थः प्रत्ययार्थश्च नेष्यते ॥१४४०॥

Here, i.e. in the deep sleep state, there do not exist the intellect etc., because there is heard a Śruti about the merger (of these into reality);¹ therefore, the (usual grammatical) meanings of the verbal root and the suffix are not to be accepted (or, understood). [1440]

¹Cf. *prāṇaṃ tarhi vāg apyeti*, quoted by SP—cp. *Kauṣītakiyupaniṣad* 3.3.

Verses 1441-1442 introduce the subject regarding the use of the *śatr* suffix in *paśyan*

Verses 1443-1447 consider that the relation of *draṣṭṛ* 'seer' and its *drṣṭi* 'the power of) seeing' a *kāraṇa* and its *kārya* is indescribable. In verses 1443-1444 is discussed whether the *draṣṭṛ* is a *kurvat* 'operative' *kāraṇa* and, in verses 1445-1446, the relation of the two as *akurvat* 'non-operative'. Verse 1447 supports the thought about the natures of the cause(s) and (their) effect(s) in the preceding verse.

In verses 1448-1450, Sureśvara continues to discuss *drṣṭi* and *draṣṭṛ* as *kriyā* 'effect' and *kriyāvat* 'cause' emphasising the nature of *kriyā* as *kārya* or *akārya* 'what is to be accomplished or what is not to be accomplished'.

कर्त्रादिकारकं नो चेत्सुषुप्ते विद्यते कथम् ।
पश्यन्द्रष्टुरिति वचः कूटस्थ उपपद्यते ॥१४४१॥

(It may be argued:) 'If there do not exist in the deep sleep state any *kāraḥ* 'factors related to an activity' such as an agent, how can there be made a statement, viz. *paśyan ... draṣṭuḥ?*'; (the answer is:) 'In the case of the immutable (Ātman, that statement) can stand to reason'. [1441]

This is clarified in the next verse, with an illustration.

यथावकाशदान्त्रिति भण्यते निष्क्रियं वियत् ।
शतृजन्तवचसा तथात्मा भण्यते ध्रुवः ॥१४४२॥

'(Since) the sky, which is inactive,¹ is described as 'one that offers space (to something else)', so also is the unmoved (or, immutable) Ātman mentioned in relation to words ending in (the suffixes) *-śatr* and *-trc*.' [1442]

स्वभावः कारकाणां च यदकृत्वेह कुर्वते ।
अकुर्वत्कारकं तस्मात्कुर्वतोऽतिशयः कुतः ॥१४४३॥
प्राविक्रयाया विनिष्पत्तेः कुर्वद्रूपं न लभ्यते ।
यतोऽतोऽकुर्वदेवेह स्यात्सर्वत्रैव कारकम् ॥१४४४॥

'(Such) is the nature of *kāraḥ* that, without doing (any activity), they (are said to) do (some activity); therefore, the *kāraḥ* here is not doing (any activity). How can there be excellence (or, change) in the case of what does (an activity)?' ¹ [1443]

'(Again,) since the form of what is doing (an activity) is here not noticeable (or, noticed) before the activity has been completed (or accomplished), therefore, (then one would have to accept that) everywhere a *kāraḥ* would be not doing (any activity)'. ² [1444]

¹ NKL (ms. p.673): *drṣṭeḥ kāryatvaṃ nirākartuṃ kurvat (-n, sic) kārakam akurvad veti vikāpyādyam pratyāha svabhāva iti, atīśayaḥ kuta iti. kurvadrūpasya kāryasyātīśayāvayavattve kāryasyāpi*

kāryāntaraprasaktir āgantukatvāviśeṣād ity anavasthety arthaḥ.

²NKL (*ibid.*) introduces this verse thus: *kurvadrūpasyā-gantukatvam eva kuto 'trāha prāg iti.*

शक्तिमत्कारकं चेत्स्यात्स्यात्कार्यं शक्तिवत्सदा ।
 शक्यानामपि सद्भावः शक्तिवत्सर्वदा यतः ॥१४४५॥
 न मिथो व्यतिरेकेण शक्तिशक्यौ प्रसिध्यतः ।
 परस्परव्यपेक्षत्वाच्छक्तिशक्यस्वरूपयोः ॥१४४६॥
 शक्तीनां नियमः शक्याच्छक्यानां चापि शक्तितः ।
 परस्पराश्रयत्वं च प्राप्नुयाच्छक्तिवादिनः ॥१४४७॥

If it is held that a *kāraka* (here, *kāraṇa* 'cause') has the power (to produce an effect), then the effect (*kārya*) should ever be possessed of the (same) power;¹ for the existence/state of what are possible (to be the effects of some cause) should (also) ever be possessed of that power. [1445]

The two (things, viz.) *śakti* (here *kāraṇa*, 'possessed of some power' and *śakya* (here *kārya* 'what is) possible (product of that)' cannot exist without each other, since the natures of *śakti* and *śakya* have the nature of dependence on each other.

[1446]

śaktis (i.e. *kāraṇas*) have (some) restraint on them (with regard to what are) their *śakyas*² (i.e. *kāryas*) and so also *śakyas* (have restraint with regard to what are their) *śaktis*;² thus, those, who hold the theory of *śakti* (in respect of *kāraṇa* and *kārya*) have (to take recourse to the principle of) mutual dependence.

[1447]

¹Cf. *śaktasya śakyakaraṇāt* in *Sāṃkhyakārikā* and also the known principle in Logic: *kāraṇaguṇāḥ kāryaguṇān ārabhante.*

²The use of singular forms *śakyāt* and *śaktitaḥ* has the meaning of plural forms. (Possibly the singular is used for metre's sake and though this is often Sureśvara's manner of using expressions.)

क्रियायाश्चाप्यकार्यत्वे कारकं न प्रसिध्यति ।
 कार्यत्वे चानवस्था स्यात्कुर्वच्चापि सुदुर्लभम् ॥१४४८॥

क्रियातत्फलयोश्चापि पौर्वापर्याप्रसिद्धितः ।

किं साध्यं साधनं चेह निश्चयो नोपपद्यते ॥१४४९॥

अविद्यामात्रहेतौ तु सर्वमेतत्समञ्जसम् ।

तत्कार्यत्वाच्च सर्वस्य न किञ्चिदसमञ्जसम् ॥१४५०॥

Further, if *kriyā* is not what is to be produced (or, an effect), then there cannot exist a *kāraka* (i.e. productive element, viz. the cause).¹ If on the contrary (*ca*) it is an effect, then there would result *infinite regress* and in that case what is operating (i.e. productive, i.e. the cause) would be difficult to obtain (i.e. would not exist),² [1448]

on account of the non-knowing³ about the earlier and the later between *kriyā* and its result (viz. *kārya*)— for there is, further, no decision possible⁴ in this case (*iha*)⁵ as to what is to be accomplished and what accomplishes it. [1449]

But, all this is easily/smoothly understandable in case (it is accepted) that it, (viz. *kriyā-kārya* relation) has only ignorance as its cause. And, all (of that) being the effect/product of it (viz. ignorance), there is nothing (in our view)⁶ unclear (i.e. non-understandable). [1450]

¹Read SP: *kriyāṃ kurvat kārakam iti sthiteḥ*, and NKL (ms. p.673): *kriyāṃ kurvataḥ kārakatvād ity arthaḥ*— this contradicts *kriyāyā akāryatva*.

²Cf. SP: *tasyā mūlakṣayakarātvena doṣaparyantatvam*.

³That is, non-ascertainment.

⁴Or, decision which can be justified with reason.

⁵Read SP: *kāryakāraṇavyavahārah saptamyaṛthaḥ*.

⁶Cf. SP: *nāsmatpakṣe tad asti*.

यत्रात्मनोऽस्य संबन्धोऽनात्मनेह विवक्ष्यते ।

अविद्याहेतुकर्त्रादिसंगतिस्तत्र मोहजा ॥१४५१॥

When/Where (again) it is intended to say that here (i.e. in the deep sleep state) there is the relation of this (individual/transmigratory) *Ātman* with the non-*Ātman*(s), there

also is the connectiⁿ (or, association) of it with the agent¹ etc. that have (only,) ignorance as their cause (and it, i.e. the latter) is caused by (i.e. has originated in) delusion. [1451]

¹This stands for the agents' capacity for action. Also, the word 'etc.' refers to other *kāraṇas*.

यत्र त्वात्मेति धीरस्य जायतेऽनात्मधीरिव ।
यथावस्त्वेव धीस्तत्र नात्राविद्याद्यपेक्षते ॥१४५२॥

When/Where, however, there arises, (in the same way) as (arises) the (usually known) awareness of being the non-Ātman, the awareness in (lit. of) this (individual/transmigratory Ātman), viz. ('I am Ātman'), (this) following the nature of the reality, then there is not (i.e. does not obtain) here (i.e. in this situation) ignorance. [1452]

NKL (ms. p.674) rightly points out the doubt at the basis of this verse thus: *karṭṛtvādiññānam bhramaś ced ātmadhīr api tathā syā(d) dhītvād atrāha yatreti*.

Verses 1453-1456 state that the real thing, i.e. the Ātman, which is without any *prapañca*, gets established thanks to the seer.

जाग्रत्स्वप्नप्रहाणेऽपि प्रत्यङ्मात्रं न हीयते ।
तद्धानेरात्मसाक्षित्वात्प्रत्यङ्जन्मादिवर्जितः ॥१४५३॥

Even when there is loss (or, destruction) of the waking and the dream (states), there is no loss of the lone (-*mātra*) inner self, on account of (there) being (i.e. existence) of the witness of that (loss); (indeed) the inner self is not (beset) with birth etc. [1453]

Thus, there concludes here the immutability of the inner self as the witness/seer.

रज्ज्वज्ञानमनादाय न सर्पादीक्षणं यथा ।
आत्माज्ञानमनादाय न तथानात्मवीक्षणम् ॥१४५४॥

As there is not (i.e. cannot be) the seeing (i.e. sight) of a serpent etc. (by a person), unless he has taken up (i.e. has been affected by) ignorance about a rope etc.;¹ so also there cannot be (in the case of a person) the awareness of being some non-Ātman (viz. individual self) unless he is affected by ignorance about the (immutable) Ātman. [1454]

¹Here is implied *ādi* in view of the later *sarpādi*.

कल्पनाबीजविरहात्कल्पना न हि लभ्यते ।
प्रतीचि कल्पितोऽनात्मा प्रतीचि व्यभिचारितः ॥१४५५॥

In the absence of the root cause (lit. seed) of any (false) notion,¹ there cannot be any (false) notion; the non-Ātman (also) is imagined (to exist) on the basis of (assuming the existence of) the inner self² but it is absent (*vyabhicārita*) in that inner self. [1455]

¹Or, imaginary existent object.

²Add: which is *really* the immutable Ātman.

आत्मनोऽव्यभिचारित्वं सर्वत्रात्मैकसाक्षिकम् ।
यतोऽतस्तत्परिज्ञाने नात्माज्ञानमपेक्षते ॥१४५६॥

Since the presence (lit. non-absence) of the Ātman has everywhere (or, at all times) the (immutable) Ātman alone as its witness, therefore, the (immutable) Ātman does not depend on (lit. expect) ignorance for (the purpose of) fully (*pari-*) getting to know it. [1456]

Cf. SP: *sarvāvasthāsv avyabhicāritvenātmanah svataḥsiddhatvam uktam bhavati*.

Verses 1457-1463 explain that the nature of the Ātman as illuminator is owing to its supposed relation to what is to be illuminated—it is not an activity.

प्रकाशयार्थाभिसंबन्धे कर्तृत्वं सवितुर्यथा ।
अप्रकाशप्रकाशित्वान्न तथात्मप्रकाशने ॥१४५७॥

As the capacity (lit. agency) of the sun (is well known/obvious) in relation to the objects to be illumined (by it), because of its capacity of/for illuminating what(ever) is not illumined (or, obvious), so it is (in the case of the immutable Ātman) with respect to revealing itself (*ātmaprakāśana*). [1457]

The basis of this illustration is the question as stated in SP and NKL (ms. p.674) following it): *svayam evātmā svātmānam āśayan ca prakāśayan katham kūṭasthaḥ syāt*.

बाह्यार्थभासनेऽप्यस्य सूर्यादेरिव कर्तृता ।
सर्वदैवैकरूपत्वाद्धानोर्नापूर्वकारिता ॥१४५८॥

In respect of illuminating (or, revealing) the external objects also, there is (accepted) the an agentship of this one (viz. the Ātman), as in the case of the sun etc.,¹ on account of having for itself (or, being possessed of) only one form (or, status)—(all the same), in the case of the sun (there is not accepted) the capacity/agency of revealing what was not there (in existence) before. [1458]

¹ Possibly other luminaries like the moon are meant.

यथा जात्यमणेः शुभ्रा ज्वलन्ती निश्चला शिखा ।
संनिध्यसंनिधानेषु प्रकाशयानामविक्रिया ॥१४५९॥
न प्रकाशक्रिया काचिदस्य स्वात्मनि विद्यते ।
उपचारात्क्रिया सास्य यः प्रकाशयस्य संनिधिः ॥१४६०॥

As in the case of an excellent (or, a genuine) jewel, a beautiful

(or, bright), burning, steady flame remains unchanged (even) in the proximity or otherwise of the objects to be revealed, [1459]

(so also) there is no act of revealing in the case of this (immutable Ātman) (or it is attributed to it). Metaphorically that act of this (Ātman) is (but) the proximity of an object to be revealed. [1460]

न चेदं दर्शनं गौणमग्निर्माणवको यथा ।

इतोऽन्यथावबोधस्य प्रतीचोऽनुपलब्धतः ॥१४६१॥

Not also is this seeing secondary/metaphorical like (the understanding in respect of the statement) 'The pupil is fire', for there is no knowing (lit. obtaining) of the inner self otherwise than (in) this (way). [1461]

Note on this NKL (ms. p.674): *anyasya mukhyasyābhāvād idam eva mukhyam ity arthah.*

ननु भङ्गुरधात्वर्थे तृचप्रयोगो जगत्यपि ।

द्रष्टृशब्दाभिलष्यस्य नित्या दृष्टिः कथं भवेत् ॥१४६२॥

(An objection:) 'But indeed (there is noticed) in the world the employment (or, use) of the suffix *-trc* in the sense of the meaning of a root, to be liable to destruction;¹ how can it be there that the (power of) seeing of the one is expressed by the word *draṣṭṛ*, viz. as (what is) non-perishing (lit. everlasting)?' [1462]

¹SP cites the examples of the words *chettā* and *bhettā* from the verb roots *chid-* and *bhid-* with the suffix *-trc* added to them.

नोक्ततत्वात्परिहारस्य सूर्यादावपि दर्शनात् ।

प्रकाशयिता सविता व्याप्तु वापि वियत्तथा ॥१४६३॥

(The answer is:) 'No, not so, since already an answer has been given;¹ viz. such (a happening) is noticed in the case of the sun etc.² The sun is the illuminator³ and so also is the sky the pervader'.³ [1463]

NKL (ms. p.674) introduces this verse thus: *kādāditkakriyāṃ nāpi savitā prakāśayaty ākāśaṃ vyāpriti* (sic., for *vyāpnoti* ?) [non-understandable!] *kartr̥trjantaprayogadarśanān maivam ity āha ti.*

¹Cf. verses 1457-1458 and 1442 above.

²The word etc. seems to refer to other luminaries like the moon; cf. note 1 on verse 1458 above.

³This is by the force of the form ending with (the suffix) *c*; though actually no activity by the so-called agent whatever is meant.

Verses 1464-1468 affirm that the *Ātman* can be described both as an agent and an illuminator.

अस्तु प्रकाशकेष्वेवं न प्रतीचीति चेन्मतम् ।

नैवं प्रकाशकत्वात्स्यात्प्रत्यगात्माख्यवस्तुनः ॥१४६४॥

If (it may yet be argued further:) 'Let this be so in the case of luminaries, (but this) is not (to be, i.e. cannot be, accepted) in the case of the inner self'. (The answer to this is:) 'No, this is not (lit. should not be) so on account of the illuminating nature of the (real) thing (viz. the *Ātman*) called (here in the case of an individual) the inner self'.¹ [1464]

This is so established already by the *Śruti*—cf. SP: *pratīcāś prakāśatvasyānavacchinnaṭvasya ca śrūtītyādisiddhatvāt kartr̥- vinā prakāśakatvādyaviśiṣṭatvam*. The next verse clarifies further.

प्रत्यक्षमात्मना लोके द्रष्टाद्यर्थावभासनम् ।

स्वयंज्योतिष्ट्वशास्त्राच्च प्रत्यगात्मा प्रकाशकः ॥१४६५॥

It is commonly known to the people from experience that there is (i.e. can be) illuminating of object(s) such as the seer (in an individual) etc.; so also¹ is the inner self an illuminator, on the strength of the (statement in the) scripture about its being self-illuminating. [1465]

¹Cf. SP: *cakāro draṣṭrāder jādyān na svato bhānam iti yuktisamuccayārthah.*

अप्यात्मैवेह सर्वत्र स्वयंज्योतिः प्रतीयते ।
ज्योतिषामपि तज्ज्योतिस्तमेवेति च शास्त्रतः ॥१४६६॥

Also, only the Ātman is here (in all the states of an individual) known (or, experienced) as ever¹ self-luminous and further (it is so known) from the scriptures² (viz. as in) *jyotiṣām api taj jyotiḥ* and *tam eva*. [1466]

¹SP clarifies the sense of the locative, as understood from the words *iha* and *sarvatra* thus: *saptamūbhyām bhāsyo 'rtho grhītaḥ*.

²Cf. BU 4.4.16, also *Muṇḍakopaniṣad* 2.2.10 and 4.4.21.

साक्षात्पश्याम्यहं कुम्भं न पश्यामीति लोकतः ।
अनुभूतेः प्रसिद्धत्वात्नैवं स्यादिति चेन्मतम् ॥१४६७॥

(An argument:) If it is said (lit. thought) that "This can never be so, since it is known among the people from their experience (expressed) thus: "I directly perceive a pitcher and/or I do not perceive it".' [1467]

मैवं पश्याम्यहं कुम्भं न पश्यामीति दर्शनात् ।
सदानश्वरदृष्टित्वं प्रतीचो गम्यते स्फुटम् ॥१४६८॥

(The answer is:) 'Do not think thus; for, from the experience (lit. seeing of the people in the statement) "I do not see

a pitcher", there is clearly¹ suggested/conveyed the nature of the inner self as having a never-perishing (power of) seeing'.

[1468]

¹The next verse explains the significance of the word *sphuṭam* 'clearly' in this verse.

verses 1469-1474 point out that the Ātman as the seer is the means for effecting the knowledge of *na paśyami* as that of *paśyāmi*.

पश्यामीत्यस्य साक्षित्वं प्रतीचो गम्यते यथा ।
न पश्यामीति चाप्यस्य तथैवेहात्मसाक्षिकम् ॥१४६९॥

As the witnesshood of the inner self is understood from (lit. suggested by) this (statement, viz.) 'I am seeing (or, I can see)'; in the same way it (is understood) here (i.e. in the experience stated) in (the words), 'I am not seeing (or, I am not able to see)'. [1469]

SP remarks, at the end of the comment on this verse: *masākṣikaṃ jñānam ajñānaṃ ceti śeṣaḥ*.

उत्खातचक्षुषां चापि दृष्टिः स्वप्नेऽनुभूयते ।
द्रष्टृदृष्टयतिरेकेण नित्या दृष्टिरतो मम ॥१४७०॥

In the case of those who do not have seeing eyes¹ also, it is known (lit. experienced) that they have the (power of) seeing (objects etc.) in their dream state; therefore, even in the absence of the seer and the (power of) seeing, there is, according to me, eternal (power of) seeing (in the case of the immutable Ātman). [1470]

¹Literally, those whose eyes are removed, i.e. those who are blind (or, have become) blind.

ज्योतिषामपि तज्ज्योतिरस्मद्वीपरिमोषणात् ।
तमोरूपमिवाभाति भानुर्नक्तंदृशामिव ॥१४७१॥

That light of (all) lights¹ appears to have (for us) the form of darkness, on account of the obscuring² of our intellect, in the way the sun appears to be dark for those who can see only in the night(s). [1471]

¹Cf. note 2 on verse 1466 above.

²Literally, 'stealing away', (add) by ignorance.

यत एवमतो दृष्टिर्नित्यैवात्मन इष्यताम् ।
अनित्यत्वस्य सर्वस्य प्रत्यग्दृष्ट्येकसाक्षितः ॥१४७२॥

Since this is so, therefore, let it be accepted that the (power of) seeing of the (immutable) Ātman is perennial (or, ever obtaining); (this is so) on account of all non-perennial (object(s))¹ having the lone witness (of them) in the (power of) seeing of the inner self. [1472]

¹Cf. *āgamiāpāyinaḥ* in verse 1426 above.

तयासाधनया दृष्ट्यापरिणामस्वभावया ।
पश्यन्नेवायमात्मास्ते तद्दृष्टेश्चोद्यहेतुतः ॥१४७३॥

With that (power of) seeing, which is not a means (of any activity), which has the nature of not undergoing (any) modification does this (individual) Ātman keep on seeing (various external objects), owing to the cause (which is stated in) the objection (raised earlier about) its (power of) seeing.¹ [1473]

¹Thus it was stated (as SP rightly points out): *svaprakāśaś ced ātmā kutaḥ supte svātmānam anyam ca na vettīti codya-pramukhasya dvaitasyātmadr̥ṣṭeḥ siddheḥ na tasyā lopo 'stīty arthaḥ*.

पश्यामीति यथाद्राक्षीरात्मदृष्ट्यैव जागरे ।
न पश्यामीत्यपि तथा नित्यदृष्ट्यैव वीक्षसे ॥१४७४॥

As you have experienced (lit. seen) in the waking state, "I am seeing", with your own (*ātman* power of) seeing itself; so do you experience (lit. see), "I do not see" also, with the perennial (power of) seeing.¹ [1474]

¹Add: in the deep sleep state (also).

Verses 1475-1480 show that *pramāṭṛtva* and *draṣṭṛtva* of the *Ātman* is dependent on *kāraṅkas* 'means of activity'; the *Ātman* is, nevertheless, only connected with the act of seeing.

पश्यन्कुम्भादिकं वस्तु देहान्तो ग्राहको यथा ।
दृष्ट्या संबध्यते द्रष्टा द्रष्टृत्वस्य तदाश्रयात् ॥१४७५॥
अकारकस्वभावत्वान्नैवं वृत्तं ममात्मनः ।
आत्मदृष्टिरतो ग्राह्या प्रत्यङ्मात्रानुरोधिनी ॥१४७६॥

In the way the perceiver within the body, who sees (lit. is seeing) the things¹ such as a pitcher, is connected with (i.e. related to) the (power of) seeing and is (called) the seer through (or, on account of) the capacity of the seer residing in him, [1475]

so there is not (lit. does not get connected) the activity in the case of my *Ātman*,² owing to its nature of being a non-agent (of any activity); therefore, it is necessary to accept the (power of) seeing of the *Ātman*, viz. that which follows³ merely (the nature of) the inner self.³ [1476]

¹By the word *vastu* in the singular is intended the plural.

²My *Ātman* means 'the *Ātman* which is posited in my theory'.

³Thus do, both SP and NKL (ms. p.675) observe: *na hi draṣṭur yāder artham upasaṃharati*, marking the completion of the meaning of the two sentences pertaining to the proposition

enunciated and the argument of cause—cf. *pratijñāhetuvākyayor artha* in the beginning of SP on the next verse. Yet, NKL (ms. p.675) observes there: *hetuvākyārtham saṁgrhya* (this is regarding the earlier portion) *pratijñārtham prapañcayati* (*yathokteti*).

यथोक्तार्थप्रसिद्धत्वाद्द्वैशब्दोऽत्र प्रयुज्यते ।

तत्र पश्यतिशब्देन कारकत्वं निषिध्यते ॥१४७७॥

The word *vai* is used here¹ owing to its being well known in the sense of 'as what has been stated earlier (*yathoktārtha*)'.² (And) in the phrase (lit. word for expression) *tan na paśyati*, there is negated (i.e. negation of) *kāraakatva* (doership).³ [1477]

¹See references to NKL explanation in note 3 of the preceding verse—that is more proper.

²Read SP: *kūṭasthadṛṣṭitvasyātmanah sarvopaniṣatprasiddheḥ*.

³This refers to agentship of the activity of seeing attributed to the seer. This is elucidated in the next two verses by an illustration.

दृश्यार्थासंभवाद्यद्वत्पश्यन्नपि न पश्यति ।

न पश्यामीतिफलतः कारकस्य यथा तथा ॥१४७८॥

अकारकात्मनोऽदृष्टिर्द्रष्टव्यार्थाप्रयुक्ततः ।

वस्तूक्तं दृष्टिशब्देन न क्रिया नापि कारकम् ॥१४७९॥

(This, i.e. the above, is meant) in the same way as (*yathā tathā*) in the happening that an individual does not see (external objects), since there is absence of any perceptible object(s) even as he does not see (himself); while he is seeing (it), for the activity (lit. effect) of (i.e. produced by) the *kāraaka* (i.e. the agent) stated in (the words), 'I do not see (or, am not seeing)'; [1478]

(that is to say:) for the reason of the non-statement (i.e. of not stating) the object(s) to be seen by the (power of) seeing and the consequent not-seeing by the Ātman which has the nature of a non-agent.¹ In (or, By) the word *drṣṭi*² there

is stated the (real) thing (i.e. Ātman), neither an activity nor a *kāraka* (thing connected with activity, i.e. really an agent, is stated therein). [1479]

¹It must be confessed that the above translation of 1478-79ab is only belaboured, for it has tried to follow the text, as it is, the note by the editor of the AnSS edition being ignored. NKL (ms.) does not offer any help!

²SP rightly points out: *dr̥ṣṭiśabdena paśyann itiśabdenety arthah.*

ग्राहकग्रहणग्राह्यहीनं रूपं यदात्मनः ।
तद्दृष्टिरिति वचसा साक्षान्नः प्रतिपाद्यते ॥१४८०॥

That which is the form of the Ātman, i.e. that which has no connection whatever with (or, lit. which is bereft of) the (notions of) one who grasps, the act of grasping and the object to be grasped, is directly declared (or, expounded) to us by the phrase *tad dr̥ṣṭiḥ*. [1480]

This is the reason for saying in the preceding verse *vastūktan dr̥ṣṭiśabdena*— it is the unsaid part of the statement (*vākyasēṣa*).

Verses 1481-1487 go to remove the supposed contradiction in paśyan na paśyati.

प्रतीच्येव समाप्तं यदक्रियाकारकात्मकम् ।
न पश्यतिगिरा रूपमात्मनस्तदिहोच्यते ॥१४८१॥

Here ¹ is meant (lit. found) in the phrase *na paśyati* that form of the Ātman which is noticed only in the inner self and is not of the nature of an activity and/or a *kāraka* (i.e. agent). [1481]

This is the meaning of *tan na paśyati*.

¹Perhaps 'in the deep sleep state', or in the phrase *na paśyati*.

ननु चोद्यानुवादोऽयं न पश्यतिगिरोच्यते ।
कृतोऽकारकवस्त्वत्र प्रमाणादभिधीयते ॥१४८२॥

(An objection:) 'But, indeed, in the statement *na paśyati*, there is here a restatement of the objection (that was raised); on the authority of what means (of knowing) is it then said here (i.e. in this respect) that there is (in this statement a mention of) the thing which is not an agent (*kāraka*)?' [1482]

ऐकात्म्यमेव नो ज्ञातं सर्वत्रैव पुरा मितेः ।
अज्ञातमेव च ज्ञातं नातश्चोद्यस्य संभवः ॥१४८३॥

(The answer:) 'What we have known is only the singleness of the Ātman. And since everywhere (in discussions and in the world) it is only what was not known before (that) right/correct knowledge makes known, there is no possibility of (or, scope for) an objection'. [1483]

स्वतःसिद्धानुभूतिश्च नाज्ञानाद्व्यतिरिच्यते ।
सांख्यराद्धान्तवन्नातश्चोद्यं मत्तोऽन्यतः कृतम् ॥१४८४॥

Further, the experience which becomes/gets established by itself (i.e. on its own strength) does not differ from ignorance. Therefore, there is not coming from me (lit. made by me) any objection, as resulting from another (condition), like the doctrine of the Sāṃkhyas. [1484]

ऐकात्म्यवादिनावश्यमेको मेयोऽर्थ इष्यते ।
मेयान्तराभ्युपगमे न ह्यैकात्म्यं प्रसिध्यति ॥१४८५॥

A person who holds the theory of the singleness of the Ātman has necessarily to accept that there is (only) one object to be known: for, in accepting (that there exists) a second object to be known, there will not be proved the singleness of the Ātman. [1485]

This is to affirm: *aikātmīyam evājñātam meyam*. No other thing/object such as a pitcher is to be taken as *ajñāta* for scriptures; cf. SP: *na ca tadaprasiddhir astu* (*meyam* to be supplied) *sarvopaniṣadvyākopād iti bhāvaḥ*.

साधनानामसामग्र्यात्सामग्र्याच्चेह कर्त्तरि ।
न पश्यतीक्षत इति विरुद्धार्थो यथोच्यते ॥१४८६॥
पश्यन्न पश्यतीत्यत्र न तथात्मनि युज्यते ।
दृङ्मात्राविक्रियात्मत्व एकत्वाकारकत्वतः ॥१४८७॥

As, on account of incompleteness and (at the same time) completeness in respect of the means (of the activity of seeing) the mutually contradictory thought (lit. meaning) conveyed in the case of (the Ātman which is) the agent (lit. the seer), by the words *na paśyati* and *īkṣate*, [1486] so, it is reasonably stated in the words *paśyan na paśyati*, in respect of the Ātman, having the nature of not being modified as merely seeing, since it is being single (i.e. having no second beside itself) and non-agent. [1487]

Verses 1488-1489 affirm that *paśyati-kriyā* is possible in the case of the Ātman even in the absence of any *kāraka*.

यत एवमतः पश्यन्नित्यस्यैवोत्तरं वचः ।
न पश्यतीति व्याख्यानं कारकादिनिषेधनम् ॥१४८८॥

Since this is so, therefore, the subsequent (or later) statement *na paśyati* is an explanation of the (earlier statement) *paśyan*; (and) it negates (or, rejects the presence of) a *kāraka*¹ 'agent of an activity' etc. [1488]

¹Literally, what is connected with an activity; the word *ādi* refers to *sādhana*, *sthala* and such other factors connected with an activity.

पश्यन्न पश्यतीत्यत्र तस्मादेकोऽर्थ उच्यते ।
अकारकात्मकं ज्योतिरद्वयं प्रत्यगात्मकम् ॥१४८९॥

Therefore, in (the statement) *paśyan na paśyati*, there is (only) one thing (lit. meaning, i.e. activity) conveyed (lit. expressed), viz. a non-dual light which is of the nature of the inner self and which does not have the nature of a *kāraka* 'agent' (connected with an activity). [1489]

Verses 1490-1500 discuss the variant reading noted in the *Mādhyandina* recension.

ग्रहीतृग्रहणग्राह्यं वस्तु द्रष्टव्यमुच्यते ।
प्रमाणदृष्टियोग्यत्वात्प्रमात्राद्यात्मवस्तुनः ॥१४९०॥

The thing to be grasped (or, seized/taken) in the activity called grasping by the agent who grasps is designated (in the Śruti by the word) *draṣṭavya* '(what is) to be seen' on account of its being suitable for seeing by the means (viz. the power of seeing, i.e. eye) for the (real) thing called the Ātman, the knower (i.e. 'the seer'). [1490]

Here, Sureśvara comments on the reading of the sentence in BU of the *Mādhyandina* recension: ... *paśyan vai tad draṣṭavyam* which includes the word *draṣṭavyam* that is not found in the *Kāṇva* recension.

प्रात्यक्ष्यं च यथैतेषां तथा पूर्वमवादिषम् ।
द्रष्टादेरात्मनश्चोक्तं वैलक्षण्यं तथा पुरा ॥१४९१॥

As to how there is direct perceptibility in these is according to what I have said earlier; so also the difference in nature of the Ātman from the (usually/ordinarily understood) seer also has been pointed out (lit. stated) earlier. [1491]

दर्शनादर्शनोक्तिभ्यामविभागात्मको दृशिः ।

इहाभिधीयते ज्योतिरन्यत्र तु विभागवत् ॥१४९२॥

By/In in the statements of seeing and non-seeing here (i.e. in the deep sleep state), there is mentioned the seer who has the nature of being undivided;¹ elsewhere (i.e. the waking and dream states), however, (the same is mentioned as) having divisions in it. [1492]

¹The reference is to *pramātr*, *prameya* and *pramāṇa*, the triad necessary for any *māna*, i.e. activity of knowing.

चित्तेरकारकत्वाच्च सर्वान्तरतमत्वतः ।

कात्स्न्यात्तदन्यथात्म्यात्पश्यन्नपि न पश्यति ॥१४९३॥

न पश्यति यथा प्राज्ञ उक्तहेत्वविशेषतः ।

तथैवैतद्ग्रहीतव्यं स्वप्नजाग्रदवस्थयोः ॥१४९४॥

Since sentience (i.e. the immutable Ātman) is not a *kāraka* (and further) it is the innermost of all (beings), it is (again) full/complete (in itself)¹ and has its real nature (quite) different from that of (all) other(s);² it does not see while it is seeing. [1493]

As Prājña (i.e. the Ātman in the deep sleep state) does not see, owing to its having non-different cause(s)³ which is (or, are already) stated; in the same way is this (i.e. the inner self)⁴ to be taken (or, understood to have the same nature) in the dream and waking states (also). [1494]

¹This refers to its being *avibhāgavat*; also cf. BU 4.5.13.

²The various objects and the individual selves which are affected by ignorance.

³Namely, those mentioned in the preceding verse, i.e. *akāraka-tvāt* etc.

⁴It is, in reality, not different from the Ātman, though it is affected by ignorance.

चित्तेर्यथाविनाशश्च स्वप्नजाग्रदवस्थयोः ।

तथैव संप्रसादेऽस्मिन्नुक्तहेतुसमन्वयात् ॥१४९५॥

As there is absence of destruction in the case of sentience in the dream and waking states, so also (it is there) in this deep sleep state, owing to its being possessed (or, lit. being closely associated with) the causative characteristics (which are already) stated.¹ [1495]

¹These are the reasons (*hetus*) *akāra*katva etc. in verse 1493 above (and earlier elsewhere also).

न हीति हेतुवचनं प्रतिज्ञातार्थसिद्धिकृत् ।
द्विप्रकारो विनाशश्च द्विर्हेतुवक्त्या निषिध्यते ॥१४९६॥

The statement *na hi* ... effects the proof (lit. establishing) of the matter stated;¹ and the destruction of two types² is twice negated by the statement of the reason.³ [1496]

¹Namely, *ātmā kūṭasthadr̥ṣṭiḥ*.

²These are stated in the next verse.

³Read SP: *ekenaiva hetunā pratijñātārthasiddher vyartham hetvantaram ityāha dviprakāra iti*.

निरन्वयो विनाशोऽस्य हीत्युक्त्या निषिध्यते ।
अविनाशीति चाप्यत्र विकारापह्नुतेर्वचः ॥१४९७॥

In/By the statement *na hi* ... is denied complete (or absolute) destruction of this (immutable) Ātman and in (the use of) the word *avināśī* there is stated the concealment of a modification (in it).¹ [1497]

¹This is owing to ignorance (i.e. *adhyāsa*)—*sāvaśeṣa nāśa* in opposition to *niranvaya nāśa*. Read SP at the end of the comment on this verse: *niravaśeṣanāśavat sāvaśeṣanāśasyāpy ayogāt kūṭasthadr̥ṣṭir ātmety arthaḥ*.

अविनाशीति मैत्रेय्यां द्विधानाशनिषेधकृत् ।
वचनं प्रागुपन्यस्तं तदेवात्रापि हेतवे ॥१४९८॥

The statement *avināśī* in Maitreyī (Brāhmaṇa)¹ purports to negate/reject (the notion of) twofold destruction. The same statement is here introduced first (*prāk*) to convey that very reason (for non-destruction). [1498]

¹This is BU 4.5 on the authority of BUB (p.590).

सर्वोच्छ्रित्यात्मसाक्षित्वादुच्छ्रितेश्चाप्यसंभवात् ।
तथा सर्वविकाराणां प्रत्यङ्मात्रैकसाक्षिता ॥१४९९॥

This is so, because the destruction of all¹ has the (immutable) Ātman as its witness and the utter destruction² (of it) is also not possible and also because all modifications have only the inner self as their witness. [1499]

This verse is an explanation as to why the immutable Ātman is not subject to absolute destruction.

¹These seem to be the individual Ātmans. Read SP: *sarvātmanocchittir niranvayo nāśas tatrātmanah sākṣitvān na tadvattety arthah*. (This appears to us somewhat unclear.) And in the same way, NKL (ms. p.677) reads: *sarvocchittirūpānanvayanāśasya vā (sic) bhāve hetum āha*.

²SP explains *ucchiti* as *sāvaśeṣo nāśo hetusaṃsargaḥ*.

पश्यन्नेवायमत्रास्ते सान्वयानन्वयौ ध्रुवः ।
नाशौ यस्मादतः सिद्ध आत्मा कूटस्थदर्शनः ॥१५००॥

Since this (immutable Ātman) keeps on seeing/witnessing the twofold destruction, viz. absolute and partial; therefore, it is established as (i.e. proved to be) having an immutable (i.e. non-perishing power of) seeing/witnessing. [1500]

Verses 1501-1502 affirm that the Śruti statement *paśyan na paśyati* is independently true or meaningful.

पश्यन्न पश्यतीत्येतत्स्वतन्त्रं चागमं वचः ।
न हीति तु प्रतिज्ञोक्तिरनुमोक्त्यनुसारिणी ॥१५०१॥
हेतुक्तिरविनाशित्वादित्युक्तार्थप्रसिद्धये ।
विनाशशक्त्यभावोक्तेर्न प्रतिज्ञैकदेशता ॥१५०२॥

Or (ca), the scriptural statement *paśyan na paśyati* is independent¹ and (tu) the proposition (in the words) *na hi* is in accordance with the inference;² [1501]

the statement of the reason (or, cause), viz. having destruction (or, imperishability) etc.³ is (only) for revealing (lit. proving) what is (already) stated (*artha*). (Further,) since there is an express statement about the absence of the liability of (its) destruction (i.e. destructibility), it (viz. *na hi ...*) is not a part of the proposition.³ [1502]

¹This refers to *nirapekṣapramāṇatva* of *āgama vacaḥ* (incidentally, *āgama* which is used in opposition to *vacas*, functions like its adjective).

²SP clarifies this thus: *drṣṭer nityatvam pratijñāya tasyaiva pratijñātasya siddhyartham anumānānusārīṇi hetūktir avināśitvād iti prayujyate tathā cānumānavat sādhanatety arthaḥ*.

³SP: *na vinaśyatīti pratijñā vinaṣṭum ayogyatvaṃ hetus tan nānāyor ekārthatety arthaḥ*.

In verses 1503-1505, there is stated an alternative way of understanding *paśyan na paśyati*.

प्रतिज्ञावचसी द्वे वा पश्यन्नित्यादिनोदिते ।
न हीति हेतुवचसी द्वे स्यातामुत्तरे तयोः ॥१५०३॥
पश्यन्नेवास्त इत्यस्याः प्रतिज्ञोक्तेः प्रसिद्धये ।
हेतुर्न हीतिवचनमुत्तरस्यापि चोत्तरम् ॥१५०४॥
निरन्वयविनाशस्य निषेधोऽत्र विवक्ष्यते ।

प्रथमे हेतुवचसि परिणामस्तथोत्तरे ॥१५०५॥

..., in the words *paśyan* ..., there are two propositions stated and the words *na hi* ... are two subsequent reasons for the same; [1503]

(us), in order to establish/prove the proposition *paśyann* *āste* 'It keeps on seeing', the statement *na hi* is (the statement the reason); (the same) is the answer to the subsequent proposition, viz. *na paśyati*) also. [1504]

(in this way) is here intended to express the negation of (any kind of) absolute destruction—thus, the first (occurs) in the statement of the reason and, in the subsequent, (there is the statement of) the result. [1505]

is is another way of dividing (i.e. marking the distinction between) the proposition and the statement of reason. Read (ms. p.677): *paśyann iti pratijñā na paśyatīti cet prapratijñā hetur na hīti dvitīyā pratijñāhetur avināśitvād iti ga ity arthaḥ. (?)*

is yet another alternative way stated in verses 1506 and

द्वौ वा हेतू यथोक्तार्थौ द्वयोरपि प्रतिज्ञयोः ।

आभ्यां संभूय सिद्धोऽर्थ एव सति भवेद्यतः ॥१५०६॥

there are two reasons, whose meanings (i.e. natures) have been (already) explained (are stated), in respect of both (these) positions; since that being so, the matters (in the positions) would be proved by (the strength of) the two (reasons) come) together.¹ [1506]

is a statement of yet another way of connecting each of the two reasons with both the propositions.

clarifies this thus: *ābhyāṃ hetubhyāṃ sambhūya* *bhyāṃ ātmano dr̥ṣṭitvam anāśaś ca [dr̥ṣṭirūpatvam ...* *bhāvaś ca* in NKL (ms. p.678)] *vivakṣito 'rthaḥ ... siddhyati.*

पश्यन्नेवायमत्रास्त इति चेत्कथमुच्यते ।

न पश्यतीति वचनं शृणु तच्च यथा तथा ॥१५०७॥

(A question:) 'If, here (in the deep sleep state), this (Ātman) keeps on seeing, how is it said (then) *na paśyati*?'; (the answer:) 'Hear that (*tathā*)', as to how (*yathā*) it is said: [1507]

Verses 1508-1514 explain the purport of na paśyati.

पुरा यदभवन्मोहात्स्वप्नजाग्रदवस्थयोः ।

प्रतीचो न तदत्रास्ति रूपं यत्कारकात्मकम् ॥१५०८॥

'Whatever was earlier the form of the inner self, owing to ignorance (on the part of it), in the two states of dream and waking, does not continue to be (i.e. not exist) here (i.e. in deep sleep)—that (form) which was of the nature of a *kāraka* (i.e. an agent of the activity of seeing).¹ [1508]

¹Read SP: *kāra-kātmakam pramāṭṛlakṣaṇam iti yāvat.*

आत्मनोऽद्वयतत्त्वस्य द्वितीयं यदविद्यया ।

सुषुप्ते न तदस्तीह प्रयुक्तं यत्स्वगोचरैः ॥१५०९॥

That which is, owing to ignorance, there the dream and waking states other than (lit. second or in addition, to external objects etc.) the Ātman, which is in reality non-dual (i.e. having no connection with duality whatever) does not exist here, in the deep sleep state—viz. that which is caused by other objects belonging to it. [1509]

सजातीयप्रयुक्तं यद्बुद्ध्यन्तं रूपमात्मनः ।

धर्मादिहेतुकं प्राज्ञे तद्धवस्तं कर्मणः क्षयात् ॥१५१०॥

Whatever be the form of the Ātman in the waking state, viz. that which is caused by those of its kind¹ and has merit

etc. as its cause, is all of it destroyed in the Prājña (form of it in the deep sleep state), on account of the cessation (lit. loss) of activity. [1510]

¹The Ātman is then, owing to the ignorance affecting it, possessed of various organs such as ears etc. that also are product of ignorance, therefore, they are its *sajātīya* 'belonging to its kind'.

तमोन्तात्कारणात्तद्वि द्वितीयं कार्यरूपतः ।
ततोऽन्यद्ग्रहणं नास्ति विभक्तं ग्राह्यमेव च ॥१५११॥

That second (form of the Ātman) is (or, occurs) on account of the cause in the form (rooted) in ignorance (lit. darkness) which is of the nature of (its) effect(s); therefore, there is no grasping of another (object) and so also (not) any (object) to be grasped, viz. that which is different from itself. [1511]

This is to convey the idea that there is no relation such as that of a *pramātr* and *prameya* etc. where the word 'etc.' refers to other *pramāṇas*.

स्वप्नेऽप्येतन्नयं नाभद्वासनामात्रशेषतः ।
किमु विध्वस्तनिःशेषद्वैतहेतौ सुषुप्तगे ॥१५१२॥

In the dream state also, this triad was (i.e. is) not there, since the objects etc.) are the remainders in the form of impressions alone; what then can one say in respect of (the Ātman) which is in the deep sleep state, i.e. the one (state) wherein the totality of entire (mass of) cause(s) is destroyed? [1512]

सुषुप्ते योऽवशिष्टोऽत्र कौटस्थ्यान्नान्यदर्श्यसौ ।
योऽप्यन्यदर्शी सोऽप्यत्र नास्ति तद्वैतसंभवात् ॥१५१३॥

What then remains here, in the deep sleep state, does not, on account of its immutability, see (any) other (thing/object);

for, whosoever is (known in worldly happenings), i.e. the seer/experiencer of other (objects), does not exist here, since there is (complete) absence of the cause of them (viz. ignorance). [1513]

द्वितीयदर्शनायालं रूपमासीद्यदात्मनः ।

तत्रास्ति तद्द्वितीयं च विभक्तं नात ईक्षते ॥१५१४॥

Whatever be the form of the Ātman there was necessary for (lit. capable of) seeing/witnessing other (objects), does not either exist, or does not exist as apart from it; therefore, (it) does not see/experience (any object). [1514]

This concludes the meaning of *na tu*

Verses 1515-1519 explain yet another meaning of the word dvitīya; it is ignorance about reality, i.e. it is merely a semblance of it.

अविद्यावद्द्वितीयं वा नित्यदृष्टेर्विवक्ष्यते ।

सदाहीनाननुदितभास्वदेकदृगात्मनः ॥१५१५॥

Further (lit. or), what is mentioned as second the perennial seeing (or, seer) is intended to be that which is affected by (lit. associated with/possessed of) ignorance, the one which is ever less than (i.e. inferior to) the Ātman and wherein there has never appeared (lit. arisen) the sole bright seer. [1515]

SP aptly sums up the nature of the postulated second thus: *sābhāsam ajñānam dvitīyam ity arthah.*

तादात्म्यव्यतिरेकाभ्यां तमस्तज्जं च नात्मनः ।

विरोधादेशतोऽकार्यकारणत्वात्परात्मनः ॥१५१६॥

Ignorance and what is produced by it do not belong to (i.e. are not connected with) the Ātman, (as understood) from the

instruction (in the Śruti about the) opposition (to them in nature) of the highest Ātman and because of its not being any effect and/or cause. [1516]

विभक्तं यत्तमोऽस्तीव नाविभक्तं मनागपि ।
तमोऽन्वितत्वाद्बुद्धयन्ते न प्राज्ञेऽनन्वयात्तमः ॥१५१७॥

Ignorance is ever distinct (from the Ātman) and not even a little unseparated from it—(this is so) because of the individual Ātman's connection (or, association) with ignorance in the waking state; so also (because) ignorance does not obtain in Prājña state of the Ātman, owing to the absence of its connection (with it). [1517]

कूटस्थदृष्टावेकस्मिन्नविभक्ते सहस्रधा ।
नामरूपादिभेदेन विभक्तं यत्तमो दृशेः ॥१५१८॥
तत्तु द्वितीयं नेहास्ति तमोऽनर्थस्य कारणम् ।
द्रष्टादिरूपसंभेदाद्यत्पश्येज्जागरे यथा ॥१५१९॥

Since, that ignorance, which is divided thousandfold in the variety of names and forms is distinguished (lit. separated) from the immutable seeing, viz. the seer which is (just) single and undivided; [1518]

therefore, indeed, that second (viz. ignorance and its products) does not exist here (i.e. in the deep sleep state). Ignorance is (but) the cause of the undesirable, since (on account of or because of its connection with the same, the individual Ātman) sees (lit. would see variety) owing to its being a conglomeration of the seer etc.¹ and the forms (of objects). [1519]

¹The word *ādi* refers to his activity and the means for accomplishing it.

अविद्यादेरभावोक्त्या कूटस्थात्मैव भण्यते ।
कारणात्मा यतोऽभावः कार्याख्यस्येह वस्तुनः ॥१५२०॥

By stating the absence of ignorance etc. is stated only the immutable Ātman of the nature of the cause; for, there is here (i.e. in the deep sleep state, complete) absence of the thing(s) called the effect (of ignorance). [1520]

This affirms that the absence of ignorance is but the existence of the Brahman.

अज्ञानान्नान्यदस्तित्वं सर्वस्यानात्मनो यथा ।
निवृत्तिस्तद्वत्तद्वेतोर्नावगत्यात्मनोऽपरा ॥१५२१॥

As there is no existence of all non-Ātmans apart from (that) in ignorance; in the same way, there is no removal (or, cessation) of that which is other than (i.e. apart from) knowing (the nature of) the Ātman, the cause of it (viz. ignorance). [1521]

तत्तु नैवेह वस्त्वस्ति द्वितीयं मोहहेतुजम् ।
साक्षिणो विषयीभूतं विभक्तं कार्यरूपतः ॥१५२२॥

And (tu) there is not (any external existent) thing and the product of delusion,¹ which is other than (lit. second to the Ātman), i.e. the one that is (lit. has become) an object (of seeing) for the (immutable) witness, that is (accepted to be) divided (in variety) in its form as the product (of ignorance). [1522]

¹SP offers a Rgvedic support for this, viz. *indro māyābhiḥ pururūpa īyate* (6.47.18).

संविदैव समाप्तत्वात्तमोजस्य पुरोत्थितेः ।
लभते न द्वितीयत्वमन्यत्वासंभवात्तमः ॥१५२३॥
कार्यस्यापि च बुद्ध्यादेस्तद्वेतोरविभागतः ।
न तदस्ति द्वितीयत्वं संविदैव समाप्तितः ॥१५२४॥

Whatever (be) the product of ignorance (lit. darkness), being overcome (lit. obtained/pervaded), before (even) its rise, by the very sentience (within the body), ignorance does not turn up (i.e. obtain itself) as the second (for sentience), since there is impossibility of (lit. absence of) being the second (i.e. in addition to sentience).¹ [1523]

Even in the case of (its) product(s), viz. the intellect etc.,² which have their cause, not divided (into variety) as such; there cannot be (or is not) the nature of its being the second; since (already) there has been the obtaining/pervasion (of the same) by the very sentience (within the body). [1524]

These two verses state that, in deep sleep, sentience within the body overcomes ignorance and its products, even before they would make their appearance.

¹SP clarifies the thought succinctly thus: *na hi tamaso nirvācyasyānyatvaṃ na ca tadabhāve dvitīyatety arthaḥ*.

²The reference here is to *manas*, the different organs and their activity.

यत एवमतः प्राह नेह तद्वस्तु विद्यते ।

यत्पश्येद्गोचरापन्नं सुखशब्दादिलक्षणम् ॥१५२५॥

यत्पश्येदिति कर्तृवितर्द्रष्टात्राशङ्क्यते यतः ।

तत्रास्ति विषयोऽल्लेखिदर्शनस्येह कारणम् ॥१५२६॥

Since this is so, therefore has (the Śruti) said, 'Here (i.e. in deep sleep) there does not exist such a thing which (the inner self or Ātman) would see, as what has become its object, i.e. what is characterized by words such as happiness;¹ [1525] in the phrase 'what (the inner self or Ātman) would see', there is statement (and, therefore, acceptance) about the agent; and, since the very seer is in a state of doubt (i.e. is doubted) here (viz. in deep sleep), there is here (in connection with the deep sleep state) not mentioned the seeing of any cause, expressive of objects. [1526]

¹ By *ādi*, possibly *duḥkha* is principally understood; maybe other kinds of experiences are also meant.

श्रोत्रादिकरणोपेतं यतोऽन्तःकरणं दृशेः ।
बाह्यार्थदर्शने हेतुः कौटस्थ्यान् तदक्षरम् ॥१५२७॥

Since it is the internal organ which, accompanied by other organs such as ears, is the cause of the seer's seeing external objects; it is not the imperishable on account of the latter's being immutable. [1527]

The basis for this verse is the Śruti statement *nānyo 'to 'sti draṣṭā* (BU 3.7.23) to mean that, since the seer is rejected (i.e. denied as existing) in the deep sleep state, it is the rejection of (the existence of) the Ātman. But that is not an acceptable argument, because the Ātman is said to be the same when it is, under the influence of delusion, possessed of the internal organs etc.; it is, in reality, ever immutable.

Read SP in this context: *śrutis tu cakṣurādidvārā rūpā-dyākāramanovikāre dr̥ṣṭyādisabdite sākṣitāsyāivety evamparā.*

तमोन्तः कारणं बुद्धेर्द्रष्टान्तःकरणावधिः ।
सुखी दुःखी च देहान्तः प्रत्यगज्ञानहेतुतः ॥१५२८॥

The cause of the intellect is the ignorance (lit. darkness) within (an individual's body); the seer (exists) so far as there exists the internal organ and the inner self is happy and/or miserable (while existing) in the body on account of the ignorance/delusion (that is) the cause (of its transmigratory existence). [1528]

Verses 1528-1529 state that in all the dealings through ignorance the real cause is but the inner self.

बुद्ध्यादेशच समुत्पत्तौ धर्माद्येवात्र कारणम् ।
यतोऽतः कारणध्वस्तौ बुद्ध्याद्येत्यात्मकारणम् ॥१५२९॥

Further, since merit etc.¹ is the cause of the rise (i.e. coming into existence) of the intellect etc.² here (i.e. in the Ātman under delusion), therefore, when there is destruction of cause(s), the intellect etc. merge into their (real root-)cause (i.e. the Ātman).³ [1529]

¹Demerit and related ritualistic activities are meant.

²Namely, *manas* and other organs of activity.

³Which has, under the influence of delusion, undergone modification into these.

Verses 1530-1531 firmly state that in the case of the non-affected Ātman there is no ignorance.

तमोन्वयस्तमःकार्ये बुद्ध्यादावेव युज्यते ।
न त्वकारणकार्येऽस्मिन्नित्यबुद्धे परात्मनि ॥१५३०॥

The connection of ignorance is to be understood with reason only in the case of the intellect etc., which are the product of ignorance, but not in the case of this highest Ātman which is neither a cause nor an effect and is ever enlightened (i.e. consisting in knowledge). [1530]

वृत्तिं च लभते कार्यं न स्वकारणतोऽन्यतः ।
न कार्यं कारणं वास्ति प्रत्यग्वृत्तव्यपेक्षया ॥१५३१॥

An effect does not come into existence from anything else than its own cause (viz. ignorance), whereas there does not come into being (or, existence) any effect or cause in relation to (*vyapekṣayā*, or through dependence on) the inner self.[1531]

In verses 1532-1536, there is explained paśyan na vai paśyati.

बुद्ध्यन्तस्यास्य मूढस्य सुखशब्दादिदर्शिनः ।
स्वकारणक्षयाद्धवस्तौ नात्मा पश्यन्नपीक्षते ॥१५३२॥

When there has occurred destruction of this deluded (individual self) which has its intellect as the last (organ to perish) and which experiences (lit. sees) happiness, words etc.;¹ then, on account of the destruction of itself (viz. of ignorance), that Ātman also does not (any more) see, though (it is) seeing.²

[1532]

¹This indicates miseries and other objects of knowing.

²This is despite its being *svaprakāśa* 'self-illuminating'.

द्रष्टृत्वादिविभागेन विभक्तो यस्त्वविद्यया ।

स कूटस्थात्मनापीतो रज्ज्वा सर्पो यथा तथा ॥१५३३॥

That one which is, on account of ignorance, divided into (such discrete things as) *draṣṭṛ* 'seer' (or 'experiencer') is overcome (or, drawn within) by the immutable Ātman, in the same way as a serpent (that is imagined to be existing) by a rope (which is its basic reality).

[1533]

द्रष्टृदर्शनदृश्यानां संबन्धोऽतो न वीक्ष्यते ।

तमस्विनः प्रलीनत्वान्नाविद्याकार्यमीक्षते ॥१५३४॥

Therefore, any connection is not seen there (in the deep sleep state) among the seer, the act of seeing and the objects of seeing—thus, because the one, overpowered by ignorance, having merged (into the immutable Ātman), that (individual Ātman) does not see (any) effect of ignorance.

[1534]

द्रष्टृदर्शनदृश्यादिभेदोऽविद्याप्रकल्पितः ।

यतोऽतो मोहविध्वस्तौ द्रष्ट्राद्यात्मनि नेक्ष्यते ॥१५३५॥

Since the division (i.e. distinctly existing world of objects), consisting in the seer, the act of seeing and the object(s) of seeing, is also created by (lit. imagined on account of) ignorance, therefore, when (that) ignorance is overcome (lit.

destroyed), there is not seen in the (immutable) Ātman (the discrete objects, namely the world of) the seer and others.

[1535]

उत्तरेष्वपि वाक्येषु यथोक्तमुपपादयेत् ।
व्याख्यानमेतदेवेति नातोऽन्यदवशिष्यते ॥१५३६॥

In the subsequent sentences (of the Śruti)¹ also, one should accept this very explanation, i.e. what has been presented (lit. stated above), therefore, nothing else than this (holds good and) remains to be stated. [1536]

¹This is reference to *yad vai tan na jighrati* (4.3.24-30).

As stated earlier in a note on verse 1408 above, the explanation of Bhartṛprapañca (from verse 1386 earlier up to that verse) was acceptable to Sureśvara; but that explanation is now subjected to critical examination, i.e. refutation up to verse 1566, up to verse 1645 below.

Verses 1537-1547 explain the exposition of yad vai tat—according to Bhartṛprapañca.

अन्ये पुनरिमं ग्रन्थमन्यथैव यथोदितात् ।
व्याचक्षते हि व्याख्यानात्तच्चापीह विभाव्यते ॥१५३७॥

Others,¹ however, explain (this portion of) the Śruti in a way different from the explanation which is presented (lit. stated) above; and that also is now examined (or, considered, lit. seen).

[1537]

¹This refers to Bhartṛprapañca.

निरस्य पूर्वपक्षोक्तीः परिहारोक्तिभिः क्रमात् ।
ज्योतिर्मात्रितया स्थानं दृशेः प्राज्ञे जगौ सुधीः ॥१५३८॥

The wise one, after having refuted the (various) arguments

of the holder of the *prima facie* view, one after another (*kramāt*) by statements for explaining them away, stated (lit. sang) that, in Prājña, the state (*sthāna*) of the seer/witness (i.e. the immutable Ātman identified with the individual self) is only being a light. [1538]

साधयित्वा स्वयंज्योतिः सुषुप्ते युक्तिभिः स्फुटम् ।
अथैवं ज्ञस्वभावोऽपि कस्मात्प्राज्ञे न पश्यति ॥१५३९॥
इत्याशङ्कापनुत्त्यर्थं परो ग्रन्थोऽवतारितः ।
तद्व्याख्यानं यथावच्च ह्यक्षराणां विभाव्यते ॥१५४०॥

Having (then) clearly established with (suitable) reasons that, in the deep sleep state, there is (only) the self-illuminating (reality), he introduces the subsequent portion (of the Śruti) for answering (lit. removing) the doubt (about the same): 'Now, though having the nature of a knower, why does it (i.e. the immutable Ātman, i.e. the individual self) not see (i.e. is not able to see) in (its state of) Prājña?' Then, the explanation of that, as presented (by those others) is being considered (i.e. examined) as indeed it is given in different words (*yathāvac ca hy akṣarāṇām*).¹ [1539-1540]

¹SP states in this context: *tadvyākhyānaṁ tacchīṣyāṇām prasiddham iti hisabdārthah*.

यद्वै न पश्यतीत्येवमात्मानमतिशङ्कसे ।
तन्मा शङ्कीर्यतः प्राज्ञे पश्यन्नात्मात्रं वर्तते ॥१५४१॥

Do not doubt what you strongly doubt thus, viz. 'the Ātman cannot (i.e. does not) indeed see', since here in Prājña (i.e. in the deep sleep state) the Ātman keeps on seeing.¹ [1541]

¹That is, it does not lose its power of seeing. SP quotes: *uktam hi— paśyann evāyaṁ tasmīn kāle bhavatīti* (possibly in the Bhāṣya of Bhartṛprapañca).

इत्थं सतत्त्वकस्तावद्द्रष्टव्यः श्रुतियुक्तिभिः ।
न पश्यतीति न पुनर्द्रष्टव्यो हेत्वसंभवात् ॥१५४२॥

(The Ātman) has to be understood (lit. seen), on the basis/support of the Śruti and reason, as being possessed of such nature,¹ but indeed it is not to be understood (or, taken, lit. seen) as one which cannot (i.e. does not) see; for, there is no reason possible (for that to be so). [1542]

¹SP refers to *paśyan* ... as a statement in the Śruti and *jaḍasyānātmataḥprasaktir ityādyā yuktiḥ*.

In verses 1543-1553 there is reasoned out how both paśyan and na paśyati are understandable.

विशेषवन्न चाप्यस्य विज्ञानमिह जायते ।
पश्यन्न पश्यतीत्येवं पदार्थद्वयमीरितम् ॥१५४३॥
तदाविष्करणे ग्रन्थः क्रमेणारभ्यते परः ।
न हि द्रष्टुरितीत्थं च सौकर्येणावगम्यते ॥१५४४॥

Also, there does not occur to (arise in) this (Ātman), here (i.e. in the deep sleep state) any specific knowledge (or, any knowledge which has some particular object).¹ Thus are explained (lit. stated) the two (lit. is ... a pair of) meanings of the words *paśyan na paśyati*. [1543]

(And) there is now begun (the subsequent portion of) the Śruti for the purpose of exposing the nature of that. (In that way, i.e.) are thus the words *na hi draṣṭuḥ* ... is thus (i.e. thereby) understood with ease.² [1544]

¹In this connection SP cites (possibly a sentence from the Bhāṣya of Bhartṛprapañca): *yathāhuḥ— na cāśya viśeṣajñānam prādurastīti*.

²Read NKL (ms. p.680): *na hītyādivākyaṃ paśyan na paśyatīty asya vyākhyānam iti pakṣe sukaram yojayitum ity āha na hīti*.

द्रष्टा दृष्टिक्रियाकारी विज्ञानात्मा पुमानिह ।
बुद्ध्युपात्तस्य रूपादेर्विज्ञानं च ततः परम् ॥१५४५॥

(They understood) here (i.e. in the worldly affairs that) the seer is the individual person who does the action of seeing—and (here in the deep sleep state) the specifically knowing Ātman is (the seer) of the form etc. presented (lit. brought) to it by the intellect—and it is later that there is for it (any) specific knowledge. [1545]

NKL (ms. p.680) explains this, briefly though, very clearly thus: *rūpāder buddhiviśayasya dr̥ṣṭi(=draṣṭi sic)kartā draṣṭocyata ity arthaḥ. yat tasya kartr̥tvaṃ kāraṇapauṣkalyāt sampannam tad anantaram cakṣurādīdvāra vijñānam ghaṭādigocaram syād ity āha vijñānam ceti.*

तत्रापि च धियो वृत्तेर्ग्राह्यग्राहकरूपतः ।
घटादिमेयविषयात्पूर्वोत्पन्नक्रियात्मनः ॥१५४६॥
क्रियान्तरस्य निर्वृत्तौ द्रष्टा तत्रापि पुरुषः ।
दृक्शक्तिः पुरुषे तत्र या रूपाद्यनुरोधिनी ॥१५४७॥

There also,¹ it is the activity of the individual Ātman² even before the function of the intellect which consists in the form of (being) one that grasps what is to be grasped, and which has a pitcher etc. as the object(s) to be grasped, [1546] (and then) also, with respect to another activity which is performed, it is the individual (who is) the seer.³ (And) what power rests there in that individual is also in conformity with the form etc. (of the objects for the seer).⁴ [1547]

¹*tatra* has a reference to *vijñāna* mentioned in the preceding verse.

²In this context SP states: *uktaṃ hi— tatrāpi buddhipratyayasya ghaṭādeś ca grāhyagrāhakabhāvena sambandhāt kriyāntaranirvṛttau draṣṭaiveti* (possibly a comment of Bhartṛprapañca himself).

³The word *puruṣaḥ* has metrical lengthening of the letter *pu*

which we often come across in the *Gītā*.

⁴In this connection, SP quotes: *tad uktam tatra yasmin puruṣe drkśaktī rūpagrahaṇādisambandhinīti*. Both SP and NKL add: *śabdādisamvedanakartr̥tvasāmarthyam ātmāśritam jadasya tad-nyogād ity arthah*.

क्रियाभावोऽवगन्तृस्थो विज्ञानात्मैककर्तृकः ।
तस्या दृष्टेः क्रियाया हि द्रष्टृधर्मत्वतः सदा ॥१५४८॥
द्रष्टृविपरिलोपोऽत्र मनागपि न विद्यते ।
गुणिस्थित्यनुरोधित्वाद्गुणानामग्निदाहवत् ॥१५४९॥

The happening (*bhāva*), called activity, (really) belongs to (lit. is in) the one who comes to know, that is (in other words) the act of seeing has, for its agent, the Ātman which has that property (i.e. of specifically knowing). (Further,) because that activity, viz. seeing, is also of the nature of the property ever abiding in (i.e. belonging to) the seer, [1548] there is not noticed even a little of the absence (lit. destruction/perishing) of the seer—this is in conformity with the existence of properties in the one who is possessed of them (i.e. the properties), just in the same way as the power of burning (ever rests) in fire.¹ [1549]

¹SP cites here: *uktam ca— yāvad guṇibhāvino hi guṇā yāvad agnis tāvad auṣṇyam iti* (possibly, a remark of Bhartṛprapañca himself).

यत एवमतो यावदात्मा द्रष्टा न नश्यति ।
न तावत्स्यात्समुच्छेदो द्रष्टुर्दृष्टेस्तदाश्रयात् ॥१५५०॥

Since it is thus, for the reasons(s) (stated above), that so long as the Ātman, viz. the seer, does not perish, there cannot be (or, is not) the perishing (or, utter destruction) of the (power of) seeing in the seer. [1550]

On this verse, SP comments: *sāmānyanyāyam prakṛte yojayati*.

This means: In verses 1545-1849, there was exposition on the nature of the seer (in common parlance) and the nature of that worldly seer can (or, has to) be attributed to the Ātman—Prājña in the present context also.

मतं गुणिविनाशेन तद्गुणोऽपि विनङ्क्ष्यति ।
अग्न्याद्यौष्ण्यादिवच्चैत्र द्रष्टुरस्याविनाशतः ॥१५५१॥

If it is held that, 'On the perishing of the one possessed of (some) property, that property also perishes, in the same way as the heat (of fire) disappears (or, becomes lost) on the extinction of fire'; then (the reply is:) 'No, that is not so, for there is not (ever) perishing in the case of this seer'.

[1551]

At the end of SP, read: *nityo hi draṣṭeti bhāṣyena dūṣayati*.

अत आहविनाशित्वाद्द्रष्टुर्दृष्टिकृतः सदा ।
विनष्टुं नात्मनः शीलं घटादेरिव युज्यते ॥१५५२॥

Therefore has the Śruti stated. Since the seer (lit. the agent of seeing) is ever non-perishing, therefore, it is not reasonable (to hold that) the Ātman has the nature of becoming lost (or, is liable to perish) as (it is the nature) in the case of a pitcher etc.

[1552]

On this, the concluding statement in SP is: *yathāhuḥ— na hy asya vinamṣtum śīlam vidyata iti*.

न विनश्यत्यसौ कस्मादिति हेतुरिहोच्यताम् ।
सर्वात्मत्वात्तथैकत्वाद्द्रष्टुर्नाशो न विद्यते ॥१५५३॥

(One would argue:) 'Why/Wherefore does it not perish? Let there be told a reason for it (lit. this)'. (The answer is:) 'There is no perishing of the seer because of its being the nature/essence of all and also because of its being alone (i.e.

only one, without any second)'. [1553]

Verses 1554-1558 point out the reason for the impossibility of the Ātman's perishing.

येनास्याशङ्क्यते नाशस्तेनास्याप्रविभागतः ।
संभाव्यते न नाशोऽस्य नष्टुर्नाशविभागतः ॥१५५४॥

(Further,) a person, who doubts/apprehends that there is perishing/destruction of this (Ātman), (holds so) on account of its not being divided (into discrete objects). But (it must be observed that) there is no perishing of this one by (lit. from) the destruction of the destroyer without any division'.

[1554]

SP supports this argument by quoting: *yathāhuḥ—yena hy anyena dvitīyena nāśa āśaṅkyeta na tad asti tena avibhaktatvāt tasyeti* (possibly from the Bhāṣya of Bhartṛprapañca).

न च तेनैव तस्यैव विनाश उपपद्यते ।
ऐकात्म्याद्द्वैतविषये यथाग्नीन्धनयोस्तथा ॥१५५५॥

'Nor also does it stand to reason that there is destruction of that (lit. itself) by that itself, while it is there in the state of singleness (or, liveness) and non-duality; in the way of (or, that there are required) the two, viz. fire and fuel (for the latter's destruction).'

[1555]

The argument of the preceding verse is supported by an illustration of what is to the opposite effect (*vaidharmyadr̥ṣṭānta*). Also, SP quotes: *tad uktam na ca tenaiva tasya vināśo 'stīti* (possibly from Bhartṛprapañca).

द्रष्टुस्ततोऽविनाशित्वान्नित्या नित्यस्य धर्मिणः ।
आदित्यरश्मिवद्ग्राह्या दृष्टिरप्यविनाशिनी ॥१५५६॥

‘Therefore, as a consequence, it is to be accepted that the (power of) seeing of the seer (or, witness) does not have destructibility and it is perennial, on account of the indestructibility of the perennial one which has that as its property (*dharmin*).’ [1556]

नित्योऽतो नित्यया दृष्ट्या पश्यन्नेवाविलुप्तया ।
द्रष्टास्ते प्रज्वलन्त्यात्र सुषुप्ते यो विवक्षितः ॥१५५७॥

‘From this (it becomes clear), the perennial seer (ever) keeps on seeing with its never-perishing (power of) seeing—the one, who is kept in mind (lit. meant to be mentioned) in (connection with) the deep sleep state.’ [1557]

SP supports the argument (viz. the conclusion which is arrived at) by stating *tad uktam— sa tayā drṣṭyāvipariplutayā paśyann evāsta iti* (possibly from *Bhartṛprapañca*).

एवं तावत्स्थितं पूर्वं पश्यन्निति यदीरितम् ।
न पश्यतीति यत्तूक्तं तदिदानीं प्रपञ्च्यते ॥१५५८॥

So far (or, to begin with) is thus settled¹ (the thought), viz. that it is first stated, ‘(It) keeps on seeing’. Now will be explained what is said, viz. *na paśyati*.² [1558]

¹This is with reference to *iti sthitam*.

²There is now a statement of what is said in BUB (p.620): *dvitīyaṃ viśayabhūtam* (to mean) *dvitīyaṃ padārthaṃ nirṇetum upādatte*.

Verses 1559-1570 discuss the meaning of *na paśyati*.

न पश्यतीदं द्रष्टव्यमिति यत्सूत्रितं पुरा ।
पश्यन्नेव यदि ह्यास्ते कथं तदुपपद्यते ॥१५५९॥

(A doubt is stated:) ‘How can that, what was stated earlier,

namely *na paśyatīdam draṣṭavyam*, be reasonable (or, stand to reason), if it keeps on seeing only?' [1559]

This is the meaning of BUB (p.620): *katham tarhi na paśyatīti* (SP). Also read NKL (ms. p.681) the introductory to this verse: *adi paśyann evāste katham na paśyatīty ucyata iti dvyaāvarttyaśaṅkām āha na paśyatīti*. The words *idam draṣṭavyam* do not form a part of BUB; they signify what is implied through the force of the arguments in the verses nearby.

यथोपपद्यते सर्वं शृणु तच्चापि भण्यते ।
पश्यन्नेवायमत्रास्ते पूर्वहेतुसमाश्रयात् ॥१५६०॥

(The answer is given:) 'Hear as to how all (of that) is reasonable. That is (how) to state—"This one, here (i.e. in the deep sleep state), keeps on seeing," for the reason (which is stated) earlier'.¹ [1560]

¹This refers to verse 1558 above. The reason, which is meant, *nityadr̥ṣṭitva*.

तत्तु द्वितीयं नेहास्ति द्रष्टव्यं यत्समाश्रयात् ।
विशेषबुद्ध्यभिव्यक्तिर्जाग्रद्वृत्ताविवेक्ष्यते ॥१५६१॥

But, that second (external object) is not here (in the deep sleep state) which is to be seen and resting on which there could be accepted the expression (or, revealing) of some particular (impression on) the intellect in the waking state.' [1561]

ननु द्रष्टव्यमस्त्येव द्वैताद्वैतात्मकत्वतः ।
ब्रह्मणोऽस्य कथं नास्ति द्रष्टव्यमिति भण्यताम् ।
द्रष्टव्यं स्याद्विभक्तं तत्राविभक्तं यथोदितम् ॥१५६२॥

An objection is raised:) 'But, indeed, there is certainly (*eva*) an object to be seen, owing to the nature of (both) duality

and non-duality (as accepted in our ¹ view)! How then could there not be an object to be seen? Let this be answered (lit. said).’ (The answer is:) ‘If there is an object to be seen, it should be divided (into discrete variety of the same); (but) it is not (so) divided as argued earlier’. [1562]

¹This refers to the view of Bhartṛprapañca.

यदि ह्यन्यत्ततो द्रष्टुर्दृश्यं तत्स्याद्विभागवत् ।
ततः पश्येद्विभक्तं सन्न त्वेवमिह विद्यते ॥१५६३॥

‘If (the object) to be seen is other than (i.e. distinct from) the seer, (only) then it would be (i.e. appear as) divided (into variety) and (the seer) would see it as being distinct (i.e. as what has variety in it), and/but such (the existence of it) does not appear here (in the deep sleep state).’ ¹ [1563]

This explains *na tu tad dvitīyam asti* in BUB.

¹Or, alternatively, here in our opinion/view.

पश्यन्नेवायमत्रास्ते द्रष्टव्यासंभवात्सदा ।
न पश्यतीति द्रष्टोक्तो न तु दृष्टिविनाशतः ॥१५६४॥

Indeed, it keeps on seeing here (in the deep sleep state), owing to the ever obtaining absence of (any object) to be seen (and), therefore, in (the words) *na paśyati* is described (or, mentioned) the seer; but not owing to the perishing (or, destruction) of the (power of) seeing. [1564]

ज्वलन्नपि यथा वह्निर्नानभ्याहितमिन्धनम् ।
दहतीह तथा द्रष्टा नाप्राप्तं दृश्यमीक्षते ॥१५६५॥

As here ¹ fire, though (ever) burning, does not burn fuel which is not kept near it; so does the seer not see what has not come its way. [1565]

This is based on BUB: *tad yathāgnir jvalann api nānabhyāhitam ahati tadvat (iti)*.

¹That is, in the world around us (*vyavahārabhūmi*).

व्याख्यानमेतत्सुधियां श्रद्धधाना उपासते ।

युक्त्यक्षरबहिष्ठात्तत्र विद्वांस उपासते ॥१५६६॥

Those (followers), who have faith in their learned (or, intelligent preceptors),¹ honour (or, adopt) this explanation (given by them); the wise ones, (however), do not honour (it) as it is outside (the sphere of) the expression with logic (as its basis).²

[1566]

¹This is reference to *Bhartṛprapañca* in plural form.

²That is, not based on logical arguments. This indicates the non-acceptability of the view of *Bhartṛprapañca*.

यथा चेदमसंबद्धं न युक्त्यक्षरसंश्रयम् ।

तथासकृत्पुराप्युक्तमधुनाप्यभिधीयते ॥१५६७॥

How this (view of *Bhartṛprapañca*) is irrelevant (i.e. not properly connected with the basic Vedānta text) and is not based on logical arguments is shown (lit. stated) by me, more than once; but, even then, the following is stated (by me).¹

[1567]

¹SP adds: *tadvyākhyāne duṣṭatoktiḥ samyaktvabhrāntinirāsā-am ity arthaḥ*.

पश्यन्नेवायमत्रात्मा सुषुप्ते व्यवतिष्ठते ।

एवंसतत्त्व एवायमिति हेतुरिहोदितः ॥१५६८॥

Here (in the argument of *Bhartṛprapañca*) is mentioned the reason as to why this Ātman exists, with such of its nature,¹ in the deep sleep state, though it keeps (only) on seeing (*paśyan va*).

[1568]

¹Add: *avinastadrṣṭi* 'not having lost its (power of) seeing.

न च प्रादुर्भवत्यस्य ज्ञानमन्यद्विशेषवत् ।

न पश्यतीति वाक्यस्य व्याख्यानमिदमीरितम् ॥१५६९॥

Nor does there occur to it another knowledge which has some special nature. Thus is stated (by me, or by those who hold this view of mine) as the explanation of the (Vedānta) sentence *na paśyati*. [1569]

पश्यन्नेवेति चेदेतद्वस्तुयाथात्म्यमुच्यते ।

इत्थंसतत्त्व इत्युक्त्या कथं द्रष्टृक्रियोच्यते ॥१५७०॥

If (it is said that) 'in the words *paśyann eva*, there is stated the nature of the (real) thing as it is, viz. it is the (power of) seeing', then (it has to be asked:) '(thereby) stating that (the Ātman) has such nature how can there be attributed (to the Ātman) the activity of the seer (i.e. agent)'. [1570]

This verse is based on a twofold doubt: Is the Ātman, described in *paśyann eva*, (i) the (power of) seeing, i.e. *drṣṭi*, or (ii) the agent of seeing (viz. an activity)? The first alternative is answered in the verse under translation. SP states the argument (in answer) of the verse succinctly thus: *pratyagātmetthamṣatattvo drṣṭisvabhāvo na tatkartā*.

The second alternative is answered in the next verse.

Verses 1571-1576 set aside the notion of the Ātman's having the property of being a seer.

द्रष्टृधीना क्रियाद्रष्टिरिति चेद्वक्तव्यते ।

कथं विपरिलोपोऽस्याः क्रियात्वे सति वार्यते ॥१५७१॥

(Also), if it is said by you that the seeing, which is an activity, rests in the seer (i.e. the agent of that action), then, (it has

to be asked:) “how could that, being an activity, perish (or, lit. have destruction)? how could that (happening) be avoided/warded off?” [1571]

SP clarifies this argument thus: *kriyā hi parilupyate kriyātvād gativat tathā ca na hītyādinīṣedhavirodhaḥ syāt*. It is to be remembered that the Śruti has declared the non-perishing of the Ātman.

अभूतदृष्टिकर्तृत्वे द्रष्टृत्वं द्रष्टुरिष्यते ।
प्रादुर्भावे तथासत्याः क्रियायाश्च क्रियात्मता ॥१५७२॥

(In your view) is held (or, accepted) seership in the case of the seer, even while there has not (ever) existed in it agentship of seeing. (And) only in the case that it comes to be (or, to occur) in it, there (seems) to be (held) the activeness of the action which has not been there. [1572]

द्रष्ट्रा च क्रियते दृष्टिर्न चासौ परिलुप्यते ।
इति स्ववचसैवैतद्विरुद्धमभिधीयते ॥१५७३॥

And, in your own statement, that the (power of) seeing is produced by the seer and that it does not perish (or, get lost) there are mutually contradictory statements. [1573]

The idea is: *dr̥ṣṭi*, being a product does perish—if *draṣṭṛ* creates it. Therefore, to say that *draṣṭṛ* creates it and that it never perishes would involve contradiction.

कार्यस्यापि च नित्यत्वं वचनाच्चेत्प्रसिध्यति ।
वचनस्याप्रमाणत्वं कारकत्वात्प्रसज्यते ॥१५७४॥

If, again, there is (thus) established the perenniality of an effect (or, a product) from the statement (so conveying); then, there follows, as contingent, the non-authoritativeness of (that) statement for the reason that there is acceptance of (the

immutable Ātman) as an agent of activity.

[1574]

The basis for the argument in this verse is the doubt about the contradiction in the statement *na hi draṣṭur dr̥ṣṭeḥ aparilopaḥ*: it involves contradiction to say that *dr̥ṣṭi*, which is a product of the *draṣṭr*, is perennial and that *draṣṭr* is the agent of the activity, viz. production of *dr̥ṣṭi*. Here, in this verse, the first alternative is discarded and in the next verse, the second.

प्रमाणं बोधकं सर्वं तच्च सिद्धस्य वस्तुनः ।

पूर्वं प्रमाणसंबन्धाद्व्यङ्ग्यव्यञ्जकसंगतेः ॥१५७५॥

All authoritative means is (merely) capable of informing of whatever is (already) existing (or, lit. established as existent), owing to the relation (or, connection) between them as what is to be revealed and what reveals, before (the acceptance of) the (actual) relation/connection of the means of knowing (with the object of knowing).

[1575]

At the end SP adds: *vidyamānaviṣayāpekṣatvād ghaṭadīpādau tathādr̥ṣṭatvād iti śeṣaḥ*.

अनुमानविरोधस्य वचसोऽस्य प्रसज्यते ।

अविनाभाविता यस्मादनित्यकृतकत्वयोः ॥१५७६॥

There follows as contingent the opposition of this statement (of the Śruti) to this inference since there is invariable concomitance of the non-eternal (or, non-perishing) and what is a product.

[1576]

SP refers to CU 8.1.6: *tad yatheha karmajito lokaḥ kṣīyate*

...

This verse paraphrases the words *yato na paśyati*.

द्वौ पदार्थावुपन्यस्तावित्येतदतिदुर्घटम् ।

यतो न पश्यतीत्येतदनूद्यान्यद्विभाव्यते ॥१५७७॥

That there are two senses conveyed by (these) words¹ together is very difficult to happen (i.e. to achieve), since, after repeating (the words) *na paśyati*, there is noticed another (statement conveying the presence of what is produced). [1577]

¹This refers to (i) *paśyan* and (ii) *na paśyati*.

Verse 1578 raises doubt about what the statement *na paśyati* would convey.

न पश्यतीति प्राप्तत्वान्नापूर्वोऽर्थोऽवबोध्यते ।
न पश्यतीत्यतोऽनूद्य पश्यन्निति विधीयते ॥१५७८॥

Since there has been known (the meaning of) *na paśyati*, there is brought out (or, conveyed the sense of what is) not (known) before, therefore, it is that, after repeating (the words) *na paśyati*, (the word) *paśyan* is stated. [1578]

पश्यन्नित्यस्य वा व्याख्या कारकत्वनिवृत्तये ।
न पश्यतीति वचनं न त्वर्थान्तरमुच्यते ॥१५७९॥

Or, the explanation of this (word) *paśyan* is for (purpose of) setting aside (the notion of the Ātman's) being an agent of activity (*kāraṇatva*) and (tu) the statement *na paśyati* is not stated as (conveying) the sense of another (object to be seen). [1579]

There follows, in verses 1580-1582, the refutation of the other view.

किमयं दृष्टिकारित्वात्पुमान्द्रष्टेति भण्यते ।
दृष्ट्यात्मकं वा किं वस्तु द्रष्टेत्यत्र विवक्ष्यते ॥१५८०॥

(A question is asked:) 'Is it that this individual is said to

be the seer because it performs the act of seeing? Or, is it something which is of the nature of being seen that is intended to be expressed by the word *draṣṭṛ* 'seer'? [1580]

न तावद्धृष्टिकर्तृत्वं कौटस्थ्यादात्मवस्तुनः ।
कौटस्थ्यसिद्धौ हेतुंश्च प्रागवोचमनेकशः ॥१५८१॥

(This is said in answer to the question:) 'In the first place, there does not belong to (or, exist in) the thing, called the Ātman, the agency of performing the act of seeing, since it is established to be immutable in nature.¹ And, in order to establish the immutability (of the same), I have already stated the reasons many times'. [1581]

¹That is to say: performing any action would be a sign of liability to modification, i.e. a change in nature.

क्रियाकारकरूपस्य प्रत्यङ्मात्रसत्त्वतः ।
नातोऽस्य कारकत्वं स्यात्साक्षित्वाच्च क्रियावताम् ॥१५८२॥

(Now, secondly) because it is of the nature of being merely the inner self, it has not the nature of a *kāraka* 'what is connected with an activity', which belongs (only) to what is of the nature of an action and/or its agent or instrument (*kriyākārakarūpa*), and also because of its being only the witness of those that are connected with action (*kriyāvat*). [1582]

Verses 1583-1585 set aside the notion about the Ātman's being a *bhoktr* 'enjoyer'—even in the form of its semblance.

बुद्ध्युपात्तस्य रूपादेर्विज्ञातृत्वं न चात्मनः ।
भोक्तृत्वमपि तस्येह चैतन्याभासवर्त्मना ॥१५८३॥

Nor also does belong to the Ātman any knowership of (some) form etc., brought/presented to it by the intellect; nor also the enjoyership is said to belong to it by way of accepting

it as a semblance of sentience (i.e. the immutable self). [1583]

मणेरेव विकारोऽयं यालक्तादिसरूपता ।
नालक्तकादेर्विकृतिर्निष्क्रियत्वादिहेष्यते ॥१५८४॥

That a jewel has the same colour as of *alaktaka* 'a red paint' is but some modification (which appears to exist) of the jewel (and) it is not accepted that there is any (real) modification caused by that *alaktaka* etc., (so also) here (is not) accepted (any modification of the Ātman) owing to its being devoid of any activity. [1584]

रक्तत्वादिप्रसिद्धयर्थं विक्रियां न प्रपद्यते ।
अलक्तकादिः सर्वत्र यथैवं ह्यात्मवस्त्वपि ॥१५८५॥

As *alaktaka* etc. does not anywhere undergo any modification in order that (there is effected) redness etc. (in a jewel etc.); indeed in this very way the (real) thing, namely the Ātman also (does not undergo any modification). [1585]

Verses 1586-1588 discard the notion of *guṇas* in *guṇasthiti*.

गुणिस्थित्यनुरोधित्वं न च सर्वत्र वीक्ष्यते ।
गुणानां केशकृष्णत्वं व्येति केशेषु सत्स्वपि ॥१५८६॥

Also it is not noticed everywhere that qualities (do) have conformity with the condition/state of what have those as property; (for example), blackness of hair disappears even while they (continue) to exist. [1586]

अग्नेरात्यन्तिको नाशो भवतापि न मृष्यते ।
न चोष्णत्वं सतोऽप्यग्नेः काष्ठादावुपलभ्यते ॥१५८७॥

You also cannot accept (lit. tolerate) that there is complete extinction (lit. destruction) of fire and also there is not noticed (any) heat (lit. hotness) in (a piece of) wood etc. even while

there is fire residing in it.

[1587]

गुणिस्थित्यनुरोधित्वमस्तु नाम गुणात्मनः ।
द्रष्टुर्दृष्टेः किमायातं क्रिया दृष्टिर्गुणो न तु ॥१५८८॥

Or (rather,) let there be conformity of what is of the nature of a quality with the condition/state of what have those properties; what (then) comes (i.e. follows) from the act of seeing the witness/seer? Indeed (tu) the activity called seeing is not any quality.

[1588]

Verses 1589-1590 discard the idea that the activity of seeing is ever going on.

कारकाणां स्वभावोऽयं यदकृत्वा प्रवर्तनम् ।
यथाभूत्वा तथा भावः क्रियायास्तत्त्वमुच्यते ॥१५८९॥

(Again) such is the nature of *kāraṅkas* (i.e. what are connected with an activity) that without (actually) doing (anything) they promote (the activity)—to this effect that the nature of an activity is to have become that which it had not been (before).

[1589]

यावद्द्रव्यानुरोधित्वं नावश्यं गुणकर्मणोः ।
द्रव्ये सत्यपि लोकेऽस्मिन्व्यभिचारस्य दर्शनात् ॥१५९०॥

(Therefore,) even while there is some substance, there is no need of any property and activity (in the case of an object) to have conformity with that (substance); for there is¹ noticed in the world a variable nature (of things) in this (respect).

[1590]

¹Or, are noticed examples contradicting (the argument concerning conformity in nature).

Verses 1591-1596 discard permanence of (i) seeing and (ii) the

seer.

जातिक्रियागुणादीनां निषेधादात्मवस्तुनः ।
अस्थूलं नेति नेतीति प्रतीचोऽन्यन्निषिध्यते ॥१५९१॥

Since there is denial (or rejection) of *jāti* 'genus', *kriyā* 'activity' *guṇa* 'quality' etc. in the case of the reality in the form of the self by the use of the words *asthūla* ... and *neti neti*; therefore, (it is to be understood that) anything else than the inner self (as existent) is denied/rejected. [1591]

द्रष्टुश्चापि न नित्यत्वं क्रियोद्धृतिनिमित्ततः ।
क्रियाकारकयो रूपमितरेतरहेतुकम् ॥१५९२॥

So also (*ca*) the perennial nature of the witness/seer is not accepted because of the occurrence of activity (of seeing in it)—in the case of an activity and its *kāraka*¹ the nature of each is determined (lit. produced) by (that of) the other. [1592]

¹ Here, an agent is meant.

स्वमात्रेण न यत्सिद्धं तत्सिद्धं परतः कथम् ।
स्वमात्रेण च यत्सिद्धं तस्यापेक्षान्यतः कुतः ॥१५९३॥

How can that be established (i.e. produced) by another, (that) which cannot be established (i.e. come into existence) by (or, on the strength/capacity of) itself alone? And, how can that, which becomes established only by itself, have expectation of (i.e. dependence on) another? [1593]

न सिद्धयोर्मिथोऽपेक्षा न स्वतोऽसिद्धयोस्तथा ।
इत्यादेः पूर्वमुक्ततत्त्वान्नेह भूयोऽपि यत्यते ॥१५९४॥

There is not (or, cannot be) mutual dependence of two (self-)established things as also of two which are not self-established things—this and other (related) matter, having

been said (or, explained) before, there is not made any effort again (to prove that). [1594]

नासतो विद्यतेऽपेक्षा नापि कूटस्थवस्तुनः ।
शक्त्यवस्थं यतो वस्तुहेत्वपेक्ष्यैति विक्रियाम् ॥१५९५॥

That which is a non-existent does not have an expectation (of, or dependence on, another); nor has the immutable thing (viz. the Ātman) have (any expectation ...); because whatever is a thing in the state of potentiality (or, has the potential to become produced)¹ undergoes a modification only depending on (or, expecting the help of) another thing (viz. the existent, immutable Ātman).² [1595]

¹This refers to ever active ignorance; cf. verse 1446 above.

²This suggests the origination of external objects through delusion/ignorance of the Ātman.

नित्यं न भवनं यस्य यस्य वा नित्यभूतता ।
न तस्य क्रियमाणत्वं खपुष्पाकाशयोरिव ॥१५९६॥

That, which is ever existing (lit. becoming) or that which has ever been (existent), does not have the nature of being produced (through some activity); as not there in the case of a sky-flower and/or sky. [1596]

The idea is: the immutable is ever existent (*bhūtaṃ vastu*).
BSB (p.69): *iha tu bhūtaṃ brahma jijñāsyam nityatvān*

उत्पत्त्यादौ तु यच्छक्तं शक्तिमात्रात्मना स्थितम् ।
तदेव हेत्वपेक्षं सदुत्पत्त्यादि प्रपद्यते ॥१५९७॥

That, which is potent (or capable) in respect of (effecting) production etc. and exists as a potentiality, alone can become a product (lit. begin to produce) etc. being dependent on (or, expecting some) cause. [1597]

उत्पत्त्यादावशक्ततत्त्वात्कौटस्थ्यादात्मवस्तुनः ।

अद्वितीयत्वतश्चास्य नोत्पत्त्यादि प्रसिध्यति ॥१५९८॥

(And) in the case of the (real) thing, viz. the Ātman, there does not proceed (or, become possible) any production etc. since it is not potent in respect of production etc. owing to its immutability and nature of being (or, existing) without any (thing as) second (to it). [1598]

शक्त्यवस्थानि वस्तुनि योग्यहेतोरसंभवात् ।

नार्तवानि प्रसूयन्ते योग्यहेतौ च तज्जनिः ॥१५९९॥

Products particular to (different) seasons are not produced (i.e. do not get produced) when there is absence of proper/suitable cause (viz. season) and remain as things in the state of potentiality; however (ca), they become produced (lit. their birth is possible) when there is (or, exists) suitable cause. [1599]

कार्यं नाक्रियमाणं सन्नाकुर्वत्कारणं तथा ।

मिथो न व्यतिरेकेण सिध्येते कार्यकारणे ॥१६००॥

An actual (or, existing) effect is not what is not being produced; so also a cause (does not exist) which is not producing/functioning. (Thus) a cause and an effect, in the absence of each other (or, when mutually unconnected) do not exist (lit. get established). [1600]

Verses 1601-1612 point out that in draṣṭuḥ ... dr̥ṣṭeḥ there is not any idea of kriyā and kāraka.

वस्त्वैव दृष्टिरत्रातो न क्रिया नापि कारकम् ।

तस्मादेवाविनाशित्वादिति हेतुरिहोदितः ॥१६०१॥

Therefore, *dr̥ṣṭi* '(the power of) seeing' is here the (real) thing

(viz. Ātman) itself—it is neither an activity nor a *kāraka* (connected with it). To this purport, there is stated here¹ the reason, viz. 'because of imperishability'. [1601]

¹That is, in the Śruti statement *na dr̥ṣṭer viparilopaḥ*.

निर्णीतं प्रथमं वस्तु पश्यन्निति यदीरितम् ।
न पश्यतीति यत्तूक्तं तस्य व्याख्याधुनोच्यते ॥१६०२॥

What thing is stated to be seeing is of the nature that is already settled.¹ And now is offered the explanation of what is stated, viz. *na paśyati*.² [1602]

¹This refers to the explanation already given in verses beginning with *na hi*; (cf. verse 1544 above). NKL (ms. p.684) states: *na tu dvitīyam ityādivākyaavyākhyāna(m) tadīyam anuvadati*.

²NKL (ms. p.684) introduces the second line with *na hīty-ādivākyaanuvādena nanv ityādy avatārayati na paśyatīti*.

दृष्टेरपरिलोपश्चेदथ कस्मान्न पश्यति ।
प्रबोधवत्सुषुप्तेऽस्मिन्निति प्रतिविधीयते ॥१६०३॥
पश्यन्नेवायमात्मेति यथोक्तन्यायसंश्रयात् ।
न तु द्वितीयं जाग्रद्वत्पश्यत्यात्मा सुषुप्तगः ॥१६०४॥

(A question is asked:) 'Why does it not see, if (the power of) seeing does not perish?' (The answer is given:) 'In the words *prabodhavat susupte 'smin*, there is answered away (that difficulty)— [1603]

By resorting to the reason as stated, (it is explained)¹ in the words *paśyann evāyam ātmā* that the Ātman resting in the state of deep sleep does not indeed (*tu*) see any other (lit. second object) as in the waking state'. [1604]

¹This refers to the reason which is stated earlier in connection with *avināśitvāt*.

द्वितीयं नेक्षते कस्मादित्यत्रैवाभिधीयते ।

हेतुर्न तु तदस्तीति पश्येद्यद्वस्तु बोधवत् ॥१६०५॥

विशेषदृष्ट्यभिव्यक्तिर्यदाश्रित्य प्रसिध्यति ।

न तदस्ति यतस्तस्मात्पश्यन्नपि न पश्यति ॥१६०६॥

(If it is asked:) 'Why does it not see any other (lit. second) object?'; in regard to this is now stated the reason (by way of an answer:) 'There is not (i.e. does not exist) that (object) which the (real) thing (viz. the Ātman), consisting in knowledge, would see (i.e. would have to see), [1605] since there does not exist that by resorting to which there is (said to be) established some specific seeing';¹ therefore, (as it is said) *paśyann api na paśyati*. [1606]

This is the outcome of the sentence, discussed so far, viz. verses 1602ff.

¹That is, the seeing of objects having particular nature.

इति व्याख्या न साधवीयं द्रष्टव्यासंभवे यतः ।

न प्रात्यक्ष्यं द्रष्टृदृष्टयोः स्यात्सुषुप्तप्रसिद्धिवत् ॥१६०७॥

The explanation thus¹ is not in accordance with reason (lit. is not acceptable/proper), because, in the absence of an (i.e. any) object of seeing, there would not be direct perceptibility with regard to the (power of) seeing and the seer, as it is not there (taken as established) in the deep sleep state.² [1607]

In this regard (like in many others in this context), Sureśvara is very cryptic, i.e. he takes for granted what is said earlier and leaves only a vague reference to it.

By *iti vyākhyā*, Sureśvara conveys the earlier explanation *draṣṭavyasya śabdāder abhāvāt paśyann apy ātmā* (i.e. *draṣṭā* etc.) *na paśyati* (NKL ms. p.694 and SP).

This portion is explained in SP at length. But NKL (ms. p.694) states it neatly and briefly thus: *draṣṭavyābhāve draṣṭṛasyor asambhavāt tadabhāve tayor bhāvaś cet tadā tayor svāpe*

pratyakṣatā syāt, na hi tathā yathā susupter na pratyakṣatā tatkāle, tasmād draṣṭavyābhāve draṣṭrdrṣtyor asambhava ity arthaḥ.

तमस्यवस्थितोऽपश्यञ्ज्ञातृज्ञानतमांसि हि ।
 प्रपद्यते विवेकेन यथा कुम्भादिवीक्षणे ॥१६०८॥
 न प्राज्ञे तु ततोऽयुक्तं दृश्यमात्रनिषेधनम् ।
 ग्राहकग्रहणग्राह्यभावाभावाद्यपह्नुतेः ॥१६०९॥

As, in relation to seeing a pitcher etc., a person, who is standing in the dark, would come to know¹ the knower (i.e. himself), the knowledge (viz. that there is dark around) and the dark (i.e. darkness) by his (capacity of) distinguishing; [1608]

(so does he not do) also (*tu*) in the state of Prājña;² therefore, it is improper/unreasonable to reject the existence merely of what is the object of seeing, i.e. since there is concealment/obscurity in relation to the presence or absence of the one who grasps, the act of grasping and the object of grasping etc.³. [1609]

¹This knowing consists in one's distinguishing the knower etc., not actually seeing, that is possible only while there is acceptance of that there really exists a pitcher. That indicates the opponent's view: *draṣṭavyābhāve 'pi sator apratyakṣatā*.

²The opponent's argument appears to be like this: *suptistho 'pi ātmā śabdādyagrahe 'pi suptim andhakārasthānīyāṃ tatsiddhiṃ ca draṣṭāraṃ ca vivicya jānīyāt*. It should be noted that the illustration and the illustrated would only indicate *viveka* by experience (*anubhūti*) and there is actually no seeing/knowing (*vivekadhī*)!

³Various modifications (*pariṇāmas*) are to be understood. The two notes above would bring out, it is hoped, the purport of the argument. Yet, the cryptic (so it appears to us!) and, therefore, a little awkward expression of Sureśvara leaves us in somewhat unclear mind!

ननु चास्त्येव तद्दृश्यं समस्तव्यस्तरूपतः ।
यथोक्तवस्तुनो मैवं तस्यानत्यन्तभेदतः ॥१६१०॥

But, indeed, (the opponent argues still) 'There does exist that object which is to be seen, in its collected and several forms of the (real) thing which is stated (or mentioned before). (Therefore) do not say so (viz. that there is no object of seeing)', since there is absence of extreme diversity. [1610]

बाढमस्त्येव तद्दृश्यं न त्वत्यन्तविभागवत् ।
स्याद्विभक्तं तदन्यच्चेत्पश्येदेव प्रबोधवत् ॥१६११॥

(The answer:) 'Granted that there is the object to be seen; but (it is) certainly not with division (into discrete objects associated with it). If there existed that with (such) division, then it (i.e. the seer), being possessed of knowledge, would see it without fail'. [1611]

नात्यन्तमेव सर्वत्र विभागोऽयं समीक्ष्यते ।
विशेषणमतोऽन्याय्यमत्यन्तमिति भण्यते ॥१६१२॥

(And) this (i.e. such) division is not accepted (lit. seen) everywhere¹ (and) to its extreme (logical extent); therefore, this specification² is said (i.e. to be accepted) as extremely improper. [1612]

¹Cf. SP: *avasthātraye 'pi*.

²That is, *viśeṣavijñānabhāvābhāvau*.

Now follows the refutation of the view regarding difference in non-difference.

विभक्तमविभक्तं वा वस्तु वस्त्वन्तराश्रयात् ।
सर्वैकत्वे विभागो वाविभागो वा न युज्यते ॥१६१३॥

A thing (can be said to be) distinct or non-distinct (only)

by resorting (or, in relation) to another thing. (As against this, existence of) division or non-division cannot be reasonable when (it is accepted that) there is (only) oneness (or singleness) of all (apparent distinct things). [1613]

Read SP: *idaṃ sarvaṃ yad ayam ātmā ityādiśruteḥ sarvasyādvayātmamātratre dvitīyavastvabhāvāt kuto bhedābhedāvatārah ity arthaḥ.*

यद्धि यस्माद्विभक्तं स्यात्तदेव स्यात्ततः कथम् ।
अविभक्तं विरुद्धत्वात्तस्मादुक्तमशोभनम् ॥१६१४॥

How can that (thing) be non-distinct from that wherefrom it is (accepted as) distinct?, for, that (i.e. such acceptance) is opposed (to every reason). Therefore, what is said (in the opponent's view) is improper (lit. unbecoming of intelligence).¹ [1614]

¹Read SP: *uktam ekam eva bhinnābhinnam tvayā kathitam iti yāvat.*

अपह्नुतिर्विभागस्य ह्यविभक्तगिरोच्यते ।
विभागान्नापरं वस्तु ह्यविभक्तगिरा ततः ॥१६१५॥

In (lit. By) the statement of non-division is conveyed the negation (lit. concealment) of division. From that statement of non-division (follows that) there (does not exist) anything else thanks to division. [1615]

अन्यद्विभक्तमिति च तथा द्रष्टव्यमित्यपि ।
सामर्थ्यादेक एवार्थो भूयो भूयोऽभिधीयते ॥१६१६॥

In (the statement) *anyad vibhaktam* and also in *tathā draṣṭavyam*, there is expressed only one thought (lit. thing) conveyed repeatedly—this is thanks to the force (in the tenor of the statements). [1616]

Sureśvara now states how he understands the words *tato 'nyad vibhaktam*.

अस्मत्पक्षे तु दोषोऽत्र मनागपि न विद्यते ।
द्रष्टव्यो दृष्टियोग्योऽर्थो ह्यन्योऽनन्यश्च युज्यते ॥१६१७॥

In our view, however, there is not even a little of a fault; for, the object to be seen, viz. that which is worthy to be seen is (there) reasonably explained (lit. connected) as 'other' and 'non-other' (than the seer). [1617]

परमार्थात्मनस्तद्वत्कल्पिताज्ञानलक्षणः ।
अविभक्तोऽपि चान्यः स्याद्वैलक्षण्यात्परस्परम् ॥१६१८॥

So also (*tadvat*) the other (thing, i.e. object to be seen), though (in reality) non-distinct from the highest reality, i.e. the Ātman, has the nature (of the product)¹ of ignorance and therefore only what is imagined; (this is so, i.e.) they are mutually distinct on account of (so-called) distinct characteristics (or, natures). [1618]

¹This explains the meaning of the word *anya*.

धर्मादीनां विभक्तत्वमविभक्तेऽपि धर्मिणि ।
एवं न पुनरुक्तत्वं द्रष्टव्यादेः प्रसज्यते ॥१६१९॥

Thus it is held that in respect of (what is held to be) a thing having (some/certain) properties and which is (in reality) non-distinct (from them), there are properties etc. and that they have a distinction (from that). In this way (i.e. by accepting our view) there does not follow the contingency of repetition in the words (expressive of the) objects to be seen. [1619]

This explains the idea of *vibhakta*.

साक्ष्यार्थो दृष्टियोग्यः स्यादन्यो मात्रादिरात्मनः ।

द्रष्टृदर्शनदृश्यार्था विभक्ताः स्युः परस्परम् ॥१६२०॥

The meaning (lit. object) conveyed by the word *sākṣin* is one that is capable of seeing and the other (viz. what is to be seen) is the means of knowing etc.¹ Thus the various objects (of the words), i.e. the seer, the act of seeing and the object of seeing) are distinguished from one another. [1620]

¹This refers to *pramāṇa*, *prameya* and *pramā* (of the *pramātr*).

द्वैताद्वैतात्मकत्वं च प्रमाणान्नोपपद्यते ।

यथेह वस्तुनः साक्षात्तथा पूर्वमवादिषम् ॥१६२१॥

And as to how, here (i.e. in this Śāstra), the nature of what consists in dual and (at the same time) non-dual in respect of the (real) thing does not expressedly (*sākṣāt*) become justified by any means of knowing, have I already stated. [1621]

पूर्ववाक्ये यथा व्याख्या कृता कृत्स्ना तथैव सा ।

उत्तरेष्वपि वाक्येषु कर्तव्या पण्डितैरतः ॥१६२२॥

Therefore, hereafter,¹ the explanation, which has been given (by me) in respect of the earlier sentence,² should, the whole of it, be followed by learned men in respect of the subsequent sentences also. [1622]

Sureśvara has completed the discussion on the explanation of *vijñāya* etc. as given by Bhartṛprapañca and turns now to his own explanation referring to that on the sentence *yad vai tan na paśyan* ... as what needs to be extended to the subsequent sentences of the Śruti.

¹We have taken *ataḥ*, which occurs at the end of the verse, to stand at the beginning and understood it to have a double sense, i.e. *tasmāt hetoḥ* and *itaḥ uttarām*. In this regard, NKL does not offer any help. However, SP understands *ataḥ* to be

in the right place, i.e. at the end, and adds after *ataḥ vyākhyāprakārasāmyād arthaviśeṣo vācya nāsti*.

²That is with reference to *yad vai tan na paśyati*.

दर्शनादिक्रियाणां यदस्तित्वं तन्न वास्तवम् ।

सदसत्त्वादिसंभेदशून्यत्वादात्मवस्तुनः ॥१६२३॥

What is taken as (the actual occurrence of) activities such as seeing is not a matter of reality, since the thing, i.e. the Ātman, is devoid of being any mixture/combination (*sambheda*) of what is existent and what is non-existent. [1623]

This is to assert that, in all the relevant statements of the Śruti, there is reference to only the single sentient Ātman.

विदितादन्यदेवैतत्तथैवाविदितादधि ।

ब्रह्मात्मवस्त्विति ज्ञेयमिति श्रौतं वचः स्फुटम् ॥१६२४॥

There is a clear statement of the Śruti, i.e. 'This thing called the Brahman, the (real) thing is other than (object(s), viz.) what is (taken as) known;' ¹ so also 'from what has been not known'. [1624]

¹Cf. *Kenopaniṣad* 1.4; cp. *Īsopaniṣad* 10 and 13.

द्रष्टुरिति तृजन्तेन कर्तृत्वमभिधीयते ।

द्रष्टा कस्येत्यपेक्षायां दृष्टेरित्यभिधीयते ॥१६२५॥

There is stated here agentship of an activity (in the case of the Ātman) by the word *draṣṭr*, (in its inflexional form *draṣṭuḥ*) (which is) a stem ending in the suffix *-trc* and in answering the query, 'of what?', is stated the word *drṣṭi* (in the genitive form *drṣṭeḥ*). [1625]

This is the opinion of Bhartṛprapañca, possibly his wording *vas kasya draṣṭā drṣṭeḥ (iti bhāṣyārtham āha)*— SP.

Now is stated what Sureśvara accepts as the meaning of the word *dr̥ṣṭi*.

दृष्टिरित्यपि भावः स्यात्समाप्तिर्या क्रियात्मनः ।
फलाश्रितोऽसौ भावोऽत्र दृष्टिशब्देन भण्यते ॥१६२६॥

Also, in the word *dr̥ṣṭiḥ* is expressed some becoming, viz. that which is accomplished (i.e. effected) by what is of the nature of an activity; thus it is a becoming based on some result¹ and is mentioned here by the word *dr̥ṣṭi*. [1626]

¹SP adds: *dr̥ṣṭir iti bhāvaḥ kriyāsamāptiyarthāḥ phalāśrito nir̥diśyate*.

फलं प्रकाशनं ज्ञानं तत्कर्तृत्वं च वस्तुनः ।
प्रत्येकमुच्यतेऽत्रैतद्वाक्येष्वेतेषु वस्तुनः ॥१६२७॥

The word result means revealing (something which is here), i.e. knowledge; and the agency in respect of that (viz. the revealing) which belongs to the (real) thing (viz. the Ātman); here in each one of these sentences is mentioned this (viz. the agency). [1627]

SP adds: *tad āhus tad etat prakāśanam ca jñānakartṛtvam ceti dharmadvayam pratyekam upadiśyata iti*— possibly a remark of Bhartṛprapañca.

इह यद्दूषणं वाच्यं तदुक्तमिति नोच्यते ।
कारकादेरसद्भावात्सुषुप्ते परमार्थतः ॥१६२८॥

What is to be pointed out (lit. to be said) here (i.e. in respect of this argument), viz. the faultiness is (already) stated¹ for the reason that there is absence of the *kāraka* etc. in the state of deep sleep, in its real sense. [1628]

¹That is, because it is refuted in the fifth (i.e. the third) Ahdyāya.

कारकादिविधर्मापि प्रत्यगज्ञानहेतुजैः ।
ग्राहकग्रहणग्राह्यरूपैरात्मैक्ष्यते तथा ॥१६२९॥

So also there is seen (in the deep sleep state) the Ātman, even if it differs in (regard to) properties, from the *kāra*kas (as characterized) by (such) forms as the one who grasps, the grasping and the (object) to be grasped which have originated from ignorance about (the nature of) the inner self.

[1629]

कर्तृकार्यावभासित्वात्कर्तृकार्यादिसाक्ष्ययम् ।
कर्तृकार्यादिवद्भाति कूटस्थोऽप्यात्ममोहतः ॥१६३०॥

This one is the witness of the agent and its activity (or, activities) because it has the nature (or, capacity) of illuminating/revealing the agent and its activity (or, activities); (thus) the immutable Ātman, through its delusion about itself, appears to be the agent and its activity (or, activities) etc.

[1630]

एकैवेयमतो दृष्टिर्जन्महानादिवर्जिता ।
बहुत्वजन्मनाशादि यात्यविद्योत्थसंगतेः ॥१६३१॥

Therefore, this *dr̥ṣṭi* is but one (viz. unique) and without (i.e. unaffected by) birth, loss etc.¹ and (yet) it comes to be (*yāti*) having multiplicity, birth, destruction etc., owing to its connection with ignorance.

[1631]

This points to the identity of *dr̥ṣṭi* and *draṣṭṛ*; cf. SP: *sā pratyagbhūtā kūṭasthaikarasety arthaḥ*.

¹This perhaps refers to six modifications. Cf. verse 343 above.

Now follows the discussion on BU 4.3.25.

यत्र रसयतीत्यत्र विजानन्वा इतीर्यते ।

विरूपं प्रस्तुताद्रूपादन्याय्यं भण्यते कुतः ॥१६३२॥

It¹ is read (in the text of the Mādhyandina recension) *yan na rasayati ... vijānan vai*, viz. that which is an irregular reading and different from what should be the proper reading; why should the unreasonable be read (lit. said)? [1632]

Here, Sureśvara questions the propriety in the reading of the Mādhyandina recension. Yet he offers some justified meaning of it in the next verse though he dubs it as unreasonable.

¹It reads *yad vai tan na rasayate vijānan vai tan na rasayati* (as reported by SP, but, in the text printed by Limaye and Vadekar, it reads *vijānan vai tad rasam (na paśyati)*! (Also, incidentally, the two scholars report *na hi rasatyitū rasāt* instead of the text in the Kāṇva recension).

नैष दोषोऽत्र विज्ञप्तिमात्ररूपे परात्मनि ।

दृष्ट्यादिशक्तिभेदोऽयं मा प्रसाङ्क्षीदित्तीर्यते ॥१६३३॥

There is not (altogether) any fault here: It is said here (i.e. in that recension) 'Let this division into discrete objects such as the powers/capacities of seeing etc. not contingently come from (i.e. cling to) the highest Ātman which is merely knowledge in its form'. [1633]

यत एवमतो ज्ञप्तिमात्रमेवाभिधीयते ।

दृष्ट्यादिशब्दैस्तस्माच्च सलिलादिवचोऽर्थवत् ॥१६३४॥

Since this is so, therefore, there is expressed in the words *dr̥ṣṭi* etc. merely knowledge/understanding (about the nature of the Ātman) and thereby becomes meaningful the statement (that the Ātman is) like water etc. [1634]

बाह्यदृष्ट्याद्युपाधिस्था प्रत्यगात्मैकलक्षणा ।

दृष्टिर्दृष्ट्यादिवाच्येह विनाशादिनिषेधतः ॥१६३५॥

The (power of) seeing, which is expressed here by the words *dr̥ṣṭi* etc., is what is based on the limiting adjunct, viz. the external (object called) the eye; (and) which is, (all the same), having the nature of the inner self, because of the rejection of its perishing etc. [1635]

Now is given the meaning of *mananavijñānayoḥ* in the *Bhāṣya*.

अन्तर्भावेऽपि दृष्ट्यादौ मतिविज्ञानयोरिह ।
स्वातन्त्र्येणापि तद्वृत्तेः सिद्धेर्भूयः पृथग्ग्रहः ॥१६३६॥

Even if thought and specific knowledge are included in *dr̥ṣṭi* etc.; yet, owing to their freedom in (connection with) their activity, they are mentioned separately¹ for establishing them. [1636]

¹This is based on *yad vai tan na manute yad vai tan na vijñānāti*.

Sureśvara now begins to discuss *bhedābheda* in respect of *dr̥ṣṭi* etc.

दहनौष्ण्यादिवद्वहेर्विभिन्नाः स्युः परस्परम् ।
द्रष्टुर्दृष्ट्यादयो धर्मा भिन्नाभिन्नात्मना स्थिताः ॥१६३७॥
उतैकस्यैव धर्मस्य तदबोधोत्थभेदतः ।
भेदोऽयं लक्ष्यते मोहाद्रवेः स्वोत्थैर्जलैरिव ॥१६३८॥

The qualities of the seer, viz. *dr̥ṣṭi* and others, are different from one another like the power of burning and the heat abiding in fire—they remain (there in the seer) as different and non-different (from one another). [1637]

Or, this difference is noticed in one and the same quality, due to the non-knowing¹ about that (viz. the nature of the inner Ātman), as (different showers of waters, though coming

from (only one source, viz.) the sun.²

[1638]

¹Read SP: *ātmanah sarvādhiṣṭhānatvāt tasmin dharmasabdah.*

²Cf. *ādityāj jāyate vr̥ṣṭiḥ* (Mahābhārata 12.255.11).

इह व्याचक्षते केचिन्नानात्वैकत्वरूपता ।

स्वत एवात्मनो ग्राह्या चैतन्यमिव सर्वदा ॥१६३९॥

Here (or, in this respect), some say that the qualites of being many and also of being (just) one have to be taken as of (i.e. as belonging to) the Ātman in the same way as sentience, whichever (remains but one).

[1639]

भेदाभेदात्मकं सर्वं वस्तु दृष्टं यतस्ततः ।

परपक्षे न दृष्टान्तः कश्चिदप्युपलभ्यते ॥१६४०॥

Since every thing is seen as involving distinction and also non-distinction, therefore, there is not to be found any example of the other person's (i.e. our opponents, or Bhartṛprapañca's) view.

[1640]

एकैव गोता गोपिण्डे सास्नाद्यर्थानुसारिणी ।

सास्नादयो मिथो भिन्ना न चान्योन्यविरोधिनः ॥१६४१॥

There is just one cowness in the body of a cow, viz. that which is in accordance with the notion about the object as one that has dewlap etc.; but the dewlaps (in different cows) are mutually different (in different cows) and they are not mutually opposed.

[1641]

न च सामान्यबुद्धयेह भेदबुद्धिर्निवर्तते ।

नापि सामान्यधीबाधो विशेषोत्थधियेष्यते ॥१६४२॥

Further, the awareness of the discrete objects does not go away (i.e. get removed) by (having known) the generality (in them), nor also is there accepted the stultification of the

awareness of the generality by the knowledge which has arisen from the discreteness in the objects. [1642]

स्थूलेषु यद्वत्सामान्यविशेषात्मकता तथा ।
संभावनीया निःशेषसूक्ष्मवस्तुष्वपीदृशी ॥१६४३॥

As one accepts having the nature in the gross objects of both generality and particularity (in them); so does one have to accept that condition in relation to all of subtle things also. [1643]

Now there is exposition of the sentence yathā sthūleṣv ekatvaṃ nānātvaṃ ca ... in BUB.

नानात्वैकत्ववत्स्थूलं दृष्टं वस्तु यथा तथा ।
आत्माद्यतीन्द्रियं वस्तु वस्तुत्वादिति गम्यताम् ॥१६४४॥

As a gross object is accepted (lit. seen) to have in it both variety and unity, so should be accepted (lit. known) such things as the Ātman etc., which are beyond perception (by sense-organs as having them), since they have the nature of being the (real) thing (to be known). [1644]

इत्येवं पण्डितमन्या अनुमानबलादिह ।
भिन्नाभिन्नात्मकं वस्तु स्थापयन्त्यविशेषतः ॥१६४५॥

Thus do those, who consider themselves to be learned men, establish, on the support (lit. strength) of inference, that the things¹ in this world are both of the nature of having (mutual) difference and non-difference without any exception in them. [1645]

¹The plural is used in translation since there is intended reference to the various objects of the world.

Now follows the refutation of the view just stated.

इत्युक्तपरिफल्गुत्वप्रबोधायाभिधीयते ।

न्यायः श्रेयोऽर्थिनां मा भूद्भ्रान्तिर्वेदान्तवस्तुनि ॥१६४६॥

Therefore, for conveying the complete (*pari*) meaninglessness in (the view) which is (earlier) stated, there is reason given for ensuring that there should not be among them, who desire the good, any wrong notion about the reality (conveyed by) the Vedānta (texts). [1646]

भेदग्राहि न नो मानं कृत्स्नेऽपि जगतीक्ष्यते ।

वस्तुस्वरूपमुज्झित्वा मेयं नास्त्यपरं मितेः ॥१६४७॥

In the whole of the world there is not for us (i.e. in our opinion) any authoritative means of knowing differences (or, discrete objects) (and) there is not for correctly knowing (*miti*) any object of knowing other than the nature of the (real) thing (i.e. the Ātman). [1647]

There is now reference to the *nyāya* 'reason' which is intended for explanation as stated in the preceding verse. In this verse, it is the nature of reality as being some discrete object(s) which is under reference.

न च स्वरूपे भेदोऽस्ति कस्यचिद्वस्तुनः क्वचित् ।

स्वरूपाच्चान्यतो भेदः प्रमाणाभासगोचरः ॥१६४८॥

Also, there does not occur in anything, anywhere, difference in its (own) nature or that from any other object so that it can be apparent from/through the appearance of an authoritative means (of knowing). [1648]

There follows now the refutation of the distinction between generality and particularity

असाधारणरूपेण व्यावर्तन्ते परस्परम् ।

यथा विशेषाः सामान्यं तथा व्यावर्तते ततः ॥१६४९॥
 तेऽपि सामान्यमात्रं चेद्विशेषा भवतो मताः ।
 विशेषविरहात्तर्हि सामान्यमपि दुःस्थितम् ॥१६५०॥

As particulars exclude (i.e. differ from) one another by each (of them) having its own specific form, so also does generality exclude (i.e. differ from) them (viz. particular forms) [1649] and if the particulars also are held by you (to exclude) only generality; then, owing to the absence of (any) particularity, generality also is in bad state. [1650]

In verses 1651-1654, Sureśvara discards the notion of difference in non-difference in the case of generality and particularity.

भिन्नं वा स्यान्न वा भिन्नं सामान्यं चेद्विशेषतः ।
 भेदे विशेष एव स्यात्सामान्यं खण्डमुण्डवत् ॥१६५१॥

Generality could be either different or non-different from particularity; if generality were different from particularity, there would be some particularity in it, as Khaṇḍa and Muṇḍa. [1651]

भेदभेदवतोभित्तावनवस्था प्रसज्यते ।
 धर्मधर्म्यप्रसिद्धिश्च तदभेदेऽपि सज्यते ॥१६५२॥

And there would contingently result *infinite regress* in case difference and what is possessed of that difference were taken to be distinct (from each other) and, in the case of non-distinction (between them), a *dharma* 'quality' and a *dharmin* 'what is possessed of that quality' would not become known (lit. established). [1652]

आत्मैव चेद्विशेषाः स्युर्धर्मिणो धर्मलक्षणाः ।
 व्यतिरेको न संसिध्येदात्मत्वं स्यात्तदात्मनः ॥१६५३॥

If it were that the Ātman itself were the particulars; that is, if the particulars were the *dharma*s of the Ātman, the *dharmin*,

then there would not be established any difference (between them); for, that would mean: the Ātman is ever itself.¹ [1653]

¹This is further elucidated in the following verses.

स्वयंरूपत्वतो नात्मा ह्यात्मनो व्यतिरिच्यते ।
अनात्माभिजना ह्येषा व्यावृत्तिर्यात्मनो भवेत् ॥१६५४॥

Indeed the Ātman could not be taken as being apart from itself, for (those particulars would be) only the form(s) of itself. Indeed, this distinguishing of the Ātman would not be on account of (lit. not be produced by) the non-Ātman(s).

[1654]

Verses 1655-1661 purport to set aside such differences as draṣṭṛ and drṣṭi.

न च धर्म्यन्तरासत्त्वे प्रत्यगात्मातिरेकिणः ।
धर्मा लभन्त आत्मानं पारतन्त्र्यात्मकत्वतः ॥१६५५॥

Also, in the absence of any (thing) that would be possessed of those (particulars as its) *dharma*s, which is apart (i.e. distinct) from the inner self, the *dharma*s would not be existent (i.e. be coming into existence), since they are of the nature of being dependent on another (which would be possessed of them).

[1655]

धर्म्यन्तरस्य चास्तित्वे प्रतिज्ञार्थो न सिध्यति ।
समस्तव्यस्ततारूप आत्मैवैक इतीरितः ॥१६५६॥

Further, if there were (accepted the) existence of any other *dharmin*; then, the matter (as stated) in the proposition would not get established, since it is already stated (there) that there is only a single Ātman having a collective form and other particular forms also.

[1656]

व्यस्ता अपि तदात्मानो धर्माः स्युश्चेत्समस्तवत् ।
विशेष उच्यतां कोऽत्र समस्तव्यस्तरूपयोः ॥१६५७॥

(Under such circumstances—or, in that case) if the *dharma*s of the Ātman, though (existing as distinct) particulars (and yet) would appear as a collective form; then, let it be told, as to what distinction would there be in the particular forms (on one hand) and the collective form (on the other). [1657]

धर्म्यन्तराश्रितैर्धर्मैर्नान्यो धर्मो विशेष्यते ।
धर्मिधर्मत्वरूपस्य संबन्धस्यासमन्वयात् ॥१६५८॥

No other *dharmin* is qualified/specified by the *dharma*s which are based/resting in another *dharmin*, because (that being so) there cannot be any connection which is of the nature of a *dharmin* being possessed of the *dharma*s.¹ [1658]

¹SP explains this with the illustration that the properties residing in a pitcher cannot be said to belong to a cart.

नेति नेत्यादिवाक्यानां नैरर्थक्यं च सज्यते ।
समस्तव्यस्तरूपत्वं यदि स्याद्ब्रह्मणः श्रुतेः ॥१६५९॥

And (on accepting that view) that the Brahman has both a collected form and particular forms, there would arise as the contingent state, the meaninglessness of the statements (in the Śruti) such as *neti neti*. [1659]

व्युत्थाप्य ब्रह्मणो द्वैतं तदनूद्य श्रुतिः पुनः ।
आत्मैवेत्यब्रवीत्साक्षात्कुतो भेदस्य संभवः ॥१६६०॥

(Thus) having raised (*vyutthāpya*) the idea of the distinction (*dvaita*— of the world) from the Brahman and then repeated it again and again, the Śruti has clearly (*sākṣāt*) stated *ātmaiva*; how (then) could there be any possibility of (that) distinction?

व्यावर्ततेऽस्वरूपं चेत्स्वरूपाद्वस्तु मानतः ।

अनवाप्तस्वरूपं सद्वस्तु स्याच्छशशृङ्गवत् ॥१६६१॥

(Then) if something which does not have any form of its own is (shown/said) to be distinct from (what has a) form—then from that (so supposed) authoritative means of knowing there would (be said to be) existing a formless thing like the horn(s) of a hare.

[1661]

Sureśvara discusses in verses 1662-1664 whether difference (bheda) means absence of the (real) thing or, (real) distinction.

मानं विधिमुखं मुक्त्वा न व्यावृत्त्येकवर्त्मना ।

लभते मेयसंबन्धं तत्सद्वस्तूपलम्भतः ॥१६६२॥

An authoritative means of knowing does not get connected with the object of knowing by being stated as distinct (from that), except through an injunction, since there does obtain the existent (real thing).¹

[1662]

¹Read SP (which is useful): *nanu mānasiddho bhedo na yuktyāpahnnavam arhati. tatra kiṃ so 'nyonyābhāvaḥ kiṃ prthak-tvam ādye kiṃ mānam bhedaṃ eva grhṇāti kiṃ vā vastv api. nādyā ityāha mānam iti.*

अघटादिव्युदासेन न घटाद्यर्थसंगतिः ।

मितेरनेवंधर्मत्वान्नाभावे व्यापृतिर्मितेः ॥१६६३॥

There is not (or, cannot be) the connection of an object such as a pitcher with proper (i.e. right) knowledge (showing/stating its) distinction from what is not a pitcher etc. (Thus) : on account of such nature (of right knowledge), there cannot be (i.e. is not) any function (served by the means of knowing etc.) in the absence (of things).¹

[1663]

¹Read the last remark of SP: *na hi mānasvānvanisedhe*

vyāpāras tasya vastubodhitvaṃ vinā niṣedhabodhitvābhāvād ity arthah.

अप्रसिद्धघटाद्यर्थोऽघटाद्यर्थापनोदनम् ।

मानेनेह कथं कुर्यादन्योन्याश्रयकारणात् ॥१६६४॥

How can an object such as a pitcher, which is not known (lit. established as existent) remove such objects as are not a pitcher etc. by any authoritative means of knowing? (This is so) because they have (in that case) a mutual dependence.¹

[1664]

¹Read SP: *dharmyādijñāne sati bhedajñānaṃ tatas tajjñānam y anyonyāśrayān na vastudhīpūrvikā bhedadhūr ity arthah.*

Verses 1665-1667 point out a contingent difficulty, viz. mutual dependence.

घटबोधप्रयुक्तेयमघटस्य ह्यपाक्रिया ।

अघटार्थव्युदासाच्च घटार्थस्यावबोधनम् ॥१६६५॥

Indeed, this removal (of the knowing) of what is not a pitcher is caused by the knowing of a pitcher and (then) by the removal (of the notion) of what is not a pitcher does there occur the knowing (that there is) an object called pitcher. [1665]

घटवच्चाघटस्यापि तदन्यापाक्रियां विना ।

नैवाधिगतिरित्येवमनवस्था प्रसज्यते ॥१६६६॥

मातृमानाप्रसिद्धिश्च तदन्यापोहनादृते ।

ताभ्यां विना प्रमेयोऽर्थो नितरां न प्रसिध्यति ॥१६६७॥

As in the case of a pitcher, so in the case of what is not a pitcher also, there can be no knowing about it unless there is the removal of the notion of an other object than that (i.e. itself) and thus there will be contingent infinite regress.

[1666]

Moreover, the non-existence (lit. being non-established) of the knower and the means of knowing (or, act of knowing) can occur without the removal of what is other than the same. (So also) the object to be known cannot at all be established without those two. [1667]

For clearly understanding these two verses, read SP: *etena yugapad-ubhayagraho nirasto na hi dharmyādikāryam bheda-jñānam tena saha bhavati kāryakāraṇayoḥ paurvāparyaniyamāt.*

Verses 1668-1674 refute the theory that distinctions/differences consist in having a separateness (or, separate existence).

पृथक्त्वं चापृथक्त्वं च गुणो येषां च वादिनाम् ।
तत्प्रक्रियानुसारेणाप्यत्र नैवास्ति भेदधीः ॥१६६८॥

Also further, according to the procedure of those disputants, who hold separateness/difference and non-separateness/non-difference (each) as *guṇa*, there cannot be (or, is not) accepted the notion of distinction(s). [1668]

पृथग्गुणस्ततोऽन्येभ्यः पृथक्त्वे वा पृथग्गुणात् ।
अपृथग्वा मिथस्ते स्युर्न तथापि भिदेक्ष्यते ॥१६६९॥

An object having distinct property, if considered different from others due to the distinct property or (as mutually non-distinct, the distinction between between them is not (properly) grasped. [1669]

अपृथक्त्वगुणद्रव्यं पृथक्त्वं संश्रयेत्कथम् ।
परस्परविरोधित्वाच्छैत्यं यद्वद्विभावसुम् ॥१६७०॥

How can a substance, which has non-distinction as its property, become distinct (lit. come to have distinct)? (That cannot be) on account of their being in mutual opposition in the same

way as cold cannot (or does not) abide in the sun (or, better, as cold is opposed to the sun). [1670]

पारतन्त्र्यस्वभावाच्च न चाप्राप्तसमाश्रयः ।

गुणत्वं लभते लोके गुणः कश्चिद्गुणी यथा ॥१६७१॥

In the (or, this) world, a *guṇa* does not come to be a *guṇa*, in the same way as a *guṇin* 'one who is possessed of it' (cannot come to be that), since it has the nature of being dependent on another (i.e. having that as a substratum for itself), (and thus) it has not found (lit. got) any substratum. [1671]

NKL (ms. p.689) observes on this verse: *tasmān nirūpya-nāṇabhedasyāsamabhavād bhedadhīr bhrāntir ity arthaḥ*.

असंभित्तिः पृथक्त्वस्य ततोऽन्येभ्यः प्रसज्यते ।

पृथक्त्वस्य न चेदन्यत्पृथक्त्वान्तरमिष्यते ॥१६७२॥

For that reason of its non-distinction or separateness from others there contingently follows the absence of distinction(s) and there is not accepted any other separateness for (that) separateness. [1672]

अन्यापेक्षं पृथक्त्वं च स्वयमेवापृथग्घटः ।

बलीयानन्तरङ्गत्वाद्बहिरङ्गं प्रबाधते ॥१६७३॥

And, separateness is dependent on another (which is some substratum); but/and a pitcher is, by its very nature, not separate (from itself)—(thus) intrinsic (nature), being stronger, sets aside (or, precludes) extrinsic (nature). [1673]

Read in this context NKL (ms. p.689): *bhedaguṇāt dravyaṁ arma sāmānyam ca vyāvṛttam tvayocyate tasya dravyāder bhedaḥ vyāvṛttasya svābhāvikam rūpaṁ aprthaktveti svarūpatvenā-taraṇigatvād balīyān dharmatvena bahiraṅgam bhedaprābhedo ādhate ity arthaḥ*.

पृथग्गुणाच्च व्युत्थाप्य द्रव्यादेः किं स्वलक्षणम् ।
स्वतोऽपृथक्त्वात्सर्वस्य पृथक्त्वमपि दुर्लभम् ॥१६७४॥

What is the peculiar characteristic of a substance after having taken it away (i.e. disregarding) what has separateness. In the case of some thing which is itself not separate (from others) in quality/qualities, separateness (of it from) all (things) of different quality would be impossible to obtain. [1674]

Verses 1675-1677 refute separateness, on the strength of (or, in view of) experience.

अथानुभवतोऽस्तीति पृथक्त्वं भवतो मतम् ।
मैवं मिथ्यानुभूतित्वाच्छ्रुतकारजतादिवत् ॥१६७५॥

If, in your opinion, there is separateness (of something existing) on account of (an individual's) experience (of it); let this not be so (held), because that could have falsity of experience like in that of silver in a mother-of-pearl. [1675]

नैकानुभूतिबलतो वस्तुनो लभ्यते भिदा ।
भिन्नानुभूतितो नापि मिथस्तासामसंगतेः ॥१६७६॥

(Also) separateness of a thing cannot be found/known on the strength (of some one's) experience, and not also, (on the strength of) some other experience, because experience would be having non-connection between one another. [1676]

एकस्यामनुभूतौ चेद्वेदो नात्मन इष्यते ।
मृषा तत्रैव स मिथो व्यभिचाराद्ध्रुवं भवेत् ॥१६७७॥

If, in one experience, the distinction of the Ātman (from other objects) is not accepted, then there would be certainly falsehood in it owing to the mutual variance among them. [1677]

In verses 1678-1681, the notion of distinction resting on experience is rejected.

नानुभूतिः प्रतीचीयमभेदाद्वेदमीक्षते ।
स्वरूपाव्यतिरेकाच्च नापि चानात्मनीक्षते ॥१६७८॥

This subsequent (*pratīcī*) experience does not consider that difference (is possible) from non-difference, so also it does not see that (distinction) in a non-Ātman, since it has not changed its nature. [1678]

न चैकबुद्धिबाधेन द्वयादिधीरुपजायते ।
तत्कारणत्वात्तद्बुद्धेर्मृत्स्नेव घटजन्मनः ॥१६७९॥

Nor also does by the stultification of some knowledge (or, awareness) arise a knowledge (or, awareness) or more knowledges (or, awareness) (*dvyādidhī*) such as a second etc.; in the same way as there originates (the awareness of) a pitcher from softened clay, that being its (material) cause. [1679]

द्वित्रयादिबुद्धिरेकस्मिन्मिथ्यातद्रूपवस्तुनः ।
समूहस्योभयत्वेऽपि स्मृतेरप्यप्रमाणतः ॥१६८०॥

The second etc. knowledge (or, awareness(es)) in respect of (just) one object/thing would be (only) false, since that (or these) is not (or, are not) in conformity with the nature of that object/thing; also in case them together as an ensemble (of knowledges) would they be unauthoritative (i.e. invalid) means of knowing, being a memory (of those knowledges) also. [1680]

न चेत्समूहो वस्तुवस्ति एकैकत्वात्समूहिनाम् ।
सत्यत्वेऽपि तथैकत्वान्नानेकत्वं तथापि च ॥१६८१॥

If an ensemble of things cannot be a thing, while they belong to that one ensemble, then also, even if (they are all) real,

on account of there being the only one (ensemble), there are not many (different) things. [1681]

Verse 1682 is the concluding remark on the notion of distinction and non-distinction.

अद्वैतविषयैवेयं द्वौ त्रयश्चेति या मतिः ।
एकत्वात्समुदायस्य न प्रमातो भिदां प्रति ॥१६८२॥

Whatever be the awareness of two and three (and more) objects (i.e. things), it is not correct knowledge about/pertaining to distinction since there is but one (or, non-different/unique). [1682]

In verses 1683-1686, Sureśvara establishes as non-authoritative the distinctions brought forth to one.

यदि प्रत्यक्षगम्योऽर्थो व्यावृत्तेस्तत्पृथक्त्वतः ।
न प्रत्यक्षाभिसंबन्धः कुम्भप्रत्यक्षतो भवेत् ॥१६८३॥

If an object is directly perceptible on account of its distinction (from other things) it does not become related to the direct perception (of it), (as, for example,) on account of its being directly perceived as a pitcher. [1683]

प्रत्यक्षगम्यधर्मश्चेद्व्यावृत्तिर्भवतोच्यते ।
धर्मिप्रतीतिरेव स्यात्सापि चेहैककर्मिका ॥१६८४॥

If you say that (any) distinct property/characteristic (of a thing) is directly perceptible, then that would be only the apprehension/grasping a thing having the same as its property (or, properties) and also (in that grasping, there would be only) one object (grasped). [1684]

धर्मिबुद्धेर्न धर्मेषु बुद्धिभेदः प्रजायते ।
देशकालाद्यभिन्नत्वादेकात्मत्वाच्च संविदः ॥१६८५॥

From the grasping of (some) object(s), having (certain) property or proerties, there would not arise any distinct grasping (i.e. awareness); since the knowledge/awareness (of the object(s) and the properties) belongs to (or, has) but one (particular) time and place (of grasping the same), and that would be (only) one uniform awareness. [1685]

सत्तत्त्वं सर्वभावानां तत्र तावन्न भेदधीः ।
भेदधीविषयो यश्च तस्मात्सद्धीर्निवर्तते ॥१६८६॥

(So long as) the nature of all positive entities (continues to be existing), there would not arise any knowledge/awareness of (any) distinction; and the knowledge of an existent object keeps/is from (lit. turns from) the object of the knowledge of distinction. [1686]

Verses 1687-1692 affirm that the world of distinct objects has only the existent Ātman as its essential nature; therefore, there are not in existence any distinct objects.

सतैव सर्ववस्तुनि बिभ्रत्यात्मानमात्मना ।
कल्पितत्वादनेकत्वाद्वज्जुसर्पद्विचन्द्रवत् ॥१६८७॥

It is only the existent (Ātman) itself that covers/pervades all the objects; only because there is the nature (of the objects) of being imagined and of having multiplicity, like the serpent in a rope or two moons (in the place of one). [1687]

This refers to the well-known examples of *adhyāsa* cited by Śaṅkara in BSB (introductory).

प्रकृत्यर्थातिरेकेण प्रत्ययार्थो न गम्यते ।
सत्तेत्यत्र ततः स्वार्थस्तद्धितोऽत्र भवन्भवेत् ॥१६८८॥

(In language), the meaning of a suffix (in a word) is not

conveyed (or, understood) as distinct/separated from the crude form of the word; from that there follows its own meaning and therefrom would be derived its secondary form (of the same, if any). [1688]

सति व्यभिचरत्येव तदन्यद्वस्तु मोहजम् ।
सर्पादिवस्तुवत्तस्मात्सत्सत्यमितरन्मृषा ॥१६८९॥

Only when the existent is (i.e. seems to be) varying (from its true nature), then is there (perceived) another thing (which is) produced by delusion. Therefore (or, thus), the existent is truth and (any) other thing/object is false, like the objects serpent etc. (in a rope etc.). [1689]

व्युत्थिता हि सतो भेदाः प्रत्यक्षागमलिङ्गतः ।
अभावात्मकतां प्राप्ता गम्यन्ते नेश्वरैरपि ॥१६९०॥

Indeed (*hi*) the distinct objects have arisen from the existent, on account of (one's adopting) perception, verbal testimony and inference (lit. mark or sign) (as the means of knowing), being in their nature negative entities, are not grasped even by capable persons (*īśvara*). [1690]

सदेकत्वमशेषेषु वस्तुष्वव्यभिचारि हि ।
व्यभिचारि ततोऽन्यद्वस्तुवतोऽद्वैतमेव सत् ॥१६९१॥

The oneness (or, singleness) of the existent alone is, indeed, invariable (in nature) while all the external objects are variable (in nature). Therefore, anything else, viz. the absence of duality alone is the existent. [1691]

व्युत्थाय न सतो यस्माद्वस्तु संभावनामपि ।
अभावमपि नाप्नोति कास्था भूत्यै विनात्मना ॥१६९२॥

Since any thing, which has not originated from the existent, would not at all be even any (positive) and/or any negative

entity, what idea could be there of the origination (of objects) unless, there exists, the Ātman (as its supposed cause)? [1692]

Verses 1693-1696 affirm that the objects can be imagined only while the existent has been established as reality.

सत्सिद्धिमेव संभाव्य सिद्धाः स्मेत्यभिमन्वते ।
सर्वे भावाः स्रजा यद्वद्भोगी सिद्धायतेऽन्यतः ॥१६९३॥

Having well (*sam*) understood only the existent as established, the Siddhas think, 'We exist'. All entities/things (lit. those which become born) get established from the other (viz. the existent reality) in the way as a serpent (becomes an object of one's knowing only) through (knowing) a wreath of flowers. [1693]

प्रत्यक्षेणापि नाभावः क्वचिज्जगति मीयते ।
तस्य सद्बस्तुमेयत्वादभावस्याप्यसंभवात् ॥१६९४॥

Also, nowhere in the world is any negative entity grasped by means of direct perception, because that negative entity also cannot become a knowable on account of only the existent reality being the (one/single) knowable. [1694]

कामं घटाद्यभावोऽयं प्रत्यक्षादवसीयताम् ।
प्रत्यक्षाभावसंसिद्धौ किं प्रमाणमितीर्यताम् ॥१६९५॥

Granted that this absence of a pitcher etc. is grasped by means of direct perception; then, let it be told as to what could be the means for establishing the absence of direct perception. [1695]

कार्यरूपाभिधाभेदादतीतानागतेष्विव ।
ऐकात्म्यं सर्वभावानां भिन्ननामादिमत्स्वतः ॥१६९६॥

Owing to differences in effects, their forms and their names, as in the case of what has been of the past, what is of the

present and what will be there in future, there is but oneness of all those things/objects, though, by itself, it has different names.

[1696]

Verses 1697-1701 give blame to the view that a *dharma* and the *dharmin* are distinct (i.e. separately existing).

अथ ब्रवीषि भेदोऽत्र स्याद्द्वयोर्धर्मधर्मिणोः ।
व्यावृत्तेर्धर्मधर्मित्वं न तयोरुष्णशीतवत् ॥१६९७॥

Now, if you (were to) say, 'There is here a difference/distinction between the two, viz. a *dharma* and the *dharmin*', (then, it is to be observed) 'There is no relation of the two as a *dharma* and the *dharmin* owing to the mutual exclusion of (as having two different properties) as in the case of hot and cold. [1697]

न भावयोरसंभित्तेर्धर्मधर्मित्वमिष्यते ।
नितरामभावयोर्न स्यान्न विरुद्धाविरुद्धयोः ॥१६९८॥

It is not accepted that there can exist between two existential/positive entities the relation of *dharma* and *dharmin* owing to their very being entirely non-different. And certainly (that can never exist) between two non-existential/negative entities; and also between (entities) which are opposed and non-opposed (to each other). [1698]

निर्भेदकस्य कुम्भस्य भेदः केनेति भण्यताम् ।
वस्त्वात्मनैव चेत्तर्हि मत्पक्षः साध्यते त्वया ॥१६९९॥

Let it be told as to what causes a difference of a pitcher which does not distinguish itself (from the real thing)? If it be said that, owing to its having the nature of the (real) thing itself, (it becomes distinct from that), then it is (only) my view that is acceptable to you.¹ [1699]

¹ Namely, the distinction is just false. Read SP: *vasturūpena*

bheda pratiyogino vastutvād advayaṃ dharmimātraṃ vastu syān na ca dharmābhāve tasmīn dharmitvam.

वस्तुस्वरूपमुज्झित्वा नान्यत्र व्यापृतिर्मितेः ।
अस्ति यस्मादतोऽद्वैतं वस्तु वस्तुनि सर्वदा ॥१७००॥

Since there cannot be any function in relation to (the process of) knowing after/when the nature of a thing (to be known) is given up, therefore, there is always some non-dual (i.e. non-different) thing, in relation to the thing (viz. the Ātman).

[1700]

व्यावृत्तिरनुवृत्तिर्वा सर्वस्यैवास्य वस्तुनः ।
अद्वैतपक्षो भवता मदीयोऽयं प्रसाध्यते ॥१७०१॥

Be it that there is difference or non-difference of this one thing (i.e. the Ātman) from every other thing, (then, in any case,) you have established this (i.e. thus) just my view. [1701]

The thought in this verse is: There is no need of any refutation in the case that there is non-difference of the Ātman from another thing. And, if the diverse nature of them were accepted, there is acceptance of the other thing, viz. that they derived (only) from the Ātman, through (of course) ignorance.

Verses 1702-1704 affirm that non-duality is understood through the knowledge that it is distinct from any other.

व्यावृत्तोऽयमिति ज्ञानं किं कुम्भे किं ततोऽन्यतः ।
अव्यावृत्तस्वरूपत्वात्कुम्भे तावन्न धीरियम् ॥१७०२॥

Does this knowledge/awareness, viz. that this one (i.e. the Ātman) is distinct, occur when there is (a thing like) a pitcher or from elsewhere (i.e. in the presence of any other thing)? To state first (*tāvat*), this knowledge cannot occur in (the presence of) a pitcher because of its nature of not being

distinguished (from it).

[1702]

There is no need of an argument in relation to what is not an existential entity. In the case of a pitcher, however, it is experienced that the occurrence of knowing it on the part of one is only on account of its having the nature of the (real) thing, of its being non-distinct (from that real thing).

नाप्यकुम्भव्युदासेन कुम्भस्य स्याद्विशेषणम् ।
न ह्यम्भस्थेन शैत्येन शिखिनः स्याद्विशेषणम् ॥१७०३॥

Also, there cannot be any specification of a pitcher by setting it aside (i.e. stating that it is different) from a non-pitcher, indeed there could not be specification of fire by coolness which abides in (i.e. is a property of) water.

[1703]

अस्यायमिति षष्ठ्यर्थः प्रत्यक्षादवगम्यते ।
घटाभावः पटे किं न कुतो वास्य घटेऽस्तित्ता ॥१७०४॥

In the statement *asyāyam*, the meaning of the genitive (form) is understood by direct perception. (The question that arises therefore is:) 'Why is not the absence of a pitcher (noticed) in a piece of cloth or (rather), whence is there the presence of this (piece of cloth) in a pitcher?'

[1704]

In verses 1705 and 1706 is stated a negative entity, because of its non-existence, cannot be a property (or, qualifier) of an existent (say, a pitcher).

भावाभावौ सतो न स्तः सत्त्वादेवासतः कुतः ।
नानयोर्धर्मधर्मित्वं विरोधादितरेतरम् ॥१७०५॥

Birth and death cannot occur in the case of what is (ever) existent; then, how (could they occur) in the case of what is (ever) non-existent? As such, there cannot be the relation of *dharma* and *dharmin* between them, owing to their mutual

opposition.

[1705]

सर्वे भावाः स्वयं सन्तो व्यावृत्तिः किंसमाश्रया ।
निराकृता स्वयं सद्भिर्यथा वियति कृष्णिमा ॥१७०६॥

All existential entities being (ever) existent, in what would be based their difference? (And) that difference (thus) disproved by those existents, would be like the dark appearance of the sky.

[1706]

This verse affirms that there is only one existent and the world is but apparently existing.

नभोवत्सदिदं सर्वं तत्र यत्तत्सदात्मना ।
साध्यत्वं नान्यथा दृष्टमसतो यदि वा सतः ॥१७०७॥

All this existent is like the sky; therefore, all that which is sought to be proved of the existent or non-existent (world), could not be seen otherwise as of what has the nature of the (ever) existent or it there were any non-existent.

[1707]

Verses 1708-1710 establish non-duality in relation to the negative entities.

वस्त्वन्तराच्चेद्व्यावृत्तिरिष्यते ह्यन्यवस्तुनः ।
वस्तुत्वात्सास्त्वभावस्य वस्तु नो चेत्कुतो भिदा ॥१७०८॥

If difference of one thing from another is accepted (lit. wished); then, on account of their being the (ever) existent thing, that could be of what is not the (ever) existent. Where is there difference for us of that which is not an existential entity?

[1708]

घटो भावात्मनाप्नोति त्वत्साध्यं चेदशेषतः ।
घटीभूतमिदं सर्वं द्वैतं ते किंप्रमं मतम् ॥१७०९॥

If a pitcher, being of the nature of an existential entity, can, in its wholeness attain (i.e. have) the nature of what you seek to establish, then on what is dependent your knowledge of duality, viz. all this is but the pitcher? [1709]

The argument is: in the absence of any dependable means, the opponent's opinion becomes untenable.

बोधकं यत्प्रमेयस्य तत्प्रमाणमिहेष्यते ।
न च प्रमाणनास्तित्वमीदृक्तस्मान्न युज्यते ॥१७१०॥

They accept that as the means of knowing (the objects to be known) if (i.e. which) is informative of what is to be known. Therefore, the absence of the means (such as you have posited in your argument above) is not reasonable. [1710]

Verses 1711-1716 affirm the absence of the means of knowing as also of the object of it.

मेयाभावः प्रमाणानां यद्यभावेन गम्यते ।
प्रमाणानामभावस्य गमकः को भविष्यति ॥१७११॥

If the absence of the object of knowing is conveyed by the absence of any means of knowing, then what would be the conveyor of the absence of the means (themselves)? [1711]

एकप्रत्ययनिर्ग्राह्यमेकं वस्तिवति भण्यते ।
प्रत्यभिज्ञाबलाद्वापि नाभावेऽस्त्युभयं हि तत् ॥१७१२॥

Or alternatively, owing to the support (lit. strength) of recognition, when it is said that the (real) thing is (just) one and it is knowable through (just) one experience, then (it is) not (so) in the case of a non-existent—(for) that (thing) would not be both. [1712]

दर्शनस्पर्शनाभ्यां स्याद्यथैकार्थग्रहस्तथा ।

प्रत्यक्षाभावमानाभ्यां नानुभूतिरिहास्ति नः ॥१७१३॥

In this matter (of knowing the Ātman), there is not for us an experience by the two means, viz. direct perception and the absence of cognition, as there could be (secured) the grasping of a thing by seeing and touching (it). [1713]

न प्रमाणं प्रमेयं वा तदभावविशेषणम् ।

तदा द्वयोरसंसिद्धेर्विरोधाच्चाप्यसंगतिः ॥१७१४॥

Neither the means (of knowing) nor the object (of knowing) is qualified by its non-existence; for, the two would then be non-established and that, through their mutual opposition, they would not have any connection (with knowing). [1714]

यद्यसन्नपि धर्मः स्यान्नैपुण्याद्भवतः क्वचित् ।

नभो मूर्तं घटोऽमूर्तो विश्रब्धैः किं न साध्यते ॥१७१५॥

If a non-existent could be a *dharma* (of some *dharmin*) somewhere, then why is it not proved by the learned (*viśrabdha*) that the sky is perceptible and a pitcher, imperceptible? [1715]

Read in this context SP: *asamakālayor api viśeṣaṇaviśeṣyatve rvam api susādhyam syād ity arthah.*

न भावयोरभिन्नत्वाद्धर्मधर्मित्वमिष्यते ।

नितरामभावयोर्न स्याद्दूरतो भावाभावयोः ॥१७१६॥

(Further) two different things (as identical with the Ātman) being non-different, there would not obtain (or, not be acceptable) the relation of *dharma* and *dharmin*; (and) that (relation) would not at all be possible of two non-existents as also of one existent and the other non-existent. [1716]

verses 1717-1720 refute (the notion of) distinction/differences.

नात्मना वस्तुनो भेदो भेदस्यान्यव्यपाश्रयात् ।

अन्यदीयोऽपि नान्यस्य भेदः स्यात्कल्पनां विना ॥१७१७॥

(Nor) is there difference of a thing from the Ātman while the difference is based on another (thing); nor also could there be the difference of the other with yet another, unless there is merely a notion (of the same).¹ [1717]

¹That is, unless it is imaginary (*kalpita*).

स्वतोऽभिन्नस्वभावत्वान्न भेदोऽन्योऽन्यसंश्रयः ।

उभयोरप्यसंभेदः कथं भिन्द्याद्विरोधिनम् ॥१७१८॥

(Again) not being different from itself, that difference (viz. a discrete object) there would not be (any) difference (since the other is dependent on (their being) the other. How then could the want of combination (i.e. connection) of the two distinguish what is opposed (to them in nature)? [1718]

विशेषणप्रभेदेऽपि विशेष्योऽर्थो न भिद्यते ।

शुक्लकृष्णादिभेदेऽपि गोपिण्डो न हि भिद्यते ॥१७१९॥

When (again) the qualifiers are different, the qualified does not become different (in connection with each); for, even when there is difference of colour as white and black in a cow's body, the body does not become different (i.e. two different bodies). [1719]

विशेषणं विशेष्याच्चेद्विशेष्यान्तरवत्पृथक् ।

भिन्नत्वात्संगतिर्न स्याद्विशेषणविशेष्ययोः ॥१७२०॥

(Also) if a qualifier would be distinct from what is qualified, just like another qualified object (is distinct); then there would not be any connection between the qualifier and the qualified.

[1720]

verses 1721-1725 state about the grasping of *viśeṣaṇa* and *viśeṣa* arising from various acts.

नैकधीगम्यता च स्याज्ज्ञानस्यायुगपज्जनेः ।
युगपन्न हि विज्ञानं जायते घटमेषयोः ॥१७२१॥

Nor also could there be (in the case of the two) the state of being known at (just) one (moment of) knowing, (even) while they come into being simultaneously; for, indeed, there does not occur a simultaneous specific knowledge of a pitcher and a lamb.

[1721]

प्रागेवानात्मसंबन्धादुत्पत्तावेव लब्धतः ।
प्रत्यग्वस्तुप्रमेयस्य तावतैव कृतार्थतः ॥१७२२॥
प्रमाणस्य ततोऽन्यस्मिन्न तन्मानत्वमर्हति ।
विरोधिव्यभिचारित्वात्तदन्यस्य च वस्तुनः ॥१७२३॥

Owing to the connection with the non-Ātman (which obtains) even already (*prāgeva*) and owing to its becoming manifest¹ (i.e. to its appearance in a person's dealings) as the object to be known, (viz. the inner self) and thereby being useful,²

[1722]

the means of knowing³ cannot attain the status of a (proper) means of knowing with respect to the other (viz. the inner self or the Ātman), since, that (known thing) which is different from the (real) thing (i.e. the Ātman) has the nature of being opposed to it and of having a variable (i.e. non-constant-impermanent) existence.⁴

[1723]

¹ Sureśvara appears to use the word *labdhataḥ* as equal in use to *labdhatvataḥ*.

² Similarly, *kṛtārthataḥ* is the same as *kṛtārthatvataḥ*.

³ This refers to *pramāṇa* in worldly dealings.

⁴ That is, being what is only imaginary or false, it does not last at all times.

सर्वं मिथोऽनपेक्षं सत्स्वात्ममात्रविवक्षया ।
प्रत्यग्रूपात्परं रूपं न वस्तुत्प्रेक्ष्यते मितेः ॥१७२४॥

All objects (of worldly life), which are independent of one another, are but the (ever) existent (Ātman); that they appear to be in existence has to convey only (the existence of) the Ātman. (Thus) from (what is properly called) knowing (*miti*) does not become known from any other thing than the inner self. [1724]

यद्वस्तु स्वात्मनैवास्ति तत्परार्थं न बोधवत् ।
पारार्थ्येनैव सद्यच्च तत्परस्माद्विरुद्धं सत् ॥१७२५॥

That thing, which is (said to be) in existence on its own account,¹ exists only for (serving) the purpose of another; it does not consist in knowledge: Being for the sake of another and, at the same time, the (constantly) existent, the thing is not the (real) existent—it is far away from the highest (Ātman). [1725]

¹This indicates the false nature of it.

In verses 1726 and 1727 is affirmed that all that is accepted as the knower etc. is but the Ātman.

असाधारणरूपत्वात्प्रत्यक्चिन्मात्रवस्तुनः ।
तत्तत्त्वानुविधाय्येव प्रमात्रादिर्भवन्भवेत् ॥१७२६॥

Because the inner self, which is only the sentient thing, has an uncommon form, the knower etc. (in all the worldly dealings), while existing, would merely be presenting the truth in that (*viz.* the inner self). [1726]

The final remark in SP is meaningful, *viz.* *ātmanātratā jagato yuktā.*

द्रष्टव्याद्यनुसारिण्या प्रत्यङ्मोहप्रसूतितः ।

दृष्ट्या विरुद्धदिक्स्थस्य प्रतीचो दर्शनं कुतः ॥१७२७॥

The (power of) seeing,¹ which merely follows the nature of an object of seeing and has its origin in delusion about the inner self—how can it have the sight of the inner self which exists in exactly the opposite direction?² [1727]

¹This refers to the worldly seeing, that is a product of ignorance.

²That is, which does not fall within the purview of worldly seeing.

In verses 1728-1733, it is stated that *Ātmajñāna* is not like the knowledge of (worldly) objects.

श्रुतिमानार्पितं चैतन्नावज्ञेयं विपरिचिता ।

पराञ्चीति तथा शास्त्रं न दृष्टेरिति च स्फुटम् ॥१७२८॥

विदिताविदिताभ्यां नो व्युत्थाप्य ब्रह्म चाब्रवीत् ।

नातो वस्त्वन्तरं ज्ञेयं तदन्यस्य निषेधतः ॥१७२९॥

And, therefore, this (real thing), which is presented by the means called the Śruti, should not be disregarded by a wise person. So also the scriptural passage *parāñci khāni ...*¹ and also the clear (words) *na dr̥ṣṭeḥ....*² [1728]

So the Śruti has taken us away from all the known and unknown objects (of the world)³ and declared to us by rejecting the existence of every (other) object⁴ that there is no other thing to be known. [1729]

¹Cf. *Kāthopaniṣad* 4.1.

²BU 3.4.2.

³Cf. *Kenopaniṣad* 1.4.

⁴Cf. *neti neti* (BU 2.3.6; 3.9.26; 4.4.22; 4.5.15).

मनुते मनसा यत्र येनाहुस्तन्मनो मतम् ।

ब्रह्म विद्धि तदेव त्वं न त्विदं यदुपासते ॥१७३०॥
 यतो वाचो निवर्तन्ते नेति नेतीति चापरम् ।
 इति स्पष्टं वचो मानं कुतो हेतोरुपेक्ष्यते ॥१७३१॥

(Also as “that) which does not consider with *manas*,” “that on account of which is the *manas* known (as existing);”¹ “know that alone as the Brahman” and (*tu*) “not that which they (generally) meditate on”.² [1730]

“(That) from which all speech recedes”³ and further, “not this, not this, ...”—all this statement⁴ is the clear means of knowing (the Brahman); (then), for what reason is it neglected? [1731]

¹Cf. *Kenopaniṣad* 1.6.

²Cf. *Kenopaniṣad* 1.9.

³Cf. *Taittirīyopaniṣad* 2.4 and 9.

⁴This is for statements— *samūha ekavacanam*.

द्रष्टुः प्रतीचि यत्साक्षात्प्रत्यग्दृष्ट्यावसीयते ।
 दृष्ट्यादिजन्मनाशादिसाक्ष्यभेदात्मकं स्वतः ॥१७३२॥

That, which is directly perceived by a seer's (power of) seeing in the inner self, is, by its very nature, of the nature of the non-differentiated witness of the origin and perishing etc. of the (power of) seeing etc. [1732]

SP points out that this verse intends to reject the view of the Mādhyamika Buddhists who would understand from *neti neti* etc. that there is only *śūnya*.

तदेतदिति मानेन तत्त्वमस्यादिना तथा ।
 ब्रह्मेति बोध्यते साक्षात्तत्त्वमोहवस्तिवर्त्मना ॥१७३३॥

With the authoritative means in the statement *tad etat ...*¹ and also by *tat tvam asi*² is the Brahman made known directly and by a way of (effecting) the destruction of ignorance. [1733]

¹Cf. BU 1.4.7; CU 3.18.2.

²CU 6.8.7ff.

Verses 1736-1740 state that the Brahman is known to be the inner self, a non-object of any act of seeing.

ब्रह्मात्मात्मानमेवावेदहं ब्रह्मेति च श्रुतेः ।
प्रत्यग्दृष्टयैव तद्ब्रह्म दृश्यते न पराङ्मया ॥१७३४॥

In the Śruti passages: "the Brahman is the Ātman,"¹ it knew the Ātman (as) "I am the Brahman,"² is the Brahman seen with the knowledge (*dr̥ṣṭi*) that it is the inner self (but/and) not with the notion that it is outside (one's body). [1734]

¹Cf. BU 4.4.25.

²Cf. BU 1.4.10.

घटोऽत्रास्तीति वाक्येऽस्मिन्को न्वर्थः संप्रतीयते ।
मेयोऽनधिगतस्तावत्स्वानुभूत्यैकसिद्धिकः ॥१७३५॥

What indeed is the meaning understood from the sentence, "There is a pitcher here"? The object to be known is the one which is established only by one's own experience¹ (in the worldly sense). [1735]

¹That is, as only an object of one's experience—not the knower himself as the Ātman.

मात्रादिजन्मनः प्राक्च नानुभूत्यतिरेकतः ।
द्रष्टृदर्शनदृश्यादिवस्त्वन्यदवसीयते ॥१७३६॥

And, even before the origin of some knowledge etc., it does not exist merely as different from experience; it is (therefore) concluded that the (real) thing (i.e. the Ātman) is other than the things, viz. the seer, its seeing and the object of its seeing.

[1736]

मातृमानप्रमेयादेरन्योन्यव्यभिचारतः ।

अनन्यानुभवात्प्रत्यक्संविदव्यभिचारिणी ॥१७३७॥

The things, viz. the knower, the means of (its) knowing and the object to be known (by it), have only variable appearances; as against this, the knower (*saṁvid*), which is (non-distinct from) the inner self, is always present owing to its being an experience of no other thing. [1737]

संविदो व्यतिरेकेण वस्तु यद्यत्प्रसाध्यते ।

रज्जुसर्पादिवत्तत्तन्नैति संभावनामपि ॥१७३८॥

Whatever thing is established as existing apart from the knower (*saṁvid*) would not become thinkable like the serpent (which appears) in a rope etc. [1738]

संविद्देशादिभेदेन वस्तु चेत्साध्यतेऽन्यतः ।

घटो नास्तीति चान्यद्वा संगतिर्नानयोर्मितेः ॥१७३९॥

If the (real) thing is established to be different from the knower (*saṁvid*) in respect of the place (of its occurrence) etc., then there cannot be (established) through the process of knowing any connection between these two, (as through knowing) this is not a pitcher or not any other (object). [1739]

This is in support of the illustration of a serpent in the place of a rope which is stated in the preceding verse.

उपलब्धोऽस्ति सन्कुम्भो लम्बोष्ठो देशकालवान् ।

पूर्वपूर्वातिरेकेण नोत्तरोऽर्थोऽनुभूयते ॥१७४०॥

An existing pitcher is obtained (or, seen) to have a wide brink, a place (to occupy) and a time (of/for its existence), but every latter of these particulars of it does not become known gradually (i.e. one after another). [1740]

In verses 1741-1744, it is stated that the knower (*saṁvid*) is the basis/support of all notions.

कर्त्रादिव्यापृतेः पूर्वं संवित्संवित्तिमात्रतः ।
अविभागादनाख्येयं तदुद्धृत्या फलायते ॥१७४१॥

Since knowledge (*saṁvitti*) remains only in the form of the knowing (one) (*saṁvid*), before (even) the operation/function of the agent etc., it is indescribable as it has no differentiation (in it) and (it) comes to be the result when there arises that (operation of the agent etc.). [1741]

अक्रियेऽपि यथा व्योम्नि ह्युद्धृतिस्थितिहानिभिः ।
जगन्नर्त्ति मय्येवं कार्यकारणवस्त्वदम् ॥१७४२॥

As the world dances (i.e. appears) in the sky (the void) again and again having its origination, sustenance and perishing, so (does) this thing comprising effect(s) and cause(s) (dances) in me.¹ [1742]

¹Sureśvara uses a form of the first personal pronoun for the Ātman; thus *mayi* is for *asmin* or *ātmani*, i.e. in the/this Ātman.

नञ्घटार्थावपह्नुत्य संवित्सद्रूपमात्रया ।
अवगत्यात्मना सत्त्वमवाक्यार्थत्वमश्नुते ॥१७४३॥

Having concealed the (meaning of the negative particle) *nañ* and (the object viz.) a pitcher, the knower attains the nature of the existent, (though) that is not the meaning of the sentence, by merely being of (i.e. assuming) the form of the existent, that is, by transforming itself as knowledge (on the part of it). [1743]

दिग्विभागोऽविभागेऽपि व्योम्नि यद्वत्प्रकल्पितः ।

प्रध्वस्ताशेषभेदेऽपि मयि भिन्नधियस्तथा ॥१७४४॥

As, even in the absence of (any) division, (the division into quarters there is imagined to be existing in the sky), so (are) various (lit. different) notions (imagined) in me¹ (who am one) with all of the differences (consisting in discrete objects) completely (*pra*) destroyed. [1744]

¹Refer to note 1 on verse 1742 above.

In verses 1745 and 1746, there is an illustration for showing that a living being, (who knows the nature of the Brahman) knows the world in its full extent.

स्वप्नेभबुद्धिर्नष्टेऽपि स्वप्न आभाति जागरे ।
यथैवं मोहजं द्वैतं नष्टे मोहेऽपि सांप्रतम् ॥१७४५॥

As the awareness of an elephant (seen) in the dream state appears (i.e. continues to be) in the waking state, even though the dream state has come to an end; so does this (awareness of) duality, born (i.e. produced) out of delusion (appears to be of) now, i.e. even when delusion has ended. [1745]

आगमादन्यतो मानाद्विन्नाभिन्नत्वमात्मनः ।
यथोक्तेन प्रकारेण न मनागपि गम्यते ॥१७४६॥

(Thus) not even a little of distinct (i.e. discrete) objects and (yet) non-different from the Ātman is understood with the help of Veda (*āgama*) or any other means of knowing, as (lit. in the manner) stated above. [1746]

In verses 1747 and 1748 is stated a doubt that the scriptures convey the idea of all things as being distinct while they are non-distinct also.

मानान्तराच्च यत्प्राप्तं मानत्वं तत्र च श्रुतेः ।

न कथं चन संभाव्यमनुवादत्वकारणात् ॥१७४७॥

And, in respect of what is already known from other means of knowing, the Śruti has in no way (*na katham cana*) to be honoured as an authoritative means of knowing, on account of its being (only) a restatement (of what is already known).

[1747]

प्रमान्तरानधिगते मानानां मानतेष्यते ।

अग्निर्हिमस्य भेषजमिति चातोऽन्यथा भवेत् ॥१७४८॥

(For, here) (some) means of knowing is accepted as authoritative in the case of what is/are not known from any other (type/kind of) knowledge. Otherwise, (the statement:) 'fire is a remedy against cold'¹ would become (an unauthoritative means of knowing).

[1748]

¹Cf. *Taittiyīya Brāhmaṇa* 3.9.5.4.

Verses 1749-1750 point to the unauthoritativeness of the Śruti in respect of what is different (and at the same time) non-different.

प्रमान्तरविरुद्धं च मातुं नोत्सहते श्रुतिः ।

स्वगोचरेश्वरं मानं न मानान्तरगोचरे ॥१७४९॥

Further, the Śruti does not proceed to understand (i.e. mention) what is opposed to the other (kind of) right knowledge; (for) whatever (means of knowing) is supreme (or, independent) in respect of its own object (of knowing) is not (so) in respect of what is the object of another means of knowing.

[1749]

श्रोत्रादिकरणानीव नातो गोचरसंकरः ।

भिन्नाभिन्नप्रसिद्धयर्थं न चेयं श्रुतिरिष्यते ।

यद्वै तदिति वचस इतोऽन्यार्थपरत्वतः ॥१७५०॥

There is not here a mixture of objects as (it is not there in respect of) the organs (in the body), viz. ears etc. Further, it is not accepted that the Śruti (lit. this) is for securing (or, establishing) what is different and (yet) non-different (both)—(this is to be understood) from the words (of the Śruti) *yad vai tat* as referring to another subject matter. [1750]

Verses 1751-1754 affirm that the Śruti does not purport to point out the existence of dr̥ṣṭi etc.

दृष्ट्यादिभेदसिद्धयर्थं नेदं वचनमिष्यते ।
भेदस्यातोऽन्यतः प्राप्तेर्न श्रुत्या तत्र यत्यते ॥१७५१॥

The statement of the Śruti is not accepted (lit. desired to be) for establishing the differences among *dr̥ṣṭi* '(the power of) seeing' etc.; since (this) difference is learnt (lit. obtained) from elsewhere (i.e. other means of knowing), (therefore) there is no effort made in that regard by the Śruti. [1751]

किंतु चैतन्यमप्यस्य कामकर्मादिवद्भवेत् ।
न स्वतोऽदर्शनात्प्राज्ञ इत्याशङ्क्यैतदीरितम् ॥१७५२॥

But there is a statement made (by the Śruti) keeping in view the (apprehension of) a doubt (on the part of some person), viz. 'The sentience in this (individual) also would be similar to (his) desire, activity etc., for the reason that it is not noticed in (the state of) *Prājña*'. [1752]

स्वप्नप्रबोधयोर्यद्वदृष्टिरस्यात्मनः स्वतः ।
मात्रादिविक्रियाग्रामसाक्षिणी साविनश्वरी ॥१७५३॥
प्राज्ञेऽपीयं तथैवास्ते कटस्थैकात्म्यलक्षणा ।
भावाभावौ त्वविद्यादेर्विशेषः केवलस्त्वह ॥१७५४॥

As in the dream and the waking states, (the power of) seeing in the (lit. this) *Ātman* is, by its nature, never-perishing (and) the witness of the entire mass/group of modifications such

as the knower,

[1753]

so in the (state of the) Prājña also, that (power of) seeing continues to be there, in the same way (as before), viz. having the nature of being immutable and having (just) singleness. Yet the only difference here is in respect of the presence and the absence (both) of ignorance.

[1754]

Verses 1755-1758 affirm the continuous presence of the witness, even if desire etc. have perished.

कामाद्यशेषोपाधीनां निवृत्तौ न निवर्तते ।

तन्निवृत्त्येकसाक्षित्वात्कामाद्यस्तित्वसाक्षिवत् ॥१७५५॥

That (sentience) does not withdraw itself when all of the limiting adjuncts such as desire recede, on account of its being the (only) one witness of their receding and as possessing the ability of witnessing the existence¹ of desire etc. [1755]

¹That is, if and when they appear to exist.

भावाभावार्थसाक्षित्वाद्भावाभावात्मिकैव सा ।

गृह्यतेऽविद्यया मूढैर्मणिः शुद्धो यथाश्रयैः ॥१७५६॥

That (power of) seeing which, on account of its being the witness of the existential and non-existential entities, is taken (by the deluded) as that which has the nature of the existential and non-existential entities, in the same way as a pure jewel (is taken) by the foolish as (having the nature of) their bases/supports. [1756]

सत्यं ज्ञानमनन्तं च विज्ञानघनमित्यपि ।

प्रज्ञानं ब्रह्म चेत्येवं ज्ञानमात्रात्मतात्मनः ॥१७५७॥

There is in the Ātman the nature of being only knowledge as (it is declared in the Śruti statements) *satyaṃ jñānam anantam*,¹ and also *vijñānaghanam*,² and further *prajñānam*

brahma.³

[1757]

¹Cf. *Taittirīyopaniṣad* 2.1.1.

²Cf. BU 2.4.12.

³Cf. *Aitareyopaniṣad* 3.3.

दृष्टान्तश्च न नो नास्ति मण्यादेरिह संभवात् ।
मणेर्नीलादिवद्भेदो दृष्ट्यादिप्रत्यगात्मनः ॥१७५८॥

Further, there is not an example in favour of our opponent's view as there is for us as of a jewel etc., owing to the possible existence of the same, here (i.e. in our opinion); for the difference/distinction such as blue etc. in respect of the jewel etc. is owing to the (power of) seeing etc. of the inner self.

[1758]

Verses 1759-1765 affirm the absence of any example to support the view of difference in non-difference.

प्रतिज्ञाहेतुदृष्टान्ता भिन्नाभिन्नत्ववादिनः ।
मिथो भिन्ना न सन्तीह भिन्नाभिन्नत्वमात्रतः ॥१७५९॥

In the theory of the disputant who postulates difference in non-difference, the proposition, the reason and the example are not mutually distinct, since they are here (i.e. in his theory) merely different and (yet) non-different.

[1759]

दृष्टान्तमात्रनास्तित्वं दोषोऽस्मास्विह चोद्यते ।
दृष्टान्तोऽस्त्येव नः स्पष्टस्त्वन्मुखेनैव तद्ग्रहात् ॥१७६०॥

What is hypothesised as an objection against us that there is not any single example does not really hold (lit. exist); but, (it has to be told) that there certainly is an example, since you have yourself voiced it.

[1760]

This is elucidated in the next verse.

भिन्नाभिन्नत्ववादेऽस्मिन्यो भिन्नो भवतोच्यते ।

स एव नोऽस्तु दृष्टान्तो नातोऽन्यः प्रार्थ्यते मया ॥१७६१॥

Let that, which you have stated in your ¹ theory of difference in non-difference as distinct, be our example, (for) no other example is desired by me. ¹ [1761]

¹Sureśvara uses here 'you' and 'me'—direct references to the two disputants.

अवश्यमेव भिन्नार्थौ भिन्नाभिन्नरवाविमौ ।

भवतैवाभ्युपेतव्यौ भिन्नाभिन्नत्वसिद्धये ॥१७६२॥

Certainly of necessity (*avaśyan eva*), you have to employ *these* two words *bhinna* and *abhinna*, which have different meanings, in order to establish the nature of (reality which is both) different and yet non-different. [1762]

ऐकार्थ्यमेव चेदिष्टं भिन्नाभिन्नाभिधानयोः ।

तवैव न स्याद्दृष्टान्तः सर्वस्यैकस्वरूपतः ॥१७६३॥

If it is desired (by you) that there be unity of meaning in the two expressions viz. *bhinna* and *abhinna*, then there is not any example for you yourself, because of only one nature of all. [1763]

भिन्नाभिन्नत्ववचसा न चैकार्थोऽपि भण्यते ।

भिन्नार्थप्रतिषेधत्वादभिन्नवचसस्तव ॥१७६४॥

Again, there is not referred to (stated) just one single thing by the word *bhinnābhinna*, for your word referring to *abhinna* thing (*vastu*) would have the power of rejecting a *bhinna* thing. [1764]

गोभिधानाभिधेयार्थाद्यथेहाश्वगिरोच्यते ।

भिन्नोऽर्थो भेदशब्दार्थान्न तथाभेदशब्दतः ॥१७६५॥

As by the word *aśva* is mentioned an object which is to be mentioned here (i.e. in worldly dealings) by the name *go*; so also a distinct object cannot be (mentioned) by (a word referring to) a distinct (object) and also (at the same time) by the word referring to some non-distinct object. [1765]

Verses 1766-1769 point out yet another fault in regard to the above.

सर्वात्मकत्वसंप्राप्तावसाधारणवस्तुनः ।
सर्वात्मत्वनिषेधार्थं प्रमाभावस्त्वयाश्रितः ॥१७६६॥

In order to understand (or, grasp) fully (what is) being of the nature of all things in the case of the (real) thing (viz. the Ātman) which is uncommon and (also) for rejecting (its) being of the nature of all, you (i.e. the opponent) have resorted to the absence of right/proper knowledge. [1766]

भिन्नाभिन्नत्ववाचेह तत्कृतं खातपरितम् ।
सर्वैः सर्वस्य चाभेदाद्व्यवहारोऽपि नश्यति ॥१७६७॥

And owing to (its) nature of being (both) different and (yet) non-different (what you have done is merely) filling a ditch (with useless matter); so also, on account of the non-difference of all from all, the (worldly) dealing would come to a halt (lit. would perish). [1767]

एकैकं भेदतो वस्तु निःसंसर्गं परस्परम् ।
एकमेव त्वभेदे स्यादसामान्यविशेषवत् ॥१७६८॥

All (lit. each one of the) things would have no connection mutually and just one thing would possess (both) generality and particularity (in case when there is accepted its) non-difference. [1768]

दृष्ट्यादिवचसां लोके प्रवृत्तेर्ज्ञान एव च ।
दर्शनाज्ज्ञप्तिमात्रं स्यादर्थस्तेषां प्रसिद्धितः ॥१७६९॥

Since the words *dr̥ṣṭi* etc. are seen among the people to be operating towards (acquiring) knowledge, therefore, from the word *darśana* the meaning (that would yield) would be only knowing—as is known (by all). [1769]

sses 1770-1774 point out that the words *dr̥ṣṭi* etc. are expressive of *jñāna*.

पञ्च श्रोत्रादिभिः साक्षाज्जानामीति समीक्ष्यते ।
शब्दादीनिह लोकेऽतो दृष्ट्यादेर्ज्ञानवाच्यता ॥१७७०॥

is known (lit. observed/seen) that one thinks, 'I know directly the words etc., by means of the five, viz. by ears etc.'; therefore, is that, in the world, the words *dr̥ṣṭi* etc. have the capacity to be expressive (merely) of knowing. [1770]

येन रूपं रसं गन्धं शब्दान्स्पर्शाश्च मैथुनान् ।
एतेनैव विजानातीत्यपि च श्रुतिशासनम् ॥१७७१॥

o also is the instruction in the Śruti: *yena rūpaṃ rasaṃ gandham śabdān sparsāṃś ca maithunān, etenaiva vijānāti*.¹ [1771]

Cf. *Kāthopaniṣad* 4.3.

लावकः पाचको वेति कारकस्य सतो यतः ।
संभेदोऽयं क्रियाभिः स्यान्नातोऽकारकतान्वितः ॥१७७२॥

nce the words *lāvaka* 'one who cuts' and (*vā*) *pācaka* 'what causes digestion' are used in the case of some existing *kāraka*; therefore, this mixture by different actions would (also) not be connected with what is not a *kāraka*. [1772]

गच्छतः पठतो भोक्तृन्नानाकर्मकृतो रविः ।
यथा प्रकाशयत्येकरूप एव तथा धियः ॥१७७३॥

As the sun, being only of one uniform nature for one who is walking, for one who is reciting (one's texts) and for the enjoyers (of pleasure) who are (thus) doing various activities; so also (does the witness see various) awarenesses (of people, being the same in nature). [1773]

दृष्ट्यादिभिन्नचेष्टास्ता भिन्नदेशादिलक्षणाः ।
एकरूपं परं ज्योतिरेकं सद्बोधते धियः ॥१७७४॥

Those different activities such as seeing, which are characterized by (their occurring in) different places does the existent, viz. the one single light, of uniformly one nature (lit. form) see (various) awarenesses (of people). [1774]

Verses 1775-1777 point out that the introductory words kinjyotiḥ ... refer to the Ātman as different from dr̥ṣṭi etc.

किंज्योतिरित्यपक्रम्य यत्नेन महतादरात् ।
अर्थोऽयमेव निर्णीतस्तद्विरुद्धं किमुच्यते ॥१७७५॥

(Now) by having carefully and very respectfully¹ begun (with the word) kinjyotiḥ (is decided, i.e. finally established) this very thought (lit. meaning); why is there stated then what is opposed to it? [1775]

¹The word 'carefully' refers to the detailed way of establishing the Siddhānta and 'very respectfully' to the use of illustrations.

मोहोत्थोपाधिसंबन्धादभिन्नोऽपि स्वतो दृशिः ।
द्रष्टा श्रोतेति नानात्वं याति यद्वदलक्तकम् ॥१७७६॥

Being the witness, in its own right, (the Ātman) becomes

manifold, viz. seer, listener etc., through its connection with limiting adjuncts (which have) arisen from delusion, just as (a jewel becomes red by the use of) *alaktaka* (paint). [1776]

रक्तादिभेदतो भेदः प्रकाशस्य प्रकाश्यतः ।
यथैवमात्मनो भेदो ज्योतिष्ट्वाद्वास्यभेदतः ॥१७७७॥

As different shades of light (appear) on account of the differences of red etc. which are (objects to be) illuminated, so do occur the distinctions in/of the Ātman on account of the differences in (the objects which are) illuminated, because of the Ātman's being the light. [1777]

Verses 1778-1779 state that the refutation of the difference in non-difference in respect of gross objects follows only smoothly.

निरंशेषु न चाप्येवं सभागेष्विव वस्तुषु ।
भिन्नाभिन्नात्मता शक्या कर्तुं साक्षादपीश्वरैः ॥१७७८॥

Also, it is not possible even for the most intelligent ones (lit. gods) themselves to posit the nature of being different and (yet) non-different in respect of those things which do not have (i.e. are not, or cannot be divided into) parts. [1778]

न चापीह निरंशेषु भिन्नाभिन्नत्वकल्पने ।
दृष्टान्तः कश्चिदप्यस्ति जगत्यसिंश्चराचरे ॥१७७९॥

Further, there is not in this world, consisting of movable and immovable things, any example for positing (*kalpame*) the nature of being different and (yet) non-different in the case those things which do not have (i.e. are not, or cannot be divided into) parts. [1779]

Verses 1780-1786 are a refutation of the view that the power of seeing undergoes various modifications such as form.

दृगादिशक्तिभेदानां चक्षुरूपादिभेदतः ।

विकारकल्पनैतेन न्यायेनात्मन्यपाकृता ॥१७८०॥

By this reason (*nyāya*) is (thus) rejected disproved (lit. set aside) the notion of differentiation in the Ātman by this positing of modifications (in it) through (seeing) such differences (i.e. different things) as have the form of the eye etc., which are the different powers of seeing etc. [1780]

कार्यलिङ्गाद्धि शक्तीनामस्तित्वं कारणत्वतः ।

यतोऽवगम्यते नातोऽकारके शक्तिरात्मनि ॥१७८१॥

Since the presence of these (different) powers is understood indeed from their characteristics, viz. the effects, on account of their being the cause(s) of them, therefore, there is not (any such) power in the non-*kāraka* Ātman. [1781]

शक्तिशक्तिमतोरैक्यं तयोर्भेदान्न युक्तितः ।

प्रतिपत्तुं क्वचिच्छक्यं प्रकृतिप्रत्ययार्थयोः ॥१७८२॥

It is nowhere possible to posit the oneness (or, identity) of powers and the powerful; (further) the meanings of *prakṛti* 'base-word' and the *pratyaya* 'suffix' is (only) owing to (seeing) differences in them, but not owing to (any valid/powerful) reason. [1782]

प्रकृत्यर्थेऽथवायं स्यान्मतुष्यद्वा ततोऽन्यतः ।

पक्षासिद्धिर्हि पूर्वस्मिन्भेदान्नैक्यं तथोत्तरे ॥१७८३॥

Let this suffix -*matup* be in the sense of the base-word or in a sense other than that, there is still absence of proof for the view (you have held) in respect of the former as also in respect of the latter. [1783]

आत्माविद्यैव नः शक्तिः सर्वशक्यस्य सर्जने ।

नातोऽन्यथा शक्तिवादः प्रमाणेनावसीयते ॥१७८४॥

For us (i.e. in our view), it is in the ignorance about (the nature of) the Ātman that there is power existing for the creation of everything; therefore, any other view about the power (of creating others) cannot be conclusively proved by any means of knowing. [1784]

अशक्तं शक्तिमच्छक्त्या शक्तिः शक्तिमता तथा ।
अशक्तैति कथं योगमन्योन्यं हेत्वसंभवात् ॥१७८५॥

(The notion that) what has power is powerless through the power of the powerful and also, in the same way, the power also is powerless on account of the powerful—how is this connection with each other possible, when there is no cause (for effecting that)? [1785]

शक्तयः सन्ति भूयस्यस्तयोरपि मतं यदि ।
तत्रापि तुल्यचोद्यत्वादनवस्था प्रसज्यते ॥१७८६॥

If it is held that there are many powers of the two; then, in that case also, there would be the same reason (for disproving the said connection) and (thus) there would result infinite regress. [1786]

This verse affirms that the Ātman itself is the power.

तस्मादज्ञात आत्मैव शक्तिरित्यभिधीयते ।
आकाशादेस्ततो जन्म यस्माच्छ्रुत्याभिधीयते ॥१७८७॥

Therefore, the (earlier) unknown Ātman itself is called that power (of creating everything), since the origin of ether etc. is stated by the Śruti as from that.¹ [1787]

¹Cf. *Taittirīyopaniṣad* 2.1.

1789-1794, BU 4.3.32: *salila eko draṣṭā ...* and in 1795-1799 is begun the discussion of BU 4.3.33.

नन्वेवं चेत्स्वभावोऽस्य निर्विभागैकदृष्टिता ।
अथ स्वभावसंत्यागे को हेतुरिति भण्यताम् ॥१७८८॥
विशेषज्ञानमेवास्य स्वभावो वाभ्युपेयते ।
सुषुप्ते तत्परित्यजः कस्मादित्यभिधीयते ॥१७८९॥

(A question is asked:) 'Well, if such is the nature of this (Ātman); viz. being the (power of) seeing of what does not have division (into discrete objects); let then be it told as to how there is its abandoning its own nature'. [1788]

'Or, if it is accepted that this one has the nature of being only (some) particular knowledge, then why is it said that there is giving up of the same in the deep sleep state"—this is stated (now/hereafter).' [1789]

This introduces discussion on *yatra vā anyat* There are two difficulties asked in these two verses.

Verses 1790-1794 discuss the thought in BU 4.3.32.

जाग्रत्स्वप्नप्रपञ्चेऽस्मिन्नात्माविद्यैकहेतुके ।
अनन्योऽपि स्वतो यत्र मोहादन्य इवेक्ष्यते ॥१७९०॥
तत्रान्यः कारको द्रष्टा तथान्येनैव चक्षुषा ।
दृश्यमन्यदविद्योत्थं पश्येत्स्वप्ने यथा तथा ॥१७९१॥
विशेषदर्शने यस्मादविद्यैवास्य कारणम् ।
अतस्तस्यां निवृत्तायां कृत्स्नो भेदो निवर्तते ॥१७९२॥
छान्दोग्योपनिषद्वाक्यं तथा च सति युक्तमतम् ।
यत्र नान्यदिति तथा चात्मैवेत्युपसंहृतेः ॥१७९३॥
मैत्रेयीब्राह्मणे चैतद्व्याख्यातं वाक्यमादरात् ।
यतो भूयो न तद्व्याख्या क्रियतेऽत्र ततोऽधुना ॥१७९४॥

In the states of waking and dream, which have ignorance alone

as their cause, the Ātman appears through delusion to be another as it were, though it is not any other. [1790]

There (i.e. in those two states) there is another *kāraka* (i.e. an agent of some activity) and yet another seer who would see other object(s) of knowing that arise from ignorance—as in the dream state, so also in the waking state. [1791]

Since, only ignorance is the cause for its seeing duality, therefore, when it has receded (i.e. is destroyed) the variety (of discrete objects), in its entirety, recedes. [1792]

When that is (accepted to be) so, the sentence in the CU becomes supported by reason. So also (is supported by reason) the sentence *yatra nānyat ...*¹ and the concluding sentence *ātmaiva*.² [1793]

And since this sentence³ is (already) respectfully⁴ explained in the Maitreyī Brāhmaṇa, therefore, there is not any explanation given of it again. [1794]

¹Cf. CU 7.24.1.

²Cf. BU 1.4.17.

³Cf. BU 2.4.14.

⁴For this, see the introductory note to verses 1775-1777.

Verses 1795-1843 discuss the thought in BU 4.3.33.

यद्वै तदित्युपक्रम्य व्याख्यातं वस्तु विस्तरात् ।
सलिलादिगिरा तस्य क्रियतेऽत्रोपसंहतिः ॥१७९५॥

The (real thing) was described at length after having begun here (i.e. in what follows), (its description) with the words *yad vai tat*; now, there is offered (lit. made) the description/explanation, in the words beginning with *salila* etc. by way of stating the conclusion (of the same). [1795]

अविद्यैव यतो हेतुः कार्यकारणतां प्रति ।

सम्यग्ज्ञानादतस्तस्यां ध्वस्तायामात्ममात्रता ॥१७९६॥

Since ignorance alone is the cause of the relation (of things) as the cause and its effect(s), therefore, when it is removed (lit. destroyed) by right knowledge (i.e. the knowledge of the real nature of the Brahman), (there remains in existence) only the Ātman. [1796]

नाविद्यामनुपादाय प्रतीचोऽनात्मसंगतिः ।

यतो विध्वंसने तस्या नात्मनोऽन्योऽवशिष्यते ॥१७९७॥

Since the inner self (in the body) cannot (i.e. does not) have (any) connection with the non-Ātman (objects), unless it has taken recourse to ignorance; (therefore) when there has occurred the destruction of that (ignorance), there does not remain anything other than the Ātman. [1797]

स्वतोऽवबोधमात्रत्वात्कुतोऽविद्यादिसंप्लुतिः ।

तस्मात्सलिलवच्छुद्धः कार्यकारणहानतः ॥१७९८॥

(A question is asked:) 'Since (the Ātman) is itself of the nature only of knowledge, how/why will there be removal (lit. washing away) of ignorance?' Therefore, (in answer it is pointed out:) '(The Ātman) is pure like water owing to (the fact that) there is removal (lit. loss) of (the relation of) cause and its effect(s)'. [1798]

This is the meaning of the words *salila*....

अन्तरेणापि संबन्धं कार्यकारणवस्तुनः ।

स्वतोऽनेकात्मकं तत्स्यादित्याशङ्क्यैक उच्यते ॥१७९९॥

Having the (someone's possible) doubt in view, viz. that (real) thing (i.e. the Ātman) would, of itself, even without (having) any connection with such things as consist in (being) cause and its effect, become manifold (or, lit. come to be possessed of the nature of variety of things); has the Śruti stated the word *ekah*. [1799]

Verses 1800-1806 bring out the significance of the word *ekaḥ*.

न कपित्थादिवत्तत्त्वं स्वतोऽनेकस्वभावकम् ।

उक्त्वा सलिलवत्तस्मादेक इत्यब्रवीच्छ्रुतिः ॥१८००॥

The nature of reality (lit. that) is not, like (that of) a wood-apple,¹ which is made up of various constituent elements; therefore, the Śruti, after describing (lit. stating) it as 'like water',² mentioned it as (being just) one. [1800]

¹In *kapitthavat*, the suffix *-vat* is used according to Pāṇini 5.1.116: *tatra tasyeva*.

²In *salilavat*, the suffix *-vat* is only *ivārthe*.

सजातीयनिषेधो वा ह्येकशब्देन भण्यते ।

सलिलोक्त्या विजातीयसंबन्धो हि निवारितः ॥१८०१॥

Or, the negation of any (other) object of the same kind/species is conveyed (lit. expressed) by the word *eka* and any connection with any (such) object of another kind/species is likewise negated (lit. set aside) by the mention of *salila*. [1801]

NKL (ms. p.700) is worth noting: *salilaikapadayor arthāntaram āha ... ekapadam ātmabhedanirāsārtham* (this last phrase *eka* ... occurs in SP also).

एकशब्दो न संख्यार्थः संख्येयासंभवादिह ।

अद्वितीयार्थतैवातो द्वितीयार्थनिषेधतः ॥१८०२॥

Here,¹ the word *eka* does not convey (lit. have) the sense of a number (i.e. the number 'one'), because there is not (here)² any possibility (lit. presence) of what can be counted (in numbers). Therefore, from the rejection (or, negation) of any other (lit. second) object (is to be understood) the sense of (the Ātman's) being without any second (i.e. being non-dual).

[1802]

NKL (ms. p.700) states by way of introducing this verse: *ekaśabdasya saṁkhyāguṇavācivād guṇaguṇisambadhād advaita-hānir atrāha* SP adds, in the end: *na hi tasminn ekatvaṁ guṇo nirguṇatvaśruteḥ*. Cf. Śvetāśvataropaniṣad 6.11: *sākṣī cetā kevalo nirguṇaś ca*)

¹That is, in this sentence.

²That is, in this context.

सदेवेत्यादिना चास्य तथा सत्यविरुद्धता ॥१८०३॥

That being so, there is no opposition (of the popularly accepted sense of the word *eka*) on account of the statement about its (being just one/alone) as stated in the Śruti statement *sad eva*¹ [1803]

Read NKL (ms. p.700): *ekaśabdasya niṣedhārthatve tasya saṁkhyāvācivaprasiddhivirodho 'trāha sad iti*. This is more apt than SP: *ekaśabdasya vṛddhavyavahāre saṁkhyāvācivaprasiddher nādvitīyārthātety āśaṅkya śrutyantaravirodhān maivam ityāha sad iti*.

¹Refer to CU 6.2.1.

प्रत्यङ्मात्रावसायित्वं प्रत्यग्द्रष्टेर्यतस्ततः ।
अकारकस्वभावत्वादद्रष्टेत्यभिधीयते ॥१८०४॥

Since seeing/realising the inner self is just the culmination (of knowledge) in realising that there is the inner self alone (as the existent); it is therefore, called the non-seer owing to its having the nature of a non-agent (of any activity). [1804]

This is the meaning of *adraṣṭā*.

यत्र हि द्वैतमित्युक्तेर्यत्र त्वस्येति चेरणात् ।
स्वतः पूर्णात्मकं ज्योतिरद्रष्टेत्यभिधीयते ॥१८०५॥

Since there is a Śruti statement, viz. *yatra hi dvaitam ...* and also by the statement/sentence *yatra tv asya*; (the Ātman which is) by its (very) nature only full/complete (by itself), the light is called *adraṣṭā*. [1805]

This verse justifies the reading of BU 4.3.32 as *salila eko 'draṣṭā*. That is explained by NKL (ms. p.700) only cryptically thus: *draṣṭeti padacchedaḥ kiṃ na syād atrāha yatreti*. But it is Ānandagiri's comment on BUB (p.599) which is clearer and more useful; read: *adraṣṭā draṣṭeti vā chedaḥ eko 'dvaita ity abhyasas tātparyalingam* It should be noted, nevertheless, that BUB is silent on this. Yet cf. BU 3.7.23: *adrṣṭo draṣṭā* and also *Maitrāyanyupaniṣad* 6.11: *amantāśrotāsprāṣṭādraṣṭāvaktāghrā-tārasayitā* and also (in the same place) *draṣṭā bhavati*. In the same way, i.e. both *draṣṭā* and *adraṣṭā* in CU 7.9.1)!

यस्मादेवमतोऽद्वैतोऽविद्यातत्कार्यलङ्घनात् ।
न ह्यविद्यादिविरहे द्वैतधीरुपपद्यते ॥१८०६॥

Since this is so, therefore, it is non-associated with duality through its having overcome ignorance and its effect(s). Indeed, in the absence (lit. separation) of ignorance etc.,¹ (the acceptance of) the notion of duality cannot be reasonable. [1806]

This is the meaning of *advaita* 'non-duality (of the Ātman)', which is further clarified in the following three verses.

¹This refers to its effects and the consequent activity (or activities) of an individual.

Verses 1807-1809 offer the etymological explanation of the word *advaita* (in the preceding verse).

द्विधेतं द्वीतमित्याहुस्तद्भावो द्वैतमुच्यते ।
तन्निषेधेन चाद्वैतं प्रत्यग्वस्त्वभिधीयते ॥१८०७॥

That which has proceeded (i.e. appeared) in two ways is (what is to be called) *dvīta* and (therefore) the nature of it is described as *dvaita* 'duality'. (And) by rejecting (or, negating) that (the existence/happening of that in the case of the Ātman) the (real) thing, viz. the inner self is mentioned (to be) *advaita* 'not having (i.e. not associated with) duality'. [1807]

SP and NKL (ms. p.700) state this to be *advaita-padasyāvayavaśo 'rtha*. Yet SP refers to the impossibility of deciding any one of the *nañarthas*.

nañarthāḥ ṣaḍ uktāḥ—

sādrśyaṃ tadabhāvaś ca tadanyatvaṃ tadalpata /
aprāśastyaṃ virodhaś ca

The meanings conveyed by *nañ* with a noun are six: similarity, absence, smallness in quantity/measure, unwelcome nature (of the thing mentioned by the constituent of the *nañ* compound) and opposition to the meaning of it.

None of these six are to be understood in the case of *advaita*. Yet SP refers to only three of the *nañarthas*! Possibly, there is no occasion/need for understanding *sādrśya*, *alpatā* and *aprāśastya*, in relation to *advaita*. Therefore, he refers only to the other three as can be possibly thought of. But SP points out the difficulty in positing any one of these.

द्विधा त्रिधा वा बहुधा कारणं सद्भवेदिह ।

तस्यात्मनि निषिद्धत्वादात्माद्वैतो भवेत्ततः ॥१८०८॥

(If) it is (there),¹ the cause is (lit. should be) here (i.e. in the worldly way) understood as twofold or threefold or manifold;² therefore, since (even) that (i.e. any one of them) is rejected (or negated) in the case of the Ātman, it is (lit. should be taken as) not having (any association with) duality.

[1808]

¹This is by *sat kāraṇaṃ bhaved iha*.

²These may be *samavāyi*, *asamavāyi* (*guṇa* or *karman*) and

nimitta which can be *sādhāraṇa* (eightfold) and *asādhāraṇa* (manifold owing to *kāryabheda*s). Cf. *Nyāyakośa*, p.226.

भेदसंसर्गहानार्थमेव यत्नामपि श्रुतिम् ।

अनादृत्यान्यथा प्राहुरहो विद्या महीयसी ॥१८०९॥

Having disregarded the Śruti which has thus made an effort to reject (or, deny) the association (of the Ātman) with variety (of other extreme objects), learned men¹ have explained (the Śruti sentence) otherwise—what a great amount of (their) learning!

[1809]

¹This refers to those who hold the theory of *bhedābheda* or of *samasta* and *asamasta* forms in respect of the Brahman. Obviously, Bhartṛprapañca is principally meant. And also there is consequently scoffing at them (ridicule of them).

Verses 1810-1816 refute the difference in non-difference in respect of dr̥ṣṭi and others.

मिथो विभागसंसिद्धिर्धर्माणां नात्मसंश्रयात् ।

धर्मधर्म्यभिसंबन्धो दृश्यत्वाद्द्रष्टृपेक्षया ॥१८१०॥

There cannot be made any distinction (among properties, lit. between (any) two of the properties) because of their having a basis in the Ātman.¹ (And) since the relation of a property (or, of properties) to that which is possessed of the same, is what can be seen, it is owing to its dependence on the seer.²

[1810]

¹There is real difficulty of distinguishing a property (or, properties) from the Ātman which is *said* to be possessed of the same and, it is known, the Ātman does not have (i.e. is not possessed of) any property.

²This argument leads to the idea of *infinite regress* in respect of the seer. Read SP for clarification of this, thus: *draṣṭṛapekṣayā*

drśyatvād eva rūpaghaṭādiṣu dharmadharmisambandho dr̥ṣṭo na cātmadharmāṇām tad drśyatvam ātmano 'pi tatprasaṅgān na ca svenaiva svasya drśyatvaṁ na ca draṣṭrantaram ato dr̥ṣṭyādīnām nātmadharmateti bhāvaḥ.

द्रष्टा सलिलवच्छुद्धो निःसङ्गैकाद्वयस्तथा ।

श्रुत्युक्तोऽतो विरुद्धोऽर्थो निर्हीकैरिह वर्ण्यते ॥१८११॥

The seer is, like water, pure and also non-attached (to anything else) and non-dual—it is described/mentioned in the Śrutis; therefore, any sense which is opposed (to that sense of the Śrutis) is, (one has to observe,) presented (or understood) in this matter by (only) the shameless. [1811]

तमोऽंशत्वं यथा भानोः सतश्चाप्यसदंशता ।

वियतो मूर्ततैवं स्याद्विन्नाभिन्नत्वमात्मनः ॥१८१२॥

(Any statement) about the Ātman as having differences (i.e. being discrete objects) and not having differences (in it) would be like stating that darkness is a part of the existent sun, though that (viz. darkness) is not existent as a part (of the same) or that the sky (which is formless) has a form. [1812]

अत ऊर्ध्वं विमोक्षायेत्युक्तं प्राग्यत्पुनः पुनः ।

तद्विमुक्तेः समाप्तत्वादेश इत्यभ्यधान्मुनिः ॥१८१३॥

Since it has been said earlier, again and again, viz. *ata ūrdhvaṁ vimokṣāya* ... (BU 4.3.14-16), therefore, the sage has (now) said, 'eṣa ...,'¹ for liberation has been (already) obtained (now).

[1813]

¹BU 4.3.32 itself and also 4.4.23.

प्रत्यग्द्रष्टव्यवहितेः प्रात्यक्ष्यादात्मवस्तुनः ।

एष इत्यात्मनिर्देशो यत्साक्षादिति च श्रुतिः ॥१८१४॥

The word *eṣa* is (used) with reference to the Ātman, because of the individual's (power of) seeing not being covered/concealed and also because of the (real) thing, i.e. the Ātman, being directly perceptible. So also is there a Śruti statement *yat sākṣāt*¹, [1814]

¹Cf. BU 3.4.1.

अव्यावृत्ताननुगतं निःसामान्यविशेषतः ।
ब्रह्मेति मुख्यवृत्त्येह वस्तु श्रुत्याभिधीयते ॥१८१५॥

The (real) thing is expressed by the Śruti here (in this sentence) by the word *brahma* in its primary sense,¹ it is neither distinguished from nor similar to (any other thing), owing to its not having in any way (*nis*) generality (or, general nature) and particularity (or, particular nature). [1815]

SP sets aside that, in the word *brahmaloka*, the constituent *brahma(n)* does not signify the god Brahmadeva who has his seat in a lotus.

¹Literally with its primary function.

तथा लोक्यतेर्धातोर्दर्शनार्थत्वहेतुतः ।
प्रकृतत्वात्तथा दृष्टेलोकिनं लोक उच्यते ॥१८१६॥

So also the word *loka* is stated (lit. uttered by the Śruti), for the reason that the meaning of the verbal root *lok* 'to see' is in view and since that (meaning) is what is intended (by that expression); (therefore) it is (the power of) seeing (which is) called *loka*. [1816]

This sets aside the commonly accepted view about the meaning of the word *loka*, '(some) region' (which is the support) for enjoyment (or experiences, of pleasure and pain).

Verses 1817-1827 explain why the word *brahmaloka* is a Karma-

dhārāya compound and not ṣaṣṭhitat-puruṣa.

कर्मधारय एवातः समासोऽत्रोपपद्यते ।

न तु षष्ठीसमासोऽत्र विभागस्याप्रसिद्धितः ॥१८१७॥

Therefore, to understand here (in the word *brahmaloka*) Karmadhāraya compound is reasonable, and (*tu*) not a genitive (Tatpuruṣa) compound, because any division (of the Brahman) is not known. [1817]

The first constituent of a genitive Tatpuruṣa compound is (usually) connected with the subsequent by the genitive suffix which shows the latter to belong to the former. Therefore, since the Brahman cannot have anything else belonging to it, the word *brahman* cannot be a constituent of 'any' genitive Tatpuruṣa compound.

श्रुतं चैकविभक्तित्वं युक्तं नाश्रुतकल्पना ।

कल्पनाहेत्वसद्भावे निराकाङ्क्षे तथा श्रुते ॥१८१८॥

षष्ठ्यादिकल्पनासाधवी तस्मादत्रेति भण्यते ।

It is proper to hold (in the word *brahmaloka*) heard (to have its two components to be) having the same case and not (to entertain) the notion of what is not heard. Since there is absence of any cause of (some/an) imagining and (*tathā*) what is heard is independent of (or, does not expect) anything else, [1818]

therefore, it is stated (by us) that here (i.e. in the compound word *brahmaloka*) it is not proper (to accept) the thought of the genitive suffix etc. [1819ab]

सामानाधिकरण्यं च विशेषणविशेष्यता ॥१८१९॥

लक्ष्यलक्षणसंबन्धो ब्रह्मलोकाभिधानयोः ।

ब्रह्मेति चात्मयाथात्म्यं लक्ष्यते नाभिधीयते ॥१८२०॥

तथा लोकगिरा ब्रह्मतत्त्वमात्मोपलक्ष्यते ।

मुख्यमैकार्थ्यमेवं स्याद्ब्रह्मलोकपदार्थयोः ॥१८२१॥

(And it is proper to hold the components of the word to be) in the relation of a substantive and its adjective, [1819cd] and, further, the relation of what is to be qualified and what qualifies (it) obtains between the (two) nouns *brahman* and *loka*; so also the real nature of the (individual) Ātman, as it is, is but (being) the Brahman is (thereby) indicated and not expressed. [1820]

In the same way (*tathā*) as of popular speech is indicated the (individual) Ātman to be (having) the nature of the Brahman. Thus (would be (understood) oneness of the meanings (signified by the two) words, *brahman* and *loka*. [1821]

न हि लोकातिरेकेण ब्रह्मत्वमुपपद्यते ।

ब्रह्मणो व्यतिरेकेण प्रत्यक्ता नान्यतस्तथा ॥१८२२॥

It is, indeed, not reasonable (i.e. it does not at all stand to reason) that the existence (lit. nature) of the Brahman is beside (what is signified by the word) *loka*. So also, the nature of the inner self is not beside (i.e. other than that of) the Brahman. [1822]

अनयोरैक्यसंमोहात्पारोक्ष्यद्वयकल्पने ।

संसारोऽयमतो मोहसमुच्छिन्नौ विमुक्तता ॥१८२३॥

In holding the notion of these two, (the worldly being's self and the Ātman) as not being directly perceptible, on account of the complete delusion in respect of the oneness of the two (viz. *brahman* and *loka*), leads to (being in) this transmigratory existence. Therefore, when there is removal (lit. destruction) of (that) delusion, (there results) the state of liberation. [1823]

अतोऽशेषमहानर्थहेतोर्मोहस्य हानये ।

एष इत्यादिवाक्योक्तिः सम्यग्दर्शनजन्मने ॥१८२४॥

Therefore, for overcoming (lit. abandoning) the delusion (i.e. ignorance), which is the cause of the greatly undesired (i.e. transmigration), there is stated the (Vedāntic) sentence *eṣa* ... in order that it gives rise to (one's having/acquiring) right knowledge (as the means to liberation). [1824]

इतिशब्दो यथोक्तार्थपरामर्शनकर्मणे ।

ऐतिह्यार्थस्तथा हेति सम्राडित्यभिमन्त्रणम् ॥१८२५॥

The word *iti* is to serve the function, viz. to refer to (or, to signify) the matter stated (earlier). The words *tathā hi* serve the purport of signifying what has (already) occurred. The word *saṃrāt* (in the vocative) is just a call. [1825]

These are the meanings of the different words in the sentence *saṃrāt*

इत्युक्तेन प्रकारेण मुमुक्षुं जनकं मुनिः ।

अन्वशात्सकलानर्थहेत्वविद्यापनुत्तये ॥१८२६॥

In this manner, which is stated (herebefore), the sage imparted instruction to Janaka, who was desirous of (acquiring) liberation, so that there should be removal of ignorance (on the part of the latter) which causes all the undesired (sorrows etc., i.e. effects of transmigration). [1826]

व्युत्थायाख्यायिकातो नः श्रुतिरेवेदमब्रवीत् ।

अन्वशात्स कथं धीमान्राजानमिति चेच्छृणु ॥१८२७॥

Having risen above (i.e. abandoned) the narrative, the Śruti has said this to us; '(If a question is asked here:) 'How¹ did the wise (sage) instruct the king?', (the answer is:) 'Well, then, listen'. [1827]

¹Or, what? That is, what is the meaning/purpose of the statement *eṣa brahmalokaḥ*

Verses 1828-1833 clarify the meaning of *eṣāsyā paramāgatiḥ*.

विज्ञानपुरुषस्यास्य या यथोक्ता पुरोक्तिभिः ।
नैष्ठिकी गतिरेषास्य गत्यन्तरसमाप्तिः ॥१८२८॥

What has been declared earlier (by the wise) as the final goal for this person, who is given to specific particular knowledge,¹ is this one for this individual, after the other (intermediate) goals (have been reached). [1828]

¹SP refers to those final goals which have been mentioned in sentences referring to statements about Aticchanda etc., cf. U 4.21.

इतोऽन्या गतयः सर्वाः क्षयिसाधनसंश्रयात् ।
क्षयिण्योऽतो हि परमा गतिरेषैव नापरा ॥१८२९॥

All goals other than this are only transitory (or, beset with an end) on account of their dependence on (or, basis in) transitory (i.e. temporary) means (i.e. those beset with limitations on them). Therefore, indeed only this is the final goal (for him), there is no other (goal for him to seek). [1829]

अविद्यामात्रहेतुत्वात्कामकर्मादिसाधनाः ।
गतयोऽपरमाः सर्वा माया स्वप्नगतिर्यथा ॥१८३०॥

(These other) goals are not the final ones, because they have for their cause ignorance alone and have as means (for achieving them) desire(s), activity etc.—they are all but a magic show (*māyā*) just as is movement (or any goal) in the dream state. [1830]

संपच्च परमैषैव मोहोत्थास्त्वन्यसंपदः ।

उत्कर्षातिशयः संपद्विभूतिश्चेति भण्यते ॥१८३१॥

Only this one is the highest bliss (or, pleasure), since other joys (or, pleasures) are rooted in (i.e. arising from) delusion. (And, therefore) the excellence in (an individual's) progress (or, rising to an eminent state/status) is described as excellence in bliss. [1831]

एषोऽस्य परमो लोको लोकास्त्वन्ये क्षयिष्णवः ।
क्षयिष्णुसाधनोत्पत्तेर्न त्वेषोऽसाधनाश्रयात् ॥१८३२॥

This is for this (individual) the highest goal (*loka*) and/but the other goals are liable to perish, since they are obtained by temporary (or destructible) means. This one is not, nevertheless, (liable to perish), since it does not depend on any means (that is temporary). [1832]

ब्रह्मैव सन्स्वतो यस्माद्ब्रह्माप्येत्यवबोधतः ।
तदविद्यानिरासेन मुक्तिर्नातोऽन्यसाधनात् ॥१८३३॥

Being by his nature the Brahman itself, the individual merges into the Brahman by his acquiring the knowledge (about the nature of it). His liberation results from (or, is caused by) the removal of ignorance (and) not from/by any other means. [1833]

Verses 1834-1843 emphasise that the word loka used here refers to the Brahman alone.

लोकशब्दस्य मुख्योऽर्थ आत्मैवेह यतस्ततः ।
कर्मादिहेतुसाध्येषु गौणी लोकार्थता भवेत् ॥१८३४॥

Since the principal/primary meaning of the word *loka* is (thus) the very (immutable) Ātman, therefore, in the case of (other *lokas* 'regions or stages'), which are reached by means (lit. the causes) viz. activity etc., there would be the sense of (the

word) *loka* in the secondary/metaphorical sense.

[1834]

न कर्मणा कनीयस्ता वृद्धिर्वा नान्तरात्मनः ।
इति बाहुमिवोद्धृत्य वेदान्तैर्घोषणा कृता ॥१८३५॥

There is not acquired any lower status through action (i.e. ritual), nor is there (from it) any excellence (or, reaching to higher status); this does not happen to the inner Ātman—thus a (loud) proclamation has been made by the Vedānta text, as if by raising the (right) arm.

[1835]

This verse refers to rise in the worldly status.

आनन्दः परमोऽस्यैष सुखोत्कर्षसमाप्तिः ।
सर्वानन्दातिशायित्वात्तथा चैवं प्रवक्ष्यते ॥१८३६॥

This is the highest bliss for this (individual), owing to (his) having acquired the excellence of happiness and on account of its excelling all (other) happiness which will be said¹ thus.

[1836]

¹This has in view *sa yo manusyāṇām* ... (BU 4.3.33).

विषयस्पर्शजानन्दाः साधनानुविधानतः ।
आद्यन्तवत्त्वस्वाभाव्याद्दुःखहेतव एव ते ॥१८३७॥

(On the other hand,) the joys which originate from (lit. are produced by) contact/connection with (external) objects, since they have conformity with (or, similarity in nature to) the means of deriving them) and are of the nature of having a beginning and (also) an end—they are only the causes of misery. [1837]

कूटस्थात्मस्वभावत्वात्सर्वसाधननिस्पृहः ।
सर्वानन्दातिवर्तित्वादानन्दः परमो मतः ॥१८३८॥

As against them, the joy/bliss) which, being the (very) nature

of the immutable Ātman, does not depend on (lit. not expect) every (lit. all) the (known) means (of achieving joy/pleasure) and thus has the nature of excelling (lit. being above) all (other) joys, is considered (or, known) as the highest. [1838]

आनन्दः परमोऽस्यैष इत्युक्तार्थप्रसिद्धये ।
एतस्यैवेति वचसा समर्थो हेतुरुच्यते ॥१८३९॥

In order to prove/establish what is so far (or, earlier) said, viz. 'This is the highest joy/bliss for this (individual),' there is then stated the proper (lit. strong) reason, which justifies it, in the statement *etasyaiva*¹ [1839]

¹This is fully explained in the next verse.

एतस्यैव यथोक्तस्य सर्वानन्दातिवर्तिनः ।
उपजीवन्ति भूतानि ब्रह्मानन्दस्य विप्लुषम् ॥१८४०॥

All beings enjoy (lit. live on) the surge (lit. drop) of the joy of (knowing the nature of) the Brahman,¹ which has been (thus) described (lit. stated), (and the one) which surpasses all (other) joys. [1840]

¹Or, alternatively, of becoming one with the Brahman.

एष एवंविधो यस्मादानन्दः परमस्ततः ।
आनन्दानतिशेतेऽन्यान्सर्वानस्यैव कृत्स्नतः ॥१८४१॥

Since this (joy) is of this nature, therefore, it is the highest and it excels all other joys, on account of the fullness-/completeness of this one (viz. individual).¹ [1841]

¹That is to say, 'because the individual has become whole or full/complete (*pūrṇa*) on attaining the nature of the Brahman'.

कृत्स्नोऽपि चैष आनन्दस्तदविद्यैकहेतुजः ।

बुद्ध्याद्युपाध्यवच्छेदान्मात्रेति व्यपदिश्यते ॥१८४२॥

And the whole of this (i.e. worldly) joy is but the product of (or, is produced by) mere ignorance about (the nature of) that (reality, viz. the inner self) and it is described as (derived) by the knower as only caused by the limitation(s) on it of the limiting adjuncts such as the intellect. [1842]

तन्मात्रावर्त्मनैवैनं बुबोधयिषुरादरात् ।
लवणाब्धिं यथा तद्वल्लवणावयवैरिह ॥१८४३॥

(Therefore, like a person who informs another) about the salty sea by (introducing to the latter the information about) its parts, i.e. the salt (etc. in it), (this sage) who was desirous of enlightening this one (i.e. king Janaka about the Brahman), with respect (or, carefully) by way of (mentioning as consisting of) the parts (viz. the agent etc.) of it (i.e. Brahman). [1843]

Now, in verses 1844-1896 follows the discussion on BU 4.3.34.

उत्तरोत्तरवृद्ध्यात आनन्दान्मानुषादधि ।
परानन्दावबोधार्थं प्रवृत्तैषा परा श्रुतिः ॥१८४४॥

Therefore has the subsequent Śruti proceeded for enlightening in respect of the highest joy/bliss, (by pointing out) the higher and the higher of every subsequent (of the joys of) human beings. [1844]

Verses 1845-1849 discuss in general the nature of human joys.

मनुष्याणां स यः कश्चित्संसिद्धोऽवयवैर्दृढैः ।
समग्राशेषचार्वङ्गो राद्धो भोगक्षमः पुमान् ॥१८४५॥

Whosoever amongst men is fully developed with his firm limbs and has all his person become handsome, is the man prepared/fully fit (*rāddha*) and capable for enjoyment(s). [1845]

कृत्स्नसाधनसंपन्नः समृद्धोऽत्राभिधीयते ।
 बाह्यैराध्यात्मिकैरेवं साधनैरन्वितः पुमान् ॥१८४६॥
 तथाधिपतिरन्येषां नृणामेवेह यो भवेत् ।
 स्वतन्त्रोऽधिपतिर्ज्ञेयो मनुष्यैर्न विहन्यते ॥१८४७॥

In these words (here *atra*) is meant (lit. mentioned) (a man) who is possessed of all means (of enjoyments); similarly, a man who is possessed of the external and internal means (of enjoyment of various joys), [1846]
 so also, who is the lord of other men (i.e. the best of them), as it were (that is to say:) he should be understood as an independent master (of them) and that he is not obstructed (lit. harmed) by (other) men. [1847]

This is the explanation of *anyeṣām*

मानुष्यकेण भोगेन संपन्नानां नृणामिह ।
 संपन्नोऽतिशयेनातः संपन्नतम उच्यते ॥१८४८॥

Therefore, he who is rich (or enriched) by his enjoyment of the enriched joys of human beings, is (known as) the best enriched among the (joy-)enriched (men). [1848]

This is significance of *sarvaih*

सर्वैर्मानुष्यकैर्भोगैः संपन्नो न तु दैविकैः ।
 आनन्द एष परमो मनुष्याणामिहोच्यते ॥१८४९॥

(He is) one, who is enriched by all joys of human beings, but not by the divine (joys). And this joy is (mentioned in this Śruti) as the highest among the joys of men. [1849]

This is the purport of the adjective *mānuṣyakaih*

Verses 1850-1853 discuss the joy of Pitṛs.

शतकृत्वो मनुष्याणामानन्दो गुणितस्तु यः ।
पितॄणामेक आनन्दस्तेन तुल्यप्रमाणतः ॥१८५०॥

That joy of human beings, which is multiplied a hundredfold, becomes one joy of the Pitṛs, (compared to it) in respect of measure. [1850]

This is the meaning of *atha*

यत्सुखं साधनाधीनं दुःखमेव तदुच्यते ।
अनन्यसाधनं तस्मात्स्वात्मस्थं परमं सुखम् ॥१८५१॥

Whatever happiness is dependent on its means (for its deriving) is to be called (i.e. to be understood as) but misery. Therefore, that happiness/joy which does not have (i.e. depend on) any means (for its deriving) and which rests on one's self is the highest happiness/joy. [1851]

तस्मादात्मपरिज्ञानात्कार्यज्ञेयसमाप्तिः ।
निरस्तातिशयानन्दो भवतीत्यस्य निर्णयः ॥१८५२॥

Therefore, (i.e. for that reason), the decision in this respect is: There occurs that joy, which has surpassed (or, is above) all excellent (of known joys), the one arises from a complete/full (*pari*-) knowledge (about the nature) of the Ātman and which has surpassed every other (joy to be produced or to be known). [1852]

तारतम्यादुपायानां शुद्धिस्तरतमा धियः ।
शुद्धेस्तरतमत्वाच्च सुखं तरतमं भवेत् ॥१८५३॥

Since there is gradation among the means (of deriving joy/pleasure), therefore, there is stated the purification¹ in respect of knowledge with (the use of adjectives ending with the suffixes) *-tarap* and *-tamap*.² So also, because there is

gradation in respect of (that) purification, happiness (resulting therefrom) would also be expressed in (words having the suffixes) *-tarap* and *-tamap*. [1853]

¹This refers to the effect in one's understanding of the various joys.

²These Pāṇinian suffixes signify the higher and the highest (of measures).

Verses 1854-1858 state the gradation in respect of pleasure/happiness.

यावद्यावन्मलो व्येति बुद्धेर्धर्मादिसंचयात् ।
तावत्तावद्धियः स्वास्थ्यं तावत्तावत्सुखोन्नतिः ॥१८५४॥

To the extent, to which impurity of (one's) intellect disappears (i.e. is removed), by having collected (more and more of) merit—i.e. to that extent results the good (and better) state of (one's) intellect and also to that extent is there (higher and higher) rise in happiness. [1854]

This is further exposition of the *dhūtāratamya* mentioned in the preceding verse.

यावद्यावद्धनीभावो बुद्धेः पापादिसंगतेः ।
तावत्तावद्धियोऽस्वास्थ्यं दुःखोद्धूतिस्तथा तथा ॥१८५५॥

To the extent to which there is the obscurity (lit. thickening) of (one's) intellect on account of its association (or, connection) with sins etc., to that extent is the want in the (good) state of (one's) intellect and accordingly (i.e. in the same measure) is there the experience (of more and more) of misery. [1855]

पितृलोको जितो यैः स्यात्पितृयज्ञादिकर्माभिः ।
जितलोकास्त उच्यन्ते पितरो दिव्यभोगिनः ॥१८५६॥

They are called the Pitṛs, also the enjoyers of divine joys—they who have won the *loka* of Pitṛs by means of the performances of rituals like Pitṛyajña;¹ also (they are called) *jitalokas* 'winners of the worlds'. [1856]

This explains the Śruti passage referring to *jitalokas*.

¹This refers to the Śrāddhas.

य एष दक्षिणः पन्थाः पितृलोकः स उच्यते ।

मनुष्यानन्दतः सोऽयं गुणितः स्याच्छताधिकः ॥१८५७॥

This one, i.e. the goal, on the way to the south, is called the Pitṛloka. This one has, in comparison with the joys of human beings, (a joy) that is multiplied a hundred times more.

[1857]

This is to explain the Pitṛloka and its joy.

उत्तरेष्वपि वाक्येषु यथोक्तमुपपादयेत् ।

शताधिकोऽयमानन्दः पूर्वस्मादुत्तरः क्रमात् ॥१८५८॥

In the (case of) the subsequent sentences (of Śruti) also, (an interpreter) should expound what is (earlier) stated; viz. this joy is greater by hundred, thus each subsequent joy in the order is greater than its preceding.

[1858]

Verses 1859-1865 discuss the nature of the joys of gods.

नक्षत्रलोकशब्देन ये पूर्वं प्रतिपादिताः ।

देवलोकगिरा तेऽत्र भण्यन्ते सूक्ष्ममूर्तयः ॥१८५९॥

Those, who were mentioned earlier by the word *nakṣatraloka*, are (themselves) mentioned here by the word *deva*, (only with this change that they are) having subtle forms/bodies. [1859]

In this verse, Sureśvara refers to the Mādhyandina recension

of BU: *ye śataṃ gandharvaloka ānandāḥ sa eko devaloka ānandāḥ* and explains the meaning of *devaloka*.

सर्गस्य जननादादौ देवत्वं ये प्रपेदिरे ।

आजानदेवास्तेऽत्र स्युः पूर्वेभ्यः सूक्ष्ममूर्तयः ॥१८६०॥

They are to be (i.e. should be) understood here as Ājānadevas, who have attained godhead, at the time of the birth of creation; they are, in comparison with those mentioned before (viz. devas), more subtle in their forms/bodies. [1860]

व्यापीनि तेषां सूक्ष्माणि शरीराणि महात्मनाम् ।

पूर्वानन्देभ्य एतेषामानन्दोऽतो महान्मतः ॥१८६१॥

The bodies of those great ones (lit. great Ātmans) are subtle, pervasive and, therefore, the joy of these is considered/accepted as greater¹ than (all) the joys (mentioned) earlier. [1861]

¹ Actually there should have been used the comparative form *mahattaram* instead of the positive form *mahān*.

नानाद्वन्द्वोपघातार्थहेतूनां बहुलत्वतः ।

आजानदेवानन्दोऽतः पूर्वेभ्यः स्याच्छताधिकः ॥१८६२॥

Because the causes for destroying various pairs¹ (in the sorrows, lit. calamities that befall) have multiplicity, therefore, the joy of Ājānadeva(-loka) is greater by a hundred than (all) the earlier (mentioned human joys). [1862]

¹ These refer to the various causes of *sukha* and *duḥkha*. Cf. *Gītā* 15.5: *dvāṇdvair vimuktāḥ sukhaduḥkhasaṃjñaiḥ*

श्रोत्रियोऽधीतवेदः स्याज्ज्ञातवेदार्थ एव यः ।

कृत्स्नचोदितकारित्वात्सर्वपापविवर्जितः ॥१८६३॥

A Śrotriya is one who has studied (lit. recited) the Veda text

and also (if he) has understood the meaning of the Veda.¹ He is devoid of (i.e. has separated himself from) all (kinds of) sins/blemishes by being a performer of all (activities) enjoined (by the Śruti).² [1863]

¹SP has clarified Sureśvara's idea of a Śrotriya thus: *artha-māntam adhyayanam ekaśākhāviṣayaṃ yasya*.

²This is the significance of the word *avijina*.

आजानदेवावधिककामानुपहताशयः ।

ततः परेषु भोगेषु जाततृष्णश्च यः पुमान् ॥१८६४॥

(This refers to) a human being whose thought is unaffected by any desire (for joy which is) greater than (that of) Ājānadeva(-loka)— and, thus, that human being, who has become thirsty (i.e. has a longing) for (even greater) joy(s). [1864]

This is to indicate the absence of any other and greater joy.

आजानदेवानन्देन समं तस्य च यत्सुखम् ।

अस्याकामहतत्वेन सुखोत्कृष्टिरिहोच्यते ॥१८६५॥

Whatever be the happiness of him as equal to the joy of Ājānadeva(-loka) is stated here as the (great) excellence of happiness, because of this person's becoming of a mind which is unaffected by desire(s). [1865]

verses 1866-1873 explain the nature of the cause for gradation of joys.

श्रोत्रियावृजिनत्वे द्वे तुल्ये एवाविरिञ्चितः ।

अकामहतताहेतोर्वृद्धौ ह्लादो विवर्धते ॥१८६६॥

The nature of being a Śrotriya and that of one free from (every) sin¹ are equal of each other till (i.e. up to) when

he becomes one with Viriñci;² for his rising to a higher status (*vrddhau*) and acquiring bliss only increases (or keeps on increasing) owing to (or, because of) his being unaffected by (any) desire(s) whatever. [1866]

¹*śrotriāvrjīnatva* should be read for *śrotriyatvāvrjīnatve*.

²This is for Hiranyagarbha.

पुर्वपुर्वोपभोगेभ्यो यादद्यावन्निवर्तते ।
कामौ विवर्धते पुंसस्तावत्तावत्सुखं हृदि ॥१८६७॥

Desire of a human being keeps on increasing as long as he keeps on turning away from every earlier enjoyment; so also does there continue for him pleasure during that while. [1867]

The argument is: One after another, enjoyments keep on luring him and he has ever-increasing pursuit of them.

कामैकक्षयतन्त्रैव यस्मात्पुंसः सुखोन्नतिः ।
अकामहततैवातः पूर्वाभ्यां साधनं परम् ॥१८६८॥

Since the increase in happiness for a man is only dependent on the decrease (or, loss of) one's desire (leading to the pursuit of another desire), therefore, being unaffected by desire alone is such a means to happiness as is the best (lit. the highest).

[1868]

साधनत्वं समानं स्यान्नयाणामिह यद्यपि ।
कामक्षयप्रकर्षोऽत्र ह्युत्कृष्टाह्लादसाधनम् ॥१८६९॥

Even if the nature of the means¹ is (just) the same for all of the three (*varṇas*), there is in this respect (*atra*)² the greater measure (*prakarṣa*) of the loss of desire the (best) means of the best of joys. [1869]

¹This is *akāmahatatā* mentioned in just a little before, i.e.

in verse 1866.

²Cf. SP: *atrety adhikṛtapuruṣoktiḥ*, this refers to various desires of the different persons in different castes, Brāhmaṇa, Kṣatriya and Vaiśya.

समुच्चयविवक्षात्र न मनागपि युज्यते ।
कर्तृत्वादिसमुच्छेदिज्ञानस्येहाश्रितत्वतः ॥१८७०॥

There is not here even a little of an intention to speak about combination (of knowledge and action) to be entertained; since, here (in the pursuit of the knowledge of the Brahman) only (that) knowledge which destroys (the notions of) agency etc. is the support (or basis, of the ensuing matchless joy). [1870]

समुच्चयनिवृत्त्यर्थं न्यायश्चापि पुरोदितः ।
नातः समुच्चयाशेह कर्तव्या सूक्ष्मदर्शिभिः ॥१८७१॥

The argument/reason (*nyāya*) for the rejection of (any of the) combinations is also mentioned (i.e. pointed out) earlier;¹ therefore, those who see (this matter of, i.e. in relation to liberation)² should carefully keep from entertaining any hope for (the support of any of the) combinations. [1871]

¹For example, in the SV.

²Cf. SP: *iheti mukter ukṭiḥ*.

साधनत्वं यतस्तुल्यं श्रोत्रियावृजिनत्वयोः ।
अवरेष्वपि भोगेषु न चोत्तमसुखं ततः ॥१८७२॥

(Then) since being a Śrotriya and being free from (any) sin have similarity in respect of being the means to (the highest) happiness, therefore, there does not lie in (other) lower means the highest happiness.¹ [1872]

¹Hereby is averted even the combination of these means (SP).

अकामहततैवात्र तारतम्यात्मकत्वतः ।
भेदादुत्तमसौख्यस्य साधनं चोत्तमा भवेत् ॥१८७३॥

Thus, with the idea of gradation (among various means) in view, the state of one's being unaffected by any desire here (*atra*)¹ understood as the best, the means of the best happiness owing to variety² (in joys). [1873]

¹Cf. note 2 on verse 1869 above.

²That is, various measures.

Verses 1874-1879 point to śrotriyatvāvrjnatve as supported by the Taittirīya's scriptures.

युवा साधुयुवेत्येवं तैत्तिरीयश्रुतीरणात् ।
अधरेष्वपि वाक्येषु श्रोत्रियादि विवक्षितम् ॥१८७४॥

On the basis of the statement in the Taittirīya Śruti: *yuvā sādhu-yuvā* ...,¹ this, viz. Śrotriya etc., is intended to be stated in subsequent sentences also. [1874]

¹SP clarifies: *sādhu-yuvā* as *avrjina* and *adhyāyaka* (which follows that word in the Taittirīya) as Śrotriya; cf. *Taittirīyopaniṣad* 2.8, in the same context (i.e. of joys).

विराट्प्रजापतिर्ज्ञेयस्त्रैलोक्यात्मकदेहभृत् ।
हिरण्यगर्भो ब्रह्मात्र तथा ब्रह्मगिरोच्यते ॥१८७५॥

Prajāpati (mentioned here) is to be taken for Virāj, the one that supports the body in the form(s) of the three worlds; in the word *brahman* is mentioned Hiranyagarbha, the Brahman. [1875]

This answers the doubt if *prajāpatiloka* and *brahmaloka* convey the same meaning.

अतः परमनन्तत्वाद्गणितं विनिवर्तते ।

यत एवमतः प्राहाथैष एवेति नः श्रुतिः ॥१८७६॥

Since (this) calculation now, after this (i.e. the statement about gradation in joys), recedes (i.e. is given up), therefore, the Śruti has stated for/to us *athaiṣa eva* [1876]

This begins the explanation of *athaiṣa*

अनेनातिशयवता ह्यस्मद्गोचरवर्तिना ।

अपास्तातिशयानन्दं सुखेनेहानुमीयते ॥१८७७॥

By (i.e. From) this happiness, which has (such) excellence and which is within our experience, is understood (lit. inferred) here¹ (the highest truth, the Ātman) which has surpassed¹ (even the most) excellent joy. [1877]

CP clarifies *iha* as *anumānabhūmi*. This *anumāna* is explained by the statement of the related *vyāpti* in the next verse.

¹ Literally, given up or set aside.

एवस्तातिशयनिष्ठत्वाल्लोके सातिशयात्मनः ।

यतोऽतोऽतिशयवता गम्यतेऽनतिशयं सुखम् ॥१८७८॥

Since, in the world, what is most excellent in nature rests on (i.e. has a basis in) what has destroyed (all other) excellences, therefore, (here) is understood an unsurpassed happiness by (the qualifier) *atiśayavat* 'possessing (the highest excellence)' (of the state of the Ātman). [1878]

CP and NKL (ms. p.704) state it thus: *sukhotkarṣatāratamyam cid viśrāntam taratamabhāvatvāt paiṇāmatāratamyavat*.

यत्रैतानि समस्तानि निष्ठां यान्ति परात्मनि ।

परमोऽसाविहानन्दः सर्वानन्दातिलङ्घनात् ॥१८७९॥

Here (among all graded joys), there is, in this highest Ātman, the highest joy wherein all (happinesses) reach their acme, because it has surpassed all of (those) joys. [1879]

Verses 1880-1885 state in the inference about the most excellent joy in the Brahman from the greater excellence of measure of joy.

एषोऽस्येति प्रतिज्ञात आनन्दः सोऽनुमानतः ।
निष्ठां प्रतीचि गमितः उत्तरोत्तरवृद्धितः ॥१८८०॥

That joy, which is stated in *eṣo 'sya ...*, is brought to its acme by inference (which is invoked) by the rise (of every joy) in every later one (of the joys). [1880]

अविज्ञातपरानन्दान्प्रत्येषानुमितिर्मता ।
साक्षाज्ज्ञातात्मतत्त्वानां प्रत्यक्षतममेव तत् ॥१८८१॥

This inference is taken to be referring to the highest of joys coming from what was not known (before, viz. the Ātman within); this is the most directly perceptible (happening) in the case of those who have a direct perception of the truth of the Ātman. [1881]

SP cites in support: *uktaṁ hi— sa eṣa paramānando vitṛṣṇaśrotriyapratyakṣo 'dhigata iti* (possibly a remark of Bhartr̥prapañca).

अकामहतधीगम्य आनन्दः प्रत्यगात्मनि ।
यः स एव यथोक्तेभ्यः परमः स्यादनन्ततः ॥१८८२॥

That joy, which is to be experienced in (the knowledge of) the inner self by those who are unaffected by desire(s), is alone the highest, (as compared to those resulting) from them which are stated (so far). [1882]

तथा च भगवान्व्यासः सर्ववेदार्थतत्त्ववित् ।
स्वयं प्राहेममेवार्थं कामानर्थजिहासया ॥१८८३॥

So has the revered Vyāsa, the knower of the meaning of the entire Veda, said, on his own, this very thought in order that the undesired resulting from desire(s) be abandoned (by his listeners). [1883]

The next two verses are Vyāsa's verses.

यच्च कामसुखं लोके यच्च दिव्यं महत्सुखम् ।
तृष्णाक्षयसुखस्यैते नार्हतः षोडशीं कलाम् ॥१८८४॥

Whatever be the happiness from (the fulfilment of) desires and so also whatever be the great joy of divine nature, they do not (i.e. cannot) deserve (to become, or to be equal of even) a sixteenth part of the pleasure (resulting) from the loss (or, overcoming/destruction) of hankering. [1884]

This is *Mahābhārata* 12.168.36.

यतो यतो निवर्तते ततस्ततो विमुच्यते ।
निवर्तनाद्धि सर्वतो न वेत्ति दुःखमण्वपि ॥१८८५॥

A person is freed from every one (of the desires) from whichever he desists (or, moves away). (Indeed) by desisting (or, moving away) from all (of the desires) it is that he does not experience even a very small misery, or unhappiness. [1885]

This is *Mahābhārata* 5.36.14.

verses 1886-1894 conclude the thoughts on *etasyaivānandasya trām*.

सलिलादिगिरा योऽर्थः प्रत्यज्ञायि पुराखिलः ।
ब्रह्मलोकान्तवाक्येन तस्य स्यादुपसंहतिः ॥१८८६॥

What thought was earlier enunciated in its entirety by the statement (of the Śruti) that began with (the words) *salila* has its conclusion in (i.e. has been concluded by) the statement ending with the sentence about Brahmaloka. [1886]

प्रश्नार्थेऽस्मिन्समाप्तेऽपि पूर्ववत्तं मुनिं नृपः ।
अन्वयुङ्क्तात ऊर्ध्वं त्वं मुक्तये ब्रूहि यत्परम् ॥१८८७॥

Even if this matter under question was thus completed (i.e. completely explained), the king demanded of the sage, (even) as before, 'Now, after this, you should say what is a greater (means) for (achieving) liberation'. [1887]

याज्ञवल्क्योऽपि राज्ञैवं पृष्टः सन्पूर्ववत्तदा ।
अबिभेदन्यतो हेतोर्न त्वसामर्थ्यकारणात् ॥१८८८॥

Yājñavalkya, on his part (*api*), when thus asked by the king as before, felt fear¹—(but), for some other reason and not owing to his inability (to answer). [1888]

¹The editor of the AnSS edition reports that, while he read in the verse the verbal form *abibhet*, he has ignored the reading *abibhyat* which occurred in the three manuscripts consulted and which is a grammatical error. NKL ms. does not offer any help with regards to this.

सर्वज्ञत्वान्मुनेर्नाभूत्प्रश्नार्थाज्ञानतो भयम् ।
कारणं त्वन्यदेवातो यतः श्रुतिरभाषत ॥१८८९॥

Because of the sage's omniscience, therefore, (it is to be remembered that) he did not feel fear (which would arise) from ignorance about the thought (about which the king) questioned—there was altogether (*tu ... eva*) a different reason from that (viz. fear etc.), as the Śruti has declared (subsequently). [1889]

अविवक्ष्मयं राजा कामप्रश्नबलाश्रयात् ।
 किंज्योतिरित्येवमादिमप्राक्षीन्मां पुनः पुनः ॥१८९०॥
 अप्रत्याख्येयो ह्यर्थश्च सत्यस्यावश्यरक्षणात् ।
 स्वयंज्योतिष्ट्वनिर्णीतिः कृतातोऽनवशेषतः ॥१८९१॥

(The Śruti had this in view:) 'May the king not ask me, who am not now wishing to say (i.e. answer), the (same) questions such as *kinjyotir* ..., again and again, emboldened by (or, lit. gathering strength from) being told to ask (whatever was) his desire (to ask). [1890]

Indeed, the matter (which the king asked) is not to be overlooked (or, lit. discarded), since the truth has invariably to be maintained. Therefore, there is (already) given a decision, viz. (The Ātman has) the nature of being self-illuminating, without leaving anything to be said'. [1891]

Before giving the answer which is stated as coming from the ruti, Sureśvara provides some introductory to it in verse 1890ff.

निर्णीतेऽप्यथ मां राजा पुनः पुनरपृच्छत ।
 अत ऊर्ध्वमिति गिरा निरुणद्धयैव मां नृपः ॥१८९२॥

'When (thus the matter has been fully) decided, the king has asked me again and again, viz. the king does again hold me by the words *ata*¹ *ūrdhvam*' [1892]

In verses 1892-1893, there is the statement as to why the sage felt fear.

¹Sureśvara uses *ataḥ* in the place and sense of *atha*. Read P: *athaśabdo 'taḥparyāyo niruṇaddhīty asmāt pūrvam sam-
 adhyate*.

कामप्रश्नाङ्कुशेनैव मां वशीकृत्य मद्गतम् ।
 समादित्सति निःशेषं ज्ञानं राजातिपण्डितः ॥१८९३॥

‘The king, (who is) so highly learned, wishes to draw (lit. take) out of me the entire knowledge which I possess (lit. which obtains in myself), after winning me over by the goad (in the form) of the question(s) (to be asked) at will (or, to the full extent of his desire).’ [1893]

इत्येष भयहेतुः स्याद्याज्ञवल्क्यस्य नान्यतः ।
भयहेतोरविद्यायाः सर्वज्ञत्वादसंभवात् ॥१८९४॥

Thus, this is the reason for the fear of Yājñavalkya; (there is) not (any other fear) from elsewhere. This is (to be so understood), since there is no possibility of existence of the cause of (any possible) fear (in him), viz. ignorance, owing to (or, because of) his omniscience. [1894]

Verses 1895-1896 point out that the sage’s fear was justified by the thought about not revealing the lore of the Brahman, so suddenly.

असकृन्निर्णयोऽकारि पृष्टे वस्तुन्यशेषतः ।
अरौत्सीन्मां तथाप्येष सर्वस्वादित्सया नृपः ॥१८९५॥
मेधावी पण्डितोऽतोऽयं ब्रह्मस्वादानकारणात् ।
न बिभेति यतस्तस्माद्धेतव्यं जनकाद्भयम् ॥१८९६॥

Not once (i.e. several times) was the decision given in respect of the full matter (which was put) under question. And, yet, this king has held me (by further questioning) with a desire to draw (lit. take) out of me all my belonging (viz. knowledge); [1895]

therefore, this king who is intelligent and (highly) learned, for the purpose of taking (out) all my wealth, (in the form of) the knowledge of the Brahman. Since (thus) he does not entertain any fear, therefore, I should be very much afraid of Janaka. [1896]

These verses reiterate what was in the mind of the sage. SP

concludes the comment on this verse thus: *yogye 'pi pātre muktiphalam jñānam sahasā nopadeṣṭavyam iti vākyārthaḥ*.

Verses 1897-1909 discuss the thought in BU 4.3.35. Yet, in verses 1897-1901, it is explained as to how the sentence *sa vā eṣa* ... is expressive of some objection, and in verses 1902-1909, of transmigration from one world to another.

ननु प्रश्ना यथोक्ताश्चेन्निर्णीतार्थाः परोक्तिभिः ।
अनिर्णीतं किमुद्दिश्य नृपोऽप्राक्षीन्मुनिं पुनः ॥१८९७॥

(A question is asked:) 'Indeed, if the questions have already, mentioned in earlier statements (and) the matters/thoughts in them (or, relevant matters/thoughts) decided (fully); with what undecided (matter) in view, did the king ask the sage again?'

[1897]

SP points to what is already stated; the questions beginning with *kimjyotiḥ* ... and the answers *ādityajyotiḥ*

स्वप्नबुद्धान्तसंचार आत्मनो यः पुरोदितः ।
दृष्टान्तत्वेन राज्ञासौ सर्वोऽपीह विवक्षितः ॥१८९८॥

What was already told, viz. the movements/activities of the (individual) Ātman in the dream and the waking states, by way of illustrations—all of it is here intended by the king (for asking).

[1898]

तस्य दाष्टीन्तिको योऽर्थो यावत्साक्षान्न कथ्यते ।
मुमुक्षति न तावत्तं राजा प्रश्नार्थशेषतः ॥१८९९॥
दृष्टान्तस्य सुषुप्तेश्च नार्थं दाष्टीन्तिकं जगौ ।
ब्रह्मास्मीत्यागमाद्बोधः सुषुप्तोदाहृतेर्मतः ।
दाष्टीन्तिकोऽर्थः प्राज्ञस्य दृष्टान्तस्यावशेषतः ॥१९००॥

(So) till when the matter for which illustrations are given (*dārṣṭāntika*) is not directly expressed/stated (in the sage's

replies), the king did (lit. does) not wish to give up (asking questions),¹ for the reason that there was yet some remainder in (the answer to) question(s); [1899]

for, (the sage) did not mention (lit. sing) the *dārṣṭāntika* for the illustration of the deep sleep state; viz. the consequent knowledge arising from the illustration of the deep sleep state as (*aham*) *brahmāsmi*— which is the *dārṣṭāntika* matter for the illustration of Prājña (form of the Ātman) and, also (therefore), as its remainder (to be said or explained). [1900]

These two verses explain the meaning of *athākāmayamānaḥ*

....

¹Or, he would not leave the sage.

उक्ते दाष्टान्तिकेऽर्थेऽस्मिन्प्रश्नार्थस्य समाप्तिः ।
सर्वमुक्तं भवेद्यस्मादतः सोऽर्थोऽधुनोच्यते ॥१९०१॥

Since there is completion of the matter under question when the *dārṣṭāntika* has been pointed out; therefore, now is stated that matter whereby everything should have become stated (lit. said). [1901]

असङ्गो मत्स्यवत्प्रत्यङ्गामकर्मादिभिः क्रमात् ।
समेति स्वप्नबुद्धान्तौ यथायं स्ववशस्तथा ॥१९०२॥
सहेतुरस्य संसारः परलोकेहलोकयोः ।
सविस्तरः स वक्तव्य इत्यर्थेयं परा श्रुतिः ॥१९०३॥

As (this inner self), being under the control of its own becomes inclined towards within (*pratyani*)¹ united with the dream and the waking states, one after another, together with its desire and activity etc., like a great fish (with both the banks of a river/stream); so, [1902]
is the transmigration of this (one) between/in this and the other *lokas*— it has to be narrated in details; therefore, the subsequent Śruti is for the purpose of stating the same. [1903]

बन्धो बन्धनहेतुश्च मोक्षस्तद्धेतुरेव च ।
सविस्तरः प्रवक्तव्यस्तदुक्त्यर्थो परा श्रुतिः ॥१९०४॥

Bondage and the cause of bondage as also liberation and the cause of it have to be told in details; for stating the same (therefore) has proceeded the subsequent Śruti. [1904]

जाग्रत्स्थानात्ततः पूर्वं स्वप्नमात्मा प्रवेशितः ।
जाग्रद्भूमिं स नेतव्यो दाष्टान्तिकविवक्षया ॥१९०५॥

Then, according to what is intended by the *dārṣṭāntika*, the Ātman is first introduced from the waking state (moving) to the dream state, it is (later) to be taken to the waking state again. [1905]

This is the purport of the sentence *sa vā eṣaḥ*

आनन्दनिर्णयान्तं तु संप्रसादवचो यदा ।
तदा निगमनार्थं तत्प्रतिज्ञातार्थगोचरम् ॥१९०६॥
अलुप्तदृष्टिरात्मायं यथोक्तं स्वप्नबोधयोः ।
प्राज्ञेऽपि च तथैवायं यद्वै तदितिवाक्यतः ॥१९०७॥

As the statement about the deep sleep state has at its end the explanation of (the nature of) joy, so also for concluding the same to (the state) which is the subject matter of the proposition, [1906]

namely, this Ātman has its (power of) seeing never lost, as this is stated in the dream and the waking states; so also is this one even in Prājña state (to be understood) from the sentence *tad vai* [1907]

The argument in the above is briefly thus: As in the two states of dream and waking, in the deep sleep state also the Ātman does not lose its power of seeing.

अतिकारकहेतुश्च यथात्मायं सुषुप्तगः ।

कूटस्थदृष्टिमात्रत्वात्तथा स्वप्नप्रबोधयोः ॥१९०८॥

As, owing to its having only the immutable (power of) seeing, this Ātman is in the deep sleep state above (every) cause of activity, so it is in the dream and the waking states also.

[1908]

इत्येवं पूर्वसिद्धेऽर्थे निगमार्थं पुनर्वचः ।

स वा इत्यादिकं ज्ञेयं न तु नाशादिशङ्कया ॥१९०९॥

Thus, it is to be known that there is once again the statement *sa vā* ... for concluding what has been earlier argued (lit. proved) and (*tu*) not owing to a doubt about the perishing (of it).¹

[1909]

¹NKL (ms. p.706) states this neatly thus: *supto mṛtavan naṣṭo deśāntaram gato veti śaikānirāsārtham kiṃ na syād ity āha na tv iti.*

Verses 1910-1925 discuss the thought of BU 4.3.36; there is yet the beginning of the description of transmigration in verses 1910-1920.

इत आरभ्य संसार आत्मनो वर्ण्यतेऽधुना ।

स्वप्नाद्बोधाप्तिवच्चास्माल्लोकाल्लोकान्तरं गतः ॥१९१०॥

इत्यर्थप्रतिपत्त्यर्थं दृष्टान्तोऽत्राभिधीयते ।

सुखावबोधसिद्धयर्थं श्रोतुरर्थे विवक्षिते ॥१९११॥

Now, beginning with this (or, from this verse) is presented the description of the Ātman's transmigration.¹ (Thus: The Ātman) has moved from this world to another as in (getting or moving) from the dream state to the waking state (and vice versa)—

[1910]

to explain/convey this happening (*artha*), there is here stated the illustration, so that there is secured (thereby) an easy understanding of the listener in respect of the matter intended

for conveying.

[1911]

¹This explains *tad yathānah* ... (BU 4.3.34).

नानार्थसाधनैर्मार्गे यथानः सुसमाहितम् ।
 शब्दान्नानाविधान्कुर्वद्गुरुभारप्रपीडनात् ॥१९१२॥
 व्रजेच्छाकटिकेनेह देशान्तरमधिष्ठितम् ।
 अनसस्तद्गताच्चार्थाद्विलक्षणवपुर्भृता ॥१९१३॥
 स्वार्थेनाधिष्ठितं गच्छेत्पथि शाकटिकेन तत् ।
 दृष्टान्तार्थेन संबन्ध एवमेवेति भण्यते ॥१९१४॥
 भुक्तदेहादिदं लिङ्गमुत्क्रान्तं भोगसंक्षयात् ।
 याति देहान्तरं तद्वत्कर्मविद्यादिसंभृतम् ॥१९१५॥

As a cart, well-laden with various means (for producing happiness for, or for serving various purposes of, men) and producing different kinds of sounds owing to the damage caused by heavy weight [1912]

would move/go to another place (lit. region), driven (lit. occupied) by the cart driver, i.e. by a cart driver bearing/having a body quite different in nature from the cart (itself) and the (burden/weight of) things (on it), [1913]

laden with things of its own (it) would move on the way—only thus is the connection of the *dr̥ṣṭānta* 'illustration' (with the *dār̥ṣṭāntika* in hand); only thus it is said: [1914]

this subtle body moves on to another region (or, *loka*), departed upwards as it has from the body (earlier) enjoyed, because there is (now) the loss/perishing of (its) enjoyment (of experiences) and (at this time) laden with (the effects of) activity, (specific) knowledge etc. in the same way (as the cart). [1915]

वियुक्तं देवताभिः सत्कर्मसंभारसंभृतम् ।
 अनौवल्लिलङ्गमेत्येतत्प्रत्यगात्मार्थसिद्धये ॥१९१६॥

(The above is to mean:) Separated from the deities,¹ laden

with the burden of good activities, like the cart, the subtle body moves on for securing (its end), viz. merging (only) into the inner self. [1916]

¹This is said for emphasising *karmavidyādisambhṛtam* in the preceding verse.

शरीरवचसा चात्र लिङ्गमेवाभिधीयते ।

शरीरदेशसंस्थत्वान्न तु प्रत्यङ्ङसंहतेः ॥१९१७॥

Further, (it should be noted) here it is only the subtle body meant by the word *śarīra*, because it had (earlier) a support in the whole of the body and not because of its remaining apart from (lit. of its not being joint with) the inner self.

[1917]

SP points out the purpose of this verse thus: *ātmaikādaśa ityūdvā ātmaśabdasya linge 'pi prayogāt tad evātra gatiyogyaṁ vivaksitam ity arthaḥ*.

प्राज्ञेनाधिष्ठितं गच्छेद्रथिना स्वार्थरूपिणा ।

प्रत्यग्धिपः समारोहमन्वात्मारूढवद्यतः ॥१९१८॥

प्राज्ञेनेहात्मना तस्मादन्वारूढोऽभिधीयते ।

भानुनेवोदपात्रादेरारोहो नात्मनः स्वतः ॥१९१९॥

(The subtle body) would move on (the way), occupied by Prājña who has assumed the form of the things etc. on it, viz. who is the master of that chariot,¹ for it is occupied by the Ātman even like (i.e. with) the (higher and higher) rise of the knowledge about (the nature of) the inner self;

[1918]

the Ātman (which is associated with the subtle body) is mentioned here as occupied by Prājña; for there cannot be any rising (higher) by/of the Ātman as (it cannot be there in the case where) a pot filled water has (in it the occupying of it, the rise) by the sun.¹

[1919]

¹This refers to the reflection of the sun in a pot filled with water and the popular way of calling it as the occupying of it by the sun.

प्राक्चोक्तमात्मनैवायं ज्योतिषेत्यादिकं वचः ।
आत्मानं रथिनं विद्धीत्यपि श्रुत्यन्तरे वचः ॥१९२०॥

And already a statement has been made: *ātmanaivāyaṃ jyotiṣā* ...; ¹ so also is there in another Śruti the statement *ātmānaṃ rathinaṃ viddhi*.² [1920]

¹BU 4.3.6.

²This is *Kāthopaniṣad* 3.3.

Verses 1921-1930 specify the movement (gamana) as caused by vairāgya. But, in verse 1926, there begins the exposition on the thought content of by 4.3.37; it runs up to verse 1971.

मर्मकृन्तनसंभूतवेदनार्दितमानसम् ।
हिविककालक्षणं शब्दं मृतिकाल'उपस्थिते ॥१९२१॥
उत्सर्जयति लिङ्गं तदिति प्रत्यक्षगोचरः ।
तदिदं भण्यते श्रुत्या पुंसां वैराग्यजन्मने ॥१९२२॥

It is the direct object of everyone's experience that the subtle body¹ moves on (i.e. departs from a body), leaving it when the time of death has come, (producing) strenuous breathing sound and when a person's *manas* is afflicted by the painful feeling caused by the tearing vitals—this is (so) stated in order that there is produced (lit. rise of) aversion (for world life) in human beings. [1921-1922]

¹This is the Ātman associated with the subtle body. Or, SP states: *tallīgam iti sābhāsaprāṇoktaḥ*

मर्मसूतकृत्यमानेषु मुच्यमानेषु संधिषु ।

मुमूर्षतोऽत्र यद्दुःखं स्मर्यतां तन्मुमुक्षुभिः ॥१९२३॥

Let it those who wish to achieve liberation remember the misery/pain experienced by a person, who is about to die, when his vitals are being torn and his joints (in the body) are becoming loose (lit. are leaving their normal built). [1923]

कस्मिन्काल इदं जन्तोः किंनिमित्तं च जायते ।
इत्यस्य प्रतिपत्त्यर्थं परो ग्रन्थोऽवतार्यते ॥१९२४॥

(Now) follows the subsequent portion of the Śruti in order that a person comes to understand when (lit. at what period of time in the life) this¹ comes to a person (that was-born) and why it is caused. [1924]

¹The word 'this' refers to what is stated in the preceding verse, viz. *duḥkha*.

उदानवायौ प्रबले यत्रैतत्स्यान्मुमूर्षतः ।
ऊर्ध्वोच्छ्वासी पुमांस्तत्र यथोक्तं जायते मृतौ ॥१९२५॥

When this would occur in the case of a person, who is about to die, while/when the Udāna wind has become stronger and then the person would have his breath going upwards¹—what is (thus) stated happens at (the time of) death. [1925]

This is in answer to the first question in the preceding verse.

¹That is, when he is breathing his last.

Now follows the discussion on BU 4.3.36.

पिण्डोऽणुत्वं यदाभ्येति जरयाभ्यर्दितस्तदा ।
उपतापान्वितो वा सन्यथोक्तं प्रतिपद्यते ॥१९२६॥

When the body (lit. lump of a person) becomes thin,¹ as it is affected by old age, or (in other words) a person becomes

afflicted by heat, then he comes to have (or to suffer) the condition as stated. [1926]

This answers the second question in verse 1924 above. Also, it explains *sa yatrāyam* ... in the Śruti. And this is further explained in the next few verses.

¹This is explained by BUB as 'assuming the state of a subtle body'.

अणिमानमणोर्भावं कार्श्यं देहो यदैत्ययम् ।
जरया रोगहेतोर्वा ऊर्ध्वोच्छ्वासी तदा भवेत् ॥१९२७॥

When this body (of a person) becomes emaciated (or, thin), i.e. it comes to have the nature of an atom, viz. (extreme) thinness, (either) by old age or by the (person's) disease, then he would be breathing his last. [1927]

जरया रोगतो वास्य जायते विषमाग्निता ।
सम्यक्पक्वितस्ततोऽन्नस्य मन्दाग्नेर्नोपजायते ॥१९२८॥
रसादिधातुभिर्देहस्ततोऽनुपचयादयम् ।
अबलः सन्पतत्येष जीर्णमन्दिरवत्क्षितौ ॥१९२९॥

On account of old age or disease, there comes to this (dying person) uneven (condition of) fire/heat ¹ (within him) and there does not result proper digestion of food by (that) weakened heat. [1928]

So also, in the absence of the collection of (digestion-)juices and essences, ² the person, becoming weak, falls down, like a dilapidated temple, on the ground. [1929]

¹That is, impaired digestion.

²That is, constituent elements in the body.

अथैवं कृशतापन्ने देहेऽन्तरुपजायते ।
या वृत्तिः सोच्यते साक्षाद्दृष्टान्तोक्त्या प्रयत्नतः ॥१९३०॥

Or, (to explain this otherwise:) then, the condition, which occurs in the (person's) thinned body, is stated with an illustration, with an effort (so as to make it) directly perceptible. [1930]

This points to the purport of *tad yathāmram*

Verses 1931-1934 explain the thought in *tad yathāmram vodum-baram*

आम्रं यथा रसादाढ्ये स्वस्माद्धृन्तात्प्रमुच्यते ।
तथेहान्नरसग्लानौ लिङ्गं देहात्प्रमुच्यते ॥१९३१॥

As a mango fruit becomes loose from its stem, when its juice has become thinned (i.e. has lessened); so also does the subtle body become separated from this person's (gross/visible) body, when the digestive juices of the food (that is eaten) have become less. [1931]

वृन्ते निबध्यते येन रसेनापरिपाकतः ।
स रसो बन्धनं ज्ञेयो वृन्तं वा बन्धनं मतम् ॥१९३२॥

That juice (in the fruit), whereby the fruit is held at (lit. kept firmly tied to) the stem, up to its purification, is known as its bond (to the tree); or the stem is understood as its bond. [1932]

SP clarifies thus: *karanavyutpattyā raso vādhikarāṇavyutpattyā vṛntam vā bandhanam.*

वृन्तेनामस्य संबन्धो रसस्यापरिपाकतः ।
बाल्ये दृढो यथा तद्वन्नैवं पक्वरसस्य सः ॥१९३३॥

The connection of the mango fruit with the stem is firm in its early state of development (lit. its young state) and (continues to be so) till it has completely purified; (but it) does not remain so when the juice has fully ripened. [1933]

क्लैद्यमापद्यमानोऽथ पाककाल उपस्थिते ।
रस आम्रं धारयितुं नैवेहोत्सहतेऽबलः ॥१९३४॥

When it is time of purification, the juice in the fruit, becoming/remaining (only) moist, becomes weak and is unable to hold it here (i.e. to the stem). [1934]

Verses 1935-1939 point out the significance of more than one illustration.

गुरुत्वाद्धन्धनाद्धृन्ताद्रसाद्वाथ प्रमुच्यते ॥१९३५॥

The fruit is then separated from the stem, viz. the bond, on account of its becoming heavy or its purified juice. [1935]

नानाहेतुकपातस्य फलस्य प्रतिपत्तये ।
दृष्टान्तानामिहोक्तिः स्याद्भूयसां भिन्नरूपिणाम् ॥१९३६॥

There is here the statement of many example of various types in order that one understands the fall of a fruit having various factors as the cause(s) of its fall. [1936]

वृन्तादेवाम्रपातोऽत्र वृन्तेनोदुम्बरं सह ।
पतत्यश्वत्थपातस्तु पाकेऽप्यन्यनिमित्ततः ॥१९३७॥

Here (i.e. among these falls) the fall of a mango fruit is from its stem, whereas an Udumbara fruit falls off together with its stem. But the fall of an Aśvattha fruit is on account of some other cause(s). [1937]

बहुप्रकारसिद्धयर्थं वाशब्दव्याहृतिस्त्वह ।
बहुहेतुर्मृतिर्यस्मात्प्राणिनां जगतीक्ष्यते ॥१९३८॥

Here the utterance of the particle *vā*¹ is for establishing various kinds (of falls)—this is so done for the purpose of showing

that (in the *dārṣṭāntika*) death of beings in the world has for it many causes.² [1938]

¹The particle does not show here, as on other occasion, the idea of an alternative.

²SP adds finally: *tasmāt tatra na vivaditavyam*.

यथायमुक्तो दृष्टान्तः पुरुषोऽप्येवमेव हि ।
लिङ्गात्मा पुरुषो ज्ञेयस्तस्यैवेहाङ्गसंगतेः ॥१९३९॥

As this example (of the mango fruit) is (thus) stated, so also does a human being (become separated from his body). Here (in the text) one has to understand by the word *puruṣa* the Ātman in the subtle body, because of its non-connection (i.e. non-presence) here (in this body). [1939]

Verses 1940-1943 lead to one's understanding *anigebhyaḥ* to have as its sense the limbs such as ears.

श्रोत्रत्वगादिनाड्यश्च प्रोच्यन्तेऽत्राङ्गसंज्ञया ।
तेषु व्युह्यैव लिङ्गात्मा यतोऽलं स्यात्स्वकर्मणे ॥१९४०॥

Ears, skin etc. and veins are meant here by (the use of) the word *aniga* 'limb'; since, being bound with/in them, does the Ātman in the subtle body become capable of (accomplishing) its activity. [1940]

अङ्गस्य कृष्णसारस्य चक्षुषः करणस्य च ।
आश्रयाश्रयिसंबन्धे हेतुरन्नरसो भवेत् ॥१९४१॥

A juice of the (digested) food would become the cause for the connection (of the Ātman in the subtle body) with the limbs, viz. the black pupil of the eye (*kr̥ṣṇasāra*) and (every other) organ (of activity). [1941]

अन्नं दामेति चाप्युक्तं रसादिपरिणामतः ।

बाह्याद्देहात्तथैवान्तर्लिङ्गं स्वाप्नं प्रपद्यते ।

यथान्यायप्रतिन्यायौ यथा तत्रोदितौ पुरा ॥१९४९॥

देहाद्देहान्तरप्राप्तौ तथैवेति विनिर्दिशेत् ।

प्रतियोनि यथास्थानमित्यत्रापि तथैव तत् ॥१९५०॥

In the same way (*tathaiva*), the subtle form of the Ātman comes to the inner body of the dream state from the external body (of the waking state). As the words *yathānyāya* and *pratinyāya* have been stated there earlier, [1949]

so also should one mention (them) in connection with the movement from one body to another—i.e. *pratiyoni* in the sense of *yathāsthāna*. [1950]

Read SP: *sa vā esa etasmin samprasāde ratvetyādau dr̥ṣṭānte* *ratinyāyaśabdo yathānyāyaśabdas ca vyākhyeyavyākhyānatayā* *thoktau tathaiivātrāpi tau vācyāv ity arthaḥ. pratiyoniśabdārtham* *a ... yathā pūrvam pratiyoniśabdo yathāsthānam ityarthe* *ākhyātas tathaiivātrāpi dār̥ṣṭāntike tadvyākhyā draṣṭavyety arthaḥ.*

श्रुतकर्मानुरूपेण चक्षुराद्यनुरूपतः ।

प्रतियोनि यथास्थानमाद्रवत्येष जन्मने ॥१९५१॥

In conformity with (one's acquired) knowledge and acts (in this life), and also with the eye etc., does (the Ātman in the subtle body) move on for a birth¹ in *pratiyoni*, i.e. *yathāsthāna*, manner. [1951]

In the earlier verses were pointed out the meanings of the words *pratinyāya* and *pratiyoni* in the Śruti statement. This verse explains the meaning of the whole of the Śruti statement.

¹This is the meaning of *prāṇāya* in the text; it is explained in the next verse.

Verses 1952-1958 explain the word *maraṇa* 'death' as suggestive of *punarjanma* 'rebirth'.

देहान्तरगृहीत्यर्थं प्राणिनां मरणं यतः ।

प्राणायैति ततो वक्ति जन्मन्यसति नो मृतिः ॥१९५२॥

Since, in the case of living beings, there is death for assuming another body (later); therefore does the Śruti state *prāṇāya*; there is no death if there is not (another) birth. [1952]

This has reference to the accepted notion of transmigration of beings who have not sought liberation: Cf. *jātasya hi dhruvo mṛtyuḥ dhruvaṁ janma mṛtasya ca* (Gītā 2.27).

प्राणव्यूहाय चैवायमाद्रवत्यन्यदेहतः ।

स्थानेष्वव्यूढकरणो नालं स्यात्कर्मणे यतः ॥१९५३॥

And this one (viz. the Ātman with the subtle body) moves from another (i.e. earlier) body for (assuming another) shape of *prāṇas*, since it would not be able for (performing) any action, unless it has its organs placed in their places (in the body to be taken up later). [1953]

प्राणव्यूहस्य संसिद्धिः कथमस्येति शङ्क्यते ।

शरीरग्रहणाशक्तेरव्यूढकरणत्वतः ॥१९५४॥

न च देहान्तरं कृत्वा राज्ञो भृत्या इवासते ।

यतः कर्मसहायोऽयमेकाक्येवेह गच्छति ॥१९५५॥

(Now, or, in this connection) it is doubted, 'How does it occur in the case of this one (i.e. Ātman in a transmigratory body), to give arrangement/shape to *prāṇas*?' '(This is said as an answer:) because, being without properly placed/shaped organs, it would not be able to have a body (which is necessary for performing actions)'. [1954]

There cannot be for a king (any) servants, unless they have occupied other bodies;¹ since he would go all alone here (i.e. in death), aided only by his *karman*.² [1955]

¹That is: unless they exist as possessed of different bodies, or, unless they exist apart from the king.

²That is to say: the servants continue to exist even after the king's death and have thus a separate existence.

इत्यस्य परिहारार्थं दृष्टान्तोऽत्राभिधीयते ।
कृत्स्नं जगत्स्वभोगार्थं पुंसोपात्तं स्वकर्मणा ॥१९५६॥

For answering away this (doubt), there is an example given here (i.e. the Śruti). A person has secured the whole of the world for his own enjoyment,¹ through his own *karman*. [1956]

This precludes the need of the king's having some servants to accompany him at death.

¹Read SP: *atrāpi śrutir uktā. yat tu nāsyā bhrtyasthāniyāḥ antīti.*

तत्कर्मफलभोगार्थं कृत्वा देहं प्रतीक्षते ।
शुभं वा यदि वा पापं श्रुतकर्मानुरूपतः ॥१९५७॥

(That *jagat*) waits for his (other) body for his enjoyment of the results of his *karman*, be that auspicious or ill, in accordance with his knowledge and performance (of ritual) acts. [1957]

This argument of Sureśvara is properly based on the statement: *dbhāvitāḥ prapadyante tasmāt tat tasya rocate* in *Kūrma Purāṇa* 7.8 (12.7); *Mārkaṇḍeya Purāṇa* 48.40 and *Brahmāṇḍa Purāṇa* 4.32.

कर्मोपात्तानि भूतानि तत्प्रयुक्तानि देहिनः ।
कृत्वा देहान्तरं योग्यं तस्थू राज्ञोऽग्रगा इव ॥१९५८॥

The various elements which are acquired by a person (and) employed by him, assume a different body that is suitable (for his next body) and wait (for him to be born with that),

like the harbingers of a king (wait for him).

[1958]

Verses 1959-1966 show the connection of tat yathā ... with the matter under discussion.

तत्रैतस्मिन्यथोक्तेऽर्थे दृष्टान्तोऽप्यभिधीयते ।
विवक्षितार्थविज्ञानप्रसिद्धिः स्यात्कथं न्विति ॥१९५९॥

As to what is stated (earlier), in this regard, there is stated an example also; that is: with the idea as to how there could be established the particular knowledge of the intended matter.

[1959]

This is given in the next verse.

यथा राजानमायान्तं सद्गपानादिसाधनैः ।
बुद्ध्वा क्लृप्तैः प्रतीक्षन्त उग्राः सूतादयो जनाः ॥१९६०॥

(This is like) the persons of mixed castes, viz. the charioteer and others, keep waiting for a king, on having known that he is coming, with various means such as a good abode (for him), drinks and others (well) kept (ready for his welcome).

[1960]

उग्रे कर्मणि ये राज्ञा नियक्ताः पापकारिषु ।
उग्रास्तेऽत्राभिधीयन्ते जातितो वाभिधा भवेत् ॥१९६१॥

Those persons are described as *ugras* (lit. cruel) who are appointed by the king in the violent act against sinning persons. Or this name could refer to (those people) of mixed castes¹ by their births.

[1961]

¹ A child born of a *kṣatriya* man and a *sūdra* woman is called *ugra*. He is ferocious in his manners and takes delight in cruelty. Refer to *Manusmṛti* 10.9.

एन एनः प्रति तथा नियुक्ता ये नराधिपैः ।
प्रत्येनसोऽत्र ते ज्ञेया भिन्नास्ते स्वाधिकारतः ॥१९६२॥

They should be known here (i.e. in this context) as *pratyenas* who are appointed by kings in connection with this or that sin; or (perhaps) those who have swerved from their own duties. [1962]

रथवाहाश्च सताः स्य रथवाहनकोविदाः ।
ग्रामण्यो ग्रामनैतारः सैनाधिपतयो मताः ॥१९६३॥

Sūtas are those who drive chariots, viz. those who are well conversant with (the act of) driving the chariots. Grāmaṇīs are known to be the leaders of clans, i.e. leaders of armies. [1963]

ते यथा कर्मणोपात्ता राज्ञः प्रागेव चागमात् ।
अन्नपानगृहाद्यर्थान्कृत्वा राजप्रतीक्षिणः ।
राजाय नः समायातीत्यासते यत्नमास्थिताः ॥१९६४॥

As they are employed by king, because of tradition (or, because of his own knowledge about them)—they keep on waiting for the king, having kept ready (for his welcome) food, drinks, good abode (for him), etc. and are making (every) effort (for his comfort) on knowing 'Here is the king coming'. [1964]

यथैवं सर्वभूतानि भोक्त्रा कर्मादिकारणैः ।
अर्जितान्युचितं देहं भोक्तुर्भोगक्षमं तथा ॥१९६५॥
कृत्वा तत्प्राप्तितः पूर्वं यथा सुतादयो नृपम् ।
प्रतीक्षन्ते प्रयत्नेन ब्रह्मैतीत्यभिकाङ्क्षया ॥१९६६॥

As this is (known, so) are all the elements earned (i.e. mastered) by an enjoyer through the means of activity etc., and also a body fit for enjoyment by the enjoyer. [1965]
When (the enjoyer) would have effected that first, do the charioteer etc. (in the example above) keep on waiting for

the king, (do the activities of a person in his earlier life), with (ever ready) effort (on their part to welcome him properly), wait (for him) to be with the wish that he attains to the Brahman.

[1966]

Verses 1967-1971 explain why the word brahman here refers to the individual self (i.e. the inner self).

विज्ञानात्मन्युपक्रान्ते ब्रह्मेति यदिहोच्यते ।
स्वतो ब्रह्मत्वतस्तस्य संसारित्वमविद्यया ॥१९६७॥

What is mentioned here as the Brahman, (when a person) having thus attained (i.e. clearly understood the nature of) the particular Brahman (i.e. the inner self), he has become the Brahman by himself (i.e. attained oneness with it)—but (the continued) nature of him as that of a transmigratory being is only through ignorance.

[1967]

This explains the meaningfulness of the word *brahman* in *idam brahmāyati*.

कथं नाम मतिस्तस्य ब्रह्मास्मीति भवेदिह ।
श्रुतिस्तत्तत्त्वबोधार्थं ब्रह्मेत्याह ततो नरम् ॥१९६८॥

In order to explain as to how that human being would come to entertain the thought 'I am the Brahman,' that is, for his getting to know the truth, has the Śruti used the word *brahman* as referring to him.

[1968]

This is an alternative way of understanding the significance of the word *brahman*.

अनुवादो न तु विधिरेवंविदमितीर्यते ॥१९६९॥
सर्वान्प्रत्यविशिष्टत्वादेवंविदमितीरणम् ।
नानुवादः फलोक्तिर्वा यथाव्याख्यातवेदिनः ॥१९७०॥

In what is stated, there is a restatement, but not an injunction, viz. *evamvidam* ..., [1969]
 since it pertains to all (human) beings, without being any particular attribute (or, qualification) of some one in particular, or, rather, the statement *evamvidam* ... is not a restatement; or, it is the statement about the consequence/result (of knowing ...), with reference to one who knows the meaning/significance of verbs (i.e. one who understands that as an injunction). [1970]

करणानुग्रहीतृणि भूतानि च मुमूर्षतः ।
 कृत्वा देहं प्रतीक्षन्ते नृपस्येव गृहं नराः ॥१९७१॥

Also, the elements in the body of a person, who is about to die, his organs, and which have favoured (him earlier), assume another form/body (for him) and wait for him, just as men, belonging to him, (wait for him) after making a suitable abode (etc.) for him. [1971]

This is the meaning of *sarvāṇi bhūtāni pratikalpayanti*.

Now follows the discussion on BU 4.3.38; also these verses 1972-1975 state another alternative for the above.

एवं जिगमिषुं देवमनुगच्छन्ति के तु तम् ।
 गच्छन्तः कस्य गत्या वा स्वातन्त्र्येणात्मनोऽथवा ॥१९७२॥

(Here arise some questions:) 'Who are they that follow him? who is about to go?, with what (kind of) movement are they going?, on their own or through (the movement) of the Ātman?' [1972]

इत्यर्थमपि दृष्टान्तः पूर्ववद्वर्ण्यते पुनः ।
 इतः प्रवसतो देहाद्देहिनः कर्मसंक्षयात् ॥१९७३॥
 यथेह प्रयियासन्तमुग्रसूतादयो जनाः ।
 राजानमभिसंयान्ति प्राणास्तद्वन्मृतौ नरम् ॥१९७४॥

BRHADĀRANYAKOPANIṢAD-
BHĀṢYA-VĀRTIKA

4.4

Śārīraka Brāhmaṇa

Verses 1-62 discuss BU 4.4.1, with an introductory remark on the relation between 4.3 and 4.4.

यत् उत्क्रान्तिरुक्तेयं विशिष्टफलसंगतेः ।
सर्वेषामविशिष्टातः स यत्रेत्युच्यतेऽधुना ॥१॥

Now that (lit. since, *yataḥ*) thus far (*iyam*) is discussed (lit. stated) the departure (of the Ātman, i.e. Jīva), owing to its association with (some) specific result(s) (of action) and as non-distinguished (in the case) of all (the Jīvas),¹ therefore is now (re-)stated *sa yatra* [1]

Read SP: *adhunā mokṣasyaiva susuptidārṣṭāntikasya śiṣṭatvāt tasmīn vaktavye punaḥ saṁsāroktir ayuktā punarukter ity āśāṅkya brāhmaṇāntaram avatārayati*. Also NKL (ms. p.710): *jāgrat-svapnasaṁcārākhyadrṣṭāntasyehalokaparalokasaṁcārah saṁsāro dārṣṭāntikaḥ svapnadrṣṭāntasya mokṣo dārṣṭāntikaḥ. tatra saṁsāra-rūpadārṣṭāntikasya varṇitatvāt ... ucyate*.

¹Cf. *evamvidam sarvāṇi bhūtāni pratikalpante* (BU 4.3.37 above).

करणानां समुत्क्रान्तिर्गमनं च तयोः समम् ।
प्रागुक्तं तत्र यन्नोक्तं तदेवेहोच्यतेऽधुना ॥२॥

It is already stated¹ that the departure of (all) the organs and that (lit. the movement (out of the body)) of the two² is similar (or, the same, i.e. together); here is now stated only that which was not stated (earlier).³ [2]

¹Cf. *tad yathā rājānam prayiyāsantam ...* (BU 4.3.38 above).

²This refers to Jīva and Prāṇa (i.e. *mukhya prāṇa*).

³That is, *tejomātrādānādi* 'taking up particles of light etc.', referring to the powers of other organs.

संसारस्याधिकारोऽयमा श्लोकोदाहृतेर्मतः ।

स यत्रेत्यत आरभ्य पुंसः संसारवर्णनम् ॥३॥

It is accepted that this topic of transmigration (of Jīva) (continues) up to the mention of the verse (later in Kaṇḍikā 6);¹ therefore, beginning with *sa yatra ...*, (there occurs) the description of the transmigration of an individual being.² [3]

This verse sets aside the idea that the whole of BU 4.4 pertains to transmigration.

¹Cf. *tad eṣa śloko bhavati. tad eva saktah saha karmaṇā ...* before *atho 'kāmayamāno yo 'kāmaḥ ...* in BU 2.6. This is to convey that, after there is description of the transmigration of the Jīva, there will follow discussion on liberation.

²*pum* refers to an individual Jīva which is subjected to transmigration.

पुंसः संसरणं पूर्वं सूत्रितं यत्समासतः ।

विस्तरस्तस्य वक्तव्य इत्यर्था वा परा श्रुतिः ॥४॥

Or, (possibly,) there is now to be described in full extent what was earlier told in brief, viz. the transmigration of an individual being and therefore (now begins) the subsequent (part of the) Śruti to convey that sense. [4]

It seems that, in the first two verses of this Brāhmaṇa (i.e. 4.4), Sureśvara has explained the connection between 4.3 and 4.4 in two ways—this is his own view. In this verse, he follows the thought of BUB—cf. *bhāṣyād bahir eva sambandhoktyā punaruktiṃ samādhāya bhāṣyoktasambandham anusṛtya tāṃ samādhatte* (SP). Read BUB: ... *savistaram saṃsaranam varṇa-*

yitavyam ity ārabhyate.

तत्संप्रमोक्षणं कस्मिन्पुंसः कालेऽभिजायते ।
कथं वेत्यादिकोऽत्रार्थो विस्तरेणोपवर्ण्यते ॥५॥

At what time does that detachment of the individual being occur (from the organs) and in what manner (or, how), etc.¹ is the matter that is described here in full extent. [5]

¹The word 'etc.' refers to the other body, other activities etc. of the newly acquired organs of the individual and the other means; cf. SP: *ādipadena dehāntaropādānopakaraṇārambhādi grhyate.*

प्रकृतात्मपरामर्शः सशब्देन विवक्ष्यते ।
संसारानर्थसंबन्धविज्ञानाय तमस्विनः ॥६॥

The word *saḥ* 'that' intends to convey the reference to the Ātman¹ which is the topic of the discussion, in order that there follows a complete understanding (*viññāna*)² of the relationship with the undesired transmigration of (the self) overpowered by (lit. having) darkness. [6]

The verse refers to BU 4.3.35: *anaḥ susamāhitam*

¹This is an individual self, i.e. really ignorant (*ajñā*).

²Namely, complete knowledge.

य आत्मा प्रस्तुतोऽविद्वान्स यदेदं शरीरकम् ।
कार्श्यं प्राप्य पूर्वोक्तैर्जरारोगादिहेतुभिः ॥७॥

The Ātman which is mentioned as the subject matter of the discussion is the non-knowing self (*avidvat*); and that brings this insignificant body (*śarīraka*) to a reduced size by the earlier stated causes, viz. old age, disease etc. [7]

This explains the meaning of *abalyam ny etya*

SP adds *yadā sammoham iva yāti tadainam vāgādayaḥ samāyantīti sambandhaḥ*. Therefore, we have to understand that as the remainder of the sentence and then the organs *vāc* etc. fall in stupour, as it were.

यदि वा स्वयमेवैत्य देहाभेदत्वहेतुतः ।
दौर्बल्यमेवं संप्राप्य संमोहमिव यात्यथ ॥८॥

Or (it could be understood in another way:) (that Ātman) itself, because of its non-distinction¹ from the body, thus attains to weakness and then² falls in a stupour, as it were. [8]

This is another explanation of the sentence *abalyam ...* and clarifies the meaning of *kārśyam prāpayya* in the preceding verse.

¹This is the result of the absence of *adhigati* 'I am Brahman', i.e. ignorance.

²This refers to *atha* in the sense of *nairantarya* 'immediately following'.

मर्छादाविव संमोहमिहाप्यात्मा निगच्छति ।
बौधमात्रैकयाथात्म्यान्नायं संमोहभाग्यतः ।
संमूढबुद्धिसाक्षित्वात्संमूढ इव भात्यतः ॥९॥

In this (moment) also, this Ātman becomes unconscious, as in stupour, and, since this one, owing to its having the real nature of being one who is the knowing only, it does not fall in a stupour and looks like¹ one in stupour on account of its being the witness of the intellect which is overpowered by ignorance (*sammoha*). [9]

We should note the use of *sammoha* in two different senses; (i) physical stupour, referring to individual being, (ii) being ignorant, referring to the intellect.

¹This is to justify the use of the word *iva* in the Śruti sentence.

संमोहहेतुकं कार्यं संमोहात्मकमिष्यते ।
अकार्यकारणं प्रत्यग्ज्योतिः संमुह्यते कुतः ॥१०॥

It is accepted that an effect which has ignorance for its cause is also of the nature of ignorance. How can the inner light (*pratyagjyotiḥ*), which is neither an effect nor a cause, fall in stupour? [10]

The first line refers to the oneness in the nature(s) of cause and effect and the second line to what is neither a cause nor an effect and, therefore, does not have ignorance (lit. stupour) associated with it. What appears as transmigration of the self is really not transmigration at all.

कार्यसंमोहसंबन्धो यतो नास्य स्वतस्ततः ।
मोहोत्थदेहबुद्ध्यादिसंगतेरिवगीरियम् ॥११॥

Since this one does not have by/in its own nature any connection with a reduced size and/or a stupour, therefore, there is the use of the word *iva* (in the Śruti sentence), owing to the association (of the Ātman) with a body, the intellect etc., which have arisen from ignorance. [11]

Refer to note on verse 9.

Verses 12-14 state another meaning of the word sammoha.

उत्क्रान्तिकाले प्राणानां स्वस्थानादाढ्यहेतुका ।
स्वगोचरेष्वशक्तिर्या संमोहोऽसाविहात्मनः ॥१२॥

What is in the case of organs,¹ at the moment of their departure (from the worldly body), viz. incapacity with reference to their objects, which has resulted from their unstability in their support (lit. abode, i.e. body),² is here the stupour, which is taken as that of the Ātman. [12]

This explains the significance of the word *sammoha* which has been so far mentioned in these verses. This refers to the basic ignorance.

¹See verse 16 below for *prāṇas* as organs.

²Refer to verse 18 below.

दाहच्छेदादयो यद्वददाह्याच्छेद्यतन्विनः ।
परोपाधिनिमित्ताः स्युर्दुर्बलत्वादयस्तथा ॥१३॥

As burning and/or cutting etc. in the case of the embodied Ātman, which is in reality what cannot be burnt and what cannot be cut, are having a cause in the delimiting adjuncts of the highest self, so also are weakness etc. (said to be of the Ātman). [13]

Refer to *Gītā* 2.24. *sammoha* really belongs to the body with which the inner self identifies itself through ignorance.

बाह्या तावदियं वृत्तिर्व्याख्याता प्रत्यगात्मनः ।
कार्श्यसंमोहरूपा या प्रसिद्धा जगतीदृशी ॥१४॥

Thus far is explained the external modification (lit. functioning) of the inner self, which has been known in this world to be thus having the nature of being reduced in size and falling in stupour. [14]

This is a brief statement of what is earlier discussed with a view to introducing the Śruti *athainam*

In verses 15-18, is explained the same (i.e. the word sammoha) as the internal functioning.

मरिष्यतोऽस्य या वृत्तिरान्तरी साधुनोच्यते ।
हृत्सन्नन्युपसंहारो यथा स्यादिन्द्रियात्मनाम् ॥१५॥

That which is the internal modification (lit. functioning) of

this one, who is about to die,¹ is now stated. And so also (is stated) the withdrawal of those which are of the nature of organs in the abode, viz. the heart. [15]

The word *vṛtti* conveys at just one time both external and internal modifications which can be taken as the functioning.

¹This refers to the inner self identified with the body.

अथैनमुच्चिक्रमिषु विज्ञानात्मानमीश्वरम् ।
प्राणा वागादयः सर्वे तं समायन्ति कृत्स्नतः ॥१६॥

Then, when this specifically knowing Ātman (*viññānātman*),¹ the lord, is about to depart (from the body); the organs, viz. *vāc* etc. merge into it in their entirety.² [16]

This verse explains the different words in the sentence *athainam*

....

¹This qualification of the *viññānātman* has in view its capacity to control the activities of the organs.

²This adverb, viz. *kṛtsnataḥ*, seeks to distinguish the cessation of the (existence of) organs and their activities in the final sense and not as in sleep.

अभीति चाभिमुख्येऽर्थे सं तु सामस्त्य इष्यते ।
अवध्यर्थे तथाङ्त्र यन्तीत्यस्य विशेषणम् ॥१७॥

The preposition *abhi* has the sense of 'being prone towards', and (*tu*) the preposition *sam* is accepted in the sense of wholeness/fullness; and so also the preposition *āni* (= *ā*) is in the sense of the limit—(all these) are modifiers of the verb *yanti*. [17]

This is the grammatical explanation of the form *abhisamāyanti*. Thus, Sureśvara sees the significance in each of the prepositions which was normally noticeable in early Vedic language.

स्वाश्रयेभ्यो गियासन्ति करणानि हृदीश्वरम् ।
यदैषां स्थानसंबन्धविमोक्षः स्यात्तदैव तु ॥१८॥

When the organs seek to go from their own abodes to the lord in the heart—only then is the release (i.e. separation)¹ of these from their abodes. [18]

¹The Upaniṣad has the intention of comparing the departure of the organs from the body into the lord in the heart with the release or getting loose of the horses of a chariot at the final destination.

SP points out the cessation of the activities of the organs as not temporary like that in a dream, sleep etc.; the same is the final one, as at the time of death, for, otherwise, there would not be proper understanding of death.

In verses 19-21 is mentioned the departure of the organs.

कथं तमभिसंयान्तीत्युक्ते श्रुत्याभिधीयते ।
आत्मानमभिसंयान्ति वागादीनि यथा स्फुटम् ॥१९॥

If (or, when) it is asked as to how they (i.e. the organs) move into that (*viññānātman*), the Śruti clearly states that *vāc* etc. move into the Ātman. [19]

This clarifies the Śruti sentence *sa etā ...* together with a question that could be asked.

Sureśvara has dropped the preposition *ā* which was used in the original, perhaps for the sake of metre.

स आत्मा प्रकृतस्त्वेताश्चक्षुःश्रोत्रादिलक्षणाः ।
तेजोमात्रा यथादेशं समये मृत्तिकर्मणः ॥२०॥

By the word *sa* (in the sentence of the Śruti) is introduced the Ātman¹ and (*tu*) (the Ātman takes)² these portions³ of lustre etc. which are known (or characterized) as the eye,

the ear etc. from their respective regions at the time of death.

[20]

¹This refers to the *avidvān ātman* as mentioned in verse 7 above.

²This refers to the use of the word *samabhyādādānaḥ* with reference to the *Ātman* which conveys the sense of *ādhyā mṛtikāle gacchati*.

³This is to convey the idea of various organs which are the modifications (*vikāras*) of lustre etc. This is the meaning of *mātrā* in this verse; for this explanation see verse 24 below.

उद्धृताकूतविज्ञानो मृतिं प्रति यदा तदा ।
आकूतानुविधायीनि जायन्ते करणान्यथ ॥२१॥

When (this *vijñānātman*) has a specific awareness of the intention with reference to death, then the organs also become prone to activities in accordance with its intention. [21]

This verse brings out the significance of the word *īśvara* for the individual self (verses 16 and 18 above) and the relation of the organs to it as being the followers of the same.

Verses 22-24 explain the meaning of *ādāna* as specific awareness of the form.

स्वाकूतानुविधायित्वं यत्तदा करणात्मनाम् ।
अभ्याददान इति तत्कर्तृत्वं स्यादिहात्मनः ॥२२॥

When following of the intention of the individual self¹ is mentioned by what have the nature of the organs; then there would be the nature of the agent of their activities in the case of the individual self—this is conveyed by the word *abhyādādānaḥ*. [22]

¹This is the meaning of the word *sva* in the verse, i.e. the

non-knowing individual self which is about to die.

एतत्कर्तृत्वमापेक्ष्य श्रुत्यैवमभिधीयते ।
अभ्याददान इति तु तेजोमात्राः स्वदेशतः ॥२३॥

Having this capacity of the individual self's being the agent, the Śruti thus employs the word *abhyādadānaḥ* (and has for its object) the portions of lustre etc. from their respective regions. [23]

Sureśvara has in mind the words *dhyāyatīva* (BU 4.3.7) and, therefore, the capacity of the individual self as the agent is to be understood only metaphorically.

मीयन्ते विषया याभिर्मात्रास्ताश्चक्षुरादयः ।
तेजोविकृतिहेतुत्वात्तेजोमात्राश्च ताः स्मृताः ॥२४॥

The organs (i.e. those *mātras*), viz. the eye etc., are those by which (various) objects become known; and because they are modifications of lustre (etc.) they are known as portions of lustre (etc.).¹ [24]

¹This explains the meaning of *tejomātrāḥ*. This is but the result of ignorance and, therefore, there is reference to modifications like lustre etc. Refer to *Gītā* 2.14 and Śaṅkara's explanation of the word *mātrā* there.

सत्त्वं तेजोऽत्र विज्ञेयं तदेव करणात्मना ।
प्रविभक्तं हि तच्छब्दस्पर्शाद्यर्थावभासनात् ॥२५॥

Here (i.e. in this context) lustre is to be understood as *Sattva* which has differentiated (itself) in the form of (various) organs owing to its revealing such objects as sound, touch etc. [25]

Sureśvara brings out the sense of the word *tejas*, viz. *sattva* as mentioned by the Sāṃkhyas. Cf. *sattvaṃ laghuprakāśakam*

in Sāṃkhyakārikā 13.

पित्ताख्यं वा भवेत्तेजस्तदंशाश्चक्षुरादयः ।
इत्येवमायुर्वेदज्ञाः करणानि प्रचक्षते ॥२६॥

Or, *tejas* can be what is called *pitta* 'bile' and its portions are the eye etc.—thus do the knowers of *Āyurveda* explain (the nature of) the organs. [26]

SP supports this saying: *uktaṃ hi— agnir eva śarīre pittāntaragataḥ kupitākupitāni śubhāśubhāni karotīti* and also *anyo 'pyāha*

*āmāśayāśrayam pittaṃ rañjakam rasarañjanāt /
buddhimedhābhīmānādyair abhipretārthasāadhanāt //
sādhakam hr̥dgatam pittaṃ rūpālocanataḥ smṛtam /
dr̥ksthām ālocakam tvaksthām bhr̥ājakam bhr̥ājanāt tvacaḥ //*
(*Aṣṭāṅgahr̥daya* 1.12.13-14).

For further clarification, read SP with profit.

Sureśvara's siddhānta in this regard is stated in verses 27-28.

यदा पञ्चावतिष्ठन्ते ज्ञानानि मनसा सह ।
इति प्रकाशरूपत्वं करणानां श्रुतिर्जगौ ॥२७॥

The Śruti has declared (lit. sung) the nature of the organs being only the light in the passage *yadā pañcāvatiṣṭhante jñānāni manasā saha* [27]

Sureśvara has taken the support of *Kāthopaniṣad* 6.3.1 and *Maitrāyaṇyupaniṣad* 6.30.

भौतिकस्तु प्रकाशोऽयं भौतिकार्थप्रकाशनात् ।
प्रदीपवन्न भूतेभ्यो जात्यन्तरमतो भवेत् ॥२८॥

And (*tu*) this light is the product of the elements, since it reveals (to view) the objects which (also) are the products

अस्य लोकस्य चेत्युक्तं शुक्रमित्यादि चापरम् ।
सर्वेष्वेषु प्रदेशेषु भूतमात्राग्रहः श्रुतौ ॥३३॥

Also, there is another statement in the Śruti: *asya lokasya* ... (BU 2.1.17) and yet (*ca*) another statement: *śukram* ... (BU 4.3.11). In all these regions (i.e. states) there is in the Śruti the understanding of portions (i.e. the organs) of the elements.

[33]

भूतेभ्यो नापरं वस्तु यस्मादात्मन ईक्ष्यते ॥३४॥
अतो विवेको भूतानां यः परोऽतीव शुद्धितः ।
तेजोमात्रादिवचसा स एवात्राभिधीयते ॥३५॥

Since there is not noticeable (*na īkṣyate*)¹ any object of the Ātman other than the elements; [34]
therefore, there is distinctly the manifestation (*viveka*) of the elements which is beyond (visible organs) and extremely pure in nature—and that alone is expressed here by the word *tejo-mātrā*.² [35]

¹According to the variant reading, 'accepted' (*iṣyate*).

²This refers to *tejomātrāḥ samabhyādādānaḥ*

Verses 36-72 refute the notion of the organs being the modifications of the Ātman.

इन्द्रियाणीन्द्रियार्थाश्च न विकारः परात्मनः ।
अतो न जायत इति तद्विकारनिषेधतः ॥३६॥

The organs and the objects of the organs are not modifications¹ of the highest self; (this is understood) from the rejection of the modification(s) of the same (*paramātmān*) in the Śruti *ataḥ* ...,² *na jāyate*³ [36]

¹*vikārah* is singular for *vikārāḥ* (plural) — *jātāv ekavacanam*.

²BU 3.4.2; 3.6.1; 3.7.23.

³Kaṭhcopaniṣad 2.18; cp. also Gītā 2.20.

जन्मादिविक्रियाषट्कं साक्षात् परमात्मनः ।
अपूर्वानपराद्युक्तेनेति नेत्यादिवाक्यतः ॥३७॥

The group of the six modifications, beginning with birth, cannot be directly (understood as) of the Ātman, (as this is clear from) the statement (about it) as *apūrvam anaparam ...*¹ (and also from) the sentence *neti neti*² [37]

¹BU 2.5.19: *tad etad brahmāpūrvam anaparam anantaram abāhyam ...*; and BU (Mādhyandina) 3.8.8: *apūrvam anaparam ... abāhyam*.

²BU 2.3.6; 3.9.23; 4.4.22; 4.5.15.~

न च वेदान्तसिद्धान्ते परमात्मातिरेकतः ।
इष्टं विकारवद्वस्तु यथा कापिलशासने ॥३८॥

And, in the doctrine of Vedānta, there is not accepted anything that undergoes modifications and is beside the highest Ātman, as there it is in the doctrine of Kapila.¹ [38]

¹The verse refers to the Sāṃkhya doctrine which accepts *īśvara* and various modifications as distinct objects of reality.

स्वतः कटस्थतत्त्वस्य तदसंबोधतस्ततः ।
जन्मादिविक्रियाषट्कसंगतिः स्यात्परात्मनः ॥३९॥

(It follows) that there is acceptance (or, postulation) of the group of six modifications beginning with birth in association with the highest Ātman as (coming) from the absence of knowledge of that which in itself has the nature of immutable reality. [39]

SP cites Śvetāśvataropaniṣad 4.10 to support this argument *māyām tu prakṛtim*

आत्मकारणवादोऽयमेवं सत्युपपद्यते ।
न तु विध्वस्तनिःशेषजन्मनाशादिकारणे ॥४०॥

This being accepted thus, this doctrine of the Ātman as the (supposed) cause (of the organs etc.)¹ becomes reasonable; but indeed not when there is (the mere statement about it) as being the cause of all the removal of (the notions of) birth, destruction etc. [40]

The first line states the reason when and why knowledge of *ātmakāraṇavāda* is necessary for liberation. The mere mention of the nature of the Ātman is not sufficient.

¹Cf. verse 29 above.

तेजोऽतो भौतिकं सर्वमन्यत्र परमात्मनः ।
स्वयंज्योतिःप्रसङ्गेन तदुक्तं प्रागपि श्रुतौ ॥४१॥

There is, therefore, everywhere else than in the highest Ātman, all elemental lustre. And that has been stated earlier also in the Śruti in the context of the self-shining (Ātman).¹ [41]

¹This refers to contents of Jyotis Brāhmaṇa.

आदित्यादीनि तेजांसि तथाध्यात्माधिभूतयोः ।
भौतिकान्येव तानीति प्रत्यङ् तेभ्यो विलक्षणः ॥४२॥

So also, the lustres such as the sun etc. which pertain to the bodies and the elements, are but the products of the elements and the inner self is (altogether of another form) distinct from theirs. [42]

ता एतास्तेजसो मात्राः समस्ताश्चाभिमुख्यतः ।
सामस्त्येनाददानः संहृत्सन्नन्युपसर्पति ॥४३॥

The Ātman, taking up in their entirety all these portions of

lustre and being their master,¹ enters into the abode of the heart. [43]

This is the meaning of *sa ...* and *hr̥dayam*

अभ्याददान एवायमन्ववक्रामतीश्वरः ।
न त्वाक्रम्य समादत्ते कथं तदिति भण्यते ॥४४॥

(Thus) this lord, taking up (these portions of lustre), enters into (the subtle form); but it does not step on the same and takes them (i.e. the portions of lustre)—how that is explained (in the following verses).¹ [44]

¹This verse explains the relation of the form *abhyādadānaḥ*, with the addition of the suffix *-śānac* to the verb in the sentence. This indicates the simultaneity of the two actions, as clarified in the second line and also in the following verses again.

विशेषज्ञानलाभोऽस्य लिङ्गात्मानुविधानतः ।
यतस्तदपकर्षेण विज्ञानात्मोपसंहतिः ॥४५॥
तद्व्याप्तौ चापि संव्याप्तिरापादतलमस्तकम् ।
स्वतस्तु व्याप्तिसंहाररहितत्वात्परात्मनः ॥४६॥

Since, for this one (Ātman), there is acquisition of specific knowledge by entering into what has the nature of the subtle form, there is the inclusion of the specifically knowing Ātman by this entering; [45]

and by pervading that (subtle form), there is complete pervasion from head to foot (of the subtle form)—for the highest Ātman is, by its very nature, without any activity of pervading and collecting (various properties etc.). [46]

SP makes a relevant observation: *liṅgasāṅkocavikāśāv eva tadupādher ātmanas tāv iti*.

सैन्धवादिरसव्याप्ते पीयमाने यथोदके ।

पानं सलवणस्यैवं लिङ्गात्मानुविधायिता ॥४७॥

As the water which is pervaded by the taste of salt etc. being drunk, there is drinking of salty (water), there is similarly the action of the Ātman of entering into the subtle form.

[47]

This gives an example of the entry of the Ātman into the subtle form as similar to the taste of salt which is entering into the water that is being drunk.

सोऽभ्यादानस्य कर्तात्र लिङ्गं योऽस्मीति मन्यते ।
आक्रामद्धृदयं लिङ्गमन्ववक्रामतीव सः ॥४८॥

That Ātman, which is the agent of activities of taking up (those forms), is here the one who thinks, 'I am this subtle form (*linga*)'; and the one, entering into the subtle form, i.e. the heart, is mentioned as one entering into it, as it were. [48]

This is once again to stress the real absence of any action on the part of the Ātman.

तथा हृदयशब्देन तत्स्था धीरभिधीयते ।
एवेत्यवधृतिश्चात्र स्वप्नप्राज्ञनिवृत्तये ॥४९॥

So also, the word *hṛdaya* is expressive of the intellect which resides in it.¹ And the specification with the use of the word *eva* here results in the warding off of the self, in both the dream and the deep sleep states. [49]

¹This refers to the intellect as having its abode in the heart, as mentioned earlier in BU 4.1.35 which begins with the discussion about transmigration of an individual.

विशेषकार्यवाहिभ्यः स्रोतोभ्यः स्वप्नभूमिगः ।
विशेषाननुसृप्यात्मा यात्वा हृदयमाश्रयम् ॥५०॥

पुरीतत्प्रमुखं देहं वृत्त्या सामान्यरूपया ।
तप्तलोहादिवद्व्याप्य शेते प्राणात्मतां गतः ॥५१॥

The individual, resting in the abode of the dream state, flows out from the organs (*srotas*) which bear particular effects (of activity etc. due to ignorance) unto some particular (objects) and then proceeds¹ to its (own) support, i.e. the heart,² [50] (and) that into the body having *purītat* (*nāḍī*) as prominent (among *nāḍīs*), in its general form³ and having become the nature of *prāṇas* (i.e. winds) remains there, occupying it, as (heat) resides in a hot piece of iron. [51]

¹*yātvā* is for *yāti*.

²This stands for the intellect.

³This is in the form of impressions. Cf. BU 4.3.

इह त्वेवेति निःशेषा लिङ्गस्यास्योपसंहतिः ।
विशेषेभ्योऽविशेषेभ्यो युक्तं प्रत्यवसर्पणम् ॥५२॥

In this (world) here, there is complete withdrawal (of the organs) in the subtle form; (for) it is reasonable (to understand) the going back (i.e. withdrawal) from all particulars (and) non-particulars.¹ [52]

¹This indicates withdrawal in the subtle form of particular (i.e. individual) effects of ignorance and the Ātman which is not an effect.

Verses 53-55 conclude the thought in hrdayam anvavakrāmati.

अवदध्रेऽत एवेति मा भूत्स्वप्नादिवतिस्थितिः ।
सामान्यं वा विशेषो वा न यतोऽत्रावशिष्यते ।
कार्त्स्न्येन हृदय एव पिण्डीभावं व्रजत्यतः ॥५३॥

Therefore, the Śruti has made specification,¹ by the use of the word *eva*, to convey that (after death) there should not

be a state like dream etc.² and, whatever it be, general or particular in nature, it does not remain here (i.e. in the body); (since,) from this (body), it becomes wholly as a lump in the heart. [53]

This is the sense of the Śruti statement *hrdayam*

¹Sureśvara uses the Ātmanepada form significantly, i.e. to indicate that this situation is not for the service of any other body.

²This refers to deep sleep state.

विधिराकर्षणे तावत्तेजोमात्राश्रयो गतः ।
अथासंवेदनविधिर्मूर्षोरुच्यते यथा ॥५४॥

So far is mentioned the manner in which there is withdrawal (*ākarṣaṇa*)¹ in relation (*āśraya*) to the portions of lustre. And then there is stated here the manner of non-knowing on the part of the individual who is about to die. [54]

The first line refers to the gist of the entire sentence *sa yatra* ... and the second line explains how, at the time of death, the individual self ceases to have the knowledge of word etc. (which is being discussed later).

¹This is for *apakarṣa* in verse 48 above.

साधारणात्मनो योऽंशो भोक्तृकर्मवशीकृतः ।
अध्यात्मं चक्षुषि रवेश्चक्षुर्व्यापारसिद्धिकृत् ॥५५॥

Whatever portion of the sun, which is of general nature, is (located) in the eye with respect to the body. It is controlled by the activity of the enjoyer and accomplishes/effects operation of the eye. [55]

This is to explain the meaning of the word *cākṣuṣa* in *sa cākṣuṣaḥ*.

Verses 56-61 explain the withdrawal of the portions of divinities (in the organs) which have favoured them.

कर्मोपभोगसिद्धयर्थं परिच्छिन्नः स्वचक्षुषा ।
चाक्षुषोऽतः स विज्ञेयः सामान्यात्मापि भास्करः ॥५६॥

Therefore, though the sun is of general nature (i.e. the pervader), that (portion of lustre) is to be known as *cākṣuṣa* 'what belongs to the eye', which is limited by that individual self's eye for effecting the enjoyment (of the result) of its activity. [56]

Sureśvara points to *Aitareyopaniṣad* 1.3.4: *ādityaś cakṣur bhūtvākṣiṇī prāviśat* (cp. *Jaiminīyopaniṣad* 8.11.12) for explaining the significance of the word *cākṣuṣa*.

स एष पुरुषो यत्र तत्प्रयोक्तृक्रियाक्षये ।
क्षेत्रज्ञार्थात्पराडेव पर्यावर्तत आत्मनि ॥५७॥

When (*yatra*) there is cessation of the activity of the impeller (i.e. the force) of that (i.e. the eye), it is this Puruṣa who resides in the Ātman, away from the objects¹ for the knower of the field. [57]

The verse explains the meaning of *arūpajño bhavati*.

¹This refers to *rūpa*.

निरनुग्रहतैवास्य पर्यावर्तनमुच्यते ॥५८॥
हल्लिङ्गप्रसृतो योऽंश उपभोगार्थमक्षिणि ।
सोऽस्य कर्मक्षयादक्षः पराडावर्तते हृदि ॥५९॥

By the word *paryāvartana* is expressed the character of this one¹ as not being a favouring (deity of an organ). [58]
Whatever portion (of the lustre), which has been in the eye, for (an individual's) experience or enjoyment and has proceeded to the subtle form, viz. heart,² and (this is to mean:) it, owing

to the cessation of the activity of this one, has turned away from the eye³ to the heart. [59]

Verse 58 explains the word *parāvartate* in the preceding verse. Verse 59 explains in detail the process called *parāvartana*.

¹This means, not being associated with the objects.

²This stands for the intellect in the subtle form.

³This refers to the abode in the body of lustre.

चाक्षुषे पुरुषे तस्मिन्नावृत्ते कर्मणः क्षयात् ।
देवता देवतामेति लिङ्गैक्यं करणं तथा ॥६०॥

When, after the cessation of the activity (of the eye), that Puruṣa (i.e. the individual self), residing in the eye, has returned,¹ (the superintending) deity also becomes the deity (of general nature) and the organ also becomes one with *liṅga* 'the subtle form' (i.e. heart, i.e. the intellect). [60]

¹The word *āvṛtta* stands for *parāvṛtta*; 'to the heart' is to be supplied.

अथैवं सत्यरूपज्ञो देवताकरणच्युतेः ।
आत्मैवमुक्तानुक्तेषु योज्यं प्राणेष्वशेषतः ॥६१॥

When this is so,¹ the individual self itself is thus the non-knower of the form of the object(s)² on account of (its) being deviated from deity and organ. This process has to be understood³ in the case of all the *prāṇas* 'organs' whether mentioned or non-mentioned. [61]

This refers to the mention of *cakṣus*, which has to be taken as indicative of other organs and their superintending deities.

¹*atha* here stands for *tadā*.

²This is ceasing to favour the activity of knowing (*anugrahakanivṛtti*).

³Literally, it means 'has to be used', or 'connected with (an

organ)'.

Verses 62-66 argue the non-noticing of any activity in an insentient (object/organ) from which the sentient (deity) has withdrawn itself.

चेतनावदधिष्ठानात्करणादेर्जडात्मनः ।
 प्रवृत्तिर्नियता दृष्टा लोकेऽतो न विपर्यये ॥६२॥

It is seen in the world that there is an activity of organs etc., which are (lit. is) insentient in nature, (only) as controlled by the support of what has sentience, and this is not (noticed) where there is the opposite of it.¹ [62]

Cp. the argument with BSB 2.2.2 (p.492-493): *na hi mṛdādayo vā svayam acetanāḥ ... dṛśyante*; and also SP points a statement in BU 3.4.1 *yaḥ prāṇena prāṇiti*

¹And, when not supported by any sentient individual.

Now follows the discussion on BU 4.4.2 in verses 63-125.

अरूपज्ञत्वहेतुः क इत्याशङ्क्योत्तरं वचः ।
 लोकप्रसिद्धिमाचष्ट एकीत्यादि मुमूर्षति ॥६३॥

The subsequent statement of the Śruti (has proceeded), having in view the objection, viz. 'what would be the cause of (the individual self's) not-knowing the form?' It states what is popularly known in the case of a dying person, in the words *ekī(bhavati ...)*. [63]

SP states the *lokaprasiddhi*. as: *devatākaraṇacyutir evārūpa-jñātvahetuḥ*.

एकीभवति सावित्रः सवित्रांशस्तथैव च ।
 लिङ्गांशश्चाक्षुषो व्यूढो लिङ्गैक्यं प्रतिपद्यते ॥६४॥

The portion of Savitr (i.e. Āditya), one residing in the eye

becomes one with Savitr and so also the portion of the subtle form which is limited by¹ Āditya (i.e. superintended over by the sun) becomes one with the subtle form. [64]

¹vyūḍha stands for *avacchinna* 'limited by'.

स्वांशिभ्यामेकतापत्तौ देवतालिङ्गभागयोः ।
अथारूपज्ञतामेति यः प्राग्रूपादिवेद्यभूत् ॥६५॥

Thus, when the deity and the portion of the deity have become one with the subtle form, that one who was formerly a knower of forms etc. becomes a non-knower of forms. [65]

अथैनं पार्श्वगाः प्राहुर्बन्धवोऽस्य ममर्षतः ।
वाक्यमेकीभवतीति निराशास्तस्य जीविते ॥६६॥

Then, at this time, the relations around this dying individual say this sentence:¹ *ekībhavati*, having become hopeless about (the continuity of) his life. [66]

¹That is, 'he is now a non-knower of form'.

Verses 67-70 point to the absence of any indication of the order in the cessation of the activities of the organs—though that of the eye is mentioned.

करणे देवता यस्मिन्पूर्वं मुञ्चत्यनुग्रहम् ।
तस्यैव प्रथमं वृत्तिनिरोध उपजायते ॥६७॥

There occurs the cessation of the activity of that organ first, in the case of which the deity gives up its favouring (or superintending over) it first. [67]

In this verse is not mentioned any specific order of the cessation of activities of various organs. The reference is only to what is experienced in this order or another of the cessation

of activities of the organs.

कस्मिंश्चित्करणे वृत्तिनिरोधः पूर्वमीक्ष्यते ।
अयौगपद्येनोत्क्रान्तौ तल्लिङ्गं देवतात्मनाम् ॥६८॥

(This is so said,) because the cessation of activity is seen first in any one of the organs. With respect to the non-simultaneous departure of what has the nature of the deity (of the organ), that (viz. cessation of activity) is an indication.¹ [68]

¹The word *linga* here does not refer to the subtle form of organ/deity, but it conveys the sense of or an indication of departure of the same. The singular means the plural (i.e. all the organs in general).

यदालोचनमात्रं स्याद्रूपादौ चक्षुरादिभिः ।
प्रविवेकता तु रूपादेः सम्यङ्नैव पुमान्भवेत् ॥६९॥
तदोत्क्रान्तां विजानीयान्मनसो देवतामितः ।
केवलालोचनाल्लिङ्गात्तथा बुद्धेश्च देवताम् ॥७०॥

When a person stops becoming a proper seer (lit. discriminator) of form etc., when there is merely noticing by the eye etc. in the case of form etc.; [69]
then should one know that the deity of *manas* has departed from this (his body); and so also (should one know) the deity of the intellect only from indication, viz. (mere) seeing. [70]

Verses 71-72 explain the intended meaning of *ekībhavati*.

एवं तद्देवतोत्क्रान्तावेकीभावेन संगतेः ।
मनुते नो न जानातीत्येवमाहुस्तथा जनाः ॥७१॥

Thus, when the deities of those (organs) have departed, i.e. when they have been understood as associated together (*ekībhāvena*), the people say, *no manute* 'he does not know'.¹

[71]

¹Cp. BU 4.3.28.

उक्तं विमोक्षणं तावत्करणानां स्वदेशतः ।
असंविज्ञानता चोक्ता हृदये चोपसंहतिः ॥७२॥

Thus is stated in the beginning (*tāvat*) the release of the organs from their abodes (in the body) and so also is explained the state of having no knowledge whatever and the withdrawal (of the organs and the sentience) in the heart. [72]

In verses 73-76 are stated some thoughts on the Ātman's movements from region to region.

अथोपसंहताशेषकरणस्यात्मनो यथा ।
लोकान्तरोपसंक्रान्तिस्तथैतदभिधीयते ॥७३॥

Now is being stated as to how there is a departure to other worlds of this individual self which has withdrawn (itself) from all of the organs. [73]

This refers to the shining (or effulgence) at the opening of the heart for another world.

तस्यैतस्य यथोक्तस्य कृत्स्नप्राणोपसंहतेः ।
नाड्यग्रं हृदयस्याथ प्रकर्षेण प्रकाशते ॥७४॥

Now, when there is withdrawing from all the *prāṇas* of this Ātman, as has been stated earlier, the tip of the vein of the heart begins to shine exceedingly. [74]

The verse is a fuller explanation of the word *atha* in the preceding verse.

सर्वेषु संहतेष्वेवं करणेषु सवायुषु ।
बुद्धेः प्रद्योततेऽथाग्रं हृदयस्य यियासतः ॥७५॥

Then, when all the organs together with (all the five types of) winds, are withdrawn,¹ then the tip of the intellect² which is the heart of (the Ātman) that is about to move out of the body, begins to shine. [75]

¹That is to say: have been abandoned by the individual self.

²The words 'of the intellect' is the paraphrase/explanation of 'of the heart'.

स एष कर्मजो बुद्धेः प्रकाशो जायते मृतौ ।
स्वकर्मनिर्मितं लोकं येनात्मायं प्रपश्यति ॥७६॥

This then is the effulgence of the intellect, produced from the activity (of the individual being);¹ this becomes visible (lit. born) at the time of death; (this is so said) since this individual self sees well the (other) world which is produced by the activity (or activities) of itself. [76]

¹This is the explanation of the word *pradyota* which occurs in verse 80 below.

Verses 77-82 describe how 'ego' of the next body comes into being.

कर्मणैवास्य विज्ञानं तादात्म्यमुपनीयते ।
पश्चादापन्नतद्भावो देहमेतं विमुञ्चति ॥७७॥

By the very activity of this one (i.e. the individual self) specific knowledge (of it) is turned into (lit. brought to the stage of) oneness with (the specific knowledge of the individual self).¹ And then later (the individual self) having obtained the nature (*bhāva*) of that² gives up this (present) body. [77]

SP clarifies that the awareness of a dying individual of what it is going to be in the next birth is identified with the individual

self itself (*tādātmya*).

¹SP points to the awareness of this specific knowledge on the part of the individual, since six months before its death—this is the individual's awareness 'I am going to be so and so' and that is called *pradyota*.

²This is related to verses 96 and 102 (= *Gītā* 8.6) below.

भाविलोकात्मिका यास्य प्रत्यक्चैतन्यबिम्बिता ।
वासनैवात्मनः प्रोक्ता प्रद्योतवचसा स्फुटम् ॥७८॥

That desire, which is said to have been reflected in the sentience of that individual self and has the nature of the ensuing world or form, is itself stated clearly by the word *pradyota*. [78]

मात्रोपादानरूपेण स्वेन भासा पुराब्रवीत् ।
स्वेनैव ज्योतिषा स्वप्ने यथा तद्वदिहापि तत् ॥७९॥

As the Śruti has stated earlier (that there is awareness of the individual self of) its own semblance, owing to its assuming in the dreaming state the various portions of lustre (or various organs) by its own light, so is it to be understood here also.¹

[79]

The verse refers to BU 4.3.

¹In BU 4.3, reference is to the dream state and here in this verse to conditions at death.

प्रद्योतेन यथोक्तेन प्रद्योतितपथा कृत-
कर्मकार्योऽथ हृदयान्निष्क्रामति यथासुखम् ॥८०॥

Then (at the time of death) this one (i.e. the individual self) moves out of the heart happily or unhappily (*yathāsukham*),¹ after it has accomplished all its activities and intended results in the way which is illuminated (or shown) by the effulgent light mentioned earlier. [80]

This refers to verse 79 above.

¹This can be dissolved as *yathā* and *sukham* or *yathā* and *asukham* (SP).

साधवेवातः प्रयत्नेन कर्म कार्यं विपरिचिता ।
पश्यता प्राणिनामेवं कर्ममूलामिमां गतिम् ॥८१॥

The wise one should do well his activities with every effort, on knowing 'such is the movement of the living beings (after death) as rooted in the activities (of themselves)'. [81]

आत्मा स्वकर्मणोपात्तं प्रद्योतेन यथोचितम् ।
लोकं पश्यन्स्वहृदयान्निष्क्रामति यथायथम् ॥८२॥

Then, the individual self (Ātman), seeing, with the help of (this) *pradyota*, the (next) world which is suitable to what is achieved through its (own) activities, moves out of its own heart accordingly. [82]

Verses 83-86 state what controls the movement of the individual self.

चक्षुष्टो वाथ मूधर्नो वा यं यं लोकं प्रपत्स्यते ।
तद्द्वारेणैव निष्क्रामन्न क्वचित्प्रतिहन्यते ॥८३॥

Or, it moves out from (or through) the eye, or from (or through) the head to whichever world it is to go; that is going out through that way, it is nowhere obstructed. [83]

This verse clarifies the word *yathāyatham* in the preceding verse (SP).

आदित्यलोकसंप्राप्तौ चक्षुष्टोऽयं निगच्छति ।
ब्रह्मलोकपरिप्राप्तौ मूधर्न आत्मा निगच्छति ॥८४॥

This (individual self) goes out from (or through) the eye in

order to reach the world of the sun and it moves out from (or through) the head, when it is to reach the world of the Brahman. [84]

In the preceding verse, two alternatives *cakṣuṣṭaḥ* or *mūrdhnaḥ* were stated; the reason for this is given in this verse.

कर्मश्रुतानुरोधेन ह्यन्येभ्यो वा यथायथम् ।
हृदयसृतनाडीभिरित आत्मा निगच्छति ॥८५॥

The individual self moves out of this body (*itah*) through veins that have proceeded from the heart, or from other (organs) accordingly and following the activity (accomplished by it) and/or the knowledge (acquired by it). [85]

लिङ्गं च सर्वतो गच्छन्न क्वचित्प्रतिहन्यते ।
अतिसूक्ष्मस्वभावत्वादपि लोहसमुद्रगम् ॥८६॥

This (individual self) going out from all these (organs) to the subtle form is not anywhere obstructed, owing to its having extremely subtle nature or form, even if it (viz. the subtle form) belonged to the ocean or iron.¹ [86]

¹The meaning of the word *lohasamudraga* which qualifies *linga* is not clear. One could see the variant reading *loham samudgatam*, but that would not be very useful. However, SP states: *abhedyād api lohādeḥ samudgacchet tenātpṛatihatam lingam!*

उत्क्रामन्तं तमात्मानं यथोक्तेनेह वर्त्मना ।
प्राणोऽनूत्क्रामति ततः प्राणं प्राणास्तथा परे ॥८७॥

Prāṇa 'the principal wind' follows it, i.e. that individual self which is departing (from the body) in the way that is stated¹ here; and then the other *prāṇas* 'organs' follow that Prāṇa.

[87]

This is the explanation of the Śruti *tam utkrāmantam*

¹Cf. *yathoktena hrdayāgrapradyotāprakāśitena pathā* (SP).

In verses 88-93 are stated the objection on the basis of śrutakrama and its answer.

नन्वात्मप्राणवागादेरन्योन्यव्यतिमिश्रणात् ।
देशकालाद्यसंभेदात्क्रमेणोत्क्रमणं कथम् ॥८८॥

(An objection is raised:) 'But indeed how can there be the departure of these, i.e. of the individual self, Prāṇa, and the organs like *vāc* etc., for the reason that they are mixed with one another and also that there is the mixture of time, place etc.?' [88]

नैष दोषो यतो नेह क्रमकालो विवक्ष्यते ।
प्रयोजकप्रयोज्यत्वं यतोऽमीषां विवक्षितम् ॥८९॥

(The answer is:) 'There is not a fault in this, since it is not intended here to state the sequence in point of time; but it is intended to state the relation of these as what are to be incited (to depart) and what incite (the others to depart)'. [89]

इहोच्चिक्रमिषा यास्य विज्ञानात्मैकसंश्रया ।
प्राणोत्क्रान्तेः प्रयोक्त्री सा वागाद्युत्क्रमणस्य च ॥९०॥

In this context (*iha*), that which is the desire of this (individual self) for departure, resulting from (lit. resting in) the nature of the specific knowledge on the part of it, is what causes the departure of Prāṇa and that is, in consequence, (the cause of) the departure of *vāc* etc. [90]

The verse explains the thought of the preceding verse.

मुख्यप्राणस्य योत्क्रान्तिः प्रयोक्त्री सैव नापरा ।
विज्ञानात्मैकनीडाया भावनायाः प्रधानता ॥९१॥

That departure of the principal Prāṇa itself is the cause (of the departure of *vāc* etc.) and not any other (can be the cause); there is here the principal role of the impression which is resting in what is of the nature of the specific knowledge of the individual self, viz. that which is of (i.e. identified with) the intellect. [91]

The second line of the verse is for introducing the Śruti statement *savijñānah*

सा हि देहान्तरप्राप्तावात्मनो मार्गदर्शिनी ।
तया प्रयुक्तः प्राणोऽयं प्राणानादाय चैतरान् ॥९२॥

Indeed, that is the one which leads the way of the individual self for reaching (or attaining to) another body; and, therefore, impelled by that one, this Prāṇa moves out taking with it the other organs. [92]

This verse explains how *bhāvanā* becomes the leading or principal force in the departure of Prāṇa etc.

आत्मनानन्यभूतः सञ्जलपात्रार्कवद्वहिः ।
निष्क्रामति यथाकर्म सविज्ञानो भवत्यथ ॥९३॥

(The individual self) not becoming different from itself, departs from the body like the sun moving out of a pot filled with water,¹ according to its activity and (at that time) becoming possessed of that specific knowledge. [93]

¹The simile points to the fact that the reflection of the sun going away from a pot of water does not mean the real movement of the sun. In this same way, we have to understand the individual

self which seems to move out of body, as not really (so doing) or different from sentience, i.e. the Ātman.

Verses 94-106 explain the intention of the Mādhyandina reading *saṁjñāno bhavati*.

ननूपसंहृताशेषकरणत्वादधीः पुमान् ।
तदाकूतानुगुण्यं स्यात्प्राणादेः कथमुच्यते ॥९४॥

(An objection is raised:) 'But indeed since this Puruṣa (i.e. the individual self), who has withdrawn itself from all the organs is, therefore, without any knowledge, how could there be stated in the case of *prāṇa* etc. their becoming subordinate to the intention (or desire) of that (Puruṣa)?' [94]

In verses 94-99 Sureśvara has taken up the statement of the Mādhyandina recension of BU: *saṁjñānam evānvavakrāmati ... sa eṣa jñāḥ saṁjñāno bhavati* as the basis of the objection.

प्रत्यभिज्ञात्मकं ज्ञानं संज्ञानमिति भण्यते ।
पूर्वं यद्धृदयस्याग्रद्योतनेन प्रकाशितम् ॥९५॥
भाविनोऽर्थस्य विज्ञानं प्रत्यभिज्ञानमुच्यते ।
स तथोद्धूतविज्ञान आत्मा देहान्निगच्छति ॥९६॥

(The answer is given:) 'Knowledge, which is of the nature of specific awareness, is stated by the word *saṁjñāna*, as the one which is revealed by the illumination at the opening of the heart, as stated earlier. [95]

Specific knowledge of what is going to result in future is stated (here) as *pratyabhijñāna* 'specific awareness'. Then that individual self moves out of the body, in which that specific knowledge has been produced in that way'. [96]

हृदयाग्रप्रकाशेन निष्क्रान्तस्यापि देहतः ।
निःसंबोधस्य गमनं कथं देहान्तरं प्रति ॥९७॥

(An objection is raised:) 'How can there be the movement to another body (of the individual self) which is without any knowledge even as it has gone out of one body through the force of the illumination at the opening of the heart?' [97]

इत्यस्य परिहाराय स इत्यादि परं वचः ।
स एष ज्ञः परो देवः सविज्ञानो भवत्यथ ॥९८॥

Therefore, in order to answer away this objection, there is the subsequent statement of the Śruti, beginning with *sa*, viz. *sa eṣa jñāḥ paro devaḥ* 'this is the knower, the highest divine being,' and he becomes possessed of that specific knowledge. [98]

संहृताशेषकरणो भावनाकर्महेतुतः ।
सविज्ञानो यथा स्वप्ने तथोत्क्रान्तावपीष्यते ॥९९॥

(The individual self) which has withdrawn itself from all the organs becomes possessed of the specific knowledge for the reason that there is the activity proceeding from desire; as this (happens) in the dream state, so is it accepted (to happen) also in (the movement of this final) departure. [99]

विशेषज्ञानसंबन्धः कर्मणैवास्य हेतुना ।
न तु स्वातन्त्र्यतो लभ्यः स्वातन्त्र्यासंभवादिह ॥१००॥

The relation of this one (i.e. the individual self) to the specific knowledge here (i.e. on death) is only for one reason, viz. (the cessation of) its own activity; that (relation) cannot be effected (lit. obtained by it) independently, since there is no possibility of any independence on the part of it. [100]

कृतकृत्यो भवेत्सर्वो विशेषज्ञानसंगतिः ।
स्वातन्त्र्येणेह चेत्तलभ्या न तु लभ्या तथाह च ॥१०१॥
यं यं वापि स्मरन्भावं त्यजत्यन्ते कलेवरम् ।
तं तमेवैति कौन्तेय सदा तद्भावभावितः ॥१०२॥

Every person (i.e. individual self) who has done all the duties to be performed comes to have association with (that kind of) specific knowledge; if that (association ...) is (to be obtained by it) independently; but it is not to be so obtained—and (the Lord) said: [101]

“A person who, at the time of death, leaves the body, remembering whatever states he has been in, comes to attain that, O son of Kuntī. (It is even so) becoming what he had always cherished as his desire.” [102]

Verse 102 is *Gītā* 8.6.

NKL (ms. p.716) states *pāṭhadvaye 'pi vākyārtham upasaṁharati evam iti. atha karmavaśād iti yāvat.*

एवमात्मा सविज्ञानो गन्तव्यं यत्पुरजितम् ।
तदात्मभावविज्ञानस्तदेवातो निगच्छति ॥१०३॥

Thus, the individual self, being possessed of the specific knowledge and having the specific knowledge in the form of itself, that moves out from this body unto that goal (i.e. region to be attained to), which is secured (by it) earlier (through activities). [103]

NKL (ms. p.716): *yasmāt karmamūlā gatis tasmān mṛtikāle śubhadehe viṣayajñānārtham puṇyam eva vivekibhiḥ anupeyam ity āha ata iti.*

यत एवमतः पुंभिः स्वातन्त्र्यार्थं प्रयत्नतः ।
योगादिसाधनाभ्यासः कर्तव्यः पुण्यसंचयः ॥१०४॥

Since this is so, therefore, men (i.e. the individual selves) have to make an effort to accumulate (i.e. make a collection of) merit and to take to repeated practice¹ of *yoga* etc.;² in order that (they secure) independence.³ [104]

¹Alternatively, *sādhana* can stand for (the pursuit of) the

means to liberation.

²This 'etc.' indicates various *upāsanās*.

³Cf. verse 100 above. SP puts it thus: *mṛtikāle kāla-vaśyavyāvṛttyartham*.

सर्वशास्त्रसमारम्भस्तदर्थोऽयं महानिह ।
वाङ्मनःकायसाध्यानामुपायानां प्रबुद्धये ॥१०५॥

In this regard,¹ it is greatly important to take to the study of all Śāstric texts, and also for conveying various means (of achieving independence) such as those which can be accomplished by means of speech, *manas* and body. [105]

¹That is, *svātantryārtham* mentioned in the preceding verse.

तथानर्थपरिप्राप्तावुपायानां निषेधनम् ।
एतावानेव शास्त्रार्थः कर्त्रधीनः सुखाप्तये ॥१०६॥

Similarly, (there is in the Śāstric texts) the rejection of (the pursuing or adopting of) the means for securing what are undesirable (effects). Only this (lit. this much) is the meaning of the Śāstric texts; it (viz. the teaching of the means of that) is related to (or dependent on) the person who practises (i.e. adopts the means) in order to acquire happiness. [106]

SP sums up the thought thus: *svātantryārthaṃ dharmo 'nuṣṭheyo 'dharmaś ca tyājyaḥ*.

In verses 107-111, there is explained the intention in *taṃ vijñānakarmaṇī*.

मात्रालक्षणमादानं कृत्वा स्वप्नस्य सर्जनम् ।
यथेह न तथा किञ्चिदुपादानं समीक्ष्यते ॥१०७॥

As the dream state is effected (for an individual self) after it has taken up (the organs etc.) characterized as the portions

(of lustres etc.), there is not noticed here (at the time of death) any adopting of any organs (by the individual self).

[107]

अथैवं देवतात्यक्ते लिङ्गे देहाद्वहिर्गते ।

लोकान्तरगतौ हेतुर्लोकारम्भे च भण्यताम् ॥१०८॥

When, as the subtle form, which is bereft of the (various) deities (of the organs), has thus gone out of the body,¹ the question is asked as to what is the cause for the movement unto another world, or for the activities in (the newly acquired) world.

[108]

The verse explains the purpose of some of the following verses.

¹This means *dehāntaragatyārambha*.

आत्मनः परलोकाय यत्स्याद्गमनकारणम् ।

भुङ्क्ते गत्वा च यत्तत्र देहारम्भे च कारणम् ॥१०९॥

लिङ्गानस इतो देहादेहमन्यं निगच्छतः ।

संभारः कोऽस्य गत्यर्थो देहारम्भे च कथ्यताम् ॥११०॥

Let it be said (as to) what would be the reason for the individual self's moving towards the other world and what it experiences on reaching there and what is the cause of the activities of that body

[109]

(that is) for this (individual self) which has a vehicle in (the form of) the subtle body, while it is going from this body to another, and what are its belongings (*sambhāra*) for the journey (lit. movement—*gatyartha*) and activities in (the other) body.

[110]

Verses 108-110 have raised some questions which are answered in the verses to follow, i.e. 111-116.

इतो जिगमिषुं विद्याकर्मणी ये पुरार्जिते ।

तं समन्वारभेते ते या चाभूत्पूर्ववासना ॥१११॥

(In answer it is to be pointed out:) 'When that (individual self) is about to go from this world (to another world),¹ knowledge and activities which were secured by it earlier, follow it and also what was the impression (effected on the intellect of it) earlier'. [111]

The verse conveys in brief the thought that the knowledge and activity of the previous life become the cause of the next world.

¹That is, from this body to a future body.

The meaning of the word vidyā is stated in verses 112-114.

विज्ञानं संशयज्ञानं मिथ्याज्ञानमथापि वा ।
प्रमाणतोऽप्रमाणाद्वा सर्वं विद्येति भण्यते ॥११२॥

Specific knowledge, knowledge which is (beset with) some doubt, or even false knowledge, which is obtained through the use of valid means or invalid means; all is understood (lit. expressed) by the word *vidyā*. [112]

SP puts it succinctly as *jñānamātram atra vidyety arthaḥ*.

संसारकारणध्वंसि यत्तु ज्ञानं परात्मगम् ।
तदत्र न परिग्राह्यं सर्वापत्कारणापनुत् ॥११३॥

But/And (*tu*) that knowledge pertaining to the highest Ātman which destroys the cause of transmigration and removes all the causes of misery, has not to be understood here (i.e. by the word *vidyā*). [113]

This specific knowledge does not have in view (*brahma*)*vidyā*. On the contrary, it has a reference to the destruction of the transmigratory existence, i.e. movement from one body to another.

संसारकारणं तस्मादात्माज्ञानाविरोधि यत् ।
अप्राप्तपरमार्थार्थं ज्ञानमात्रं जिघृक्षितम् ॥११४॥

Therefore, the cause of transmigration is only that knowledge which is not opposed to the ignorance about the (highest) Ātman,¹ (and) that which cannot have secured the highest reality—that is here intended to be expressed (or, understood).

[114]

¹ AnSS edition notes a variant reading *tasmād ātmajñānavirodhi* ..., but the reading also would yield the same sense (as stated above); therefore, we have ignored it.

Verses 115-121 explain what is *karman*.

वाङ्मनःकायसाध्यं च शास्त्रतो यदि वान्यतः ।
दृष्टादृष्टार्थरूपं यत्तच्च कर्मेति गृह्यते ॥११५॥

It is understood (here) that action is what can be accomplished through (the use of) speech, *manas*, bodily organs, and which is learnt from scripture or some other sources (of knowledge) and which has for/as its purpose what is seen or unseen. [115]

अन्वारभेते गच्छन्तं यथोक्ते ज्ञानकर्मणी ।
गच्छन्तं पुरुषं यस्मादन्वेते स्वस्वभावतः ।
गच्छतोऽतौऽनुशब्दोऽत्र पश्चादर्थे प्रयुज्यते ॥११६॥

These knowledge and action, as are stated, follow the departing individual self, since these two, by their own nature, follow the one in the moment of its moving out. Therefore, the word/preposition *anu* here (in the word *anvārabhete*) is used in the sense of following the movement of going. [116]

This is merely an explanation of *taṃ samanvārabhete*. Sureśvara takes *anvārabhete* for *gacchantam anu* and *ārabhete*,

i.e. he takes the word *anu* as a preposition governing the accusative form *gacchantam* (as a *karmapravacanīyam*).

गमनादिविधौ पुंसः साधनत्वं निगच्छतः ॥११७॥
 कर्मणः क्रियमाणस्य संस्कारो यो हृदि श्रितः ।
 तत्फलस्य च भुक्तस्य पूर्वप्रज्ञेति सोच्यते ॥११८॥

Knowledge acquired earlier (by the individual self) in its act of going out unto (another body) is (in other words) the impression of the act which is being performed and which is becoming (a means) for transmigration, and also of the result of which is enjoyed. That (impression) has found a support in the heart. [117-118]

See the next two verses and also verses 95-96 above.

पूर्वोपचितसंस्कारहेतुभ्यः साभिजायते ॥११९॥
 षण्मासशेषप्रोद्धूता वासना यास्य देहिनः ।
 मरिष्यतोऽन्यदेहार्थं पूर्वप्रज्ञेति तां विदुः ॥१२०॥

That ('(specific) awareness acquired before') is produced from the causes in the form of the impressions acquired (by the intellect of a transmigratory being) in the previous life; [119] and the desire which is produced in the person who is going to die as a remainder of (the preceding) six months for moving unto another body is known as '(specific) awareness acquired before', [120]

समर्था सैव ते यस्मादुद्धोद्धं ज्ञानकर्मणी ।
 नरस्यातः प्रधानत्वात्पृथक्तस्या ग्रहः कृतः ॥१२१॥

Only that is capable of conveying the knowledge and action of a man (i.e. a transmigratory being who is about to die) which are mentioned separately from 'specific awareness acquired before', since it is more prominent (than the two). [121]

In the Upaniṣadic sentence knowledge and action are mentioned together in a compound and 'specific awareness acquired before' is also mentioned separately and for this reason, Sureśvara has mentioned them here and the same thought is explained in the next verse.

Verses 122-125 state the reason as to why vidyākarmaṇī is expressed in a compound whereas there is a separate mention of pūrvaprajñā.

समासेनैव निर्दिष्टे कारणत्वाविशेषतः ।
 अन्योन्यकारणत्वाच्च श्रुत्येह ज्ञानकर्मणी ॥१२२॥
 पूर्वप्रज्ञात उद्भूतिर्विद्यायाः कर्मणो यतः ।
 ताभ्यां च भावनोद्भूतिर्निर्देशोऽतो यथोदितः ॥१२३॥

Here, knowledge and action are mentioned by the Śruti in a compound only, because both of them do not have a cause which is distinct (in the case of each), and because each is the cause of the other. [122]

Since the rise of knowledge and (also) action is from the 'specific awareness acquired before'; therefore, there is, as said before, the rise of the two from impression (*bhāvanā*).¹ [123]

¹This is for *pūrvaprajñā*.

कर्मणो भुज्यमानस्य परिशेषो हि भावना ।
 मूलं च जायमानस्य प्रधानं तेन भण्यते ॥१२४॥

The remainder (of the result) of an action, which is enjoyed, is *bhāvanā* 'impression' (and), since it is the root cause of what is being born, it is described as prominent. [124]

परिच्छेत्री विनिर्मात्री विद्या लोकान्तरस्य हि ।
 विकर्तृ कर्म वोढुरी च पूर्वप्रज्ञेह पूर्वयोः ॥१२५॥

Indeed, knowledge is the delimiter and the creator of the other world (i.e. birth), and it is the 'specific awareness acquired before' which is the performer of modifying action for the first two.¹ [125]

¹This refers to knowledge and action.

Now follows the discussion on BU 4.3.3 in verses 126-136.

नानाविकल्पसद्भावात्संदेहो गमनं प्रति ।
पक्षीव वृक्षात्किं तावत्परिच्छिन्नो व्रजत्ययम् ॥१२६॥

Since there are various notions (among thinkers) about the movement (of the individual self from one body to another), there may arise a doubt: (i) Does this one, being delimited, move (to another body) like a bird from one tree to another?¹ [126]

SP points out the holders of these views; they are: (i) Digambara Jainas, (ii) Devatāvādins, (iii) Sāṃkhyas, (iv) Vaiśeṣikas, and (v) Vedāntins.

¹This simile is adduced by Digambara Jainas.

Verses 127-136 are explanation of BU 4.4.3.

आतिवाहिकदेहेन किं वा देहान्तरं प्रति ।
गतिर्विकाशसंकोचौ भिन्नकुम्भस्थदीपवत् ।
मतं वा किं मनोमात्रं देहादेहान्तरं व्रजेत् ॥१२७॥

(ii) Does it move to another body with the help of some another body as its carrier?¹ (iii) Or, is the movement of this one but the expansion or contraction like (the light) of one lamp (put) in different pitchers?² (iv) Or, is it considered to be only *manas* which goes from one body to another?³ [127]

¹SP states *devatā yena dehena viśiṣṭau jīvam paralokam nayati so 'yam ātivāhiko dehaḥ*.

²SP states this as Sāṃkhya view.

³This is, as SP points out, the view of Vaiśeṣika.

किं वा सर्वगतानां स्यात्करणानामिहात्मनि ।
श्रुतकर्मानुरोधेन वृत्तिहान्युद्भवौ क्वचित् ॥१२८॥

(v) Or, could it be that there is here¹ the origination and destruction at some time,² of all the organs belonging to all transmigratory beings in the (highest) Ātman in accordance with knowledge and action? [128]

¹This refers to what is held by the Siddhāntin.

²This refers to the time of death in the case of some transmigratory beings and the moment of liberation of some others.

इति भूरिविकल्पायां भूमौ सिद्धान्त उच्यते ।
अनन्ताः सर्व एवैते वाङ्मनःप्राणलक्षणाः ॥१२९॥

Thus, there being various notions in this context, i.e. *bhūmi* (the moment of transmigration of a being from one life to another), the Siddhānta is to be stated now. Indeed, all these beings, which are characterized by speech, *manas* and *prāṇas* are innumerable. [129]

In verses 130-136 is stated the final opinion as given by the Śruti.

प्राणिकर्मानुरोधेन प्लुष्यादिपरिमाणता ।
इति श्रुत्युक्तितस्तेषां प्रतिप्राणि यथामति ।
यथाकर्म गतिः स्थानं परिच्छेदोऽथ विस्तृतिः ॥१३०॥

(Now) in accordance with the action of (different) living beings,

there is their being possessed of magnitude, such as (that of) a gnat—this is from the statement (of this) in the Śruti.¹ Here is the mention of their states (viz. goals)² in accordance with their thoughts at the end of (the earlier) life, in accordance with their actions as also (*atha*) their delimitations and their expanse. [130]

¹Cf. BU 1.3.22; BUBV 1.3.205.

²The singular form in the original is indicative of the plural form (*jātāv ekavacanam*).

स्वातन्त्र्यं पारतन्त्र्यं वाणिमाद्यैश्वर्यमेव वा ।
करणानामिदं सर्वं ज्ञानकर्मादिहेतुकम् ॥१३१॥

Be it dependence or independence (of them), or (having) the characteristics of being minute etc., or being the lord of these organs, it is all but caused by *jñāna*¹ and action etc.² [131]

Regarding movement to the state of animals etc. and attainment of *aiśvarya*, some commonly known injunction is given.

¹That is, *vidyā*.

²This refers to various modifications of three *guṇas* of various *Jīvas*.

अस्मदादेर्यथा तद्वद्विद्याकर्मानुरोधतः ।
अनात्मनोऽपि चानन्त्यं न स्वतः सिद्धमात्मवत् ॥१३२॥

As in our case, so also in the case of non-Ātman,¹ there is infiniteness (in number) in accordance with its knowledge¹ and action. But it is not existent, in its own right, like the (highest) Ātman. [132]

¹This distinguishes living beings from those bodies which have no life in them (i.e. things).

इतीमं पक्षमाश्रित्य श्रुत्या दृष्टान्त उच्यते ॥१३३॥

तृणाग्रस्था जलूकेह प्राप्य तस्मात्तृणान्तरम् ।
संहरत्यात्मनात्मानं पूर्वस्मात्तत्र सा क्रमात् ॥१३४॥

Having resorted to this view (of Vedānta) has the Śruti expressed an example: [133]

The case is like that of a leech, which is sitting on the tip of some blade of grass, contracts itself (= *ātmanā* equal to *svāyavas*) and, from that earlier (body), gradually moves unto another blade of grass in its new body (*ātmānam*). [134]

यथैवमेवमात्मेदं शरीरं कर्मणः क्षयात् ।
निहत्याचेष्टमापाद्य स्वात्मलिङ्गोपसंहृतेः ॥१३५॥
गमयित्वा तथाविद्यां जाड्यं निःसंज्ञतामिदम् ।
अतोऽन्यमाक्रमं देहं प्राप्य भावनयाञ्जितः ।
पूर्वदेहस्थमात्मानं संहरत्यात्मनात्मनि ॥१३६॥

As it happens in this way, so also does this one individual self strike down the body, owing to the loss of its action. Through the withdrawal of the characteristic signs of its own body (that is, from the organs, into the subtle body) it attains inactive (state) and by bringing about the loss of knowledge, inactivity and lifelessness and then attaining to another state, i.e. body, and being tainted with *bhāvanā*, it enters into another body, taking itself away from the earlier body. [135-136]

This explains the *dārṣṭāntika* 'exemplified' of the *drṣṭānta* 'example' in verse 133.

Now follows the discussion on the example in BU 4.4.4 in verses 137-146.

जलूकावद्गतिरियमात्मनः प्रतिपादिता ।

This is (thus) presented as an exposition on the individual self's movement to another state as that of a gnat. [137ab]

तत्र देहान्तरारम्भ उपादानं किमात्मनः ॥१३७॥
 उपमृद्योपमृद्यास्य नित्योपात्तं किमिष्यते ।
 पुनः पुनरपूर्वं वा देहारम्भाय कल्पते ॥१३८॥

(A question is asked:) 'There, in that coming into another body, what is the material¹ for this individual self?' [137cd]
 (The question continues:) 'What is accepted (as the material cause) (by that individual self) ever for creating another body, i.e. by repeatedly crushing it again and again? and whether it is some new (material cause)?' [138]

SP, while explaining the verse 137cd, gives some more details: whether or not there is any material cause which the individual self has as the means and, if there is none, there would not be produced another body, which is a positive entity, and, if there is any material means, that requires to be stated.

Under verse 138 also, SP supplies yet more details involving this explanation which can be useful for a clearer understanding of the thought.

¹This is material cause.

इति दृष्टान्तवचसा निर्णयोऽस्योपवर्ण्यते ॥१३९॥
 पेशस्कारी यथा मात्रामुपादायेह पेशसः ।
 विमृद्य रचनां पूर्वां कुरुते रचनान्तरम् ॥१४०॥
 नवान्नवतरं रूपं कल्याणतरमेव च ।
 कल्याणादिति दृष्टान्तो यथा तद्वदिहापि च ॥१४१॥

This (i.e. the number of questions above) is decided with the statement of an example: [139]

A goldsmith takes from gold a little piece and, after crushing the earlier shape of it, creates another shape, [140]
 thus creating a newer and newer and more and more beautiful form of it than which it had earlier—this is the example. As it is there,¹ so it is here² also. [141]

On verse 140 SP states: *nityopāttam eva bhūtapāṇcakam*

ārambhakam ity asyārthasya dr̥ṣṭāntena nirṇayo na ca māyā-vādavirodhaḥ pratyakcāitanyāśritamāyāvivartabhūtapāñcakapari-ṇāmo jagad iti sthiter iti bhāvaḥ. See verse 149 below which is the basis of this explanation.

¹In the action of the goldsmith.

²In the case of the creation of a new body.

आपेक्ष्य नवमादानं तत्कार्यं नवमुच्यते ।
श्रुत्या नवतरं रूपं कल्याणतरमेव च ॥१४२॥

With this in view, viz. the (individual's or the organs') taking up (of their materials),¹ the effect (i.e. product) of them is described by the Śruti as new; and (every) newer form is (indeed) more blissful. [142]

¹This refers to the five elements, as stated in just the next verse.

नित्योपात्तानि भूतानि करणानि च देहिनः ।
द्वे वाव ब्रह्मणो रूपे इति पूर्वमवादिषम् ॥१४३॥

And thus are the various elements always taken (as the material for creating another body), and the various organs of a living being. And I have already stated¹ that there are indeed two forms of the Brahman. [143]

¹Cf. BU 2.3.1. This explains the subtle form of the five elements as also the gross form of the same which are related to the two forms of the Brahman.

Here also SP gives a detailed note which can be read with profit.

उपमृद्योपमृद्यैषां रचनां प्राक्तनीं पुनः ।
यथाकर्म यथाज्ञानं कुरुते रचनान्तरम् ॥१४४॥

(This means:) In repeatedly crushing earlier shape, the

individual self creates another shape, in accordance with the action and in accordance with the knowledge (of the earlier life). [144]

पित्रादियोग्यं पित्र्यादि ह्युत्तमाधममध्यमम् ॥१४५॥
 पित्र्यादिलोकेष्वात्मायं यथाकर्म यथाश्रुतम् ।
 तनुते देहजातानि भूरिरूपाण्यविद्यया ॥१४६॥

This individual self creates (lit. extends the net of) various bodies which have different forms owing to its ignorance thus: viz. those of the fathers etc. which are suitable for the forefathers etc., varying as the best, less and lowest in the worlds of the manes, in accordance with the action and knowledge (*śruta*) (of the earlier life). [145-146]

Now follows, in verses 147-234, the discussion on BU 4.4.5.

न तु चैतन्यवत्साक्षात्संसारोऽस्य स्वतो मतः ।
 इत्यर्थप्रतिपत्त्यर्थमाजगामोत्तरं वचः ॥१४७॥

But/And (*tu*) this transmigration of this individual self is not held to be, in its own right, directly perceptible, as is sentience; (then) in order to expand this (particular) thought, there now follows every later statement (of the *Śruti*). [147]

Verses 148-152 explain the two forms of the *Ātman*, viz. the real and the other which is imagined.

यच्चास्य वास्तवं रूपं यच्चाविद्योत्थमात्मनः ।
 स वा इत्यादिना तस्य निर्णयः क्रियतेऽधुना ।
 तन्निर्णयादशेषोऽर्थोऽनिर्णीतः स्यात्कथं न्विति ॥१४८॥

Now there is a decision made in the *Śruti* statement *sa vai* ... as regards: the real form (or nature) of this individual self and that which has arisen from ignorance, but, the words *katham nu* indicate the question: How is the whole thought

not decided by the decision of that? ¹

[148]

¹This refers to what is mentioned earlier in as regards

संसारी यो यथोक्तेन ग्रन्थेन प्रतिपादितः ।
तद्गृहीत्यै सशब्दोऽयं तत्स्मृत्यर्थं तथा च वै ॥१४९॥

The word *saḥ* in this sentence is for including ¹ in the discussion (the individual self) which is described as a transmigratory being in the statement already made; and so also the word *vai* is used for reminding one of the thought of that.

[149]

¹This is for 'referring to'.

अनात्मभूत एतस्मिन्कार्यकारणलक्षणे ।
संसारे प्रथते योऽर्थ आत्मनानन्यमानगः ॥१५०॥

This individual self reveals itself (i.e. appears) in this transmigratory existence which is the non-Ātman by nature characterized by effects and their causes, ¹ it is not to be grasped by any other means, (other than the Śruti).

[150]

¹Cp. BUBV 4.3.1154, and also verses 153 and 155 below, but SP explains *kāryakāraṇa* as *avidyā* and *tatkārya*.

यत्साक्षिकौ यथोक्तस्य भावाभावौ प्रसिध्यतः ।
संसारवस्तुनः सोऽयमात्मेत्यत्राभिधीयते ॥१५१॥
व्यभिचारौ न यस्यास्ति सर्वेषु व्यभिचारिषु ।
तदवष्टम्भतः सिद्धेर्व्यभिचारस्य सर्वदा ॥१५२॥

That one, on whose being the witness, are established existence and non-existence of the already mentioned things ¹ of the transmigratory world is stated (in the words) 'This one is the Ātman'

[151]

and it does not change even while all (the transmigratory

things) are changing because their changeableness becomes established ever through their dependence on that (Ātman). [152]

¹-*vastu* is for -*vastūni*— viewed severally.

Verses 153-161 pertain to the propriety in referring to the individual self as 'this'.

प्रत्यक्तयास्य साक्षात्त्वादक्रियाकारकत्वतः ।
अनन्यबोधमानत्वादयमित्युच्यते ततः ॥१५३॥

Therefore, this one is mentioned as *ayam* because it is inside (every other being or thing), directly perceptible, and is not of the nature of any instrument of activity and because it has only the knowledge (from the Śruti) as the means of knowing (it). [153]

This explains why the Ātman is referred to by the demonstrative pronoun *idam* which yields the form *ayam*, i.e. directly perceptible, not beyond the ken of the means of perception.

निःशेषानात्मतद्वेतुनिराकरणवर्त्मना ।
आत्मत्वमात्मनः सिध्येन्नान्यशेषमनात्मवत् ॥१५४॥

The nature of the individual self of being the Ātman gets established by way of the removal of (the notion/acceptance of) the entire non-Ātman (things) and their cause(s); it is not dependent on any other thing as is every non-Ātman. [154]

The verse points to the real non-delimited character of the individual self.

असाधारणसिद्धयैव सिद्धिः स्यादात्मवस्तुनः ।
यतोऽत आत्मवस्त्वेव कार्यकारणवज्जगत् ॥१५५॥

Since the thing called the Ātman would get established only by the uncommon (means of) establishing (it);¹ therefore, the thing called the Ātman is itself this world which is made up of (what are called) effects and causes. [155]

This is to emphasise the nature of the transmigratory world as the result of *adhyāsa*.

¹That is, by the Śruti.

न हीदमात्मनः स्थानं ततोऽन्यत्रापि वाश्नुते ।
आत्मनोऽव्यतिरेकेण यतोऽनात्मा प्रसिध्यति ॥१५६॥

This (world) does not come to have any abode (or support, or place) for itself elsewhere than in the Ātman; since the non-Ātman (which is identified with the world) gets established as being non-different from the Ātman, i.e. not without it. [156]

This supports the nature of the transmigratory world as the result of *adhyāsa*.

आत्मा त्वनात्मप्रत्यक्त्वाद्व्यतिरेकं न सोऽर्हति ।
स्रज्जीव सर्पदण्डादेः स्रग्विद्योत्थवस्तुनः ।
स्रक्तत्त्वव्यतिरेकेण सिद्धिर्नान्यत्र कुत्रचित् ॥१५७॥

And (*tu*) that Ātman cannot be (mentioned as) being distinct (from the non-Ātman), because of its being within the inner part of it. (This is) as there cannot be established in a garland the existence of a serpent or a stick etc. which is a thing arising out of non-cognition of the garland, as it cannot be elsewhere (than in that garland etc.¹) as apart from being the real thing, viz. garland. [157]

¹This word 'etc.' is demanded by *ādi* in *sarpadaṇḍādeḥ*.

न चाभावसाध्येतदभावस्यापि भाववत् ।

प्रत्यङ्मात्रैकयाथात्म्यादश्रुतत्वान्न चार्थतः ॥१५८॥

Also the non-existence of this (world) does not end in non-existence just like the existence of the same, because its true nature is being one with the inner sentience alone; because it is not so heard (or, known) and not because (there exists) another object. [158]

SP supports the last statement by citing the Śruti, *neti neti*.

अनद्य निखिलं विश्वं तत्तत्त्वप्रतिपत्तये ।
आत्मैवेति श्रुतं यस्मान्नातोऽन्यत्किंचिदिष्यते ॥१५९॥

(This is so, also) because it is heard *ātmaiva* ... after there was the statement made about the entire world with a view to the exposition of the nature of that Ātman; therefore, there is nothing else than that which is accepted. [159]

The reference in this verse to the Śruti passage is for setting aside every possible notion of the existence of anything other than the Ātman.

प्रत्याख्याय न चात्मानमनात्मा व्यतिरिच्यते ।
व्यतिरेकस्वभावत्वान्नापि चात्मनि सिध्यति ॥१६०॥

Further, the non-Ātman does not have any distinct existence apart from (or beside) being the Ātman; similarly, it does not get established, while there exists only the Ātman, owing to its having a nature distinct from that of the Ātman. [160]

The thought in this verse is: The world, being insentient, cannot exist while there exists only the sentient Ātman; so also for the same reason, it cannot come from any non-sentient thing.

प्रत्याचष्टे श्रुतिरतः सर्वं नेतीति चात्मनि ।
सर्वमात्मेति च तथा व्यतिरेकं निषेधति ॥१६१॥

Therefore, the Śruti denies the existence (of) all, (while there exists only) the Ātman, by the words *neti*; also, (the Śruti) denies (the existence of any object) distinct (from it) by the words *sarvam ātmā* [161]

Verses 162-166 explain the meaning of the word brahman in the Mantra.

अपूर्वानपरानन्तराबाह्यं ब्रह्मलक्षणम् ।
उक्तात्मवस्तुस्वाभाव्यादात्मा ब्रह्मेत्यतो वचः ॥१६२॥

The definition of the Brahman is (stated as what is) *apūrva*, *anapara*, *anantara* and *abāhya*;¹ therefore, because of having that nature of the real thing, the Ātman as stated, the Ātman (i.e. the individual self) is described as the Brahman. [162]

¹Cf. BU 3.8.8; *apūrva* 'having nothing prior to it', *anapara* 'having nothing posterior to it', *anantara* 'having nothing inside it', and *abāhya* 'having nothing outside it'.

प्रत्यक्त्वं ब्रह्मणस्तत्त्वं ब्रह्मत्वं चात्मनस्तथा ।
परोक्षद्वयहानेन ह्यात्मा ब्रह्मेति बोध्यते ॥१६३॥

The true nature of the Brahman is being within (every living being); similarly, (that of) the Ātman (individual self) is being of the nature of the Brahman itself—thus, by the rejection of (being) imperceptible and duality, the Ātman (individual self) is made known to be the Brahman. [163]

The first line points to the direct perception of the Brahman as the individual self and also the non-existence of anything else than the Ātman—this is *parokṣa-dvaya-hāna*.

अव्यावृत्ताननुगतो ब्रह्मशब्दार्थ इष्यते ।
नात्मनोऽन्यत्र लभ्योऽसौ नाप्यात्मा ब्रह्मणोऽन्यतः ॥१६४॥

It is accepted that the thing signified by the word *brahman* is what is not distinguished from another and what is not similar to any other thing; and that cannot be perceived (lit. obtained) elsewhere than the Ātman and the Ātman also is not found elsewhere than (i.e. apart from) the Brahman. [164]

आत्मनोऽपि परोक्षत्वं ब्रह्मणोऽविद्यया यथा ।
आत्मनः सद्वितीयत्वं ब्रह्मणोऽपि तथा मम ॥१६५॥

As there is non-perceptibility of the Ātman (within an individual being) owing to its non-knowing of the Brahman (through ignorance), so also is my self i.e. the Ātman (in me¹) accompanied by a second (i.e. the objective world) and the Brahman also is likewise. [165]

¹This sudden reference to me (i.e. myself) indicates an individual's awareness of a distinct existence.

अतोऽविद्यासमुच्छित्तौ यथावस्त्ववबोधतः ।
आत्मा ब्रह्मैव सन्नेष ब्रह्माप्येति स्वतोऽद्वयम् ॥१६६॥

Therefore, when there is the destruction of ignorance that results from knowing of the real thing as the Ātman (of an individual) being one with the Brahman, (that individual) attains (the nature of) the Brahman, which is in its own right without any second. [166]

Verses 167-169 explain the words vijñānamaya, manomaya etc.

यथोक्तबोधविरहादस्यानर्थपरंपरा ।
विज्ञानाद्यभिसंबन्धो यथा तदधुनोच्यते ॥१६७॥

Owing to the absence of that knowledge which is mentioned (earlier) there is, for this individual self, a series of (causes of the) undesired results and also the association with the

specific knowledge etc.—how that is explained now. [167]

This begins the exposition of the supposed transmigratory state of the Ātman which is mentioned in *viññānamaya*.

आत्मा ब्रह्मैव सन्नेष धर्मैर्यावद्विरन्वितः ।
अज्ञानात्संसारत्यत्र वर्ण्यते तत्समासतः ॥१६८॥

This Ātman of an individual, being just one with the Brahman, keeps on transmigrating owing to (its association with) ignorance, being possessed of whatever properties (seen or assumed by it)—that is described here in brief. [168]

This is an explanation of BUB *yasya*

यतोऽविद्यान्वयेऽशेषसंसारानर्थसंगतिः ।
तद्धवस्तावात्मनस्तस्मात्पुरुषार्थः समाप्यते ॥१६९॥

Since, while there is a connection (adaption or applicability of an individual self) with ignorance, there is connection (*sangati*) with the entire mass of the undesired (results of) the transmigratory world; therefore, the (highest) end of human life is obtained for that Ātman (i.e. the individual self) when that ignorance is destroyed. [169]

Verses 170-174 point out: the subsequent portion of the Upaniṣad is for conveying that all the undesired effect is produced from ignorance.

अविद्यामात्रहेतूत्था ह्यात्मनोऽनर्थसंगतिः ।
इत्यस्य प्रतिपत्त्यर्थं परो ग्रन्थोऽवतार्यते ॥१७०॥

Indeed the connection of the Ātman (of an individual being) with the undesired (results) arises only from ignorance. Therefore, to convey this thought, there is now introduced the subsequent (portion of) the Śruti. [170]

यद्यविद्यैकहेतु स्यात्संसारित्वं तदात्मनः ।
विद्यार्थोऽयं समारम्भो युज्यते नान्यथा सति ॥१७१॥

This beginning of the Śāstra is for acquiring the knowledge of the true nature of the Ātman; this is understandable only if the Ātman (within an individual being) is (taken as) transmigratory owing to mere ignorance, not otherwise. [171]

प्राणात्मत्वाभिमानो सन्यतः प्राणः प्रसयते ।
प्राणप्राणोऽपि सन्मोहात्प्राणनादि प्रपद्यते ॥१७२॥

Since Prāṇa is produced (or impelled) while it identifies itself as being of the nature of Prāṇa, then, even though being the vitality or power of *prāṇas*, on account of delusion or ignorance it comes to have (the activities of) breathing etc. [172]

This is the explanation here of the word *prāṇamaya*, even if it is mentioned in the text later after *vijñānamaya* etc.—this is setting aside the *pāṭhakrama* in the Śruti. SP supports the argument in this verse by citing *Muṇḍakopaniṣad* 2.1.3; *Praśnopaniṣad* 6.4 and BU 4.4.18. There is notable a play on the word *prāṇa*.

ततो बुद्धिसमुत्पत्तौ विज्ञानोऽस्मीतिभावतः ।
विज्ञानमयतामेति स्रक्सर्पमयतामिव ॥१७३॥

Then, at the time of the creation of the intellect, it becomes mostly of the nature of specific knowledge (*vijñāna*), owing to its having the impression, 'I am *vijñāna* (= *buddhi*),' as a garland comes to have mostly the nature of a serpent.¹ [173]

¹Here the suffix *-mayat* is in the sense of *prācurya* 'mostly consisting of'.

मनसो ग्रहणं चात्र बुद्धिवृत्त्युपलक्षणम् ।
असुबुद्धी यतो हेतु सर्वेषामिन्द्रियात्मनाम् ॥१७४॥

And, here, the mention of the word *manas* is indicative of the modification (*vṛtti*) of the intellect; (this is so,) since Prāṇa and the intellect are the cause (i.e. origin) of all of them which have the nature of the organs. [174]

कर्मेन्द्रियाणां सार्थानां प्राणः कारणमुच्यते ।
स एव बुद्ध्यतिशयः श्रोत्रादेरपि कारणम् ॥१७५॥

It is said that Prāṇa is the cause (i.e. origin) of the various organs of action together with the objects of them; and that itself, when dominated by the intellect, becomes the cause of the ear etc. [175]

Prāṇa itself becomes the intellect and then that becomes modified as the ear and its objects etc.

SP refers to some Ātharvaṇa Śruti *ātma hi ... sṛjati* (not traced) as the support for the argument in the verse.

Verses 176-182 state that the cause of transmigration is the ignorance about the Ātman.

स्वाभ्यस्तभावनातोऽस्य श्रुतकर्मनुरोधतः ।
प्राणो बुद्धिर्मनश्चक्षुःश्रोत्राद्यज्ञस्य जायते ॥१७६॥

Prāṇa, the intellect, *manas*, eye, ear etc. are produced (lit. become born) of this ignorant individual self on account of its own accumulated conceptions/apprehensions in accordance with its (worldly) knowledge (*śruta*) and action. [176]

A product of the organs in a (new) body is owing to the knowledge and action of the self in its previous life—that is, it is the material cause of the same.

प्रायार्थे च मयिज्ञेयो विकारादेर्निषेधनात् ।
अविज्ञातात्मतत्त्वस्य विकारो वास्त्वदोषतः ॥१७७॥

The suffix *-mayat* is to be understood in the sense of *prāya* 'mostly consisting in', since there is a denial of modification etc.;¹ or let it be understood, without involving any fault, as the modification of the Ātman whose nature has not been known. [177]

In the case of the Ātman, there cannot be any modification—it is clear. But, in the case of the Ātman affected by ignorance, modification can be accepted. SP supports the argument in this verse by citing the rejection in *Muṇḍakopaniṣad* 2.2 and *Kāthopaniṣad* 2.1.10.

¹This refers (very possibly) to the six modifications (*bhāva-vikāras*) and also to their consequent effect.

सर्पादयो यथा रज्ज्वा विकाराः स्युरबोधतः ।
अज्ञानादात्मनस्तद्वत्तेजोबन्नादिविक्रिया ॥१७८॥

As there can be the modifications such as a serpent etc. (understood) of a rope, owing to the ignorance (of its real nature), similarly there can be the modification(s) into fire, water, food etc. of the Ātman, owing to the ignorance about it. [178]

न हि वेदान्तसिद्धान्ते ह्यज्ञातात्मातिरेकतः ।
सांख्यानामिव सिद्धान्ते लभ्यते कारणान्तरम् ॥१७९॥

Indeed, in the doctrine of Vedānta there is not noticed any cause other than the unknown Ātman as there is (or, are) noticed some other cause (or causes) (than Prakṛti) in (the doctrine of) Sāṃkhyas.¹ [179]

The word *hi* 'indeed' in the verse points to the support of the Śruti, the Smṛti and the reason for the Vedānta doctrine

to be in contrast with that which has the support of Sage Kapila for Sāṃkhyas. Cp. the *smṛti-adhikaraṇa* of BS.

¹This refers to *mahat*, *pradhāna* etc. which are the causes of every subsequent modification.

प्राणादिमयतां यात्वा तद्वृत्तीनामबोधतः ।
आत्माकर्त्तापि कर्तृत्वमेति तासां समुद्भवे ॥१८०॥

The individual self, though a non-agent (of any action) comes to have agentship (of the same), when they (i.e. various actions) appear, on account of the non-knowing (*abodhataḥ*) of its having become mostly as Prāṇa-etc. and as (performing) their functions. [180]

In verses 172-175 references are made to the Ātman becoming its modifications Prāṇa etc.; this is not a real happening—it is this that this verse points to. SP adds: *uktaṃ hi—*

kāraṇam puruṣas tasmāt kāraṇajñair udāhṛtaḥ /
na cet kāraṇam ātmā syāt khādayaḥ syur ahetukāḥ //
(not traced).

चक्षुषश्चक्षुरप्येवं यथा चक्षुर्मयस्तथा ।
श्रोत्रादिमयताप्यस्य व्याख्येया प्रत्यगात्मनः ॥१८१॥

Thus, (the Ātman) is the eye (i.e. the eye-sight or power) of the eye (the organ). As it is of the nature of the eye, so also its being of the nature of the ear etc. is to be explained in the case of the inner self. [181]

This explains the meaning of *cakṣurmaya* and *śrotrādimaya*

....

स विज्ञानमनःप्राणचक्षुःश्रोत्रादि मोहजम् ।
मन्वानोऽविद्ययात्मैति तन्मयत्वं न तु स्वतः ॥१८२॥

That individual self considers itself through its ignorance, (to

be possessed of) the specific knowledge (of itself as) being *manas*, *Prāṇa*, eye, ear etc., which are the products of ignorance, but this (does) not belong to it, by its own nature.

[182]

This is to point to the effect of ignorance (*bhrānti*) on the part of the individual self. SP supports this argument by citing *uktam hi—avyaktam ātmā kṣetrajñāḥ śāśvato vibhur avyayaḥ iti* (not traced).

In verses 183-185, it is stated that *Ātman* which has the nature of *Virāj*, consists mostly of the five elements.

समासव्यासतस्तद्वत्पञ्च भूतान्यविद्यया ।
अशब्दादिमयोऽप्यात्मा तन्मयत्वं निगच्छति ॥१८३॥

The *Ātman*, though not consisting of word etc.,¹ becomes through ignorance (as it were) what consists mostly of them, i.e. the five elements, in their totality or in each one of them individually.²

[183]

¹SP supports this by citing *Kāthopaniṣad* 4.3.15.

²SP clarifies this thus: *avidyayā pṛthivyādibhūtāni virāḍātmanā sūtrātmanā ca sāmastyena vaiastyena ca pratyekam abhimanyamāno bhūtamayatvam āpnotīty arthaḥ*.

लिङ्गदेहाविमावेवं पञ्चभूतमयावुभौ ।
प्रधानगुणवृत्त्योक्तौ सूक्ष्मस्थूलविभागतः ॥१८४॥

Thus, both of these two, i.e. the subtle form¹ and the gross one,² are made up of five elements, one of them being the principal in relation to the subsequent as its subordinate and also as divided into the subtle and the gross (forms).

[184]

¹This is mentioned in the BU sentence *vijñānamayaḥ ... before pṛthivīmayaḥ*.

²This is mentioned in the subsequent part of sentence, i.e. *prthivīmayaḥ ... kāmamayaḥ*.

उक्तयोरात्मनोरन्तर्यद्रूपं भावनामयम् ।
कामादिमयतोक्त्येह तदिदानीं विभाव्यते ॥१८५॥

Now is explained here what are the forms of the two *ātman*s,¹ mentioned in the statement of its becoming inside (the body) (and) mostly of the nature of desire etc., which is product of *bhāvanā*. [185]

¹This stands for 'bodies'.

Verses 186-187 explain the intention of kāmamaya.

कामं क्रोधं तथा धर्मं तद्विरुद्धं च मोहतः ।
संभावयन्प्रतीच्यात्मा तन्मयत्वं निगच्छति ॥१८६॥

The Ātman, imagining desire, anger and also merit and its opposite to be existent in the inner self attains the nature of them through its ignorance. [186]

प्रवृत्तय इहेक्ष्यन्ते वाङ्मनःकायसाधनाः ।
यावत्यो भावनाः पुंसामपि तावत्य एव तु ॥१८७॥

Impressions of individual beings are known to be as many as there are noticed their activities having *vāc*, *manas* and body as their instruments. [187]

Verses 188-194 are explanation of idammaya and adomaya.

इत्येवमादयोऽनेके कोशाः स्युर्भावनामयाः ।
असंख्येया बहुत्वात्ते संक्षेपोऽतौऽत्र भण्यते ॥१८८॥

These and many others are the sheaths¹ (of the Ātman), consisting of *bhāvanās* since they are many, rather uncountable;

there is here the mention of them in brief.

[188]

¹This refers to the entire mass of the worldly causes and effects.

इदमित्येव यत्साक्षात्किञ्चित्कर्मोपलक्ष्यते ।
परोक्षं भावनारूपं तेनादोमयतेष्यते ॥१८९॥

By the word *idam* is conveyed (*upalakṣyate*)¹ some action which is directly perceptible; therefore, the form of impression(s), which is beyond perception (*parokṣa*), is considered to have the nature of what can be (signified by the word) *adomaya*.

[189]

¹In the case of the directly perceptible thing, 'conveying' means directly referring to it and in the case of the other, that word means 'indicated (suggested) by that'.

इदमयेन लिङ्गेन संबन्धोऽदोमयात्मनः ।
प्रत्यक्ष आत्मनि यथा तथान्यत्रापि लिङ्ग्यते ॥१९०॥

This thing which is of the nature of *adomaya* has its connection with that which is of the nature of *idamunaya*;¹ as this is understood in the case of the directly perceptible body, so is it inferred elsewhere² also.

[190]

¹This means: whatever regarding the body etc. of the directly perceptible thing is mentioned can be mentioned of what are signified by the word *adomaya*.

²That is, when not directly perceptible.

धूमाग्नयोरिव संबन्धस्तयोर्दृष्ट इहात्मनि ।
अकामप्रमुखैर्योगैस्तथा कामादियोगतः ॥१९१॥
धर्माधर्ममयो भूत्वा पमान्सर्वमयो भवेत् ।
धर्माधर्मेकहेतुत्वात्सर्वस्य जगतस्ततः ॥१९२॥

The relation between the two (viz. *idammaya* and *adomaya*) is seen (as obtaining) here in the Ātman¹ as (is that obtaining) between smoke and fire, because of their connections with the absence of desire as the principal (among them) and, in the same way, with desire etc. [191]

Having (first) become possessed of² merit and demerit, this man (i.e. the transmigratory being) then becomes possessed of all, since all (that exists in/belongs to this) world is effected (or, caused) only by merit and demerit.³ [192]

¹That is, with reference to the two subtle and gross bodies which the Ātman is said to be possessed of.

²Literally, mostly consisting of.

³Alternatively, has only merit and demerit as its cause.

अदोमयत्त्वं लिङ्गं स्याल्लिङ्गेनेदंमयात्मना ।

भावनाकर्मविद्यानामेवमुक्तेन वर्त्मना ।

भूरिभेदान्न शक्यन्ते वक्तुं रूपाण्यशेषतः ॥१९३॥

By the subtle body, which has the nature of *idammaya*, there can be (indicated) the subtle form as having the nature of *adomaya*.¹ Thus, since there is much variety in respect of the impressions, actions and knowledges, in the way stated so far, it is not possible to state (i.e. enumerate) the forms in their entirety. [193]

This is the meaning of the sentence *tad yad etad*.

This refers to the impressions on the intellect.

¹Here Sureśvara uses the word *liṅga* in two senses: (i) *liṅgam*—subtle form of the Ātman which is suggested. Thus the word *liṅga* stands for what is *liṅgin* 'having some characteristic' for its inference, and (ii) *liṅgena* which is mentioned in *idammaya* is a characteristic for inference of the subtle form. Cf. the first line of verse 190 above.

किं कारणं पुमान्यस्माद्यथाकारी भवत्ययम् ।
यथाचारी च लोकेऽस्मिंस्तथारूपो भवत्यसौ ॥१९४॥

(A question is asked:) 'What could be the reason for which this individual self becomes *yathākārin* 'doing as told' and also *yathācārin* 'behaving as seen in this world'?—that is, why does he become so?' [194]

In verses 195-197 the two karaṇa and caraṇa are distinguished.

करणं नियतं चैव ततोऽन्यच्चरणं तथा ।
करणं कर्मशक्तिर्वा चरणं प्रत्ययात्मकम् ॥१९५॥

karaṇa is what is laid down (for one by scripture etc.) and (that which is) other than that is *caraṇa*. Or, *karaṇa* refers to the eligibility or capacity (of a person) for doing (some action) and *caraṇa* is of the nature of what is experienced (in the case of) a person's behaviour (or doing at his will). [195]

साधुकारी पुमान्यः स्यात्साधुरेव भवत्यसौ ।
पितृगन्धर्वदेवादौ साधुसाधनसंपदा ॥१९६॥

An individual being is called a good man, if he does what is good;¹ then, he (becomes born among) *pitrs*, *gandharvas*, *devas* etc., owing to his being possessed of the means for good (states of various lives).² [196]

¹This refers to *dharma* and *dharmakaraṇa*.

²Being born as a god is also the stage of transmigration of a being—this is particularly noticeable in Jaina writings in numerous details.

पापकारी च पापश्च स्थाण्वादावभिजायते ।
कामक्रोधादिभूयिष्ठः पुमानुग्रेण कर्मणा ॥१९७॥

A sinful man, who does sinful actions, becomes born among immovables (like trees) etc., having his nature predominantly consisting of desire, anger, etc.—on account of his fearful act(s). [197]

Verses 198-208 state the exposition of BUB on the suffix conveying tendency of an individual (*tāccīlya*).

साध्वादि भूयोऽभ्यासात्स्यात्ताच्छील्यप्रत्ययश्रुतेः ।
फलमित्यतिशङ्क्याह पुण्य इत्यादिकं वचः ॥१९८॥

The Śruti has made a statement *punyaḥ* ..., (as is clear) from the repeated use of (the words) *sādhu* etc. and also the hearing of the suffix conveying the idea of *tāccīlya*, (having to convey) the result. [198]

नैवाभ्यासव्यपेक्षास्ति पुण्यपापफलाप्तये ।
सकृदप्यनुतिष्ठन्ना प्राप्नोत्येव फलं तयोः ॥१९९॥

In respect of obtaining the result of merit or sin, there is not any relation to the expectation of repetitive performance; doing either of the two, even once, a person acquires the result of the two. [199]

फलातिशीतिरभ्यासाज्जायते पुण्यपापयोः ।
तत्फलस्य तु या प्राप्तिः सा सकृत्करणादपि ॥२००॥

From the repetitive performance of merit or sin there arises excellence in respect of the result; so far as the obtaining of the result is concerned, that occurs even by a single performance (of the same). [200]

कामक्रोधादिपूर्वैव कर्तृता पुण्यपापयोः ।
पुंसः सर्वमयत्वस्य हेतुः संसारकारणम् ॥२०१॥

(Thus) agentship of an individual self in respect of merit and

sin is necessarily (*eva*) preceded by desire, anger etc. That would be the cause of its being made up of all and also the cause of transmigration. [201]

This is the purport of BU sentence *yathākārī* ... before *atho khalv āhuh*.

धर्माधर्मात्मकं कर्म संसारानर्थकारणम् ।
एतद्विषयमेवैतद्वेदशास्त्रमधीयते ॥२०२॥

Action consisting in *dharma* and *adharma* is the cause of undesired transmigration. Thereby the Vedic scriptures having the (same) subject matter (regarding rituals) are studied (by them). [202]

कर्मैव वेदशास्त्रेऽस्मिन्प्रधानं निश्चितं यतः ।
पुंसोऽभ्युदयदुःखाप्तौ कार्यं वर्ज्यं च तत्ततः ॥२०३॥

Since, in this Vedic scripture, it is action alone which is decided to be (of) principal importance; therefore, the action relating to that (*tat = vedaśāstravihita*) is to be avoided with respect to (acquiring) worldly prosperity (and averting) the experience of misery. [203]

This is clarified in the next verse.

कर्म साधवेव कर्तव्यमिच्छताभ्युदयं चिरम् ।
पापं तु सर्वदा हेयं दुःखेभ्यस्त्रस्यता भृशम् ॥२०४॥

Only good action has to be performed by one who desires worldly prosperity (to last) for long and (*tu*) sinful action has ever to be avoided (lit. abandoned) by one who very much fears miseries. [204]

संसारानर्थनिष्पत्तौ सर्वेषामविशिष्टता ।
आरम्भकाणां विज्ञानप्रमुखाणामिहात्मनः ॥२०५॥

यद्यप्येवं तथापीह धर्माधर्मात्मकं बुधाः ।
 कर्म प्रधानमिच्छन्ति यतः कर्म प्रयोजकम् ॥२०६॥
 प्रयोज्यमितरत्सर्वं विज्ञानादि यदीरितम् ।
 प्रयोजकं प्रयोज्याच्च प्रधानमिति निश्चितम् ॥२०७॥
 पुण्य इत्यादिवचसा कर्मप्राधान्यवाञ्छया ।
 कर्मोपसंहृतं श्रुत्या यथोक्तेनैव हेतुना ॥२०८॥

In respect of the occurrence (lit. coming into being) of the transmigratory existence, which is the undesired, all actions which begin to produce a result, there it is *viññāna* 'specific knowledge' etc.¹ that are not peculiar to an individual self. [205]

Even if this is so, wise ones have considered (lit. desired) action consisting of *dharma* and *adharma* as the principal one, since action is productive (lit. inciter) of (a result); [206] everything else is what is to be produced (lit. incited), viz. that which is described as specific knowledge etc.; and (that action) is productive; therefore, it is decided that what produces (an action) is more prominent than what one has to produce, [207]

by the statement *punyaḥ* ..., which asserts predominance of activity, has the Śruti completed the statement of (or, briefly stated) that activity, together with (that of) the reason, as is already stated.² [208]

The second line of verse 207 reaffirms what is stated in 205-207ab.

¹This refers to *buddhi*, *bhāvanā*, *karma*.

²*yathokta* stands for *prayojakatva*.

Verses 209-213 state the decision in *atho khalu*.

कर्म प्रधानमित्येवं साक्षाच्छ्रुत्योपसंहृतम् ।
 पूर्वपक्षेऽथ सिद्धान्तः खल्वाहुरिति भण्यते ॥२०९॥

Thus has the Śruti directly (or, expressedly) stated that action is the principal one—this is by way of (the statement of) the *prima facie* view and the answer to it (i.e. the Siddhānta) is then stated in the words *atho khalv āhuḥ*. [209]

अथो खल्वत्र पूर्वोक्ते प्राहुरुच्चैर्विपरिचतः ।
 न कर्ममय एवायं पुमान्सर्वमयः कुतः ॥२१०॥
 यतः काममयो भत्वा प्राप सर्वमयात्मताम् ।
 प्रयोजकप्रयोज्यत्वे ज्ञानादीनां प्रयोजकम् ॥२११॥
 कर्मैवावधृतं यद्वत्कर्मान्तानां प्रयोजकः ।
 काम एवेति तत्स्पष्टं स यथेति विभाव्यते ॥२१२॥

In the sentence, which is earlier stated in the word *atho khalu* ..., the wise ones have (already) intensely stated that 'this individual being is not made up of (only) action', 'Then why is it called *sarvamaya*?' [210]

Since this one, having first become full of desire, has later become of the nature of one full of all (activity etc.); therefore, the state of being what produces and what is to be produced become productive of knowledge etc. [211]

As it is only action that is specified, so also it is desire that is productive of all as ending in action—this is very clear, as it is noticed in (the use of) the word *yathā* [212]

प्रयोजकत्वे कर्मादेः कामप्राधान्यमीरितम् ।
 प्रयोजकानां निष्ठात्वे न तु कामो विवक्षितः ॥२१३॥

In the case of action etc., being productive (of others), there is conveyed the notion of desire as the principal one, but desire is not intended to be firmly rooted in what are productive (of transmigration etc.). [213]

Verses 214-217 state adhyāsa as the cause of all desire.

यथावस्त्वपरिज्ञानं कामस्यापि प्रयोजकम् ।
 आप्ताशेषसुखापास्तदुःखत्वादात्मवस्तुनः ॥२१४॥

नानवाप्तं सुखं किञ्चिन्नानपास्तं तथा सुखम् ।
यो वै भूमेति वचनाद्योऽशनायेति चात्मनि ॥२१५॥

In the case of desire also, absence of complete knowledge (*prajñāna*) of the thing (i.e. reality) is productive of it, because the thing, i.e. the Ātman has the nature of what has obtained every kind of happiness and thrown away every kind of misery.

[214]

There is not any happiness which is not obtained (by the Ātman) and so also there is not any happiness which is not thrown away (by it)—this is on the basis of the Śruti statement *yo vai bhūmā ...*¹ and also *yo 'śanāyā ...*² in respect of the Ātman.

[215]

¹CU 8.3.1. ~

²BU 3.5.1.

स्वत एवंविधं वस्तु यतोऽतस्तदबोधतः ।
कामद्वेषादिसंभूतिर्मिथ्याज्ञानत्वकारणात् ॥२१६॥

Since the thing (i.e. reality) is, in its own right, of this nature; therefore, owing to the ignorance about it, i.e. for the reason of its being false knowledge, there is the rise of desire, hatred etc.

[216]

अज्ञातं वस्तु चोद्दिश्य तत्तत्त्वप्रतिपत्तये ।
प्रमाणानां प्रवृत्तिः स्यादन्यथा नोपपद्यते ॥२१७॥

In order to know the truth about a thing which was unknown earlier means of right knowledge begins their activity, not otherwise.

[217]

This verse states the purpose of what are called *pramāṇas*. This is to lead to that the Śruti is the means of knowing the nature of the Ātman which was unknown earlier.

Verses 218-220 state that ignorance is the cause of any worldly activity of an/the individual self.

प्रयोजकत्वेऽविद्येयं यदि नामेह न श्रुता ।
मितिप्रवृत्तिहेतुत्वात्तथाप्यत्राश्रितैव सा ॥२१८॥

Even if indeed, this ignorance has not been heard¹ getting to know other things (in respect of) its being productive (of desire etc.), this is yet positively taken as the basis here (i.e. in respect of them), because of its being the cause of any so-called knowing activity. [218]

सर्वेषामपि मानानां प्रमाणं परमं श्रुतिः ।
सर्वमेयातिवर्त्यात्मयाथात्म्यप्रतिबोधतः ॥२१९॥

Among all the means of knowing, the highest (lit. final) is the Śruti, on account of its giving rise to the knowledge of the true nature of the Ātman which is beyond all objects to be known (by any other means). [219]

तस्मादज्ञात आत्मैव कामादेः स्यात्प्रयोजकः ।
यतोऽबोधस्य विध्वस्तौ पुंसः स्यात्कृतकृत्यता ॥२२०॥

Since the Ātman, which has been not known (before as thus), is productive of desire etc.; for when the destruction of the absence of knowledge is achieved this consists in, for an individual being, the state of accomplishment of what has to be achieved. [220]

Verses 221-225 explain the words sa yathākāmaḥ.

वाङ्मनःकायसाध्यायाः प्रवृत्तेः काममूलता ।
यथा तत्प्रतिपत्त्यर्थं स यथेत्युत्तरा श्रुतिः ॥२२१॥

The subsequent Śruti begins with the words *sa yathākāmaḥ* for giving rise to the knowledge that every activity, which is

to be accomplished by means of *vāc*, *manas* and body, has its root in desire. [221]

सर्वस्य जगतो हेतू पुण्यापुण्ये समीरिते ।
यद्यपीह परो हेतुः काम एव तयोरपि ॥२२२॥

Even if merit and demerit have been mentioned here to be the two causes of the entire world, the ultimate (*para*) cause of the same, viz. the two, is desire alone. [222]

अकामस्य क्रिया काचिद्दृश्यते नेह कस्यचित् ।
यद्यद्वि कुरुते जन्तुस्तत्तत्कामस्य चेष्टितम् ॥२२३॥

There is not noticed any activity in the case of one who is without any desire; (for, it is said:) whatever a being does is the doing of desire. [223]

This was earlier referred to in BUBV 1.4.1816 and 2.1.578; cp. *Manusmṛti* 2.4.

निष्फलं कर्म सर्वं स्यान्न चेत्कामपुरःसरम् ।
अपराधलघुत्वं च दृष्टं पुंसोऽप्यकामतः ॥२२४॥

Every activity would be fruitless, were it not prompted by desire; (for,) in the case of a person, there is noticed (or recorded) mitigation of an offense, if (he has done an act) without a desire. [224]

SP states for the gist of the fault as stated in *Dharmaśāstra* thus:

caṇḍālānnaṃ pramādena yadi bhūñjīta yo dvijaḥ /
tataś cāndrāyaṇaṃ kuryān māsaṃ ekaṃ vrataṃ caret //
(*Parāśarasmiṛti* 11.1); *Kūrmapurāṇa* 2.34 conveys the same.

कामप्रयुक्तो हि नरः संचिनोति शुभाशुभे ।
आत्मैवेदमिति गिरा श्रुत्यैतत्प्रागपौरितम् ॥२२५॥

Indeed, a person, prompted by desire, collects (or acquires) the auspicious and inauspicious (results)—this has been already stated by the Śruti in the words *ātmaivedam agra āsīd eka eva, so 'kāmayata*.¹ [225]

¹BU 1.4.17.

The meaning of kāma is explained in verses 226-234.

कामो गर्धोऽभिलाषश्च तृष्णेत्येकार्थवाचकाः ।
आसङ्गपूर्वकः कामो नासङ्गविरहादसौ ॥२२६॥

Desire, greed, longing and thirst are (all words) expressive of (but) one meaning, viz. that desire is preceded by some attachment (to objects); that, i.e. desire, cannot be without any attachment. [226]

ध्यायतो विषयान्पुंसः सङ्गस्तेषूपजायते ।
सङ्गात्संजायते काम इति सर्वज्ञशास्त्रतः ॥२२७॥

In the case of a man, who is thinking about the objects (of desire), there arises his attachment to them; from that attachment arises (further) desire—this is learnt from the preaching¹ by the all-knower.² [227]

¹*Gītā* 2.62.

²Sureśvara uses the word *sarvajña* for Kṛṣṇa, not for Buddha.

पुंसो या विषयादित्सा स काम इति भण्यते ।
तद्गुणस्मरणाभ्यासादिच्छा पुंसोऽभिवर्धते ॥२२८॥

The desire of a person for taking up an object, is called *kāma* and the desire of a person goes on increasing owing to the repeated memory of the excellence (of that object). [228]

कामिताद्विषयान्नान्यस्तदा तस्येह रोचते ।
निराकर्तुं न च ततः शक्यते येन केनचित् ॥२२९॥

Then (i.e. in that state) a person does not like any other (object) than the desired object and it is not possible that the person is warded off from that (i.e. from pursuing that) by anyone (or anything). [229]

इत्येवं वर्धमानः सन्क्रतुत्वं प्रतिपद्यते ।
यदनन्तरमेवेहा स कामः क्रतुरुच्यते ॥२३०॥

Thus, (ever) increasing, it comes to be (an individual's) thought (*kratu*), because that desire, viz. longing, comes to be called *kratu* only after that being there. [230]

क्रतुना यादृशेनायं यत्क्रतुः स्यात्पुमानिह ।
कुरुते तादृशं कर्म वाङ्मनःकायसाधनैः ॥२३१॥

Having that kind of thought, i.e. by that kind of thought, this individual being in this world (being possessed, i.e. overcome) does that kind of activity by means of *vāc*, *manas* and body. [231]

यत्कर्म कुरुते चायं शुभं वा यदि वाशुभम् ।
संपद्यतेऽथ तत्साक्षादात्मत्वेन पुमानयम् ॥२३२॥

Whatever action, be it auspicious or inauspicious, this individual self performs, the person becomes that itself, because of its attaining the nature of the same. [232]

अपूर्वमिति चेदं स्याददृष्टमिति चोच्यते ।
पुण्यापुण्यमय इति प्राक्चैतदुपवर्णितम् ॥२३३॥

And this would be called *apūṛva* or it is also called *adr̥ṣṭa*—which has already been described as consisting of merit and demerit. [233]

पुमान्काममय एव कर्मादेः स्यात्प्रयोजकः ।
यथा तदुक्तं श्रुत्येह मन्त्रोऽप्यत्र निगद्यते ॥२३४॥

An individual being, only full of desire, would be the cause (*prayojaka*) of inciting (i.e. performing) of action etc. As that is said here in the Śruti, so also by the Mantra.¹ [234]

¹This refers to what follows as a Mantra at BU 4.4.6.

Verses 235-254 are the discussion on BU 4.4.6: In verses 235-237, Sureśvara states the explanation of the Mantra tad eva ... and later verses 238-252 follow BUB.

तदेवैति पुमानस्य सक्तं यत्र मनो भवेत् ।
आत्मा सक्त इदं लिङ्गं कर्मणा सह तत्सदा ॥२३५॥

In the verse *tad eva*, (it is stated that) the individual self goes to where his *manas* has always clung to; the Ātman has clung to this subtle body together with its actions. [235]

This means, according to SP, that sentience thus becomes affected by desire and activity and therefore becomes transmigratory.

सूक्ष्मो देहोऽत्र लिङ्गं स्याल्लिङ्गनात्प्रत्यगात्मनः ।
स्वात्मचैतन्यबिम्बेन निःसङ्गः सक्त आत्मना ॥२३६॥

Here, the subtle form of the body is an indication (*linga*) of the individual self owing to its function of indicating (*lingana*); (for,) the Ātman, which is (by its nature) without any attachment, becomes attached to the reflection of its own sentience (in the subtle body). [236]

उदपात्रार्कगतिवदगतेर्गतिरात्मनः ।
ध्यायतीवेति च तथा निषिद्धैव स्वतो गतिः ॥२३७॥

This movement of the Ātman is understood (really) from non-movement in the same way as the (supposed) movement of the sun from a waterful pot. So is it that the movement of the Ātman, by itself,¹ is denied (lit. rejected) (by the Śruti) in the words *dhyāyatīva*.² [237]

¹Cp. the preceding verse. This is to stress the idea of *adhyāsa* to be the basis of the self's movement.

²Cf. BU 4.3.7.

Verses 238-253 explain the meaning of BUB sentence *tad eva*

तदेवैतीति यदि वा गन्तव्यमभिधीयते ।
कामप्रधानता चैवं प्रकृतार्थानुरोधिनी ॥२३८॥

Or perhaps by the words *tad evaiti* is mentioned the goal of the self's movement and thus there follows the self's having desire as its prominent impelling force and that is in accordance with the matter in hand. [238]

Read SP: *pūrvavyākhyānād asya sāksāt prakṛtopayogitvena yuktataratvam* is understood from the second line.

कामादयो यतो धर्माः स्वान्तस्यैवेह कीर्तिताः ।
तदात्ममानिनोऽतः स्युरात्मनस्ते न तु स्वतः ॥२३९॥

Since here are mentioned the properties of *manas* of the self, viz. desire etc.; therefore, they are to be often understood also of the Ātman which has identified itself with them, and not because of its own nature (*svataḥ*).¹ [239]

¹Once again, there is a stress on *adhyāsa* of the self on a body.

लिङ्गासक्तिवशादात्मा सक्त इत्यभिधीयते ।

सक्तः सन्कर्मणा सार्धमेत्यात्मा कर्मणः फलम् ॥२४०॥

Individual self is said as clung (to the subtle body) under the influence of its attachment to the subtle body; and (saying that) the self has clung to (the subtle body) together with its action, is but the result of action (in the earlier transmigratory existence). [240]

मनोभिष्वङ्गवशगः कर्मणैति यतः सह ।

कामस्यातः प्रधानत्वं तत्प्रयुक्तात्मसंसृतेः ॥२४१॥

Since it moves (out from a body) together with its own action, having been under the influence of its identification with *manas*; that indicates the prominence (*pradhānatva*) of desire, which is (or, has resulted) from the self's transmigration caused by it. [241]

लिङ्गं मनःप्रधानत्वलिङ्गं मन इहोच्यते ।

यदि वा लिङ्गयते तेन मनो लिङ्गमिहात्मनः ॥२४२॥

In this context, *manas* is called *linga*, on account of *manas* being the prominent¹ (among the seventeen constituents of) the subtle body or because the self is indicated, i.e. is realised² by *manas*— thus *manas* is mentioned here as an indication of the self?³ [242]

¹Here Sureśvara uses the word *linga* in the sense of conglomeration of seventeen Sāṃkhya principles. Cf. verse 48 above, and SP on it: *saptadaśakalingātmany ahamabhimānī sah*.

²BUB (p.628): *lingyate 'vagamyate 'vagacchati yena tallingam*.

³This is the word of BUB *atha vā*

निश्चयेन तदासक्तं यस्मिन्विषय आत्मना ।

विषयं कर्मणा सार्धं तमेवैतीति संगतिः ॥२४३॥

The mind goes, together with (its) action, to that object, to which it has clung together with the self by its resolve (*niścaya*)— this is the connection. [243]

इति कामप्रधानत्वसिद्धान्तस्योपसंहतिः ।

Thus¹ is the conclusion of (the statement) of the doctrine of Vedānta about the prominence of desire (in transmigration). [244ab]

¹This is with reference to the word *iti* in the Mantra (BU 4.4.6) under discussion.

कर्मणोऽन्तं फलं प्राप्य भुक्त्वा निरवशेषतः ॥२४४॥
 कस्य कर्मण इत्युक्ते यत्किंचेहेति तद्वचः ॥२४५॥
 फलभोगावसानेऽथ किमसौ प्रतिपद्यते ।
 तस्माल्लोकादिमं लोकं पुनरैति स कर्मणे ॥२४६॥

(That is to say:) 'Having attained to the end, i.e. the result of action, and having enjoyed it in its fullness, [244cd] (result) of which action, if it is asked the answer is whatever is here (in this world). (Also) that (self) goes to this (another) *loka* 'transmigratory existence' from that (earlier) world—(this is an answer to what is asked, lit. said) what does it become after the exhaustion (*avaśāna*) of the enjoyment of the result?' [245-246]

Verse 245 refers to action by the word *kin ca* and verse 246 explains the words *tasmād* ... in BUB, preceded by the question implied.

अस्मै लोकाय देहाय देहयोगश्च कर्मणे ।
 इत्येवमपरिश्रान्तो बभ्रमीति पुनः पुनः ॥२४७॥

(It goes) unto this world, i.e. the body (*deha*) and the connection with the body is (for performance of) action; thus

does (this transmigratory being) repeatedly keep on wandering without getting tired. [247]

This explanation is offered after dividing *asmai lokāya* and *karmanē* in the sentence.

The idea of this verse is amplified in the next verse.

अनिर्ज्ञातात्मतत्त्वः सन्कामबन्धनबन्धनः ।
घटीयन्त्रवदश्रान्तो बभ्रमीत्यनिशं नरः ॥२४८॥

A human being ever keeps on moving without getting tired, just like a wheel for drawing water, without having known the (true) nature of the Ātman and bound by a rope in the form of desire. [248]

इतीत्युक्तपरामर्शे न्विति खेदानुकम्पयोः ।
एवमज्ञः कामवशाद्भूयो योनीः प्रपद्यते ॥२४९॥

(Now the word) *iti* (in the BU passage) is used for referring to (*parāmarśa*) what was stated (earlier) and (the word) *nu* is used in the sense of sorrow and pity. Thus, (remaining) ignorant, (the individual self) moves to (i.e. is born in) various species under the influence of desire. [249]

What is meant by sorrow and pity is explained in the next verse.

अस्माल्लोकादमुं लोकममुष्मादिममेव च ।
अज्ञः कामाङ्कुशाकृष्टो जायते म्रियतेऽसकृत् ॥२५०॥

The ignorant self, dragged/impelled by the goad in the form of desire becomes born many times and (also) dies, moving from this world to that and from that to this (world). [250]

Reference to two different worlds for a transmigratory being evokes the sense of sorrow and feeling of compassion.

इति कामप्रधानस्य संसारानर्थसंगतिम् ।
उक्त्वा तदुपसंहारमितीतिवचसाकरोत् ॥२५१॥

Having thus described the association with the undesired transmigration (of the individual self), overpowered by desire (*kāmapradhāna*), the Śruti made the concluding remark pertaining to that (description of the self's association) by using the word *iti*. [251]

This explains the connection between the two words *uktvā iti* with *atra*.

एवं कामयमानोऽयं स्वप्नबुद्धान्तवन्नरः ।
संसरत्यप्रबुद्धः सन्परलोकेहलोकगः ॥२५२॥

Thus entertaining desires, this person transmigrates, remaining unknowing and thus moving from the other world to this world, as a person moves from the state of dream to the state of waking (and *vice versa*). [252]

अथ तस्यावदत्पूर्वं योषिदालिङ्गने यथा ।
सौषुप्तं स्थानमाप्तस्य रूपं कामादिवर्जितम् ॥२५३॥

Now, the Śruti has stated earlier about the form of that self which is without desire etc., when it has come to the state of deep sleep, as similar to the state at the time of (a man's) embracing a woman.¹ [253]

¹This refers to BU 4.3.21. The point of similarity is here 'not being aware of anything else than happiness'.

तद्वा अस्यैतदित्येवं प्राक्श्रुत्या प्रतिपादितम् ।
मोक्षो दाष्टीन्तिकस्तस्य दृष्टान्तस्येह वर्ण्यते ॥२५४॥

The Śruti has already explained earlier the nature of this state

in the words *tad vā asyaitad* Now here is described liberation, which is the matter to be exemplified by this example. [254]

The second line connects the BUB explanation *yasmāt* ... with what has been stated earlier in verses 252-253.

In verses 255-263 there is explanation of the BUB passage yasmāt

अथशब्दोऽत्र हेत्वर्थ उक्तस्य तदपेक्षतः ।
काम्येव हि यतोऽजस्रं संसरत्यविचक्षणः ॥२५५॥

Here the word *atha* is to express the sense of the cause on which it depends, or what is already stated: since (this self) is merely full of desire and therefore it continuously undergoes transmigration, being ignorant (lit. non-discriminator) (of its true nature). [255]

From here starts the discussion in BU on the state of liberation of an individual self. This has a reference to what is said earlier about the portion of BU in the beginning with BU 4.4.

तद्भावभाविहेतुत्वादतोऽकामो विमुच्यते ।
नरोऽकामयमानः स्यात्कामहेतोर्निराकृतेः ॥२५६॥

From this (bodily state), a human being, who is (now) without any desire, is released on account of his (earlier body) being the cause of what he is going to be, on account of the existence of that (i.e. earlier desire). It would be without any desire, since the cause of desires has been removed.¹ [256]

¹The state of being without any desire, at the time of liberation, is distinguished from the state of desirelessness in the deep sleep state—for, there in that state, the causes of desires have not been destroyed/removed.

स्वत एवाखिलसुखप्राप्ततत्त्वे स्व आत्मनि ।
निरस्ताशेषदुःखे च मोहात्तत्र विपर्ययः ॥२५७॥

And (yet) there is (i.e. can be) the reversal (of desirelessness) owing to the ignorance on the part of the Ātman itself, when in its own nature, it has obtained the nature of being full of all bliss and also become one that has thrown away the entire (mass of) miseries. [257]

This verse explains why the desireless Ātman proceeds to manifest itself in the worldly relation of beings and objects.

अप्राप्तं दुःखवन्मोहान्मन्वानः सुखमुत्तमम् ।
सुखं मे स्यादिति सदा नरः कामयतेऽबुधः ॥२५८॥

Considering misery as excellent happiness which has not (really) come to it, a non-knowing (man), i.e. the individual self desires, 'let there be happiness for me'. [258]

This is another expression of the same sense of *viparyaya* in the preceding verse.

तथा परिहृताशेषदुःखहेतुः स्वतोऽपि सन् ।
मा भूद्दुःखं ममेत्येवं जाड्यात्कामयतेऽनिशम् ॥२५९॥

In that way, the individual self (or, being), though by its very nature, the cause of (the state wherein) all miseries have been removed ever thinks, 'let there no misery befall me', on account of the ignorance (*jādyā*). [259]

कृत्स्नानन्दस्य चानाप्तिरवाप्तिरसुखस्य च ।
नात्मवस्त्वनुरोधेन तदबोधात्तदश्नुते ॥२६०॥

Further, non-obtainment of the entire bliss and also obtainment of all miseries does a human being experience not considering

in accordance with the (real) thing, viz. the Ātman, (but) on account of not knowing (the true nature) of it. [260]

This explains the state of a human being as a product of ignorance.

वस्तुतन्त्रा भवेद्विद्या कर्तृतन्त्रैव च क्रिया ।
अतः कामयमानत्वं कर्तृतन्त्रमबोधतः ॥२६१॥

Any specific knowledge would depend on the (real) thing, viz. the Ātman; the activity (of a human being) depends on it as the agent; therefore, the state (of an individual) of having a desire depends on its being the agent through ignorance. [261]

कारकाण्युपमृदनाति विद्या बीजमिवोषरम् ।
तत्कारणोपमर्दित्वाज्जन्मनैव न कारकम् ॥२६२॥

Knowledge¹ destroys various means of activity in the same way as a barren land destroys the seed (of any crop); there does not exist any means of activity, since (that knowledge) is, by its very rise (lit. birth), capable of destroying the cause of that, i.e. ignorance. [262]

¹This refers to the knowledge of the Brahman and not *pūrvavidyā* which had been under reference earlier.

यत एवमतो विद्वान्कामहेतूपमर्दनात् ।
स्यादकामयमानोऽत्र न त्वविद्वान्कथं चन ॥२६३॥

Since this is so, therefore, a knower (of the nature of the Ātman), by destroying the cause, i.e. desires, becomes devoid of them, and here (in acquiring liberation) a non-knowing person is not eligible in any way. [263]

Verses 264-270 state that desirelessness consists in the absence

of ignorance.

कतोऽकामयमानः स्यादित्येवमभिचोदिते ।
यौऽकाम इति वचनं पूर्वप्रत्युक्तिरुच्यते ॥२६४॥

If one asked 'Why is that individual self not having any desires?', there is an answer to the question in the statement *yo 'kāmaḥ*. [264]

कामा यस्य न विद्यन्ते दृष्टानुश्रविका बहिः ।
सोऽकाम इति संभाव्यः कृत्स्नकर्मनिराकृतेः ॥२६५॥

It is to be understood that one (individual self) is without any desire when in its case there are not seen the desires (for activity in response to the statement in) the Śruti (lit. seen text) and the hearing (of the tradition or Smṛti),¹ since there is complete abandoning of all activities. [265]

¹The word *dr̥ṣṭānuśravika* reminds one of *Sāṃkhyakārikā* 2.

क्रियमाणो यथा कामः कृत्वादीनि प्रसूयते ।
तथा संत्यज्यमानोऽपि नैष्कर्म्येणावर्तिष्ठते ॥२६६॥

As desire, being pursued (or accomplished) gives rise to (*prasūyate*) thought etc., so also, being abandoned, it comes to remain in the state of liberation (lit. state of being devoid of any activity).¹ [266]

¹Sureśvara uses the word *naiṣkarmya* principally in the sense of abandonment of activity, thereby indicating the state of liberation, which is the subject matter of his work *Naiṣkarmyasiddhi*. So also, *prasūyate* is not understood passively; cf. its paraphrase in SP as *ādhatte*.

अकामोऽपि क इत्येवं पृष्टे निष्कामं उच्यते ॥२६७॥
प्रयोजकात्मकाः कामा निष्क्रान्ता यस्य बुद्धितः ।

अतिग्रहाः स निष्कामो विद्वद्विरभिधीयते ॥२६८॥

If one were to ask 'And who is this one devoid of desires?', it is stated (in answer), *niṣkāma* 'the one who has discarded desires'. [267]

That one is described by the wise as 'one who has discarded desires', i.e. from whose intellect have gone away desires which have the nature of being the promoters (of activities), and also the sense organs.¹ [268]

¹This refers to BU 3.2.

बाह्यानामान्तराणां च कार्यकारणता मिथः ।
प्रत्यगज्ञानहेतुः स्यात्तदुच्छित्तौ न सा ततः ॥२६९॥

Further, (the desires) which are (noticeable) outside the body, and which are inside the same (i.e. are imperceptible), have the relation of being causes and effects mutually; they become the cause of ignorance about (the nature of) the inner self; but that¹ does not remain there when that, i.e. the cause (*pratyagajñānahetu*), is destroyed. [269]

¹This refers to *kāryakāraṇatā*.

तदुच्छित्तावतः प्रत्यग्याथात्म्यज्ञानमुच्यते ।
आप्तकामादिवचसा यथावस्त्ववबोधिना ॥२७०॥

Therefore, when that (*kāryakāraṇatā*) is destroyed, there arises (it is said) the knowledge of the true nature of the inner self by the statement about *āptakāma*¹ which brings about the cognition of the (real) thing as it is. [270]

¹BU 4.4.6; 4.3.21.

Verses 271-281 are the statement as to why the knower of the nature of *Ātman* comes to have attained all desires. Among

these, verses 271-272 state first that the knower has virtually obtained liberation.

आप्ताः सर्वे स्वतोऽप्यस्य कामा ये बाह्यसाधनाः ।
फलतोऽवाप्तकामोऽसौ परानन्दस्वभावतः ॥२७१॥

For this one (i.e. the knower), all these desires, which have external means (for their fulfilment), are themselves obtained; therefore, this one (the individual self) becomes the one, who has obtained all his desires, owing to its being of the nature of the highest delight. [271]

मानुषानन्दमारभ्य ह्युत्तरोत्तरवृद्धितः ।
सहस्रदशमांशोक्त्या परानन्दो निरूपितः ॥२७२॥

(The experience of) the highest delight is described (in the Śruti statement) as beginning from human delight, which goes on increasing one after another, as conveyed by the statement about its being thousandfold, tenfold etc.¹ [272]

¹Refer to *Taittirīyopaniṣad* 2.8.

Verses 273-282 point out that desirelessness leads to attainment of liberation.

कामिकामप्रभेदस्य प्रसक्ताविदमुच्यते ।
श्रुत्यात्मकाम इत्येवमात्मैवामी न ते पृथक् ॥२७३॥

In the context of the difference between desire and those who have desires, it is said that they are indeed only the Ātman i.e. not different from it as stated by the Śruti, by the word *ātmakāma*. [273]

आत्मैव सर्वमित्येवं बुद्धावस्याप्तकामता ॥२७४॥
अबाह्याभ्यन्तरः कृत्स्नः प्रज्ञानघनमात्रभाक् ।
इत्येवं यस्य वेदान्तवाक्योत्थं ज्ञानमात्मनि ॥२७५॥

ध्वस्ताशेषतमस्कत्वात्सम्यग्ज्ञानप्रसूतिः ।

वद तस्य कुतो हेतोः कामादेः स्यात्समुत्थितिः ॥२७६॥

In the case of cognition, the state of this one in having obtained all the desires is stated in the words *ātmaiva sarvam*.¹ [274]

So also, knowledge arises, in the case of this individual self, from the Vedānta sentences as *abāhyābhyantaraḥ kṛtsnaḥ prajñānaghanamātrabhāk*, [275]

and since that (individual) is one who has the entire ignorance of him destroyed and (in whom) there has been the rise of right (or, exact) knowledge,² then one would say, 'Tell me this, owing to which cause does there arise in this one desire etc.' [276]

¹CU 7.25.1.

²Add: of the nature of the Ātman.

यत्र वा अन्यदित्येवं सत्येवाज्ञान आह हि ।

ज्ञातृज्ञेयादिकं भेदं तमोध्वस्तौ न सोऽस्त्यतः ॥२७७॥

Such being the case, (the answer is:) 'The Śruti has indeed stated ignorance in (the words, viz.) *yatra vā anyat*¹ Also it has stated with reference to the distinctions of the knower, the object of knowing etc. And, therefore, when ignorance is removed, that (distinction) does not remain any more (or, thereafter)'. [277]

¹BU 4.3.31.

यत्र त्वस्येत्यतः प्राह ध्वस्तात्मतमसि श्रुतिः ।

तत्केन कमितीत्यादि साक्षेपं वचनं स्वयम् ॥२७८॥

Therefore, has the Śruti itself stated, in respect of the one who has destroyed darkness on the part of itself, *yatra tv asya* ...¹ and together with (or followed by) *tat kena kam*² [278]

¹BU 4.5.15.

²BU 2.4.14; 4.5.14.

ऐकात्म्यमात्रकूटस्थप्रबोधावसितेः कुतः ।
मातृमानक्रियामैयव्यवहारस्य संभवः ॥२७९॥

How could there be any existence possible of the dealings¹ in terms of knower, means of knowing, activity of knowing, and object of knowing after the final attainment of the knowledge of the immutable (self) revealing merely the singleness of the Ātman? [279]

¹The singular in the original is taken in plural sense.

अविजानन्हि विज्ञेयं कामं कामयते कथम् ।
ज्ञात्वैव विषयाँल्लोके सर्वः कामयते यतः ॥२८०॥

How indeed would the individual self have a desire when it is not knowing (any object of) desire to be known? (This is asked.) Indeed (*hi*), every person in the world desires various objects only after knowing about them. [280]

इत्येवमात्मकामत्वादाप्तकामोऽत्र यो भवेत् ॥२८१॥
आप्तकामतया तद्वन्निष्कामत्वं समश्नुते ।
निष्कामत्वेन चाकामः स आत्मज्ञो विमुच्यते ॥२८२॥

Thus, having obtained (the fulfilment of) the desires of its own (*ātmakāma*), the one, who has here become one of desires fulfilled (*āptakāma*), [281]
attains the state of desirelessness (*niṣkāmatva*) through having all the desires fulfilled; therefore, being one without any desire, for all of its desires have disappeared, and thus a knower of the Ātman, he is liberated. [282]

Verses 283-290 state that the purport of the subsequent portion

of the Śruti is: there is liberation of the desireless.

संसारानर्थबीजस्य प्रध्वंसादात्मबोधतः ।
तस्मादात्मनि विज्ञाते कामहेतोरसंभवात् ॥२८३॥
कामकर्माद्यसद्भावात्पूर्ण आत्मावतिष्ठते ।
न तस्येत्युत्तरोक्त्यायं यथोक्तोऽर्थः समर्थ्यते ॥२८४॥

After there has been achieved the destruction of the seed of (all) the undesired in the transmigratory world through knowing (about the nature) of the Ātman, there would not be any possible existence of the cause of desire, as/when the Ātman has become known through that (knowledge). [283]
There remains (only) the Ātman in/with its fullness owing to the non-existence of desire, activity etc.; this sense which is (just) stated is supported/justified by the later statement *na tasya* [284]

अपास्तानर्थहेतुत्वं यदुक्तं प्रत्यगात्मनः ।
योऽकाम इत्यादिगिरा यो वेदात्मानमागमात् ॥२८५॥
जिघृक्षत्यायसं तप्तं शास्त्राचार्यात्मनिश्चयात् ।
तस्योत्क्रामन्ति न प्राणा आसते नापि तत्र ते ॥२८६॥

By the words *yo 'kāmaḥ* whatever is said regarding the one, the individual self who has known the Ātman from the tradition (of the scriptures) to be the cause of the removal (lit. throwing away) of all the undesired. [285]
and wishes to hold a heated piece of iron¹ by the decision of scriptures/preceptors, that one's life-breaths do not depart (from that one's body), nor also do they (continue to) remain in that (body). [286]

¹This refers to CU 7.1.1. This pertains to the earlier practice of the Vedic people for testing truthfulness in the speech of a person. If he spoke the truth, a hot piece of iron would not cause any burn to his hand.

स्थित्युत्क्रान्त्योर्हि यो हेतुरात्माविद्यादिलक्षणः ।
 दृवस्तत्वात्तस्य सर्वस्य प्रत्यग्याथात्म्यदर्शनात् ॥२८७॥

Indeed, that which is the cause of the existence (in a body) and departure (from it, in the case of a transmigratory being), noticed as ignorance about the Ātman; that being destroyed, in its fullness, there results the awareness (lit. sight) of the true nature of the Ātman (and there is liberation of that being).

[287]

Verses 288-290 have amplified the thought expressed in verse 287.

यत एवमतः प्राणाः सम्यग्ज्ञानस्य जन्मनि ।
 नोत्क्रामन्ति न तिष्ठन्ति न च नश्यन्त्यहेतुतः ॥२८८॥

Since this is so, when there has arisen (in him) proper knowledge of the Ātman the life-breaths of that person do not either depart from his body nor do they remain there (in it)—(then the life-breaths) do not get destroyed, since there is not any (real) cause (of the same).

[288]

रज्जुसर्पो यथा लोकेऽज्ञातरज्जुसतत्त्वकः ।
 नोत्क्रामति न चाप्यास्ते न च नश्यति रज्जुतः ॥२८९॥

This is as it is in the world: like the serpent, which is (really) a rope, with its true nature of being a rope not known, it does not either disappear (lit. go out) nor does it continue to remain, nor does it get destroyed on account of the (real) rope.

[289]

स्थित्युत्क्रान्तिविनाशानां रज्जुस्तत्त्वं यतस्ततः ।
 रज्जुज्ञानसमुत्पत्तौ रज्ज्वा नान्योऽवशिष्यते ॥२९०॥

Since the rope is the truth (underlying) the (temporary/-assumed) sustenance, the departure and the destruction (of

the imagined serpent); therefore, there remains nothing else than the rope, when there has arisen the knowledge of the rope. [290]

Verses 291-295 explain the meaning of *samavanīyante* as *adhi-
sthānamātratayā tiṣṭhanti*.

अविद्यातज्जनिर्मुक्तं वस्त्वत्रैवेति भण्यते ।

(By this) it is said that the (real) thing (i.e. the Ātman) which is freed from ignorance and its effect(s), remains only here (i.e. in this very body). [291ab]

समित्यैकात्म्यमात्रेण प्राणानां स्थितिरुच्यते ॥२९१॥
अवनीयन्त इत्युक्त्या नाशादिभ्योऽन्यतोगतिः ।
प्रत्यङ्मात्रैकनिष्ठत्वात् भावाभावयोः स्थितिः ॥२९२॥

In the statement of the Śruti,¹ the preposition *sam* conveys the sustenance of *prāṇas* only as being one with the single Ātman; [291cd]
by saying *avanīyante*, there is reference to (their) movement away from destruction etc.—thereby it is pointed out that there does not exist any positive and negative entity owing to the fact that those *prāṇas* have remained supported in the inner self. [292]

SP states *prāṇānām ātmamātratayā sthitiḥ avanayanam*.

¹The Mādhyandina recension of BU says: *atraiva samavanīyante*, but not the Kāṇva recension of the same.

तादात्म्यमेव सर्वस्य कार्यकारणवस्तुनः ।
उत्क्रान्त्यादेश्च कृत्स्नस्य सर्वमात्मैतिशास्त्रतः ॥२९३॥

The oneness (with that Ātman) of everything known as effect and/or cause; and, is (referred to) because of the departure etc.¹ of the entire (mass of things) and (also) (this is) on

the basis of the scriptural text *sarvam ātmā*.²

[293]

¹This refers to *nirgama* and *dehāntaraprāpti*.

²BU 2.4.6; 4.5.7.

इति वस्तु स्वतो बुद्धमज्ञानं चानुभूतितः ॥२९४॥
प्रत्यग्याथात्म्यमात्रत्वात्तन्मोहाद्यप्यशेषतः ।
निवर्तते निवृत्तं चेत्येतदप्यनुभूतितः ॥२९५॥

Thus (the real) thing is, in its own right, what is known and there is (only) ignorance (of the worldly objects)—this is on the basis of experience (of us all). [294]

Ignorance about that (Ātman) etc.,¹ in its fullness, on account of its having its real nature to be the inner self, disappears (i.e. gets destroyed); and that it has disappeared is also (understood/known) through experience (of everyone). [295]

¹This refers to the effects of ignorance.

यत एवमतो वस्तु मुक्तमेव विमुच्यते ।
कठवल्लीषु चाप्युक्तं विमुक्तश्च विमुच्यते ॥२९६॥

Since this is so, therefore the (real) thing which is already free (from everything else) is said to be freed from it; in the sections of the *Kāthopaniṣad* also it is said; *vimuktaś ca vimucyate*.¹ [296]

¹*Kāthopaniṣad* 5.5.1.

इहापि सपरीवारं श्रुतिन्यायोपपत्तिमत् ।
श्रुतिस्तदेव चाचष्टे वस्तु ब्रह्मैव सन्निति ॥२९७॥

Here, in this context also, it is reasonable to understand from the example of the Śruti (that there is the release of the (real) thing, viz. the inner self) together with it accompanying (world of objects); for the Śruti has said just about that, viz. the

(real) thing in the words: *brahmaiva san*¹

[297]

¹*brahmaiva san brahmāpyeti* (BU 4.4.6).

There follows in verses 298-303 the conclusion of the Upaniṣadic statement *brahma vā idam*

ब्रह्म वा इदमित्येवं सूत्रितं वस्तु यत्पुरा ।
स्पष्टं व्याख्याय तच्छ्रुत्या ह्युपसंहियतेऽधुना ॥२९८॥

That (real) thing, which was earlier stated in a brief statement: *brahma vā idam*,¹ has been thus explained by the Śruti clearly thus and then it is now concluded.

[298]

¹This refers to BU 1.4.10-11 and 1.6.1 and in passing *brahma te bravāṇi ...* (BU 2.1.1).

योऽयं संसारभूमिष्ठो व्याख्यातोऽज्ञाततत्त्वकः ।
कार्यकारणरूपोऽयं मोहवृत्तानुरोधतः ॥२९९॥

This one (individual self), who is in the state of transmigration and has the nature of the Ātman not known (to it), is (so far) explained as the one having the form of effects and causes, in accordance with the procedure (or, modifications) of ignorance.

[299]

यतो ब्रह्मैव सन्नेष प्रथते मोहतोऽन्यथा ।
ब्रह्मैवैतीह सन्ब्रह्म तस्मान्मोहनिराकृतौ ॥३००॥

Since, being the Brahman itself (though), it becomes known (in the transmigratory world as the individual self), owing to its ignorance, but (otherwise) it is only the Brahman, therefore it is here said to become the Brahman itself after (its) ignorance about that has been removed.

[300]

This is the purport of verses 297-299.

नान्यदज्ञानतोऽस्तित्वं द्वितीयस्यात्मनो यथा ।
निवृत्तिस्तद्वदेवास्य नावगत्यात्मनोऽपरा ॥३०१॥

As there is no existence of a second (apart) from the Ātman except one from ignorance (about it), therefore, the return (of it) from worldly existence (i.e. becoming one with the Ātman) is (also) not different from (merely) knowing (about itself as being) one with the Ātman. [301]

यस्मादेतत्स्वतो बुद्धं स्वतः शुद्धमतोऽद्वयम् ।
प्रमात्रादेस्तदज्ञाननिवृत्तौ विनिवृत्तितः ॥३०२॥

Since this one (i.e. the Ātman) is, by its nature what is known (i.e. knowledge), by its own nature (only) pure, therefore it is without a second, and that (becomes known) after the ignorance about it as knower etc. has been destroyed, there is discontinuation of the individual self (apart from the Ātman). [302]

मुक्तं चातः स्वतस्तत्त्वं मुक्तमित्युपचर्यते ।
तदविद्यादिविध्वंसात्रिर्वः शपथयाम्यहम् ॥३०३॥

For this reason, the true thing, though, by its own nature, free, is stated metaphorically as being released, and that on account of destruction of ignorance about it—this do I state to you on oath three times. [303]

Verses 304-307 state that the knower of the Brahman does not have to perform any activity.

योऽक्रियाकारकं साक्षादक्रियाकारकात्मकः ।
आत्मानमात्मनैवात्मा साक्षाद्वेत्ति सुषुप्तवत् ॥३०४॥
निरस्ताशेषसंभेदं दृष्टिमात्रं निरञ्जनम् ।
वितमस्कं स आत्मज्ञस्ततोऽन्ये मूढचेतसः ॥३०५॥

That person is the knower of the self, who directly experiences himself by himself¹ as one not (being related to) any activity or its means, not of the nature of either action or its means to be like the one who is in deep sleep, i.e. merely the untainted seer with all distinct objects for him disappearing and who is thus free from ignorance; and others are of dull intellect. [304-305]

¹It means not through help of any other person.

न तस्य जीवतः कश्चिद्विशेषोऽस्ति मृतस्य वा ।
यतः सर्वविशेषाणामविद्यैवास्ति कारणम् ॥३०६॥

There is not any difference in him when he is alive or when he is dead; since the cause of all the differences is merely ignorance. [306]

अविचारितसंसिद्धिप्रत्यङ्मोहादिलक्षण-
व्यवधानमात्राभावेन ब्रह्माप्येतीति शब्दघटे ॥३०७॥

The statement *brahmāpyeti* is made with a view to referring to only the absence of any hindrance characterized by ignorance about the individual self etc., which is (already) established ever without any (deliberate) consideration. [307]

Verses 308-312 affirm that liberation is not effected by any activity.

इतोऽन्यथा चेन्मोक्षः स्यादारम्भोऽनर्थकः श्रुतेः ।
मुक्तेश्च कर्महेतुत्वादनित्यत्वं प्रसज्यते ॥३०८॥

If liberation were otherwise (in nature), then the activity¹ of the Śruti would be meaningless; and liberation would then be understood as having action as its cause (and then) would be non-eternal.² [308]

¹This refers to the Śruti statement enjoining it.

²This is based on the accepted doctrine: whatever is produced by action perishes.

एष नित्यो महिमेति श्रुतिवाक्यं विहन्यते ।
स्वाभाविकात्स्वभावाच्च नित्यो नान्योऽस्ति कश्चन ॥३०९॥

And, the statement in the Śruti *eṣa nityo mahimā*¹ would then be contradicted and (further) the nature and the natural property of the Ātman (also would be opposed); also, there is not any thing else (than that as) eternal.² [309]

¹BU 4.4.23.

²This refers to *ato 'nyad ārtam*.

आत्मस्वभावो मोक्षश्चेद्वियच्छिद्रत्ववत्सदा ।
अग्न्युष्णवच्चाशक्योऽतः कर्मोत्थ इति भाषितुम् ॥३१०॥

If liberation is (thus) ever the (very) nature of the Ātman like a hole in the sky (which is not, or cannot be, ever there), then it would be impossible to state that it (i.e. liberation) has arisen from any action like heat in fire.¹ [310]

¹One can never make a hole in the sky and also one cannot be said to produce heat in fire, since not having a hole and having heat in the case of the two respectively is merely natural. This supports the argument in the preceding verse.

ज्वलनव्यापृतेरग्नेः प्रकाशौष्ण्यादि चेत्फलम् ।
नोपलब्ध्यन्तरायार्थध्वंसाभिव्यक्त्यपेक्षतः ॥३११॥

If it is held that light, heat etc. of fire were the result of the burning activity of fire, (then we should be required to say that) it is not so, because they depend only on the revelation of (that fire) on (or, after) the destruction of the obstacle for finding it. [311]

ज्वलनव्यापृतेर्वहेः प्रकाशौण्यादिजन्मनः ।
न त्वग्न्यपेक्षयौण्यादेरभिव्यक्तस्वभावतः ॥३१२॥

(This is so) as light, heat etc. are (held to be) produced from fire, which has burning as its activity, but (*tu*) heat etc. have the nature of being revealed (together with fire) and, therefore, (they are) not dependent on fire (i.e. its activity of burning).

[312]

Verses 313-316 state that the Ātman is, by nature, luminous and does not thus expect any revealer (of itself).

नाभिव्यञ्जकसंसाध्या घटादेरिव चात्मनः ।
अभिव्यक्तिः स्वतोभास्वद्वोधमात्रैकरूपतः ॥३१३॥

Also, the revelation of the Ātman is not to be obtained like a pitcher¹ through (the help of) any manifestor, because it is of only one form, that is bright knowledge by its own nature.

[313]

¹It becomes visible to the eye through the light of a lamp; it cannot reveal itself.

अग्नेरन्यस्य पुंसोऽग्निज्वलनादिनिमित्ततः ।
उष्णप्रकाशयोर्व्यक्त्यवधानस्य संभवात् ॥३१४॥

And the hindrance is possible in the case of (the appearance of) heat and light of fire, for it (*viz.* the fire) is revealed through (some) incidental activity of a person enkindling it.

[314]

अप्यभिव्यक्तिरूपेऽस्मिन्मोक्षे नैवास्ति कार्यता ।
प्रदीपादेरभिव्यक्त्यं नैव कार्यं घटादिकम् ॥३१५॥

Further, even though liberation (of an individual self) is of

a sort of revelation (of the Ātman itself), it is not of the nature of an effect; it is indeed not like a pitcher etc., an effect to be manifested through (the help of) a lamp etc.

[315]

अभिव्यक्तिश्च नैवास्ति सौण्ययाद्यात्मकवस्तुनः ।
तदन्तरायासद्भावाद्वास्तवी न तु मोहजा ॥३१६॥

And there is not at all any manifestation of the thing, fire which has the nature of being possessed of heat etc.; because there is really no existence (of any) hindrance to it (i.e. its manifestation), it is a matter of fact (in worldly sense), being not a product of ignorance.

[316]

ज्वालानुग्रहतो वह्नेस्तत्प्रकाशादिदर्शनात् ।
भ्रमोऽयमग्निव्यापारादुष्णादेर्जन्मकल्पना ॥३१७॥

This notion of the production of heat etc. as resulting from the activity of fire is false cognition (or error), because light etc. of fire become seen (only) through the help (lit. favour) of the flames of fire.

[317]

न चेदग्नेः प्रकाशादिस्वभावोऽभ्युपगम्यते ।
यत्स्यात्स्वाभाविकं यस्य तदुदाहरणं भवेत् ॥३१८॥

If one did not accept light etc. to be the nature of fire, then there would be (adduced by us) as an example which would be a natural property of a thing.

[318]

The first line of the verse opens the discussion whether a thing can have its natural property and in the second line it makes a point that there can be some natural property of a thing as it is understood in light and heat as natural property of fire. But, if for argument's sake, one did not regard them as natural properties, then Vedāntin would like to point out such natural property of fire as can be suitable example for

liberation as natural to the Ātman. The next verse refers to the non-existence of such a property in a thing.

न च स्वाभाविको धर्मः कस्यचिन्नास्ति वस्तुनः ।
स्वयं तु भवतो यस्माद्वस्तुनोऽन्येन संगतिः ॥३१९॥

It is not that a thing does not have a natural property of its own, for it is only thereby that it is connected with another thing while it is in existence in reality. [319]

निगडध्वंसवन्नापि पुंसो मोक्ष इहात्मनः ।
निवृत्तिमात्रं बन्धस्य कथंचिदुपपद्यते ॥३२०॥

Moreover, here (i.e. in Vedānta), liberation of the individual self is not like the destruction of fetters of someone (bound), i.e. consisting in mere removal of bondage—that cannot stand to reason in any way. [320]

एकमेवाद्वितीयं सद्द्वितीयं तदबोधतः ।
न च बद्धस्ततोऽन्योऽस्ति यस्य नश्यति बन्धनम् ॥३२१॥

And that, existent (the Ātman, here, the individual self) is not (really) fettered because that one single self, which is without a second, is taken to be having some second owing to the ignorance about it(self),¹ therefore, that whose fetter is destroyed (lit. perishes) is a thing other than that (Ātman). [321]

¹CU 6.2.1.

प्रतीचो व्यतिरेकेण तथैवाव्यतिरेकतः ।
वस्त्वन्तरस्य सद्भावमभावं च प्रयत्नतः ॥३२२॥
निराकार्षं सुयुक्त्युक्त्या मोक्षोऽतोऽज्ञाननिहनुतिः ।
सर्पाद्यभाववद्रज्जुमोहमात्रनिवृत्तितः ॥३२३॥

I have (already) refuted with a detailed thought (*prayatnataḥ*);¹

with good and plausible reasons that there does not exist any positive and negative entity apart from individual self: not also as not apart from it; this, therefore, liberation is (merely) the removal (lit. concealment) of the absence of knowledge—it results from the mere removal of ignorance as in the case of a rope which is (actually) not accompanied by a serpent etc.² [322-323]

This verse is based on BU 1.4.7

¹SP explains this by the word *vicāraparinispīdanam*.

²Other examples of *adhyāsa* and basis for the same are implied by this word.

Verses 324-329 refer to a view on mokṣa (most probably of the Kashmirian thinker Bhāsarvajña or some of his predecessors) together with some codakas 'questioners' doubts' and verses 330-336 give the refutation of the same.

ये तु व्याचक्षते मोक्षे नित्यानन्दैकगोचरा ।
ज्ञानाभिव्यक्तिरित्येवं स्वसिद्धान्तसमाश्रयात् ॥३२४॥
तैरभिव्यक्तिशब्दार्थो वक्तव्यः कीदृशिष्यते ।

(Those) who state, by resorting to their own view,¹ that, in the state of liberation, there is manifestation/revelation of knowledge, which has only one object (for it), viz. eternal bliss, [324]

have to explain as to what sort of meaning is understood of the word *abhiv्यakti* 'manifestation'.² [325ab]

It is mentioned by the MRI edition that there is here a reference to the view of Bhāsarvajña (who could have belonged to the ninth century). It is not certain whether he was a predecessor or contemporary of Sureśvara. The view under reference should better be understood as a view of some Vaiśeṣika who held a view similar to that of Bhāsarvajña, which

can be summarised in his words thus: (*tat*) *siddham nityasaṃvedyamānena sukhena viśiṣṭāntikī duḥkhanivṛtīḥ puruṣasya mokṣa (iti)*; (quoted from *Nyāyasāra* of Bhāsarvajña, ed. with translation and notes in Marathi by Raḍḍiśāstri, Pune, 1922, p. 167).

¹This suggests that the view under reference does not have any authoritative basis, viz. the Śruti or good reasoning.

²This indicates the fact that the meaning of *abhivyakti* 'manifestation' cannot be production (*utpatti*).

प्रसिद्ध एव चेदर्थो विज्ञानालम्बनाप्तिता ॥३२५॥

विज्ञानालम्बनप्राप्तिः किं सतो वाथवासतः ।

अभिव्यक्तिः सतश्चेत्स्याद्यस्य मुक्तस्य तत्सुखम् ॥३२६॥

स्वरूपमेव तस्येति विशेषणमनर्थकम् ।

If the meaning (of that word) is just which is well-known, viz. getting to know (lit. obtaining) it by some specific means of knowing (*viññānālabhāna*), [325cd]

(the question arises:) 'Is that getting to know (lit. obtaining) by some specific means of knowing manifestation/revelation through (or, by) some existent or non-existent (means)?' If it is held to be through (or, by) some existent (means), then that happiness, which would come to/for the liberated being [326]

(is) the very nature of it (and, therefore) the specification *tasya* (to/for it) would be redundant (lit. meaningless).¹ [327ab]

¹Cp. *Nyāyasāra* (*ibid.*, p. 162): *sukhasaṃvedanayor nityatvān muktasaṃsāriṇo 'viśeṣaprasaṅga iti cen na ..., duḥkhādeḥ saṃsārāvasthāyāṃ sambhavāt tannāśe ca muktāvasthāyāṃ bhavati sukhasaṃvedanayor (saṃvedana=jñāna) sambandha ity ato nāviśeṣaḥ*.

मुक्तौ तद्व्यज्यते ज्ञानं सुखं चेति यदीरितम् ॥३२७॥

स्वात्मभूतं हि यद्यस्य नैव तद्व्यवधीयते ।

आत्मनस्तत्स्वभावत्वात्सर्वदेति विनिश्चयः ॥३२८॥

अमुक्तावथवा मुक्तौ विशेषोऽस्ति न कश्चन ।

And as to what has been stated: 'There, it is in liberation that there become manifest (or, revealed) knowledge and happiness,'¹ [327cd]

indeed (*hi*), that² which has been one's own nature cannot be obscured, because the Ātman has always that (i.e. bliss) as (part of) its own nature; this is the decision.³ [328]

There is not any difference whatsoever whether or not it is the state of liberation. [329ab]

¹This argument implies the non-existence of any means of knowing manifestation, if it were accepted as known (*prasiddha*).

²This refers to the thing to which that knowledge and happiness belong.

³That is, knowledge and happiness cannot ever be obscured in the case of the Ātman, for it has both of them as a part of its nature.

प्रत्यगात्मस्वभावत्वात्सुखविज्ञानयोरतः ॥३२९॥

मुक्तौ तद्व्यज्यत इति विशेषवचनं मृषा ।

स्वसिद्धान्तविरोधोऽपि तदभिव्यक्तिवादिनः ॥३३०॥

सत्कार्यवादिनो यस्मादभिव्यक्तः प्रशस्यते ।

व्यज्यते सर्वमेवेदं सत्त्वात्सर्वस्य वस्तुनः ॥३३१॥

Therefore, happiness and knowledge being the nature of the inner self, [329cd]

the statement of the specification that 'it becomes manifested (or, revealed) in liberation', is false. Further, there would occur self-contradiction in the doctrine of the one who postulates the manifestation of the same; since it is proposed (lit. praised) by one, i.e. the holder of the view that the effect is (but what has been) already existent, and from that there is manifestation/revelation,¹ [330-331ab]

(that is to say:) all this world is (but) manifested/revealed from the (real) thing, because of its (continuous) existence

(for ever).

[331cd]

This refers to the manifestation of happiness and knowledge (*sukha-vijñāna*).

This refers to the acceptance of *satkāryavāda* by the thinker under reference, and, if he were to be taken to hold *asatkāryavāda* (or *ārambhavāda*), there is here an argument against that opinion which is stated in the following verse.

¹The refutation of the view under reference begins actually here.

आरम्भवादे त्विच्छादेः कार्यत्वादसदात्मता ।
असत्तत्त्वाप्यभिव्यक्तिर्न युक्ता खरशृङ्गवत् ॥३३२॥

In the view regarding the beginning, the desire etc. are considered as having the nature of non-existence on account of (their) being the effect.¹ Now, it is argued that there could not be any modification/revealing of them as non-existing! This is like the horn of a *khara*!

[332]

¹This implies the existence of desire to create something and/but desire is said to be an effect of something else.

व्यङ्ग्यव्यञ्जकसंबन्धः प्रदीपघटयोरिव ।
उभयोः सिद्धयोर्योगान्नेष्टा कारणकार्यता ॥३३३॥

Because this relation of the manifestor and the manifested is taken to be of two already existent but different things, as of a lamp and a pitcher, therefore, it is not desirable to accept the relation of cause and effect between liberation and some cause of it.

[333]

This implies a twofold question: whether or not there is real manifestation of happiness and knowledge. In the next two verses, the two aspects of them are discussed severally.

सखविज्ञानयोश्चापि किमभेदोऽथवा भिदा ।
नैक्येऽभिव्यक्तिशब्दार्थः कदाचिदपि लभ्यते ॥३३४॥

Further, one has to ascertain if there is non-difference or difference between happiness and knowledge; if there is non-difference, there cannot ever be obtained any meaning (i.e. meaningfulness) of the word 'manifestation'. [334]

अथ भेदस्तयोरिष्टो व्यवधानं प्रसज्यते ।
तद्वेदाभेदतासिद्धौ न च मानमिहास्ति वः ॥३३५॥

If (on the contrary) it is accepted that there is difference between the two, then there would contingently follow (the existence of) what separates (or differentiates) the two. Thus, there is not, for you¹ any authoritative means of ascertaining if the two are different or non-different, in proving/holding them, here.² [335]

¹Sureśvara refers to the holder of the other view as present before him, as it were, and therefore directly addresses him.

²That is, in relation to this, either the Ātman or liberation.

भेदग्राहि न नो मानमितोऽन्यत्रापि विद्यते ।
मेयमात्रावसायित्वात्सर्वमानस्य सर्वदा ॥३३६॥

There does not exist for (all of) us, be it in this (context) or elsewhere, any means of knowing which grasps the difference (between happiness and knowledge), because all the authoritative means of knowing are ever to result into (knowing) merely the objects of their knowing.¹ [336]

¹A valid means by its nature secures the exact nature of the thing to be known, but since there is not here either difference or non-difference between happiness and knowledge as certain, that cannot be accepted by a valid means of knowledge.

In verses 337-348 there is a discussion on the nature of a valid means of knowing, as giving rise to distinct properties of the things to be known.

स्वमेयव्यतिरेकेण मेयान्तरसमाश्रयः ।

न व्यावृत्त्यनुवृत्त्यादिव्यापारोऽस्ति मितेः क्वचित् ॥३३७॥

There is not anywhere in any situation of knowing (*miti*) the function of distinguishing one object from another or showing one as similar (to another) which is related to an object of knowing and another which is apart from the object of its knowing.

[337]

अभिव्यक्तिः सुखस्यास्तु कामं ज्ञानेन संगतेः ।

ज्ञानव्यक्तौ तु किं मानं यतोऽभिव्यक्तिर्वागियम् ॥३३८॥

Granted that there is manifestation of happiness owing to its close (*-sam*) association with knowledge; but (the question) would be as to what can be the means for manifesting that knowledge, since there is the Śruti statement about the manifestation (*abhivvyakti*) (of happiness).

[338]

प्रमाणानां प्रमाणत्वं न स्वरूपप्रमेयता ।

न च मानान्तरादिष्टं तयोस्तुल्यस्वभावतः ॥३३९॥

Valid means of knowing have the nature of being valid only by referring to the objects of their knowing, in their own forms, and it is not accepted that some other means of similar nature can reveal the difference between their objects of knowing.

[339]

अभिव्यक्तिर्मताथापि कादाचित्की न सर्वदा ।

तदन्तरायसद्भावादव्यक्तिः स्यात्सदा ध्रुवम् ॥३४०॥

If again manifestation (of happiness and knowledge) is held

to be occasional (at some time) and not on all times, then there would always be certain non-manifestation (of the object of knowing) on account of the existence of some obstruction to it. [340]

अन्तरायनिवृत्तौ च व्यपेक्षा वः प्रसज्यते ।
साधनान्तरविषया तज्ज्ञानव्यतिरेकतः ॥३४१॥

And, further, with reference to the removal of that obstruction, there would be necessary for you to expect yet another means as apart from the knowledge of the same. [341]

उपलब्ध्येकनीडत्वे व्यवधानस्य कल्पना ।
न चोपपद्यते मानात्तयोरेकात्मकत्वतः ॥३४२॥

Moreover, this notion of the existence of some obstruction does not stand to reason, if there is accepted oneness of cognizing the two (i.e. happiness and knowledge) together, because each of them has the nature of being a means of knowing but one object. [342]

एवं च सत्यभिव्यक्तिः सर्वदा सुखबोधयोः ।
अभिव्यक्तिर्न चेदेवं नाभिव्यक्तिः सदा तदा ॥३४३॥

This being so, there would ever be manifestation of happiness and knowledge (together); if manifestation were not like this (i.e. not occurring simultaneously with knowledge) then there is never any manifestation. [343]

इतोऽन्यथा कल्पनायां न प्रमाणं समीक्ष्यते ॥३४४॥
नाप्येकाश्रयिणां लोके धर्माणां क्वचिदीक्ष्यते ।
मानमेयत्वसंबन्धो मिथोयोग्यत्वतस्तथा ॥३४५॥

For holding a notion other than this, there is not seen any other valid means of knowing (the same), [344]
for there is not seen anywhere, in this world, in the case

of properties which have but one support/basis as that between a means of knowing and its object so as to be suitable to one another. [345]

सुखादिव्यक्तितः पूर्वं यस्य संसारिता मता ।
सौन्दर्य एव सदाव्यक्तनित्यज्ञानसुखात्मनः ।
शीतोष्णयोरिव तयोर्वैलक्षण्यात्परस्परम् ॥३४६॥

The one, in respect of whom it is held (by you, my opponents) the nature of a transmigratory being before there appeared (in that one) happiness etc.¹ It is certainly quite different (from the Ātman), which is of the nature of eternal knowledge and happiness and is ever unmanifest; (this is so) on account of their mutual difference in characteristics as in the case of what is cool and what is hot. [346]

¹This refers to knowledge.

परात्मभेदकलृप्तौ च संत्यागो वः प्रसज्यते ।
यतो वैदिकपक्षस्य नातः कल्प्यात्मनो भिदा ॥३४७॥

And there occurs a contingency (in your opinion) of abandoning (Vedic authority), when (you accept) distinction between the highest Ātman and individual self, since any such differentiation/difference cannot ever be considered in the doctrine of one who follows the Vedic¹ text. [347]

¹This refers to Vedāntic texts. Refer to *Śvetāśvataropaniṣad* 6.11: *eko devaḥ sarvabhūteṣu ...*; CU 6.2.1: *ekam evādvitīyam*

आत्मधीमानमात्रत्वात्प्रत्यगात्मैकवस्तुनः ।
प्रमाणासंभवश्च स्यादात्मभेदप्रकल्पने ॥३४८॥

In respect of the acceptance of the two the Ātman¹ and the individual self as different (which you postulate), there

is impossibility of any valid means of (so) knowing only one reality, i.e. the self as dependent only on the knowledge of the Ātman as the means of knowing it. [348]

¹This refers to the highest Ātman and the individual self.

Verses 349-358 state that, in the view of the Vedānta, there is no differentiation in the case of the Ātman, because that is (so-called) bondage and (the state of) liberation.

नन्विदानीं यथा तद्वन्मुक्तौ चेदविशेषता ।
नातियत्नो भवेन्नृणां शास्त्रवैयर्थ्यमेव च ॥३४९॥

(An objection is raised:) 'Indeed, as (argued by you) there does not exist any non-difference (in the Ātman) in the state of liberation and in the way (you have stated), but then there would not be on the part of men a great effort¹ (to get to know the nature of the Ātman) and there will only be meaninglessness/futility of the scripture'.² [349]

¹Sureśvara uses this word in the sense of effort to acquire the *śamadamādisādhanasampat*. (SP explained *śāstrīyaśamādir atiyatnaḥ*.)

²This refers to *mokṣaśāstra*.

नात्माविद्याहानमात्रकारित्वादागमात्मनः ।
तदर्थं यत्नसाफल्यं शास्त्रारम्भोऽपि चार्थवान् ॥३५०॥

(The answer is given:) 'This is not so, because usefulness of the scripture is in that it is for liberation, for bringing about the destruction of ignorance about the Ātman, and thus the activity of (*mokṣa*)*śāstra* is meaningful'.¹ [350]

¹SP supports the argument of this verse by citing Bharṭṛ-prapañca: *yathāhuḥ— avidyākālpitābhedanivṛttiparatvāc chāstrasya (iti)*.

मुक्तामक्तत्वरूपोऽयं न विशेषोऽस्ति वस्तुनि ।
तदविद्यैव निःशेषविशेषाणां प्रसूतिकृत् ॥३५१॥

There does not exist in the (real) thing this difference of what is liberated and what is non-liberated; therefore, only ignorance is the cause (lit. origination) of the entire differences (in respect of products etc.). [351]

अशेषानर्थहेतुं तामविद्यां शास्त्रजा मतिः ।
यतो निहन्ति तेन स्यात्साफल्यं यत्नशास्त्रयोः ॥३५२॥

Since knowledge which results from the study of (*mokṣa*)śāstra destroys fully that ignorance which is the cause of all the undesired effects; therefore, there would be meaningfulness/usefulness of *yatna* and *mokṣaśāstra*. [352]

अथाविद्यावतोऽविद्याहान्यहानिकृतो भवेत् ।
विशेष आत्मनः कश्चिदिति चेन्नैवमिष्यते ॥३५३॥
अविद्यामात्रहेतुत्थगोचरत्वसमाश्रयात् ।
रज्जुखण्डाद्यविद्योत्थसर्पादिविनिवृत्तिवत् ॥३५४॥

(An objection:) 'Now, if one were to say: there does occur some difference in respect of the Ātman which is effected by ignorance that is caused by the destruction and non-destruction of ignorance'; then (the answer is given:) 'No, it is not so accepted, [353]
because this is based on objects which have originated only from ignorance—this would be like the removal (of the knowledge) of a serpent etc. which has arisen from the ignorance about a piece of a rope etc.'¹ [354]

¹We have followed the reading of AnSS edition *rajjukhaṇḍādya* ... and ignored the variant reading *rajjūṣarādya* Yet it appears that the variant might have been intended here in view of the use of *ādi* in the word *-sarpādi*. However, looking to Sureśvara's

casual (or indifferent) use of *ādi* in a number of verses, we have ignored that better looking variant. NKL (ms.) does not show any indication of the v.l.

आत्मनो मोहकर्तृत्वमकर्तृत्वं यदीष्यते ।
विशेष इति नैवं स्याद्व्यायतीवेति वारणात् ॥३५५॥

(An objection is raised:) 'If it is held that the individual self is the agent of creating ignorance and the absence of it (i.e. both) and the difference in it'; (the answer is:) 'It is not so, because there is warding away of it in the (Śruti) statement *dhyāyatīva*'.¹ [355]

¹BU 4.3.7.

अजो न जायते नेति ध्यायतीवेति चागमैः ।
निषेधः क्रियतेऽशेषविकारादेरिहात्मनः ॥३५६॥

Further, there is the rejection of every modification here¹ in respect of the Ātman (as) by the traditional texts of the non-born (Ātman) in *na jāyate*,² *neti*³ and *dhyāyatīva*.⁴ [356]

¹This means: in respect of *mokṣasāstra*.

²*Kāthopaniṣad* 2.1.18.

³BU 3.9.26, 4.3.3, 4.4.22 and 4.5.15.

⁴BU 4.3.7.

विषयत्वोपपत्तेश्च प्रत्यङ्मोहतदुत्थयोः ।
नाविद्यावान्भवेदात्मा नापि तत्कार्यवांस्ततः ॥३५७॥

Moreover, because ignorance about the inner self and what arises from it are known by reason to be the object(s) (of some knowing), the Ātman would not be affected by ignorance, nor can it be possessed of the effect(s) of the same. [357]

While translating this verse, we have ignored the note of AnSS

editor regarding variant reading *-kāryavānataḥ*. NKL (ms.) does not give any indication of that v.l.

ग्राहकग्रहणग्राह्यभावाभावप्रसिद्धता ।
यथात्मसाक्षिका तद्वन्न वेद्मीत्यात्मसाक्षिकम् ॥३५८॥

As it is known that the distinction of what grasps, the act of grasping and the object of grasping, these objects, positive and/or negative entities, is witnessed/known by the Ātman; so also the cognition 'I do not know' has the Ātman as its witness/knower. [358]

Verses 359-381 state that ignorance does not have a support in the Ātman.

अज्ञातत्वान्यथाज्ञातसिद्धेरात्मैकसाक्षितः ।
अज्ञानमन्यथाज्ञानमतो नास्त्यात्मसाक्षिणः ॥३५९॥

Since being unknown or being known otherwise becomes established only on account of the witness, the Ātman; therefore, ignorance or wrong knowledge (lit. knowledge other than what the thing is) cannot exist there wherein there is the Ātman as the witness. [359]

न हि यो यत्र साक्षीह स तत्राज्ञ इतीर्यते ।
असामान्येन तत्सिद्धेः साक्षिसाक्ष्यपदार्थयोः ॥३६०॥

Here (in the worldly dealings) the one, who is the witness in respect of something, is not called ignorant in respect of that (thing); because the meanings of the two words *sākṣin* and *sākṣya* become established as not belonging to one thing in common. [360]

तस्मिन्साक्षी च मृदश्चेत्यतीवैतद्विरुध्यते ।
मिथो वाक्यमतो नैदृग्वक्तव्यं मानिना ततः ॥३६१॥
न जाने मुग्ध एवाहं भवदुक्तं मनागपि ।

इति चेद्वीक्षसे तर्हि मूढमज्ञं च कुम्भवत् ॥३६२॥

(Therefore) a witness in respect of that thing is also the one deluded in respect of that same thing—this statement is altogether (*atīva*) self-contradictory; such a sentence as this should not be uttered (by you), holding (as valid) means of knowing, [361]

as in your statement, 'I do not know and I am deluded'; if you see thus, then (you see) yourself as both deluded and ignorant just as there would be an (ignorant) pitcher. [362]

त्वं त्वज्ञो मूढ एवेति भव कामं यथेच्छसि ।
मूढाज्ञयोस्तु यः साक्षी नासौ मुग्धोऽज्ञ एव वा ॥३६३॥

Well, be you a deluded one or an ignorant person, as you have wished; but the one, who witnesses both the deluded and the ignorant one, is indeed neither deluded nor ignorant. [363]

This explains BUB *bhavatvajño* ... (BUB p.637)

लोकेऽपि यस्य यः साक्षी सम्यग्दर्श्येव तस्य सः ।
यथा लोके तथेहापि साक्षी सम्यक्प्रपश्यति ॥३६४॥

In the world also, one who witnesses something is a person who well sees that thing; as this is so in the world, so also is it here:¹ the witness well sees (the object of its seeing). [364]

¹This refers to *mokṣasāstra*.

महाभूतादिधृत्यन्तं क्षेत्रमेवेति चाब्रवीत् ।
साक्षात्स्वयंभूर्वेदात्मा संसारानर्थशान्तये ॥३६५॥

Further, the self-born, the Ātman of the nature of the Veda himself has said for the removal of the undesired (elements) in transmigratory existence: from the statement *mahābhuṭa* up

dhṛti being the field.¹

[365]

¹This refers to *Gītā* 13.5-6. Read SP on this verse with profit.

यथा प्रकाशयत्येकः कृत्स्नं लोकमिमं रविः ।
क्षेत्रं क्षेत्री तथा कृत्स्नं प्रकाशयति भारत ॥३६६॥

(So also there is a verse in agreement with this verse:) "As this sun alone illumines this entire world, so does the possessor of the entire field illumine the entire field, O son of Bharata".

[366]

This is *Gītā* 13.33 and referred to in 4.3.87ab, 291cd, 345ab, 1773cd.

ज्योतिषामपि तज्ज्योतिः स्वयंज्योतिःश्रुतेस्तथा ।
न तत्र सूर्यो भातीति नान्योऽतोऽस्तीति च श्रुतेः ॥३६७॥

So it is known from (what is said in) the Śruti in *jyotiṣām api taj jyotiḥ*,¹ *svayaṃ jyotiḥ*,² and also from *na tatra sūryo bhāti*,³ *nānyo 'to 'sti*.⁴

[367]

¹'It is the light of lights'; cp. BU 4.4.16.

²BU 4.3.9, 14: 'the light itself'.

³*Muṇḍakopaniṣad* 2.2.11; *Kāthopaniṣad* 5.15; *Śvetāśvataropaniṣad* 6.14: 'the sun does not shine there'.

⁴BU 3.7.23: 'therefore, there is no one (other)'.

यत एवमतो नास्ति विशेषोऽत्र मनागपि ।
बन्धमोक्षादिरूपोऽयमात्मनीति विनिश्चयः ॥३६८॥

Since this is so, therefore, there is not here in respect of the Ātman even a little difference which has the nature of bondage and liberation etc.¹—this is the decision.

[368]

¹Perhaps *sukhaduḥkha*, *punya-pāpa* are meant.

ये त्वतः कल्पयन्तीममन्यथैव महाधियः ।
अर्थवादं च बन्धादिशास्त्रं व्याचक्षते तथा ॥३६९॥

But those people of great intellect, who think of this Ātman to be otherwise, explain the scriptural text as referring to bondage etc. and as an Arthavāda¹ in that way. [369]

This refers to the other view as not based on the Śruti proper. Cf. also SP which refers to *Taittirīyopaniṣad* 2.7.

¹It is an explanatory statement praising the purport of a precept or an injunction.

इत्युक्तावंसकृत्पूर्वं परिहारोऽपि वर्णितः ॥३७०॥
एवं परिहृतेऽप्याहुर्यथेच्छं दषणं परे ।
विद्वद्भिस्त उपेक्ष्याः स्युर्बालौन्मत्तसमा जनाः ॥३७१॥

In respect of this statement (of theirs) there has been many times earlier presented a refutation. [370]

Yet, in respect of their refuted thought, the others have, at their (sweet) will, mentioned that there is the fault (in our view); but those are to be ignored by the wise; they are indeed like children or mad men. [371]

The second line of verse 371 is based on *ta utsahante khe 'pi* (BUB p.637).

Verses 372-544 are the exposition of BU 4.4.7.

ब्रह्माप्येतीत्यतो वाक्यमुपचारसमाश्रयात् ।
तदविद्योत्थदेहादिसंतत्युच्छेदहेतुतः ॥३७२॥

Therefore, (the Śruti) statement *brahmāpyeti* is to be understood by resorting to a metaphor, because there is a reason in the destruction of the continuity of the body etc. which arises from ignorance about that (the Brahman). [372]

अविद्याध्वस्तिमापेक्ष्य सम्यग्धीजन्ममात्रतः ।
आत्मा ब्रह्मैव सन्साक्षाद्ब्रह्माप्येतीति भण्यते ॥३७३॥

What is said here is: The Ātman, itself being the Brahman, is said to be going/entering into it, on account of the mere rise of proper understanding (about the nature of it), consequent to the destruction of ignorance. [373]

Hereafter follows the exposition of BU 4.4.7.

इत्येतत्सर्ववेदान्तसर्वस्वं ब्राह्मणोदितम् ।
अर्थस्य ब्राह्मणोक्तस्य द्रढिम्नेऽतः परा श्रुतिः ॥३७४॥

This is then, the whole of all the Vedānta texts, which is expressed in this Brāhmaṇa. Therefore, the subsequent Śruti statement is for confirming the thought that is conveyed by the Brāhmaṇa. [374]

This is to state the purport in general of the Śruti sentence *tad* ... (BU 4.4.7).

यथा काममये तद्वन्मन्त्रं श्लोकमुदाहरत् ।
ब्रह्मास्मीति परिज्ञानात्प्रत्यगज्ञानहानतः ॥३७५॥
यदा सर्वेऽखिलाः कामाः काम्यैश्च विषयैः सह ।
प्रमुच्यन्ते विनश्यन्ति तेषामज्ञानहेतुतः ।
कार्याणां कारणे वृत्तिर्नान्यत्र जगतीक्ष्यते ॥३७६॥

As (in the case of the Ātman), consisting in desire in a similar way, here also the Śruti has cited a Mantra *brahmāsmi*, because there is the removal of ignorance about the individual self by knowing that thoroughly. [375]

When all of the desires, together with their objects to be wished for, are abandoned, they perish, because they have ignorance (about the individual self) as their cause; it is noticed in this world that the effects exist (*vṛtti*) in their cause, not

elsewhere.

[376]

यदा कामाः प्रमुच्यन्त इत्युक्त्यैव कृतार्थता ।
विशेषणं सर्व इति किमर्थमभिधीयते ॥३७७॥

(An objection is raised:) 'When the purpose is served by the very statement, "when the desires are abandoned," then why is stated in addition the attributive (*viśeṣaṇa*) word *sarva* 'all'?'

[377]

जाग्रत्स्वप्नक्षये कामाः प्रमुच्यन्तेऽखिला नृणाम् ।
संस्कारमात्रशेषास्ते सुषुप्ते यान्ति संक्षयम् ।
यतस्तदवरोधार्थं तस्मात्सर्वविशेषणम् ॥३७८॥
कामहेतौ हि विध्वस्ते न कश्चिदवशिष्यते ।
संस्कारो वाथवाप्यन्यः सर्वस्याज्ञानमूलतः ॥३७९॥

(The answer is given:) 'Since, at the end of the states of waking and dream, all of the desires of human beings get abandoned; remaining in the form of impressions they get gradually exhausted in the state of deep sleep; therefore, the attributive word *sarva*, is used for precluding (lit. stopping) even that.

[378]

Indeed, when the cause of the desires is destroyed (or removed), there does not remain either an impression or even the other (i.e. desire itself) as all (of it)¹ has its root in ignorance'.

[379]

In the state of liberation, there do not exist even impressions of worldly desires.

¹This refers to desire.

हृदि श्रिता इति वचः कामधर्म्यब्रवीन्मनः ।
कामः संकल्प इत्येवं तथा च प्राक्श्रुतीरणम् ॥३८०॥

The statement in the Śruti *hṛdi śritāḥ* expresses the sense of *manas* which has desire as its property/characteristic; so

also, there is already the statement in the Śruti: *kāmāḥ saṅkalpāḥ*¹ [380]

¹BU 1.5.3

इदं च हेतुवचनं प्रतिज्ञातस्य वस्तुनः ।
हृदि श्रिता यतः कामाः प्रमुच्यन्तेऽखिलास्ततः ॥३८१॥

And the statement of the cause of the thing which is enunciated as *hṛdi śritāḥ* (is made) because all the desires are then¹ abandoned. [381]

In this context, read SP: *kāmāḥ pramucyanta iti pratijñāta-vastuno hṛdi śritā iti hetuvākyam ity anum eva vibhāgam prakathayati.*

¹It means attaining the state of liberation.

Verses 382-389 point out that *tattvajñāna* leads to the removal of ignorance which, in its turn, destroys desires etc.

अविद्याया यतः कार्यमध्यात्मादिविशेषणम् ।
त्रयं वा इदमित्युक्तं वाङ्मनःप्राणभेदवत् ॥३८२॥

It is mentioned as *trayam vā idam*, since the effect of ignorance which is about the distinct notions of *vāc*, *manas* and *prāṇa*,¹ and which are attributive in relation to what is related to the body etc.² [382]

¹Cf. BU 1.5.

²Actually BU 1.6.1 mentions *nāma*, *rūpa*, *karma* as the three.

अतोऽविद्यासमुच्छिन्नौ तद्वेतूनामशेषतः ।
कामानामपि नाशः स्याद्ग्रहातिग्रहरूपिणाम् ॥३८३॥

Therefore, when there is destruction of ignorance, there is entirely the destruction of all of the desires which are having

that (ignorance) as their cause, and which have the forms of *graha*¹ and *atigraha*.² [383]

¹This refers to the organs (lit. that which perceives).

²This refers to the objects of sense organs and invites *ādhibhautika*, *ādhidāivika* also; cf. SP: *trividham vāgādikam jagadāvidyam iti*.

निःशेषजनिमद्वेतुः काम एवावधारितः ।
श्रिता अतिग्रहाः कामा इन्द्रियाणां प्रवर्तकाः ।
हृदि श्रिता इति वचस्तेषामवरुरुत्सया ॥३८४॥

It is specifically pointed out (*avadhārita*) that desire is the cause of all of those that are born (and) desires, viz. *atigrahas*, which have resorted (to *grahas*) are the inciters/impellers of (various) bodily organs; and the reference to them is made in the words *hṛdi śritāḥ* with a desire to emphasise them.

[384]

Refer to BU 1.5.2: *dhiyā dhiyā janayate karmabhiḥ*.

वेदव्यासोऽपि च मुनिर्जगादेमं यथोदितम् ।
श्रुत्यर्थमुररीकृत्य लोकानुग्रहकाम्यया ॥३८५॥
विषया विनिवर्तन्ते निराहारस्य देहिनः ।
रसवर्जं रसोऽप्यस्य परं दृष्ट्वा निवर्तते ॥३८६॥
एवं बुद्धेः परं बुद्ध्वा संस्तभ्यात्मानमात्मना ।
जहि शत्रुं महाबाहो कामरूपं दुरासदम् ॥३८७॥

The sage Vedavyāsa also has spoken of this, as stated (here), as the meaning of the Śruti, after having accepted it with a desire to do favour to the people in general: [385]

"In the case of a person, who has abstained from food, the objects (of desire) keep themselves away (from him and yet) without hankering for them; but/and (that, viz. the hankering)

keeps itself away from him, after he has seen the highest Ātman." [386]

"Thus having known the one beyond the intellect and having steadied yourself¹ by yourself, kill, O (warrior) of large arms, (your) enemy, viz. the one who has the form of desire which is difficult to contain." [387]

Verse 386 is *Gītā* 2.59 and verse 387, *Gītā* 3.43.

¹This is addressed directly to Arjuna.

हेत्वर्थे चाथशब्दोऽयं हेत्वर्थप्रकृतत्वतः ।
यस्मादज्ञानतो मर्त्योऽतोऽमृतोऽज्ञानहानतः ॥३८८॥

Further, this word *atha* is to convey the reason, because it has been used in the sense of a reason of the matter in hand; (this is so), since (a human being) is mortal owing to his ignorance and he becomes immortal by abandoning (or the destruction of) ignorance. [388]

This verse explains the meaning of the second line in the Mantra quoted in the Śruti; cf. verse 384.

प्रत्यग्याथात्म्यविज्ञानं यदत्रेत्यभिधीयते ।
सम्यग्ज्ञानसमुत्पत्तावत्रैव ब्रह्म सोऽश्नुते ॥३८९॥

In the words *yad atra*, there is reference made to the specific knowledge of the true nature of the inner self; and when that proper knowledge has arisen, that individual being attains the Brahman in this very (inner self). [389]

The verse explains the meaning of the word *atra*.

Verses 390-412 speak regarding the knowledge about the nature of the Ātman, in its own right, which is the means to the end of bondage in the case of the individual self. However verses 391-412 present the view of *Bhakti-prapaṇca* on the Mantra cited

in the Śruti.

ब्रह्मज्ञानोदये यस्माज्जन्मबन्धो व्यपेयते ।
मृतिरात्ममतिस्तस्य हेतुहेतूपमर्दनात् ॥३९०॥

Since, at the rise of the knowledge of Brahman, the bondage of being born (in the case of an individual) ceases to continue (lit. goes away); therefore, the death of that individual consists in its having the knowledge of the Ātman: that is, by the destruction of the cause of the cause.¹ [390]

¹This refers to the cause, i.e. ignorance of the desire which, in its turn, is the cause of the cycle of birth(s).

यथोक्तादन्यथैवेमं व्याख्यानाद्यत्नतो बुधाः ।
श्लोकं व्याचक्षतेऽयुक्त्या हुतभुग्वरसंश्रयात् ॥३९१॥

The wise ones, (however,) explain this Mantra easily in an unreasonable way (*ayuktyā*) which is other than what is stated as an explanation (of it) before; this, (he does) by taking recourse to the boon of fire. [391]

Sureśvara scoffs at Bhartṛprapañca by referring to him in this verse in the plural, with the sense of mockery, and refers to the alleged boon of fire received by him.

यथैव पूर्वं संसारः काममूलोऽनुवर्णितः ।
श्लोकेन तद्वन्मोक्षोऽपि निष्कामस्योपवर्ण्यते ॥३९२॥

As, in the earlier portion, it is described that the transmigratory existence is rooted in desire, so also, in this Mantra, it is stated that there is liberation for (a transmigratory being) who is without desire. [392]

SP cites *uktam ca— yathā pūrvasmin kāmair bandha iti ślokenodbhāvitam evam evehāpi nişkāmo 'pi mucyata iti*

ślokenodvibhāvayaṣatīti.

प्राज्ञादात्मन एतस्मात्प्रमुच्यन्तेऽखिला यदा ।
कामास्ते कतम इति तद्विशेषणमुच्यते ॥३९३॥
हृदि येऽस्य श्रिताः कामाः प्रमुच्यन्ते त एव तु ।
आत्माश्रितास्तु ये त्वस्य प्रमुच्यन्ते न ते सदा ॥३९४॥

When it is said that all (of desires) become abandoned in the case of this individual self, who is now possessed of excellent knowledge (*prājñā*);¹ then (the question is asked:) 'Which are those desires?' and then (in answer) it is stated as attributes of them, [393]

'those desires which have taken their abode in the heart'—it is these that are abandoned; whereas those desires, which have resorted to the self, do not ever get abandoned. [394]

Verse 394 refers to the intellect, while the Ātman has also desires associated with it, in contrast with those resorting to the intellect.

¹This refers to the grammatical explanation of it, viz. *prājñāḥ eva prājñāḥ*.

हृदयं नाम विज्ञानं मांसपेशी च भण्यते ।
रूढ्या वृत्तिर्मांसखण्डे तात्स्थ्याद्विज्ञानवाचकम् ॥३९५॥

'Heart' is called the organ of (acquiring) knowledge, (though, in reality) it is a lump of flesh; yet, by usage, the meaning (of that word is restricted) to a lump of flesh; it is expressive of specific knowledge, because that gets an abode in it (*tātsthya*). [395]

कामाः पुनरिहोच्यन्ते य उक्ता वासनात्मकाः ।
माहारजनमित्यादिवाक्येनात्मविशुद्धये ॥३९६॥

And, here,¹ desires which are (earlier) explained and have the nature of impressions are meant in the sentence, which

begins with the word *māhārajanam*;² this is for clarifying (the meaning of) the Ātman. [396]

¹This refers to BU 4.4.7.

²BU 2.3.6. SP quotes: *yathāhuḥ— kāmāḥ punar māhārajanādirūpā iti*.

प्राज्ञस्याभ्यन्तरं रूपं तन्माहारजनादिकम् ।
हृदयाश्रयिणस्ते तु बाह्याः स्युर्बाह्यसंश्रयात् ॥३९७॥

The inner form of a person of excellent knowledge is expressed (in the words) beginning with *māhārajana*¹ (the usually known desires) and they have their abode in the heart, while they are external, since they are related to external (object(s)). [397]

This verse explains the forms of desires which are mentioned as impressions.

It seems that Bhartṛprapañca divides the desires, inside the human body, into two classes: (i) desires which resorted to the lump of flesh called heart; they are in contrast with (ii) those desires which resort to the Ātman. The former are described here by the word *bāhya*.

¹SP cites: *tad uktam— tad ye māhārajanādilakṣaṇāḥ kāmaviśeṣāḥ te bāhye hr̥daye śritā iti*.

हृदयाश्रयिकामेभ्य आत्मसंश्रयिणां यतः ।
प्रसूतिरिह कामानामतोऽनेकसमाश्रयात् ॥३९८॥
हृदयाश्रयणं तेषां विशेषणमिहोच्यते ।
आत्माश्रयाणां कामानां विनिवृत्तिः फलं हि तत् ॥३९९॥

Since, in the case of those desires which resort to the Ātman, their origin is in the desires which have their abode in the heart, therefore here (i.e. in the individual self) there is one attributive explanation used of them in 'resorting to the heart' on account of their relation to many objects; but, in the case of those desires which resort to the Ātman, the result is their

cessation.

[398-399]

SP quotes: *yathāhuh- tato hi teṣām prasūtir bhavatīti.*

The Ātman here refers to Jīva, i.e. one having transmigratory nature; so is the case with verses 404 and 406.

मनोद्वारोपसंक्रान्ता भावना यात्मनि स्थिता ।
देहिनो जन्मबीजं सा तदुच्छेदाद्विमुच्यते ॥४००॥

That impression, which has entered through the doorway of *manas* and has (at the end) resorted to the Ātman, is the seed of the embodied self's being born again; and when that (impression) is destroyed one attains liberation. [400]

बीजस्थस्याङ्कुरस्येह जन्माश्रित्य यथैव गाम् ।
आश्रयादेव जन्मैवं कामानां हृदयाश्रयात् ॥४०१॥

As here (i.e. in this world) there is the appearance/birth of a sprout, which was already residing in the seed, (only) after resorting to the earth, similarly there is the rise/birth of the desires (only) from having a resort (inside the transmigratory body) through their resorting to the heart. [401]

SP invites attention to another explanation of the word *āśrayāt* as *hrdayāśrayāt*; also it cites: *uktaṃ hi- yathā bījagatasyāṅkurasya pṛthivīm āśritya prasūtir evaṃ prājñāśritānām hrdayaṃ yonir iti.*

हृदयेन च संबन्धाद्दृश्यन्ते येन तेऽखिलाः ।
अतो विशेषकार्येण विशेष्यन्ते हृदैव ते ॥४०२॥

Since all of them are perceived/understood on account of their connection with the heart, they are thus distinguished by the distinguishing effect (of *kāma-vyakti*), viz. the heart. [402]

हृदि श्रिता यदा कामाः प्रमुच्यन्तेऽस्य देहिनः ।
अथ मर्त्योऽमृतः प्राज्ञो भवतीत्येष निश्चयः ॥४०३॥

When the desires of an embodied (self), which have resorted to his heart, are abandoned, then does the mortal one become immortal (and) excellent knower—this is the decision. [403]

In earlier verses was explained the meaning of the first half of the Mantra in BU and this verse has explained the meaning of the second half of it.

विद्याकर्मसमूहेन येनायं परमात्मनः ।
संसारित्वं परिच्छिद्य प्रापितः स यदाखिलः ।
प्रमुच्यतेऽथ तद्वानाच्छुद्धो ब्रह्म समश्नुते ॥४०४॥

When that combination of knowledge and action (first) cut off that individual self from (the state of being) the highest Ātman and was (later) brought to the state of a transmigratory being, (that being) is wholly removed (lit. released); then, thereby, being purified after the removal (lit. abandoning) of that,¹ it attains to (the state of) the Brahman. [404]

¹This refers to *vidyākarmasamuccaya*.

आत्मकामोक्तिमानाच्च प्रागप्येतद्विनिश्चितम् ।
आत्मैव कामा अस्येति न भिन्ना हार्दकामवत् ॥४०५॥

Earlier also, this has been decided on the basis of the authoritative statement about the Ātman's desire(s) in the statement that desires themselves are the Ātman of this individual self and they are not different (from it), as they do in the form of desires of the heart. [405]

तत्र ये त्वात्मनोऽभिन्नास्तेभ्योऽनन्यत्वकारणात् ।
प्रमुक्तिरात्मनो नास्ति तैरसंसर्गतः सदा ॥४०६॥

There (i.e. between the two types of desires), from those which are non-different from the Ātman, owing to their not being

other thing than the Ātman, there cannot be the release of the Ātman, since there has ever been a non-contact (of it) with them. [406]

संसर्गः प्रविवेको वा भिन्नयोर्वस्तुनोर्यतः ।
नाभिन्नयोरतो मुक्त आत्मस्थानामभेदतः ॥४०७॥

Since a contact or distinction (can be thought of) of two distinct things and, not of two non-distinct things; therefore (*atah*), in the case of the Jīva who is liberated (contact or distinction cannot be considered) on account of the non-distinction (of the desires) which are (accepted as) residing in the Jīva itself. [407]

मिथ्यादर्शनजा ये तु माहारजनपूर्वकाः ।
अन्यत्वेऽवस्थिता बन्धहेतुत्वेन च सर्वदा ॥४०८॥
संसर्गप्रविवेकौ स्तो यतस्तैरात्मनः सदा ।
तानेवोद्दिश्य तेनेदं विशेषणमिहेरितम् ॥४०९॥

But/And (*tu*) (the desires which are mentioned) as those (which are stated) with *māhārajana* in the beginning and (which are said to be) produced from (a being's) wrong cognition (lit. seeing), have always remained in the state of being different (from the Ātman) and as the cause of bondage; [408]
since they are in contact with and separate from the Ātman, they would always be there, and with reference to them only is here (in the Mantra) stated this attributive adjunct (viz. *kalpita* and *āgantuka* together). [409]

हृदयाश्रयिणो येऽस्य न त्वात्मैकसमाश्रयाः ।
कामास्तेऽस्य प्रमुच्यन्त इत्येतत्प्रागपीरितम् ।
तदा तीर्णो भवत्येष शोकान् हृदयसंश्रितान् ॥४१०॥

And those desires, which resort to the heart and are not having a resort in the Ātman (this being), are abandoned; and this has been stated earlier also: "Then this one has crossed over

the sorrows which have resorted to the heart'.

[410]

This refers to the earlier statement about this in BU 4.3.22.

शोकाभिधानास्तत्रापि कामा एवोदिताः पुरा ।
न्यायस्तत्राप्ययं कृत्स्नः संभवत्येव निर्णये ॥४११॥

There also, those desires have been earlier described (lit. called) by the word (or, name) *śoka*; even there this whole manner of interpretation (*nyāya*) does become imperative/relevant (*sambhavaty eva*) to the reference to the decision.

[411]

Read SP: *atra hr̥dītiviśeṣaṇasambandhī yo nyāyaḥ sa sarvo 'pi tīrṇavākye hr̥dayasyetiviśeṣaṇārthavattvanirṇaye draṣṭavya iti yojanā.*

इति श्रीमन्महाभर्तृप्रपञ्चस्य महीयसः ।
व्याख्यामधीयते धीरा न्यायागमबहिष्कृताम् ॥४१२॥

Thus do the wise ones learn (i.e. understand) the explanation of the great scholar Bhartṛprapañca, i.e. the one which is rejected by the traditionally known Vedānta and logic (*nyāya*).

[412]

Sureśvara's mocking words are specifically to be noted.

Verses 413-424 are in refutation of the view of Bhartṛprapañca.

सर्वात्मभावं विद्यायाः फलमुक्त्वा च नः श्रुतिः ।
अथ योऽन्यामिति गिरा प्राहाविद्यां तथा फलम् ॥४१३॥

After the Śruti has stated the result of the lore of the Brahman, i.e. all is but (one with) the Ātman, it has once again stated for us (the nature of) ignorance and its results, by the words *atha yo 'nyām*.

[413]

This refers to BU 1.4.10.

कार्यकारणरूपेण यदेतद्वेददर्शनम् ।
अविद्याया इदं कार्यमन्योऽसाविति भण्यते ॥४१४॥

This, viz. which is the cognition of the differences (consisting in worldly objects) in the form of effects and causes, is but the result of ignorance; and that (Ātman) is (quite) different (from the transmigratory world)—so is this stated— [414]

आ समाप्तेस्तृतीयस्य प्रत्यगज्ञानहेतुकम् ।
ब्रह्म वा इत्युपक्रम्य मोहकार्यं विवक्षितम् ॥४१५॥

up to the end of the third Adhyāya;¹ it is intended to state the effect of delusion, which has ignorance about the inner self as its cause—(this) with the words *brahma vā*² in the beginning. [415]

¹This refers to the end of BU 1.4.

²BU 1.4.10.

अस्यामविद्याधिकृतौ सप्तान्नाविष्कृताविह ।
फलात्मकानामन्नानां प्रसङ्ग इदमीरितम् ॥४१६॥

This is (already) stated, with reference to (or, in the topic about) ignorance (about the nature of the self), i.e. in the exposition on seven types of food in connection with the foods being the nature of the results (of desires and actions). [416]

This refers to BU 1.4.5.

अव्याकृतस्य तत्त्वस्य नामरूपक्रियात्मभिः ।
व्याकृतियोदिता पूर्वं तदज्ञानविजृम्भितम् ॥४१७॥

This modification, which was earlier stated of the highest truth unmodified by means of what have the nature of *nāma*, *rūpa*

and *karman* was (but) full (vi-) expression of ignorance. [417]

This has reference to BU 1.4.7.

नामरूपादिभेदेन वर्णादिप्रविभागतः ।
कार्यमेतदविद्यायाः श्रुत्या व्याख्यायतेऽखिलम् ॥४१८॥

It has been explained in the Śruti that on account of the division into Varna etc., all these results of ignorance have been explained with reference to name, form etc.¹ [418]

¹This refers to *karman* also.

Verses 419-501 refer to Kaṇāda and Jaimini for refutation.

कणभुजैमिनीयैर्य आत्मधर्मा इतीरिताः ।
नात्मनोऽनात्मनस्ते तु काम इत्यादिनोदिताः ॥४१९॥

Those (properties), which are mentioned by Kaṇāda and Jaimini's followers as properties of the Ātman, are (in reality) not of the Ātman; but they are of the non-Ātman—but/and (tu) this is (already) expressed (in the verse) *kāmaḥ*¹ [419]

Read the introductory to this verse in NKL (ms. pp.735-736):
*evam śrutipaurvāparyapratisaṁdhānena kāmāder anātmadharma-
tvam pratīpādyā tasyādharmatvadarśanaṁ sarvavedavirodhād anā-
daraṇīyaṁ ity āha (kaṇabhug ...) iti.*

¹Cf. 4.4.226 and particularly, the words *āsaṅgapūrvakaḥ kāmāḥ* have to be noted.

यावत्किञ्चिज्जगत्यस्मिन्नूपं मेयत्वमागतम् ।
सर्वं तन्मन एवेति श्रुत्या साक्षात्स्फुटीकृतम् ॥४२०॥

Whatever form in the world has become the object of knowing, is all but *manas* only—so is this clearly stated in the Śruti. [420]

Cf. *etaddhi sarvāṇi nāmāni bibharti* (BU 1.6.1-3).

प्रकाशोऽपि च यः कश्चिदभिव्यञ्जक इष्यते ।
अभिव्यङ्ग्याभिसंबन्धः स च वागित्यथावदत् ॥४२१॥

Also whatever is light, that is described as the revealer (of forms etc.) and the relation of what is to be revealed and what, the revealer, is all but *vāc*— so has it said. [421]

Cf. BU 1.6.1-3.

क्रियात्मकं च यत्किञ्चिन्मानतो जगतीक्ष्यते ।
तत्सर्वं प्राण एवेति संजहार श्रुतिः स्वयम् ॥४२२॥

Whatever is of the nature of activity, perceived in this world with help of means of knowing, is that all but *Prāṇa* only/alone—so has the Śruti itself concluded. [422]

Cf. BU 1.6.1-3.

निश्चितं यच्च संदिग्धं तथाविज्ञातमेव च ।
वाङ्मनःप्राणरूपाणि तानि हीति श्रुतिर्जगौ ॥४२३॥

Indeed has the Śruti declared (lit. sung) that whatever is ascertained, doubtful, and unknown is but the forms of *vāc*, *manas* and *prāṇa*. [423]

¹Refer to BU 1.5.8: *vijñātam vijijñāsyam avijñātam eta eva*.

यतोऽविद्यात्मकान्येव रूपाण्येतान्यतो दृशेः ।
नात्मनः स्युः समस्तानि कार्यकारणबाह्यतः ॥४२४॥

Since these forms are only of the nature of ignorance which is different from the seer itself, therefore all of them cannot

be of the Ātman, due to their being beyond effect(s) and cause(s). [424]

In verses 425-427 it is stated that hṛdaya alone is the support of all forms and names etc. and not the Ātman.

तथा दिग्भेदभिन्नानां नामरूपक्रियात्मनाम् ।
उक्तं हृदय एवेति नीडं नात्मा परो मतः ॥४२५॥

So also is it said that, with respect to those (things) of the nature of *nāma*, *rūpa* and *kriyā*, which are different in point of their areas; the heart is the abode of them; but not the highest Ātman. [425]

This verse refers to BU 3.9.22-24.

समान उपसंहृत्य जगत्कारणरूपके ।
कारणस्याप्यपह्नुत्यै नेतीत्यात्मानमब्रवीत् ॥४२६॥

Having explained (the Ātman) as the merging point of the entire world made up of causes by the words *samāne*, the Śruti has declared *neti* with the view to rejecting (lit. concealing) the (final) cause also. [426]

This refers to BU 3.9.26, the Śruti stating the origin of the varied universe and finally rejecting the idea of origin also.

कार्यकारणयोरेवं निषेधात्रेतिवाक्यतः ।
आत्माश्रयत्वं कामानां निष्प्रमाणकमुच्यते ॥४२७॥

Thus, from the statement in the Śruti *neti*: (i.e.) by rejection of both cause(s) and effect(s), it is brought out that the desires, being described as having a support in the Ātman, have not any authoritative basis (for holding their existence as true). [427]

In verses 428-429 is refuted the idea that desires arise in the Ātman, having a resort as they do in the intellect.

हृदयोत्पाद्यता नापि कामानामिह कीर्त्यते ।
हृदि श्रिता इति ह्युक्तेर्न श्रुता कारणात्मता ॥४२८॥

Also, it is stated here (in the Śāstra) that the desires are not produced from/by the heart; from the statement *hr̥di śritāḥ* (it is not to be understood) as (the heart's) being their cause. [428]

नेति नेतीति चोक्तोऽर्थो जनकं प्रति यः पुरा ।
किंज्योतिरित्युपक्रम्य स एवार्थः प्रपञ्च्यते ॥४२९॥

Also, what is conveyed earlier¹ to Janaka by the words *neti neti* is itself fully explained in the words beginning with *kiṃ jyotiḥ*.² [429]

¹It was introduced in BU 4.2 and further explained in BU 4.3.

²BU 4.3.20-23.

Verses 430-436 state the reasons indicative of the absence of desires in the Ātman.

क्रियाकारककर्मभ्यो व्युत्थाप्यात्मानमेकलम् ।
पुमासनादिलिङ्गेन रवीन्दूदाहृतेस्तथा ॥४३०॥

After having separated, i.e. distinguished, the single Ātman as above activity, means of activity and action by pointing out the characteristics of the Ātman such as sitting¹ etc. and also by citing of the examples of the sun and the moon (Śruti rejects desires etc.) [430]

¹This signifies activity in general.

व्यतिरिक्तस्य तस्यैवमुक्ताध्यात्मादिभेदतः ।
स्वयंज्योतिर्विशुद्ध्यर्थं स वा इत्यादिका श्रुतिः ॥४३१॥

The Śruti, beginning with the words *sa vā ...*, is for amplifying the thought of the self illuminating which is thus distinguished from the various distinctions such as *adhyātma*¹ etc. which are (already) stated. [431]

Cf. BU 4.3.15.

¹This also refers to *ādhidaivika* and *ādhibhautika*.

स्वतोऽसंदूषितः प्रत्यङ्कामकर्मादिभिर्मलैः ।
अनन्वागतवचनात्तथासङ्गश्रुतेरपि ॥४३२॥

The inner self,¹ itself being unaffected by impurities such as desire and action, (is described) by the Śruti also by the word *ananvāgata* and the statement of being non-attached. [432]

¹The text reads *pratyankāma-* but it should have read *pratyak-kāma-* because *pratyani*, derived from a verb root *prati-anic* is the nominative form of *pratyak* (adjective) in adverbial sense 'turned within'; this is not at all relevant!

आत्मशुद्धेर्विवक्षेह न त्वशुद्धेः कथं चन ॥४३३॥
विशेषणस्य श्रवणाद्धृदीत्यात्मनि चेन्मतम् ।
सव्येनाक्षणा न पश्यामि यथा सामर्थ्यतस्तथा ॥४३४॥

Here, the intention is to state the purity of the Ātman but not that of its impurity. [433]

But, (if it is said:) 'It is held that, on hearing the attributive word *hr̥di* in relation to the Ātman as they understand in the statement, 'I do not see with the left eye', so also from the tenor of the expression'. [434]

नोक्तोत्तरत्वात्साधवेतद्ववतेहाभिधीयते ।
प्रतिज्ञातार्थसिद्धयर्थहेत्वर्थं तद्विशेषणम् ॥४३५॥

(The reply is:) 'This is not (to be so said), because there has been already an answer given to it; therefore, you should say that 'it is right' in respect of this Mantra (*iha*). That attribute is (stated) for the purpose of establishing the matter which is enunciated.'

[435]

That is to establish *kāmāḥ na ātmāśrayāḥ*.

सर्वेषामपि कामानामाश्रयो हृदयं यतः ।
तद्वेत्त्वतिक्रमादात्मा सर्वशोकातिगस्ततः ॥४३६॥

Since, heart is the abode/support of all the desires, therefore, by overcoming the cause of them, has the Ātman been (described as) one that has overcome all sorrows.

[436]

Verses 437-439 affirm that *kāmā hr̥di* does not set aside *anabhivyakta* 'appearance of desire' and its cessation.

अनाश्रितविभागार्थमथवास्तु विशेषणम् ।
तेषु यत्नविधेयत्वात्सफलं स्याद्विशेषणम् ॥४३७॥

Or, let the specifying phrase (*hr̥di śritāḥ*) be for the sake of distinguishing what is (really) not supported; since (only) in the case of them, where an effort has been made (for their removal), that specifying phrase would be meaningful (or, having a result).

[437]

नाश्रयापेक्षयैतत्स्याद्धृदीतीह विशेषणम् ॥४३८॥
न हि हृद्व्यतिरेकेण कामानामाश्रयान्तरम् ।
श्रुतौ स्मृतौ वा न्यायाद्वा दृश्यतेऽपि प्रमान्तरात् ॥४३९॥

Here, the specifying phrase *hr̥di* ... is not used with the expectation of the abode in view.

[438]

Indeed, there is not for desires any support other than the heart—this is known (lit. seen) from the Śruti, the Smṛti, logical reasoning, or any other type of knowledge.¹

[439]

¹This may refer to the *upamāna*.

In verses 440-441 kāma is related to karman.

प्रवृत्तिः कामशब्दस्य भूयःस्वर्थेषु दृश्यते ।
कर्मादिषु जगत्सिंस्तानपेक्ष्यात् उच्यते ।
हृदि श्रिता इति वचो नाश्रयान्तरवीक्षया ॥४४०॥

In this world, the word *kāma* is known to have the capacity to express many meanings, action etc.,¹ therefore, keeping them in view, has the Śruti stated *hṛdi śritāḥ* and not with any other abode in view. [440]

¹SP explains these meanings thus: *kāmyata iti vā kāmyate 'neneti vā kāmanam iti vā kāmāśabdasyānekārthatvam*.

अतिच्छन्दा इति वचः कामाधारत्व आत्मनः ।
विरुध्यते प्रमाणं सन्न चान्यार्थत्वमिष्यते ॥४४१॥

In holding the Ātman as the abode of desires, there would result opposition to the statement in the Śruti *aticchandāḥ* ... (BU 4.3.21); that being an authoritative statement, it is not accepted that the word has some other meaning to convey. [441]

Verses 442-453 state the absence of any means to show the Ātman as the abode of desire(s).

आत्मनः कामनीडत्वे न च मानान्तरं क्वचित् ।

And (also) there is not anywhere an authoritative means of knowing that the Ātman is the abode of desires. [442ab]

सर्वकामादिवचनं प्रमाणमिति चेन्मतम् ॥४४२॥

तत्रातिच्छन्दवचसा विरोधात्रास्य मानता ॥४४३॥
 वस्तुनोऽप्यनृतन्त्रत्वात्षोडशिग्रहणादिवत् ।
 विकल्पोऽप्यत्र नैवास्ति न हि वस्तु विकल्पते ॥४४४॥

If it is held that the statement about *sarvakāma*¹ ... is the authoritative means (of knowing that, viz. *ātmanah kāmānīdatva*), [442cd]

that is not so, because there is opposition to this statement by the statement of *aticchandāḥ*² [443]

Further, there is no opinion here in respect of the real thing, since it does not depend on (the activity of) a human being like taking up the *ṣoḍaśī* cup (in ritual); indeed the (real) thing cannot entertain any option here.³ [444]

Verses 442cd-443 show Vedāntas' acceptance of only one teaching to be the purport of Vedāntas.

The acceptance of *vikalpa* is related to ritual actions, such as *ṣoḍaśīgrahana*, but this is not accepted in the case of the statement about the nature of the (real) thing. SP supports this thus: *uktaṃ hi*—

evam eṣo 'ṣṭadoṣo 'pi yadvrīhiyavavākyayoḥ /
vikalpa āśritas tatra gatiḥ anyā na vidyate // (iti)

¹CU 3.14.1-2.

²BU 4.3.21.

³In respect of the two sentences of *sarvakāmaḥ* ... and *aticchandāḥ*

सर्वं हि खल्विदं ब्रह्मेत्येवं तत्रापि च श्रुतिः ।
 प्रतिज्ञायाह युक्तिं च तज्जलानिति सादरात् ॥४४५॥

Because, in the context of (the statement) *sarvaṃ khalv idam brahma*,¹ has the Śruti stated regardfully (*sādarāt*) the reason for what is enunciated in the words *tajjalān* [445]

¹CU 3.14.1.

अक्रियाकारकफलं यतो ब्रह्माद्वयं ततः ।
त्यक्ताशेषक्रियैस्तस्मात्तदुपास्यं सदात्मना ॥४४६॥

Since the Brahman, not being related to activity, its means and its results is without any duality; therefore, individual selves who have discarded all other activities ever have that Brahman to be the object of worship,¹ as the inner self. [446]

¹SP states *sadā dheyam* as paraphrase of *upāsyam*.

इत्येतज्जगतो वृत्तं ब्रह्मैवाकार्यकारणम् ।
अव्यावृत्ताननुगतं प्रत्यङ्मात्रसतत्त्वकम् ॥४४७॥

(Thus) this is all that is related to the world, and the Brahman is but what is devoid of effects and causes, neither distinguished from nor similar to any other (object) and has the nature of being only the inner self. [447]

Thus, in this verse, Sureśvara concludes the thought that has been explained in verses 442cd-446.

उक्तवैवं वस्तुनो वृत्तं तद्याथात्म्याप्रबोधजम् ।
कर्त्रादिकारकापेक्षं क्रियावृत्तमभाषत ॥४४८॥

Having thus stated what is related to the (real) thing, the Śruti has stated what is related to its activity which is produced from ignorance about its true nature and depends on various factors related to activity such as the agent. [448]

The verse introduces the thought in CU 3.14.1 *atha khalu*

....

ब्रह्मात्मानमुपासीत ब्रह्मतत्त्वाविचक्षणः ।
कुर्वीत स क्रतुं कर्ता ह्यकार्यत्वेऽपि वस्तुनः ॥४४९॥
मनोमयादिविषयः क्रतुः पुंसो विधीयते ।
स हि तस्मिन्न्यतः शक्तो लोकाग्न्यादिविधौ यथा ॥४५०॥

A person, who has not been cognizant (*avicakṣaṇaḥ*) of the Brahman, should worship the Brahman which is the Ātman; he should entertain a thought about the (real) thing though it is not of the nature of what is to be produced; [449] the thought of the man¹ is here stated to have for its object what is made up of *manas*² etc., since he is capable (of any activity) related to that such as, for example, enkindling of the usual fire etc. [450]

¹This refers to *avicakṣaṇa*.

²SP states: *manomayatvādiguṇake parasminn ātmani sopādhike dhyānaṃ vidhīyate sarvatra prasiddhopadeśād ity nyāyāt*.

अतः कर्त्रादितन्त्रत्वात्सर्वकामादिवस्तुनः ।
अतिच्छन्दोक्तिबाधः स्याद्वस्तुतन्त्रत्वहेतुतः ॥४५१॥

Therefore, all such things as desires etc. depend on (the activity of) an agent etc.; there would be stultification of the same by the statement *aticchandāḥ* ... since the reason is this (latter) as dependent on (the meaning of the real) thing. [451]

SP explains the purport of this verse: *vastunaḥ sarvakāmādirūpasya kriyātmakatvena kārakatantratvāt tadarthavākyasya na vastuparatvam aticchandavākyasya tu tatparatvād anyato balīyaśtvād atulyatvam atas tadbādhaḥ sarvakāmādiśruter ity arthaḥ*.

विकल्पोऽत्र न युक्तः स्यादेवमुक्तेन वर्त्मना ॥४५२॥

Here (the acceptance of) an option is not reasonable as shown in the above way. [452]

Verses 453-465 state the significance of *akāmatva* in the case of the Ātman.

असत्यकामनुत्तर्या कामोक्तिर्यापि चाष्टमी ।

सत्यास्त इम इत्यादि स्तुतिर्वा स्याद्विधित्सते ॥४५३॥

And, also, that reference to desire stated in the eighth Adhyāya (*prapāṭhaka*) which is related to the removal of the desires for the unreal (things/objects) is (just) a praise as in *satyās ta ime* with respect to what is sought to be prescribed. [453]

This verse refers to CU 8.1.1 which is like an injunction and CU 8.3.1 which is like an Arthavāda (*stuti*). There is stress on the unreal aspect of desires.

सन्त्यात्मनि न चेत्कामास्तदेवं फलवद्वचः ।
अतिच्छन्दा इति शुभं कामशोकनिषेधकृत् ॥४५४॥

If there are not any desires in the Ātman, then the statement related to the result (*phalavat*) i.e. *aticchandāḥ* ... would be auspicious, in that it would purport to reject desires and the (consequent) sorrows. [454]

निषिध्यन्ते न चेत्कामा यथोक्ताः प्रत्यगात्मनि ।
अथ काममयत्वेऽस्य संसारोऽपि न वार्यते ॥४५५॥
मतं नालं प्ररोहाय ये कामाः प्रत्यगात्मनि ।
किमर्था तर्हि तत्रैषां कल्प्यते भवता स्थितिः ॥४५६॥
न कश्चिदुपयोगोऽत्र कामानां विद्यते स्थितौ ।
अजागलस्तनस्येव प्रमाणाद्वन्धमोक्षयोः ॥४५७॥

(An objection is raised:) 'If it is held that desires, which have been mentioned, are rejected (as existing) in the individual self, then it would be full of desires and its transmigration also would not be rejected (lit. warded off). Then, in the case of those desires, which you have stated are obtaining in the inner self, they are not for producing any result, why then have you entertained their existence in that Ātman?'

[455-456]

'The existence of desires here (in the Ātman) is not at all

useful in respect of the removal of bondage and (securing) liberation; the authoritative means of knowing this is then like an udder on the neck of goat.' [457]

These arguments are based on the Śruti statement *sa yathā kāmō bhavati* which should lead to the absence of liberation.

प्रमाणलब्धसद्भावो निष्फलोऽपि न वार्यते ।
प्रतीचि कामसंबन्धो न तथेति निषिध्यते ॥४५८॥

(The answer is made:) 'If there is existence (of a thing) known from an authoritative means of knowing, it is not rejected even if it is useless; therefore, the relation of desires to the inner self is rejected by the words *na tathā*'. [458]

कामादीनामनर्थानां प्रतीचि शतशः श्रुतौ ।
निषेधकानि वाक्यानि सन्त्यपि स्मृतिशासने ॥४५९॥

There are in the Śruti hundreds of sentences¹ which reject (the existence of) the useless things such as desire; so are they there in the teachings of the Smṛti² as well. [459]

¹For example, refer to *asthūlam avikāryam* ... (BU 3.8.2).

²For example, *Gītā* 2.25: *avikāryaḥ*

कामक्लृप्तिरतो नेह प्रत्यगात्मनि युज्यते ।
प्रमाणासंभवात्तस्मात्सा न कल्प्या विपरिचिता ॥४६०॥

Therefore, it is not reasonable to entertain the notion (of the existence) of desires in relation to the Ātman; that notion should not be entertained by the wise owing to the impossibility or non-existence of an authoritative means (of conveying that).

[460]

प्रमाणवन्त्यदृष्टानि कल्प्यानि सुबहून्यपि ।
अदृष्टशतभागोऽपि न कल्प्यो निष्प्रमाणकः ॥४६१॥

In respect of the Śruti, one has to imagine very many things (*subahūni*) even if they are not seen, but as having (the Śruti) as the authoritative means (of knowing them); one should not entertain (any notion), even a hundredth portion of it, unseen, which does not have any authoritative means (of knowing it).

[461]

NKL (ms. p.739): introduces this verse thus: *nirmūlakalpanā nātra kāryety atra bhātṭasaṁvādam āha pramāṇavanti ātmani kāmasambandho na kalpyate pratyakṣaśrutiviruddhatvād atrāha na ceti.*

न चात्मकाम इत्यत्र कामाधारत्व आत्मनः ।
मानान्तरप्रसिद्धत्वात्प्रामाण्यं लभ्यते श्रुतेः ॥४६२॥

In the statement *ātmakāma*, there is not noticed any authoritative statement of the Śruti which points to the Ātman's being the basis of desires (even if) that (i.e. the absence of desires) is (already) known by some other authoritative means.

[462]

This is based on BU 4.3.21 and 4.4.6.

न चोपास्योऽयमप्यर्थः सर्वकामादिवच्छ्रुतेः ।
ऐकात्म्यवस्तुयाथात्म्यप्रकाशनपरत्वात् ॥४६३॥

Also, this thing (i.e. *kāma*) is not an object of worship (as it is clear) from the Śruti *sarvakāmaḥ* ..., because the purport (of the Śruti statement) is to reveal the true nature of the real thing, i.e. its being single.

[463]

This is based on CU 3.14.2.

कणभुङ्गन्यायसिद्धा चेत्कामाद्याश्रयतात्मनः ।
श्रुतेस्तदनपेक्षत्वान्नापेक्ष्यं कणभुङ्गमतम् ॥४६४॥

If it is held that the Ātman can be the basis of desire etc., as established in the Nyāya system of Kaṇāda, then (it is to be pointed out:) that view of Kaṇāda is not to be respected (*nāpekṣyam*), because it is not sanctioned (lit. or supported) by the Śruti.¹ [464]

In the system of Kaṇāda, *kāma*, *icchā*, *prayatna* etc. are said to be the properties (*dharmas*) of the Ātman—that is the basis of the argument in this verse.

¹SP states: desires etc. are the properties of *manas* and not of the Ātman which is *nirguṇa* as stated in the Śruti. Therefore, *upekṣyam tanmatam*.

तन्निषेधश्रुतेश्चापि नापेक्ष्यं तद्विरोधतः ।
सौगताद्युक्तवत्तस्मान्न कामाश्रयतात्मनः ॥४६५॥

Further, on account of the Śruti's rejection of that,¹ also, that (i.e. the opinion of Kaṇāda)² is not to be respected (*nāpekṣyam*), for the reason of its (being in) opposition to it (i.e. Śruti), like the teaching of Sugata (to be ignored, for the same reason). Therefore, there cannot be in the Ātman (the quality of) being the abode of desire. [465]

¹This refers to *ātmanah kāmāśrayatā*.

²This is already under reference in the preceding verse.

In verses 466-470, there is affirmation of the complete absence of any authoritative means to show the Ātman to be the support of desires.

न च कामाश्रयत्वेऽन्यत्प्रमाणं किञ्चिदीक्ष्यते ।
मानमेयातिवर्तित्वात्स्वतः सिद्धेश्च वस्तुनः ॥४६६॥

Moreover, there is not seen (i.e. known) any other¹ valid means of knowing in the case of *kāma* as having an abode

in the Ātman; and also because the (real) thing is established, in its own right, with the nature of being beyond all the activity of knowing and the objects of knowing. [466]

¹This implies that the opponents of Vedānta might hold the sentence *sa vā ayam ātmā ... dharmamayo 'dharmaṃmayah sarvaṃmayah* (BU 4.4.5) as an authoritative means for knowing the Ātman as the abode of desires.

मातृमानप्रमेयार्थश्चागमापायिनः सदा ।
वीक्षते योऽविलुप्ताक्षः स आत्मानन्यमानगः ॥४६७॥

And the one, whose sight is never lost and who does not accept any other means of knowing, sees those objects (other than the Ātman) as knower, means of knowing and object(s) of knowing, which ever keep on coming into existence and perishing. [467]

यः स्वतो नागमापायी तद्विरुद्धेषु सर्वदा ।
तत्रैवात्मेति धीरेषा नागमापायिवस्तुषु ॥४६८॥

The one, who is, on its own, not coming into existence and perishing, is to be known as the Ātman; with respect to it, one should not entertain this notion which is the opposite of it (i.e. the one being), as they keep on coming into existence and perishing. [468]

कामिनं दुःखिनं मूढं योऽविलुप्ताक्ष ईक्षते ।
नासौ कामोऽथवा कामी तत्संबन्धोऽथवा स्वयम् ॥४६९॥

The one, who has never lost the sight, and who sees a person full of desires and sorrows (and) deluded (or ignorant), is itself not desire, nor one who has desires, nor is in any way related to that (i.e. desire). [469]

एवं दुःखादिषु ज्ञेयमुक्तं प्रत्यक्षसंश्रयात् ।

इच्छादेशिचतधर्मत्वात्कर्मस्थत्वं सुनिश्चितम् ॥४७०॥

Thus, it is well-established that one should know the existence of sorrows etc. as resulting from (lit. abiding in) activity, because it is so seen directly that the desires are the properties of *citta*.¹ [470]

¹This refers to the intellect which is associated with the inner self. Cf. BUBV 4.3.922.

This verse states that the one who is the support of manas, the abode of desires, cannot be their support.

इच्छादिधर्मवत्साक्षाद्यः सदा वीक्षते मनः ।
तस्येच्छाद्यभिसंबन्धः केन मानेन गम्यते ॥४७१॥

The one who ever sees *manas* to have the properties of desire etc.—how can it have relation to desires etc.? by what authoritative means can this be known? [471]

SP explains the thought in the saying: *auṣnyadhīr jale bhrāntir icchādidhīr apy ātmani tādrśī ced aviruddhetī bhāvaḥ*:

Verses 472-481 state that desires etc. are not the properties of the Ātman—this is known by pramāṇa.

प्रत्यग्वस्तु पराबुद्धिगम्यैरिच्छादिभिः कथम् ।
विरुद्धत्वाद्विशेष्यं स्यात्तमसा दिनकृद्यथा ॥४७२॥

(A question is asked:) 'How can the (real) thing, i.e. the inner self, which is apart (lit. away) from body and objects, be characterized by desires etc. which are known (only) through the intellect, on account of its being opposed (to them), just as the maker of the day (=the sun cannot be characterized) by darkness?' [472]

एकबुद्ध्यधिगम्यत्वं विशेषणविशेष्ययोः ।
नीलोत्पलादिवद्दृष्टं न तद्दृष्टं विरुद्धयोः ॥४७३॥

'Being known in only one cognition (of a thing) is seen in the case of the qualifier and the qualified as in (the case of) a blue lotus and that (relation) is not seen in what is opposed (to them in character). [473]

नापि चात्मातिरेकेण ग्राहकोऽन्योऽवसीयते ।
ग्राहकस्थश्च कामादिः स कथं ग्राह्यतां व्रजेत् ॥४७४॥

Also, it is not ascertained that anyone else than the Ātman is one who grasps or knows; therefore, how can desire etc. which are held to be existing in the one who grasps be considered as an object to be grasped? [474]

This sets aside the notion that desire etc. cannot be the one who grasps an object or even a part of the one.

चक्षुर्दृष्टेन चक्षुस्थं कृष्णत्वाद्येति दृश्यताम् ।
प्रमातृस्थं न कामादि तद्वदेयात्प्रमेयताम् ॥४७५॥

The blackness etc. existing in the eye does not become an object of sight for the seeing eye; similarly, desire etc. which exist in the knower (i.e. the Ātman) would not become the object of its knowing. [475]

This confirms by example what is stated in the preceding verse.

आत्मत्वावगमाद्वापि जडस्यैवेह वस्तुनः ।
कामकाम्यादि तस्यास्तु दृष्टिमात्रात्मनो न तु ॥४७६॥

Or, let desire and the object of desire belong to that insentient thing which can here be taken to be the Ātman; but it cannot be the object of the Ātman which is merely the seer. [476]

This presupposes the opponent's hypothesis about the abode of desire to be either an insentient Ātman or merely a non-insentient (*ajada*) Ātman.

अचेतनैकनीडत्वं मयापीह प्रसाध्यते ॥४७७॥
स्वेन भासेति च स्वप्ने सर्वकामादिवर्जितम् ।
स्वेनैव ज्योतिषेत्युक्तं स्वयंज्योतिष्ट्वसिद्धये ॥४७८॥

In this case also, I can establish that (desires etc.) have only the non-sentient as the basis. [477]

It is said in the Śruti *svena bhāsā* ... in relation to the dream of (the inner self) being devoid of all desires etc.; also it is established in the words *svena jyotiṣā* ..., that the Ātman is by nature a self-shining light. [478]

This is based on BU 4.3.9.

स्वयंज्योतिष्ट्वसिद्धिश्च श्रुतिन्यायपुरःसरा ।
कामाद्याश्रयतोक्त्यार्थात्सा त्वया बाधिता भवेत् ॥४७९॥

And that establishing (of the Ātman) as a self-shining light,¹ preceded by reasoning and the Śruti² would be opposed by you by your statement (about the Ātman) as being the abode of desire etc. [479]

This refers to Sureśvara's mention of the opponent/object 'directly'—as 'you', 'in you' etc.

SP reads a concluding remark on the verse: *sā hi śrautī naiyāyikī vātmanah svaprakāśatvaprasiddhas tvayā kāmādīnām ātmāśrayatvoktyā bādhitā syāt svāśrayavṛttiviśeṣād eva tadāśrayasyātmāno vaiśeṣikādivad dr̥ṣṭisambhavād ity arthaḥ*.

¹Cf. BU 4.3.14.

²Cf. SP: *śruteḥ nyāyācca*.

तथैवात्मनि दृष्टे च सर्वं दृष्टं भवेदिति ।
कामादेरात्मनोऽन्यत्वे तच्चापि स्यात्प्रबाधितम् ॥४८०॥

And, yet further, that (statement in the Śruti), viz. *ātmani dr̥ṣṭe sarvaṃ dr̥ṣṭam bhavet*, would also be opposed; if desire etc. are held to be different object(s) (as existing apart) from the Ātman. [480]

The basis of this argument is CU 6.1.3ff.

सर्ववेदान्तबाधश्च कामाद्याश्रयता यदि ।
आत्मनोऽभ्युपगम्येत तेषां तत्प्रतिषेधतः ॥४८१॥

If it is accepted that the Ātman is the abode of desire etc., there would result stultification of all the Vedānta (texts), because rejection of that (viz. desire etc.) is the purport of them. [481]

Verses 482-488 are concluding remarks of Sureśvara about the rejection of the view of the Tārkikas.

ऐकात्म्यस्यागमार्थत्वाच्छ्रुतेश्चान्यानपेक्षतः ।
यतोऽतस्तार्किकोक्तीस्ता नैवापेक्षामहे वयम् ॥४८२॥

Since only the non-duality of the Ātman is the thought conveyed by the traditional scripture and they do not depend on any other means of knowing; therefore, we do not favour (lit. regard) the statements of the Tārkikas. [482]

SP makes this point clear, at length.

हृद्याश्रितत्वं कामानां नन्वत्रोक्तं विशेषणम् ।
संभवे व्यभिचारे च तच्च स्यात्फलवत्सति ॥४८३॥

(An objection is raised:) 'But indeed here is specifically stated about desires of their being supported by (or, having abode in) the heart; and that would be meaningful only if they were taken as being produced (there) and as different (or, apart)

from (it)'. [483]

हृद्यनाश्रितकामानां संभवादिष्टमेव तत् ।
आत्माश्रयातिरेकेण तच्चावोचं पुराप्यहम् ॥४८४॥

(The answer is given:) 'In case there is possibility of desires not being supported by (or, not having an abode in) the heart, then that is desirable (or, acceptable) to me, since I have earlier also said that they are apart from their support/abode, i.e. the heart'. [484]

This refers to verses 437-439 above.

मूर्तं मर्त्यं स्थितं सच्च पृथिव्यप्तेजसामिदम् ।
न विशेषणमित्यस्मादमूर्तत्वादिकल्पनम् ॥४८५॥

(Since) *mūrta*, *martya*, *sthita* and *sat* are not the specifiers (or, attributes) of earth, water and fire; therefore, there is here the notion (about them) being *amūrta* etc. [485]

This refers to BUBV 2.3.27-34.

चलनात्मा मरुन्नित्यं दाहकोऽग्निरितीरिते ।
विशेषणश्रवात्क्लृप्तिनैतयोस्तद्विरुद्धयोः ॥४८६॥

Since it is said that wind (*marut*) is always of the nature of movement and fire has the capacity for burning; therefore, on hearing (those) specifiers of these two, there cannot be (any specification) of what can be opposed to them. [486]

SP observes: *itaś ca viśeṣaṇaṁ vyāvartakam iti niyantum aśakyam*.

वास्येऽर्थे वासनाः सर्वाः सजातीये च ता यतः ।
निःसङ्गे भिन्नजातीये ताः कुतः प्रत्यगात्मनि ॥४८७॥

Since all the impressions (*vāsanās*) are always to be noticeable in an object which should bear those (impressions) and which belong to the same type (lit. species); (therefore, how could) those (impressions be found) in the inner self which is of different species and has no attachment whatever? [487]

प्रत्यगात्मातिरेकेण प्राज्ञोऽन्यश्चेद्विवक्ष्यते ।
नेति नेतीति तस्योक्तान्निषेधात्नेह संभवः ॥४८८॥

If it is intended to state that a wise one (*prājña*,¹ who has known the nature of the *Ātman*) is different from the inner self, then such possibility is not acceptable here (in the discussion of scriptures), since it has been stated (to have the characteristic) in the words *neti neti*. [488]

¹Though this can refer to the *Ātman* in the sleep state, there is literal translation given.

In verses 489-498, it is argued that desires do not exist in the Ātman; this, on the basis of the Śruti's statement tad vā asya

निःशेषकामकर्मादेर्व्युत्थाप्यात्मानमब्रवीत् ।
तद्वा अस्यैतदित्युक्त्या नातः कामादयोऽत्र ते ॥४८९॥

The Śruti¹ has stated. (the nature of) the *Ātman*, after having raised it above (i.e. after distinguishing it from) the entire mass of desires, action etc.; therefore, those desires etc. are not there (as revealed) by the statement *tad vā asyaitat*¹ [489]

¹BU 4.3.21.

तद्वा अस्यैतदित्यादेः प्राज्ञस्यान्तरूपतः ।
वासनाकामकर्मादेः कुतोऽस्यान्तरूपता ॥४९०॥

From the statements such as *tad vā asyaitat ...* it becomes known that the wise one has the nature of being inside the human body; therefore, how could impressions, desires, actions etc. belong to its inner nature? [490]

SP clarifies this thus: *prājñasya kāmakarmādinirmuktaṃ rūpam antaraṅgam ity aṅgīkāraṇa na kāmādes tadantaraṅgarūpatetyarthaḥ*.

पीतरक्तादिभी रूपैः कर्मकार्यैः प्रयुज्यते ।
निर्देष्टुं शक्यते तस्मादनिर्देश्योऽपि सन्नसौ ॥४९१॥

Being indescribable also, it has been mentioned to have the forms that are yellow, red etc., viz. those which are the effects of activity;¹ therefore, this (*vāsanā*) is thus² mentioned. [491]

¹This refers to the explanation given by Bhartṛprapañca of the process (*prakriyā*) in relation to BU 2.3.

²BUBV 2.3.158-163; SP explains *nirdeṣṭuṃ śakyate* by saying *karmakāryavāsanātmakarūpasambandhe kāryam*.

भावनैव विजृम्भन्ती स्थूलत्वमुपगच्छति ।
अव्याकृतादिभावेन खवायवादित्यसंज्ञितम् ॥४९२॥

It is only impression (*bhāvanā*),¹ which spreading itself, attains grossness; thus assuming various forms of what was unmanifest, viz. it becomes known as sky, wind, the sun etc. [492]

SP clarifies this: *prakṛtīvikṛtibhāvena vijṛmbhamāṇā bhāvanā bhūtabhautikātmakaṃ sthāulyam āpnotīti yāvat*.

¹Sureśvara understands *bhāvanā* as a synonym of *vāsanā*.

मूर्तामूर्तादिभावाच्च क्षीयमाणा हि सैव तु ।
निर्गुणं सन्तमात्मानं रञ्जयित्वावतिष्ठते ॥४९३॥

And, having become *mūrtāmūrta* etc.,¹ the same (gradually) perishing² continues to stay after it has tainted the Ātman

which is by nature devoid of any properties.

[493]

This is to refer to the existence of *bhāvanā* in association (as it were) with the non-attached Ātman.

¹This refers to *martya*, *sthiti*

²This means *sūkṣmatvam upagacchantī*.

भावना बहुरूपासौ बहुरूपत्वमात्मनः ।
करोत्यनामरूपस्य मणोरास्तरणं यथा ॥४९४॥

That impression, which has various forms, causes multiplicity of forms in the case of the Ātman which is (in reality) without any name and form, as a covering (lit. wrapper causes various appearances) of a jewel (*maṇi*). [494]

This explains the thought in the preceding verse.

Verses 495-500 bring out the self-contradiction in the statement by Bhartṛprapañca.

इत्यादि भवतैवोक्तं वासनोक्तिप्रसङ्गतः ।
इहोक्तेस्तद्विरुद्धत्वात्परस्परविरुद्धता ॥४९५॥

This and such other ¹ statements, which you have made in relation to (*prasaṅgataḥ*) the statement about impressions, point to a mutual contradiction between the statements here (and) that (which you made earlier) on account of their being (mutually) opposed. [495]

This refers to Bhartṛprapañca's positing of three *rāśis*; cf. BUBV 2.3.112-113.

¹SP states: *atra mantrē kāmādīnām ātmāśrayatvaṃ svato 'stīti bhavadvākyasya pūrvoktenātmāny aupādhikakāmasambandhavādi svavākyena viruddhatvān mitho viruddhatvāt svavyākhyānasyā-tmano na kāmādyāśrayatety arthaḥ*.

कर्मराशिगिरात्मापि यदि तत्र विवक्षितः ।
निषेधात्तस्य नेतीति शून्यतैव प्रसज्यते ॥४९६॥

If, by the statement of (or, words about) *karmarāśi*, it is intended, by you, to refer to the Ātman also, then there would result mere void, owing to the fact that it (i.e. *karmarāśi*) has been rejected/denied in the words *neti* [496]

This refers to BU 2.3, and reference to *śrutivirodha* in relation to mutual contradiction in the theory of Bhartṛprapañca under verse 496.

परमार्थात्मनोऽथान्यः कश्चिदात्मेति भण्यते ।
अस्तु कामं स कामादेराश्रयो न निवार्यते ॥४९७॥

(An objection is raised:) 'It may be stated that (this) Ātman¹ is different from the highest Ātman'; (then the answer is:) 'Well, be it so, yet that also cannot be warded off as being the support of desires etc.' [497]

The Ātman is understood by the opponent as having unreal nature (*aparamārtha*) and then it could not be described as the abode of desires etc.

¹It refers to the abode of desires.

शक्त्यात्मनाप्यवस्थानं कारणात्मनि युज्यते ।
तस्य शक्त्यभिसंबन्धान्न त्वकारण आत्मनि ॥४९८॥

Also, in the case of this Ātman, which is taken as the cause (of this complex world) it has been there in the form of one having a capacity to create (*śaktyātmanā*); then, there can be close association of that capacity (with desires etc.) But (this is) not (so), in the case of the Ātman which is not the cause (as said before).¹ [498]

¹This refers to *sūkṣma* form of this postulated Ātman which

is *paramātmān*.

न च कारणमात्रत्वं रूपमिष्टं परात्मनः ।
अनिर्मोक्षप्रसक्तित्वाच्छ्रुत्यनारम्भसक्तितः ॥४९९॥

Moreover, it is not accepted that the highest Ātman has the form which consists merely in being the cause (of the universe), because (if it were so accepted) there would result the contingency of the absence (or impossibility) of liberation and also of the absence of the activity of the Śruti (for conveying the nature of the Ātman). [499]

स्थलादीनां च सर्वेषां प्रतीचि प्रतिषेधतः ।
विशेषणानां संबन्धो नातः स्यात्प्रत्यगात्मनः ॥५००॥

Owing to the rejection/denial of all attributes such as *sthūla*, there is not any relation of the inner self to the specifiers. [500]

Verses 501-502 are the concluding remark in refutation of Bhartṛprapañca.

आत्माश्रयत्वं कामानां न युक्त्या नापि शास्त्रतः ।
अपव्याख्यानतस्तेषां कामा आत्माश्रया इति ॥५०१॥
एवं समवनीतेषु प्राणेष्व्वात्मनि तद्विदः ।
पूर्ववद्देहसंबन्धः किमिवेह न जायते ॥५०२॥

That desires have an abode in the Ātman cannot (be postulated on the strength) of reasoning or scripture; therefore, the statement 'Desires have an abode in the Ātman' is an incorrect explanation. [501]

When the *prāṇas* have been thus brought down (i.e. have merged) into the Ātman, there does not any more remain here¹ any relation to a body, (as before) in the case of the one who has known that (Ātman). [502]

¹On this SP writes: *viduṣo vidyayātmanamātratvena prāṇeṣu bādhiteṣv api dehe ced asau vartate pūrvavad asya tadyogaḥ syāt tato vidyāvaiyarthyam iti codyārthaḥ.*

Verses 503-509 explain the BU sentence *tadyathāhinirivayanī*.

सर्पनिर्मोकवत्कृत्स्नमात्माविद्यैकहेतुजम् ।
यथावस्तुधिया हित्वा निर्ममो निरहंकृतः ॥५०३॥

All (of the things) produced merely by/from ignorance about the nature of the Ātman are, in their entirety, like the slough of a serpent; because the Ātman, having abandoned (the ignorance), has become without (any feeling of) having a sense of its belonging(s) and without ego, on account of (i.e. on having attained) the knowledge (*dhī*) of the real thing as it is. [503]

This refers to the statement of the one liberated, while apparently continuing in the body of this life.

वर्तमानोऽपि देहादौ लोकदृष्टिव्यपेक्षया ।
नात्मात्मीयत्वबुद्ध्यासौ देहादीन्समुदीक्षते ॥५०४॥

Continuing in the body etc. though, in the eyes of the people (of the world), the Ātman does not look upon body etc. with an impression that (some) belonging of itself. [504]

षष्ठ्यर्थहेतुविध्वंसाद्यथावस्त्ववबोधतः ।
अव्यावृत्ताननुगतं पूर्णं वस्त्ववतिष्ठते ॥५०५॥

Owing to the destruction of the cause which is expressed by the sense of genitive case¹ and also by (having) the knowledge of the (real) thing as it is, (the individual self) stays as undifferentiated as and dissimilar to (any other thing), and the (real) thing in its fullness. [505]

¹This refers to *ātmīyatvabuddhi* mentioned in verse 504 and also *mameti buddhi* in verse 510 below.

अहिनिल्वयनीवाचा सर्पनिर्मोक उच्यते ।
मृता सत्यहिना न्यस्ता वल्मीकान्तर्बिलाश्रये ॥५०६॥

By the word *ahinirivayani* is expressed the slough of a serpent and that being discarded by a serpent becomes dead and (remains) ¹ in its abode, viz. in the hollow of an ant-hill. ²

[506]

¹This is expressed in the word *satī*.

²This refers to the popular notion that a serpent resides in a big hillock/mound made by ants from particles of earth.

अहिदेहवियोगोऽत्र मृतशब्देन भण्यते ।
वल्मीकाश्रयणं तस्याः प्रत्यस्तेत्यभिधीयते ॥५०७॥

In this sentence, the word dead (*mṛta*) expresses the separation (of the slough) from the body of the serpent; and the word *pratyastā* expresses its being supported ¹ in an ant-hill. [507]

¹Actually, *āśrayaṇa* refers to a support but the slough cannot take a support in the way it lies therein.

अहिनर्मोकविषयो व्यापारस्तावदीरितः ।
निर्ममाहंकृतित्वं तु सर्पदृष्टान्तसंश्रयम् ॥५०८॥

Thus (or, to begin with *-tāvat*) the happening (lit. activity) in relation to the slough of a serpent is explained, and (the Ātman's) ¹ not having the sense of any of its belonging (lit. having no feeling like 'This is mine') and not having the ego has a place (only) in the example of the serpent. [508]

¹This refers to a man who has been liberated in his life, as said in verse 505 above.

बिले त्यक्तेऽहिना यद्वत्स्वनिर्मोके न पूर्ववत् ।
 निर्गच्छन्प्रविशन्सर्पो निर्मोकमनुरुध्यते ॥५०९॥
 नाहं ममेति वा बुद्धिस्तत्राहेरुपजायते ।
 तत्रैव वर्तमानस्य यथैवं प्रत्यगात्मनः ॥५१०॥
 संबन्धहेतोरुच्छित्तेरात्मसंबन्धवर्जितम् ।
 शेते शरीरं सूक्ष्मं च स्थूलं चैकात्म्यधीहनुतम् ॥५११॥

When a serpent has left its slough in an ant-hill it does not appear to go out of and enter into it as before and thus remains unconnected with the slough, [509]

that is to say, there does not arise on the part of the serpent in respect of it (viz. the slough) any feeling as 'I am this, this is mine'; similarly, in the case of the inner self which continues to be there in the body of that life, [510]

there remains its body, be it gross or subtle, covered (lit. concealed)¹ by the knowledge of its oneness with the Ātman, owing to the destruction of the cause of its relation (to the body) and also (because it is) devoid of any relation to the body (*ātmasambandhavarjita*). [511]

¹Cp. verses 519 and 520 below, for this use of the word *nihnute*.

अहिनिर्मोकदृष्टान्तदाष्टान्तिकमितीरितम् ।
 दाष्टान्तिकोऽर्थः सर्पस्य दृष्टान्तस्याथ उच्यते ॥५१२॥

Thus, there has been the statement made about the example of the slough of a serpent and what is (thereby) exemplified. Now is explained (or, described in full) the nature of what is exemplified in connection with the example of a serpent. [512]

In the verse, the words *atha ucyate* occur together without a Saṃdhi; the use of Sureśvara's avoiding Saṃdhi is to be

explained by SP as the reference to the sentence in the discussion (viz. the *pratīka* of it).

अहिनिर्मोकयोरत्र संगतिः पूर्ववन्मिथः ।
निषिध्यते प्रयत्नेन स्थितिर्नात्र विवक्षिता ॥५१३॥

Here (in this example) the mutual association of the serpent and its slough is denied as before, with a special effort¹ and mere existence (of the two in two different places) is not intended here. [513]

¹This consists in the use of the different attributive sentences in relation to the slough of a serpent. In relation to this, SP adds the following: *evam dārṣṭāntike 'pi mīthyābhimānākhyasambandhanīṣedho vivakṣito bhedenā sthitis tv avivakṣiteti śeṣaḥ*.

In verses 514-519 there is explanation of *athāyam aśarīro 'mṛtaḥ*.

प्रधानवादः प्राप्नोति यदि देहात्मनोः पृथक् ।
विवक्ष्यते स्थितिरिह न्यषेधि बहुशः स च ॥५१४॥

(An objection might be raised:) 'If this¹ existence of the body and the Ātman as two distinct things is intended, then that leads to (the acceptance) of the theory of the Sāṃkhyas (*pradhānavāda*).²' (The answer is: 'No, this is not so) that is many times rejected (by the Śruti)'. [514]

¹That is, in the statement of a person who has attained the knowledge of the Ātman and, therefore, liberation in this very life (*vidyāvasthā*).

²According to the Sāṃkhya *pradhāna*, i.e. *avyakta prakṛti* is the cause of universe.

हेत्वर्थे त्वथशब्दोऽयं हेतुवतेः प्रकृतत्वतः ।
सकारणस्य देहस्य त्यागो हेतुर्विवक्षितः ॥५१५॥

This word *atha* is for conveying the sense of reason, because the statement of reason is what is to be stated as a matter of course; (hereby) is intended to express (a person) abandoning the notion of having this body together with its cause, i.e. ignorance. [515]

स्रगज्ञानमनादाय नाहियोगः स्रजो यथा ।
प्रतीचो देहसंबन्धो नात्माज्ञानादृते तथा ॥५१६॥

As there cannot be (entertained) the notion of a serpent in the place of a wreath, unless one accepted ignorance about (the true nature of) the wreath; so also, there cannot be (accepted) the connection of the inner self with the body without ignorance. [516]

प्रत्यग्ज्ञानशिखिध्वस्ते मिथ्याज्ञाने सहेतुके ।
नेतिनेतिस्वरूपत्वादशरीरो भवेत्ततः ॥५१७॥

Then, after the false knowledge, together with its cause (i.e. ignorance), is burnt (lit. destroyed) by the fire in the form of knowledge (about the nature) of the inner self, there would be the bodiless Ātman (known/established) to have the form (i.e. to be describable) in the words *neti neti*. [517]

This explains the meaning of the word *atha* by way of repetition and *aśārīra* as an attribute of the Ātman.

स्वतोऽदिग्देशकालादेः प्रत्यक्चिन्मात्रवस्तुनः ।
देशादिमच्छरीरेण न संबन्धस्तमो विना ॥५१८॥

There cannot be any connection of the (real) thing (which consists only in) the inner self that is not delimited by direction, region, time etc. with a body which is possessed of region etc., (unless that has known the limitation on it by its own nature), that there exists darkness, viz. ignorance. [518]

कल्पितेनाभिसंबन्धो न ह्यकल्पितवस्तुनः ।
अज्ञानकालेऽप्यस्तीह किमुताज्ञाननिहनुतौ ॥५१९॥

Indeed, there cannot be any connection of a really existing thing with what is (merely) imagined even in the state of ignorance; what then to say (that it is not) here in (i.e. this context of) concealment of the ignorance. [519]

Verses 520-522 discuss the Mādhyandina reading *anasthiko 'śarīraḥ prājña ātmā ... brahmaiva loke eva samrāt*.

अनस्थिकगिरा स्थूलदेहस्येह निवारणम् ।
तथाशरीरशब्देन सूक्ष्मो देहो निषिध्यते ॥५२०॥

In (or, By) the word *anasthika* (of the Mādhyandina recension), there is here (in this statement) rejection of the gross body; so, also, in (or, by) the word *aśarīra*, there is the rejection of the subtle body. [520]

In the Kāṇva recension the word *anasthika* is not read.

सूक्ष्मदेहनिषेधोक्त्या स्थूलस्यापि निषेधतः ।
तन्निषेधाय यत्नोऽतः काण्वश्रुत्या न भण्यते ॥५२१॥

(With reference to this Sureśvara says:) By the statement of the rejection of the subtle body, therefore, there follows (or, is easily understood) the rejection of even the gross body; there is not stated in the Śruti of Kāṇvas any specific expression for the rejection (of the same). [521]

यद्वाशरीरशब्देन तच्छ्रुतौ लिङ्गनिहनुतिः ।
स्थूलस्यामृत इत्युक्त्या निषिद्धत्वात् निहनुतिः ॥५२२॥

Or perhaps. in (or, by) the word *aśarīra* in that recension there is conveyed the rejection (lit. concealment) of the subtle form, since being denied there is not the rejection of the

gross body by (the use of) the word *amṛta*.

[522]

This is some justification offered regarding the meaning conveyed in verse 520 above.

SP states in this context the Mādhyandina recension *viśeṣaṇadvayārtho 'mṛtaśrutau piṇḍīkr̥tyocyate*. Also it states the reason for the Kāṇva recension which does not state any rejection thus, according to the rule, *yaś cārthād artho na sa codanārthaḥ*.

Verses 523-525 explain the *śruti prāṇo brahmaiva*.

साक्षिणः प्राणशब्देन विशेष्यस्याभिधेयते ।
ब्रह्मैवेति तु शब्देन तद्विशेषणमुच्यते ॥५२३॥

By the use of the word *prāṇa*,¹ it is accepted that the one, who is to be qualified is the witness. And, in the expression (lit. words, *śabda*) *brahmaiva*, there is stated the predicative expression about that (i.e. the witness).

[523]

By *viśeṣaṇa-viśeṣya* one should not understand grammatical substantive and its adjective. There is reference only to the accepted practice of predicating something of any other thing(s).

¹This refers to the individual self in verse 526 below.

साक्षिणः सद्वितीयत्वं ब्रह्मणश्च परोक्षताम् ।
तद्वेतुप्रतिषेधेन वाक्यमेतन्निषेधति ॥५२४॥

This sentence rejects the notion of the witness as being with a second and of the Brahman as being beyond perception, i.e. through the rejection of the causes of the same.

[524]

In the statement *prāṇo brahmaiva*, we find that the words *prāṇa* and *brahman* are put in the same case (*samānādhikaraṇa*); therefore, there is explanation necessary of the same, as given in this verse.

नामोपक्रममाशान्तं प्राणकारणसंश्रयम् ।
प्राणो ब्रह्मेति वचसा तदात्मनि निषिध्यते ॥५२५॥

By the expression (i.e. statement) *prāṇo brahmaiva* is denied in the context of the Ātman the resorting to *prāṇa* as its cause, which begins with (the mention of) the name and ends in that of the quarters. [525]

Verses 526 and 527 explain the significance of *teja eva*.

ब्रह्मात्मनोश्च संसर्गो मा प्रापत्कृष्णसर्पवत् ।
इत्यर्थं तेज एवेति श्रुतिः संसर्गवारिणी ॥५२६॥

In order that there should not occur (the idea of) any connection between the Brahman and the Ātman (the individual self),¹ as between (the property) dark colour and a serpent, there is the statement in the Śruti *teja eva*, and which averts (such) connection. [526]

SP refers to *tasya bhāsā ... sarvam idaṃ vibhāti* (Kāthopaniṣad 5.15; Muṇḍakopaniṣad 2.2.11; Śvetāśvataropaniṣad 6.14). This serves to avoid the notion of any relation between *prāṇa* and *brahman* as an attribute and a substantive. The addition of *teja eva* is helpful in understanding *prāṇa* as *tejas* and therefore it is not only an attribute of the Brahman.

¹This is what is earlier referred to as *prāṇa* in verse 523.

व्यावर्त्यभेदादाभाति भेदो ब्रह्मात्मशब्दयोः ।
वस्तुतस्त्वेक एवात्मामानित्वादिर्यथा तथा ॥५२७॥

There (is accepted) a difference (of signification) in the expressions *brahman* and *ātman* on account of (the effort of the speaker for) achieving distinction (between the two); however, in reality, there is only one single Ātman (and the Brahman does not exist apart from it), as it is mentioned by the use of the expression *amānitva* etc. [527]

Verses 528-530 bring out the import of the twofold use of the word *eva*.

ब्रह्मैव तेज एवेति ह्युभयत्रावधारणम् ।
संसर्गप्रतिषेधार्थं मा भूत्रीलोत्पलादिवत् ॥५२८॥

In the words *brahmaiva* and *teja eva*, there is, at both places, the specification for the purpose of averting the idea of any contact (between them), lest it might occur/arise as (it does) in the word *nīlotpala*. [528]

सर्वानर्थैकबीजस्य प्रत्यगज्ञानरूपिणः ।
कार्योऽत्र वचसा बाधः केवलो नान्य इष्यते ॥५२९॥
यस्मादेतत्स्वतो बुद्धमतः शुद्धमसंगतेः ।
मुक्तं चातः स्वतो वस्तु किमन्यत्कार्यमिष्यते ॥५३०॥

Here by the statement of the Śruti, there is expected (the idea of) only the stultification of the seed of all the undesired (effects) which is of the form of ignorance regarding the inner self and no other (stultification) is kept in view.¹ [529]
Since this is so, (it is accepted) that (the real) thing is, by its own nature, awakened and, therefore, pure owing to its being non-attached and (thus) ever liberated—what other effect is then sought to be achieved? [530]

¹The statement of the purport of the following sentence *atha* ...; viz. BU 4.4.7.

Verses 531-536 state that the knower (of the Brahman) has acquired all that is to be achieved.

कृतं चिकीर्षितं सर्वं बुद्धं यच्च बुभुत्सितम् ।
आप्तं बोधात्तथाप्तव्यं वर्जनीयं च वर्जितम् ॥५३१॥

(In the state of liberation) there is accomplished all that is

sought to be accomplished (by an individual), also known whatever is sought to be known, and obtained, through knowledge, all that is to be obtained, and avoided whatever is to be avoided. [531]

कामप्रश्नः समाप्तोऽतो निराकाङ्क्षोऽभवन्नृपः ।
सोऽहं सहस्रमित्याह तस्मादेव च कारणात् ॥५३२॥

Thus, there is here the conclusion in respect of the question about desires; therefore, the king (now) became one without any (more) expectation. Then (i.e. for that reason) only, he said, 'May I (offer you) a thousand?' [532]

ननु प्रश्नः समाप्तश्चेन्नादात्सर्वं स किं नृपः ।
सहस्रमेव तु प्रादादेकदेशोक्तिवत्कथम् ॥५३३॥
मतं विद्यारसाकृष्टो विद्यां भूयोऽपि चेन्नृपः ।
शुश्रूषति तदर्थं च सहस्रं मुनये ददौ ॥५३४॥
शुश्रूषालिङ्गमेतत्स्यान्न त्वियं गुरुदक्षिणा ॥५३५॥
सर्वस्वं चेदहं दद्यामिहैव च तदा मुनिः ।
निवृत्तकामं मां मत्वा विद्यां भूयो न वक्ष्यति ॥५३६॥

(A doubt arises:) 'Indeed if the question about desires is thus concluded, why did the king not give (away) all? Instead he gave only a thousand! Why only a part of the promised present?' [533]

'If it is held that the king, being overwhelmed by his thirst (or, longing) for acquiring the lore (of the Brahman), wished to hear about it yet again; and, therefore, he gave away to the sage thousand, and [534]

this would be the indication of his desire to hear but (was) not this the fee to be given to the preceptor?' [535]

(His thought would be:) If I were to give all of my belongings; then the sage would think that I have stopped having any more desire (and) would not instruct me again. [536]

Verses 537-541 state a hypothesised explanation of the king's small gift and its rejection.

इत्येतस्माद्भयाद्राजा श्लोकशुश्रूषयेरितः ।
प्रादात्सहस्रमेवास्मै शुश्रूषालिङ्गवित्तये ॥५३७॥

'With this apprehension in mind, the king, prompted by a desire to hear (more about) the *śloka*, gave only a thousand (cows) for conveying (that to the sage), so that he knew the desire (on his own part) for hearing (more).' [537]

इति चेन्नैतदेवं स्याच्छ्रुतेः प्रामाण्यकारणात् ।
श्रुतौ न युक्ता व्याजोक्तिरप्रमाणनरोक्तिवत् ॥५३८॥

(The answer is:) 'If this is so held, it would not be so, since the Śruti is always authoritative; in respect of the Śruti, it is not reasonable to hold (that it would make) some statement under certain pretext which would be like the statement of a human being which is not as much authoritative (as the Śruti)'. [538]

The Śruti is held to make a direct statement and not any indicative statement which may be made by a human being.

संभवाच्चार्थशेषस्य सर्वसंन्यासरूपिणः ।
प्राग्यथोक्तात्मविज्ञानसाधनस्येह चाश्रवात् ॥५३९॥

'Moreover, there is the possibility of yet more of the thought to be conveyed in respect of what is about total renunciation, since there is not heard here (in this Śruti) (any mention of) the means to achieving the specific knowledge (*vijñāna*) of the Ātman as it was stated before.' [539]

यत एवमतोऽयुक्ता पुनरुक्तार्थकल्पना ।
गतौ सत्यामनृज्वीयं नापि विद्यास्तुतिर्मता ॥५४०॥

‘Since this is so, it is unreasonable (to hold) the notion of repetition of the matter (*artha*); so also this praise of the lore of the Brahman should not be considered as not following in smooth course (*anrjvī*), when there has been a way (of explaining the situation mentioned in the Śruti).’ [540]

This refers to BU 3.5.1 for *śama* etc. in relation to this praise. Read SP (which explains the meaning thus): *na tāvat saṃnyāso vidyāstutir viditvā vyutthāyeti samānakartṛkatvanirdeśāt—uktaṃ caitat pañcame nāpi śamādi vidyāstutis tatrāpi vidher vakṣya-mānatvād iti.*

ननु यद्यर्थशेषोऽस्ति कस्माद्ब्रूते न पूर्ववत् ।
विमोक्षायैव मे ब्रूहीत्यदोषोऽयं कुतो यतः ॥५४१॥
विमोक्षायैह नैवालमन्यदात्मावबोधतः ।
मुक्तस्य च मुमुक्षोश्च सर्वत्यागव्यपेक्षतः ॥५४२॥

(Yet another objection:) ‘But indeed if something yet remained to be said, why does not the Śruti state it (even) as before? Tell me, “this is for liberation,” for that would be faultless; why (this way)?’ (The answer:) ‘Since [541] anything else than the knowledge of (the nature of) the Ātman is not sufficient for attaining liberation and because, in the case of both the liberated and the one seeking liberation, there is need of abandoning everything’. [542]

In this context, read SP: *muktena mumukṣuṇā ca saṃnyāso ’pekṣyate tasya muktisāadhanatve na sa muktena mumukṣuṇe-vāpekṣyeta sādhyābhāvād ity arthaḥ.*

It is to be noted incidentally that in verse 542 onwards, there is reference to the subsequent Śruti which, as BUB states, is for prescribing Saṃnyāsa for both the *mumukṣu* and the *mukta*.

स्वरूपसाधनत्वाभ्यां त्यागस्यैवान्तरङ्गतः ।
नापूर्ववद्विधेयत्वं न च त्यागाद्विमुक्तता ॥५४३॥

For the reason that renunciation is only a part (of liberation) owing to its being the nature of and means to it, that should not be considered as what is to be prescribed like (any means of attaining) *apūrvā*; so also, liberation does not result from renunciation.¹ [543]

This last argument is to answer away the objector's stand on the basis of another Śruti statement.

¹*tyāgenaike amṛtatvam ānaśuḥ (Taittirīya Āraṇyaka 10.10.3).*
Also cf. SV 215: *tyāga eva hi sarveṣāṃ mokṣasādhanaṃ uttamam.*

प्रागात्मज्ञानसंभूतेः संन्यासो ज्ञानसाधनम् ।
उत्पन्नात्मधियः पश्चाज्ज्ञानमेव हि तत्तथा ॥५४४॥

Indeed (*hi*), before the rise of the knowledge of (the nature of) the Ātman, renunciation is a means to (that) knowledge and, in the case of one in whom the knowledge of the Ātman, has arisen, only knowledge is that (means to renunciation). [544]

Read SP in this context: *sarvakarmatyāgātmakam pārvirājyaṃ tad ity ucyate vividiṣāsaṃnyāsasya dhīhetutvavad itarasya phalātmam tathāśabdārthah.*

In verses 545-560, there is the exposition of BU 4.4.8.

उक्तब्रह्मविदो मोक्ष इत्यर्थे ब्राह्मणोदिते ।
श्लोका अपि भवन्त्यत्र ब्राह्मणोक्तविनिश्चितौ ॥५४५॥

After it is pointed out that the Brāhmaṇa text has stated about liberation in the case of the knower of the Brahman, as said, there are, in this respect, verses also for ascertaining what was said by the Brāhmaṇa text. [545]

अणुस्थूलादिनिःशेषविकल्पातिक्रमादयम् ।
अणुरात्मैकयाथात्म्यज्ञानं पन्थाः पुरातनः ॥५४६॥

Securing the knowledge of the true nature of this Ātman as atomic in size, after its having transgressed various concepts such as atomic in size, gross etc. in their entirety (and) this then is (the way known as) the path (to liberation) since the days of yore. [546]

अनन्तात्मैकमेयत्वाद्विततश्चातिविस्तृतः ।
अनुत्पन्नागमोत्थत्वात्पुराणश्चेति शब्दघटे ॥५४७॥

And it is said to be extensive, i.e. to have spread to a very wide extent, on account of its having the only object of knowing, what is infinite; and is stated in the word *purāṇa*, because of its not being produced and also of having its rise in traditional scripture (alone). [547]

Verses 548-560 refer to the reading in the Mādhyandina recension vitara for vitata of the Kāṇva recension (so it is pointed out in BUB).

तरन्त्यनेन विस्पष्टं संसारानर्थसागरम् ।
यतोऽतो वितरः पन्थाः प्रत्यग्बोधोऽभिधीयते ॥५४८॥

Since they cross over the ocean of the undesired transmigration with certainty (*vispaṣṭam*) by this one (i.e. the knowledge about the Ātman); therefore, here is mentioned the knowledge about the inner self as *vitara*, the path (for crossing over misery). [548]

मां मुक्त्वासंभवो यस्माद्ब्रह्मार्थस्यात उच्यते ।
मां स्पृष्टो मामनुप्राप्त एष पन्था यथोदितः ॥५४९॥

Since setting aside *mām* 'me' there is no possibility of the existence of the (real) thing, the Brahman; therefore, there is the statement made *mām sprṣṭaḥ*, in the sense of *mām anuprāptaḥ*; this is the path as told. [549]

SP has taken care to draw attention to the Saṃdhi of *muktvā* and *asambhavaḥ* in *muktvāsambhavaḥ*.

शास्त्राचार्योक्तितः पश्चादनुवित्तो मयैव च ।
ज्ञेयाज्ज्ञाता परो नास्ति प्रत्यग्ज्ञाने यतस्ततः ॥५५०॥

Since (it is first) known from the statement, i.e. teaching of the preceptor and of the scriptures and later known accordingly (*anuvittah*) by me (through *manana* etc.), (therefore) the knower is not beyond the object of knowing after there has resulted the knowledge of the inner self. [550]

Read SP: *brahmajñeyam brahmanvijñātā tayoḥ abhedād avadhāraṇam ity arthaḥ*.

प्रागप्यवोचं बहुश इममर्थं यथोदितम् ।
श्रुतितो न्यायतः स्पष्टं नात्मनोऽन्योऽस्ति वेदिता ॥५५१॥

Even earlier have I many times spoken about this very thing, as stated here; (this matter has been made) clear from the Śruti (-statements) and on the basis of reasoning,¹ that there is not any other knower than the Ātman. [551]

Cf. BU 3.7.23.

¹Cf. SP: *nyāyataḥ pratīco 'nyasya ghaṭavan na draṣṭṛtetyāder ity arthaḥ*.

तेनानेन पथा धीराः प्रत्यग्ध्वान्तच्छिदा सदा ।
ब्रह्मापियन्ति निर्द्वन्द्वा आप्तमेव तमोहनुतेः ॥५५२॥

By this way, which destroys the darkness about the inner self, the wise ones, having risen above duality (*nirdvandva*), ever attain to the Brahman, which is already obtained, by the removal (lit. concealment) of darkness (i.e. ignorance). [552]

आत्मैव ब्रह्म चात्मापि ब्रह्मैव स्याद्यतः स्वतः ।
तद्याथात्म्यापरिज्ञानात्तद्विपर्ययधीरियम् ॥५५३॥

Since the individual self is the Brahman and so also the Brahman itself is the individual self; therefore, there arises, on its own, this knowledge; the reversal of the two, viz. (the knowing that) the Brahman and the individual self (are distinct) arises from the absence of the complete (*pari*) knowledge of the true nature of the two (i.e. their oneness). [553]

This verse points to the purpose of *āptam eva* in the preceding verse.

निःशेषमिथ्याविज्ञानहेत्वविद्याविनाशकृत् ।
नान्योऽस्ति ब्रह्मसंबोधाच्छ्रुतिस्तेनेत्यतोऽवदत् ॥५५४॥

There cannot be anything else than the knowledge about the Brahman that effects the destruction of ignorance which is the cause of the false specific knowledge in its entirety; therefore has the Śruti stated this, viz. *tena*. [554]

स्वर्गोऽयमेव प्राग्वतः स्वर्गकामवचस्यपि ।
कर्मभिस्तदसिद्धेर्हि वेदान्तज्ञानसिद्धितः ॥५५५॥

Earlier (also), while making a statement about one desirous of heaven, it is pointed out (by the Śruti). 'This itself is heaven'; and since that cannot be attained (or secured) through (the performance of ritual) actions, (it is obtained) by securing the knowledge from the Vedānta text(s). [555]

Cf. BU 4.3.22; here is distinguished liberation as heaven from the commonly known heaven in the Vedic part of rituals.

परमानन्द एवातः स्वर्गशब्देन भण्यते ।
मोक्षप्रकरणान्नित्यः क्रियोत्थोऽतो न गृह्यते ॥५५६॥

For this reason only is understood (or, is expressed) by the word *svarga*, the highest delight. Therefore, since the topic is that of liberation, the eternal (*svarga*) is not taken to be one which has originated by (the performance of ritual) act. [556]

In BU 4.3.22, the reference is to the highest delight in liberation, though mentioned by the word *svarga*, since the topic (*prakaraṇa*) is that of liberation and any ritualistic idea is not to be entertained.

इत उक्तात्मसंबोधमोहोच्छित्तेरनन्तरम् ।
स्वत एव यतो मुक्ता मुच्यन्तेऽतस्तमोहनुते ॥५५७॥

Thus, after the destruction of delusion through the knowledge of the Ātman, which has been stated as from this (i.e. the Vedānta text), the liberated ones have attained liberation automatically by the removal of darkness. [557]

The verse explains the words *itah*

देहपातव्यपेक्षा स्याद्यत्र कारणसंगतिः ।
सर्वकारणविध्वस्तौ नान्यद्बोधादपेक्ष्यते ॥५५८॥

Where (however is understood) association with the cause (i.e. ignorance), there is dependence on the fall of the body; (but) when there is destruction of the cause in its entirety (*sarva*), nothing else than the knowledge of the Ātman is required (lit. expected). [558]

मुक्तौ तमोतिरेकेण नान्तरायोऽन्य इष्यते ।
यतोऽतोऽज्ञानविध्वस्तौ मुक्तः सत्रा विमुच्यते ॥५५९॥

Since it is not accepted that, in respect of liberation, there is any hindrance other than darkness (i.e. ignorance); therefore, after there is destruction of ignorance, a person becomes

liberated, that is, he attains liberation.

[559]

ब्रह्मैव सन्निति तथा प्रागपीदं श्रुतीरितम् ।
देहपातव्यपेक्षातो न स्यादूर्ध्वश्रुतेरिह ॥५६०॥

Even earlier there has been made this (very) statement in the Śruti, *brahmaiva san* ...; therefore, because of the statement *ūrdhvam* in this Śruti, there is not here¹ the need of (i.e. dependence on) the fall of the body. [560]

¹That is, for the attainment of liberation.

Verses 561-597 are the explanation of BU 4.4.9.

मोक्षमार्गे यथोक्तेऽस्मिन्नविद्योपप्लुताशयाः ।
दर्शनानि विचित्राणि कल्पयन्ति यथारुचि ॥५६१॥

In the context of (lit. in respect of) the way to liberation which is already stated, those who have been affected in mind by ignorance entertain various theories (or, notions), and (describe the same) according to their liking. [561]

शुक्लं ब्रह्मातिसंशुद्धमिति केचिद्विनिश्चिताः ।
शरदि व्योमवन्नीलमित्याहुरपरे जनाः ॥५६२॥
पिङ्गलं तत्परं ब्रह्म वह्निज्वालेव शाश्वतम् ।
वैदूर्यवच्च हरितं केचिदाहुर्विपरिचतः ॥५६३॥
अपरे लोहितं प्राहुर्जपाकुसुमसंनिभम् ।
यथा रूपे तथा ज्ञेया शब्दादिष्वपि कल्पना ॥५६४॥

Some (of them) have decided that the Brahman is bright and extremely pure; others have said that (it is) blue like the sky during autumn. [562]

And some wise ones have said that the highest Brahman is eternally tawny like a flame of fire, while some (others among them) have described it to be green (blue?) like the jewel *vaidūrya* 'the cat's eye gem'. [563]

(Yet) others have described it to be red and similar in colour to *japā* flower. Thus, about the colour (of the Brahman), so there has to be understood, in respect of sound (referring to the Brahman), (a similar variety of) notion. [564]

Verse 562 has a reference to CU 8.6.1; this is also a reference to the various veins in the human body through which there is the journey of the consciousness to attain the Brahman.

Verse 563 refers to BU 4.2.3.

Verse 564 refers to BU 4.3.20.

अविद्यापटसंवीतचेतसामागमादृते ।
कामापहतबुद्धीनामेवमाद्या विकल्पनाः ॥५६५॥

These and such ones are the various notions of those whose intellects have been overwhelmed by desires and whose minds (*cetas*) were wrapped by the band of ignorance, (that is when there is) the absence of traditional learning (*āgama*). [565]

एकमेवैकरूपं सद्वस्त्वज्ञातं निरञ्जनम् ।
जात्यन्धगजदृष्टयेव कोटिशः कल्प्यते मृषा ॥५६६॥

Thus, the existent only reality, which is untainted, of only one form and is falsely conceived in numerous (lit. krores of) ways, as it happens in the case of the born-blind men's seeing an elephant.¹ [566]

SP gives ingenuous reasons for the different attributes assigned to the Brahman.

¹This is a reference to the known story of some blind men seeing an elephant and entertaining various notions about its form. Possibly, this is based on the then known Jaina story (or, folklore?).

अस्थूलाशब्दनेतीति सर्वमात्रादिनिहनुतेः ।
कुतोऽकारणकार्येऽस्मिञ्शुक्लादेः संभवः परे ॥५६७॥

How can there be the possibility (of any colour) such as white in respect of the highest (Brahman), which is not (associated with) cause(s) and effect(s), since there has been the rejection (or, denial) of all the means of knowing etc.,¹ as expressed in the words *asthūla, aśabda, neti* (etc.). [567]

¹This refers to the agent etc., i.e. *mātr, māna* and *meya*.

यस्तु वेदोदितोपायक्षपिताशेषकल्मषः ।
ब्रह्मणैवानुवित्तोऽयं तेन पन्था गुरुवित्ततः ॥५६८॥

This path has been experienced (lit. known) through faith in (lit. devotion to) the preceptor, by a person himself, i.e. a Brāhmaṇa,¹ (he) who has wiped away (lit. destroyed) the entire (mass of) sin by (various) means prescribed in the Vedas. [568]

¹Cf. SP: *brahmaśabdena brāhmaṇo gṛhyate*; here, *brāhmaṇa* is *anuvittah*, i.e. *brahmavittam asya iti brahmavittah*.

अव्यावृत्ताननुगतब्रह्मरूपातिरेकतः ।
न रूपमात्मनोऽस्त्यन्यच्छ्रुतिन्यायानुभूतितः ॥५६९॥
यतोऽतो ब्रह्मणैवायं पन्था ज्ञातः प्रमाणतः ॥५७०॥
ब्रह्मणैवेति च ज्ञेया इत्थंभूतार्थलक्षणा ।
तृतीयेयं न कर्त्रादौ प्रतीचि तदसंभवात् ॥५७१॥

Since there is not any form of the Ātman (i.e. individual self) other than (or beside) the form of the Brahman, which is neither distinguished from nor similar to (any other thing); (this is known) from the Śruti, reasoning and experience; [569] therefore, this path (to liberation) is known through the Brahman itself, as known from the authoritative means, [570] the word *brahmaṇā*¹ there should be understood (as instrumental form) in the sense of the characteristic of what the thing (i.e. the person) has become; this instrumental case

is not to be understood (lit. used) to convey the sense of an agent etc.,² (for) that (use) is not³ possible in the case of the inner self. [571]

¹SP points out that in verses 570 and 571 *brahmaṇaiva* are not to be considered as the words from the Śruti; the Samdhi *brāhmaṇā* and *eva* is for the sake of metre, used by Sureśvara himself. The specification by *eva* is not intended by the Śruti.

²This refers to the means of knowing (*karāṇa*).

³That is, it is *akāraka* 'not related to any activity'. This is clarified in the next verse. Read yet SP: *hastena śareṇa rāmeṇetivat kartrādaḥ kiṃ na syād ata āha neti*.

क्रियाकारकभेदोऽयं प्रत्यगज्ञानहेतुजः ।
यतोऽतो न तृतीयेयं कर्त्रादाविह युज्यते ॥५७२॥

Since this distinction of action and its means is the effect of the cause, viz. ignorance about the inner self; therefore, this instrumental case is not used to convey the sense of the agent etc. [572]

ब्रह्मात्मनोरभिन्नत्वं वस्तुतो यद्यपीक्ष्यते ।
अनन्तानर्थसंप्राप्तिस्तथापि तदबोधतः ॥५७३॥

Even if there is really accepted non-distinction of the Brahman and the individual self, still there is occurrence (*samprāpti*) of infinite variety of the undesired things,¹ owing to ignorance about that (non-distinction). [573]

¹This refers to transmigratory existence of different lives.

तथा च यदि नाम स्याद्यथोक्तज्ञानपूर्वकम् ।
पराक्सर्वार्थविज्ञानं वस्तुवृत्तानुरोधतः ॥५७४॥

Further, if indeed that were so, as preceded by the knowledge (of it) which is stated; then there could have been, in

accordance with the nature of the things, specific knowledge of all external objects. [574]

तथाप्यब्रह्मवित्तेन न कैवल्यं पथैति तत् ।
तेनैति ब्रह्मवित्तस्मान्नान्यः पन्था इति श्रुतेः ॥५७५॥

Even thereby¹ a person would not be a knower of the Brahman;² one does not attain to that Brahman (lit. the state of singleness) by that (knowledge). A knower of the Brahman goes by that path (as told in the Upaniṣad)—there is no other way (to attain to the Brahman)—so it is learnt/known from the Śruti. [575]

¹This reference is to *parāksarvārthavijñānam* in verse 574 above.

²Cf. note 1 on verse 568 above.

Sureśvara explains in verses 576-578 the meaning of the word brahmavit.

ब्रह्मवित्त्वे च को हेतुरित्याशङ्क्याह नः श्रुतिः ।
पुण्यकृतैजसश्चेति भवेद्ब्रह्मविदुत्तमः ॥५७६॥

Having entertained a doubt as to what could be the cause of being a knower of the Brahman,¹ the Śruti has stated the words *punyaḥkṛt taijasaś ca* the knower of the Brahman would thus become excellent, i.e. liberated. [576]

¹Cf. note 1 on the verse 568 above.

पुण्यकृज्जायते यस्माच्छुद्धधीरिह मानवः ।
शुद्धसत्त्वोऽथ तद्ब्रह्म साक्षादात्मनि पश्यति ॥५७७॥

Since (in this context of the attainment of liberation) a human being, who has done meritorious deeds, becomes pure in the intellect; therefore, being pure in his being, he then verily

sees in his inner self that Brahman.

[577]

तेजःशब्देन संशुद्धं सत्त्वमेवाभिधीयते ।
तस्मिन्भवस्तैजसः स्यात्प्रत्यक्प्रवणधीर्नरः ॥५७८॥

By the word *tejas* is expressed only the extremely pure being; (therefore), one produced from that (*tejas*) would be *Taijasa*,¹ i.e. 'a person who has turned (or, is inclined) towards understanding the inner self'.

[578]

¹Cf. verse 581 below.

ज्ञानमुत्पद्यते पुंसां क्षयात्पापस्य कर्मणः ।
यथादर्शितलप्रख्ये पश्यत्यात्मानमात्मनि ॥५७९॥

There arises knowledge on the part of human beings after there is complete removal of their sinful activity, so that a human being sees the Ātman, in his inner self, in the way as (one sees oneself) in the clean surface (*prakhya*) of a mirror.

[579]

गामैर्होमैर्जातकर्मचूडामौञ्जीनिबन्धनैः ।
महायज्ञैश्च यज्ञैश्च ब्राह्मीयं क्रियते तनुः ।
योगिनः कर्म कुर्वन्ति सङ्गं त्यक्त्वात्मशुद्धये ॥५८०॥

"By making offerings in relation to a body of the foetus, the performance of Jātakarman, Cūḍākarma and Upanayana,¹ and by sacrifices big and small, this body (of a human being) is turned into that of (i.e. fit to be) the Brahman."² (Also), "The yogins perform activities after giving up attachment (of every kind), in order to purify themselves."³

[580]

¹*Manusmṛti* 2.27ab.

²*Manusmṛti* 2.28cd.

³*Gītā* 5.11cd.

Verses 581-582 state another meaning of punyakṛt.

योगी वा तैजसोऽत्र स्यात्प्रत्यग्दृष्टौ समर्थतः ।
विषयाकृष्टधीर्यस्मात्र क्षमः प्रत्यगीक्षणे ॥५८१॥

It is only Yogins or a Taijasa¹ who would have the capability for seeing (the true nature of) the inner self, since a person who has his intellect attracted towards the (external) objects is not capable of seeing the inner self. [581]

¹Cf. verse 578 above.

सर्वभूतस्थमात्मानं सर्वभूतानि चात्मनि ।
ईक्षते योगयुक्तात्मा सर्वत्र समदर्शनः ॥५८२॥

“A person, who has devoted himself to Yoga, sees the Ātman residing in all beings and also all the beings in his inner self; (thus), having one and the same attitude towards (i.e. outlook on) all everywhere.” [582]

This is a verse from *Gītā* 6.29.

Verses 583 and 584 adduce the supporting Śrutis for a Taijasa of purified citta.

इत्येवं स्मृतयः सन्ति श्रुतयश्च सहस्रशः ॥
कर्मभिः शुद्धसत्त्वस्य सम्यग्ज्ञानस्य जन्मनि ॥५८३॥

There are thus various Smṛti texts and also the Śruti statements, in thousands, (pertaining to) the rise of the proper knowledge in the case of a person who has purified his being through the performance of actions. [583]

In this verse, Sureśvara states the general purport of the Smṛtis and the Śrutis. There is a stress on *cittaśuddhi* through (Vedic) rituals.

यस्मिन्विशुद्ध इत्येवं सत्त्वशुद्धौ ध्रुवा स्मृतिः ।
तमेतमिति च स्पष्टं श्रौतानि च वचांसि नः ॥५८४॥

In the words *yasmin viśuddhe* (*Muṇḍakopaniṣad* 3.1.9), and so also in *sattvaśuddhau dhruvā smṛtiḥ* (CU 7.26.2) and further in *tam etam* (BU 4.4.22), there are, for us, clear statements from the Śruti.¹

[584]

The verse justifies reference to the Śruti texts in the preceding verse.

¹SP observes on this: this use of *ca* is to commence the statement *yena kena cana yajeta* with what are actually stated above.

This verse states the result for puṇyakṛt and taijasa.

प्रसिद्धमहिमानौ वा पुण्यकृद्योगिनाविह ।
ब्रह्मवित्स्तूयते ताभ्यां ब्रह्मविद्याप्रवृत्तये ॥५८५॥

In this world,¹ those who perform meritorious deeds and the Yogins have their greatness known (to all); and the knower/-experiencer of the Brahman is praised by them in order that they enter on (securing) the lore of the Brahman.

[585]

This is the gist of BU 4.4.9. Read SP: *yo brahmanavittam gacchati sa eva puṇyakṛt taijasaśceti brahmanavidas tābhyāṃ stutiḥ sā ca mumukṣūnām brahmanavidyoddeśena śravaṇādipravṛttāvupakarotīty arthaḥ.*

¹SP: *iheti jantumātroktiḥ.*

In verses 586-603 is presented the view of jñānakarīnasa-muccyavādins and its refutation.

इह केचिन्महात्मानः प्रत्यङ्मोहच्छिदा सह ।
पुण्यकृत्तैजसत्वाभ्यां ज्ञानेनाहुः समुच्चयम् ॥५८६॥

In this context, some great scholars¹ have posited (the theory of) the combination of being a performer of meritorious deeds and having a purified intellect by (the aquisition of) the knowledge about the Brahman which destroys ignorance about the inner self. [586]

Verses 586-589 explain the BU sentence *tena ...* according to those who hold the theory of *jñānakarmasamuuccaya*.

¹This is possibly the reference to Bhartṛprapañca or his followers.

पुण्यकृत्पुण्यकर्मा यो योगी तैजस उच्यते ॥५८७॥

By *punyaḥkṛt* is understood a Yogin who has done meritorious deeds and is (also) a Taijasa. [587]

This explains the *samuuccaya* understood by them, who are mentioned in the preceding verse.

ब्रह्मज्ञानैकनिष्ठः सन्पुण्यकृतैजसश्च सन् ।
शास्त्रोपदिष्टमैकात्म्यं शक्तो योगेन वीक्षितुम् ॥५८८॥

Being devoted only to (the acquisition of) knowledge about the Brahman and a performer of meritorious deeds and also (being a) Taijasa; he is able to see through (or, by means of) Yoga¹ the non-duality of the Ātman which is taught in the scripture. [588]

¹SP explains: *yogaḥ sādhanānām melanam*— see the next verse.

परस्परं व्यपाश्रित्य यथोक्तं साधनत्रयम् ।
एकार्थसिद्धयेऽलं स्यान्नान्यथेदं त्रिदण्डवत् ॥५८९॥

These three means together (to the acquisition of the knowledge) as stated (before) become effective, after having

depended on one another; otherwise, this triad would not be sufficient for acquiring the one object/end; like three pieces of straw.¹ [589]

¹The thatched wall of a hut (*kudyādi*) built up of straws, say three in number; but if these straws are taken singly they cannot be effective in building a hut. if only they are together, they are suitable for building a hut; in the same way, the three means, mentioned above, have to operate together—this is the idea of *jñānakarmasamuccaya* theorists.

Verses 590 and 591 are a brief refutation of jñānakarmasamuccaya.

समुच्चयोऽयमस्माभिर्यथाभाणि तथा यदि ।
व्याख्यायते न दोषः स्यात्तत्र मानस्य संभवात् ॥५९०॥

If this combination (of the three means) is explained in the way as we have said earlier, then there would not be any fault in it, for that can possibly be an/the authoritative means for securing liberation. [590]

इतोऽन्यथा चेद्व्याख्यानं क्रियते बुद्धिलाघवात् ।
दुर्निवारेह साप्नोति योक्ता दोषपरंपरा ॥५९१॥

If, however, another sort of explanation is offered, through weakness of intellect;¹ there occurs unavoidably a chain of undesired results which has been stated before. [591]

¹The original word *buddhilāghava* is significantly used with two senses, (i) strength of the intellect and (ii) weakness of the intellect—the first is only mockingly hinted at. Cf. SV 357ab: *vijñānakarmaṇos tredhā*.

अपुण्यपुण्योपरमे यं पुनर्भवनिर्भयाः ।
शान्ताः संन्यासिनो यान्ति तस्मै मोक्षात्मने नमः ॥५९२॥

“Salutation to Him, who is of the nature of liberation, the one whom they attain to; those who, after merit and demerit have ceased (to function/to produce results), have become free from fear of rebirths, the tranquil ones and the Saṁnyāsins.”

[592]

This is *Mahābhārata* 12.47.37.

त्यज धर्ममधर्मं च उभे सत्यानृते त्यज ।
उभे सत्यानृते त्यक्त्वा येन त्यजसि तं त्यज ॥५९३॥

“Give up both merit and demerit, both truth and untruth; having abandoned truth and untruth, abandon (even) that through (the help of which) you abandon the two.”

[593]

This is *Mahābhārata* 12.316.40.

निराशिषमनारम्भं निर्नमस्कारमस्तुतिम् ।
अक्षीणं क्षीणकर्माणं तं देवा ब्राह्मणं विदुः ॥५९४॥

“Deities have called (i.e. accepted) him a Brāhmaṇa, who does not have any hankering, who does not enter upon any activity, who does not come with salutation and praise, the unexhausted and he who has exhausted (i.e. got over) all the activities.”

[594]

This is *Mahābhārata* 12.255.33.

नैतादृशं ब्राह्मणस्यास्ति वित्तं
यथैकता समता सत्यता च ।
शीलं स्थितिर्दण्डनिधानमार्जवं
ततस्ततश्चोपरमः क्रियाभ्यः ॥५९५॥

“A Brāhmaṇa does not have any (other) wealth which is like his one-mindedness, equanimity, and truthfulness; (also)

exemplary conduct, demeanour, the discharge of the right to punish (or, non-violence?), and straightforwardness—from all of them (there is for him) the cessation of all activity (and its effects).” [595]

This is *Mahābhārata* 12.169.35.

अर्थस्य मूलं निकृतिः क्षमा च
कामस्य रूपं च वयो वपुश्च ।
धर्मस्य यागादि दया दमश्च
मोक्षस्य सर्वोपरमः क्रियाभ्यः ॥५९६॥

“The origin/source of wealth is insult and forgiveness and the nature of desire is beauty and form; that of Dharma is performance of sacrifice, compassion and control over senses; so also that of liberation is total keeping away (or abstinence) from (ritual) activities.” [596]

Verse 596 is reported to be a composition of Vyāsa as in the text. But no definite text is traceable.

इत्येवं स्मृतिशास्त्राणि सर्वत्यागपुरःसरम् ।
ज्ञानजन्माभिदधति तथा श्रुतिवचांसि च ॥५९७॥

This and such other various scriptures in the form of the Smṛtis speak about the rise of knowledge (about the Brahman) as preceded by renunciation of everything; so also are there the statements in the Śruti.¹ [597]

¹For example, BU 1.5.16: *na karmanā ...* (SP).

Verses 598-605 are explanation of BU 4.4.10.

ऐकात्म्यदर्शनादुक्ताद्यदन्यद्दर्शनान्तरम् ।
अन्धं तम इति श्रुत्या तदिहापोद्यतेऽखिलम् ॥५९८॥

Whatever be the view adopted by some person(s), other than what is already stated, viz. knowing (lit. seeing) the non-duality of the Ātman is, the whole of it, rejected by the Śruti in the statement *andhaṃ tamaḥ* (BU 4.4.10). [598]

तमोमोहादिभेदेन तमोऽनेकस्वलक्षणम् ।
यतोऽतोऽन्धं तम इति विशिनष्टि श्रुतिस्तमः ॥५९९॥

Since *tamas* 'darkness/ignorance' has various characteristics of its own, varying as want of knowing, delusion etc.;¹ therefore the Śruti specifies darkness as *andhaṃ tamaḥ* 'blinding darkness'. [599]

¹This refers to *mahāmoha*, *tāmisra*, *andhas* as varieties of darkness.

अन्धं मूढं तमो यान्ति येऽविद्यां समुपासते ॥
विरक्ता अपि संसारान्नैकात्म्यं ये विदुर्नराः ॥६००॥

Those, who devote themselves to what is really ignorance,¹ reach *andha tamas* where *andha* means delusion—(this refers to) even those men, who, though indifferent to or detached from the transmigratory world,² have not known the non-duality of the Ātman. [600]

¹This refers to those who continue to perform some meditations which also are some kinds of rituals.

²In connection with this, SP states *aviraktāḥ kevalakarminas tāmasaṃ dehaṃ gṛhṇanti viraktā daharādiparā rājasam iti bhedaḥ*.

संभतिवचसापीयमविद्यैवाभिधीयते ।
अविद्यातो हि संभूतिः सर्वस्य जगतो यतः ॥६०१॥

In (or By) the word *saṃbhūti* (of the Mādhyandina recension)¹ also, this very ignorance is meant (or, expressed); since (*hi*) the origin of the entire world is (only) from ignorance. [601]

¹*andhaṃ tamah praviśanti ye saṃbhūtim* where *avidyā* of Kāṇva is replaced by *saṃbhūti*.

ततो भूयस्तमो यान्ति ये विद्यायां रता जनाः ।
अणिमादावविद्योत्थे पराविचत्तया रताः ॥६०२॥

From that (i.e. the world) do they go to darkness again—they, i.e. the people, who are devoted to *vidyā* 'worldly knowledge'¹; (indeed) they are interested in such (*siddhis*) as² *aṇimā* 'minuteness' etc. which have arisen from ignorance, with their mind turned outwards (away from) reality. [602]

¹Cf. verse 603 and 604 below.

²For instance, *laghimā*, *mahimā*, ... *aiśvarya*.

ग्राह्यग्राहकभेदेन याविद्यामात्रकारणा ।
विद्येति सेह विज्ञेया नैकात्म्यप्रसमीक्षणम् ॥६०३॥

Here (in this context) *vidyā* is to be known as having a cause merely in *avidyā*, characterized together with distinctions such as *grāhya* and *grāhaka*; implying as this means not mindful of the non-duality (of the Ātman). [603]

This calls for an explanation of a term *vidyā* in verses 604-605.

कर्मार्थद्योतिका वेह विद्यात्राप्यभिधीयते ।
तस्यामभिरता ये स्युर्वेदान्तार्थानपेक्षिणः ॥६०४॥
विशन्त्यज्ञास्तु ते सन्तस्ततो भूयः परं तमः ।
मिथ्याज्ञानाधिकत्वेन भूयस्त्वं तमसो भवेत् ॥६०५॥

Even here also that *vidyā* is intended (lit. expressed) which is the conveyor (lit. revealer) of the objects of activity; those who are devoted to it are (persons) who do not pay heed to the meaning of the Vedānta texts; [604]
being ignorant, however, they enter once again from that (*vidyā*)

into great/pitch darkness (*param tamah*); the greatness of the darkness is owing to the excessive measure of false knowledge. [605]

In verses 603-605 Sureśvara glosses on the word *vidyā* as *naikātmyaprasamīkṣaṇam*, *karmārthadyotikā(vidyā)* and *mithyā-jñānādhikā*. It appears in the last line of verse 605 that Sureśvara strikes at the Mīmāṃsakas who hold ritual to be more important than Īśvara himself.

Verses 606-608 are the explanation of BU 4.4.11.

यदि ते तत्तमो यान्ति को दोष इति चोदिते ।
अनन्दा इति वाक्येन तद्दोषोऽथाभिधीयते ॥६०६॥

(If it is expected:) 'What fault is seen in that they go to darkness?'—this being argued, the answer is: 'The fault in that is expressed in the sentence *anandāḥ*' [606]

अनानन्दाभिधा लोकास्तीव्रदोषसमन्विताः ॥६०७॥

Those worlds, which are beset with (lit. accompanied by) severe difficulties/faults are called by the name *anānanda*.¹ [607]

¹This is the paraphrase of *ananda*, for the sake of metre.

तांस्ते प्रेत्याभिगच्छन्ति येऽविद्वांसोऽबुधो जनाः ।
अविद्वांसो न सामान्यात्किंतु येऽत्राबुधो जनाः ॥६०८॥

Having died, they go to those worlds; those who have not known (the nature of the Ātman) and are therefore unwise;¹ they are not to be taken as non-knowers (about the Ātman)—not in a general way—but that they are persons who are (entirely) ignorant² (about the same). [608]

¹This is almost a quotation from BU 4.4.11; *abudhaḥ* = *abudhāḥ*

from the root-noun *budh*.

²This means 'unaware of'.

Verses 609-615 explain BU 4.4.12.

आत्मानं चेद्विजानीयात्सर्वधीवृत्तिसाक्षिणम् ।
अशनायाद्यतिक्रान्तं कथंचित्सत्त्वशुद्धितः ॥६०९॥
कथं तमभिजानीयादित्युक्त इदमुच्यते ।
पुरुषः परमात्मायमयमस्मीतिवाक्यतः ।
किमिच्छन्कस्य वार्थाय शरीरं संज्वरेत्तदा ॥६१०॥

'If a person would know the Ātman as the witness of all the modifications of the intellect, and as one which has transgressed hunger etc., somehow through purification of himself (or his intellect), [609] how should one know that person?' If this is asked, the following is said (in answer): 'This individual being (*puruṣa*) is the highest Ātman, as understood from the sentence *ayam asmi*'.¹ Then (i.e. in that modification)² how would the body feel torment, with the want of which thing and for the sake of what thing?' [610]

¹This is quoted from BU 4.4.12. Also SP adds there the well-known Mahāvākya *tat tvam asi*.

²This refers to the second half of BU 4.4.12.

सर्वेच्छानां समाप्तत्वादात्मकामप्रबोधतः ।
आक्षिप्यतेऽत इच्छेह किमिच्छन्नितिवाक्यतः ॥६११॥

Since all the desires have been obtained through knowing about the (real) desire the Ātman, there is, therefore, in the sentence *kim icchan* ... snapped aside (i.e. rejected) desire (in its entirety). [611]

प्रत्यगात्मातिरेकेण यस्माच्चान्यत्र पश्यति ।
कस्य कामाय वा चातोऽप्यनात्माक्षिप्यतेऽखिलः ॥६१२॥

Since (this person)¹ does not see anything else than the individual (or, lit. inner) self, there is the question asked in the words *kasya kāmāya vā ca*, with reference to all (of) the non-Ātman. [612]

¹This refers to one who has obtained the knowledge of the Brahman.

शरीरज्वरमन्वेष संज्वरेद्ब्रह्म सन्कथम् ।
निःसङ्गस्य हि संबन्धो देहेनास्य न कश्चन ॥६१३॥

How would he, being the Brahman itself, feel torment after the torment of the body? Indeed, in the case of the person, who is non-attached (to the body), there is not any connection of him with the body. [613]

नातो देहादिदुःखेन दुःखित्वं प्रत्यगात्मनः ।
निःशेषदुःखसंबन्धहेतूच्छित्तेः प्रबोधतः ॥६१४॥

Therefore, in the case of the individual self, there is no feeling of sorrow on account of the torment of the body; for (already) there is complete destruction of every connection with misery (or sorrow) on account of the knowledge of the Ātman. [614]

भयोऽसह्यमहादुःखनीडदेहप्रवेशन-
हेत्वविद्यासमुच्छित्तेर्देहं चानुविशेत्कुतः ॥६१५॥

How would he again enter into a body since there is destruction of ignorance which is the cause of (his) entry into the body, i.e. the abode of extremely unbearable misery? [615]

This is based on the reading of the Mādhyandina recension *śarīram anusaṅcaret* for *anusañjvaret* of the Kāṇva recension

Verses 616-623 explain BU 4.4.13.

शास्त्राचार्यप्रसादात् क्षपिताशेषपाप्मनः ।
वित्तो बुद्ध्यादिसाक्षीशः प्रतिबुद्धस्तथैकलः ॥६१६॥

However, through the favour of the preceptor and the scripture(s), the person has his entire sin destroyed; therefore, being an experiencer of the Brahman, he becomes the witness of the intellect etc.¹ and also alone (that is separated from the body) and enlightened (*pratibuddha*). [616]

This is the meaning of the Mantra beginning with *yasya* and connected with *sa hi sarvasya kartā*.

¹This refers to various organs.

अत्रात्तेजोभिरत्यर्थं देहः संदिह्यते यतः ।
संदेहस्तेन देहोऽयं संदेघश्छान्दसत्त्वतः ॥६१७॥

Since this body is fattened¹ excessively by food, i.e. various types of lustres; therefore, this body is described as *saṁdeha*. In the text of the Upaniṣad, the reading *saṁdegha* is to be regarded as a Vedic peculiarity.² [617]

¹The word is *saṁdihiyate* is paraphrased by SP as *samyag upacīyate*.

²It seems Sureśvara has accepted that the reading in BU 4.4.13 is *saṁdegha*, as reported by Limaye, under BU 4.4.13, as a reading in some mss. of the Mādhyandina recension. There are however two other readings, viz. *saṁdehye* and *saṁdehe* read by the mss.

आध्यात्मिकाधिभूताधिदैविकार्थातिसंकरात् ।
गुणप्रधानभावेन गहनोऽयं ततो मतः ॥६१८॥

Owing to a complete intermixture of objects that pertain to the body, to the elements, and to the divine world, there is connection among them as the principal and its subor-

dinates—and, therefore, this (worldly body) is very complex (i.e. very difficult to grasp). [618]

संदेहे गहनेऽत्रात्मा प्रविष्टो जलसूर्यवत् ।
विविच्य येन विज्ञातः स स्याद्विश्वकृदीश्वरः ॥६१९॥

In this very complex *saṁdeha* (for *saṁdehya* in the text of BU) this Ātman has entered, as the sun (enters) into waters, by whom having discriminated/deliberated, it was known specifically it would become the creator of all, the Lord. [619]

This verse explains the meaning of *praviṣṭa* and *sa viśvakṛt*.

प्रत्यग्याथात्म्यसंबोधात्सर्वं तेन कृतं भवेत् ।
निःशेषपुरुषार्थाप्तेर्न कार्यं शिष्यते परम् ॥६२०॥

By knowing the nature of the inner self, it would have done all (that has to be done); (for) after obtaining all the ends of human life, there would not remain for it anything else to be done (or accomplished). [620]

स हि सर्वस्य कर्तेति तस्मादेवाभिधीयते ।
कृतकृत्यत्वतो हेतोर्लोकोऽयं तस्य लोकिनः ॥६२१॥

Therefore, it is said *sa hi sarvasya kartā ...*; therefore, for the reason of his being one who has accomplished all the tasks to be performed, there is for him, the world, it belongs to the master of this world. [621]

Verses 622-623 explain *sa viśvakṛt*.

निःशेषजनिमत्कार्यहेतोर्वा ज्ञाततत्त्विनः ।
विश्वकृत्त्वं भवेदेवं हीतिहेतुपरिग्रहात् ॥६२२॥

Or (rather), being the performer of all the tasks of the life (lit. birth), i.e. by being the knower of the tasks of life, he

would have the nature of the performer of everything (*viśvakṛt*); (the word) *hi* (in the text) is for the sake of conveying the cause (of his being *viśvakṛt*). [622]

तस्य साक्षादयं लोको योऽहं ब्रह्मेतिबोधितः ।
भेदाशङ्कापनुत्त्यर्थं स उ लोक इतीर्यते ॥६२३॥

The words *sa u loka* are used in the statement for averting any doubt about his distinction (from the world); since this world is for him directly perceptible, as he is awakened (to the knowledge) *aham brahma*. [623]

We have followed the text *aham brahmetibodhitah* which could be read as *aham brahmetibodhatah*.

Verses 624-629 explain BU 4.4.14.

इहैव कृतकृत्यत्वात्सन्तः स्याम परं यदि ।
ब्रह्म प्रत्यक्तया विद्मः कथंचित्कल्मषक्षयात् ॥६२४॥

(It may be asked:) 'If we would have accomplished what is to be accomplished and become the highest (Brahman) in this very (transmigratory existence), then, somehow, we would understand it being its inner self, owing to the wearing away/destruction of all the sin'. [624]

This is to explain the sentence *ihaiva* ... pointing to the result of knowing the non-distinction between the Ātman and the non-Ātman.

न चेदथ परं विद्मः शास्त्राचार्यानुसारतः ।
अवेदिनं तदा बालं विनष्टिर्महती व्रजेत् ॥६२५॥

'If, on that knowing (*atha*), we do not know the highest (Brahman) by following the preceptor and the scripture(s), then to this non-knower of the Vedas,¹ the ignorant one,²

there would come great loss (i.e. destruction).'

[625]

This explains *na ca*

¹That is, one who has not been able to distinguish between the Ātman and the non-Ātman.

²The word in the original BU text is *avedi*, which is paraphrased by SP *vedanahīnaḥ*.

विनष्टिं महतीं चेयाद्योऽवेद्यात्माविचक्षणः ॥६२६॥

विनष्टिर्महती चेह विनाशादिप्रसतितः ।

आत्माविद्यैव निर्दिष्टा सामानाधिकरण्यतः ॥६२७॥

And a person, who has not known the Veda and has therefore been unable to distinguish between the Ātman and the individual self, would come to great loss. [626]

And here (in this situation), great loss (would result) into the effect, viz. perishing etc., (for, in these words) there is mention made of ignorance about the Ātman by the use of the same case-relation between the two words. [627]

In the first line the words *avedī*, *avicakṣaṇa* repeat the thought expressed by the words *avedin* and *bāla* in the preceding verse.

उक्तार्थस्य प्रकाशार्थमुत्तरार्धेन भण्यते ।

ये तद्विदुरिति श्रुत्या स्पष्टार्थप्रतिपत्तये ॥६२८॥

In order to express this thought, which is (just) mentioned, there is stated by the Śruti in the latter half (of the sentence) *ye tad viduḥ*, in order that one understood the thought very clearly. [628]

Read SP for details: *ye tad vidur iti śrutirūpeṇottarārdhena pūrvārdhārtha eva prapañcārtham ucyate prapañcanam caktārthasya spaṣṭatāpratipattiyartham iti yojanā tatra prathamapādārthas trtīyapādena prapañcyate dvitīyapādārthas caturthapādeneti vibhāgaḥ*.

ब्रह्मैव सन्तो विज्ञानात्प्रागतो ब्रह्मबोधतः ।
भवामो ब्रह्म नानासं दशमो दशमं यथा ॥६२९॥

Therefore, being the Brahman itself before knowing the Brahman, i.e. even before acquiring the specific knowledge (about it from the sentence), we become the Brahman which has not been obtained, just like a person (in a group of ten persons knows himself) as the tenth one. [629]

Verses 630-634 are explanation of BU 4.4.15.

ब्रह्मास्मीति यदैवैतमात्मानं देवमञ्जसा ।
अनुपश्यति साक्षात्तमीश्वरं भूतभव्ययोः ॥६३०॥
ईश्वरप्रत्यगात्माप्तेस्तदा तद्देदनाशतः ।
ईशितव्यत्वसंक्रान्तेर्न ततो विजुगुप्सते ॥६३१॥

When (the individual being) sees this inner self, the shining one, the divine (being) as 'I am Brahman', in a clear (or, smooth) way, then does he directly perceive the Lord of both of what was and what will be. [630]

Then, because of the removal (lit. destruction) of the distinction between the two, that is through knowing (lit. obtaining) the nature of the Lord as the inner self, and by turning into the one having the nature of what is to be controlled, the individual self does not (anymore) wish to conceal itself from (lit. censure) it.¹ [631]

The word *añjasā* 'in a smooth way' is paraphrased as *sākṣāt* 'directly' in the second line.

¹Cf. *guptim icchati* in just the next verse; also *nindati* in verse 634 below.

गुप्तिमिच्छति सर्वोऽपि यत ईशाद्व्यातुरः ।
अयं तु तदभिन्नत्वान्न ततो गुप्तिमिच्छति ॥६३२॥

(This is so said) since everyone wishes to conceal (himself) from the Lord, being overpowered by fear; but this one (i.e. the individual self), owing to the non-difference from that (i.e. the Lord), does not wish to remain concealed from him. [632]

This means that, on knowing the non-distinction between himself and the Brahman, the individual self does not entertain any fear any more. Cf. *abhayaṃ vai janaka prāpto 'si* (BU 4.2.4).

यतो वाचो निवर्तन्ते अप्राप्य मनसा सह ।
आनन्दं ब्रह्मणो विद्वान् बिभेतीति शास्त्रगीः ॥६३३॥

Such is the statement in the scripture: 'An individual self, knowing the bliss in the form of the Brahman, does not feel fear'—'(That Brahman) from which all speech, together with *manas*, withdraws (itself), not having obtained it.' [633]

This is *Taittirīyopaniṣad* 2.4 and 2.9; this is adduced as the scriptural support for the thought in the preceding verse.

न वा निन्दति निःशेषद्वैतहेतुविनाशतः ।
ऐकात्म्यदर्शनाद्विद्वान्यत्र त्वस्येतिशास्त्रतः ॥६३४॥

On the basis of the scriptural text *yatra tv asya* (BU 4.5.15) it is clear that (the individual self), now the knower, does not (any more) censure himself because of the complete removal (lit. destruction) of the cause of all duality and because of the (direct) perception of its non-duality (or, non-difference from it). [634]

Verses 635-639 are the explanation of BU 4.4.16.

निःशेषविक्रियाहेतुकालातिक्रमहेतुतः ।
जन्मादिविक्रियाषट्कसंगतिस्तस्य नेष्यते ॥६३५॥

The association with the group of six modifications, viz. birth

etc.,¹ is not accepted in the case of that (the Ātman), since that overcomes (lit. transgresses) the causes and periods of time (as well) of all the modifications. [635]

¹This refers to the six *bhāvavikāras* recorded in *Nirukta* 1.2.

अर्वाग्यस्मादयं कालो विकुर्वञ्जनिमज्जगत् ।
संवत्सरः स्वावयवैरहोभिः परिवर्तते ।
ज्योतिषामपि तज्ज्योतिरायुर्देवा उपासते ॥६३६॥

This time (which is down) below whom (i.e. the Brahman), (named) as the year, keeps on rotating together with its own parts, viz. days, modifying the world that has an origin—the divine ones wait on (or, are devoted to) that light of luminaries as the very life,. [636]

कौटस्थ्यादमृतं ज्योतिर्मृत्युभूम्यतिलङ्घनात् ।
कालस्य जरणादात्मा श्रुतौ कालंजरो मतः ॥६३७॥

Owing to its immutability, the immortal light, i.e. the Ātman, (mentioned) as *kālāṇjara* is known in the Śruti on account of its transgressing the region of death and its reducing *kāla* (to nothingness). [637]

Cf. *Śvetāśvataropaniṣad*: *upāc dyuh* (5.5) and *jñāh vidyah* (6.16); also SP states *uktam hi*—

kālah pacati bhūtāni sarvāṇy eva satātmanā /
(*Maitrāyaṇyupaniṣad* 6.15ab);

and

kālah pakvo yam anveti yas tam veda sa vedavit //
kālah sa pacyate yatra na kālas tatra vai prabhuḥ /
kālasyaiva ca mṛtyoś ca jaṇigamasthāvarasya ca //
iśate bhagavān ekaḥ satyam etad bravīmi te /
(not traced);

and also cites from *Mahābhārata* 12.238.9:

āhatya sarvasaṅkalpān sattve cittam niveśayet /

sattve cittam samāveśya tataḥ kālañjaro bhavet //

भावाभावात्मकस्यास्य कार्यकारणवस्तुनः ।
परमात्मा स्वतः सिद्धेरायुरस्य परार्थतः ॥६३८॥

The highest Ātman, because of its existence in its own right (or on account of itself), is in reality the very life of this thing (lit. world) consisting of effect(s) and cause(s), which is of the nature of positive and negative entities. [638]

गन्धर्वाः पितरो देवा रक्षोभिश्च सहासुराः ।
यस्मिन्पञ्चजनाः पञ्च वियदन्ताः प्रतिष्ठिताः ॥६३९॥

That is the Ātman (in whom) are supported (alternatively, abiding) five tribes, viz. Gandharvas, Pitṛs, Gods, demons and Asuras;¹ or they are the five (elements ending with) sky.² [639]

¹The distinction is made between *rākṣasa*(s) and *asuras* in keeping with the Vedic practice.

²They are *pr̥thivī*, *ap*, *tejas*, *vāyu*, *ākāśa*.

Verses 640-642 are the explanation of BU 4.4.17.

पञ्च प्राणादयो वा स्युरन्नान्तास्तच्छ्रुतत्वतः ।
अत्राभावे विवक्ष्यन्ते काण्वानां ज्योतिषा सह ।
तमेव कारणात्मानं विद्वान्मन्येऽमृतोऽमृतम् ॥६४०॥

The five would as well be the five *prāṇas* mentioned with food in the end, for they are so heard; in the absence of the mention of the food, the five are intended by the followers of the Kāṇva recension (as four which are specifically stated in the text) together with light (*jyotis* as the fifth); that one, do I, the immortal knower, understand as the immortal Ātman which is the cause (of all). [640]

This is specifically so mentioned in BU 4.4.17 of the Mādhyandina recension.

In this verse, Sureśvara has stated two interpretations of *pañca jana* (i) according to the Mādhyandina tradition and (ii) according to the Kāṇva tradition, but, in this latter, there is no reading of *anna* which is replaced by the word *jyotiṣāṃ jyotiḥ* as the fifth one, from BU 4.4.16. Cf. BS 1.4.12.

कार्यकारणयोस्तत्त्वं यस्मादात्मैव निर्द्वयः ।
मन्य आत्मानमेवातः कार्यकारणवज्जगत् ॥६४१॥

Since the reality (truth) of effect(s) and cause(s) is only the Ātman, which is without duality; therefore, do I consider only the Ātman itself as this world which consists in effect(s) and cause(s). [641]

The verse explains the idea of the word *kāraṇātman* in the preceding verse.

प्रध्वस्तभेदहेतुत्वात्कारणादेरसंभवात् ।
अमृतोऽमृतमित्याह स्वयं विद्वानिति श्रुतिः ॥६४२॥

And the Śruti itself has declared that this (individual self) knows the immortal (i.e. the Ātman) and itself (thereby) becomes immortal, because there is destruction of the cause of distinction and because there does not any more remain any cause as possible. [642]

Verses 643-647 are the explanation of BU 4.4.18.

यतः प्राणादिभावोऽयं प्राणादीनां तमेव ये ।
निचिक्युस्ते विदुः साक्षादग्र्यं ब्रह्म सनातनम् ॥६४३॥

Since those who perceive with respect to the *prāṇas* that there is this becoming (of the Brahman) as *prāṇas* etc.; therefore, they have directly known only that one, the Brahman, which

is the foremost (among all the *prāṇas*) and which has been in existence all the time. [643]

This explains the same thought as in *prāṇasya prāṇam* ... in BU 4.4.18 itself.

निरपेक्षात्मनैवेह सर्वस्यात्मवतो यतः ।
प्राणादेरात्मवत्ता स्यात्प्राणस्य प्राणमित्यतः ॥६४४॥

Since the state of being sentient belongs to all vital breaths possessed of sentience, by nature without having any expectancy, therefore, (that) *Prāṇa* is the life of the *prāṇas* (i.e. organs). [644]

अनात्मा हि स्वतोऽसिध्यन्स्वतःसिद्धमपेक्षते ।
आत्मनस्तु स्वतः सिद्धेर्नापेक्षानात्मसंश्रयात् ॥६४५॥

Indeed (*hi*) the non-Ātman, which cannot exist in its own right, does expect (i.e. depends on the Ātman), that exists in its own right; but since the Ātman has been existent, in its own right, it does not have a resort in any non-Ātman. [645]

अन्यतः संगतिः सेयमविचारितसिद्धिका ।
अविद्योत्सङ्गसंस्थैव तत्त्वज्ञानाद्विनश्यति ॥६४६॥

This is then the association of the Ātman with another, being established (even) without (any deliberate) consideration (*avicāritasiddhika*), resting only on the lap of ignorance; it gets destroyed through knowledge of reality.¹ [646]

This refers to *prāṇādeḥ ātmavattvam*.

¹This is the result of knowing the relation between the Ātman and the non-Ātman.

अकार्याकारणात्मैव कार्यकारणवस्तुनः ।

तत्त्वमुक्तं पृथिव्यादेर्नभोन्तस्याक्षरं परम् ॥६४७॥

Thus is stated the true nature of this (world) consisting of effect(s), and cause(s), as the Ātman having the nature of non-cause and non-effect; that is, of all, which begins with (the mention of) earth and ends with sky; namely, in reality, the highest imperishable self. [647]

Verses 648-672 are the explanation of BU 4.4.19.

तस्यास्य दर्शनोपायः कः स्यादित्यभिचोदिते ।
मनसैवेत्यतः प्राह श्रुतिर्ब्रह्मावबोधने ॥६४८॥

Now one might ask: 'What can be the means of the sight of this one, which is (so far described)? The Śruti states (in answer), 'With *manas* only (there can be the seeing)'; in order that one should well (*ava*) know the Brahman. [648]

अवदधे यतश्चेयं मनसैवेति च श्रुतिः ।
मनोतिरेकतोऽपेक्षा नैवातः साधनान्तरे ॥६४९॥

Also, since this Śruti again¹ emphasised (or specified this (Brahman as what can become known) only with (i.e. by means of) *manas*, therefore, there is no need (lit. expectancy) of any other means than the *manas* (for knowing it). [649]

¹This refers to *Kāthopanīṣad* 4.11: *manasaivedam āptavyam*; this is understood by force of the second *ca* in this verse.

आत्मानात्मपदार्थेषु विज्ञानोत्पत्तिसाधनम् ।
मनः साधारणं दृष्टं सर्वज्ञानैकहेतुतः ॥६५०॥

In respect of the objects, such as the Ātman and the non-Ātman, it is known that *manas* is the common means that brings about the rise of the specific knowledge (*vijñāna*) about them; for the reason that it is the only cause that gives

rise to all types of knowledge.

[650]

Here the oneness of *manas* and the intellect is the basis of this thought; this reminds us of the two inseparable (yet distinguishable) aspects of the inner organs (*antaḥkāraṇa*) of human beings. Therefore, instead of the intellect, *manas* is mentioned as what grasps; as it is said: it takes the shape of the object grasped (and not the intellect, as is usually mentioned).

प्रत्यक्चिदाकृतिस्तत्र सर्वदा धर्मधर्मिणोः ।
हेत्वन्तरानपेक्षत्वादात्मत्वात्संनिधेः सदा ॥६५१॥
आत्माकृतिरतो नित्या तद्धेतोः संभवात्सदा ।
अज्ञानादेश्च चिद्रूपं तद्याथात्म्यान् वार्यते ॥६५२॥

In that respect (*tatra*), there would always be the shape of the sentience within, since there has always been the proximity of the Ātman and what grasps and what is grasped (*dharma-dharmin*)¹ as there is no other cause of the expected/-necessary proximity. [651]

Therefore, the shape of the Ātman (which *manas* comes to have) is ever abiding (*nitya*), on account of there being the possibility of the ever existent cause of it² and such form of ignorance etc., as the shape of the sentience cannot be overruled (lit. averted); because of its being the true nature of the same (i.e. *manas*). [652]

This verse presupposes the question: *manodhīnā ced ātmasiddhir ātmano jādatvaṃ syād atrāḥa ... pratyag iti* (NKL ms. p.751); and then NKL (ms. p.751) explains verse 651 thus: *buddhitaddharmayoḥ svarūpalābhamātreṇa cidābhāsavyāptatvāt buddhyādisādhakatvād ātmano na jādyam ity arthaḥ*. Then it introduces verse 652: *na kevalam buddhyādeḥ svarūpatvena tatra sadātanaś cidābhāsaḥ kiṃ tu sarvatrety āha—ātmeti*.

On these two verses SP states *āmaprasādād eva sarvasya sattā sphūrtiś cetyātmano na jādyam taddarśane manasaḥ sādhanatvoktis tu sadā tadākārasya tasya śravaṇādisaṃskārāpekṣayā*

kādācitkatadrūpapariṇāmadhāritvād iti vārtikayos tātpariyārthaḥ.

¹*dharmīn* is the intellect which grasps and *dharma* is knowledge, which is grasped.

²This is the ever existing proximity of the Ātman and *manas*.

धर्माधर्माद्यपेक्षत्वादन्यत्वाच्चान्यवस्तुनः ।

शब्दाद्याकारता तस्मात्कादाचित्की धियो भवेत् ॥६५३॥

Therefore, on account of its (i.e. of *manas*) dependence on *dharmādharmā* and its being different from other thing (i.e. Ātman), the state of having the shape of a sound etc. on the part of the intellect ¹ is only occasional. [653]

¹SP explains *dhī* as *manas*.

In verses 654-658 there is a discussion that every object taking the shape of the Ātman can lead to ignorance about the knowledge of it.

यद्यपीमौ जगत्यस्मिन्नात्मज्ञानपुरःसरौ ।

शब्दाद्यनात्मविज्ञानभावाभावौ स्वभावतः ॥६५४॥

तथाप्यनुभवादेव प्रत्यक्तत्त्वानभिज्ञता ।

अनात्मबोधवत्सिद्धाविद्यातः प्रत्यगात्मनि ॥६५५॥

Even if, in this world, the positive and negative forms of specific knowledge of the non-Ātmans, e.g. sound etc. are by nature preceded by the knowledge of the Ātman; [654]
there is yet ignorance (about the Ātman) owing to its being inside (the body)—as understood from experience; therefore, this absence of knowledge in respect of the inner self is established as having been beset with knowledge about the non-Ātman. [655]

उत्पन्नस्यापि चोत्पत्तिः कृपाकाशादिवत्ततः ।

प्रत्यग्याथात्म्यबोधस्य व्युत्पत्तेर्गुरुशास्त्रतः ॥६५६॥

And, this rise of knowledge about the true nature of the inner self, though (thus) produced (by the proximity of the Ātman and *manas*) from learning (imparted to an individual) by a preceptor and scriptures, is just like (the origination of) the sky which is (delimited by) a well—it is the origination of what is (already) originated. [656]

प्रसादादनु शास्त्रादेर्मनसैवेत्यतः श्रुतिः ।
द्रष्टव्यमात्मनस्तत्त्वमित्याहास्मद्वितैषिणी ॥६५७॥

Therefore, the Śruti, which desires good for us, has said that, after clear understanding (*prasādād anu*)¹ of the scripture, one should experience (lit. see) the true nature of the Ātman with the help of *manas*. [657]

This is a kind of the concluding remark about the meaning of the sentence *manasā*

¹However SP states *anuśabdo draṣṭavyam ity anena sambadhyate*.

दृश्यं चेन्मनसैवैतद्द्रष्टृत्वादिप्रभेदतः ।
पुनः प्रसक्तं नानात्वं मैवं यस्मान्निषिध्यते ॥६५८॥

If it is said that there is again contingency of accepting variety (of distinct objects) owing to this distinguishing of the faculty of seeing etc., when it is observed (in the Śruti) that the Ātman is to be seen with the help of *manas*; then the answer is: 'Let this not be said, since (that variety) is rejected'. [658]

A doubt in this verse is at the basis of the BU statement *neha*

Verses 659-661 explain the Śruti *neha nānāsti*

नेह प्रमाणतो मेयं यस्मान्नानास्ति किं चन ।
अज्ञातं यदि वा ज्ञातं वस्तु नानात्वभाङ्गं हि ॥६५९॥

नानात्वबुद्धये नालममितोऽर्थो यतस्ततः ।
 अज्ञातः संशयज्ञातो मिथ्याज्ञातो न भित्तये ॥६६०॥
 सम्यग्ज्ञातोऽपि नैवार्थो द्वैतबोधकृदिष्यते ।
 द्वैतकारणबाधेन सम्यग्ज्ञातत्वसिद्धितः ॥६६१॥

Here (i.e. in Vedānta) there is not any object to be known by any means of knowing, since there is nothing which has a variety in it; be it unknown or known; the (real) thing does not have any variety in it. [659]

Since the immanent (lit. unlimited) thing is not such as to give rise to the cognition of variety; there is, therefore, not any distinct part in it (which is) not known, doubtfully known, or falsely known. [660]

And even if that (real) thing were well-known, it is not regarded as causing the cognition of duality by its effecting removal of the cause of duality and by establishing the nature of itself as what is well-known. [661]

In verses 662 and 663, there is reasoning presented for the absence of variety (in knowledge).

मेयव्याप्तिश्च मानानां नान्यव्यावृत्तिवर्त्मना ।
 व्यावर्त्येष्वापि तत्सक्तेर्न चापि लभतेऽवधिम् ॥६६२॥
 मेयेनैव समाप्तत्वात्ततोऽन्या व्यापृतिर्न च ।
 नातो वस्त्वन्तरव्याप्तिं व्यावृत्तिं वाश्नुते प्रमा ॥६६३॥

Grasping (lit. pervading) the object(s) to be known by any/all means of knowing is not (to be understood) by way of excluding other (things), since that¹ would contingently follow in the case also of those which are to be excluded and, thus, it (i.e. a means of knowing) would not have any scope. [662]

Since in only its object of grasping is (the function of a means of knowing) completed, there is no other function (of it) whatever; therefore, right knowledge does not involve grasping of any other object of knowing or even excluding (the same).

[663]

¹ Namely, *anyavyāvṛtti*.

This verse states that any means of knowing cannot be related to exclusion, distinguishing or any non-existent distinction.

व्यावृत्तेश्चाप्यवस्तुत्वात् सद्बस्तूपलम्भनैः ।
प्रमाणैरपि संबन्धः प्रत्यक्षप्रमुखैः क्वचित् ॥६६४॥

Also, even the means of knowing, such as direct perception and others, which are for grasping existent things, do not anywhere have any connection with exclusion, on account of its being a non-existent thing. [664]

Sureśvara in verses 665-667 refutes the idea of the sixth pramāṇa i.e. negation or non-apprehension as the means of effecting exclusion.

अभावमात्रबोधित्वान्नाभावादपि भेदधीः ।
भावाभाववभावेन प्रत्यक्षेणेव नेक्षते ॥६६५॥

Since negation (the sixth means of knowing) can give cognition of only non-existence, it also cannot give cognition of distinction. As by perception, so by negation (i.e. non-apprehension) existence and non-existence both cannot be apprehended. [665]

योऽपि प्रत्यक्षतोऽभावं वादी कश्चित्समीक्षते ।
तावन्मात्रावसायित्वाद्द्वैतं नासावपीक्षते ॥६६६॥

And whichever disputant might see here a negative entity (or the absence of a thing) by means of direct perception, even he does not (really) see duality (i.e. the existence of another thing), since that (direct perception) would have accomplished (i.e. got exhausted after achieving) its purpose.¹ [666]

¹ Cp. *anyā vyāptir na* in verse 663 above.

प्रत्यक्षस्यानुवृत्तिं च व्यावृत्तिं तद्विदां च सः ।
प्रत्यक्षेणैव संपश्येत्कथमित्यभिधीयताम् ॥६६७॥

Now, let it be told as to how that (person)¹ will see only by direct perception the continuity of what is directly perceptible and also the exclusion of those that are different from it. [667]

¹This refers to the *vādī* 'disputant' in the preceding verse.

Verses 668-678 affirm the absence of any means of knowing which grasps variety.

यतो मानं न हीहास्ति नानात्वप्रतिपत्तये ।
खकाण्यवदतस्तत्स्यादविचारितसिद्धिकम् ॥६६८॥

Since here (in respect of the (real) thing) there is not any means of knowing, which can simultaneously result in the awareness of a variety among things; it is established, (even) without (any deliberate) consideration, just like darkness associated with the sky. [668]

अज्ञातवस्तुहेत्वेव यस्मान्नाना ततोऽवदत् ।
मृत्योः स मृत्युमाप्नोति योऽत्र नानेव पश्यति ॥६६९॥

Since variety of things is caused merely by unknown things; therefore has (the Śruti) stated *mṛtyoḥ sa mṛtyum āpnoti yo 'tra nāneva paśyati* 'One who sees variety here goes from death to death'. [669]

This is for BU 4.4.19; it is noted in *Kāthopaniṣad* 4.10 also.

मृत्युर्हिरण्यगर्भः स्यात्स्वकार्यप्रलयत्वतः ।
तस्यापि मृत्युर्विज्ञेयो यत आविरभूदसौ ॥६७०॥

Mrtyu 'death' should be understood as Hiranyagarbha, since it is associated with (or accompanied by) complete merger (dissolution) of its own effect(s); therefore, death should be known of itself (i.e. that death) also, since it has appeared (as a modification). [670]

Whatever is related as a cause to some effect is perishable—this is the basic idea in this verse.

मिथ्यादर्शनदोषित्वान्मिथ्यादर्शनकारणम् ।
मृत्योर्मृत्युमसावेति यो नानेवेह वीक्षते ॥६७१॥

He, who sees here¹ (what is) like variety, keeps on moving from death to death, which has for its cause false knowledge because of its having the fault of wrong (or false) viewing (of reality). [671]

¹This is to mean 'while there exists only the Brahman'.

पूर्वं ज्ञानसमुत्पत्तेर्नानैवेति ह्यभून्मतिः ।
ज्ञानोत्पत्तौ तु तद्वाधान्नानैवेति प्रयुज्यते ॥६७२॥

(That person) had a thought that there exists variety (of things) in this world, before there was the rise (in him) of knowledge (about the Ātman) and, when the knowledge has arisen, there is the removal of that (ignorance or wrong viewing) and therefore (in the Śruti) are used the words *nāneva*.¹ [672]

¹This explains the force of *iva* after *nānā*.

Verses 673-703 are the explanation of BU 4.4.20.

वस्तुवृत्तं यतोऽद्वैतं नानात्वं मोहहेतुजम् ।
एकधैवात आत्मायं द्रष्टव्यः श्रुतिवर्त्मगैः ॥६७३॥

Since the existence (*vr̥tta*) of the (real) thing is that of non-duality, therefore the variety (of things) is a product of delusion and, as a result, this Ātman has to be seen as only of one form, (as explained) by them who follow the path of the Śruti. [673]

This is the meaning of the sentence *ekadhā*

एकेनैव प्रकारेण भास्वच्चिन्मात्ररूपिणा ।
शास्त्रैकमानतो ब्रह्म द्रष्टव्यं प्रत्यगात्मना ॥६७४॥

(This means that) the Brahman is to be seen by the individual self with the help of only one authoritative means, i.e. the scriptures only, in one way, i.e. as having the form of mere bright sentence.¹ [674]

¹Here the instrumental case in *bhāsvaccinmātrarūpiṇā* is in accordance with the Sūtra *ittham bhūtalakṣane* (SP *itthambhāve*) *tr̥tīyā*.

समस्तव्यस्ततादृष्टिरेकधैवेतिवाक्यतः ।
मिथ्येति गम्यते श्रौतान्मृत्योरिति च निन्दनात् ॥६७५॥

It is understood from the sentence *ekadhaiva* ... that whatever has the view of totality and of particularity is false; for, there is censure (of duality) in the Śruti (in the words) *mṛtyoh* [675]

This refers to verses 669-671 above. Read SP: *vākyasya śrautārtham uktvādhikārtham āha* as introductory to this verse.

एतदप्रमयं ब्रह्म मृत्युहेतोर्निषेधनात् ।
मृत्युर्वै तम इत्युक्तं तच्च बोधान्निराकृतम् ॥६७६॥

This Brahman is ever obtaining (lit. never failing) as understood from the censure of the cause of death; as stated in *mṛtyur*

vai tamaḥ (BU 1.3.28); and (death) is removed (lit. discarded) by the knowledge (arising) from the Śruti.¹ [676]

AnSS reads a variant *-aprameyam* for *-apramaya* (only in one ms.); this word is used for the sake of metre.

¹Read NKL (ms. p.753): *vākyottharthajñānam ajñānanivartakātvena mānaṃ na tu vastubodhakatvenety abhipretyāprameyatvam ucyata ity āha etad iti* (as introductory to this verse).

एकधैव यतस्तत्त्वं सर्वस्य जगतस्ततः ।
क्रियाकारकसंभेदधीर्मृषेत्यवधार्यताम् ॥६७७॥

Since the true nature of the whole world is, then (*tataḥ*, or, from that statement), only (in being) the Ātman of just one form; therefore, the awareness of distinctions such as activity and the means of activity is to be firmly considered as false.

[677]

यत्र हि द्वैतमित्येवं यत्र त्वस्येति च श्रुतिः ।
नानात्वदृष्टेर्मिथ्यात्वं स्वयमेवावदत्पुरा ॥६७८॥

Further, the Śruti *yatra hi dvaitam ...* and also the other, *yatra tv asya* have themselves¹ declared already the falsity of viewing the variety of things (in the universe).

[678]

The two parts of the Śruti stated are from BU 2.4.14 and 4.5.15.

¹This is for *svayam*; it could be alternatively translated into 'itself' as well—thus referring to but one text.

Verses 679-684 pertain to the discussion on the internal contradiction involved in *ekadhā draṣṭavyaḥ*.

एकधा चेत्परं ब्रह्म द्रष्टव्यं कथमुच्यते ।
द्रष्टादिभेदसद्भावे द्रष्टव्यत्वप्रसिद्धितः ॥६७९॥
अप्रमेयं कथं वस्तु प्रमाणेन प्रमीयते ।

मीयते चेत्प्रमाणेन नाप्रमेयं तदिष्यते ॥६८०॥

(An objection is raised:) 'If the highest Brahman has to be seen as only of one form,¹ how then is it said that the Brahman is to be seen?'² ('This is so,' the awareness has arisen), 'because the nature of things to be seen can be established only when there is existence of duality consisting of *draṣṭṛ* etc.' [679]

(This means to say:) 'How can a thing, that cannot be known (or, be said to be the knower) with the help of some means of knowing; if it becomes known by some means, it is (not to be) accepted as an object not to be known.' [680]

Regarding verse 679: a general rule stated in the second line is for justifying the question raised in the first line.

¹That is, non-dual.

²In the absence of duality, there cannot be the seeing of the Brahman by someone else.

नैष दोषः पुरोक्तत्वात्परिहारस्य चाञ्जसा ।
भूयोऽपि परिहारोक्तौ भवेत् पिष्टस्य पेषणम् ॥६८१॥

(The answer is given:) 'This is not a fault, because the refutation (of this argument) has been already stated clearly as such, (and) in stating the refutation (of that question) once again would be (the same) as grinding what is already ground'. [681]

प्रमात्रादेरुपादानमैकात्म्यप्रतिबन्धकम् ।
यतोऽतस्तत्प्रबोधेऽस्मिन्न प्रमात्राद्यपेक्षते ॥६८२॥

Here, accepting (the notions of) the knower etc. is to be precluded in respect of this awareness (lit. knowing) of the non-duality of the Ātman and, this (duality), i.e. of the knower etc. is not expected (or required) in the knowing of that (i.e. non-dual Ātman). [682]

The verse has a verb *apekṣate* which should have been *apekṣyate* instead, but Sureśvara has often used such active and passive forms (for each other) in the entire BUBV.

मेयस्य मानसंबन्धे प्रमेय इति गीरियम् ।
 प्रमाफलं त्वप्रमेयं यतो नातो विरुद्धता ॥६८३॥
 अज्ञातवस्तुना योगो मानस्येह यतस्ततः ।
 ज्ञातस्य चाप्रमेयत्वात्रापेक्षा मानसंगतौ ॥६८४॥

(The use of) the word *prameya* is (possible) only when there is connection of what has to be known with what knows it (i.e. the means of knowing); but, since the result (here), consisting in the right knowledge, is what is not to be known, therefore there is no contradiction (involved in the statement of the Śruti). [683]

Since here (i.e. in this context),¹ there is the connection of knowing with the (real) thing, which has not been known, therefore, there has not been any dependence (noticeable) in the association of the means of knowing with the object (to be known); (this is) owing to the non-knowability of what has been already known. [684]

¹This refers to *pramāṇabhūmi*, or *vyavahārabhūmi*.

Verses 685-691 argue that being subjected to the function of knowing is merely imagined (kalpita) and, as a result, there cannot really be any result to be achieved. This leads to the idea that the Brahman is aprameya.

फलात्मनैव तन्मानं न तु मात्रादिरूपतः ।
 अभिव्यनक्ति नो ज्ञातं नातोऽस्य स्यात्प्रमेयता ॥६८५॥

That can be a means of knowing (in any context) which leads only to what is of the nature of result, and not by its having the forms such as the knower.¹ Further, it (i.e. that means

of knowing) reveals to us what is (already) known (and) therefore this (Ātman) does not have the nature of what is to be known (with the help of some means). [685]

Read NKL (ms. p.753): *svaprabhe pravṛttam mānaṃ svaprabhātmanaiva bodhayati na viśayatayety arthaḥ.*

¹This refers to *māna*, *meya*

तरावेव च्छिदा यद्वद्वैधीभावे तु नेष्यते ।
प्रमेयत्वं तथाज्ञाते न तु ज्ञाते फलात्मता ॥६८६॥

It is not accepted that (some non-duality) becomes divided (into duality), as in the case of a tree (such a division into two) is accepted/effected by (act of) cutting it; therefore, in respect of the so-called unknown, there can be (only) its nature as what has to be known—however, in respect of what has been already known, there is not (accepted) the peculiarity of being the result. [686]

Read NKL (ms. p.753) the introductory to this verse: *mānakṣptasya mānāviśayatvaṃ dr̥ṣṭāntena sādhayati tarāv iti.*

आगमोऽपीममात्मानं तत्तमोऽवस्तिवर्त्मना ।
अवबोधयतीत्येवं भण्यते दृष्टितत्त्वतः ॥६८७॥

Traditional scripture also makes known to us this Ātman by way of removing (lit. destroying) the darkness (i.e. ignorance) about it; that is why (*draṣṭavyam*) is stated with the notion of seeing one as the true nature of the Ātman. [687]

Read SP: *na hi vṛttivyāpyatvād r̥te pratīcaḥ sanvidvyāpyatvaṃ kalpyaṃ tadātmavād ity arthaḥ.*

स्वतःसिद्धाद्यतः सिद्धिरज्ञातादपि चात्मनः ।
सिद्धयसिद्धयोः प्रमात्रादेस्तत्सिद्धौ किमपेक्षते ॥६८८॥

And, since this establishing of the unknown Ātman, which has already existed in its own right becomes established; therefore, what can be expected¹ for establishing it, viz. the knower etc., when establishing and non-establishing are concerned? [688]

¹See note on verse 682 above.

ज्ञानव्याप्तिर्हि शब्दादौ स्यादेकप्रकृतित्वतः ।
अकार्यकारणे व्याप्तिः कथं स्यात्प्रत्यगात्मनि ॥६८९॥

Indeed, grasping (lit. pervading) some knowledge could be (understood/accepted) in respect of sound etc. owing to their having only one nature;¹ how then could there be (such) a grasping (lit. pervading) in respect of the inner self which is not (of the nature of) cause(s) and effect(s)?² [689]

¹This refers to sound etc. produced by the activity of organs and the intellect.

²Because of the non-duality of the Ātman, there can be no case of things having just one (or, uniform) nature.

शब्दप्रवृत्तिहेतूनां प्रत्यगात्मन्यसंभवात् ।
नाभिधानाभिधेयत्वसंगत्यातः प्रबोध्यते ॥६९०॥

Therefore, it is conveyed to us that, owing to the impossibility (the existence) of cause(s) of the function of words etc., in the case of the individual self, there is not (any) association of it (i.e. the inner self) with names and what are named. [690]

प्रत्यगज्ञानहेतूत्थो यत्रानात्मा प्रसिध्यति ।
ज्ञातृज्ञेयप्रभेदः स्यात्तत्र प्रत्यगनात्मनोः ॥६९१॥

Where, (however), the non-Ātman gets established, arisen as it has from ignorance about the inner self, there could (or,

can) be distinction of knower, object of knowing in respect of the inner self and the non-Ātman. [691]

This refers to the Śruti statement *yatra hi dvaitam iva ...* (BU 2.4.14).

In verses 692 and 693, it is stated that, in respect of the Ātman (in Vedānta), there cannot be the triad mātr, māna and meya—the Ātman being the meya.

यत्र त्वात्मैव मेयः स्यात्तत्र मेयातिरेकतः ।
 कः प्रमाता प्रमाणं वा यमेवेति तथा श्रुतिः ॥६९२॥
 मानापेक्षयेव यो भावः स एवामानतो न सन् ।
 मानानपेक्षसिद्धिस्तु कस्मान्मानमपेक्षते ॥६९३॥

But, where the Ātman alone is to be the object of knowing, whence could there be, beside that object of knowledge, a knower or a means of knowing, because there is the statement to this effect, viz. *yam eva* [692]

Whatever be the thing, which has the need of an authoritative means (of proving its existence), it is not (an external entity), because there has been the absence of any authoritative means of knowing it.¹ However, how there can be the existence of what is (in existence) without any dependence on a certain means (of proving its existence)—how would that expect some means? [693]

Verse 692 refers to *Kāthopanṣad* 2.20 and *Muṇḍakopaniṣad* 3.2.3.

Regarding verse 693, SP clarifies the idea thus: *svaprakāśasya na mānāpekṣā*.

¹This refers to the absence of *śrutiprāmānya*.

Verses 694-698 seek to establish the Ātman as aprameya.

मातृमानप्रमेयाणां प्रत्यक्त्वादात्मवस्तुनः ।

नातः प्रमेयता तस्य स्वतश्चावगमात्मनः ॥६९४॥

Since the (real) thing, i.e. the Ātman is the inner self, there is not here (the need of supposing) a knower, means of knowing and object to be known; therefore, the Ātman being itself by nature self-revealing it is not made an object of knowing.

[694]

प्रमातृफलयोर्भित्तेर्नेह चोद्यस्य संभवः ।
क्रिययोर्हि प्रभेदे तत्किं पूर्वमिति चोद्यते ॥६९५॥

There is no scope here for any doubt (or, objection) which can proceed from the (accepted) distinction between (the act of) knowing and its result; for, only when there is distinction between two activities,¹ a doubt can be raised as to what precedes it.

[695]

¹These means: *pramā* is *pramāprāpti*, that is one action and *phala* is for *phalaprāpti* which is the second action.

अपीतकरणग्रामः पुमान्यद्वत्सुषुप्तगः ।
शब्दान्निद्रामपास्याथ यथावस्त्ववबोध्यते ॥६९६॥

'As a person who has been in deep sleep and has the entire group of his organs merged within (the inner self), comes out of (lit. gives up) his sleep on account of a call aloud (*śabda*) (by someone), so also (should it be known) that the individual self is awakened as to the nature of the (real) thing (by word etc.).'

[696]

अगृहीत्वैव संबन्धमभिधानाभिधेययोः ।
हित्वा निद्रां प्रबुध्यन्ते यथेहापि तथात्मनि ॥६९७॥

As men are awakened after giving up sleep even without apprehending the connection between words and what they signify, so is the case here in the context of the Ātman. [697]

In the verse there is stress on *abhidhānābhidheyasambandhāgrahaṇa* 'non-grasping of the association of names and those that are named'.

शब्दशक्तेरचिन्त्यत्वादात्मत्वाद्वोधरूपिणः ।
तत्साक्ष्यत्वाच्च निद्राया विद्यस्तं मोहहानतः ॥६९८॥

Owing to the impossibility of ascertaining (lit. thinking about) the capacity of words (for signifying the Ātman), and also because of the nature of the Ātman that has the form (only) of knowledge and also being the object to be seen in that (i.e. sleep), we know that (i.e. the Ātman) after giving up the ignorance about it. [698]

In this context, SP states: *uktam hi— codanā hi bhūtam bhavantam ityādi*.

Verses 699-703 explain *virajāḥ para ākāśāt*

धर्माधर्मौ रजो ज्ञेयं रजोवत्तन्मलत्वतः ।
तदकर्तृत्वतो ब्रह्म विरजोऽकारणत्वतः ॥६९९॥

By *rajas* are to be understood *dharma* and *adharma*, (the Brahman is to be understood as) possessed of *rajas*, i.e. possessed of the impurity, connected with it; therefore, on account of not being the agent of (effecting) them, the Brahman is to be understood as devoid of *rajas* (i.e. impurity), since it is not the cause (of them). [699]

असम्यग्ज्ञानयाथात्म्यो जनिमत्प्रकृतित्वतः ।
आत्मैवाकाशशब्देन श्रुत्येह प्रतिपाद्यते ॥७००॥

In the Śruti is stated here, i.e. in the word *ākāśa*,¹ the Ātman itself, because it is the origin of all that has birth, its true nature not being well-known. [700]

This describes the nature of *ākāśa* which is merely stated as the Ātman.

¹SP has pointed out that the instrumental forms *śrutyā* and *ākāśaśabdena* are *samānādhikaraṇa*.

जनिमत्कारणादात्मा योऽस्थूलादिविशेषणः ।
आकाशात्स परो ज्ञेयस्तस्यापूर्वादिरूपतः ॥७०१॥

The Ātman, which is the cause of what has birth, described with qualifications such as *asthūla*, has to be known as beyond (that) *ākāśa* as having the forms of being *apūrva* etc. [701]

This verse explain the significance of the word *para*.

यस्मादेवमतोऽजोऽसावकार्याकारणत्वतः ।
अजत्वादेव निःशेषविकाराणामपाक्रिया ॥७०२॥

Since this is so, the one is unborn, on account of its being neither cause(s) nor effect(s); and, therefore, there is rejection of the entire group of modifications (in the case of the Ātman).¹ [702]

¹That is, only on account of its being unborn.

अव्यावृत्ताननुगतेर्महानात्मेति भण्यते ।
कौटस्थ्याच्च ध्रुवो ज्ञेयो विकारोच्छ्रित्यसंभवात् ॥७०३॥

Since it is neither differentiated from nor is similar to (anything else); therefore, the Ātman is mentioned as the great one. And, owing to its immutability, it is to be known as permanent; for, there is no possibility of the destruction of (any of) modification (which are not related to it). [703]

Verses 704-972 are the explanation on BU 4.4.21. In this portion there are other incidental points discussed (they are so shown

in their proper places).

प्रत्यक्तया श्रुतेर्वाक्यात्तमेवोक्तविशेषणम् ।
 अन्वयव्यतिरेकाभ्यां विज्ञायात्मानमादितः ॥७०४॥
 ब्रुभत्सोच्छेदिनीं प्रज्ञां सर्वाज्ञाननिरासतः ।
 सर्वज्ञेयसमाप्तेश्च कुर्याद्वाक्यार्थबोधतः ॥७०५॥

On the basis of (i.e. from) the sentence of the Śruti, one should have first known that Ātman, whose attributes have been stated (by the Śruti as shown earlier) and, by the method of Anvaya and Vyatireka, [704] should one have obtained the object of knowing (as existence) in all (of the Ātman) by the complete removal of (the entire)¹ ignorance, i.e. by the excellent knowledge, that destroys completely the desire to get to know (the Ātman), after understanding the meaning of the Śruti-sentence. [705]

This is the total meaning of the BU statement *vijñāya prajñāṃ kurvīta*. Verse 704 explains the word *vijñāya* and verse 705, *prajñāṃ kurvīta*.

¹This indicates that the effects of ignorance also are included.

Verses 706-740 state the view of *Bhārṭṛprapañca* on this sentence: *vijñāya prajñāṃ kurvīta*.

इह व्याचक्षते केचिदुक्ताद्व्याख्यानतोऽन्यथा ।

Here (i.e. in this context) some offer an explanation in a way different from what is stated (by us). [706ab]

This is merely introductory to the view of *Bhārṭṛprapañca*.

कृतायाः करणं कीदृक्प्रज्ञाया इति चोदिते ॥७०६॥
 उच्यते वचसा बुद्धौ वस्तुमात्रं समर्प्यते ।
 विज्ञातस्य सतत्त्वस्य तादात्म्यप्रतिपादनम् ॥७०७॥

भावनाज्ञानसंतानैः प्रज्ञाकरणमुच्यते ।

(Now), when it is asked: 'How can there be accomplishing of (that) excellent knowledge which is (already) obtained?', [706cd]

(it is said in answer:) 'By the statement in the Śruti is presented to the intellect merely the thought about the (real) thing; then, as it has become known in its real nature, there is exposition of the becoming (of the individual self) one (with the Ātman), [707]

by means of the continued impression (of the same) and the (specific) knowledge—this is known/called as *prajñāprakaraṇa* 'the topic of *prajñā*.' [708ab]

अस्मिन्काले तु सा प्रज्ञा निष्ठां नीता कृता भवेत् ॥७०८॥

At this point (or, juncture), that knowledge (*prajñā*) is/would be completely achieved (or, taken to its goal). [708cd]

This explains the process of knowing the Brahman, on having understood the meaning of the words in the Śruti. For this, read SP: *śabdena kṛtā prajñā sāksātkāra-kāle niṣṭhām nītā saphalā syād atah śābdajñānavatāpi sāksātkāro 'pekṣyata iti.*

इत्येतदुररीकृत्य विज्ञायेत्युक्तमादरात् ।

प्रमाणवृत्तमुक्तवैतन्मनसैवेतिवाक्यतः ॥७०९॥

Having held this thought in mind, the Śruti has carefully stated (the word) *viññāya* ...— (this becomes known) after the Śruti has stated the functioning of the means of knowing from the words *manasaiva* [709]

मात्राद्यप्रविभक्तं सदद्वैतं ब्रह्म शाश्वतम् ।

द्रष्टव्यं तत्कथं साक्षान्मातृमानाद्यसंभवात् ॥७१०॥

(Now) it is asked, 'That Brahman, which is not divided into

knower etc., is the existent, having no duality in it, the eternal one—how can (it be said that) it is to be seen (*draṣṭavya*), since there is no possibility of any direct agent, the means of knowing etc., (which are) connected with it?' [710]

द्रष्टव्यं मनसैवैतन्नान्या गतिरिहेष्यते ।
कथं तदिति चेदत्र मानव्यापार उच्यते ॥७११॥

(The answer is:) 'This has to be known with the help of only one means, that is: by *manas*; there is no other way (*gati*) accepted (or understood) in this respect'.¹ If again it is asked, 'How can that be?'; then, for answering this (*atra*), this is stated, as the functioning of the means of knowing. [711]

¹This is for *iha* which means the seeing or knowing of the Brahman.

Verses 712-721 explain the *mānavyāpāra* understood by *Bhartr-prapañca* and mentioned in the preceding verse.

तत्त्वमस्यादिवाक्योक्तौ शब्दमात्रावलोकनम् ।
श्रोत्रेण क्रियते तस्य शब्दस्यालोचितस्य तु ॥७१२॥
स्वरवर्णपदोक्त्यानुपूर्वी या प्रविभागभाक् ।
प्रविभक्तक्रमवती मनसा तस्य कल्प्यते ॥७१३॥

First, there is merely grasping (lit. seeing) the words in the statements, viz. the sentences *tat tvam asi* etc. with the help of the sense of hearing, and, after that word is understood, (or, well-thought over), [712]

there is stated the division (i.e. cut into parts), the sequential (order) of the meanings, conveyed by the vowels, syllables, words etc. which the Śruti has, viz. which gets divided (into parts) with the help of *manas*. [713]

स्वेनार्थेनाभिसंबन्धः सिद्धशब्दस्य यः सदा ।
दृश्यते मनसैवासौ नातोऽन्येनेह केनचित् ॥७१४॥

Whichever relation exists in the senses of the individual (parts of) the (well-)formed word to its own meaning is grasped (lit. seen) by only *manas* and, therefore, not by anyone else as it is understood here.¹ [714]

¹This refers to the moment of understanding the meaning of the Śruti sentence (*vyutpattikāla*).

तत्रार्थप्रत्ययो योऽसौ प्रमातुर्मानसो भवेत् ।
अविशिष्टः स बाह्येन मेयेनार्थेन संगतेः ॥७१५॥

Whatever be the acceptance (lit. cognition) of the meaning (in, i.e. from, the sentence) that would be the modification of the *manas* of the knower;¹ that (object/meaning) signified is not modified (lit. characterized) by any external object to be known, since it² is associated with the (already existing) object. [715]

This explains the process of understanding the meaning of the words in common parlance of the world—naturally of the words of the Śruti also.

¹This is 'one who reads and understands the Śruti texts'.

²This refers to the grasping of the meaning that is stated earlier.

प्रत्ययश्च यथारूपो मानसोऽस्योपजायते ।
प्राज्ञ आत्मापि तादात्म्यात्तन्मयत्वं निगच्छति ॥७१६॥

And also grasping (of the object) in conformity with its form arises in the *manas* of this (individual self); then, this individual self, which is (now) the excellent knower (*prājña*) becomes one with that, through realising its own oneness with that (Ātman). [716]

मनोबुद्ध्योरभेदेन व्यवहारश्रुताविह ।

तत्रैवं सति योऽप्यस्य देवताविषयो भवेत् ॥७१७॥
 यथा श्रुतौ मनस्येव प्रत्ययः सोऽवतिष्ठते ।
 तन्मयत्वं तथैवैतिक्रमेणैव स मानवः ॥७१८॥
 द्वैतैकत्वं श्रुताच्छब्दात्पश्यतीह यदा ह्यसौ ।
 हैरण्यगर्भमात्मेति बौद्धं ज्ञानं तदा भवेत् ॥७१९॥

Here (is stated), in this statement of the functionings of *manas* and the intellect, as being non-distinct. This being so, whatever be this one's (i.e. the individual self's) thought regarding the deity—

[717]

as stated in the Śruti—so does that very thought become fixed (lit. gets a firm place) in *manas* itself of the individual. In the same way, that human being (achieves) oneness with that in this same order (as stated before).¹

[718]

When that person sees (i.e. understands) from the word 'heard' here (in this statement of the Śruti), the oneness in the duality, there would then be in his intellect the awareness that his own self is what is connected with Hiranyagarbha.

[719]

¹All along, there was mention made only of *manas*, but the association between *manas* and the intellect has to be understood—this is stated in the verse.

स खलुत्पन्नविज्ञानस्तन्मयः संस्तथा व्रजेत् ।
 तस्मिन्नैव स विज्ञान आत्मरूपे स्थितो भवेत् ॥७२०॥
 बौद्धेऽथ स यदा तत्त्वं परं समनुपश्यति ।
 तदा विविच्य रूपाणि क्रमशो यो धियः शुभम् ।
 वीक्षते केवलं शुद्धं तत्त्वं ब्रह्म सनातनम् ॥७२१॥

That person, in whom there has arisen the specific knowledge thus (about his own self), becoming one with that (i.e. Sūtra), attains to that (i.e. the status of the Sūtra); and, in that status of the Sūtra itself, he is possessed of specific knowledge¹ and becomes steady in the form of the Ātman.

[720]

When later, the person sees the highest reality in the knowledge of the intellect, then, having distinguished the (various) forms

of the same (i.e. the intellect) one after another, he sees only the auspicious, non-dual (lit. single), pure reality, viz. the ever-obtaining Brahman. [721]

In these verses there is description of the inner being's attaining to the status of the Sūtra.

¹Here the word *viññāna* can be taken as in apposition either to *saḥ* (i.e. *saḥ* and *viññānaḥ*) or to *ātmarūpe* (i.e. as *viññāne ātmajñāne*). We have taken (sa) *viññānaḥ*; this can be explained as *viññānam asya asti iti viññānaḥ*. The word *viññāna* is to be understood as 'one who is possessed of specific knowledge'.

In verses 722 and 723 there is stated *kramamukti*.

तन्मनोऽथ परे तत्त्वे लब्धलक्ष्यं स्व आत्मनि ।

रूपाणि विलिखत्साक्षान्निर्वाणं संप्रलीयते ॥७२२॥

परं तत्त्वं प्रदृश्यैवं मनस्यद्वैततां गते ।

विज्ञानं केवलं शुद्धं स्वात्मन्येवावतिष्ठते ॥७२३॥

Its (i.e. that being's) *manas* has stuck (lit. obtained) its own target¹ in the highest reality (which really is) the individual self itself thus determining exactly (*vilikhat*) the various forms (of the intellect), merges (finally) into (the Brahman viz.) its own extinction (*nirvāṇa*).² [722]

Having thus seen the highest reality when *manas* has attained the status of oneness (with the Ātman), there remains the pure knowledge alone,³ only by/in itself, in the Ātman. [723]

This refers to liberation of an individual self in the accepted sequence of its knowing the oneness of the Ātman (*kramamukti*).

¹This refers to *praṇavo dhanuḥ śaraḥ ...* (Muṇḍakopaniṣad 2.2.4).

²This word here has not any philosophical import; it refers only to extinction.

³It is *viññāna = ātmajñāna*.

In verses 724-728, there are statements about *manas* in the state of liberation.

दाह्यं दग्ध्वा यथा वह्निर्दाह्यनाशमनु स्वयम् ।
नश्यतीदं मनस्तद्वद्वैतमद्वैतरूपताम् ।
आपाद्य विषयं सम्यक्स्वयमेव प्रलीयते ॥७२४॥

As fire, after having burnt whatever had to be burnt, itself gets extinguished this *manas* also, which is associated with duality, (in the form of) its activity, having obtained the form of the non-dual Ātman, perishes (i.e. merges into the Ātman).

[724]

मनस्यस्मिन्निलीने तु यत्सुखं स्वात्मसाक्षिकम् ।
योगावस्थां परामेतामाहुर्योगविदो जनाः ॥७२५॥

And this state of that happiness (which is experienced by an individual) after the merger of his *manas* into it,¹ witnessed by one's own Ātman have the knowers of Yoga called the highest state of Yoga.²

[725]

¹In this context, SP cites *sarvavṛttinirodhe tv asaṃprajñātasamādhir iti (Jīvanmuktiviveka*, ed. S. Subramanya Śāstri and T.R. Śrīnivāsa Ayyaṅgar, Theosophical Publishing House, 1935, p.94, line 9).

²This refers to the *jīvanmuktāvasthā* of the knower of the Brahman.

भूमौ यथाहितं लोहं भूमित्वमुपगच्छति ।
मनोऽक्षरे धृतं तद्वदक्षरत्वं निगच्छति ॥७२६॥

As iron-ore (*loha*)¹ placed in the earth, attains the nature of the earth, in the same way does *manas*, which is fixed on the imperishable,² attain the status of the imperishable.

[726]

¹Regarding *loha* we note that it refers to any ore taken from the earth; not necessarily copper or iron (which is usually so understood).

²This is for the *akṣara* Ātman.

एतच्च दृष्टं लोकेऽपि यैर्भावैः संप्रयुज्यते ।
मनस्तन्मयतामेति तद्भावेनानुरञ्जितम् ॥७२७॥

And this is seen in the world¹ also, i.e. that *manas* becomes one with them, viz. those persons or things with whom or which it gets firmly connected, becoming tainted with the nature of the same. [727]

This is the support of some worldly matter of common experience for the truth conveyed in a Vedāntic discussion.

¹This stands for all worldly dealings.

एवमस्मिन्परे तत्त्वे भाव्यमाने मुमुक्षुणा ।
तद्भावमचिरेणैति स्थैर्यं चात्रैव गच्छति ॥७२८॥

Thus, when the highest reality is being pondered over by one who is seeking liberation, that one soon becomes (one with) it and here¹ itself obtains permanence (lit. steadiness). [728]

This is to confirm what is stated in the note on the preceding verse.

¹This refers to the state of liberation which obtains even while the individual is alive.

In verses 729-740, it is stated that the end (i.e. merger) of *manas*, is for a seeker of liberation.

मनोविनाशमन्वेष विज्ञानात्मा विलीयते ।
यथा संकल्पितश्चार्थ उभयोर्ज्ञानयोगयोः ॥७२९॥

And, after the merger (lit. destruction) of *manas*, the individual self, which is possessed of specific knowledge (*viññānātman*), merges (into the highest Ātman)—so this has been conceived as the truth (resulting from) the two, knowledge and Yoga.¹

[729]

¹This is to convey the sense of activity.

एतदेवमभिप्रेत्य तदुक्तं नेह किं चन ।
नानास्तीत्येवमेकत्वमस्मिन्शास्त्रेऽभिधीयते ॥७३०॥

Thus, having all of this in mind, the Śruti has stated *neha nānāsti kiṃ cana*— thus there is stated in the scripture, the nature of non-duality (lit. the singleness of the Ātman). [730]

मुक्तिप्रवेशोपायोऽयं यथोक्तेनेह वर्त्मना ।
उक्तो मनस एकस्मिन्प्रत्ययो मानसो यतः ॥७३१॥

This one is stated here in this way (as stated above), the means of entering (*manas*) into the state of liberation, since it is already said that the awareness of oneness of self belongs in reality to *manas*.¹ [731]

¹SP paraphrases this as *atyantadr̥dhapratyayah*. Also, *yataḥ*— cf. *prathamārthe yataḥśabdah*.

एकत्वधीव्यवस्थापि मानस्येवेति गम्यताम् ।
वृत्तिः सा त्वपरिक्षीणा मनोवृत्तिरियं भवेत् ।
तावद्यावदमी सर्वे विशेषाः स्युः क्षयं गताः ॥७३२॥

Let it be understood that this manner related to the knowing of the oneness of the Ātman belongs only to *manas* and that is a modification of *manas* which is its continued functioning; up to that time when all these distinct objects have perished.

[732]

स्वात्मन्येवाथ संशुद्धं ज्ञानमद्वैतरूपकम् ।
अवस्थितं भवेत्साक्षादेवं कृत्वेदमुच्यते ॥७३३॥

(Only) then, there comes to abide in the individual self knowledge, which is extremely pure and has the form of non-duality. Having directly experienced thus is expressed in the word *kṛtvā*. [733]

मनसानुप्रविश्येदं क्रमेणैकात्म्यमुत्तमम् ।
यत्नादप्रमयं तत्त्वं द्रष्टव्यं तद्विपरिचिता ॥७३४॥
कौटस्थ्याद्ध्रुवमक्षय्यं प्रत्यगात्मन्यवस्थितम् ॥७३५॥

After having entered into the highest (or, all-excelling) singleness (or, non-duality), by means of *manas* the knower¹ should in course of time (or, gradually) see with efforts the (usually/otherwise) unknowable truth, [734]
(which is) permanent (and) undecaying owing to its immutability, and the one having an (all time) abode in the inner self. [735]

This verse refers to the gradual process of one's liberation.
¹The one who has attained the status of Sūtra.

विरजः शुद्ध इत्यर्थ आकाशात्परतः स्थितः ।
अजो न जायते यस्मान्महान्सर्वमहत्तरः ॥७३६॥

virajah means 'one who is pure' (i.e. the Ātman) and then it has stood beyond *ākāśa*, since it does not become born (again) and, it is Mahat, because it is greater than all. [736]

This explains the meaning of *dhruvaṃ virajah*.

तमेवंविधमात्मानं ज्ञात्वा कुर्यान्मतिं दृढाम् ।
भावनाज्ञानसंतानसंरुढामविचालिनीम् ॥७३७॥
द्वैताभिधायकाऽशब्दान्ध्यानकाले न चिन्तयेत् ।
वाचं ते ग्लापयन्त्येतां येयमेकत्ववाचिनी ॥७३८॥

Having known that Ātman, who has been of this nature, a person should have a firm awareness (or faith), which does not get shaken and which has taken firm root (*saṃrūḍha*) in the continuous stream of impression and knowledge. [737]
 During the time of meditation or devotion to the worship of the Brahman, a person should not think of (or, remember) any words which express duality, (for) they render futile (lit. weaken)¹ this speech which is (as said just before) expressive of non-duality (lit. the singleness of the Ātman). [738]

¹The usual form should be *glapayanti*; but Sureśvara has used *glāpayanti*.

ग्लानौ तस्यास्तदर्थेऽस्य मनोऽस्मिन्नाधिवर्तते ॥७३९॥
 तस्मात्तु चिन्तयेदेतान्किन्तु यैकत्ववाचिनी ।
 वाक्पूर्वं चिन्तयित्वा तां तदर्थे धारयेन्मनः ॥७४०॥

(Since) *manas* of this individual does not remain fixed in this (Ātman) when that speech is weakened; [739]
 therefore, he should not think of these but having first thought over the speech which is expressive of non-duality (lit. the singleness) of the Ātman, he should steady his *manas* with reference to that speech. [740]

श्रीमद्भर्तृप्रपञ्चस्य श्लोकव्याख्येयमीरिता ॥७४१॥
 मनसैवेत्युपक्रम्य

Thus is stated the explanation of the *śloka*, which is given by the revered (Śrī) Bhartṛprapañca, [741]
 after having begun it with the words *manasaiva*. [742a]

सा त्विदानीं विचार्यते ।
 न्याय्यान्यायेति वा यत्नाद्युक्तिभिः प्रविभागशः ॥७४२॥

And (*tu*) it is now put under consideration, to see whether or not it is in conformity with reason, carefully taking different

arguments in its different parts and (adducing) reasons (for the same). [742b-d]

मनसैवानुद्घष्टव्यमिति यद्ववतेरितम् ।
सत्यमेतन्मनो मुक्त्वा न तस्यास्त्यन्यतो गतिः ॥७४३॥

As to what you have said, viz. (that reality) is to be seen with the help of *manas* only, it is true (i.e. that is right), because there is not now any way other than *manas* for knowing that. [743]

Cf. verse 711 above.

तत्त्वस्माभिर्यथाभाणि मनसैवेति दर्शनम् ।
मनसा शक्यते द्रष्टुं तत्तथैव प्रमान्वयात् ॥७४४॥

The truth is (conceived by you in the same way) as is stated by us; (so also) the seeing (of the reality) is only by *manas*. (This is so, since) it is possible to see reality with *manas* (only), as it becomes an object of right knowledge, only in that way (*tathaiva*): [744]

This is in agreement with the explanation of Bhartṛprapañca stated in verses 712 and 713.

प्रमाणव्यापृतिर्योपि भवतेहोपवर्णिता ।
सापि कामं भवत्वेव न दोषस्तत्र भण्यते ॥७४५॥
शब्दप्रधानं विज्ञानं प्रमातृव्यापृतौ पुरा ।
जायतेऽनन्तरं शब्दः स्वव्यापारक्रमादथ ।
ज्ञानप्रधानतामेति स्वार्थसंकेतवर्त्मना ॥७४६॥

Also, as to the functioning of means of knowing which you have described here (in this context), let that also be accepted. There is not any fault to be stated as occurring therein. [745]
First, there arises in respect of the functioning of the knower (i.e. hearer) the specific knowledge, where understanding of

(words) is prominent and, after that, each word, gradually doing its own function, (viz. conveying its own sense) becomes subordinate to knowledge¹ by way of (bringing out) its conventional meaning. [746]

Cf. verses 714 and 715.

¹Or, alternatively—comes to have knowledge as its principal (sense to convey).

वर्णस्वरादिक्रमवद्वाक्यरूपानुरञ्जितम् ।
अज्ञातार्थाधिगतौ तु ज्ञानं मानमितीर्यते ॥७४७॥

And (thus) knowledge which is tainted in accordance with the form (i.e. meaning) of sentence containing the order of letters, vowels etc. and leading gradually up to the understanding of the thing which was not known, is considered as a valid means of knowing (the meaning). [747]

शब्दाभिन्नं पुरा ज्ञानं शब्दरूपानुरञ्जितम् ॥७४८॥
स्वप्नमेये प्रमाणं तदिति यद्वदिहोदितम् ।
प्रमेयेऽपि तथैवैतत्पूर्वं मेयप्रधानकम् ॥७४९॥

As you have said here in this context, so it is, viz. first, knowledge becomes one with (lit. non-distinct from) every word, gets tainted (or, marked) in accordance with (or, by) the form of the words and then becomes a valid means of knowing its object; so also, in respect of the object of knowing (as what you have said), there is the object of knowing more prominent. [748-749]

Cf. verse 715 above.

मेयव्यापारतः पश्चात्प्राप्तज्ञानानुरञ्जनात् ।
गुणत्वं व्रजति ज्ञाने प्रमेयोऽर्थः प्रमातरि ॥७५०॥

Since there is after the functioning (of the means of knowing)

in relation to the object of knowing, knowledge becomes tainted with (or, marked by) whatever is known (lit. obtained through the means of knowing); the object which had to be known becomes, in this knowledge, subordinate (i.e. subservient) to the knower. [750]

Cf. verses 715 and 716.

अमितार्थानुगं ज्ञानं प्रमेयार्थानुरञ्जितम् ।
पूर्वोक्तेन प्रमाणेन संगतेर्मेय उच्यते ॥७५१॥

Knowledge, which follows that object of knowing that was not known earlier, and is tainted (or, marked) in accordance with the object of knowing if it is associated with the means of knowing, which is already stated, is called the object of knowing. [751]

मेयमानाभिसंबन्धो यथेह प्रतिपादितः ।
एवमेवैष विज्ञेयो मेयमानान्तरेष्वपि ॥७५२॥

Such is the relation between the object of knowing and the means of knowing it—as has been described (by you) here (i.e. in this context); this (relation) is to be accepted (only) in this way, in the case of the other objects of knowing also. [752]

मेयमानाभिसंबन्धान्मानमेयार्थसंकरात् ।
नश्यद्विशेषणत्वं तन्मानं याति फलात्मनि ॥७५३॥

Owing to the close association of the object of knowing and the means of knowing (it), and the intermingling of the two, viz. that which is to be known and the means of knowing, that means of knowing, being lost (on account of the momentariness), becomes a distinguishing attribute at the (time of) result. [753]

तावन्मात्रप्रधानत्वात्प्रमाणफलमुच्यते ।
इत्येष मानव्यापारो यथावदनुवर्णितः ॥७५४॥

Only that being the prominent (end of the knowing activity), it is described as the result (obtained) by a valid means of knowing—this is the function of knowing—as you have correctly (*yathāvat*) described. [754]

So far, Sureśvara has restated the acceptable part of explanation given by Bhartṛprapañca. There will now follow his argument against him.

व्यापारः कर्तृतन्त्रः स्यात्तनुवाग्बुद्धिसाधनः ।
पुंसस्तत्र स्वतन्त्रत्वाद्विद्याच्छास्त्रं प्रवर्तकम् ॥७५५॥

In this context (*tatra*), the activity (on the part of an individual), having a body, speech and the intellect as the means (of accomplishing that activity), depends on the agent of the activity; because of that individual's independence, the scripture is only the impeller (of the individual's activity). [755]

वस्तुतन्त्रं तु संघत्र विज्ञानं जायते बलात् ।
तत्रापुरुषतन्त्रत्वान्न कश्चिद्विधिरिष्यते ॥७५६॥

Where, however, there arises, with (all its) force, the specific knowledge depending on (the nature of) the (real) thing, there is not accepted any injunction, since that (i.e. knowledge depending only on the object) does not depend on an individual's activity. [756]

व्यापारः कर्तृतन्त्रो हि तमेतमितिशास्त्रतः ।
नित्यो ध्यानादिरूपो वा स स्याद्बुद्धिविशुद्धये ॥७५७॥

Indeed, from (the statement in) scripture, viz. *tam etam* ... (it is clear that) there is an activity which involves dependence on the agent; that is always of the nature of meditation (or

worship); and that would be (only) for purification of the intellect. [757]

तमोरजोभ्यां मुक्ता धीर्यदा स्यादुक्तसाधनात् ।
शमादिमान्यथातत्त्वमथात्मानं समीक्षते ॥७५८॥

When the intellect would become free from *tamas* and *rajas* (i.e. from total ignorance), with the help of the means stated (before), then an individual practising *śama*, *dama* etc. sees the Ātman as it is. [758]

तस्मिन्दृष्टेऽथ सर्वस्य तावन्मात्रैकतत्त्वतः ।
सर्वाज्ञानसमुच्छित्तेः सर्वज्ञानोदयस्तथा ॥७५९॥

On that (Ātman) being seen, then, all of the things come to be/turn only into one truth in them, viz. being one with that, owing to the destruction of all ignorance, and also there is the knowledge (of the Ātman as) all. [759]

AnSS edition reads the variant *sarvajñānodayāt tathā* for *-dayas tathā*. We believe, that reading should have been better as it would be in tune with the tenor of the verse.

निःशेषपुरुषार्थाप्तिः सर्वदुःखौघनिहनुतिः ।
यतोऽत आत्मनि ज्ञाते कृतकृत्यत्वहेतुतः ॥७६०॥
वाङ्मनःकायसाध्याया व्यापृतेः स्यादसंभवः ।
फलावधित्वात्सर्वेषामुपायानां जगत्यपि ॥७६१॥

Since there is the achieving of the entire group of the ends of human life, the removal (lit. concealment) of the flow of all miseries and, therefore, the obtainment of having achieved all that is to be achieved, on knowing the Ātman; [760] there is impossibility of any activity which can be accomplished with speech, *manas* and body— as, in the world also, all means of achievement (continue to function) only up to the end (lit. obtaining the results). [761]

प्रमेयमयतां कामं प्रमातैव ब्रजत्वयम् ।
तस्यैव परिणामित्वात्प्रमेयेन च संगतेः ॥७६२॥

Be it granted that this knower itself comes to be what is to be known; since that alone has (numerous) modifications¹ and there is association of it with what is to be known. [762]

¹These are falsely attributed to it.

षड्भावविक्रियाभावादसङ्गाच्चाप्यनात्मना ।
विज्ञानादिमयत्वं स्यान्न स्वतः प्रत्यगात्मनः ॥७६३॥

The non-Ātman could come to have the nature of being made up of specific knowledge (*viññāna*) etc., owing to its having the six forms of modifications (lit. becoming or things)¹ and the non-attachment of the inner self, by its own nature. [763]

¹Or alternatively this could be 'owing to the absence of the six modifications of beings or things' and this should refer to the inner self. And this alternative appears to be more likely, since the word *asaṅgāt*, which immediately follows, goes with the inner self.

एवंभूतोऽपि चाज्ञातः कार्यकारणरूपताम् ।
ब्रजत्येष यथा रज्जुरज्ञाता सर्परूपताम् ॥७६४॥

Even if the individual self is so, being unknown (before), it attains the forms of cause(s) and effect(s) in the same way as a rope, which, while unknown, comes to assure the nature of a serpent. [764]

मनआदेरशेषस्य प्रत्यगज्ञानहेतुतः ।
हेतुध्वस्तौ भवेद्ध्वस्तिरकार्याकारणेऽक्षरे ॥७६५॥

Since *manas* etc., all of them, have the cause (for their

existence) in ignorance about the inner self; therefore, after the destruction of that cause, there would be their merger (lit. destruction) in the imperishable which is neither an effect nor a cause. [765]

तत्त्वबोधात् न नाशः स्याद्व्यतिरेकान्वयौ न च ।
प्रत्यङ्मात्रैक्याथात्म्यादविद्यादेरिहात्मनि ॥७६६॥

There would not really be the destruction (of ignorance) unless there arises the awareness of reality; so also there would not be possible the method of Anvaya and Vyatireka,¹ since on account of only the non-duality of the inner self being the real nature of the Ātman, there has been (existence) of (only) ignorance (imagined) in the Ātman. [766]

¹ Literally, no dissimilarity with and similarity to (anything else).

In verses 767-769 it is stated that there would be rebirth contingent, if manas is not overcome with the stultification of its functioning.

विनाशः क्रियते यत्र व्यतिरेकोऽथवान्वयः ।
कार्यकारणसंबन्धान्मुक्तिस्तत्र सुदुर्लभा ॥७६७॥

(This argument is made on the ground that) where there is destruction effected (or) where that notion of distinction or similarity is involved, there would be extremely difficult (to think of) liberation for those¹ which have among them the relation of cause(s) and effect(s). [767]

¹ This refers to *vināśa*, *vyatireka*, *anvaya*.

ध्यानादिसंस्कृतं चेतो यदि मुक्तौ प्रणश्यति ।
सभावनं सहेत्वेवं ध्यानं सर्वमपार्थकम् ॥७६८॥

If *manas*, which is purified by meditation etc., (is accepted

to) perish in (i.e. after attaining) the state of liberation, every kind of meditation would thus be futile (lit. meaningless), together with the impressions (created thereby), the cause (viz. those impressions which are basis of it). [768]

अथ मुक्तौ तदन्वेति कारणेन सहान्वियात् ।
अज्ञाने सति संसारो वद केन निवार्यते ॥७६९॥

If, on the contrary, it is accepted as continuing to occur (in existence) in the state of liberation also, as in connection with the cause (i.e. the Ātman), then, ignorance remaining there, tell me what could set aside transmigratory existence.¹ [769]

¹That is, what is said to be liberation would really be the absence of it.

Verses 770-774 point out that iron(-ore) etc. are but the earth.

लोहादेः कारणं भूमिर्भूमिष्ठं भूमितामितम् ।
विरोधिहेतुसंपर्काल्लोहाद्येति न वायुताम् ॥७७०॥

The origin of iron(-ore) etc. is the earth (and therefore) being put into the earth, that could become possessed of the nature of the earth; (as against this) iron(-ore) etc., when in connection with the origin of what is opposed to it in nature, it could not become possessed of the nature of the wind. [770]

Iron(-ore) etc. is not the product/effect of wind and, therefore, it would never become one with the latter. This example is to support the thought of the preceding verse by two examples resting on Anvaya and Vyatireka of cause(s) and effect(s).

स्वकारणस्थं नित्यं च कार्यं सर्वमिदं मतम् ।
न चैति कारणत्वं तत्तस्मादुक्तमपेशलम् ॥७७१॥

It is accepted that all this, i.e. which is effect, ever abides

in its own cause and therefore it cannot be said to have come to be possessed of the nature of the cause; and, therefore, what is said (earlier) is not reasonable. [771]

Read SP: *sarvam apīdaṃ kāryaṃ sadā svakāraṇe brahmaṇi tadātmanā sthitam iti pariṇāmanavādinām matam atas tat kāryaṃ kadācit kāraṇatvam etīty ayuktaṃ tathā ca brahmaṇaḥ kāraṇatvaṃ vastuto na siddhyed ity arthaḥ*. Thus, this verse refutes the view of the Sāṃkhyaś:

कुलालाद्युत्थसंस्कारविनाशादेव तत्स्वयम् ।
कार्यं कारणतामेति न तु तत्कारणस्थितेः ॥७७२॥
आरभ्यं यत्र कार्यं स्यात्तत्रैव व्यापृतिर्ध्रुवम् ।

That effect, i.e. a pitcher, comes to have the nature of its own cause, i.e. clay, when there is the removal (lit. destruction) of the modifications (*saṃskāras*) which have arisen from (the activity of) the potter etc.; but not because it has always remained in (the same form as of) the cause. [772]
(Again,) where an effect has to be begun,¹ only there would necessarily occur someone's activity. [773ab]

This explains the basis of the thought in the preceding verse.
¹Cf. verse 768 above.

तमित्यस्याः श्रुतेर्ज्ञेया भावनाज्ञानकर्मणाम् ॥७७३॥

This activity (*bhāvanā*) (i.e. meditation etc.) is to be known only in relation to the activities originating in ignorance—(this is to be known) from the Śruti statement *tam etaṃ (vedānuvacanena)*.¹ [773cd]

¹BU 4.4.22.

ब्रह्मैव सन्स्वतो यत्र ब्रह्माप्येति तमोहनुतेः ।
नामीषां व्यापृतिस्तत्र ह्युत्पत्त्यादिविरोधतः ॥७७४॥

When a person, himself being the Brahman, comes to be the Brahman by the removal (lit. concealment) of ignorance, there is not any activity of these (viz. meditation etc.) because there has (already) been an opposition to origination etc. [774]

Verses 775-783 deny that the repetition in the process of knowing would bring about oneness of the Brahman.

प्रत्यगज्ञानविध्वंसिज्ञानाभ्यासोऽपि नेष्यते ।
सकृदात्मप्रसूत्यैव बोधस्याज्ञानहानतः ॥७७५॥

It is not also accepted that there is repetition (of acquiring) the knowledge which removes (lit. destroys) ignorance about the inner self; since there is the removal of ignorance effected by that knowledge which has its own rise only once. [775]

न ह्यावृत्तिव्यपेक्षं सन्मानं जगति किं चन ।
स्वप्रमेये तमो हन्ति स्वसाध्ये साधनं यथा ॥७७६॥

Indeed, there is not any means of knowing in the world, which, depending on repeated use of it, is an authoritative means of knowing; (for), it removes ignorance in respect of the object to be known by it (just) like a means towards its own effect to be achieved (would become useful). [776]

भावनाजं फलं यत्स्याद्यच्च स्यात्कर्मणः फलम् ।
न तत्स्थासिन्वति मन्तव्यं पण्यस्त्रीगमनं यथा ॥७७७॥

It is to be known that a result is produced by some activity and that which is the result of an activity is not permanent, in the same way as (an individual's) union with (lit. going to) a courtesan. [777]

The example here indicates an activity without any scripture-sanctioned purpose.

संसार्यस्मीति चेद्धवस्ता कोटिकल्पोपबृंहिता ।

स्वलपीयोऽभ्यासजा स्थास्न्वी भावनेत्यत्र का प्रमा ॥७७८॥

(An objection is raised:) 'If there has been a firm faith, which has been produced by (even) a little of repetition (of meditation etc.) and which is strengthened in numerous (lit. crores of) Kalpas (in the form), 'I am a transmigratory being', and if it is destroyed, then what right knowledge could be (permanent)?' [778]

तस्मात्र साधिवदं सर्वं भावनासंचयार्थिभिः ।

ध्यानादि यदुपन्यस्तं निःशेषानर्थमुक्तये ॥७७९॥

वाक्येनावेदितं कृत्स्नं यदि साक्षात्प्रबोध्यते ।

वस्तु बुद्धौ वद ध्यानव्यापारात्किमपेक्षते ॥७८०॥

'Therefore, this (i.e. what is stated earlier) is not well-said.' (An answer is given:) 'What is presented here, viz. meditation etc., by those who have the purpose of strengthening the faith, is only for the sake of release from all of the undesired effects'.

[779]

(An objection is raised:) 'If the entire reality which is made known by the Śruti sentence, is known directly in (a person's) intellect, then tell me what is expected from the activity of meditation?' [780]

निःशेषानर्थसंप्राप्तिकैवल्यानाप्तिकृत्तमः ।

तच्चैज्ज्ञानादपद्धवस्तं समाप्तं यच्चिकीर्षितम् ॥७८१॥

'If, darkness, which causes the non-obtainment of separating (the sentient individual) from the entire mass of the undesired, (affecting that individual), is destroyed by knowledge, then (it has to be accepted that the individual) has (already) obtained what is desired by him to achieve. [781]

कृतं चिकीर्षितं सर्वं बुद्धं यच्च बुभुत्सितम् ।

सम्यग्ज्ञानोदयात्सर्वं वर्जितं यज्जिहासितम् ॥७८२॥

All that was sought to be achieved is accomplished and all that was sought to be known has become known, through the rise of the proper knowledge (and) all, which is sought to be abandoned, is abandoned. [782]

तथेप्सितं च संप्राप्तमित्येवं कृतकृत्यता ।
प्रत्यग्याथात्म्यसंमोहद्वंसमात्रात्प्रबोधतः ॥७८३॥

And, therefore, all that was sought to be achieved is obtained; thus, there arises the state of a person's having done what had to be done, through the knowledge which merely destroys the delusion (or, ignorance) about the true knowledge of the inner self. [783]

Verses 784-788 convey the significance of the injunction prajñām kurvīta.

समर्पितं चेच्छब्देन बुद्धौ वस्तु यथोदितम् ।
प्रज्ञां कुर्वीतेति विधिः किमर्थ इति भण्यताम् ॥७८४॥

(An objection is raised:) 'If, as you have said, "the (real) thing is known by the (Vedic) statement in a person's intellect," then tell me for what purpose is there the injunction *prajñām kurvīta*?' [784]

न चेत्समर्पितं साक्षाद्वस्तु श्रुत्या यथोदितम् ।
अप्रामाण्यं श्रुतेः प्रापत्स्वार्थस्याप्रतिपादनात् ॥७८५॥

(The answer is given:) 'If the (real) thing were not directly said (i.e. conveyed) to an individual by the Śruti, there would then follow unauthoritativeness of the Śruti by its not conveying its own meaning (i.e. the subject-matter)'. [785]

स्वप्रमेये प्रमाणं सत्प्रवृत्तं स्वात्मलाभतः ।

अज्ञानाद्यनिरासेन नास्ति लोके प्रबोधकम् ॥७८६॥

A means of knowing which begins to function after it has come to the attainment of one's self is said to be good with respect to the object of its knowing; it (i.e. any means of knowing) is not informative (about any thing) in this world by the removal of ignorance etc. (about the same). [786]

अज्ञानमिथ्यासंशीतिव्यतिरेकेण नापरम् ।
प्रत्यर्थि मेयविषये मानस्येहास्ति किं चन ॥७८७॥

In our worldly dealing (*iha*) with respect of the means of knowing, there is nothing which is opposed to the object to be known, viz. what is other than ignorance, falsity and doubt. [787]

अज्ञानादित्रयं बाध्यं मेययाथात्म्यसंश्रयात् ।
मानं बाधकमेवात्र बाध्येन न हि हन्यते ॥७८८॥

The three beginning with ignorance¹ can be stultified by an individual's understanding (lit. resorting to) the true knowledge of the object of knowing. Here it is only a means of knowing² which is the stultifier and it is not stultified by what is (known as) to be stultified (lit. struck down).³ [788]

¹Cf. the preceding verse—the two beside ignorance are falsity and doubt.

²It intends to refer to the Śruti which is the best stultifier.

³The second half of the verse states the rule about *bādhya-bādhaka* relation among the means of knowing.

Verses 789-795 speak about the result of knowledge, removing the ignorance about the nature of the Ātman.

बाध्यस्य बाधनादेव प्रमाणस्य प्रमाणता ।
स्वमेयतत्त्वसंबन्धलब्धरूपस्य सर्वदा ॥७८९॥

It is ever (known) that an authoritative means of knowing becomes authoritative only through stultifying what is to be stultified, that *pramāṇa* has come to have its nature (viz. authoritativeness) as a result of the connection with the true nature of the object of its knowing. [789]

नादग्ध्वाभ्याहितं दाह्यमग्नेरग्नित्वमिष्यते ।
यथा बाध्यमबाधित्वा नैवं बाधकता मितेः ॥७९०॥

As the nature of fire in the case of fire is not accepted if it has not burnt what is to be burnt; so also, right knowledge cannot (be said to) have the nature of being a stultifier if it has not stultified what is to be stultified. [790]

न च प्रामाणिकं ज्ञानमुत्पत्त्यादौ नियज्यते ।
स्वमेयव्यक्तितस्तस्य न कार्यान्तरमिष्यते ॥७९१॥

And further, knowledge which has resulted through the operation of a certain (proper) means of knowing cannot be (or, is not) employed in the production (of the object of its knowing) etc.;¹ it is not expected to have any function other than revealing its own object of knowing. [791]

¹SP clarifies this saying: *pramāṇajñānasyotpattyādiphalatvam aprāmāṇikam iti bhāvah.*

न च मानान्तरैर्मैये मानस्येष्टा विरोधिता ।
असाधारणमेयत्वान्मानानां चक्षुरादिवत् ॥७९२॥

Further, in respect of the object of knowing (which becomes known by means of knowing) it is not accepted that other authoritative means of knowing are opposed to that means of knowing (by which the object of knowing has become known), since all the means of knowing have for the objects of knowing an uncommon¹ object of knowing, as for instance,

eye etc.²

[792]

¹Those means of knowing alone are peculiar to them, not others.

²This refers to anything else than an eye which cannot be taken as the means of seeing.

मानान्तरैर्विरोधश्चेन्मानस्याभ्युपगम्यते ।

तदुच्छितौ न हेतुः स्याद्विरोधस्य प्रमाश्रयात् ॥७९३॥

If it is accepted that there is an opposition of other means of knowing to an authoritative means (knowing its object of knowing), then there would not be any cause for its removal, the opposition having a basis in right cognition (of the object of knowing).

[793]

It may be noted that Sureśvara often makes such general remarks about *pramāṇas*, while his intention is a reference to the matter in hand. Read the introductory to this verse (in SP): *astu vā tattvamasyādivākyasyādhyakṣādibhir virodhas tathāpi sa prātibhāsiko vā vāstavo veti vikalpyādyam anigīkṛtya dvitīye doṣam āha—mānāntarair iti.*

न च सामान्यतो ज्ञानं ल्यबन्तेनाभिधीयते ।

प्रत्यग्वस्तु यतः सिद्धमसामान्यविशेषवत् ॥७९४॥

Also, knowledge about the generally accepted (object of knowing) is not expressed (in some sentence) by an absolute form of a verbal root (*lyabanta*) in it; since (the knowledge of) the (real) thing inside a (human) body (i.e. the inner self) which is self-established does not have its general and particular (aspects/parts).

[794]

सामान्येनेक्षमाणस्य विशेषेण च वस्त्वदम् ।

अपवादः पुरा तस्य न पश्यन्तीति वर्णितः ॥७९५॥

This (real) thing (i.e. the inner self) is being seen¹ earlier in its general nature and (now) in its particular form—thus (this sentence, viz. *viññāya* ...) is stated as an *apavāda* (i.e. for conveying an exception), i.e. to convey the sense: it was not then seen (in its full/proper form). [795]

¹Possibly, *īkṣamāṇasya* is for *īkṣyamāṇasya*. Therefore, even *paśyanti* (that comes later) is to be taken as *drṣṭam*.

Verses 796-802 refute Maṇḍanamiśra's view on this sentence.

अन्ये तु पण्डितमन्याः संप्रदायानुसारतः ।
विज्ञायेति वचः श्रौतमिदं व्याचक्षतेऽन्यथा ॥७९६॥

And yet others, who look upon themselves as Paṇḍitas 'learned or wise', explain this Śruti statement, viz. *viññāya* ..., in (yet) another way, in accordance with their tradition.¹ [796]

It should be noted that SP identifies this portion as pertaining to the view of Maṇḍanamiśra—a great Mīmāṃsaka—earlier identified as Sureśvara himself?

¹This refers to the Mīmāṃsaka Maṇḍanamiśra's explanation of the Śruti sentence; it runs up to verse 810.

तत्त्वमस्यादिवाक्योत्थविज्ञानेन यथोदितम् ।
विज्ञाय वस्त्वसंसर्गि प्रज्ञां कुर्वीत यत्नतः ॥७९७॥

Having well (or, fully) known the (real) thing, the unattached (or, unrelated to any thing, i.e. reality) which is described (in the Śruti) in sentences such as *tat tvam asi*, with the help of the specific knowledge that arises from statements that a person comes to possess—let him with (repeated) effort¹ secure clearer form of that knowledge. [797]

¹Read SP: *yatnata ity āvṛttiḥ sūcyate*; cf. *nididhyāsītavyaḥ* in BU 2.4.5 (=4.5.6).

नन्वत्रापि कृतैवासौ ल्यबन्तेनाभिधीयते ।
प्रज्ञातः करणं तस्या भूयः कस्माद्विधीयते ॥७९८॥

(A doubt is asked:) 'But, indeed, even here (in this theory) that specific knowledge which has been obtained already, is expressed with an expressed absolute form; therefore, why is it that it is again laid down for acquisition?' [798]

This verse conveys an argument similar to that made in verses referring to the view of Bhartṛprapañca.

मैवं पदार्थसंसर्गरूपस्यैवातथात्मके ।
ऐकात्म्ये वाक्यहेतूत्थबोधस्योद्भूतिकारणात् ॥७९९॥
ब्रह्मासंसर्गि तद्यस्मादसामान्यविशेषवत् ।
संसर्गरूपं वाक्योत्थं ज्ञानं नीलोत्पलादिवत् ॥८००॥

(The answer is:) 'May you not think so. Since the singleness of the Ātman has been understood from the knowledge that has come from the statement in the Śruti which is the source (lit. cause) of it, which is of the nature of the connection together among the meanings of (different) words (in them) and also which is not of the nature of that (*ātman*), [799] i.e. the Brahman, unrelated (to anything else); and since that does not have any common or particular character.¹ (As against this) the knowledge that has come from the sentences is of the nature of the interrelation (of a verse and the word-meanings) as in the case of (words like) blue and lotus.' [800]

¹The knowledge of the Brahman consists in the non-relation of various objects and their attributes conveyed by the words in common parlance; therefore, the knowledge of it is not like our usual knowledge in common life. This is clearly stated in just the next verse.

स्वभावतोऽखिलं वाक्यं संसर्गात्मकमेव हि ।
परोक्षवृत्त्या च तथा वस्तु बोधयति स्वतः ॥८०१॥

Indeed, all sentences¹ which are of the nature of the interrelation (of words and their senses) are by their nature conveyors of knowledge, and convey some things¹ which are not directly perceptible.² [801]

¹The singular form in the original is indicative of the plural sense.

²For example, the sentences convey such things as *svarga* which are not directly perceptible.

Verses 802-810 state by way of a doubt that the sentence-meaning (comprising the meanings of the words in the same) is prajñā that leads to the realisation of the Brahman.

स्वस्वभावं न चोल्लङ्घ्य स्वभावान्तरसंश्रयात् ।
ब्रह्मासंसर्गि साक्षाच्च शब्दः शक्नोति बोधितुम् ॥८०२॥

Therefore, words (in the scripture) cannot convey the directly perceptible and unattached¹ Brahman by transgressing their own nature and by resorting to another nature. [802]

This refers to the knowledge acquired after understanding the meanings of different words (though, a word in the singular is actually stated!) in the sentences. Naturally, therefore, they relate to some indirectly perceptible object as heaven etc. and thus they do not convey the knowledge of the Brahman which is directly perceptible.

¹Or, unrelated to anything else.

अलब्धब्रह्मयाथात्म्यं ज्ञानं वाक्योद्भवं यतः ।
तस्मात्प्रज्ञां प्रकुर्वीत साक्षाद्ब्रह्मैकगोचराम् ॥८०३॥

Since knowledge, which has arisen from the (scriptural)

sentences, does not convey the nature of the Brahman as it is; therefore, let a person make an effort to acquire the knowledge which has to convey directly only one object, i.e. the Brahman. [803]

अपास्ताशेषसंसर्गं यया ब्रह्माधिगम्यते ॥८०४॥
केनेति च व्यपेक्षायां विज्ञानेनेति गम्यते ।
ल्यबन्तोक्तेन सांनिध्यात् ततोऽन्यदपेक्ष्यते ॥८०५॥

And with this (specific knowledge arising from the sentences) is known the Brahman which is without (lit. has cast off) all relations (to anything external)—this is in answer to the question 'By/With what ...?', and, therefore, with a statement of a form ending with the suffix *-lyap* being nearby, nothing else than that¹ is expected. [804-805]

¹This refers to *prajñā*.

योग्यं संनिहितं चेदं साकाङ्क्षं च समीक्ष्यते ।
विज्ञानं यल्ल्यबन्तोक्तं तदेवात्र तु साधनम् ॥८०६॥

Further, this knowledge (arising from a sentence) expects that there is in the nearness (the statement of what is) suitable—that knowledge expressed in the form ending with the suffix *-lyap* is here the means of knowing the (Brahman later). [806]

तस्माद्वाक्योत्थविज्ञानसाधनाभ्यासतोऽनिशम् ।
प्रज्ञां कुर्यादसंसर्गिब्रह्मयाथात्म्यबोधिनीम् ॥८०७॥

Therefore, (a person) should acquire the knowledge which brings about the awareness of the real nature of the unattached Brahman, by a continuous repetition of the means of specific knowledge which arises from the (Śruti) sentences (containing mutually related words and meanings). [807]

अपेताशेषसंसर्गं तयैव ब्रह्म गम्यते ।

यतोऽशेषतमोहन्त्री प्रज्ञा सैवात इष्यते ॥८०८॥

Since that knowledge, by which becomes known the Brahman which is without all connections (among words and meanings) and which thus destroys delusion completely, is desired (as a result). [808]

साक्षाद्दर्शनसिद्धयर्थमन्यत्रापि विधीयते ।
निदिध्यासनवाक्येन साधनं ध्यानलक्षणम् ॥८०९॥

Elsewhere¹ also by a sentence regarding *nididhyāsana* is there prescribed a certain means of accomplishing the direct knowledge (of the Brahman), characterized as meditation. [809]

¹BU 2.4.5 (=4.5.6).

इत्येवमादिवाक्यानि गम्भीरन्यायवेदिनः ।
केचिद्व्याचक्षते यत्नादत्र प्रतिविधीयते ॥८१०॥

This and such other sentences¹ do some serious thinkers explain with effort, in this respect—that is now stated (the following) in refutation. [810]

¹This refers to ĀU 8.7.1, as SP points out.

In verses 811-814, the view of Maṇḍanamiśra (stated in verses 797-810) is refuted.

मानान्तरापरिज्ञाते प्रमेयार्थे प्रमां स्फुटाम् ।
मेयाज्ञातत्वबाधेन कुर्वन्मानमितीर्यते ॥८११॥

That is called a means of knowing, which causes a clear and right understanding about the object to be known, when it has not been known with the help of any other means, and in such a way that it removes (lit. stultifies) the unknownness in respect of what is to be known. [811]

On this, SP writes the clarification of the different attributes of a means of knowing thus: *tat saṁvādavisamvādābhyām phala-bhāvena cābhāsatvaṁ nirasitum viśeṣaṇāni*.

ब्रह्मानधिगतं चेदं वाक्यादन्यैः प्रमान्तरैः ।
तद्यथा बोधयेद्वाक्यं तत्तथैवेति गृह्यताम् ॥८१२॥

Therefore, that Brahman should be taken to be such as was not known before from any (other) sentence and by other ways of knowing and so also as this sentence (from the Śruti) conveys. [812]

प्रमाणादेव यत्प्राप्तं कथं तदतिशङ्क्यते ।
ब्रह्म संसर्गरूपं वा यदि वातोऽन्यथा श्रुतेः ॥८१३॥

How can that be doubted, i.e. that which is known from an authoritative means? Therefore, the Brahman, whether having a form that is connected with (any other objects), or, that is otherwise than what should be taken from the Śruti. [813]

प्रमाणतोऽपि संप्राप्तं यदि वस्त्वतिशङ्क्यते ।
तदा शङ्कानिवृत्त्यर्थं मानादन्यत्किमिष्यताम् ॥८१४॥

If the (real) thing is doubted, even if it is learnt (lit. obtained) from an authoritative means of knowing (i.e. the Śruti); then, what else than the authoritative means should one accept or desire for the removal of the doubt (about the nature of it)? [814]

Verses 815-832 state the prima facie view that there is a sequence among the means of knowing the Brahman.

न चापि स्वप्नमेयेऽस्ति मानानां बोधहेतुतः ।
तारतम्यं यथा कार्ये कारकाणामसंभवात् ॥८१५॥

Further, there is not any gradation in the case of the various means of knowing for (knowing) their own object, since they are the causes of understanding (the same), in the same way as (there is gradation) not possible in the case of the *kāraṇas* 'factors of producing' some effect that is to be produced. [815]

SP and NKL (ms. p.762, 'having the same purport) explain this thus: *cakṣuṣo dūrastham vṛkṣādy apekṣya vastv iti vā dravyam iti vā sāmānyenādaḥ bodhamādāya punaḥ samīpagamanādy-apekṣayā vṛkṣo 'yam iti tattvajñānahetutvavat prathamam śabd-asyāpi svabhāvam anusṛtya saṃsrṣṭāparokṣatayā brahma bodha-yatas tadabhyāsasacivasyāsaṃsrṣṭāparokṣabodhitā.*

न च प्रमान्तरैः साक्षादज्ञाते ब्रह्मवस्तुनि ।
अथवावस्त्विति ज्ञानं वक्तुं शक्यं विपरिचिता ॥८१६॥

And it is not possible for (even) a learned man to state that the knowledge in respect of the (real) thing, i.e. the Brahman, which was not directly known by any other way (or means) of knowing, is not in conformity with the (real) thing as it is. [816]

This is to stress that the knowledge about the Brahman given by the Vedic sentence cannot be false.

अपि मानान्तराज्ज्ञाते तद्विरुद्धस्वभावके ।
न चैवं युज्यते वक्तुं द्वयोरपि मितित्वतः ॥८१७॥

Also, it is not reasonable to say that, in respect of what is known by other way of knowing and also in respect of what is in nature opposed to that (i.e. the (real) thing, the Brahman), as (not authoritative), since both of them are of the nature of proper knowledge (from those means of knowing).¹ [817]

¹SP states the reason for it thus: *mānāntaravat tan-mānatvasyāpi durvāratvād ity arthaḥ.*

प्रमान्तरेण चेज्ज्ञातं ब्रह्मासंसर्गरूपकम् ।
कृतत्वात्तर्हि प्रज्ञाया निष्फलोऽयं पुनर्विधिः ॥८१८॥

Therefore, if the Brahman becomes known by any other way of knowing, the Brahman of the nature of what is not connected with (any other objects or other means of knowing)—then, since (the knowledge) has been already acquired, this injunction, which stipulates *prajñā* 'meditation', becomes unnecessary (lit. fruitless). [818]

प्रज्ञायाश्च समाप्तत्वादविद्याया निराकृतेः ।
पुरुषार्थस्य चाप्तत्वात्किमर्थं विधिशासनम् ॥८१९॥

Since (the effect of *prajñā*) 'meditation' is obtained, the ignorance is removed and the end of human endeavour has been obtained, what then is the purpose of the instruction of Vedic injunction? [819]

वाक्यमानोद्भवं ज्ञानमयथावस्त्वतीर्यते ।
यथावस्त्वप्रमोत्थं च चित्रं सर्वज्ञचेष्टितम् ॥८२०॥

It is said, that the knowledge which arises from the authoritative means of knowing, i.e. Vedic sentence, is not in accordance with the nature of the (real) thing, as it is, and that the knowledge which arises from the constant study¹ and is in conformity with the (real) thing is excellent or distinguished—all this is the doing of an omniscient person!² [820]

¹Cf. SP: *apramābhyāsaḥ*. It is called *apramā* (lit. unauthoritative or incorrect knowledge), perhaps because the stage of perfect knowledge is not yet attained. It is a stage of repeated exercise, therefore unauthoritative.

²Sureśvara uses the word *sarvajñā* which may not be necessarily taken for the Buddha; he seems to be scoffing at such a person.

न च मिथ्याधियोऽभ्यासात्सम्यग्ज्ञानसमुद्भवः ।
तथा सत्यप्रयत्नेन मुक्तिः स्यात्सर्वदेहिनाम् ॥८२१॥

Further, there cannot arise the right knowledge from repeating the false learning; (for) in case that is so, there would be liberation of all the embodied beings without any effort (to secure it). [821]

संसारमिथ्याविज्ञानमभ्यस्यन्त्येव सर्वदा ।
प्राणिनो न च सम्यग्धीस्तेषां ब्रह्मणि जायते ॥८२२॥

Human beings ever repeatedly pursue the knowledge, which is (in reality) false, about the transmigratory world and there does not arise in them the proper knowledge in respect of the Brahman. [822]

सम्यग्ज्ञानप्रसूतेश्च विघातायैव जायते ।
मिथ्याज्ञानाभ्यासहेतुः संस्कारो न तु जन्मने ॥८२३॥

The impression, created (on a person's mind) by the repeated pursuit of false knowledge becomes the cause only for destruction and the rise of right knowledge which is certainly not for (giving rise to subsequent/further) birth(-cycle). [823]

तथा च प्राह भगवान्व्यासः सत्यवतीसुतः ।
पूर्वमर्थान्तरे न्यस्ता कालान्तरगता मतिः ॥८२४॥

So has the revered Vyāsa, the son of Satyavatī, said: 'A certain thought, which was earlier fixed on some other matter becomes a firm thought in later time (i.e. in births) also'. [824]

As in the case of verse 569, this verse is also not traced, though it is reported to be the composition of Vyāsa.

तेनान्यं सन्तमप्यर्थं द्वेषात् प्रतिपद्यते ।
परीक्ष्य यो न गृह्णाति गृह्णाति च विपर्ययात् ॥८२५॥

As a result (*tena*), (a person) does not accept even any other truth (i.e. meaning conveyed by Vedic sentences etc.), owing to a dislike (lit. hatred) for the same; he who does not accept (some knowledge), after properly ascertaining (lit. examining) it, accepts it as being otherwise. [825]

दृढपर्वश्रुतत्वाच्च प्रमादाच्चापि लौकिकात् ।
चतुर्भिः कारणैरेतैर्याथातथ्यं न विन्दति ॥८२६॥

A person does not know the reality (or otherwise of matters learnt) on account of these four reasons: because they have been learnt before and have become firm, and because of their (unusual) worldly faults etc.¹ [826]

¹The word etc. stands for sleep, signifying ignorance (or inactivity), and laziness. Whether they are among the four is to be ascertained! Or, could there be *dr̥ḍhaśruta*, *pūrvaśruta*, *pramāda* and *laukika*(-*prasiddhi*)?

नातो मिथ्याधियोऽभ्यासः सम्यग्ज्ञानस्य जन्मने ॥८२७॥
अपि मिथ्याधियोऽभ्यासः सम्यग्ज्ञानस्य जन्मने ।
स्यादेव चेच्छ्रुतेर्मात्त्वान्न मितेर्व्यञ्जकत्वतः ॥८२८॥

Therefore, repeated pursuit of what (may) be false learning, is not the cause of right knowledge. [827]

If again it is said that repeated pursuit of false knowledge is for the rise of right knowledge, since it is heard (from some other teacher and therefore is right knowledge), that is not a correct way of understanding (at all), because the right way of knowing is only indicative (of the matter to be known from the Śruti). [828]

This sets aside some stand taken on the basis of some Smṛti texts which also are heard (*śruta*). But see *smṛtyadhikaraṇa* of BS.

कार्योत्पत्तौ स्वतन्त्रत्वं कारणस्यैव निश्चितम् ।
मानस्य व्यञ्जकत्वात् मेयतत्त्वानुरोधिता ॥८२९॥

In respect of only a cause (of some effect) it is decided that it has freedom with reference to the production of its effect; however, in respect of the (proper) means of knowing, because it is indicative, (it is) that it has to be in conformity with the object to be known (i.e. the Brahman). [829]

This is only to affirm that repeated pursuit of false knowledge cannot produce the knowledge of the Brahman.

अपि चाभ्यस्यमानस्य दाढ्यं दृष्टं जगत्पि ।
तदभ्यासवशादेवमत्राप्यध्यवसीयताम् ॥८३०॥

Further, it is known that in this world, there is firmness also of what is repeatedly pursued; therefore, here (i.e. in the matter of the pursuit of knowledge of the Brahman) also, there would be determined (the firmness of false knowledge) under the influence of its being a repeated pursuit. [830]

भवद्व्याख्यात एवार्थो न चास्य वचसो ध्रुवम् ।
व्याख्येयः सोऽपरेणापि राज्ञामाज्ञां विना क्वचित् ॥८३१॥

Also, certainly it is not that the meaning of this (Vedic) sentence has to be explained by some other person, in the same way as done by you, unless (perhaps) in some place where there is an order of a king (to do so). [831]

भवद्व्याख्यानतोऽस्माभिरुक्ता दोषपरंपरा ।
सा यथा प्रसजेन्नेह व्याख्येयं तत्तथा वचः ॥८३२॥

Therefore, here¹ the sentence has to be explained in such a way that there does not forcefully (or, contingently) follow a series of faults, which I have mentioned in respect of your

explanation² (of it).

[832]

¹This means: in respect of the explanation of a Vedic sentence.

²Both SP and NKL (ms. p.764) state that the suffix *-tasil* (in actual form *-tas*) is in the sense of the locative (not ablative).

From verse 832, Sureśvara begins to offer his own explanation of the sentence vijñāya

सर्वमानाविरोधेन वाक्यार्थो गम्यते यथा ।
गुणवृत्त्यान्यथा वा तद्व्याख्येयं सुविपरिचिता ॥८३३॥

Therefore, a careful (*su-*) wise person should explain the meaning of the sentence either in a way that is not opposed to all the (right) means of knowing, or in another, metaphorical way (which would be suitable to reason). [833]

Sureśvara states in verses 834 and 835 that vijñāna consists in knowing the meaning of the words in a sentence, whereas prajñā has a basis in one's experience.

वाक्यमाहात्म्यसंभूतं शाब्दं विज्ञानमुच्यते ।
मेययाथात्म्यतो जाता प्रज्ञेतीहाभिधीयते ॥८३४॥

What has come out of (or, is understood from) the strength of the sentence is called *vijñāna* which is pertaining to the words (i.e. the Veda) and here (i.e. in respect of the Vedic sentence) that is called *prajñā* which has come from (the knowing of) the real nature of the object to be known (i.e. the Brahman). [834]

शाब्दविज्ञानमानेन प्रज्ञामैकात्म्यलक्षणाम् ।
ब्रह्मास्मीति प्रकुर्वीत बुभुत्सोच्छेदिनीं दृढाम् ॥८३५॥

(As a result) one should (acquire) *prajñā* which is characterized by (the knowledge of) the singleness of the Ātman,

by means of *vijñāna*, acquired from (understanding the meanings of) the words, 'I am the Brahman' so that it is firm and also is capable of destroying any desire to get to know any other matter.¹ [835]

¹This indicates the removal of any further desire to get to know some other related matters.

(i) Verses 836-841 present other explanations of the same sentence.

विज्ञायेति ल्यबन्तेन प्रमाणव्याप्तिरुच्यते ।
मेयस्य तेन माव्याप्तिः प्रज्ञामित्यभिधीयते ॥८३६॥

In/By the absolutive form *vijñāya*, which ends with the suffix *-lyap*, there is stated the limit of the means of knowing in respect of the object to be known, (whereas) in/by the word *prajñām* is expressed the wide sphere (*vyāpti*) of right knowledge. [836]

प्रमाणव्यापृतेर्यस्मान्मेयस्य व्यापृतेस्तथा ।
प्रज्ञाफलं जायतेऽथ यदपूर्वादिलक्षणम् ॥८३७॥

Then follows (lit. is produced) the result of *prajñā*, which is characterized as *apūrva* etc.,¹ from the function of the means of knowing (*śabda* 'Veda') and the existence (lit. function) of the object to be known (i.e. the Brahman). [837]

¹That has reference to *apūrva*, *bāhya* ... (BU 3.8.8; 2.5.19).

प्रमात्रादिविभागेन मानं मेयं समश्नुते ।
मेयेनाप्तौ तु तद्धवस्तिर्मेययाथात्म्यमात्रतः ॥८३८॥

A means of knowing (i.e. the Vedic sentence) grasps (lit. reaches) the object to be known (i.e. the Brahman) by dividing the matter into such division as knower etc. And (*tu*) after

there is pervasion (of the matter together) with the objects to be known, there is destruction of them merely on account of the true nature of the object to be known (i.e. the Brahman, as it is). [838]

This explains how there is removal of the notions of the division into knower etc. by the mere existence of the object of knowing, viz. *mevavyāpti* or *mevavyāprti* mentioned in the preceding verse.

सकारणस्य मात्रादेः प्रत्यग्दृष्ट्यतिरेकतः ।
तत्त्वं नान्यद्यतस्तस्मात्तन्मात्रेणैव तद्धतिः ॥८३९॥

Since there does not exist any reality in the case of the knower (*mātr*) etc., which have a cause (ignorance) for their existence, in addition to (or beside) the seeing by the inner self; therefore, there is the destruction of the same (i.e. *mātrādi*) effected only by the mere existence of that (i.e. seeing the same by the inner self). [839]

निद्रान्धः सन्यथा स्वप्ने ह्यग्निव्याघ्रादिसंगतेः ।
निद्रास्वप्नप्रहाणेन बोधमात्रार्थभागभवेत् ॥८४०॥
प्रत्यगज्ञानसंभतनानात्वोत्थप्रबोधतः ।
प्रध्वंसादात्ममोहस्य तथैकात्म्यं समश्नुते ॥८४१॥

Since a person, being overpowered (lit. blinded) by sleep, has an association in his dream with fire, a tiger etc.;¹ so also, by the removal of sleep and dream, he comes to have only knowledge of the desired object. [840]

So also does he attain oneness with the Ātman on account of the knowledge of variety that had occurred as a result of ignorance about (the nature of) the inner self and (subsequently) that destruction of the delusion of the Ātman. [841]

¹This refers to other destructive forces or things.

(ii) Verses 842-844 present yet another meaning of the same sentence.

शास्त्राचार्यमतिर्वात्र विज्ञायेत्यभिधीयते ।
प्रज्ञेत्यादिकया वाचा ह्यात्मप्रत्यय उच्यते ॥८४२॥

Or, it is that the word *vijñāya* refers to the thought (acquired from) the scripture(s) and/or the preceptor(s) and by the word *prajñā* is mentioned one's awareness (or, experience) of the Ātman. [842]

शास्त्राचार्यव्यपेक्षत्वात्परतन्त्रैव तन्मतिः ।
अनन्यापेक्षतो ज्ञेया प्रत्यग्बुद्धेः स्वतन्त्रता ॥८४३॥

(In the case of this man, he has) his (earlier) knowledge, dependent on the scripture(s) and/or the preceptor(s), i.e. it is *paratantra* 'guided by another'. As against this, his knowledge of the inner self, not being dependent on another, has *svatantratā* 'independence'. [843]

आत्मप्रत्यय आत्मैको द्वितीयः पुनरात्मनः ।
अनात्मप्रत्ययः सोऽहमुत्पत्त्यैवास्मि केवलः ॥८४४॥

His knowledge (or, awareness) of the inner self is just (the existence) by itself, while the knowledge (or awareness) of the non-Ātman is different (i.e. apart) from itself and that arises by mere awareness 'That I (am)' and/or 'I am all by myself'. [844]

(iii) Verses 845-855 present yet another explanation.

यदि वोक्तात्मयाथात्म्यबोधेनैवाद्वयात्मिकाम् ।
ब्रह्मप्रज्ञां प्रकुर्वीत विशेषणसमाश्रयात् ॥८४५॥

Or, perhaps, it is said (i.e. meant): A person should acquire the knowledge of the Brahman (*prajñāṃ kṛ*) which is of the

nature of (the awareness of) non-duality through the correct knowledge (which he has acquired) about the true nature of the Ātman, stated in (or given by) what is stated,¹ i.e. by resorting to (the understanding the meanings of) the attributes (of the Brahman).² [845]

¹This refers to *śāstra*, *ācārya* mentioned earlier in 842 and 843.

²This refers to BU 4.4.20: *aja ātmā mahān ...*; though it might appear paradoxical.

अव्यावृत्ताननुगतब्रह्मार्थोऽनात्मनोऽन्यतः ।
लभ्यतेऽत्र यतस्तस्मात्तमेवेत्यभिधीयते ॥८४६॥

Since here (i.e. in this explanation or by the way stated) there is obtained by a person the real nature of the Brahman as not distinguished from or not similar (to any other) as contrary to non-Ātman; therefore the Śruti said: *tam eva*¹ [846]

¹BU 4.4.21.

अव्यावृत्ताननुगतब्रह्मार्थात्रापि चान्यतः ।
प्रत्यक्ता लभ्यते साक्षान्महानात्मेत्यतोऽत्र गीः ॥८४७॥

The true nature of the inner self is directly obtained from the awareness of the Brahman, which is neither distinguished from nor is similar (to any other), and not from any other knowledge; therefore there is a statement *mahān ātmā* here.¹

[847]

¹This refers to *Muṇḍakopaniṣad* 2.2.10.

व्यावर्त्यार्थातिरेकेण नात्मब्रह्मपदार्थयोः ।
स्वरूपेऽस्ति भिदा काचिदमानित्वादिवस्तुवत् ॥८४८॥

There is no difference between the natures of the inner self

and the Brahman beside the matter which is to be set aside as, for example, *amānitva* 'absence of being proved' etc. [848]

Absence of being proved can only be distinguished from being proved, but apart from that distinction in words there does it not really exist as a positive entity. This is established in the next verse.

विरुध्यतेऽक्रियारूपं मानित्वादिक्रियात्मकैः ।
अमानित्वादिकं वस्तु यथेहापि तथेष्ट्यताम् ॥८४९॥

As, here is the thing such as absence of pride etc. (taken to be in opposition to pride etc.), so also should it be accepted as opposed (to other external things) which are of the nature of activities, proceeding from being proud etc., (though) it is not of the nature of any activity. [849]

SP usefully points out the break-up of the Samdhi as *virudhyate* and *akriyārūpam*.

प्रत्यग्वस्त्वद्वयमपि तदबोधोपघाततः ।
स्रग्निवाह्यादिरूपेण प्रथते भेदवन्मृषा ॥८५०॥

The (real) thing, i.e. the inner self, though non-dual, appears here falsely as possessed of (or, associated with) variety (of objects), on account of the advent (lit. affectation) caused by ignorance about itself, as a rope etc. (appear) in the form of a serpent etc. [850]

तथैवात्मापि तद्ब्रह्म तदविद्यैकहेतुतः ।
परोक्षमिव तद्भाति तिमिरोद्भूतचन्द्रवत् ॥८५१॥

In the same way, the Ātman also, which is (as already described or known) the Brahman, appears to become visible from non-direct (i.e. not directly perceptible) on account of the

only reason, viz. ignorance about (the nature of) it, just like the moon which appears to come out of darkness. [851]

The illustration in the verse speaks of the appearance of the moon which was obscured by darkness. This suggests that the Brahman was not directly perceived first, but it became perceptible later. The word *timira* 'darkness' suggests ignorance. Despite all this, the illustration has to be taken as somewhat unusual.

सद्वितीयपरोक्षत्वे यतोऽज्ञानैकहेतुके ।
न वस्तु स्पृशतस्तस्मात्प्रमाणोत्थप्रबोधतः ॥८५२॥

Since, being with another (i.e. a second) and not directly perceptible have only ignorance as their cause (i.e. origin); therefore, they do not affect (lit. touch) the (real) thing, on account of the knowledge which arises from the authoritative means (i.e. Śruti). [852]

यथावस्त्वभिसंबन्धान्निवर्तेते सहेतुके ।
अकारकात्मबोधस्य जन्मनैव तमोहनुतिः ॥८५३॥

(Those two)¹ which have for them a cause (i.e. an origin) recede (i.e. become destroyed), as they come to be connected with the (real) thing, as it is; the concealment (i.e. destruction) of ignorance is caused by the very rise of the knowledge about the Ātman as a non-*kāraka* '(what is) not connected with any activity'. [853]

¹These are mentioned in just the preceding verse.

नान्वयव्यतिरेकाभ्यां नाप्यभावेन तद्धतिः ।
आत्मब्रह्मपदार्थैकरूपेणैव हनुतिर्यतः ॥८५४॥

The destruction of that (ignorance) can be neither by Anvaya and Vyatireka, nor by the absence (of itself), since the

concealment (i.e. destruction/removal) of it is (caused) only by (understanding) only one meaning of the (two) words *ātman* 'the inner self' and *brahman*. [854]

नान्यदज्ञानतोऽस्तित्वं द्वितीयस्यात्मनो यथा ।
निवृत्तिरप्यविद्याया नावगत्यात्मनोऽपरा ॥८५५॥

As a thing other than the Ātman cannot have existence unless without ignorance (about the Ātman); so also, there cannot be the cessation of ignorance as distinct from knowing of the Ātman. [855]

(iv) Verses 856-860 present yet another explanation of the sentence.

पदार्थप्रतिबोधो वा वाक्यार्थज्ञानजन्मने ।
विज्ञायेत्युच्यते श्रुत्या पुंसस्तत्र स्वतन्त्रतः ॥८५६॥

Or, it is the knowledge of the meanings of the (two) words (signifying the two things, the Ātman and the Brahman) which is necessary for the rise of the knowledge of the meaning of the sentence—which is expressed (by its connection with the verbal form), *vijñāya*; because a person is, in respect of that (i.e. in understanding those meanings), (fully) independent. [856]

Sureśvara's intention is like this: The knowledge of the Brahman is *vastutantra*, not dependent on any human effort. But the knowledge of the words in the sentences of the Śruti requires human effort, i.e. it is *puruṣatantra*. This is clarified in the next verse.

अन्वयव्यतिरेकाभ्यां वाक्यनीडपदार्थयोः ।
पुमानलं विवेकाय न तु वाक्यार्थवित्तये ॥८५७॥

A person is able to distinguish between the meanings of the

(two) words in the nest (in the form) of the sentence by adopting Anvaya and Vyatireka (method with reference to them), but certainly not for getting to know the meaning of the sentence. [857]

Thus Sureśvara distinguishes between the two meanings of the *vi-jñāya* and *prajñā* (in other words, of two verbal roots, *pra-jñā* and *vi-jñā*).

नानुत्पन्ने विधिः पुंसोऽशक्यत्वाद्वास्तुतन्त्रतः ।
उत्पन्नेऽपि कृतार्थत्वात् स्याद्वाक्यार्थबोधने ॥८५८॥

There cannot be any injunction for a person, when (the knowledge of the meaning) has not occurred, because it is just not possible since it does depend on the (real) thing (*vastutantra*) itself; so also, even when it has occurred (to him), it (i.e. an injunction) cannot be there, since, on knowing the meaning of the Vedic sentence, the person should have achieved the desired end. [858]

The sentence *vi-jñāya prajñām kurvīta* has the appearance of an injunction and Sureśvara very clearly rejects here the idea of its being one. This is clarified further in the next verse.

अन्वयव्यतिरेकाभ्यां लौकिकत्वात्पदार्थयोः ।
शक्तस्तद्विषयं ज्ञानं कर्तुं वाक्यार्थवित्तये ॥८५९॥

A person is able to get the knowledge of the meanings of the (two) words (in the sentence) by the method of Anvaya and Vyatireka, since they belong to (his usual) world (i.e. the world of commonly spoken language) and that would result in his knowing the meaning of the sentence. [859]

SP brings out the purport of the verse thus: *vivekasya kriyātvād yāgādāv iva puṁsaḥ svātantryāt tatra yukto vidhir ity arthaḥ*.

आत्मा द्रष्टव्य इत्यादावयमेव विधीयते ।
पदार्थविषयः पुंसो व्यापारो योऽनुमात्मकः ॥८६०॥

(Thus) in sentences such as *ātmā vā are draṣṭavyaḥ*, this very injunction, which has the meaning of the words as its subject, i.e. an activity of man, of the nature of some inference, is laid down. [860]

(v) Verses 861-865 refer to yet one more explanation of the sentence.

वाक्यार्थप्रतिबोधस्य पदार्थाज्ञानमेव तु ।
अन्तरायो यतस्तस्मात्पदार्थाज्ञानचोदना ॥८६१॥

Since, for (acquiring) the knowledge of the meaning of a sentence there is only one difficulty, viz. ignorance about the meanings of the words; therefore, there is an injunction for (acquiring) the meanings of the words. [861]

ज्ञात्वात्मानं तमेवेति तन्मोहोत्थादनात्मनः ॥८६२॥

(The injunction is fruitful after a person) having known the Ātman in the words *tam eva ...* (distinguishes it) from the non-Ātman, which is his coming forth due to delusion (in respect of the nature of the Ātman). [862]

अनात्मार्थप्रधानोऽयं यावदात्मा समीक्ष्यते ।
ब्रह्मास्मीति न तावद्धीर्जायते सान्तरायतः ॥८६३॥

For this person the thing called the non-Ātman is more important (*pradhāna*), till when the Ātman is seen (by him); (for) that knowledge, 'I am the Brahman', does not arise in him owing to the hindrance (caused by ignorance). [863]

अनात्मनो यदात्मानं प्रत्यगज्ञानकल्पितात् ।
विविनक्त्यनुमानेन तदा वाक्यार्थधीर्भवेत् ॥८६४॥

When a person distinguishes the Ātman from the non-Ātman, (the notion of which is) produced by ignorance about (the nature of) the inner self; there arises (in him) then the knowledge of the meaning of the sentence with the help of inference. [864]

SP states: *anumānena* means *anvayādinā tadanusāriśrutyā ca*.

आत्मन्येव यदात्मानं व्यत्थाप्यानात्मनो नरः ।
विजानाति तदा सर्वमात्मैवेति प्रपश्यति ॥८६५॥

When a person raises himself above (the notion of) the non-Ātman and sees the Ātman in himself, he sees that all, that is (existing(!) around him) is but the Ātman (*sarvam ātmaiva*). [865]

(vi) Verses 866-871 offer one more explanation.

अथवा पुरुषार्थत्वात्प्रज्ञायाः करणं नृणाम् ।
स्वतः प्राप्तमनूद्येह तमेवेति नियम्यते ॥८६६॥

Or, since *prajñā* is for men an act to be accomplished on account of its being the final goal, which is self-accomplished; therefore, (the Śruti) has repeated that (performance of the activity) and then restricts the same by the words *tam eva* [866]

This verse is an illustration of what is called *anakoluthon* (in Greek), which is: one part of the sentence is in the active and the other (which was also expected to be in the active) is put in the passive. Actually, the sentence should have been ... *anūdyā, iha tam eveti (naraṃ) niyamayati*. This is clarified in just the next verse.

प्रज्ञां कुर्वीत यदिह तत्तमेव यथोदितम् ।

तां प्रकुर्वीत विज्ञाय स्वात्मानं न त्वनात्मनः ॥८६७॥

What is stated here, i.e. in *prajñāṃ kurvīta*, is what is mentioned as *tam eva* (This means:) 'Having known (the nature of) one's own self, one should meditate (on only that) and/but not on (any) non-Ātman.' [867]

तत्त्वमात्मैव सर्वस्य कार्यकारणवस्तुनः ।
यस्मादात्मानमेवातः प्रज्ञां विज्ञाय कुर्विति ॥८६८॥

'Since the true nature of all the things, which stands in relation of cause(s) and effect(s), is but the Ātman; therefore, having known that Ātman, (now) take to meditation'—thus¹ (is the restriction). [868]

¹SP states that the word *iti* has the force of a restrictive injunction (*niyama*). To explain: if one notion has any optional meanings, then *niyama* restricts that one to one of those meanings.

तदन्यविषयज्ञाने न किञ्चिद्वेति तत्त्वतः ।
न च कृत्स्नतमोहानिः सर्वज्ञानोदयो न च ॥८६९॥

When there is knowledge of the objects other than that (i.e. the Ātman), a person does not know anything as reality; and there is not the removal (lit. destruction) of the entire ignorance and, further, there has not arisen the knowledge of all. [869]

This verse states why one should have known the nature of non-Ātman as understood in the other view.

प्रत्यगात्मनि तु ज्ञाते श्रुत्युक्तेनैव वर्त्मना ।
नानुत्पन्नं क्वचिज्ज्ञानं नेहाध्वस्तं तमोऽप्यतः ॥८७०॥

Therefore, when (the nature of) the inner self becomes known (to a person) in the way¹ stated by the Śruti, it is not that there does not arise (in that person) any time (*kva cit*) the

knowledge (of the Brahman), and not that the person's ignorance has not been destroyed (thereby). [870]

¹This refers to *ātmā vā are draṣṭavyaḥ*

विज्ञायेह तमेवातः प्रज्ञां कुर्वीत सद्द्विजः ।
अज्ञानादि तथा कृत्स्नमात्मनोऽन्यत्र वेदने ।
सर्वमात्मानमेवेति श्रुतेरपि वचस्तथा ॥८७१॥

Therefore, having known (the nature of) that (Ātman) alone should one, a seeker of the Brahman (*saddvija*), take to meditation. Further, (*tathā*) in anything else than in the knowledge of the Ātman, there is all ignorance and the statement of the Śruti also is *sarvam ātmānam eva*¹ [871]

¹Cf. *sarvam ātmānam paśyati* (BU 4.4.23) and *ātmānam eva lokam upāsīta* (BU 1.4.15).

(vii) This verse is still another explanation.

निष्कर्मिका वा प्रज्ञेह विहितेत्यथ भण्यते ।
कर्म तस्यास्तमेवेति विज्ञायेत्यनुवादतः ॥८७२॥

Now, if it is said: 'Here is described (some) meditation which is not connected with (lit. is without) any activity,' then it is to be stated (for the removal of the doubt): 'By the repeated statement of *viññāya* ... is conveyed the activity of it, viz. *tam eva*'. [872]

(viii) Verses 873-879 state one more explanation.

प्रज्ञा वा परमात्मेह प्रज्ञानमितिवाक्यतः ।
विज्ञायेह तमात्मानं प्रज्ञां कुर्वीत सद्द्विजः ॥८७३॥

Or, here the word *prajñā* means the highest Ātman—this is on the basis of the Śruti statement *prajñānam (brahma)* ...;¹

(thus) here (is stated:) 'Having known that Ātman should a seeker of the Brahman take to meditation.' [873]

¹*Aitareyopaniṣad* 3.3; *Maitrāyaṇyupaniṣad* 5.6.31.

इमं देहस्थमात्मानं विज्ञायोक्तेन वर्त्मना ।
परां प्रज्ञां प्रकुर्वीतेत्येष शास्त्रस्य संग्रहः ॥८७४॥

'Having known this Ātman, which abides in the body in the way stated (in the Śruti), (a seeker of the Brahman) should take to the highest meditation¹'—this is, in brief, the statement (of the thought) of the scripture. [874]

¹This means: knowing the proper meaning of the sentence of Vedānta. This marks Sureśvara's concluding remark on various views.

तत्रैवं संभवत्यर्थे सर्वमानाविरोधिनि ।
वाक्यार्थः कल्प्यते कस्माद्विरुद्धो यः प्रमान्तरैः ॥८७५॥

When this can be the meaning (of the statement *viññāya prajñāṃ kurvīta*), which is not opposed to any one of the means of knowing, why is another thought about it (i.e. meaning) imagined on the basis of other ways of knowing? [875]

In verses 876-890, there is stated the view of Mīmāṃsakas, who belong to the Vedāntins' fold in some way (svayūthya).

असंतोषादतोऽन्येऽत्र भूरिदोषप्रदर्शिनः ।
व्याख्यानादन्यथा चक्रुर्व्याख्यां वेदार्थनिश्चिताः ॥८७६॥

In respect of this (i.e. this Vedic sentence), there are others, who find many faults (regarding the above interpretation), and, out of dissatisfaction, they, who have decided the meaning of the Veda (very methodically, or firmly), offer some

interpretation other than the one given (by me) above.¹ [876]

¹Cf. verses 832-835 above.

वेदान्तवाक्यजं ज्ञानं यथावस्त्वेव मोहनुत् ।
प्रामाण्याद्वेदवचसस्तज्जं मिथ्या भवेत्कथम् ॥८७७॥

(They say:) 'The knowledge, which arises from the sentences of Vedānta, is only in accordance with the (real) thing, it removes delusion (on the part of one). How can that be false, i.e. that which is produced from that, viz. the statement of the Veda being only authoritative?' [877]

वाक्यश्रवणकाले तत्सर्वाज्ञानतमोपनुत् ।
जायते यद्यपि ज्ञानं कृत्स्नैकात्म्यसमाश्रयम् ॥८७८॥
जन्मानन्तरमेवैतदनादितमसाखिलम् ।
तथापि बाध्यते ज्ञानमविद्याकार्यदर्शनात् ॥८७९॥

(That is to say:) Even if there arises knowledge (of the Brahman) which rests on (the notion of) only oneness of the Ātman in all and which removes/destroys the entire ignorance consisting in the absence of knowledge (about the nature of the Ātman), when one hears the Vedic sentences, [878] all of that knowledge (of the Vedic sentences) is stultified immediately, at the end of this life, by the beginningless ignorance, because of that person's seeing the effects of ignorance (again in the next life). [879]

This is clarified in the next verse.

In verses 880-896 is described twofold ignorance about the Ātman and, on that account, there is the introduction of prajñā.

अविद्याहेतुरागादीन्सम्यग्ज्ञानादनन्तरम् ।
यतो वीक्षामहे तस्माज्ज्ञानस्याज्ञानबाधनम् ॥८८०॥

Since we see that soon (or, immediately) after the right knowledge has occurred in this life, there do come to exist attachments (to the external objects) etc., which are caused (in the next life) by ignorance; therefore is this the stultification of ignorance¹ by the knowledge (of the Brahman). [880]

¹We have to understand *ajñānabādhana*m as a *sāpekṣa samāsa* (i.e. compound presupposing something) related to *jñānasya*. The second line of the verse could be translated alternatively as: Therefore (or, in other words), this is not the stultification of ignorance by the knowledge of the Brahman. But, this does not seem to be intended.

नैसर्ग्यागन्तुकी चेति ह्यविद्या द्विविधा स्मृता ।
आगन्तुकी स्याद्विषये नैसर्गिक्यात्मनीष्यते ॥८८१॥

Ignorance is known to be of two kinds, viz. natural and adventitious. Adventitious ignorance would abide in the object, whereas natural ignorance is accepted as abiding in one's own self. [881]

तत्रागन्तु यदज्ञानं तत्सकृज्ज्ञानजन्मना ।
अपैति नासि शबरो राजासीत्युक्तितो यथा ॥८८२॥
नैसर्गिकी तु याविद्या सा सकृज्ज्ञानजन्मना ।
ध्वस्तापि पुनरेवैति तज्जरागादिदर्शनात् ॥८८३॥

There (i.e. between the two), that ignorance, which is adventitious, recedes (i.e. gets destroyed) at the rise of the knowledge of the Brahman (even) only once, as (there is the removal of ignorance on the part of one) by the statement (addressed to a person:) 'You are not a forester; you are a king'. [882]

As against this, that which is natural ignorance, is once destroyed by the rise of the knowledge of the Brahman and does come to exist again, as it is noticed from (a person's having) attachment (to external things) etc. which are produced

by that (ignorance).

[883]

There is herein understood a story of a prince, who was, owing to some mishap, brought up among foresters and considered himself a forester till when he was told by another person (who knew him in his true nature), 'You are a king (i.e. prince), not a forester' and, thus, he realised his true status in life.

यस्मादेवंस्वभावैषाविद्या नैसर्गिकी ततः ।

विज्ञायापि परं तत्त्वं कुर्यात्प्रज्ञां पुनः पुनः ॥८८४॥

Since this ignorance is of this nature and only natural (in the case of one); therefore, one should take to meditation again and again, even after having known the highest reality.

[884]

तावत्प्रज्ञां प्रकुर्वीत यावद्धवस्ता निरन्वया ।

आत्माविद्या यथोक्तात्मविद्याभ्यासेन यत्नतः ॥८८५॥

A person should take to meditation by repeated pursuit of the knowledge of the Ātman, as described, with every effort¹ till the ignorance (on one's part) about (the nature of) the Ātman is completely removed, so that there does not remain even a little of it.

[885]

¹According to SP, this is for over a long period of time and continuous.

श्लोकांश्च गौडपादादेर्यथोक्तार्थस्य साक्षिणः ।

अधीयतेऽत्र यत्नेन संप्रदायविदः स्वयम् ॥८८६॥

In this context, men, who are knowers of the tradition of Vedānta, and who are knowers, lit. seers, of what is stated above, themselves recite/study the verses of Gauḍapāda and others¹ respectfully, or with effort.²

[886]

¹This refers to Vyāsa whose verses are quoted in verses 889-890 below.

²It is seeking instruction from a preceptor and other knowers of the Vedānta tradition.

तत्त्वमाध्यात्मिकं दृष्ट्वा तत्त्वं दृष्ट्वा तु बाह्यतः ।
तत्त्वीभूतस्तदारामस्तत्त्वादप्रच्युतो भवेत् ॥८८७॥

Having seen the truth about what abides in the body and also the truth of what exists outside, a person, who has thus become the very truth itself and is having that as the resting place, would not have (ever) fallen from it. [887]

This is *Gauḍapāḍakārikā* 2.38.

यदा न लीयते चित्तं न च विक्षिप्यते पुनः ।
अनिङ्गनमनाभासं निष्पन्नं ब्रह्म तत्तदा ॥८८८॥

When the intellect does not merge (into the Ātman) and does not again get distracted, then (that means:) there (the individual) attains the Brahman, which does not act or which does not have any semblance of any object. [888]

This (also) is *Gauḍapāḍakārikā* 3.46.

मन एव मनुष्याणां कारणं बन्धमोक्षयोः ।
बन्धाय विषयासक्तं मुक्त्यै निर्विषयं यदा ॥८८९॥

It is only *manas* which is for men the cause of bondage and/or liberation; when attached to external objects, it is for causing bondage, whereas not having any external objects (i.e. connection with them) it effects liberation. [889]

This is *Viṣṇupurāṇa* 6.7.28 and the first line is *Mahābhārata* 13.295*(1)ab; the asterisk shows that it is not accepted in the critical text of the *Mahābhārata*.

तावदेव निरोद्धव्यं हृदि यावत्क्षयं गतम् ।
इदं ज्ञानं च ध्यानं च शेषोऽन्यो ग्रन्थविस्तरः ॥८९०॥

(*manas*) is to be checked or confined in the heart till it has merged into (lit. lost into the *Ātman*)—this is both knowledge and meditation, and all other (things said/written) are but an appendage of a book/composition. [890]

This is *Yogavārtika* attributed by SP to Vyāsa.

Verses 891-898 refute the preceding view.

इति व्याचक्षते केचिद्विज्ञायेति वचः स्फुटम् ।
महामीमांसका धीरा अत्र प्रतिविधीयते ॥८९१॥

Thus do some wise men, i.e. great Mīmāṃsakas, explain clearly the statement *vijñāya* In this respect, (the following) is stated in opposition. [891]

यदासाधारणाविद्या प्रत्यगात्मैकगोचरा ।
अज्ञानाद्यात्मिका सिद्धा द्वैविध्यं स्यात्तदा कुतः ॥८९२॥

When (it is said that) ignorance is unique (lit. uncommon) and (that it) has only the inner self as the object to affect and (then it is) established that it is only of the nature of ignorance about (the nature of) the *Ātman*; whence could then be there a twofold character of the same? [892]

If ignorance means ignorance of just one inner self (which is but single), then it can be only one—there could not be the scope for any acceptance of twofold ignorance.

अज्ञात एव सर्वत्र मानानां मेय उच्यते ।
आत्मैव ज्ञेय एष्टव्यो ध्रुवमैकात्म्यवादिना ॥८९३॥
अज्ञातोऽर्थोऽन्यतो यस्मान्नैवैकात्म्यात्प्रसिध्यति ॥८९४॥

Everywhere, what is not known is the object of knowing for various means of knowing (i.e. it is what has not been known before). (Therefore) it is only the Ātman which is to be known and to be sought by one and certainly by such a person, who holds the singleness of the Ātman; [893]
since an object, that is not known by any other means, gets established only by knowing the singleness of the Ātman. [894]

न चानधिगतत्वस्य प्रसिद्धिः स्यात्प्रमाणतः ।
अतिशीतेरसद्भावान्न च बाधोऽस्य माश्रयात् ॥८९५॥

Also, there cannot be any establishing of (the Ātman), which has not been known by any (generally accepted) means of knowing, owing to the non-existence of any excellence; so also there cannot be the stultification of this one by resorting to any knowledge (obtained by the other accepted means of knowing). [895]

The force is to indicate that the Śruti alone is the *pramāṇa*—it is not among the commonly accepted *pramāṇas*.

न चाप्यनात्मना सिद्धिरज्ञातस्येह वस्तुनः ।
तस्याप्यविद्यारूपत्वाज्जडोऽनात्मेति हीष्यते ॥८९६॥

And there cannot be any establishing of the (real) thing (i.e. the Ātman) which is not known by means of any non-Ātman; for, in the case of that also, its nature is that of ignorance and that the non-Ātman is accepted as insentient. [896]

This is to assert that the commonly accepted *pramāṇas* are rooted in (or, connected with) the non-Ātman (objects).

अतो मात्राद्यभावेऽपि योऽज्ञातत्वस्य सिद्धये ।
अलमर्थः स एवात्र मेयोऽज्ञात इहेष्यते ॥८९७॥

Therefore, even in the absence of the means etc., (that

knowable) which is capable of for establishment of (its) not being known, it is only accepted/understood here¹ that it is unknown and it is sought to be known. [897]

¹SP explains *atra* 'here' as the sleep state or, the dream state also (read: *svāpāder iheti mahābhuṃmer uktiḥ*).

बोधमात्रातिरेकेण नान्योऽर्थोऽज्ञानसिद्धिकृत् ।
अज्ञानादित्रयं तस्मात्स्वतोबोधैकसंश्रयम् ॥८९८॥

There is not anything else than mere knowledge which really causes rise of ignorance; therefore, the triad,¹ viz. ignorance etc. is dependent on the knowledge itself. [898]

¹This refers to false knowledge and doubt also. See verse 788 above.

संभाव्यते जगद्यस्मिन्बोधमात्रपुरःसरम् ॥८९९॥

It is possible that (the triad)¹ exists in this world as preceded (i.e. caused) by knowledge only. [899]

¹By triad may be understood *ajñānāditraya*.

अज्ञायमानो मात्रादिर्न यस्मादनुभूयते ।
अज्ञातचितिवत्तस्मादज्ञातोऽनुभवः स्मृतः ॥९००॥

Since, (the triad) beginning with the knower, when being unknown, is not experienced, therefore, experience is understood as the unknown just like sentience which has been unknown. [900]

अज्ञातायां यथा शुक्तौ रजताद्यर्थनिश्चितिः ।
अनात्मनिश्चितिस्तद्वदज्ञातेऽनुभवात्मनि ॥९०१॥

When a mother-of-pearl (etc.)¹ is unknown there is ascertain-

ment regarding the things such as silver etc; so when the nature of the experience (of the Brahman) is not known there is determination regarding the non-Ātman. [901]

¹Sureśvara mentions only a mother-of-pearl; though some more objects should have been mentioned, in view of *rajatādi*. This is his usual way of writing.

ज्ञानात्पृथगसंसिद्धे रजतादेरमेयता ।
शुक्तेरिव त्वविज्ञातज्ञातत्वस्य ततोऽन्यतः ॥९०२॥

When silver etc. are not established without/part from (any certain) knowledge they are (considered as) not being the object of knowledge, as there is unknownness in the case of the mother-of-pearl, which is other than that (i.e. silver etc.) and whose true nature (lit. perception) is not known. [902]

This verse is marked by the most usual cryptic expression of Sureśvara. It needs to be explained in fuller details as in SP, or, in just the next verse.

यतो न लभते मेयं शुक्तौ रजतधीरतः ।
न रूप्यधीः प्रमाणं स्यात्प्रमेयासंभवादिह ॥९०३॥

since there does not (really) exist an object of knowing; therefore, there is cognition of silver in a mother-of-pearl (and) the cognition of silver would not be valid,¹ owing to the absence of (a real) object there.² [903]

¹The word 'not valid' means 'not properly conveyed by a means of knowing' (here direct perception).

²This is worldly dealing.

यथा न रजते मानं शुक्तावपि तथैव सा ।
तदप्रबोधताबाधात्तस्याश्चाशुक्तिकात्मनः ॥९०४॥

As (in the example of the preceding verse) there is no valid means of knowing in case of silver, so also there is that (i.e. invalidity) in respect of a mother-of-pearl as well; because that (i.e. valid means) is stultified by its not conveying (the proper) knowledge about it (i.e. silver), and it (i.e. silver) is (in fact) of the nature of (or, similar to that of) a mother-of-pearl. [904]

यथैवं सर्वमानानि प्रत्यङ्मानातिरेकतः ।

अनात्ममेयभाञ्ज्येव विज्ञेयानीति निश्चितिः ॥९०५॥

As this is so; therefore it is certain that all the means of knowing beside the inner self are to be understood as referring only to the object(s) of knowing other than the Ātman. [905]

प्रत्यक्संवित्त्वविज्ञाता तथैवेहानुभूयते ।

अपि प्राङ्मानसंव्याप्तेर्यावद्व्युत्पाद्यते न ना ॥९०६॥

And, the experience (or, awareness) of the inner self is not (properly) grasped, it is experienced here (i.e. in worldly life), in the same way (i.e. as in the example above); (this is so) till a person is not enlightened before the pervasion (of the inner self) by (i.e. its connection with) a means of knowing (viz. the Śruti). [906]

The AnSS edition notes variant reading *tayā* in place of *tathā* (i.e. *tayaiva* ... in the place of *tathaiva* ...) and that indicates (perhaps better) the experience of the inner self as apart from external objects, owing to that ignorance which was posited by the opponent.

वास्तव्येव तु संसिद्धिरनुभूतेर्यतस्ततः ।

नाज्ञातत्वस्य बाधः स्याच्छ्रुतिकाबाधसिद्धिवत् ॥९०७॥

Since the experience related to the real thing is an established fact (*samsiddhi*); therefore, there is no stultification of the

nature of (the inner self as) being unknown, in the same way as the occurrence of stultification (of silver)¹ by a mother-of-pearl. [907]

¹Or, alternatively, of its own being unknown as/in the case of a mother-of-pearl.

मानेनानभिसंबन्धात्रेयं षष्ठेन्द्रियार्थवत् ।
 अनुभूतेः सुषुप्त्यादेर्न चाप्यनुभवत्वतः ।
 निरपेक्षा प्रमाणाप्तौ मानाप्तकरबिल्ववत् ॥९०८॥

This (unknownness of the inner self) is because of its non-connection with the means of knowing, i.e. the Śruti. It is not like what is the object of the sixth sense, i.e. what is imaginary.¹ And also, owing to being experienced in the case of the experience in the deep sleep state etc., it is not independent of requiring some proof (of its existence) like that of a Bilva fruit on the palm which is known by a means of knowing (viz. direct perception). [908]

¹That is, conceived only by *manas*.

प्रमाणव्यापृतेः पूर्वमेवं मेयोऽत्र लभ्यते ॥९०९॥
 नैवं वेदान्तसिद्धान्तादन्यसिद्धान्तशासने ।
 मेयसिद्धिर्यतस्तस्मात् मानं तत्र विद्यते ॥९१०॥

Thus, the object to be known here, (i.e. the Ātman) is (in our view, according to the opponent) already known (lit. has ever obtained) even before the operation of any means of knowing. [909]

(The Siddhāntin's answer is:) 'No, this is not so, because establishing the object of knowing is not there in the teaching of any other school other than that of Vedānta; therefore there does not exist a proof for it'. [910]

Up to verse 909, there was expressed a doubt (*codaka*) of

an opponent. Verses 910ff. are an answer to the doubt.

इह त्वज्ञात आत्मैव मिथ्याज्ञातस्तथैव च ।
 तस्य प्रमाणसंबन्धात्सर्वाज्ञानप्रहाणतः ॥९११॥
 तत्त्वमस्यादिवाक्येभ्यः सर्वज्ञानप्रसूतितः ।
 सर्वाज्ञानापनुत्तेश्च ज्ञेयकार्यसमाप्तिः ॥९१२॥
 प्राप्यस्य सर्वस्यावाप्तेस्तथा हेयस्य हानतः ।
 सम्यग्धिगः सकृत्सूतेः किं कार्यमवशिष्यते ॥९१३॥

But, in this (view of Mīmāṃsakas) that the Ātman itself is not known and also (if known) it is falsely known, for (in this state) that (Ātman) has a connection with a means of knowing and thus thereby through the destruction of all ignorance, [911]

because of the rise of all knowledge from sentences such as *tat tvam asi*, because of the removal of all ignorance through obtaining (i.e. knowing) the effect of what is to be known (i.e. ignorance); [912]

because of the complete obtaining of what is to be obtained and, so also, by the abandoning of what is to be abandoned and (consequently) the rise once (and for all time) of right knowledge; (tell me) what (other effect) remains to be brought about. [913]

SP adds in the end: *sakṛtsūter uktaśeṣaphalasiddher iti śeṣaḥ*.

अविद्या पूर्ववच्चेत्स्यात्सम्यग्ज्ञातेऽपि वस्तुनि ।
 भूयोऽपि सा मृतेरुर्ध्वं नेष्यतीत्यत्र का प्रमा ॥९१४॥

If, in your view, ignorance continues to be there as before, even when the (real) thing has become well-understood; then, what proof could there be that it will not come again after death? [914]

In this verse a word *neṣyati* seems to be a misprint for *naiṣyati*. SP and NKL do not help in this regard.

The thrust of the argument is that the rebirth in the case of even the liberated cannot be avoided, if the opponent's view were held.

अविद्याविद्ययोर्यस्माद्बाधकसंगतिम् ।
मुक्त्वान्यो नास्ति संबन्धो दाह्यदाहकयोरिव ॥९१५॥
बाध्याविद्या कथं विद्यां बाधिकां बाधते वद ।
दाहकस्य न दाहोऽस्ति वह्नेर्दाह्येन वस्तुना ॥९१६॥

Since between ignorance and knowledge there is no connection other than that of stultified and stultifier, like the connection existing between what is to be burnt and what burns; [915] (therefore), tell me, how can ignorance, which is to be stultified, stultify knowledge which is the stultifier? (Indeed) there cannot be the burning of what burns, viz. the fire, by a thing to be burnt (i.e. fuel). [916]

विद्यमानाप्यविद्येयं विद्यां चेन्नावधीत्पुरा ।
ध्वस्ता बाधिष्यतेऽविद्या विद्यामित्यत्र का प्रमा ॥९१७॥

If this ignorance, while existing, has not been able to destroy knowledge earlier, how then could that right knowledge (or, understanding) be stultified by that ignorance, which has been already destroyed? What could be the right knowledge there, in that case? [917]

अविद्यया चेद्विध्वस्ता विद्येयं कात्स्नर्यतस्तदा ।
मुषितात्मपरिज्ञानः प्रज्ञां कुर्यात्कथं जडः ॥९१८॥

If this knowledge becomes destroyed in its fullness by ignorance, then how can a foolish person, who has the knowledge of his own self taken away (lit. stolen) from him, take to meditation? [918]

This is a blame given to the argument which began with the word *yasmād evaṃsvabhāvaiṣā* ... (verse 884 above).

किं च हेतुमतो जन्म सर्वत्र स्यात्पुनः पुनः ।
सर्वहेतोस्त्वविद्याया ध्वस्तायाः स्यात्कुतो भवः ॥९१९॥

(Moreover), there would be everywhere the birth of what has a cause, viz. origin, again and again; therefore, from what (origin) could there be the birth of ignorance, which is (posited as) the cause of all, and which is (once) destroyed? [919]

Verses 920-922 state that ignorance could not be born of the Brahman, lest it might be permanent.

ब्रह्मणश्चेद्भवस्तस्या अनिमोक्षः प्रसज्यते ।
स्थास्नुत्वाद्ब्रह्मणो नित्यं किरणानां रवेरिव ॥९२०॥

If it were said that (there would be) the birth of it (i.e. ignorance) from the Brahman, then there would forcefully (contingently) result the absence of liberation because of the perennial nature of the Brahman;¹ (this is so) as in the case of the rays of sun.² [920]

¹This implies the continuous (or, ever) rise (or, appearance) of ignorance.

²The illustration points to the ever existing nature of the sun and therefore also of its rays; consequently, the continuity of ignorance has to be understood as a contingency.

अनादेर्नाप्यनुच्छिन्तिः सर्वत्रोच्छिन्तिदर्शनात् ।
अनाद्यज्ञातमेयेषु ह्यज्ञानस्य प्रहाणतः ॥९२१॥

(If it is argued that) 'There would be non-destruction of what has no beginning (viz. of ignorance)'; (the answer is: 'This is not so) because it is noticed that everywhere there is destruction in the case of the beginningless and (also) unknown objects of knowing, indeed through the destruction of ignorance'. [921]

अनाद्यज्ञानवन्मेयमूरीकृत्येह सर्वतः ।
उच्छिन्दन्ति प्रमाणानि ह्यज्ञातत्वं प्रमेयगम् ॥९२२॥

Here (in worldly dealings) everywhere, authoritative means of knowing destroy the unknownness characterizing objects to be known, after having first accepted/understood the objects as characterized by beginningless ignorance (i.e. unknownness). [922]

Here there is stated a general rule as to when and how the means of knowing (of the unknown object of knowing) stultify ignorance.

In verses 923 and 924 it is pointed out that the destruction of ignorance does not mean the merger of effects into cause.

न च कारणसंसर्गो नाशोऽज्ञानस्य भण्यते ।
उरगादेः स्रजीवास्य ब्रह्मणोऽकारणत्वतः ॥९२३॥

It is also not said that the destruction of ignorance consists (merely) in the merger (of it) into its cause, as in the case of (the merger of) the serpent etc. in a garland of flowers; because the Brahman has the nature of not being the cause (of it). [923]

अज्ञातज्ञापनं मुक्त्वा न चेहास्त्यपरो विधिः ।
तावतैव कृतार्थत्वान्न कार्यमवशिष्यते ॥९२४॥

Here (in Vedānta), there is no other injunction for acquiring the knowledge of what is not known; because, only being that much (instruction), there could have been accomplished what is intended to achieve; therefore, there remains nothing to be done. [924]

Sureśvara offers in verses 925-935 his comments on the views of the followers of (i) Prabhākara, (ii) Kumārila Bhaṭṭa, (iii)

the Sāṃkhyas, (iv) the Vedāntins in general, (v) the Vaiśeṣikas and (vi) the Lokāyatas, with regard to the supposed injunction in *viññāya prajñāṃ kurvīta*.

आत्मैव कारणं यस्य सर्वज्ञानस्य कार्यतः ।

आत्मान्वितेः स्वतः सिद्धेर्न कार्या तस्य चात्मधीः ॥९२५॥

(i) In the case of him, who has understood the Ātman alone as the cause of the effect, viz. the knowledge of all; there is continuity of the Ātman understood and thus the knowledge of the Ātman, established by itself, does not have to be obtained (lit. effected by following the injunction). [925]

This is in refutation of an opinion of a Prābhākara: 'Here the Ātman itself is the basis of knowledge and thus there is a continuous existence of the same and there is thereby suggested the unnecessariness of following injunction which is implied.'

अंशाशिसंगतेरात्माप्यहंबुद्ध्यानुभूयते ।

तस्यापि नित्यसंबन्धात् विधेयात्मधीरियम् ॥९२६॥

(ii) In the case also of him in whose opinion there is experienced (the existence of) the Ātman in the form of the notion of *aham* through the connection of parts and whole (made up of them), there is not to be prescribed an injunction for acquiring the knowledge of the Ātman, because that connection is eternal. [926]

In the opinion of the followers of Kumārila Bhaṭṭa, things to be known and their knowledge stand in their relation of parts and whole (made up of them together); by this connection with the never missing existence of the Ātman and, therefore, on account of the ever continued experience of the same, any injunction for getting to know it becomes only redundant.

आत्मानात्मपरिज्ञाने यस्य साधारणं मतम् ।

करणं बुद्धिरेवेह न तं प्रत्यपि चोदना ॥९२७॥

(iii) Also for him, who considers the intellect itself as the common means of fully knowing the self and the non-self,¹ here, there is no necessity of an injunction. [927]

¹We have used the self and the non-self and precluded the use of the words the Ātman and the non-Ātman, because, in this view of the Sāṅkhyas, there is reference to a number of Puruṣas and a variety of effects of Prakṛti and, since there is continuous existence of the intellect, which is product (or, modification) of ever existing Prakṛti along with Puruṣas, there is therefore not any additional effort required to get to know the same by the injunction, as implied.

बुद्ध्यादेर्विषयान्तस्य प्रतीचोऽन्यस्य वस्तुनः ।
आत्मात्मीयत्वतस्तस्माच्चित्स्वभावमिदं जगत् ॥९२८॥

(iv) As being one's own nature, the Ātman is (connected) with the inner self and other things beginning with the intellect up to the objects of sense-organs, therefore, this world is of the nature of sentience. [928]

In verses 928-932, Sureśvara refers to the general view of Vedāntins who would dispense with any injunction in respect of getting to know the Brahman. This view shows a lot of similarity with Sureśvara's own view.

चित्स्वभावं सदा तत्स्यादन्यहेत्वनपेक्षणात् ।
धर्माधर्माद्यपेक्षत्वादनात्माकारतां प्रति ॥९२९॥

That (world) would ever be having the nature of sentience because of its independence of any other cause for it in respect of its own nature of being the non-Ātman, dependent as it is on merit and demerit. [929]

SP states as the support for this argument, the thoughts contained in BSB on 1.1.2-1.4.23 and 2.1.14-20 of BS.

वियत्संपूर्णतां नर्ते घटो नानाविधैर्युतिम् ।
द्रव्यैर्याद्वियोगं वा संविदते तथा धियः ॥९३०॥
शब्दाद्याकारतां यान्ति संशयाद्यात्मतां तथा ।
प्रत्यक्चिच्छतपूर्णतां मुक्त्वा शून्यतां न च ताः सदा ॥९३१॥

A pitcher does not become united with or separated from various kinds of things, unless it is full of Ākāśa; so also, without the intellect the knowledges or consciousness (of men) [930]

can not come to have the shape of words etc. and also of the uncertainty etc.; setting aside (the fact that) they are full with (i.e. pervaded by) consciousness of the inner self; therefore, there would always remain mere void (i.e. non-existing in reality). [931]

यतोऽतो नात्मधीः कार्यं नापि तत्संततिस्तथा ।
स्वभावादेव तत्सिद्धेः सर्वप्राणभूतामपि ॥९३२॥

Since (this is so); therefore, (Vedāntins) do not have to make effort to get knowledge of the Brahman and also to secure the continuity of the same; for that has been already established in the case of all living beings, by their own nature (as existents). [932]

सर्वेषामपि भिन्नानां तथाभेदत्वहेतुतः ।
न कार्यैवात्मधीः पुंभिः कृतत्वादेव हेतुतः ॥९३३॥

In the same way, the various discrete things are in reality having the nature of non-distinction (from the Ātman) and, therefore, human beings do not have (to make any effort) to effect the knowledge of the Ātman—because that is already effected (or has already occurred to them). [933]

आत्माधाराणि यस्यापि ज्ञानादीनीह वादिनः ।
तस्यापि नात्मधीः कार्या नित्यप्राप्तत्वकारणात् ॥९३४॥

(v) In the case of that theorist also, in whose opinion all types of knowledges have only the Ātman as their basis, the knowledge about the Ātman has not to be effected, for the reason that it has ever been obtained already. [934]

This view of Vaiśeṣika is: 'knowledge is one of the qualities of the Ātman and thus there is, according to him, *guṇa-guṇin* relation between knowledge and the Ātman; and since that is an ever existing relation, any special injunction has, therefore, not to be made for acquiring that quality of the Ātman.

देहस्य सर्वदैवास्य जीवत्तश्चित्स्वभावतः ।
स्वभाववादिनोऽपीयं कार्या नैवात्मधीस्तथा ॥९३५॥

(vi) In the case of him also, who holds the nature of all things as the ever existing and living sentience in the form of this body; there is no necessity of effecting any knowledge (i.e. awareness) of the Ātman (i.e. the self). [935]

This has reference to the Lokāyata, who identifies the body with the Ātman and, this being so, a person does not have to take to any action for getting to know what is called the Ātman.

Verses 936-938 set aside the view of the Vaidikas who feel the need of an injunction for the acquisition of the knowledge of the Ātman. Verse 938 is the conclusion of verses 925 onwards.

नियमे परिसंख्यायां सर्वानात्मासमीक्षणात् ।
वैयर्थ्यं कर्मकाण्डस्य निर्मलत्वात्प्रसज्यते ॥९३६॥
न चापि नित्यप्राप्तत्वात्तयोरस्तीह संभवः ।
अप्राप्तांशे यतो नित्यं विधिः सर्वोऽपि चेष्ट्यते ॥९३७॥
कर्तव्यमात्मविज्ञानमित्यत्रैव निराकृतः ।

विधिः सर्वप्रकारोऽपि न त्वबुद्धार्थबोधनम् ॥९३८॥

As one notices (i.e. refers to) all that is non-Ātman in the case of the rules called *niyama* and *parisaṃkhyā*,¹ there follows contingently the meaninglessness of the entire portion of the Veda, relating to ritual activity, as there is really no basis or support for the same. [936]

Also, because (the Ātman is) what has been ever obtained; therefore, there is no possibility of the occurrence of the two (i.e. *niyama* and *parisaṃkhyā*), since every injunction is ever expected to have a reference to what has not been obtained. [937]

Thus, there is refutation stated in respect of every kind of (postulated notion of) injunction as regards the sentence mentioning the acquisition of the knowledge of the Ātman; but (there is not set aside the notion of) informing one of what is not known.² [938]

In verses 936-938 Sureśvara examines the nature of the sentence *viññāya prajñāṃ kurvīta* as an injunction.

¹*niyama* is a kind of rule defined as *pākṣika*, what is related to one of the alternative (already known) ways of performing a ritual, and *parisaṃkhyā* refers to the exclusion of what occurred to one as a way of performance (*nityaprāpta*).

The intention in this verse is to state that *viññāya* ... does not belong to any of the two kinds of injunction. What therefore might remain is the acceptance of the sentence as *apūrvavidhi*. But that can be accepted only when the sentence is taken to have reference to what is not known before (*ajñātajñāpana*) and that does not mean: 'There is not any activity to be understood by any person for acquiring the knowledge of the Ātman.' Therefore, the sentence cannot be taken as an *apūrvavidhi* also.

²This last clause sets aside the idea of a *pravartakavidhi* 'injunction which promotes an activity' in the sentence *viññāya* This has reference to verse 893 above.

कर्तव्यता न साध्यस्य विज्ञातत्वाद्विधीयते ।
दुःखत्वाच्च न यागस्य ह्युपायोऽतोऽत्र बोध्यते ॥९३९॥

There is not prescribed (here) what is to be performed in the case of what has to be obtained, owing to that (the latter) has been already known and, further, there is not prescribed here any means towards performance of any sacrifice, because that involves misery.¹ [939]

¹This refers to the so-called Karma Kāṇḍa portion of the Veda.

प्रवृत्तिरप्रवृत्तिर्वा मेयवस्त्वनुरोधिनी ।
प्रमात्र बोधिकैवातो न प्रवृत्तिः प्रमाणतः ॥९४०॥

Here, i.e. in the Veda, any activity or cessation of an activity has only to be in accordance with (the nature of) the thing to be known; therefore, the proper knowledge acquired from the same (i.e. Veda— *atra*) is merely informative. Therefore, there is not any activity (promoted) by the means of knowing (i.e. by the Veda). [940]

The basis of the argument in this verse is that, according to some Bhāvanāvādins, Veda (i.e. Vedic words) would purport to promote an activity which is good and to avert activity which is ill. But, in the case of the Ātman, any general idea, good or evil, is irrelevant and, therefore, the Veda should not be taken as promoter of any activity.

कर्त्रादिहेतूच्छित्तेऽत्र प्रवृत्तेर्नास्ति संभवः ।
सम्यग्ज्ञानसमुत्पत्तौ मेयस्याकारकत्वतः ॥९४१॥

Further, on account of the removal of the cause,¹ i.e. the agent etc.² (of an activity), there is not any possibility of any tendency to act—(this is so) because of the rise of the proper knowledge of the object of knowing as being what is not a

kāraka, 'an agent' etc.

[941]

¹This refers to ignorance.

²*kartrādi* refers to *kartr*, *karma* and *karana*.

अज्ञानध्वंसि विज्ञानं न च कारकरूपताम् ।
गृहीत्वेह तमो हन्ति द्वैधीभावेऽसिवत्क्वचित् ॥९४२॥

Here, i.e. in respect of the inner self, the particular knowledge is (merely) the destroyer of ignorance; it does not destroy (that) ignorance by assuming the form/nature of any means of activity (*kāraka*); since (a means assumes that nature) elsewhere, like a sword,¹ for there is accepted the relation based on duality.

[942]

¹A weapon for killing implies the existence of someone to be killed and, thus, a sense of duality is involved in respect of the same.

Verses 943-946 are the refutation of the view: ignorance is removed by repetition of acquiring knowledge.

प्रत्यग्बोधोऽप्रमः सिद्ध आगमापायिमातृवत् ।
प्रत्यङ्मात्रफलत्वेन साक्षित्वेन च सर्वदा ॥९४३॥

It is settled that the knowledge about (the nature of) the inner self does not come from (what is usually known as) the knowledge resulting from (or, produced by) the means of knowing in the same way as the knowledge of a knower (in the worldly doings), who is born and later dies; that (the inner self) is ever known to be the witness and also the result consists merely in the inner self itself.

[943]

अनात्मवस्तुना नात्माकारकत्वाद्विना तमः ।
संबन्धं लभते साक्षात्तथानात्मापि चात्मना ॥९४४॥

The Ātman does not come into connection with anything that is non-Ātman and ignorance (also) cannot be there unless it is associated with what has the nature of a *kāraṇa* '(a factor connected with an activity such as) an agent'; even the non-Ātman does not get connected with the Ātman. [944]

This verse clarifies that there is not any real or unreal relation (or, connection) between the witness, i.e. the inner self, and the non-Ātman.

SP rightly draws attention to the break-up of the Saṃdhi in the first half as *ātmā akāraṇatvāt*.

बुद्ध्यादिर्जडरूपत्वात्स्वमहिम्ना न सिध्यति ।
बोधात्मवत्स्वतःसिद्धप्रत्यक्सिद्धयैव सिध्यति ॥९४५॥

The intellect etc.¹ do not get established by their own strength, since they have the nature of non-sentience; they become established only through the establishment of the inner self, which is of the nature of knowledge (itself) and which is established by itself. [945]

¹The word 'etc.' implies the plural—that is maintained in the whole of the verse.

स्वार्थं प्रत्येव सर्वोऽपि परार्थोऽर्थः प्रसिध्यति ।
यथा स्वप्नविनिर्माणं सिध्येत्स्वप्नदृशं प्रति ॥९४६॥

Everything, which serves the purpose of another, gets established (only) with reference to its own object; as, for example, the creation in the dream state would be useful (lit. get established) only for the seer of the dream. [946]

In verses 947 and 948, it is asserted that Ātman is only self-established.

पृथक्त्वे वापृथक्त्वे वा नैव तस्य मृषात्मता ।

पृथक्त्वे स्वमहिम्नैव तस्य सिद्धेः परात्मवत् ॥९४७॥

(The world could be held) different or non-different (from that Ātman), (yet) that cannot at all be of nature of what is false. For, if it be held to have difference (from the Ātman); then, being established by its own greatness, it would be like the highest Ātman.¹ [947]

¹The simile purports to convey: it would be just (another?) Ātman. That is to say: there cannot be the world as non-different from the existent Ātman.

आत्मत्वादपृथक्त्वे च मानं नाशे च नेक्ष्यते ।
परमार्थमनाविश्य न मिथ्येति प्रसिध्यति ॥९४८॥

And further in/for holding it as the Ātman (and therefore) non-different (from it), there is not seen any proof (or, means of knowing it to be so) and (its having) destruction.¹ Also, it would/could not be established as not false, unless it be pervaded by the Ātman.² [948]

¹SP supports this by quoting *Gītā* 2.16: *nāsato vidyate bhāvo nābhāvo vidyate sataḥ*.

²Read SP on this: *ātmano bhinnābhinnātmanā jagan na siddhyati cet tarhi tadrāhitātmavat tad api svena svatantra rūpeṇa [sa syāt]*.

Verses 949-952 affirm: What is said to be 'imagined' (or, conceived) cannot be thought of unless it has a basis in a real support.

क्लृप्तसर्पाद्यभावोऽयं न संवत्त्वात्पृथङ्मितः ।
व्यतिरेकेण तत्सिद्धेर्नापि चात्मानमन्वियात् ॥९४९॥

This absence of serpent etc. which is imagined is not known (by an authoritative means of knowing) as different from the

reality, which is the wreath of flowers; further, by its being established ever in the absence of that, it would not resemble the Ātman. [949]

स्वार्थस्य प्रत्यगात्मत्वात्प्रत्यग्याथात्म्यतोऽपि च ।
खण्डमुण्डादिवन्मतो नानात्मा लभते भिदाम् ॥९५०॥

Also because a non-Ātman has for its own property as of the nature of the inner self from the inner self and also, because of the real nature of the inner self, it would not itself get to exist as some discrete object like *khaṇḍa*, *muṇḍa*. [950]

सर्वमात्मेत्यतो वाक्यात्प्रत्यङ्मात्रैकरूपताम् ।
तदबोधप्रहाणेन प्रतीमो जगदात्मनः ॥९५१॥

From the statement of the Śruti *sarvam ātmā* we understand the non-Ātman (lit. what is of the form of the universe) only as the inner self, through the destruction of ignorance about that (i.e. the inner self). [951]

तत्त्वप्रबोधनं मुक्त्वा कार्यकारणवस्तुनः ।
अपूर्वाद्यर्थवचसा नान्वयाद्यवबोध्यते ॥९५२॥

By the statement *apūrva* ...¹ is not known Anvaya etc. of things that are related as cause(s) and effect(s), except without (understanding) the true nature of them. [952]

Cf. *idaṃ sarvaṃ yad ayam ātmā* (BU 2.4.6; 4.5.7) quoted by SP.

¹BU 2.5.19: *tad etad brahmāpūrvam anaparam anantaram abāhyam* ...; cf. BU 3.8.8; and cf. note on verse 837 above.

Verses 953-957 conclude the discussion regarding an injunction in relation to the knowledge of the Ātman.

बोधोऽप्यकारको यस्माद्धन्त्यज्ञानमिहात्मनि ।
न चावृत्तिव्यपेक्षः सन्व्यञ्जकत्वात्तमोपनुत् ॥९५३॥

Since (acquiring) knowledge also is not produced by any *kāraka*, it destroys ignorance here in the Ātman. And, not being dependent on repeated study (of the scripture etc.), it removes ignorance through its power of revealing (the true nature of the object to be known). [953]

This is only to affirm that, in knowing the Ātman from Veda, there is no need of expecting any injunction.

एवं स्वात्मनि विज्ञाते निष्क्रियेऽकारकेऽफले ।
प्रवृत्तौ वा निवृत्तौ वा को हेतुरिति भण्यताम् ॥९५४॥

Thus, when one's own Ātman is known (by one) as having no activity, being a non-agent (*akāraka*)¹ and not having any result (lit. fruit to produce), what reason (or, cause) could there be for any inclination to or cessation from (an activity)—let this be told. [954]

¹Or better, not being connected with any activity.

प्रत्यङ्मात्रैकतां मुक्त्वा तदविद्यामृते न हि ।
विद्वान्रूपान्तरं पश्येद्यत्र हीति तथा श्रुतिः ॥९५५॥

Indeed, the knower (of the Brahman) would not see here anything else than the mere singleness of the inner self and without (even a little of) ignorance about it—to this effect (or, to say this) there is a Śruti statement, viz. *yatra hi* [955]

नातोऽविद्यासमच्छित्तौ ब्रह्मयाथात्म्यबोधतः ।
प्रतीचि भूयोऽविद्यायाः संभवोऽस्ति प्रमाणतः ॥९५६॥

Therefore, when there is the destruction of ignorance (about

the nature of the Ātman) no possibility of (there being) any ignorance with reference to (or, lit. any authoritative means of knowing) the inner self in its true nature as the Brahman. [956]

रागादिदर्शनं यच्च ज्ञानिनोऽपीह चोद्यते ।
बाधितस्यैव तत्सूतेस्तदप्युक्ते न दूषणम् ॥९५७॥

And as to what is stated as a counterargument, viz. the noticing of attachment etc. on the part of a knower (of the Brahman), (it may be pointed out that), because it has its birth which is stultified (viz. ignorance), there cannot be considered a fault in what is said (by us). [957]

Verses 958-960 state that there is no fault (or, difficulty) in the recurrence of what has been (once) stultified.

बाध्यबाधकयोर्यस्मात्संबन्धः सकृदेव तु ।
संबन्धोत्तरकाले तु तत्स्मृत्योरेव संगतिः ॥९५८॥

The connection of what is to be stultified and what stultifies it occurs only once and (*tu*) in the time subsequent (to the existence of) that connection, there is association of only memories of them. [958]

This is to state that there will not really exist any ignorance when it is once destroyed; there might remain only the memories of those discrete objects which were its products—yet, see the next verse.

न च स्मृतेः प्रमाणत्वं क्वचित्सिद्धान्त इष्यते ।
प्रमाणलक्षणाभावान्न च बाधोऽप्रमाणतः ॥९५९॥

Also (or, But) nowhere in the Siddhāntin's view is accepted memory as an authoritative means of knowing; therefore, owing to the absence of any authoritative means (regarding that),

there cannot be any stultification (of the knowledge of the nature of the Brahman) by the absence of any authoritative means of knowing. [959]

मात्रादिकारणव्यवस्थेः पराङ्मानं प्रबाधतः ।
प्रत्यक्षादिविरोधोऽपि नातश्चोद्यः कथं चन ॥९६०॥

(Thus) from the destruction of the cause(s) such as the knower etc. and also from the stultification of any external means of knowing it would not also be proper to hypothesize (or, put forth a counterargument) about the means such as direct perception. [960]

This verse rejects the expectancy of any means for acquiring prajñā.

उदकै च शमादीनि साधनानि प्रवक्ष्यति ।
उक्तप्रज्ञाप्रसिद्धयर्थं येषु स्वातन्त्र्यमिष्यते ॥९६१॥

Further, in the subsequent portions, the Śruti will state such means as śama etc. for securing/establishing what has been enunciated—(those means) with reference to which is accepted freedom (on the part of a seeker of liberation). [961]

This verse begins to explain the words in BU 4.4.21, after there has been earlier the refutation of the explanation given by Bhartṛprapañca in relation to vijñāya This continues up to verse 964 below.

नाभिध्यायेदतः शब्दाननात्मार्थावबोधिनः ।
बहून्तित्यनुवादः स्यात्तद्वहुत्वस्य सिद्धितः ॥९६२॥

Therefore, one should not meditate¹ on words which are not informative of the Ātman; the word *bahūn* (in the Śruti) is just a restatement of the multiplicity (of the objects) that is already established. [962]

¹*abhidhyāyet* is the paraphrase of *anudhyāyāt* in the original, cf. verse 969 below.

वाचो विग्लापनमिति श्रुत्या निन्दाभिधीयते ।
भूरिशब्दानुचिन्तायास्तन्निषेधप्रसिद्धये ॥९६३॥

In the phrase *vāco viglāpanam*, there is stated by the Śruti the censure of meditation on many words, in order that the rejection of that (i.e. the same) becomes (firmly) established.

[963]

प्रभूतशब्दाभिध्यानं नालं मोक्षार्थसिद्धये ।
न चेदेवं फलं तत्स्याद्वाक्तालुगलशोषणम् ॥९६४॥

Meditation on many words does not effect/result into (or bring about) the attainment of the state of liberation; if otherwise (lit. if that would not be so), it would result in drying up of speech, palate and throat.

[964]

In verses 965-969, Sureśvara takes up the refutation of the view of Bhartṛprapañca in this regard.

उक्तव्याख्यानतोऽन्यस्य व्याख्यानस्य यथोदित-
न्यायेन दूषितत्वात्तद्वृषणार्थं न यत्यते ॥९६५॥

On the strength of the explanation stated (just now), there is no effort made to give blame to the explanation which is given by another,¹ because it is refuted for the reason pointed (out earlier).²

[965]

¹This refers to those words of Bhartṛprapañca which are quoted by SP thus: *dvaitābhidhāyakāñ śabdān dhyānakāle na cintayed (iti)*.

²That refers to *mokṣārthasiddhaye nālam* in the preceding verse.

ओमित्येवं सदा ध्यायेदन्या वाचो विमुञ्चथ ।
तेऽनुवित्त्वेति च तथा त्रयीत्यागे वचः स्फुटम् ॥९६६॥

There are clear statements in the Śruti thus: *om ity evaṃ sadā dhyāyed*,¹ *anyā vāco vimuñcatha*,² *te 'nuvittvā*,³ with reference to giving up of (the study of) the Vedic triad. [966]

¹*Muṇḍakopaniṣad* 2.2.6; 'meditate on om (as the soul)'.

²*Muṇḍakopaniṣad* 2.2.5; 'dismiss other utterances or words'.

³Not traced; 'They, having found'.

हेत्वर्थ इतिशब्दोऽयं बहुशब्दजिहासया ।
मन्त्राम्नायसमाप्त्यर्थं यदि वेतिसमीरणम् ॥९६७॥

This word *iti* (is used here) for conveying the reason; viz. through the desire of giving up (the meditation on) many words; and the statement *yadi vā* ... is to cover (or completely convey) what is obtained from the Mantra and tradition.¹ [967]

¹Perhaps this refers to the Brāhmaṇa as that is mentioned specifically in the next verse.

सहेतुकावभिहितौ बन्धमोक्षौ प्रयत्नतः ।
मन्त्रोक्त्या ब्राह्मणोक्त्या च पुंसां श्रेयोभिवाञ्छिनाम् ॥९६८॥

That, bondage and liberation have for them (some) causes, is carefully (or specifically) mentioned by statements of the Mantra¹ and also of the Brāhmaṇa² in relation to persons who wish to acquire the good. [968]

¹SP refers to *saktaḥ saha karmaṇī* ... (cited in BU 4.4.6).

²SP refers to *sa yatrāyam ātmā* ... (BU 4.4.1).

नानुध्यायाद्बहुशब्दानिति कस्मादिहोच्यते ।
अल्पीयसां वा न त्यागः कस्मादित्यभिधीयताम् ॥९६९॥

(A question is asked:) 'Why is it stated here 'one should not meditate on many words?' or, 'Why is not there (stated) the giving up of fewer (words)?' Let this be told. [969]

The discussion on BU 4.4.22 begins here. Verses 970-972 state that the rise of the desire to know the Brahman leads to the pursuit of the Veda, i.e. Vedic rituals.

शब्दस्याल्पीयसोऽत्यागे तत्र तावदिहोच्यते ।
हेतुस्त्रय्यास्तु संत्यागे तमेतमिति वक्ष्यते ॥९७०॥

To begin with, then, here is stated (the reason) for not abandoning smaller word (i.e. Karma Kāṇḍa); and as for abandoning of (the recitation of) the Vedic triad, it will be stated in the Śruti itself thus: *tam etam ...* (BU 4.4.22). [970]

यदि वा भिन्नवाक्यत्वात्कर्मविज्ञानकाण्डयोः ।
वेदान्तैः कर्मकाण्डस्य परस्परविरोधतः ॥९७१॥

Or rather (this is so), because there is mutual contradiction of Vedic portion referring to rituals, i.e. Karma Kāṇḍa with that about (*vijñāna* i.e.) the Upaniṣads/Vedānta texts, since the two portions of the Veda given to the ritual activity and to knowledge are mutually opposed. [971]

हेतुतां प्रतिपद्यन्ते कर्माण्यपि विमुक्तये ।
बुद्धेः संस्कारकत्वेन यथा तदभिधीयते ॥९७२॥

(Now) is stated as to how even ritual activities become the cause of liberation by their becoming the means of purifying the intellect. [972]

Verses 973-979 discuss BUB: evaṁ tasminn ātmaviṣaye sarvo vedah ...

पूर्वो भागः समस्तोऽपि वेदान्तार्थावबुद्धये ।
 यथा भवति वेदस्य तथाथ प्रतिपाद्यते ॥९७३॥
 वेदान्तार्थं यथायातमनद्य श्रुतिरादरात् ।
 स वा इत्यादिनोक्तार्थं प्रवक्तुमुपचक्रमे ॥९७४॥

Now is stated as to how the entire earlier portion of the Veda results into (lit. becomes the cause of, or, leads to) the knowledge of the matter (stated) in the Vedānta texts;

[973]

then, having restated the teaching of the Vedānta texts, as it came (into tradition) in the words *sa vā* ... the Śruti began respectfully to state the matter, already stated.

[974]

परामर्शः सशब्देन पूर्वोक्तस्य प्रसिद्धितः ।
 वैशब्दः स्मृतये तस्य मृतिजन्मादिधर्मिणः ॥९७५॥

In the word *saḥ* is there a reference to what has been already said, (this is so) on the basis of its being known; the word *vai* is for reminding one of that person in whose case there occur the incidents of death, birth, etc.

[975]

In this verse, Sureśvara gives the meanings of the two words *saḥ* and *vai* from the statement about *vividiṣā*. Also, the word *dharma* is used in some peculiar sense, i.e. of incident, or, happening.

ध्रुवान्तमन्त्राम्नायोक्त एष इत्यभिधीयते ।
 महानज इति वचस्तद्विशेषणसिद्धये ॥९७६॥

In the word *eṣaḥ* is referred to (that person) who is stated in the Mantra ending with the traditional ending *dhruva*;¹ the statement *mahān ajah* is used for effecting (the sense of) attributes of him.

[976]

This is the explanation of *eṣa mahān ajaḥ*.

¹This refers to BU 4.4.20: *virajaḥ ... mahān dhruvaḥ*.

अन्वयव्यतिरेकार्था योऽयमित्यादिका श्रुतिः ।
विशेषणविशेष्यार्थं सर्वस्येति तथा वचः ॥९७७॥

The Śruti text which begins with (the words) *yo 'yam* is for (effecting) the Anvaya and Vyatireka (in respect of the Mantra); so also, the word *sarvasya* is for specifying (the nature of) the substantive by (its) adjectives. [977]

यदत्र किञ्चिद्वक्तव्यं तस्य प्रागेव चोक्तितः ।
सामानाधिकरण्यादेर्नेह तत्पुनरुच्यते ॥९७८॥

Since there has been earlier ¹ the statement of whatever that has to be stated here, viz. of being in the same case relation etc.; therefore, that is not stated here again. [978]

¹This refers to the discussion of *sāmānādhikaranya* etc. in Brahma Kaṇḍikā. Cf. BUBV 1.4.1416-1427.

भूयान्स साधुना नेति ज्ञानस्य फलमुच्यते ।
एष सर्वेश्वरोक्त्या च यथोक्तस्यैव संस्तुतिः ॥९७९॥

In the words *bhūyān sa sādhuṇā na* there is stated the result of (the acquisition of) knowledge and in the statement *eṣa sarveśvaraḥ* there is praise of what is already stated. [979]

Verses 980-985 state the purport of the Mahāvākya, *sa vā eṣa mahān*

एतदुक्तं भवत्यत्र योऽयमित्यादिनोदितः ।
विविक्तः कामकर्मादेः स्वयंज्योतिश्च शब्दितः ॥९८०॥
स एष ईश्वरः साक्षादिति श्रुत्या प्रदर्शितः ।
विशेषणविशेष्यत्वमीशितव्येशयोरिह ॥९८१॥

This is mentioned (or, referred to) in the words *yo 'yam ...* (Then the meaning) intended: In this context, (the person who is) shown to be aloof from desire, action etc. and also called the self-illuminating, [980]
and is mentioned (lit. shown) by/in the Śruti as *sa eṣa īśvaraḥ sākṣāt ...*; this is because there is here the relation of being the qualifier and what is qualified¹ between the one to be controlled and the other, the controller. [981]

¹Thus there is stated the division of *viśeṣaṇa* and *viśeṣya* in the Śruti statement.

यमपेक्ष्येश्वरत्वं स्यात्तत्तावत्प्रतिषेधति ।
विशेषणविरोधित्वान्महत्त्वं कुम्भगं यथा ॥९८२॥

The Śruti then (*tāvat*) rejects that with reference to which there would be the lordship (of the master); this is on the basis of the opposition between the adjectives (of the two), as, for example, between the great ether and the ether obtaining in a pitcher.¹ [982]

¹The example is elucidated in the next verse.

ईशितव्यापनतौ च तदपेक्षैकसंश्रयात् ।
ईशित्वमपि निःशेषं प्रतीचो विनिवर्तते ॥९८३॥

When the one to be controlled is set aside the lordship also in respect of the inner self would not entirely remain (as established), for that lordship is with reference to the expectancy of that (which is to be controlled). [983]

घटाकाशो महाकाश इत्युक्ते कुम्भखहनुतौ ।
आकाशमात्रताशेषो यथैवेह तथात्मनि ॥९८४॥

As, when it is said for effecting the concealment/denial of ether in a pitcher, in the statement of the ether in a pitcher,

it is described as the great ether, there is only ether that remains (in one's understanding), so also, here in the case of the Ātman alone.¹

[984]

This is elucidation of the illustration expressing *mahat*

¹Add to complete the sense; there remains only the Ātman. There remains the immanent with all its attributes given up.

विरुद्धयोरसंसर्गो यथैवमविरुद्धयोः ।

तदबोधसमुच्छित्ताववाक्यार्थोऽवशिष्यते ॥९८५॥

As there cannot be any connection between two things that are opposed in nature, so also there cannot be any connection of things which are not opposed.¹ (As) there is removal of ignorance about that (i.e. the inner self), what remains is only what is not the meaning of the sentence.²

[985]

¹*ghaṭa*, *paṭa* do not have any connection between them, since there is mutual opposition of the two; so also if *pratyaktva* and *advitīyatva* are but one (that is, they do not have any opposition between them) they do not have between them any connection also.

²By *avākyaṛtha* Sureśvara understands the inner self which cannot be the subject or object of usual sentences.

Verses 986-992 state meanings of different words in the text.

ऐदंपर्यमिदं तावत्पदार्थोऽथाधुनोच्यते ।

स वा इतिवचोऽर्थस्य व्याख्यातत्वान्न यत्यते ।

तद्व्याख्यानाय भूयोऽपि तस्य चेहानुवादतः ॥९८६॥

This is, so far, the purport of all this (that is said) in the text. Now is explained the meaning of the (different) words. (Yet) because, the meaning of the words *sa vā* has already been explained, there is not any effort made again for explaining it; therefore, the mention of that is merely a

restatement.¹

[986]

¹It is a restatement for the purpose of stating the reason for the earlier argument and, therefore, it should not be considered as repetition.

आकाशवचसा चोक्तः परोऽज्ञातो जगद्गुरुः ।
जगज्जनिस्थितिध्वंसहेतुरात्मविशेषणम् ॥९८७॥

By the word *ākāśa* is here stated the highest, the unknown and the best (lit. venerable or respectable) in the world—the specification of the nature in the case of the Ātman is in the word 'it is the cause of origin, sustenance and destruction of this world'.

[987]

क्षेत्रक्षेत्रज्ञयोरेष स्वभावः प्राक्समीरितः ।
अप्रबुद्धात्मतत्त्वः सन्कारणात्मतया स्थितः ॥९८८॥

This is thus the nature of the field and the knower of field as stated before—the Ātman, being of unknown nature, is stated there, as being the cause of the world.

[988]

सर्वमस्य वशे यस्माद्वशी सर्वस्य तेन सः ।
उदासीनस्य तस्य स्याद्वशित्वमिति चेन्मतम् ॥९८९॥
वशित्वशक्तिसंबन्धान्मैवं यस्मात्पुनर्वचः ।
सर्वस्येशान एवेति सर्वस्येष्टे सदैव सः ॥९९०॥

Since all (the world) is under the control of this one, therefore it is called the master (or, lord) of all. But, if it were held that there could not be the masterhood of all when (i.e. for) it is inactive;

[989]

(we say, this is not so) owing to its connection with the power of being a controller; therefore, do not think this way, as there are once again the statements *sarvasyeśāna eva* and *sarvasyeṣṭe sadaiva*.

[990]

कुमारनृपवत्तत्स्यादीशानत्वं परात्मनः ।
 इति चेन्नैतदेवं स्याद्यतोऽधिपतिरुच्यते ॥९९१॥
 अधिष्ठायान्तर्यामिणोऽद्वैतसिद्धिर्वा
 त्रिविधेनाधिपत्येन स जगत्पाति सर्वदा ॥९९२॥

If one were to say, 'This lordship in the case of the highest Ātman would be like that of royalty in a prince', this is not so, because that one is described as *adhipati* 'overlord'. [991]
 That lord ever protects the world, with its threefold mastery, in relation to origin, sustenance and destruction (of the same), since that one has pervaded it by its being the effect of the Ātman. [992]

Verses 993-998 state: on the basis of the *Śruti sa sādhanā*—that the overlord does not have any merit and/or demerit.

धर्माधर्मसमायोगो लोकवच्छासनात्प्रभोः ।
 प्राप्नोति चेन्न तत्प्राप्तिः स नेति वचसः श्रुतेः ॥९९३॥

If it is held that (this overlordship) comes to the Ātman because of its controlling, as in the world where there occurs the connection of merit and demerit, that (acquisition of that master or overlord) is not (real), as it is understood from the statement in the *Śruti sa neti*. [993]

स्वकर्तृफलदायित्वं स्वभावः कर्मणां मतः ।
 कर्तृस्वामित्वविरहान्नेशस्य फलसंगतिः ॥९९४॥

It is held that bringing about the result of his own (actions) to the agent is the nature of actions; (but it is not so in the case of the overlord) since there is no connection of the result (of any of its activity) owing to the absence of agency and mastery.¹ [994]

¹These two are merely attributed to the Ātman—they are not real—and this is explained in the next verse.

कौटस्थ्यात्रास्य कर्तृत्वमकार्यकारणत्वतः ।
कार्यकारणभेदेन तदविद्यैव संस्थिता ॥९९५॥

Because of its immutability, there is no agentship (of any activity) in the case of this one and also, because it is neither a cause nor an effect, it has no connection with such discrete things as cause(s) and effect(s); therefore, there is only ignorance that is established. [995]

अस्थलं नेति नेतीति न जायत इति श्रुतिः ।
अपूर्वानपरेत्याद्या तथा च सति युज्यते ॥९९६॥

(Further) the Śruti (statements): *asthūlam, neti neti, na jāyate, apūrvānapara* and others would be reasonable only if that be the state (of the Ātman or overlord as stated above). [996]

स्वस्वामित्वादिसंबन्धस्तथा नास्याद्वितीयतः ।
यत्र हि द्वैतमित्येवं तथा च श्रुतिशासनम् ॥९९७॥

In the same way, there is not in the case of this Ātman (i.e. the overlord) any connection between what is its own and also its mastery on account of its being non-dual; to this effect is there an instruction in the Śruti, viz. *yatra hi dvaitam*. [997]

जन्मादयो विकारा ये संबन्धाश्चापि ये मताः ।
अविद्योपप्लुतस्यैव ते सर्वे स्युर्न तु स्वतः ॥९९८॥

And the modifications such as birth etc. and also the relations which are held (by the opponents to be obtaining in respect of the overlord) cannot be there, on their own, since all of them belong to that Ātman which is overwhelmed by ignorance. [998]

In verses 999-1003 is stated the reason for the overlord's not having any connection with merit and/or demerit.

यत एवमतो नेशो भूयान्स्यात्साधुकर्मणा ।
कनीयान्नापि पापेन तदकर्तृत्वहेतुतः ॥९९९॥

Since this is so, the Ātman would not be the overlord by its good doing or be less than others by its ill (doings) owing to its not being the cause, i.e. because of the absence of agency (in any action). [999]

क्षेत्रज्ञस्य सतो यद्वत्पुण्यपापाभिसंगतिः ।
कर्तृत्वाद्यभिमानित्वान्नैशस्य तदसंभवात् ॥१०००॥

As there is the connection of the Ātman with good and/or evil (doings), while it is the knower of the field and on account of its having consciousness of being an agent (of actions) etc., these are not possible in the case of the overlord. [1000]

निर्हेतुत्वात्प्रतीचोऽस्य तमस्वित्वस्य सर्वदा ।
हानिवृद्धी न तस्यातो धर्माधर्मैरसंगतेः ॥१००१॥

Because this one, while it is the inner self, has been never a cause of its being possessed by ignorance; therefore, there cannot be any waxing and decrease (or, waning) on account of its non-connection with merit and demerit. [1001]

न कार्यकारणं वास्य यत्कर्तृत्वादिकारणम् ।
स्वतोऽसङ्गस्वभावत्वान्निरंशैकत्वतस्तथा ॥१००२॥

Nor is this one (i.e. the Ātman) the cause of some effect, i.e. that which is really the cause of being an agent (of some activity) etc., because of its own nature of being unattached (to anything else) and also because it is one single entity without being comprised of any parts. [1002]

स्वत एवंस्वभावोऽपि तदविद्यासमाश्रयात् ।
एष सर्वेश्वरो देव ईशितव्यव्यपेक्षया ॥१००३॥

Thus, being of this nature, in its own right, and having a relation to ignorance about itself, this one is called the overlord of all, the shining one in relation to what are to be lorded over. [1003]

In verses 1004 and 1005, Sureśvara sets aside the notion of repetition with reference to the statement in the Śruti sarvasyeśānah.

एष सर्वेश्वर इति पुनरुक्तं किमुच्यते ।
वक्ष्यमाणबुभुत्साया विषयत्वप्रसिद्धये ॥१००४॥

(A question is asked:) 'Why are the words *eṣa sarveśvaraḥ* repeated?' and the answer given is: 'It is for establishing the subject matter for a person's desire to know,¹ as will be stated'.

[1004]

¹On *bubhuṭsā* refer to verse 1021 below.

अज्ञात एष एवात्मा तावन्मात्रसतत्त्वतः ।
ईशादेर्विषयान्तस्य कल्पितत्वमतो भवेत् ॥१००५॥

This Ātman is already (*eva*) not known, because it has only that (i.e. being unknown) as its nature; therefore, there occurs falsity in respect of (all things) beginning with the overlord up to all the objects of knowing.¹ [1005]

¹When there is the knowledge of things like the overlord etc.; that is taken to be the product of ignorance and those are all only non-Ātman.

Verses 1006-1009 state that the overlord does not come to have any merit etc. by doing any favour to its devotees.

साध्वाद्यनभिसंबन्धे यदि वा हेतुरुच्यते ।

एष इत्यादिवचसा सर्वेशस्यात्मनः स्फुटः ॥१००६॥

Or rather, in the statement *eṣa ...*,¹ there is stated a clear reason why there does not obtain any connection of the overlord, i.e. the Ātman, with good etc. [1006]

¹This has reference to *sa na*

धर्माधर्मादितन्त्रोऽर्थस्तत्फलेनेह लिप्यते ।
विज्ञानात्मा न तु तथा सर्वेशत्वात्परो भवेत् ॥१००७॥
सर्वस्य कर्मणोऽप्येष कारकस्य च तत्कृतः ।
स्वतन्त्र ईश्वरो यस्मान्नातो धर्मादितन्त्रता ॥१००८॥

The specifically knowing Ātman depends on merit, demerit etc. and is thus affected by the result(s) of the same; but the lord (the highest Ātman) would not be like that, owing to its lordship of all. [1007]

Also, since it is an independent overlord of all activity (i.e. activities) and also of all the factors of that activity (viz. *kāraṅkas*); therefore, there is no dependence (in the case of it) on (i.e. not its being guided by) merit etc. [1008]

भूतानि जनिमन्त्येष यतः पालयतीश्वरः ।
भूतपालस्ततो देवः कार्याणां कारणत्वतः ॥१००९॥

Since this overlord protects all the beings, that were born, therefore, the divine one is the protector of the beings, by being the cause of all effects (or, discrete worldly objects). [1009]

This justifies why the overlord is described as the protector of beings.

कारणेन हि पाल्यन्ते कार्याणीह यतस्ततः ।
तत्कार्यत्वाच्च भूतानां भूतपालत्वमात्मनः ॥१०१०॥

Since all effects are governed by their cause(s);¹ therefore, the Ātman is the protector of (all) the beings, their being the products of the same. [1010]

¹SP refers to the idea of BS 1.1.2: *janmādy asya yataḥ*.

Verses 1011 and 1012 state the purport of the words bhūtādhipati in the Kāṇva recension and of lokapāla in the Mādhyandina.

भूताधिपतिशब्देन ब्रह्मा वात्राभिधीयते ।
इन्द्रो लोकेश्वरश्चात्र वरुणाद्यात्मना तथा ॥१०११॥
लोकपालोऽपि चाप्येष तथाकार्यस्य दर्शनात् ।
प्रशासितापि चाप्येष तदेतदभिधीयते ॥१०१२॥

Or, the word *bhūtādhipati* is mentioned here for Brahmadeva¹ and the lord of the worlds here is Indra, so also as being Varuṇa and others. [1011]

This one (i.e. Ātman) is also the protector of the worlds,² since there is noticed on its part the activity of a similar kind. Also, this one is the ruler of them—that is mentioned here (thus). [1012]

¹This has reference to God Hiranyagarbha, who, SP states, is mentioned in the well-known Hiranyagarbha-Sūkta of the Veda.

²The word *lokapāla* is read in the Mādhyandina recension of BU and, therefore, Sureśvara offered an explanation of it also.

It is stated in verses 1013 and 1014 that the overlord itself is the ruler of the different worlds, by assuming the forms of Indra and others.

लोकानां रचना यैषा क्षित्यादीनां व्यवस्थिता ।
सिद्धासंकीर्यमाणेह साप्यस्यैवानुशासनात् ॥१०१३॥

What is established as this arrangement of the worlds like

the earth etc. is also made unflittering by the dictates of this one.¹ [1013]

¹SP explains this nature of the Ātman by referring it to *ato nyad ārtam* (BU 3.4.2; 3.5.1; 3.7.23).

वर्णाश्रमादिहेतूनां व्यवस्थानामसंकरः ।
नैव सिध्येद्विना हेतुं सेतुरेष इतीक्ष्यताम् ॥१०१४॥

Since there would not be established (among the (people's) castes and stages of life etc.) the non-distinction of the order of the different causes responsible for castes and stages of life; therefore, let this one¹ be accepted (lit. seen) as the bridge. [1014]

¹Namely, the highest Ātman, existing in all individuals.

In verses 1015-1021, the bridge is described as the cause for non-mingling (or, order/arrangement) of the (earlier) said distinction.

यथोदकप्रवाहस्य सेतुर्विधरणस्तथा ।
सर्वलोकव्यवस्थानां सेतुः स परमेश्वरः ॥१०१५॥
किमर्थं सेतुरित्येवमाकाङ्क्षायां परं वचः ।
असंभेदाय लोकानामेषामित्यभिधीयते ॥१०१६॥

As a bridge is the supporter of any stream of water, so also is that overlord the bridge of all kinds of arrangements/orders among all the people. [1015]

The subsequent statement *asambhedāya lokānām* 'to keep (different) worlds apart' is made in the Śruti in answer to the expectation (or, question) as to why the bridge is made. [1016]

असंभिन्नव्यवस्थाः स्युः कथं नाम यथोदिताः ।
तस्मै तस्मै फलायालं सेतुरीशो भवेत्ततः ॥१०१७॥

(An argument is adduced in the form of a question:) 'How indeed would (people), as stated above, have the definite and arranged order?' For everyone of them, i.e. the various results, is the lord responsible (lit. capable). [1017]

एवं तावत्समासेन षष्ठाध्यायोक्तमादरात् ।
श्रुत्यानूद्याखिलं वस्तु तस्याथ प्रतिपत्तये ॥१०१८॥
उपायतां यथा सर्वो वेदोऽयं प्रतिपद्यते ।
तमेतमिति वाक्येन तदेतदभिधीयते ॥१०१९॥

Thus far, after respectfully restating in brief, all the matter in the sixth (i.e. fourth) Adhyāya, the Śruti has now stated for his (i.e. listeners') understanding, [1018] that it becomes the means (for that arrangement among them, in the words) *sarvo vedo 'yam*— this is (now) stated in the sentence *taṁ etaṁ* [1019]

एतं विविदिषन्त्युक्तं वेदानुवचनादिभिः ।
उपायैरीश्वरं साक्षादपेताशेषकल्पनम् ॥१०२०॥

The statement: *etaṁ vividiṣanti* '(Brāhmaṇas) seek to know it' and also the various means in the words *vedānuvacana* etc. are the ways of (getting to know) directly the lord, who is above the entirety of false notions. [1020]

स्वातन्त्र्येणेशविषया बुभुत्साप्यतिदुर्लभा ।
गम्यते तदुपायानां विधानाद्यत्नतः श्रुतौ ॥१०२१॥

(This is for the reason that) this desire to know about the overlord would be difficult to obtain (in any human being) through his free will (*svātantrya*); therefore, there is a special statement made about those means in the Śruti. [1021]

This verse points out that distinct sentences occur in the Karma Kāṇḍa and the Vedānta texts, after keeping in view their different

viniyogas.

विनियोगप्रयत्नाच्च कर्मविज्ञानकाण्डयोः ।
गम्यते भिन्नवाक्यत्वं नैकत्र विनियोगीः ॥१०२२॥

Further, from this attempt to specify the employment of the means in the two different portions of Veda, i.e. those which relate to (ritual) activity and to knowledge there is understood the lack of unanimity/difference. There is **not** there (in Veda) at one place any statement about the employment (of the same). [1022]

Verses 1023 and 1024 point to (i.e. speak of) the rituals as the cause for the desire to know the Ātman.

यद्बुभुत्सापि दुष्प्रापा वद तत्तत्त्वबोधनम् ।
ततोऽपि दुर्लभतरमुपायाल्लभ्यते कुतः ॥१०२३॥

Give me the information about that reality, the one which is desired to be known (and) which is very difficult to be obtained (among people)—whence is that to be obtained by (the adoption of) the means which are more difficult than that (i.e. the desire)? [1023]

बुभुत्सामात्र एवामी वेदानुवचनादयः ।
विनियुक्ता यतस्तस्मात्रैते तज्ज्ञानसिद्धये ॥१०२४॥

Since these, i.e. *vedānuvacana*¹ etc., are employed (with an intention to create) only the desire to know (the Ātman); therefore, it follows that they do not result in the knowledge of that (i.e. the Ātman). [1024]

¹In *veda* and *anuvacana* there is a separate mention of each; the former is Mantra in the Saṃhitā and the latter, the Brāhmaṇa text(s).

Verses 1025-1027 affirm that *śama* etc. are the cause of knowledge.

अत एव श्रुतिर्यत्नाच्छमादीनेव वक्ष्यति ।
उपायानात्मयाथात्म्यविज्ञानाय यमात्मकान् ॥१०२५॥

(It is) just for this reason that the Śruti will specifically state the means *śama* etc., which are of the nature of *yama* etc., as the means to the knowledge of the Ātman as it is. [1025]

SP, following BUB, refers to *yama* as *ahimsā*, *satya* etc.—so stated in the *Yogasūtra*. Possibly, this refers to the view of Bhartṛprapañca or his followers.

बुभुत्सासाधनेष्वेषु वेदानुवचनादिषु ।
अधिकारोऽविशेषेण ह्याश्रमाणां यथायुति ॥१०२६॥

In respect of these means for satisfying the desire to know (the nature of the Ātman), i.e. *veda*, *anuvacana* etc., various stages of life have eligibility without any differentiation (among them), and in accordance with (what is stated) in connection with each (*yathāyuti*).¹ [1026]

¹ AnSS edition records another reading *yathāśruti* in place of *yathāyuti*.

यथायोगं यथाश्रद्धं तद्बुभुत्साप्रसिद्धये ।
सर्वाश्रमैरमी कार्या वेदानुवचनादयः ॥१०२७॥

Persons belonging to all the stages of life should take to *vedānuvacana* etc., according to their connection with them and (also) according to their faith, in order that their desire to know that (Ātman) is fulfilled. [1027]

There follow in verses 1028-1031, the meanings of *vedānuvacana* etc.

वेदानुवचनोक्त्यात्र वेदाध्ययनमन्वहम् ।
श्रुत्येह भण्यतेऽस्मभ्यं नित्यस्वाध्यायलक्षणम् ॥१०२८॥

(Hence,) the Śruti has stated in the word *vedānuvacana* the daily study of the Veda which features as one's daily study for (all of) us. [1028]

This has reference to *Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa* 11.5.6.3; 11.5.7.2; 11.5.7.11.

ब्राह्मणग्रहणं चात्र द्विजानामुपलक्षणम् ।
अविशिष्टाधिकारित्वात्तेषामात्मावबोधने ॥१०२९॥

The mention here (in the Śruti) of a Brāhmaṇa is indicative of all the twice-borns,¹ because, with respect to getting to know the nature of the Brahman, there is not any specific qualification (of a Brāhmaṇa). [1029]

¹This refers to Brāhmaṇa, Kṣatriya and Vaiśya, all of whom have the same eligibility for acquiring the knowledge of the nature of the Brahman.

विविदिषन्तीतिगिरा संबन्धः प्रतिसाधनम् ।
साकाङ्क्षत्वादिह ज्ञेयो निराकाङ्क्षत्वसिद्धये ॥१०३०॥

The word *vividiṣanti* has connection with every means (mentioned in *vedānuvacana* etc.); here, owing to the expectancy (of the knowers for knowing the Brahman), it is to be known for effecting the state of being desireless. [1030]

वेदानुवचनोक्त्या वा कर्मकाण्डपरिग्रहः ।
व्याख्यानायाथ तस्यैव यज्ञेनेत्यादिरुच्यते ॥१०३१॥

Or, in the statement *vedānuvacana*, there is mention (lit. acceptance) of (only) that portion of the Veda which is related

to (ritual) activity, because there is (later) stated *yajñena* etc. in order to explain the idea of that very (statement). [1031]

In verses 1032-1034, Sureśvara refutes the view of Bhartrprapañca on the purport of vedānuvacana.

प्रकाशयमानमात्मानं वेदानुवचनेन तु ।
इति व्याचक्षते ये तु तेषां वेदान्तमात्रकम् ।
प्राप्तं वेदानुवचनं तदन्यस्याप्रकाशनात् ॥१०३२॥

However, for them, who explain that it is only by *vedānuvacana* that (the nature of) the Ātman is revealed, there is, in the word *vedānuvacana*, mention made of only the Vedānta texts, because the parts of the Veda other than that do not reveal that. [1032]

विरह्य न वेदान्तान्वेदेऽन्येन कथं चन ।
ग्रन्थेनाविष्कृतिः साक्षादात्मनोऽस्योपपद्यते ॥१०३३॥

(They think) that the Vedānta works, being kept apart, it is not reasonable to hold that the other works in (i.e. portions of) the Veda do not in any way directly reveal the nature of this Ātman. [1033]

तं त्वौपनिषदमिति नियमार्थे सतीष्यते ।
श्रौतं वाक्यमिदं न्याय्यं न तु सर्वोक्तिभासने ॥१०३४॥

In the words, *taṁ tv aupaniṣadam* ..., there is accepted (the study of only the Vedānta texts) for restricting (one's attention to the Upaniṣads); this statement of the Śruti is thus reasonable, but it is not to be taken with reference to (the nature of) all the statements (in the Vedānta texts as are capable of) revealing (the nature of the Ātman). [1034]

This is how they accept a kind of *niyamavidhi* in *taṁ tv*

Sureśvara states in verses 1035-1037 the faults in his own Siddhānta.

ननु सर्वस्य वेदस्य त्वत्पक्षेऽपि न सिध्यति ।
ग्रहणं यज्ञदानादिवाचकस्यैव संश्रयात् ॥१०३५॥

(A hypothetical objection is:) 'But, indeed, in your view also, this (revealing the nature of the Ātman) does not become established in respect of the entire extent of the Veda, because there is support taken in the mention which is expressive of (the performance of) sacrifice, (making) gifts etc' [1035]

मैवं विविदिषामात्रहेतोरेव परिग्रहात् ॥१०३६॥
वेदानुवचनस्येह न तु तत्त्वावबोधिः ।
त्रय्यन्तस्य ग्रहोऽत्र स्यात्साक्षाज्ज्ञाने तु तद्ग्रहः ॥१०३७॥

(The answer is made:) 'Do not think so, because that was accepted (by us) only for the desire to get to know'. [1036]
With reference to the statement *vedānuvacana*, however, showing there is not acceptance with reference to what reveals the nature of reality; the acceptance here of Vedānta, lit. the end or sequel of triad, also is reasonable, since there is acceptance of that for directly knowing (the Brahman). [1037]

अप्यभ्युपगमे नायं दोषोऽस्मान्प्रति द्वौकते ।
कृत्स्नवेदग्रहादाद्यव्याख्याने दोष एव न ॥१०३८॥

In case even that¹ is accepted, there will not come to us any fault, because there is, in our first explanation, the mention of the acceptance of the entire Veda and, therefore, there is not any fault. [1038]

¹Namely, the blame given to the Siddhāntin by Bhartṛprapañca or his follower, as stated in verse 1025.

In verses 1039-1041, Sureśvara states that the opponents consider

vedānuvacana etc. as leading to the desire to know the Brahman and finds fault with their view.

प्रकाश्यमाने मानेन बुभुत्सापि न युज्यते ।
साक्षात्त्वाद्बुभुत्सो माप्तेर्बुभुत्सा प्राक्प्रमायुतेः ॥१०३९॥

Also, when (the nature of the Ātman) is taken to be revealed by the means of knowing (i.e. by Vedānta), it is not reasonable to talk about any desire to know, since, owing to having obtained (what is to be known), i.e. the nature of the Ātman directly, that desire to know the Ātman (has to be taken) before one has acquired the right knowledge of it. [1039]

वेदानुवचनोक्त्यात्र नित्यं कर्मोपदिश्यते ।
यज्ञदानादिभिस्तस्य साहचर्येण हेतुना ॥१०४०॥

Here, i.e. in the sentence regarding *vedānuvacana*, there is mention made only of the daily duty (of the twice-born) for the reason that it has an intimate connection (*sāhacarya*) with the performance of sacrifice, making gifts etc. [1040]

सिद्धिर्विविदिषायाः स्याद्वेदानुवचनादिभिः ।
कथमित्युच्यते तेषां बुद्धिसंशुद्धिहेतुतः ॥१०४१॥

If a question is asked as to how there can be established the desire to know (the nature of the Brahman) by such (means) as *vedānuvacana*, it is stated (in answer) that it is so because they effect the purification of the intellect. [1041]

Verses 1042-1050 adduce authorities for holding the ritual performance to be a means of purification of the intellect.

इदं मेऽङ्गमनेनेति पुंसंस्कारश्रुतेस्तथा ।
यज्ञो दानं तपश्चेति स्मृतेरपि वचः स्फुटम् ॥१०४२॥

So also, from the Śruti referring to the purification of (the

intellect of) a person in the words *idam me 'ṅgam ...* (the same has to be understood). So also, there is a clear statement in a Smṛti *yajño dānaṁ tapaś ca*¹ [1042]

¹This is from *Gītā* 18.5.

यस्मिन्विशुद्ध इति च सत्त्वशुद्धौ ध्रुवा स्मृतिः ।
इत्येवमादिवाक्यानि श्रौतान्युक्तार्थसिद्धये ॥१०४३॥

So also in sentences like *yasmin viśuddhe*¹ and *sattvaśuddhau dhruvā smṛtiḥ*,² there is a statement made of the Śruti's effecting the said purpose. [1043]

¹Not traced.

²Not traced.

ज्ञानमुत्पद्यते पुंसां क्षयात्पापस्य कर्मणः ।
यथादर्शितलप्रख्ये पश्यत्यात्मानमात्मनि ॥१०४४॥

By the destruction of evil activity (which is effected by the above means), there arises, in human beings, the knowledge (of the nature of the Ātman), just as (there is) recognition of one's own self while one is looking at oneself in a clear mirror. [1044]

This is *Mahābhārata* 12.198.8.

यज्ञदानतपःकर्म न त्याज्यं कार्यमेव तत् ।
यज्ञो दानं तपश्चैव पावनानि मनीषिणाम् ॥१०४५॥
चत्वारिंशत्तथाष्टौ च संस्कारा इति च स्मृतिः ।
योगिनः कर्म कुर्वन्ति सङ्गं त्यक्त्वात्मशुद्धये ॥१०४६॥
योगयुक्तो विशुद्धात्मा विजितात्मा जितेन्द्रियः ।
सर्वभूतात्मभूतात्मा कुर्वन्नपि न लिप्यते ॥१०४७॥

"Sacrifice, charity, penances and (ritual) activity should not be given up; (each) has to be done. (Indeed) sacrifice, charity

and also penances are, for the wise ones, purifiers.”¹ [1045]

So also, there is a Smṛti (statement): “There are (in all) forty-eight *saṃskāras*.”² “Yogins do (various ritual) activities, after they have abandoned attachment (to all the desires); and (this) for the purification of their intellect.”³ [1046]

“One who is devoted to Yoga, who has purified his intellect, who has overcome his *manas* and who has subdued the sense-organs, and who is of the nature of the essence of all beings—even if this one is doing (action) is not affected by them.”⁴ [1047]

The word *ātman* means here ‘the intellect’.

¹This is *Gītā* 18.5.

²Not traced.

³This is *Gītā* 5.11.

⁴This is *Gītā* 5.6.

गार्भैर्होमैर्जातकर्मचडामौञ्जीनिबन्धनैः ।

बैजिकं गार्भिकं चैनो द्विजानामपमृज्यते ॥१०४८॥

“Sin of the twice-borns which has come from the semen¹ and/or from the state of being in the womb² is wiped off by performance of offering(s) in fire after the time of conception, at the time of birth, cutting of hair, tying of the string of Muñja grass.” [1048]

This is *Manusmṛti* 2.27.

²Seminal sin is regarded as paternal-relating to the father..

³This is regarded as maternal-relating to the mother.

स्वाध्यायेन व्रतैर्होमैस्त्रैविद्येनेज्यया सुतैः ।

महायज्ञैश्च यज्ञैश्च ब्राह्मीयं क्रियते तनुः ॥१०४९॥

“This (body of theirs) is made into a body suitable for the knowledge of the Brahman by means of the daily study of Vedic triad, by various vows, by offerings into fire, by sacrifices,

by (having) sons and by performing sacrifices, great and small.”
[1049]

This is *Manusmṛti* 2.28.

इत्येवं शतशः सन्ति यथोक्तार्थप्रसिद्धये ।
स्मृतिवाक्यानि पुंबुद्धिशुद्धिशंसीनि कर्मभिः ॥१०५०॥

This and such others, hundreds of them, are sentences from Smṛti texts which speak of the purification of human intellect by various (ritual) activities, in order that there is acquisition of the things which are stated. [1050]

This verse states that kāmīya acts are to be given up—so is the dictate of the Veda.

संसारानर्थहेतुत्वज्ञानायैव च कर्मणाम् ।
काम्यानामिह निर्देशस्तज्जिहासाप्रसिद्धये ॥१०५१॥

There is here mention made of the desired activities only for getting to know the nature of the cause of the undesirable transmigration and also for effecting a desire to know that (i.e. the Brahman). [1051]

Verses 1052 and 1053 state that even kāmīya activities give rise to the desire to know the Ātman.

यद्वा विविदिषार्थत्वं काम्यानामपि कर्मणाम् ।
तमेतमिति वाक्येन संयोगस्य पृथक्त्वतः ॥१०५२॥

Or perhaps, even the kāmīya activities have the purpose of creating (in a human being) a desire to know (the Brahman); because the connection with the Śruti statement *tam etam* ..., is separately mentioned. [1052]

This has reference to what is stated in SV 322.

देशे काले च पात्रे च दानं श्रद्धादिपूर्वकम् ।
शुद्धिकृत्स्याद्वियः पुंसो बहिर्वेद्यपि शास्त्रतः ॥१०५३॥

Making of gifts,¹ at some (appropriate) place,² at some (appropriate) time,³ to a deserving person,⁴ with faith etc.⁵ would be effecting purification of the intellect of a person, even if (any of) them is made outside the altar but according to scripture. [1053]

This refers to *Gītā* 17.20.

¹SP supports this making of gifts by citing a sentence *dāne sarvaṃ pratiṣṭhitam tasmād dānam paramam vadanti* (source not traced).

²Kurukṣetra etc.

³Time of eclipse of the sun or the moon by the force of Rāhu.

⁴*śrotriya* the knower of matters pertaining to the Ātman etc.

⁵The word etc. indicates devotion.

Verses 1054-1056 explain the meaning of the word *tapas*.

नियमाद्द्वन्द्वसंपातसहनं तप उच्यते ।
तस्यापि बुद्धिसंशुद्धिहेतुत्वं शास्त्रतो मतम् ॥१०५४॥

By the word *tapas* 'penance' is meant (lit. mentioned) what is forbearing, as a rule,¹ the occurrence of pairs of opposites² because it is known from the scriptures that it also has the capacity to cause purification of the intellect. [1054]

¹Or, with a specific intention (*saṃkalpa*).

²For example, *sukhaduḥkha*, *lobhamoha*, *rāgadveṣa*

विजिज्ञासस्व तद्ब्रह्म तपसैवेति च श्रुतिः ।
तपसा कल्मषं हन्तीत्यपि च स्मृतिशासनम् ॥१०५५॥

There is also a statement in the Śruti 'Do you desire to know that Brahman by means of austerity?' and also a teaching of a Smṛti: 'He destroys the (moral) stain by penance'.

[1055]

The first line is *Taittiyīyopaniṣad* 3.2; and the second line is not traced, but compare *Manusmṛti* 12.104, where *kilbiṣam* for *kalmaṣam*.

यद्दुस्तरं यद्दुरापं यद्दुर्गं यच्च दुष्करम् ।
सर्वं तत्तपसा साध्यं तपो हि दुरतिक्रमम् ॥१०५६॥

Whatever is difficult to get over, whatever is difficult to obtain, whatever is difficult to approach and whatever is difficult to perform— all that becomes obtainable (i.e. obtained) through penance; indeed penance is inevitable. [1056]

SP states the example of drinking of ocean by Sage Agastya—this indicates the greatness of penance.

Verses 1057-1060 state that fasting unto death is also to effect purification of the intellect.

अनाशकं चानशनं कामानशनलक्षणम् ।
रागद्वेषवियुक्तैस्तु विषयानिति चाह हि ॥१०५७॥
कामानशनबोधार्थं वेदव्यासोऽपि यत्नतः ।
मृत्यवन्तं वा सनियमं तदप्यत्यन्तशुद्धिकृत् ॥१०५८॥

Because (the lord) has said: 'The object of desires (should be overcome) by those who are free from desire and hatred¹—thus is the definition of not enjoying desires in the words *anāśaka*, *anaśana*. [1057]

Even Vyāsa, the redactor of Veda, has specifically made a statement that (not enjoying the desires) up to one's death or together with some vows effects purification in a very great measure—this is for the sake of informing others about not

enjoying desires (as significantly important).

[1058]

¹This is *Gītā* 2.64.

प्रत्यग्विविदिषामात्रहेतुत्वात् मृतेर्भयम् ।
अनेकजन्मसंसिद्धस्ततो यातीति च स्मृतेः ॥१०५९॥

So also, there is a statement in the Smṛti: 'A person, who has reached the perfection/completed (his penance), in the course of many births, attains (liberation),'¹ to convey that there is not any fear from death, because it has become merely the cause of the desire for getting to know the inner self.

[1059]

¹This is from *Gītā* 6.43.

भावितैः करणैश्चायं बहुसंसारयोनिषु ।
आसादयति शुद्धात्मा मोक्षं वै प्रथमाश्रमे ॥१०६०॥

This person who has purified his intellect obtains, (even) in the first stage of life, the liberation, with his sense-organs that are (thus) well-disposed in many transmigratory existences.[1060]

This verse states an authority for holding the view that fasting unto death (also) is a cause of liberation.

पृथूदकादितीर्थेषु तथा च मरणं स्मृतौ ।
श्रूयते मुक्तये साक्षात् भयं स्यादतो मृतेः ॥१०६१॥

So also it is heard in Smṛti¹ that death in holy places such as Pṛthūdaka results in liberation; therefore, there should be no direct fear of death.

[1061]

¹SP cites *brahmajñānena mucyante prayāgamaraṇena vā* (*Skandapurāṇa* 7(4).31.37).

Verses 1062-1070 state that one who is capable for śravaṇa etc. should not enter on fasting to death.

साक्षात् वस्तुविज्ञाने श्रुत्या यत्र नियुज्यते ।
विद्वान्परिहरेत्तत्र मृतिहेतुं प्रयत्नतः ॥१०६२॥

But when (lit. where) a person is specifically enjoined by the Śruti to get to know the (real) thing by direct perception, that learned man should avoid, with every effort, any cause of death. [1062]

Here, there is stress on the pursuit of the knowledge of the Brahman in preference to waiting for death at some holy places etc.

चतुर्णामाश्रमाणां वा वेदानुवचनादिना ।
श्रुत्येह ग्रहणं ज्ञेयं तद्बुभुत्साप्रसिद्धये ॥१०६३॥

Or, it should be understood here that, in referring to the four stages (in a man's life) there is intended (lit. mentioned) by the Śruti, which uses the words *vedānuvacana* etc. for giving rise to (or, effecting) the desire to get to know that Brahman. [1063]

This is the meaning of *grahana*; the following two verses clarify this.

ब्रह्मचर्यान्तवाक्येन ब्रह्मचारिपरिग्रहः ।
तपसा तापसस्यैव यज्ञेन गृहिणस्तथा ॥१०६४॥
श्रद्धानाशकवाक्यं तु सर्वार्थमिति गम्यते ।
एतमेव विदित्वेति पारिव्राज्यं च वक्ष्यति ॥१०६५॥

In the statement ending with (the word) *brahmacarya*,¹ there is inclusion of a celibate, so also, by the word *tapasā* there is inclusion of only an ascetic; as also (*tathā*) by the word *yajñena* that of a householder. [1064]

And yet, the sentence pertaining to *śradddhānāśaka*² is understood to refer to all of them; (for) the Śruti will say about leading the life of a mendicant: 'after having known this very Brahman ...'. [1065]

¹Reference to a celibate in this portion of BU is according to the Mādhyandina recension.

²This refers to the reading in the Mādhyandina recension, *tam etam ... dānena tapasānāśakena*.

सर्वेऽपि क्रमशस्त्वेते सेव्यमाना यथाविधि ।
यथोक्तकारिणं विप्रं नयन्ति परमां गतिम् ॥१०६६॥

All of these (stages of life), being followed in their due order, according to ordinance or precept, lead a Brāhmaṇa, who does what is stated or prescribed in the scriptures, to the highest goal. [1066]

चतुर्भिराश्रमैरेभिर्यथाशास्त्रमनुष्ठितैः ।
अत्यन्तं क्षेममाप्नोतीत्यापस्तम्बोऽप्यभाषत ॥१०६७॥

Āpastamba also has said (this): '(A person) obtains the highest well-being by leading (all) the four stages of life, performing (his duties) according to the scriptures'. [1067]

This is reference to *Āpastambadharmasūtra* 2(9).21.1-2.

यं तं विविदिषन्त्युच्चैर्यथोक्तैः साधनैः परम् ।
एतमेव विदित्वाथ मुनिः स्यात्प्राग्यथोदितः ॥१०६८॥

(Concluding himself) with (performances) which are the means, as prescribed, and (thus) wishing to know (the nature of) whom—the one (known from the Upaniṣad), does (lit. would) one become a sage as stated in (the words) *etam eva viditvātha munih*. [1068]

पाण्डित्यबाल्ययोर्निष्ठां मुनित्वं प्रागवादिषम् ।
सर्वकर्ममुक्तां यस्मान्न तत्साधारणं ततः ॥१०६९॥

I have already spoken¹ about the nature of a Muni 'sage' on his being devoted to wisdom and his strength (arising from the study of the Veda); since this is not common (in relation to) all those who give up doing actions. [1069]

¹This refers to BU 3.5.1.

योगस्य च समस्तस्य प्रत्यग्विज्ञानजन्मने ।
उपयोगो यतस्तस्मान्नात्मज्ञानोदयात्परः ॥१०७०॥

Since there is utility of the entire (practices of) Yoga for the rise of the specific knowledge about the inner self; therefore, there is no other (Yoga) than the rise of knowledge of the Ātman. [1070]

In verses 1071 and 1072, it is pointed out that only those who have renounced can be Munis 'sages, the knowers of the Brahman'.

शमादीन्येव विद्यायाः साधनानि यतस्ततः ।
कुतोऽसंन्यासिनस्तत्स्यान्मुनित्वं निष्प्रमाणकम् ॥१०७१॥

Since tranquillity (*śama*) etc. alone are the means of (acquiring) the lore (of the Brahman), therefore, how could Munihood be attributed to one who has not renounced? His attaining the status of a sage would be (understood) without any authority. [1071]

मननात्मकमेवास्य कर्म नान्यद्यतस्ततः ।
मुनित्वं न्यासिनो युक्तं मौनाच्चाप्यस्य सर्वदा ॥१०७२॥

Since, for this one (Muni), there is no activity other than what consists in meditation etc., therefore, it is reasonable

to understand the status of a sage in the case of one who has renounced and also on account of (or, through) his (observing) speechlessness.¹ [1072]

¹SP clarifies *mauna* thus: *satatam atiniyatavāgādivyāpārāvāc ca tasya munitvaṃ yuktam*.

Incidentally Sureśvara refutes in verses 1073-1078 the view of Maṇḍanamiśra on this topic.

प्रत्यग्याथात्म्यविज्ञाननिष्ठता मुनिता यतः ।
तज्ज्ञानजन्मनो नोर्ध्वं मुनिता तत्फलत्वतः ॥१०७३॥

Since Munihood (thus) means being devoted to (acquiring) specific knowledge about the inner self, as it is, therefore, there is nothing more than (effecting) the rise of the knowledge of that, for Munihood which is the result of that (activity etc. of him). [1073]

एतमेवेत्यवधृतेरस्यैवैकस्य वस्तुनः ।
तदज्ञानैकहेतुत्वात्सर्वस्यानात्मवस्तुनः ॥१०७४॥

(This is so) because, in the words *etam eva*, there is the specification of just one single thing and because all the non-Ātmans¹ have only one cause, i.e. ignorance (about the nature) of that (Ātman). [1074]

¹The plural is meant, though the singular form is used.

सामर्थ्याच्च ततोऽस्यैव प्रत्यग्याथात्म्यवेदिनः ।
मुनित्वं प्रत्यगज्ञानहेतुकर्मापवर्जनात् ॥१०७५॥

Therefore, (it follows) that there is Munihood in the case of only a knower of the inner self, as it is, on account of his strength acquired by avoiding all activities which are caused by ignorance about (the nature) of the inner self. [1075]

किं चैतमेवमात्मानं सर्वानर्थैककारणम् ।
 मोहमात्रव्यवहितमाप्नुमिच्छन्त आदरात् ॥१०७६॥
 आत्मयाथात्म्यविज्ञानसर्वाविद्योपमर्दिना ।
 सम्यग्ज्ञानप्रदीपेन प्रत्यक्प्रवणबुद्धयः ॥१०७७॥
 विरक्ताः सर्वसंसारादाग्रजाद्बुद्धिशुद्धितः ।
 उत्पन्ननिखिलानर्थतित्यक्षा दोषदर्शनात् ॥१०७८॥
 वाङ्मनःकायकर्मभ्योऽतः प्रव्रजनशीलिनः ॥१०७९॥
 एतमेवेत्यवधृतेर्न लोकत्रयकामिनाम् ।
 पारिव्राज्येऽधिकारोऽस्तीत्ययमर्थोऽवगम्यते ॥१०८०॥

Moreover, persons wishing, through respect to obtain (or, know) this very Ātman, which is the single cause of all undesirables, namely in being affected by mere delusion, (renounce)¹ [1076] with their intellect inclined towards getting to know (the actual nature of the inner self) by means of the lamp in the form of right (or proper) knowledge which destroys the entire ignorance about the specific knowledge of the real nature of the Ātman,² [1077] becoming averse to the entire transmigratory existence up to the state of being the first-born (Hiraṇyagarbha), through the purification of the intellect and such in whom there has arisen a desire to abandon all the undesired things on seeing the faults in the same [1078] and, therefore, have become inclined towards renunciation of (i.e. keeping away from all) activities of *manas*, speech and body— [1079] thus, from the specification *evam eva*, it is understood (or, learnt) that there is eligibility for renunciation in the case of (all) those who desire to secure the three worlds. [1080]

¹SP concludes this verse by adding the verb *pravarjanti* 'they renounce'; it appears for us that from 1076 up to 1080 form one complete unit of meaning, though too long!

²SP concludes this verse by adding the phrase *ātmānaṃ āptum*

icchanti 'they wish to get to know the Ātman', but that is perhaps unintended.

From verse 1081 up to verse 1088, there is given the meaning of *etam eva lokam*.

असाधारणसाध्यानि पुत्रादीनि यथा तथा ।
पुत्रादिकामत्यागोऽपि स्यादसाधारणोऽर्थवान् ॥१०८१॥
परस्परविरोधाच्च पराक्प्रत्यक्फलात्मनाम् ।
पुत्रादिसाधनानां च तत्यागस्य च वर्त्मनः ॥१०८२॥

Since (*yathā*) having a son etc. are uncommon means (of happiness), therefore, in the same way (*tathā*), abandoning of desires for a son etc. is also an uncommon significant means (to the same effect). [1081]

(This is so,) because such means as having a son etc. have mutual opposition among them and also have results that are in the form of keeping away the inner self and, therefore, giving them up is the way to that (i.e. to the knowledge about the Ātman). [1082]

पूर्वे समुद्रे यः पन्था न स गच्छति पश्चिमम् ।
एकः पन्था हि मोक्षस्येत्यपि व्यासोऽपि चावदत् ॥१०८३॥

That path which leads to the ocean in the east does not ever lead to the west—thus has even Vyāsa said, 'Indeed there is only one way to liberation'. [1083]

ekah panthā hi mokṣasya ... is *Mahābhārata* 12.266.4. SP supports this argument with SV 215.

प्रव्राजिनोऽत्र गृह्यन्ते प्रसिद्धेर्यदि वा परे ।
त्रिदण्डिनः समाख्यायास्तेष्वेवातिप्रसिद्धितः ॥१०८४॥

Here are mentioned (i.e. understood) only the wandering mendicants owing to their being the knowers, or the other

tridaṇḍins,¹ because of their becoming more known. [1084]

SP adds *pāramahamṣīm vṛttim grhṇantīti bhāvaḥ*.

¹Regarding *tridaṇḍins* cf. *Manusmṛti* 12.10:

*vāgdaṇḍo 'tha manodaṇḍaḥ kāyadaṇḍas tathaiva ca /
yasyaite nihitā buddhau tridaṇḍīti sa ucyate //*

In the case of this type of Saṃnyāsins, it is noticed that they hold in their right hand three staffs (*daṇḍas*) bound together—these indicate restraint on *manas*, speech and body. The tuft of hair on the head, the sacred thread and the normal way of wearing the lower garment are not to be given up by them. They can return to a householder's life, if and when they wish.

पराञ्चि खानीत्यादीनि श्रौतानि च वचांसि नः ।
तानि वा इति निन्दित्वा न्यासो ब्रह्मेति शासनात् ॥१०८५॥

This is from the instruction of the Śruti, i.e. Upaniṣads in the words: *parāñci khāni*¹ and also *tāni vā*,² which occurs after censuring them (i.e. *khāni*); as there is stated 'renunciation is Brahman'.³

[1085]

¹*Kāthopaniṣad* 4.1.

²CU 3.5.4.

³This is *nyāsa*, which is a word shortened for *saṃnyāsa* for metre's sake. The same is the case in the following verse.

उपायो न्यास एवातः प्रत्यग्ज्ञानस्य जन्मने ।
प्रत्यग्ज्ञानविरुद्धत्वान्मनोवाक्कायकर्मणाम् ॥१०८६॥

Therefore, the means to the rise of the knowledge (of the nature of) the inner self is only renunciation (*nyāsa*) of the activities of *manas*, speech and body; since they which are opposed to the knowledge about (the nature of) inner self.

[1086]

Read SP for some more detail on this point.

शब्दादिप्रकृतीन्येव कार्याणि करणानि च ।
प्रत्यग्ज्ञानाय नैवालमतस्तानि विरोधतः ॥१०८७॥

Since all the effects and means of producing (or achieving) them are but rooted in words etc.; therefore, they are not capable of (or, sufficient/useful for) effecting the knowledge of the inner self, on account of their opposition (to the same).

[1087]

आत्मलोकपरीप्सायां तस्मात्साधनमुत्तमम् ।
त्याग एव हि विज्ञेयं मनोवाक्कायकर्मणाम् ॥१०८८॥

Therefore, the best means of the desire of attaining to that *ātmaloka* (which is equal to *brahmaloka* as stated before) is only renunciation of the activities of *manas*, speech and body.

[1088]

It is pointed out in verses 1089-1093 that renunciation is the only means of accomplishing the knowledge of the Ātman.

प्रतिसाध्यं सतादीनि यथा लोकत्रयार्थिनाम् ।
नियतानि तथैवेह प्रत्यग्लोकाप्तिमिच्छताम् ॥१०८९॥
सर्वकर्मपरित्यागः साधनं परमं मतम् ।
असंभवे हि कर्माणि विधीयन्तेऽस्य सर्वतः ॥१०९०॥

As the means of getting a son etc., are with reference to every one of the ends to be achieved and fixed with reference to them alone who hanker for the three worlds; so here also, in the case of those who wish to attain *pratyagloka*, [1089] it is held that abandoning all activities is the best means – indeed all activities are prescribed, when there is a complete impossibility of this one (viz. renunciation). [1090]

रागाद्याकृष्टचेतस्त्वान्न चेच्छक्नोत्यशेषतः ।

कर्माणि मानवस्त्यक्तुं स करोतु यथाविधि ॥१०९१॥
 कर्माणि कर्मसंत्यागसामर्थ्यार्थं दिवानिशम् ।
 न कर्मणामनारम्भात्तथा च स्मृतिशासनम् ॥१०९२॥

If a human being is not able to abandon completely his activities, owing to his mind being attracted by attachment etc., then let him do them, day and night according to the prescription in the Śruti, with a view to acquiring the capacity for abandoning those activities. To this effect is there the instruction of the Smṛti *na karmanām*¹ [1091-1092]

¹This is *Gītā* 3.4.

आरुरुक्षोर्मुनेर्योगं कर्म कारणमुच्यते ।
 योगारूढस्य तस्यैव शमः कारणमुच्यते ॥१०९३॥

'For a Muni, who is about to begin practising Yoga, action is a means (of the same); and in the case of just the same, who is (already) established in Yoga, the means is tranquillity.' [1093]

This is *Gītā* 6.3.

Now is stated in verses 1094-1096 the purposes of abandoning all activity.

कोऽभिप्रायोऽखिलं कर्म त्यजतां साधनैः सह ।
 आत्मलोकार्थिनां पुंसामिति पृष्टेऽर्थ उच्यते ॥१०९४॥

(When it is asked:) 'What is the intention (or, purpose/desired end) of men, who are giving up their entire activity, together with their means, and are thus wishing for (attainment to) *ātmaloka*?'; there is now stated that intention— [1094]

एतद्ध स्मेति वचसा पारिव्राज्येऽभिधीयते ।

अर्थवादस्वरूपेण हेतुः श्रुत्या प्रयत्नतः ॥१०९५॥

In the words *etad dha sma ...*¹ there is statement made with reference to renouncing — (and) this is the reason stated by the Śruti, very carefully, in the form of an Arthavāda. [1095]

¹This refers to BU 4.4.22.

तदेतत्कारणं स्पष्टं पारिव्राज्येऽभिधीयते ।
ऐतिह्यार्थं च ह स्मेति वैशब्दः स्मरणाय च ॥१०९६॥

The words *tad etat* clearly state the cause for renunciation. And the words *ha sma* are used for conveying the matter of traditional instruction and the word *vai* is only for reminding (one of what is said). [1096]

In verses 1097-1100 is stated the purpose of the word prajāṃ, i.e. an indication of the desire for vitta, loka etc.

पूर्वेऽतिक्रान्तकालीना विद्वांसो ज्ञाततत्त्वकाः ।
तिसृणामेषणानां स्यात्प्रजामित्युपलक्षणम् ॥१०९७॥

The word *pūrve* means those who belonged to the times of the past and *vidvāṃsaḥ* are those who have known the truth (i.e. reality). The word *prajāṃ* is (lit. should be taken as) indicative of the three desires.¹ [1097]

¹Cf. verse 1104 note 1.

न कामयन्ते नेच्छन्ति पुत्रोत्पत्त्यादिलक्षणाः ।
एषणाः सकला एताः कस्मादित्यभिधीयते ॥१०९८॥

na kāmayate means: "They do not wish (for) Why are these desires stated here, viz. all the three desires which are for begetting a son etc.?" [1098]

एषणास्त्यजतां तेषामभिप्रायमिमं शृणु ।
एषणात्रितयस्यापि किमित्याक्षेप उच्यते ॥१०९९॥

Hear now this as the intention of them who are giving up their desires. In the use of the word *kim* is stated the question relating to the intention about/of the three desires. [1099]

प्रजया किं करिष्यामः कनीयःफलया वयम् ।
स्वतःसिद्धैकलो ह्यात्मा येषां लोको ध्रुवोऽक्षयः ॥११००॥

'What shall we do by having an offspring which yields a lower result?' (For) them, there is the eternal and never-perishing *loka*, as it is, viz. the Ātman, which is established by itself as (all) alone. [1100]

Verses 1101-1103 affirm that attainment of the knowledge of the Ātman is the best of results acquired by one.

आत्मत्वादेव चावाप्तः सर्वसाधननिःस्पृहः ।
वस्तूत्पत्त्यादिमद्यस्मात्साधनानि व्यपेक्षते ॥११०१॥

Having obtained (lit. reached) the (real) thing, which is (through ignorance) whatever has origin etc., the person, because of (himself) being the Ātman itself, becomes desireless with respect to all the means (of activity) and, therefore, ignores them all. [1101]

यच्चोत्पत्त्यादिमद्वस्तु तत्तुच्छं स्वप्नवस्तुवत् ।
आत्मज्ञाने तु निःशेषफलान्तर्भावकारणात् ॥११०२॥

Whatever thing has an origin etc. is worthless like an object (obtained or seen) in the dream state, for the reason that there is the inclusion of all of the results only (*tu*) in the knowledge of the Ātman. [1102]

नात्मलाभात्परो लाभः कृत्स्नेऽपि जगतीक्ष्यते ।

सर्वप्राप्त्यर्थसंप्राप्तेः सर्वहेयनिराकृतेः ॥११०३॥

In the whole of the world, there is not seen any gain higher than the acquisition of the Ātman, because there is, through that, the acquisition of all the objects to be gained and (also) the setting aside of all that is worth abandoning. [1103]

इति चेतसि संधाय ह्याक्षिपन्ति प्रजादिकम् ।
नृलोकादिफलं सर्वमेषणात्रयमादरात् ॥११०४॥

Having kept this in mind do they respectfully question (or, doubt) about offspring etc., viz. the results such as are of the world of men and of the entire triad¹ of desires. [1104]

¹That is, *putra*, *vitta* and *loka*.

उत्पाद्यमाप्यं संस्कार्यं विकार्यं चैषणाफलम् ।
तस्मिन्नेवंविधे कः स्यात्संतोषो विदुषामपि ॥११०५॥

The result of the desires is either that which is produced, that which is to be reached (or obtained), that which is to be purified, and that which is to be modified. And in (achieving) them (i.e. the results) which are of this nature, what satisfaction could there be for the learned? [1105]

Verses 1106-1113 state that even a person ignorant (about the nature of the Ātman) can renounce, if he is averse to worldly life.

आत्मब्रह्मानुलोम्येन ह्येषणात्याग इष्यते ।
साधनं ब्रह्मविद्येव ब्रह्मज्ञानस्य जन्मने ॥११०६॥

Abandoning of desires is accepted as a means lower in order with reference to the Ātman and the Brahman; but, it is also like the lore of the Brahman, a means for the rise of the knowledge of the Brahman. [1106]

आप्ताशेषपुमर्थस्य प्रत्यग्याथात्म्यबोधिनः ।
दग्धात्मतमसः पुंसो नैषणापेक्षितेष्ट्यते ॥११०७॥

There is not to be accepted (or, entertained) any desire by (or, in the case of) a person who has obtained all of the ends of human life, (the one). who is possessed of knowledge of nature of the inner self and has burnt his ignorance in respect of the Ātman. [1107]

सर्वभतात्मभूतस्य सर्वैकात्म्यं प्रपश्यतः ।
आप्ताशेषपुमर्थस्य त्यक्ताशेषासुखस्य च ॥११०८॥
प्राप्तस्य परमं स्वास्थ्यं वद किं स्यात्प्रजादिभिः ।
इति निश्चित्य निःसङ्गाः प्रव्रजन्त्येव सर्वतः ॥११०९॥

'Tell me what use can there be of having offspring etc. for a person who sees the complete oneness of the one and has become the nature of all, who has obtained all the ends of human life, who has abandoned sorrows/afflictions in its entirety and who has obtained the highest'—having thus decided, do those, who become unattached to the desires, wholly renounce them. [1108-1109]

धावतोऽविदुषो दृष्ट्वा मृगतृष्णोदकार्थिनः ।
ततोयतत्त्ववित्कर्षिचन्न हि धावति मूढवत् ॥१११०॥

Having seen the non-learned, who are running with a thirst for the water of mirage, no knower of knowledge, who knows the truth of that water, runs like the one that is deluded. [1110]

SP invites attention to the break-up of the Saṃdhi as *dhāvato* and *aviduṣaḥ*.

यथैवं श्रुतितोऽशेषवाङ्मनःकायसाधन-
प्रवृत्तिविषयप्रत्यग्याथात्म्यज्ञानिनामिह ॥११११॥
अविद्यापटसंवीतधिषणान्कामिनो नरान् ।

पुत्रोत्पत्त्यादिसाध्येषु प्रवृत्तान्वीक्ष्य यत्नतः ।

अस्माकं न प्रवृत्तिः स्यात्कृतार्थत्वाच्च कारणात् ॥१११२॥

As this is so, there would not be any activity on the part of us, who have, with the help of the Śruti, knowledge of the real nature of the inner self which has for the object of his entire activity with the means of speech, *manas* and body, after seeing men who are full of desires, their intellects being wrapped by the bondage of ignorance, and proceeding with every effort towards getting those objects, e.g. the birth of a son etc.?

[1111-1112]

यदज्ञानात्प्रवृत्तिर्या तज्ज्ञानात्सा कुतो भवेत् ।

तस्मात्सर्वप्रवृत्तीनां हानिः स्यादात्मबोधतः ॥१११३॥

Whence (or, How) can there be that inclination to (performing) activity, which has proceeded from whatever is the knowledge of that, through the ignorance of which (it has been there)? Therefore, (know that) there is abandoning of all activities as a result of the knowledge of the Ātman.

[1113]

In verses 1114-1117, there is justification/pleading for ignoring all results of activity, viz. production and others:

सदोत्पत्तेरनुत्पाद्योऽनाप्यश्चापि तथात्मनः ॥१११४॥

असंस्कार्योऽक्रियाङ्गत्वान्निर्गुणत्वात्तथात्मनः ।

कौटस्थ्यादविकार्योऽयं वद स्यात्कर्मणा हि किम् ॥१११५॥

Similarly, because the Ātman has ever been existent (lit. has originated — *bhūta*), it is not to be created and not also to be obtained.

[1114]

In the same way, since it is not subordinate to any activity and has no proper quality (whatsoever), it is not to be purified and, because of its immutability, this one cannot be modified. (Now) tell me what is the use of the (performance of) action?

[1115]

नोत्पत्त्यादि स्वतो यस्य स्वत एवास्ति यस्य तत् ।
न तस्य कर्मापेक्षास्ति कर्मापेक्षा ततोऽन्यतः ॥१११६॥

Since it (i.e. the Ātman) does not have origination etc., by its very nature, and which has existed also by its own nature. As such, it has no need of actions; the need (lit. expectancy) of the (performance of) action is in respect of someone other than that. [1116]

उत्पत्त्यादौ समर्थं यद्वेतुमात्रमपेक्षते ।
फलवत्कर्म तत्रैव ततोऽन्यत्राफलं भवेत् ॥१११७॥

(The performance of) action would be having a result only when it is capable of origination etc. (of others) and which expects for its rise merely some cause; elsewhere than in that, that activity would be without any result. [1117]

Verses 1118 and 1119 are an injunction for renouncing.

उक्तहेतुबलात्तस्माद्विदित्वात्मानमात्मना ।
प्रव्रजेयुः समस्ताभ्य एषणाभ्यो द्रुतं बुधा ॥१११८॥

Therefore, the wise ones should quickly proceed away from all of the desires, after having known the Ātman by themselves through the force of the cause which is already stated.¹ [1118]

¹On this, read SP: *caturvidhakriyāphalavilakṣaṇatvalakṣaṇo-ktahetu ...*; cf. verses 1114 and 1115 above.

पुत्रोत्पत्तिं समुद्दिश्य ह्येषणा दारसंग्रहः ।
पुत्रैषणेति सेहोक्ता यदि वातोऽन्यथैषणा ॥१११९॥

Indeed, taking a wife with the intention of begetting a son is an *eṣaṇā*; and that desire is here mentioned as the desire

for a son; or, (perhaps) it would be another desire as well.

[1119]

Verses 1120 and 1121 are the explanation of te ha sma putraiṣaṇā

मनुष्यलोकसंप्राप्तिं समुद्दिश्यास्य यैषणा ।
पुत्रौत्पत्त्येह तत्प्राप्तौ सात्र पुत्रैषणोच्यते ॥११२०॥

That desire of a person for attaining the world of men is here called the desire for begetting a son, because by begetting a son that (world of men) is obtained.

[1120]

This is based on BU 1.5.16.

दैवं च मानुषं वित्तं कर्मणो यत्प्रयोजकम् ।
देवतादिपरिज्ञानं दैवं पशुवादि मानुषम् ॥११२१॥

Wealth, divine and human¹ are what cause activity; divine wealth is the full knowledge about the deity etc. (of the ritual activity) and human wealth is what consists in animals etc.

[1121]

¹Cf. BUBV 1.4.1847-1849.

In verses 1122-1127 it is stated that divine wealth is not the knowledge of the Brahman—it means only knowledge about the deities of the rituals.

संसारकारणध्वंसि यत्तु ज्ञानं विमक्तिदम् ।
वित्तश्रुत्या न तद्ग्राह्यं तस्य कर्मविरोधतः ॥११२२॥

That knowledge which brings about liberation, is destructive of the cause(s) of transmigratory existence, but that should not be understood from the statement about wealth, because of its being opposed to (ritual) action.

[1122]

यस्य साधनभावः स्यात्प्रवृत्तौ सर्वकर्मणाम् ।
गर्तादेरिव वित्तत्वं तस्य ज्ञानस्य कर्मसु ॥११२३॥

That kind of knowledge is of the nature of being wealth in relation to the activities by its being the means towards inclination to all kinds of (ritual) activities, as in the case of a ditch¹ etc. [1123]

¹This stands for the place for the *āhavanīya* fire etc. as SP reports. In the place of *gartāder iva*, AnSS has a variant reading (noted and explained by SP also): *gavāder iva* and that sounds better, for it refers to cows etc. that are necessary for the performance of ritual etc. SP refers also to the existence of thorns etc. beside ditch, as deterrents of any ritual activity—this is an alternative explanation for that referring to the *āhavanīya*.

कर्महेतुविरुद्धं तु न वित्तं ज्ञानमिष्यते ॥११२४॥
कर्मप्रकरणाकाङ्क्षि ज्ञानं कर्मगुणो भवेत् ।
यद्धि प्रकरणे यस्य तत्तदङ्गं प्रचक्षते ॥११२५॥

But (*tu*) knowledge, which is opposed to the causes that promote activity, is not to be considered as wealth. [1124]
(Yet) knowledge, which has the expectation for it in the topic of (religious) activity, would become subordinate to the activity. That which occurs in the context of another becomes subordinate to it—they say. [1125]

स्वरूपलाभमात्रेण यत्त्वविद्यां निहन्ति नः ।
न तदङ्गं प्रधानं वा ज्ञानं स्यात्कर्मणः क्वचित् ॥११२६॥

But, that knowledge, which by mere coming into existence destroys our ignorance, is not subordinate to or principal (aspect) of an action anywhere. [1126]

एतद्वलेन संन्यास एषणाभ्योऽवसीयते ।

देवलोकफलं ज्ञानमेषणैवेति गम्यते ॥११२७॥

On the strength of these (arguments in the preceding verses) is the renunciation superior to desires so it is concluded. From this it follows that knowledge, which results in one's attaining to the world of gods, is only (a kind of) desire.

[1127]

This verse states that lokaiṣaṇā is intended in vittaiṣaṇā.

लोकैषणाग्रहेणैव वित्तान्तर्भावसिद्धितः ।

फलोद्देशेन या चेष्टा सैव लोकैषणा यतः ॥११२८॥

Since, by the mention of the word *lokaīṣaṇā*, there is inclusion of wealth in them (i.e. *lokas*); therefore, that (ritual) activity (which is performed) with the intention of (securing) some result, is also *lokaīṣaṇā*.

[1128]

Verses 1129 and 1130 point out vittaiṣaṇā, because of what is stated in the preceding verse, is nityakarman.

यत्तु चोदितमित्येव क्रियते कर्म निष्फलम् ।

वित्तैषणेति तां ब्रूमो जामित्वविनिवृत्तसया ॥११२९॥

And that action, which is performed only for the reason that it is enjoined (in the scriptures) and is without any result to be produced, we call *vittaiṣaṇā*,¹ with a desire to keep away from any connection (of it with activity).

[1129]

¹This refers to *nityakarman* and means to achieve it. SP: *vittaiṣabdena nityaṃ karma tatsādhanaṃ ca punaruktiparihārārthan grahyamityarthah.*

लोकोद्देशेन या चेष्टा वाङ्मनःकायसाधना ।

लोकैषणेति तामाहुरेषणार्थविदो जनाः ॥११३०॥

That activity, which has for its means speech, *manas* and body and is (performed) with a desire for *lokas*, have the knowers of the meaning of *eṣaṇā* called *lokaiṣaṇā*.¹ [1130]

¹This refers to *kāmyakarman* and means to achieve it. SP: *kāmyaṃ karma tatsādhanam cātra vivakṣitam iti na paunar-uktyamityarthaḥ*.

Verses 1131-1133 explain the word *vyutthāna*:

क्रियाकारकरूपाभ्य एषणाभ्यः प्रबोधतः ।
प्रातिलोम्येन यत्स्थानं व्युत्थानमिति तद्विदुः ॥११३१॥

Acquiring that state (by a person) through acquiring knowledge (for keeping himself away) from desires, which have the form of *kāraṇas* of activities, i.e. by being averse to them, is known as *vyutthāna*. [1131]

इत्येवमादि व्याख्येयं व्याख्यातं पूर्वमेव तु ।
कहोलब्राह्मणे नातस्तद्व्याख्यानाय यत्यते ॥११३२॥

This and other matter, that is to be explained, has been already explained in Kahola Brāhmaṇa;¹ therefore, there is no effort made here for explaining that again. [1132]

¹This is BU 3.5.

प्रव्रजेयुरतो लोकमीप्सन्तो ब्राह्मणा बुधाः ।
प्रव्रजन्तीति च विधिरर्थवादेन संगतेः ॥११३३॥

Therefore, the knowing (or, wise) Brāhmaṇas who wish for the *loka* (of the Brahman) should renounce—this, (the word) *pravrajanti* '(they) renounce' is an injunction as it is connected with Arthavāda. [1133]

The idea of the verse is to relate the statement *pravrajanti*

to the statement about the results which are stated in the form of an Arthavāda.

In verses 1134 and 1135, it is pointed out that in the case of the form pravrajanti there is an Arthavāda proper.

नार्थवादान्तरापेक्षा ह्यर्थवादस्य युज्यते ।
विधिनैवैकवाक्यत्वमर्थवादस्य युज्यते ॥११३४॥

Indeed, it is not reasonable to hold that an Arthavāda is dependent on another Arthavāda; having unanimity, i.e. the same purport as only that of an injunction is reasonable in the case of Arthavāda. [1134]

Hereby it is affirmed that the statement *pravrajanti* should not be taken as mere Arthavāda but it should be taken as an injunction and has the sense of *pravrajeyuḥ*. This is clarified in just the next verse.

अर्थवादेन लिङ्गेन तस्माद्विधिरयं स्फुटः ।
विधिषेष्टत्वमुज्झित्वा नार्थवादो यतोऽन्यतः ॥११३५॥

Therefore, by the very indication, viz. Arthavāda, is this (i.e. the statement *pravrajanti*) a clear injunction; the reason is: an Arthavāda does not consist elsewhere than in being subordinate to an injunction. [1135]

Verses 1136-1143 state that the viśiṣṭa-vidhi in viditvā vyutthāya is for leading one to Ātmaloka.

समानकर्तृकत्वोक्तेर्विभागोक्तेः फलस्य च ।
प्रव्रजन्तीत्येष विधिरर्थवादेन चान्वयात् ॥११३६॥

(Thus) this injunctive statement in *pravrajanti* gets connected with the Arthavāda on account of the statement in them about one and the same agent and also by stating the result

separately.

[1136]

विज्ञानेन विदित्वेति श्रूयतेऽस्यैककर्तृता ।
विविनक्ति फलं चापि येषामित्येवमादिना ॥११३७॥

The sameness of the agent (in these two) is clearly heard in the Śruti *viññānena viditvā*. Further, by making a statement beginning with *yeṣām* ..., Śruti distinctly states the result. [1137]

प्रव्रजन्तीति नाप्येतत्सकृच्छ्रुतमिहेष्यते ।
प्राप्तवल्लोकनृत्यर्थमर्थवादव्यपेक्षि च ।
प्रधानवदतो नैदं लोकस्तुतिपरं भवेत् ॥११३८॥

Also this word *pravrajanti* is not heard here only once,¹ this does not purport to praise *loka* as already obtained and like the principal (injunction), nor does it expect an Arthavāda for praising (or leading to) *loka*. [1138]

¹SP: *tatra tatrabhyasyate pravrajinaḥ pravrajanti vyutthāya bhikṣācaryam caranti viditvā munirbhavati*.

नाप्यनुष्ठेयरूपेण पारिव्राज्येन संस्तुतिः ।
आत्मलोकस्य युक्ता स्यान्नापि तज्ज्ञानसंस्तुतिः ॥११३९॥

There is not here any praise stated for leading a life of an ascetic as some activity to be performed; also the praise of the knowledge of that (*pārvirājya* 'renunciation') would not be reasonable with reference to *ātmaloka*. [1139]

अथानुष्ठेयमपि संस्तुत्यर्थं भवतेष्यते ।
अनुष्ठेयस्य दर्शादेः स्तुत्यर्थत्वं प्रसज्यते ॥११४०॥

(An objection:) 'If you think that what is to be performed (i.e. an action), is also stated as a thing for the sake of praise; then in the case of (sacrifices like) *darśa* etc., which have to be performed, the state of being what is (stated) for the

sake of praise would follow.

[1140]

कर्तव्यता न च ज्ञाता पारिव्राज्यस्य कुत्रचित् ।
स्तुत्यर्थत्वं यतोऽस्येह भवता परिकल्प्यते ॥११४१॥

‘And nowhere is it known that taking to the stage of a mendicant is a thing to be performed, so that you have now taken here that as the state of being what is for the purpose of praise.’

[1141]

अन्यत्रापि विधौ कल्प्य इहैवासौ समर्थ्यताम् ॥११४२॥
भूमिष्ठे मधुनि प्राप्ते को विद्वान्पर्वतं व्रजेत् ।
लब्धेऽपि प्रव्रजन्तीति विधावन्यत्र किं श्रमः ॥११४३॥

(If it is said:) ‘Elsewhere also that has to be accepted in connection with an injunction. Let that be understood so even here.’

[1142]

(The reply is:) ‘When honey is available (lit. obtained) in the field,¹ who wise would go to a mountain (to get it)?’ (Therefore), when an injunction is available in the word *pravrajanti*, why then take the trouble (to find injunction) elsewhere?

[1143]

¹In fact the well-known adage refers to a bush called Arka, not to a field, cf. SP: *arke cen madhu vindeta*.

Verses 1144 and 1145 refute the notion that renunciation is for one who is not eligible to perform a ritual.

काणकुण्ठादिविषये यत्तु कैश्चित्प्रकल्प्यते ।
पारिव्राज्यं न तद्युक्तमननुष्ठेयरूपतः ॥११४४॥

As to what some have thought, that the state of a wandering ascetic has a reference to the squint-eyed, the maimed and others, that is not proper because it does not have the nature of what is to be done (or performed).

[1144]

कर्तव्यत्वेन न ज्ञातं वृक्षाद्यारोहणं यथा ।
 संन्यासोऽपि तथैवायं नैव कार्यतया मतः ।
 प्रव्रजन्तीत्यतो नास्य स्तुतिगन्धोऽपि विद्यते ॥११४५॥

As climbing a tree is not known to be a thing to be performed, so also leading the life of an ascetic is not held to be a matter to be performed; therefore, in the use of the word *pravrajanti*, there is not even a bit of praise. [1145]

Verses 1146-1148 are an objection to there being an injunction for renouncing.

ननु चात्मप्रबोधेन विधिगोचरलङ्घिनः ।
 कृतकृत्यस्य मुक्तस्य विधिरेष कथं भवेत् ॥११४६॥

(A question is asked:) 'But, indeed, how could this be an injunction for him who has thought that his knowledge of the Ātman has transgressed (the nature of) an objection falling within the purview of any injunction, for (this one), who has accomplished whatever was to be done and is liberated? [1146]

परिहारोऽस्य चोद्यस्य कहोलब्राह्मणेऽखिलः ।
 यतोऽभाणि मया पूर्वं नेहातः पुनरुच्यते ॥११४७॥

Since the refutation of this hypothetical objection has been stated by me in full in the Kahola Brāhmaṇa (BU 3.5) earlier, therefore it is not stated here again. [1147]

ब्रह्मचर्यं समाप्येतिप्रत्यक्षश्रुतिमूलतः ।
 चतुर्णामाश्रमाणां स्यान्नोपेक्षातोऽनुमानतः ॥११४८॥

It is on the direct basis of the Śruti (that we get the knowledge of) one's having completed the state of celibacy and, on that basis, we should not show neglect for the four stages of life as thus understood by inference. [1148]

SP refers to *aikāśramyaṃ tv ācāryāḥ pratyakṣavidhānād gārhaṣṭhyasya* as a statement of Gautama (*Gautama Dharma Sūtra* 1.3.35).

Verses 1149 and 1150 state that the authority of the Śruti does not depend on (that of) any Smṛti.

न च वेदैकमूलत्वविरहात्स्यात्प्रमाणता ।
आचारस्य स्मृतेर्वापि बौद्धाद्याचारवद्ध्रुवम् ॥११४९॥

And being an authoritative means of knowledge (in the case of any statement) is not possible in the absence of any Vedic basis (for it), even if it be the practice (of the learned) or sanctioned by any Smṛti—indeed like the conduct of a Buddhist. [1149]

धर्मस्य वेदमूलत्वादवेदस्य न धर्मता ।
इत्येवं न्यायवद्वाक्यमाहुर्वेदप्रमाणकाः ॥११५०॥

Religious duty (*dharma*) has its root in the Veda; whatever is non-Vedic does not have the character of religious duty—thus have those who have held the Veda as the authority said as a dictate.¹ [1150]

SP refers to *śabdāmūlako hi dharmah* (*Sābarabhāṣya* 1.3.1).

¹Cf. the word *nyāyavat* in the original; it literally means 'what is like a rule'.

वेदशास्त्रानपेक्षत्वं स्मृतिशास्त्रस्य चेन्मतम् ।
निर्ग्रन्थिशास्त्रतुल्यत्वं स्मृतीनां वः प्रसज्यते ॥११५१॥

If it is held that the scriptures called the Smṛtis do not depend on (or, are not based on) the Vedic scriptures, then in the case of these Smṛtis there will be a similarity with the scriptures of the Nirgranthas.¹ [1151]

SP supports this argument stating *yathāhuh— yuktam śruti-virodhāt smṛtir apramāṇam iti* (not traced).

¹This is a reference to the Jainas.

नापि स्मृतिव्यपेक्षास्ति श्रुतेः स्वातन्त्र्यकारणात् ।
स्मृत्यर्थस्यानुवादोऽयं पारतन्त्र्येऽसति श्रुतेः ॥११५२॥

Further, the Śruti does not have any dependence on the Smṛti, because of its independence. Therefore, when there is not such dependence of the Śruti (on any other work), this should be taken as matter repeated from a Smṛti. [1152]

SP refers to *ataś ca pramāṇamanapekṣatvāt* (Śābarabhāṣya 1.1.5). Also, read SP: *śruter asati pāratantrye nāsti smṛtyarthā-nuvāditvam iti pūrvanāṇi anvayena yojanā*.

स्वतन्त्रयोर्मिथोऽपेक्षा नापि स्यात्परतन्त्रयोः ।
पारतन्त्र्यात्र चापेक्षा स्वतन्त्रस्य स्वतः क्वचित् ॥११५३॥

Again, independent works do not have any mutual dependence; so also that (mutual dependence) is not observed in the case of two works that are dependent (on some other or others); nowhere an independent work has, of itself, any dependence on what is not independent. [1153]

This verse states that the Śruti does not restate any matter from the Smṛti.

स्मृत्यर्थं न श्रुतिस्तस्मादनुवक्तीह कुत्रचित् ।
स्मृतिस्त्वनुवदत्येव श्रुत्यर्थं परतन्त्रतः ॥११५४॥

The Śruti does not anywhere state any matter (which is already) stated in the Smṛtis; but it is the Smṛti that restates the matter which is stated in the Śruti, because of its dependence. [1154]

SP states *uktaṃ hi— pramāṇam eṣā smṛtir vijñātaṃ tat kim*

ity anyathā bhavatīti (not traced).

Verses 1155-1161 explain *sa eṣa neti neti*.

आत्मा चेदिष्यते लोकः कर्माण्येव न किं नराः ।
तत्प्राप्त्यर्थं प्रयत्नेन कुर्वन्तीह दिवानिशम् ॥११५५॥
पारिव्राज्येन किं कार्यमिति चेदुच्यते शृणु ।
अस्यात्यन्तमसंबन्धादात्मलोकस्य कर्मभिः ॥११५६॥

If the *ātma-loka* is desired, 'why then do not men perform, with every effort, actions for getting the same, day and night?'

[1155]

If it is asked: 'What is the use of (or, to be done through) being an ascetic?'; (then the answer is:) 'Listen, that is being stated—this *ātmaloka*, has not at all any connection whatever with actions'.

[1156]

नोत्पत्त्याद्यभिसंबन्ध आत्मनोऽस्योपपद्यते ।
यतोऽतः कर्मणां कार्यं नेह संभाव्यतेऽण्वपि ॥११५७॥

Since it does not stand to reason that this *Ātman* has any connection with origination etc.; therefore, not even a little of action is to be imagined (or, understood, or done) here (in this context of this *Ātman*).

[1157]

तदसंभावनायाश्च को हेतुरिति भण्यते ।
स एष नेति नेत्यात्मा यस्मात्प्रागपि वर्णितः ॥११५८॥

If one asked, 'What is the reason for the absence of any possibility of it?', then (in answer) it is to be said, 'This is so, since, even earlier, it has been stated (in the Śruti): *sa eṣa neti nety ātmā*'.¹

[1158]

¹BU 3.9.26; 4.3.4; 4.4.22; 4.5.15.

प्रध्वस्तैकात्म्यसंमोहो नेति नेत्यात्मविद्यया ।

अगृह्याद्यात्मतां यातः स्वमहिम्नि व्यवस्थितः ॥११५९॥

A person, who has destroyed his ignorance about the nature of his inner self as its being only a single entity, through the pursuit of the lore of the Ātman which is stated in *neti neti*, becomes possessed of the nature of the Ātman, which is ungraspable etc. and becomes steady in his own greatness.

[1159]

कर्मणां चात्मविद्यायां चरितार्थत्वकारणात् ।
विद्ययापि न चेत्कार्यं कर्मभिः स्यात्कथं नु तत् ॥११६०॥

Further, how indeed could it be that,¹ since (ritual) actions have already fulfilled their purpose² here, in respect of the lore of the Ātman, that lore also does not have anything to do with actions?

[1160]

¹Read SP: *utpannāyāṃ vidyāyāṃ tatkārye cāvidyāatatkārya-dhvanise siddhe vidyāpi kāryaṃ na kiṃ cid asti cet karmakāryam ātmaloke nāstīti kim u vaktavyam ity arthaḥ.*

²This is by way of purification of a person's intellect.

एवं चतुर्भिरध्यायैर्यथाव्याख्यातवर्त्मना ।
मुमुक्षुः प्रापितः स्वास्थ्यं परमैकात्म्यलक्षणम् ॥११६१॥

Thus, in these four Adhyāyas, a seeker of liberation is brought to the state of his own, i.e. that which is characterized by (or, as) the highest Ātman, in the way as explained. [1161]

Verses 1162-1167 affirm that a knower of the Ātman does not have to do any more (of) action.

यस्मादेवमयं तस्माद्विदिते परमात्मनि ।
ज्ञेयकार्यसमाप्तत्वान्न किञ्चिदवशिष्यते ॥११६२॥

Since he¹ is so; therefore, when he has obtained all the

knowledge of the highest Ātman and secured fulfilment of the activities in relation to that (highest Ātman) which had to be known (by him), and thus there does not remain anything for him to do. [1162]

¹This has reference to *mumukṣu* in the preceding verse, but SP states we should understand *ayam* in the sense of the state of liberation!

सर्वकर्मफलानां च तथान्तर्भावसंभवात् ।
आप्ते कर्मफले नात आरम्भः कर्मणामिह ॥११६३॥

Further, because the results of all activities are possible to be included (in his getting to know the Brahman), and, thus, the result of activities is obtained; there is, therefore, no beginning (or, performance) of any other activity (now). [1163]

तथा च भगवान्व्यास इममर्थमुवाच ह ।
सर्वं कर्माखिलं पार्थ ज्ञाने परिसमाप्यते ॥११६४॥

In that same sense has the revered Vyāsa stated this: 'O son of Pṛthā, all (i.e. the entire mass of) activities, are accomplished in (acquiring) knowledge'. [1164]

This is *Gītā* 4.33.

नातो विज्ञाततत्त्वस्य कर्महेतुप्रबाधनात् ।
वाङ्मनःकायसाध्यानामारम्भः सर्वकर्मणाम् ॥११६५॥

Therefore, there is no beginning (or, performance) of all (or, the entire mass) of activities, which are to be accomplished by speech, *manas* and body for one, who has specifically known the reality by (effecting) destruction of the cause(s) of activity. [1165]

यस्त्वेषणानिवृत्तः स्यान्नेति नेत्यात्मविद्यया ॥११६६॥

नेतीत्यात्मैव संवृत्तो यतोऽतस्तं विपश्चितम् ।
उभे न व्याप्नुतोऽज्जोत्थे नेति नेत्यात्मनि स्थितम् ॥११६७॥

This (seeker of liberation) who has withdrawn himself from all desires by (securing) the lore of the Ātman (which is expressed in the words) *neti neti*, [1166]

since he has become one with the Ātman itself (described in the words) *neti*; this one, therefore, him, the knowing one, both good and ill do not overpower and has (now) become steady (i.e. remained, or, stands) in the Ātman (described in the words) *neti neti*. [1167]

In verses 1168-1172 is explained the Śruti *ubhe hy ete na tarataḥ*.

के ते उभे न तरत इत्युक्तार्थविवक्षया ।
अत इत्यादिकं तस्मादाजगामोत्तरं वचः ॥११६८॥

With the intention to state (the answer to the question) 'Which are the two that do not overpower him?', there has come as an answer the subsequent statement in the Śruti which begins with the word *ataḥ*. [1168]

अतो निमित्तादत्यर्थमहं पापमकारिषम् ।
भोक्तव्यं तन्मयेदानीं मरणात्समनन्तरम् ॥११६९॥
असह्यानन्तदुःखौघमहाभयमुपस्थितम् ।
इत्येष घोरसंकल्पो हिक्किकावशवर्तिनः ।
सर्वसामर्थ्यहीनस्य जायते तापकारणम् ॥११७०॥

ataḥ means for this reason—"I have exceedingly sinned; therefore, now, immediately after death,¹ there is to be experienced by me [1169]

very great ill that has come, or comes, in an unbearable and unending flow of miseries"—with this notion of the terrible, there occurs (all) that causes affliction (or heat) to the one, who is under the influence of final hard breathing and who has lost all his strength. [1170]

These two verses and the next are almost parenthetical.

¹This is the explanation of *idānīm*.

क्षयिष्णु पुण्यं चैतस्माद्धेतोरकरवं परा ।
इत्येते विचिकित्से द्वे सर्वस्य भवतौ मृतौ ॥११७१॥

Also, 'it is for this (very) reason that I have earlier collected (some) merit, which is (or, and that) perishable'¹—these two fearful questions occur to all human beings at the time of death.

[1171]

¹Cf. *Gītā* 9.21ab.

एते न तरतोऽज्ञोत्थे तद्धेतुवज्ज्ञानघस्मरम् ।
अशनायाद्यतिक्रान्तं ब्रह्मास्मीत्यात्मवेदिनम् ।
कथं ते व्याप्नुतोऽविद्याहेतूत्थे ब्रह्मवेदिनम् ॥११७२॥

These two, i.e. good and evil do not overpower the knower of the Ātman, who knows 'I am the Brahman' which devours ignorance that has been the cause of that (sorrow), that is beyond hunger etc. (The question then is:) 'How do they, which have arisen from the cause, i.e. ignorance, overpower the knower of the Brahman?'

[1172]

तापाय पुण्यमप्याहुः परिणामादिसंगतेः ।
क्षयातिशययोगित्वात्तथा व्यासोऽप्यभाषत ।
तस्य स्थानवरिष्ठस्य सर्वे निरयसंज्ञिताः ॥११७३॥

(This is so because) they say, 'Even merit results in affliction (or heat), owing to its association with (different) modifications etc. and its being possessed with destruction and excellence; so has also Vyāsa said, 'In the case of one, who is in the highest state, there are (all sorrows) called *niraya*.'¹

[1173]

This is the third line of *Mahābhārata* 12.191.11.

¹This is *naraka* 'hell'.

न व्याप्नुतस्ते तं कस्मात्कर्मणी साधवसाधुनी ।
इतिहेतूपदेशार्थमुभे इति परं वचः ॥११७४॥

In order to state (lit. instruct about) the cause as to why both types of actions, i.e. good and evil, do not affect (or, overpower) him, there is the subsequent statement beginning with the word *ubhe*. [1174]

उभे एते तरत्येष विद्वांस्तद्धेतुबाधनात् ।
उभे न तरतोऽतस्तमुभे न तपतश्च तम् ॥११७५॥

This knower of the Brahman overcomes both of these by (effecting) the stultification of their cause; therefore, the two do not overcome/overpower him; the two do not torment him. [1175]

कृतं फलप्रदानेन प्रत्यवायेन चाकृतम् ।
न तापयति कर्मैतन्नेति नेत्यात्मदर्शिनम् ॥११७६॥

This activity does not torment the seer of the Ātman by bringing to him the result of what he has done and by (causing) difficulties for what he has not done. [1176]

पुण्यं वा यदि वा पापं न कर्महास्ति तादृशम् ।
लोकोऽस्य मीयते येन ब्रह्मविद्याप्रकाशितः ॥११७७॥

Be it either merit or sin, an action of this kind, by which is to be measured that *loka*, which is illuminated by the lore of the Brahman is not noticed here (i.e. in one's state of liberation). [1177]

न तस्य प्रतिमा अस्ति यस्य नाम महद्यशः ।
इति मन्त्रोऽपि चानन्त्यमैकात्म्यस्यावदत्स्वयम् ॥११७८॥

There is no equal of that person (liberated), whose description

is 'great fame'--this Mantra also has itself declared the infiniteness of singleness (of the liberated one). [1178]

सर्वकर्मातिगं ब्रह्म प्रत्यङ्मात्रसतत्त्वकम् ।
मन्त्रेणाप्यात्मनो रूपं तदेतदिति वर्ण्यते ॥११७९॥

The Brahman is beyond all action and has only one nature, that of being the inner self. The Mantra also states this nature of the Ātman in the words *tad etat* [1179]

एष योऽभिहितः पूर्वं तं साक्षाद्दृष्टवानृषिः ।
तत्रैव निष्ठां यातः सन्मन्त्रमेतमुदीरयेत् ॥११८०॥

This one, which was earlier described (or, mentioned), has the sage seen directly—and has become devoted to that alone. Thus he should recite this Mantra about the existent. [1180]

In verses 1181-1184, there is the explanation of eṣa nityo mahimā.

आ ब्रह्मणोऽस्य ये सिद्धा अविद्याकर्महेतुतः ।
सर्वेऽपि महिमानोऽमी क्षणप्रध्वंसिनो मताः ॥११८१॥

All these greatenesses of him, which exist right up to Brahman (Hiranyagarbha), are established as perishing in a moment since (their) having the cause in ignorance and action. [1181]

एष एवैकलो नित्यो बाह्यसाधननिस्पृहः ।
महिमा ब्राह्मणस्योक्तो नेतीत्याद्युक्तिभिः पुरा ॥११८२॥

The greatness of the Brāhmaṇa is stated here (thus): 'This one is only, the single one, eternal, having no desire whatever for any external means of action'—with reasons which are stated earlier in *neti* etc. [1182]

अस्यैकस्य स्वतः सिद्धेर्न वृद्धिः पुण्यकर्माभिः ।
न च पापैः कनीयस्ता तस्यासाध्यत्वहेतुतः ॥११८३॥

On account of the existence of it, by its own nature there is neither any greater status (achieved) by meritorious deeds nor any lower status through sins, since it is itself not (an activity) to be accomplished. [1183]

This is the meaning of *na vardhate karmaṇā*.

वृद्धिहानी यतो दृष्टे कर्मसाध्यस्य वस्तुनः ।
कर्मानपेक्षसंसिद्धेः कथं ते भवतो वद ॥११८४॥

Since the two, i.e. greater status and lower status, are seen to have been accomplished through the performance of action; how could there be that of the real thing, as it exists, without any dependence on action? Tell me. [1184]

Verses 1185-1187 point out that the word Brāhmaṇa in the Śruti sa brāhmaṇaḥ is expressive of a knower of the Brahman, not of the caste.

स ब्राह्मण इति गिरा यः श्रुत्या प्रतिपादितः ।
ग्रहणं ब्राह्मणस्येति तस्यैवेहात्मवस्तुनः ॥११८५॥

That one, which is conveyed by the Śruti in the words *sa brāhmaṇaḥ*, has to be taken here as the Brāhmaṇa (i.e. Brahman), the reality called Ātman. [1185]

महिमा विद्यमानोऽपि तदविद्यासमुद्भव-
देहजात्यादिमानस्य वृद्धिहान्यादिसंगतेः ॥११८६॥
अविद्यमानवज्ज्ञेयो महिमाप्रतिबोधतः ।
ब्राह्मणग्रहणेनातः कृतकृत्य इहोच्यते ॥११८७॥

That greatness, though existing in the one, has to be taken as non-existing because of its association with rising higher and going lower of the ego in respect of body, caste etc. which results from the ignorance about that (i.e. Ātman).

Therefore, by the use of the word *brāhmaṇa*, here is stated the one who has accomplished what was to be accomplished, on acquiring the knowledge of greatness. [1186-1187]

Verses 1188-1190 state the explanation of padavit tvampadārthavit.

महिमैवंविधो यस्माद्ब्राह्मणस्यात आदरात् ।
पदवित्स्यान्महिम्नोऽस्य महत्तज्ज्ञानतः फलम् ॥११८८॥

Since such is the greatness of the *Brāhmaṇa*, therefore, through respect for that, a person would be the knower of his own status—(thus) the result, that comes from his knowledge, is great. [1188]

तत्त्ववित्स्यान्महिम्नोऽस्येत्येष मन्त्रो विधित्सतः ।
फलवादोऽर्थवादः स्यादस्यैव तु विधेः परः ॥११८९॥

‘May the person be the knower of the truth of this greatness’—the result of this Mantra is here intended to be enjoined and its statement is merely an *Arthavāda* that comes after the injunction.’ [1189]

महिम्नोऽस्यैव वा साक्षाद्वाक्यार्थप्रतिबुद्धये ।
अन्वयव्यतिरेकाभ्यां स्यात्पदार्थविचक्षणः ॥११९०॥

(It means to say:) (A person) should be careful in deciding the meaning/significance of the status through *Anvaya* and *Vyatireka* in order that he has directly the knowledge/awareness of the meaning of the sentence, i.e. of this very greatness. [1190]

Verses 1191-1199 affirm that the result is knowledge of the meaning of the sentence.

यतः पदार्थसंबोधान्नेति नेत्यादिलक्षणम् ।
महिमानं श्रुतेर्वेति फलं चेत्स्यात्ततोऽपि किम् ॥११९१॥

Since he knows from the Śruti this greatness through his knowledge of the meaning/significance of the thing, i.e. his status, which is characterized as *neti neti*, even then the question is: 'What would come thereafter?' [1191]

तं विदित्वेत्यतः प्राह फलं वाक्यार्थबोधतः ।
 यस्मादेवंफलं ज्ञानमेवंविद्यत्नतस्ततः ॥११९२॥
 शमादिसाधनो भूत्वा महिम्नः पदविद्वेत् ।
 इति मन्त्रोक्त एवार्थो ब्राह्मणेनापि वर्ण्यते ॥११९३॥

Therefore, the Śruti has stated, in the words *taṁ viditvā*, the result that accrues from knowing the meaning of the sentence. Since the knowledge 'has this as the result'; therefore, one, being a knower of this with every effort, [1192] should have become possessed of the means such as *śama*; knowing thus, then one should become a knower of the status—this is the meaning stated in the Mantra and is described by the Brāhmaṇa also. [1193]

धर्माधर्मासमायोगो यस्मात्प्रत्यङ्घियः फलम् ।
 एवंविदादरात्तस्मात्प्रत्यक्प्रवणधीर्नरः ॥११९४॥

Since dissociation from merit and demerit is the result of the knowledge of the nature of the Ātman; therefore, should a person be jealously inclined towards (securing the knowledge of) the inner self. [1194]

उत्पन्नात्मबुभुत्सुः सन्वेदानुवचनादिभिः ।
 विरक्त आग्रजाल्लोकान्मोक्षादर्वाक्षु भूमिषु ॥११९५॥

Being one in whom the desire for knowing the Ātman has arisen through (the study of) the Veda and the Brāhmaṇa, (one becomes) averse to the world right up to the first-born (i.e. Hiranyagarbha), at various levels up to that of liberation. [1195]

संशुद्धधिषणोऽत्यर्थं वैदिकैरेव साधनैः ।
 पराङ्मुखीकृतः शुद्ध्या तैस्तैः सांसारिकैः फलैः ॥११९६॥
 दुःखात्मकत्वात्सर्वेषां शिखिविन्यस्तहस्तवत् ॥११९७॥

This person, whose intellect is purified with (the help of) the means taught in the Veda, and on account of purity is averse to (lit. has his face turned away from) various worldly results, [1196]
 because all of them by nature involve suffering, just like a hand which is placed in fire. [1197]

इत्येवं ध्वस्तनिःशेषकल्मषः पूर्वसाधनैः ।
 उत्पन्नात्मबुभुत्सुः संस्त्यक्तसर्वपरिग्रहः ॥११९८॥

Thus, having destroyed the entire blemish on his part by the earlier mentioned means, this person should have a desire to know the Ātman arisen in him and should abandon all (his) belongings (possessed earlier). [1198]

रजस्तमोजरागादिदोषानाक्षिप्तशेषैः ।
 मुमुक्षुवस्थां संप्राप्त एवं पूर्वोक्तसाधनैः ॥११९९॥

This one, who has thus become a seeker of liberation through the means, which are already stated, he should have his devotion unaffected by the blemishes such as attachment born of *rajas* and *tamas* (*gunas*). [1199]

Verses 1200 and 1201 state the result arising from the knowledge of one's status.

मन्त्रब्राह्मणरूपिण्याथेदानीं विनियुज्यते ।
 श्रुत्याशेषतमोघातिप्रत्यग्ज्ञानस्य जन्मने ॥१२००॥

Now he is enjoined (or prepared) by the Śruti in the form

of Mantra and Brāhmaṇa, for the rise of the knowledge of the inner self which destroys the entire ignorance. [1200]

एवं पूर्वोक्तमन्त्रार्थज्ञानतत्फलवित्सुधीः ।

शमादिसाधनो विद्यादन्वयव्यतिरेकतः ।

व्युत्थाप्यानात्मनः पश्येत्प्रविश्यात्मानमात्मना ॥१२०१॥

Thus, this person, possessed of good intellect, becoming a knower of the knowledge of the significance of the Mantra stated earlier and its result/fruit, should come to have the means such as śama and should know through Anvaya and Vyatireka the Ātman; afterwards, having raised himself above the non-Ātman and having entered into the Ātman. [1201]

This verse states (as coming in this context) the meaning of the sentence tat tvam asi.

वाक्यादेव ततोऽसङ्गः सर्वमात्मेति वीक्षते ।

इत्येतद्ब्राह्मणेनेह प्रयत्नेन विधीयते ॥१२०२॥

Then, becoming unattached (to the external world), with the help of the Śruti (lit. sentence), he sees (i.e. comes to know) 'All is the Ātman'. This is thus enjoined by the Brāhmaṇa with particular care. [1202]

Verses 1203 and 1204 point out the order of the two words dānta and śānta as coming from the sequential order of their meanings.

दान्तो भूत्वा ततः शान्तस्ततश्चोपरतो भवेत् ।

अर्थक्रमो बलीयान्स्याद्यतः पाठक्रमादिह ॥१२०३॥

Then, having become subdued and then pacified, he should have drawn himself away from that (external world); this is so; since here the *arthakrama* 'meaning sequence' is more powerful than *pāṭhakrama* 'reading sequence'. [1203]

क्रियानिवृत्तिविषये प्रयोगो जगतीक्ष्यते ।
अभिधानस्य शान्तादेः प्रत्यक्षेणेह सर्वतः ॥१२०४॥

It is directly noticed everywhere in the world that the use of such words as *śānta* refer to the subject of desisting from activity. [1204]

This verse states the meaning of dānta to be one whose organs have ceased to be turned externally.

बहिष्करणचेष्टाया निवृत्तौ दान्त उच्यते ।
दान्तोऽश्वो गौर्गजो वापि प्रयोगस्तत्र वीक्ष्यते ॥१२०५॥

A person is described as *dānta* 'subdued', when tendency of moving outwards has stopped as in the case of a subdued horse, a bull or an elephant, since such use is noticed in respect of them. [1205]

In verses 1206 and 1207 is pointed out the propriety of reversing the order of the words śānta and dānta.

अन्तःकरणचेष्टाया निवृत्तौ शान्त उच्यते ।
शान्तो भिक्षुस्तपस्वीति तत्प्रयोगसमीक्षणात् ॥१२०६॥

When the activity of the internal organ (of a person) has stopped, that person is called *śānta*. This is noticed in the use of the word *śānta* in statements like *śānto bhikṣus tapasvī*. [1206]

SP supports the purpose of this verse by referring to *Gītā* 3.6: *karmendriyāni saṁyamya ya āste manasā smaran*. Also SP points out that the words *śānta* and *dānta* are used in this order in BUB also, which justifies verse 1203 above, saying that *arthakrama* is stronger than *pāthakrama*.

नन्वप्राप्तौ विधिर्युक्तः प्राप्तास्त्वेते दमादयः ।
कुतस्तत्प्राप्तिरिति चेद्यथा प्राप्तिस्तथोच्यते ॥१२०७॥

(An objection is raised:) 'But, indeed, the injunction is reasonably understood, in case the matter under reference is unobtained; but, here, these, i.e. *dama* etc., are already obtained. Therefore, if there is a question: 'Where does one get them from?', then an answer is given in the way to show how they are obtained'. [1207]

Verses 1208-1217 mention the fourfold nature of action.

प्रतिषिद्धं तथा काम्यं चापलं नित्यमेव च ।
इयदेव जगत्यस्मिन्पुंसां कर्म समीक्ष्यते ॥१२०८॥

(To indicate this:) What is prohibited, so also what is to be desired, what is rash doing and what is purely obligatory. This much of action is noticeable among human beings in the world. [1208]

निषिद्धस्य निषिद्धत्वात्कर्मकाण्डेऽपि कर्मणः ।
कुतो वेदान्तविद्यायां तस्य प्राप्तिर्मनागपि ॥१२०९॥

Since, even in Karma Kāṇḍa (of Veda) there is mention made of some forbidden action as prohibited (specifically); how then can that, even a little of it, be noticeable (or, mentioned) in the lore of Vedānta? [1209]

मुक्तेरर्वाक्ष काम्येषु मुमुक्षुत्वाद्विरक्ततः ।
काम्यकर्मापि नैवेह मुमुक्षोः संभवत्यतः ॥१२१०॥

Since one who is desirous of liberation, has in the stages earlier to liberation aversion to action motivated by desire; therefore, in the case of this person that (*kāmya* action) cannot be possible. [1210]

रजस्तमोऽतिवर्तित्वात्सत्त्वसंशुद्धिहेतुतः ।

चापलान्यपि कर्माणि नातः सन्त्यस्य कानिचित् ॥१२११॥

Therefore, because of (one's) having transcended *rajas* and *tamas* and also because of the purification of one's own being rash actions on one's part are not noticed. [1211]

न पाणिपादचपल इत्युक्तेर्वा निषेधतः ।

नातः संभाव्यते कर्म मुमुक्षोश्चापलं क्वचित् ॥१२१२॥

Also, because there is rejection (in the Smṛti statement) *na pāṇipādacapalah*,¹ there is no act of rashness possible for a person desirous of liberation. [1212]

¹*Manusmṛti* 4.177a.

नित्यस्याकरणाद्यः स्यादनर्थः करणादपि ।

नित्यस्यावाप्यतेऽसौ चेद्वद किं नित्यकर्मणा ॥१२१३॥

Whatever evil would come as a result of not performing obligatory acts would come also in case that one does these obligatory acts—if this is so, what is the use of the performance of obligatory rites? [1213]

एवं नित्यानि कर्माणि कुर्वतः शुद्धचेतसः ।

तित्यक्षा जायते पुंसो नित्येष्वपि च कर्मसु ॥१२१४॥

Thus (it is:) 'In the case of a person, who is doing his obligatory rites (i.e. acts) and has secured the purification of his mind (or, the intellect?), there arises a desire to abandon even the obligatory rites. [1214]

संसारमोक्षणायाशु नित्यं कर्म न चेदलम् ।

कोऽर्थस्तेनेह पुंसः स्यादकृतेन कृतेन वा ॥१२१५॥

If (the performance of) obligatory rites is not capable of

effecting release from transmigratory existence, then what is the use of that act to a man, whether it is not performed or performed. [1215]

इति संजातपरमवैराग्यो नित्यकर्मणः ।
स्वतस्त्यागं करोत्येव प्राप्तास्तेन शमादयः ॥१२१६॥

If this person, in whom there has arisen thus an extreme aversion to the performance of obligatory rites, of himself gives them up, then he will have acquired *śama* etc. [1216]

यमान्सेवेत सततं न नित्यं नियमान्बुधः ।
यमान्पतत्यकुर्वाणो नियमान्केवलान्भजन् ॥१२१७॥

A wise person should ever (or, continuously) take to *yamas* 'restraints' and not to *niyamas* 'observances'; not practising *yamas* (and) only taking to *niyamas*, he comes to have a fall. [1217]

For *yama* SP refers to *Yogasūtra* 2.30; and for *niyama* to *Yogasūtra* 2.32.

Verses 1218-1220 point out to an injunction related to the means (*sādhana*s), viz. *śama* etc. which are *svataḥprāpta*.

सत्यमेवं शमादीनां प्राप्तत्वान्नेष्यते विधिः ।
प्राप्तानामेव तेषां तु साधनत्वं विधीयते ।
प्रत्यग्याथात्म्यविज्ञानजन्मने श्रुतिवाक्यतः ॥१२१८॥

True, thus it is that *śama* etc. are already acquired and there is not a need of (i.e. not expected) an injunction (with regard to acquiring them); in the case of them, which are already acquired, it is stated in the Śruti that they are the means to the rise of specific knowledge about the real nature of the inner self. [1218]

यथोक्तविषये तेषां साधनत्वं न मानतः ।

यतः प्राप्तमतः श्रुत्या साधनत्वं विधीयते ॥१२१९॥

(But) since their being the means to the subject, which is already mentioned, is not known from any other source of knowing, the Śruti, therefore, prescribes their being the means (to that). [1219]

निवृत्तिमात्रं प्राप्तं वा भवेदुक्तेन वर्त्मना ।

कर्तव्यता निवृत्तेस्तु न प्राप्तेति विधीयते ॥१२२०॥

These are means just for one's withdrawing (or, cessation) from action as is known in the way you have mentioned; the necessity of cessation is, however, not known yet (*vā*)¹ and therefore they are prescribed (as the means to the desired end). [1220]

¹ Cf. SP: *vāśabdo 'vadhāraṇārthah*.

In verses 1221-1225 is stated the purport of the Śruti in respect of one's being uparata; verses 1226-1228 affirm the need for an injunction with regard to one's having uparati.

ननु दान्तशमोक्त्यैव सर्वस्यैवेह कर्मणः ।

वारितत्वादुपरतश्रुत्यान्यत्किं विधीयते ॥१२२१॥

बहिरन्तःक्रियातोऽन्या न क्रिया विद्यते यतः ।

नोत्सर्गविधिना यस्मान्नापवादस्य बाधनम् ॥१२२२॥

भूताहिंसाविधिर्यस्मान्नाग्नीषोमीयमारभित् ।

ऊर्ध्वं प्राणा उत्क्रामन्ति यूनः स्थविर आयति ॥१२२३॥

प्रत्युत्थानाभिवादाभ्यां पुनस्तान्प्रतिपद्यते ।

इत्यौत्सर्गिकमाचारं यथा ब्रह्मा प्रबाधते ॥१२२४॥

आगच्छति गुरौ तृष्णीमासीनस्तद्वदत्र च ।

औत्सर्गिकत्यागविधिं नित्यकर्मविधिर्बलात् ।

तस्य जीवनमात्रैकहेतुत्वाद्बाधते ध्रुवम् ॥१२२५॥

नित्यकर्मविधेर्यस्माच्छ्रमादिविधिना हतिः ।
न संप्राप्तेत्यतो यत्नात्प्रारब्धोपरतश्रुतिः ॥१२२६॥

(A doubt is expressed thus:) 'But, since all of the activity (i.e. the actions) is (i.e. are) set aside (or, warded off) by the statement about cessation (from all activities) insisting on (a person's being) subdued and (having acquired) *śama* 'tranquillity (of mind)', what other (action) is prescribed? [1221] Since there is no external activity (by sense-organs) other than internal activity (by internal organs), (therefore, there) cannot be (the objection) (and) since there is not the stultification of a general rule by a rule for exception: [1222]

(Again, it is not that) a person should not kill¹ the animal intended for Agni and Soma, because there is a general rule regarding non-violence in relation to all animals.' [1223ab]

(See again this:) When an elderly person approaches, the *prāṇas* of a young person move upwards (i.e. they begin to leave his body, as it were) and the young one gets them back (in the body) again by rising up (from his seat and offering) him his obeisance.² [1223cd-1224ab]

Since the Brahman priest sets aside this behaviour (prescribed) by a general rule, [1224cd]

he remains seated silent (even) when an elderly person has come. In the same way, here, [1225ab]

the rule for (the performance of) an obligatory act stultifies, through its force, the general rule regarding abandoning (activity), because it is the cause (i.e. basis) for life alone.

[1225c-f]

Since there is thus no setting aside (lit. striking down) of the general instruction regarding obligatory acts by the rule about *śama* etc., therefore, the Śruti has begun with particular care the statement about cessation (from all activities). [1226]

At the end of verse 1221, there was reference made to a mendicant not doing any activity, but the general rule about activity is 'whatever is prescribed in the scripture has to be

done' and thus there is a conflict between the exception rule (*apavāda*) and the general rule (*utsarga*). Here, the person, who has hypothesised an explanation for this opposition or this objection, has in mind two cases: one from Śrauta and the other from Smārta domain of activities, where the said conflict is accepted as not arising. In the first case, there is absence of non-conflict between the injunction regarding non-violence to all beings and another injunction where killing of an animal for Agni and Soma is prescribed. The second case is from *Manusmṛti*— rule regarding a young pupil's/celebrant's behaviour towards an elderly person and what the Brahman priest has to do in a similar situation, i.e. he does not go by the rule of Smṛti—the hypothetical answer is: each of the two cases of different acts belongs not to the same context and, therefore, there could not be any procedural conflict involved. Here also, *śānta* and *dānta* have reference to activity, while *uparata* does not have any, and, therefore, the argument is made in the beginning, that there is no conflict.

¹The word *ārabhit* is here difficult to understand. It may be taken for *ārabheta* while the reading stands for the scriptural word *ārabheta*. It seems that Sureśvara made this change in the verbal form for the sake of metre. Also the variant reading noted in AnSS edition *āranut* does not offer any help whatsoever!

²*Manusmṛti* 2.120.

इह चोपरतश्रुत्या तिष्ठत्यादिवदुच्यते ।
 कर्मकर्मैव पुंसोऽस्य ह्यनुष्ठेयतयामृतेः ॥१२२७॥
 अनुष्ठेयतया श्रुत्या निवृत्तिः सर्वकर्मणाम् ।
 यस्माद्विधीयते तस्मात्तत्यागी पतितो भवेत् ॥१२२८॥

Further, in the statement about *uparati*, one's cessation from activities is conveyed (lit. stated) as similar to the activity indicated by the verbs *tiṣṭhati* etc.¹ because (those activities) are what are to be done by him (even involuntarily) up to his death.

[1227]

Since cessation from all activities is mentioned by the Śruti

as what is to be done; therefore, one, who gives up that (i.e. doing actions) would be considered as a man fallen (from proper conduct). [1228]

¹This refers to *svapiti*.

In verse 1229, a position is taken thus: 'One does not have to give up performance of daily/obligatory duties.'

इत्यत्र चोदयित्वैके परिहारं प्रचक्षते ।
नित्यानां कर्मणां कस्मात्परित्यागो विधीयते ॥१२२९॥

Having then hypothesized an objection, some people have offered its refutation thus: (The question asked is:) 'Why is (here) prescribed the abandoning of the obligatory duties?' [1229]

Verses 1230-1233 are to answer away the hypothetical position taken (in verse 1229).

काम्यादिकर्मवत्तेषां मनोव्याक्षेपहेतुतः ।
त्यागोऽतश्चोद्यते श्रुत्यां नित्यानामपि कर्मणाम् ॥१२३०॥
भत्वा समाहित इति समाधानं विधास्यते ।
चौद्यस्यासंभवोऽस्यात्र श्रुत्यैव विहितत्वतः ॥१२३१॥
साधनत्वेन शान्त्यादेः सम्यग्ज्ञानस्य जन्मने ।
नातश्चोद्यावकाशोऽत्र शमादेर्विहितत्वतः ॥१२३२॥
साध्यसाधनसंबन्धविधाने सत्यसंभवः ।
स्वर्गादाविव यागादेर्विधानादेव कारणात् ॥१२३३॥

(The position taken is:) 'Because they are, like the performance of desired activities, the cause of the destruction of a person's mind and therefore abandoning of even those obligatory duties is prescribed by the Śruti.' [1230]

This will be answered/explained away in the words *bhūtvā samāhitah*; since there is really no place (lit. possibility) for

the hypothetical objection owing to the fact that the Śruti itself has prescribed (the same) [1231]

śānti etc. as the means for the rise of proper knowledge and there is therefore thus not any scope for that position; for, śama etc. have been already prescribed. [1232]

(Then now follows their explanation:) When there is thus a prescription (in the Śruti) about the connection with what is to be accomplished and the means for accomplishing it, there is no possibility (or scope for that position being taken) in respect of heaven etc., (they are not ignored) only for the reason that there is prescription for (the performance) of a sacrifice. [1233]

In verses 1234-1238, Sureśvara states his own view.

दोषान्तरप्रसङ्गार्थं परिहारः कृतस्ततः ।
 चोद्यपूर्वक एतस्मिन्नन्यचोद्यस्य संभवात् ॥१२३४॥
 यदि व्याक्षेपकारित्वान्नित्यं कर्म निषिध्यते ।
 बहु भिक्षाटनाद्यस्ति तत्कस्मान्न निषिध्यते ॥१२३५॥
 वेदान्तश्रवणाद्यस्ति बहु व्याक्षेपकारि च ।
 तन्नित्यकर्मवत्कस्माच्छ्रुत्येह न निषिध्यते ॥१२३६॥
 नैष दोषः प्रधानार्थसमाप्तेरेव कारणात् ।
 भिक्षाटनाद्यनुष्ठानं तादर्थ्यान्न निषिध्यते ॥१२३७॥
 प्रत्यग्याथात्म्यविज्ञानसमाप्त्यापेक्षितत्वतः ।
 वेदान्तश्रवणादीनां न त्यागोऽतोऽत्र भण्यते ॥१२३८॥

Thus there is warding off (of the faults seen in the preceding verses); in case there contingently occur some other faults they are preceded by a yet (other) objection which has a scope for another objection in this context: [1234]

'If an obligatory act is (thus) prohibited for the reason that it causes destruction (of the person's mind), then why is it that going for begging etc. are not prohibited? [1235]

And there is much (of such other doings) as hearing the

Vedānta text(s) etc. which cause destruction (of the mind). Then, why is it (also) that it is not prohibited by the Śruti like obligatory rites (as said above)? [1236]

(The answer to this is:) 'This is not a fault, since there occurs the fulfilment of what is principally stated (as what is to be performed); however, the performance of activities such as going for begging are not prohibited because of their having the same purpose as of acquiring knowledge about the Ātman'.¹ [1237]

As obtaining the specific knowledge about the real nature of inner self is what is expected; so there is not stated the giving up of hearing the Vedānta text(s) etc. [1238]

¹SP invites attention to some Smṛti statement which is not traced:

*ārūḍho naiṣṭhikaṃ dharmam yas tu pracyavate punaḥ /
prāyaścittam na paśyāmi yena śudhyet sa ātmahā //*

Verses 1239 and 1240 state one Sāṅkhya view, viz. that even a prohibited act is to be performed, on the authority of upādāna 'acceptance' by some (mīmāṃsakas).

समाप्तिं न समायाति प्रधानं यदसंभवे ।
निषिद्धमपि तत्कार्यं तत्समाप्तिप्रयुक्तितः ॥१२३९॥
प्रधानचोदनैवास्य चोदनातोऽवगम्यते ।
भिक्षाटनादिना नर्ते प्रधानं हि समाप्यते ॥१२४०॥

A prohibited act, in the absence of which the principal activity does not come to its completion (i.e. fulfilment), even that act has to be performed, since it has promoted the fulfilment of that principal activity. [1239]

Therefore, from this person's being enjoined (to cessation from all other activities), there is enjoining of him for the principal activity only; indeed, the principal activity is not fulfilled (i.e. completed) without going for begging etc.¹ [1240]

The word 'some' possibly means Mīmāṃsakas; for this see SP on verse 1241. It dwells at length on the discussion of *śeṣabhakṣa*— that should throw some light on the point. We do not enter into this.

¹SP supports this by quoting *śarīram me vicarṣaṇam* (Taittirīyopaniṣad 1.4).

शेषभक्षं न कुर्वन्ति प्रधानार्थानुरोधतः ।
साक्षाद्विहितमप्येवं तादर्थ्यात्कर्म नो मतम् ॥१२४१॥

They do not partake of the *śeṣa* 'remainder of materials for offering' owing to that it is in keeping with the principally desired object; therefore, even though it is directly prescribed it is not to be considered as an activity, as it has the same purpose as of that (principal activity). [1241]

SP states, in the context of this verse, the Mīmāṃsā procedure at length—it would be read with profit.

Verses 1241-1243 present the Siddhāntin's view: even a rite prescribed by the Śruti has to be given up, if it conflicts with the performance of the principal rite.

याः काश्चिज्जीवता शक्यास्त्यक्तुं तित्यक्षता क्रियाः ।
ताः सर्वाः संपरित्यज्य निमेषादौ व्यवस्थितः ॥१२४२॥

Whatever activities are possible for one's giving up, if one who wishes to renounce while one is alive, one should have given up all of them within a moment and should become steady in the state (of a liberated being). [1242]

उक्तविध्यर्थविषयाद्याः क्रिया विषयान्तरे ।
निषिध्यन्तेऽत्र ताः सर्वा व्याघातायैव ता यतः ॥१२४३॥

Those activities, which are on account of their being for the purpose of the injunction that is enjoined, are prohibited with

respect to another topic, for the reason that they are only for creating obstruction (to right knowledge). [1243]

Verses 1244 and 1245 clarify the nature of titikṣā.

द्वन्द्वप्रवाहसंपातसहिष्णुरभिधीयते ।
तितिक्षुवचनेनात्र दुरुक्तादेस्तथैव च ॥१२४४॥

Here, in the word *titikṣu*, and in the same way, also in the statement of censure etc., is described (a person) who is capable to bear the occurrence of the stream of pairs of opposites.¹ [1244]

¹For example, *sukhaduḥkha*, *śīta-uṣṇa*, see verse 1054 note 2 above.

स्वातन्त्र्यं येष कर्तुः स्यात्करणाकरणं प्रति ।
तान्येव तु निषिद्धानि कर्माणीह शमादिभिः ॥१२४५॥

Here are set aside (lit. prohibited) by *śama* etc. only those activities, towards the performance and/or non-performance of which an agent has liberty (or, a choice/an option). [1245]

Verses 1246-1248 state that the agent, with reference to an activity, can give up the performance of it, even if it did not allow him any option—this, after he has given up any other performance which allowed him an option.

अस्वातन्त्र्यं तु येष स्यात्कर्तुः कर्मसु सर्वदा ।
समाहितोक्त्यर्थेदानौ तन्निरोधौ विधीयते ॥१२४६॥

But, now, a prohibition is specifically prescribed by the word *samāhita* in respect of those activities with reference to which the agent does not ever have such liberty. [1246]

पिण्डीकृत्येन्द्रियग्रामं बुद्धावारोप्य निश्चलम् ।

विषयांस्तत्स्मृतींस्त्यक्त्वा तिष्ठेच्चिदनुरोधतः ॥१२४७॥

Having collected together (i.e. controlled) the group of sense-organs and fixed the same to be steady in the intellect and then having abandoned all the objects (of enjoyment) and also the memories of them, a person (or, an agent) should remain inclined towards (only) sentience. [1247]

SP states this as *asamprajñātasamādhi*, as called in the *Yogaśāstra*.

एषोऽभ्युपायः सर्वत्र वेदान्तेषु विधीयते ।
तत्त्वमस्यादिवाक्यार्थज्ञानोत्पत्त्यर्थमादरात् ॥१२४८॥

Everywhere, in the Vedānta works, there is zealously prescribed this excellent remedy for (causing/effecting) the rise of the knowledge of the meaning of the sentences such as *tat tvam asi*. [1248]

Verses 1249-1260 adduce sentences from the Vedānta texts in support of what is stated (just) before.

नाविरतो दुश्चरितान्नाशान्तो नासमाहितः ।
नाशान्तमानसो वापि प्रज्ञानेनैनमाप्नुयात् ॥१२४९॥

A person would not get (to know) this (Ātman) by his excellent knowledge (also), if he has not stopped himself from (doing) evil acts, if he is not put (his mind) in the state of satisfaction, if he is not (i.e. does not feel) satisfied, or even if he is not calm/tranquil in his mind. [1249]

Cf. *Kāthopaniṣad* 2.24.

मुक्तेर्हि बिभ्यतो देवा मोहेनापिदधुर्नरान् ।
ततस्ते कर्मसूद्युक्ताः प्रावर्तन्त दिवानिशम् ॥१२५०॥

Indeed, gods, being afraid that liberation (might be secured by men), wrapped/covered them with delusion; then, they (i.e. men), becoming prone to activity, began their activity day and night. [1250]

Cf. SV 218 where *prāvatantāvicakṣaṇāḥ* is for *prāvartanta divāniśam* of this verse. SP states this to be a citation from some Vedic text.

यतः कर्म तमोहेतुस्तस्मादेव मुमुक्षुभिः ।
ज्ञानेन भित्त्वा संमोहं सर्वानर्थैकसंश्रयम् ॥१२५१॥

Since action is the cause of ignorance; therefore, for that reason only, those, who are desirous for liberation, should have first destroyed (lit. broken) the entire delusion (*sammoha*), (which is) the support of all evil (results) by means of knowledge (by taking to renunciation).¹ [1251]

¹SP adds: *mumukṣubhir eva saṁnyāsaḥ kartavya iti śeṣaḥ*.

संन्यस्य सर्वकर्माणि प्रत्यक्प्रवणधीर्नरः ।
प्रत्यग्याथात्म्यविज्ञानमात्रमेव समाश्रयेत् ॥१२५२॥

Having renounced all actions, a person should, with his mind inclined towards (knowing the nature of) the inner self, resort only to the specific knowledge about the reality of the inner self. [1252]

तत एवैकलाद्यस्मात्संसाराद्विप्रमुच्यते ।
इत्येतदाह विस्पष्टं भाल्लविब्राह्मणं वचः ॥१२५३॥

Therefore has the Brāhmaṇa (text) of the Bhāllavis made a very clear statement: 'Only through that does one become free from transmigratory existence'. [1253]

SP elucidates this thought thus: *muktisāadhanajñānopadeśena*

saṃnyāsapūrvakaṃ śravaṇādī kāryam ity etad bhāllaviśrutyā vivakṣitam.

यदा पञ्चावतिष्ठन्ते ज्ञानानि मनसा सह ।
बुद्धिश्च न विचेष्टेत तामाहुः परमां गतिम् ॥१२५४॥

They have called that as the highest state where the five senses,¹ together with *manas*, become non-operating and the intellect also does not remain active.² [1254]

¹This is for the sense-organs (*hetuhetumator aikyam*), cf. *indriya-* in the next verse.

²Cf. *Kāthopaniṣad* 6.10 (with *viceṣṭati* for *viceṣṭate*).

तां योगमिति मन्यन्ते स्थिरामिन्द्रियधारणाम् ।
अप्रमत्तस्तदा भवति योगो हि प्रभवाप्ययौ ॥१२५५॥

That firm stopping (lit. holding the activity) of the (sense-)organs do they call Yoga. Then does one become unfaltering. Indeed, Yoga consists in origination and merger.¹ [1255]

¹Both SP and NKL (ms. p. 793) explain it thus: *śṛṣṭipralayā-nusaṃdhānarūpapratyayavṛttikaraṇaṃ yogaḥ*. Also SP states that this is *samprajñātasamādhi* of *Yogaśāstra*.

यच्छेद्वाङ्मनसौ प्राज्ञस्तद्यच्छेज्ज्ञान आत्मनि ।
ज्ञानमात्मनि महति तद्यच्छेच्छान्त आत्मनि ॥१२५६॥

A wise man should control his (power of) speech¹ and *manas*; he should control that (i.e. *manas*) in the knowing about the one, i.e. the *Ātman*;² he should control that knowing about the one in the great *Ātman*³ and he should control that (great *Ātman*) in the tranquil *Ātman*.⁴ [1256]

¹SP points out: *vāk* (nominative form) is for *vācam* (accusative

form) and *manasī* for *manasi* with the Vedic lengthening of it.

²This is with reference to the intellect within an individual which is identified with the Ātman because of its extreme nearness to it.

³This refers to Hiraṇyagarbha.

⁴This is the highest Ātman.

उत्तिष्ठत जाग्रत प्राप्य वरान्निबोधत ।
सत्येन लभ्यस्तपसा ह्येष आत्मा
सम्यग्ज्ञानेन ब्रह्मचर्येण नित्यम् ।
अन्तःशरीरे ज्योतिर्मयो हि शुभ्रो
यं पश्यन्ति यतयः क्षीणदोषाः ॥१२५७॥

'Arise, wake up, (and) having approached the excellent (O men), get to know (that Ātman)';¹ 'This Ātman is ever to be known (lit. obtained) by truth, by penance/austerity, by proper knowledge and by observing celibacy', '(This one) is within the body, consisting of light, and the bright one and him see ascetics, who have their faults gone.'² [1257]

¹*Kāthopaniṣad* 3.14.

²*Muṇḍakopaniṣad* 3.1.6.

न चक्षुषा गृह्यते नापि वाचा
नान्यैर्देवैस्तपसा कर्मणा वा ।
ज्ञानप्रसादेन विशुद्धसत्त्वस्ततस्तु
तं पश्यते निष्कलं ध्यायमानः ॥१२५८॥

It is not grasped by the eye, not by speech either, not by other gods,¹ by austerity or by (any) action. But, one realises (lit. sees)² that undivided one through the purity obtained by/from knowing (it), with one's own being purified³ and (ever) meditating (on it). [1258]

¹Here the gods, who superintend over the sense-organs, stand for the latter.

²The use of the Ātmanepada form *paśyate* is to be noted: One does not see here any outside object, but one realises oneself to be the Brahman.

³That is, cleansed of every blemish.

प्रतिशाखं तथान्यानि ज्ञानोपायप्रसिद्धये ।
तन्मूलानि तथान्यानि स्मृतिवाक्यानि कोटिशः ॥१२५९॥
सन्त्येवात्मपरिज्ञानसाधनानां प्रसिद्धये ।
अग्निरनिकेतः स्यादशर्माशरणो मुनिः ॥१२६०॥

In every school (lit. branch) of the Veda, there are, to this effect, other (sentences) having the purpose of being the means (lit. root-cause) for acquiring the knowledge (about the Brahman) and also other sentences in the Smṛtis, crores of them, based on (i.e. rooted in) them, [1259]
are indeed there to serve as the means of achieving full knowledge about the Brahman. The word *anagni* means one who does not have a home, (thus) the word *aśarmā* not having a protection (i.e. protecting roof), i.e. an ascetic (or, a Muni). [1260]

Verses 1261-1266 adduce support for this from the Smṛti texts.

त्यज धर्ममधर्मं च उभे सत्यानृते त्यज ।
उभे सत्यानृते त्यक्त्वा येन त्यजसि तं त्यज ॥१२६१॥

Leave off merit and demerit both; give up (the consideration of) truth and untruth. By giving up both, truth and untruth, give up (also) that through (the help of) which you give them up. [1261]

Cf. BUBV 1.4.1054cd; 3.5.162ab; 4.4.126 above; cf. *Mahābhārata* 12.167.10.

यतो यतो निवर्तते ततस्ततो विमुच्यते ।
निवर्तनाद्धि सर्वतो न वेत्ति दुःखमण्वपि ॥१२६२॥

A person (who is a seeker of the Brahman) is freed from each of whatever he withdraws himself from. Indeed, by withdrawing himself from all, (he comes to such a state that) he does not experience (even) a little of misery. [1262]

Cf. BUBV 4.3.1885ab.

कोऽहं कस्य कुतो वेति कः कथं वा भवेदिति ।
प्रयोजनमतिर्नित्यमेवं मोक्षाश्रमी भवेत् ॥१२६३॥

'Who am I?', 'To whom I belong?' and (vā) 'Whence (have I come)?', 'What and how will be (my condition)?'—having entertained (lit. become full of) such in thoughts (i.e. mind), a person should ever be in the stage (for securing, or suitable) for liberation. [1263]

नैतादृशं ब्राह्मणस्यास्ति वित्तं
यथैकता समता सत्यता च ।
शीलं स्थितिर्दण्डनिधानमार्जवं
ततस्ततश्चोपरमः क्रियाभ्यः ॥१२६४॥

There is not for a Brāhmaṇa (any other) wealth of this kind, as being only one single entity (i.e. the Brahman), being equal (towards all outside objects/individuals) and being (devoted to) truth. From that come to him (exemplary) conduct, steadiness, laying down the rod, straightforwardness and, then later, cessation from all of the activities. [1264]

निवर्तयित्वा रसनं रसेभ्यो घ्राणं
च गन्धाच्छ्रवणं च शब्दात् ।
स्पर्शानुं रूपगुणाच्च चक्षुस्ततः
परं पश्यति स्वं स्वभावम् ॥१२६५॥

Having turned away the sense of taste from (all) tastes and the sense of smell from (every) fragrance and (also) the sense

of hearing from the word and (the whole of) the body¹ from (every object of) touch and the eye from (every) excellence of form, a person sees the highest (Ātman/Brahman) which is (really) his own nature. [1265]

¹This stands for the sense of touch.

एवं मनुवसिष्ठादिधर्मेष्वपि सहस्रशः ।
स्पष्टानि सन्ति वाक्यानि यथोक्तार्थप्रसिद्धये ॥१२६६॥

Thus, there are thousands of clear statements in the Dharma works of Manu, Vasiṣṭha and others also and they go to prove the matter stated (earlier). [1266]

SP cites *Manusmṛti* 6.43-44:

*anagnir aniketaḥ syād grāmam annārtham āśrayet /
upekṣako 'saṁcayiko munir bhāvasamanvitaḥ //*
*kapālaṁ vṛkṣamūlāni kucelam asahāyatā /
samatā caiva sarvasminn etan muktasya lakṣaṇam //*
(*asaṁkusuko* and *bhāvasamāhitaḥ* are the actual readings in the text of *Manusmṛti* 6.43cd which are rendered variantly by SP as *saṁcayiko* and *bhāvasamanvitaḥ*.)

Vasiṣṭhasmṛti: (exact place not traced)

*aranyanītyasya jīvendriyasya sarvendriyaprītinivartakasya /
adhyātmacintāgatamānasasya dhruvā hy anāvṛttir
upekṣakasya //*

*na śabdaśāstrābhiratasya mokṣo na cāpi lokagrahaṇe ratasya /
na bhojanācchādanagarvitasya na cāpi rāmyāvasathapriyasya //*

Yājñavalkyasmṛti: (3.158 and 159; though *nīrajas tamasā* for *virajaṁ samatā* at 159a)

*viśayendriyasamirodhatandrālasavivarjanam /
śārīrapariśaṁkhyānam pravṛttiṣv adarśanam //*
*virajaṁ samatā sattvaśuddhir nisprīhātā śamaḥ /
etair upāyaḥ saṁśuddhasattva योग्यमृतिं भवेत् //*

Verses 1267-1273 explain the reading in the *Mādhyandina*

recension: *śraddhāvitto bhūtvā*

साध्यस्य कर्मणस्त्यागात्सामर्थ्यादेव सिद्धतः ।
तत्साधनस्य संत्यागे श्रद्धावित्तगिरात्र किम् ॥१२६७॥

Since giving up (the performance) of an action, which is to be accomplished, is already understood (lit. established) for the purpose of conveying the giving up of its means, where is there the need of (using) the word *śraddhāvitta*? [1267]

This verse is based on the reading *śraddhāvitto bhūtvā* in the Mādhyandina recension of BU (for *saṁhīto bhūtvā*, cf. SP on this: *śraddhaiva vittam asyeti vyutpattyā vittāntaratyāgo vivakṣyate sa ca karmatyāgenaiva gatas tathācoparatādiśrutya śraddhāvitta-śruteḥ paunaruktyāt pramādapāṭho 'yam ity arthaḥ*).

मैवं दृष्टार्थविषये यत्कर्मास्यावशेषितम् ।
तत्साधनेष्वममताविधानार्थं वचो यतः ॥१२६८॥

Do not (think) so, since the statement is made with the idea of (a person's) having no feeling (about) it to be his own means towards that, viz. the remainder of the activity in relation to what is seen (as an object to be achieved). [1268]

SP supports this argument by citing *uktaṁ hi—*

*na kutyāṁ nodake saṅgo na caile na tripuṣkare /
nāgāre nāsane nānne yasya vai mokṣavit tu saḥ //*
(not traced)

SP adds: *tasmād apunarukter yuktā mādhyandinaśrutir ity arthaḥ*.

श्रद्धैव वित्तमस्येति नान्यदस्य यतस्ततः ।
श्रद्धावित्तोऽयमित्युक्तः संन्यासी सर्वकर्मणाम् ॥१२६९॥

Since only *śraddhā* 'faith' is the wealth of this person and not any other; therefore, he who has given up all activities

is described in the words *śraddhāvitto 'yam*.

[1269]

भत्वेत्यस्याभिसंबन्धः सर्वैः शान्तादिभिः पदैः ।
विधिनास्यापि चाक्षेपाद्विधितन्त्रत्वमिष्यते ॥१२७०॥

(It is to be understood that) the word *bhūtvā*¹ has connection with every one of the words beginning with *śānta*; since this also is implied by the injunction, this is to be accepted as dependent on (or, subordinate to) the injunction. [1270]

¹Read NKL (ms. p.794): *katham atra śamāder vidheyatvam iti paśyed iti vidhisannidhānād ity āha vidhineti*.

पाण्डित्यादि पुरोक्तं यत्तस्येयमुपसंहृतिः ।
प्राक्तदात्मानमेवावेदिति यच्च समीरितम् ।
सेतिकर्तव्यताकोऽथ विधिस्तस्यायमुच्यते ॥१२७१॥

Whatever is stated earlier, viz. wisdom etc., has this as its conclusion; and with reference also to what was said earlier, viz. *tad ātmānam evāvet*,¹ this is now stated as the injunction (to lay down the procedure:) thus, it should be done. [1271]

¹Cf. BU 1.4.10.

अन्वयव्यतिरेकाभ्यां यथोक्तैः साधनैर्युतः ॥१२७२॥
आत्मन्येव तमात्मानं निष्कृष्यानात्मराशितः ।
पश्येदित्यभिसंबन्धः पश्यतीत्यथवा भवेत् ॥१२७३॥

By the method of Anvaya and Vyatireka, a person, who is possessed of the (necessary) means, [1272]
should see that Ātman within himself, after seeing it apart from the entire mass of the non-Ātman (objects). The proper (*abhi*) connection would be with the verb *paśyet*¹ or *paśyati*. [1273]

Note the play on the word *ātman*.

¹This is read in the Mādhyandina recension.

In verses 1274-1282 Sureśvara points out/to the propriety in the reading of the Kāṇva recension.

विद्यर्थस्य पुरा प्राप्तेः काण्वानामनुवादतः ।
द्रष्टव्याद्युक्तितस्तस्मात्पश्यतीत्यभिधीयते ॥१२७४॥

As the (actual) injunction has been made (lit. obtained) before, the Kāṇvas have resorted to restating and there is the use of the words *draṣṭavya* and others, therefore, (the verb) *paśyati* is used. [1274]

Cf. the preceding verse wherein Sureśvara could not but bring this reading (though not necessary). Also, SP remarks that there is not any significant difference of meaning of the readings of the two recensions.

आत्मानात्मप्रधानत्वाद्ब्रह्मरूपेण नेक्ष्यते ॥१२७५॥
विशेषणत्वं स्वार्थोऽपि सत्कार्ये कारणे गतः ।
स्वात्माविद्यासमुत्थेऽस्मिन्नात्माविद्यासमाश्रयात् ॥१२७६॥

When this one (i.e. the Ātman) has arisen from ignorance about itself, by resorting to the ignorance about itself and owing to the predominance of the non-Ātmans, the Ātman, though of its own nature, who attains to the cause having the effect which is existent, is not seen as distinct (by one) to be having the form of the Brahman. [1275-1276]

देहेन्द्रियमनोधीभ्यो ह्यन्वयव्यतिरेकतः ।
मुञ्जेषीकावदुत्कृष्य पश्येदात्मानमात्मनि ॥१२७७॥

Having pulled out (i.e. distinguished) the Ātman from the body, the sense-organs, *manas* and the intellect by the method of Anvaya and Vyatircka, as (one pulls out) the sharp blade of Muñja grass, a person sees (i.e. will find) it in himself

(i.e. his inner self).

[1277]

SP refers to *caturthe*, i.e. chapter 4 of *Mīmāṃsāsūtra*, on the point that *ca* is to be understood as 'known'.

आत्मन्येव यदात्मानं विभज्यानात्मनोऽखिलात् ।
प्रपश्यति तदानात्मा न पृथग्व्यवशिष्यते ॥१२७८॥

When, after separating it from all (the mass of) the non-Ātmans, the person well (*pra*) sees a Ātman within himself; then, there does not remain any non-Ātman (any more). [1278]

स एष नेति नेत्यात्मेत्यथैतस्मात्पुरोदितात् ।
वाक्यात्सर्वमसंसर्गमात्मानं परिपश्यति ॥१२७९॥

Then, with (the help of) this Śruti statement, viz. *sa eṣa neti nety ātmā*, which was stated earlier, the person sees (i.e. understands) that all (this world) is (but) the Ātman which does not have any connection (with any other thing). [1279]

अविद्यातज्जकार्याणां प्रत्यग्दर्शनबाधतः ।
अव्यावृत्ताननुगतं ब्रह्मात्मानं प्रपश्यति ॥१२८०॥

(Then) on account of the stultification of ignorance and (all) the effects produced from it, i.e. by seeing (i.e. understanding about the nature of) the inner self, (a person) sees the Brahman, the Ātman, as not distinguished from and not similar to (anything else). [1280]

नानुत्पन्नमतो ज्ञानं नाप्यज्ञानमबाधितम् ।
कृत्स्नज्ञेयसमाप्तत्वात् किञ्चिदवशिष्यते ॥१२८१॥

Therefore, it is that this knowledge is not produced, nor also is it that ignorance is not stultified. (Thus) owing to all of what is to be known, being known (lit. obtained), there does not remain anything (yet to be known). [1281]

इयं सा ब्रह्मविद्योक्ता मधुकाण्डे पुरोदिता ।
या तस्या जन्मनः काले फलं श्रुत्याधुनोच्यते ॥१२८२॥

This is (thus) that lore of the Brahman, which was earlier discussed in Madhu Kāṇḍa and which is now called by the Śruti to be the result accruing (to one, who seeks to know the Brahman) at the time of the rise (of the knowledge mentioned above). [1282]

After restating in brief the result of the knowledge about the Ātman, verses 1283-1285 are for conveying the purport of the Śruti statement *nainam pāpmā*

In verses 1283-1285 is explained the statement of the Śruti: sarvam pāpmānaṃ tarati.

अकर्तृत्वात्मविज्ञानाद्धवस्तात्माज्ञानहेतुतः ।
नैनं ब्रह्मविदं पाप्मा तरत्यज्ञं यथा तथा ॥१२८३॥

Owing to his specific knowledge about the Ātman, which is a non-agent (of activity), i.e. that which has destroyed the cause of the ignorance about the Ātman, sin does not affect (or, overpower) the knower of the Brahman, in the way it overpowers an ignorant person.¹ [1283]

¹That is, a non-knower of the Brahman.

पाप्मशब्देन धर्मोऽपि देहोपादानहेतुतः ।
मुमुक्षोस्तदनिष्टत्वादिह निःशेष उच्यते ॥१२८४॥

With (the use of) the word *pāpmā* is here stated even merit, the whole of it, which exists in (or, is of) the seeker of liberation, owing to his still having a body and its¹ being (there) an undesired thing. [1284]

¹That is, that body's.

दुःखाभावः सदेहस्य नैवास्तीति श्रुतेर्मतम् ।
तस्मादेहोऽप्यनर्थः स्यादेहो नाशाच्च सर्वदा ॥१२८५॥

It is held by the Śruti that there cannot at all be (i.e. is not) the absence of any suffering of one, who is having a body;¹ therefore, even (being in) a body is ever² an undesired thing and also for the reason that a body perishes. [1285]

¹Cf. CU 8.12.4: *na vai saśarīrasya sataḥ priyāpriyayor apahastir asti.*

²Read SP: *sarvadety anarthapadena yujyate.*

Verses 1286-1290 explain *sarvam pāpmānaṁ tapati.*

न तपत्यथ तं कस्मात्तापकोऽप्यात्मवेदिनम् ।
पाप्मेति हेतुरधुना तत्र श्रुत्याभिधीयते ॥१२८६॥
अकर्तृत्वात्मयाथात्म्यसम्यग्ज्ञानाग्निना यतः ।
सर्वं पापं तपत्येष भस्मसात्कुरुतेऽग्निवत् ॥१२८७॥

'Well then,' (the question is asked,) Why (is it said) in the statement *na tapati* (that) there is a tormentor of (even) a knower of the Ātman? (The answer is:) 'Because there is sin in that (i.e. in the body)', (as) it is being told in the Śruti now: [1286]

(That is to say:) Since, like fire, this one burns, i.e. renders into ashes, the whole of the sin by the fire of right knowledge about the real nature of the Ātman, viz. about its not being an agent (of any activity)'. [1287]

SP adds: *ato na karma vidvaddr̥ṣṭitāpakam iti śeṣaḥ.*

स्वयमेवेश्वरः प्राह प्रपन्नाय किरीटिने ।
पुराणः शाश्वतोऽचिन्त्यः सर्वभूतानकम्पया ॥१२८८॥
यथैधांसि समिद्धोऽग्निर्भस्मसात्कुरुतेऽर्जुन ।

ज्ञानाग्निः सर्वकर्माणि भस्मसात्कुरुते तथा ॥१२८९॥

The lord, the ancient one, the eternal and incomprehensible has himself, out of his compassion for all beings, said to Arjuna who approached him (with devotion): [1288]

'As a well-enkindled fire burns the fuel to ashes, O Arjuna; so does the fire of knowledge render into ashes all of the actions (of a person).' [1289]

This is *Gītā* 4.37.

संबन्धे सति पाप्मायं स्वफलेनानुतापयेत् ।
अकर्तृत्वान्न संबन्धो विदुषोऽस्तीह पाप्मभिः ॥१२९०॥

While there is connection (of that seeker of the Brahman with a body yet), this sin would torment (his person) by its effect. (But) in the case of a knower (of the Brahman) here,¹ there is no connection of his (whatever) with sins due to his being a non-agent. [1290]

¹Cf. SP: *iheti vidyāvasthoktiḥ*.

Verses 1291-1294 explain *nainam pāpmā tapati*.

तदेतदुच्यते श्रुत्या नैनं पाप्मेति यत्नतः ।
नैनं ब्रह्मविदं पाप्मा तरति व्याप्नुते स्वतः ॥१२९१॥
तदकर्तृत्वतो हेतोर्ब्रह्मवित्तु सकारणम् ।
सर्वं तरति पाप्मानं सर्पादीन्नशना यथा ॥१२९२॥

This is thus stated by the Śruti, with particular emphasis, *nainam pāpmā* ..., since sin does not, of itself, affect (or, overcome/overpower) this knower of the Brahman [1291] (and) that (is so) for the reason of his not being the agent (of any action); as against this (*tu*), a knower of the Brahman himself affects (i.e. overcomes) all of the sins, together with their cause (viz. the actions performed through ignorance and

that ignorance itself) in the same way as a garland (affects/-overcomes the wrongly imagined) serpent etc.¹ [1292]

¹Sureśvara's use of *sarpādīn*, instead of the expected form *sarpam* is, as on a number of occasions elsewhere, owing to his tendency to coalesce more than one instance of error (*adhyāsa*) together.

आत्मयाथात्म्यवित्सोऽयं विपापो विरजाः स्वतः ।
निष्कर्मा स्याद्विपापोऽयं विरजस्कोऽप्यकामतः ॥१२९३॥
सर्वसंशयहेतोश्च प्रत्यङ्मोहस्य नाशतः ।
स्यादेषोऽविचिकित्सोऽतः सर्वसंशयवर्जितः ॥१२९४॥

This person, then, being a knower of the real nature of the Ātman, and himself (now) devoid of any sin and devoid of any blemish (*virajah*), devoid of any activity, is sinless and free from (all) blemish, on account of his being desireless.

[1293]

And, owing to the destruction of (his) delusion about (the nature of) the inner self, which is the cause of all doubts this person is without any (more) question and free from all doubts.

[1294]

This verse brings out the significance of brāhmaṇo bhavati.

एवमात्मपरिज्ञानाद्धवस्ताविद्यो भवेद्यदा ।
अनापन्नादिमध्यान्तं ब्राह्मण्यं लभते तदा ॥१२९५॥

Thus, on account of his complete knowledge of (the nature of) the Ātman, he has become one whose ignorance has been destroyed; he then obtains the nature of the Brāhmaṇa (*brāhmaṇya*), which has never a beginning, a middle stage (of awareness of the transmigratory existence) and an end (i.e. death) coming to it.

[1295]

Verses 1296-1298 relate the word Brāhmaṇa to the knower (of

the Brahman).

इमामवस्थामापन्नो मुख्यो ब्राह्मण उच्यते ।
भाविवृत्त्या स गौणस्तु प्रागतो ब्राह्मणो भवेत् ॥१२९६॥

On his coming to this state, he is called an eminent Brāhmaṇa; for, in view of what he becomes later, he was (or, is) an inferior Brāhmaṇa, herebefore. [1296]

जातौ ब्राह्मणशब्दोऽयं मा प्रापदिति तं श्रुतिः ।
व्याचष्टेऽतः प्रयत्नेन ब्रह्मलोकगिरा स्वयम् ॥१२९७॥

Here, i.e. in/by the use of the word *brahmaloka*, the Śruti has itself specifically (*prayatnena*) explained this word *brāhmaṇa*, in order that it should not go to (be understood in the sense of) the caste. [1297]

अव्यावृत्ताननुगतं ब्रह्मेत्यत्राभिधीयते ।
लोकोऽपि दृष्टिमात्रत्वात्प्रत्यङ्मात्रं निरुच्यते ॥१२९८॥

Here ¹ is stated that the Brahman is neither distinguished from nor is similar to (any other external thing); so also the word *loka* (i.e. *brahmaloka*) is explained to be the inner self alone, on account of its being only *dr̥ṣṭi* 'the seeing one', (i.e. knowing the true nature). [1298]

¹Cf. SP: *atrety akhaṇḍapadoktiḥ*.

Verses 1299-1302 explain the word *brahmaloka* as a Karma-dhāraya compound.

अन्योन्यार्थसमाप्तिवात्कर्मधारय एव तु ।
समासोऽत्र परिग्राह्यो निषादस्थपतिर्यथा ॥१२९९॥

(In the word *brahmaloka*) since (both the words in the compound) attained the meaning of each other, there is to

be understood (lit. to be taken) only a Karmadhāraya compound, as in the case of the word *niṣādasthapatiḥ*¹ [1299]

¹This means *niṣādaś cāsau sthapatiś ca* and not *niṣādānām sthapatiḥ*. Read SP for its erudite grammatical explanation of the compound.

श्रुतमेकविभक्तित्वं विभक्त्यन्तरकल्पनात् ।
लघीयोऽतीव यत्तस्मात्कर्मधारय एव सः ॥१३००॥

Since, being in the same case, which is heard, is shorter¹ than holding another case-relation; therefore, that (compound) is only Karmadhāraya. [1300]

¹That means: easier for understanding. In this context also, SP, which is so erudite, is to be read with profit.

ब्रह्मलोकमिमं साक्षाद्धे सम्राड्ब्रह्मविद्यया ।
प्रापितोऽस्यभयं पूर्वं यत्प्रतिज्ञातवानहम् ॥१३०१॥
इत्येवं याज्ञवल्क्यस्तं नृपमुक्तेन वर्त्मना ।
साक्षादनुशशासैनमित्युक्तिः स्याच्छ्रुतेरियम् ॥१३०२॥

To this very (*sākṣāt*) *brahmaloka* was the sovereign king¹ led (or taken) by (his) possession of the lore of the Brahman. '(From fear to the state of) freedom have you been led by me, O Sovereign, as I had promised you earlier.'— [1301]
thus, (did) Yājñavalkya (say) to the king. That is to say; 'In the manner stated, he instructed him directly'—this is to be taken as the statement of the Śruti. [1302]

¹This is to refer to the Kūrca Brāhmaṇa.

Verses 1303-1306 state that, after receiving instruction from Yājñavalkya, the king offered to him (the whole of) the kingdom itself.

अनुशिष्टोऽथ नृपतिर्विद्यानिष्क्रयहेतुतः ।

सोऽहमित्यादिकं वाक्यं गुरुमाह त्वरान्वितः ॥१३०३॥

Then, the king, (thus) instructed, making haste,¹ said to the preceptor, the words *so 'ham ...*, with the purpose of paying (him fees for) the lore. [1303]

¹Cf. SP: *brahmavidyānūrūpā nāsti dakṣiṇeti sūcayati tvarānvita iti*.

ब्रह्मविद्या समाप्तेयं ससंन्यासाद्वयात्मिका ।

सेतिकर्तव्यताकेयं साङ्गा निःश्रेयसे नृणाम् ॥१३०४॥

This lore of the Brahman, when obtained together with (the need of) renunciation which is of the nature of (being) the non-dual, which is complete in all respects and being (explained) in all of its subsidiary aspects becomes the cause of complete bliss for men. [1304]

निःशेषपुरुषार्थोऽयं समाप्तो ब्रह्मबोधतः ।

सर्वानर्थनिरासार्थमेतावानेव चादृतैः ॥१३०५॥

कर्तव्यो यत्नमास्थाय कृते यस्मिन्कृतार्थता ।

नान्यतः कृतकृत्यः स्यादुक्तज्ञानातिरेकतः ॥१३०६॥

(Thus) he has (now) obtained¹ completely all the ends of human life through (the acquisition of) the knowledge about the Brahman; that is only this much for the removal of all the evils (effects, or external things) and (therefore, it is) to be obtained by those who have a desire (lit. regard) for it; (the one)— on whose being obtained through every effort there results the state of one's having accomplished all the objects (to be obtained). It is not that a person will have done all that which should (or, has to) be done, through any way other than (through) knowledge, which has been already stated. [1305-1306]

¹Sureśvara has used *samāptaḥ* for *samāptavān*.

Now follows in verses 1307-1314 the discussion of BU 4.4.24.

व्याख्यातो योऽयमत्रात्मा स विज्ञानानुरोधतः ।
फलाय स्यादविज्ञात इत्येतदधुनोच्यते ॥१३०७॥

That Ātman, which has been explained here, would bring about the result in accordance with a person's specific knowledge (about it). Now is to be explained the statement *avijñataḥ*.

[1307]

पञ्चमान्त उपन्यस्तं रातेर्दातुः परायणम् ।
तद्विदस्तिष्ठमानस्येत्यस्य चेहोपसंहतिः ॥१३०८॥

At the end of fifth Adhyāya,¹ there was statement made (about) the final goal (to be accomplished) through (making of) gifts; in the words *tadvidas tiṣṭhamānasya*; and there is here the conclusion of it.

[1308]

¹Namely, BU 3rd Adhyāya.

आत्मान्तेनास्य वाक्येन स्वतस्तत्त्वमिहोच्यते ।
अत्रादवसुदानाभ्यामविद्योत्थं तु भण्यते ॥१३०९॥

In the statement, ending in the word¹ *ātmā*, there is stated here the reality of this (person who has obtained the knowledge about the Ātman), but by the word *annādavasudānābhyām*² is stated what arises out of ignorance.

[1309]

¹Namely, *sa vā eṣa mahān aja ātmā*.

²This stands for *annāda(tva)vasudāna(tva)*; such is Sureśvara's way of shortening words.

निःशेषात्रादनादात्मा प्राणान्तोऽत्राद उच्यते ।
आत्मायं कारणं यस्मात्कार्यमित्यखिलं ततः ॥१३१०॥

On account of his eating all of the foods, the Ātman which is of the nature of Prāṇa,¹ is called the enjoyer of food, since this Ātman is (thus) the cause and also all this, that is the effect. [1310]

¹Read SP: *ajñāto hi paraḥ prāṇasvabhāvaḥ kāraṇātmā sarva-kāryasaṃhartrītvād annādo vivakṣita ity arthaḥ.*

कारणेऽनुपयुक्तं यत्कार्यं तन्नेह विद्यते ।
कार्येऽप्यनुपयुक्तं यत्र तत्कारणमुच्यते ॥१३११॥

There is not here (i.e. in this world) any effect which is not dependent on¹ its cause and, further, what is not dependent on an effect is not the cause. [1311]

This verse points to the relation between cause and effect of being mutually dependent.

¹This is for *anupayukta*, as paraphrased in SP by the word *anapekṣa*.

अन्योन्यार्थव्यपेक्षित्वात्कार्यकारणवस्तुनोः ।
नान्योन्यार्थातिरेकेण सिध्येते कार्यकारणे ॥१३१२॥

Since the things, known as cause and effect, have mutual dependence; therefore, both cause and effect do not exist (or, do not get established) as one despite another thing. [1312]

वसूपकरणं प्रोक्तं तद्वदातीश्वरत्वतः ।
यतस्ततोऽज आत्मायं वसुदान इहोच्यते ॥१३१३॥

By the word *vasu* is mentioned some means (of enjoyment);¹ because a person, being a master (or, possessed of) it gives it (to another); therefore, this unborn Ātman is mentioned, here, as *vasudāna* 'a giver of *vasu*'. [1313]

¹Cf. SP: *upakaraṇam bhogasādhanam iti yāvat.*

अत्रादवसुदानाभ्यां गुणाभ्यां यः समीक्षते ।
ईश्वरं स यथादृष्टिं फलमाप्नोति मानवः ॥१३१४॥

A human being, who looks upon (or, conceives of) the lord (i.e. the Ātman) as being possessed of the qualities of being an eater of food and a giver of wealth, obtains a result in accordance with this (his) seeing. [1314]

This is the meaning of *vindate*

Verses 1315-1333 pertain to (or, discuss) BU 4.4.25.

इत्येवमयथावस्तुदर्शिनः फलमीरितम् ।
यथावस्तुदृशोऽप्येवं यथा रज्ज्वादिदर्शिनः ॥१३१५॥

Thus is mentioned the result which accrues to one who sees the (real) thing as what it is not.¹ So also is stated the result accruing to one who sees the (real) thing as it is, as, for example, (the result coming) to one who sees the rope etc.² [1315]

¹That is, as being of another nature.

²This refers to *abhaya* in two ways: (i) freedom from every cause of fear, viz. *avidyā* and its effects, and (ii) the absence of fear which would arise out of the notion of a serpent etc. This is once again where Sureśvara uses *ādi* 'etc.' because of his memory of other errors. Also, the last word is a cryptic statement in expectancy of the word *mithyāśarpāda*.

ये यथा मां प्रपद्यन्ते तांस्तथैव भजाम्यहम् ।
इति चाहेश्वरो वाक्यमुक्तार्थप्रतिपत्तये ॥१३१६॥

In order to convey this (very) matter (or, thought), which is (thus) stated, the Lord made the statement: 'I take to them

in the same way as they take me'.¹

[1316]

¹*Gītā* 4.11.

यथातत्त्वं तु योऽज्ञातं वस्तु साक्षात्प्रपद्यते ।
यथावस्त्वेव तस्यापि फलं स्यादिति भण्यते ॥१३१७॥

If a person perceives some (earlier) unknown thing directly as having the nature which it (really) has, what is said (in respect of him, i.e. the knower of the Brahman) is: 'In the case of him also, there will accrue a result which is according to the nature of the thing (referring to the Brahman), (as he has seen).'

[1317]

SP invites attention to the Saṁdhi in *yo ajñātam*.

काण्डद्वयस्य वा योऽर्थः स संक्षिप्याभिधीयते ।
स वा इत्यादिवाक्येन सारार्थस्य जिघृक्षया ॥१३१८॥

Or, what was the purport (lit. meaning) of two Kāṇḍas¹ is told here by abbreviating (the same) in the sentence *sa vā ...*; (this is done) with the desire of taking up (i.e. bringing out) the essential sense of it.

[1318]

¹That is, Madhu Kāṇḍa and Muni Kāṇḍa of BU.

अविद्यावान्पुरा योक्तो मृत्युजन्मादिसंसृतिः ।
स वा इति गिरा सोऽत्र स्मार्यते ब्रह्मसंगतौ ॥१३१९॥

In the words *sa vā ...* the one, having association with (lit. being possessed of) ignorance, who has been mentioned earlier, who is (affected by) transmigratory existence comprising death, birth etc.¹, and who is now² in connection (i.e. has now a feeling of identity) with the Brahman, is brought back to the listener's memory.

[1319]

The expression *yoktaḥ* in the first line is an instance of double Samdhi of *yaḥ uktaḥ* > *ya uktaḥ* > *yoktaḥ*. This kind of Samdhi is a Vedic usage – cf. SP on this.

¹This is reference to the other (known) *bhāvavikāras*.

²Literally here in this last Kaṇḍikā of BU.

स वा एष पुरोक्तेन यो वाक्येन प्रकाशितः ।
प्रध्वस्ताज्ञानतज्जः सन्परां निर्वृतिमागतः ॥१३२०॥

The person, who was shown (i.e. pointed out) ¹ by the earlier statement *sa vā eṣaḥ*, attained great delight, being the one with his ignorance and its effects destroyed. [1320]

¹Add: by the word *loka*.

महानित्यभिधानेन सत्यज्ञानादिलक्षणम् ।
ब्रह्मैव प्रोच्यते साक्षात्प्रत्यगात्मविशेषणम् ॥१३२१॥

By (the use of) the expression *mahān* is mentioned the Brahman which has the characteristics of being truth, knowledge etc. (i.e. endlessness); the one, having as its attribute, the directly perceptible inner self. [1321]

ब्रह्मैवात्मा स्वतोऽबोधाद्ब्रह्मैव प्रकाशते ।
जरादिधर्मवांस्तस्माद्ब्रह्मणैव विशेष्यते ॥१३२२॥

The Ātman itself is the Brahman and the same, owing to its non-knowing, (i.e. not being known in its true nature) reveals (itself) as the non-Brahman; being possessed of the qualities of old age etc., and (is thus) distinguished ¹ from the Brahman. [1322]

¹Though such distinguishing is only unreasonable.

प्रमान्तरानधिगता ब्रह्मता प्रत्यगात्मनः ।
प्रत्यक्त्वं ब्रह्मणस्तद्वद्वचसैव प्रबोध्यते ॥१३२३॥

Since the state of having become the Brahman in the case of the inner self is not obtained (known by it) through any other means of knowledge; (therefore,) the existence of the Brahman, in the form of the inner self, is revealed (or, made known) only by the statement in the Śruti. [1323]

अहं ब्रह्मेतिवाक्योत्थविज्ञानात्प्रत्यगात्मनः ।
 एवस्तेऽज्ञाने सकार्येऽथ यद्रूपं तदिहोच्यते ॥१३२४॥

Here is described that form of the inner self which results from its specifically knowing (about its own nature), which arises from the sentence *aham brahma* and when its ignorance, together with the effect of the same; is destroyed. [1324]

रज्जुः सर्पादिनेवात्मा विनाविद्यां न जायते ।
 कार्यात्मना यतस्तस्मादात्माज इति भण्यते ॥१३२५॥

Since the Ātman does not become born without ignorance, which is in the form of its products; as a rope cannot appear as (having the form of) a serpent (without the knowledge about it to be so); therefore, the Ātman is mentioned as unborn. [1325]

This explains the meaning of the word *aja*.

सर्वभावविकाराणां जन्म मूलं यतस्ततः ।
 सर्वेषां प्रतिषेधः स्यान्निषेधादात्मजन्मनः ॥१३२६॥

Since origination is the root-cause of all the modifications of things; therefore, there is rejection of them all by the denial of the birth of the Ātman. [1326]

तथापि ताञ्श्रुतिर्यत्नाज्जरादीन्प्रतिषेधति ।
 स्वाभाविकत्वाशङ्कायाः प्रतिषेधस्य सिद्धये ॥१३२७॥

Yet, the Śruti specifically rejects (the existence of) those (qualities, viz.) old age etc. (in the Ātman), for establishing the denial of the (possible) doubt about their belonging to the nature (of the Ātman). [1327]

कालात्मना ह्यवच्छेदात्रायं कालंजरत्वतः ।
देहादिवज्जरामेति तस्मादात्माजरः स्मृतः ॥१३२८॥

Since, by its capacity to reduce time to nothingness, this Ātman does not come to (have) old age, as does a body, by becoming limited through time; therefore, the Ātman is known as ageless. [1328]

सर्वस्य परिणामस्य हानोपादानमात्रतः ।
जराजन्मनिषेधेन सर्वोऽतोऽत्र निषिध्यते ॥१३२९॥

As every modification is being given up or being assumed, all (modifications) are rejected here (in the case of the Ātman) by the rejection of old age and birth. [1329]

परिणामोऽस्य येनान्त्यः श्रुत्येह प्रतिषिध्यते ॥१३३०॥
देहस्थितेरवसितिर्मृतिशब्देन भण्यते ।
तन्निषेधोऽमरोक्त्यात्र नित्यस्यात्मन उच्यते ॥१३३१॥

Since it is the last of the modifications that is denied here (in the case of the Ātman) by the Śruti; [1330]
therefore, the end of the existence of a body is expressed by the word *mṛti*. Here, by (the use of) the word *amara*, in respect of the never-perishing (or, eternal) Ātman, is expressed the rejection of that (viz. *mṛti*). [1331]

नाजस्यापरिणामस्य मरणं जगतीक्ष्यते ।
अजोऽजरश्च तेनोक्तोऽमरश्चैष ततः स्मृतः ॥१३३२॥

There is not seen in the world the death of the Ātman, which is not born and is devoid of (all) modifications; therefore,

it is mentioned as unborn and ageless and is known, on that account, as undying also. [1332]

परिणामात्मको मृत्युरमरोक्त्या निवारितः ।
अमृतोक्त्याथ नाशोऽस्य वार्यते यो निरन्वयः ॥१३३३॥

(Thus, the idea of) death, which is of the nature of a modification, is set aside by the word *amara*; then, by (the use of) the word *amṛta* is set aside the absolute destruction of it as well. [1333]

अविनाशीत्यपि तथा विनाशद्वयमात्मनः ।
श्रुत्या निषिध्यते साक्षात्प्रत्यक्कौटस्थसिद्धये ॥१३३४॥

So also, by (the use of) the word *avināśī* is rejected directly, by the Śruti, the two destructions (viz. absolute and partial) of the Ātman, establishing thereby the immutability of the inner self. [1334]

कामकर्मतमोभावादमरोऽमृत एव च ।
तत एवाभयः प्रत्यङ्भयं हि तदबोधतः ।
कारणस्य निषेधोऽतो भयकार्यनिषेधतः ॥१३३५॥

The Ātman is only non-perishing and also deathless because of the absence in it of desire, action and ignorance. Only as a result of this (*tata eva*), it is free from (any kind of) fear—indeed, the inner self can have fear (only) because of the absence of knowledge in it. Therefore, there is rejection of the cause (of fear) conveyed by the denial of (the existence of) the effects of (or, what is) fear. [1335]

कुतोऽभयत्वसंसिद्धिः प्रतीच इति शङ्किते ।
ब्रह्मेत्याहात्मनस्तत्त्वं ब्रह्म त्वभयमेव हि ॥१३३६॥

When (or, if) it is doubted: 'How (or, for what reason) can there be established the inner self's freedom from fear?', the

Śruti has answered: 'That is, this is so, because the Brahman is the nature of the Ātman and the Brahman is fearlessness itself'.

[1336]

अहं ब्रह्मेत्यतः साक्षाद्यथोक्तेनैव वर्त्मना ।
भयहेतोर्निरासेन स ब्रह्माभयमश्नुते ॥१३३७॥

Therefore, by the removal of the cause of fear by/through the direct (statement in the Śruti) *aham brahma*, which is (understood) in the way as told, he (i.e. seeker of the knowledge of the Brahman) secures freedom from fear. [1337]

This explains *abhayaṃ hi*

सर्वोपनिषदामेष संक्षिप्तोऽर्थ इहोदितः ।
उत्पत्त्यादिविकल्पोऽयमस्यैव प्रतिपत्तये ॥१३३८॥

Here is (thus) stated the idea (*artha*) of all the Upaniṣads, in brief: Such various notions as the origin etc. of this (inner self are also stated) for the purpose of (one's getting) the knowledge about this one. [1338]

एकप्रभृतिसंख्येयं रेखासंकेतवर्त्मना ।
प्रतिपत्तिरसंख्येयवस्तुनः स्याद्यथा तथा ॥१३३९॥
सर्वप्रमाणविषयलङ्घिनोऽकार्यकारण-
वस्तुनः प्रतिपत्तिः स्याज्जन्मादिद्वंसवर्त्मना ॥१३४०॥

The reference to the numbers one and others is made only by noting down various ideas (about numbers) in a row or series (with the intention) that there arises (in one) the knowledge of the (real) thing which cannot be counted (or, by pun, cannot be described); [1339]
also, there arises (in one) the knowledge of the (real) thing that is neither an effect nor a cause by the way of destruction of (the notions, such as) the origin etc. and as what transgresses (or, is beyond) all the objects of various means of knowing

(them).

[1340]

संख्येयत्वं न रेखायाः संख्यात्वं वाञ्छसेष्यते ।
तदध्यारोपगत्यैव तथापि प्रतिपत्तये ॥१३४१॥

(Though it is pointed out) neither countability (or, describ-
ability) nor being a number can be seen (lit. is noticed) in
a line; yet (it is to be understood) as resulting from
superimposing (the same on it), (yet that is done) to the effect
that one can understand it (i.e. what a line is). [1341]

यथैवमवगच्छन्ति प्रध्वस्ताशेषकल्पनम् ।
आत्मानं स्थितिजन्मादिकल्पनोपायमात्रतः ॥१३४२॥
पत्रकज्जलरेखाभिर्यथा वाध्यासवर्त्मना ।
वर्णाञ्जानन्त्यकारादीन्पत्रादिभ्यो विलक्षणान् ॥१३४३॥
तथोत्पत्त्यादिकाध्यासवर्त्मना तद्विलक्षणम् ।
जन्मादिहेतुध्वंसेन नेतीति ब्रह्म गम्यते ॥१३४४॥

Since they thus understand the Ātman as having all (false)
notions about it destroyed (or, removed), only by means of
(variously) imagining such notions as its sustenance, birth etc.;
[1342]

(imagination takes place) in the same way as there are known
by means of lines (drawn) with collyrium on a piece of
paper/leaf, i.e. by way of superimposition, different letters such
as *a*, though they are different from (that piece of) paper/leaf,
[1343]

so also, by way of (or with the help of) such superimposition(s)
of origin etc. on it and through the destruction of the causes
such as origination, which are (in reality) different from the
same, the Brahman becomes known as in the word *neti neti*.
[1344]

इति काण्डद्वयोक्तोऽर्थः संहृत्य सफलोऽखिलः ।
इह प्रदर्शितो वाक्ये तत्समाप्तिविवक्षया ॥१३४५॥

Thus is shown (i.e. presented) here in this sentence the entire thought which has been stated in these two Kāṇḍas,¹ after collecting the same, together with the results from the same, for the purpose of (drawing) a conclusion (from it). [1345]

¹That is, Madhu Kāṇḍa and Muni Kāṇḍa.

इति श्रीबृहदारण्यकोपनिषद्भाष्यवार्तिके चतुर्थाध्यायस्य
चतुर्थं ब्राह्मणम् ॥४॥

BUBV 4.5

निरधारि पुरा ब्रह्म मधुकाण्डागमेन यत् ।

याज्ञवल्कीयकाण्डेन तद्युक्त्याऽथोपपादितम् ॥१॥

1. Now (in this section of Yājñavalkya¹) is supported with reason (the thought on) the Brahman which is earlier ascertained by the tradition (noted) in the Madhukāṇḍa²

NOTES

It is useful to note how Ānandagiri points out the relation of 4.5 to the preceding section of BU. He says : In BU 4.4 which precedes this section, were narrated the evil, the cause of evil, the aim of human beings, and the cause of human end (viz. liberation) with the help of the Śruti. Further, it was pointed out that the entire Veda teaches the way to obtaining the final end, which is elaborately described by the Śruti itself and that the Brahman, described as *sopādhika* and / or *nirupādhika*, the knowledge of it and the fruit obtained thereby were also stated. Therefore, one may doubt that this section would be of no use, therefore, Sureśvara states the purport thereof.

It is only proper that the necessary logical support to the Śruti should be pointed out. Apparently, Sureśvara follows Śaṅkara who has stressed the need of logical reasoning in 'tadavirodhitarkopakaraṇā vedāntavākyamīmāṃsā' (cf. BUB 1.1.1, p.6) and 'āgamavaśatarka' (cf. BUB 2.1.11, p.194)

1. The Yājñavalkyakāṇḍa (= Munikāṇḍa) corresponds to BU ch. 3-4.

2. The Madhukāṇḍa corresponds to BU ch. 1-2. The word *āgama* means tradition recorded in the Śruti texts. Cf. verses 5-6 below.

जल्पन्यायेन तत्पूर्वं पञ्चमे प्रतिपादितम् ।

वादन्यायेन तद्भूयः षष्ठे सम्यक्प्रपञ्चितम् ॥२॥

2. It has been exposed first in the fifth (chapter, viz. BU ch. 3)¹ in the way of the dialectic mode, and (once) again fully elaborated in the sixth (chapter, viz. BU ch. 4) by way of the assertion.

NOTES

Sureśvara thus refers to the two parts of the logical argument in the *Munikāṇḍa* (BU ch. 3-4); one section adopts the method of *jalpa* and the other, *vāda*. *jalpa* is defined as *yathoktopapannaś chala-jātīnigrahasthānasādhanopālambho jalpaḥ* in the *Gautama Sūtra* 1.2.2 or *jalpas tu yathāsambhavam sarva-nigrahāṇām adhikaraṇam parapakṣe dūṣite svapakṣasthāpanaprayogā-vasānaś ceti bodhyam* in the *Tarkabhāṣā pariccheda* 44 (the *Nyāyakośa*, p. 257) and *vāda*, *pramāṇatarkasādhanopālambhaḥ siddhānta-viruddhaḥ pañcāvayavopapannaḥ pakṣapratipakṣaparigraho vādaḥ* in the *Gautama Sūtra* 1.2.1 (the *Nyāyakośa*, p. 672). And MĀDHA-VĀNANDA (p. xi) says, “....logical explanation of that great doctrine of Advaita through the employment of the dialectic modes of argumentation known as *jalpa* (arguing constructively as well as destructively for victory) and *vāda* (arguing for truth).”

1. Regarding the concordance, see remarks in the Preface.

अथाधुना निगमनस्थानीयमिदमुच्यते ।

मंत्रेयीब्राह्मणं श्रुत्या तथा च न्यायविद्वचः ॥३॥

हेतुक्वित्तः प्रतिज्ञायाः सिद्धार्थाया यदुत्तरम् ।

वचो निगमनं तत्स्याद्वाक्यस्यावयवोक्तिभाक् ॥४॥

3-4. Now, the Śruti declares this Maitreyī-section (viz. BU 4.5) as the *nigamana*.¹ For, in that sense there is a statement of logic. That later statement of the enunciation which is (earlier) proved by the statement of the cause is called *nigamana* ‘conclusion’. It should form a part of (the whole) statement (of the syllogism).

NOTES

Cf. the *Nyāyasūtra* 1.1.39 : *hetvapadeśāt pratijñāyāḥ punar-vacanam nigamanam*, “*nigamana* is the re-statement of the proposition, pointing out the reason.”

vākya means *mahāvākya* consisting of five parts, i.e. syllogism; these five parts are: *pratijñā*, *hetu*, *udāharāṇa*, *upanayana* and *nigamana*.

The conclusion is a restatement of the proposition, but now standing proved.

ससंन्यासाऽऽत्मविद्या या मधुकाण्डागमोदिता ।

उपपत्तिप्रधानेऽपि सैव मोक्षेऽवसीयते ॥५॥

5. The lore (about the nature) of the Ātman, together with (its means viz.) renunciation which has been discussed by the tradition (of the Vedāntins recorded) in the Madhukāṇḍa is itself shown to culminate into liberation, even, in (the Munikāṇḍa which has) the predominance of reasoning (in it).

NOTES

Another purpose served by this section is now stated. The Maitreyī-section in the Madhukāṇḍa (viz. BU 2.4) stated the knowledge of the Ātman together with renunciation as the means to liberation, on the strength of tradition (of the Vedāntins); in this Munikāṇḍa also it is understood that the knowledge of the Ātman is the cause of liberation, but on the strength of reasoning.

आत्मज्ञानं ससंन्यासं मोक्षायेत्यागमाद्यथा ।

युक्तितोऽपि तथा ज्ञेयमिति चेहोपसंहृतिः ॥६॥

6. (And such) is the conclusion here (i.e. in this chapter) : Just as the knowledge of the Ātman from its description in the Śruti leads to (lit. is for) liberation,¹ so can it be known from reasoning also.

NOTES

One might ask: In respect of the questions of Kahola and others (cf. BU 3.5 ff.) this knowledge was proved by reasoning, what then is the use of this section? The verse is an answer to this objection. Since this section intends to conclude the matter already established by the Śruti and reasoning, it is

not useless. The two *dharma*s mentioned in the example (*udāharaṇa*) are proved to have *sādhya-sādhana* relation : (In *parvato vahnimān, dhūmāt, yathā mahānase, vahnimat* is *sādhya* and *dhūma* is *sādhana* (*sādhaka, siddha*). The conclusion is restated for denying the opposite view in respect of the *sādhya* — this brings the significance of the word *upasaṁhṛti* in the verse.

1. SP supplies *jñānam* after *mokṣāyeti* in the first line (cf. *itiśabdād ūrdhvaṁ jñānam ity adhyāhāraḥ*) and, accordingly, one could translate the first line as 'it is to be understood that'.

व्याख्यातत्वात्पदार्थानां चतुर्थेऽध्याय एव तु ।

तद्व्याख्यानाय यत्नोऽतो न भूयः क्रियतेऽधुना ॥७॥

7. But, since the meanings of the (various) words (relevant upon the subject) have been (already) explained in the fourth chapter (viz. BU 2.4), no effort is to be undertaken here to explain them.

NOTES

1. The fourth chapter means the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka* ch. 4, i.e. BU ch. 2, (cf. remarks in the Preface); here the Maitreyī-section of BU ch. 2, i.e. BU 2. 4, is meant.

शब्दस्यैवाऽऽत्मनो जन्म चतुर्थे प्रतिपादितम् ।

सर्वोपसंहृतेरत्र यागादेरपि भण्यते ॥८॥

8. In the fourth chapter,¹ it is stated that the word is born of the Ātman. (And) all (activity such as) the sacrifice etc. is also (to be taken as born of the Ātman), since here (i.e. in the Ātman) is all concluded (withdrawn).

NOTES

If the meaning of the word is not to be stated, this section should be taken as completed here because the purport has been already mentioned in verses 1-6. Therefore for the removal of such a doubt is mentioned the purport of the sentence *iṣṭam hutam āśramam....* (BU 4.5.11).

1. See note (1) on the preceding verse.

शब्दोऽयं बहुधा भिन्नो नामैव परमात्मजम् ।

यागदानादिकं कर्म रूपं लोकगुरःसरम् ॥९॥

9. 'Word' (i.e. the Śruti) which is variously divided is but the name that is born of the highest Ātman. (And) the activity

such as sacrifice, giving of gifts etc. which precedes the word *loka* is its form.

NOTES

'Word' is divided into different parts : Śruti, Brāhmaṇa etc. But these are nothing but different names of one and the same Ātman. This is the purport of the sentence *yad ṛgveda ... vyākhyānāni* (BU 4.5.11), also of the sentence *iṣṭam hutam āsitam ... pāyitam* the purport is similar, viz. all that is born of the highest Ātman refers to the form of the Ātman. The sentence *ayam ca lokaḥ niḥśvasitāni* (BU 4. 5. 11) concludes the list of all that is said to be born of the highest Ātman. This refers to the section of creation.

सर्वमेतदयत्नेन तत एव विनिःसृतम् ।

अनन्यभूतं तेनातः साक्षात्तत्त्वं प्रगीयते ॥१०॥

10. All this has proceeded only from that without any effort (on the part of that) and is, therefore, not different from that (viz. the Ātman). (Thus) is stated here the reality of all (which is clearly) perceptible.

NOTES

The first line presupposes the question : 'Since there is total absence of effort on the part of the highest Ātman, how does the world which is of the nature of name, form and action arise from the highest Ātman?' and answers the same thus: The Veda also is included in this world created from the Ātman without any effort on its part. Let this be similar to the illusory creation only in that the rule *sarvadharmopapattēś ca* (the *Brahmasūtra* 2.1.37) applies to it. The rule is: Although an actual change is impossible in respect of the Ātman having no attributes, an apparent modification is possible. Because of ignorance, all the attributes are superimposed on the Ātman which is supposed to be the cause for such a creation. The second line points to the significance of this statement about creation : The oneness of the apparent *kārya* with the *apparent kāraṇa*—in reality there is (and there remains) but one Ātman—this is shown by the word *ataḥ*; that is to say, there is no effect apart from the cause.

अन्तर्बहीरसघनः सैन्धवस्य घनो यथा ।

विज्ञानघन एवायं विज्ञानात्मा तथैव च ॥११॥

11. As a lump of salt is both inside and outside the lump of (but one) taste, so is this knowing Ātman (but) a mass of consciousness.

NOTES

This is the meaning of *yathā saindhavaghanaḥ kṛtsnaḥ prajñā-naghana eva* (BU 4.5.13).

स्वविकारोपसंश्लेषाद् विज्ञानात्मत्वमेत्यतः ।

तद्धेतुनाशात्प्रकृतिं स्वामेव प्रतिपद्यते ॥१२॥

12. It becomes the knowing Ātman owing to its close contact with the modification(s)¹ of its own². Therefore, after the destruction of the cause of it (viz. the contact which was caused by ignorance) it gets back its own nature, viz. pure consciousness.

NOTES

The first line explains the sentence : *etebhyo bhūtebhyaḥ samutthāya* (BU 4.5.13) and the second, *tāny eva anuvinaśyati* (BU 4.5.13). When sentiency is related to the intellect etc., the nature of the Jivātman exists. By overcoming ignorance through the knowledge of its own, the Jivātman begins to shine in its true nature of the Brahman.

1. *svavikāra* means 'the intellect etc.'

2. The word *sva* means the *pratyagātman* 'individual consciousness.' (SP)

परिणामनिषेधः स्यादविनाशिगिराऽऽत्मनः ।

अनुच्छित्तिगिरा नाशो वार्यते यो निरन्वयः ॥१३॥

13. In the word *avināśi*, there is rejection (of the idea of any) transformation of the Ātman and by the word *anucchitti*, is warded off the complete destruction.

NOTES

Commenting on *avināśi vā are'yaṁ ātmānucchittidharmā* (BU

4.5.14), Sureśvara points out that the two words are not tautology (*apunarukti*).

मात्रासंसर्पजस्त्वेष यो विनाशाविधर्मवान् ।

अविद्यामात्रहेतूत्थो रज्जुसर्पादिवन्मतः ॥१४॥

14. But this one that is born due to the contact with the sense-organs, and has the properties, perishing etc.¹ is understood as one arisen from but (one) cause, viz. ignorance, like a serpent arising from a rope etc.

NOTES

Incidentally, Sureśvara explains the reading *mātrāsaṃsargas tv asya bhavati* in the Mādhyandina recension of this Upaniṣad.

1. Here, *mātrāsaṃsargaja* is *viśeṣa* and *jiva*, *viśeṣya*.

ब्रह्मैवैकः स आत्मोक्तो ह्याध्यायेषु चतुर्ष्वपि ।

उपायमात्रभेदोऽत्र न तूपेयः प्रमिद्यते ॥१५॥

15. In all the four chapters of the Upaniṣad, it is declared that the Ātman (i.e. Jīvātman) is said to be only the Brahman¹. There is differentiation only as regards the means (to understanding the real nature of the Ātman) but not as regards the goal (viz. the Ātman that is to be known).

NOTES

In various chapters of this Upaniṣad, are mentioned various means to obtaining the Brahman. But this should not lead one to say : The Brahman is not homogeneous, but *anekarasa* 'heterogeneous'. To such a doubt this verse is an answer.

1. That is, nothing else or not different from it.

नेति नेति चतुर्थोऽसौ यथैव प्रतिपादितः ।

नेतीति पञ्चमेऽप्येवं निर्विकल्पोऽवधारितः ॥१६॥

षष्ठेऽपि जनकाख्यानप्रारम्भे तद्वदीरितः ।

निर्विकल्पो यथैकोऽर्थो नेतीत्यत्रोपसंहृतः ॥१७॥

नेतीति शास्त्रावसितौ तथैवात्मोपसंहृतः ।

एकरूपमतस्तत्त्वं सर्वत्रैव विवक्षितम् ॥१८॥

16-18. As it is described in words '(The Brahman is) not this, not this' in the fourth chapter (viz. BU 2.3.6) so is that ascertained in words 'not this' in the fifth chapter (viz. BU 3.9.26) and having no specifications¹. In the beginning of the narrative of Janaka of the sixth chapter (viz. BU 4.2.4 also), (it is) described in the same way; there (also) it is concluded in words 'not this' and one having no specifications. Just so, in the end of the Śruti (viz. Maitreyī-section, BU 4.5.15) it is concluded that the Ātman (which is to be described as) 'not this'. Therefore (i.e. thus), it is everywhere intended to point out that reality is of but one form.

NOTES

Sureśvara points out that the goal is the same; though there are many ways to it as stated in various parts of the BU, it is mentioned as *eṣa neti nety ātmā* (BU 4.5.15).

1. The word *vikalpa* refers here to some definite attributes etc.

नेति नेत्यात्मकात्तत्त्वात्प्रकाराणां शतैरपि ।

निरूप्यमाणे नान्यादृग्यस्मात्तत्त्वं समीक्ष्यते ॥१६॥

तर्कतो यदि वा वाक्यादय एवेदमेव तु ।

नेतिनेत्यात्मविज्ञानममृतत्वंकसाधनम् ॥२०॥

ससंन्यासं विनिश्चेयमिति शास्त्रस्य संग्रहः ।

अमृतप्राप्तयेऽलं स्यात्साधनान्तरनिःस्पृहम् ॥२१॥

यथोदितमिदं ज्ञानं सहकार्यन्यसाधन-

निरपेक्षमलं मुक्त्या इत्येतदभिधीयते ॥२२॥

19-22. Since they have not seen the reality as anything other than what is of the nature of (being grasped as) 'not this, not this', even if it is explained in hundreds of ways; therefore, one has to obtain (lit. ascertain) this very knowledge of the Ātman alone as the mean to immortality¹, together with renunciation, whether by means of reasoning or from the Śruti (statement). Such is the gist of the whole Śruti². This knowledge as stated (herein) is capable of securing (i.e. effecting/bringing about)

immortality without expecting (help of) any other means. It is so stated (in the Śruti) that (this knowledge) non-expectant of any other ancillary means is capable of achieving (for one) liberation³.

NOTES

1. It is repeatedly spoken that the knowledge of the non-dual Ātman which has no attribute whatever, together with renunciation, is the cause of liberation.

2. The word *saṁgraha* means 'a brief statement of the whole teaching'; cf. Bharata's *Nāṭyaśāstra* 6.9 : *vistareṇopadiṣṭānām arthānām sūtrabhāṣyayoḥ nibandho yaḥ samāsenā saṁgraham taṁ vidur budhāḥ*||

3. This is based on the Śruti sentence : *etāvad are khalv amṛtatvam*. Immortality consists in only knowing the oneness; after knowing, one does not have to do anything else.

एतावदर एवैतदमृतत्वस्य सिद्धये ।

प्रत्यग्याथात्म्यविज्ञानं नान्यत्किञ्चिदपेक्ष्यते ॥२३॥

23. In this statement *etāvad are khalv...* is mentioned the knowledge of the real nature of the individual consciousness as (sufficient) for attaining immortality. It does not expect anything else¹.

NOTES

1. I follow the variant reading *apekṣate* (recorded in footnote no. 1); that expresses the original idea better and also explains *nirapekṣam* in the previous verse. But following *apekṣyate*, one could translate alternatively : In this statement *etāvad are khalv...* is mentioned the knowledge of the real nature of the individual consciousness as (sufficient) for attaining immortality. (In this context), nothing else is expected.

इत्युक्तार्थपरिज्ञानदाद् यार्थं सर्वसाधनम् ।

कर्माणि चापनुद्याऽऽशु प्रवद्व्राजाविचारयन् ॥२४॥

24. Then, in order to reaffirm that the knowledge which has been mentioned becomes the means to all (human endeavour

towards liberation) after having set aside all the action, he renounced immediately¹ after this conversation, not (even a little) thinking² (i.e. hesitating).

NOTES

This is the explanation of *vijahāra* (BU 4.5.15).

1. It is suggested that on the occasion of renunciation, there is on the part of a knower, no necessity to look to any injunction.

2. The words *āśu* (in verse 24) and *tvarayā* (in verse 26) point out that the seeker of the knowledge of the Ātman does not have to perform any rite for renunciation and that renunciation of all desires in action is a necessity for such knowledge.

न केवलमिदं ज्ञानं कर्मसाधननिस्पृहम् ।

निःशेषकर्मसंन्यासापेक्षाऽपि स्याद्यतो मुनिः ॥२५॥

सम्यग्विज्ञाततत्त्वत्वात्कृतार्थोऽप्यखिलं स्वयम् ।

तत्याज कर्म त्वरया बाङ्मनःकायसाधनम् ॥२६॥

25-26. Since not only is this knowledge non-expectant of (all) action and means, but there is (together with it) the expectation of abandonment of entire action also, therefore, the sage, though he had accomplished the objects (of desire) on account of having well understood the nature of that (reality), hurriedly¹ himself gave up (all) action which has speech, *manas* and body as the means.

NOTES

1. See note (2) on the previous verse.

अतोऽवगम्यते नूनं न कर्म सहतेऽखिलम् ।

आत्मज्ञानं यतोऽत्याक्षीत्सम्यग्ज्ञानोऽपि तन्मुनिः ॥२७॥

27. Since the sage possessed of the right knowledge (of the Ātman) gave up all action, from this, it is understood that the knowledge of the Ātman does not tolerate whole action.

NOTES

The implication is that knowledge and action stand in contradiction.

कर्महेतुविरुद्धत्वात्सम्यग्ज्ञानस्य कर्मणा ।

विरोधोऽप्यर्थमेवातस्तस्यक्तं ज्ञानशालिना ॥२८॥

28. Since right knowledge is opposed to the cause of (any) action (viz. ignorance), this (said) contradiction (of knowledge to action) is to the extreme. Therefore it is renounced by the sage who excelled with knowledge.

एवं काण्डद्वयेनेयं सफलताऽनवशेषतः ।

सर्वसंन्यासनिष्ठा च ब्रह्मविद्या समीरिता ॥२९॥

29. Thus, in the *Madhukāṇḍa* and the *Munikāṇḍa*, are stated in full the lore about the Brahman to be fruitful and (that it is) resting on complete renunciation.

NOTES

Thus is restated the purport of both the *kāṇḍas*.

एतावानुपदेशः स्याद्वेदे ध्येयोर्थिनां नृणाम् ।

कृतकृत्यो भवेत्क्षिप्रमेतज्ज्ञात्वाऽनुशासनम् ॥३०॥

30. (Only) this much is the instruction in the Veda¹ for man who is desirous of the highest good²; having understood this instruction, he would immediately become one who has accomplished his end³.

NOTES

1. This suggests that there is no need of any other instruction in order to attain liberation.

2. The instruction about paying homage to the temple etc. is possible for persons who are not striving for liberation.

3. This suggests that there is expectancy of no other means to bliss.

BRHADĀRANYAKOPANIṢAD-
BHĀṢYA-VĀRTIKA

5.1

समाप्तं याज्ञवल्कीयं काण्डमैकात्म्यनिष्ठितम् ।
खिलकाण्डमथेदानीं यथावदुपवर्ण्यते ॥१॥

The Kāṇḍa of Yājñavalkya which dealt with the singleness of the Ātman is concluded. Now then is explained (lit. described) the Khila Kāṇḍa 'Kāṇḍa of the remainder'. [1]

संभावितं न यत्पूर्वं कर्मविज्ञानकाण्डयोः ।
तदत्र भण्यते सर्वं खिलकाण्डत्वहेतुतः ॥२॥

Whatever was not treated earlier in the two Kāṇḍas pertaining to activity and knowledge is now all (of it) stated here, since this forms the remainder (of the same). [2]

अपास्तनिखिलध्वान्ततज्जं ब्रह्मोपवर्णितम् ।
पूर्वैश्चतुर्भिरध्यायैर्यद्विः कैवल्यसिद्धये ॥३॥

The earlier four Adhyāyas dealt with (lit. described) the Brahman from which all ignorance about and the product of it (viz. ignorance) were far removed (lit. thrown away)—(that Brahman) whose knowledge results into the achievement of liberation. [3]

सोपाधिकस्य तस्यैव व्यवहारानुपातिनः ।
उपासनानि वाच्यानि यान्यनुक्तान्यतः परम् ॥४॥
प्रकृष्टाभ्युदयार्थानि क्रममुक्तिकराणि च ।
क्रियाभिश्चाविरुद्धानि वाच्यानीति परा श्रुतिः ॥५॥

Hereafter are stated those (modes of) worship of that same

(Brahman), which is delimited by adjuncts and which is subjected to worldly dealings and then such (modes of) worship as were not stated (earlier). [4]

The subsequent portion of the Upaniṣad (begins with the purpose) to state (those modes of worship) which are for the sake of excellent worldly prosperity, which cause gradual liberation and which are not opposed to (ritual) activities. [5]

This is in brief the statement of the contents of the Khila Kāṇḍa.

तथोकारं दमं दानं दयामित्यादिकानि च ।
सर्वोपास्त्यङ्गभूतानि वक्तव्यानीति यत्यते ॥६॥

So then (*tathā*) an effort is made to state *om*, *dama* 'restraint' *dāna* 'gift-making' and *dayā* 'compassion' etc.¹ which have been the ancillaries of all modes of worship. [6]

¹By the word etc. are understood the future (i.e. after-departure) movement of one, the oneness of the Ātman and the results attained.

कार्यकारणसंबन्धव्याजमाश्रित्य तत्परम् ।
व्याख्यातं यत्नतः पूर्वमात्मज्ञानप्रसिद्धये ॥७॥

Earlier, that highest (reality) was explained with care, by resorting to the false relation between causes and effects,¹ in order that one should acquire the knowledge of the Ātman. [7]

¹This refers to the basic falsity (*mithyātvā*) of the discussion on *kāryakāraṇasambandha* among worldly objects.

चरितार्थत्वतस्तस्य कार्यकारणवस्तुनः ।
निषेधायेयमुक्तिः स्यात्पूर्णमित्येवमादिना ॥८॥

This statement in the words *pūrṇam* ... is¹ for rejecting (the existence) of the thing(s) comprising effects and causes, because that (or, they) has (or, have already) fulfilled the purpose.

[8]

¹*asti* is for *syāt*.

न व्यावृत्तमिदं सर्वं परावप्रत्ययमानम् ।
नानुवृत्तं तथैवैतन्नाप्यभावैकनिष्ठितम् ॥९॥

All this world is (really) not distinguished (from it¹), (because) it is understood by the means of knowing (which are) outside (the inner self). Similarly, this is not comparable (to it¹) and also it is not based on (or, supported in) only non-existence.²

[9]

¹This refers to the Brahman which obtains everywhere (among all worldly things).

²One cannot ignore this world of objects, since it fulfils one's desires.

In verses 10-27 Sureśvara gave the meaning of pūrṇam adah ... in the tradition known to him.

अव्यावृत्ताननुगतमात्मप्रत्ययमीरितम् ।
यस्मात्पूर्णमिदं साक्षात्तादात्म्यं तेन वर्ण्यते ॥१०॥

Since this *pūrṇa* is stated to be neither distinguished from nor similar to (any other thing) and is experienced in one's own self, therefore there is described here its oneness¹ with the Ātman.

[10]

¹It literally means: 'being of the same nature of the Ātman-Brahman'. This verse refers to the inner self which experiences the world of objects.

अज्ञातमिथ्याविज्ञाततत्त्वमात्रैकनिष्ठितम् ।
सम्यग्ज्ञानं यतस्तस्मात्पूर्णं तज्ज्ञेयमुच्यते ॥११॥

Since right knowledge rests on only the truth (lit. being that Brahman) which is either not known or falsely known, therefore that *pūrṇa* is stated as what is to be known. [11]

These two verses give the purport of the sentence beginning with the words *pūrṇam adah*, viz. the Brahman within every being.

गोत्ववन्नानुवृत्तं यत्र व्यावृत्तं च खण्डवत् ।
अनन्यमानमानन्दं पूर्णं तदभिधीयते ॥१२॥

That *pūrṇa* is described as what is not (continuously) existent (in many) like cowness and what is not distinguished (from any other) like (some cow called) Khaṇḍa. It is described as not having any means of knowing (it), other than itself, bliss and (only) full. [12]

The second line is the reason for *atyantaparokṣatva* (of the Brahman).

अदः परोक्षमत्यन्तं सर्वकार्यस्य कारणम् ।
कार्यानुमेयं तद्विद्यात्पूर्णमात्रसतत्त्वकम् ॥१३॥

(The pronominal form) *adah* refers to what is entirely (*atyantam*) beyond perception, the cause of all effects and one should understand that as what can be inferred from the effect(s) (it is merely *pūrṇa* in nature). [13]

इदं यज्जनिमत्किञ्चिन्नामरूपक्रियात्मकम् ।
प्रत्यक्षाद्यवसेयं यत्पूर्णं तदपि पूर्ववत् ॥१४॥

In the same way as before (i.e. in the preceding statements), that also is *pūrṇa* which is this, viz. whatever has origin,

whatever is of the nature of name, form and activity and whatever is to be grasped (*avaseya*) by (the means) such as direct perception. [14]

This is the meaning of *pūrṇam idam*. SP adds that the two words *adaḥ* and *idam* refer to what are expressed and indicated by the usually known word *tvam*. So also the mention together of the four words *pūrṇam adaḥ pūrṇam idam* purports to establish the oneness of both which are conveyed by *adaḥ* and *idam*.

कार्यकारणयोश्चेष्टा पूर्णात्पूर्णमितीर्यते ।
वस्तुवृत्तमिदं तावत्प्रागपि ज्ञानसंगतेः ॥१५॥

In the statement *pūrṇāt pūrṇam* is conveyed the activity (*ceṣṭā*) of the cause(s) and the effect(s). This refers just to the function of the (worldly) things,¹ but that is (to be known as occurring even) before the acquisition of the right knowledge (of the same). [15]

¹Two explanations can be offered in this respect. The 'thing' can refer (i) to the worldly thing, for one understands the same while one is only under the influence of ignorance (*avidyā*), (ii) to the Brahman, which is in reality the cause of all the apparent relations of causes and effects.

अथ हेतुफलावेशनिषेधाय परं वचः ।
पूर्णस्य पूर्णमादाय पूर्णमेवावशिष्यते ॥१६॥

Then, the subsequent statement (*vacah*), viz. *pūrṇasya pūrṇam ādāya pūrṇam evāvaśiṣyate*, serves the purpose of rejecting the introduction of the idea of the result and the cause. [16]

ब्रह्म वा इदमित्यादि मधुकाण्डे यदीरितम् ।
तदेव पूर्णमित्यादिवाक्येनैहोपसंहृतम् ॥१७॥

What was stated (earlier) in the Madhu Kāṇḍa, viz. *brahma*

vā idam etc., is itself finally concluded here¹ by the statement beginning with *pūrṇam*. [17]

¹This refers to the Khila Kāṇḍa.

अपीताखिलकार्यं सत्तमोमात्रावशेषगम् ।
भास्वत्स्वार्थं चिदेकस्थमदः पूर्णमिहोच्यते ॥१८॥

In the sentence *adaḥ pūrṇam* is stated that the sentience, the existent which has withdrawn (in itself) all (the so-called) effects, which rest in only the remainder, i.e. darkness,¹ which reveals itself (only in) brightness and which resides only in one. [18]

What was explained as the Brahman in BU first Adhyāya is explained here in the sentence *pūrṇam adaḥ*.

¹This refers to existence of worldly objects.

तमोन्वितं च यत्कार्यं साक्षिणः साक्ष्यतां गतम् ।
प्रत्यक्षमागमापायि विद्यात्पूर्णमिदं तथा ॥१९॥

So also should one understand *pūrṇam idam* (to be referring to) whatever is effect, associated with darkness and which has become perceived by the perceiver (viz. the sentience within), which is directly perceptible, and which comes into existence and (also) to an end. [19]

Verses 18 and 19 form a pair to describe reality succinctly.

ईशक्षेत्रज्ञयोरेवं तमस्तज्जाभिसंस्थयोः ।
सामानाधिकरण्यादेर्वाक्यादैकात्म्यमुच्यते ॥२०॥

Thus is conveyed the oneness of the Lord and the knower of the field¹ who rest on² darkness and its effects by putting the two in *samānādhikaraṇa* in the sentence. [20]

SP adds that this verse implies the meaning of *pūrṇasya pūrṇam ādāya* ... to be the same as of *tasmāt tat sarvam abhavat*.

¹These refer to the Ātman or Parātman and Jīva 'the inner self'.

²Literally, are related to.

क्षेत्रज्ञेश्वरभेदेन ह्यभिन्नं वस्त्वविद्यया ।
भिन्नं बोधात्तमोऽवस्तौ नेतीत्यात्मावशिष्यते ॥२१॥

One and the same thing (*abhinnam*), is (understood) through ignorance as the knower of the field and the Lord, viz. as two distinct objects; and owing to the knowledge (of their real nature) from the sentence *neti neti* there results the removal of darkness and (consequently) there remains only the Ātman. [21]

न भेदो न च संसर्गो नाप्यभावोऽवसीयते ।
तन्मूलाज्ञानविध्वस्तेर्यथोक्तागममानतः ॥२२॥

Neither distinction nor contact (of the two distinct ones) nor even their non-existence is concluded (from the sentence *pūrṇam* etc.), since there has occurred the destruction of the basic ignorance (about the nature of) the two, as already stated by the scripture which is other means of knowing (reality). [22]

स्रगज्ञानमनादाय तदुत्थैः संगतिः स्रजः ।
नैव संभाव्यते यद्वत्तथेहात्मनि वीक्ष्यताम् ॥२३॥

As unless one has ignorance about a wreath there cannot be any connection of the wreath with the (notions) that have arisen from it (viz. ignorance); so also, should it be understood about ignorance etc. with respect to the Ātman. [23]

कार्यकारणयोर्ध्वस्तावपूर्वाद्यवितबोधतः ।
आत्मप्रत्ययमागम्यः स्वार्थं आत्मावशिष्यते ॥२४॥

From the understanding of the statement, viz. *apūrvam* ..., (when there results) the removal of (the notion of) cause and effect, (there follows) only one meaning, viz. the Ātman, which is understood from the means of knowing, viz. the awareness of the Ātman. [24]

In the word *ātmapratyaya-mā-gamya* in the third quarter, *mā* is to be understood as *māna*.

यादृगस्य द्वये रूपमात्मनैवावगम्यते ।
तावदेव हतान्ध्यस्य तदन्यानवशेषतः ॥२५॥

What is understood by one by oneself (*ātmanā*) as a form of this (Ātman) while (there exists) duality,¹ only that much (i.e. the same) is really (the form) of it from which darkness² has been removed; for there does not remain anything else than that. [25]

¹It literally means: a pair of the Ātman and the *jagat*.

²This stands for ignorance.

यदेवेहेति च तथा मन्त्रोऽप्युच्चैर्जगाद नः ।
अन्यदेवेति च श्रुतिः कार्येतरनिषेधिनी ॥२६॥

So also, the Mantra *yad eva* ...¹ has here² emphatically (lit. loudly) declared and also there is a Śruti, viz. *anyad eva*,³ which rejects anything else than the effect.⁴ [26]

¹*Kāthopaniṣad* 4.10.

²This implies words *tad amutra, yad amutra, tad anv iha* from the Upaniṣad quoted in the preceding note.

³*Īśopaniṣad* 10, 13; *Kenopaniṣad* 1.4.

⁴This refers to *kāraṇa* and hereby is *kāraṇakāryabhāva* rejected.

आत्मेतिदृष्टेर्मेयत्वं स्वार्थावगतितोऽपरम् ।

नान्यदुत्सहते वोढुमिति पूर्वमवादिषम् ॥२७॥

Since there is a knowledge¹ (that all this is) the Ātman, nothing else than that can have the character of an object to be known—so have I said earlier.¹ [27]

¹This refers to a passage *ātmani jñāte sarvaṃ jñātaṃ bhavati*.

In verses 28-63c states *Bhārtrprapañca's* view on *pūrṇam adaḥ*....

एवं यथोदिते तावत्प्रमाणार्थेऽप्यवस्थिते ।
अन्यथेदं वचः केचिद्व्याचख्युरतिनैपुणात् ॥२८॥
पूर्णमित्यादिवाक्यस्य षष्ठान्त्यवचसा सह ।
वक्तुकामो हि संबन्धमेवं यत्नादचीकृत् ॥२९॥

When such has been the meaning (understood from) the authoritative means (viz. Śruti),¹ as stated (herebefore), others² have explained this statement (*vacah*) in another way (and) with great skill. [28]

Because he, wishing to point out (i.e. see) the connection of the statement *pūrṇam* ... with the last statement of the sixth Adhyāya,³ has presented (lit. imagined) with effort (his opinion) thus: (i.e. in what follows).⁴ [29]

¹As stated in the preceding verses.

²The reference is to *Bhārtrprapañca*—here in the plural; in the next verse, in the singular.

³This refers to BU 4.5.15, *yatra hi* ... Sureśvara numbers that Adhyāya as 6, according to the tradition known to him.

⁴This is made clear in verses 30ff.

द्वैताद्वैतात्मकं ब्रह्म मैत्रेय्यै वर्णितं किल ।
यत्र हि द्वैतमित्युक्त्या यत्र त्वस्येति चादरात् ॥३०॥

Indeed (*kila*) the Brahman which is of the nature of duality and non-duality is explained to Maitreyī in the statement *yatra*

*hi dvaitam ... and also in yatra tv asya ... with great regard (for the Śruti).*¹ [30]

¹Cf. BU 4.5.15.

यद्यद्वैतं परं ब्रह्म तत्र स्यात्परमार्थतः ।
कल्पितं प्रसजेद्द्वैतं तोयबुद्धिरिवोषरे ॥३१॥

If there (i.e. in the statement) was (mentioned) in reality the highest Brahman, viz. the non-dual (Brahman), there would contingently follow duality as merely what is imagined, in the same way as the apprehending of water in a barren place. [31]

मृषात्वाद्धेदजातस्य सर्गस्थित्याद्यसंभवात् ।
सर्गस्थितिलयानां स्यादन्वाख्यानं मृषैव तु ॥३२॥

Since it is impossible that there is origin, sustenance etc.¹ of the (world of) discrete objects, for the reason that they are false, a restatement of their origin, sustenance and merger would only be meaningless (lit. false). [32]

¹This includes merger (which is later specifically mentioned).

श्रवणप्रतिपत्ती च व्यर्थे स्यातां तथाद्वये ।
अथ स्वेनैव रूपेण द्वैतमस्तीति भण्यते ॥३३॥
अन्वाख्यानं सतामेव सर्गादीनां तथा भवेत् ।

And so also in respect of the non-dual (reality, i.e. Ātman) there will be meaningless hearing, and pondering over (the same).¹ Then again (if it is said that) there is duality as a state of reality— [33]
then there would be restatement of what are (already existent objects) in respect of origin etc. [34ab]

This verse would imply the authoritativeness of the Upaniṣad

which states *śrotavyo mantavyo nididhyāsītavyaḥ*.

¹This is *śravaṇa* and *pratipatti* to which is to be added *nididhyāsa*.

तथाप्यद्वैतसंदृष्टेर्मृषात्वं स्याद्विरोधतः ॥३४॥
परिकल्पिततादोष एवमत्र प्रसज्यते ।
तद्दोषापनुत्सायै पूर्णमित्यादिका श्रुतिः ॥३५॥

But in that case also, there would follow from the acceptance of non-duality falsehood as opposed to it. [34cd]

Thus, there would follow the fault, viz. only imagining notions and, therefore, out of a desire for the removal of that fault, there is a Śruti beginning with *pūrṇam*. [35]

न कश्चिदपि दोषोऽत्र यथा तदभिधीयते ।
स्वानुभूत्यनुसारेण सर्वं सुस्थं भवेदतः ॥३६॥

Now is explained as to how there is not in this statement any fault, so that, in accordance with one's own experience, all would be well-stated (lit. put) in order. [36]

अदः परोक्षमत्यन्तं कारणं पूर्णमुच्यते ।
व्योमवद्व्यापि सद्ब्रह्म सर्वतोऽनवखण्डितम् ॥३७॥

adah is what is entirely beyond perception and *pūrṇa* is stated to be the cause, viz. that existent Brahman, the all-pervasive like the sky, and everywhere as not consisting of parts (lit. not divided). [37]

ब्रह्मणो याद्व्यावस्था सैव तावदिहोदिता ।
एवं चेदद्वयं ब्रह्म द्वैतावस्था न सिध्यति ॥३८॥

So far is stated the state of the Brahman, viz. of non-duality alone. Now, if this is so, i.e. the Brahman is non-dual, then there would not result the state of duality. [38]

इति दोषनिषेधार्थमिदं पूर्णमितीर्यते ।
यथोक्तावस्थयोर्मा भून्मृषात्वं ब्रह्मणः सदा ॥३९॥

Therefore, for avoiding (i.e. rejecting) that fault is stated *pūrṇam idam*; this (with the idea that) there would not ever be falsehood regarding the Brahman with respect to the two states that are already mentioned. [39]

पूर्णब्रह्मपरिज्ञानाव्यतिरेकत्वहेतुतः ।
अदोवत्कार्यमप्येतत्पूर्णमेवावसौयताम् ॥४०॥

(Therefore) for (the reason that) the effect has no distinction from (the cause, viz.) the *pūrṇa* Brahman consisting in all-sided knowledge (*parijñāna*) this *kārya* also is to be finally considered as *pūrṇa* like that (Brahman).¹ [40]

¹*adah* refers to what is *parokṣa* 'not perceptible', in contrast with what is perceptible (*idam*).

पूर्णेनाभेदतः कार्यं पूर्णं स्यान्न मृषा श्रुतेः ।
यद्यतो नातिरेकेण तत्तदेवेति निश्चितिः ॥४१॥

The effect also would be *pūrṇa* on account of its non-distinction from *pūrṇa* (cause)—this would not give falsehood to the Śruti; for, the decision (in this regard) is: that which¹ is not in addition to (i.e. beside) what² it has come from (viz. the cause) is only that. [41]

Both NKL and SP only refer to *ghaṭa* and *śarāva* as examples. This needs some explanation. *ghaṭa* and *śarāva* are products of clay and are at the same time not different from it. That implies that the effect in the form of the wind is not different from its cause in the form of the Ātman.

¹This refers to effect.

²This refers to cause.

एवं तर्ह्येकरूपेऽस्मिन्स्तत्त्वे सत्ये समर्थिते ।
ततः सर्गाद्यभावः स्यादेकरूपतया स्थितेः ॥४२॥

(It is argued against Bhartṛprapañca:) If this is so, viz. that the truth is justifiably held to be this reality, which is only oneness; then there would follow the non-existence of the origin etc. since the reality has existed only in one form. [42]

This is an argument of the followers of Śaṅkara against Bhartṛprapañca.

नैवं यतः श्रुतिः प्राह पूर्णात्पूर्णमुदच्यते ।
पूर्णात्कारणतः पूर्णं द्वैतमेतदुदच्यते ॥४३॥

(Bhartṛprapañca's answer would be:) This is not so, since Śruti (itself) has declared 'pūrṇa has come out of pūrṇa' i.e. from the pūrṇakāraṇa has the pūrṇa, viz. duality originated. [43]

The thought in verse 42 is related only to cause-effect relation between things (which are essentially one). Yet this verse specifies the Śruti 'pūrṇa has come out of pūrṇa' as a specifier of the real distinction between the cause and the effect, according to Bhartṛprapañca.

यस्मादुद्विच्यमानं हि द्वैतं नैवातिरिच्यते ।
तदेवोद्वेचनं चेत्स्याद्द्वैतस्येति मतं यदि ॥४४॥

If it is argued:¹ Duality does not exist beside (i.e. in addition to) what it has originated from—that is the (real nature of) the origin of duality. [44]

¹This verse is yet another argument against Bhartṛprapañca.

नैतदेवं कुतो यस्माद्दृष्टहानं प्रसज्यते ।
प्रत्यक्षतो हि दृष्टोऽयं द्वैताख्यो विषयः स्फुटः ॥४५॥
तथा दर्शनतः सिद्धो विधितश्चावसीयते ।

प्रामाण्योच्छेद एव स्याच्छ्रुतेरेवं समर्थने ॥४६॥

(The argument is answered thus:) This is not so. Why? Since there follows as contingent the rejection of what is actually seen—indeed this world of objects is clearly perceived directly.

[45]

(The world of objects) is established thus by direct perception and also by injunction(s). And there would be, in your justifying (the unreal nature of that world) with the help of the Śruti, (complete) discarding (lit. destroying) the authoritativeness (of the Śruti).

[46]

This verse explains the *dr̥ṣṭatva* and *śrutatva* of this world (*idam*).

पारमार्थ्यं क्वचिच्छास्त्रं क्वचिच्चाप्यनृतात्मताम् ।
विदधन्मानतां जह्यात्परस्परविरोधतः ॥४७॥

(Thus), stating (lit. prescribing) at some place(s) the character of the ultimate reality and at some other(s) that of falsehood (i.e. unreality) of the same, the Śāstra¹ (i.e. Śruti) would give up its reliability as an authoritative means owing to mutual contradiction (in its own statements).

[47]

This clarifies the thought of verse 46cd above.

¹The definition given by Ānandagiri on BUB 5.1.1:

pravṛttir vā nivṛttir vā nityena kṛtakena vā /
pumsāṃ yenopadiśyeta tac chāstram abhidhīyate //

पूर्णत्वेनाजहद्वृत्त्या त्रिष्वप्यध्वसु वर्तते ।
द्वैताद्वैतात्मकं ब्रह्म पूर्णत्वेनाविभागतः ॥४८॥

The Brahman, having the nature of duality and non-duality, exists as *pūrṇa*, by its not giving up its nature¹ of the three *adhvans*,² viz. as the *pūrṇa* Brahman without having any division in itself.

[48]

¹This is the meaning of *vṛtti*, viz. its usual existence.

²They are the three periods of time as noted in verse 55 below.

कुतोऽविभागो मानाच्चेदुभयोरप्यवस्थयोः ।
पूर्णादित्यादिवचनान्महाप्रलय आत्मनि ॥४९॥

(A question is asked:) 'Why is this absence of division?' The answer is: On the basis of Śruti in respect of both the states and also from the statement *pūrṇāt* ..., they have final merger in the Ātman. [49]

This is Bhartṛprapañca's explanation of the undivided nature of the Brahman as stated in the preceding verse; he refers to the state of duality at the time of *mahāpralaya* 'final merger'.

इदं च द्वैतमस्त्येव तथादोऽद्वैतमेव च ।
पूर्णत्वाख्याजहद्वृत्त्या समुद्रोर्मिवदीक्ष्यताम् ॥५०॥

And thus duality does exist and so also (does exist) that, viz. the non-duality, therefore, from the description (of the Brahman) as *pūrṇa* by its not giving up the (natural) existence (viz. the state of being undivided), let this be seen (i.e. understood) as in the case of the ripples on the ocean. [50]

The ripples on the ocean are seen at times and at other times they again merge in the water; in both these states the water and the ripples of the ocean are but one and real. This is the example for *pūrṇa* Brahman consisting in duality and non-duality.

अग्रे चलत्वमूर्मीणां मध्य ईषच्चलात्मता ।
निष्कम्पत्वं तथा मूले समुद्रः सर्वरूपभृत् ॥५१॥

In the beginning, there is undulating of the ripples and later (lit. in the course of their existence) there is a very gentle

undulating, and the absence of undulating in its initial states—only the ocean has assumed all (these different) forms.

[51]

This verse explains *sanudrormivat* in the preceding verse.

यथैता यौगपद्येन वृत्तीरुर्मिभिरात्मनः ।
अनुभूयन्त एकत्र देवदत्तादिके तथा ॥५२॥

As these are simultaneously the different functioning forms of the ripples (of the ocean), so also (various functions) are noticed (lit. experienced or seen) in only one and the same Devadatta and others¹

[52]

¹This refers to various knowers known as Caitra and Maitra. This is clarified fully in the two following verses.

निष्कम्पा देवदत्तस्य वृत्तिः स्यात्परमात्मना ।
ईषत्प्रचलिता प्राणभावेनेत्यवगम्यते ॥५३॥
विराड्भावेनातितरां चण्डप्रचलितोर्मिवत् ।
ऊर्म्यग्रवत्पिण्डभावे नामरूपक्रियात्मना ॥५४॥

There would be a flutterless function of Devadatta, who is (in the state of) the highest Ātman;¹ the same is seen as slight fluttering on his becoming the Prāṇa (identical with the individual self)—so is this understood.

[53]

And in his being Virāj, it is like the exceedingly agitating ripples(s)—thus, in the nature of name, form and activity, (the Ātman) has become embodied (*piṇḍa*) like the upsurging ripples.

[54]

¹This is to be understood in the sense of the Sūtrātman.

जनिस्थितिलयेष्वेवं त्रिषु कालेषु पूर्णता ।
कार्यकारणयोर्ज्ञेया द्वैताद्वैतस्वभावयोः ॥५५॥

Thus, in the three states of origin, sustenance and merger and in the three periods of time, there is to be understood the character of *pūrṇa* in the cause(s) and effect(s) which are by nature duality and non-duality. [55]

सा चैकैवाविभागत्वात्कार्यकारणभेदतः ।
भेदेन व्यपदेशार्हा सर्वमेवं समञ्जसम् ॥५६॥

And that¹ is just one, on account of being undivided and is to be described as existing in distinct things on account of the differences, viz. cause(s) and effect(s); all this is thus reasonable. [56]

¹This is *pūrṇatā* in verse 54.

आविर्भावतिरोभावैः कार्यकारणरूपिभिः ।
समुद्रवन्नृत्यति च प्रत्यवस्थं विभुः स्थितः ॥५७॥

The all-pervading (Ātman) has, in each of its states, continued to exist through its appearance and disappearance in the form of the causes and the effects, dancing (as it were) like the ocean. [57]

एवं द्वैतस्य सत्यत्वे कर्मकाण्डस्य मानता ।
अनन्तपुरुषार्थीप्तिरिष्यते कर्मकाण्डतः ॥५८॥

Thus, in (accepting) the reality abiding in duality, (there follows) the authoritativeness of (what is called) the Karmakāṇḍa; and from the Karmakāṇḍa is expected (to be realised) the accomplishment of the infinite end of human life. [58]

This expresses the result from accepting duality.

यदा तु कल्पितं द्वैतमद्वैतं परमार्थतः ।
उच्छिन्नं कर्मकाण्डस्य प्रामाण्यं विषयादृते ॥५९॥

When, however, duality is taken as the product of imagination and non-duality as the ultimate truth, then the authoritativeness of the Karmakāṇḍa is entirely to be given up (lit. destroyed), owing to the absence of the object (to be accomplished). [59]

एकदेशस्य चामात्वे वेदस्याप्यप्रमाणता ।
सर्वनाशो भवेदेवं सर्वाप्रामाण्यहेतुतः ॥६०॥

Further, in accepting one part of Vedas as unauthoritative, there follows the unauthoritativeness of the Veda¹ and thus there would follow the loss of everything in life for the reason that the whole has become unauthoritative. [60]

Already Bhartṛprapañca holds the Karmakāṇḍa as authoritative, but if that part of the Veda is held as unauthoritative, the Veda, in its entirety, cannot be accepted as authoritative—this is a complete loss!

¹This is for the Vedānta texts, according to NKL.

अतो विरोधनुत्त्यर्थं सत्यत्वप्रतिपत्तये ।
कार्यकारणयोः शास्त्रं पूर्णमित्यादिनावदत् ॥६१॥

Therefore, in order to ward away the opposition (between the effect(s) and the cause(s)), the scripture has stated *pūrṇam* ... so the truth of the Śāstra is established. [61]

प्रत्यक्षादीनि मानानि भेदग्राहीणि सर्वदा ।
तेषां चाप्यप्रमाणत्वं प्रापदद्वैतवादिनः ॥६२॥

(Indeed) the means of knowing, viz. direct perception etc., ever accept objects which are distinct; therefore, there would result for the propounder of the non-dual (Ātman), unauthoritativeness of them¹ (also). [62]

¹These are the accepted means of knowing.

इति वेदविदः केचिद्विन्नाभिन्नसतत्त्वकम् ।
सर्वं वस्त्वभिवाञ्छन्ति

Thus do some knowers of the Vedas (i.e. Vedānta) hold (lit. wish) that all the things (in the universe) are of the nature of discrete and non-discrete objects.¹ [63abc]

¹That is, being different in being non-different also.

Now in verses 63d-94 follows the refutation of *Bhartrprapañca*'s view.

तत्तु युक्त्या न युज्यते ॥६३॥

But that (view) is not supported with reasoning. [63d]

न युक्तमदिदं गीतं ह्यपवादविकल्पनम् ।
न्यायासंभवतः स्पष्टं स च न्यायो विभाव्यते ॥६४॥

Indeed this division (of the Vedic statement into the general rule and) its exception is not favoured by reason (i.e. *tarka* or *nyāya*); this is clear from the want (lit. impossibility) of (proper) reasoning. And that reasoning is now examined (lit. considered). [64]

अहिंसन्सर्वभूतानीत्यहिंसा सर्वभूतगा ।
शास्त्रेणोत्सर्गतः प्राप्ता तीर्थे सार्पौघते यथा ॥६५॥

(Now) non-violence pertaining to all beings is known from the scripture in the general rule *ahiṃsan sarvabhūtāni* ... and that (*ahiṃsā*) is accepted (by the scripture) in (relation to) a sacrifice.¹ [65]

This verse points out the *utsargāpavāda* notion of the Karmakāṇḍa.

¹ Namely, the Agniṣomīya rite.

न तथेहाद्वयावस्था श्रुत्योत्सर्गेण यत्नतः ।
 प्रापिता तद्विशेषेऽसौ निर्भागत्वान्निषेधभाक् ॥६६॥
 विकल्पानुपपत्तेश्च षोडशिग्रहणादिवत् ।
 वस्तुतन्त्रं हि नो मानं कर्तृतन्त्रं विकल्पते ॥६७॥

Not in that way ¹ has the Śruti presented to us ² the non-duality here ³ in the form of a general rule, in such a way as to offer possibilities of option; ⁴ nor also does it purport to reject some specific part of it, ⁵ since it is devoid of any parts, [66] and because there cannot be (here) ³ any reason for (stating) an option as in the case of taking up of the *ṣoḍaśi-graha*. ⁶ Our authoritative means of knowing is dependent only on the (real) thing ⁷ and what is dependent ⁷ on the agent (of activity) can leave scope for option. [67]

The Advaita Vedānta distinguishes between the means of knowing as *vastutantra* and *kartṛtantra*. The first does not leave for a knower any option of understanding about the nature of the object to be known, viz. the Brahman. The second, however, depends on a knower's wish to undertake the performance of a ritual (which is conveyed by some injunction) or not to do so; as, for example, the taking up of a cup called *Ṣoḍaśin*—the sacrificer may or may not take it up. The *vastutantra* leads only to one end, viz. liberation. [More details of Mīmāṃsā can be overlooked.]

¹ As in the preceding verse.

² That is, informed us of

³ That is, in respect of the Brahman.

⁴ 'In such ... option' is based on SP's observation: *yatnas tu prāptau niṣedhe cobhayatra sambadhyate*.

⁵ That is, partless non-duality, i.e. the Brahman.

⁶ *Ṣoḍaśi* is the proper name of a cup to be drunk at the Atirātra sacrifice, optionally. The general note above clarifies this point.

⁷The two terms *vastutantra* and *karṣṭtantra* (or, *puruṣatantra*) distinguish between the Vedānta and Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā notions regarding the authoritative means of knowing. For the Vedānta, the Brahman is all: *jñātr*, *jñeya* and *jñāna* (instrument of knowing). As such, knowledge about the Brahman depends only on the thing, viz. Brahman, itself. In Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā, however, the *jñātr* etc. are all different. As a consequence, the performance of the rituals (which is the purport of the Karmakāṇḍa) depends entirely on the performer (*karṣṭ*) who is the knower; this leaves scope for his performing or not performing the ritual activity—that is, there is scope for option.

यत्कर्तुं वाप्यकर्तुं वाप्यन्यथा कर्तुमेव वा ।
कारकैः शक्यते लोके तद्विकल्पस्य गोचरः ॥६८॥

In the world that is the subject of option which is possible (for the performer) (i) to do, or (ii) not to do, or (iii) to do otherwise. [68]

Thus Sureśvara states his idea of the province of *vikalpa*.

परस्परविरोधाच्च नैकदैकत्र संभवः ।
द्वयोरवस्थयोर्यद्वत्प्रकाशतमसोरिह ॥६९॥

And, therefore, here, in respect of these two states (of non-duality and duality), there is no possibility of their existence in one and the same thing and at one and the same period of time, owing to their mutual opposition, as in the case of light and darkness. [69]

ekadā, *ekatra* refer to the three *adhvans* already mentioned in verses 48 and 55 above.

श्रुतिन्यायविरोधाच्च कल्पनेयमशोभना ।
अपूर्वानपरानन्तप्रज्ञानैकरसाद्वयम् ॥७०॥
अपूर्वानपराबाह्यं भेदसंसर्गवर्जितम् ।

अस्थूलं नेति नेतीति यथोक्तार्थे वचांसि हि ॥७१॥

And (thus), owing to the opposition to Śruti and to reasoning (both), this view is not proper. (And) *apūrvānaparānanta-prajñānaikarasādvayam*;¹ [70]
apūrvānaparābāhyaṃ bhedaśaṃsargavarjitam,² *asthūlam*³ (and) *neti neti*⁴ are (the Śruti) statements pointing to the matter as stated (by us). [71]

¹BU 2.5.19.

²BU (Mādhyandina) 3.8.8.

³BU 3.8.8.

⁴BU 3.9.25; 4.2.4; 4.4.22; 4.5.15.

अमात्वाशङ्कासद्वावाद्यथोक्तार्थविनिश्चितौ ।
 अब्धौ क्षिप्तानि तानि स्युरन्यार्थासंभवत्वतः ॥७२॥

And those statements would be thrown into the ocean, if there is a decision regarding the already stated object (i.e. the single Ātman) to be otherwise, owing to the possible fear of the unauthoritativeness (of them)—this is so, since there is no possibility of the existence of any (other) object. [72]

anyārthāsambhavatvataḥ is for *-sambhavāt*.

तथा न्यायविरोधोऽपि क्रियाकारकरूपिणः ।
 जडाध्रुवानात्मनो हि त्वत्कृता कल्पनेष्यते ॥७३॥
 न तु चिन्मात्ररूपस्य ध्रुवानंशात्मनः स्वतः ।
 नित्यत्वं चात्मनः सिद्धं प्रत्यभिज्ञादिमानतः ॥७४॥
 प्रसजेत्तद्विरोधश्च भिन्नाभिन्नत्ववादिनः ।
 कल्पनायाश्च वैफल्यमनित्यत्वे परात्मनः ॥७५॥

So also, your view is entertained here in respect of what is of the nature of activity and agent and in respect of the non-Ātmans that are insentient and not imperennial—and thus there is opposition to reasoning. [73]

And there is not established from (your) means of knowing (the character of the agent etc.) in the case of the Ātman, which exists in its own right (*svataḥ*) as only sentient in nature, perennially partless and eternal. [74]

Then there would follow contingently opposition to that by the view of one who holds difference in non-difference and, consequently, there would be fruitlessness resulting from the highest Ātman being taken as imperennial. [75]

अकृताभ्यागमः प्राप्तः कृतनाशश्च सत्त्वरः ।
कर्मकाण्डस्य वैफल्यमेवं कल्पयतो भवेत् ॥७६॥

(Thus) there follows the acceptance of what is not done and also immediately (i.e. close on its heels) the destruction of what is performed. Thus, for one who has thus entertained this view (of difference in non-difference) there would result the meaninglessness (lit. fruitlessness) of the Karmakāṇḍa. [76]

मकरी ननु दृष्टान्तो भिन्नाभिन्नत्वसिद्धिकृत् ।
ब्रह्मणः प्रागुपन्यस्तोऽसाध्वीयं कल्पना कथम् ॥७७॥

(The objector puts forth one argument yet:) 'Indeed, we have earlier stated the illustration of the sea¹ to prove the duality and the non-duality of the Brahman; how then is this theory improper?' [77]

¹That is, having crocodiles in it. The word *makarī* stands ordinarily for a female crocodile, but here it refers to the sea.

अतोऽन्यविषयत्वात्सोऽविरोधः प्रागुदीरितः ।
न तु चिन्मात्ररूपस्य ह्यत्रावोचं विरुद्धताम् ॥७८॥

(This is an answer to it:) That (illustration), which you have earlier stated, is unopposed (to our theory), since it has some other thing¹ for its subject matter (*viṣaya*), but not for what has only sentience as its form. And here, in this respect,²

I have said that there occurs opposition (to your illustration).
[78]

¹Here, there is reference to the Sūtra and the following embodied state of the Brahman which are accepted by the Vedāntin.

²This refers to *cinmātra*. Cp. verses 73-75 above.

नाद्येयत्वाच्च शास्त्रार्थकल्पनेयं त्वया कृता ।
षड्भावविक्रियं वस्तु द्येयं वक्तुं न हि श्रुतिः ॥७९॥
स्वतस्तस्य च संप्राप्तिर्विनाप्यागमशासनम् ।
द्येयत्वेनेह सर्वेषां खरोष्ट्रादेरपीक्षणात् ॥८०॥

[In verse 80, the Siddhāntin states how various objects of meditation are not the subject matter taught in the scripture.]

And this opinion regarding the object of scriptures¹ is not to be studied, because the Śruti does not state as the object of meditation any entity which undergoes six modifications.
[79]

And also because that² is obtained by itself,³ without (even) an injunction in the scripture (and also because) there are noticed among all the objects to be thought of (such objects as) a mule, a camel etc.
[80]

Verse 80 refers to what is called the Advaita view of Vedānta, the *vyavahārabhūmi* 'the world of various objects known' through the adoption of *pramāṇa-prameya* relation among them.

¹This refers to what is thought by Bhartṛprapañca in the scripture.

²This refers to the variety of objects as objects of meditation.

³This is referring to actual experience.

एकधैवानुविज्ञेयमिति च श्रुतिशासनम् ।
भेददृष्ट्यपवादाच्च मृत्योरिति विनिन्दनात् ॥८१॥

Further, there is an instruction in the Śruti, viz. that (reality) is to be known as but one;¹ and this is because there is exception taken to seeing variety of things and since there is censure of the same in the words *mṛtyoḥ*² [81]

¹Cf. BU 4.4.20: *ekadhā*

²Cf. *Kāthopaiṣad* 4.10-11; BU 4.4.19: *mṛtyoḥ*

यत्तूक्तं वेदभागत्वाद्विन्नवस्त्ववबोधिनः ।
नामात्वं कर्मकाण्डस्येत्यत्र प्रतिविधीयते ॥८२॥

As to what is stated, viz. 'The Karmakāṇḍa, which informs us about discrete things, being a portion of the Veda is not authoritative', there now follows an answer (to it): [82]

न हि जात्यादिसंभेदसंसिद्धौ मानता श्रुतेः ।
प्रत्यक्षाद्यनवष्टब्धे तस्यामात्वं यतः स्थितम् ॥८३॥

Indeed the Śruti is not authoritative in respect of establishing variety such as *jāti*.¹ And this is so, since the unauthoritativeness of that (variety) is established for the reason that reality is not dependent on (the means) such as direct perception. [83]

Verse 82 has referred to the variety of objects. Therefore, that raises two questions: whether the Karmakāṇḍa refers to that variety as what is to be accepted in reality or that is to be taken as unreality. The first line answers the first question, whereas the second line answers the second one.

¹This refers to various classes of society.

भेदग्राहि न नो मानं लौकिकं वैदिकं च यत् ।
अविचारितसंसिद्धिस्तस्माद्वेदोऽवसीयताम् ॥८४॥

For us, it cannot be a means of knowing, which accepts discreteness of objects; be it popularly (accepted) or the Vedic. Therefore, let it be concluded that the variety (of the objects

of knowing) is established (even) without any thought(-activity). [84]

While commenting (only too briefly) on this verse, SP states about the means thus: *pratyakṣādīni śāstrāṇi bhedagrāhīni anyonyāśrayatvāt*. This is made clear in the following verses.

न स्वतः परतो वायं भेदो वस्तुन ईक्ष्यते ।
सर्वस्यैव स्वतोऽभितेस्तदन्यस्याप्यभेदतः ॥८५॥

Indeed this discreteness among all the things¹ is not established on account of itself or any other thing/means. (This is so) because (in the first instance) all (that variety) is itself non-different from itself² (and secondly) any other (distinct thing, if it is granted to be existent) also cannot be shown as distinctly existent.³ [85]

¹*vastunaḥ* (singular) signifies *vastūnām* (plural).

²The first part of the second line sets aside a possible idea that all different things cannot be said to be distinct from themselves—if it is so said, that would result into stating that there are no things in existence. Read SP: *sarvaṃ vastu svasmād abhinnaṃ anyathā vastvabhāvaprasaṅgāt*.

³The second part of the second line affirms that there cannot be shown anything as distinct from all the things (itself being included among them). Here also, read SP: *parato 'pi (vastuno) bhedo na prāmāṇiko 'sti ... vastuno 'nyatvenēṣṭasyāpi na sattvam (bhedasyādyāpy asiddheḥ)*.

वस्तु वस्त्वन्तरं भिन्द्याद्योगाद्यद्वा विभागतः ।
योगे नातिशयैकत्वात्तयोश्चाप्येकरूपतः ॥८६॥

A thing can distinguish another thing (from itself) by either its union (with it) or its separation from the same. In case (it is accepted that) there is a union of them, (then such distinguishing is) not (possible), because there exists some

common (lit. one excellence) in them and (consequent) oneness of them. [86]

विभागेऽपि न भेदः स्यात्तयोरेकात्मना स्थितेः ।
अन्यदीयोऽपि नान्यस्य भेदः स्यात्कल्पनां विना ॥८७॥

Further, in respect of their differentiation, there is no (possibility of) variety (of differences) since both of them remain as having only one nature. And there cannot exist the difference of the other thing unless there is a notion that there exists another thing. [87]

This refers to an actual separation obtaining between two things. *yoga* refers to 'union' of two things.

In connection with this verse, SP points to a variant reading: *yoge 'natiśayaikatvāt* and remarks on the same: *bhedo 'tiśayas tasmād anyas tatprayojakasambandho 'natiśayas tasyaikyān na bhedaḥ syāt*.

मेययाथात्म्यसंलेहि मानं मानत्वमश्नुते ।
भेदं न लभते मेये मेयादन्यत्र न प्रमा ॥८८॥

A means of knowing becomes an (authoritative) means, if it touches (i.e. brings out) the true nature of the object to be known. It does not exist in the object to be known as a distinct (object). Right knowledge cannot obtain elsewhere than in the object to be known. [88]

The argument is: Since difference from the thing itself cannot naturally exist, there is doubt about its property as existing apart from it—but that is impossible.

सतो न व्यतिरेकेण भेदो नापि सदन्वयात् ।
यथैवं नासतोऽप्येवं भेदो नैवावसीयते ॥८९॥

A distinct object (does not exist) in addition to (or besides)

the existent (viz. reality): nor (does it exist) as associated with (it² as a part of) the existent (reality). As this is so, so also there cannot exist beside the non-existent any (other) distinct object—such is the conclusion. [89]

सर्वं सदेव यस्येष्टमथवासदिदं जगत् ।
भेदः किमाश्रयस्तस्य विरोधान्न द्वयाश्रयः ॥९०॥

For him, who has accepted (lit. desired) all this as the existent alone or this as non-existent, what could be the substratum of the distinction among objects? Because it is opposed to (distinct, that distinction objects) there cannot have any duality as its substratum. [90]

SP states that the Sāṃkhyas, the Buddhists and the Jains are meant here to have the opinion expressed in the verse.

अन्यापेक्षं पृथक्त्वं चेत्स्वत एवापृथग्घटः ।
बलीयानन्तरङ्गत्वाद्बहिरङ्गं प्रबाधते ॥९१॥

If it is held that distinction depends on something other than itself, then (it has to be said that) the pot is distinct from itself. The external aspect of a thing, being stronger than the internal property, stultifies it. [91]

This is to disprove the existence of distinction among objects with reference to the views of the Tārkikas.

द्रव्याद्विन्नं पृथक्त्वं चेदनवस्थैति सत्त्वरः ।
द्रव्यमेव पृथक्त्वं चेदपृथक्स्यादिदं जगत् ॥९२॥

If the distinction of some substance is considered to be different from the substance itself, then there quickly follows *infinite regress*. If again substance itself is the distinction (of itself), then this world (also) will be non-distinct. [92]

स्वतश्चेद्वस्तुनो भेदो वस्तु शून्यं प्रसज्यते ।
आपेक्षिकोऽपि क्लृप्तत्वात् भेदो रज्जुसर्पवत् ॥९३॥

(Again) if the distinction of something comes from itself, the thing will be only void (*śūnya*). The distinction also, being imagined, would (really) be non-difference as between a rope and a serpent (imagined in its place). [93]

Verses 94-100 are related to the discussion on the Karma Kāṇḍa being unauthoritative.

इत्येवमादि बहुशो भिन्नाभिन्नत्वदूषणम् ।
प्रागप्युक्तं तदत्रापि संधेयं वस्तुसिद्धये ॥९४॥

This and such other manifold fault (in the view regarding) difference in non-difference has been explained (by us) on a number of occasions (even) before; that has to be remembered (lit. brought into this discussion) even here so that (the nature of) the thing (viz. the reality for Brahman) is established. [94]

अपि वेदैकदेशस्य प्रामाण्यं यदि नेष्यते ।
कर्मकाण्डस्य सर्वस्य वेदस्यापि प्रसज्यते ॥९५॥

And this could be said (*api vā*);¹ if it is not desired that one part of the Veda, viz. the Karmakāṇḍa, is not authoritative, then (that) unauthoritativeness follows contingently in respect of the whole of the Veda. [95]

¹In *api vā* for introducing an alternative, Sureśvara follows Yāska, the author of the *Nirukta*.

इति यत्प्रागुपन्यस्तं तस्य दूषणमुच्यते ।
साध्यसाधनसंबन्धे तस्यापीष्टा प्रमाणता ॥९६॥

(Now) is stated a fault with respect to what has been thus

stated. (For,) that also has to be accepted as an authoritative means, when there is reference to the relation between what is to be accomplished and what accomplishes it. [96]

भेदः प्रमान्तरैः सिद्धो न त्वागमसमाश्रयात् ।
पशवोऽपि हि जानन्ति भेदमक्षादिमानतः ॥९७॥

Distinction (among different objects) is established by different cognitions and not by resorting to the Āgama (i.e. Veda). Even animals do know such differences with (the help of) the means called direct perception etc. [97]

¹This refers to different results from different contacts of different sense-organs with different objects.

न च मिथ्यात्वधीर्भेदे जन्मनैवेह कस्यचित् ।
अप्युत्थापितबुद्धीनां भेदेऽसंभावना न च ॥९८॥

Further, the awareness of falsehood in respect of distinction among objects does not find in anyone right from their origin. So also, there cannot be impossibility of the awareness of distinction in the case of those whose intellect has been awakened (by someone). [98]

According to SP, the second line seems to refer to the followers of the Buddha and such others who do not hold the falsehood of distinct object. So also, it should apply in the case of those who do not accept the authority of the Veda.

क्रियाकारकसंभितौ वस्तुतत्त्वेन मा श्रुतिः ।
साध्यसाधनसंबन्धमात्रैकविषयत्वतः ॥९९॥

Let not the Śruti be considered as the means of (determining) the distinctions such as actions and their means since (it relates to) the true nature of the thing (called reality) whereas the distinctions have for their subject matter only the relation

(among those distinct objects) as the ends and the means.

[99]

The aim of the verse is to affirm the real silence of the Śruti in respect of the imaginary world of differences.

लोकसिद्धमतो भेदमादायेष्टार्थसिद्धये ।

इदं कार्यमिदं नेति वेदशास्त्रं प्रवर्तते ॥१००॥

Therefore, (only) having accepted what is popularly established as the distinct objects, the Śruti proceeds to establish what can be desired by men, viz. this should be done and not this.

[100]

सर्वतस्तु विरक्तो यः कर्माभिः शुद्धधीर्नरः ।

कामयानः पूर्णफलमुत्पत्त्यादिविलक्षणम् ॥१०१॥

तमोमात्रान्तरायत्वात्प्रतीचः पूर्णरूपिणः ।

स्वतःसिद्धत्वतस्तस्य व्यञ्जकं नान्यदीक्ष्यते ॥१०२॥

As for a person of purified intellect, (who has become) averse to all (the worldly things) and is desirous of the result of fullness¹ that is different from origination etc.²

[101]

does not expect any (thing else) that reveals the inner self, which has merely ignorance as the cover of obscurity, which is of the nature of the full and of the self-established.

[102]

However AnSS reads: *vyañjakānnānyad īkṣyate*.

¹*pūrṇaphalam* is for *pūrṇatvaphalam*.

²The word etc. refers to *āpyatā*, *saṃskāryatā* and *vikāryatā*.

स्वतः प्राप्तस्य संप्राप्तौ वाक्यान्मोहप्रहाणतः ।

मानापेक्षा न भूयः स्यात्फलाप्तेस्तत्कृतार्थतः ॥१०३॥

(In the case of that) which has come into existence, on its own, and caused by the (scriptural) sentence after there is destruction of the ignorance (about its own nature), there is

not any more an expectation of a means (towards obtaining that), since the result is already obtained and its own end is (already) achieved. [103]

साध्ये हि साधनापेक्षा सिद्धेऽसौ विनिवर्तते ।
किंन्वसाध्ये समस्तस्य पूर्णत्वेन समाप्तिः ॥१०४॥

Indeed, in the case of what is to be achieved there is need of some means (towards the achievement) and that (*sāadhanāpekṣā*) ceases to be there when (the end) is (already) achieved. What then could one say in the case of that which is complete in itself and already obtained, since it is *pūrṇa* and therefore is not an end to be achieved? [104]

द्वैताद्वैतात्मकं ब्रह्म यदाण्वभ्युपगम्यते ।
तदापि न विरोधोऽयं केनचिद्विनिवार्यते ॥१०५॥

(And) when the Brahman, which might be even very minute (in form), is accepted as of the nature of the dual and non-dual (of the world), even then there will not be any opposition to this argument and that (argument) cannot be set aside by anyone. [105]

समस्तव्यस्तभूतस्य ब्रह्मण्यवसितात्मनः ।
ब्रूत कर्मणि कौ हेतुः सर्वानन्यत्वदर्शिनः ॥१०६॥

Say what reason is there for the activity of the one which has culminated into the Brahman, which has the nature of totality and also severality and which has fully grasped that all are not anything else (than the Brahman). [106]

सर्वजात्यादिमत्त्वे च परस्परविरोधतः ।
व्याघातान्न प्रवृत्तिः स्यान्निषेधेऽथ विधौ तथा ॥१०७॥

(An objection is raised:) And in the case (that the Brahman) has all the castes etc.¹ (within itself), there will occur mutual

opposition (among the duties of those castes etc.) and thus there would arise obstruction and there will be no activity since that would amount to prohibition (*niṣedha*) regarding (every) injunction.² [107]

¹The word etc. refers to the various religious duties assigned to them.

²The case would be that an injunction would require the performance of some duty as a Brāhmaṇa and that performance will be prohibited for the same person being a Kṣatriya etc. This would result into non-performance of all the ritual that is prescribed by the Śāstra.

न चावच्छेदमानित्वं विदुषोऽस्त्यासुरत्त्वतः ।
विदुषोऽप्यासुरत्त्वे स्यान्निष्फलं ब्रह्मदर्शनम् ॥१०८॥

(The answer is:) And indeed there is not on the part of the knower (of the nature of the Ātman) any awareness of the limiting adjuncts (on it) owing to that being of demoniac nature. And in case there is this demoniac nature on the part of the knower then the knowing (lit. seeing) the Brahman would be only meaningless (lit. fruitless). [108]

तस्मादसदिदं गीतं भिन्नाभिन्नत्वसिद्धये ।
श्रुतिन्यायविरुद्धत्वात्प्रकृतं त्वधुनोच्यते ॥१०९॥

Therefore, (all) this which is stated (lit. sung) for establishing the nature of dual and non-dual (Brahman) is opposed to (both) the Śruti and reasoning. There is now stated what is begun (relevant in the Upaniṣad). [109]

Now follows the explanation of om kham brahma.

ओं खं ब्रह्मेति मन्त्रोऽयं श्रुत्येह ध्यानकर्मणि ।
नियुज्यते फलप्राप्तौ यथा तदभिधीयते ॥११०॥

Now as to how this Mantra, viz. *om kham brahma*, it is enjoined here by the Śruti in respect of (i.e. in the context of) the activity of meditation. As to how it leads to attaining the result is now explained. [110]

परस्य ब्रह्मणः साक्षाद्याथात्म्याधिगमो यथा ।
 पूर्वैश्चतुर्भिरध्यायैस्तथा श्रुत्योदितोऽब्जसा ॥१११॥
 अस्यैव प्रतिपत्त्यर्थमुपासनमथोच्यते ।
 ओं खं ब्रह्मेति वचसा पुंसां श्रेयोऽभिवाञ्छताम् ॥११२॥

As regards the aquisition of the direct awareness of the oneness (of the individual self) and the highest Brahman there has been clearly stated in the four preceding Adhyāys as of the Śruti, [111]

Now a mode of worship¹ for acquiring this (desired result) is stated in the words *om kham brahma*; this is for men who wish for bliss. [112]

¹Here *upāsanam* means *dhyānam* 'meditation'.

ब्रह्मेतीह विशेष्यार्थः खमित्यपि विशेषणम् ।
 सामानाधिकरण्योक्तेस्तद्वृत्तिः कृष्णसर्पवत् ॥११३॥

In this (sentence), the word Brahman signifies the object to be qualified and (*api*) the word *kham* is the attribute (qualifying it); (this is understood from) the occurrence of these two words) in *samānādhikaraṇa*¹ and this is so as in the case of (the statement:) a black serpent. [113]

¹*samānādhikaraṇa* refers to their occurring in the substratum and grammatically in the same case relation. In the case of a black serpent, blackness and serpentness coexist, similarly Brahmaness and *khaness* coexist. SP adds the example of *nīlam utpalam*.

प्रवृत्तिर्ब्रह्मशब्दस्य बृहद्वस्त्वेकगोचरा ।

खेन तद्विशिनष्टयत्र सामान्यांशैकपातिना ॥११४॥

The currency (lit. function) of the word *brahman* belongs to the greatest¹ thing (i.e. Brahman) only; (Brahman) the Śruti qualifies it by the *kha* which occurs as a part in that which is generality. [114]

¹Literally, biggest.

अनाकाशस्वभावेभ्यः खेन ब्रह्म निवर्त्यते ।
तथाब्रह्मस्वभावेभ्यः सामर्थ्याद्ब्रह्मणा च खम् ॥११५॥

(As) the Brahman is set away by the word *kha* from all that have the nature of *ākāśa*; so also is *kha* set away from what do not have the nature of the Brahman, on account of the strength of the Brahman. [115]

सामान्यमात्रवाचित्वात्खशब्दस्य विशेषणम् ।
पुराणमिति निर्वक्ति कारणप्रतिपत्तये ॥११६॥

Because the word *kha* is expressive of (the sky) in a general way, therefore the Śruti has used¹ the word *purāṇa* 'the ancient one' with a view to conveying the cause of) the varied objects.² [116]

¹Literally said in the word *nirvakti*; there is no purpose served by the proposition *nis* ordinarily *nis* before the verb root *vac* 'to derive, to occur'. Generally, it is used for signifying the function of etymologising a word.

²This is for avoiding any *tanmātras* and gross elements.

यत्तद्ब्रह्म खमित्युक्तं तदोशब्दाभिधानकम् ।
चिन्तयेत्सततं धीमानोमालम्बनमेव वा ॥११७॥

That Brahman which is mentioned as *kha* has for its name the word *om*. Thus should an intelligent man ever think, or

(he should consider it) as a prop (or symbol of meditation).
[117]

एतदालम्बनं श्रेष्ठमिति च श्रुतिशासनम् ।
एतेनैवाक्षरेणेति ह्यथर्वाणोऽप्यधीयते ॥११८॥

And there is an instruction of the Śruti *etad ālambanam śreṣṭham*¹ And the followers of the *Atharvaveda* recite in their tradition *etenaiva akṣareṇa*² [118]

¹This refers to *Kathopaniṣad* 2.17.

²This refers to *Praśnopaniṣad* 5.5.

अतीन्द्रियत्वात्तस्यापि कथं स्यात्तदुपासनम् ।
वायुरं खमिति प्राह तदालम्बनसिद्धये ॥११९॥

(A question is asked:) 'Since that also is beyond the sense-organs,¹ how could there be a meditation on it?' (The answer is:) The Śruti has said *vāyuraṁ kham*,² in order that that can be established as an object of meditation. [119]

¹This is to indicate that it cannot be an effect or a cause.

²This means it is the support of wind, therefore perceptible and, as such, it can serve as an object of meditation.

Compare *madhura* or *dhīra*, derived by adding of suffix to the word *madhu*, *dhī*; therefore, *vāyura* is that which has the support of *vāyu*. The word is used only here—so Vadekar/Limaye have pointed out.

Now follow in the next three verses an objection raised by one born from *Kauravyāyāṇi*.

खं पुराणं न विज्ञेयं मन्त्रेऽस्मिन्निति मन्यते ।
कौरव्यायणिजो धीमान्वायुरेतिप्रसिद्धितः ॥१२०॥

The intelligent son of *Kauravyāyāṇi* thinks that *kham* in this

Mantra should not be taken as the ancient sky (*kha*), because the word *vāyura* comes from what is well-known (from perception). [120]

रूढ्या वृत्तिः खशब्दस्य वायुरे व्योम्नि लक्ष्यते ।
बहुशश्च प्रयोगोऽतो वायुरं खं प्रतीयताम् ॥१२१॥

The word *kha* is by usage seen to refer to the sky, which is *vāyura*. So also, there is the usage (or employment of it in language); therefore, let it be understood that there is in the word *kham* reference to the sky. [121]

पुराणं यदि तद्वयोम यदि वा वायुरं भवेत् ।
ध्येयं तदोमिति सदा पक्षयोरुभयोरपि ॥१२२॥

[This verse answers two questions: (i) is there a reference to *kha* as the causal Brahman? and (ii) is there a reference to the elemental sky?; which is better?]

Whether the sky be the ancient one or whether it be the support of wind, that has to be ever meditated on as *om*—this is held true in respect of both these views. [122]

आलम्बनतयोंकार उपास्तिविषयो भवेत् ।
चतुर्भुजाङ्कितं दारु विष्णोरिव निगच्छति ॥१२३॥

The word *om* becomes¹ the object of meditation as a prop in the same way as people understand² a piece of wood which is marked by four hands as Viṣṇu³ having them. [123]

¹*bhavet* for *bhavati*.

²This is singular use in the form of *nigacchati* for referring to the entire mass of men.

³This indicates Sureśvara's reference to common practice of Viṣṇu worship at his time. In the example, a piece of wood etc., the four hands are taken as a prop (or symbol) of Viṣṇu.

नेदीयो ब्रह्मणः स्थानमोमितीदं प्रतीयताम् ।
शालग्रामो हरेर्यद्वत्सर्वानर्थापहारिणः ॥१२४॥

Let this (letter) *om* be understood as the nearest expression (lit. *sthānam* 'place') of the Brahman; for, a black stone called *śālagrāma* would be a symbol of Viṣṇu who removes all the undesirable situations or things (in a man's life). [124]

यद्वाभिधानमो विद्यात्तस्यैव परमात्मनः ।
तस्मिन्निविष्टचित्तस्य तद्ब्रह्माशु प्रसीदति ॥१२५॥

One should know that *om* is the name of the highest Lord, in the case of a person who has fixed his mind on that (viz. highest Ātman), the Brahman would quickly be pleased with him. [125]

SP clarifies here under this verse that *om* as standing for the four states in the life of a human being are comparable to those described in the *Māṇḍūkyaopniṣad*.

ओंकारो वेद एवेति ब्राह्मणास्तु प्रचक्षते ।
वेदैनेन यतो वेद्यं ब्रह्म वेदस्ततो मतः ॥१२६॥

And the Brāhmaṇas say that the word *om* is but the Veda, since by this one knows the knowable Brahman. Therefore, (the word *om*) is accepted as Brahman. [126]

अभिधानतयैवैनमोंकारं विदुरञ्जसा ।
ब्राह्मणास्तदभिध्यानाद्विदन्ति ब्रह्म निर्भयम् ॥१२७॥

Thus, the Brāhmaṇas have understood very smoothly the word *om* as a name (of the highest Ātman). By meditation on it do they attain to that Brahman, which is (the state of) fearlessness. [127]

वेदोऽयमिति चोक्तिः स्याद्यथोक्तोपासनं प्रति ।
स्तुतित्वादर्थवादोऽयं नातोऽन्योऽर्थोऽवसीयते ॥१२८॥

So also the statement 'This is Veda' is with reference to the meditation. This is a statement of praise and, therefore, not any other object is to be decided by it. [128]

उद्गीथादिप्रभेदेन यं वा संविद्रते द्विजाः ।
वेदोऽसाविति विज्ञेयस्त्रय्यास्तत्र समाप्तिः ॥१२९॥

The one, which the twice-born have known¹ as differentiated in the Udgītha etc.,² is to be known as this Veda, for there is included in that the three Vedas (*trayī*). [129]

¹The word *saṁvidrate* is rather unusual in later Sanskrit; only in *Rgveda* do we find a form *vidre*. So, the variant in AnSS *da* for *dra* should have been preferred. Yet, of course, it is difficult to set aside the principle of textual criticism that the more difficult or unusual form is likely to be original!

²The word etc. refers to the Prastāva and the Pratihāra parts in the Udgītha chant.

तस्मिन्प्रयुज्यमानेऽतः सर्वो वेदः ससंग्रहः ।
प्रयुक्तः स्यादतो वेद ओंकार इति गम्यताम् ॥१३०॥

Therefore, that being used, the entire Veda, with its ancillaries, would become recited; as such, let *om* be understood as the Veda. [130]

इति श्रीबृहदारण्यकोपनिषद्वाङ्मयवार्तिके पञ्चमाध्यायस्य
प्रथमं ब्राह्मणम् ॥१॥

BRHADĀRANYAKOPANIṢAD-
BHĀṢYA-VĀRTIKA

5.2

उक्तमाभ्यन्तरं तावद्ब्रह्मोपासनसाधनम् ।
ओंकारोऽथ दमादीनां साधनत्वं विधीयते ॥१॥

Earlier there is stated the opinion about the worship of the Brahman within one. And now is explained (here) the nature of restraint (*dama*) etc. as the means to it (viz. *Upāsanā*). [1]

दान्तो दाता दयालुश्च सबाह्याभ्यन्तरः शुचिः ।
एवंविधोऽधिकारी स्यात्सर्वासूपास्तिभूमिषु ॥२॥

Thus, a person should be considered as eligible in respect of all the modes of worship: (he should be) one having his sense-organs subdued, a giver, having compassion (for others), and pure, both outside and inside (one's self). [2]

दमादिविधिशेषोऽयमर्थवादोऽभ्युपेयताम् ।
त्रया इत्यादिको ग्रन्थः स्पष्टार्थोऽतो न यत्यते ॥३॥

Let this be understood as an *Arthavāda*, i.e. ancillary to the injunction regarding restraint (*dama*) etc.¹ The section beginning with (the word) *trayā* has a very clear meaning and there is therefore no effort made (by me) in clarifying it. [3]

¹The word etc. refers to *dāna* and *dayā*.

इति श्रीबृहदारण्यकोपनिषद्भाष्यवार्तिके पञ्चमाध्यायस्य
द्वितीयं ब्राह्मणम् ॥२॥

BRHADĀRANYAKOPANIṢAD-
BHĀṢYA-VĀRTIKA

5.3

ब्रह्मानुपाधि पूर्वत्र व्याख्यातं यत्नतोऽधुना ।
सोपाधिकस्य तस्यैव ह्युपास्तिर्वक्ष्यते स्फुटा ॥१॥

Earlier (i.e. on BUBV 5.1-2) the Brahman without any limiting adjuncts has been carefully explained. Now is stated in clear terms (*sphuṭa*) the worship of that very (Brahman) that has limiting adjuncts. [1]

In BUBV 5.1-2 there was discussion about *omkāra*, *dama*, *dāna* and *dayā* as ancillary to the worship of the Brahman.

श्रुतः प्रजापतिः पूर्वं कोऽसाविति न गम्यते ।
सामान्योक्तेर्विशेषार्थमेष इत्यादि भण्यते ॥२॥

(In) earlier (Brāhmaṇas, viz. BUBV 5.1-2), there was heard (the mention of) Prajāpati, (but) who he is is not understood; therefore, the words *eṣa* ... explain (lit. state) the specific meaning of that which was stated only (in a) general (way). [2]

SP points out: Prajāpati is in a general way understood as the instructor of the gods and, therefore, this might refer to Dakṣa and others. Therefore, in order to distinguish Prajāpati in this context, there is here the use of the word *viśeṣārtha*.

हृज्जिरा मांसपेश्युक्ता तात्स्थ्याद्बुद्धिस्तु लक्ष्यते ।
हृदि नामादिसंहारं यत्र शाकल्य ऊचिवान् ॥३॥

By the word *hr̥d* is to be understood (lit. stated) a lump of flesh (in the body). Yet, thereby (i.e. by that word) is

indicated intellect (*buddhi*) owing to its abiding in it (*tātsthyāt*),¹ in the *hṛdaya* there is collection of name etc., as Śākalya has stated (as the secondary sense of the word).² [3]

¹This is the meaning of the word *hṛdaya* that was used earlier in the Śākalya Brāhmaṇa; i.e. BU 3.9.11, 14, 16, 20-24; cf. BUB on it: *hṛdayam loko hṛdayena buddhyā paśyati*. (At one place in BUB 3.9.20, however, Śaṅkara has said that the word *hṛdaya* is to be taken for the combination of *hṛdaya* and *manas*— this is to point to them as the internal organ.)

²This is relevant to the fifth Adhyāya.

सर्वभूतसमत्पत्तेस्तथा सर्वेश्वरत्वतः ।
प्रजापतिरिति ज्ञेयं हृदयं तेन हेतुना ॥४॥

hṛdaya should be known as Prajāpati because there is the origin of all beings from it for the same reason.¹ [4]

¹Cf. SP: *śākalyabrāhmaṇoktena tryannādhikāroktena hetunā tayor ekalakṣaṇatvād aikyam ity arthaḥ*.

सर्वज्ञेयस्य तद्व्याप्तेर्ब्रह्मापि हृदयं भवेत् ।
यत एवमतो यत्नादुपास्यं हृदयं सदा ।
हृदयाख्याक्षराणां च श्रुत्योपासनमुच्यते ॥५॥

Because what is to be known by all is pervaded by it, the Brahman also is *hṛdaya*. Since this is so; therefore, *hṛdaya* has to be worshipped with proper attention.¹ And, the Śruti states the worship of three *akṣaras* occurring in the word *hṛdaya*. [5]

¹SP clarifies *yatnāt* as *ādara-nairantarya-dīrghakālarūpa(tayā)* 'at length time and place'.

इति श्रीबृहदारण्यकोपनिषद्भाष्यवार्तिके पञ्चमाध्यायस्य
तृतीयं ब्राह्मणम् ॥३॥

BRHADĀRANYAKOPANIṢAD-
BHĀṢYA-VĀRTIKA

5.4

तस्यैव हृदयाख्यस्य ब्रह्मणोऽन्यदुपासनम् ।
सत्योपाधिविशिष्टस्य तद्वै तदिति भण्यते ॥१॥

Now is stated in the words *tad vai tat* another mode of worship of that very Brahman which is called *hṛdaya* and which is modified by the limiting adjunct *satya*. [1]

तच्छब्देन परामर्शो वैशब्दः स्मरणाय च ।
प्रकारान्तरनिर्देशे तदासेति च तद्वचः ॥२॥

The word *tat* refers to what is earlier stated, the word *vai* is for reminding (one of the earlier context). When (now) there is a mention of another mode (of worship of the Brahman) there is the statement of that in the words *tad āsa*. [2]

सत्यमेव तदासेति यदुक्तं हृदयात्मना ।
मूर्तामूर्तात्मकं सत्यं ब्रह्म पूर्वं प्रपञ्चितम् ॥३॥

What is stated in the words *tad āsa* is the nature of *hṛdaya* is *satya* itself. The *satya* Brahman, having the nature of *mūrta* and *amūrta*, has been already explained fully (in BUBV 2.3). [3]

महत्तत्परिमाणेन यक्षं पूज्यतमत्वतः ।
अग्रजः प्रथमोद्भूतेस्तदन्यत्कार्यजन्मनः ॥४॥

That is called *mahat* with reference to its (great) measure, *yakṣa* for having the nature of what is to be most worshipped

and *agraja* because of having its origin first (among all the things) and also because of the production of the effects other than itself. [4]

Sureśvara is very brief in his description of this Brahman as Virāj.

यः कश्चिदेतं व्याख्यातं वेदोपास्ते दिवानिशम् ।
लोकाञ्जयति स सर्वाश्शत्रुश्चास्य जितो भवेत् ॥५॥

Whosoever knows this one (i.e. Prajāpati) thus explained and worships him day and night conquers all the worlds and his enemy becomes conquered. [5]

इति श्रीबृहदारण्यकोपनिषद्भाष्यवार्तिके पञ्चमाध्यायस्य
चतुर्थं ब्राह्मणम् ॥४॥

BRHADĀRANYAKOPANIṢAD-
BHĀṢYA-VĀRTIKA

5.5

उक्तं प्रथमजं सत्यं कथं तदिति भण्यते ।
आप एवेदमित्युक्त्या यथोक्तार्थस्तवाय तु ॥१॥

We have already explained that *satya*, which was the first born, (and how it is¹ so is now stated). Further, the statement *āpa evedam* ... is only for praising the already stated thing.²

[1]

¹Namely, how it has that nature. Also the word here refers to the worship of it (*satyabrahmopāsti*).

²The thing already stated is the Brahman, which is described as *satya*.

पयःसोमादिका आपो ह्यग्निहोत्रादिकर्मसु ।
सर्वाहुतिषु संसृष्टा बाहुल्यादप्परिग्रहः ॥२॥

In the ritual acts Agnihotra etc., water,¹ Soma and others² are waters; since (waters) are mixed as an ingredient of *āhutis* in profuse quantity. Therefore there is (here) a (specific)³ reference to waters (in this text). [2]

This verse explains the significance of the word *āpah* (accusative plural).

¹Water may be primarily meant here, (though milk cannot be ruled out).

²The word 'others' refers to various sacrificial materials such as barley grains, sesame etc.

³This explains away the non-mention of elements other than water. This is fully clarified in the following verse.

सत्स्वप्यन्येषु भूतेषु भूयस्त्वादाप एव तु ।
प्राधान्याच्चैव गृह्यन्ते न त्वन्यद्विनिवार्यते ॥३॥

Even while there are other elements (involved in a sacrifice) only waters are mentioned because of their profuseness (in quantity) and of their (having a) principal role in the same; but (let it not be supposed that) others¹ are (wholly) excluded.

[3]

¹Actually, the verse uses the word *anyat* in singular; it means (any) other of the elements. Yet we have translated *anyat* as 'others' purposely.

प्रक्षेपोत्तरकालं ताः सर्वमानातिवर्तिना ।
तस्थुः सूक्ष्मेण रूपेण क्रियामाश्रित्य सर्वतः ॥४॥

(Those waters) have ever remained,¹ in their subtle form which surpasses all the means of perception,² being a part of (lit. having resorted to) the (ritual) activity, in its entirety, even after their first pouring (into the fire).

[4]

¹It means 'continued to be in existence'.

²The subtle form of waters could not be easily perceived after their first pouring; that is to say, in any later sacrificial activity the actual pouring of waters meant only some redundancy. This is the special characteristic of waters in the sacrifice.

यावत्किञ्चिज्जगत्यस्मिन्नाहुत्येह व्यपेक्ष्यते ।
अन्तर्भूतं तदप्स्विति ह्याप एवेदमित्यतः ॥५॥

Since whatever here in this world is expected to be in an *āhuti* 'offering' is already included in waters, therefore, is made the statement *āpa evedam*¹

[5]

¹This refers to waters which form the first thing of origin

(*mūlakāraṇa*) giving rise to the later objects in creation.

अग्रे प्रथमतः सृष्टेरग्रजस्य प्रजापतेः ।
 सत्यं ब्रह्मासृजन्नापः कारणत्वादपां ततः ॥६॥
 तदिदं हिरण्यगर्भस्य व्यक्तीभावो महेश्वरात् ।
 आदित्यस्येह वाक्येन वर्ण्यतेऽग्रजसिद्धये ॥७॥

In the beginning (*agre*), i.e. before creating the first-born (or, the eldest-born) Prajāpati, waters created that *satya* Brahman; therefore, waters have the nature of the cause (of creation).

[6]

This is then the origin, i.e. the manifestation of Hiranyagarbha, i.e. of Āditya, from the great Lord, thus described in this sentence,¹ for establishing 'that he was the first-born' [7]

The meaning of the statement is *tanmātram sūtrotpatteḥ pūrvam jagad āsīt*.

¹The sentence under reference is *tā āpaḥ satyam asṛjanta*. Also, it aims at pointing out how so *vyākṛta* 'manifest' came from *avyākṛta* 'unmanifest'.

भूतादिव्यक्ततो व्यक्तिरग्रजस्यापि नान्यथा ।
 ताः सत्यमिति तेनाह सत्यं ब्रह्मातिविस्तृतेः ॥८॥

The origin of the first-born proceeded from the (earlier) manifestation of the elements etc.¹ and not otherwise; therefore, the Śruti has stated *tāḥ satyam*, i.e. *satyam brahma*, on account of its manifesting itself in large number (of things). [8]

Earlier, i.e. in BUBV 5.4.1, it was stated that the *satya* Brahman was *upādhiviśiṣṭa* 'modified by the limiting adjunct'. This is restated in the sentence *tāḥ satyam*.

¹This refers to the *tanmātras*.

सूर्यादिकरणं देवं ब्रह्मास्राक्षीज्जगद्गुरुम् ।
 देवान्विराडपि ब्रह्मा ससर्जेत्यनुषज्यते ॥९॥

It follows that the divine Brahman, the maker of sun etc. (first) created the teacher of the world¹ and that Virāj Brahman, on its part, created the gods.² [9]

¹This is for god Prajāpati who is none other than first manifest sacrificer, the Sūtra or Āditya etc.

²This refers to the deities superintending over (or, associated with) the *prāṇas* 'sense-organs'.

एवं सत्याद्यतो जातं क्रमेण ब्रह्मणो जगत् ।
महत्सत्यमतो ब्रह्म यक्षत्वं तूपवर्ण्यते ॥१०॥

Thus, since the world became gradually manifested (lit. produced) from the *satya* Brahman, therefore the Brahman is described as *mahat* 'the great one' and its being worship-deserving¹ is now explained. [10]

¹*yakṣatva* is being *yakṣa* 'worship-deserving'.

अतीत्य पितरं देवाः पितामहमुपासते ।
यतोऽतो ब्रह्म यक्षं च सत्यं प्रथमजं विदुः ॥११॥

Since the gods, overlooking (lit. going beyond) the father,¹ worship the grandfather, therefore they have known the *satya* Brahman as worship-deserving and the first born. [11]

¹The father refers to Virāj. The line is this: *satya* Brahman → Virāj → gods.

तस्यापि ब्रह्मणो नाम त्र्यक्षरं सत्यमुच्यते ।
प्रथमोत्तमे त्वमृतमक्षरे सस्वरत्वतः ॥१२॥

And the name of the Brahman also¹ is stated as the three-letter-word; viz. *satya*,² further, the first and the third letters of the two are immortal (*amṛta*) on account of their

having a vowel.

[12]

This is the meaning of the Śruti, *tad etad ...*

¹This refers to *hr̥daya* Brahman.

²This is thus: *sa* is one letter, *t* is another and *ya* is the third.

निरच्छं मध्यतो मृत्युर्निर्जीवं देहवत्स्थितम् ।
भूयोऽमृतेन तद्ग्रस्तं मृतं चापि स्वतो यतः ॥१३॥

Between (the two letters) there is (the letter) *t* which does not have a vowel associated with it. That is *mṛtyu* and has remained like a lifeless body. And, though dead in itself,¹ it is encircled (lit. swallowed) by the immortal (pair of letters *sa* and *ya*).

[13]

This is the meaning of *madhyataḥ ...*

¹In the note above, the middle letter is shown as *t* which is without any vowel and, therefore, considered dead.

इत्येवं पर्युपासीनो नामाभिज्ञो नरः सदा ।
सत्यभूयं भवेदेव नैनमित्यादियुक्तिगीः ॥१४॥

A knowing man, ever worshipping (the Brahman) thus and conversant with the proper name (of the Brahman) which has become *satya*, would himself become *satya*— certainly thus there is a statement of the reason in the words *na enam ...*

[14]

इति श्रीबृहदारण्यकोपनिषद्भाष्यवार्तिके पञ्चमाध्यायस्य
पञ्चमं ब्राह्मणम् ॥५॥

BRHADĀRANYAKOPANIṢAD-
BHĀṢYA-VĀRTIKA

5.6

संस्थानवदथेदानीमध्यात्मे चाधिदैवते ।
रूपं प्रकल्प्य सत्यस्य भण्यते तदुपासनम् ॥१॥

After conceiving the form of *satya* in relation to the body and also in relation to the sphere of deities, there is now explained (lit. stated) the (two modes of) worship of the same which are related to the various parts of the body.¹ [1]

¹This is *saṁsthānavat*, a qualifier of *upāsana*.

अक्ष्यादित्याख्यनीडस्थौ स्थानमात्रप्रभेदतः ।
भिन्नाविव समीक्ष्येते देवतैकैव सा सती ॥२॥

(The two deities) which reside in the coteries called the Ādityas in the (two) eyes are yet considered to be different, as it were, only on account of the difference of the places (they reside in), even while there is just one and the same deity. [2]

उपकार्योपकारित्वसंबन्धेनेतरेतरम् ।
प्रतिष्ठितौ तावध्यात्मे चक्षुष्यादित्य एव च ॥३॥

They are both steady in each other through their relation as the benefactor and the beneficiary; and in relation to the body it is Āditya in the eye.

¹It is suggested that, in the sphere of gods, there is another Āditya.

प्रतिष्ठितौ तावन्योऽन्यं कथमित्युच्यते यथा ।
अक्षिण रश्मिभिरादित्यः प्राणैस्तरिंमश्च चाक्षुषः ॥४॥

(Now) is told how both of them are steady in each other: in the eye, Āditya has become steady by its rays and so also has the Āditya in the eye become steady in (i.e. through) the sense-organs (*prāṇas*). [4]

It follows from the preceding verse that Āditya in the eye illuminates the objects to be seen and Āditya in the sphere of gods, the whole world.

अरिष्टदर्शनं चात्र प्रासङ्गिकमथोच्यते ।
ज्ञातारिष्टः कथं नाम कुर्यादात्महितं पुमान् ॥५॥

And now is told here the sight of some undesirable element which arises as a matter of course. (For, otherwise) 'how could a man, who has known the (imminent) undesirable element, bring about his own good? [5]

उत्क्रमिष्यन्यदा भोक्ता भवतीहायुषः क्षये ।
चन्द्रमण्डलवच्छुद्धं वीक्षते रविमण्डलम् ॥६॥

When the enjoyer is, at the end of his life, about to leave the (body) he sees the pure orb of the sun look like the orb of the moon. [6]

रश्मयो न समायान्ति विज्ञानपुरुषं प्रति ।
भोगेन प्रक्षयाद्भोक्तुस्तद्वशीकारिकर्मणः ॥७॥

The rays do not come to the *vijñānapuruṣa* (i.e. the individual self) proper, because they get exhausted through the enjoyment by the person who does his activities (*karman*) which have brought them (i.e. the rays) under (their) control. [7]

इति श्रीबृहदारण्यकोपनिषद्वाज्यवार्तिके पञ्चमाध्यायस्य
षष्ठं ब्राह्मणम् ॥६॥

**BRHADĀRANYAKOPANIṢAD-
BHĀṢYA-VĀRTIKA
5.7**

शरीरं व्याहृतिमयं कल्प्यतेऽक्षरविस्थयोः ।
तस्यैव सत्यनाम्नोऽथ तदुपासाप्रसिद्धये ॥१॥

Now is explained (the nature of) the body of (the Brahman), named *satya*, which is made up of the *vyāhrtis*, in order to clarify (the nature of) the worship of the two, Āditya in the eye and Āditya among the gods, in that form.¹ [1]

In the initial verse of the seventh Brāhmaṇa, Sureśvara gives the purport of the preceding Brāhmaṇa.

¹That is, in the form of the three *vyāhrtis*. These *vyāhrtis*, it must be pointed out, are not the usually known *vyāhrtis*—these are to be understood as *sa*, *t* and *ya* which form *satya* which is the name of the Brahman.

तस्यैव नामोपनिषद्ब्रह्मणो भण्यते द्वयोः ।
स्थितस्य स्थानयोः साक्षाद्यद्ग्रहात्तत्प्रसीदति ॥२॥

Now is stated the secret name¹ of that very Brahman which is residing in the two places¹ by the direct grasping of which that³ becomes favourable. [2]

¹These are two, viz. *ahan* and *aham*— these are related to the three *vyāhrtis*.

²The eye and the sky (i.e. heaven) are meant.

³This is *satya* Brahman.

हन्तेर्वेदं जहातेर्वाहरित्येतदिहेष्यते ।
पाप्मानं हन्ति तेनातो जहाति च न संशयः ॥३॥

In the context, the word *ahan* or *aham* is accepted as derived from the root *han* (together with the preposition *ā*) or from the root *hā*;¹ and then it² certainly strikes down the sin or it abandons it. [3]

It should be noted that the various worships in the Khila Kāṇḍa are ancillary or additional and not basically philosophical.

This Brahman explains the significance of worship of *satya* Brahman by each of the two names. This is based on the Brahmanical etymology of the words *ahan* and *aham*.

¹*ā-han* means 'to strike down' and *ā-hā* 'to give up'. The preposition is shortened, in each case.

²That is, *ahan* or *aham*.

इति श्रीबृहदारण्यकोपनिषद्भाष्यवार्तिके पञ्चमाध्यायस्य
सप्तमं ब्राह्मणम् ॥७॥

**BRHADĀRANYAKOPANIṢAD-
BHĀṢYA-VĀRTIKA**

5.8

मनोमयोऽयमिति च तस्यैव ब्रह्मणोऽपरम् ।
स्वान्तोपाधिविशिष्टस्य ह्युपासनमथोच्यते ॥१॥

Now, in the words *manomayo 'yam*, there is stated yet another worship of that very Brahman, which is limited (lit. modified) by the adjuncts within. [1]

We should remember that the Khila Kāṇḍa pertains to various modes of worships of the Brahman, affected by the limiting adjuncts (*sopādhika*), as noted under verse 3 of the preceding Brāhmaṇa.

मनोभिमानतोऽज्ञानात्पुरुषोऽयं मनोमयः ।
यदि वा मनसि व्यक्तैर्मनसा वोपलभ्यते ॥२॥
भाः प्रकाशोऽमलं ज्योतिः सा सत्यमविनाशतः ।
तस्मिन्नित्यादिवचनं पूर्वोक्तस्थानसिद्धये ॥३॥

The word *manas* is based on its function called *abhimāna*;¹ it is on account of *ajñāna* 'ignorance'² that this Puruṣa 'the inner self' is taken as made up of *manas*; or because that becomes known owing to his manifestation in *manas*. [2]
The word *bhās* means light or spotless flame; that (= *bhās*) is *satya* for it does not (ever) perish. The words *tasmin* ... are to specify the two places (of Āditya) already stated. [3]

Here, the word *manomaya* is explained in two ways: (i) with reference to the property of *manas*, *abhimāna*, and (ii) from the substratum wherein the inner self is manifest.

¹*abhimāna* is for *abhimanana*—*manana* which is the function

of *manas*; cf. *Sāṃkhyakārikā*. This refers to *aham ity abhimānaḥ*.
²*manas* is insentient (*jaḍa*), therefore there is ignorance or darkness.

बुद्ध्युपाधिव्यवच्छेदाद्व्रीह्यादिपरिमाणता ।
 स्वतोऽनन्तत्वतो मानात्सर्वेशानादिरूपता ॥४॥

It has, on account of the limiting adjunct, viz. intellect, the magnitude of rice etc. (and) also the nature of the ruler of all, owing to its being known by itself and on account of its infiniteness.¹ [4]

This is to explain how the ruler of all can have even a small magnitude.

SP, in typical commentarial style, reads an alternative *ananta-tvato 'mānāt* Therefore the alternative translation could be: 'on account of not being known by any known means'.

¹Cf. *satyaṃ jñānam anantam brahma (Taittirīyopaniṣad 2.1)*.

इति श्रीबृहदारण्यकोपनिषद्भाष्यवार्तिके पञ्चमाध्यायस्य
 अष्टमं ब्राह्मणम् ॥८॥

BRHADĀRANYAKOPANIṢAD-
BHĀṢYA-VĀRTIKA

5.9

विद्युद्देहस्य तस्यैव ब्रह्मणोऽन्यदुपासनम् ।
अशेषपाप्मविध्वस्त्यै श्रुत्याथ प्रतिपाद्यते ॥१॥

Now is prescribed by the Śruti yet another (mode of) worship of that very Brahman, which is in the form of lightning, in order that there is removal (lit. destruction) of the entire sins.

[1]

This verse states the purport of the ninth Brāhmaṇa.

विद्युद्ब्रह्मेति युक्तं तद्विद्युद्धि स्याद्विदानतः ।
द्यतेरेतद्यतो रूपमवखण्डनकर्मणः ॥२॥

It is (only) proper (to look on) lightning as the Brahman. Indeed, (the word) *vidyut* is derived from its act of tearing away (*vidāna*), since this form (of the word *vidyut*) is based on the root *do* 'to tear away or asunder' in the sense of the act of cutting to pieces (or *khaṇḍana*). [2]

The root *do* in the sense of *khaṇḍana* has connection with the object, the sin.

This verse gives only the verbal meaning of the word *vidyut*.

तमोऽन्धकारमखिलमवखण्डयति क्षणात् ।
विद्युद्यथा तथास्मत्तः पाप्मानं तदुपासितुः ॥३॥

Lightning destroys *tamas*¹ 'darkness', in its entirety, within a moment; therefore, (that which is superimposed on the Brahman) cuts sin away from us, i.e. its worshippers.² [3]

This verse is the statement of the result, viz. destruction of sin consisting in having ignorance about the nature of the Brahman.

¹*tamas* can be taken as darkness by the clouds and therefore can be distinguished from darkness standing for ignorance; alternatively *tamas* stands for darkening sin—this explanation is offered by SP. For bringing out that the use of both *tamaḥ* and *andhakāram* does not involve repetition.

²*asmattaḥ ... upāsituḥ* is translated here only in the plural as that is warranted by the form *asmattaḥ*— this is despite the singular form *upāsituḥ*.

इति श्रीबृहदारण्यकोपनिषद्भाष्यवार्तिके पञ्चमाध्यायस्य
नवमं ब्राह्मणम् ॥९॥

BRHADĀRANYAKOPANIṢAD-
BHĀṢYA-VĀRTIKA
5.10

तस्यैव ब्रह्मणोऽथान्यदुपासनमिहोच्यते ।
वाग्धेनूपाधियोगेन फलाय महतेऽधुना ॥१॥

Now is stated here (in this Brāhmaṇa) yet another (mode of) worship of that very Brahman, in accordance with its limiting adjuncts, viz. the cow in the form of speech, since that yields great result (lit. fruit). [1]

In this Brāhmaṇa the metaphor *vāgdhenu* is fully worked out.

वागित्यत्र त्रयी ग्राह्या न स्थानकरणादयः ।
स्वाहाकारादि नान्यत्र त्रय्याः संभाव्यते क्वचित् ॥२॥

Here (i.e. in this context) the word *vāc* should be understood as the Vedic triad, not the place of articulation and the functioning organ which acts etc.¹ (This is so because) *svāhākāra* etc.² are not to be found anywhere else³ than in the Vedic triad. [2]

This refers to the *sthāna* of *vāc*. The functioning organ which acts is mentioned as *karaṇa* 'sense-organs'.

¹The word etc. stands for the deity that superintends over the place of articulation and the functioning organ which acts.

²This word etc. stands for *vaṣaṭkāra*, *hantakāra* and *svadhākāra*. The utterance of *svāhākāra* and *vaṣaṭkāra* accompanies the offerings to gods. The utterance of *hantakāra* indicates invitation to a priest for the ritual act which the sacrificer undertakes. The utterance of *svadhākāra* is to accompany the offering to the Pitrs 'manes'.

³The words 'anywhere else' refer to the place of articulation, the organ (itself) and its superintending deity.

त्रयीयं धयते सर्वं स्वाहाकारादिभिः स्तनैः ।
धेनुमित्येव तां तेन सदोपासीत भारतीम् ॥३॥

This Vedic triad suckles all (human beings) by its udders in the form of *svāhākāra* etc.;¹ therefore, one should ever worship Vāc (i.e. Bhārati).² [3]

Cp. a later classical verse, i.e. *Uttararāmacarita* 5.31:

*kāmān dugdhe viprakarṣaty alakṣmīm kīrtiṃ sūte duṣkṛtan
yā hinasti /
tām capy etām mātaram maṅgalānām dhenuṃ dhīrāḥ sūnṛtām
vācam āhuh //*

¹Cf. note 3 on the preceding verse.

²This refers to the Vedic triad, not Vāc.

केभ्यः क्षरति सा धेनुरित्येतदधुनोच्यते ।
तस्यै द्वौ स्तनावित्युक्त्या कथ्यन्ते च स्तनास्तथा ॥४॥

Now is stated here as to wherefrom that cow trickles drops of milk: and to explain that are mentioned the four udders¹ in the statement *tasyai dvau stanau*.² [4]

¹The plural refers to the four udders.

²This Vedic use of the dative for the genitive.

ऋषभोऽस्यास्तथा ज्ञेयः प्राणस्तस्मात्प्रसूयते ।
अप्राणस्य न वागस्ति वागप्युच्चार्यते बलात् ॥५॥

Then (*tathā*) for this one (viz. *vāc*, i.e. cow) is to be known the bull in (the form of) Prāṇa 'sentience'. From that (Prāṇa) it produces (offspring). (Indeed), in the case of one without Prāṇa, there does not exist *vāc*, and *vāc* also is enabled to utter through strength (of the Prāṇa). [5]

वाक्प्रस्रवणहेतुत्वाद्धेन्वा वत्सो मनो भवेत् ।
यद्यद्व्यायति मनसा तत्तद्वाचा प्रभाषते ॥६॥

manas is then the calf (of that cow), since it is the cause of the trickling (i.e. activity) of *vāc*;¹ whatever one ponders over with one's *manas* is what one speaks through *vāc*.² [6]

¹This is for *vāgdhenu*.

²This is usual *vāc* 'the organ of speech'.

यथोक्तोपासनफलमुक्तब्रह्मात्मरूपता ।
तं यथा यथा इत्युक्तेरनिर्देशेऽपि गम्यते ॥७॥

The result of the worship thus stated is (now stated as an individual's) becoming of nature (lit. form) of the Brahman. (In this case), this (viz. result) is to be understood even while there is no mention of the result, in the words *taṁ yathā yathā*. [7]

इति श्रीबृहदारण्यकोपनिषद्भाष्यवार्तिके पञ्चमाध्यायस्य
दशमं ब्राह्मणम् ॥१०॥

BRHADĀRANYAKOPANIṢAD-
BHĀṢYA-VĀRTIKA

5.11

उपास्त्यन्तरमस्यैव कौक्षेयाग्नेर्वपुर्भूतः ।
अयमग्निरिति श्रुत्या यत्नेनाथ विधीयते ॥१॥

Now is carefully (*yatnena*)¹ prescribed yet another (mode of) worship of this very (Brahman) which possesses a body, viz. what is fire in the stomach of beings (i.e. *Vaiśvānarāgni*), in the Śruti *ayam agniḥ*² [1]

Cf. *Gītā* 15.14ab: *aham vaiśvānaro bhūtvā prāṇināṃ deham āśritah*.

¹Cf. SP: *upāsyārthasya sākṣāttvakathanam yatnah*.

²This refers to BU 2.9.1.

वैश्वानरगिरास्याग्नेः सामान्येनाभिधानतः ।
योऽयमन्तरितीत्युक्त्या तद्विशेषणमुच्यते ॥२॥

After there is a general mention of this Agni in the words *vaiśvānarāgni*, there is then stated specification (of the same) in the statement *yo 'yam antāḥ....*¹ [2]

¹This also refers to BU 2.9.1.

तस्याग्नेरेष घोषः स्यात्कर्णौ प्रोर्णय यच्छ्रुतिः ।
उपास्यार्थस्य साक्षात्त्वं घोषरूपेण वर्ण्यते ॥३॥

This is the loud noise (*ghoṣa*) or 'roaring' of that fire, which is heard by one after one has closed (or covered) one's ears; the direct perceptibility of the object of worship (viz. *Vaiśvānarāgni*) is explained as that which has a form of *ghoṣa*.¹

[3]

¹SP states *kaukṣeyaṃ hi jyotir iha spaṣṭayitavyam brahmaṇas tadupādhikasyopāśyatvāt*.

अरिष्टदर्शनं चात्र प्रासङ्गिकमथोच्यते ।
नैनं घोषं शृणोतीति प्रत्यासन्नमृतिर्नरः ॥४॥

And now, as a matter of course, is stated in the words, 'he does not hear this *ghoṣa*' that there is the possibility of some danger, i.e. the man's death is imminent. [4]

This is similar to the statement at BUBV 5.6.5 above.

इति श्रीबृहदारण्यकोपनिषद्भाष्यवार्तिके पञ्चमाध्यायस्य
एकादशं ब्राह्मणम् ॥११॥

BRHADĀRANYAKOPANIṢAD-
BHĀṢYA-VĀRTIKA

5.12

गतिः फलं च वक्तव्यं पर्वत्र तदनुविततः ।
उपासनानां सर्वेषामित्यर्थः पर आगमः ॥१॥

(Now) is to be told the aim and the result of all the Upāsanās as there has been no mention of them in the earlier (portion of the Upaniṣad), therefore there follows the subsequent (portion of) the scripture. [1]

This is the general purport of this Brāhmaṇa.

उत्क्रामति यदा विद्वाञ्शरीरादायुषः क्षयात् ।
आश्वेव वायुं दुर्भेद्यं स आगच्छति वेगवान् ॥२॥

When, at the expiration (of the length) of life, the knower (of the Brahman) moves upwards (*ut-*) from the body, then he, possessed of speed, quickly¹ reaches Vāyu which is impregnable. [2]

There are explanations of different words occurring in this Brāhmaṇa.

¹This refers to CU 8.6.5: *sa yāvat kṣipyen manas tāvad ādityaṃ gacchati*

प्राप्ताय लोकभोगार्थं वायुस्तस्मै विगच्छति ।
कियच्छिद्रं मरुद्द्याद्रथचक्रखमानगीः ॥३॥

As he arrives there for the enjoyment of the region, Vāyu gives way to him. (At this, in answer to a question:) 'Of what size does Vāyu offer him a hole (i.e. the way for him)?', there is (an answer in) the statement of the magnitude of the hole

in the chariot.

[3]

द्विकाष्ठसंतताघातमाडम्बरमिहोच्यते ।
भेरीं च दुन्दुभिं विद्यात्तेनोर्ध्वं यात्युपासकः ॥४॥

Here is stated the *ādambara* which means continuous beating (of a drum) by two sticks. One should know *dundubhi* in the sense of a *bherī* 'drum'. The worshipper goes upwards through that (viz. the hole in the drum). [4]

लोकं प्रजापतिं ब्रह्म प्रैत्यसौ भावनाबलात् ।
अशोकमहिमं चेति दुःखतद्वेतुर्वर्जितम् ॥५॥

(Then) he reaches the region, viz. (of) Prajāpati, (then) the Brahman, on account of the strength of his devotion. The region is described as devoid of sorrow¹ and pain because it is free from any misery and its cause. [5]

¹*aśoka* refers to physical (*śārīra*) pain and *ahimam* refers to mental pain.

शाश्वतीश्च समा नित्या अस्मिन्ललोके वसत्यसौ ।
पूर्वत्रानुक्तकार्याणामुपास्तीनामिदं फलम् ॥६॥

Then he stays there in this region for ever-lasting years (*śāśvatīḥ samāḥ*). This is the result of the (modes of) worship whose results (or effects) were not stated. [6]

SP points out that, since the results of the modes of worship of *hr̥daya*, *satya* etc. have been already stated, this verse refers to various other modes of worship whose effects have not been stated.

इति श्रीबृहदारण्यकोपनिषद्भाष्यवार्तिके पञ्चमाध्यायस्य
द्वादशं ब्राह्मणम् ॥१२॥

BRHADĀRANYAKOPANIṢAD-
BHĀṢYA-VĀRTIKA

5.13

ज्वरादिव्याधिना तप्तो व्याधितस्तप्यते तु यत् ।
परमं तत्तपश्चिन्त्यं परमं लोकमीप्सता ॥१॥

That one is pained (or, tormented) by the diseases like fever etc. and that one is pained (i.e. tormented), be considered as the highest penance (*tapas*) done by one who desires for the highest region (viz. the Brahman). [1]

In the earlier Brāhmaṇas, there have been stated some modes of worship, together with their results, and now there is a discussion of some modes of worship not related to the Brahman proper.

व्याधिग्रहग्रहाविष्टोऽसह्यं दुःखं समश्नुते ।
तपोऽतः परमं हि स्यात्तच्चिकित्सामकुर्वतः ॥२॥

A person experiences unbearable pain as he is afflicted by the goblins in the form of the attacks of (i.e. seizure by) diseases. Therefore, penances are indeed the highest (pain for a person), who does not censure it.² [2]

¹The word *graha* is used twice. The first *graha* with *vyādhi* stands for the attack of some disease and the second *graha* is metaphorically understood as goblins.

²This is the meaning of the words *cikitsām akurvat*. Normally *cikitsā* refers to treating of some disease, i.e. ascertaining the nature of the disease and determining the medicine for it. In *tapas* there is no scope for anybody's becoming sorry for it. In other words, *cikitsām akurvat* means 'One who does not fret

over it' (*anindā* is *aviṣāda*).

निर्हरन्त्यृत्विजोऽरण्यमन्ये वा मां मृतं गृहात् ।
परमं तदपि ध्येयं वानप्रस्थेन संमितम् ॥३॥

(A person should think thus:) 'That either the *ṛtviks* or others take me out of my house, when I shall be dead is also to be considered as the highest penance).' This is on par with the state of a person's taking to the stay in the forest. [3]

This is the meaning of *etad vai paramaṁ tapo yaṁ pretam*

अभ्यादधति यच्चाग्नौ प्रेतं मां ज्ञातयोऽथ तत् ।
परमं तदपि ध्येयमग्न्यावेशसमत्वतः ॥४॥

(Also he should think:) 'And that the relations put me into the fire when I am dead is also to be considered as the highest (penance), since that is similar to entering into the fire.' [4]

उचितं यस्य यद्यत्स्यात्तत्तल्लोकगिरोच्यते ।
तपसस्तापसस्यैवमग्न्यावेशस्य यत्फलम् ॥५॥

In the words of *loka*¹ is stated the result, viz. that whichever is proper in the case of each of *tapas*, *tāpasa* and putting (the dead body) into fire. [5]

Ordinarily, there is (but) one statement about the result of (any) *upāsanā*, viz. *paramaṁ haiva lokaṁ jayati*. But, here are meant different *Upāsanās* and different results.

¹Here the word *loka* stands for the results achieved by different modes of worship or various kinds of the *upāsanās*.

इति श्रीबृहदारण्यकोपनिषद्भाष्यवार्तिके पञ्चमाध्यायस्य
त्रयोदशं ब्राह्मणम् ॥१३॥

BRHADĀRANYAKOPANIṢAD-
BHĀṢYA-VĀRTIKA

5.14

अन्नं ब्रह्मेति निर्वक्ति पुरेवान्यदुपासनम् ।
उदारफलसिद्धयर्थं तस्य न्यायेन निर्णयः ॥१॥

The words (of the Śruti) *annam brahma* state,¹ as before, another mode of worship (viz. other than that of the Brahman). In order that there follows more profuse result, there is now a decision (about that) with proper reason. [1]

In the three previous Brāhmaṇas, the Śruti has discussed (those modes of) worship which were not related to the Brahman. But, here, (in this Brāhmaṇa), is discussed the worship of the Brahman proper. This is the purport of this Brāhmaṇa.

In the case of other modes of worship like those of *anna* and *prāṇa*, which involved the view of the Brahman in some things other than the Brahman, there do follow some results but actually viewing the non-Brahman as the Brahman meant greater result followed them. That is discussed here (in verses that follow) with proper reason so as to establish the same.

¹*nirvakti* here is only *vakti*.

अन्नमेव परं ब्रह्मेत्येक आहुर्विपरिचतः ।
तत्तथा नावगन्तव्यं क्लिद्यत्यन्नमसुं विना ॥२॥

Some wise men have declared that *anna* alone is the highest Brahman.¹ But that should not be so accepted, (because) *anna*, which is without *Prāṇa*, becomes putrid. [2]

Regarding the Brahman (i.e. Ātman), it is said in the *Gītā*

2.24ab: *acchedyo 'yam adāhyo 'yam akledyo 'śoṣya eva ca*. The verb root *klid* means 'to get wet, to become putrid or rotten'.

¹Cf. BU 5.12.1.

प्राणो ब्रह्मेति चाप्यन्ये तच्च ग्राह्यं पुरेव न ।
अत्रादृते यतः प्राणः शोषमाशु निगच्छति ॥३॥

And also, some others (have declared), 'Prāṇa is the Brahman'.¹ And that also is not to be accepted, as before;² (this is so) owing to that, without food, Prāṇa quickly withers up. [3]

Sureśvara considers that the words *anna* and *prāṇa* without each other would not be properly having the characteristics of the Brahman. He bases his argument probably on the statement in the *Gītā* as noted under the preceding verse.

¹BU 4.1.3; CU 4.10.4; *Kauṣītakyupaniṣad* 2.1; *Taittirīyopaniṣad* 3.3.

²It is as in the case of *annam brahma* as mentioned above.

ब्रह्मत्वं नानयोर्यस्मादेकैकस्य न युक्तिमत् ।
संभूय देवते तस्माद्ब्रह्मत्वं संनिगच्छतः ॥४॥

Since (each of) these two,¹ taken singly, does not reasonably have the nature of the Brahman; therefore, the two deities of those, joining together, obtain the nature of the Brahman. [4]

¹It refers to *anna* and *prāṇa*.

तदेतत्संप्रधार्याह प्रातृदः पितरं किल ।
किंस्विदित्यादि संहृष्टस्तद्वोषस्यासमीक्षणात् ॥५॥

Having well considered this (in mind), (i.e. ascertaining, a person called) Prātr̥da is reported to have said to his father, *kiṃsvit* ... 'Should I indeed ... ', surprised as he was by the

worshippers' not seeing a fault (in worshipping what was other than the Brahman).² [5]

¹This has reference to the sentence in BU 5.12.1.

²Read SP: *guṇahīnoktabrahmaṇopāstau doṣasyeti*.

किंस्विदेवंविदे साधु कृत्स्नसाध्वाप्तिहेतुतः ।
कुर्यामसाधु वा तस्मै सर्वासाधुनिराकृतेः ॥६॥

(He meant) 'Could I do (any) good to the person, who knows thus,¹ for the reason that he has obtained all good (or, everything),² or could I do him any evil owing to his having discarded all that is not good?'³ [6]

This explains the meaning of the sentence *kiṃ svit ...*

SP points out the purport of the sentence thus: the worshipper of the Brahman, in the form of *anna* or *prāṇa*, has his desires fulfilled, and, therefore, does not have anything to obtain or to discard.

¹That is, who knows *anna* and *prāṇa* as the Brahman.

²Namely, since, by his worship, he has obtained all his desires.

³His proper worship has avoided all untouched happenings.

पाणिना मैवमित्युक्त्या तं पिता प्रत्यषेधयत् ।
संभूय परमत्वं कः स्वतोऽशक्तिरवाप्नुयात् ॥७॥

With the words 'Do not (think or, say) like this', the father prohibited him by the (wave of his) hand. He asked, 'The state of being the highest (can be obtained by these two) being together. Who, himself without ability, could obtain (that)?' [7]

The meaning of the question in the second line is: A worshipper of only *anna* or only of *prāṇa* would become one with the objects of his worship and would not have ability to attain the highest status, viz. the nature of the Brahman.

स्वतोऽशक्तिमतोलोके शक्तिर्योगेऽपि नेक्ष्यते ।
जात्यन्धयोर्न योगेऽपि शक्ती रूपवदीक्षणे ॥८॥

Nowhere in this world is seen ability of (any) two (individuals), each one of whom has, on his own, no ability, even when they are in union; there is no ability for seeing objects that have forms in the case of two persons who are (both) born blind. [8]

This verse points out that the union of any two persons each of whom has no ability of his own, is also ineffective. This is made clear by the illustration in the second line. Read SP (at the beginning of the comment on the next verse): *aśaktānām mitho yoge 'pi na śaktiḥ*.

तस्माच्छक्तिमतोरेव ग्रासांशानां यथा तथा ।
तृप्तिशक्तिरिहापि स्यात्प्राणात्राद्यात्मनोर्युतौ ॥९॥

Therefore, as (there is capacity of bringing about satisfaction) in the case of two of the morsels of eatables, which alone are (then) capable (for that purpose), in the union of *Prāṇa* and (eatable) food, so also is here the capacity of (effecting the union with the Brahman) in the union of *prāṇa* and *anna*. [9]

न चेत्परमतां यातः कथं परमतोच्यताम् ।
प्रत्येकं शक्तिमतत्वोक्तिर्वीत्यादिवचसोच्यते ॥१०॥

Let it be said: If a person does not attain the status of the highest (by worshipping *anna* and *prāṇa* together), how could there be (for him) the nature of the highest achieved? The answer is given in the words *vi* ... by the statement of each (of *anna* and *prāṇa*) as having the capacity. [10]

The second line of this verse is fully explained in the following verses.

व्याख्यानाय तु वीत्यस्य त्वन्नं वै वीति भण्यते ।
 अत्रे विष्टानि सन्त्येव भूतत्वं यान्ति येन हि ॥११॥
 अत्रविष्टानि सर्वाणि भूतानीत्यत्रमुच्यते ।
 वीति तेन सदा प्राणो रमित्येवमिहोच्यते ॥१२॥
 प्राणे सति रमन्ते हि लोके दृष्टानि सर्वदा ।
 भूतानि रमिति प्रोक्तस्तस्मात्प्राणोऽपि सूरिभिः ॥१३॥

Just (*tu*) for explaining *vi* ..., it is said (in the Śruti) *annam vai vi*, (which means), since only on having entered into food, (the elements) they come to have the nature of the elements,

[11]

therefore, food is called all the elements that have entered into (i.e. supported in) food. Therefore, they are ever (called) *vi* Similarly, *prāṇa* is called here *ram*.

[12]

In the world are seen the elements enjoying happiness while *Prāṇa* is there among them. Therefore *Prāṇa* also is called by the wise ones as *ram*.

[13]

These are two instances of the symbolic references to *anna* and *Prāṇa* (viz. *vi* and *ram*), and also their Brāhmaṇical etymologies: *vi* stands for *viṣṭa*, which seems to be an abbreviation from root *viṣ*, so also *ram* from root *ram*.

स्वतो गुणवतोरेवमत्रप्राणात्मनोर्भवेत् ।
 संभूय परमत्वं हि फलोक्तिः सैव योदिता ॥१४॥

Thus, there would be (the attainment of) the highest status for the two which are of the nature of *anna* and *Prāṇa* and which are (in their own nature) possessed of capacities, when they have continued together. (This is to say:) 'That is the statement of the result which is (thus) described'.

[14]

This refers to the Śruti: *sarvāṇi ha vā asmin* ... and it is taken

as the statement of the result for a person who worships *anna* and Prāṇa together as the Brahman.

विशन्ति सर्वभूतानि ह्यत्रभूते प्रजापतौ ।
रमन्ते प्राणभूते च फलमेतदुपासितुः ॥१५॥

Indeed, all the elements enter into Prajāpati, who has become *anna* and feel delight (in him) who has become the Prāṇa. This is the result for him, who worships this (union of *anna* and Prāṇa). [15]

इति श्रीबृहदारण्यकोपनिषद्भाष्यवार्तिके पञ्चमाध्यायस्य
चतुर्दशं ब्राह्मणम् ॥१४॥

BRHADĀRANYAKOPANIṢAD-
BHĀṢYA-VĀRTIKA

5.15

उक्थादिगुणपूगेन विशिष्टस्यानरूपिणः ।
उपासनमथेदानीं ब्रह्मणो भण्यते परम् ॥१॥

Now hereafter is stated the worship of the Brahman in the form of *ana* (i.e. *Prāṇa*) which is characterized by the multitude of qualities beginning with *uktha*.¹ [1]

¹The word *ādi* in *ukthādi* refers to *yajus*, *sāman* and *kṣatra*. And *uktha* stands for the *ṛc*.

उक्तं प्राणः कुतो यस्मात्प्राणे सति चराचरम् ।
उत्थापयति कर्मेदं कर्ता वा नान्यथा ततः ॥२॥

*uktha*¹ is *Prāṇa*. Why? (It is so) because while there exists *Prāṇa* (in a body), an agent can raise (i.e. perform) movable and/or immovable² to an (i.e. any) activity—is not possible in any way other than that. [2]

¹The word *uktha* stands for what is known in Vedic ritual as *śāstra*; this latter is derived from the verb root *śamś* 'to praise, to recite'. Therefore, it means a praise comprising one verse (*ṛc*) or more. Actually, *uktha* is derived from the verb root *vac* 'to speak, to utter' and therefore means 'prayer'. See [Vol.4;1991] Introduction, where we have pointed out the relation between *uktha* and the R̥gvedic Upaniṣads. Yet Sureśvara derives this word in a different way (of course, following the Upaniṣad which retains the Brāhmaṇa style of etymologising)—cf. *Jaiminīya Brāhmaṇa* 2.24: *tān ukthair utthāpayati tad ukthānām ukthatvam*; and *Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa* 10.4.1.4: *eṣa u eva ukthasyaitad annam*

than tad uktham, and also Śaṅkara who follows suit!). Obviously, *uktha* is derived here from verb root *ut-sthā* (in causal) 'to raise' and means 'what raises'. This *uktha* is *Prāṇa*, as declared in this verse, and also identical with the Brahman—cf. *brahman* which is *anarūpin* in verse 1 above.

²The words 'movable and immovable' refer to *punṇyā-* and *apunṇya-karmans* (SP).

वीरश्चोक्थात्मवित्पुत्र उपासीनस्य जायते ।
दृष्टं फलमदृष्टं तु ह्युक्थस्यैकात्म्यमश्नुते ॥३॥

To him, who is the worshipper (of *uktha*), is born a son who is brave and also a knower of the nature of *uktha*. (There is a) seen result (or reward of this) *uktha*¹ and (*tu*) also an unseen result in that he (i.e. the worshipper) attains oneness with the Ātman. [3]

¹This refers to *śāstra* in Vedic ritual, as mentioned above, yielding (at times) some worldly (known) results also.

यजुश्च प्राण एवेति सदोपासीत यत्नतः ।
कुतौ यजुष्ट्वं तस्येति युक्तिलेशोऽभिधीयते ॥४॥
युज्यन्ते सर्वभूतानि संहन्यन्ते परस्परम् ।
प्राणे सति यजुस्तस्मात्फलोक्तिः पूर्ववत्तथा ॥५॥

yajus also (*ca*) is but *Prāṇa*; if one should worship with attention/care.¹ Why is there the character of *yajus* in that (viz. *Prāṇa*)? With regard to that, (here) is stated some (*leśa*) reason. [4]

Because *yajyante sarvabhūtāni*² means 'They get mixed with one another', when there exists *Prāṇa* (in them),³ therefore, it is *yajus*;⁴ (and) the result (which follows) is also like the one (stated) before. [5]

This is to explain *prāṇe hīmani...* (BU 5.15.2).

¹SP paraphrases *yatna* as *ādara* 'respect' and alternatively as

nairantarya 'continuity'.

²This indicates the derivation of *yajus* from verb root *yuj* 'to unite, to get mixed (with another)'!

³Cf. verse 2 above.

⁴The word *yajus* is usually derived from verb root *yaj* 'to worship, to offer'. Also cf. *Jaiminīya Upaniṣad* 1.40: *vāg eva yajuḥ, vācā hi yajur anuvartate*. This indicates the recitation of a prose formula for offering.

सामापि प्राण एवेति कथं तदिति भण्यते ।
सम्यञ्चि सर्वभूतानि प्राणे सति यतस्ततः ॥६॥

sāman also is *Prāṇa*. How is it (so)? It is stated (thus): Because all the beings assemble (*añc*) together, (only) when *Prāṇa* exists there (in them); therefore (it is so). [6]

क्षत्रं च प्राण एवेति चिन्तयेत्सततं हृदा ।
त्रायते हेति युक्त्युक्तिः क्षत्रत्वस्य प्रसिद्धये ॥७॥

kṣatra also is but *Prāṇa*: (thus) should one entertain (lit. meditate) in mind (lit. heart). 'Because it protects' is the statement of the reason (adduced) for establishing the character (of *Prāṇa* as *kṣatra*). [7]

क्षणितोर्हि क्षतात्प्राणस्त्रायते न तु तं विना ।
क्षत्रं प्राणस्ततो ज्ञेयो यथोक्तन्यायगौरवात् ॥८॥

Because *Prāṇa* protects (one) from an injury (caused) by an injuring (person/thing)¹; and (*tu*) there is none other than that (for protection). Therefore should it be known that *Prāṇa* is *kṣatra*, out of regard for the reason² stated. [8]

¹Cf. *Raghuvaṃśa* 2.53: *kṣatāt kila trāyata ity udagraḥ kṣatrasya śabdo bhuvaneṣu rūḍhaḥ*.

²Note Suresvara's use of *nyāya* in the sense of reason, viz. cause.

प्राप्नोत्यत्रमसौ क्षत्रमत्रातृकमनीश्वरम् ।
स एव त्राता सर्वस्य ह्यत्र क्षत्रमतो भवेत् ॥९॥

He ¹ attains here ² the character of an eater (of all food), viz. *kṣatra*, which does not have a lord (or ruler) over (it). He himself (becomes) the protector of all, the eater (of all food) and *kṣatra*.³ [9]

¹This refers to the worshipper of Prāṇa.

²That is, in/by the worship of Prāṇa.

³This indicates the worshipper's union/oneness with Prāṇa.

इति श्रीबृहदारण्यकोपनिषद्वाङ्मयवार्तिके पञ्चमाध्यायस्य
पञ्चदशं ब्राह्मणम् ॥१५॥

BRHADĀRANYAKOPANIṢAD-
BHĀṢYA-VĀRTIKA

5.16

हृदयं सत्यमित्यादिबहूपाधिसमाश्रयम् ।
उपासनमतिक्रान्तं ब्रह्मणः फलवद्बहु ॥१॥

So far has been described (in the Brāhmaṇa) beginning with *hrdayam satyam* the worship (of various kinds) in relation to many limiting adjuncts (of the Brahman), which is profusely fruitful. [1]

SP states the connection of this Brāhmaṇa with its immediately preceding Brāhmaṇa (viz. BU 5.15). This is, according to him, the reference in this verse. Yet the words *hrdayam satyam* refer to the third Brāhmaṇa onwards (viz. BU 5.3-15) and this is according to Śaṅkara—Sureśvara follows him.

सर्वोपाध्युपसंहारिगायत्र्युपाधिकं प्रभोः ।
अधुनोपासनं वाच्यमित्यर्थः पर आगमः ॥२॥

Now is to be discussed (lit. stated) the worship of the All-pervader (*prabhoh*), who has the limiting adjuncts of Gāyatrī that concludes (the sphere of) all the limiting adjuncts. For this purpose, there follows the subsequent text of the Śruti. [2]

sarvopādhyupāsanhāri refers to the purport of the Gāyatrī Brāhmaṇa (viz. BU 5.16) which now begins.

उदारफलसंप्राप्तावैश्वर्यं तत्र तत्र हि ।
श्रुतं श्रुतौ हि गायत्र्यास्तदुपास्तिर्वरा ततः ॥३॥

Since,¹ in the different portions (lit. here and there in the

Śruti) is heard great richness (*aiśvarya*) in the obtainment of profuse fruit through (lit. from) Gāyatrī (the deity of the metre) indeed;² therefore, the worship of that is superior to them (all).³ [3]

¹This refers to the first *hi* in the verse.

²This refers to the second *hi* in the verse.

³That is, the other modes of worship.

उदारफलसंबन्धो ब्राह्मणस्यैव नान्यतः ।
ब्राह्मणस्य च गायत्री कारणं तेन सा वरा ॥४॥

Enjoying (lit. connection with) profuse fruit is only in the case of a Brāhmaṇa and not of anybody else, and Gāyatrī is the origin¹ of a Brāhmaṇa; therefore, that one is considered as superior. [4]

¹This is for *utpattikāraṇa*; cf. Śruti: *brāhmaṇo vyutthāya ...* (BU 3.6.1) and also *gāyatrī brāhmaṇam asṛjata. anyataḥ* (untraced) is for *anyasya*.

BU 5.16.1 is under reference.

भूमिरित्यादिवाक्येन त्रिलोक्यष्टाक्षरोच्यते ।
अष्टाक्षरं पदं सिद्धं गायत्र्याः प्रथमं च यत् ॥५॥

In the sentence beginning with the word *bhūmiḥ*, there is mentioned (the collection of) the three worlds (whose names together) comprise eight letters; thereby is established that foot¹ of Gāyatrī which is its first. [5]

This verse refers to *bhūmi* (two letters), *antarikṣa* (four letters) and *dyaus* (two letters)—this refers to the Vedic practice of accepting the word *dyaus* as bi-syllabic, viz. *diaus*. This is an instance of the known mystical Brāhmaṇical equations.

¹*pada* stands for 'a foot of a metre'.

अष्टाक्षरत्वसामान्याद्गायत्र्याः प्रथमं पदम् ।
तच्चेदं चैकतामेति संख्यासामान्यहेतुतः ॥६॥

On account of the similarity in having eight letters, the first foot of Gāyatrī and that, viz. this (triad of worlds), become one, the reason being the equality of numbers.¹ [6]

Because there are eight letters in *bhūmiḥ* ... and also in the foot of Gāyatrī, therefore they are equal. So also, because the number three is common, therefore Gāyatrī is equated to the three worlds. Thus, there are two levels considered; the level of words and the level of mystic oneness. This is explained in the following verse.

¹The verse in Gāyatrī metre has three feet and there are three worlds, *bhūmi*, *antarikṣa* and *dyaus*.

त्रैलोक्याभिहितिरियमष्टाक्षरसमत्वतः ।
गायत्र्याद्यपादसमतो विराजात्मैक्यमश्नुते ॥७॥

This mentioning of (the collection of) the three worlds is owing to the equality in respect of eight letters. Because of the equality with the first foot of Gāyatrī, (a worshipper) attains oneness with Virāj. [7]

The three worlds together are Virāj and, therefore, the knowledge of the first foot of Gāyatrī as having the nature of the three worlds together means that one attains the nature of Virāj.

एवं पदं त्रयो लोका अभिधानाभिसंगतेः ।
अत्यन्तमभिधेयस्य विराजैक्यं प्रपद्यते ॥८॥

Thus, by construing together the expressions, viz. the foot (of Gāyatrī) and the three worlds, a worshipper acquires oneness with Virāj, which is the ultimate end (*atyantam*) of (this)

expression.¹

[8]

¹Possibly, what is to be said, viz. equality (of them). This is clarified in the following verse.

उक्ताभिधानद्वारेण संपन्नो यस्त्रिलोकताम् ।
यथोक्तोपासनाभ्यासाद्विराडेव भवेदसौ ॥९॥

He, who has thus obtained the nature of (the collection of) the three worlds through the already stated expression himself becomes Virāj, by the repetition of the worship thus stated.

[9]

The worship consists in meditating on the first line of Gāyatrī as identical with the three worlds together.

त्रिषु लोकेषु यावत्स्यात्पुंभोगायेह साधनम् ।
तावत्सर्वं जयत्याशु प्रथमोपास्तितः फलम् ॥१०॥

Whichever is in the three words the means of/for the enjoyment of a man, all that he easily (lit. quickly) wins; this is the result from (i.e. of) the worship of first foot (of Gāyatrī).

[10]

In the previous verse, there was a mention made of the Śrauta result of the worship under reference and in this verse there is now a mention of a non-Śrauta result (of the same).

रूपराशिरशेषेण भूम्याद्युक्त्योपसंहृतः ।

(Thus), by the mention of *bhūmi* etc. is stated together the entire mass of what has forms (viz. the mass of different things).

[11ab]

BU 5.16.2 is under reference.

ऋच इत्यादिना ज्ञेया नामराश्यापसंहतिः ॥११॥

By the words *ṛcaḥ* etc.¹ is to be understood (the collection of) what are names.² [11cd]

¹The word etc. stands for *yajūṃṣi* and *sāmāni*.

²This refers to the form of the second foot of Gāyatrī.

अभिधेयाभिधानाख्यराशी नित्यौ व्यवस्थितौ ।
परस्पराभिसंबन्धौ गायत्रीवर्त्मनोदितौ ॥१२॥

The two collections of what is to be named and what is name are thus clearly enumerated (*vyavasthitau*); (the two) having close (*abhi*) mutual relationship are expressed in the way of (the mention of the first two feet) of Gāyatrī. [12]

ऋगादेरभिधानस्य यावती व्याप्तिरिष्यते ।
तावत्सर्वमवाप्नोति यथोक्तोपासनान्नरः ॥१३॥

Whatever is extent of that (which is conveyed by the) name *ṛc* (i.e. Rgveda etc.) is all that a man attains through the worship already stated. [13]

व्याख्या तुल्यैव पूर्वेण वाक्येनोत्तरवाक्ययोः ।
अक्षराणामिह ज्ञेया नातो व्याख्यायते पुनः ॥१४॥

The explanation of the two subsequent statements is the same as that of the previous (i.e. first) sentence, i.e. in respect of (the number of) letters here. Therefore, it is not stated again. [14]

BU 5.16.3 is under reference.

कर्मराशिरथेदानीं प्राण इत्यादिनोच्यते ।
विधृतिः पूर्वयोः प्राणो मधुकाण्डे यथोदितः ॥१५॥

Now, in the words beginning with *prāṇa* is mentioned the mass of ritual actions. That *prāṇa* is the supporter of the two former collections¹ is stated in the Madhu Kāṇḍa.² [15]

¹Supply: of names and forms in the earlier portion of Brāhmaṇa.

¹This refers to BU 1.5, i.e. Saptāṇṇa Brāhmaṇa.

प्राणात्मानं यथोक्तेन पादेनापाद्य यत्नतः ।
प्राणात्मैव भवत्याशु सदा तद्भावभावितः ॥१६॥

Having carefully understood the nature of Prāṇa as consisting in (the third) foot of Gāyatrī, as stated (before), (the worshipper), having ever devoted himself to become that (Prāṇa), soon becomes (possessed) of the nature of Prāṇa.

[16]

SP adds that the worship of the second foot of Gāyatrī has also a similar result. This is very likely to be becoming equal in status to the Trayī, or all that is nameable.

अभिधेयोपसंहारस्त्रिलोकीवचसोदितः ।
ऋच इत्यादिना तद्वदभिधानोपसंहतिः ॥१७॥

In the statement of (the collection of) the three worlds, there is expressed the collection of all that is to be expressed. And, (in the statement) beginning with the word *ṛcaḥ*, there is similarly (a statement of) (the collection of) all the names.

[17]

कर्मणोऽप्युपसंहारः प्राण इत्यादिना तथा ।
एतावद्वस्तु जगति गायत्रीपादसंश्रयम् ॥१८॥

In the same way, in the words beginning with *prāṇa*, there is (a statement of) the collection of (the content in ritual)

activity. So far, (there has been a statement made about) the collection of things in the worlds as what rests on (the three) feet of Gāyatrī. [18]

अभिधेयस्य गायत्री यस्येयं त्रिपदा मता ।
तस्याभिधित्सयेदानीं प्रारब्धैषोत्तरा श्रुतिः ॥१९॥

Now the subsequent portion of Śruti begins with the intention of stating that which(ever) is to be named or expressed, viz. consisting in which is taken Gāyatrī having three feet. [19]

SP points out that this refers to the explanation of Hiranyagarbha which is of the nature of Āditya.

¹Alternatively, expressive of which.

व्याचष्टे स्वयमेवार्थं तुर्यादिपदसंहतेः ।
यद्वै चतुर्थमित्यादिवचसा यत्नतः श्रुतिः ॥२०॥

The Śruti itself carefully (or regardfully) explains the meaning of the unit of words beginning with *turya* in the statement beginning with the words *yad vai caturtham*. [20]

रागो रज इति ज्ञेयः प्रवृत्तेः कारणं तु यत् ।
रञ्जनं काम आसङ्गः सर्वानर्थकृदात्मनः ॥२१॥

It is colour (*rāga*) that is to be taken (or known) as *rajas* and the cause of this usage of it is (the act of) colouring, viz. desire (or) close attachment (to the objects) which causes all undesirable (effects) on the individual self. [21]

The verse uses the word *ātman* in the sense of Jīva. SP justifies it with *Gītā* 2.62c: *saṁgāt saṁjāyate kāmah*

तं क्रमित्वोपरि स्थित्वा तपतीति क्रियापदम् ।
भूतानि वा रजोवाचा भण्यन्तेऽत्राखिलानि तु ॥२२॥

The verb *tapati* means (i.e. refers to) transgressing (from verb root *kram*) that and remaining above (the same). And (*tu*) here (in the BU sentence) are expressed all the *bhūtas* 'elements' by the expression *rajaḥ*. [22]

उपर्युपरि तान्येष तपत्युल्बणरश्मिवान् ।
 श्रीयशोभ्यां यथैवायं तपत्येवमुपासकः ॥२३॥
 गुणैः सर्वानतिक्रम्य स्थित्वोपरि श्रिया ज्वलन् ।
 यशसा च सुदीप्तेन विद्वांस्तपति विद्विषः ॥२४॥

As this one (i.e. Āditya), of very powerful rays, shines over and above (*upary-upari*) them, so also the worshipper (who is) thus (devoted to Gāyatrī) shines with glory and fame. [23]
 A knower (of the nature of Gāyatrī) causes torment to his haters by his brilliantly shining fame, after having overcome all of them by his excellences, and thus, having stood over and above (them), with exceedingly shining (lit. burning) fame. [24]

These two verses explain the contents of verse 22 above.

कामितार्थस्य लब्धत्वात्सर्वग्रहणमात्रतः ।
 उपर्युपरीति वीप्सा किमर्थमिति भण्यते ॥२५॥

(An objection is raised:) 'Since, by the very mention of the word *sarva*, all the desired objects are understood (lit. grasped), for what purpose is there then a repetition mentioned (in the words) *uparyupari*?' [25]

नैव दोषो यतो येषां सूर्यः स्यादुपरि स्थितः ।
 लोकानां सर्वशब्देन तेषामेव ग्रहो भवेत् ॥२६॥
 पराञ्चो ये रवेर्लोकास्तेषामपि परिग्रहः ।
 कथं नु नाम सिद्धः स्यादतो वीप्सा प्रयुज्यते ॥२७॥

(The answer is given:) This¹ is not at all a fault, because there would be grasping (i.e. understanding) from the word

sarva of only those regions above which the sun is shining (lit. standing). [26]

(For) there is grasping of even those regions, which are beyond (the light of) the sun, (and since there would be a difficulty) as to how that (understanding) would be possible (lit. established), there is therefore repetition employed, (in the words *uparyupari*). [27]

¹This refers to the so-called repetition.

BU 5.16.4 is under reference.

व्याख्याता या पुरा यत्नाद्गायत्री जगदात्मिका ।
मूर्तामूर्तरसे भानौ त्रिपादेषा प्रतिष्ठिता ॥२८॥

That Gāyatrī, which has been so far explained as having the nature of the entire world (*jagat*), is, with its three feet, supported in the sun which is (the very) essence of *mūrtāmūrta*. [28]

This is the meaning of *saiṣā* ... (BU 5.14.4).

तदपीदं पदं तुर्यं सत्येऽध्यात्मे प्रतिष्ठितम् ।
अक्षिण प्रकाशरूपे हि सर्वं रूपं प्रतिष्ठितम् ॥२९॥

And that, viz. this fourth foot (of Gāyatrī), in relation to the body also is supported in truth (*satya*); indeed in the eye, which is of the nature of light, is all (that has) form is supported. [29]

This explains the meaning of *tad vai tat satye pratiṣṭhitam*.

किं पुनस्तत्सत्यमिति सत्यं चक्षुरितीर्यते ।
चक्षुषः सत्यता कस्मादिति चेदुच्यते तथा ॥३०॥

(The question is:) 'What again is (that) *satya*?' Therefore (in

answer) it is stated (*iti*) the nature of the truth (*satyatā*) abiding in the eye. Again, if (the question is): 'Why?', it is likewise (*tathā*) answered (now):¹ [30]

¹That is, in the following two verses.

तस्मादित्यादिवाक्येन सत्यताक्ष्णो विभाव्यते ।
दृष्टं मृषापि श्रवणं न तु दृष्टिर्मृषेक्ष्यते ।
तस्या विशेषनिष्ठत्वान्मृषात्वं नोपपद्यते ॥३१॥

In the statement *tasmāt* ..., there is expressed (clearly seen) the nature of truth (*satyatā*) abiding in the eye. Also what is heard (*śravaṇam*) is found (lit. seen) to be false, but the act of seeing (*dr̥ṣṭi*) is not found (lit. seen) to be (grasping what is) false (i.e. what does not have the nature of truth). Since that (viz. seeing) is rooted in some particular (form), the idea of untruth in it cannot stand to reason. [31]

एवं तुरीयमेतस्मिन्सत्ये चक्षुषि सर्वदा ।
प्रकाशैकस्वभावे हि साक्षादेव प्रतिष्ठितम् ॥३२॥

Thus this fourth (foot of Gāyatrī), is ever perceptibly supported in the eye (viz. this truth) which has the nature of only illuminating objects. [32]

The purpose of this verse is to point out the similarity in the nature of the eye and Āditya as *ādheya-ādhāra*.

अक्षिण प्रकाशरूपेऽस्मिन्सर्वं रूपं प्रतिष्ठितम् ।
बले प्राणे प्रतिष्ठा च चक्षुषोऽपि प्रदर्श्यते ॥३३॥

In this eye, which is of the nature of light, all (that is) form is supported and the support of the eye also is shown (i.e. stated) (in the Śruti) to be in strength, viz. the Prāṇa. [33]

This is the explanation of *tad vai tad*

इन्द्राग्नी ताविमौ सिद्धावग्निस्तत्र प्रकाशकः ।
इन्द्रो विधरणः प्राणः पूर्वयोर्नामरूपयोः ॥३४॥

These two (viz. Indra and Agni) are thus established (as supported)¹ and, between the two, Agni is the illuminator whereas Indra the sustainer, and (further) Prāṇa (is the supporter) of the first two (viz. name and form).² [34]

¹In Āditya and the eye.

²Prāṇa is the same as Indra and Agni (which is itself Āditya). This is in relation to the world.

यावान्प्रकाशो जगति स सर्वोऽग्निरिहोच्यते ।
परिस्पन्दश्च सर्वत्र प्राण इन्द्रस्तथोच्यते ॥३५॥

Whatever light there is in this world is the whole of it called here Agni, (and whatever) movement (lit. throbbing) obtains everywhere is, in the same way,¹ called Prāṇa (viz. Indra). [35]

Prāṇa is known as the deity of strength and therefore is to be worshipped as being Indra, i.e. *bala*.

¹As in the case of Agni earlier.

त्रिलोकी च त्रिवेदी च प्राणादित्रयमेव च ।
प्रतिष्ठितमिहाध्यात्म एवमुक्तेन वर्त्मना ॥३६॥

(The collection of) the three worlds, and that of the three Vedas and also the triad beginning with Prāṇa,¹ is here² supported in relation to the body (*adhyātme*), in the way described. [36]

This is the purport of *prāṇo vai balam*.

¹This refers to *prāṇa*, *apāna*, *vyāna*.

²In the metre Gāyatrī.

प्राणादित्यौ हि गायत्रीसक्तावुक्तेन वर्त्मना ।
 संजीवनं तदन्येषां प्राणानां भवतीश्वरात् ॥३७॥
 सा हैषेति श्रुतिरतो यथोक्तार्थावबुद्धये ।
 प्राणान्गयान्यतस्तत्रे गायत्रीयमतो मता ॥३८॥

(Thus), in the way stated (earlier), Prāṇa and Āditya are supported (*sakta*) in the Gāyatrī and that¹ becomes the life of all other *prāṇas*, i.e. through (the strength of) the overlord.²

[37]

Therefore (follows) the Śruti *sā haiṣā* for making one know what is already stated. Since it protected the *prāṇas*, the *gayas*,³ it is called (or known) as Gāyatrī.

[38]

This is the explanation of *evam v eṣā gāyatri adhyāmam pratiṣṭhitā sā haiṣā gayāṃs tatre*.

The word Gāyatrī is here derived from *gaya* connected with a root *traī* 'to protect'.

¹This refers to their being so supported in the Gāyatrī.

²This stands for the powerful Gāyatrī.

³Śaṅkara (in BUB p.736) derives the word *gaya* (for *prāṇa* 'organ') from the verb root *gai* 'to produce sound' (*śabdakaraṇāt*). Read Ānandagiri on BUB: *gāyantīti gayā vāgupalakṣitāś cakṣurādayaḥ*— here the expressed vocal organ stands for all organs.

उपनीतौ स आचार्यः पच्छश्चार्धर्चशस्तथा ।
 सावित्रीं याममं प्राह बटवे मन्त्रलक्षणाम् ॥३९॥
 साप्येषैव च विज्ञेया व्याख्याता या प्रयत्नतः ।
 यस्मै प्राह स आचार्यस्तस्य प्राणानवत्यसौ ॥४०॥

This Sāvitrī¹ (*rc*) which the preceptor recited to a pupil, foot by foot, or (also) by half-verse by half-verse, at the time of the thread ceremony (*upanītau*), viz. that (verse) which has the nature of a Mantra,
 that also is to be known as this very verse,² the one which

[39]

is carefully explained. It protects the *prāṇas*³ (of that pupil) to whom the preceptor has recited (this Mantra). [40]

This is the meaning of *sa yām evāmūṣṇ sāvitrīm anvāha*

¹The word Savitr̥ refers to a ṛc in Gāyatrī metre which is addressed to the deity Savitr̥. Cf. *R̥gveda* 3.62.10.

²Namely, the Gāyatrī ṛc.

³This is the explanation why the Gāyatrī and the Sāvitrī are identical.

एवंवित्सन्स आचार्यो यस्मा अन्वाह सादरः ।
त्रायते तस्य गायत्री बटोः प्राणात्र संशयः ॥४१॥

Undoubtedly, Gāyatrī protects the *prāṇas* of that pupil to whom the preceptor, being conversant with (the matter) thus (stated), carefully recited the ṛc. [41]

This explains the meaning of the preceding verse more clearly.

BU 5.16.5 is under reference.

माणवकस्योपनयनसमये वेदवादिनाम् ।
छन्दः प्रति विवादोऽयं तन्निर्णीतौ परा श्रुतिः ॥४२॥

Among those, who recited the Veda, this is a dispute on *Chandas* 'metre' of this verse, (recited) at the time of the thread ceremony of a young boy; (therefore), in order to give a decision on that, there follows the subsequent Śruti (statement). [42]

This is the purport of *tām etām*

तां हैतामिति वाक्येन सावित्रीं प्रतिदर्शयताम् ।
अनुष्टुप्छन्दसं ब्रूयात्पूर्वपक्षप्रसिद्धये ॥४३॥
तामेतामेक आचार्या उपनीताय यत्नतः ।
अनुष्टुप्छन्दसं प्राहुः सावित्रीं न्यायसंश्रयात् ॥४४॥

By the sentence *tām haitām* (one should express the opinion) regarding the Sāvitrī as having the metre Anuṣṭup, so that the *prima facie* view is established. [43]

Some preceptors have carefully recited to the initiated pupil this verse, viz. Sāvitrī ṛc, in the metre Anuṣṭup—this (they did) by resorting to some reason.¹ [44]

¹This is explained in the following verse.

वागनुष्टुब्धतः साक्षाद्वाक्च साक्षात्सरस्वती ।
उपनीताय सैवातो वक्तव्या न ततोऽपरा ॥४५॥

Since Vāc is itself the Anuṣṭup¹ and Vāc is the Sarasvatī (also), the same (i.e. only that) is therefore to be taught to the one who is initiated, not any² other (ṛc). [45]

¹For Vāc as Anuṣṭup, cf. the Śruti: *vāg vā anuṣṭup*.

²SP points out the purport of this Sāvitrī Mantra in the words *tathā ca tat satitur vṛṇīmahe vyaṃ devasya bhojanam, śreṣṭham sarvadhātaram turam bhagasya dhīmahi anuṣṭupchandaska-sāvitryarpaṇe sarasvaty evārpitā syād ity arthaḥ*.

यथैतद्वक्तमाचार्यैः कुर्याद्विद्वान्न तत्तथा ।
गायत्रीमेव सावित्रीं ब्रूयात्सर्वफलाप्तिः ॥४६॥

A learned man should do as he has been taught by the preceptors, not in that way as said before by other preceptors: He should recite the Gāyatrī itself as Sāvitrī, since (thereby) (for him) (i.e. all the results accrue to him). [46]

This verse states the Siddhāntin's view *na ... phalāptitaḥ*.

SP points out that, by the mention of only Anuṣṭup, the result that accrues to the worshipper is (the favour of) Sarasvatī; but, by the mention of Gāyatrī, the result is the acquisition of everything. Therefore, there is emphasis on recitation of only Gāyatrī.

This would mean that a verse addressed to Savitr can be in Anuṣṭup metre, but that is set aside in favour the one (to Savitr) in Gāyatrī metre.

यथोक्तायां हि गायत्र्यां कृत्स्नं जगदुपाहितम् ।
तदुक्तौ सर्वमुक्तं स्याद्यत्पुमर्थाय साधनम् ॥४७॥

Indeed, the entire world is placed in the Gāyatrī, as has been already explained; in reciting that, there occurs the statement of all that which is the means to (the acquisition of) the end of human life. [47]

विज्ञानपुरुषस्येदं स्वभावादेव सर्वदा ।
आत्मैव हि जगत्कृत्स्नं साधारणविशेषवत् ॥४८॥

This entire world is ever the Ātman owing to the very nature of the *viññānapuruṣa*, 'the individual self', which comprises the common and the uncommon¹ (things in it). [48]

This verse explains the purport of *yadi ha*

¹Cf. next verse where *viśeṣa* is paraphrased as *asādhāraṇa*.

साधारणानि वस्तूनि तथासाधारणान्यपि ।
नानुपादाय कृत्स्नानि जन्तोः काचित्क्रियेयते ॥४९॥

Without taking up the common things and also the uncommon things, there is never done (lit. desired) any action of whosoever was born. [49]

SP states that the thought of this verse has been fully clarified in the Madhu Brāhmaṇa.

अभिव्यक्तेः पुराप्येतद्रूपमासीत्स्वभावतः ।
अभिव्यक्तौ तु तत्साक्षात्समष्टिव्यष्टिलक्षणम् ॥५०॥

Before the manifestaion (of an individual self), there was this form (of its cause), by its very nature, and, after the manifestaion (of an individual), the same became characterized by collective (world) and particulars in it. [50]

एवं सिद्धे महिम्न्यस्मिन्यथोक्तेनैव वर्त्मना ।
कनीयस्ता विवृद्धिर्वा नैव संभाव्यते मितेः ॥५१॥

Thus, when the greatness (of Gāyatrī) is thus established here, in the way stated, there is not possible any decrease (i.e. becoming less) or increase of the knowledge.¹ [51]

¹Sureśvara uses the word *miti* for *mātr*, i.e. the knower, viz. one who knows the Ātman.

ऊरीकृत्येममेवार्थं स य इत्यादिनोच्यते ।
महाप्रतिग्रहेणापि नैवविद्वोषमृच्छति ॥५२॥

Having accepted this as the very purport, the Śruti has stated in words *sa yaḥ* ... that the person, who knows thus, does not come to have any blemish, even though he has obtained (varied) great advantage.¹ [52]

This verse marks the statement of the particular result acquired from the knowledge of the nature or the purposefulness of the Gāyatrī.

¹Add: (as are hinted at) in the preceding verse (SP).

दर्शनस्य स्तुतिरियं स य इत्यादिनोच्यते ।
तादृक्प्रतिग्रहस्येह न क्वचित्संभवो यतः ॥५३॥

In the words (of the Śruti) *sa yaḥ* ..., there is a praise of (this view), because there is no possibility here, any similar advantage. [53]

प्रतिग्रहस्य निन्दा वा विद्वन्मानात्प्रसक्तितः ।

निःशेषपुण्यमोषित्वान्निषेधार्थाय कुत्स्यते ॥५४॥

Or rather, there is here censure of accepting gifts since there is a contingency of a person's being proud of being a knower¹—such a person is found fault with,² because (his pride) has the nature of wiping away³ all his merit—(thus is this censure) for prohibiting.⁴ [54]

This is another way of stating the purport of what is mentioned earlier.

¹That is to say: he may have greater pride than what he might legitimately have as the feeling of a knower. Or he might be proud, even if he would not be a knower—A knower of the significance of Gāyatrī is meant.

²Or, 'is spoken ill of'; alternatively, 'made a butt of ridicule'.

³Literally, steals away, i.e. destroys.

⁴Supply: acceptance of gifts.

BU 5.16.6 is under reference.

उक्तपादेष्वपि ज्ञानं नैवालमपबाधितुम् ।
गायत्रीवेदिनो जन्तोरपि भूयान्प्रतिग्रहः ॥५५॥

Even knowledge in relation to the feet (of the Gāyatrī, i.e. Sāvitrī ṛc) which are stated is not effective (lit. capable) in warding away (that censure); for, in the case of a knower of the Gāyatrī¹ also, there can be greater acceptance of gifts.

[55]

¹This refers to its significance.

नैवं दाता जगत्स्मिन्न च तादृक्प्रतिग्रहः ।
ग्रहीता वेह नैवेति कुत इत्यादिनोच्यते ॥५६॥

In the words of the Śruti *kutaḥ ...*,¹ the purport is: there is not in this world a giver of gifts like this one, there is

not a similar acceptance of gifts, and there is not any one who (has the capacity) to secure them. [56]

¹Cf. BU 5.14.6.

अप्यभ्युपगमे चैषां नैव दोषस्य संभवः ।
विदुषोऽस्तीत्यतः प्राह स य इत्यादिना श्रुतिः ॥५७॥

When all these ¹ are accepted, there is no blemish to follow in the case of a knower of the Gāyatrī—to say this, ² the Śruti has begun with (the words) *sa yah* [57]

¹What we mentioned in preceding verse, viz. rich gifts.

²That is, to answer the question implied in this statement.

स यः कश्चिदिमाँल्लोकान्पूर्णान्पुंभोगसाधनैः ।
विद्वान्संप्रतिगृह्णीयात्कथंचित्कामसंप्लुतेः ॥५८॥
आद्यपादपरिज्ञानमात्रस्यैव प्रतिग्रहः ।
क्षयायालं न शेषस्य गायत्रीदर्शनस्य सः ॥५९॥

He whosoever, a knower (of the Gāyatrī), would accept these worlds, abounding in (various) means of enjoyment for human beings (and) somehow, on account of being overpowered by desires, [58]

(would have received only what can come as) the result from the complete (*pari*) knowledge of (just) the first foot (of the Gāyatrī); that is not powerful enough to destroy (i.e. exhaust) (the result of) the knowledge of the remaining feet of the Gāyatrī. [59]

These verses answer the question implied in the preceding verse in a very cryptic style.

यावतीयं त्रयी विद्या तावन्तमपि गृह्णतः ।
द्वितीयपदविज्ञानक्षतिरेव न सर्वतः ॥६०॥

In the case of the one who accepts only that much (the reward) as a result of his knowledge of the three Vedas, there is destruction, a loss only in respect of his knowledge of the second foot, (but) not the destruction of all (that he has known from the Gāyatrī).

[60]

असंभवेऽपि कल्प्येत यदि तादृक्प्रतिग्रहः ।
त्रैविद्यलक्षणः सोऽपि तृतीयं नाप्नुयात्पदम् ॥६१॥

If a result of that is magnitude imagined, (for a person) even while there is no possibility of it, then he, though possessed of the knowledge of (all) the three Vedas will not obtain (the result of) the third foot (of the Gāyatrī).

[61]

अन्तरण्डविभक्तस्य यथोक्तैः स्यात्प्रतिग्रहैः ।
क्षयो नानन्तरूपस्य स्यात्समष्टिवपुर्भूतः ॥६२॥

By the acceptance of the gifts (thus) described, there would not be destruction of the one (viz. the inner self of a person, i.e. the Ātman) which has divided itself (as it were) in the universe¹ and has infinite (number of) forms (and yet, in reality) bearing the form of collection (of all beings together).²

[62]

¹Literally, the egg (form of the Brahman); cf. the commonly used word *brahmāṇḍa*.

²This refers to the result of a person's knowledge of the fourth foot of the Gāyatrī, viz. the whole of the Gāyatrī.

परिच्छिन्नेन सर्वत्र प्रतिमानं जगद्यपि ।
अन्तवद्विषयं दृष्टं न त्वनन्तस्य कुत्रचित् ॥६३॥

And there is seen in the world 'an example for what is limited (in magnitude) and is, therefore, having an end, but there is not seen anywhere that (viz. example) one for what is limitless.

[63]

The purport of the verse is to bring out the result of the worship of the fourth foot of Gāyatrī which is imperishable, as against that of any of the other three feet. This is to strengthen further what is said in the end of the preceding verse.

अयं चानन्तमात्मानमक्षिसूर्यव्यवस्थितम् ।
अगादुपासनात्प्राणमात्मत्वेन दिवानिशम् ॥६४॥

For, this one, i.e. the worshipper, has reached the infinite Ātman, through worshipping it, day and night as the Prāṇa, viz. the Ātman that has been abiding in the eye as the sun.

[64]

संभाव्यते क्षयस्तस्य न कुतश्चिदनन्ततः ।
अन्तवान्क्षीयते लोके न त्वनन्तः कुतश्चन ॥६५॥

There can never be conceived the destruction (lit. loss) of this one, since it has infiniteness.¹ In this world, that which has an end is seen to come to destruction but not, on any account, that which is limitless.

[65]

¹*anantataḥ* stands for *anantavattvataḥ*.

आवृत्तिः क्षयशब्देन दुःखप्रायासु भूमिषु ।
कैवल्यावसितेर्नासौ स्यात्समष्टिवपुर्भूतः ॥६६॥

By the word *kṣaya* (is) indicated rebirth (lit. repeated existence of one) at various levels which are mostly full of grief/sorrow, whereas that (rebirth) is not to be conceived in the case of one who has assumed the form of collection (of all beings, i.e. the Ātman) on account of having achieved liberation (lit. the state of singleness).

[66]

BU 5.16.7 is under reference.

उपस्थानं यथोक्ताया गायत्र्याः श्रद्धयान्वितः ।
 गायत्र्यसीतिमन्त्रेण कुर्यादुक्तार्थवित्सदा ॥६७॥
 एकद्वित्रिपद्यसीति पूर्वान्पादान्विचिन्तयेत् ।
 चतुष्पात्त्वं च तुर्येण यथोक्तेन विचिन्तयेत् ॥६८॥
 अपदसीत्यपि गिरा तस्या आनन्त्यमुच्यते ।
 अव्यया चाक्षयासीति न ह्यन्तस्तेऽधिगम्यते ॥६९॥
 नमस्तेऽस्तु तुरीयायेत्युक्त्या तुर्यप्रधानताम् ।
 गुणभावं यथोक्तस्य विद्यात्पादत्रयस्य तु ॥७०॥
 शत्रुनामगृहीत्यर्थमसावितिपदं त्विह ।
 फलोक्तिरद इत्येतदुपासितुरहं तथा ॥७१॥

A person, who has known the significance (of Gāyatrī) which is already explained, should ever with faith offer the worship¹ to Gāyatrī which is described before, with the Mantra *gāyatrī asi* [67]

He should ponder (think to himself) over the first three feet, (reciting the Mantras) *ekapadī asi*, *dvīpadī asi*, and *tripadī asi*.² And he should ponder over the nature (of the Gāyatrī) as being four-footed (reciting the whole Mantra of Gāyatrī, viz.) *turya* (the fourth one which is already stated). [68]

Also in the words *apad asi* there is stated the infiniteness of that (Gāyatrī) and (in the words) *avyayā cākṣayāsi* is understood (the meaning) 'there is indeed no end of you (O Gāyatrī)'. [69]

One should know from the statement *namas te 'stu turīyāya* ... that the *turya* has prominence (with reference to the three feet) and also the subordinateness of those three feet that are (already) described. [70]

And, in this context (of the Brāhmaṇa), the word *asau* is for uttering (in its place) the name of the enemy and the word *adaḥ* and *aham* as well are used as the statements of the result for the worshipper. [71]

¹This is meant by the word *upasthāna*; verse 73 also uses

it in the same sense.

²Sureśvara uses the compound of *eka*, *dvi* and *tri* with *padī*. Also, as a consequence, the verb *asi* is used only once. Translation indicates this, by separating one sentence into three sentences.

शत्रुणा कामितो योऽर्थो मा प्रापत्तमसाविति ।
मा समृद्धयथवा सोऽस्मै तं वाहं प्राप्नुयामिति ॥७२॥

'Let that thing which is desired by my enemy not come to him.' Or, let it not prosper for him. Or, may I obtain that.

[72]

This explains Mantras *asāv ado mā prapat kāmo 'smai mā samṛddhy aham adaḥ prāpam*.

अभिचारार्थमेतस्मिन्पस्थाने यथोदिते ।
अभिधानैकदेशोक्त्या विकल्पः फलगोचरः ॥७३॥

In this worship, which is thus described in this (statement),¹ is for conveying black magic (*abhicāra*) (and) in this statement (of one of the three names of the Gāyatrī as said before) there is option pertaining to the result.

[73]

¹Namely, what is said under verse 72: *asāv ado*

स्वार्थे त्वहमद इति ह्युपस्थाने फलं भवेत् ।
अदः प्रयोजनं देवि प्राप्नुयां त्वत्प्रसादतः ॥७४॥

And with reference to the purpose for himself the result (of the worship) is (as expressed in the words) *aham adaḥ*. (The thought in worshipper's mind is:) 'O goddess (Gāyatrī), may I obtain that purpose through your favour'.

[74]

BU 5.16.8 is under reference.

एतावदेव किं ज्ञेयं किं वान्यदपि शिष्यते ।

अस्त्यन्यदपि विज्ञेयं तद्विनाकृत्स्नता यतः ॥७५॥

(A question could be asked:) 'Only this much is to be known, or, is there anything else which remained to be stated?' (In answer it is said:) 'Yes, another thing is also to be known, since without that there is incompleteness (in respect of the knowledge about the Gāyatrī). [75]

कात्स्न्येन विद्या स्वभ्यस्ता फलायालमुपासितुः ।
विपर्ययेणानर्थाय तदेतत्प्रतिपाद्यते ॥७६॥

The lore (of the Gāyatrī) which is well-studied¹ in its completeness, results into (good) effect thereof for the worshipper; as against this, that is alternatively, it results into undesirable (result for him). It is this that is put forth, (in the subsequent portion of the text). [76]

¹That is, Gāyatrī is repeatedly recited.

In the following, Sureśvara has referred only to the significant part of a small bit of narrative that is told in BU—he omits a few details thereof. This marks the cryptic character of his treatment of the whole Brāhmaṇa.

सर्वात्मकत्वाद्वायत्र्या अग्नेरपि परिग्रहः ।
तन्मुखत्वेनासंसिद्धेस्तादर्थ्येनोत्तरा श्रुतिः ॥७७॥

Since the Gāyatrī is of the nature of all (objects in the world), therefore, there is understood even Agni. Thus since (Agni has been) established as the mouth of the Gāyatrī, the subsequent (portion of the) Śruti is for (stating) its purpose. [77]

मुखविज्ञानविरहादनर्थफलकीर्तनम् ।
अग्निरेव मुखं तस्या इत्युक्त्या कृत्स्नतोच्यते ॥७८॥

There is (in the narrative in the Brāhmaṇa) the statement about the undesirable result arising from the absence of the knowledge (of the Gāyatrī) of the mouth. (As such), by the statement *agnir eva mukhaṃ tasyāḥ* there is stated the fullness of the worship. [78]

गायत्रीदर्शनस्येह फलकात्स्नर्यं तथैव च ।
यथोक्ताग्निमुखज्ञानाद्यदीत्यादिगिराधुना ॥७९॥

There is thus stated here¹ the fullness of the result (arising) from viewing the Gāyatrī (in this way) and also from knowing that Agni is its face, as said (before)—now in this statement *yadi*² [79]

¹That is, in the Brāhmaṇa.

²Read: *yadi ha vā api bahv ivāgnāv abhyādadhati sarvam eva tat sandahati.*

यो वेदाग्निमुखामेतां गायत्रीमग्निरेव सः ।
अग्निरिन्धनवत्सर्वं दहेद्विद्वान्प्रतिग्रहम् ॥८०॥

He, who has known this Gāyatrī as having Agni as its face, himself is Agni. The learned man, (who has thus become) Agni, burns the mass of all advantages,¹ just as a fire (burns) the fire-wood. [80]

¹Add: which he has received by accepting the gifts as fees.

दाहकस्य न बह्वस्ति दाह्ययोगाभिवृद्धितः ।
क्षयश्चाशेषदाह्यस्य यस्मात्तस्मादिवेतिगीः ॥८१॥

For the one that burns,¹ there does not exist (too) much (to burn), (even) when there is increase in what is to be burnt² and there is destruction of what is to be burnt, in its entirety—since (this is so), therefore there is (in the text) the word *iva*. [81]

This is an explanation of the use of *iva* in BU, and SP points to the connection of *iva* with the *dārṣṭāntika* also.

¹This refers to the worshipper of the Gāyatrī.

²The sins of the worshipper are meant.

एवंविदेवमेव स्यात्पापं वह्निवदिन्धनम् ।
सर्वं संभक्ष्य तत्पापं शुद्धः पापवियोगतः ॥८२॥

One, who has known this, would become just this one (viz. Prajāpati), his sin would be the fuel associated with fire.¹ That knower will have eaten up that sin and would become pure, owing to his separation from the sin. [82]

¹That is to say: It will get burnt.

पूतोऽसंसर्गिधर्मत्वादजरोऽपरिणामवान् ।
अमृतोऽस्थूलदेहत्वात्प्राणमात्रस्वभावतः ॥८३॥

He is pure because he has not any contact with various Dharmas (implied by ritual), he would never be aging because he will not have any modifications (in him by the ritual). He would be immortal because his body will not have grossness and because he has the nature of only Prāṇa. [83]

इति श्रीबृहदारण्यकोपनिषद्भाष्यवार्तिके पञ्चमाध्यायस्य
षोडशं ब्राह्मणम् ॥१६॥

**BRHADĀRANYAKOPANIṢAD-
BHĀṢYA-VĀRTIKA
5.17**

यथोक्तोपासनाभ्यासभावितस्य क्रियाकृतः ।
उपस्थानं प्रवक्तव्यमित्यर्थः पर आगमः ॥१॥

(Now) there is to be prescribed some mode of worship for the performer of religious acts, (for him) who has known and repeatedly devoted himself to the (already prescribed modes of worship). For this purpose, there now follows the subsequent Āgama (i.e. Brāhmaṇa). [1]

In the beginning, Sureśvara does intend to include *jñāna-karmasamuccaya* even in respect of the worship of Gāyatrī, of course, following Śaṅkara.

तुरीयं पदमादित्यो लोकद्वारं च येन सः ।
संभाव्यते प्रसङ्गोऽत आदित्योपस्थितेतिह ॥२॥

The fourth foot (of the Gāyatrī) is Āditya and, because that (Āditya) is the entrance¹ to the *loka* (of the Brahman), therefore, there necessarily follows (*prasaṅga*) here the occasion for (prescribing) the worship of Āditya. [2]

In the earlier Brāhmaṇa, a special mode of worship of Āditya was not discussed, but here it is discussed for one in whom there is *jñānakarmasamuccaya*; cf. note under verse 1 above.

¹Āditya is extraordinarily so called, because, in the case of one who attains liberation, one has always to come to Āditya and then proceed onwards.

हिरण्यं ज्योतिरमृतं मण्डलेन तदात्मना ।

सत्यस्य परमार्थस्य द्वारमाच्छादितं रवेः ॥३॥

Hiranya means flame, immortality. And by the orb of Āditya, which has that (flame) as its nature, is closed the door to Āditya, the highest reality, viz. *satya*. [3]

त्वद्दर्शनार्थिने मह्यं पुषन्द्वारमपावृणु ।
जगत्पुष्णाति वृष्ट्याद्यैः पूषादित्यस्ततः स्मृतः ॥४॥

‘O God, Pūṣan, open that door for me, who am desirous of seeing you.’¹ Since he nourishes the world by showers etc.,² therefore, Pūṣan is known as Āditya. [4]

This explains *tattvam*

The Vedic god Pūṣan is identified with Āditya. And also, there is a derivation of the name Pūṣan attempted.

¹This is a gist of a verse from *Vājasaneyi Saṃhitā* 40.17 (also in BU of Kāṇva recension). This gist continues in the next verse also.

²The word etc. refers to nourishing plants and beings by giving them suitable heat, protecting the human beings from the fear of the dark, and showing them the proper paths (as will be clarified later in verses 6ff. and also verse 19 below).

सत्या अवितथा धर्मा यस्य मानव्यपाश्रयात् ।
तस्मै मे सत्यधर्माय दृष्ट्यै द्वारमपावृणु ॥५॥

‘Open the door for me, who have *satya* as religious duty,¹ so that I can see (Reality)’²—for me, whose religious duties are never false, on account of (my) resorting to the (authoritative) means (of knowing the same). [5]

This explains *satyadharmāya*

¹This is *dharma* which can be a law (for one’s conducting oneself) also.

²This is clear from verse 3 above.

हिमघर्माम्बुदानेन पुष्पातीदं यतो जगत् ।
 तस्मात्पूषा यतश्चैको गच्छत्येकर्षिता ततः ॥६॥
 संयमात्सर्वयाम्यानां यमोऽसि परमेश्वरः ।
 स्वीरणाच्छीततोयादेः सूर्यस्तेनासि घर्मदः ॥७॥
 प्रजापतिः परं ब्रह्म कारणं तदपत्यतः ।
 प्राजापत्योऽसि तेन त्वं गीयसे विपुलश्रुतैः ॥८॥

Since he nourishes this world by giving cool, heat and waters, he is called Pūṣan and, since he is the only one that acts (lit. goes), therefore, he is the only Rṣi 'seer'.¹ [6]

By controlling all those, who need to be controlled, you are Yama, the Great Lord. And by a proper (lit. good, *su*) urging of cool water etc.² you are Sūrya and, therefore, the source (lit. giver) of heat.³ [7]

Prajāpati is the highest Brahman, the cause (viz. origin) (and therefore), being an offspring of his, you are described as Prājāpatya—and, therefore, praised (lit. sung) by those who have much learning.⁴ [8]

Sureśvara explains the different words in the prayer to Pūṣan.

¹In the original Mantra there is an epithet of Pūṣan, *ekarṣi*.

²The word etc. refers to *gharma* 'heat'.

³This gives the derivation of the names Yama from verb root *yam* and Sūrya from verb root *īr* with *su* prefixed to it.

⁴That is, who have studied the Vedas extensively.

रश्मीनपनदाशेषांस्तेजः संयच्छ संहर ।
 कल्याणं तै यदत्यर्थं रूपं यच्च तवैव तत् ॥९॥
 सदा त्वाहं प्रपश्यामि सत्यधर्मान्वयाद्यथा ।
 भगवन्सत्यरूपेण मद्धर्मोऽपि भवांस्तथा ॥१०॥

Drive far and wide (your) rays, well control the lustre, i.e. well-organize (it) most, that form (of yours) which is the most blissful and is only yours. [9]

And as I ever see you on account of your association with

the *dharma*s 'laws'¹ and *satya* 'truth', O Bhagavan, let my *dharma* also be of the nature of *satya* and may you look upon me to be so.² [10]

Now follows the meaning of *vyūha*

¹Or, 'duties'; in the Vedic notions of religion, the gods also follow certain laws (there, the word is *vrata*). Cf. *dhṛtavrata* of Varuṇa, *śucivratā* of the two Aśvins.

²That is, I also am *satyadharmānvayin*.

योऽसावादित्यगो देवः सोऽहमस्मीतिबुद्धिगः ।
स्थानमात्राच्च तौ भिन्नौ वस्तुतो नावयोर्भिदा ॥११॥

That god, which resides in Āditya, and that, which abides in (my) intellect in the form of the awareness 'I am that' are distinct only on account of the (difference in their) abodes. In reality, however, there is no difference (whatsoever) between us two. [11]

This explains *yo 'sāvasau puruṣaḥ so 'ham asmi* in BU 5.15.1.

देवतामनिलं यातु वायुर्योऽयं शरीरगः ।
शरीरं भस्मसाद्यातु मर्त्यत्वं हेतदाश्रितम् ॥१२॥

May this wind (Vāyu), which is existing in my body, go to the divine Vāyu. (And) may (this) body which is rendered to ashes go (to the earth), since this one, has related¹ to mortality. [12]

This explains *vāyuh ... śarīram* in BU 5.15.1.

¹That is, is beset with; however, lit. resorted.

भस्मान्तमिति लिङ्गाच्च कर्मिणः स्यादुपस्थितिः ।
न तु संन्यासिनो न्याय्या दाहासंभवहेतुतः ॥१३॥

And, there, the notion understood about a performer of rituals

on the basis of the indicative word *bhasmāntam* 'ending into ashes', does not, however, reasonably pertain to an ascetic, because there is no possibility of the burning (of the body) of that one. [13]

This explains the significance of the word *bhasmāntam*.

वायुरित्यादिकं ग्राह्यमुपलक्षणमेव तु ।
शिष्टानां देवतांशानां यथास्वं प्रतिपत्तये ॥१४॥

The words, beginning with *vāyuh*, are to be taken only as an indicator of the deities (who superintend over different parts of the body), so that it becomes what was its own source.¹ [14]

This explains *tathānyadevatāḥ svām ...* in BUB.

¹Each of these deities merges into its own origin.

अग्निं स्वात्ममनःसंस्थामधुना देवतां गृही ।
प्रार्थयत्योमिति गिरा मुमूर्षुस्तत्परीप्सया ॥१५॥

Now, a householder, who is about to die, offers a prayer to Agni, (who is the deity) residing in his own body and *manas*, uttering the word *om*, with a desire to obtain (oneness) with the same. [15]

One remembers here *Gītā* 8.6:

yaṁ yaṁ vāpi smaran bhāvaṁ tyajaty ante kalevaram /
taṁ taṁ evaiti kaunteya sadā tadbhāvabhāvitah //

¹Here, the word *ātman* refers to the body.

सर्वस्याप्यवनादो स्यादवतेरो यतस्ततः ।
ऋतुर्मनोमयत्वाच्च सा हि संकल्परूपिणी ॥१६॥

Since Om is derived from the root *ava*, this one (Agni) is Om on account of his offering protection to all. And *kratu*

is because it originates in *manas*; that (deity)¹ is of the nature of a design (of what is to be done). [16]

¹The verse uses the word *sā* (a feminine form) and therefore it should be taken to refer to the *devatā* (feminine) of *kratu* (masculine).

ओं क्रतो इति संबोध्य स्मरेत्यत्र नियुज्यते ।
प्रकृष्टफलसंप्राप्तेः स्मृतिमात्रैकहेतुतः ॥१७॥
स्मर्तव्यं स्मर तेनाद्य मरणे प्रत्युपस्थिते ।
आदरार्थं स्मरेत्यस्य पुनः पुनरुद्वैरणम् ॥१८॥

Having addressed (the deity) with the words *Oṃ krato* ...— that (address) is connected with the word *smara*, because we obtain excellent fruit only by remembrance (of the deity). [17] Therefore (it is meant to say) remember what is to be remembered, now when (my) death is imminent. The repetition of the word *smara* again and again is only to express regard (for the deity). [18]

This is anakoluthic construction that was at times noticed only in Vedic Saṃhitās.

सुपथा नय नो वहे सुपथेति विशेषणात् ।
उदङ्मार्गग्रहो न्याय्यः शिष्टानां पुनरागतेः ॥१९॥

From the specification by the adjective *supatha* in 'O fire, lead us by a good path', it is only reasonable to accept the (movement of a departed Jīva by) the northern path; (this is so) because the others (who are not included in us in the prayer) do come back (to the mortal world) again. [19]

राये कर्मफलायेति रयिः कर्मफलं यतः ।
प्रज्ञानानि च सर्वाणि देव विद्वान्क्रियास्तथा ॥२०॥

The word *rāye* means *karmaphalāya* 'for securing the result

of the (ritual) activity', since it (viz. *rayi*) is the result of *karman* 'ritual activity'. (So also it is said) 'O god ...' (for) he is a knower—there is here a reference to all the inner thoughts¹ (of the worshippers) as also to (ritual) actions. [20]

¹These are *prajñānāni*, a paraphrase of the word *vayunāni* in the Vedic Mantra. Since the phrase *kriyās tathā* stands beside *prajñānāni*, we have to refer it to the inner thoughts.

कुटिलं च तथा पापमस्मत्तस्त्वं वियोजय ।
वयं तु कृतकृत्यत्वादशक्ताश्च मुमूर्षवः ॥२१॥
नमउक्तिमतो भक्त्या तुभ्यं बहुतमां धिया ।
आयुषोऽन्ते विधेमाद्य क्षम देव प्रसीद मे ॥२२॥

And similarly remove from us our sin, i.e. evil, (O God). As for ourselves, we are now weak after having done our religious duties and are about to die. [21]

Therefore, at the end of our life, we offer to you with devotion a respectful prayer (which is) the most potent in thought (*bahutamā dhiyā*).

Therefore we offer you at the end of our life a prayer in (full) respect, with devotion, and the most potent in thought (*bahutamā*). Forgive me, O God, and be favourable also. [22]

Here, in these verses, there is a change from *vayam* understood from 'us' to *aham* (viz. me). This is because Sureśvara is trying to explain the intention in the Vedic verse, viz. the offering of a prayer by one which meant the offering by all.

मस्करीन्द्रप्रणीतस्य भवनामभृतो यतेः ।
भाष्यस्य वार्तिकोक्त्यैवमध्यायः सप्तमो गतः ॥२३॥

Thus ends the seventh Adhyāya of my statement in the Vārtika on the Bhāṣya composed by the best of the ascetics who bears the name of Bhava (i.e. Lord Śiva). [23]

इति श्रीबृहदारण्यकोपनिषद्भाष्यवार्तिके पञ्चमाध्यायस्य
सप्तदशं ब्राह्मणम् ॥१७॥

इति श्रीमत्परमहंसपरिव्राजकाचार्यभगवत्पज्यपादशिष्य-
श्रीसुरेश्वरचार्यविरचिते बृहदारण्यकोपनिषद्भाष्यवार्तिके
पञ्चमोऽध्यायः ॥५॥

**BRHADĀRANYAKOPANIṢAD-
BHĀṢYA-VĀRTIKA**

6.1

समाप्तः सप्तमोऽध्यायः प्राप्तावसर उच्यते ।
अष्टमः खिलकाण्डेऽस्मिन्पूर्वकाण्डेष्वनुविततः ॥१॥

The seventh¹ Adhyāya has been discussed conclusively. Now will be explained the eighth Adhyāya, which has an occasion (i.e. proper scope) in this Kāṇḍa, the Khila Kāṇḍa 'book pertaining to what is to be appended',² owing to the absence of the discussion (lit. statement) about it in the former Kāṇḍas.³ [1]

¹Sureśvara refers to the traditional method of numbering the Adhyāyas of BU. Therefore Adhyāyas 1, 2 ... 6 are mentioned by him as Adhyāyas 3, 4 ... 8. Cf. note at the beginning of our Udgītha Brāhmaṇa [Vol.4,1991], i.e. BUBV 3.1.1.

²BU Adhyāyas 1-2 are named Madhu Kāṇḍa, Adhyāyas 3-4, Yājñavalkya Kāṇḍa (cf. 3.1.1 above) or Muni Kāṇḍa and Adhyāyas 5-6 comprise Khila Kāṇḍa.

³This indicates the matter in this Adhyāya, viz. what is non-Brahman (SP).

गायत्र्याः प्राणभावोक्तिः कस्माद्धेतोः पुरोदिता ।
न तु वागादिभावोऽस्यास्तत्र हेतुरिहोच्यते ॥२॥

There was statement earlier of the reason as to why the Gāyatrī¹ became Prāṇa; but it was not stated as to why it did not become Vāc and others. (Now) is stated here the reason for that (viz. not so happening). [2]

¹Refer to BU 5.14.

ज्येष्ठः श्रेष्ठो यतः प्राणो न तु वागादयस्ततः ।
प्राणात्मभाव एवोक्त आनन्तर्यार्थमेव तु ॥३॥

Since Prāṇa is the eldest and the greatest, and (*tu*) Vāc and others are not (so); therefore, there it was stated that Gāyatrī became (only) Prāṇa. And (this subsequent Brāhmaṇa is) only for stating (what) follows (*prāṇopāsanā* in the preceding Brāhmaṇa). [3]

This verse rejects the view that the reference to the *jyeṣṭhatva* ... of Prāṇa would indicate this section to form an ancillary of *ukthopāsanā*.

उपास्त्यन्तरमेवैतत्फलवत्तु विवक्षितम् ।
न तूक्तशेषतैतस्या भिन्नोपास्तित्वकारणात् ॥४॥

(One would say:) 'This is another worship¹ and has a result also; it is intended to state this'. (The Vedāntin answers:) 'This is not for conveying any ancillary (or a subordinate) to what is mentioned (earlier);² since there is a different reason for another worship'. [4]

¹One connected with Mantha 'offering of a stream of clarified butter'.

²This refers to the Mantha offering at BU 6.3.1.

मन्थकर्मणि ये मन्त्राः पञ्च ज्येष्ठादयः श्रुताः ।
प्राणात्मवेदिनस्तेषां प्रयोगोऽत्रोपवर्ण्यते ॥५॥

Here is described the mode (of the performance of the recitation) of the five Mantras,¹ viz. *jyeṣṭha* etc., in the ritual of the Mantha by one who knows the nature of Prāṇa. [5]

¹These are discussed in BU 6.3 and this Brāhmaṇa is then ancillary to the Mantha worship and is thus useful.

पृथग्वा फलनिर्देशाद्यो ह वा इति पञ्चधा ।
प्राणविद्या पृथङ्मन्थान्मन्थस्तु महिमार्थिनः ॥६॥

Or rather, on account of the distinct mention of the fivefold result in (the words) *yo ha vā* (BU 6.1.2-6),¹ the worship of Prāṇa is different from the Mantha (offering) and (*tu*) the Mantha is (prescribed) for one who seeks for (or, desires) greatness.² [6]

¹This is to reaffirm the distinction between the worship in BU and that in CU; in this latter, the Prāṇavidyā is described to be fivefold. The reason for the distinction is the reference to the Mantha worship.

²The ritual of the Mantha aims at achieving worldly prosperity and, as against this, the worship of Prāṇa aims at oneness with it.

फलेऽन्यस्मिन्ननिर्दिष्टे वाक्यशेषगतं फलम् ।
तस्मिन्सति हि सद्भावाद्वागादीनां न तं विना ॥७॥

If the result (of the worship of Prāṇa) were not mentioned as distinct, then it could belong to what was ancillary to (that mentioned in) the statement (of the Mantha worship). (But, only) that¹ being there, there would ensue (a result).² (And, the result) of speech and others could not (realise) without that.¹ [7]

¹Namely, Prāṇa.

²That is, becoming one with Prāṇa.

शास्त्रेणोक्ता शरीरेऽस्मिन्वृत्तिः प्राणस्य जीवनम् ।
पूर्वमाविशति प्राणो देहं पश्चाच्च मुञ्चति ॥८॥

The (distinct) function¹ (of each of Vāc and others) in a body is described by the scripture as the existence² of Prāṇa

(in it). (Thus:) Prāṇa first enters into a body and leaves it later (i.e. in the end). [8]

¹This is *vr̥tti*.

²This is also *vr̥tti* (= *astitva*).

ज्येष्ठः श्रेष्ठश्च सर्वेषां प्राणानामाश्रयो हि सः ।
श्रेष्ठता वक्ष्यमाणेन ग्रन्थेनास्य विभाव्यते ॥९॥

And that (Prāṇa is) the eldest and the greatest, because it is the support¹ of *prāṇas*.² The greatness of this (Prāṇa) is explained by the text which will be stated.³ [9]

This explains *yo ha vai jyeṣṭham...* (BU 6.1.1).

¹That is, abode (during the span of an individual's life).

²It means: organs and/or the winds in a body.

³This refers to BU 6.1.7ff.

असिंमल्लोके परसिंमश्च वागेव न विहन्यते ।
देहान्तरस्थान्प्राणांश्च नियुङ्क्ते सा ततोऽधिका ॥१०॥

Only Vāc is not destroyed in this world and in that beyond; it enjoins the *prāṇas* abiding in various bodies.¹ Therefore, it is greater (than them).² [10]

¹Like Prāṇa, Vāc remains in both the worlds; even though it exists in different bodies.

²Read SP: *sarvapravṛtter vāgadhīnatvād atas tebhyo 'dhikā*. It adds: *sopāsyā* 'that Vāc is to be worshipped'.

श्रुतान्मतात्तथोक्ताद्वा प्रमाणं दृष्टिरात्मनः ।
चक्षुः प्रतिष्ठा ज्ञानानामात्मा तत्र प्रतिष्ठितः ॥११॥

Knowledge (lit. seeing) of the Ātman¹ is considered (by some) a (greater) means of knowing than what is heard,² thought or as stated by;³ (therefore,) *cakṣus* is the support of all kinds

of knowledge, for the Ātman is steady there (in *cakṣus*). [11]

This explains *yo ha vai pratiṣṭhām* ... (BU 6.1.3).

¹That is, the nature of it.

²Or alternatively, accepted/upheld by the elites.

³Three alternatives are understood thus: *śruta*, *mata* or *ukta*.

वाग्धि संपद्यते श्रोत्रादश्रुतं न हि भाषते ।
स्ववृत्तेः परवृत्तेश्च संपच्छ्रोत्रे प्रतिष्ठिता ॥१२॥

Since Vāc is enriched on account of ear and does not 'indeed' speak what is not heard; (therefore) the richness from the function of itself (i.e. ear) or of others is steadied¹ in the ear. [12]

This explains *yo ha vai sampadam* ... (BU 6.1.4); *sampad* here is 'riches'.

¹Or alternatively, firmly established.

मन आयतनं तत्र वागादीनां हि वृत्तयः ।
स्थितास्तत्पूर्विकाश्चैव ध्यायतः साधनं हि तत् ॥१३॥

manas is the abode and therein, indeed, (are performed) the functions of Vāc and the others and they are steadied¹ only (when) preceded by it,² (for) that is the means for one who meditates. [13]

This explains *yo ha vā āyatanam* ... (BU 6.1.5).

¹In other words, they continue to be performed.

²Namely, the function of *manas*.

उपस्थेन्द्रियं प्रजातिः स्यात्तस्य जन्मैकहेतुतः ।
न हि रेतो विना जन्म प्राणिनोऽत्र समीक्ष्यते ॥१४॥

*prajāti*¹ is the generative organ, because it is the cause of the origin (of beings); nowhere is here² noticed the birth

of any being without a seed.

[14]

This explains *yo ha vai prajātim ...* (BU 6.1.6).

¹That which has the attribute of generation.

²Namely, in this world.

वृत्तीनां प्राणपूर्वत्वाद्द्वयपदेशाच्च तत्कृतात् ।
प्राणानां प्रथमः प्राणः स ह्यत्तान्नं हि तस्य तत् ॥१५॥

Since the (various) functions (of the organs in the body) are preceded by Prāṇa¹ and mention is made of them² by that,³ therefore, Prāṇa is the first⁴ of *prāṇas*. It is indeed⁵ the eater and that food is for it.⁶ [15]

This states the purport of the six worships mentioned earlier in BU 6.1.1-6.

¹Cf. verse 8 above.

²That is, the organs.

³Namely, by the word *prāṇa*.

⁴Possibly both the eldest and the greatest.

⁵Read SP: *prathamō hiśabdo mukhyaprāṇasya jīvābhedanātrītopapādako dvitīyo vāgāder bhogyāntarbhāvena tathā-tvāvedakah.*

⁶The words 'for it' can be expressed as 'belonged to it'. 'That food' refers to the enjoyment through various organs.

Now follows the exposition of the narrative of the dispute among *prāṇas* over the greatness of only one (BU 6.1.7ff.). This occurs also at CU 5.1.6-12; 5.2.2; (in brief at) Kauṣītakyupaniṣad 2.14, 3.3; Praśnopaniṣad 2.1.2-4.

ते प्राणाः स्वगुणैरुक्तैर्वसिष्ठत्वादिलक्षणैः ।
श्रेयानस्म्यहमेवेति विवदन्तः परस्परम् ॥१६॥

Those *prāṇas* (which are thus) characterized by their own properties, beginning with the word *vasiṣṭha*¹ as stated (before

in BU 6.1.2ff.) were disputing with one another (over their relative greatness in words) 'I am greater'.² [16]

¹The best helper or the one who covers/protects best.

²SP comments: *nirdhārayitum na pārayanti sma*.

निर्णयार्थाय ते ब्रह्म जग्मुरिन्द्रं प्रजापतिम् ।
को नो वसिष्ठ इति तं पप्रच्छुर्निर्णयार्थिनः ॥१७॥

For obtaining a decision (regarding that matter), they¹ approached the Brahman,² viz. Indra³ Prajāpati. They,¹ seeking decision, asked him, 'Who amongst us is *vasiṣṭha* 'most shining'?' [17]

¹This refers to Prāṇa.

²Or Prajāpati denoted by the word Brahman. That is also Indra because of his connection with, or superintending over, the *prāṇas*.

³Indra, possibly because of his connection with *indriya*?

यस्मिन्व इति वाक्येन वसिष्ठत्वस्य लक्षणम् ।
प्राणेभ्यः प्राब्रवीद्ब्रह्म पक्षपातभयात्किल ॥१८॥

The Brahman declared to the *prāṇas* the description¹ of being *vasiṣṭha* in the sentence *yasmin vah ...*,² lest he might be taken to have shown partiality, (as it were). [18]

¹Literally, indication.

²Cf. BU 6.1.7.

जानन्नपि वसिष्ठादिगुणवत्त्वं यथार्थतः ।
तथापि नावदद्ब्रह्म स्वानुभूत्यवबुद्धये ॥१९॥

Knowing though full well¹ about the (character of Prāṇa as) being possessed of the qualities of *vasiṣṭha*² etc., the Brahman did not declare (the same yet), with the intention that (they³

should have) their own (i.e. direct) experience. [19]

¹Or alternatively, though he (Indra Prajāpati), in reality, knew full well.

²These are: being *vasiṣṭha*, *pratiṣṭhā*, *sampad*, *āyatana* and *prajāti* mentioned in BU 6.1.2-6.

³This refers to the *prāṇas*.

उत्क्रान्तेऽन्यतमे यस्मिन्प्रत्येकमपसर्पणे ।
पापीयो मन्यते लोको वसिष्ठो वः समीक्ष्यताम् ॥२०॥

‘Let that one amongst you be known as *vasiṣṭha* who having departed from (the body), i.e. gone away (from it), the people would consider the body as more wretched.’¹ [20]

¹Already, it is held, the body is wretched (lit. full of sin or impurity), but it would now be more wretched. SP paraphrases *pāpa* as *asprśya* ‘not worth touching’.

अन्वयव्यतिरेकाभ्यां वसिष्ठत्वावबुद्धये ।
उपास्यार्थपरीक्षायै प्रवृत्तैषा परा श्रुतिः ॥२१॥

Now proceeds this subsequent (Śruti) text to examine (the nature of) the object (worthy) to be worshipped by Anvaya and Vyatireka, with a view to ascertaining the character of *vasiṣṭha* etc. [21]

This refers to *vāg ghoccakrama* ... (BU 6.1.8ff.).

संहतानां क्रियासिद्धेः करणानां पृथक्पृथक् ।
नैकैकस्य क्रियासिद्धिः शिबिकोद्वाहवत्ततः ॥२२॥

(This is so) since the activity of the organs can be secured (only if they function) as jointly,¹ there cannot be therefore the performance of the function by (any) one of them, by itself, as in the case of carrying a palanquin (by its bearers

jointly and not severally).²

[22]

¹The words 'jointly' and 'by itself (i.e. severally)' are emphasised with a view to ignoring the period of a year (which is not of much significance) in the context.

²This is an instance of Sureśvara's cryptic expression of a simile; that is, some relevant corresponding details are omitted.

प्राणप्राधान्यसिद्धयर्थं श्रुत्याख्यायिकच्छद्मना ।
अन्वयव्यतिरेकाभ्यां न्यायो लौकिक उच्यते ॥२३॥

(Here) is stated in the Śruti a well-known instance in the worldly happenings, under the pretext of a narrative, yet by employing (the method of) Anvaya and Vyatireka, with a view to establishing the superiority of Prāṇa (to the *prāṇas*). [23]

The word *-khyāyika-* is adopted for *-khyāyikā-*.

This states the purport of *yathākalāḥ yathāsandhāḥ yathā badhirāḥ yathā mugdhāḥ* and *yathā klībāḥ* in BU 6.1.8-12.

यथा मुका विना वाचा यथान्धाश्चक्षुषा विना ।
इत्यादिवचसा प्राणे सति जीवनमुच्यते ॥२४॥

By the statement 'as they are dumb, when without Vāc', (and) 'as they are blind, when without *cakṣus*' etc. it is asserted that there is activity (or capacity for any function) (in a body) when there is Prāṇa in it.¹ [24]

¹SP adds *tasmāt prāṇāḥ śreṣṭha iti śeṣaḥ*.

उत्क्रान्तौ च प्रवेशे च ह्यलं देहः स्वकर्मणे ।
वागादीनां न पातोऽस्य नापि चोत्थानमीक्ष्यते ॥२५॥

Since a body is capable of activity even while Vāc and others leave it and/or enter into it, the fall or rise of Vāc and others (by themselves) is not (anywhere) seen. [25]

उत्क्रान्ते प्राण एवास्माच्छरीरं पतति ध्रुवम् ।
उत्तिष्ठति प्रविष्टे च प्राणः श्रेयांस्ततोऽन्यतः ॥२६॥

A body certainly falls when only Prāṇa has departed from it¹ and it rises when (Prāṇa) has entered (into it); therefore Prāṇa is greater (than others and not for any other reason).²

[26]

¹Literally, this one.

²That is to say: No other reason needs be adduced to prove its superiority.

मामृते जीवितुं ययं यद्यशक्ताः स्थ सर्वदा ।
प्रधानं तर्हि मां वित्त भवन्तश्चापराधिनः ॥२७॥

'If you are, at all times, unable to live¹ without me; then know me (as) the principal (one) and you (who have denied this earlier) are offenders.'²

[27]

This is the purport of *te hocur* ... (BU 6.1.13).

¹That is to say: to perform your function.

²This is the intended/imaginary remark by the Brahman (Prajāpati Indra) which concludes the controversy among the *prāṇas*. They are offenders in not recognising the greatness of Prāṇa.

करं बलिं प्रधानाय दत्त वागादयोऽचिरात् ।
इत्युक्तास्ते तथेत्यूचुः सर्वस्वं ददते प्रभोः ॥२८॥

'Therefore, O Vāc and others, quickly¹ give tribute, i.e. offering of oblation, to the principal one', (said the Brahman). Thus told, they said, 'So (be it)' and they gave all that was their own to the lord.²

[28]

¹That is, without hesitation or delay.

²That is, Prāṇa, their overlord.

त्वद्वसिष्ठतयैवाहं वाग्वसिष्ठेत्युदाहरत् ।
इत्युक्त्वान्येऽपि सर्वस्वं ददुर्वागादयः सुराः ॥२९॥

Vāc said, 'I am *vasiṣṭha* only through your being *vasiṣṭha*'. Thus saying,¹ the other deities,² also (addressed Prāṇa) Vāc and others gave (to Prāṇa) all that was their own. [29]

¹It means: in these words.

²That is to point out that the deities of the organs, viz. Agni etc., accepted the superiority of Prāṇa.

किमन्नं मे बुभुक्षोः स्याद्वासो वा मे किमीर्यताम् ।
इति प्राणवचः श्रुत्वा प्रत्यूचुः करणानि तम् ॥३०॥
आ श्वभ्यो यदिदं किञ्चिदा कृमिभ्यश्च लक्ष्यते ।
अन्नं तद्वतः सर्वं वयं त्वच्छेषभोगिनः ॥३१॥

Then having heard the words of Prāṇa, 'What is the food for me, who am hungry (lit. desirous of eating), and (*vā*) what garment for me? Tell me', said the organs to it, [30]

'Whatever food is noticed (to be) for (the beings, viz.) from the dogs and up to the insects, (all of it) is (only) for you and we are partakers of what remains (from it).' [31]

जीवः प्राणोऽत्र संसारी भोक्तेन्द्रियमनःपरः ।
प्राणो ह्येतानि सर्वाणि भवतीति च लिङ्गतः ॥३२॥

In this context, Prāṇa is the individual being (which is) transmigratory, the enjoyer, and dependent on organs and *manas*. That Prāṇa, indeed, becomes all of these (known) from the indication (in the Śruti).¹ [32]

Verse 32 averts the idea that sentience in an individual is different from Prāṇa, which can be devoid of a body.

¹Cf. *ātmendriyamanoyuktam* ... (*Kaṭhopaniṣad* 3.4).

तन्मया हीतरे प्राणास्तन्मूलास्तन्निबन्धनाः ॥३३॥

Indeed, the other *prāṇas* are made up of that;¹ they have it as their origin and they have dependence on it.² [33]

¹That is, *Prāṇa*, called *jīva* when in a transmigratory body.

²The origin, the sustenance and also the merger into it are understood from this. Cf. BS 1.1.2: *janmādy asya yataḥ*. Also cf. *sa eva teṣāṃ svāmī tam utkrāmantam iti śruteḥ* (SP).

एवंविदे हि नानन्नं किञ्चिदस्तीति दर्शनात् ।

फलं स्यात्प्राणसायुज्यं सर्वं तस्य हि भोजनम् ॥३४॥

In the case of the one, who knows thus, there is not anything which is not food—this is so, because of (thus) seeing (by the Śruti). Therefore, the result will be one's union (i.e. oneness) with *Prāṇa*, because all the food is (only) for it.¹

[34]

¹Cf. verses 30 and 31 above; (only) is used to indicate the force of *hi*.

भवत्यत्ता स सर्वस्य नान्नं भवति कस्यचित् ।

केवलेऽवस्थितेऽतृत्वे मृत्युनापि न गीर्यते ॥३५॥

And (*Prāṇa*) is the eater of all; food cannot be for anyone (else). Thus is established as the character (of *Prāṇa*) as the (one) eater, without a second, it is not swallowed even by Death.

[35]

अद्भिः परिदधत्येनमशिष्यन्त इति श्रुतेः ।

विदधाति ह्यपां पानमपूर्वं शास्त्रलक्षणम् ॥३६॥

(It is understood) from the Śruti (statement) *adbhiḥ paridadhaty enam aśiṣyantah*. ['They encircle this one with water, when

they are proceeding to eat.']. (Here) the scriptural injunction¹ lays down sipping of water which was not (known) before.² [36]

¹Cf. *bhokṣyamānam bhuktavantam ca prāṇam adbhiḥ paridadhāti* (not traced).

²SP tells that sipping of water is different from that prescribed by a Smṛti.

शास्त्रं मुख्यार्थमेव स्याद्विध्यर्थं यदि कल्प्यते ।
युक्तः फलानुषङ्गोऽस्य वासोलाभो विधिर्यदि ॥३७॥

Śāstra would (generally) be¹ conveying the primary sense,² if³ it is taken for an injunction.⁴ (And) it is only proper that it (viz. this injunction)⁵ has association with a result, viz. if⁶ (it is accepted as) an injunction for acquiring garments.⁷ [37]

¹The words 'would be' mean 'is'.

²That is, that which is expressed by the verbs in the Present Indicative sense.

³This 'if' is for 'because'.

⁴Cf *dadhnā juhōti* (a *vidhi* 'injunction' means '*dadhnā juhuyāt*').

⁵This injunction has reference to sipping of water which is mentioned earlier.

⁶The word 'if' means 'when'.

⁷Cf. SP: *nāphalānuṣaṅgo yukto vidheḥ*.

एके च शाखिनो व्यक्तं विधिरूपमधीयते ।
मन्त्रेण प्राशनं चापामेकेषां शाखिनां मतम् ॥३८॥

But (*ca*) some followers of another branch (of the Veda) read (in this context) a clear form of the injunction¹ and the opinion of the followers of yet another branch (of the Veda) is that there is 'sipping of water with (the recitation of) a Mantra'.² [38]

¹These are the followers of CU. The injunction is *asiṣyann ācāmed aśitvā cācāmet* (cp. BU 6.1.14). SP refers to *sarva-vedāntapratyayanyāya*, i.e. BS 3.3.1; cf. note under BUBV 3.1.3 above.

²*amṛtopastaranam asy amṛtāpidhānam asi* (*Taittirīya Āraṇyaka* 10.32.1; *Hiranyakeśi Grhya Sūtra* 1.13). This implies that sipping of water, which is mentioned earlier, is without any recitation.

अत्रदर्शनवच्चैके वासोदृष्टिं प्रचक्षते ।
 प्रायत्यार्थमपां पाने दृष्टेः प्रकरणादिह ।
 सर्वाभक्ष्यप्रसक्तिः स्याद्यदि कर्म विधित्स्यते ॥३९॥

Some say that this looking upon (water) is accepting it as a garment, because, here, through the force of the context (*prakaraṇa*), looking upon water has the meaning of not being naked.¹ If a ritual were (actually) prescribed, then there would be the contingency of eating all forbidden food. [39]

¹See Śaṅkara's paraphrase of *prāyatyārtham* (CU 5.2.2) as *anagnatārtham* 'for not remaining naked'.

इति श्रीबृहदारण्यकोपनिषद्भाष्यवार्तिके षष्ठाध्यायस्य
 प्रथमम् ब्राह्मणम् ॥१॥

BRHADĀRANYAKOPANIṢAD-
BHĀṢYA-VĀRTIKA

6.2

Introductory.

यत्र संभावितं पूर्वं वस्तुप्राधान्यहेतुतः ।
वक्तुं तदत्र वक्तव्यं खिलकाण्डाधिकारतः ॥१॥

What was not considered earlier for saying, on account of the fact that there was prominence (given to) the thing (i.e. Ātman) is (to be stated) here, since there is the scope¹ for it in this (portion of the) Khila Kāṇḍa. [1]

¹This refers to *adhikāra*, viz. the topic which is begun in BU fifth Adhyāya.

सप्तमावसितावुक्तं मार्गप्रार्थनमग्नितः ।
सुपथेति श्रुतं तत्र श्रुत्या मार्गविशेषणम् ॥२॥

In the end of the fifth Adhyāya is stated a request to Agni (for showing) the way; there, in the words *supathā* ...¹ of the Śruti, is heard a qualifying attribute of the path. [2]

This verse states what is not said in the end of BUBV 5.17.

¹This is reference to BUBV 5.17.19; the *rc* in view is *R̥gveda* 1.189.1.

²Sureśvara uses *supathā* as an adjective of *mārga*; but, the *rc* has *supathā*, (in the instrumental case) which means 'by good path'. Sureśvara clarified his thought in the following verse.

संभवे व्यभिचारे च विशेषणविशेष्ययोः ।
दृष्टं विशेषणं लोके यथेहापि तथेक्ष्यताम् ॥३॥

And as, about the rule of the concomitance of an adjective and a substantive (in common parlance), there is a possibility of deviation from it, viz. (only) the adjective is noticed (or, used); so also should this¹ be understood (lit. seen) here.

[3]

¹Sureśvara seems to take *supathā* as only an adjective of *mārgena* which is to be supplied. His idea is: the word *loke* 'in common parlance (lit. the world)' refers, as SP points out, to the use of *nīlam* (*ānaya*) for *nīlam kamalam* (*ānaya*); the use of the adjective alone becomes meaningful. NKL (ms p.822) writes *raktakambalaḥ ityādaḥ viśeṣaṇaviśeṣyāyor vyabhicāre viśeṣaṇam dr̥ṣṭam ity arthaḥ!* Also, it adds: *vimatānām pathām kathanāyottarabrāhmaṇam iti.*

सुपथेति ततो युक्तं संभवे भूयसां पथाम् ।
विशेषणमतो वाच्याः पन्थानः कर्महेतवः ॥४॥

Therefore, the adjective *supathā* would be proper, since there is a possibility that there are many paths (available). And, as such, the paths of ritual action, as their cause, have to be stated.

[4]

This is according to NKL (ms pp.822-823) the result following from the preceding verse (*phalitam āha*). Sureśvara appears to take *supathā* only as an adjective and implies the substantive *mārgena* (in the plural sense). But that appears to be tautologous like *gavām gopatim*. In the Vedic word *supathā*, *su* qualifies *pathin* and therefore it is there only a noun and that precludes the need of any other substantive.

दक्षिणोदगधोमार्गा विहितप्रतिषिद्धयोः ।
विपाकाः कर्मणोर्वाच्यास्तद्वैराग्यप्रसिद्धये ॥५॥

They are the paths to the south, to the north and towards (the world) below; they are the results of actions, either

prescribed or prohibited. They are to be stated so that one comes to have aversion to that.¹ [5]

Read with profit NKL (ms p.823) *ke mārṅāḥ kimartham vā kathyante (ity) āha.*

¹This refers to ritual action implied by *vihitapraṭiṣiddha*.

नाविरक्तस्य निःशेषसांसारिकपुमर्थतः ।
प्रवृत्तिर्मुक्तये तस्माच्छ्रुत्या यत्नात्तदुच्यते ॥६॥

There is here not (seen) any tendency (lit. activity) of one who is not averse to the entire group of the ends of human activity; therefore, that¹ is stated by the Śruti with special care. [6]

SP introduces this verse with *vairāgyoktir akiñcitkareti cen nety āha.*

¹This is referring to ritual activity which should be, according to the author, the cause for one's aversion to the same.

शक्नुवन्ति न कर्माणि सर्वकामसमापनम् ।
निषेद्धं वाखिलानर्थास्तत्फलस्यातिफल्गुतः ॥७॥

Ritual activities are not sufficient for (i.e. capable of) accomplishing all the desires (of a man), or for warding off all the undesirable results, because the result (lit. fruit) of them is¹ entirely insignificant. [7]

¹The singular implies all results— *jātāv ekavacanam*.

न कर्म कारणं मुक्तेर्नाग्निर्दाहज्वरापनुत् ।
कर्मभ्यो जन्म नियतं जन्म चेन्निर्वृतिः कुतः ॥८॥

Ritual activity is not the cause for (effecting) liberation, (in the same way as) fire is not a remover of burning fever. From (the performance of) rituals, it is certain that there is birth

(of an individual for a second time). So also, if there is a birth (again), how could there be the highest delight (i.e. liberation)? [8]

This verse argues, with examples, that rituals do not lead to the attainment of liberation.

न कर्मणा कनीयस्ता महत्त्वं चान्तरात्मनः ।
इति बाहुमिवोद्धृत्य वेदान्तैर्घोषणा कृता ॥९॥

There is neither inferiority nor superiority of the inner self by (one's doing the performances) of ritual activity—the Vedānta (texts) have loudly declared this, raising the hand upwards, as it were! ¹ [9]

Here is cited an argument for proving what is said in the preceding verse.

¹This indicates the sense: with full force.

न तत्र दक्षिणा यन्ति विद्ययैव तदाप्यते ।
इति श्रीयाज्ञवल्क्येन मुक्तकण्ठमुदाहृतम् ॥१०॥

There *dakṣiṇās* do not approach, ¹ that is obtained only through knowledge—the revered Yājñavalkya has uttered this, giving full vent to his throat. [10]

¹*Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa* 10.5.4.16.

अतो मुक्तिं परीच्छद्भिरुत्पत्त्यादिविरोधिनीम् ।
त्यक्त्वा कर्माण्यथैकात्म्यज्ञानं सर्वात्मनाश्रयेत् ॥११॥

Therefore, those, who aspire ¹ for liberation which is opposed to origin etc. (should abandon ritual activities). Then (one should), after having abandoned (all) activities, whole-heartedly (*sarvātmanā*) turn to (securing) the knowledge of (one's own) oneness with the Ātman. [11]

SP quotes in support of the last part of the verse the Śruti statement *brahmasaṁsthō 'mṛtatvam eti* (CU 2.23.1).

¹*parīcchadbhiḥ* is derived from *iṣ* with the preposition *pari*.

तमोन्तरायतो मुक्तेर्नान्तरायोऽपरोऽस्ति हि ।
तमोहतिर्न कर्मभ्यो ज्ञानात्सा व्यञ्जकत्वतः ॥१२॥

Since liberation has only darkness (i.e. ignorance) as its impediment and that there is, therefore, no other impediment, there is no destruction of darkness through rituals. It is (effected) by knowledge, because that has the capacity to reveal (the true nature of the Brahman). [12]

Thus, in the first twelve verses of this Brāhmaṇa, Sureśvara has stated the twofold connection of it with what is foregone: (i) something remained to be stated regarding rituals, viz. regarding many paths as indicated by the word *supathā*, and (ii) there is liberation resulting only from knowledge and ritual actions are connected with it as causes of bondage.

न तु त्वमेतयोर्वेत्युत्क्रान्त्यादिस्वलक्षणम् ।
षड्विधं परिणामार्थमग्निहोत्राहुतीहयोः ॥१३॥
इति प्रश्नप्रतिवचस्ते वा इत्यादिकं जगौ ।
लोकं प्रत्युत्थितं यावदग्निहोत्राहुतीहयोः ॥१४॥

'Have you indeed not known of these two?'—this, as indicative of the upward movement etc.,¹ viz. the sixfold things which result from the two, viz. Agnihotra-offering and desire; [13] these are the question and the answer, thus has the Śruti stated (lit. sung) in (the words) *te vai ...* and up to the words *lokam pratyutthitam ...* which have resulted from Agnihotra and desire. [14]

¹The word etc. refers to *gati*, *pratiṣṭhā*, *tripti*, *punarāvṛtti* and *loka*.

Now, Sureśvara refers to what was said in the context of the Agnihotra.

अपूर्वपरिणामोऽयमग्निहोत्राख्यकर्मणः ।
उत्क्रान्त्यादिगिरेहोक्त आलोकोत्थानवाक्यतः ॥१५॥

Here is stated the result ¹ of *apūrva* ² coming from the ritual activity called Agnihotra, beginning with the word *utkrānti* (and up to) rising unto a *loka*.³ [15]

¹SP refers this to the sixfold character of worldly existence.

²*apūrva* is a term used by the Mīmāṃsakas for referring to the subtle form of a ritual performance which has the potency to produce its effects (even at a later day, though not necessarily immediately).

³See note 1 on the preceding verse.

आहुत्योरग्निहोत्रस्य ह्यन्तरिक्षादिभेदतः ।
आ लोकोत्थानतः श्रुत्या उक्तापूर्वस्य विक्रिया ॥१६॥

The Śruti has declared (i.e. explained) the modification of *apūrva* in the words up to rising unto *loka*, viz. as divided into the sky etc. (as the result of) the two ¹ *āhutis* of Agnihotra. [16]

¹Cf. SP: *agnihotrasya dve sāyam prātarāhuti tayor apūrvasyāntarikṣadvyādilakṣaṇaṃ lokam pratyutthānād ā śadvidhā jagadātmikā vikriyā*.

BU 6.2.1 is under reference.

तदेवोक्तमिहालम्ब्य तदग्नीक्षणसिद्धये ।
श्वेतकेतुरिति ग्रन्थः पर आरभ्यतेऽधुना ॥१७॥

Having stuck to that very statement here, this subsequent part

of the Śruti, which begins with the word *śvetaketuh*, is now taken up for establishing the viewing of Agni (in the manifold world). [17]

पञ्चाग्निविद्या यत्नेन वृद्धेनाब्राह्मणादपि ।
हित्वा धनं च मानं च लब्धेत्युक्तिः स्तुतिर्धियः ॥१८॥

The statement, viz. an elderly person gave up wealth and respect and obtained with effort the lore of five fires, even from one who is not a Brāhmaṇa, is a statement of praise of the knowledge (of the Ātman). [18]

Cf. BU 6.3.1-15.

परिणामो हि पाकेन पाकश्च न विनाग्निना ।
दर्शनात्परिणामस्य पक्ता सर्वत्र पावकः ॥१९॥

Ripeness (can be effected) only by heating and there cannot be heating without fire; therefore, since there is sight of ripeness, one should see everywhere the fire as the heater. [19]

This is the purport of the narrative (*ākhyāyikā*). It occurs at BU 6.3.1-15 (cp. CU 5.3.1-5.10.2). Read NKL (ms p.823): *pariṇāmasya pākakāryatvāt pākasyāgnikāryatvāt dyulokādīpañcapadārthānām dehāpariṇāmahetutvād agniśabdatvam ity arthaḥ*. (This is clearer than SP.)

The narrative is given in the following verses.

समाप्ताशेषविद्यं हि समावर्त्य पिता सुतम् ।
समाप्ताशेषविद्योऽसीत्येवमाहोत्ससर्ज च ॥२०॥

The father (saw) the son, who returned (from his preceptor's house), after he had acquired fully¹ all the lores (to be learned), and said to him 'Now, you have fully obtained all the lores' and sent him away. [20]

¹SP states that the word *aśeṣa* refers to the knowledge of the Veda, together with the Purāṇas and Nyāyaśāstra.

निकषोपलसंस्थेषु वेदवित्सु परीक्ष्यताम् ।
विद्येयं यत्नतो वत्स द्रढिम्ने मच्छ्रुतस्य च ॥२१॥

(He said to him:) My child, let this learning (of yours) be tested among the knowers of Veda who stand as touch-stone (of knowledge); this (for) confirming that (learning) and also (that) which you have received from me. [21]

This explains the father's purpose in sending the son away.

प्रसिद्धातीव विद्वत्ता पञ्चालब्राह्मणेषु हि ।
तामेव परिषदं तस्मादाजगाम त्वरान्वितः ॥२२॥

Since the excellence of knowledge of the Brāhmaṇas of the Pañcāla country had been known; therefore, he went to the assembly of them, hastening (or, with haste). [22]

पञ्चालब्राह्मणाञ्जित्वा विद्योत्कर्षैकहेतुतः ।
राजानमपि जेष्यामीत्याजगाम नृपं ततः ॥२३॥

Then, with an intention, 'after having conquered the Brāhmaṇas of the Pañcāla country by the excellence of (my) learning, I shall conquer the king also', he came to the king. [23]

तं जिगीषुं समायान्तमुन्मार्गे संस्थितं द्विजम् ।
सन्मार्गप्रतिपत्त्यर्थं राजोवाच स्वशास्त्रतः ॥२४॥

Having seen him, a Brāhmaṇa, who was desirous of winning (others) and thus going on a wrong way, the king said to him with the purpose that he learnt (about) a good path, in accordance with the scriptural injunction for himself.¹ [24]

¹Cf. SP: *unmārgagā prajā sanmāрге sanḥkramaṇīyeti rājakṛtyam* and NKL: *unmārgasthaḥ sanmāрге netavyo rājñēti dharmasāstrād ity arthaḥ*.

आमन्त्रयामास च तं कुमारा३ इति बालवत् ।
प्रतिशुश्राव सोऽप्युक्तो भो३ इत्युक्त्या गुरुं यथा ॥२५॥

And he addressed him as unto a young lad 'O, boy'; he, on his part, answered 'Yes, Sir' as unto a teacher. [25]

These two ways of addressing are unusual according to the custom of the day. The boy was a Brāhmaṇa, and the king a Kṣatriya and, therefore, these ways of addressing were not considered as having propriety in them. But, that way was adopted by the king purposefully.

दर्पोत्सेकसमावेशान्नानुशिष्टोऽयमादरात् ।
पित्रेति जातसंदेहः पर्यपृच्छदतो नृपः ॥२६॥

Then, on account of excessive pride (in Śvetaketu), the king entertained a thought (lit. doubt in his mind), 'This one was not instructed by his father carefully¹' and asked (him) a question. [26]

¹Literally, with respect for the method of instruction.

अनुशिष्टोऽसि किं पित्रा उताहो नेति भण्यताम् ।
नानुशिष्टस्य जगति वृत्तमीदृक्समीक्ष्यते ॥२७॥

'Have you been instructed by your father?¹ or not? Tell me this.' (This he did) since such a behaviour (as Śvetaketu's) is not seen in this world, on the part of one who is instructed.

[27]

¹This (viz. *pitṛā utāho*— not joined in Saṃdhi) is in accordance with SP: *kalpadvayaspaṣṭatāyai viśaṃdhikaraṇam*.

बाढं पित्रानुशिष्टोऽस्मि किं न पश्यसि मज्जयम् ।
त्वत्पण्डितेषु सर्वेषु पृच्छ मां यदि शङ्कसे ॥२८॥

‘Yes, I have been instructed by my father. Why! do you not see my victory (in debate) among all your learned men (i.e. Paṇḍits)? Ask them, if you have any doubt (about my instruction).’ [28]

This is the meaning of *om* in BU.

एवं राज्ञो यथोक्तोक्त्या ह्यभ्युपेतेऽनुशासने ।
श्वेतकेतुमथाप्राक्षीत्पञ्च प्रश्नान्क्रमान्नृपः ॥२९॥

Thus, at the words of the king that are stated (before), when (Śvetaketu) admitted¹ (that he had received) instruction from the father, the king asked him five (following) questions in order. [29]

¹Add, in his answer ‘*om*’.

BU 6.2.2 is under reference.

अनुशिष्टोऽसि चेद्ब्रूहि तुल्येऽपि मरणे प्रजाः ।
यथा विप्रतिपद्यन्ते भिन्नवर्त्मप्रभेदतः ॥३०॥

(i) ‘Tell me, now that (lit. if) you have been instructed, how all people, (who) have a common death, proceed variously along different ways.’ [30]

येन कर्मविशेषेण समानायां मृतौ प्रजाः ।
अन्या अन्येन संयान्ति यथान्येनापरास्तथा ॥३१॥

(ii) ‘By what specific action do the people, who have a common death, proceed, some of them by one way and some others, by another?’ [31]

त्वयोक्तं न विवेदाहं नानुशिष्टिरिहास्ति मे ।
वेत्थेह ता यथा भूय आवर्तन्ते प्रजा इति ॥३२॥

(Śvetaketu answered:) 'I do not know what you have asked (lit. said); there has been no instruction imparted unto me, in this respect.' (iii) 'Have you known as to how the people once again come to this world?', (the king asked). [32]

यथा येन मृताः सत्यो हेतुनानेन च प्रजाः ।
तं वेत्थ स्विन्न वेत्युक्तो नेति होवाच तं पुनः ॥३३॥

'(And) as to how, after having died, the people (return to life) and by such and such a cause, have you or have you not known that?', thus asked, Śvetaketu answered him again, 'No, (I do not know)'. [33]

प्रयद्भिरसकृद्भूतैर्महद्भिर्बहुभिः सदा ।
नैवासौ पूर्यते लोको यथा वेत्थ तथात्र किम् ॥३४॥

(iv) 'Also, have you known how the world does not get fully filled when the ever large number of beings are moving (unto it) again and again?' [34]

नेति होवाच पृष्टः सन्नाजा पप्रच्छ तं पुनः ।
हुतायामाहुतौ वेत्थ यतिथ्यां पुरुषाभिधाः ॥३५॥
आप एव समुत्थाय पुरुषाकृतयो हुताः ।
प्रवदन्ति यथा वेत्थ तथाशु प्रतिपद्यताम् ॥३६॥

(Thus) asked, (Śvetaketu) answered; 'No, (I do not know)'. Then the king asked him again (v) 'Have you known as to what is the number of the offering, in order, in which waters are called men, [35]
rise in the form of men and begin to speak?, tell me quickly, if you know this.' [36]

राजानं नेति होवाच नाहं वेद्मि त्वयोदितम् ।
 पर्यपृच्छदतो राजा शान्तदर्पं द्विजं पुनः ॥३७॥
 पथस्त्वं देवयानस्य पितृयाणस्य वाञ्जसा ।
 वेत्थ प्रतिपदं किंवा न वेत्सीत्यभिधीयताम् ॥३८॥

To the king he said (in answer): 'No, I do not know what you have said'. Then the king again asked the Brāhmaṇa, whose pride was subdued; [37]

'Have you known well about the path Devayāna and/or Pitṛyāna? or, have you known or not known the means to the access (to it)? Tell me.' [38]

This verse explains the meaning of the word *pratipad* 'action towards securing (Devayāna etc.)' i.e. what becomes useful as a means. Read also BU *yat kṛtvā (devayānaṃ vā panthānam) pratipadyante*; cf. the following verse.

प्रतिपद्वचनस्यार्थं यत्कृत्वेत्यादराच्छ्रुतिः ।
 व्याचष्टे देवयानादिप्रतिपत्तौ क्रियैव सा ॥३९॥

In the words *yat kṛtvā* ... 'i.e. by doing which' the Śruti has respectfully explained the meaning of the word *pratipad*: it is just an action for securing the Devayāna etc. [39]

स्वाभ्युह इति मा शङ्कीर्यतो मार्गद्वयेऽपि नः ।
 ऋषेर्मन्त्रस्य श्रवणमस्ति तच्च विभाव्यते ॥४०॥

'Do not think that this is my construct (or, imagination), since, in respect of the two paths also, we have heard a Mantra from a seer and that is being revealed (i.e. explained) to you.' [40]

द्वे सृती अशृणवं साक्षात्संबन्धिन्यौ दिवौकसाम् ।
 पितॄणां चापि मर्त्यानां मार्गौ तावधिकारतः ॥४१॥

'I have heard (i.e. known about) two paths which are related

directly to the dwellers of the heaven (i.e. gods) and also of the manes; and these two are for men according to their eligibility.' [41]

This is *Rgveda* 10.88.15.

ताभ्यां सर्वमिदं गच्छद्यथाकर्म यथाश्रुतम् ।
समेति मध्ये भोगाय रोदस्योः कर्मणौ जगत् ॥४२॥

Going by those two paths, all this world attains (to them): between the two worlds,¹ in accordance with its actions or knowledge, for experiencing the result² of the action. [42]

¹This refers to the heaven and the earth.

²Singular form implies plural (*jātāv ekavacanam*).

त्वदुक्तात्प्रश्नगणतो न वेद्म्येकमपीरितम् ।
प्रश्नं मा मामतः प्राक्षीरित्युक्त्वावाक्शिरा ह्यभूत् ॥४३॥

(Śvetaketu) said: 'From the number (lit. group) of questions I have not known any one question, which you have asked me; therefore, do not ask me (any more)'. Having said this, he stood with his head lowered down. [43]

This explains *athainam* ... (BU 6.2.3).

BU 6.2.3 is under reference.

निर्धूताशेषकलुषं शान्तदर्पं समीक्ष्य तम् ।
वसत्यामन्त्रयांचक्र उष्यतामिति पार्थिवः ॥४४॥

Having seen him with all his blemish washed away (and) with his pride subdued, the king invited him to stay¹ (with himself), saying, 'Stay with me'. [44]

¹*vasatyā* is for *vasatyartham* as paraphrased in the next verse.

हीतो रोषाच्च तद्वाक्यं वसत्यर्थमुदीरितम् ।
अनादृत्य प्रदुद्राव यत्रास्ते गौतमः पिता ॥४५॥

Disregarding his words, for invitation to stay, (Śvetaketu), on account of shame and anger, rushed away (*pra*) to where his father Gautama stayed. [45]

This explains *anādr̥tya* in BU text.

प्राप्याथ पितरं रोषात्साभ्यसूयं निराह सः ।
इति वावेति वचनं पूर्वोत्तरविरोधतः ॥४६॥

Having approached his father he said to him, with anguish (lit. anger) with exasperation, '(Have you not) thus (declared to me) "Thus indeed (you have been fully instructed)."'? (The words) contradict (what was said) earlier and (what the situation is now) later. [46]

This explains *taṁ hovāca* in BU.

इतीत्युक्तपरामर्शो वाकोवाक्यं नृपेरितम् ।
अप्रात्यक्ष्यात्किलेत्युक्तिरनुमानाद्धि तद्गतिः ॥४७॥

The word *iti* (in BU 6.2.3) refers to what was said (viz.) the series of questions asked by the king; the word (lit. utterance) *kila* is owing to the indirectness (in it); it is understood by inference.¹ [47]

The falsehood in the father's words, 'You have been fully instructed' is inferred from the son's ignorance about what the king asked. This is 'clarified' in the following verses: The word *vākovākya* in the verse primarily means Tarka (as also *praśnavacanāsamūha*— NKL) and therefore the use of the words *anumānād dhi tadgatiḥ* becomes imperative.

नृपोक्त्यभिभवान्लिङ्गाद्विचिंतोऽस्मीति लिङ्गयते ।
यथावदनुशिष्टस्य नाभिभूतिर्यतोऽन्यतः ॥४८॥

From the indication, viz. the insult inflicted (on the son) by the words of the king, is conveyed (lit. indicated), 'I have been deceived (by you)', since there would not have come any insult from (another person) to one (i.e. me, here) who was properly instructed (by you, as told by you then). [48]

तं मामननुशिष्यैव किमित्युक्तं त्वया पुरा ।
अनुशिष्टोऽसि पुत्रेति विचिंतोऽस्मीत्यतौ मतिः ॥४९॥

'(Thus) having not (fully) instructed me, why did you tell me thus earlier: 'O son, you are (now fully) instructed'? Therefore, I feel that I have been deceived', said the son. [49]

कथं त्वं नानुशिष्टोऽसि ब्रूहि तत्कारणं मम ।
पञ्च मामित्यतोऽवोचद्यथा ह्यननुशासनम् ॥५०॥

'(Now) how do you say, you were not fully instructed (by me)? Tell me the reason (for your saying this)', (said the father). Then (Śvetaketu said in answer), '(The king) asked me five questions and then spoke to me in a way (that indicated:) (I have) not received (full) instruction.' [50]

प्रश्नास्ते कतमे वत्स यांस्त्वं न ज्ञातवानसि ।
प्रश्नप्रतीकानवदत्पृष्टः पित्रा समासतः ॥५१॥

(The father asked him), 'What are those (five) questions, my son, which (i.e. whose answers) you did not (know)?' (Śvetaketu), thus asked, told him the initial words of the questions,¹ in brief. [51]

¹This is the meaning of *ima iti ha ...* in BU 6.2.3.

ब्राह्मणज्ञानतोऽन्यत्र विद्यां पप्रच्छ भूमिपः ।
न हि ब्राह्मणविज्ञाने किञ्चिदस्ति त्वयागतम् ॥५२॥

(The father said:) 'The king has asked you about the lore (which exists) elsewhere than in the knowledge of the Brāhmaṇas; indeed, there is nothing of what is in the knowledge of a Brāhmaṇa, viz. that which is not known to you. [52]

This is the meaning of *sa hocāca* ... in BU.

इत्येतद्धृदये कृत्वा तथा न इति सोऽवदत् ।
मा शङ्किष्ठास्ततो मां त्वं नोक्तं सर्वं ममेति हि ॥५३॥

Thinking about it to himself, the father said to him: 'It is not so'.¹ Do not therefore disbelieve in me. (Do not think) indeed, "All is not told to me". [53]

This explains *tathā naḥ* in BU.

He meant: 'Also, know that I have told you all that a Brāhmaṇa should be taught. You should not doubt about the instruction you have received.'

¹Note the absence of Saṃdhi in (*tathā*) *na iti*.

प्रेहि तत्र गमिष्यावस्तद्विद्यालब्धिसिद्धये ।
ब्रह्मचर्यं च वत्स्याव आवां तत्र नृपे गतौ ॥५४॥

'Go quickly (*pra*) (with me), let us go there¹ for securing that (or, his) lore; let us, on going, accept studentship under the king.' [54]

¹This means unto the king or, to his (capital) city (SP).

यातु तत्र भवानेव नाहं तं गन्तुमुत्सहे ।
इत्युक्तः सूनुना हीतः स्वयमेव जगाम तम् ॥५५॥
ससंभ्रमः स चोत्थाय तस्मा आसनमाहरत् ।

अप आहारयांचक्र अर्घ्यपाद्यार्थसिद्धये ॥५६॥
 सत्कृत्य च यथाशास्त्रं राजाथ तमवाच ह ।
 वरं कामं प्रयच्छामो यः कामो वाञ्छितस्त्वया ॥५७॥
 ऋषिराहाथ राजानं कामितार्थस्य सिद्धये ।
 प्रतिज्ञातो वरस्तावद्ववताप्रार्थितोऽपि सन् ॥५८॥

'May you go there yourself, I do not feel like going to him', thus told by the son, out (of his sense) of shame, (the father) himself went to him. [55]

He (i.e. the king), on his part (*ca*), rose up hastily in respect for him, and brought to him a seat (and) also caused water to be brought for effecting worship of him and washing of his feet. [56]

Having received him respectfully, according to the custom, the king then said to him, 'We wish to give you a boon, according to your choice, viz. that which you desire'. [57]

For securing what he wished, the sage (i.e. Gautama) said to the king, 'You have promised the boon for the fulfilment of my desire,¹ even if that boon was not asked for by me'.² [58]

This explains *bhavān eva ...* in BU 6.2.4.

¹*kāmitārthasya* is paraphrased as *vidyālābhāya* (NKL ms p.802)!

²Cf. SP and NKL: *brāhmaṇaṃ svayam āhūya yācamānam akiñcanam ityādinyāyas te mā bhuḍ iti (sūcitam)*. (*Mahābhārata* iii.App.I.321.35), cf. *Mahābhārata* iii. App. I. 32(35).

अस्तु सत्यप्रतिज्ञोऽत्र प्रतिज्ञातं त्वयेह यत् ।
 देहि प्रश्नात्मिकां वाचं यां मत्सूनोरभाषथाः ॥५९॥

'May you be truthful in this your promise, the promise which you have given me here (i.e. in this assembly).¹ Give me those words, in the form of questions, which you had spoken to my son.'² [59]

¹These insistent words of the father imply the king's possible reply, 'My promise ever stands'.

²This implies 'the answers to them'.

BU 6.2.5 is under reference.

राजापि तमुवाचाथ दैवेष्विति परं वचः ।
दैवेष्वयं वरः सिद्धो मानुषाणां वरं वृणु ॥६०॥

And then the king said to him in the words *daiveṣu* ...:¹
'This boon is known (lit. established) as one among the gifts
by the gods (to men), therefore, choose a boon of men'. [60]

¹This refers to the word *daiveṣu* in BU 6.2.6.

BU 6.2.6 is under reference.

न हि मानुषतो दैवः प्रार्थनीयो विजानता ।
मानुषस्तूचितो दातुमादातुं मानुषाद्वरः ॥६१॥

'Indeed a person, who is learned (*vijānat*), should not ask
of a human being for a boon of a divine gift. It is only proper
to give what is a human boon and also to receive (that) from
a human being.' [61]

BU 6.2.7 is under reference.

ममाप्यस्त्येव तत्सर्वं यद्यद्वित्ससि मानुषम् ।
विज्ञायते भयैवादौ भवतापि प्रमान्तरात् ॥६२॥

(Gautama said), I have indeed all that, viz. whichever human
gift you wish to give me (and) it is already known by me;
(this is known) to (lit. by) you also from other means of
knowing.¹ [62]

¹This is for *pramāntara* which is paraphrased by SP as *āptavākyādi*. In all probability, *pramā* stands for *pramāṇa*.

न च तत्प्रार्थनीयं मे भरि यद्विद्यते मम ।
तस्माद्वैवो वरो मह्यं दीयतां नास्त्यसौ मम ॥६३॥

'I do not have to ask for that which I have in plenty. Therefore, may that divine boon be given to me, since I do not have it. [63]

बहोरनन्तापर्यन्तदैववित्तस्य लोभतः ।
मा भूरभ्यवदान्यस्त्वं दाता भूत्वेह नः प्रति ॥६४॥

'Do not be a misery giver owing to attachment (*lobhataḥ*) to that ample, endless, immeasurable divine wealth after you have been a (liberal) giver.' [64]

दैवं वरं न संदातुं प्रत्याख्यातुं च तं द्विजम् ।
इति दुःखित्वमापन्नस्तीर्थेनेच्छेत्युवाच तम् ॥६५॥

(The king) became grief-stricken (as he was) unable to grant to the Brāhmaṇa the boon of a divine gift and also to displease (lit. discard) him; nevertheless (he said) to him, 'Wish (for this boon) in a proper way.'¹ [65]

¹*tīrtha* means according to the customary mode regarding one's approach to a preceptor.

तीर्थेन विद्या देयेति नातीर्थेनेति चागमः ।
यतोऽतस्तीर्थसृत्यैव मत्तो विद्यां त्वमाप्नुहि ॥६६॥

Since the tradition¹ is that a lore is to be taught (lit. given) by one who is a preceptor² and not by one who is not a preceptor; therefore, you should obtain this lore from me, in the customary way. [66]

¹So it is heard from old.

²This is for *tīrtha*. Refer to *Yājñavalkyasmṛti* 1.28 where six types of teachers are stated.

BU 6.2.8 is under reference.

शास्त्रार्थं स्मारितः सोऽथ राज्ञोपैमीत्यथोचिवान् ।
वाचैव ह्यवरान्पूर्व उपयन्ति यतस्ततः ॥६७॥

(Gautama), thus reminded by the king of the Śāstra, said to him: 'I am approaching you, (O preceptor)'. (Thus he did) since the higher born approached the lower born only uttering (i.e. with) these or such words.¹ [67]

¹The higher and the lower refer to the higher and the lower castes. 'Only uttering (i.e. with these (or such) words)' in this case means the Brāhmaṇa sage should not take in his hands sacrificial fuel etc. as was customary. (Cf. *Taittirīya Āraṇyaka* 2.11)

स होपायनकीत्यैव ब्रह्मचर्यमवास ह ।
उपैमीति हि संकीर्तेर्नान्यत्किञ्चिच्चकार सः ॥६८॥

By merely stating about (his) approach (*upāyanakīrtyaiva*), he stayed (with the king) as (his) student. He did not do anything else than saying; 'I approach (you)'. [68]

सापराधं स्वमात्मानं राजा परिहरन्नथ ।
क्षमयामास तमृषिं तथा न इतिवाक्यतः ॥६९॥

Then the king, wishing himself not to have any blemish,¹ requested him (for forgiving), in the words 'Do not do so ...'. [69]

¹It literally means an offence. An alternative translation could be: "... king, avoiding himself (to be) one who has committed

an offence....”

मा नोऽपराधिनो मंस्थास्तव पूर्वे पितामहाः ।
नामन्यन्त यथा तद्वद्वानप्यपराधिनः ॥७०॥

‘Please do not consider me as offending, since your elders (or forefathers) did not consider (themselves) as offending (towards my elders). So also do you (not consider yourselves as offending me.)’ [70]

त्वत्संप्रदानतः पूर्वं विद्येयं हि कदाचन ।
नोवास ब्राह्मणे साध्वी साक्षादपि बृहस्पतौ ॥७१॥

(He continued to say:) ‘Before my imparting (lit. giving this) to you, this excellent¹ lore did not (ever) abide in any Brāhmaṇa; yes, not even in Brhaspati himself (*sākṣāt*)’. [71]

¹This is for *sādhvī*, though it may merely mean ‘good’.

एवं गुप्तमपि तु तां वक्ष्याम्येवाहमञ्जसा ।
प्रत्याख्यातुं समर्थः को ब्रुवन्तं ब्राह्मणं नृपः ॥७२॥

‘I shall impart this unto you, without any hitch (*añjasā*), the one which was kept (*gupta*) from (the Brāhmaṇas);¹ who can stop him who is imparting this instruction to a Brāhmaṇa?’ [72]

¹Cf. verse 71 above.

BU 6.2.9 is under reference.

असाविति क्रमोऽभेदि कस्माद्धेतोरितीर्यताम् ।
प्रश्नस्येह चतुर्थस्य प्राधान्याद्विद्यते क्रमः ॥७३॥

(Now) let it be said as to why the order (of the answers to the king’s questions) has been set aside (lit. broken) in

the words *asau* ...;¹ (the answer is:) 'The order is set aside, since there is prominence of (the answer to) the fourth question'.¹ [73]

This refers to verse 35 above and also to the discussion on this point occurring in BUB at the beginning of this Brāhmaṇa.

¹BU 6.2.9: *asau vai loko'gninā*

उत्पत्तेस्तदधीनत्वाज्जन्मायत्ता स्थितिस्तथा ।
स्थित्यपाये प्रयाणं च श्रुत्याभेदि क्रमस्ततः ॥७४॥

The order of the (answers to the questions) has been set aside by the Śruti, since origination depends on that (viz. what is said in the fourth question), so also sustenance depends on origination and merger (lit. departure) on sustenance. [74]

This supplies the reason for *bhidyate kramah* in the preceding verse.

दूरतोऽमुष्य लोकस्य स्यादसाविति गीरियम् ।
समिद्धमादिभी रूपैर्लोक्यते लोकगीरपि ॥७५॥

The word *asau* is for that world (*dyauh*), (for it is) in the distance; so also the word *loka* (is used) since it is seen (from the verb root *lok* 'to see') by means of sacrificial fuel, smoke etc.¹ [75]

Now follows the discussion of the answers in BU.

¹This refers to cinders, sparks etc.

वैशब्दः स्मरणाय स्यादग्निस्तत्परिणामतः ।
यत आहवनीयोऽग्निर्द्युलोकात्मतया स्थितः ॥७६॥

The word *vai* is for the remembrance (of what is commonly known) and the word *agni*, for its result (*pariṇāma*);¹ since *āhavanīya*² Agni has stayed (in this world) as the form of

heavenly fire.

[76]

¹*pariṇāmataḥ* is used for *pariṇāmatvataḥ*.

²This is the principal fire in a sacrifice, this is Agni's earthly existence.

अपर्वपरिणामोऽयमग्निहोत्राख्यकर्मणः ।
द्युलौकोपक्रमो ज्ञेयो यावत्पुरुषसंभवः ॥७७॥

This is the result of *apūrva*,¹ pertaining to the ritual called Agnihotra. This introductory reference in BU to the heavenly world is to be understood in relation to the origin of a man.

[77]

¹For *apūrva*, refer to note 2 on verse 15 above. SP understands *utkrānti* etc. by *dyulokopakrama*.

आहुत्योरग्निहोत्रस्य या विभूतिः पुरोदिता ।
सैवेह दृष्टिविध्यर्थं श्रुत्या व्याख्यायतेऽञ्जसा ॥७८॥

That (particular) appearance of the two *āhutis* of Agnihotra¹ ritual which was stated formerly is now explained here by the Śruti so as to prescribe (that) viewing² without difficulty.³

[78]

¹Cf. SP: *karmāpūrvapariṇāmo jagat ity āhutyoh stutyatvena uktam (pūrvatra i.e. agnihotrādhikāre)*.

²This points out the significance of *asau*, viz. *tad eva jagat (iti dr̥ṣṭiḥ)*. This justifies the *āhavanīya* etc. as Agnikārya; i.e. *apūrvapariṇāma* as understood in the preceding verse.

³That is, smoothly (*añjasā*).

अध्यात्मे चाधियज्ञे च ह्यधिलोकाधिदैवयोः ।
श्रुतिराहवनीयादेर्व्याचष्टे विस्तृतिं स्फुटाम् ॥७९॥

The Śruti has clearly stated extensively about *āhavanīya* etc.

in the spheres of the body, of the sacrifice, of the world and of the gods.¹ [79]

¹God here means one who superintends over the subtle form of organs and bodies.

लोक आहवनीयोऽग्निरसाविति विचिन्तयेत् ।
आदित्यादिष्वपि तथा समिदादिसमीक्षणम् ॥८०॥
समिन्धनात्समिद्भान् रश्मयो धम इत्यपि ।
समिन्निर्गमसामान्यादर्चिरहस्तथैव च ॥८१॥

One should think that the *āhavanīya* fire of this world is that ¹Agni; so also in the case of *Āditya* and others should one hold that they are the sacrificial fuel etc.¹ [80]

(The word) *samidh* is (based) on the act of enkindling, so also are the words *bhānu*, *raśmi* and *dhuīma* coming from the *samidh*;² in the same way, *arcis* also is from *ahan*.¹ [81]

¹In the entire verse, the different effects of one cause are identified with it.

²All these words refer to act of enkindling. This is how the Brāhmaṇa relates these words to the meaning at the base.

शान्तत्वाच्च दिशोऽङ्गाराः समिद्धि परिणामतः ।
अर्चिरङ्गारभावस्य यथैवं भानुहेतुकाः ।
रश्मयश्च दिशश्चैता आदित्यसमिदाश्रयाः ॥८२॥

Further, owing to their coolness, the (cardinal) quarters are cinders; indeed they are the *samidh* itself, since they are the effects (of the same). As the flame (is the cause of) the (becoming) of cinders, so do the rays have *bhānu* as their cause, and these quarters are dependent on¹ the *samidh* (in the form of) *Āditya*. [82]

Verses 81-82 explain why one has to understand fire and the things related to the fire to be, in reality, *Āditya*.

As in verse 81 we understand *dhūma* etc. to be the effects (*pariṇāmas*) of *samidh*, so should we understand here *raśmi* etc. to be the *pariṇāma* of *Āditya*.

¹That is, caused by. Read SP: *raśmyādīnām ādityavikāratvāt tadāśrayatvāt teṣu dhūmādidṛṣṭiḥ kāryā*.

अवान्तरदिशस्तद्विद्विक्षितवैकहेतुतः ।

विस्फुलिङ्गा इति ज्ञेयास्तस्मिन्नग्नौ यथोदिते ॥८३॥

In the same way, the subordinate quarters are to be known as small sparks, for the reason that they are scattered variously. Into that fire described above (do gods make their offerings).¹

[83]

¹SP states *devā juhuvatīti śeṣaḥ*.

त्रयस्त्रिंशच्च ये देवाः स्युस्तेऽध्यात्मादिभूमिगाः ।

होतारस्तत्र तत्र स्युः कर्मज्ञानानुरोधतः ॥८४॥

And those gods, thirty-three¹ in number, who belong to the various levels, viz. those related to the body etc., are to be known as the Hotṛ priests at different (levels), in accordance with the knowledge about their activities.

[84]

¹These are eight Vasus, eleven Rudras, twelve Ādityas, Indra and Prajāpati. These are subdivided as supported in *adhyātma*, *adhibhūta* and (*adhidaivika* cf. verse 79 above) and they become the Hotṛs in the body of a sacrificer in accordance with his different actions in the sacrifice and thus they represent his *prāṇas*, viz. *vāc* and other sense-organs.

ऋत्विगूपेण ते ह्यासन्यथा प्राकृतकर्मणि ।

होतारः परिणामेषु तथैवोत्तरभूमिषु ॥८५॥

As they were in the form of different Hotṛs in the initial (ritual) act, so are they in the later levels (i.e. subsequent

ritual actions), which are their outcome (or modifications).

[85]

uttarabhūmis refer to the initial sacrificer's subsequent lives which are the effects of the acts in every later life.

आहुत्योः परिणामोऽयमग्रसोऽपूर्वमित्यपि ।
तस्य श्रद्धैकहेतुत्वाच्छ्रद्धा नामैति कीर्त्यते ॥८६॥

The effects of two *āhutis* is this energy, the essence, and also the *apūrva* and, that (viz. effect), has only *Śraddhā* as its cause, (that is why) it is named as *Śraddhā*. [86]

तस्याश्चाप्याहुतेः सोमो राजा संभवतीति च ।
तस्याभिवृद्धिः संभूतिर्न त्वभूतजनिर्यतः ॥८७॥

And also (it is said in the *Śruti*) that Soma is the king of that offering, because it (i.e. Soma) has growth but not an origin,¹ for it was never born (of anything else). [87]

¹The reason for this statement is that Soma is already in existence as the cause of the growth of one's body after it reaches the heaven, in the lunar orb.

द्यौरग्निः समिदादित्यः श्रद्धा तस्मिन्निह हूयते ।
सूर्ये समिधि दीप्तायां श्रद्धां जुहति देवताः ॥८८॥

The heaven (is) the fire, *Āditya* (is) the sacrificial fuel, and *Śraddhā* is offered into that; (indeed) gods make their offerings (of *Śraddhā*) when the sun, the sacrificial fuel, is blazing. [88]

In verses 80-88, there was the discussion of the first way of metaphorically looking at the Agnihotra in its elaborate form. Now, there will be the discussion of the second metaphorical explanation of Agnihotra from verse 97cd. Verses between 89 and 97ab are some general observations regarding the

metaphorical explanations.

श्रयतेः श्रद्धधातेर्वा श्रद्धेत्याहुर्विपरिचतः ॥८९॥
 श्रयणाद्वारणाच्चापः श्रद्धाह्वाः कारणात्मिकाः ।
 भूत्वाप इति लिङ्गाच्च आपः श्रद्धाभिधास्ततः ॥९०॥

The wise ones have used the word *śraddhā* on the basis of (its derivation) from the verb root *śri* 'to resort to, or, the verb root *śrat-dhā* 'to support'.¹ [89]

Waters are called *Śraddhā*,¹ since they are resorted to and they lend support, and (thus) they are (also) of the nature of the cause—on the basis of the indication by the words *bhūtvāpaḥ* and therefore waters are known by the name *Śraddhā*. [90]

Verses 89-90 are Brāhmaṇical explanations of the name *Śraddhā* for waters.

¹Cf. *Taittirīya Saṃhitā* 1.4.8.1. The verb root *śrat-dhā* has the sense of *dhāraṇa*.

आकृष्टं रश्मिभिस्तोयमादित्ये प्रतितिष्ठति ।
 तस्मादादित्यगः सोमः क्षीण आप्यायते पुनः ॥९१॥

Waters, pulled (lit. attracted, i.e. drawn) by the rays, become steady in *Āditya*. Therefore, Soma which abides in the Sun, has waxed again¹ though it has waned. [91]

¹This waxing of Soma, who had waned, is called its birth from *āhuti*.

परिणामो ह्यपां सोमः शीतांशुस्तेन सोऽम्मयः ।
 श्रद्धाहुतेर्हि सोमस्य संभवः शास्त्र उच्यते ॥९२॥

Since Soma is the effect (lit. modification) of waters, therefore, it (i.e. Soma) is of cool rays,¹ it is described as full of waters; indeed, in the scriptures, the birth of Soma is said to be from

the offering with Śraddhā.²

[92]

This is to refute the opinion that Soma is born (only) of Tejas. And this offers the reason for the argument in the preceding verse (NKL ms p.826).

¹This points to the direct perceptibility of Soma.

²Sureśvara does not oppose the origin of Soma from Tejas also, for *śraddhāhuti* indicates that.

अङ्गाराश्चन्द्रमास्तस्मिन्हुतेऽग्नौ सोमसंभवः ।

सोमचन्द्रमसोरेवं भेदः शास्त्रेण दर्शितः ॥९३॥

The cinders (of the above-said fire) are the moon and, after the offering is made into that fire,¹ there is the origin of Soma; thus is the difference between Soma and the moon explained by the scripture.

[93]

In common parlance, Soma and Candramas are understood as synonymous, but there is a basic difference between them, as scripture has shown.

Also, the argument proceeds against those who stand on the Śruti *candramā aṅgārāḥ*. The argument is according to SP: *kārahbhūtaś candramā phalabhūtaḥ somaḥ*.

¹This refers to the heavenly fire.

चन्द्रमा मण्डलं स्वच्छं चन्द्रकेण मितो हि सः ।

सोमस्तु मण्डले श्वेतो वर्धते हसते च यः ॥९४॥

The moon is the brilliant orb and it is compared with mica; but, the moon is white in the orb¹ and it waxes and wanes also.

[94]

SP notes that Soma is comparable to a creeper which also grows and withers (i.e. it wanes.) Also, it is meant that the Śruti statement *evam enāns tatra bhakṣayanti* does not refer to the moon's orb, since only the *tanmātra* is not *bhogyā* 'an object

of enjoyment' (in contrast with the Soma plant, cf. BUBV 2.1.57).

¹This has, according to SP, reference to the Puruṣa in the moon.

चन्द्रमाः पर आदित्यादर्वासोमः श्रुतेर्मतः ।
 आदित्याच्चन्द्रमित्याह नैते संवत्सरं तथा ॥९५॥
 सोमचन्द्रमसोस्तस्माद्भेदः समवगम्यते ।
 देशाभेदादभिन्नौ तावेष सोम इति श्रुतेः ॥९६॥
 भिन्नौ च धर्मभेदेन तस्मादुभयथा श्रुतिः ।

The Śruti has held that Candramas 'moon' is beyond Āditya 'the sun' and Soma is below (not beyond Āditya); therefore, the Śruti said in the words *ādiyāt candram* and also *naite saṁvatsaram*. [95]

Therefrom is understood the difference between Soma and Candramas; but, considering them as belonging to the same region, they are held as identical and the Śruti has said *eṣa somaḥ*. [96]

And (yet), in respect of their properties, they are different; therefore, the Śruti has expressed itself in two ways.¹ [97ab]

Verse 95 points out the difference between Soma and Candramas on the basis of the Śruti, viz. CU 5.10.2: (referring to Devayāna) *māsebhyaḥ saṁvatsaram. saṁvatsārād ādityam ādityāc candramasam* and 4: (referring to Pitṛyāna) *māsebhyaḥ pitṛlokaṁ. pitṛlokād ākāśam. ākāśāc candramasam. eṣa somo rājā*. The first points out that the Jīvas who go by the Devayāna path proceed thus: Saṁvatsara → Āditya → Candra. As against this, those who go by the Pitṛyāna proceed thus: (They do not go to Saṁvatsara) Months → Pitṛyāna → Candra → Soma, the king. This leads to the difference: Candra is beyond Āditya whereas Soma is below the same.

SP has supplied the Śruti passages which are cited in the note under the preceding verse. This justifies the non-difference between Soma and Candramas that are already described as

different. Read SP: *svarūpabhede saty eva deśābhedena pitṛlokāc candram eṣa somo rājety abhedaśrutiḥ somasya maṇḍalasthatvād deśāntarābhāvād ity arthaḥ*.

¹The two passages quoted above are meant.

BU 6.2.10 is under reference.

पर्जन्योऽग्निरिति ज्ञेयः समित्संवत्सरः स्मृतः ॥९७॥
 संवत्सरे समिद्धे हि पर्जन्यस्य समेधनात् ।
 धूमोऽभ्राणीति सादृश्याद्विद्युदर्चिस्तथैव च ॥९८॥
 शान्तिवर्तलतोऽङ्गाराः पर्जन्यशिखिनोऽशनिः ।
 विक्षिप्तवैकसामान्यात्स्फुलिङ्गाः स्तनयित्नवः ॥९९॥
 सोमं जुह्वति तत्राग्नौ देवाश्चात्रोदिताः पुरा ।
 वृष्टेश्च संभवस्तस्माल्लोकेऽस्मिन्सापि हूयते ॥१००॥

Parjanya is to be known as Agni and Saṃvatsara is known as the sacrificial fuel,¹ [97cd]

because Parjanya is active (lit. enkindled) when the Saṃvatsara is enkindled. Smoke is the clouds on account of their similarity in appearance; in the same way, lightning is the flame. [98]

Lightning is cinders of the fire in the form of Parjanya, since (both) become cool (or extinguished) and are round in shape.²

Thunders are sparks owing only to their similarity in respect of being scattered. [99]

In that fire do the gods, who are mentioned above,³ make their offering of Soma and from that⁴ is the origin of showers.

Therefore, that⁵ also is poured into that fire. [100]

¹In *samit saṃvatsaraḥ*, there is *kramabheda*.

²*śāntivartulataḥ* is for *śāntitaḥ vartulatvataś ca*; cf. *śāntatva-vartulatvābhyām* in verse 103 below.

³Cf. verse 88 above.

⁴The gods' act of pouring Soma into fire.

⁵Namely, *vṛṣṭi*.

BU 6.2.11 is under reference.

लोकोऽयमग्निर्विज्ञेयः पृथिवी समिदुच्यते ।
पृथिव्या हि समिद्धोऽयं समित्तेन क्षितिर्मता ॥१०१॥

This world is to be known as fire. (And) the earth is called the sacrificial fuel; the earth is understood as the sacrificial fuel, since this fire is enkindled by the earth. [101]

This is yet another way of considering *loka* and *prthivī* as Agni and *samidh*.

अग्निर्धूमस्तदुत्थानाद्रात्रिर्चिस्तथैव च ।
रात्रिर्माहुः क्षितिच्छायामङ्गाराश्चन्द्रमास्तथा ॥१०२॥
शान्तत्ववर्तुलत्वाभ्यां विस्फुलिङ्गसमत्वतः ।
नक्षत्राणि स्फुलिङ्गाः स्युस्तस्मिन्नित्यादि पूर्ववत् ॥१०३॥

Smoke is Agni, since it rises from that; in the same way is the night the flame (of that). They have called night the shadow of the earth and similarly the moon is cinders, [102] because of its coolness (or, extinction) and roundness (of shape) and owing to its similarity with sparks. The constellations (also) are¹ sparks. (The statement) *tasmin* ... is (to be understood) as before.² [103]

¹*syuh* is for *santi*.

²That is, as in the instances considered before.

अन्नस्य संभवस्तस्मात्पुमग्नौ तच्च हूयते ।

The origin of food is from that¹ and that (food) is offered in the fire in the form of man. [104ab]

BU 6.2.12 is under reference.

पुरुषोऽग्निरिति ध्येयो व्यातं तस्य समित्स्मृता ॥१०४॥

Puruṣa is to be considered (lit. worshipped) as Agni and his open mouth is taken (lit. known) as the sacrificial fuel. [104cd]

व्यात्ते मुखे हि तद्दीप्तिर्धूमः प्राणो मुखोत्थितः ।
पुंदीप्तेर्वाङ्निमित्तत्वादर्चिर्वाक्तेन भण्यते ॥१०५॥

Since in (his) open mouth there is his lustre,¹ his vital breath is smoke for it rises from his mouth. And because the lustre of man is caused by Vāc 'power of speech',² therefore Vāc is called the flame. [105]

¹This refers to his being famed by his speech and learning.

²That is, it manifests the same.

स्थितेरङ्गारवच्चक्षुरङ्गाराः श्रोत्रमेव च ।
विस्फुलिङ्गा इति ज्ञेयं तस्य विक्षेपसंस्थितेः ॥१०६॥
अत्र जुहति तत्राग्नौ संभवो रेतसस्ततः ।

The eyes¹ are cinders, since they exist like cinders² and the ears² are to be known as sparks, since they are in the state of being scattered. [106]

In that fire, they (the gods) pour food; from (that) fire, there is the origin of semen. [107ab]

¹The word eyes is for eye in the singular.

²This refers to the cooling down and being the substratum of lustre (i.e. fame).

³The word ears is for ear in the singular.

BU 6.2.13 is under reference.

योषिदग्निरिति ज्ञेया उपस्थश्च समित्तथा ॥१०७॥
तदपस्थेन संदीप्तेर्धूमो लोमानि साम्यतः ।
अर्चिर्वर्णसमानत्वाद्योनिरर्चिर्भवेत्ततः ॥१०८॥

A woman is to be known as fire and also her sexual organ (is to be known as) sacrificial fuel, [107cd]
 since there is enkindling (of the fire) through her sexual organ.
 The hair (on her sexual organ) are smoke; her sexual organ is the flame owing to its similarity of colour. [108]

अन्तः करोति यत्कामी तेऽङ्गारास्तत्समानतः ।
 विस्फुलिङ्गाः सुखलवाः क्षणिकत्वैकहेतुतः ॥१०९॥

And, that a man, full of desire, puts (semen drops) into (the sexual organ) they are cinders, because they are similar.¹ The moments of happiness are sparks, since they have momentariness. [109]

¹In that they culminate into extinction (or, cool down).

रेतो जुहति तत्राग्नौ देवाश्चेन्द्रियरूपिणः ।
 पञ्चम्या आहुतेस्तस्याः पुरुषः संभवत्ययम् ॥११०॥

There, in that fire, do the gods, who have the form of the organs, pour semen; and from that fifth offering (i.e. pouring) is this Puruṣa born. [110]

Verses 101-110 describe the cohabitation of a man and a woman as similar to Agni's union with the sacrificial fuel, which is the act of sacrifice. Thus, based on religious union, that of man and woman and the consequent begetting of a son are looked upon as a holy act.

Also this is the answer to the fourth question that was asked by the king.

यथोक्तवर्त्मना ह्यापः प्राप्ताः पुंस्परिणामताम् ।
 पाकजः परिणामोऽयमेवं पञ्चभिरग्निभिः ॥१११॥

Waters have thus, in the way described, attained the nature of modification, viz. manhood. This modification (or mani-

festation) is produced thus by the heating by the five fires (mentioned so far). [111]

तस्मादापः सूक्ष्मभावाः स्थूलतां यान्ति पाकतः ।
अग्निभिः पञ्चभिः पक्वाः पुरुषाख्या भवन्ति हि ॥११२॥

Therefore waters, having (earlier) a subtle form, attain to grossness through heating; thus, (being) cooked by five fires, they become known by the name Puruṣa. [112]

BU 6.2.14 is under reference.

तस्मान्मृतं प्रियं बन्धुं हरन्त्यग्नय ऋत्विजः ॥११३॥

Therefore, do *ṛtviks*, take him, the dear relation (lit. brother), who is dead, for the fire.¹ [113]

This refers to the funeral of the worldly sacrificer. It is explained in the following verses.

¹That is, to be offered into the fire, i.e. *agnaye* should stand for (*śmaśāne*) *agnau* (*hotum*) *dagdhum*.

यथैवाहवनीयाग्नेः प्रसिद्धं समिदादिकम् ।
श्मशानाग्नेस्तथैवैतत्सर्वं ज्ञेयं न कल्प्यते ॥११४॥

As the sacrificial fuel etc. of the *āhavanīya* fire is known, so also, all this is to be known in the case of the usual fire, that is used in the cremation ground; (a new fire)¹ is not imagined. [114]

¹This is on the basis of BUB. There is not any idea of *dr̥ṣṭi* as in the previous portion of the Brāhmaṇa.

अन्त्यसंस्कारसिद्धयर्थं तस्मिन्नग्नौ यथोदिते ।
ऋत्विजो जुह्वति नरमन्त्याहुत्यै विधानतः ।

आहुतेर्जायते तस्याः पुमान्भास्वरूपभृत् ॥११५॥

For completing the final Saṃskāra (of the deceased sacrificer), the *ṛtviks* offer the man into that fire (which is enkindled) according to the procedure prescribed (in the Pitṛmedha section of the Gṛhyasūtra); from that offering (of his body) is (then) born a human being with a brilliant form.¹ [115]

¹This is the result of the Sāttvika portion in the dead sacrificer's body. It is the *sattva* that makes the form brilliant (*bhāsvara*).

राजसं तामसं रूपमितो ह्यन्यत्र वक्ष्यते ॥११६॥

The Rājasa and the Sāttvika forms (of the sacrificer's body) are described elsewhere. [116]

This is to point out specifically the brilliant form mentioned in the preceding verse.

इतोऽग्निभ्योऽग्निमेवायं स्वां योनिं प्रतिपत्स्यते ।
इति लोके समाचारादग्निभ्यः संभवस्ततः ॥११७॥

From here, i.e. from that fire,¹ this one (the deceased sacrificer) assumes the form of his own origin²—such is the supposition (among the people of) this world that (i.e. after the burning in the funeral fire, there is then this) origin (of the body) from fires. [117]

¹This refers to the funeral fire.

²This refers to the subtle form from which the sacrificer's gross (i.e. worldly) body had originated.

पञ्चम्यामाहुतावेवं पुनाम्नो जन्म कीर्तितम् ।
गतिस्तस्याथ वक्तव्या उदग्दक्षिणभेदतः ॥११८॥

Thus is told (i.e. described) the origin (lit. birth) of one, called Puruṣa, when the fifth offering is offered and now is to be described his movement in the different directions, with reference to north and the south. [118]

BU 6.2.15 is under reference.

ते य एतद्यथाजातं ज्ञानं पञ्चाग्निसंश्रयम् ।
विदुरर्चिः समायान्ति बहूक्तेश्च द्विजातयः ॥११९॥

They (i.e. the learned), who have known this, viz. the thus produced (i.e. originated) *jñāna*¹ pertaining to five fires, reach² the flame; because there is a mention of many (persons),³ only the twice-born (i.e. the first three castes)⁴ are meant. [119]

¹This refers to the knowledge of the five fires which are discussed earlier.

²This refers to the *arcirādi mārga*, i.e. *udanimārga*— cf. verse 118 above.

³That is, the use of *te*, a form in the plural.

⁴*dvijātayaḥ* is a plural form, it shows that it does not refer only to the Brāhmaṇas.

उत्पत्तिसंस्थितिलया यथोक्ताग्न्येकहेतवः ।
इत्थं ये विदुरर्चिस्ते संभवन्त्यात्मभाविताः ॥१२०॥

The origin, the sustenance and the final merger of a man are caused only by the fires mentioned earlier (i.e. the five fires). Those who have known thus become the flame,¹ being devoted to the Ātman.² [120]

¹That is, attain to the flame etc. and finally to (oneness with) the Brahman.

²This refers to those sacrificers who have ever thought that, by worshipping the five fires, they would attain the nature of

(i.e. oneness with) the Ātman.

इष्टापूर्तकृतो ये वै ग्रामस्थेभ्यश्च ये परे ।
 अरण्य इति गृह्यन्त इतरेषां पृथग्ग्रहात् ॥१२१॥
 यज्ञदानतपांसीह गृहस्थ इव तापसे ।
 गृहस्थाचार्यवासाच्च न ग्रहो ब्रह्मचारिणाम् ॥१२२॥
 नारण्यस्था न च ग्राम्या अपेक्षन्तेऽत्र विद्यया ।
 सामान्यवचसोपात्तेर्न विशेषपरिग्रहः ॥१२३॥
 सश्रद्धस्यापि सत्यस्य यद्यप्यन्यत्र संभवः ।
 तथापि यतयो ग्राह्या अरण्येन विशेषणात् ॥१२४॥
 ते य एवं विदुरिति यदि वा गृहिणां ग्रहः ।
 अग्निसंबन्धतो न्याय्यो वनस्थस्यापि संभवात् ॥१२५॥

They, who had done (in their life) sacrificial and charitable acts¹ and also those who are other than the inhabitants of villages (and towns) and those, mentioned as (dwelling in the) forest—(but the celebrates are not meant) since there is a separate mention of them— [121]

here (in this context), sacrificial performances, making gifts and performing penances are to be understood in the case of a mendicant² in the same way as in the case of a householder; but (*ca*) there is no inclusion of the celebrates, because of their stay with (i.e. dependence on) householders and/or preceptors. [122]

Here,³ in respect of this lore,⁴ the forest-dwellers and the villagers are not to be reckoned; since there is only a statement (of *dvijātis* in general), there should not be included any particular (or, specific) individuals.⁵ [123]

Where, however, there is a possibility that there can be elsewhere (i.e. among the householders) one who has faith (in the worship of) truth and is himself truthful, the mendicants also are to be included, because there is a mention of them by the specifying word *aranya*. [124]

Or, in the words *te ya evaṃ viduḥ*, there is mention made

of (only) the householders; (even then) the (inclusion) of a dweller in a forest is reasonably possible on account of their relation to the fire. [125]

These verses refer to those who are intended as eligible to secure the knowledge of the five fires and through that oneness with the Brahman.

¹Cf. Kullūka on *Manusmṛti* 4.126: *iṣṭam antarvedi yajñādikarma pūrtam tato 'nyat puskariṇīkūpa prapārāmādi (nirmāṇam)*.

²This is a reference to the *vānaprasthas* 'those who have taken to a forester's life', i.e. 'who stay away from human dwellings'.

³This refers to the topic of five fires, so far discussed.

⁴That is, the lore regarding worship of five fires.

⁵That means: this refers only to householders.

न चाग्निहोत्रशेषत्वमुक्तदृष्टेरिहेष्यते ।

सामान्येन ग्रहात्तस्याः पञ्चाग्निरितिलिङ्गतः ॥१२६॥

And here it is not accepted that (the connection with Agnihotra) is only, in the case of such a knower,¹ because this seeing (viz. possessing the knowledge of five fires) is mentioned in a general way and understood from the word *pañcāgni* by indication. [126]

¹This refers to the wise ones mentioned above.

त्रिलोकीसाधनत्यागात्रापि संन्यासिनो ग्रहः ।

दैवी विद्या हि वित्तं स्याद्वित्ताच्च व्युत्थितिर्यतः ॥१२७॥

प्रजया किं करिष्याम आक्षेपो ब्रह्मवेदनात् ॥१२८॥

On account of his abandoning the various means (for the attainment of) the three worlds, there is no inclusion of a *Samnyāsin*¹ also, because this lore pertains to the gods (i.e. godly gifts of) wealth and because they have risen above that wealth. [127]

This is so, because they ask a question, 'What shall we do

with offspring?'

[128]

Why they abandon the three worlds, i.e. the pleasures in them, is explained in verse 128.

¹Non-performance of a ritual is prescribed for a person.

पञ्चाग्निज्ञानवद्भाव्या गतिरप्यत्र सर्वदा ।
यतोऽतो गतिरप्युक्ता नान्यथा तदुदीरणम् ॥१२९॥

Here, (we should understand) everywhere that the movement is to be in conformity with the knowledge of the five fires, since the movement is also mentioned from this,¹ and the statement is not to be taken in another sense. [129]

¹Cf. *Viṣṇupurāṇa* 2.8.92abc and 94d:

aṣṭāṣītisahasrāṇām ṛṣiṇām ūrdhvaretasām /
uttareṇāryamṇaḥ panthās te 'mṛtatvaṃ hi bhejire //

[The text quoted here is from BUB. But *Viṣṇupurāṇa* reads *munīnām* for *ṛṣiṇām* and *udakpanthānam aṛyamṇaḥ* for *uttare-ṇāryamṇaḥ*.]

देवतोपासनस्येह प्रकृतत्वात्तथा गतेः ।
अर्चिःशब्देन तेनेह देवतैवात्र गृह्यते ॥१३०॥

Since there is here under reference worship of the god and so also the movement (or, the departure), the word *arcis* is to be understood here in the sense only of a god. [130]

अर्चिर्देवतयैकत्वं प्राप्याहर्देवतैकताम् ।
संभवन्तीति सर्वत्र संबन्धोऽत्रानुषज्यते ॥१३१॥
गृह्यते देवता नो चेदर्चिरादिगिरा तदा ।
असंभवोऽन्यत्र मृतेरित्यपार्था गतिश्रुतिः ॥१३२॥
यत्तूदगयनापेक्षा भीष्मस्य श्रूयते स्मृतौ ।
सत्यवादित्वसिद्धयर्थं शंतनोस्तदपीक्ष्यताम् ॥१३३॥
अन्यथा कृतनाशः स्यादकृताभ्यागमस्तथा ।

देवताग्रहणात्तस्माद्देवतैर्वार्चिरुच्यते ॥१३४॥

Later after having obtained oneness with the god of the flame (*arcis*), the householders (etc.) become one with the god of the day—thus this relation continues everywhere in the relevant text. [131]

If a god is not understood here by the words *arcis* etc., it is that the Śruti statement *anyatra mṛteḥ* about the movement (of the departed) would be without any meaning. [132]

(And) what is heard in the Smṛti as the desire of Bhīṣma (to die) when there is the movement (of the sun) towards the north is (only) for establishing his truthfulness in speech; (in the case) of Śantanu¹ also, it should be thus understood (lit. seen). [133]

Otherwise,² there would result the loss of what has been done³ and the acceptance of (a result) of what is not done. Therefore, accepting (the sense of a) god (i.e. as the becoming the god of *arcis* etc.) means that *arcis* is but the god. [134]

¹This refers to Śantanu's boon to his son Bhīṣma that he would die only at his own will.

²It means: if *arcis* etc. were not accepted as gods.

³This refers to the performance of sacrificial rituals.

तस्माद्देवंविदो धीरा अर्चिराद्यभिमानिनीम् ।
क्रमेण देवतां यात्वा वैरिञ्चं यान्ति तत्पदम् ॥१३५॥

Therefore, the wise ones¹ who know thus, becoming (lit. going to) (each) god of *arcis* etc., attain to that status of Viriñca.²

[135]

¹They are sacrificers who have knowledge about rituals.

²That is, they become one with the god Viriñca.

श्रद्धधानास्तपस्यन्तः सत्यं ब्रह्म समाहिताः ।
उपासते बहिर्ग्रामाद्वर्चिस्ते संभवन्त्यतः ॥१३६॥

Therefore, those, who have faith (in this), performing penances and, with their mind well-composed, worship the truth, the Brahman (even) outside the village (etc.), become (one with) the flame (etc.). [136]

ब्रह्मणः स्थानमायान्ति यद्वा स्वाश्रमकर्मभिः ।
संन्यासाद्ब्रह्मणः स्थानं तथा च स्मृतिशासनम् ॥१३७॥

Or, they attain to the abode of the Brahman¹ by the performances of their (own) duties in keeping with the orders of their life (*āśrama*); so also do they attain to the abode of the Brahman—thus is the instruction in the Smṛti.² [137]

¹This refers to what is mentioned as the truth, the Brahman, in the preceding verse and is the same as the Sūtrātman.

²*Manusmṛti* 6.96.

ततोऽहर्देवतां यान्ति शुक्लपक्षं ततः क्रमात् ।
षण्मासांश्च ततो यान्ति ह्युत्तरायणलक्षणान् ॥१३८॥
देवतां च ततो यान्ति देवलोकभिमानिनीम् ।
तत आदित्यमायान्ति वैद्युतं चापि भास्करात् ॥१३९॥
ब्रह्मणा मनसा सृष्टो मानसः पुरुषस्ततः ।
ब्रह्मलोकान्स नयति सोऽप्यभ्येत्याथ वैद्युतान् ॥१४०॥
ते तेषु ब्रह्मलोकेषु दीप्यमानाः पराः समाः ।
ब्राह्ममानाः समा ग्राह्या ब्रह्मलोकेषु तच्छ्रुतेः ॥१४१॥

Thence they attain to the godhead of *ahan*, then, in sequential order, the half of a month, and then the two half-years (lit. six months together) which are characterized by the northward movement (of the sun); [138]

thence to such a god as has the awareness of belonging to the region of gods, then to Āditya-(loka) and from (that *loka* of) Āditya to that of lightning— [139]

Then is created by the Brahman a man from his mind. He

(i.e. that man) having approached from the region of the Brahman takes (the departed one) to the regions¹ of the Brahman and later to the worlds of lightning. [140]

Then those² (many men, i.e. departed sacrificers), looking brilliant in the worlds of the Brahman, (stay there) for years; here the years are to be taken to have the magnitude of the days of the Brahman; this is, on the basis of a Śruti about the same. [141]

¹The plural indicates the wideness of them.

²This refers to the many departed men, who are thus brought by the man born from the mind of the Brahman.

सार्ष्टिसालोक्यसायुज्यव्यपेक्षा बहुगीरियम् ।
समष्टिव्यष्टिभेदं वा व्यपेक्ष्य बहुवागियम् ॥१४२॥

(This use of) the word *bahu* is in view of (the three states,) viz. similarity in appearance, sameness of the abode and being just one; or, this word *bahu* is owing to the difference between collected form and severality of forms (*samaṣṭivyāṣṭi*). [142]

There are offered two alternative explanations of the preceding verse.

आवृत्तिर्न पुनस्तेषां यावदाभूतसंप्लवम् ।
आभूतसंप्लवस्थानममृतत्वं हि भाष्यते ॥१४३॥

There is no return (or, rebirth) of them till when there is a complete merger (of them) into elements. Indeed the state of complete merger into elements is spoken of as immortality. [143]

ऐकात्म्यधीसमुत्पत्तेर्यदि वा ब्रह्मलोकतः ।
मुच्यन्ते न निवर्तन्ते यथा धूमादिमार्गगाः ॥१४४॥

Or, since there has arisen (in them) the knowledge of their

oneness with the Ātman, they do not return (to this world) from the world of the Brahman,¹ as those who go by the path beginning with smoke (do). [144]

¹This refers to Hiranyagarbha, Virāj.

इमं मानवमावर्तमित्याद्यस्य विशेषणात् ।
अत्रैव कल्पेऽनावृत्तिर्न त्वन्येष्वनिवारणात् ॥१४५॥
देवयानः समासेन पन्था यत्नात्प्रपञ्चितः ।

Since there is a specification in the words *imam mānavam āvartam* ...; therefore, they (i.e. the sacrificers' Jīvas) do not return in (i.e. during) the period of this creation (*kalpa*)¹; but (this is not so) in other (i.e. subsequent) creations, since there is no prohibiting statement (regarding their return in them). [145]

(So far), the path called Devayāna is thus briefly and carefully (*yatna*) explained.² [146ab]

¹This explains the sentence *teṣām* ... where there is stress on the word *imam* (*kalpam*).

²This refers to the BU proposition: *atha ye yajñena*

BU 6.2.16 is under reference.

व्याख्याथ पितृयाणस्य सम्यगारभ्यतेऽधुना ॥१४६॥

Now there begins properly the explanation of the path called Pitryāṇa. [146cd]

This is the purport of the following verses.

देवादिज्ञानहीनेन येऽथ यज्ञेन सद्विजाः ।
लोकाञ्जयन्ति दानेन सद्देशादिमता तथा ॥१४७॥
निःशेषकल्मषध्वंसितपसा वाविपश्चितः ।
मृतास्ते धूममायान्ति धूमाद्रात्रिं तमस्विनः ॥१४८॥

रात्रेरपरपक्षं च दक्षिणायनदेवताम् ।
मासेभ्यः पितृलोकं हि पितरो यत्र शेरते ।
पितृलोकाच्च ते चन्द्रं यान्त्यत्र तद्विवौकसाम् ॥१४९॥

Now those good twice-borns,¹ who win the worlds by the performance(s) of sacrifice(s) wherein their knowing about (the real nature of) gods etc.² is lacking and who, by making gifts such as (that of) a good land etc., win different *lokas*; [147] or, the ignorant ones, who have by penances washed off (their) entire sins,³ go to smoke, when they are dead, from smoke, which is full of darkness,⁴ they go to the night; [148] from the night to the second half of the month (and thence) to the god of the period of the movement of the sun to the south;⁵ from those months to the world of the manes, where indeed the manes rest (lit. sleep); and from the world of the manes they move to the moon as the food of the gods.⁶ [149]

¹This refers to three castes as already understood in verse 119 above.

²This refers to their ignorance about reality or the Brahman.

³Cf. a Smṛti statement: *tapasā kalmaṣam hanti*, cp. *Manusmṛti* 12.104 where *kilbiṣam* is read for *kalmaṣam*.

⁴Or alternatively: *tamasvinaḥ* is further in addition to *avipaścitaḥ* and hence the translation: ... are dead and, from smoke they, full of ignorance (lit. darkness), go to the night;

⁵This refers to the months which are the period for the sun's movement to the south.

⁶This whole, viz. verses 147-149, is the description of the *dhūmādhimārga* mentioned in verse 144 above.

चन्द्रं प्राप्यान्नभावं च ते यतस्तत्र संस्थिताः ।
असकृद्वक्ष्यन्त्येतानाप्याय्याप्याय्य सोमवत् ॥१५०॥

Since, after having attained to the moon, i.e. to the status of food, they stay there, (the gods in the region of the moon) eat them again and again, repeatedly fattening them just as

(the *ṛtviks* in the sacrifice fatten) the Soma.¹

[150]

This explains *te candram*

¹This refers to sacrificial practice of *somāpyāyāna* 'fattening the juice of Soma with milk and water'; the *ṛtviks* partake of this fattened Soma. So also do the gods in the moon eat the well-fed and thereby fattened sacrificers who have attained to the moon.

पक्षे शुक्ले तमाप्याय्य कृष्णे तं भक्षयन्त्यथ ॥१५१॥
भोगसाधनभावश्च भक्षयन्तीति भण्यते ।
न त्वभ्यवहतिनिर्याय्या वेदवर्त्मनि तिष्ठताम् ॥१५२॥

Or (*atha*), they (i.e. the *Jīvas*), after having fattened it (i.e. the moon) in the bright (half of the month), eat it in the dark (half of the month); [151]

in the word *bhakṣayanti* is stated the *Jīvas*' becoming the means of enjoyment (for the gods); indeed, it is not reasonable (to accept) the eating up of those who have followed the path of the Vedic (ritual). [152]

This is another explanation of *te candram*...

यदा तपचितं कर्म पर्यवस्यति भोगतः ।
तेषामथैतमध्वानमावर्तन्ते यथागतम् ॥१५३॥
आकाशमनुनिष्पद्य वायुमायान्त्यभोगिनः ।
वायोर्वृष्टिमवाप्याथ वृष्टेश्च पृथिवीं ततः ।
अन्नभावं पृथिव्यातस्ते समायान्ति भूमिगाः ॥१५४॥

And when the *karman* (i.e. the *apūrvā* caused by it), which is collected (by them in the worldly life), gets exhausted through their enjoyment,¹ they return to this path by which they have come. [153]

Having fallen to the sky, they, not having enjoyment (any more), come to Vāyu, from Vāyu to rain, then from rain to the earth and then, together with the earth,² to the state of food—they

who thus come to the earth.

[154]

¹See verses 151 and 152 above.

²The instrumental form of *pr̥thivī* is explained by SP as *sahārthe tṛtīyā*. Therefore, they become food along with (i.e. as) the earth becomes it.

घटीयन्त्रवदश्रान्ता एवमेव पुनः पुनः ।
परिवर्तन्ति संसारे कर्मवायुसमीरिताः ॥१५५॥

In this very way, like a *ghaṭīyantra* 'a mechanical device of raising water from a well', they keep on rotating,¹ without becoming tired (as it were), rotate¹ in this world, impelled by the wind in the form of the ritual activity. [155]

¹The Parasmaipada is for the Ātmanepada form.

दक्षिणस्य पथो व्याख्या यथावदनुवर्णिता ॥१५६॥

Thus is described the path to the south, as given in scriptures (*yathāvat*). [156]

यथोक्तलक्षणौ ये तु पन्थानावुत्तरेतरौ ।
न विदुस्ते भवन्तीह कीटाद्या दुःखभोगिनः ॥१५७॥

And (*tu*) those, who do not know these two paths, viz. one to the north and the other (to the south), which are thus described, become here (i.e. in this world) insects etc., experiencing miseries. [157]

नाद्रियन्त इदं ज्ञानमुदङ्मार्गसिसाधनम् ।
कर्म वा पितृयाणाप्तौ ते कीटाद्यामियुर्गतिम् ॥१५८॥

Those, who disregard this knowledge, which is the means to attaining to the path to the north, or (follow that which leads) to the Pitryāṇa, attain to the state of insects etc. [158]

गोमयाद्युद्धवाः कीटाः पतङ्गाः शलभास्तथा ।
दंशाश्च मशकाश्चैव दन्दशूकाः सपन्नगाः ॥१५९॥

(The insects etc. means) the insects born from cow-dung, flying insects, locusts and biting insects, mosquitoes, as also biting insects and the serpents. [159]

यतिथ्यामिति यः प्रश्नः स पुंजन्मोक्तितो गतः ।
तदनन्तरमेवोक्ता व्यावृत्तिश्च पथोर्द्वयोः ॥१६०॥

The question in the words 'In what is the number of ...' is (thus) answered by the statement about the birth of man;¹ then immediately thereafter is stated the difference between the two paths. [160]

¹This is reference to the *mānasa puruṣa* mentioned in verse 140 above.

आकाशाद्यभिसंभूत्या पुनरावर्तनं गतम् ।
देवयानं च यत्कृत्वा पितृयाणं च लभ्यते ॥१६१॥
साधनं तदपीहोक्तं ज्ञानकर्मस्वलक्षणम् ।
लोकस्यापूरणे हेतुः समाप्तावुदितः स्फुटः ॥१६२॥
कीटादीनामगमनाद्गतानां चागतेस्तथा ।
एवं पञ्चापि निर्णीताः प्रश्ना ये प्राक्प्रचोदिताः ॥१६३॥

By (the statement about) becoming the sky etc. (of the deceased worshippers) is explained their return (and also that means) by adopting which, they attain to the Devayāna and/or the Pitryāna. [161]

Also, there is stated the means of each, viz. having the nature of knowledge and of ritual. And also there is clearly stated why the world does not get filled. [162]

And (there are explanations about) the Jīvas not going to or going to the states of insects etc. Thus, all the five questions,

which were first put forth, have been answered.

[163]

इति श्रीबृहदारण्यकोपनिषद्भाष्यवार्तिके षष्ठाध्यायस्य
द्वितीयं ब्राह्मणम् ॥२॥

BRHADĀRANYAKOPANIṢAD-
BHĀṢYA-VĀRTIKA

6.3

वित्तं विना न सिद्धिः स्याद्दृष्टादृष्टार्थकर्मणः ।
यतोऽतः कर्म मन्थाख्यं तादर्थ्येनाभिधीयते ॥१॥

Since there cannot be accomplishment of the (ritual) action intended for securing the seen and/or the unseen results, unless one has the wealth (necessary for the performances); therefore, a ritual act that is called Mantha is now prescribed (lit. stated) for that purpose. [1]

This introduces the relation between this Brāhmaṇa and the earlier ones. The earlier discussed effects, viz. the movement of the departed ones, relate to their *jñāna* (of BU 6.1) and *karman* (of BU 6.2). Now follows the subsequent portion which is allied to it.

पितुर्लोक्यो यथा पुत्रः कर्मणेहोपजायते ।
तादृक्पुत्रार्थिनः कर्म त्वेषामित्यादिनोच्यते ॥२॥

In the words *eṣām ...*¹ there is prescribed (lit. stated) a (ritual) action for one desiring to have a son, in a way that through that action becomes born to a father a son who is conducive to (his achievement of) the *loka*. [2]

¹Cf. BU 6.4.1.

यः स्यात्कामग्रहग्रस्तो वित्तापत्योद्धवं प्रति ।
तं प्रत्येवेति विज्ञेयं कर्मेदं न त्वकामिनम् ॥३॥

It should be known that this (ritual act) is (intended) for

him who is possessed by a strong desire (*kāmagraha*) for getting (lit. for the rise of) wealth and offspring and not for one who has no (such) desire. [3]

Thus, every householder, who desires for an excellent after-life, should perform the Mantha ritual.

प्राप्नुयां सुमहद्वित्तमिति यः कामयेत ह ।
इत्युक्त्यावाप्तवित्तस्य नेदं कर्मेति गम्यते ॥४॥
महत्त्वमात्मनोऽत्यर्थं यो वा कामयते गृही ।
महत्ता न विना वित्तं कर्मातो वित्तसिद्धये ॥५॥

It is implied that this (ritual) act is not for one who has (already) obtained wealth, as it is understood from the statement: he who desires, 'May I obtain very great wealth'; [4]

or a householder, who desires to obtain for himself exceeding importance; (as) indeed (such) greatness cannot be (obtained) without wealth, therefore is this (ritual) act meant for acquiring wealth. [5]

In the two verses the word *mahat* is understood in two ways: (i) in verse 4, *mahat* is adjective of wealth, (ii) in verse 5, *mahat* means importance among people or *aiśvarya* 'fame etc.' for which wealth is implied as the essential part.

The following is the explanation of BU sentence *sa yaḥ udagayane*

....

कालो विधीयते चास्य मन्थाख्यस्येह कर्मणः ।
श्रुत्योदगयनाद्युक्त्या कर्मासिद्धयै प्रयत्नतः ॥६॥

The time for the performance of this rite called Mantha is prescribed here, since the Śruti has specifically stated in the words beginning with *udagayane* for the accomplishing of the (ritual) act. [6]

This explains the meaning of the BU sentence *udagayane* '(at the time of the movement of the sun) ... northward ...',

SP points out: This is according to the accepted belief *kāle karma vidhīyate nākāle* (not traced).

प्रार्थनीयः पुरा कालो विशुद्धिश्चात्मनस्ततः ।
द्रव्याण्योषधयश्चैव देशश्च तदनन्तरम् ॥७॥

First, the time (for the ritual act) has to be properly desired (i.e. decided by the householder), then also his own purification, various materials (for example, utensils and grains (lit. herbs) (have to be acquired), and then (a suitable) place for the performance (is to be fixed). [7]

कालादीनां गुणानां च कर्मण्यस्मिन्समुच्चयः ।
न विकल्पः समृद्धिः स्यात्कर्मणोऽस्य समुच्चितौ ॥८॥

And, in this (ritual) action, there is a combination of time etc.¹ and also of excellences;² there is no alternative (for the same prescribed here), because only in (such a) combination (is ascertained) the richness of the (ritual) action. [8]

¹This refers to the material and the place.

²This is called *guṇas*, not qualities, viz. purified body and mind and faith etc.

कर्मणश्चास्य निष्पत्तौ विद्वत्तापि समाश्रिता ।
यतोऽतः सूत्रितं नेदं सूत्रकृद्भिर्यथोदितम् ॥९॥

Since again, in (successfully) completing this (ritual) action, the state of (the worshipper's) being possessed of the knowledge (about the action) is also expected; therefore, this (ritual act), which is mentioned (above), is not prescribed in their (Grhya-)sūtra by the composers¹ of the same. [9]

¹The plural here marks the respect for the composer of the Gr̥hyasūtra, or for indicating more than one Gr̥hyasūtra related to the Saṃhitā of the relevant Vedic school.

यो ह वै ज्येष्ठमित्यक्त्या विद्वत्ता या पुरोदिता ।
तस्यां सत्यामिदं कर्म ज्येष्ठायेत्यादिलिङ्गतः ॥१०॥

This (ritual) act is (to be performed) by a worshipper, in case he is possessed of the knowledge (about the ritual action), this (lit. which) was stated before in the words *yo ha vai jyeṣṭham* ... (BU 6.1). This (is understood) from the indicatory (words) *jyeṣṭhāya* etc. [10]

भूमिशय्या पयःपानं ब्रह्मचर्यं च वाग्यमः ।
उपसद्ब्रतमेतत्स्यादमावास्येति लिङ्गतः ॥११॥

Also (there is to be understood) from the indicatory (word) *amāvāsyā* that this is the vow called *upasad* wherein a worshipper has to observe sleeping on bare earth, subsist (only) on (lit. drink) milk, (observing) abstinence from sex act and restraint on speech. [11]

अग्निमित्येकवचनात्तथैवोल्लेखनादितः ।
न मुख्योपसदामत्र संभवोऽस्तीति गम्यते ॥१२॥

Also it is understood from the use of the singular form *agnim* and also from the reference to drawing (of lines) etc. (on the place of the ritual) that there is no acceptance (lit. possibility) of the principally known *upasads*.¹ [12]

¹These refer to those vows prescribed in relation to a Jyotiṣṭoma sacrifice. They are more elaborate and those under reference are comparatively simpler. *ullekhana* etc. are prescribed for various domestic rituals.

ताम्रं नौदुम्बरं ग्राह्यमिध्मैस्तस्य विरोधतः ।
वानस्पत्यमतो ग्राह्यं कर्मण्यौदुम्बरं श्रुतौ ॥१३॥

And an Audumbara (vessel) made of copper is not to be used in this (ritual) act, because that is opposed by the *idhmas* 'sacrificial fuel sticks'.¹ Therefore, one should use in this (ritual) act an Audumbara (vessel) made of wood. [13]

This verse rejects a view that the Audumbara vessel, made of copper, is to be used in this (ritual) act; because there is the scriptural statement *audumbara idhmaḥ* (BU 6.3.13).

ग्राम्याणि दश धान्यानि फलपुष्पाणि सर्वतः ।
अप्रमादकराणीह भक्ष्यमेध्यानि यानि च ॥१४॥

(One should use during the performance of the ritual) ten types of grains produced from land, as also fruits and flowers which do not cause intoxication and such eatables as are suitable (for the performance of the rituals).¹ [14]

¹This is to avoid the eating of garlic etc.

दशेति नियमार्थं स्यान्न ततोऽन्यनिषेधने ।
भूरिदोषोपदुष्टत्वात्परिसंख्याविधेरिति ॥१५॥

The word *daśa* is mentioned (here) for restricting (the nature of the kinds of grains to be offered in the Mantha rite) though not for prohibiting other grains, because the injunction called *Parisaṃkhyā*¹ (is not to be accepted) as it suffers from many defects (or, faults).² [15]

¹*niyama* refers to what is adopted among/between alternatives that are enjoined in an injunction (*pakṣe 'prāptasya prāpako vidhiḥ*) and *parisaṃkhyā* refers to what is excluded from alternatives that obtain simultaneously (*ubhayoś ca yugapatprāptāv itaravyāvṛttiparah parisaṃkhyāvidhiḥ*). (*Arthasaṃgraha*. ed. S.S.

Sukthankar, Bombay: 1931, pp.78-79).

²Read SP: *śrautasarvaviśeṣaṇatyāgo 'śrutānyanivṛttisvīkārah ... ityādismṛtivorodhaś ca.*

कंसाद्याकारसिद्धयर्थं कंसाद्युक्तरिहोच्यते ।
तण्डुलान्फलपुष्पाणि पिष्ट्वा पात्रे निधापयेत् ॥१६॥
दधना च मधुना पिष्टं सम्यगालोड्य पात्रगम् ।
स्थापयेत्कृतरक्षं सच्छुचौ देशे प्रयत्नतः ॥१७॥

Here is a statement made about bronze etc.¹ in order to get effected the vessel of a material called bronze. The performer of this rite should first paste (together) rice grains, fruits and flowers and then place them in that vessel. [16]
Then, having softened the paste with curds and honey by vigorously stirring these in the pot together, he should place them carefully in a purified region, properly protected.² [17]

¹That refers to the material from which the Audumbara vessel is made.

²Cf. BUB pp.786-787.

परीत्यादिगिरा चात्र देशसंस्कार उच्यते ।
संस्कृते भूप्रदेशेऽथ ह्यग्निं संस्थापयेद्गृही ॥१८॥

And by the mention of *pari-*¹ etc., here is expressed the purification of the place (for the performance), then, on this (purified) place, the householder should establish the fire. [18]

¹This refers to the three acts *parisanūhana* 'sprinkling water (in some particular way) around the fire(-place)', *parilepana* 'smearing with cowdung the altar,' and *paristarana* 'strewing or spreading (*darbhas*) around (the fire)'.

लेपनादि च कर्तव्यं कृतपूर्वेऽपि तद्विधेः ।
इति कातीयवचनमदृष्टार्थत्वकारणात् ॥१९॥

Smearing (that place) etc. has to be done, even if (that has been already) performed, since it has been so prescribed in a statement of Kātyāyana¹ for (effecting) some unseen purpose.

[19]

¹Read SP: *dr̥ṣṭārthatayā kṛtaśodhane 'pi deśe lepanādi kartavyam* (Kātyāyana Gr̥hyasūtra; and also SP: *parisamuhyo-palipyollikhyoddhr̥tyābhyukṣyeti*.

पाकयज्ञविधानेन संस्कृत्याज्यं यथाविधि ।
 पुंसा हस्तादिनक्षेण मन्थमानीय सिद्धये ॥२०॥
 खजकेनैकधीकृत्य मन्थद्रव्यमतः परम् ।
 आवापस्थान आज्यस्य हुत्वा नित्याहुतीस्ततः ॥२१॥
 यावन्त इत्युपक्रम्य मन्त्रैराज्यं यथाक्रमम् ।
 हुत्वा हुत्वा च मन्थेऽथ संस्रवं प्रक्षिपेन्मुहुः ॥२२॥

(The performer of the rite) should, in keeping with the prescription of simple offering(s), (viz. *pākayajñas*), first purify the clarified butter according to the procedure and then, bringing the Mantha for accomplishment (of the rite), at the time of the constellation of Hasta etc. (which bears) a male (name),

[20]

mixing together the material for Mantha, by means of a churning stick and then making usual offerings of clarified butter, in the place of the offerings,

[21]

he should begin with Mantras *yāvantaḥ* ...— Then, making the offerings, one after another, he should later in the Mantha rite, offer (into the fire) the remainder of the (clarified butter).

[22]

Now, BU 6.3.2 is under reference.

स्वाहाकारावसानाः स्युर्मन्त्राः सर्वे यथोदिताः ॥२३॥

All the Mantras, as stated, should end with the utterance *svāhā*.

[23]

मन्त्रद्वयेन ज्येष्ठादौ होमः कार्यो विजानता ।
अग्न्यादावेकशः कार्यो यावन्मन्थावमर्शनम् ॥२४॥

A knower (of the ritual) should perform the *homa* (i.e. make the offerings) under the constellations Jyeṣṭhā etc., with the recitation of the two Mantras *agni* ... till there is the completion of the Mantras. [24]

SP states: *uktaṃ ca bhāṣye retasa ityādyārabhyaikaikāṃ āhutim hutvā ityādi* (possibly from Bhartṛprapañca on BU).

अथ स्विष्टकृदन्तेऽस्मिन्होमानन्तरमेव तत् ।
द्वितीयेन मथालोड्य ह्यथाभिमृशति पाणिना ॥२५॥
भ्रमसीत्यादिना मन्थं स्मरंस्तद्देवतां हृदा ।
भ्रमसि प्राणभूतस्त्वं न ह्येकत्रावतिष्ठसे ॥२६॥
ज्वलज्जाज्वल्यमानस्त्वं जठरस्थान्नपाककृत् ।
पूर्णं च सर्वतोव्यापि सर्वत्रानवखण्डितम् ॥२७॥
प्रस्तब्धोऽसि स्थिरत्वाच्च वियद्वन्न विकम्पसे ॥२८॥
सर्वतोऽपरिपन्थित्वात्सर्वैश्चाप्यनुकूलतः ।
त्वमेकशफमित्युक्तं शफैका या त्वदात्मिका ॥२९॥

Then, after the *sviṣṭavṛt*¹ offering is made in the rite—which is immediately after that offering²—he should mix together that material of the Mantha offering for a second time. Then he touches (the Mantha) by his hand, [25]

remembering the deity of the Mantha and reciting the Mantra *bhramasi* ...; (the Mantra means:) You have now become Prāṇa and you do not stay just at one place (in the body).³ [26]

The Mantra *jvalat* ...— means: ‘You are shining brilliantly and the author of the digestion of food that is in (viz. has reached) the stomach. And you are (the Brahman), *pūrṇa* and pervading on all sides, and nowhere obstructed’. [27]

‘(And) you are, on account of steadiness, steady (in the body)

and, (even) like the sky, you do not shake. [28]

Since from all sides you do not have any opposition and because all are agreeable⁴ (or helpful) to you, therefore it is said 'you have (only) one hoof'. What is a single hoof is only yourself in nature.⁵ [29]

¹This is an offering to Agni, made from all the remnants of the materials for the *homa* put together. It marks an unimpeded completion of an offering (*su* 'well'). (Incidentally Agni—specially the *Āhavanīya* in the Śrauta ritual—is also called *sviṣṭakṛt*).

²This is explained by *homānantaram eva tat* where *tat* is the *manthadravya* 'material for the Mantha rite'.

³That is to say: the deity of the Mantha, being *Prāṇa*, moves everywhere in the body. Now follows the explanation of *jvalat*

....
⁴*anukūlataḥ* is to be understood as *anukūlaiḥ*, qualifying *sarvaiḥ*. To paraphrase this: *sarveṣāṃ anukūlatvāt*.

⁵Read SP here: *yā khalv ekā śaphā jagadātmikā nikhilam api jagat tava pādabhāgatvena vartate na tu pādatve 'pi paryāptam ato 'navacchinnaś tvam ity arthaḥ*.

उद्गात्रा हिंकृतं पूर्वं स्तोत्रमुद्गायता स्फुटम् ।
यज्ञारम्भे तदा मध्ये गीयमानेऽथ सामनि ॥३०॥
अपि हिंक्रियमाणोऽसि तथोद्गीथे विनिर्दिशेत् ।
श्रावितोऽध्वर्युणा च त्वमग्नीधा च तथोत्तरम् ॥३१॥

(You are) what was produced by the *Udgātr* as *hum* sound while he was singing in clear voice, at the beginning of the sacrifice and in the middle of it and also while the *Sāman* was being sung.¹ [30]

You are also the one who are addressed with *himkāra* and so he (i.e. the performer of the Mantha rite) should mention in the *Udgītha* song. You have been sung by the *Adhvaryu* and later by the priest *Agnīdh* also. [31]

¹The words *himṅkṛta*, *himṅkriyamāṇa* refer to different points of time, yet the *himṅkāra*, being only one, belongs to all points of time and does not involve any contradiction.

आर्द्रे मेघोदरे विद्युत्संदीप्तोऽसीति कथ्यते ।
विविधं त्वमेव भवसि यतोऽतो विभुरुच्यते ॥३२॥
सोमो वृष्ट्यादिभावेन प्रभुः प्रभवसीत्यतः ।
आदित्यः प्राणभावेन ह्यन्नभावेन सोमता ॥३३॥

It is said that you are resplendent in lightning in the wet interior of a cloud. Since you yourself become varied (in form), therefore, you are called *vibhu* 'all-becoming'.¹ [32]

You are Soma by becoming rain etc. and the Lord because you prevail; also Āditya by becoming Prāṇa and you have the nature of Soma² by becoming food. [33]

¹This is from *vi* in the sense of *vividha* 'various' with the verb root *bhu*— not the usual explanation: 'all-pervading'.

²Possibly this refers to the Soma plant which has been identified with Soma earlier, (see under BUBV 2.1.57).

अन्नान्नादद्वयं सर्वं त्वमेव तदपि प्रभो ।
निधनं कारणत्वात्त्वं कारणे कार्यसंलयः ॥३४॥

You are yourself the pair, viz. food and the eater of food, O Lord and you are the end, because you are the cause (of all) (in that) all effects merge into the cause. [34]

This is like a pot, which is made of clay and finally merges into clay itself.

वागग्न्याद्यात्मसम्पातात्संवर्गोऽसीति भण्यते ।
इति मन्त्रः समाप्तोऽयमभिमर्शनकर्मणि ॥३५॥

It is said (in the Mantra), 'You are the *saṁvarga*¹ (of all), since Vāc, Agni and others end themselves (into you)'. Thus

is this Mantra adopted (lit. obtained or accepted) while there is the action of touching the Mantha. [35]

This is the meaning of *saṁvargo* 'si in BU; where *saṁvarga* can be translated alternatively as 'collection or collective form'.

¹*saṁvarga* refers to what stands for a collection of some things belonging to one class; e.g. *vāyu* is called the *saṁvarga* of all winds in the body.

Now, BU 6.3.5 is under reference.

अथैनं मन्त्रपूतं सदुद्यच्छति यथोदितम् ।
आमंसीत्यादिमन्त्रेण तदर्थविष्कृतिस्त्वयम् ॥३६॥

Now that this one is purified by the Mantras as prescribed, he lifts it up, reciting the Mantra *ā maṁsi* The explanation of its meaning is thus: [36]

आमंसीति भवेद्रूपं ज्ञानार्थस्यैव मन्यतेः ।
लेट्याङ्पूर्वस्य संसिद्धं शब्लुकीत्यवधारणात् ॥३७॥

The form *āmaṁsi* is derived from the verb root *man* conveying the meaning 'to know', with the prefix *ā*, in the *let* 'subjunctive mood' and determined¹ by the dropping of the conjugational sign *śap*. [37]

¹This is in accordance with the grammatical rule regarding the dropping of it.

आसमन्ताद्विजानासि सूक्ष्मादि जगति स्थितम् ।
ज्ञेयं यावज्जगत्किञ्चिदामंसीति ततः सदा ॥३८॥

You know everything around, viz. what is existing in the world beginning with the subtle (and) whatever is to be known; therefore, (it is said) 'You ever know all the world'. [38]

This explains the meaning of *āmaṇsi* which is in BU and also in BUB as *āmaṇhi*.

यथास्मांस्त्वं विजानासि तथैव त्वां वयं सदा ।
मन्यामहे वरीयांसं गुणवद्भ्यो गुणाधिकम् ॥३९॥

As you know us all, so do we ever think about you, who are better (than all others) and having more excellent qualities than those who are possessed of (those) qualities. [39]

महि महत्त्वं जानीम आमोऽसि त्वं तथा प्रभो ।
न त्वं पाकसमायोगात्फलवन्नाशमृच्छसि ॥४०॥
आमोऽपक्वं त्वयि गतं महत्त्वमपि भण्यते ।

We know your *mahi*, i.e. *mahattva* 'greatness'. So also you are, O Lord, unbaked or uncooked, i.e. you never meet destruction like a fruit (which meets destruction) after coming into contact with heat or cooking. [40]

āma means unbaked; thus the greatness in you is described (lit. expressed). [41ab]

यस्माद्राजास्य सर्वस्य मां च देवः स सर्वदा ॥४१॥
राजानं च तथेशानं करोत्वधिपतिं च माम् ।
उद्यम्यानेन मन्त्रेण भक्षयत्यथ भागशः ॥४२॥

And since you (are) the king of all this, therefore, may you, the god, ever (rule or protect) me. [41cd]

May (his Mantha) make me a king, a ruler, (and) the lord.¹ Reciting this Mantra, he first lifts up (the Manthagraha) and then partakes of it, part by part. [42]

¹That is, May that grant me power/excellence similar to yours.

Now, BU 6.3.6 is under reference.

गायत्र्या मधुमत्या च व्याहृत्या चेति पादशः ।

ग्रासमश्नाति मन्थस्य ह्युत्तरेषु तथैव च ॥४३॥

He partakes of the Mantha, bit by bit, each with one line of the Gāyatrī Mantra, and a verse containing (the word) *madhu* in it and also a Vyāhṛti¹ (one after another). [43]

The elaborate procedure is this: the first line of the Gāyatrī Mantra and a verse containing (the word) *madhu* in it and the *vyāhṛti bhūḥ*; then the second line etc. with the *vyāhṛti bhvaḥ*; and then the third line, etc. with the *vyāhṛti svaḥ*.

¹This refers to the sacred utterances *bhūḥ*, *bhvaḥ* and *svāhā*. This is clear from BU.

सवितुस्तद्वरेण्यं स्याद्भर्गमन्नं महात्मनः ।
ऋतायन्ते तथा वाता मधुवत्सुखकारिणः ॥४४॥

The words *savituh tat ...*, *varenya* is *bharga*¹ referring to the food of the great one. So also *ṛtāyante vātāḥ* (which should be) 'causing pleasure' like *madhu*. [44]

Sureśvara paraphrases the words in the original verses and supplies only some words in their paraphrase for clarifying the ideas in the same.

¹This is for the Vedic form *bhargah*. Of course, it is possible that the Vedic word *bhargas* could also have another alternative form *bharga*. But the meaning *annam*, as suggested by Sureśvara is not meant in the well-known Gāyatrī Mantra—it means there 'lustre'.

अनुद्वेगकरा हृद्या ऋतायन्ते वहन्ति च ।
अमृतं मधु नद्योऽपि मदर्थं सर्वदा शुभम् ॥४५॥

(The verses convey the following thoughts): (The winds) which do not cause any pain (and) which are delightful to the heart, follow the *ṛta*, and thus (may) they flow (pleasantly). So also do the rivers (bring) *amṛta*, viz. sweet,¹ for my sake and (also)

bliss, forever,

[45]

¹*madhu* refers to harmony in every walk of life; here it is called 'sweet' only metaphorically.

तृप्ता मोदामहे येन क्षरन्तीति क्रियापदम् ।
अत्यर्थं मधुररसाः सन्तु ह्योषधयश्च नः ॥४६॥

so that we do feel delight, satisfied that we are. The word *kṣaranti* '(they) trickle' is a verb (conveying the idea:) may they indeed be for us exceedingly sweet in their juice; and so also may the herbs (flow sweet) for us. [46]

त्रिकमुच्चार्य भः स्वाहेत्याहुतिं प्रक्षिपेन्मुखे ।
त्रिकं त्रिकं तथोच्चार्य ह्युत्तरैष्वपि योजयेत् ॥४७॥

Having recited the three (*vyāhrtis*) together, he puts into (his own) mouth the offering (i.e. mouthful) with the utterance; so also he recites, the group of the three one by one, while taking the subsequent mouthfuls.¹ [47]

¹The elaborate procedure is clearly explained in the following verses up to verse 55.

देवस्य द्योतनवतो हृद्यं यच्चिन्तयेमहि ।
मधु नक्तमथो रात्रिर्मधुरा दुःखहानिकृत् ॥४८॥
उषसो दिवसस्यापि माधुर्यं नोऽस्तु सर्वदा ।
पार्थिवं च रजो लोको ह्लादकृन्मधुमांस्तथा ॥४९॥
द्युलोकः पितृलोकोऽथ पिता हि द्यौर्यतो मतः ।
भुवः स्वाहेति मन्थस्य द्वितीयामाहुतिं क्षिपेत् ॥५०॥

(The *bhargā*¹) of the resplendent god, which is pleasant to the heart (and) sweet²—and (*atho*) *naktam* is night³—let (night) be (sweet and) ever a remover of misery. [48]
Also may there be for us the sweetness of Uṣas, and of the

day also. And may the earthly region, viz. this world, be for us the cause of delight and full of sweetness as well. [49]

So also may the heavenly region and the region of the Pitṛs be pleasant (for us), for the heaven is known as the father indeed. Then, let him, reciting (the *vyāhṛti*) *bhuvah* and (the word) *svāhā*, make the second offering of the Mantha (into his own mouth). [50]

¹This is taken from verse 44 above (where *bharga-* is for the Rgvedic *bhargas-* as already pointed out there).

²That is, agreeable.

³This is parenthetical.

धियः प्रचोदयेद्यो न उद्यन्प्रज्ञेन्द्रियाणि च ।

प्रचोदयतु नो देवः श्रेयसे सर्वदात्मनः ॥५१॥

dhiyah *pracodayet* *yo naḥ* means 'May that god, rising, ever incite our intellect and sense-organs, may (he be) for the well-being of the Ātman (the inner self). [51]

वनस्पतिस्तथा चन्द्रः सूर्यस्तु मधुरोऽस्तु नः ।

गावो दीधितयः सन्तु मधुमत्यो दिशोऽथवा ॥५२॥

In the same way, may the herb, also the moon, and (*tu*) the sun be for us sweet; may the cows, the rays, be for us full of sweet, or, may the quarters (be sweet).¹ [52]

¹*diśo 'thavā* is possibly added as an explanation of *dīdhitayah*, because they, in the sense of the rays (of the sun). Yet this might be taken as a repetition after the mention of *sūrya*. This leaves *gāvaḥ* 'cows' as an independent source of delight.

Possibly Sureśvara refers *gāvaḥ* to rays and *dīdhitayah* to the quarters; so SP.

स्वः स्वाहेत्याहुतिक्षेपः समस्तां व्याहरेत्ततः ।

सावित्रीं मधुमतीश्चैव तिस्त्रोऽपि व्याहृतीस्तथा ॥५३॥

चतुर्थीं प्रक्षिपेदेवमाहुतिं पर्ववन्मुखे ।
अहमेव जगत्सर्वं भूयासमिति निर्ब्रुवन् ॥५४॥

Let there be the (third) offering with (the utterance of the *vyāhṛti*) *svaḥ* (and the word) *svāhā*. Then he should recite the full *Sāvitrī* (i.e. *Gāyatrī*) verse and all those verses which contain the word *madhu* in them, together with all of the three *vyāhṛtis* [53]

and thus he should make the fourth offering into (his own) mouth, (even) as before, saying 'May I be the entire world'. [54]

स्मार्तमाचमनं त्वन्ते प्रायत्यार्थमिहोच्यते ।
अग्नेः पश्चिमतोऽथान्ते प्राक्शिराः संविशेत्ततः ॥५५॥

Then there is prescribed here, in the end, the sipping of water, according to the *Smṛti*, for *prāyatya*.¹ Then may he sleep to the west of the fire, with his head towards the west. [55]

¹This is for securing purity. SP refers to *Manusmṛti* 2.222 for clarifying *prāyatya*:

ācamya prayato nityam ubhe saṁdhye samāhitah /
śucau deśe japej japyam upāsita yathāvidhi //

प्रत्यूषसि ततो भक्त्या ह्यादित्यमुपतिष्ठते ।
वक्ष्यमाणेन मन्त्रेण ह्युपासीत रविं सदा ॥५६॥

Then, in the morning, he indeed, worships the sun, with devotion; let him indeed¹ ever worship the sun with the verse which is being stated hereafter. [56]

¹SP states that the use of the word *hi* is to point out the well-known prescription of the worship.

एकपुण्डरीकमिति प्रधानत्वं विवक्षितम् ।
एकशब्देन नो संख्या यथैकः श्वेतवाहनः ॥५७॥

The use of the word *ekapūṇḍarīka* intends to convey the prominence (of the object of worship); the word *eka* does not signify the number; (It is like in the phrase *ekah śvetavāhanah*,¹ viz. the only one, who has white horses.) [57]

This verse gives the meaning of the Mantra which is referred to in the preceding verse.

¹This refers to Arjuna. He alone is known by the name Śvetavāhana.

दिशां यद्वत्प्रधानस्त्वं मनुष्याणां तथा ह्यहम् ।
भवेयं त्वत्प्रसादाद्भोः स्फीतः पुंभोगसाधनैः ॥५८॥

As you are prominent among all the quarters, so also may I be among men, O Lord, through your favour, enriched with many means of men's enjoyments. [58]

Now, BU 6.3.7 is under reference.

यथेतमेत्याथासीनः पश्चादग्नेः समाहितः ।
तं हैतमिति यत्नेन वंशं जपति भक्तिततः ॥५९॥

Then, going (back by the way which) he has come, he seats himself by the side of the fire, and with his mind (well) composed, he recites, with full attention and with devotion the words *taṁ ha etam* ..., he mentions (lit. utters) the line of his teachers (*vaṁśam*). [59]

Now, BU 6.3.8 is under reference.

तं हैतं मन्थं यत्नोक्तमुद्दालतनयः सुधीः ।
उक्त्वाथ याज्ञवल्क्याय तं प्रोवाचाथ विस्मितः ॥६०॥
मन्थं शुष्केऽपि यः स्थाणौ निषिञ्चेदुक्तसंस्कृतम् ।
जायेरन्नेव तच्छाखाः प्ररोहेयुर्दलानि च ॥६१॥

Then, having told with an attentive mind, (about) this Mantha

(rite) to Yājñavalkya, the intelligent son of Uddālaka¹ (again) said, with a smile: [60]

‘Whosoever would offer this Mantha, which is thus sanctified, even on a dry (i.e. withered) tree, (would find that) its branches become full of life and also would put forth young leaves.’ [61]

This asserts the potency of the Mantha.

Now, BU 6.3.9-12 are under reference.

यादृगर्थोऽस्य वचस उत्तरेष्वपि तादृशः ।

The meaning of the words even in the subsequent sentences is similar to what it is of this statement (viz. BU 6.3.8). [62ab]

Now, BU 6.3.13 is under reference.

चतुरौदुम्बरोक्त्यर्थो व्याख्यातः पूर्वमेव तु ।

सुखावबोधतश्चैव स्वयमेव प्रतीयताम् ॥६२॥

The meaning of the statement in the words *caturaudumbara* ... is already explained;¹ may one know it with ease for understanding. [62c-f]

¹That is, as in the case of Audumbara vessel made of bronze in verses 13ff. above.

इति श्रीबृहदारण्यकोपनिषद्भाष्यवार्तिके षष्ठाध्यायस्य
तृतीयं ब्राह्मणम् ॥३॥

**BRHADĀRANYAKOPANIṢAD-
BHĀṢYA-VĀRTIKA**

6.4

In some of these verses Sureśvara often refers to the actual words of the Mantras in BU and supplies together with them his paraphrases of the same. Therefore, our translation had to appear as bits of phases!

BU 6.4.1-2 are under reference.

एषामिति नृबीजस्य स्तुतिरुक्त्या विवक्ष्यते ।
प्रतिष्ठां कल्पयानीति यस्यां पुंस्त्वं प्रपद्यते ॥१॥

In the words *eṣām* ..., the statement (in the Śruti) intends to express the praise of the seed of man. And, the words *pratiṣṭhāṃ kalpayāni* (signify that) in which the nature (lit. birth) of a male is secured. [1]

In this verse, Sureśvara summarizes the introductory arguments of BU 6.4.1-2 by citing only a few words from it.

Now, only BU 6.4.2 is under reference.

शुक्रं निषिक्तं यत्रेदं पुरुषत्वं निगच्छति ।
प्रतिष्ठां तादृशीमीशः प्रजापतिरचीकलृपत् ॥२॥

Prajāpati, the ruler (or, Lord), thought of such a firm abode in which the semen planted (lit. poured) gets the (potential) quality of a male. [2]

This explains the thought of the second half of the preceding verse.

स्त्रियं ससर्ज तद्योग्यां मधुकाण्डे यथोदिताम् ।

सृष्ट्वाथाधः प्रदेशे तामुपास्ते ग्राम्यधर्मतः ॥३॥

Then he created a woman who is suitable for that,¹ as mentioned in the Madhu Kāṇḍa.² Then, after creating her, he attended to her in her lower part (of the body), as in common life.³ [3]

This explains *sa striyaṃ sasrje* in BU.

¹That is, for being an abode for the seed.

²Cf. *tataḥ patiś ca patnī cābhavatām* (BU 1.4.3).

³This is, *grāmya dharma*, that is to say it is not the sign of the religious elite. This indicates that Sureśvara's expression is the precursor of Ānandagiri's expression *paśukarma* and that it conforms to the *Kāmasāstra*. The lower part here means a woman's sexual organ.

अपत्योत्पत्तये स्त्रीणामधोदेशं प्रजापतिः ।

प्रागुपासितवान्यत्नादुपास्यं तेन तत्ततः ॥४॥

(Since) Prajāpati had, in earlier time, attended to the lower part of the body of the woman,¹ for producing a son (lit. a child),² therefore, one should attend to that with special care (*yatna*). [4]

This is to explain *tasmāt striyaṃ adha upāsīta* in BU.

¹It is possible to understand that Sureśvara uses the word *strīṇām* (plural) to express the idea of the class-word *striyam*.

²In such a context, the word *apatya* is to be taken as a synonym of *putra*.

सोमाभिषवरूपत्वक्लृप्तयेऽथाधुनोच्यते ।

एतं ग्रावाणवच्छिन्नमुदपारयदात्मनः ॥५॥

Now is stated hereafter to establish the form of the Soma-pressing in the placing of the seed in a woman. In the words *etam*,¹ (the Śruti states) that he made his generative

organ penetrate (into the woman's sexual organ), like the stone (for Soma-pressing). [5]

This and the following two verses explain *sa etam ... abhyasrjata* in BU.

¹This refers to the generative organ because of its hardness at the time of intercourse. SP refers to the similarity between human intercourse and the preparation of the Soma drink, i.e. Vājapeya 'strong drink' -sacrifice.

प्राञ्चं कृत्वाथ तं शिश्नं यथैवाभिषवोपलम् ।
एकीभावेन तं नार्या यत्नात्समुपवेशयेत् ॥६॥

Then he makes his penis hard like the Soma-pressing stone and becoming one (in mind with the woman) he enters it into the woman¹ with (proper) attention (*yatna*). [6]

SP states *nārīśabdas tadīyendriyaviṣayaḥ*.

तथाभूतेन ग्रावणैतां स्त्रियमभ्यसृजन्मुहुः ।
आत्मनः पुरुषार्थाय यथोक्तोपासनं भवेत् ॥७॥

By that (which has become as hard as the Soma-pressing) stone,¹ he united with the woman again (and again) for securing his own aim of life—so that the attendance on the woman, as prescribed would be effected. [7]

This points out the significance of *tenainām abhyasrjata*.

Now, BU 6.4.3 is under reference.

यस्यां प्रजननं पुंसा स्त्रियामभ्यन्तरीकृतम् ।
तस्या वेदिरुपस्थः स्यादूर्वोरुपरि दर्शनम् ॥८॥

The (sexual organ of that woman) in which the man has entered his own generative organ is the alter; and it is seen between

(lit. above) her laps—so is to be understood.¹

[8]

¹This is a metaphorical identity (*dr̥ṣṭi*).

बर्हिस्तज्जानि लोमानि चर्माधिषवणे तथा ।
चर्महानडुहं पश्येत्सोमाभिषवसिद्धये ॥९॥

The hair grown there are the *barhis* (grass) and the lips (of the vulva) are the stones for pressing (Soma, *adhiṣavane*) and the skin of hers is the bull's skin—so should he see (it, viz. the skin) for securing *abhiṣava* 'sprinkling of Soma'¹

[9]

¹It means: planting the seed in the woman.

फलके चाधिषवणे यथासंख्येन निर्दिशेत् ॥१०॥
यो योन्यन्तर्गतो देशः समिद्धश्चर्म निर्दिशेत् ।
तद्देशमभितस्तौ यौ मुष्कौ तौ वृषणाविति ॥११॥

And he should refer to the stones for Soma-pressing thus in order:

[10]

That part which is within her vulva is (to be taken as) what is enkindled (viz. Agni). And he should consider (lit. refer to) the part around the region (of the vulva) as the (bull's) skin and those two fleshy parts as the testicles.

[11]

लोकः स्याद्वाजपेयेन यजमानस्य मानतः ।
तावन्तं लोकमाप्नोति यावन्तं वाजपेयतः ॥१२॥

By the authoritative means (i.e. by the text of the Śruti); a sacrificer of the Vājapeya (sacrifice) would get the world; the householder also (by his act under reference) secures as extensive a world as from (the performance of) a Vājapeya (sacrifice).

[12]

अत्रानि संभ्रियन्ते हि दश सप्त च भागशः ।
वाजपेये कृतावन्नकामस्य स विधीयते ॥१३॥

Since, in a Vājapeya sacrifice, ten and seven foods are brought (lit. collected together)—in (two) portions; therefore, that (viz. a Vājapeya) is enjoined on one who is desirous of food. [13]

The purport of this verse is not fully/clearly understood by us. However, read SP: *paśukarmāṅgeṣu vājapeyāṅgādhyāse 'pi katham tatra tadadhyāsaḥ sāmyābhāvād ity āśaṅkya sāmyārtham vājapeyasyānnatvam sādhayati.*

रेतसोऽन्नरसस्यैव यत्रान्नाहुतिरीक्ष्यते ।
वाजपेयाभिसंपत्स्यान्मैथुनाख्यक्रतोरतः ।
सामान्यादिति विज्ञेयं वाजपेयफलार्थिनाम् ॥१४॥

Therefore, where (the planting of) the seed by man is seen as the very offering of the essence of food, there would result from the ritual of intercourse the rich result of a Vājapeya rite¹; this should be known from the similarity by those who desire for the results of the Vājapeya.² [14]

¹Alternatively: SP quotes a Śruti: *yasmin puruṣe 'nnāhutir iṣṭā tasminn etasminn agnau devā annam juhuvati* and adds *iti tasya puṁso reto bhuktānnarasas tasyaiva yasmin karmani hūya-mānatvam tasya pūrvavad annatvāt tasmīn vājapeyadrṣṭiḥ.*

²That means: the result would follow, even without the actual performance of a Vājapeya rite.

स्त्रीणां च सुकृतं वृङ्क्ते सर्वमावर्जयेच्छुभम् ।
अधोपहासं यो विद्वान्यथोक्तमुपसेवते ॥१५॥

He, who, knowing this, attends to the lower part of the woman,¹ as prescribed (by the scripture), secures (for himself) the woman's merits and all bliss. [15]

¹That is, unites with her in intercourse.

अनेवविदुषः पुण्यं सुकृतं वृञ्जते स्त्रियः ।
मैथुनोपनिषत्तत्त्वमेतद्ध स्माह भावितः ॥१६॥

In the case of him, who is not knowing this, women¹ take away his merit, and his good deed(s). This is the secret doctrine of intercourse. Thus has he (Āruṇi), knowing well,² stated.

[16]

¹The plural is somewhat strange!

²Or, having devotion (properly determining it).

Now, BU 6.4.4 is under reference.

सर्वदैवाहुतीर्विद्वाञ्जुहोत्यश्नन्नपः पिबन् ।
उपगच्छन्स्त्रियं तद्वदार्णिर्गोत्रतः किल ॥१७॥

A knower (of the Vājasaneyā sacrifice) makes all the offerings to gods, eating, and (drinking water); (so) also uniting with (his) woman; (just) in the same way (as in a Vājapeya sacrifice, secures his desired result)—so, it is reported (*kila*), did Āruṇi (know) in family tradition (*gotratāḥ*)¹

[17]

¹SP adds: and spoke about it.

ब्राह्मणा जातिमात्रेण स्त्रीभिर्हृतशुभागमाः ।
उक्तं विधिमजानन्तो म्रियन्ते मैथुने रताः ॥१८॥

Those, who are Brāhmaṇas only by birth, not knowing the prescribed mode of intercourse (and) whose excellences (i.e. merits collected) are taken away by women, die (if only) addicted to (or, engaged in) intercourse.

[18]

It signifies censure on those given to intercourse just for deriving delight from it.

बह्वेतदिति विज्ञेयं प्रयोजनबहुत्वतः ।

रेतः स्कन्दति यत्सुप्तौ जाग्रतो वापि कामिनः ॥१९॥

Since it has many purposes, it (i.e. semen) has to be known as (having) manifold (effects), viz. that man's semen sometimes spills while (he is) in sleep, or even while (he is) awake; (of that man) who is (only) sensuous (i.e. full of desire). [19]

Now, BU 6.4.5 is under reference.

हस्तेनालभ्य तद्रेतः पश्चाच्चाप्यनुमन्त्रयेत् ॥२०॥
यदद्य मेऽपतद्रेत ओषधीरसरच्च यत् ।
अपोऽगच्छत्स्वयोनिं च तदहं भूय आददे ॥२१॥

He should touch that semen and later recite the Mantra (*yan me ...*)¹ [20]

May that semen of mine, which has spilt (lit. fallen) and has moved to the herbs, gone to its origin, viz. the waters, so that I take it up again.² [21]

¹This is given in the text of BU; also paraphrased in the following verse.

²Ānandagiri in his commentary on BUB explains: *mamā-dyāprāptakāle yad retah prthivīm ... rāgātirekeṇa skannam āsīt ... svayoniṁ gatam abhūt tad idaṁ retah sampraty ādade 'ham (ity ādānamantrārthaḥ)*.

अभिमर्शनस्य यो मन्त्रो ग्रहणस्य स एव तु ।
पुनर्मामैतु तद्रेतो विज्ञानं तेज उच्यते ॥२२॥

The Mantra, which is recited (at the time) of *abhimarśaṇa* 'touching', is the same in taking it up, viz. 'May that semen, that lustre (*viññāna*), come back to me, (for) that is called *tejas*.' [22]

This and the following three verses have reference to verses 20 and 21 above.

सौभाग्यं पुनरग्निः स्युः परिशिष्टाश्च देवताः ॥२३॥

'May that fortune (once again come back to me); and let Agni and the other gods (be for me).'¹ [23]

¹The protectors of various organs, which they superintend over, are meant. The idea is that those gods once assume again the nature of that semen.

प्रकाशकत्वात्सर्वासां धिषण्याश्चाप्यग्नयो मताः ।
गमयन्तु यथास्थानं देवा अग्न्यादयो मम ॥२४॥

And fires are understood as the *dhiṣṇyas*, since they are the illuminators of all. Also, those other gods are fires, let them make my (dropped) semen go back to the places (over which they superintend). [24]

अङ्गुष्ठानामिकाभ्यां तद्रेत आदाय चात्मनः ।
स्तनौ भ्रुवौ वा निमृजेन्मध्ये च स्तनयोस्तदा ॥२५॥

And, taking up that semen by his thumb and the ring finger, he should smear with it his breast and brows. Also (he smears it) between the breasts. [25]

Now, BU 6.4.6 is under reference.

रेतःस्वयोनावुदक आत्मानं चेत्प्रमादतः ।
पश्येन्मन्त्रेण ततोयमनेनैवानुमन्त्रयेत् ॥२६॥

If, by mistake, he sees himself¹ in the waters, viz. the origin of (his) own semen, he should look at them, reciting this (same) Mantra. [26]

¹That is, his own reflection. Here, waters are understood as the *yoni* 'origin' of semen.

मयि तेजोऽस्तु विज्ञानमिति रेतोऽभिधीयते ।
विशिष्टापत्यहेतुत्वाज्जपेदेवं तथोत्तरे ॥२७॥

(In the Mantra) *mayi tejo 'stu ...*; ¹ semen is called *vijñāna*. ² Thus he should recite it later also, because that semen is the cause of the desired son (lit. child). [27]

¹The Mantra stated in BU is: *mayi teja indriyam yaśo draviṇaṃ sukṛtam* where *indriyam* is for *vijñānam* as is specifically so mentioned in verse 22 above.

²See verse 22 above.

उद्गतं मलवद्वासश्चतुर्थेऽहनि यत्स्त्रियाः ।
तां मलोद्वाससं पत्नीमाहुस्तत्कर्मकारिणः ॥२८॥

When, on the fourth day (of her period), a woman's soiled garment has been given up, the wise ones, who wish to enter on sexual act, consider this wife as one who has given up wearing a soiled garment. [28]

This is to prohibit a sex act during a woman's period.

गुणाढ्यापत्यफलवत्पुष्पभतत्वकारणात् ।
मलवद्वाससं प्राहुः श्रियं श्रीहेतुतः स्त्रियम् ॥२९॥

They have known a woman, who wore (during her period) a soiled garment, as glory, since she had become (the bearer of) a flower that fructifies in (the form of) a son that is rich in qualities, thus (verily) a cause of (future) glory. [29]

This brings out the purport of *śrīr ha vā eṣā strīṇām ...* in BU.

चतुर्थे दिवसे स्नातां गत्वा तामुपमन्त्रयेत् ।
आत्मनोऽभिमुखीभावे वाग्यत्नोऽत्रोपमन्त्रणम् ॥३०॥

On the fourth day, when she has taken a bath (after her period), may he approach and invite her (for sexual union). This invitation here¹ is his (careful) attempt in words to make her inclined towards himself (for the union). [30]

¹That is, to the proposed sex act.

Now, BU 6.4.7 is under reference.

प्रेम्णोपमन्त्रिताप्यस्मै पत्ये दद्यान्न चेदसौ ।
वस्त्राभरणभोगाद्यैरात्मनो वशमानयेत् ॥३१॥

If she does not give him that consent for the sex act, though invited with love, then he should bring her to willingness (lit. under his control) by (offering to her) garments, ornaments and enjoyments etc.¹ [31]

This explains *sā ca* ... in BU.

¹The word etc. is for other unsaid means for effecting her willingness (SP).

तथाप्युक्ता न चेद्दद्याद्बलात्तां वशमानयेत् ।
उपेयात्तामतिक्रम्य शापदानाय रोषितः ॥३२॥
इन्द्रियेण त इत्यादिमन्त्रेणाथ शपेद्द्रुषा ।
पतिशापादपुत्रा सा वशमाशु भवेत्तदा ॥३३॥

So addressed also, if she does not give her (consent), then he should bring her under his control with force; he should unite with her, over-riding (her disagreement) (and) being full of anger, be bent on pronouncing a curse on her. [32]

He should then curse her with anger, reciting the Mantra *indriyeṇa te*¹ Then she would be under his control, (for fear that) she should be without a child (or, a son), on account of her husband's curse. [33]

¹This Mantra is given in BU thus: *indriyeṇa yaśasā te yaśa*

ādade.

शप्स्यामि त्वामिति ह्युक्त्वा वशं तामानयेत्पतिः ।
दद्याच्छापभयात्सा चेदनुलोमं तदाचरेत् ॥३४॥

May the husband bring her under (his) control (only)¹ saying 'I shall curse you' and she also, owing to the fear of the curse, would behave in an agreeable way. [34]

¹The word (only) is added to point out that such a curse would result into misery for her and for himself also. Therefore, he should, as far as possible, avoid cursing her.

Now, BU 6.4.8 is under reference.

अथ शापभयाद्दद्यात्पत्ये कामितमादरात् ।
तदा निवर्तयेच्छापं मन्त्रेणानेन सत्पतिः ॥३५॥

If, however, she gave to her husband what he has desired, owing to the fear of the curse, the good husband should then withdraw the curse with the Mantra *anena*¹ [35]

¹This Mantra is *anenendriyeṇa te yaśasā yaśa ādadhāmi*.

Now, BU 6.4.9 is under reference.

पुरुषद्वेषिणीं भार्यां पतिश्चेदभिकामयेत् ।
मामियं कामयेतेति कुर्यात्तस्या इमं विधिम् ॥३६॥

If (again) a husband would have a longing (for a union with) a wife, who hates the man (i.e. union with the husband), then he should perform this (i.e. the following) rite,¹ with a desire 'Let her long for me'. [36]

This explains *sa yām* ... in BU.

¹This refers to the (Putra)mantha rite already described—cf.

the next verse.

उक्तमन्थविधानेन चरितव्रत एव सन् ।
उत्तरेष्वपि कार्येषु सर्वं तदनुवर्तयेत् ॥३७॥

Certainly, being one who has followed the procedure of the already prescribed (Putra)mantha rite, he should do all that (which is prescribed there) in later actions of his (as well).¹

[37]

¹Cf. verses 3ff. above.

स्त्रीलक्षणे प्रवेश्यान्तरात्मीयं पुंस्त्वलक्षणम् ।
वक्त्रं वक्त्रेण संधाय स्पृष्ट्वोपस्थं जपेदथ ॥३८॥
अङ्गादङ्गात्संभवसि जग्धान्नपरिणामतः ।
रसाच्छोणितमित्यादिक्रमाच्छुक्रतया मम ॥३९॥

Having entered his generative organ into the sexual organ of (his) woman and, putting his mouth to her mouth, he should touch her sexual organ, (and) then recite the Mantra: [38]

anigād anigāt sambhavasi ... to mean 'You are produced from each of my limbs', in the form of my semen as the result of the food (I have eaten); beginning with, my blood is from the *rasa* of the food etc.¹ [39]

This explains *hr̥dayād* ... in BU.

¹The word etc. refers to the flesh.

शुक्रप्रवहया नाड्या हृदयाच्चाभिजायसे ।
स त्वमङ्गकषायोऽसि दिग्धविद्धां मृगीमिव ।
स्नेहोपरोधादेवैतां पत्नीं मे वशमानय ॥४०॥

(Flowing) by the vein which carries the semen, you are produced from the heart. You are thus the essence of my limbs and, thereby, bring this my wife under my control, with a bent of love, even like a female deer who is affected by

(an arrow) smeared (with herbs).

[40]

This explains *atha yām ...* in BU.

Now, BU 6.4.10 is under reference.

मा बिभर्गर्भमित्येवमथ यां कामयेत सः ।
रूपभ्रंशो हि भवति यतो गर्भस्य धारणे ॥४१॥
तथा यौवनहानिश्च तस्मादेवं स कामयेत् ।
तस्यां स्वमर्थं निष्ठाय मुखेनेत्यादि पूर्ववत् ॥४२॥

Now, if (he would think about a woman) whom he longs for that she should not bear a foetus—for a woman's beauty is lost (or diminishes) in case she bears a foetus¹— [41]
so also is there a loss of youth—he should thus desire, having placed verse,² (putting his mouth) with her mouth (he should unite with her). [42]

¹This is parenthetical.

²That is, reciting the Mantra: *indriyeṇa te retasā reta ādade*; cf. verse 38ef above.

प्राण्यादौ रेचकं कृत्वापानयेत्तदनन्तरम् ॥४३॥
निषिक्तमपि तद्रेतः प्राणवृत्त्या यथाविधि ।
अपानवृत्त्या तद्धवस्तमित्येतत्कर्मणः फलम् ॥४४॥

Having first inhaled breath and then having held his breath within, he should exhale later. [43]

Then that semen of his, though planted in her, with the function of *prāṇa(-vāyu)*, according to prescription, would become destroyed—this is the result of this act. [44]

इन्द्रियेण त इत्यादिमन्त्रोक्त्या तां परामृशेत् ॥४५॥
इन्द्रियेणैव त्वद्रेतो रेतसा आददे स्वयम् ।
अरेता एव सा स्त्री स्यादेवं पत्याभिमन्त्रिता ॥४६॥

He should approach (i.e. touch, or unite with) her, reciting the Mantra *indriyeṇa te* [45]

Through my sexual organ (*indriya*), the semen, do I myself take away¹ the semen from you; thus addressed by her husband, that woman would then be without the seed. [46]

This explains *atha yām* ... in BU.

¹In *retasā ādate* there is the absence of *saṁdhi*, in occasional Vedic way (SP).

Now, BU 6.4.11 is under reference.

दधीत गर्भमित्येवं यामिच्छेत्पतिरङ्गनाम् ।
तामपान्य प्रयत्नेन प्राण्यान्मन्त्रेण कारयेत् ।
इन्द्रियेण त इत्युक्त्या आदधामीति सत्पतिः ॥४७॥

The husband, who wishes the wife (*aṅganā*) to bear for him a foetus, should first carefully (*prayatnena*) make her exhale, and then, himself inhaling, induce (lit. make) her do (what he desires)¹—the good husband, reciting (at that time) the Mantra (which begins with) *indriyeṇa te* (and ends with) *ādadhāmi*. [47]

¹That is, his wish that she joins him in the sex act.

Now, BU 6.4.12 is under reference.

अथाभिचारिकं कर्म प्रसङ्गादभिधीयते ।
उपायत्वेन विज्ञप्त्यै श्येनवन्न विधीयते ॥४८॥

Now is described some act of black-magic (*abhicāra*) that the occasion has demanded. This is (only) to inform one about it as some remedy¹ and, therefore, is not prescribed as the rite of Śyena.² [48]

¹SP points out: *na hiṁsyād iti śrutivirodhān na hiṁsārtho*

vidhir ity āśāṅkya ... (upāyatvena).

²Śyena is a ritual not prescribed, since it involves violence (*himsā*).

अथ यस्य गृहस्थस्य पत्न्या जारो भवेत्क्वचित् ।
तं चेद्विष्याद्रुषैवैनामारभेत तदा क्रियाम् ॥४९॥

Now, in case a householder's wife has some lover, and if he should hate him, he should, in utter¹ anger, begin the performance of the act (which is now prescribed). [49]

¹This is the force of *eva*.

न ह्यद्विष्टमनस्कस्य कर्मैतत्सिद्धिमश्नुते ।
अतोऽधिकारिविज्ञप्त्यै द्विष्यादिति विशेषणम् ॥५०॥

Indeed, this act would not be successful (in yielding the result), if a man is not having anger in his mind; therefore, in order to convey his eligibility for that act, there is this specification by the words *dviṣyāt* [50]

आमपात्रेऽग्निमित्युक्त्या ह्यभिचाराख्यकर्मणः ।
योग्यतैवामपात्रस्य भिदुरत्वसमन्वयात् ॥५१॥

In the statement *āmapātre 'gnim* ... is stated the suitability of that pot for the rite of black-magic, because a raw pot (of clay (*āmapātra*)) is invariably associated with breakability. [51]

यथामं भिदुरं पात्रमप्सु सद्यो विलीयते ।
प्राप्तजारोऽपि मे शत्रुस्तथैवाशु विदीर्यताम् ॥५२॥

As a raw pot which is breakable melts away at once when (put) into waters, so '(my wife's) lover should get destroyed into pieces quickly'¹, (should he recite). [52]

¹This is the significance of the comparison with *āmapātra*.

अग्निमित्येकवचनादुल्लिख्यादेश्च लिङ्गतः ।
आवसथ्याग्निनिर्देशो न तु त्रेताग्निसंग्रहः ॥५३॥

From the word *agni* in the singular and by the use of the word *ullikhya* etc.,¹ which serves as indication, there is here the mention of the domestic fire and not of the three fires.²

[53]

¹The word etc. refers to *āmapātra*, *śarabarhis* etc.; cf. BU text. Also the word *ullikhya* implies *parisamūhana*, *parilepana* etc. as mentioned earlier (cf. BUBV 6.3.18-19 above).

²This refers to the three sacred fires, viz. *āhavanīya*, *gārhapatya* and *tretā*.

प्रतिलोममवस्तीर्य कर्मणः प्रतिलोमतः ।
शरबर्हिः प्रयत्नेन विद्वान्रोषसमन्वितः ॥५४॥
तस्मिन्नग्नौ शरेषीका घृताक्ता जुहुयादथ ।
जारस्य दोषं प्रख्याप्य मन्त्रेणानेन सत्वरः ॥५५॥

Then he, the knower, full of anger, should with effort strew (the *barhis* grass) against the usual procedure¹—since this act is contrary to the normal act—

[54]

then offer into that fire the spearlike *śara* grass, smear the same with ghee, (and) having quickly (i.e. at the same time) spoken aloud the blemish of the lover with this Mantra:

[55]

¹That is, the procedure of *paristarana* in a domestic rite.

मम स्वभूते योषाग्नौ समिद्धे यौवनादिना ।
शुक्राहुतिं यतोऽहौषीरेष तेऽत्र व्यतिक्रमः ॥५६॥
आददेऽतोऽपराधात्ते प्राणापानौ जिजीविषोः ।
फट्कारेणैव जुहुयाच्छरभृष्टीर्यथोदिताः ॥५७॥

‘Since you have offered the oblation of your semen into the

fire in the form of (my) woman that has been enkindled (with desire for you) by her youth etc., let this (lit. this my offering) be your dishonour (*vyatikrama*).¹ [56]

Hereby, have I taken (away), on account of your offence, *Prāṇa* and *Aṇa*, from you, who are wishing to live.' Let him offer the spear-like *śara* grass,² which is mentioned earlier producing the sound *phaṭ*. [57]

¹Or rather, let this be my revenge on you.

²Refer to verse 55 above.

तथा पुत्रान्पशूंचैव आददे तेऽद्य कामुक ।
श्रौतमिष्टं विजानीयात्स्मार्तं सुकृतमित्यपि ॥५८॥

Also,¹ (let him say) 'so also do I take away now (lit. today) your sons and cattle, O voluptuous one!'. In this act, one should understand that which is approved by the Śruti as *iṣṭi* and also *sukṛta* in (the prescription(s) of) Smṛti(s). [58]

¹SP adds: 'he should announce the blame of that clandestine lover'.

श्रौतं स्मार्तं च यत्किञ्चित्पुण्यं कर्म त्वया कृतम् ।
तत्सर्वं त आददेऽहमाहुतिं प्रक्षिपेद्गुषा ॥५९॥

With the words, 'I am taking away all of yours, viz. whatever meritorious work as prescribed by the Śruti and also the by Smṛti which you have done', let him make the offering in anger. [59]

प्रार्थनाशेति विज्ञेया पराकाशा प्रतीक्षणम् ।
आदानान्तो भवेन्मन्त्रः सर्वत्रैवं विनिर्दिशेत् ॥६०॥
वाङ्मात्रेण प्रतिज्ञातं कर्मणा नोपपादितम् ।
तत्प्रतीक्षणमाकाङ्क्षा पराकाशेति भण्यते ॥६१॥

By the word *āśā* one should know desire and by *parākāśā*,¹

hope for the result; the Mantra should have *ādāna* (i.e. *aham ādade*) at its end. This he should mention everywhere (i.e. at the end of every offering). [60]

parākāśā is that which is announced (as what will be undertaken) in mere words but not actuated in action and what is mentioned as what is longed for. [61]

These two verses explain the words *āśā* and *parākāśā*.

¹Sureśvara has used the feminine *parākāśā* for masculine *parākāśa* in BU.

स वा इत्यादिनाथास्य फलमुक्तस्य कर्मणः ।
भण्यते वचसोक्तस्य निरिन्द्रियपुरःसरम् ॥६२॥

Then in the words beginning with *sa vā* is stated the result of the act that is described,¹ viz. what is stated in the words beginning with *nirindriya*. [62]

¹Namely, of the *abhicārakarman* 'act of black-magic'.

निःशेषपुरुषार्थसिलोपकृत्कर्म वर्णितम् ।
जायया मैथुनाख्यं यच्छ्रोत्रियस्य विपरिचतः ॥६३॥

Thus is described the act of one's intercourse with the wife by a learned, *śrotriya*,¹ which is the destroyer of the entire achievement of the ends of human life. [63]

¹Cf. the oft-quoted verse:

*janmanā brāhmaṇo jñeyah saṁskārair dvija ucyate /
vidyayā yāti vipratvaṁ tribhiḥ śrotriya ucyate //*

उपहासमतो नेच्छेत्सार्धं श्रोत्रियजायया ।
मैथुनं तु विशेषेण ह्युक्तानर्थजिहासया ॥६४॥

Therefore, one should not wish even to play jokes with the wife of a *śrotriya* and (*tu*), in particular, a sex act, so that

(one fulfils one's) desire to avoid any untoward result that is mentioned. [64]

Now, BU 6.4.13 is under reference.

कर्माभिचारिकं प्रोक्तं प्रसङ्गात् प्रधानतः ।
यदर्थस्तु प्रयासोऽयं तत्कर्मार्थं प्रपञ्च्यते ॥६५॥

The act of black-magic is mentioned here, for it was so occasioned and not with (the idea of giving) it as of principal significance. And now is explained that ritual act¹ for whose result all this effort (is undertaken). [65]

¹The text of the AnSS edition has a misreading *tatkamārtha*.

यस्य मन्थविधिज्ञस्य जाया चेदार्तवं व्रजेत् ।
तिस्त्रो रात्रीर्न कांस्येन पानं कुर्यात्तथाशनम् ॥६६॥

If the wife of the knower of the procedure of the Mantha (rite) comes to have her period, she should not drink (water) with a metal (lit. bronze) cup for three nights, nor should she take food in a similar way. [66]

The construction of this verse is a little awkward. Yet SP laudably avoided the awkwardness by observing (at the end) *tadā tasya sā jāyati śeṣaḥ*.

तथैवाहतवासाः स्यादहःस्वेतेषु शुद्धधीः ।
वृषलो वृषली वैनानोपहन्यात्कदाचन ॥६७॥

Similarly, in these three days, she, of pure mind, should have put on an uncut garment; so also, no Śūdra man or Śūdra woman should even (or ever) touch¹ her. [67]

¹The verb *upahan* is used in some peculiar sense. The verb root *han* with *upa* means 'to touch' also 'to approach' [already

so in BU], but 'to strike' is not the usual sense.

अन्यो वा पापकृत्कश्चित्स्पर्शसंभाषणादिभिः ।
व्रतस्थां नोपहन्यात्तामभीप्सितफलाप्तये ॥६८॥

Nor should any other man contact¹ her, who is in her vow,
by touch or conversation, for securing what he longed for.

[68]

¹*sparsā* with *upahanyāt* would demand this translation; that avoids tautology.

सा त्रिरात्रान्त आप्लुत्याहतवासाः शुचिः सती ।
श्रपणाय चरोर्भर्ता व्रीहीस्तामवघातयेत् ॥६९॥

That woman wears an uncut garment when she has bathed
at the end of the third night and become purified.¹ The
husband makes her pound rice grains for preparing (lit.
cooking) the *caru* 'ball of cooked rice'. [69]

¹We take the first line as a complete sentence. The
construction in the text is awkward, or anakoluthic.

*From this verse onwards, Sureśvara occasionally gives us, almost
in a parenthetic way, his paraphrases of (some) words in the
Mantras of BU. It has been difficult, therefore, to translate his
Vārtika in a well connected form. As such, our translation will
appear to the readers disconnected bits of sentences. We regret
our helplessness!*

Now, BU 6.4.14-16 are under reference.

शुक्लो गौरोऽत्र विज्ञेयः शुक्लो वा बलदेववत् ।
सुव्याख्येयत्वतः शेषः स्वयमेवावगम्यताम् ॥७०॥

The word *śukla* should be understood in the sense of fair
(lit. white) or fair like Baladeva.¹ The remaining portion (of

the Śruti) is to be understood by oneself, because of its easy explanation. [70]

¹It refers to Kṛṣṇa's elder brother.

क्षीरौदनं तथैवाथ पाचयित्वा स्वयं पतिः ॥७१॥

Then, after the husband has made the wife herself cook rice in milk— [71]

दंपती घृतवन्तं तमश्नीयातामथौदनम् ।
स्वतन्त्रावीश्वरौ स्यातां सत्पुत्रप्रसवाय तौ ॥७२॥

The couple should eat that rice cooked in ghee, and then they would be able, i.e. eligible¹ for begetting a good son. [72]

¹Read SP *īśvaraśabdārtham āha svatantrāṁ iti*.

यथोक्तपुत्रप्रसवे यदि वा क्षिप्रकारिणौ ।
यथोक्तकर्मणैतेन स्यातां तावेव दंपती ॥७३॥

Or if that very couple are in a haste to beget a son of already given description, (they would be able to do so)¹ by performing the rite described earlier.² [73]

¹This is suggested by *svatantrāṁīśvarau* in the preceding verse.

²Possibly it refers to Mantha ritual.

Now, BU 6.4.17 is under reference.

दुहिता पण्डितेत्यत्र स्त्रीणामुचितकर्मसु ।
तत्पाण्डित्यमिह ज्ञेयं न तु वेदार्थगोचरम् ॥७४॥

In the words *duhitā paṇḍitā* should be understood the daughter's being learned in the duties proper for women, not

in respect of Vedic matters.

[74]

This may indicate the commonly held belief of the people in Sureśvara's times that learned women meant those who were capable of discharging all the household duties of a woman but not eligible for Vedic studies and rituals!

Now, BU 6.4.18 is under reference.

विजिगीतो जगत्यस्मिन्नत्यर्थं यो विशब्दितः ।
विद्वत्सभा च समितिस्तद्योग्यः समितिङ्गमः ॥७५॥

The word *vijigīta* means one who is in the world exceedingly praised, i.e. praised in many (or, various) words. The word *samiti* means the assembly of the learned; therefore, *samitingama* means one who is fit (or, eligible) to sit in (that) assembly.

[75]

This explains *vijigīta* ... in BU.

प्रकृतायां त्रिसंख्यायां सर्वशब्दप्रयोगतः ।
प्रतीयाच्चतुरो वेदान्सर्वशब्दार्थवित्तये ॥७६॥

Ordinarily, the number three is used (in the context of the Vedas), yet there has been used the word *sarva* and therefrom one should understand that (there are meant) four Vedas, in order that the meaning of all words become understood.

[76]

This is to explain that the usual sense of three Vedas as understood from the word *sarva* should not be accepted.

तण्डुलान्मांससंमिश्रान्पक्त्वा मांसौदनं विदुः ।
उक्षा सेचनशक्तो गौः स एव ऋषभो महान् ॥७७॥

They have understood by meat-rice that which one has cooked

with rice grains mixed with meat. *ukṣan* means a bull which has become capable of sprinkling seed and the same, when well (or fully) grown up, is *ṛṣabha*. [77]

The second line specifies two phases in the growth of a bull and thus explains away the doubted repetition in *aukṣeṇa vārṣabheṇa vā* in BU (SP).

प्रसिद्धयसंभवात्त्वद्य ह्युक्तं मांसौदनं प्रति ।
मांसं कृष्णमृगच्छागविषयं त्वद्य कुर्वते ॥७८॥

This is so said here since, with reference to this meat-rice, there is no acceptance of it¹ today.² As such, they take that meat to be referring to that of a black deer or a goat. [78]

¹ Either *aukṣa māṁsa* or *ārṣabha māṁsa*.

² This is in keeping with the popular avoidance of beef, in Sureśvara's times. Cf. *Vimalodayamālā of Jayantasvāmin*. (ed. K.P. Jog, Poona: University of Poona, p.96): *tato gor ālambhaḥ prāptaḥ gor ālambhasya loke duṣṭatvād goḥ pratinidhitvena cchāga ālabhyate*. Possibly, Jayantasvāmin was a (senior) contemporary of Sureśvara.

यत्नेनोपार्जितं तच्चेत्क्रीत्वा वा मांसमाहरेत् ।
हिंसायाः प्रतिषिद्धत्वात्पशून्हन्यान् तु स्वयम् ॥७९॥

If that were to be obtained with (great) effort, then he should buy that meat and bring (it to the ritual), because killing has been prohibited; (any way), he should not kill animals. [79]

Now, BU 6.4.19 is under reference.

अथशब्दो विकल्पार्थो यथोक्तानां यथारुचि ।
काम्यानां ह्यन्यतमं पक्षमाश्रित्य भण्यते ॥८०॥

The word *atha* has the sense of an option¹ (among meats)

mentioned or (that which is) according to one's choice. This is said with any one (of the desired meats) in view. [80]

¹This explanation of *atha* is occasioned by its repeated use in BU (SP).

आरभ्योद्गमने भानोः सर्वं स्नानाद्यशेषतः ।
निर्वर्त्य संस्कारमथ यत्नात्प्राग्य उदाहृतः ॥८१॥

Having begun at the sunrise, all Saṃskāras, viz. a bath etc., he should perform the rite (of Mantha), which has been described before.¹ [81]

¹Cf. BUBV 6.3.3ff.

स्थालीपाके क्रिया या सा चावृदित्यभिधीयते ।
स्थालीपाकविधानेन संस्कृत्याज्यं तथैव तु ॥८२॥

And that (series of actions) which is prescribed in the context of a *sthālīpāka* is called here by the name *āvṛt*; therefore, having purified (*saṃskṛtya*) the clarified butter just in the same way as is prescribed for the *sthālīpāka* (he makes his offering).¹ [82]

The procedure of the *sthālīpāka* rite is well-known among the Vedists and, therefore, no details of the same are given with any particular attention.

¹The word *juhōti* is understood.

उपलक्षणमन्येषामाज्यस्य ग्रहणं भवेत् ।
आदिशब्दस्य वा लोपादाज्यादिमिति गम्यताम् ॥८३॥

The mention of taking up *ājya* 'clarified butter' is indicative of other (details of the rite),¹ or the word to be understood is *ājyādi* with the suppresion (*lopa*) of the word *ādi* in it. [83]

This verse averts a possible doubt that could arise from the words *saṁskṛtyājyam* in the preceding verse and restricting that the performance should be with *ājya* alone.

¹This refers to other materials of the *sthālīpāka* ritual.

उपहत्योपहत्याथ स्थालीपाकस्य मन्त्रतः ।
नित्यास्तत्राहुतीर्हुत्वा आवापस्थान आदरात् ॥८४॥

Then, having repeatedly pounded (the rice grains), he should (utter) the Mantra(s) of the *sthālīpāka* ritual and he should respectfully offer the usual *āhutis*, in the place where *āhutis* are poured. [84]

This is the meaning of *sthālīpākasya* ... in BU.

प्रधानाहुतयस्तिस्त्रो याः स्युरग्न्यादिपर्विकाः ।
हुत्वा स्विष्टकृदन्तं तत्समापय्य यथौदितम् ॥८५॥
कर्मेदं तत उद्धृत्य चरं स्थाल्याः समाहितः ।
सर्पिष्मन्तमथाशनीयात्कामितार्थानुरोधतः ॥८६॥

Having offered those three principal *āhutis* 'offerings' which begin with those for Agni, he should have completed up to the end of the *sviṣṭakṛt*, as mentioned (in the ritual text), [85]

this rite; then he should have lifted up the *caru* from the plate which was kept (aside). He should then eat it having ghee in it, intending it (to effect) his desired end. [86]

This specifies the number of offerings.

चरं प्राश्य स्वयं शेषं भार्यायै संप्रयच्छति ।
उच्छिष्टमेव भार्यायै चरं भर्ता प्रयच्छति ॥८७॥

Having eaten of that *caru*, he should give the rest of it to his wife. A husband (always) gives to the wife only what is

left over (after he has eaten).¹

[87]

This explains *prāśya* ... in BU.

¹The second line is to specify that *śeṣam bhāryāyai prayacchati* does not refer to the remains of the *caru* from the plate.

पाणी प्रक्षाल्य यत्नेन सामर्थ्यादेव गम्यते ।
स्मार्तमाचमनं शुद्धयै पाणिप्रक्षालनोक्तितः ॥८८॥

(The instruction) 'Having washed his hands with care'¹ is understood from the force (i.e. power) of the words. Here is meant the sipping of waters, as prescribed by the Smṛti, since there is a mention of the washing of hands. [88]

This explains *prakṣālya* ... in BU.

¹With care (*yatnena*) is clarified by SP thus: *malatyāgārtham bahujalam ānīya paunaḥpunyena kṣālanam yatnaḥ*.

उदपात्रमथादाय तदद्विस्त्रिः सुताप्तये ।
वक्ष्यमाणेन मन्त्रेण जायामभ्युक्षयेन्मुहुः ॥८९॥

Having then taken up (in his hand) that pot containing water, he should repeatedly sprinkle water over his wife three times; reciting the Mantra which is stated (just below). [89]

This is the meaning of *udapātram* ... in BU.

अतोऽस्मदीयदारेभ्य उत्थायान्यत आव्रज ।
विश्वावस्वभिधानेन गन्धर्वोऽत्र प्रबोध्यते ॥९०॥

'Leaving (lit. rising away) from my wife, do you go elsewhere', (this is the meaning of the Mantra.) Here (i.e. in the Mantra), the mention 'O Viśvāvasu' refers to the Gandharva of that name. [90]

This is the content of Mantra.

प्रपूर्व्यामिति नार्यत्र भण्यते तरुणी किल ।
प्रपूर्वी पीवरीमन्यां याहि विश्वावसो द्रुतम् ॥९१॥

In the text *prapūrvyām*, the word *prapūryā* conveys (the sense of) a young woman.¹ (Therefore, the meaning of the verse is:) 'You, O Viśvāvasu, quickly go away to another *prapūrvī*, i.e. plump¹ woman. [91]

This explains *anyām iccha*.

¹The line *prapūrvyām ... kila* is to be taken parenthetically.

प्रपूर्व्यामिति लिङ्गाच्च तरुण्यां सत्पतिः सदा ।
यथोदितं कर्म सत्यां कुर्यात्सत्पुत्रजन्मने ॥९२॥

From the indicative word *prapūrvyām* (one should understand that) a good householder (lit. husband) should ever¹ perform the said ritual only with a young and chaste wife,² so that there is born a good son. [92]

¹SP states that the word *sadā* 'ever' stands for the time after the woman's period.

²SP elaborates thus: *prapūrvyām iti tārunyadyotakaśabdavaśāt ... taruṇyām satyām iti sambandhaḥ*.

अहं तु स्वामिमां जायां समुपैमीति संगतिः ।
एवं प्रस्थाप्य गन्धर्वमथैनामभिपद्यते ॥९३॥

As for myself, I am uniting with this my wife—this is the construe of the sentence (in BU).¹ Having thus sent away that Gandharva,¹ he approaches (i.e. unites with) her. [93]

This explains *jāyām patyā saha* in BU.

¹Ānandagiri on BUB (also in his comment on this verse, SP, with some difference) makes this cryptic verse clear, thus: *pīvarīm anyām yāhi* means: *viśvāvaso gandharva tvam uttiṣṭhānyām*

*ca jāyām prapūrvyām taruṇīm patyā saha saṁkrīḍamānām
ichhāham punaḥ svām imām jāyām sanupaimi.*

Now, BU 6.4.20 is under reference.

अभीष्टगर्भाधानाय जायामालिङ्गते पतिः ।
अमोऽहमिति मन्त्रोक्त्या तावावां देवतात्मकौ ॥९४॥
कर्मारभावहै देवि सत्सतोत्पत्तिसिद्धये ।
त्वं चाहं चैव संभूय योनौ रेतो दधावहै ॥९५॥

The husband embraces (i.e. unites with) the wife for placing in her the desired foetus, reciting the Mantra *amo 'ham*¹
'Now both of us, of the nature of gods, [94]
let us begin our act (of union), O my dear, for begetting a good son; let us, you and I, having joined together, place the seed in the womb'. [95]

This is the meaning of *abhipadyate* in verse 93 above.

¹BU gives the full Mantra thus: *amo 'ham asmi sā tvam asy
amo 'ham sāmāham asmi ṛk tvam dyaaur aham pṛthivi tvam tāv
ehi saṁ rabhāvahai saha reto dadhāvahai puṁse putrāyā vittaye
dyotake.*

रेतःक्षेपफलं चाह पुंसे पुत्राय लब्धये ।
मन्त्रोक्त्यनन्तरं तस्या विजिहीथामितीरयेत् ॥९६॥

(The Śruti) has mentioned the result of the placing of the seed (in the words) *puṁse putrāya labdhaye*.¹ After the Mantra is recited, he should say, 'May you separate (your thighs), [96]

¹*labdhaye* is Sureśvara's word for the original Vedic word *vittaye*.

विहापयति मन्त्रेण ऊरु पत्न्याः प्रयत्नतः ।
ऊर्वोरामन्त्रणं चैतद्विजिहीथामितीक्ष्यताम् ॥९७॥

thus, reciting the Mantra,¹ he carefully makes apart the thighs of his wife. The invocation² to the thighs is to be seen in the word *vijihīthām*. [97]

¹*mantreṇa ūrū* is an instance of the absence of Saṃdhi in Vedic style.

²This is for *āmantraṇa* in the sense of 'address (i.e. invocation) to'. An unusual sense! Already, Sureśvara used in verse 30 *upamantraṇam* and in 31 *upamantrita*.

विजिहीतेरिदं रूपं ण्यन्तस्य गतिकर्मणः ॥९८॥

This is a form of the verb root *hi* with *vi* (as prefix), referring to the activity or movement, with its causal ending (suppressed).¹ [98]

¹*vijihīthām* is to be understood as *vijihāpayethāḥ*.

मन्त्रतः पाणिनाथैनां त्रीन्वाराननुलोमतः ।

अनुमाष्टर्यथ तां जायां मन्त्रं विष्णुरितीरयन् ॥९९॥

Reciting the Mantra *viṣṇuḥ* he caresses his wife's limbs¹ with his hand three times, in an agreeable manner, (and) then² (unites with her). [99]

SP on this verse does not appear to be quite satisfying!

¹SP explains *anulomataḥ* thus: *mūrdhānam ārabhya pādāntam iti yāvat*.

²Cf. SP: *paśukarmānantaryārtho 'thaśabdaḥ*. Thus Ānandagiri suggests the sense of *anumārṣṭi* as 'he unites with her in sex act'.

Now, BU 6.4.21 is under reference.

समर्थनं कल्पनार्थस्त्वष्टावयवशस्तथा ।

निर्वर्तयतु रूपाणि शोभनानि सुतस्य मे ॥१००॥

The meaning of *kalpana* (from the verb root *klp*) is enabling.¹ (The Mantra continues:) So also, may god Tvaṣṭṛ create in all your limbs beautiful appearance² and (also in those) of my son.² [100]

¹This refers to the word *kalpayatu* in the Mantra *viṣṇuḥ* ... etc. cited in the end of the preceding verse. SP states: *putra-janmani śaktatvāpādanam iti yāvat*.

²BU and Ānandagiri on BUB seem to take the creation of the beautiful appearance in the limbs of the wife who has delivered a son—cf. Ānanagiri: *tvaṣṭā savitā tava rūpāṇi piṁśatu vibhāgena darśanayogyāni karotu*. But, Sureśvara adds *sutasya me*, he does not specifically mention the wife. Yet, see on this SP: *ātmano bhāryāyāś ca rūpāṇi nirvartitāni kim tvaṣṭṛety āśanikyāha sutasyeti*.

दर्शाहर्देवता चेह सिनीवालीति भण्यते ।

पृथुष्टुकेति सैवोक्ता पृथुस्तुतिरसौ यतः ॥१०१॥

Here, the goddess of the new moon night is called *Sinīvālī*; that very goddess is stated by the name *Pr̥thuṣṭuka*, since she has profuse praise offered to her. [101]

गर्भं ते सम्यगाधत्तामश्विनौ पुष्करस्त्रजौ ।

सूर्याचन्द्रमसावेव विज्ञेयावश्विनाविह ॥१०२॥

स्वरश्मिस्रग्विणौ तौ हि प्रसिद्धौ जगति यतः ॥१०३॥

May the two Aśvins, who wear lotus garlands, properly place you foetus; the two Aśvins are to be known here as the sun and the moon; [102]

they are indeed known as wearing (or, having) the wreathes in the form of their own rays. [103]

Now, BU 6.4.22 is under reference.

हिरण्यं ज्योतिरमृतं तन्मय्यावरणी शुभे ।
निरमन्थतां याभ्यां तावद्विनावमृतं पुरा ॥१०४॥

The word *hiranya* means the immortal flame and the two coverings, which are made up of that (*hiranya*, for the flame) are resplendent (lit. beautiful) wherewith those two Aśvins have formerly produced (lit. churned) immortality. [104]

अश्विनौ यादृशं गर्भं प्रयत्नान्निरमन्थताम् ।
आदधावस्तथा रूपं दशमे मासि सूतये ॥१०५॥

Let us two place (in our son), to be born in the tenth month, such (beautiful) form as will be similar to what the two Aśvins have carefully produced (lit. churned) as the foetus.¹ [105]

¹This refers to the beauty and immortality as implied by *amṛtam* and *rūpam* in verses 104 and 105.

यथाग्निगर्भा पृथिवी द्यौरिन्द्रेणेव भानुना ।
वायुर्दिशां यथा गर्भो दृष्टः श्लथनकर्मकृत् ॥१०६॥

Just like the earth which has Agni in the womb, like Dyaus by Indra,¹ (who is possessed of) bright lustre; so also like Vāyu, the foetus of the quarters, that (foetus in you) is seen as the agent of loosening.² [106]

The verse is very awkwardly expressive of the meaning of the BU passage.

¹*indreṇa bhānunā* is taken here a substantive (noun) followed by an attribute (noun). SP states that *bhānu* is the meaning of Indra. Yet, here it is not so specifically understandable as in Ānandagiri's comment on BUB, viz. *indreṇa sūryeṇeti yāvat*.

²Cf. verse 109 below.

आत्मनाम समुच्चार्य तथा गर्भं दधामि ते ।

तस्या वा नाम गृह्णीयान्मन्त्रमुच्चारयन्पतिः ॥१०७॥

Then, uttering his own name, this householder says, 'I place the foetus in you', after that, he should utter her name; all this, while he is reciting the Mantra.¹ [107]

¹This refers to *garbham dadhāmi te* stated in the second line.

Now, BU 6.4.23 is under reference.

मन्त्रेणाथैष सोष्यन्तीमद्विरभ्युक्षयेच्छनैः ।
वायुः पुष्करिणीं यद्वत्समिञ्जयति चालयेत् ॥१०८॥
यथा पुष्करिणीं वायुश्चालयन्नपि सर्वतः ।
न करोति क्षतिं तद्वद्गर्भ एजतु ते सुखम् ॥१०९॥

Then, when she is about to deliver, he should gently sprinkle her with water, reciting the Mantra,¹ that is to say, 'in the same way as Vāyu makes the lotus-lake stir²'; so does he activate her. [108]

(This is to mean:) As Vāyu, while making the lotus-lake stir everywhere, does not cause any harm to it, so (also) should this foetus stir in a way that causes your happiness. [109]

Verse 108 is the meaning of *soṣyantīm*

¹This is *yathā vāyuh puṣkarinīm*

²AnSS reads *samiñjayati* which should be corrected as shown above.

गर्भस्त्वां सुखयन्नेतु सहोल्बेण जरायुणा ।
व्रजो मार्गो हि गर्भस्य सार्गलोऽयं कृतः पुरा ॥११०॥

May your foetus move, causing you happiness, wrapped as it is by the chorion; indeed the way, this path of the foetus was earlier barred by the bolt (of Indra). [110]

This explains the meaning of (*garbhah*) ... *sahāvaitu jarāyunā* ... in BU.

जरायरर्गलस्तं त्वमिन्द्र निर्जहि सत्वरः ।
 गर्भे विनिःसृते पश्चाद्या निर्गच्छति योनितः ॥१११॥
 मांसपेशी समा तन्वी सावरेति निगद्यते ।
 प्राणश्चेन्द्रोऽत्र विज्ञेयः स एव प्रार्थ्यते ततः ॥११२॥

The word *jarāyu* 'chorion' refers to the bar. 'O Indra, do you strike it down, being quick.' Then, that which moves out of the genital organ (of the woman) after (the foetus has moved out), [111]

a lump of flesh, which is slender and straight(?) is called *avarā* chorion, (i.e. the outer membrane of a foetus). And here Prāṇa should be understood as Indra, as he is addressed in the prayer. [112]

Now, BU 6.4.24 is under reference.

जाते कुमारेऽथ पतिरङ्गमारोप्य तं पिता ।
 अग्निं ह्युपसमाधाय प्रसिद्धार्थमथापरम् ॥११३॥

After the son was born, the husband, viz. the father now,¹ having first placed the son on his lap and, having enkindled the fire (which is known),² (offers oblation to it). [113]

This refers to the Jātakarman rite (*saṃskāra*).

¹The words 'After ... now' for *atha* indicate that the rite of the Jātakarman is over.

²This is *āvasathya* 'domestic fire'.

घृतं दधि च संमिश्रं पृषदाज्यमितीर्यते ।
 एकीकृत्याथ संनीय पृषदाज्यस्य मन्त्रतः ॥११४॥
 उपघातं जुहोतीति णमुल्वाभीक्ष्ण्य इष्यते ।
 उपहत्योपहत्येति पृषदाज्याहुतीः क्षिपेत् ॥११५॥

Ghee and curds, which are mixed together, is known as *prṣadājya*.¹ Then, having mixed them together and brought from the *prṣadājya*, with the recitation of the Mantra,² [114]

he makes an offering, pounding (the rice grains) again and again; the suffix *ṇamul* (in the word-form *upaghātam*) is desired to convey the repetition of the action conveyed in the words *upahatyopahatya*; thus he pours the offerings of *prṣadājya*. [115]

¹It is the mixture of clarified butter, curds (and according to some honey etc. also). This is offered in rituals.

²This is mentioned in verse 116 below.

पुण्यासं स्वे गृहेऽत्राहं मनुष्याणां प्रकामतः ।
सहस्रसंख्यया शश्वद्ब्रह्महोनाम सहस्रगीः ॥११६॥

‘May I nourish, in my house here, men, thousand in number, to their hearts’ content; the word *sahasra* is a word signifier of many. [116]

एवं त्वं वर्धमानोऽत्र मन्वीथाः पुत्र संततिम् ।
संततावुपसन्ध्यां त्वं पश्वादेर्मे करिष्यसि ॥११७॥

‘Thus, growing here (i.e. in my home), O my son, may you think of continuity’—the word *upasandyām* means ‘in respect of continuity’ (*saṃtatau*)— (to mean) ‘you will multiply the cattle etc. which belong to me’. [117]

नैव व्यपेक्षते व्याख्यां स्पष्टार्थत्वेन हेतुना ।
मयि प्राणानिति ग्रन्थः स्वयमेवावगम्यताम् ॥११८॥

The portion, beginning with the words *mayi prāṇān*, being very clear in meaning, does not expect any explanation; therefore, may you understand it yourself.¹ [118]

¹This is Sureśvara’s address to his readers.

Now, BU 6.4.25 is under reference.

अथास्य स्वमुखे कर्णं दक्षिणं प्रणिधाय तु ।

वाग्वागिति हि त्रिर्ब्रूयात्त्रयी वागिति भण्यते ॥११९॥

Then, having placed the right ear of the son near unto (lit. into) his own mouth,¹ he should utter the word *vāc* three times; (because, indeed,) the three Vedas are called *Vāc*. [119]

¹That is, having placed his mouth near unto the son's ear.

Now, without referring to BU 6.4.26, Sureśvara turns to BU 6.4.27.

त्रयी वाक्त्वां श्रोत्रमार्गेण श्रेयसे प्रविशत्विद्यम् ।
यस्ते स्तन इति गिरा शस्यतेऽत्र सरस्वती ॥१२०॥

May the three Vedas, viz. *Vāc*, enter you through your ear for your bliss. In the words *yas te stanah!* here (in this context)¹ is praised *Sarasvatī*. [120]

¹This refers to the child's sucking the mother's breast.

उदारगुणसंपत्तिः सुतस्यास्त्विति भण्यते ।
शशयः शशयो ज्ञेयः शयश्च फलमुच्यते ॥१२१॥

What is said is: May there be for the son profuse excellence of qualities. The word *śaśaya* is to be known as *saśaya* 'which is accompanied by a result',¹ (wherein) *śaya* means the result.

[121]

¹That is, which shall yield a result.

गुहा शयो वा शशयः श्रुत्यैव प्रतिपादितः ।
मयोभूरन्नभूतोऽयं सर्वप्राणिभृदुच्यते ॥१२२॥
रत्नस्य पयसोऽत्यर्थं रत्नाधारश्च यः स्तनः ।
वसुनो धनस्य लब्धा च तस्य वृष्ट्यादिहेतुनः ॥१२३॥

The word *guhā* means *śaya*¹ or *śaśaya*; and the Śruti itself has stated thus: this one is the source (or, cause) of well-being.

It has become the food and nourishment (i.e. sustainer) of all living beings. [122]

The word *ratnasya* means *payasaḥ* 'of milk' and the breast is what is the substratum of *ratna*. It is the procurer of *vasu* 'wealth', the cause of showering (profuse milk) etc.² [123]

¹The word *guhā* means the base of the heart and *śaya* refers to the result that would be produced.

²We have followed the reading in the AnSS edition which is to be taken as an adjective of *dhanasya* (in neuter).

भरिकल्याणदातृत्वात्सुदत्र इति भण्यते ।
यैन पृष्यसि वार्याणि सर्वाणीह सरस्वति ॥१२४॥
देवादीनि वराणि त्वं सर्वैर्भोगैः प्रपृष्यसि ॥१२५॥

Being a giver of extensive well-being, it is described here (i.e. in this sentence by the word) *sudatra* 'liberal donor'. Since you nourish, O Sarasvatī all the choice gifts here (i.e. of this world), [124]

(this is to say:) you increase¹ the excellent gifts (*varāṇi*), viz. (those from) the gods¹ etc., by all (kinds of) enjoyments'. [125]

Sureśvara begins a new sentence in 124cd and completes it in 125 which is a verse of one line.

¹*prapūṣyasi* literally means 'nourish', yet 'increase' can go well with both the gifts and gods etc. The word etc. refers to the elements, semi-divine and human beings. It can be argued that 'increase' indicates 'growth' 'nourishment' as well.

²*devādīni* qualifies *varāṇi* (used for *vāryāṇi*— a Vedic word).

पानाय मम पुत्रस्य स्त्रीस्तने संनिवेशय ।
यथोक्तगुणकं देवि स्वस्तनं सर्वकामदम् ॥१२६॥

O Goddess, place into the breast of my wife your own breast about whose excellences I have just (spoken) and which grants

all the desires (of beings), so that my son may drink. [126]

Now, BU 6.4.28 is under reference.

इलासीत्यथ मन्त्रेण सूनोर्मातरमादरात् ।
अभिमन्त्रयते साधुकर्मावाप्त्यै स्वयं पतिः ॥१२७॥

Then, reciting the Mantra *ilāsi*, he lovingly (lit. respectfully) praises the mother of the son, so that (he,) the husband himself, should be able to complete well (i.e. successfully) his ritual performances. [127]

इति श्रीबृहदारण्यकोपनिषद्वाङ्मयवार्तिके षष्ठाध्यायस्य
चतुर्थं ब्राह्मणम् ॥४॥

BRHADĀRANYAKOPANIṢAD-
BHĀṢYA-VĀRTIKA

6.5

संभावितं न यत्पूर्वं कृत्स्नेऽस्मिन्ब्राह्मणेऽपि तत् ।
खिलकाण्डे तदखिलं पुत्रमन्थान्तमीरितम् ॥१॥

Whatever was not considered (i.e. discussed) in the whole of this Brāhmaṇa¹ earlier, is all of it considered in the Khila Kāṇḍa (so far) up to the end of (the discussion on) the Putramantha ritual. [1]

This refers to what has been discussed up to the end of the preceding Brāhmaṇa (viz. BU 6.4); cf. SP *vṛttaṃ saṃkīrtayati*.

¹This is for BU itself.

पूर्वकाण्डैकदेशत्वात्खिलकाण्डं न वंशभाक् ।
पूर्वत्र विद्यासंभेदाद्भिन्नौ वंशविहोदितौ ॥२॥

The Khila Kāṇḍa, being a (complementary) part of the earlier Kāṇḍas, (it does not have a separate) line of teachers. In the earlier Kāṇḍas (i.e. in their two groups) there were two distinct lines (of teachers), therefore, they (viz. the two lines) were stated here¹ with reference to the distinction of the lores in them.² [2]

In this verse and the preceding, it is pointed out as to why there is no mention of any line of teachers in relation to the Khila Kāṇḍa.

¹The word here refers to the two Kāṇḍas, viz. Madhu Kāṇḍa and Muni Kāṇḍa.

²One could have objected that the two Kāṇḍas (Madhu- and Yājñavalkya-) pertained to only one lore, i.e. *brahmavidyā*.

Therefore, it would not be right to say: *pūrvatra vidyāsambhedah*. This objection is answered away by the present verse.

पूर्वैश्चतुर्भिरध्यायैस्त्वाष्ट्रं कक्ष्यं च यन्मधु ।
व्याख्यातं तदशेषेण वंशस्तत्र तदर्थभाक् ॥३॥

In the first four Adhyāyas (of the Upaniṣad) was fully explained that Madhu, which belonged to Tvaṣṭṛ and was hidden, and, therefore, (for those Adhyāyas) the line (of teachers) related to the contents of the same. [3]

मधुकाण्डागमार्थस्य यथावत्प्रतिपत्तये ।
काण्डं स्याद्याज्ञवल्कीयं वंशस्तद्विषयस्तथा ॥४॥

In order that one should well understand the meaning of the tradition relating to the Madhu Kāṇḍa, there followed (or better, was presented) the Kāṇḍa of Yājñavalkya and also the line (of the teachers) relating to the same.¹ [4]

¹*yathāvatpratipatti* makes this verse significant. In the earlier Kāṇḍa, there was refutation of varying views, whereas, in the latter Kāṇḍa, the thought (though the same) was presented with suitable reasoning in support of it. This clarifies what is meant by *vidyāsambheda*.

अयं तु वंशो विज्ञेयः कृत्स्नप्रवचनाश्रयः ।
समाप्तौ ब्राह्मणस्योक्तेरयमर्थोऽवसीयते ॥५॥

As for (*tu*) this line (of teachers), it has been related to the entire discussion in the Upaniṣad. Therefore, at the end of (the entire) Brāhmaṇa,¹ this (line of teachers is to be for the whole of it); this is to be concluded from the statement.

[5]

उक्तवेदार्थविज्ञानसाकल्यप्रतिपत्तये ।
जपो वंशस्य येनातः श्रुत्या वंश इहोदितः ॥६॥

Since, in order that one attains completeness in one's knowledge about the meaning of the Veda that is taught, there is the recitation of the line (of teachers of the same). As such, this Śruti (also) has stated here the line (of teachers).

[6]

सर्वज्ञानां यतो वंशास्त्रयोऽप्येते यथोदिताः ।
अतस्तत्स्मृतितः सम्यग्ज्ञानभानूदयो भवेत् ॥७॥

Since all these three lines of the all-knowing teachers have been stated (here in the Upaniṣad), therefore, by the remembrance of them (all), there would certainly (lit. well) arise the sun in the form of knowledge.

[7]

पुत्रमन्थेन संस्कारः स्त्रीणामेवेह वर्णितः ।
यतोऽतः स्त्रीप्रधानोऽयं पुत्राणां वंश उच्यते ॥८॥

Since, in (the prescription of) the Putramantha there was described here (i.e. in this Upaniṣad) a Saṃskāra for women, therefore, this line of the sons (who are teachers) is stated, prominence (being given) to women (who were their mothers).

[8]

अन्यतोऽन्यत एवायं संप्रदायो यथाभवत् ।
न तथा ब्रह्मणस्तस्मात्तत्स्वयं भवति शब्दते ॥९॥

As this tradition followed (i.e. came into being) from one to another, so it did not happen in the case of the Brahman; therefore, it is mentioned as self-born.

[9]

This explains why the word *svayambhu* is used with *brahman*.

अन्येषां वेदतो ज्ञानं भूरिसाधनसंश्रयात् ।
स्वतो वेदात्मनस्तस्मात्सर्वज्ञानमयो हि सः ॥१०॥

In the case of others, there occurs the knowledge from (the

study of) the Veda, by using many means (towards acquiring the same); but, in the case of the Ātman of the Veda, (its) knowledge (occurs of itself). Therefore, that (viz. the Vedātman) is (said to be) 'possessed of all knowledge'. [10]

सर्वस्यैष वशीत्यादि तथापि प्रागवादिषम् ।
परैव देवता वेदो यच्च किञ्चिच्चराचरम् ॥११॥

(As regards) *sarvasyaiṣa vaśī* etc. also *api* ¹ I have said earlier: ² the Veda (or the Vedātman) is the highest deity itself and also (it is) whatever exists, movable and immovable. [11]

¹The force of 'also' evokes reference to *yaḥ sarvajñaḥ sarvavid* ... (*Muṇḍakopaniṣad* 2.2.7).

²Cf. BUBV 3.8.29.

प्रतिपाद्यात्मनात्मानं नामरूपादिसाधनः ।
एति पूर्णात्मतां साक्षाद्वियां वाचामगोचरम् ॥१२॥

(Therefore), one, possessed of the means, viz. name, form etc., knows one's own self by oneself and becomes complete in nature, directly perceptible to oneself, not (becoming) a subject of one's own intellect and words. [12]

त्रय्यैव ब्राह्मणो विद्वानात्मनैवाद्वयं परम् ।
विदित्वा निर्वृतिं याति कार्यकारणयोः पराम् ॥१३॥

A Brāhmaṇa becomes a knower only through (the study of) the *trayī* and by himself (becoming) the knower of the non-dual highest (Vedātman) and then, having known (his own true nature), attains the highest bliss which is beyond the cause and effect relations. [13]

वेदोऽसीत्यत एवास्य नाम जातस्य कुर्वते ।
वेदात्मना कथं नाम परं ब्रह्म प्रपत्स्यते ॥१४॥

For this very reason do they name the newly born (son) in the words *vedo 'si*. How can he, being himself the Veda, understand the highest Brahman? [14]

This brings out the purpose of naming the new-born son as Veda. Being Veda, i.e. the Ātman, he is considered to be a natural knower of his own self.

वाजिशखासु सर्वासु ह्यासुरायणपर्वकाः ।
समाना वंशर्षयोऽमौ ह्या समाप्तेरितीक्ष्यताम् ॥१५॥

In all the branches of Vājasaneyins, the lines of seers are the same, as beginning with Āsurāyaṇa. Let this be understood up to the end (of this last Brāhmaṇa). [15]

आदित्येन हि प्रोक्तानि यजुष्येतानि यानि तु ।
आदित्यानीत्यतस्तानि सम्यगाचक्षते बुधाः ॥१६॥

Since all these Yajus Mantras are declared by Āditya, therefore, the wise ones have well described them as coming from Āditya. [16]

वेदात्मनो रवेरेवं संप्रदायोऽयमागतः ।
परमेष्ठ्यादिकान्सर्वान्पारंपर्येण मानुषान् ॥१७॥

This entire tradition has thus come from the sun, the Ātman of the Veda, up to all men, beginning with Parameṣṭhin in a successive line. [17]

असंसृष्टं परं ब्रह्म सर्वदोषविवर्जितम् ।
एतदादित्यगं भाति तद्वेदानां परं वपुः ॥१८॥

The highest Brahman is unaffected by (lit. mixed with) anything else, and is devoid of any fault. This one, existing in the sun, shines forth as the highest form of the Veda. [18]

उत्सन्नमपि यद्ब्रह्म तदादित्ये न नश्यति ।
तदार्षेणैव विन्दन्ति तपस्तप्त्वा महर्षयः ॥१९॥

And that Brahman, even though destroyed,¹ does not (really) perish.² The great seers come to know it after performing penances in the seers' tradition.³ [19]

¹This refers to *tasmād yajñāt sarvahutaḥ*, conveying thereby that the Vedas, comprising composition of words, get destroyed at the time of the deluge (*pralaya*).

²This is because Āditya, identified with the Brahman, does not perish even in the deluge.

³SP clarifies this tradition by a verse, viz. *Mahābhārata*:
yugānte 'ntarhitān vedān setihāsān maharṣayaḥ /
lebhire tapasā pūrvam anujñātāḥ svayambhuvā // (12.203.17)

वेदब्रह्मण आरभ्य सर्वेषामपि शाखिनाम् ।
सांजीवीसूनुपर्यन्तो वंश एको न भिद्यते ॥२०॥

In the case of the followers of all the branches (of this Veda), this one line of teachers, which begins with Vedabrahman and up to (the mention of) the son of Sāñjivī, does not differ.

[20]

सांजीवीपुत्रतस्त्वर्वाकप्रतिशाखं पृथक्पृथक् ।
आचार्यभेदाद्विद्यन्ते वंशा वाजसनेयिनाम् ॥२१॥

And, from the son of Sāñjivī, the later lines of the teachers of the Vājasaneyā Brāhmaṇas differ from one another in relation to different teachers.

[21]

इत्युक्तैकात्म्यवाक्यप्रविकचकमला प्राज्यसन्न्यायगन्धा
काण्डैश्चित्रा षडधैर्मधुमुनिखिलकैर्मस्करीन्द्रालिजुष्टा ।
श्लोकग्रन्थिप्रबद्धाविषयमितिफला प्रेमसत्सूत्रसूत्रा
माला गङ्गेव शंभुं पदममलमजं वैष्णवं सानुयाता ॥२२॥

Thus, this wreath of fully blown lotuses in the form of sentences (relating to) the singleness of the Ātman (which is propounded in the Śruti), having the profuse fragrance (in the form) of good reasoning, variegated in its three (lit. half of six) sections (called) Madhu, Muni and Khila, enjoyed by the bee (in the form of) the pre-eminent (or the chief) ascetic, tied up by knots (in the form of) Ślokas, bearing fruit (in the form of) knowledge of what cannot be the object (of knowing) and stringing (together) the bliss(-giving) existent Sūtra (i.e. Hiranyagarbha), has followed the step of the all-pervading (lit. Viṣṇu) which is the most pure (or faultless) and unborn, in the same way as Gaṅgā (followed the head of) the source of well-being (lit. Śambhu, i.e. Śiva). [22]

This is a very ornate verse, deliberately worked out by Sureśvara. He compares his composition in verses to a wreath of lotuses, many minute details of the composition and the different components of the wreath being shown as similar; these are explained in their fullness in SP. The words Śambhu and Vaiṣṇava *pada* are purposely used by Sureśvara because (it appears) he wants to show his great regard for, or devotion to, the bliss-bringing Śāṅkara, who could be compared to the commonly accepted gods of his times—Śiva and Viṣṇu.

यत्प्रजोदधियुक्तिशब्दनखजश्रद्धैकसन्नेत्रक-
स्थैर्यस्तम्भमुमुक्षुदुःखितकृपायत्नोत्थबोधामृतम् ।
पीत्वा जन्ममृतिप्रवाहविधुरा मोक्षं ययुर्मोक्षिणस्
तं वन्देऽत्रिकुलप्रसूतममलं वेधोभिधं मद्गुरुम् ॥२३॥

I bow down to my Guru, who is born in the family of Atri, called Vedhas¹ and (the purest among the) pure, from whose nectar(-like) instruction/teaching, that came from his efforts out of compassion for the sorrow-stricken seekers of liberation, as the steady pillar for the churning rod in the form of the reasonable preaching words and the churning rod in the form of faith which helps churning the ocean-like intelligence,

and drinking which the seekers of liberation attained liberation, being freed from (lit. becoming bereft of) the stream of births and deaths. [23]

SP offers an elaborate explanation of the first two lines which can be read with profit.

यामस्मद्गुरुरेव वेदशिरसामैकात्म्यतात्पर्यतो
वृत्तिं सज्जनशंकरिं सुविमलां नानानयोद्वयोतिताम् ।
चक्रे काण्वसमाश्रितोपनिषदो दुस्तर्कदोषापहां
श्रद्धामात्रबलेन वार्तिकमिदं तस्याः समासात्कृतम् ॥२४॥

With the strength of my faith (in my Guru) alone have I composed in brief this Vārtika on that Vṛtti on the Upaniṣad belonging to the Kāṇvas' recension which my Guru himself has written as the purport (of all the Upaniṣads), viz. the singleness of the Ātman (conveyed as) the head (i.e. most important) of all the Vedas, illuminated by varied reasoning, extremely clear and causing happiness to the wise (lit. good) men. [24]

Thus Sureśvara emphatically asserts the extreme clarity and faultlessness of Śaṅkara's Vṛtti on BU of Kāṇva recension.

आ शैलादुदयात्तथास्तगिरितो भास्वद्यशोरश्मिभिर्
व्याप्तं विश्वमनन्धकारमभवद्यस्य स्म शिष्यैरिदम् ।
आराजज्ञानगभस्तिभिः प्रतिहतश्चन्द्रायते भास्करस्-
तस्मै शंकरभानवे तनुमनोवाग्भिर्नमस्तात्सदा ॥२५॥

May this be my obeisance, with my body, mind and speech, to the Sun in the form of Śaṅkara, whose disciples have pervaded this universe from the rising mountain up to the setting mountain¹ by the brilliant rays of their fame and, (as a consequence), it (viz. the universe) has become free from darkness, and by the rays of whose knowledge, the Sun is vanquished, (even) from afar and (he then) appears like the

moon.

[25]

Once again, Sureśvara works out the sustained metaphor here as in verse 22 above.

¹Actually the mountain from behind which the sun rises and that beyond which it sets.

इति श्रीबृहदारण्यकोपनिषद्भाष्यवार्तिके षष्ठाध्यायस्य
पञ्चमं ब्राह्मणम् ॥५॥

इति श्रीमत्परमहंसपरिव्राजकाचार्यश्रीमच्छंकरभगवत्-
पूज्यपादशिष्यश्रीमत्सुरेश्वराचार्यकृतौ
बृहदारण्यकोपनिषद्भाष्यवार्तिकप्रस्थाने
षष्ठोऽध्यायः ॥६॥
